MOSCOW AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT: May 1987
THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE

Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Kremlin has undertaken more vigorous efforts aimed at drawing non-aligned states, foreign communists, socialists, and noncommunist pacifist groups into a Soviet-led campaign to isolate the United States on the peace issue. The new Soviet party program, the Gorbachev regime's most comprehensive and authoritative statement of overall goals and strategy, endorses Moscow's expanded efforts to use public opinion and political movements in the West to influence Western governments.

In this context, the Kremlin appears to be relying increasingly on highly organized, party-controlled domestic groups to generate support abroad for Soviet foreign and defense policies among groups (scientists, physicians, athletes, and business people, for example) outside the U.S.S.R.'s traditional network of supporters. This shift in tactics parallels General Secretary Gorbachev's skillful public relations efforts at building bridges to organizations with which Moscow has had past differences. It also comes at a time when the Soviets are lowering the profile of some of the well-known, Soviet-backed international fronts, such as the World Peace Council (WPC), which previously have attempted to fulfill this role.

This paper will discuss the work, organization, and role of one such domestic organization-the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (SCDP), known outside the U.S.S.R. as the "Soviet Peace Committee." The SCDP downplays its Communist Party connections to promote ''people-to-people'' contacts, to break down "harmful stereotypes" of the U.S.S.R., and to manipulate foreign perceptions of controversial international issues. After several years of alienation from mainstream European pacifist movements (during which time some foreign countries denied SCDP officials visas because of suspected intelligence connections), the SCDP aims to cultivate a more accommodating image and increase its appeal among Westerners. The CPSU doctrine that guides its activities has not changed, however. (See Appendices C and D.)

The recent appointment of Genrikh Borovik, a CPSU member, well-traveled correspondent, veteran propagandist, and former KGB agent (who maintains close ties to the KGB through

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Soviet Subversion of the Peace Movement

Expulsions. In October 1981, Vladimir Merkulov, a KGB case officer working under the guise of a Soviet Embassy second secretary in Copenhagen, was expelled from Denmark. He had arranged through a local KGB agent of influence to have some 150 Danish artists sign an "appeal" for a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone. He also supplied funds to have the appeal placed as an advertisement in a number of local newspapers. Merkulov often visited the headquarters of the Danish Committee for European Security and Cooperation, an affiliate of the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation (see Appendix B).

In another highly publicized case, on April 29, 1983, Switzerland closed the Bern-based Novosti (APN) press bureau and expelled its director, Alexi Dumov, for the "political and ideological indoctrination" of members of the Swiss peace movement and for planning anti-U.S. street demonstrations.*

Visa Denials. On February 11, 1983, the Danish press reported that Alexander Kislov—identified as an instructor at the USA/Canada Institute in Moscow and a member of the SCDP—was denied an entry visa to visit Denmark. He was to have addressed 23 peace meetings throughout the country from February 19 through March 6, 1983. Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was quoted as saying that "the refusal to grant the visa is based on a concrete assessment of the person in question, and it is not the first time that we have refused to grant him an entry visa to Denmark."* *

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*For more information, see Foreign Affairs Note, "Expulsions of Soviet Officials, 1986," January 1987. Current SCDP Chairman Borovik is a prominent Novosti political commentator.
* *June 1986, Kislov was promoted to Deputy Director of the Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations, headed by SCDP First Vice President Primakov.

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family ties) to head the SCDP is the most visible indication of Soviet efforts to rehabilitate the organization. Although often aggressive and ideological in his role as a journalist, Borovik nonetheless is capable of smooth and engaging behavior.

Moscow believes that his ability to demonstrate flexibility with foreigners will help generate interest in the SCDP as a legitimate "peace" organization (see box, p. 3).

Since Borovik's appointment, the SCDP has been in the forefront of a skillful Soviet public relations effort to promote Moscow's "new thinking" and push arms control initiatives, primarily through a series of well-publicized meetings with prominent Westerners. Currently, the SCDP is managing an effort to gather millions of signatures for a petition supporting Soviet arms control positions. The Soviets hope to present this "People's Peace Treaty" to President Reagan, UN Secretary General de Cuellar, and General Secretary Gorbachev August 6, the 42nd anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

The SCDP

The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace is a Moscow-based "public" organization that receives directives and overall guidance from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The SCDP was formed in August 1949, just 5 months after the creation of the Helsinki-based World Peace Council.[1] Because it constitutes the U.S.S.R.'s official "peace movement," the SCDP invariably supports all Soviet-sponsored peace and disarmament initiatives and refrains from criticizing any aspect of Soviet foreign or domestic policy. For example, it failed to denounce the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the December 1981 declaration of martial law in Poland, and the September 1983 Soviet shootdown of a Korean airliner. Moreover, the SCDP has never condemned Soviet human rights violations, and frequently has defended the harassment and imprisonment of "unofficial" Soviet peace activists; it has vigorously fought the efforts of some Western peace activists to contact and maintain relations with these individuals.[2]

Soviet officials maintain that the SCDP, as a "public" organization, represents solely the opinions of the Russian people; Moscow implies that it is not controlled or influenced by the CPSU.[3] Soviet spokesmen on numerous occasions have

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[1]See Foreign Affairs Note, "Soviet Active Measures: The World Peace Council," April 1985.

[2]At a March 11, 1984 meeting in London, for example, SCDP delegates in Britain at the invitation of a Quaker group were "forcibly" challenged about official Soviet harassment of independent peace activists in the U.S.S.R., according to the London *Guardian*. The SCDP representatives replied that the arrests of the activists had "always led to criminal charges" and that no one had been detained simply "because of their beliefs." More recently, *New Times* (#11, 1986) accused Dutch Interchurch Peace Council officials of "looking for malcontents" in the Soviet Union and "pompously [holding] some of them up as 'the true peace movement' in the U.S.S.R."

