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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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I. April 1941: Regular War Operations Against Germans and Italians
In Yugoslavia:

1. Then a Major of the Yugoslav General Staff, on 2 April 1941 Subject reported to General Mihajlo LUKIC, C.O. of the Triglav Alpine Detachment, at Skofja Loka as his Chief of Staff. As such, Subject was responsible for operations on a 100 kilometer mountain front extending from Kamnik to Ziri, against both Italian and German forces. Subject's unit belonged to the VIIIth Yugoslav Army in Slovenia.
2. On the morning of 6 April, the enemy attacked along the entire front. After several days of successful operations in which Subject's unit captured a number of prisoners and succeeded in driving the invader back, orders were received from Army headquarters to withdraw because of the situation on the Croatian right flank, where the Germans had broken through in the direction of Zagreb. In spite of difficult operational conditions and despite the work of German and Communist fifth columns, the Triglav Alpine Detachment resisted until 11 April, and was the only unit in Slovenia remaining reasonably intact. On that date, Subject's unit was entirely isolated and cut off from the main part of the Yugoslav Army as a result of treason in Croatia, and subsequent occupation of Zagreb, Karlovac and Ogulin by the Germans and insurgents; thus, surrounded and under bombardment of the German Airforce, the unit had no possibility of defense. In addition, by this time there had been established a Slovenian political committee which had initiated negotiations with the enemy and had invited all armed forces in Slovenia to cease resistance, and advised all personnel that they should return to their homes as the war was finished. Subject then proceeded to burn his files and gave instructions that all armament should be destroyed or hidden. This order was carried out and the enemy was unable to seize any material for later use in the resistance movement. With certain insignificant exceptions, the enemy was likewise prevented from taking any prisoners.
3. In company with General LUKIC, Subject tried to fight his way from Slovenia to Bosnia through Croatia, supposing that the Army was still resisting the enemy there. Unsuccessful in this attempt, wearing civilian clothes, they returned clandestinely to Ljubljana, which had already been taken by the Italians, in order to avoid being taken prisoner. General LUKIC, a Croat, left for Croatia to join the Croatian Army, while Subject remained in Ljubljana.

II. 1941: First Steps:

4. Despite the tragic result of regular war operations, Subject refused to regard the war as finished and decided not to surrender. Puzzled as to the course he should follow, the only measure he took in precaution of not sleeping in the open.

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S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

which was under police surveillance. Although he was able to avoid arrest in this manner, the Germans took advantage of the situation to requisition his home and to make off with all his belongings.

5. Together with Major Ivo FREGL (later captured and shot by the Germans) and Dr. Vjekoslav BUCAR (later arrested and interned by the Italians, currently in exile in Italy), Subject attempted to organize a group of officers and soldiers in a national resistance movement. Owing to the current negative attitude of the old Slovenian political groups, the trio joined the Communist Liberation Front where they collaborated with the group lead by Dr. MARUSIC (later Minister in the SUBASIC Government in London, and TITO's in Belgrade), Eng. SERNEC (later a member of TITO's Regency in Belgrade), and Colonel AVSIC (later a Communist General). They also collaborated with Communist leaders Boris KIDRIC, Ales BEBLER, both of whom are now TITO Ministers, and Vinko MEDERNDORFER.
6. In July, Major FREGL joined the General Draza MIHAILOVIC movement in Serbia and remained there. In September, Subject received a letter from his friend, Zarko TODOROVIC (later arrested by the Germans and sent to a PW camp in Germany) in Belgrade, appointing him in MIHAILOVIC's name as the sole representative of the movement in Slovenia. Accepting the appointment, Subject immediately initiated activities. After some time, he decided to go to Serbia to meet personally MIHAILOVIC who had meanwhile been promoted from Colonel to General by King PETER II, who had also named him Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Yugoslav Home Army.
7. Dr. MARUSIC and Eng. SERNEC, hoping to attain a position of dominance vis-a-vis the Communists in the O.F. (Liberation Front) through use of MIHAILOVIC's name, agreed to Subject's proposal and offered to finance his journey to MIHAILOVIC's headquarters. These two, however, claimed military leadership for their candidate Colonel AVSIC, who should accompany Subject on his trip. Communist leaders had been informed of Subject's intention to visit MIHAILOVIC. Provided with false documents, Subject and AVSIC proceeded to Belgrade and thence to Ravna Gora, where they arrived in late November, and discovered to their great amazement that the Chetniks and TITO's partisans were engaged in full scale warfare. They reported to General MIHAILOVIC on the greatly different Slovenian situation where their own organization collaborated with the Communists against the enemy without political distinction.
8. After some days, MIHAILOVIC named AVSIC Commander, and Subject Chief of Staff of Royal Yugoslav forces to be organized in Slovenia under the supreme command of MIHAILOVIC. Despite the tragic situation prevailing in Serbia, they were authorized to collaborate with all resistance forces, including the Communists; at the same time, however, they were instructed that the non-Communist elements should maintain a strength to guarantee against Communist attack. Both AVSIC and Subject received written credentials in confirmation of MIHAILOVIC's order. Leaving Ravna Gora, they returned to Slovenia, where they arrived on 1 December 1941.
9. Upon his return to Ljubljana, Subject and his friend, Dr. BUCAR, held two meetings with Communist leader Boris KIDRIC and the Communist MEDERNDORFER. At this meeting Subject negotiated with KIDRIC as to the possibility of continued cooperation. KIDRIC, however, refused to permit any independent organization of Royal Yugoslav units, having in the meantime launched a bitter propaganda campaign against General MIHAILOVIC. Subject was thus forced definitely to break relations with the Communists and the O.F., deciding at the same time, however, to avoid any armed conflict insofar as this might be in his power. Colonel AVSIC, Dr.

SECRET
(CONTROL)

MARUSTIC and Eng. SERNEC, on the contrary, betrayed General MIHAILOVIC by joining the Communists. By this move, AVSIC abused the credentials which he had received from MIHAILOVIC and which he refused to hand back at the latter's direct request.

10. Subject's path, on the basis of his duty towards his country, his King, and the Western Allies, thus lay clearly before him as it was no longer possible to collaborate with the Communists whose loyalties were in another direction.
11. As an immediate result, Subject was denounced by the Communists to the Italians as a rebel, and from that time on, he was hunted by Italian authorities until the end of their occupation.

III. 1942: First Attempt and Disillusionment:

12. In February 1942, General MIHAILOVIC, then already Minister of War in the London Royal Yugoslav Government, dismissed Colonel AVSIC and charged Subject with the task of reorganization of the Royal Yugoslav Army in Slovenia as its temporary commander. At that time Subject already disposed in Ljubljana of an organized staff as well as of a group of the clandestine "SKOL Legion", numbering some hundred members, with which to form the initial active and reserve units. Shortly afterwards, his organization was joined by a group of political dissidents of varied political hue, who had banded together under the name "People's Legion". This group brought with it an already functioning, though small, propaganda and information service. The main bulk of non-Communist military personnel, which was provided with a considerable quantity of hidden armament and equipment, was organized in the Clerical clandestine "Slovenian Legion". This large group of some thousands of members was under the leadership of Colonel PETERLIN, who still opposed the MIHAILOVIC organization and continued to act independently.
13. The initial problem was obviously that of uniting all these ideologically diverse legions under MIHAILOVIC's command as exercised by Subject, to obtain a solid political basis and permanent liaison with the London Government, and to procure the means necessary for maintenance of the organization and its Army. Union of all the country's positive forces into a compact representative body entrusted with the task/directing political behavior under enemy occupation, and with supporting the organization and activity of the national resistance movement within the framework of the sole legal armed force, MIHAILOVIC's Royal Yugoslav Army was indispensable.
14. Finally after long negotiations, in which NOVAK took an active part, the clandestine "Slovenska Zaveza" (hereafter referred to as the S.Z.) was founded. This Slovenian agreement of alliance included the Clerical Party (S.L.S.), the Liberal parties (J.N.S. and S.D.S.), the Socialist Party (S.P.J.), and recognized Colonel NOVAK as its military leader and as representative of General MIHAILOVIC and the Royal Yugoslav Army. The Communist Party refused to take part in the alliance.
15. The S.Z.'s program, as promulgated by the London Yugoslav Government, favored a united Yugoslav kingdom led by King Peter II; it declared itself on behalf of democracy, federation, and political, social, economic, and cultural reforms in accordance with the desire of the majority of the people; and it recognized the Royal Yugoslav Home Army under General MIHAILOVIC and his legally appointed regional commanders. It clearly recognized the King and the Royal Government in London as the sole legal representatives abroad of the Sovereignty and continuity of its country temporarily occupied by the enemy.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

16. The S.Z.'s military program provided that no party was to be allowed to maintain private military formations, and all such organizations (the various "legions") existing up to that time were to be incorporated into the Royal Yugoslav Army. Such formations were to be put under command of General MIHAILOVIC and his Slovenian representative who was responsible for the organization and activity of Armed forces in that region.
17. It was agreed that the S.Z. would provide the MIHAILOVIC organization and Army with the necessary funds which were to be collected by an S.Z. organized financial subscription; funds also were to be procured from the Government abroad under guarantee of one member each from the Clerical and Liberal parties and from NOVAK.
18. Later, in Rome in 1943, however, NOVAK learned that he had been deceived by various politicians as to the amount of funds received from abroad, in order to cover up their failure to provide funds for operational units.
19. As drawn up, the S.Z. program was sound and well suited to provide a solid basis for Royal Yugoslav Army operations in Slovenia, providing it were respected and consistently applied in its entirety according to the solemn pledges of its members. Unfortunately, however, the "gentlemen's agreement" among the political parties was not unconditionally respected, nor were the various individuals concerned capable of laying aside personal difficulties during the war period. An additional point of weakness lay in the fact that the Clerical party, representing the majority of the population, was split into three different currents; one of these, the "Straza" under ZEBOT (who is now in Rome), ERLIH and CASAR (both killed by the Communists), was not represented in the S.Z. because of its position against a united Yugoslavia. Because of its active nature, however, the Straza group strongly influenced the official current in the Clerical Party which was represented in the S.Z. by Dr. Milos STARE and Marko KRANJC (both of whom are now in Rome) against the left wing Christian Socialists under GOSAR represented in the S.Z. by Prof. SOLAR (both Dr. GOSAR and SOLAR were interned at Dachau by the Germans; they are now members of the opposition in Yugoslavia). The official wing of the Clerical Party (STARE and KRANJC) which was in contact with Dr. Miho KREK in London and supported by the majority of the Clergy in Slovenia, did not understand the problem raised by necessity for a choice between MIHAILOVIC and TITO; as a result of their inability to understand the implications of the question as it affected both the country and its Western Allies, during the war in the Balkans the Clerical Party attempted to impose its political line on the S.Z. as a whole, against the will of the Liberals, Socialists and Christian-Socialists. Thus, it was that the S.Z. program remained only a scrap of paper and no serious attempt at its realizations was ever made.
20. Though not particularly preoccupied with the purely political aspect of the matter, NOVAK was deeply concerned with the attitude of the official Clerical wing insofar as it regarded military matters. Initial small differences led soon to a definite break.
21. NOVAK himself sums up his policy in military affairs from the first to the last day of his activities in Slovenia, as follows: "Immediate propaganda effort, intelligence activities, and guerrilla and sabotage operations the enemy in preparation for final action on the strategic level on orders to be issued by the Government and General MIHAILOVIC; all this to be carried out while maintaining a defensive attitude against the Communists. The armed forces must act under the orders of General MIHAILOVIC and of myself as the responsible military leaders."

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

22. The policy of the S.Z., or, better, of its Clerical majority, on the other hand, was at first secretly, later more and more openly, as follows: "Our armed forces should be restricted to maintaining a passive attitude as regards the occupying forces and should limit themselves to a minimum propaganda effort. Active units, therefore, should not be developed at all, or at least should be held down to a minimum inactive secret force. At the same time Communism should be fought with all means, even collaborating with the occupiers in order to prevent Communist terror and enemy reprisals. General MIHAILOVIC's orders are not applicable to Slovenia if the S.Z. considers them impracticable. NOVAK is to act only with direct permission of the S.Z." Thus, it might be said, a more or less independent Slovenian Army was envisaged.
23. Regarding the steadily mounting accumulation of differences between himself and the S.Z. at this period, NOVAK describes as disgraceful the fact that the Clericals never officially renounced the military program previously accepted by the S.Z., and permitted him to continue his bonafide activities in a manner which could not be satisfactory to the S.Z. or to its objectives. Constantly obstructed in his activities during this initial phase, NOVAK for a certain was unaware of the reasons for his difficulties. There existed a permanent crisis in his relations with the political, especially Clerical, leaders of the S.Z.
24. NOVAK's position, as it turned out, was the right one. The Clerical attitude had succeeded in preventing his building up strong effectives, and in 1943 his units had been overcome by joint German-Italian-Communist action. The 10,000 Clerical adherents who had been prevented from joining NOVAK's units were destroyed by the Partisans and Italians with whom they had collaborated up to that time, and were forced into German service. Their persistence in collaborating with the Germans subsequent to their Italian collaboration ended in the tragedy of 1945, when innocent soldiers were treated as an independent Slovenian army after having surrendered to the Allies, and were handed over to TITO and massacred.
25. In the first phase, however, NOVAK was unable to foresee such a tragic future and having, at least theoretically, the Slovenian Clerical Legion at his disposition, he began organizing his headquarters and minor staffs and commands.
26. In the first half of March 1942, a fresh blow hit NOVAK's organization when all but three active officers of his organization were arrested and interned. The three who escaped were Captain LESJAK, later killed by Slovenian Quislings; Lt. KRANJC, later killed by the Italians; and Lt. STRNISA, later killed by the Communists. NOVAK was thus compelled to reorganize his staff with civilian members of the three Legions who, in addition to their good intentions, also brought along their political attitudes. One of the best of these, Reserve Captain PERSUH, was treacherously killed by the Communists a short time later as the first in a long list of victims.
27. After reorganization of his headquarters and construction of a relatively solid framework for the Royal Yugoslav Army in Slovenia, NOVAK proceeded to organize fighting units. He proposed to the S.Z. that in every village there be organized a small group of volunteers from the three Legions to form the first cadres of the Army, and to gather, cache, and guard all available armament, equipment, and food for a future more complete mobilization. These first small groups had to be brought into liaison with one another, organized into larger units, and provided with military leaders by NOVAK's headquarters. Thus organized, these units

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

were to have protected their villages from being terrorized and forcibly mobilized by the Communists; and, at NOVAK's order, were to begin the guerrilla and sabotage campaign against the enemy in such a manner as to avoid insofar as possible direct enemy reprisals against inhabitants of the various villages.

