



# Intelligence Information Report

PAGE 1 OF 13 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

HR70-14

~~SECRET~~

REPORT NO. FIRDB-312/ 00934-83


DATE DISTR. 30 JUN 1983


## TRANSMITTAL OF PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE REPORT

1. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the source, the attached Intelligence Information Report (FIRDB-312/00934-83 ) is being distributed only to the addressees listed below. The addressees are requested to limit circulation of this report to those officers who have a clearly evident need to know.
2. Further use of this intelligence information must not violate the controls which have been placed on it.
3. Addressees are asked to consult the Reports Clearance Office of the Directorate of Operations  whenever use beyond that authorized by the dissemination controls is contemplated.

Distribution: Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
United States Air Force  
Director of Naval Intelligence  
Director, National Security Agency  
Deputy Director of Intelligence  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR/EE  
National Intelligence Officer for GPF  
Director, Office of European Analysis  
Director, Office of Scientific and Weapons  
Research  
Director, Office of Soviet Analysis


~~SECRET~~





~~SECRET~~

4. Polish strategic-operational exercises normally focus on operations of the Polish FRONT within the context of the Western Theater of Military Operations. Representatives of allied forces, usually an operations group from a tank army subordinate to the Belorussian Military District, have participated in most of the operational-strategic exercises conducted in recent years.



3

2


1

~~SECRET~~


3

2

1




~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~



8. Polish National Air Defense exercises almost always occur as part of the Warsaw Pact air defense exercises identified as the GRANIT series. These exercises are directed by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact for Air Defense (Soviet Marshal Aleksandr ((Koldunov)) and include participation by the Polish Air Forces and the air defense forces of the FRONT, in addition to the National Air Defense Forces. During these exercises, NATO air forces are simulated either by communications or by actual flights. In the simulations, the threat on the Baltic Axis is portrayed by Soviet Air Force units, the threat on the Western Axis is portrayed by air forces of the Group of Soviet forces, Germany (GSFG), and the threat on the Southern Axis is portrayed by the Czechoslovak air force units. Polish air force units are used to conduct simulated strikes on targets in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.




2


~~SECRET~~

2

1



~~SECRET~~



11. The SOYUZ exercises are command staff exercises directed by the Soviet General Staff or the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and focus on operations of the combined staffs of the Warsaw Pact forces (high commands of the strategic grouping of forces the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations). The SOYUZ exercises began in the late 1960s as classroom command staff exercises involving a relatively small number of participants (usually 30-40 personnel comprised a FRONT staff and 15-20 comprised an army staff). By the mid-1970s, SOYUZ exercises had expanded to involve operations from deployed command and control facilities to include the establishment of necessary communications facilities. Until 1980, the exercises were directed by the Commander-in-Chief or the Combined Armed Forces, and the staffs of the FRONTS and armies consisted only of operations groups with the exception of signals troops; no troop units were involved. The first SOYUZ exercise that planned for the use of troop units was SOYUZ-80. This exercise, planned by the Soviet General Staff, was scheduled to begin on 9 December 1980 as a cover for the Warsaw Pact intervention into Poland with a 15 division force. This exercise was cancelled by the Soviets during the course of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee on 6 or 7 December 1980. SOYUZ-81 was conducted in March and April 1981, also under the direction of the Soviet General Staff, and included participation by all of the Warsaw Pact member states. SOYUZ-81 was intended to apply pressure on NATO and the Poles and the Soviets deployed signals units into Poland for the exercise without first requesting permission from the Poles.

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~


The Soviets apologized after the Poles detected these units and lodged a complaint.) SOYUZ-81 was extended one week and was terminated by Brezhnev during the Warsaw Pact meeting in Prague. Twelve Polish officers attended a critique of the exercise conducted by Marshal Viktor ((Kulikov)) and Army General Anatoliy ((Gribkov)) for key personnel of the allied armies. This critique was poorly organized and the information presented bore little resemblance to the actual exercise. [redacted] The Soviets were not serious about the military aspects of SOYUZ-81). Polish generals and other key Polish officers subsequently attended a critique presented by General Florian ((Siwicki)), Chief of the Polish General Staff. [redacted] General Siwicki's actually was written by the Soviet General Staff since only the Soviets had sufficient information on the exercise from which to prepare such a critique.)