[3]When the Soviets speak of the SCDP as a "mass" or "public" organization, the implication is that it is not bound by CPSU rules and regulations and that it may pursue its policies independent of party directives. However, CPSU statutes make it clear that this is not the case: "At congresses, conferences, and meetings convened by administrative, trade union cooperative, and other workers' mass organizations and also in the electoral organs of these organizations where there are at least three party members, party groups will be organized. *The task of these groups will be the comprehensive increase of influence of the party and of the conduct of its policy among the nonparty members, the strengthening of party and state discipline, the struggle against bureaucratism, and verification of party and soviet directives. . . . Party groups must, strictly and unswervingly follow the decisions of leading party organs on all questions.*" (From Section 9, " Party Groups in Nonparty Organizations" of the CPSU Statutes, adopted by a CPSU Central Committee plenum on August 4, 1961, and revised by the 24th CPSU Congress April 9, 1971. Revised and readopted at the 27th CPSU Congress, February/March 1986. Emphasis added)

declared that it is natural for the Soviet public to praise the "peace-loving" actions of the U.S.S.R. while criticizing the policies of Western nations.

The Statutes of the SCDP (*20th Century and Peace, #3, 1985*) mandate the organization to "promote relations and contacts with foreign organizations and movements," "carry out work to explain the burning issues of the Soviet and the worldwide movements for peace," and "represent the Soviet peace supporters in the World Peace Council."

In this context, the SCDP is tasked by the CPSU to play a central role in generating Western interest in and support for the "struggle for peace," a political/ideological tenet central to the U.S.S.R.'s efforts to unite diverse Western pacifist groups and

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"The communists everywhere play the most active organizing part in the public peace movements. . . [They] deem it essential to employ in the struggle for peace all resources and levers at their disposal. "

The World Communist Movement,
**edited by Vadim Zagladin,
Moscow, 1982**

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nonruling communist parties and direct their protests exclusively against the West. As Deputy Chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, Dmitri Volkoganov, recently defined the "struggle for peace":

> . . .the real struggle for peace is not a kind of abstract form of pacifist condemnation of war "in general." It is above all the exposure of the true culprits of the terrible danger threatening mankind. It is a struggle against those who are blocking the peace initiatives of the socialist countries and who are unwilling to abandon the criminal idea of solving the main contradiction of the age by nuclear force. (*Kommunist,* No. 9, June 1986)

The unidirectional "struggle" described by Volkoganov similarly found expression in the new party program adopted at last year's 27th CPSU congress:

> Mass democratic movements [are] objectively aimed against the policy of reactionary imperialist circles and merge into the common stream of the struggle for peace and social progress. . . . The communists. . .are now on the frontline of the struggle for the conservation of peace on earth. . . . They clearly understand the reasons for the threat of war, expose those really to blame for the aggravation of international tension and the arms race, and seek to cooperate with all those who can contribute to the antiwar struggle. (CPSU Program, Pravda, March 7, 1986).

The "struggle for peace" concept starkly contrasts with the equal responsibility" doctrine espoused by many Western pacifist groups. That doctrine maintains that both the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two superpowers, bear equal blame for the nuclear arms buildup and international tensions. Since the early 1980s, the SCDP unsuccessfully has sought to discredit this idea of superpower equivalence. In the process, SCDP officials have demonstrated a striking lack of tolerance for the opinions and positions of Western pacifist groups and individual activists who have disagreed with the "struggle for peace" concept, criticized equally U.S. and Soviet policies, or failed to recognize and support Moscow's self-proclaimed "peace

Profile: Genrikh Borovik

Genrikh Borovik, 56, is a native of the Belorussian Republic and an English-speaking graduate of the Moscow Institute of International Relations. From 1965 until 1982, he served as a Novosti reporter, alternating between Novosti's editorial board in Moscow and its New York bureau. Since 1982, Borovik has remained in Moscow as a Novosti political commentator. He was identified during a recent London libel trial as a former agent during the 1960s in the Tenth Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, responsible for recruiting foreign journalists. * Borovik has retained close ties to the KGB through his brother-in-law, Vladimir Kryuchov, head of the KGB's First Cheif Directorate, responsible for all Soviet intelligence activities abroad.

Borovik takes a hard line on a range of international issues; a harsh xenophobia has consistently characterized his print and television commentary. Since 1980, he has leveled numerous personal attacks on U.S. officials, including President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz. On occasion, he has censured the U.S. press and American filmmakers for their "distortions" of Soviet policies and has defended such controversial issues as human rights violations in the U.S.S.R. and the September 1983 Soviet shootdown of a Korean airliner.- Borovik scripted a Soviet television program, aired in the U.S.S.R. in January 1983, on the crimes" of the CIA and in September 1986 conducted a lengthy interview on Soviet television with American defector Edward Lee Howard. Speaking to an All-Union ideological conference in Moscow (December 10-11, 1,984), Borovik urged "greater ideological aggressiveness" to counter Western "misperceptions" of Soviet policies.†

"A global struggle is being in the world for the minds of people. . . . [The] ideological struggle demands quick reactions and decisive action by all kinds of ideological weapons. "

Genrikh Borovik, December 1984
ideological conference, Moscow

Moscow television (March 18) screened a videotaped report by Borovik, who had returned from a mid-March 1987 visit to Afghanistan to report on the war and to interview Afghan communist party leader Najibullah. Speaking "on behalf" of the SCDP, he blamed the continued Soviet occupation of the country on the United States and asked "writers, journalists, and scientists, actors, directors, and religious figures" to "put pressure" on the U.S. Government to stop the war in Afghanistan.

*Details of Borovik's intelligence connections were revealed during testimony during a recent 8-week trial in London's High Court of a libel suit brought against The *Economist magazine's Foreign Report* newsletter by Greece's most popular daily newspaper, To *Ethnos,* which the *Foreign Report* accused of being a Soviet propaganda mouthpiece. See the *Wall Street Journal*, April 15,1987, p. 35, and The *Economist,* April 18, 1987, pp. 19-22. See *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents*, John Barron, Readers Digest Press, 1974, pp. 95-126, for details on KGB organization.