28. After lengthy discussion, both within and without the S.Z., NOVAK's proposal was accepted. Invited to issue the necessary orders, he immediately did so.
29. The following day, however, to his great surprise he was informed that his orders could not be carried out for fear of enemy reprisals and Communist vengeance.
30. This incompetent interference on the part of the S.Z. proved to be an enormous error whose consequences could not be corrected throughout the war. The unfortunate inhabitants of the villages, though imbued with a deep hatred of the Communists, were forcibly mobilized into Partisan units, terrorized in every way, deprived of all their possessions, and, in addition, they were forced to suffer the reprisals of the occupiers who burned their villages, executed, tortured, imprisoned, and deported all those who did not wish to join the Communists. These individuals were, ironically for the most part members of the various preponderantly Clerical Legions whose loyalties belong to the MIHAILOVIC organization, rather than to the Communists. Finally, people who had been prevented by their political leaders from using their own weapons and forced to deliver them to the Communists, were compelled to accept arms from the occupiers only in order to save their lives and the poor remnants of their person.
31. In Ljubljana and in other smaller towns, the Italians began large scale mop-up operations and deported about 30,000 people, most of them non-Communists, to concentration camps. In Ljubljana, this program of internment almost halved the membership of the "SOKOL" and the "People's" Legions. The pusillanimity of the political leaders did not prevent either Communist terror or reprisals, but caused the loss of the best individuals as well as of nearly all armament and equipment.
32. After this heavy blow to the S.Z., NOVAK decided to act on his own and salvage whatever might be possible. After enormous difficulties placed in his way from all quarters, he finally succeeded in May 1942, in organizing three small units; despite Italian and Communist attack, he managed to concentrate them in a group of about 100 men in the Gorjanci mountains in the Novo Mesto area. Accepting the fait accompli, the S.Z. promised to provide NOVAK with necessary funds for his forces maintenance.
33. As a result of the propaganda campaign launched against the occupying forces and the Communists in NOVAK's paper "Svoboda ili smrt" (Liberty or Death), NOVAK was constantly denounced to the Italian police. The Italians searched for him actively, but being unsuccessful, they satisfied themselves with looting his home in Ljubljana.
34. In late May 1942, NOVAK decided to contact General MIHAILOVIC again and to establish w/t communication between their two headquarters. He thus travelled to Serbia with false documents in the company of Mrs. KRISTOF, whose special task was radio and code.
35. In Zagreb, NOVAK held a meeting with Dr. RAPOTEC, who had come from Cairo by submarine on a special mission to Yugoslavia and to General MIHAILOVIC. With RAPOTEC, he also met a group of Croat nationalists and Dr. MACEK's representative, Dr. FAROLFI.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

36. From Belgrade, Mrs. KRISTOF and NOVAK were accompanied by Tugomer PREKORSEK and by a guide furnished by the MIHAILOVIC organization in Belgrade, who was to accompany them through Serbia and the Sanjak to MIHAILOVIC's headquarters in the mountains near Sahovici. In Nova Varos, Mrs. KRISTOF was held by local Chetniks as a sort of hostage, a strange though understandable and necessary measure for the security of General MIHAILOVIC's security.
37. Meeting MIHAILOVIC in the mountains, a few hours march from Sahovici, NOVAK remained at his headquarters for only two hours. He reported on the situation in Slovenia, on the development of the organization there, and on his relations with the S.Z. political organization. MIHAILOVIC approved NOVAK's policies and encouraged him to proceed in the face of all difficulties. He confirmed NOVAK's appointment as Commander in Slovenia, and enlarged his political and military powers and provided him with new written credentials. NOVAK also received credentials authorizing him to undertake preliminary negotiations with Croat nationalists and with the H.S.S. in Zagreb with a view to collaboration. In order to render him independent from the financial point of view, MIHAILOVIC gave him 3,000 dollars; after establishing all details concerning radio liaison with MIHAILOVIC's headquarters, NOVAK left for Slovenia via Belgrade. To NOVAK's considerable regret, on this occasion he could not renew his acquaintance with British Captain Bill HUDSON, whom he had already met in 1941, as Chief of the British Mission to MIHAILOVIC's headquarters, because HUDSON was absent on some business connected with his mission.
38. On his return journey, NOVAK again met Dr. FAROLFI in Zagreb, but was unable to make contact with Dr. MACEK, as the latter was kept in hermetic isolation by the Ustascha. It was thus impossible to take any steps in the direction of a Croatian rapprochement on this occasion and, as NOVAK was under close observation, it was impossible for him to undertake further journeys to Zagreb.
39. Towards the end of June 1942, NOVAK returned to Ljubljana after a month's journey for the purpose of spending two hours with General MIHAILOVIC. He reported to the political leaders and presented them his new credentials.
40. Within a short time radio communication had been established between MIHAILOVIC and NOVAK's headquarters, and functioned smoothly with only occasional interruptions when headquarters were moved, during NOVAK's entire tenure. Radio equipment was constructed by radio operators HASL, BRICELJ, and STEBOV, who also established and maintained all radio links with great courage, ambition and self-sacrifice in collaboration with Mrs. KRISTOF who acted as traffic supervisor and personally enciphered and deciphered all messages. Unfortunately, all three radio operators were fairly receptive to the flattery and various intrigues coming from all sides, both within and without the organization, especially in its most critical periods. BRICELJ, for example, whom NOVAK originally considered his best operator, tried first in Rome in 1943 and later in Trieste in 1945, to sabotage NOVAK's w/t link with MIHAILOVIC; though compelled to cease using his services, NOVAK continued to pay him in order to prevent further mischief on his part. Subsequent to NOVAK's arrest by the Germans, Mrs. KRISTOF relieved BRICELJ of crystals in his possession, in order to prevent his misuse of them. Mrs. KRISTOF broke off all relations with BRICELJ, who in the meantime had started to work for JEVDJEVIC. NOVAK later heard that BRICELJ had fallen even deeper into treachery by working for the Gestapo, in order to satisfy his greed for money and his desire for an easy life; NOVAK, however, has no concrete evidence to this effect.

SECRET
(CONTROL)

41. During NOVAK's absence, his unit in the Novo Mesto area carried out, sometimes with Partisan aid, several successful operations against the Italian garrisons at Stopice, Pogance and Rates. During these actions the Chetniks destroyed the principal stone bridge on the Novo Mesto-Krsko road, an important communication link between the German and Italian zones of occupation. This bridge was never entirely reactivated throughout the war.
42. For the first half of July 1942, an operation was planned against Italian defensive positions of the Novo Mesto suburb Smihel, but on the 9th of July, NOVAK's detachment was attacked by the Partisans. Although the treacherous Communist attack was repelled with only one Chetnik killed, before returning to Ljubljana, NOVAK ordered his unit to leave the area in order to avoid further clashes with the Partisans. His precaution was in vain: Although continuously under Italian artillery fire, the unit was attacked every place it appeared by greatly superior Partisan forces, and suffered heavy casualties.
43. Finally, after two months of heroic resistance against attack from both Italians and Partisans, the unit found itself overwhelmed and surrounded, with Partisans before it and Italians behind it, without food and ammunition, under heavy gun fire, and cut off from all communication with Colonel NOVAK. In this situation, the unit was compelled to renounce its allegiance to Gen. MIHAILOVIC and to accept the Italian offer of surrender and non-aggression. NOVAK learned of this tragic event only two weeks later, and was left only the hope that in a more fortunate future he might persuade the officers and soldiers to return to the organization under his command. Such an occasion never presented itself, however, because with few exceptions, the dispersed unit's members were under the influence of local politicians, and constituted only village guards outside the MIHAILOVIC organization.
44. In the meantime the Italian Army had undertaken a cycle of large-scale anti-rebel operations. The Partisans offered no resistance and were soon dispersed. The Italians burned the villages, looted their inhabitants possessions, and many of those who were fortunate enough to escape with their lives, were sent to concentration camps. For their defense against the Communist terror, the Italians issued the remaining villagers a small quantity of rifles and ten rounds of ammunition for each weapon. The farmers, although hating the Italians, could only accept the offer and the number of White Guard anti-Communist fighters soon reached between 5 and 6000, who defended their villages successfully against the Partisans, whom they drove back into the woods and the mountains.
45. NOVAK informed General MIHAILOVIC of these new developments in Slovenia, and was instructed to carry on in the attempt to organize new active units of the Royal Yugoslav Army and to do everything possible to bring the village guards into the MIHAILOVIC organization.
46. Now commenced the struggle among the Italians, the Communists, the various Clerical politicians, and Colonel NOVAK for control of the village guards. Although sympathizing with the MIHAILOVIC organization, most of the farmers in the village guard were not active in the movement because of their fear of reprisals. Thus, it was planned to effect a clandestine penetration of the village guards, in order not to arouse Italian suspicion, a task not too difficult where the local priests were sympathetic as they were in most cases. As long as the Clerical politicians remained loyal to the military charter of the S.Z., and as long as the Church extended its sympathies to the MIHAILOVIC organization, then, it should have been

SECRET
(CONTROL)

relatively easy to persuade the village guards to renounce their affiliation with the Italians, to join the Royal Yugoslav Army, and to fight not only the Communists but also the occupying forces.

47. With this view in mind, Colonel NOVAK despatched special emissaries to the village guards for the purpose of attempting to draw the latter into the organization. Captain DEBELJAK was sent into the Novo Mesto area, Captain LESJAK into the Ljubljana area, and Captain VOSNER into the Rovete-St. Jost area. NOVAK further suggested to those sympathetic to his organization that reliable elements should be sent to as many villages as possible, in order to assume positions of command for the purpose of preventing such posts from falling into the hands of pro-Italians, Communists, and others hostile to the MIHAILOVIC program. Soon a number of villages was in the hands of people sympathetic to the movement, or in some way affiliated with it.
48. The same program was attempted by the Communists but with a lesser degree of success. The strongest village guard, however, that in Trebnje, was under the command of one BAN, a philo-Communist and pro-Italian. This unit, a perfect example of Communism's ability to turn all means to its own ends, was the only one organized and trained on Fascist lines - it even adopted the Fascist salute!
49. The Italians, for their part, attempted by all means to prevent the MIHAILOVIC influence from permeating the village guards and to bring their own elements into positions of power. They found only an insignificant number of traitors, however, and as a result of Communist propaganda to the effect that the village guards might adhere to the Royal Yugoslav Army and engage in attacks against the Italians, they sent liaison officers and military units to control the guards. The village guards were thus forced to open collaboration.
50. Last but not least, the Clerical politicians, who previously feared Italian reprisals and Communist vengeance, now felt that they were being given the opportunity to fight the Communists legitimately; in this situation, they preferred the status quo to the alternate solution of fighting and being fought by both the Italians and the Communists. They, too, therefore, although some of them were members of the S.Z. or directly affiliated with the MIHAILOVIC movement, obstructed NOVAK's work among the village guards, especially towards the end of 1942 when it seemed that the Partisans in Slovenia were on the definite decline.
51. NOVAK, on the contrary, in view of the decline in Partisan strength and the disillusionment of the people concerning Communism, considered the moment propitious for rallying all those who wished to fight the enemy in units strong enough to prevent Communist terror without necessity for collaboration with the occupying forces. It was necessary, therefore, that NOVAK attract to his banner all the nationalist and non-Communist fighters from the badly shaken Partisan army, which had been reduced from its previous summer's strength of 15,000 to a bare 2,000. Partisan forces, stripped of all but Communist elements, could not possibly outnumber Royal Yugoslav units and would be forced to give up further aggression. MIHAILOVIC's forces, unhindered by Partisan aggression, could thus dedicate themselves to the primary task of fighting the enemy in accordance with MIHAILOVIC's express instructions. Unfortunately, however, the politicians prevailed again: Through its "Slovenian Legion", the Clerical Party took control of the village guards, overtly with permission of the Italian authorities, covertly through the Slovenian Legion's members. Believing the Communist danger had already passed, the Clericals proceeded to take all measures to prevent MIHAILOVIC influence among the village guards, which they preserved as an armed force of the party. This constituted the second fatal

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

blunder of the politicians, one which again prevented a large-scale development of the Royal Yugoslav Army, and which gave the Communists time to reorganize their units with the decisive aid of the Croatian Partisans.

52. In late August 1942, the Italian police arrested KRESKIJ, KRALJ, MACUS and PETROVIC, all of them either members or supporters of NOVAK's Ljubljana headquarters; NOVAK himself was barely able to escape and because he was actively sought by the Italian police, he was forced to leave Ljubljana for a certain period.
53. Being without a unit of his own at that time, NOVAK decided to proceed clandestinely to the Novo Mesto area to contact the village guards in an attempt to bring together his old Chetniks, whom he believed to be secretly still loyal to the MIHAILOVIC organization and to himself. Disguised as a simple soldier, or some times as a friend of the local parson in Stopice, NOVAK remained there, with a few interruptions, from the middle of September to the middle of December 1942. At first, NOVAK's project seemed to be making satisfactory progress; the officers seemed to be willing to obey and to help in preparing, arming, and equipping the soldiers to rejoin the organization. With time, however, the combined effect of Communist propaganda and denunciations led to more severe Italian control in the village guards, and the officers became more reluctant. Local politicians, aided by certain clergymen, were active in attempting to persuade the soldiers of dangers in store for them if they deserted the village guards. The officers who negotiated with NOVAK, had been denounced to the Italians and placed under strict surveillance; as a result, they refused, at least for the time being, to break off their contacts with the Italians. Himself threatened with arrest and consignment to the Italians or with outright assassination, NOVAK was forced to disappear, completely unsuccessful, in the company of only one officer, Marjan PAVLIC.
54. Still more discouraging was the failure of NOVAK's deputy, Captain LESJAK, in the Ljubljana area. After having hidden arms for the units planned for the future, he was treacherously and brutally killed by the village guards, who afterwards looted his home, not only of private property, but also of funds belonging to the organization. This murder had been arranged by the people of the "Straza" Ultra-Clerical Group, in collaboration with the priest GLAVAC (now in Italy) and his men, together with Italian Captain TORNARI. GLAVAC had previously been a highly considered member of NOVAK's headquarters and the motives behind his terrible treachery are not clear. GLAVAC subsequently maintained an extremely hostile attitude towards the MIHAILOVIC movement and advocated unconditional collaboration with the occupying forces in order to fight the Communists.
55. After the tragedy of Captain LESJAK, NOVAK's emissary, Captain VOSNER, who had been sent to the Rovte-St. Jost area, postponed further action until the situation might improve.
56. On the night after NOVAK's return to Ljubljana, the infamous Christmas 1942 round-up of almost a thousand men and women suspected of being members or sympathizers of the Communist movement, was initiated. Colonel PETERLIN, the Italian-appointed chief of all village guards and Ljubljana secret police member, working with Dr. SMARD and Italian Captain TORNARI, participated in this operation which clearly showed the existence of open collaboration between the Italians and the village guards. The round-up, which affected not only Communists but also many innocent people, was an error from both the political and moral points of view; in addition, it was most inefficient because the Italians soon liberated all the real Communists who could pay ransoms defined by "over-the-table deals", while those without funds were sent to concentration camps.

57. It was thus that Eng. SERNEC, one of the leaders of the Communist movement and later Tito's regent in Belgrade, was released after furnishing his written "word of honor" that he had not previously and that he would not in the future, occupy himself with political matters; this same document also contained his statement that he had never been a member of the liberation front!
58. Later, the Communists accused the MIHAILOVIC organization with the responsibility for this mop-up operation. Not only was NOVAK not informed of what was going on, but only at the last moment did village guards desist in their search of the home of the KRISTOF family where NOVAK was in hiding. Had the search been completed, NOVAK would have been discovered - quite incidentally - and turned over to the Italians. On the basis of the local Communist propaganda line, it was well known that the KRISTOF family was anything but pro-Communist. Who, then, was searched for in their home? Had he been informed of the imminent round-up operation, NOVAK would have certainly done everything in his power to prevent its being carried into effect.
59. When Lt. Colonel PETERLIN returned from internment in Italy, he had already been appointed commander of village guards. He subsequently offered to provide NOVAK's units with weapons and volunteers from his village guards until the moment when all village guards would join the MIHAILOVIC movement. Payment was demanded for this service, and payment of the amount requested by PETERLIN was made by NOVAK. In reality, however, as the exponent of the collaborationist group including the "Straza" and Father GLAVAC, and as the Clerical candidate for the position then held by NOVAK, PETERLIN not only failed to furnish positive aid, but proved to be the technical executor of all actions against that section of the MIHAILOVIC organization and Royal Yugoslav Army under NOVAK's command.
60. Thus ended the year 1942, without success. Deeply disillusioned and completely disgusted, NOVAK was forced to begin the new year on an entirely new basis.

IV. Second Attempt and Tragedy, 1943 - Direct Cooperation with the Middle East Forces Allied HQ. Cairo:

61. After his previous disappointing experiences, NOVAK decided that in 1943 he would act independently and attempt to diminish insofar as possible the influence of the various politicians on his military activities, as it was already clear that he could not persuade them to take a definite stand against the enemy. If it were not possible to obtain any support from the Slovenian politicians, NOVAK hoped to obtain direct support from abroad and from General MIHAILOVIC.
62. According to instructions received from MIHAILOVIC via radio, NOVAK's mission continued to remain more or less the same: To create active units to fight the enemy on a worthwhile scale, to increase the propaganda effort, and to enlarge intelligence activities in support of the Allied struggle for Africa.
63. NOVAK's propaganda campaign was begun on a sharply anti-German and anti-Italian line, while maintaining a clearly defensive attitude with regard to the Partisans.
64. With regard to his intelligence mission, NOVAK proposed to General MIHAILOVIC that a special military mission be sent into Slovenia by Allied Headquarters in Cairo. MIHAILOVIC promised to take the necessary steps; in the meantime, it was necessary for NOVAK to organize a military unit strong enough to protect any Allied mission which might be sent.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

65. Because of constant Clerical opposition to NOVAK's aggressive attitude, the latter no longer counted upon the Clerical "Slovenian Legion", but concentrated his attention on the "SOKOLS". As NOVAK had promised to operate in the Gorizia area where there were no village guards, the S.Z. consented to support his project to create a unit to operate against the enemy, although it was demanded that the unit not exceed 30 fighting men. As there was no danger of Italian retaliation against village guards in the Gorizia area, the Clericals also promised to invite their adherents in the Venezia Giulia area to grant all possible aid.
66. In Ljubljana, NOVAK gathered a number of volunteers who were soon joined by several members of the village guards who had deserted their units because they were unwilling to collaborate further with the Italians. Thus, towards the end of February 1943, NOVAK disposed of a unit of 27 fighters near the old Italo-Yugoslav frontier; the unit was under the secret command of Captain VOSNER.
67. When the Communists learned of the existence of this unit, their "Free Yugoslavia" radio station in Russia launched a counter-propaganda campaign, contending that the Italian Government had ordered General MIHAJLOVIC to destroy the Partisans in Venezia Giulia, and that General MIHAJLOVIC had entrusted NOVAK with this task in Slovenia. The Communists, of course, were well aware of the falsity of this line, but it was eminently successful in informing the enemy of NOVAK's activity and in frightening Clerical circles. Once again opposition from the latter set in.
68. In early March, NOVAK assumed personal command of the unit which was known as "the first Slovenian Chetnik detachment" and undertook a small scale raid into the Idria area and beyond into old Italian territory. This undertaking showed immediately that previous promises of the politicians had not been kept. Nothing had been prepared for the reception of the unit and for support of its action.
69. NOVAK and his unit returned to their operational area just in time for the reception of paratroopers and w/t equipment from Cairo. Special messages in connection with this operation had been broadcast by BBC London on their Slovenian program on the 15th, 16th and 17th of March 1943. The operation was completed on 17 March, without casualties, damage or loss, and NOVAK's headquarters was congratulated by Cairo for the well-organized reception of the three paratroopers (two radio operators and one enlisted man, all of them Slovenians of Italian citizenship, who had been taken prisoner during the African war), three radio sets and w/t equipment, food, and money.
70. The following day radio communication was established with Cairo to everyone's complete satisfaction. That was the first direct contact between the Allies and Slovenia. The mission of the radio team was outlined in a letter to NOVAK from Major MILLER of Cairo Headquarters, as confirmed by the Allied Mission attached to MIHAJLOVIC's headquarters; slight subsequent modifications were from time to time ordered by Cairo, or were sometimes imposed by the local situation.
71. The radio team was given complete freedom of action, it retained all ciphers, and all funds received were at its disposition. NOVAK limited himself to protection of the team and to providing it with information as received by Cairo. As it turned out, NOVAK-MIHAJLOVIC organization received no direct advantage from the presence of this Allied radio mission, but on the contrary was forced to assume this enormous responsibility, and was subjected to intrigue from all sides. Almost half of NOVAK's entire time was spent on behalf of Cairo, and his troops became increasingly only a unit for the protection of the radio sets; they had constantly to stand guard, to move, to sweat, to fight, and to die protecting the liaison with Cairo. All this they did willingly for the Allies

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

with the fervent hope that their own sweat and blood might save the lives of some of their Allied comrades engaged in the battle for Tunis and Sicily.