12. The ZAPAD-type exercises are prepared and directed by the Soviet General Staff and are the most important of all of the combined exercises. These exercises include participation of FRONT and army staffs, in addition to the higher level combined staffs, and normally are designed to test and improve the operational relationships and procedures established for wartime. Representatives from all Warsaw Pact states participated in ZAPAD-77 but only Soviets participated in ZAPAD-81. Exercise ZAPAD-77 was particularly significant in that it provided the other Warsaw Pact States with the first glimpse of the significant changes the Soviets were developing in the command and control system within the Western Theater of Military Operations. In essence, ZAPAD-77, served as the foundation for the implementation of the subsequently forthcoming Statute for the Wartime Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. The significant highlights of this exercise included the activation of the supreme command, the establishment of the high commands of the strategic groupings of forces within the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations, and the employment of the Soviet General Staff as the executive agent for the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces in wartime. The Poles were shocked at some of the changes in the roles and relationships assigned to the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces and personnel in ZAPAD-77; specifically, the greatly reduced role of the NSWP national and political leaders (clearly subordinate to Kulikov), the NSWP ministers of defense serving as deputies for national matters to the Commander-in-Chief of the high command, the

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

minor roles assigned to the general staffs of the NSWP forces, and the subordination of national civil defense forces and assets to the Commander in Chief of the forces within the theater of military operations. [redacted] The national civil defense forces were, for the first time, assigned to facilitate the transit of Soviet forces across Polish territory.) In conducting the ZAPAD exercise, the NSWP staffs were briefed prior to the exercise, representatives of the Soviet exercise director's staff were present; however, the Soviet representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact in Poland (Army General ((Shcheglov)) and his staff served as umpires responsible for overseeing the operations of the Polish staffs. The staffs of the NATO forces were represented and played by the exercise controllers. Another significant feature of ZAPAD-77 was the use of data coefficients indicating the relative effectiveness of NATO and Warsaw Pact units and weapons systems employed on various axes. Prior to this exercise, the data used, at least by the NSWP staffs, was strictly quantitative. The new data provided both qualitative and quantitative factors to the staff decision process. The Soviet General Staff was extremely secretive about this data and the methodology used in its development never was revealed to the Poles. The data was provided by the Soviet General Staff and was still being used in late 1981. In fact, the Soviet General Staff revalidated the data, in writing, at the request of the Poles in January 1981.


13. General Staff training drills, a new type command staff exercise serving generally the same purpose of the ZAPAD exercise but narrower in scope and of small scale, were conducted in 1978, 1979, and 1980. These exercises were controlled by the Soviet General Staff through the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and involved participation by the staffs of at least six FRONTS and "tens" of armies in addition to operations groups from the general staffs, civil defense forces, territorial forces, naval forces, and national air defense forces of each NSWP country. The purpose of these unnamed exercises was to test the working relationship between the Soviet General Staff and the General Staffs of the national armies and among the general staffs of the national armies. The emphasis has been on conduct of front operations within the Western Theater of Military Operations and the transition from peacetime to war.

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

~~SECRET~~





~~SECRET~~

In these exercises, the Commander-in-chief of the forces within the theater of military operations assumed command of the national forces committed to the FRONT from the moment combat readiness was raised before full combat readiness was attained - in violation of the Polish constitution and article four of the Warsaw Treaty. This procedure foreshadowed the provisions of the wartime statute. The data pertaining to the balance and combat potential of the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces used in these exercises is considered to be quite realistic. The data on the strength, composition, disposition, and combat effectiveness of the NATO forces reflect current Warsaw Pact intelligence holdings and assessments. Some of the data on the Warsaw Pact forces' strength, disposition and composition are distorted but the overall capabilities are portrayed accurately. For example, the number of tanks in each division of an army may not reflect the accurate division-level TO&E holding; however, the total number of tanks within the army is accurate.


14. The TARCZA (Shield) type exercises are directed by the commander and staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact with the host country minister of defense serving as the figurehead exercise director. The TARCZA exercises are command staff exercises with some troop participation. Normally, the sponsoring country provides two or more maneuver divisions for the exercise and the other Warsaw Pact member states send a FRONT or army-level staff plus a division-level staff. [redacted] Romania has been less than enthusiastic about participating in TARCZA exercises and their participation was limited to the staff of one division and token amounts of equipment.) These exercises are announced under the provisions of the Helsinki Accords and serve as showpiece demonstrations of Warsaw Pact unity, military strength and efficiency. The TARCZA exercises feature carefully prepared, flashy demonstrations which have been rehearsed for months in advance. The demonstrations are conducted to display, under ideal conditions, selected capabilities, such as assault river crossing, etc., for outside consumption. While the demonstrations are open for viewing by the observers, the scenario details regarding identity of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces and borders are not revealed.

15. The FALA exercises involve training of the combined Soviet, Polish, and East German Naval forces within the framework of the "Combined Baltic Fleet" (Zjednoczona Flota Baaltycka). The exercises are conducted in the Baltic and

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

~~SECRET~~




~~SECRET~~

and North Seas and include participation by the Soviet Baltic Fleet, the East German navy, the Polish navy, the Polish 7th Sea Landing Division and a Soviet naval infantry regiment. The primary purposes of the exercise are to develop the new command and control relationships resulting from the establishment of the combined fleet under overall command of the commander of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and to work on coordination with the Soviet Northern Fleet.