* *See his review of a book by Konstantin Chemenko defending Soviet human rights policies (Literatumaya Gazeta, September 9, 1981); criticism of U.S. policy toward Poland (Literatumaya Gazeta, December 23, 1981); attacks on President Reagan (*Sovietskaya Rossiya*, February 28, 1982; *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, March 7, 1982); and his criticism of American newspapers, television, and radio stations for spreading "anti-Soviet propaganda" *(Komsomolskaya Pravda,* December 22,1985).

†See *The Perfection of Developed Socialism and the Ideological Work of the Party in Light of the Decisions of the CPSU Central Committee June 1983 Plenum; Materials from a Moscow 10-11 December 1984 All-Union Scientific Practical Conference*, edited by former CPSU propaganda secretary Boris Stukalin, *Politicheskaya Literatura*, Moscow, 1984.

initiatives."[4] Soviet press accounts of international peace gatherings have indicated that the hard line adopted by the SCDP publicly also has found its way into private exchanges with Westerners. This apparently happened at a ''peace forum'' staged in Moscow last February (see p. 6).

[4]The equal responsibility doctrine also has affected Soviet relations with certain nonruling communist parties (i.e., the Italian and Japanese) critical of Soviet policies in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. Leading Soviet theoreticians and ideologists have criticized these and other parties for their reluctance to join in the U.S.S.R.'s ''struggle for peace'' and for their failure to recognize the significance of large and newly activated antiwar groups. To some extent, these same officials also have attributed the weakening of the international communist movement to a failure among these communist parties to counter effectively the notion of equal responsibility. Recently, Soviet journals have made reference to the 7th Comintern Congress (July-August 1935), at which the "popular front" strategy was developed, as a reminder to communist parties that collaboration with sometime opponents in the face of the ''imperialist'' threat is more important than polemics over strategy and tactics. To this end, the Soviets and their allies have been promoting a meeting of the world's communist parties to develop a common approach to what the Soviets refer to as ''issues of war and peace.'' On May 13, 1987, Romanian President Ceausescu, in an address to a gathering of Soviet-bloc Central Committee secretaries in Bucharest, called for such a meeting (Scinteia, May 14); his proposal was promptly rejected by Italian Communist Party international affairs chief Antonio Rubbi, who called it ''not only untimely but clearly inadequate'' (Rome, ANSA, May 16, 1987).

Organization

The SCDP is organized nationally, with more than 120 regional affiliates scattered throughout the U.S.S.R.; all are responsible for organizing ''peace activities'' at the local level in Soviet enterprises, state farms, universities, and scientific institutes.

The SCDP controls several "commissions" on disarmament, religion, the Third World, art and culture, and the mass media. One of its newest commissions, the "Retired Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament," recently met in Vienna with its Western counterpart organization, the "Generals for Peace and Disarmament'' (TASS, April 29, May 4, 1987). Through these special-interest subsidary bodies, the SCDP seeks to mobilize noncommunist pacifists, journalists, clergy, scientists, and representatives of other interest groups in support of Soviet foreign poliCy.[5] SCDP commissions meet regularly at SCDP headquarters to formulate plans for counterpart organizations run by the WPC and other "special interest" international

[5]The SCDP works on behalf of the CPSU international Department (ID), which directs the activities of pro-Soviet communist parties and international front groups (as well as their local affiliates) and so-called national liberation movements. The ID also maintains liaison with noncommunist groups and parties as well. Headed by Anatoliy Dobrynin, it plays a prominent role in Soviet "active measures" activities in coordination with the Committee for State Security (KGB). Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the ID and a specialist in European communist parties, occupies a central position in the Soviet "active measures" apparatus.

communist fronts such as the International Organization of Journalists, the World Federation of Scientific Workers, and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization.[6]

All commissions are headed by well-known Soviet media, academic, literary, and scientific personalities in order to facilitate SCDP contacts with foreigners in those professions. One of the SCDP's most active subsidiary bodies is the "Scientific Council on Research on the Problems of Peace and Disarmament" (SCRPPD), targeted specifically at Western scientists (see box, above). In the future, the SCDP will rely more heavily on the SCRPPD, as well as its various commissions, to promote contacts with Westerners.

The SCDP is staffed by prominent academics, journalists, and scientists, among others (see Appendix A). The organization currently is headed by Genrikh Borovik, who replaced Yuriy Zhukov[7] in early March. Borovik was identified recently as a former agent in the Tenth Department of the Second Chief Directorate of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), responsible for recruiting foreign journalists (see box, p. 3).

The SCDP publishes a monthly magazine entitled *20th Century and Peace*, first issued in 1958 and now translated from Russian into English, French, Spanish, and German. The journal publicizes the work of the WPC, reports on major SCDP gatherings, and carries articles critical of the United States and NATO; it also features articles which attack Western peace activists who disagree with Soviet policies. The journal is edited by Al'bert Belyayev, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Central Auditing Commission and editor-in-chief of the Central Committee daily *Sovietskaya Kultura*.

The SCDP and the Soviet Peace Fund

The Soviet Peace Fund is another party-controlled organization that finances the work of the Soviet-backed international fronts via the SCDP. The fund, a type of financial clearinghouse administered by the SCDP, is headed by Soviet chess master and SCDP member Anatoliy Karpov. The chairman of the Board of the U.S.S.R. State Bank, Viktor V. Dementsev, also is an SCDP vice president; Dementsev's position allows funds collected by Karpov to be funneled expeditiously to the WPC and other fronts.

Like the SCDP, the Peace Fund is nationally organized with local affiliates throughout the U.S.S.R. Soviet citizens make "donations" to the fund, which are mailed to SCDP headquarters or paid through the U.S.S.R. State Bank. The most common method of collecting money is for individual factories, plants, and collective farms to hold a 1-day "work shift for peace." Individuals participating in such work shifts then "donate" their day's wages to the fund. In fact, such "donations" usually represent levies imposed by the central authorities on the individual local affiliates.

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[6]For more Soviet-supplied information on the SCDP, see Pravda, November 30, 1982 *Sovietskaya Rossiya*, May 26, 1982, and *New Times*, #24, 1982.

[7]Zhukov, who headed the SCDP from March 1982 to March 1987, is a member of the CPSU Central Committee, the U.S.S.R. Parliamentary Group, and a deputy chairman of the USSR-USA Friendship Society. He continues to write for the CPSU daily *Pravda*.