72. NOVAK enlarged his intelligence service and developed new links, all of which employed a considerable number of people. After some time, in addition to other messages, Cairo headquarters was receiving regular daily reports on all German movements and traffic between Germany and Italy through Slovenia. Cairo headquarters was at all times satisfied with the effort being carried out, and sent a number of congratulatory messages, their thanks, and their promises, stating that their work was of increasing value for Allied Headquarters and the heavily engaged Allied troops. No practical help in the form of weapons, food, equipment, or funds was received.
73. NOVAK's cooperation along these lines lasted until mid-September 1943, when the combined action of the Germans, Italians, and Partisans destroyed his units and compelled him to leave Slovenia, in order to avoid arrest.
74. As previously mentioned, the radio stations under NOVAK's protection were at all times at the exclusive disposition of Cairo Allied Headquarters where all NOVAK's dealings were through Major MILLER; in Cairo, Professor RUDOLF acted as translator. With the permission of Cairo, the latter maintained communications with the Clerical Party's representative in Slovenia Dr. MILO STARE; Dr. KREK used the same link from London via Cairo, or directly, using his own special cipher. NOVAK was never informed of the contents of messages between KREK and STARE. In his dealings with Cairo, NOVAK first used his own name, later the code name Major BOR.
75. According to instructions from Cairo, B.I.S. representative in Ljubljana, ANTIC, also used the radio stations, and all procedural matters were settled between him and NOVAK. ANTIC's messages were signed "BBZ" and messages to him were marked "for BBZ". This arrangement worked to everyone's satisfaction, but in late September 1943 ANTIC, too, was compelled to leave Ljubljana.
76. Reception of the air operations from Cairo, which coincided with the first Allied air raid in Slovenia, gave rise to varying reactions from NOVAK's own feeling of great responsibility, through the enthusiasm and accompanying indiscretions of his soldiers, the fears and joys of the true friends of the MIHAILOVIC organization, the envy and intrigues of those who should have been its friends, to the open treason of its enemies and the Communists.
77. As soon as radio liaison had been established with Cairo and the first messages had been drawn up for transmission, and after having built the foundations of an I.S. to act on Cairo's behalf, it became necessary to find a means of withdrawing Italian attention from the radio stations. To this end NOVAK personally led his unit in a raid on the Novo Mesto area. He hoped that news of his unit's cooperation with Cairo would persuade a considerable part of the Village Guards to cease their Italian collaboration and to come over to the MIHAILOVIC organization. If this hope had been realized, it would not only have made protection of the Allied radio stations easier, but would have made possible more effective resistance to the occasional Communist attacks, and would have permitted a larger scale of aggressive action against the occupying forces. Once again, however, NOVAK was unsuccessful in realizing this project: Some of the Village Guards displayed a benevolent attitude, others indifference, and still others open hostility. They had already been warned against joining the MIHAILOVIC organization, and had developed a sort of immunity to the temptation. The commanding officer of the Village Guards of Sticna, who with a pair of his soldiers had secretly aided NOVAK's unit in avoiding Italian positions while crossing the Ljubljana-Novu Mesto railway, and who had promised to join NOVAK's

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

unit shortly, was soon denounced along with his soldiers and imprisoned and maltreated by the Italians.

78. During the course of its incursion into the Novo Mesto area, NOVAK's unit was observed by the Italian airforce and near Vodice it was heavily shelled by Italian artillery. From an unknown source, the Italians had learned of the unit's presence in the Zaplaz mountain region, where it celebrated the 27th of March, anniversary of the date when the Royal Yugoslav Army denounced the shameful Axis pact, overthrew the Government, and brought young King PETER II to the throne. On this occasion, a service was held in the famous Church of the Pilgrims followed by a small propaganda meeting. From the Unit's presence there, the Italians concluded that the radio stations must be nearby, and heavily bombed the area, damaging the church; from a document later taken from the Italian I.S. office in Ljubljana, NOVAK learned of Italian suspicion as to the whereabouts of his radio stations. At about this time, too, it was learned that the Italians had discovered the contents of one of the radio messages, either by deciphering it or some other means. It was thus that NOVAK changed his name to BOR and revised his radio procedure.
79. During the course of its raid, the Unit was also attacked by the Partisans, but fortunately did not suffer any casualties.
80. In general, the local populations received the Unit warmly when they learned that they were in no danger, that it took only such supplies as were offered voluntarily, that it paid for everything requested, that it aided the victims of Italian and Communist terror, and that it tried to appear and disappear secretly in order to avoid provoking reprisals.
81. These very factors, however, marked the beginning of a full scale propaganda campaign, both public and covert against the MIHAILOVIC organization, not only by the Communists but by those who should have been its friends as well as by its political opponents. Initial localized alarm at the Unit's success among the population, among the Village Guards, and even among the non-Communist members of the Partisan units, soon spread to the entire Clerical Party. Official Clerical leaders continued to maintain a cool, though not yet hostile, attitude towards the organization, and tried to limit its number to about 30 fighting men on the pretext that a greater strength might endanger the Village Guards.
82. General MIHAILOVIC, on the other hand, insisted on a rapid and unlimited development of NOVAK's Unit in order to be able to fight the enemy without fear of attack from the rear by the Communists. The arrival of volunteers into the Unit was constant though slow. It was joined by a certain number of Nationalists, who deserted from Partisan units in the German-occupied and Venezia Giulia areas. Some 30 officers returning from internment in Italy immediately obeyed NOVAK's order to escape from Ljubljana and to join the Unit. Thus, a force of over 100 men was soon gathered, although it was hoped greatly to increase this strength. Enlargement of the Unit, however, was hampered by the constant fear that acceptance of too great a number of ex-Partisans might lead to its becoming a Communist tool.
83. For this reason NOVAK further attempted to separate the Village Guards from the Italians, this time in the Rovte area, where they were commanded by Captain VOSNER, and in the Krim area where they were commanded by Sgt. HUDNIK; both VOSNER and HUDNIK had already rendered valuable service in providing armament, food, courier service, and in affording sanctuary. VOSNER, a member of the "SOKOL Legion", and HUDNIK, a member of the "Slovenian Legion", were both considered highly reliable elements. Negotiations with them were carried out in the presence of Dr. SMAJD and Dr. JANEZ, both representatives of the Slovenian Legion at NOVAK's headquarters, and in

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

the presence of Liberal Party member Rudolf ZITNIK; at this meeting procedure was established and the time element for preparation and execution of NOVAK's plan was fixed. A few days later, however, NOVAK was informed that "someone" had informed the Italians of the intentions of VOSNER and HUDNIK. The former, being under close surveillance by both Italians and the Village Guards, therefore delayed action until the situation should be more favorable; the latter flatly refused to proceed any further in the plan.

84. Having heard of the Unit's presence in his area, the Italian Commander of Logatec decided to wipe it out and to capture the radio stations, and compelled Captain VOSNER and his Village Guards to participate in the operation. VOSNER gave NOVAK advanced warning of the Italian plan, and his men sabotaged the action of Italian troops; it was thus possible to save the radio stations and avoid being placed in too difficult a situation. Nevertheless, NOVAK blamed VOSNER for the participation of his anti-Communist troops in the Italian hunt against the MIHAILOVIC unit. Invited by NOVAK to join his unit with those of his soldiers whom he considered reliable, on the following night VOSNER sent messengers to all his units with the order that the best men with their arms should come over to NOVAK. VOSNER's authority, however, was already undermined to such an extent that his subordinate commanders refused to obey and forced all their soldiers to remain with the Village Guards by threatening reprisals against their families should they desert. In the face of this latest failure, NOVAK reproached the Village Guards for their servility towards the enemy; in reply he was told that "The Supreme Political Council (!) prohibited any contact between the Village Guards and the Chetniks of General MIHAILOVIC."
85. Slovenian Legion representatives SMAJD, MALOVRE, and DUHOVNIK, all attached to NOVAK's headquarters, personally intervened with the Village Guards against the MIHAILOVIC organization and against NOVAK himself. Considering their activities of a treasonable nature, NOVAK, informing the Slovenian Legion of his reasons, forced all three of them to leave his headquarters, and requested new representatives.
86. The Slovenian Legion answered by breaking off all relations with NOVAK's headquarters. In addition, Legion leaders launched an anti-MIHAILOVIC propaganda campaign, through the Village Guards, forbade the population to sell food to NOVAK's soldiers, secretly encouraged some of his officers and men to desert the Unit and join the Village Guards or to go home, organized a sabotage effort to prevent further recruiting, organized a system to intercept escapees from German territory and forced them to enter the Village Guards, threatened NOVAK's unit with attack by Village Guards, attempted to steal radio sets and equipment, attempted to dissuade NOVAK's w/t operators from serving further, etc.
87. From that time on, General MIHAILOVIC's Slovenian organization, especially its combat units, was completely surrounded by its German, Italian, Partisan, and Village Guard enemies, a situation which lasted in more or less acute form until the very end.
88. In answer to his protest to the S.Z. regarding the behavior and attitude of the Slovenian Legion, NOVAK was charged with full responsibility for the situation by the Clerical Party which supported the course of Dr. SMAJD and his circle. Liberal and Socialist representatives who attempted to reconcile differences between NOVAK and the Clericals always ended by yielding to pressure from the latter. In order to impress upon NOVAK the inadvisability of his further developing combat units, the S.Z. even went so far as to cease providing his organization with funds; this stand was carried to the point of failing to turn over funds received from the Government abroad for the very purpose of organizing the Army under MIHAILOVIC. This fact was kept from NOVAK at that period.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

89. Informing General MIHAILOVIC of the entire unsatisfactory situation, NOVAK tendered his resignation and proposed that another representative be sent to Slovenia with precise instructions as to how to deal with the politicians. MIHAILOVIC refused to accept NOVAK's resignation, and ordered him to carry on with the organization of clandestine units and collaboration with the politicians. With no other choice but obedience, NOVAK was able to maintain his organization with funds provided from MIHAILOVIC's sources in Switzerland, to resist S.Z. pressure, and to fight sabotage intrigue, and treachery.
90. NOVAK re-staffed his headquarters with new officers who had been released from Italian concentration camps following Bishop ROZMAN's charitable intervention on behalf of the internees. Fearing that NOVAK's activities might again bring them to the concentration camps, these officers unfortunately soon fell under the influence of the politicians unfavorable to the MIHAILOVIC organization; these politicians even tried to draw these officers into the Village Guards by misusing the names of MIHAILOVIC and NOVAK. NOVAK's influence with the officers was very limited by reason of the fact that he was forced to live underground, was constantly pursued by the enemy, could not move about in public, and was unable to meet with them for full discussion to counterbalance the destructive action of the politicians. Once again Lt. Col. PETERLIN acted as the technical executor of this policy of obstructionism.
91. Thus, it was that reliable collaborators both within and without his headquarters became fewer and fewer. Being able to trust so few persons, NOVAK was forced personally to supervise and carry out almost all political and organizational work, propaganda, I.S. activities, and operational matters.
92. In June 1943, the Italians started a new attack against MIHAILOVIC units in Slovenia; in this operation NOVAK lost one officer killed, Lt. LAVRIC, and others had to be dismissed or sent to hospitals because of physical exhaustion and illness. The situation in his old area becoming too precarious, with two units NOVAK set out on a raid in the Venezia Giulia and German-occupied areas, then transferred the bulk of his effectives to the Krim mountain area. There the unit was subjected to Italian air attack, and to ambushes by the Partisans against individual soldiers. Although these unprovoked individual attacks wounded a number of Chetniks, NOVAK refrained from reprisals.
93. About mid-July 1943, NOVAK sent his unit in march towards the Novo Mesto area where a new unit composed of about 100 "SOKOLS" and Village Guard deserters was being organized. At Ilova Gora, the detachment was shelled by Italian artillery, and some days later it spent two days in crossing the Italian defended railway near Sticna. At Otocec, near Novo Mesto, both detachments were united, and the unit now disposed of 200 effectives. It easily repelled a Communist attack there, and lost only one man wounded.
94. In the meantime, on the 25th of July 1943, the historic event of Fascism's fall from power took place. It was clear that this event portended Italy's gradual break from Germany, progressive German penetration in Italy, and final occupation of the greater part of Italian territory. This outcome had been predicted by NOVAK in his 1942 pamphlet "Liberty or Death", which stated that Italy would in any case finish the war on the Allied side.
95. On the 26th of July, the S.Z. summoned a conference which was attended by important politicians and military representatives in addition to its regular membership. After lengthy discussion, it was decided that Colonel KLINAR be sent to inform Italian Commander-in-Chief in Slovenia General GAMBARA that the new situation in Italy would force Slovenian political leaders to act in the future without any regard whatsoever for Italian authorities (!), keeping in mind only the

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

interests of the Slovenian people. With reference to military measures, NOVAK emphatically pointed out that the time had come for the Village Guards to break with the Italians if it were wished that they not fall under German authority in the future. He requested that at least half of the Village Guards, some 5000 - 10,000 soldiers, should desert the Italians and join Royal Yugoslav troops under his command, in order that they might disarm the Fascists and fight the Germans if they tried to occupy Slovenia, and to resist the Communists if necessary, and to cooperate with the Allies against the German enemy. After long negotiation, NOVAK's request was accepted, but as a result of the personal intervention of Clerical leader AVSENEK (now in Rome), the number was cut down to only 25 percent of Village Guard effectives, that is, about 2500 men. NOVAK was forced to agree that Lt. Col. PETERLIN be appointed Commander-in-Chief of all Village Guards in order to carry out their union with the Royal Yugoslav Army in an orderly manner; PETERLIN was given necessary information concerning the movements of NOVAK's units.