Prior to the mid-1970s, each navy was assigned its own area of operations/responsibility and each force was responsible for coordinating its operations with the other naval forces. The development of the combined fleet was the result of a concept pushed by Marshal Kulikov in the mid-1970s.) These exercises are designed to provide these naval forces with training necessary to support the fleet's primary missions of defeating NATO naval forces in the Baltic Sea and seizing and securing the Danish straits to control access into and out of the Baltic Sea. The role of the Polish navy is to conduct the sealanding operation against Seeland Island as part of the overall naval operation. The commander of the Polish Navy is the commander of this operation in wartime.



As an outgrowth of the FALA exercise, a smaller scale exercise involving ships of the three navies was conducted in the North Sea in 1980.




16. The transit exercises are combined Warsaw Pact rear services exercises conducted under the personal direction of Kulikov and are designed to test specific, selected aspects of the infrastructure - particularly transportation. The main emphasis in these exercises is on supporting the movement of forces across Poland and East Germany to include providing logistics support to the forces in transit, lines of communications, security, etc. Specific elements included in the exercise include:

5  
4  
3  
2  
1


5  
4  
3  
2  
1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- the designation of rail, highway and water lines of communications;
- the storage of materials for Soviet forces;
- distribution of materials to Soviet forces;
- refueling of forces in transit across Poland (one time);
- setting up hospital bases;
- allocation of the use of civilian hospitals;
- planning for the establishment of blood banks;
- the use of military facilities and civilian ships/plants to repair rolling stock;
- the designation and preparation of transloading areas near the Vistula and Oder Rivers to compensate for the destruction of all bridges by NATO was given priority attention.



These exercises take up to two years in preparation and involve rear services units and installations as well as the national defense infrastructure of Poland. In addition to the rear services staffs, operations groups from FRONT staffs participated to feed the scenario and special units required to test specific problems, such as medical units, also participated. Only two transit exercises are known to have been conducted - the most recent in 1978. A third transit exercise is planned for 1983. The transit exercises are built around the assumptions that NATO will succeed in destroying the major port facilities and all bridges over the Oder and Vistula Rivers in the first days of the war. Accordingly, a great deal of attention is devoted in these exercises to building new or alternate bridges, using territorial defense forces, and the development of alternate, smaller ports and unimproved sites capable of supporting "across the beach" operations.



5  
4  
3  
2  
1

2  
1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

17. Combined division-level exercises involving one Polish and one Soviet Division of the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) are conducted annually in Poland. These exercises are organized by the commander of the NGF and one of the Polish military district commanders. The participating units rotate and the command alternates from year to year.

Press reports of March 1982 indicate that East German forces also participate now - possibly laying the groundwork for future intervention into Poland if necessary.)


18. The trends in exercises in the late 1960s and early 1970s indicated a more defense oriented approach to combat in Europe. At that time, the Soviets talked of FRONT defensive operations, or at least the need for at least one army within the FRONT being called upon to conduct defensive operations. During the same period, the exercises reflected a slowing of the operational tempo, i.e., a decline on the battlefield rates of advance during operations against NATO. This trend held until about 1980, since which time the Soviet planners have made all-out efforts to reverse it. The introduction of air cavalry type units, the increase in artillery densities, the use of operational maneuver groups as well as airborne and strategic air forces to support operations within the theatre of military operations are all part of the effort to increase the operational tempo. The stated doctrine regarding the nuclear strikes has not changed since the 1960s. The exercises continue to be played with NATO initiating nuclear war - the pact will not launch a first strike. In the typical scenario, the Warsaw Pact will detect NATO preparations and launch nearly simultaneous strikes to preempt, and the Warsaw Pact strike will be massive, using all delivery systems available.

The academic discussions at the Soviet General Staff Academy support these tenets. Despite the NATO discussions of changing nuclear strategies over the years, the Soviets have never discussed any change in the concept of a massive retaliatory strike. There are no known plans for any graduated response and even the detonation of NATO atomic demolition munitions are said to be enough to trigger a massive nuclear strike by the Warsaw Pact). Overall, the Soviet strategy has remained the same for at least the last twenty years - "take Western Europe in a rapid, conventional "Blitzkrieg", while intimidating NATO with the nuclear threat." Trends to be alert for in the future include exercises designed to align the training with the provisions of the wartime statute. This is expected to involve more exercising of the

5  
4  
3  
2  
1


5  
4  
3  
2  
1

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

role of the commander and staff of the high command of the strategic grouping of forces within the Western (and Southwestern) Theater of Military Operations. These exercises may be "tipped off" by general staff drills in the various countries as the staffs prepare for the theatre wide exercise. As part of the effort to improve the procedures, there probably will be increased attention placed on monitoring of readiness as well as a greater (daily) use of the Monument alert system. The NSWP members are hopeful that future exercises will reveal in greater detail the role of the national political-military hierarchies within the theaters. The new concept for strategic employment of air forces has been evolving slowly and should be exercised with increasing frequency in the near future. Similarly, combined exercises of the air forces within the theaters may be forthcoming and may be conducted along the same lines as the present combined naval exercises (FALA) and the combined air defense exercises (GRANIT).



ALL PORTIONS

CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

5  
4  
3  
2  
1