On the 25th anniversary of the Peace Fund, chairman Karpov told the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times* (#18, 1986) that "many contributions [to the fund] come from other countries, from our compatriots living abroad and from foreign nationals." He said that the fund finances "mass public organizations," such as the SCDP, the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation (the Soviet affiliate of the International Committee on European Security and Cooperation; see Appendix B), and other Soviet affiliates of international front groups. Karpov acknowledged that the Soviet Peace Fund maintains "business contacts" with some foreign "peace funds" but did not identify them.

Former Peace Fund Chairman Boris Polevoi also admitted to Soviet funding of "international democratic organizations working for peace," the Soviet euphemism for the international fronts (*20th Century and Peace,* #4, April 1980); *Moscow News* (No. 19, 1981) reported that the fund helps finance some of the WPC's "large public initiatives." The October 1973 World Congress of Peace Forces, staged in Moscow and organized jointly by the SCDP and the WPC, was almost completely financed by the Peace Fund, according to the WPC's monthly bulletin *Peace Courier* (November 1973). The fund backed the WPC-sponsored "week of action for a ban on nuclear weapons" in the U.S.S.R. in late 1985, according to a fund statement distributed by TASS (August 5, 1985).

During a WPC organizational session in Sofia, Bulgaria, in April 1986, a special working group met to find ways to increase financial contributions from Western WPC affiliates to the WPC's Helsinki headquarters, a responsibility traditionally assumed by the Peace Fund. This was one of several public relations measures undertaken at Soviet behest by the WPC in the presence of Western participants to demonstrate that not all WPC operating expenses come from Moscow.

Over the years, the Soviets have gone to great lengths to portray the Peace Fund, like the SCDP, as a "public" organization. Some Soviet officials have, however, publicly acknowledged that the Peace Fund takes its cues from the CPSU. Fund chairman Karpov, in an interview with *Sovietskaya Rossiya* (April 26, 1986), said that it is under the guidance of the party and that its "principal directions," i.e., the development and expansion of the antiwar and anti-imperialist movements, were based upon the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. He also said that money collected by the fund is allocated to support the work of 16 Soviet public organizations[8] that do "everything in their power" to foster solidarity among "peace-loving forces."

Other SCDP Ties to the WPC

The SCDP serves as the WPC's *eminence grise*. Through direct organizational ties, the SCDP funds and structures the WPC's yearly activities and determines the content, focus, and priorities of its anti-Western campaigns, most of which are given prominent coverage by the SCDP's monthly journal. For example, the chairman of the SCDP traditionally is a member of the WPC's decisionmaking Presidential Committee, attending and steering its most sensitive strategy deliberations. CPSU International Department Deputy Chief Vitaly Shaposhnikov is on the WPC presidium. Many SCDP members simultaneously are WPC members (see Appendix A).

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[8]These public organizations include the SCDP, the Soviet Women's Committee, the Soviet Committee of Youth Organizations, the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Latin American Peoples, the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, and the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

About 2 years ago, former SCDP Chairman Zhukov discussed the SCDP-WPC relationship in *International Affairs* (July 1985). He admitted that the SCDP and its counterparts in Eastern Europe "actively participated" under the WPC aegis and were doing "all in [their] power to enhance" its role. Zhulkov also praised the work of the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (ILFPF, a front headed by WPC President Romesh Chandra and sharing the same WPC street address in Helsinki). He acknowledged Soviet funding of the ILFPF when he asserted that the SCDP would "go on making its constructive contribution" to the "preparation" and "staging" of ILFPF meetings.

Although Moscow's commitment to the World Peace Council and its affiliates has not wavered, the CPSU has lowered the WPC's profile as its effectiveness as a Soviet front has diminished in recent years. In March 1983, the Soviet foreign affairs monthly journal *International Affairs* complained that "many national peace organizations and movements" in the West "avoid establishing ties of an organizational nature with the WPC." The failure of the WPC's 14th congress in Copenhagen, October 15-19, 1986—largely due to controversy over communist domination of the event—was instrumental in its decline.

"[O]ur adversaries. . . continue to draw on the 'two superpowers' argument, implying that the USA and Soviet Union are equally responsible for the rise and growth of tension. This weakens the peace movements because it confuses a section of people in it. . . . It is our purpose to provide peace activists and the public at large with as much information as possible to help them distinguish between truth and lies.

Arne Jorgensen, Executive Committee Member, Communist Party of Norway, *World Marxist Review,* **August 1986**

A WPC strategy session on April 24-27 in Sofia, Bulgaria, preceded the Copenhagen congress. Then-SCDP Chairman Zhukov called the session a "dynamic, businesslike, critical, and impartial" set of discussions at which the WPC was called upon to "radically change" its "style of work, denounce formalism and complacency outright and adopt a new approach to cooperation with all antiwar movements." Zhukov later criticized unidentified "peace campaigners" attending the April meeting for their "lack of experience" in politics, their "dim notions" of international affairs, and their inability to determine "who is responsible" for the arms race (*New Times*, #20, 1986). During the session, he imposed new organizational changes upon the WPC in a traditional, heavy-handed manner, even though such changes were intended to create an image of the organization acceptable to noncommunist peace activists.

CPSU International Department officials responsible for liaison with foreign peace groups probably were not pleased with the Copenhagen congress. Published Soviet accounts prior to the congress indicated that Soviet organizers expected disagreement at the gathering. *New Times* (#42, 1986), for example, anticipated debate on "sharp and contradictory problems," such as human rights and the invasion of Afghanistan, and admitted that preparatory meetings were "by no means easy," requiring "big efforts, great patience, and ... political tact." In the aftermath of the congress, *New Times* (#43, 1986) made the unprecedented admission of violence at a Soviet front-sponsored event,

reporting that "Danish activists" pulled the "thugs" (a reference to noncommunist activists who raised the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) off the stage and "kicked them out" of the assembly hall.