96. At a subsequent meeting on the evening of the same day, tempers had already considerably cooled and courage had disappeared. Colonel KLINAR did not, after all, contact General GAMBARA and possible "violent Italian reaction" against the politicians was avoided; again it was considered expedient to treat the Italians who were not yet weak enough and "still dangerous" with all due regard. NOVAK was not particularly concerned with these political aspects, but to his considerable amazement, Clerical representative Dr. STARE declared that no definite steps had been taken that morning in connection with the Village Guards, and stated that further negotiations must take place. After further discussion, then, it was finally concluded "definitely" that 25 percent of the Village Guards should immediately desert the Italians and join NOVAK's units; should German intervention take place, the Village Guards should come over to NOVAK in their entirety. This agreement was reached, however, only on the condition that a military council made up of Colonels VAHNIK, PREZELJ and PETERLIN, and of NOVAK be set up as the instrument of the S.Z. for military matters; under the orders of General MIHAILOVIC through NOVAK were to be left only the operational units.
97. NOVAK accepted these humiliating conditions which represented complete disruption of the S.Z.'s military program, and an unwarranted interference in the structure of the Royal Yugoslav Army. NOVAK hoped still to be able to fulfill his Royal Yugoslav Army commitment to MIHAILOVIC. PETERLIN was then authorized to issue necessary orders to the Village Guards.
98. NOVAK then hurried to the Novo Mesto area to reorganize his unit there in preparation for a big influx of Village Guards. Here, however, a new blow awaited him: Instead of being ordered to join the Royal Yugoslav Army, the Village Guards received from PETERLIN the written order not to do so, by informing them that they had become the "Slovenian Army" under Commander-in-Chief PETERLIN, who had been appointed by the S.Z. and the military council.
99. Sad and disillusioned following such incredible deception and treachery, NOVAK returned to Ljubljana and requested a new meeting of the S.Z. to be attended by the military council. PETERLIN prudently did not appear. At the meeting NOVAK exhibited a copy of PETERLIN's order to the Village Guards, and Clerical representative KRANJC (now in Rome) expressed a favorable opinion in its regard. This statement, however, was too much even for the docile Liberal politicians and the members of the military council, and an open break in the S.Z. appeared imminent. The more moderate members of the S.Z. again attempted to reconcile NOVAK's policy with the Clerical view, but their efforts only led to postponement. The following day PETERLIN confessed that he had issued the order

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

in question with the approval of the Clerical politicians, and had only executed their instructions.

100. This was the third and definite blunder in the S.Z.'s military policy, a blunder which soon led to the catastrophe of the Village Guards, and still later to the tragedy of the Slovenian DOMOBRANS, a consequence of the first catastrophe.
101. With the support of some members of the military council, NOVAK again attempted to persuade the Clerical politicians of the validity of his views. He was first promised 1000 men, a figure subsequently cut to 400, but it was demanded that he pay over 500,000 lire for their equipment. NOVAK made the requested payment, but not a single Clerical follower was sent into his units. Considering its continued existence without point, as its every proposal was refused, or, if accepted, not maintained, the military council with the exception of PETERLIN, resigned.
102. Worse still, Clerical leaders not only failed to maintain their Royal Yugoslav Army obligations, but even started to organize a Slovenian (not Yugoslav !) Chetnik unit of their own consisting of some 30 men under the command of Dr. JAN; this unit attempted to persuade NOVAK's soldiers to desert to it. After the war, Dr. JAN, who had been captured by the Partisans, was put on trial in Ljubljana for having organized MIHAILOVIC Chetniks and for having committed a series of crimes in MIHAILOVIC's name. NOVAK, admitting that he knows nothing of the activities of Dr. JAN and his men, forcefully affirms that JAN was never a commander of a Royal Yugoslav unit, and that neither he nor his men belonged to the MIHAILOVIC organization. This, however, is representative of the general Communist attitude which lays to MIHAILOVIC and his organization all crimes committed by others; it is also typical of the attitude of various traitors and Quislings who made unauthorized use of MIHAILOVIC's name during the war, and who are now trying to exculpate themselves on the grounds of pretended affiliation with MIHAILOVIC and his organization.
103. Clerical reluctance to order the Village Guards into the Royal Yugoslav Army can be attributed to their Separatist tendencies and to their fear that the Guards might have been disarmed by the Italians, a step which would have deprived the Party of the armed forces required for imposition of their policies in the future.
104. The Clerical Party's separatist tendencies were clearly demonstrated by their charges of pan-Serbianism levelled against General MIHAILOVIC and NOVAK; this line, strangely enough, was the one also followed by the Communists. Still greater evidence of their separatist tendencies appeared in 1945 at the time of the German collapse when, together with lesser politicians, most of them collaborationists, the Clericals proclaimed the State of Slovenia, the Slovenian Government, and the Slovenian Army, all independently of General MIHAILOVIC.
105. As concerned submission to the Italians, the Clericals were completely influenced by Colonel Vladimir VAUHNIK who, subsequent to the Italo-German meeting at Tarvisio, predicted that the Italians would persevere in maintenance of their alliance with the Germans. This prediction was sufficient to dispel the vestigial courage of the Clerical politicians who, after apparently getting some glimpse of light on the day of MUSSOLINI's fall, soon returned to their normal state of passive timidity.
106. It was quite apparent that the situation in Italy and in her army was undergoing a great change. The Italians' former energy in persecuting both the Partisans and the Chetniks gradually waned. Their artillery was placed on the German frontier and provided with radio equipped observation points. They provided the Partisans with

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

armament and food. They attempted to establish contacts with both Partisan and Chetnik leaders. In the face of this situation, a German division took over protection of the Ljubljana-Trieste railway, despite the fact that there were Italian garrisons along its entire length. In Ljubljana the Gestapo openly installed itself as an agency to observe the Italian authorities. The situation became so tense that the slightest incident would have led to open clash between German and Italian troops.

107. In the event of a definite break between the Italians and the Germans, it was legitimate to assume, Slovenia would have been occupied by the Germans, and the following questions arose: What would be the attitude of the Italian troops when the Germans began to disarm them? What would be the attitude of the Partisans and the White Village Guards? Should the Slovenians continue to fight among themselves instead of joining forces in an attack against the still relatively small German forces dispersed over a large area and divided into isolated groups along the Ljubljana-Trieste line? Would it be possible to cut German lines of communication? Would it be possible for NOVAK's small units to continue protecting the Allied radio stations and to continue maintaining communications with Cairo? Would the Allies intervene in such a difficult situation?
108. In the face of these difficult questions, NOVAK acted along the lines of the following policies set down by General MIHAILOVIC:
- a) Obtain adherence to the MIHAILOVIC organization of the 10 to 12,000 Village Guards in order to be able to protect the Allied radio stations and to continue cooperation with Allied Headquarters in Cairo.
 - b) Avoid all unnecessary clashes with the Partisans and oppose the Germans to the greatest possible extent.
 - c) Relations with the Italians to be maintained on the basis of their own attitude and according to instructions from Cairo.
109. At that time it would have been most advantageous to both the MIHAILOVIC organization and to the Allies if the latter had sent into the important Slovenian area with its Austria-Italian communication lines, a member of the Cairo Headquarters with enough authority to impose his jurisdiction over all parties. NOVAK's suggestion to Cairo that such a course would obtain a maximum result in action against the Germans, was without success.
110. In the meantime, NOVAK had divided his effectives into four units:
- a) The "Dolenjski odred" in the Ribnica area, which grew to a strength of 200 men and was attempting to establish contact with Chetniks in Croatia.
 - b) The "Gorenjski odred" which reached a strength of 50 men, operated on the German frontier for the purpose of raiding German territory and gathering information as to German movements and intentions.
 - c) "Primorski odred", which also grew to a strength of 50 men, was located in the Sv. Tri Kralja area and was assigned to raiding operations against the Gorizia area and to observation of the Italians; in this area there was located a more or less independent radio station belonging to the Cairo network.
 - d) "Ljubljanski odred", strength about 50 men, was located at St. Paul near Ljubljana, for the purpose of accepting volunteers from that city, and to protect the principal radio station operating with Cairo and with General MIHAILOVIC.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

111. All these groups maintained radio liaison among themselves and with NOVAK's Ljubljana headquarters; NOVAK's headquarters was in direct separate w/t communication with MIHAJLOVIC's headquarters.
112. Under the circumstances, this was the most favorable disposition of forces for the purpose of gathering information and maintaining radio communications. It also served as insurance against being casually overrun by German or Italian forces and, last but not least, it was the best disposition for reception and mobilization of volunteers. The units' position, however, especially in the Ribnica area, would have been precarious in case of a Partisan attack in force.
113. The Communists unfortunately decided to attack only while NOVAK's units were still weak and isolated, and to force Village Guards and Partisans to join their own organization after destruction of NOVAK's forces. Considering the Chetniks as the only organization capable of offering competition in future political development, the Partisans ceased fighting the Italians and Village Guards and concentrated solely on NOVAK's units. Towards the end of August, they attacked the detachment at Ortnok in the Ribnica area, but were repelled with heavy losses.
114. Finally convinced that further negotiation with the politicians would be useless, that the Village Guards had no intention of joining his forces, and that sudden developments might place his small effectives in a desperate situation, NOVAK suggested to MIHAJLOVIC that his Slovenian units be reinforced with Chetniks from the Lika area where all strength was being wasted in the useless and never-ending Partisan-Chetnik warfare. MIHAJLOVIC gave his approval to the suggestion and ordered Lt. Colonel BJELAJAC to send about 500 men into Slovenia from Srpske Krajine.
115. As BJELAJAC was reluctant to carry out his orders immediately, NOVAK visited him in an attempt to persuade him of the hopeless situation of his 2 to 3,000-man force in the event of Italian capitulation. NOVAK pointed the advantage of uniting the two forces: NOVAK's organization had too many officers, BJELAJAC's too few; NOVAK disposed of a well-organized radio net and communications with the Allies, BJELAJAC had none; and finally, united, the two forces would greatly out-number the Partisans, whose strength in Slovenia was barely 2,000, whereas BJELAJAC's troops in Lika were in the minority.
116. NOVAK also pointed out the possibilities of forcing the Village Guards to join such a united force and of receiving non-Communist elements who wished to desert the Partisans. In this manner it would be possible soon to reach a strength of about 15,000 men, which could successfully resist the Germans in the event of Italian capitulation, could resist the Communists if necessary, and could disarm all units preferring to surrender to the Germans rather than to fight them. Thus, it was pointed out, cooperation with the Allies could be continued even under German occupation.
117. Agreeing on principle, BJELAJAC showed reluctance and was uncertain as to the possibility of immediately carrying out the proposal; this despite the fact that he, too, had also received an impression of imminent Italian collapse. For the time being he consented to send into Slovenia only a brigade of 300 volunteers to come under NOVAK's personal command. During the next 2 or 3 days, however, negotiations bore no fruit. As NOVAK's presence was urgently required in Ljubljana, it was agreed that the brigade would be under the command of Major MAROVIC (who later died in Rome), and that his troops should join NOVAK's units south of Kocevje. NOVAK furnished BJELAJAC with a radio set and the operator HASL @ KORITNIK, in order to establish communications with the Ljubljana headquarters. In view of the urgency of the situation, during his visit to BJELAJAC, NOVAK persuaded his friend Captain KAPETANOVIC, commander of the Medak Chetnik

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

Brigade, to come over to his forces, should BJELAJAC continue irresolute.

118. Returning to Ljubljana, NOVAK learned that the Germans had located the radio stations in the village of St. Paul. A German police unit reinforced by an Italian battalion undertook a surprise attack against the Ljubljana detachment. NOVAK's unit was forced to withdraw but managed to save the radio sets; the Germans captured Captain HARBIC, however, as well as all food and equipment.
119. After this unfortunate September 1943 episode, NOVAK managed to re-establish contact with the Unit, and radio communications with Cairo and General MIHAJLOVIC were soon functioning efficiently again.
120. On 6 September 1943 NOVAK visited his two units, the "Primorski" and "Gorenjski" Detachments, in the Sv. Tri Kralja area, and instructed them to withdraw into Venezia Giulia, taking with them if possible the Village Guards, in the event of German penetration into Italian-occupied territory; the units were also ordered to mobilize volunteers in Venezia Giulia and to disarm all Italians who did not desire to resist the Germans. The radio operator VETZEL-ADAM was given the order to act independently in maintaining communication with Cairo in the event he should be cut off from the rest of his unit.
121. As soon as he had been informed by BJELAJAC that a group of 300 Chetniks were enroute from Srpske Moravice to the Kocevje area, NOVAK ordered his unit at Ortnak to proceed to the village of Grcarice in order to establish contact with the Chetniks coming from Croatia. It was NOVAK's intention to unite both detachments into one unit to operate in the region south of Kocevje which had become a no-man's-land subsequent to Italian withdrawal. It also was planned to establish there an independent operational area for the reception of further reinforcements from Lika and of air-drops of personnel and materiel from Cairo. From this base effective operations against the Germans could be mounted.
122. On 7 and 8 November, radio messages from Grcarice announced that NOVAK's unit there was under strong Partisan attack. On 8 September a radio message from the Chetnik group at Srpske Moravice announced that it was enroute to Kocevje and that it had already established radio communication with the Grcarice unit. Thus, it was expected that the two units would join forces the following day, despite the Partisan attack against Grcarice. Then, much to everyone's surprise, the Italian armistice was announced on the night of 8-9 September 1943; the Chetnik unit which was already nearing Grcarice, instead of proceeding with all energy towards Kocevje in order to take over all Italian Army equipment and to join afterwards the unit at Grcarice, exploiting the confusion of the armistice period, returned to Srpske Moravice. The Partisans, on the other hand, took full advantage of the situation, disarmed the Italian garrison, and, reinforced by an Italian Artillery group and Italian officers, returned to Grcarice to continue the fight against NOVAK's unit there. For the Communists, the project of destroying the MIHAJLOVIC units received full priority; Italians, Germans, and Village Guards were of secondary importance.
123. The fate of the 200 Chetniks at Grcarice was sealed. Surrounded by 3 to 4000 Partisans reinforced with heavy Italian artillery that set the village in flames, its commander BORUT fatally wounded, its best officers and men killed, without water and ammunition, its radio communications with NOVAK's headquarters cut, the Unit continued fighting desperately for two more days. Finally the remaining members of the Unit accepted the Partisan offer to cease action, under the condition that they be permitted to withdraw with their weapons towards Trieste where Allied troops were reported to have

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

landed. When firing ceased, the Partisans rushed into undefended Chetnik positions disarming and capturing the soldiers. Major BORUT, still alive, committed suicide. After some weeks, all the Chetniks were killed, the wounded having been slaughtered in their beds. Only a group of 10 men escaped after having killed their guards. To satisfy the requirements of their propaganda, the Communists even put a number of Chetnik officers and soldiers on trial (the "Kocevje" trial) and condemned them to death together with a number of Quislings and even the murderer of NOVAK's late deputy Captain LESJAK.

124. Some days later, NOVAK's Ljubljana unit, which had unsuccessfully attempted to break through the Partisan lines toward Grcarice, withdrew to Zapotok. From here the last radio messages were sent to Cairo by W/T operator TONY -- BIAZ, and to General MIHAILOVIC's headquarters by W/T operator BRICELJ. Attacked by overwhelming Partisan forces supported by Italian infantry and armored cars, the unit was forced to withdraw towards Ljubljana after having suffered heavy casualties, and most of the troops were captured by the Germans. Some of the troops, especially the wounded, fell into the hands of the Partisans and were immediately massacred. The chief operator of the station in communication with Cairo was captured and shot by the Partisans. W/T operator BRICELJ on the other hand, was able to escape, but lost his radio set.
125. Of NOVAK's forces there thus remained only the "Primorski" and "Gorenjski" detachments on the Italo-German frontier where the first and, up to that time, only fighting against the Germans took place. While all Italian, Partisan, and Village Guard forces were engaged in fighting among themselves or in surrendering to the Germans, the "Gorenjski" unit was ordered to resist the Germans; it was, of course, greatly outnumbered and was forced soon to withdraw. Subsequent Partisan attacks against the Germans, after they had destroyed NOVAK's small units and Village Guard forces, came too late as the enemy had in the meantime occupied and consolidated strategic positions. They were able easily to repel the Partisans, and they established the Quisling regime of General RUPNIK and his Domobrans.
126. Seeing that continued existence of his units under such circumstances could only cause unnecessary bloodshed and sacrifice without serving the Allied cause, NOVAK deactivated the remnants of his forces and organization, and dismissed all their members. Informing General MIHAILOVIC of the reasons for his decision, NOVAK again recommended that another Slovenian deputy, capable of arriving at a modus vivendi with the Clerical leaders, be appointed.
127. It now became imperative that NOVAK himself move out of the area in order to avoid the Germans who were actively searching for him; they had already requisitioned the home of Mr. KRISTOF where NOVAK was hiding, and had looted it completely. NOVAK managed to escape at the last moment but his deputy Colonel PRESELJ and, a few days later, his radio operator Engineer STEMBOV were arrested. STEMBOV's arrest cut off NOVAK's remaining radio link with MIHAILOVIC.
128. In this situation NOVAK decided to flee Trieste and proceed to Rome, taking along with him W/T operator BRICELJ, although the latter had already come under the influence of elements unfavorable to NOVAK's activities.
129. NOVAK appointed Colonel KLINAR his deputy in Ljubljana for the purpose of taking care of his ex-soldiers and fallen comrades, providing him with funds necessary for the purpose. KLINAR, aided by Dr. KROSELJ, was ordered to keep abreast of developments in Slovenia, to attempt to establish communications with MIHAILOVIC, and to maintain contact with NOVAK by courier and, if possible, by radio. KLINAR was further instructed to continue W/T activities through VENZEL-ADAM, the remaining Cairo W/T operator who was in the Sv. Tri Kralja area. For this purpose, NOVAK furnished KLINAR with a radio set

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

which was later seized by the Quislings and with W/T operator NAPAST, later killed by the Communists.