In a subsequent interview with *New Times* (#45, 1986), then-SCDP Chairman Zhukov publicly admonished pacifist groups that advocated the equal responsibility thesis at the session: "some participants" wanted to make the renunciation of nuclear weapons conditional on the "settlement of issues that have nothing to do with the substance of the matter . . . . They keep citing a thesis which . . . leads to the demand to change the social system in the socialist countries. . . . This is a dangerous line." No written resolutions or communiques were adopted due to concern that noncommunist activists would demand that criticism of Soviet policies appear in the text. Zhukov's explanation: the session did not produce a final document because "to draft a final document, we would have had to set up a drafting commission. It would work through the night, thrashing out a formula. The result would be a long paper with which the commission would be pleased. But what next?"

Soviet television coverage of the WPC congress was sparse and provided contrasting images of the event. For example, on October 18, the Moscow evening news program "Vremya" carried an interview with Borovik-described positively in the report as one of several Soviet "experts" at the October 11-12, 1986 U.S.-Soviet summit at Reykjavik, Iceland. Borovik told the correspondent that radically "new thinking" in the peace movement was necessary and praised the "great" work of the WPC congress. The following evening "Vremya" replayed videotape showing fistfights in the assembly hall; about 4 hours later, TASS disseminated an interview with SCDP Chairman Zhulkov, who admitted that "certain forces" staged "acts of hooliganism . . . bunches of hooligans broke into the assembly hall and led things to blows."

Recent Trends in the Soviet "Peace Movement"

As a result of the Copenhagen congress imbroglio, Moscow has decided not only to lower the profile of the WPC but also to place the SCDP in a more prominent position. SCDP organizational sessions since the end of 1986 and a "peace forum" hosted in Moscow in February 1987 indicate the beginning of Moscow's tactical shift to an ostensibly less ideological approach in its dealings with Western peace and antiwar groups. These meetings have set the stage for both a more activist SCDP program and for what Moscow hopes will be the start of "new thinking" among noncommunist pacifist movements and a period of anti-U.S. cooperation.

An SCDP Plenary. On December 31, 1986, the SCDP and the Soviet Peace Fund held an unusual joint plenary session in Moscow to assess Soviet participation in the International Year of Peace (in which the Copenhagen congress was a central element) and outline the SCDP's, future tasks. In his keynote address, SCDP Chairman Zhukov declared that the SCDP had been forced to acquire a much more "diversified character" as a result of the situation taking shape in the global antiwar movement. He asserted that the time had come for serious restructuring of the SCDP if it were to engage in activities outside the aegis of the World Peace Council and establish ties with Western mass movements that "ignore" the Helsinki-based front. While it is not clear whether Zhukov was aware that his impending removal as

SCDP chief was part of this "restructuring," he evidently was laying the foundation for the more accommodating facade to be promoted by his successor.

Zhukov indicated that in the future the SCDP would rely more heavily on its commissions to "promote direct contacts" with "scientists, physicians, cultural personalities, sportsmen, and retired military leaders." In this context, Zhukov mentioned that the SCDP was "striving to expand cooperation with business community centers that are capable in some measure of exerting a restraining influence on the Western ruling circles."

Zhukov added that although the climate for SCDP discussions with these groups had improved, "very essential differences" still separated them. Expounding on themes heard at the April 1986 WPC session in Sofia, Bulgaria, Zhukov recommended "adjustments" to the SCDP's work, urging its personnel to "learn to listen better and perceive everything rational and useful they are told, even if this be criticism; they should engage in substantive and polite polemics." In this context, Zhukov stated that "workers and peasants" were at times more convincing in exchanges with Westerners than were the most experienced SCDP activists (*20th Century and Peace,* #2, 1987).

The Moscow "Peace Forum." A Soviet-sponsored international forum entitled "For a Nuclear Free World, for the Survival of Humanity," was staged February 14-16, 1987, in Moscow. Pravda (February 14) reported that nearly 1,000 people of different political, ideological, and religious views had come to attend the conclave, hailed by the Soviets as an example of Moscow's "new political thinking" and billed by Soviet radio and television commentators as a "fresh impetus" to the peace and antinuclear struggle.

The day the session opened, Soviet media gave no indication of SCDP involvement in the forum's planning or organization; TASS reported only that the gathering had been called "on the initiative of Soviet cultural figures." Yevgeniy Velikhov, Chairman of the Committee of Soviet Scientists Against the Nuclear Threat-another party-controlled organization whose activities specifically are aimed at Western scientists-subsequently declared that the forum had been arranged "on the initiative of a group of scientists," according to *Izvestiya* (February 17, 1987). That same day, SCDP Vice President Primakov told Radio Moscow that various Soviet working groups-composed of political scientists (including Primakov), religious figures, scientists, and others-were established before the forum; they individually contacted their professional counterparts abroad to invite them to Moscow.

In the days leading up to the forum, Soviet officials went to considerable lengths to stress the open and spontaneous nature of the gathering. At the same time, they betrayed concern that disagreement—about the source of the nuclear threat, who was to blame for the arms race, and the "orientation" of the peace movement—would surface there. For example, TASS foreign news chief Vitaliy Chukseyev told a Radio Moscow news program on February 13 that "interesting, acute, and most probably difficult dialogue" could be expected at the gathering. The following day *Pravda* anticipated "possible debates" at the session and asserted that the "adoption of resolutions or joint communiques" was not envisaged. (As noted, the organizers of the WPC's Copenhagen congress last October similarly failed to adopt written resolutions or communiques.)

Representatives of some of the traditional Soviet-backed international fronts attended the session. ID Chief Dobrynin met on February 15 with the "Generals for Peace and Disarmament," a front described by TASS as a "Western public group." (Some of the generals have written articles in *New Times* and in other Soviet journals critical of the United States and NATO but not of Soviet policies.) Christian Peace Conference (CPC) Secretary General Lubomir Mirejovsky attended the forum *(Rude Pravo,* February 21), as did CPC Vice President Paulos Mar Gregorios (also a WPC vice president).[9]

In his address to the gathering on February 16, General Secretary Gorbachev called the forum a "true embodiment of world public opinion" but urged participants to form a "correct opinion" about Soviet foreign policy. He downplayed the notion that there is "a Soviet threat to peace and freedom." In a reference to the October 15, 1986 sham Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, he told the assembled audience that the U.S.S.R. had "brought back six regiments" from the country.[10] Finally, bowing to noncommunist pacifist groups in Europe, Gorbachev declared that the U.S.S.R. would "readily respond" to proposals made by other "public movements."