130. This was the end of NOVAK's activity in Slovenia. On 26 September 1943, travelling on false documents identifying him as Croat citizen Ivan JARDAS, he left for Trieste.
131. On 12 October 1943 he arrived in Rome where he intended to remain until the city's liberation, or until the first opportunity of crossing the German lines into Allied territory. A few days later, W/T operator BRIGELJ arrived. It was NOVAK's intention to establish and maintain a radio liaison with Slovenia and with General MIHAJLOVIC, to inform MIHAJLOVIC of the Slovenian developments which had forced him to come to Rome, to join the Allies and to report to their Cairo headquarters, and to place himself at the disposition of his government and army for further orders.
132. In Rome, NOVAK contacted and maintained relations with the Yugoslav Legation to the Holy See (Monsignor MUSCATELLO, Counselor CUKIC, ZALAB and KOTNIK), with Monsignor Hugh O'FLAHERTY, and with British Major MANDERS, an ex-prisoner of war, furnishing them information about the situation in Slovenia for their respective governments.
133. A radio receiver was bought, BRIGELJ constructed a transmitter, and in November 1943 radio liaison was established with General MIHAJLOVIC. A certain amount of equipment for the transmitter was obtained from Italian Colonel PALMIERI, a member of the Rome underground. Probably because of technical shortcomings of equipment in Slovenia, it was impossible to establish radio contact with Ljubljana; thus, it was necessary to rely on occasional couriers.
134. From Rome, NOVAK again forwarded funds to Ljubljana for the families of his fallen soldiers, and forwarded the information that in Rome it was possible to shelter and maintain such officers and soldiers in Slovenia as were in danger of arrest by the Germans or forcible mobilization into Quisling General RUPNIK's Domobran army. Thus, there arrived in Rome the officers Major DRZAN, the COTIC Brothers, KOMOTAR, and PAVLIC, and the soldiers VRTOVEC, KETTE, CERNE, and KREK. They had no special mission in Rome, but were only to remain in hiding. The entire group was provided with false identity documents obtained by purchase. At this time NOVAK went under the alias Prof. Bruno ARCADI, and Mrs. KRISTOF was known as Mrs. Giovanna MARCONI.
135. Among the Slovenian politicians who arrived in Rome during this period were the Clericals AVSENEK, GODINA, ZEBOT, and KRALJ, and the Liberals BREZIGAR, MACUS, ZITNIK, and URSIC; as Rome's liberation did not appear imminent, the two latter returned to Slovenia while the others remained. Of this group, NOVAK's main contact was with Dr. BREZIGAR. His only contact with the Clericals was on one occasion when Dr. KRALJ insisted upon a meeting at which he requested NOVAK to furnish a declaration for the Allies concerning events in Slovenia identical to one being prepared by the other politicians. Feeling that he would perjure himself by doing so, NOVAK refused.
136. At last there arrived in Rome the Slovenian "enfant terrible" Vojvoda Dobrosav JEVDJEVIC, an intelligent man, fluent in several languages, good orator with a strong mass appeal, a politician with chameleon-like ability to change color, even during the war a pleasure and money seeker, highly ambitious, and extremely garrulous. In Herzegovina, he had aroused the Serbian people to resistance against the Croatian Ustascha; with both overt and secret Italian support, he had organized his own Chetnik groups to fight the Croats and the Communists, he had arranged "accommodations" with the Italian authorities, had carried on a number of double games, and had also managed to furnish considerable useful information to the Allies. He later established relations with General MIHAJLOVIC to whose organization he rendered a number of valuable service, but still more disservices.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

General MIHAJLOVIC could never completely count upon JEVDJEVIC upon whom he had no power to impose his personality or his points of view. Thus, JEVDJEVIC carried on using and mis-using General MIHAJLOVIC's name as he saw fit. MIHAJLOVIC never agreed with the activities carried on by JEVDJEVIC, usually did not even know in what such activities consisted. JEVDJEVIC often sent false information to MIHAJLOVIC in the hope of obtaining the latter's benevolence and stamp of legitimacy. Although he professed special talents in the field of I.S. activities, JEVDJEVIC was incapable of distinguishing between important facts and trivia, and was completely lacking in the "conditio sine qua non" of this delicate field, ability to maintain security. Although he did furnish a certain amount of useful information along with a mass of useless details, JEVDJEVIC publicly boasted that he was "an English spy" and that he was in radio contact with General MIHAJLOVIC. By the summer of 1944, JEVDJEVIC had gone so far in his childish and dangerous boasting that General MIHAJLOVIC was forced publicly to disavow any connection with him. In spite of the dubious aspects of his activities, JEVDJEVIC was not actually pro-German or pro-Italian and he did not wish to bring any harm to the MIHAJLOVIC organization; pursuing his own political and personal aims, however, JEVDJEVIC was not greatly bothered by tactical questions and stooped to the basest ways and means of attaining his ends, exalting his own beloved person as much as possible, and surrounding himself by worthless, well-paid, but obedient people.

137. NOVAK's first meeting with JEVDJEVIC was in Ljubljana, where the latter had come on private business in the summer of 1943. He gave NOVAK certain information concerning Chetniks in the Lika area, and gave him two messages to be forwarded to General MIHAJLOVIC. In one message he reported that he could not attack the Italians as requested by General MIHAJLOVIC, as the IInd Italian Army Headquarters had allegedly informed him that in the event of an armistice the Italians wished to turn all arms over to his Chetniks. MIHAJLOVIC, expressing his lack of belief in JEVDJEVIC's "diplomatic skill", replied that he did not want anything from the Italians, and that the latter would do far better to negotiate with the Allies. The other message dealt with JEVDJEVIC's proposal that he should proceed to Switzerland as MIHAJLOVIC's political representative and emissary to set up channels for forwarding funds to the organization. This proposal, too, was refused by MIHAJLOVIC who considered JEVDJEVIC's qualifications far short of those required in the case of such a delicate mission. JEVDJEVIC, of course, spoke openly of these messages and within a few days their contents, along with a number of other items of information, were known to the Italians and the Communists.
138. When JEVDJEVIC appeared in Rome he was forced, probably for the first time - and the last - during the war, to live underground. The entire Axis press was full of his recent activities with the Italians against German and Croatian interests. Therefore, when JEVDJEVIC requested an appointment with NOVAK, the latter readily agreed. On this occasion he gave the interesting news, to be forwarded to MIHAJLOVIC, that he was in contact with numerous groups of British and Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war in Bologna, Padova, and Monte Grappa; these prisoners had escaped after the armistice and, according to JEVDJEVIC's story, he was furnishing funds for their maintenance. He also gave information on German AA defenses in Bologna, and other military information. Naturally, he requested MIHAJLOVIC to furnish him money.
139. In reply, MIHAJLOVIC instructed NOVAK to accept JEVDJEVIC's collaboration in gathering information, to provide him with funds necessary for himself and his agents, to check the reliability of his information, to intensify activities and gather the greatest possible amount of information on German movements in Italy,

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

information which was of great value to the Allies to whom MIHAILOVIC re-transmitted it.

140. NOVAK's position was now one of considerable danger, in view of the possibility that German and Fascist CE agencies might locate his transmitter in Rome and arrest him on charges of espionage. It should be kept in mind that even listening to Allied radio broadcasts was at that time punishable by sentences ranging up to death in severity. Collaboration with the talkative and boastful JEVDJEVIC immeasurably increased this danger.
141. In Rome, NOVAK learned to his considerable amazement that the Yugoslav Government was sending large sums of money through its Legation to the Holy See to the "Slovenska Zavesa" (Slovenian Union), chiefly for organization and maintenance of Yugoslav armed forces. Previously, NOVAK had not been informed of this arrangement for receiving funds from abroad; it was evident that such information was kept from NOVAK by the politicians in order to increase their control over him. He therefore initiated the necessary steps to put an end to this method of transmitting funds, and to provide for a direct payment to the MIHAILOVIC organization. After his arrest by the Germans, however, the original manner of payment continued.
142. In November, accompanied by a number of his officers and soldiers, NOVAK tried to cross the German lines south of Rome with the help of Monsignor O'FLAHERTY. Upon reaching Pluggi, however, the group found that the front was stabilized and closely guarded by the Germans, and was forced to return to Rome.
143. In early December, NOVAK came down with a serious attack of pneumonia and was forced to stay in bed until the middle of January 1944. In this condition it was impossible for him to supervise the activities of JEVDJEVIC, W/T operator BRICELJ, and the others, all of whom soon came into contact with persons contrary to the MIHAILOVIC organization and to NOVAK. BRICELJ especially was subjected to pressure in an effort to persuade him to stop working for NOVAK and to break off the contact with MIHAILOVIC. By the Clericals in Rome as represented by GODINA, by General RUPNIK's Domobran circles, and by Dr. KROSELJ, BRICELJ was asked to come over to the opposition and to return to Ljubljana. Slavko JURIC @ ZELEN, an ex-member of the MIHAILOVIC organization, also attempted to persuade BRICELJ to return.
144. This situation was especially critical, as the loss of BRICELJ, NOVAK's only remaining W/T operator, would force suspension of the contact with MIHAILOVIC, and would make impossible the project of establishing direct contact with Allied headquarters in Bari; this latter project was planned in agreement with British Major MANDERS and Monsignor O'FLAHERTY in order to speed up and increase efficiency of service. As BRICELJ had arranged technical details of the service with MANDERS, there was a possibility that the former might possibly misuse the future link with the Allies in Bari if he were not under close supervision. NOVAK therefore refused to confer further with JURIC, and cut off his contact with Dr. KROSELJ in Ljubljana who had proved not to be loyal.
145. In order to maintain closer surveillance over BRICELJ's activities, he and his radio set were installed in NOVAK's home where his work would be under the direct supervision of Mrs. KRISTOF. This course greatly increased the personal danger of NOVAK who was ill and bed-ridden. BRICELJ, however, worked or not much as he pleased, often saying that it was impossible to make contact. From time to time, however, considerable valuable information was sent to MIHAILOVIC for transmission to the Allies.
146. Notwithstanding NOVAK's considerable difficulties, his activities were highly appreciated by MIHAILOVIC, who sent a message disapproving NOVAK's intention of awaiting the Allied liberation in Rome, and

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

ordering him to withdraw gradually to Slovenia, remaining behind the German lines, where he should organize a new I.S. against the Germans on a large scale in order to continue the work interrupted by the events of September 1943.

147. This latest order forced a revision of all previous plans, and NOVAK spent the last days of the year of 1943 in studying the manner in which the order should be carried out, attempting to foresee all possibilities and probabilities in connection with future I.S. activities which had nothing to do with his former operational role in Slovenia. In the future, NOVAK felt, he must act exclusively in the interests of the Allies, either directly or through General MIRALOVIC.

148. "Well", states NOVAK, "I could only obey."

V. 1943 - NOVAK's Mission as Allied Headquarters' Envoy to Gen. GAMBARA:

149. 1943 military operations in Tunis and Sicily clearly demonstrated that even with German support the Italian Army was no longer capable of resisting Allied pressure. While Italian forces in Tunis still showed some combative spirit, events on Pantelleria, Lampedusa, and Sicily brought about a complete breakdown not only among the troops but also in the highest command levels. The arrogant manner with which the Germans treated their Italian comrades, not excluding the highest military leaders, was not at all conducive to maintenance of the loyalty of the Italian authorities and population to the German ally. It was quite plain to see that an open break would develop sooner or later; even numerous members of the Fascist Party were tired of the war and continued collaboration with the Germans.

150. Contrary to the expectations of certain high political and military circles, MUSSOLINI did not denounce the alliance with Germany during his 19 July 1943 meeting with HITLER at Feltre, and on 25 July he was swept from power. Both the Italians and the Germans were well-aware of the significance of MUSSOLINI's removal: The Italians undertook official steps towards an agreement with the Allies, and the Germans began their occupation of the vital Austria-Brenner-Italy and Ljubljana-Trieste lines of communication in Italy, and took the necessary precautionary measures in the Genoa, Spezia, Bologna, and Rome areas. Conferences of Italian and German leaders at Tarvisio on 6 August, and at Bologna on 14 August, served only to gain time for both sides which were attempting to dissemble their respective aims.

151. General Gastone GAMBARA, commander of the XIth Army Corps in Slovenia, was an executive member of the group of top-ranking Italian officers who prepared the rupture between Germany and Italy; this group included BADOGLIO, AMEROSIO, ROATTA, CASTELLANO, CARBONII, and ROSSI. As is now known, GAMBARA had been appointed to take over the mobile forces of the VIIIth Italian Army in Venezia Giulia and of the XIth Corps of the IInd Army in Slovenia, and to prepare plans for destruction of German 71st Division forces in Slovenia, to cut German lines of communication between Ljubljana-Trieste and Udine-Trieste, and to defend the ports of Trieste and Fiume until the expected landing of Allied troops had taken place. In order to carry out this mission, GAMBARA had to attempt to obtain the cooperation of local Chetnik and Partisan forces.

152. General GAMBARA, certainly, behaved far better in Slovenia than did his predecessor, the atrocious General ROBOTTI. Both from personal conviction and as a consequence of his clashes with Marshal ROEMEL in Africa in 1942, GAMBARA was decidedly anti-German. German behavior subsequent to 25 July, only served to confirm his anti-German attitude.

153. After large scale mopping-up operations in the Novo Mesto area, mounted for the purpose of capturing NOVAK, the Italians attempted

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

to contact him through persons thought to enjoy his friendship or favor: Among these were Captain NADRAH, Col. KLINAR, Dr. ZAJC, and ZITNIK. NOVAK informed MIHALOVIC of the Italian desire to contact him; the latter advised refusal of such contact for the time being. Then, about mid-July 1943, General GAMBARA acting through ZAJC insisted on a meeting. NOVAK then informed Allied headquarters of anti-German tendencies in the Italian Army, and of the possibility of organizing a Fifth Column within Italian units in Slovenia. Following Cairo's instructions to study the matter and report more fully, NOVAK consented to meet GAMBARA. The first meeting was only of an introductory nature and no negotiations were conducted. Both principals, however, were well-aware of the basic reason for their conference. At this time GAMBARA's only point of insistence was that the Germans should not be provoked.

154. At the next meeting fundamentals were discussed. After preliminary discussion of his future plans and activities against the Communists, NOVAK asked that all witnesses be dismissed, and the two discussed the possibilities of an alliance in the near future against the Germans. GAMBARA agreed in full with NOVAK, but as neither had the necessary authorization to negotiate such an important matter, the discussion remained a strictly personal one without commitments from either side.
155. Some days later NOVAK received a message from Cairo instructing him to enter negotiations with GAMBARA, to persuade him of the necessity for breaking with the Germans and collaborating with the Allies, and to insist that GAMBARA accept NOVAK as the go-between in negotiations with Cairo.
156. On this basis, then, NOVAK informed GAMBARA, to the latter's satisfaction, that he was authorized to negotiate. At the next several meetings technical details of a possible future joint action against the Germans were discussed. GAMBARA wished to know to what extent he could count upon Allied aid against the Germans. Cairo's reply that for the time being Allied intervention would consist in air support, deeply discouraged GAMBARA who had hoped in an Allied landing in the Trieste area. Quite naturally Allied operational plans could not be revealed, but the possibility of such an Allied landing was expected by the Germans quite as much as by the Italians.
157. At one meeting GAMBARA inquired as to the number of effectives NOVAK could mobilize against the Germans. At that time the latter disposed of only 100 to 200 men who were fully occupied in protecting the radio stations, but he still hoped that sooner or later the politicians would order the Village Guards to join his units, in which case he would dispose of some 12,000 troops in addition to the 2 to 3,000 Chetniks from the Lika area. Realizing that such a force would be poorly armed, GAMBARA offered to provide necessary weapons and equipment; NOVAK, hoping that all requirements would be provided by the Allies, refused the offer.
158. Both GAMBARA and NOVAK realized that the Village Guards were in no condition to offer effective resistance to the Germans. GAMBARA, well-aware of NOVAK's propaganda campaign aimed at persuading the Village Guards to cease collaboration with the Italians and join his units, insisted that the matter be settled in a legal form, and one which would salvage Italian Army honor; he insisted, that is, upon the dismissal from Village Guard units of all elements desirous of joining NOVAK's organization. To this end, GAMBARA was ready to appoint DEBELJAK and VOSNER to act as Village Guard inspectors to act on NOVAK's behalf in counter-balancing Clerical influence against the MIHALOVIC organization. NOVAK, on the other hand, was firm in his contention that Village Guards should cease useless collaboration with the Italians and should desert them whether the Italians liked it or not. It was impossible for GAMBARA and NOVAK to agree on this point, and the latter continued to call upon the Village Guards to desert and join his organization.

SECRET
(CONTROL)

159. NOVAK asked Cairo headquarters to furnish weapons for 12,000 men, and Cairo forwarded the request to London for decision.
160. Cairo asked that GAMBARA should furnish detailed information concerning German forces in Italy proper as NOVAK's information referred only to Slovenia. GAMBARA refused to engage personally in espionage but he offered to furnish NOVAK's agents facilities for traveling among the Germans for the purpose of surveillance. Furthermore, when German troops began to penetrate into Slovenia and it was necessary to keep Cairo constantly informed, GAMBARA even furnished a document for one of Cairo's W/T operators; this document exempted the operator and his baggage - which consisted of a suitcase-type receiver-transmitter - from search at control points.
161. Towards the end of August, GAMBARA requested that a British officer authorize to negotiate final agreements be parachuted into NOVAK's operational area. Cairo, unfortunately, did not adhere to the request. Such a qualified officer, provided with written credentials and directives, at that time could not only have obtained GAMBARA's collaboration in the Allied cause, but most likely could also have persuaded the Partisans and Village Guards to join forces for action against the Germans. The Allies, unfortunately, had too little confidence in the good will and security consciousness of Italian political and military leaders. This understandable lack of confidence in the enemies of yesterday and friends of tomorrow led not only to the complete collapse of the Italian Army, but was directly against Allied interests in that it permitted the Germans to occupy a large part of Italy and to take over practically intact all communications in strategically important Slovenia, as well as in Italy.
162. It is still believed that GAMBARA, even had he been left to his own devices, would have acted successfully against the Germans after the Italian Armistice, had he been in Slovenia and in contact with NOVAK. Unfortunately, he did not return to Slovenia after he had been ordered to Rome for conference. On his return trip he was overtaken by events and his troops were destroyed before he could take the necessary steps.
163. Only a part of the Italian "Isonzo" Division of General CERHUTI in the Novo Mesto area joined the Partisans, not, however, for the purpose of fighting the Germans, but in order to aid the Communists in their all-out civil war in Slovenia. It is likely that CERHUTI, probably with the secret approval of GAMBARA, had been negotiating with the Partisan leaders for a long time, and that he had furnished considerable arms and equipment to their units.
164. Thus, NOVAK's mission to GAMBARA, despite mutual good will, was without success. Acting on the half-hearted encouragement he received from Italian headquarters in Rome, GAMBARA had been studying the possibilities of resisting the Germans on his own. He had proceeded to set up artillery and observation points against the Germans, a matter of which NOVAK immediately apprised Allied headquarters in Cairo, but no positive steps could be taken without definite order from higher headquarters.
165. NOVAK's mission to GAMBARA likewise had no particular influence on the Slovenian MIHALOVIC organization, chiefly because all negotiations were on a strictly personal level. Chetnik units continued to conduct raids against Italian territory and into the German zone, and to engage in casual fighting with enemy forces. Local Italian commanders, alone or with the support of Village Guards or Germans, undertook several operations against MIHALOVIC's Chetnik units. Although NOVAK's forces, in order to protect their radio stations, were forced to avoid combat wherever possible, they lost one officer killed, one officer captured by the Germans, and several minor casualties. During the various retreats a great amount of precious equipment and food was lost. In Ljubljana the Italian police

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

captured a considerable part of NOVAK's propaganda section as represented in the persons of the KONCAR family and their printing equipment; in Novo Mesto the same blow was suffered when Dr. PUSENJAK (now in Italy) with all his printing equipment was captured. A number of the members of NOVAK's organization were arrested when the Italians discovered their false travel permits; by way of reprisal the Italians often arrested the wives and relatives of NOVAK's soldiers.

166. During their period of negotiation, GAMBARA did everything in his personal power to facilitate NOVAK's comings and goings; as concerned the police, however, he was powerless as such units were made up chiefly of Fascist elements under strong Gestapo influence. Preferring therefore to use his own means, NOVAK avoided any surveillance by GAMBARA. Then, too, both parties wished to maintain complete secrecy as to their negotiations. Discovery by the Germans or by the Fascists would have been especially dangerous for GAMBARA; if there were third parties at their conferences, they discussed the Communists, and only when alone discussed the matter of resistance to the Germans. The only person who knew the true purpose of the GAMBARA-NOVAK contact was the latter's interpreter Dr. ADJEVIC who, after the war, was arrested by the Communists, tried and condemned to death.
167. In order to avoid premature German intervention, GAMBARA requested NOVAK to transfer his main force along with the radio stations south of Kocevje, an area already evacuated by the German Army, and more distant from the Germans. This move fitted in with NOVAK's plans as he had intended to transfer there in order to reorganize his forces and await the arrival of Chetniks from Lika.
168. As no reply had come from London regarding furnishing arms to his units, and as a clash with German forces seemed imminent, NOVAK accepted GAMBARA's offer of 300 rifles with ammunition only four days before the Italian Armistice. At the time the weapons were not needed, as NOVAK's Chetniks were already provided with rifles, but the weapons were accepted against the probable influx of volunteers in the event of German occupation of the country.
169. At no time did GAMBARA request NOVAK's collaboration; the only cooperation contemplated was one against the Germans. And in the meantime Chetnik units continued their anti-Italian guerrilla activities, the Italians continued their persecution of the Chetnik organization. On one occasion when GAMBARA asked that anti-Italian propaganda be diminished, NOVAK refused; he also refused GAMBARA's attempts at discussing the future political relations of their two countries.
170. NOVAK emphasizes his firm conviction that at that time GAMBARA stood out as one of the few high Italian commanders sufficiently blessed with the good sense to understand that Italy's future was on the side of the Allies, not on that of the Germans. He was also a member of that much smaller circle of high-ranking Italian commanders who had the courage to act according to his own conviction.
171. On the basis of GAMBARA's pre-Armistice attempts to act against the Germans, NOVAK is at a loss to explain GAMBARA's short period of collaboration with the Germans subsequent to the Armistice. He is extremely loath to believe that the General could have changed his opinions concerning the Germans.

VI. 1944 - Through German Prisons:

172. For 1944, NOVAK had set himself the task of engaging in I.S. activities on behalf of the Allies; and it was MIHAILOVIC's intention to appoint a new representative in Slovenia. NOVAK's program contemplated re-establishment of contact broken in September 1943 with Allied headquarters. With the help of Monsignor O'FLAHERTY and

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

Major MANDERS, as previously mentioned, it was intended to establish a direct radio link with the Allies who were by now in Bari.

173. According to plans made in early January 1944, while he was still confined to bed, NOVAK intended to establish observers in Ljubljana, Trieste, Fiume, Udine, Treviso and Venice in order to maintain surveillance of all German movement between Italy and Slovenia; it was planned that a radio station set up in the Trieste area for communications with General MIHAILOVIC would be under NOVAK's personal supervision, and another one for transmission of information was to be set up in Venice under the joint direction of NOVAK and JEVDJEVIC. In order to avoid complete dedication to the I.S. phase, it was decided to set up a third station for propaganda purposes.
174. At this juncture there appeared in Rome, Rudolf ZITNIK, who had rendered useful service to NOVAK in Slovenia. ZITNIK reported that an important German official of Slovenian origin wanted to meet NOVAK and through him and his government establish contact with some Allied agency. ZITNIK furnished full assurances that NOVAK could return undisturbed to Slovenia where he could continue his cooperation with the Allies, even to the extent of engaging in such operational activities as the reception of air-drops, etc. The German official in question, in order to show his good will, released Colonel PRESERJ who had been arrested in September 1943; this appeared almost too good to be true, although the fact of the German's alleged Slovenian origin might constitute an explanation, and might represent a means of facilitating the dangerous mission contemplated for NOVAK. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the whole affair might only be a trap; this later proved to be the case. With great clarity, however, there emerged the fact that the Germans were aware of NOVAK's presence in Rome; through ZITNIK they could discover NOVAK's exact hiding place and capture both him and the radio set while he was still unable to move. In order to gain time, NOVAK did not definitely refuse the proposal, and he asked ZITNIK to study the project further and to determine whether or not it represented a means of entrapment. JEVDJEVIC who was present at the meeting, however, immediately consented on his own behalf to meet the German, and despite NOVAK's attempts at dissuasion, forwarded a message in that sense through ZITNIK.
175. Two weeks later ZITNIK appeared in Rome and brought reassurances that the project was a bonafide one, and brought a "parole d'honneur" that NOVAK should be undisturbed if he agreed to meet one DUSHA (a Slovenian name) in Trieste. In the event that no agreement were reached at the DUSHA-NOVAK meeting, it was guaranteed that the latter would be permitted to return to Rome without danger of arrest.
176. NOVAK now had to choose between destroying his radio and ceasing operations on behalf of MIHAILOVIC and the Allies, and risk the meeting. Trusting to his luck, NOVAK decided to take the chance.
177. Accompanied by ZITNIK and JEVDJEVIC, NOVAK proceeded to Trieste where he and JEVDJEVIC spent several days awaiting ZITNIK's return from Ljubljana where he had gone to fetch the mysterious DUSHA. Upon ZITNIK's arrival in Trieste with DUSHA, NOVAK asked JEVDJEVIC to make a preliminary examination of DUSHA's reliability. As JEVDJEVIC returned with a favorable report, on the following day NOVAK met with DUSHA who was in the company of one SHUSTER, both of them minor figures of the Ljubljana police. The following day in Ljubljana, NOVAK was also presented to a police officer named SHLIFFER; he later learned that all three of them were black-market companions of ZITNIK. As they declared that they were only acting on behalf of a fourth high-ranking personage still to be informed of NOVAK's presence in Slovenia, only unimportant matters were discussed. NOVAK gave advance refusal to any plans of collaboration which might be advanced on the basis that his government was at war with Germany, but stated that he was prepared to act as mediator if their "boss" was actually desirous of contacting the Allies.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

Not daring to mention his connection with espionage activities, NOVAK stressed only his activities in the anti-Partisan fight, although he had no authorization to do so being no longer the MIHAILOVIC representative in Slovenia. In his speech, NOVAK considerably exaggerated his past operational activities in order to cover up the true nature of his undertakings; this, chiefly in an attempt to extricate himself from the unfortunate situation in which ZITNIK's superficiality had placed him.

178. These three minor policemen, who were only the executive triumvirate of their chief, still unknown to NOVAK, certainly were in no position to further NOVAK's over-all mission. If, however, they were open to subornation - as proved to be the case - they could be useful in furnishing documents, travel permits, etc. At NOVAK's request they facilitated the escape of W/T operator STEBOV, who had been arrested in September 1943; this was the only service rendered by them. And again they gave their parole that NOVAK would not be arrested while awaiting their chief.
179. It was quite apparent that NOVAK must clear out of this situation, but before leaving he felt that it was his duty to organize a local I.S. unit, and it was necessary to act quickly.
180. He therefore set out for Rome to pick up his radio operator and w/t set, Mrs. KRISTOF, and certain other collaborators. Enroute, to his considerable surprise, NOVAK met a certain Captain MANDIC in Bologna where he commanded a group of 200 ex-Chetniks from Croatia; this group had been captured by the Germans during its flight to Bari from Dalmatia and had forced it into German service. The group's activities in Bologna actually consisted in sabotage, stealing of German and Fascist materials, black-marketing in German gasoline and tires, and even in burning a number of German airplanes. MANDIC also furnished JEVDJEVIC with details concerning German AA defenses and material dumps in the Bologna area; this information was radioed to General MIHAILOVIC for re-transmission to the Allies. Disapproving of even such limited Yugoslav collaboration with the enemy, NOVAK persuaded MANDIC to escape with his entire group when necessary arrangements could be completed. NOVAK then proceeded on to Rome.
181. Returning to Rome, NOVAK discovered that his radio operator had been persuaded by others to leave for Trieste; it was thus impossible to inform MIHAILOVIC of latest developments and to forward latest information. Thus, NOVAK only informed his Legation to the Holy See that he was returning to Slovenia, ordered his officers and men to join him in Trieste (an order which they did not carry out, partly because of persuasion from outside sources, partly because they preferred staying in Rome to further risking their lives and liberty as the Allies had in the meantime landed at Anzio and Nettuno), ordered Major DRZAN to remain in Trieste as his link with the Legation and with the Allies and the Yugoslav Military Mission when Rome should be liberated, and, accompanied by Mrs. KRISTOF and taking with him the radio set, he left for Trieste at the beginning of February 1944.
182. Meeting his radio operator BRICELJ in Trieste, NOVAK ordered him to establish immediate contact with General MIHAILOVIC and to construct new sets for the future radio network. At this time BRICELJ's sabotage became apparent. He received only one unimportant message from MIHAILOVIC, and refused to transmit any on the grounds that atmospheric and technical conditions made operation from Trieste impossible. Having already considerable reason to doubt BRICELJ's loyalty, NOVAK ceased using him altogether. BRICELJ later worked for JEVDJEVIC and, continuing to remain in Trieste, for circles in Ljubljana. NOVAK cut off all contact with BRICELJ, continuing to pay him, however, in the hope of preventing further betrayal, and re-employed STEBOV whom he had succeeded in freeing in the meantime.
183. NOVAK now disposed of enough personnel to set up necessary observation points for the frame-work of his future information service.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

A more difficult problem was that of where to set up the radio set and where to obtain soldiers for the protection of a propaganda station in the mountains. For this purpose NOVAK traveled clandestinely to Gorizia and to Ljubljana. Being unsuccessful in these places, especially in Ljubljana where he was opposed by the Demobrans, he decided to make an attempt in Abazzia.

184. In Abazzia, NOVAK encountered Captain DJAKOVIC who was in command of the ex-Chetnik group from Bologna; the unit's previous commander Captain MANDIC, and some of his men had been arrested in Bologna on suspicion of espionage and sabotage. The unit was then transferred to Abazzia and put under the command of DJAKOVIC who still pretended allegiance to the MIHAILOVIC organization although his collaboration with the Germans was quite open. An attempt was made to persuade DJAKOVIC to desert the Germans and to escape to the mountains where NOVAK would take over command of his unit. Although DJAKOVIC refused this proposal, he did put at NOVAK's orders five men who were to have deserted and mobilized other volunteers in the Gorizia area for protection of the future radio station there; he further agreed to hide Mrs. KRISTOF, Engineer STERBOV and the radio set among his soldiers. For the time being NOVAK was forced to be satisfied with this arrangement, but hoped for more in the future. About the middle of March 1944, STERBOV re-established radio contact with MIHAILOVIC, but it was already too late to be of use—NOVAK was arrested on 16 March 1944.
185. In the meantime, to his considerable sorrow and amazement, NOVAK learned that JEVDJEVIC had come across some old Italian friends of his, among them Colonel GRIGNOLO, then in German service, currently in Rome; by this Italian group he was introduced to a group of German officers which included Lt. HENCKEL with whom he associated publicly despite NOVAK's remonstrations. With the Germans, JEVDJEVIC discussed the possibilities of his collaboration with them against the Communists; this course which had been steadfastly refused by NOVAK was immediately accepted by JEVDJEVIC. As usual JEVDJEVIC did a great deal of talking and furnished the Germans with considerable material for anti-NOVAK propaganda; during this time NOVAK was forced to stay in hiding and used JEVDJEVIC as a front.
186. In these circumstances NOVAK decided to rid himself of JEVDJEVIC, and as soon as radio liaison could be established to proceed to MIHAILOVIC's headquarters in Serbia on a permanent basis, it being no longer possible to return to Rome where the Germans could easily find him with JEVDJEVIC's help. It was NOVAK's intention first to reach MIHAILOVIC's radio station, in order to instruct Mrs. KRISTOF to flee secretly to Switzerland. JEVDJEVIC and ZITNIK were told only that NOVAK's trip was in connection with administrative and financial questions; this latter aspect of his journey would insure the pair's support of his trip.
187. False documents for the journey could not be obtained from the MIHAILOVIC organization in Belgrade owing to the lack of radio communication, nor was the old Ljubljana document-forging organization still functioning. Thus, NOVAK asked JEVDJEVIC and ZITNIK to obtain a travel permit to Belgrade by bribing someone in German service. Subsequent to ZITNIK's ingenuitiness in allowing NOVAK to walk into a trap designed to force his liquidation or collaboration, NOVAK no longer dared make personal contact with German elements. Towards mid-March 1944 ZITNIK sent word that one PERSTENER, an SS-Colonel, chief of the Blede-Valdes security service, was the "high" personage wishing to meet NOVAK and JEVDJEVIC in Ljubljana. Considering that negotiation on such a minor level would be fruitless, NOVAK flatly refused the meeting; JEVDJEVIC and ZITNIK on the other hand, went to the meeting but did not keep NOVAK informed of what went on. JEVDJEVIC only stated that he had succeeded in obtaining travel documents for NOVAK and ZITNIK to go to Belgrade from whence the former would have to proceed to MIHAILOVIC's mountain headquarters by his own means. Departure

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

was fixed for the following day although, strangely enough, SHUSTER was to be a member of the party. Despite the suspicious nature of this circumstance, it was impossible for NOVAK to flee, as such a course would probably have led to German discovery of the radio set and capture of Mrs. KRISTOF and Engineer STEBOV as spies. This was all the more likely in view of the fact that the unreliable JEVDJEVIC and the careless ZITNIK would remain in German hands where they could be used as hostages - if they were not already acting in concert with the Germans, a perfidy of which NOVAK was unwilling to believe them capable. NOVAK could only take the risk and hope for good fortune.