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[9]See Foreign Affairs Note, "Soviet Active Measures: The Christian Peace Conference," May 1985, for more information on the CPC.

[10]The "withdrawal" of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan on October 15, 1986, timed just 3 weeks before the annual UN General Assembly vote on the Soviet occupation, was a deliberate deception intended to manipulate international perceptions of Soviet policy on a sensitive political and military issue. New tanks were sent to the country in mid-September only to be withdrawn a month later; Soviet antiaircraft regiments, useless because the *mujahidin* have no air force, also were withdrawn. Furthermore, new equipment used in the switch of motorized rifle regiments, crucial for military operations against the *mujahidin, was* on its way to Afghanistan as early as July 1986. The movement of fresh Soviet troops into the country while the "withdrawal" was taking place indicated that Moscow, from the outset, had no intention of removing significant fighting forces.

Although the Soviets sought to put the best face on the Moscow forum, indications surfaced of debate and disagreement:

• At a news conference called to assess the results of the forum, Velikhov declined to give an appraisal of the forum: "Many important opinions were voiced, and I will not sum them up. It seems to me many very important and interesting opinions were voiced . . . . [I]n the beginning, we had a number of ideas-this came about spontaneously-so we simply couldn't resist this. There arose a spontaneous desire to discuss . . . acute issues . . . . " (Radio Moscow, February 16, 1987)

• Radio Moscow commentator Vladimir Pozner admitted that participants at the gathering "openly and candidly exchanged ideas, argued and debated." He castigated the Western press for alternately labeling the forum "propaganda" and a "Soviet ploy" and declared that the session would have received more attention had it been staged in the United States. (Radio Moscow, February 17)

• In an article in the *Morning Star* (the organ of the Moscow-controlled faction of the British Communist Party, February 26, 1987), CPSU Central Committee and SCDP member Georgiy Arbatov admitted that the Soviet sponsors of the forum "did not expect that the participants would discuss Soviet foreign policy." The forum's task, wrote Arbatov, was "to continue East-West dialogue at a broad public level"; he complained that "quite often contradictory views were expressed." *Moscow News* (No. 10, March 19, 1987) reported that West European participants requested the formation of a human rights committee before the forum got underway.

"There can be no political or moral basis for an antiwar movement that is directed against the policy of the socialist governments."

Sh. Sanakoyev, *International Affairs***, October 1982**

On February 25, shortly before Zhukov's removal from the SCDP chairmanship, Gorbachev addressed the 18th Soviet trade union congress in Moscow. He indicated that different tactical and ideological approaches taken by noncommunist participants clashed with Moscow's line on "questions of war and peace" (i.e., who is to blame for the arms race) and that this was the source of much of the discord at the peace forum. Moreover, he implied that Soviet peace activists had not adequately bridged the ideological gulfs separating them from grass roots pacifist groups in the West:

The forum has been an important event in international life, a barometer, I would say, of the mood of public opinion on the planet. . . . There were indeed very heated disputes on how to move in this direction, how this or that problem should be resolved and there were essential differences in the approach to them. (TASS, February 25, 1987)

Zhukov's Removal. Zhukov's advocacy of a doctrinaire ideological line during the 5 years he served as SCDP chairman proved to be a public relations disaster, exacerbating precisely those criticisms of the U.S.S.R. which he sought to prevent, generating extensive Western criticism of the SCDP, and, despite the conciliatory tone of his December 31, 1986 address, ultimately undermining his effectiveness as SCDP chairman.

On March 6, 1987, TASS reported that an SCDP presidium session had been held that day to discuss "practical tasks in the immediate period." According to TASS, Zhukov had been "released" from his duties as SCDP chairman; the presidium expressed gratitude to him for his "great contribution" to the development of the "Soviet peace movement." TASS reported that Genrikh Borovik was named to replace Zhukov; Anatoliy Dobrynin took part in the session, underscoring International Department interest in establishing the SCDP's credibility internationally."

The Accession of Genrikh Borovik. The appointment of Borovik as SCDP chief was a tactical move designed to demonstrate to Western organizations that Moscow is genuinely committed to dialogue and flexibility in its relations with Western pacifist groups.

Borovik is well-qualified to head the SCDP. He is an English-speaking graduate of the Moscow Institute of International Relations, a well-traveled correspondent, veteran propagandist, editor-in-chief of *Theater* magazine, and secretary of the board of the U.S.S.R. Writers Union. He also is a member of the board of the Soviet Copyright Agency, whose chairman, Nikolay Chetverikov, was expelled from France in April 1983 along with 46 other Soviet officials for espionage.[12] Although often aggressive and ideological in his role as journalist-his writings have harshly criticized the United States (see box, p. 3)-Borovik is, nonetheless, capable of smooth and engaging behavior. The CPSU believes that his ability to demonstrate flexibility with foreigners will help generate interest in the SCDP as a legitimate peace" organization. At the same time, his defense of such

controversial issues as human rights violations in the U.S.S.R. and the September 1983 Soviet shootdown of a Korean airliner suggests an ability to engage in polemics with individuals and groups critical of Soviet policies.

Since his appointment, the SCDP has been in the forefront of a skillful Soviet public relations effort to promote Moscow's "new thinking" and push arms control initiatives, primarily through well-publicized meetings with prominent Westerners. For example, the SCDP recently organized a Soviet-West German meeting of political, social science, and business officials for 2 days of talks (TASS, March 28, 1987). On March 30, an SCDP delegation called on British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, then in Moscow to meet with CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev, to attack British support for U.S. defense policies and criticize the "scarcity of truthful information" in Great Britain about the U.S.S.R. (*Izvestiya*, March 30, 1987). And in late April, the "Retired Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament" met in Vienna with its Western counterpart organization, the "Generals for Peace and Disarmament" JASS, April 29, May 4, 1987). The latter organization, formed in 1981, has held gatherings regularly in Vienna since 1984; a future meeting is planned for 1988 to discuss "alternative" security arrangements.

Conclusion

For the past 5 years, the SCDP has sought international recognition as a genuine peace organization. The SCDP's importance to Moscow as a front for the presentation of Soviet policies has grown as the credibility of the World Peace Council has declined in recent years. The failure of the WPC's 14th peace congress in Copenhagen in October 1986 and the controversy generated by communist domination of the event were important catalysts to Moscow's rehabilitation of the SCDP.

SCDP Chairman Zhukov's advocacy of a doctrinaire ideological line during his 5-year tenure generated extensive Western criticism of the SCDP. At the end of his term, Zhukov pointed out the necessity for restructuring the SCDP in order to establish ties with Western peace movements outside the aegis of the World Peace Council. To this end, he indicated that the SCDP would rely more heavily upon its commissions in the future.

The new SCDP Chairman Borovik, although often aggressive and ideological in his role as journalist, nonetheless is capable of smooth and engaging behavior. Moscow hopes that Borovik's ability to demonstrate flexibility in dealings with Westerners will help improve foreign perceptions of the SCDP. However, relaxation of the SCDP's vitriolic objection to the equal responsibility doctrine is unlikely to occur in the near future.

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[11]As if to underscore the necessity for Zhukov's March 6 removal from the SCDP chairmanship, *Pravda* ran a lead editorial on March 7 urging that party cadre selected for leading posts on party committees and other bodies have the "best professional, ideological, and moral qualifies." The editorial warned against "comrades' who "try to do too much at once." "see nothing through to the end," and "embark on the path of violating the requirements of the party statutes, the Leninist work style, and the norms of our life."

[12]Chetverikov discussed the functions of the Copyright Agency in *New Times* (#30, 1986); he stressed it was "particularly important" for the agency to "expose the aggressive policies and myths created by bourgeois propaganda."

Selected SCDP Members*

President

Genrikh A. Borovik. Novosti journalist; editor-in-chief of *Theater* magazine; secretary of the board of the U.S.S.R. Writers Union; member of the board of the Soviet Copyright Agency; WPC first vice president.

First Vice Presidents

Yevgeniy M. Primakov. Director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations; WPC vice president.

Vladimir N. Orel. Academician; head of a section in the International Department; former first secretary at the U.S.S.R. Embassy in Prague (1969-73).

Vice Presidents

Anatoliy A. Anan'yev. Editor-in-chief, *October* magazine; WPC member.

Alida-Viya F. Artmane. Actress; People's Artist of the U.S.S.R.; member, Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation; WPC member.

Viktor V. Dementsev. Chairman of the board, U.S.S.R. State Bank; CPSU Central Committee candidate member.

Yevgeniy A. Dolmatovskiy. Professor at the Gorky Literature Institute; WPC member.

Aleksandr T. Gonchar. President, Ukranian Peace Committee; WPC member; CPSU Central Committee candidate member.

Igor 0. Gorbachev. Artistic Director, Leningrad Pushkin Theater; People's Artist of the U.S.S.R.; WPC member.

Alla G. Masevich. Deputy chairman, USSR-USA Society; WPC member.

Vikenty A. Matveyev. Journalist; deputy chairman, USSR-USA Society; WPC member.

Pavel A. Naumov. Deputy chairman, U.S.S.R. Journalists' Union.**

Mirgiyas A. Zaidov. Chairman, Uzbek Republic Committee for Labor and Social Affairs; president, Uzbek Peace Committee; Uzbek Supreme Soviet deputy; WPC member.

Vitally V. Zhurkin. Deputy chairman, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences USA/Canada Institute; WPC member.

Other Presidium Members

Georgiy A. Arbatov. Director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' USA/Canada Institute; WPC member; CPSU Central Committee member.

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*The names on this list were derived from various Soviet and WPC publications and should not be considered complete.

**The U.S.S.R. Journalists' Union recently was identified by Ilya Dzhirkvilov, a former deputy general secretary of the Union who defected to Great Britain in 1980, as a KGB-run operation. See *The Economist,* April 18, 1987, pp. 19-22.

Alevtina V. Fedulova. SCDP executive secretary; WPC member.

Anatoliy Y. Karpov. President, Soviet Peace Fund.

Izzat N. Klychev. President of the Turkmen Peace Committee; U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet deputy; WPC member.

Vitaliy G. Korionov. Journalist.

Zinaida M. Kruglova. CPSU Central Committee member; chairperson, Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship with Foreign Countries; WPC member.

Vladimir N. Kudryavtsev. Deputy chairman of the Soviet Sociological Association; Presidium member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; director of the Academy's State and Law Institute; WPC member.

Vladimir P. Maslin. First vice president, Soviet Peace Fund; deputy chairman, Znaniye [Knowledge] Society; chairman, U.S.S.R.-Laos Society; WPC member.

Stepan A. Shalayev. Chairman of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; CPSU Central Committee member; Supreme Soviet member; WPC member.

Tair F. Tairov. Professor; U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations; WPC Secretariat member.

Valentina V. Tereshkova. Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Committee of Soviet Women; former cosmonaut; CPSU Central Committee member; Supreme Soviet member; WPC member.

Timur T. Timofeyev. Director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences International Labor Institute; vice chairman of the Scientific Council on Research of Problems of Peace and Disarmament; member, Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

Other Members

Andrey A. Kokoshin. Deputy Director, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences USA/Canada Institute; vice president, Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against Nuclear War; WPC member.

I. E. Maloshenko. Secretary, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences USA/Canada Institute; WPC member.

The International Committee for European Security and Cooperation

The ICESC, headquartered in Brussels, was formed in 1968, purportedly to promote the work of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It staged its first large "public" assembly 4 years later, June 2-5, 1972, in Brussels, just after an "expanded session" of the WPC Presidential Committee (May 24-25, also in Brussels).