189. His good fortune betrayed him, however, and he was arrested within a few hours of his arrival in Belgrade. After an interrogation during which he talked quite freely, ZITNIK was permitted to return to Ljubljana with SHUSTER. JEVDJEVIC was not disturbed at all and plunged into full scale collaboration with the Germans; he misused the name of MIHAILOVIC and his organization, deceived him as to the true nature of his activities, and furnished him entirely false information. In order to prevent Mrs. KRISTOF's apprising MIHAILOVIC of the true situation, he kept her away from the radio work and began using a new code set up by BRICELJ and STEBOV. Mrs. KRISTOF, however, managed to inform MIHAILOVIC by letter; MIHAILOVIC subsequently publicly disavowed all connection with JEVDJEVIC and his activities, and sent Captain BATRICEVIC (now in Italy) from his headquarters to investigate the case. Quite "amazingly" before he could send any messages to MIHAILOVIC, BATRICEVIC was arrested after he had established contact with JEVDJEVIC. At this point MIHAILOVIC ordered his soldiers to leave the Germans immediately and to escape into the mountains; only a few managed to do so.
190. NOVAK expresses the hope that ZITNIK and JEVDJEVIC were not personally responsible for his arrest by the Germans, although it is apparent that they maintained close relations with them afterwards, despite NOVAK's fate. It is interesting to note that ZITNIK did not immediately inform Mrs. KRISTOF and JEVDJEVIC of NOVAK's arrest, thus exposing them, too, to the danger of being caught with the radio set. They were informed of NOVAK's arrest only two weeks later. In the meantime, most certainly, the Germans reached the conclusion that JEVDJEVIC's services would be of value to them.
191. In Belgrade, NOVAK was arrested at 4 P.M. on 16 March 1944, while in the company of ZITNIK and SHUSTER; the arrest was carried out personally by Captain BRANDT and Dr. FRANZESI, chiefs of the Serbian Gestapo section operating against General MIHAILOVIC and his organization. After the arrest, BRANDT produced a red-bound dossier bearing NOVAK's name on the cover, and cited numerous details of his activity, especially in Serbia and in Rome; some particulars were true, others were false or greatly exaggerated. Greatest emphasis was placed on NOVAK's activities in Rome, and his providing General MIHAILOVIC with information on German activities. Describing such activities as constituting espionage, BRANDT asked NOVAK if he were aware of the consequences. BRANDT then insisted on his certainty that NOVAK intended to visit MIHAILOVIC's representative Sasa MIHAILOVIC in Belgrade. Fortunately, NOVAK was unaware of the latter's address, but BRANDT, refusing to believe in NOVAK's ignorance on this point, declared that his fate depended on whether he would talk or not. BRANDT then delivered a political lecture in which he declared that the Germans were not greatly worried by the Communists in Serbia where they were not particularly active, that German authorities were determined to destroy MIHAILOVIC's organization once and for all, and that adherence to MIHAILOVIC was political folly as the man of the future was LJOTIC.
192. NOVAK was then escorted to cell No. 17 of the infamous "Ratnicki dom" jail of Gestapo headquarters in Serbia. In this two-by-two meter cell without a window, he remained for 34 days without exercise or recreation, with a continuously glaring electric light so that he never knew whether it was day nor night. Once daily he was

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

given a small piece of black sour bread and a plate of watery soup. Inmates of the "Ratnicki dom" jail were comprised chiefly of MIHAILOVIC adherents and Allied fliers; at the time of NOVAK's incarceration the jail housed three crew members of a British plane which had been shot down. Despite the misery of his existence during this period, NOVAK was far better treated than many of his comrades who were savagely tortured and kept in solitary confinement in the dark for months; NOVAK was often threatened but never actually tortured.

193. After an initial short period of imprisonment, NOVAK was subjected to a three-day interrogation, during the course of which, he learned that a number of his comrades had been unable to resist Gestapo questioning methods and that, hence, the Germans were accurately informed of his previous movements and activities in Serbia. It was also apparent that ZITNIK had done considerable talking as the Germans were aware of certain particulars not known to NOVAK's Serbian contacts.
194. The accusations against NOVAK, aside from certain minor details, were concerned chiefly with the following points:
 - a) Espionage in Rome on behalf of the Allies through the MIHAILOVIC link.
 - b) Radio communications between Rome and MIHAILOVIC.
 - c) Aiding British and American officers in escaping from Rome to Switzerland.
 - d) Contacts with Major Sasa MIHAILOVIC in Belgrade. Sasa was the organizer of the execution (or assassination, according to the point of view) of Colonel MASSALOVIC and Minister DJORDJEVIC, both intimate collaborators of Serbian Quisling NEDIC. According to one version, Sasa MIHAILOVIC was killed by the Communists in 1946; according to another, he is still engaged in fighting TITO in Jugoslavia. At the time of NOVAK's interrogation, Sasa held top priority on the German "wanted" list.
195. With reference to points (a) and (b) above, the interrogator cited a message allegedly sent by MIHAILOVIC to General Petar ZIVKOVIC in Cairo which dealt with NOVAK's presence in Rome and with NOVAK's furnishing MIHAILOVIC with information on German movements, which information was intended for onward transmission to the Allies.
196. NOVAK was not aware whether the German CI actually was in possession of the radio message mentioned, but he steadfastly denied having engaged in such activities in Rome, as he had been ill and unable to work or move. NOVAK also denied having had a radio set in Rome, maintaining that he could have established contact with the Allies through the Rome underground had he desired to do so.
197. The charges listed under (c) and (d) above, were actually unfounded.
198. Although no definite proof could be produced, the Gestapo insisted on NOVAK's having engaged in espionage and in having maintained contact with Sasa MIHAILOVIC.
199. After having signed his declarations, NOVAK returned to his cell to await his fate. In accordance with standard Gestapo procedure, he would not know his sentence until it was executed or until he was released.
200. NOVAK remained in solitary confinement at "Ratnicki dom" until the building was damaged during the 16-17 April 1944 air raids; the building was hit by two bombs and a considerable portion of the files, NOVAK's possibly included, were burned or otherwise destroyed.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

201. On 18 April 1944 all prisoners of "Ratnicki dom" were transferred to Banjica, the Yugoslav Buchenwald, which was under the joint jurisdiction and administration of both Gestapo and Serbian Quisling authorities. The Serbian administrator there was the notorious and blood-thirsty VUJKOVIC (now an inmate of the British Afragola camp near Naples) who, in addition to countless other cruelties, is said to be responsible for tens of thousands of executions by German firing squad. The German commander of the jail was one WINTER who operated under Dr. JUNG, a worthy minion of HIMMLER, who was in charge of all Balkan prisons. Although treatment and food conditions in Banjica were even worse than those previously existing at "Ratnicki dom", it was possible to receive parcels once a week and thus to maintain some sort of clandestine contact with the outside world. At this time Banjica housed about 3,000 prisoners, half of them MIHAILOVIC followers, about a quarter of them Communists, and the rest common criminals. NOVAK was confined to a ward housing 108 prisoners of 13 different nationalities. Among the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Greeks, Italians, Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgars, Russians, French, Albanians, Jews, and Germans from all ranks and walks of life, there were even a number of Allied distressed air personnel.
202. Among other inmates of NOVAK's ward were Major PERHINEK, Captain OBRADOVIC, Dr. Njegos PETROVIC, Dr. ZIVANOVIC, Dr. GRISOGONO, Engineer DIMNIK, Engineer LUKIC, and ANGELOV. At this time NOVAK learned to his great regret that the Germans had succeeded in capturing almost the entire strength of the MIHAILOVIC Belgrade organization, among them the Corps commander and three brigade commanders, in addition to lesser figures. Among the female prisoners was the wife of NOVAK's friend Zarko TODOROVIC; shortly before, General MIHAILOVIC's wife, extremely ill, had been released after 12 months imprisonment.
203. Sanitary conditions in the prison were appalling. In addition to those executed by the Germans, there were 10 or 15 deaths among the prisoners from other causes.
204. NOVAK managed clandestinely to inform his organization of his imprisonment in Banjica, and received an answer that an attempt would be made to liberate him.
205. In May 1944, NOVAK was re-interrogated, this time by Wehrmacht representatives. By now, General MIHAILOVIC had been dropped by London and was no longer Minister of War; the SUBASIC government had thrown its support behind TITO's policies; the Germans supported MEDIC and LJOTIC in a propaganda campaign against MIHAILOVIC, a campaign which had its proponents in the prison.
206. NOVAK was shown far greater consideration by the Wehrmacht than by the Gestapo during the "Ratnicki dom" questioning, and there was already apparent a wide divergency of method and opinion between the two services. The Wehrmacht interrogators apparently accepted NOVAK's story and handled him with a certain degree of regard.
207. After nearly two months imprisonment at Banjica, exhausted and ill, NOVAK was transferred to Bled in Slovenia where he was placed at the disposition of the Colonel PERSTENER whom he had previously refused to meet. He arrived there on 8 June 1944.
208. In Bled, NOVAK was confined to a room in a hotel partially occupied by the German security service. After having been interrogated on the Slovenian phase of his activities, he was permitted to walk about the village, but was required to take his meals in his room and to remain there when not actually walking. Though closely watched, NOVAK was far better off than in Belgrade: He could now write, although his letters were subject to censorship; and he also had considerable opportunity to engage in clandestine correspondence; most important of all, NOVAK had opportunity to bribe those charged

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

with his surveillance. He never spoke to Colonel PERSTENER, but had to deal with Captain PACHER in all matters concerning his internment. PACHER was said to be favorably disposed towards the Slovenians and to have liberated a number of Jugoslavs from the Gestapo, although for a price. He proved to be kindly disposed towards NOVAK, too, and did everything in his power to make internment easier. When NOVAK finally escaped, it was because of PACHER's benevolence or carelessness - or a combination of both.

209. After two months, on 4 August 1944, it was ordered that NOVAK should be placed at the disposition of German authorities in Trieste for final decision, and PACHER arranged that transportation should be by train rather than by automobile. He thus had an opportunity in Abazia to contact Mrs. KRISTOF, who succeeded in organizing their escape from Trieste before the Germans could prevent it.
210. On 14 August 1944 NOVAK and Mrs. KRISTOF departed for Bologna, where they hoped to meet the Allies who had already liberated Florence.
211. NOVAK admits that he was somewhat guilty of carelessness in placing so much faith in ZITNIK and in the German word of honor. This carelessness had exposed him to the danger of being shot as a spy, and had caused him the loss of five months, three of them spent in jail, two of them in internment. In the meantime, the entire situation had changed: Radio contact with General MIHAILOVIC had been lost and NOVAK could only inform MIHAILOVIC by letter that current conditions for which the unreliable JEVDJEVIC was responsible, no longer permitted his activities in Slovenia. NOVAK therefore preferred to leave for Italy with the hope of joining a regular army unit fighting the Germans.
212. The relatively kind treatment which he received at Blud is still a source of wonderment to NOVAK. He feels it may have been the result of bribery handled from Belgrade, or it may have been a result of the new government alignment behind TITO after abandonment of MIHAILOVIC, which gave rise to a German hope that NOVAK, persuaded to renounce MIHAILOVIC, would be prepared to collaborate with the Germans. In any case, NOVAK was not freed through any particular effort of his own, but only through fortunate exploitation of apparent German carelessness. He was not even forced into collaboration by the Germans, though they may have intended to follow this course after his arrival in Trieste. His escape from Trieste, as he was told in 1946 by Colonel GRIGNOLO, was a great disappointment to the Germans.
213. Explaining to them General MIHAILOVIC's disapproval of the activities of JEVDJEVIC, NOVAK obtained the support of a number of the latter's Chetniks who aided NOVAK and Mrs. KRISTOF in their flight by escaping with them and by covering them with their own false documents. Contrary to NOVAK's hopes, Bologna had not been liberated by the time he and Mrs. KRISTOF arrived there on 26 August 1944. Living under false documents as Professor Bruno ARCADI, NOVAK stayed in Bologna for six months, hoping continuously in the city's imminent occupation by the Allies. For the first time during the war, he was inactive. After a few weeks, however, he learned from certain ex-soldiers of JEVDJEVIC that he was sought by German and Fascist police in Bologna as a result of a denunciation to the effect that he was carrying important messages to the Allies. In reality, NOVAK was engaged in no such mission, but evidently some of his "friends" were desirous that he should disappear forever and be prevented from joining the Allies. To avoid recapture, in the critical October 1944 period, NOVAK, with the benevolent connivance of some of its anti-German and anti-Fascist personnel, was received as a patient of the Sant'Orsola hospital in Bologna.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

VII. 1945 - Through British Jails:

214. The period of NOVAK's stay in Bologna was uneventful until March 1945, when the Fascist police became greatly interested in his presence in the city. On 22 March, there took place an event which made it urgent that NOVAK carry out his intention of crossing the German lines at the earliest possible moment. On that day he and Mrs. KRISTOF had been stopped in the Via San Vitale at about 11 A.M. by a Fascist policeman who took custody of their false documents and ordered them to accompany him to the police station for questioning and thorough search. NOVAK knocked the policeman to the ground and escaped to the nearby hospital unharmed despite a fusillade of bullets from the ruffled policeman. Panic produced in the passers-by by the policeman's shooting, greatly facilitated NOVAK's escape, but Mrs. KRISTOF was brutally beaten there in the street and later at the police station. NOVAK's quarters were searched and the Fascists took all their personal funds as well as those of the MIHAILOVIC organization; the German police then intervened and took their radio receiver. Mrs. KRISTOF was required to present herself twice daily to the German police where she was interrogated by a Sgt. SKIPT. Fortunately, the Germans did not know Mrs. KRISTOF's true identity and she avoided being held as a hostage for NOVAK. In this manner, a few days' time was gained.
215. As soon as the Bologna patriots learned of the incident which had befallen NOVAK, they offered him their help and provided him with a false travel permit. On 25 March one of them, a certain Mario ZUCHELLI from Fanano, with the aid of a relative of his named Maria, accompanied NOVAK from Bologna to Fanano, and from there through the German lines on the following day.
216. Brazilian authorities at Iizzano and American authorities at Porretta gave NOVAK a heart-warming reception, and on 28 March consigned him to the Florence refugee camp from which he was released by British Lt. SMITH. Two days later Mrs. KRISTOF and her daughter Tatjana arrived in Florence via the same route.
217. In Florence, NOVAK presented himself to the local FSS office and requested that he be sent to Rome or Bari in order to report to the Royal Yugoslav Mission attached to the British headquarters with which he had cooperated in 1943. NOVAK was promised that his request would be granted, but on 2 April, without any explanation whatsoever, he was incarcerated in the Italian Muratte prison in Florence. In British Sgt. LEWIS' office, NOVAK was relieved of all his money and personal belongings and no receipt was given him. From among his effects there disappeared 2,000 Swiss Francs, property of Mrs. KRISTOF. All NOVAK's subsequent requests that these Swiss funds be returned to him were without avail. He never received the money.
218. Mrs. KRISTOF and Tatjana, in the meantime, had been interned in the Hotel Fenice and were left there for several days without food or money. They were later given most of the money taken from NOVAK at the local FSS office, and were allowed to buy their own meals in public restaurants where they were always guarded by Italian Carabinieri or public security agents.
219. NOVAK was not subjected to interrogation in Florence.
220. On 26 April, NOVAK, Mrs. KRISTOF and Tatjana were flown to Carbonari near Bari, where they were imprisoned, each in a separate solitary cell.
221. Mrs. KRISTOF and the 13 year old Tatjana remained in the Carbonari prison until 1 December 1945. Although she was interrogated during the months of April and May, she never received any information as to the nature of the crime she had presumably committed, nor was she told why she was being subjected to such a long period of solitary

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

confinement. After some time she became ill and was given utterly incompetent treatment by the camp doctors; the latter went so far as to mishandle her in a flagrantly obscene manner for a disease which she did not have at all, as was later clearly stated by competent physicians of the British hospital in Naples. As a result of such improper medical care, this woman, who eight months previously had been capable of easily making her way on foot through 100 kilometers of mountain trails in German territory, was no longer able to move; after three months she was finally transferred first to the hospital at the Eboli camp and later to the British hospital in Naples, where NOVAK found her towards the end of January 1946, receiving competent medical care and well on the way to recovery.

222. Until the beginning of December 1945, NOVAK had been questioned only in May and June by various interrogators. On 10 December, Captain SANDOR declared that all misunderstandings had been cleared up, and stated that NOVAK would soon be transferred to the camp where Mrs. KRISTOF was an inmate. SANDOR explained that NOVAK had been imprisoned so long because prison headquarters had "sort of forgotten" him. On the 26th of December, however, to his great surprise, NOVAK was transferred to the Italian prison in Bari where he was kept in solitary confinement, given very little food, and where he suffered from the extreme cold. Guarded by his former Italian enemies, he had no opportunity of communicating with the outside world.

VIII. 1946 - Among Prisoners of War and War Criminals:

223. On 25 January, NOVAK was escorted to the PW-DP camp at Eboli. Here he again met Tatjana, and the following day he was permitted to visit Mrs. KRISTOF at the hospital in Naples. On 2 February NOVAK took her out of the hospital and the couple was married. At Eboli camp NOVAK, in addition to elements which had actually belonged to the MIHALOVIC organization, found a multitude of people who, during the war had fought against it and had joined the Royal Yugoslav Army only subsequent to German defeat. Among the inmates there were deserters and even some who had received orders from the betrayers of NOVAK the order to kill him and Mrs. KRISTOF with German help. Although he did not desire to bring harm to anyone, NOVAK felt that his continued stay would be most inadvisable. Therefore, acting on the advice of British camp authorities, he applied for review of his case and requested that he be allowed to live outside of the camp free of its restrictions. At the same time he also made application for restitution of the 2,000 Swiss Francs which had been taken from him by the British police in Bologna. No reply was given to his request.
224. On 26 March, the anniversary of NOVAK's casting his lot with the Allies, he was again arrested, transferred to Afragola, and thrown into the compound with German and Italian war criminals.
225. Without explanation and without being interrogated, NOVAK was forced to undergo the humiliation of confinement with German and Italian war criminals while the shabby JEVDJEVIC was confined in the officers' compound. To his shocked amazement, NOVAK learned that his old Belgrade acquaintance, Banjica jail administrator VUJKOVIC, was also a member of the favored circle in the officers' compound of Afragola. VUJKOVIC was not considered a war criminal, although NOVAK, who had suffered two months imprisonment in the prison where the former compiled lists of victims for the German firing squad, was so considered!
226. Taking advantage of an opportunity which presented itself, NOVAK escaped from prison on 4 May 1946.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

IX. Conclusion:

227. During the entire war, NOVAK acted according to his lights as a Royal Yugoslav Army officer defending his King, his government, his country, and his people, and fighting and harming the enemy to the greatest possible extent. At no time did he favor the enemy who rewarded him in the following manner:
- a) 1941 - The Germans looted his home in Celje.
 - b) 1942 - The Italians looted his home in Ljubljana.
 - c) 1943 - The Germans looted his home and that of Mrs. KRISTOF's.
 - d) 1944 - Three months imprisonment in the most notorious German jails, plus two months of internment because of his cooperation with the Allies.
 - e) 1945 - His home in Bologna looted by the Fascists and the Germans.
228. During the war, NOVAK did not give in to the enemy. Therefore, he was persecuted by the enemy, and after the war, by the British. Those who did surrender, however, had a peaceful war-time existence as POW's and subsequently received Allied protection.
229. During the war, NOVAK preferred imprisonment or execution to collaboration with the enemy. For this reason he barely managed to save his life and re-gain his liberty by breaking through the German front line, only to be treated as a war criminal by British authorities. At the same time those who were in German or Italian pay and collaborated with the enemy as government authorities or political or military leaders, all traitors to their country, lived in security throughout the war. After German defeat these same people came over to the Allies and are now free and protected.
230. During the war, NOVAK attempted to cooperate with the Allies in all ways possible; his 1943 activities must be well documented in the archives of Cairo Allied Headquarters, which often thanked and congratulated him.
231. During the war, NOVAK always attempted to reach an agreement with the Communist Partisans and never allowed his troops to attack them although it was his duty to defend the policy of his legal government. When his government placed its weight behind the Communists, he was already in German prison; subsequently, he had no more occasion for political activity.
232. With reference to the present situation in Yugoslavia, NOVAK states that he is unequivocally opposed to any regime based on terror and oppression. His country, he maintains, is not a free and independent state, but is a satellite enslaved by the USSR.
233. NOVAK feels, therefore, that the attitude of British authorities toward him will change, and that British retribution for non-existent crimes cannot indefinitely pursue him while the various Quislings remain undisturbed.
234. NOVAK emphatically assures all Allied authorities of his loyalty as his ideals will always remain on the side of the democratic nations willing to aid and bring freedom to all oppressed peoples.
235. NOVAK is beset by adversaries from all sides, but it is not his person that they hate and fear. Between them and him there is truth, straight-forward thinking, and honest action.

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

X. Index of Personalities, Traces:

236. Traces held on personalities mentioned above are listed below:

<u>Name:</u>	<u>Mentioned in Para. No.:</u>	<u>Previous Traces:</u>
ADAM @ of FERIANCIC Venceslav	120, 129	Possibly identical with ADAM of 2-8-1058 CSDIC/CMF/SD 86 SCHIFFER
ALUJEVIC Dr. Branko	166	PIR-612
AMBROSIO General	151	2-8-842 CSDIC/CMF/SD 57, DOLLMANN
ANGELOV	202	
ANTIC	75	
ARCADI Bruno (@ of PETROVSKI)	134, 213	
AVSEMEK Ivan	95, 135	JZX-6653, PIR-612
AVSIC Colonel Jakob	5, 7-9, 13	PIR-626
BADOGLIO Marshal	151	
BATRICEVIC Capt. Mihailo	189	
BEZ (call signal of ANTIC)	75	
BEHLER Ales	5	P-7831, PIR-1190
BJELAJAC Lt. Col. Slavko	114, 115, 117, 121	GX-2607
BLAZ (@, NU)	124	
BOK Sgt. Ivan @ HUDNIK	83	
"BOR" Major (@ of PETROVSKI)	74, 78	
BORUT Major (@ of KOPRIVICA Danilo)	123	
BRANDT Captain	191	JZX-1786, JBX-238
BREZIGAR Milko	135	PIRA-894
BREZNIK (@ of Father MALOVHR)	85	
BRIGELJ Ivo	40, 124, 128, 131, 133, 143-145	2-8-776 CSDIC/CMF/SD 40 KUBIN; PIR-160
BUCAR Dr. Vekoslav	5, 9	PIRA-849
CARBONI General Giacomo	151	JZX-3080
CASAR	19	
CASTELLANO General	151	
CERNE Franjo	134	
CERRUTI General	163	
COTIC Ratko and Vojko	134	
CUKIC Kosta	132	
DEBELJAK Captain Janko	47	

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

<u>Name:</u>	<u>Mentioned in Para. No.:</u>	<u>Previous Traces:</u>
DIMNIK Eng.	202	
DJAKOVIC Captain Dusan	184	
DJORDJEVIC Minister Svetan	194	AFHQ Handbook of Yugoslav Personalities
DRZAN Major Albin @ DEZELIC	134, 181	
DUHOVIK Anton	85	
"DUSHA" (true name unknown)	175, 177	
ERLIH, Prof.	19	
FAROLFI Dr. Ivo	35, 38	
FERIANCIC Venceslav @ VENZEL @ ADAM	124	
FRANZESI Dr.	191	JBX-238, FPX-8198, FX-144
FREGL Major Ivo	5, 6	PIRA-748
GAMBARA Gen. Gastone	95-6, 151-56, 157-8, 160-66, 168-70-71	PIR-326
GLAVAC Franc	54	JZX-7769, SILO BX/P/300
GODINA Father Josip	135, 143	JZX-5692
GOSAR Dr. Andrej	19	
GRIGNOLO Colonel	212	2-8-776 CSDIC/CMF/SD 40 KUBIN; 2-8-1324 SC CSDIC SD 53 KOPS London; JZX-6259
GRISOGONO Minister	202	X-4129 (?)
HARBIC	118	
HASL Viktor @ KORITNIK	40, 117	
HENCK Lt.	185	
HIMMLER Heinrich	201	
HITLER Adolf	150	
HUDNIK Sgt. @ of BOK Ivan	83	
HUDSON Capt. BILL	37	PIRA-829
JAN Dr. Slavko	102	
JANEZ Dr.	83	
JARDAS Ivan @ of NOVAK	130	
JEVDJEVIC Dobrosav	40, 136-40, 143, 173, 177, 180, 182, 185-90, 211, 213, 225	PIRA-850
JUNG Dr.	201	
JURIC (@ of ZELEN Slavko)	143, 144	
KAPETANOVIC Capt. Miodrag	117	

SECRET
(CONTROL)

<u>Name:</u>	<u>Mentioned in Para. No.:</u>	<u>Previous Trace:</u>
KETTE Soldier	134	
KIDRIC Boris	5, 9	X-8025
KLINAR Col. Anton	95, 96, 129	
KOMOTAR Dr. Franc	134	PIRA-758
KONCAR Family	165	Not identical with KONCAR Family of JBX-222
KOPRIVICA Danilo @ BORUT	123	
KORITNIK @ of Viktor HASL	40, 117	
KOTNIK Ciro	132	PIRA-891
★ KRALJ Dr. (Ivan ?) ★	52, 135	Worked for MIHAILOVIC in Ljubljana until April or May 45, then went to Italy to escape Partisan occupa- tion (Local file 2-2a-3222)
KRANJC Marko	19, 99	JZX-1980
KREK Dr. Miha	19, 74	PIR-1185
KREK Janez	134	
KRISTOF Mrs. Jovanka	34, 36, 40, 145, 180-81, 184, 186, 188-90, 209, 213-14, 216-18, 221-23, 226	2-8-776 CSDIC/CMF/SD 40 KUBLN
KRISTOF Tatiana	216, 218, 221, 223	
KRISTOF Mr.	127	
KRISTOF Family	58	
KROSELJ Dr. Anton	52, 129, 143, 144	
LAVRIC Lt.	92	
LESJAK Capt. Josip	26, 54, 123	
LEWIS Sergeant	217	
LJOTIC Dimitrije	191, 205	2-8-1323 1 SC/CSDIC/SD 36 London
LUKIC Gen. Mihajlo	1, 3	
LUKIC Eng. Mihajlo	202	
LACEK Dr. Vladimir	35, 37-38	PIRA-413
MACUS Eng. Franc	52, 135	JZX-1980, JRX-4440
MALOVRRH Father @ BREZNIK	85	
MANDERS Major	132, 144, 172	
MANDIC Captain	180, 184	JZX-6767, X-4903 (?)
MARCONI Mrs. Giovanna (@ of Mrs. KRISTOF)	134	

SECRET
(CONTROL)

<u>Name:</u>	<u>Mentioned in Para. No.:</u>	<u>Previous Traces:</u>
MARIA (relative of Mario ZUCCHELLI)	215	
MAROVIC Major	117	
MARUSIC Dr. Drago	5, 7, 9	P-7831, 7942
MASSALOVIC Colonel	194	
MEDERNDORFER Vinko	5	
MEDVED (# of Milos STARE)	74	
MIHAILOVIC Gen. Draza	6 et seq.	
MIHAILOVIC Major Sasa	191, 194	Draza MIHAILOVIC's Commander of the Belgrade Corps. Killed in a gun battle with OZNA men, 6-7 May 1945 (Local file 2-2a-3907).
MILLER Major	70, 74	
MOSCATELLO Mons. Antonio	132	PIR-332
MUSSOLINI, Benito	105, 150	
NADRAH Captain	153	
NAPAST, fmu	129	
NEDIC Milan	194, 205	
NERADOVIC Capt. Dusan	202	F-7950 (?)
O'FLAHERTY Mons. Hugh	132, 142, 144, 172	JRX-271
PACHER Captain	208	2-8-628 CSDIC 400 MU SD 1 LERCH; 2-8-749 CSDIC/CMF/SD35 ROESENER; 2-8-732 1 SC CSDIC SD 5; 2-8-753 1 SC CSDIC SD 9; JRX-2012
PAIMIERI Colonel	133	
PAVLIC Marjan	53, 134	
PERHINEK Major Rudolf	202	
PERSTENER, SS-Col.	188, 207-08	
PERSUH Capt. Ivo	26	
PETER II, King	6, 10, 15, 78	
PETERLIN Lt. Col. Ernest	13, 56, 59, 90, 95, 96, 98, 99, 101	PIRA-19
PETROVIC Dr. Njegos	52, 202	
PREKORSEK Eng. Tugomer	36	PIRA-829
PREZELJ Gen. Ivan	96, 127, 174, 211	MAS-81; PIRA-717
PUSENIAK Dr. Bogumil	165	PIRA-450
RAPOTEC Dr.	35	

SECRET
(CONTROL)

<u>Name:</u>	<u>Mentioned in Para. No.:</u>	<u>Previous Traces:</u>
ROATTA Gen. Mario	151	JZX-5570
ROBOTTI General	152	In prison at Brescia awaiting execution (local file 2-2a-1040 10/27/44, 2-2a-1671 12/30/44).
ROMMEL Field Marshal	152	
ROSSI General	151	In prison at Brescia awaiting execution (local file 2-2a-1671 12/30/44).
HOZMAN Bishop Dr. Gregor	90	JZX-6651
RUDOLF Prof.	74	
RUPNIK Gen. Leon	125, 134, 143	PIRA-748
SANDOR Captain	222	
SEIFERT Sergeant	214	
SERNEC Eng. Dusan	5, 7, 9, 57	PIRA-748
SHLIFFER	177	Possibly identical with SS-Maj. August SCHIFFER; hanged as war criminal as per MTO Gen. Ord. #119 6/20/46).
SHUSTER	177, 188, 191	Probably identical with SS-Oeschaf. Alfons SCHUSTER of 2-8-732 1 SC CSDIC SD 5 PACHER
SLAJD Dr. Albin	56, 83, 85, 88	JZX-6687
SOLAR Prof. Jakob	19	Possibly identical with or related to Ermanno SOLAR of JZX-8767
STARE @ "MEDVED", Dr. Milos	19, 74, 96	PIRA-19
STEMBOV Eng. Vinko	40, 127, 178, 182, 184, 188, 189	2-8-776 CSDIC/CAT/40 KUBIN
STRNISA Lt. Marjan	26	
SUBASIC Ivan	205	
TITO Josip BROZ	19, 24, 57, 194, 212	
TODOROVIC Maj. Zarko	6	MAS-81
TONNY (@ assigned by Cairo)-BLAZ (local @), NU	124	
TORNARI Captain	54, 56	
URSIC Andrej	135	JRX-4880, PIR-700
VAUHNIAK Col. Vladimir	96, 105	MSB-875
VENZEL (@ assigned by Cairo)-ADAM (local @; true name FERIANCIC Venceslav)	120, 129	

S E C R E T
(CONTROL)

<u>Name:</u>	<u>Mentioned in Para. No.:</u>	<u>Previous Traces:</u>
VOSNER Capt. Pavle	47, 55, 66, 83, 84, 158	
VRTOVEC Bogar	134	Arrested 12/2/44 on suspicion of collaboration with Germans. Later released (Local file).
VRTOVEC Marjan	134	Idem, Slovene. Member SIS. Arrived with brother in Rome before Italian Armistice. Brother 19 killed in motor accident March 1945 (Local file 2-2a-2949).
VILJKOVIC	201, 225	
WINTER	201	
ZAJC Dr. Marjan	153	PIRA-831
ZALAR Dr.	132	
ZEBOT Dr. Ciril	19, 35	X-4256, PIR-54
ZELEN Slavko @ JURIC	143, 144	2-8-776 CSDIC/CMF/SD 40 KUBIN
ZETNIK Rudolf	83, 135, 153, 174-75, 177, 188-91, 193, 211	PIRA-757
ZIVANOVIC Dr. Miodrag	202	
ZIVKOVIC Gen. Petar	195	PIRA-848
ZUCCHELLI Mario	215	

XI. Comment:

237. The above report, completed by Source in late June or early July 1946 and submitted on 25 August 1946, has not been previously forwarded owing to backlog of work and lack of editorial personnel; held on file at the local station, it has served as valuable background material. Angry and hurt at his reception and imprisonment after making his way into AOT, Source prepared the report in order to clarify his position vis-a-vis British authorities, and it was chiefly to the latter that his work was addressed. Besides the original which Source retains, and the copy given the local station, two copies of the report were furnished to Mons. Hugh O'FLAHERTY. As far as is known, the latter has not transmitted the report to British authorities. Definite information in this regard will be obtained.
238. A forthcoming report will contain Source's comment on his report after the elapse of a year.

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