Some 1,000 delegates from 28 countries attended, the majority from Eastern Europe. The WPC was represented by its president, Indian Communist Party member Romesh Chandra, plus four other WPC Presidential Committee members, as well as two WPC secretaries. Most of the other Soviet-backed fronts were represented at the initial ICESC assembly, including the Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions, the Budapest-based World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Prague-based International Union of Students, the East Berlin-based Women's Inter-

national Democratic Federation, the Paris/London-based World Federation of Scientific Workers, and the Prague-based International Organization of Journalists. A WPC message sent to the assembly expressed "full support" and looked forward to "continued and growing cooperation with all organizations and individuals interested in promoting European security and cooperation, in the work which must assuredly follow this great assembly."

The ICESC has approximately 31 affiliates located in East and West European countries, as well as in the United States, U.S.S.R., Canada, and West Berlin. According to a 1979 ICESC brochure, the purpose of the organization is to "inform large areas of the public" about "everything connected with the CSCE's cause, the process of detente, and the extension of peaceful coexistence between states of Europe with different social and economic systems." To achieve this goal, the ICESC "coordinates the action of its own national committees, circles, and forums, as well as other gatherings of public opinion. . . . "

ICESC national affiliates work closely with their locally based WPC counterparts. An article in *International Affairs* (June 1983) listed the ICESC along with the WPC, World Federation of Trade Unions, International Organization of Journalists, and other fronts as yet another organization that "convincingly demonstrates the growing role of the public peace forces in Europe opposing the militarist designs of the U.S. and NATO." Moreover, as of 1982, at least 16 ICESC affiliates were known to include members who belonged simultaneously to their national WPC branches. The "dual membership" cases at that time were found in Belgium, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Portugal. Today, at least two Soviet members of the Moscow-based Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation (SCESC), headed by CPSU Central Committee member Lev Tolkunov, simultaneously are members of the SCDP.

Five years ago, ID First Deputy Chief Vadim Zagladin inadvertently acknowledged that the U.S.S.R., through the Soviet Peace Fund, finances the work of the ICESC's affiliates. In an interview with the Vienna Arbeiter Zeitung (May 21, 1982), he discussed Moscow's view of the European peace movement and explained how Soviet peace activities mesh with those in Europe.

> We highly appreciate the [European] peace movement as an expression of the people's will to prevent war. We understand this and we would like to support this cause and this will . . . . We also have a mass peace movement, but it expresses itself in other forms . . . . Our young people are now writing letters to Brussels, to the NATO organizations. Over 6 million youths have written such letters. Although May 9 was an official holiday, several working brigades came to work and collected all the money they had earned for the Soviet Peace Fund.

In response to the interviewer's question "What did they do with the money?" Zagladin stated:

> You have several peace committees for European security. They are printing newspapers, and all Soviet participants in peace demonstrations here in Vienna, Amsterdam or Brussels are being paid with the money from this fund.

Last year, Soviet Peace Fund Chairman Anatoliy Karpov told *New Times* (#18, 1986) that the fund finances the SCESC.

A Sampling of SCDP Activity

1982: The Swedish Peace March

In July, Moscow granted permission for 300 independent Scandinavian peace activists to stage a march across the northern U.S.S.R. As part of the march, the SCDP organized a rally on July 28 at the Khatyn war memorial near Minsk in Belorussia. According to the Copenhagen daily *Berlingske Tidende* (July 29, 1982), one-third of the Scandinavian marchers refused to participate because of the similarity of the name Khatyn to the village of Katyn near Smolensk, where thousands of Polish officers were believed to have been executed by the Soviets in 1940.

When the rally took place despite the Nordic visitors' protests, a representative of the Swedish Christian Peace Movement raised the Katyn issue publicly. Zhukov, the principal Soviet official present, was described as "infuriated." He reportedly seized the microphone from the activist, announced that the executions had been carried out by the Nazis, and asserted that anybody who insisted on reviving the issue was using "Goebbels propaganda" to conduct "psychological warfare" against the Soviet Union. Some marchers complained that their public statements had been altered in the Soviet press to eliminate criticism of Moscow and add an anti-American tone.

1982-83: The Zhukov Letter

In an effort to blunt subsequent communist and noncommunist criticism of Soviet policies, Zhulkov met in Moscow in October 1982 with Western organizers of the second annual European Disarmament Conference, a pan-European peace gathering then scheduled to be held May 9-15, 1983, in West Berlin (sponsored by the Committee for European Nuclear Disarmament—END), and in which Moscow was considering participating. The session apparently was stormy, and led Zhukov in early 1983 to send a highly critical letter to the organizers; copies of it were sent to hundreds of other European peace activists. The letter revealed that during their meeting in Moscow, the conference organizers had refused to accede to Zhukov's request to make criticism of NATO deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces the sole focus of the session.

END was further criticized for supporting the "equal responsibility" concept and for favoring ties with unofficial dissident peace movements in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. In the end, the SCDP and the World Peace Council boycotted the convention, and unofficial Soviet-bloc peace activists were not allowed to attend.*

1984: The Third European Disarmament Conference

Unlike the 1983 conference in West Berlin, SCDP and WPC representatives attended this gathering, staged July 17-21, in Perugia, Italy. Approximately 1,500 independent activists

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*Soviet intransigence on the issue of cooperation with noncommunist activists critical of Soviet policies apparently had a domestic impact. During officially organized peace protests in the U.S.S.R. during 1983-84, " differences" and "a number of problems" emerged among the participants, particularly concerning the "forms of the movement, organizing methods, and search for new ways of antimilitarist propaganda." These problems were "by no means easy to solve," according to Pyotr Fedoseyev (*20th Century and Peace,* #2, 1985).

Excerpts From the Zhukov Letter, January 1983

". . . 1983 is the year in which deployment of American missiles in Western Europe is to commence. For this reason, we think, this year will be an especially responsible and in a sense crucial period in the struggle against this threat to peace and European security.

At the same time, one must not overlook the fact that the adversaries of the forces of peace have intensified their activities by leaps and bounds. They are making every effort to neutralize the peace movement, to lead it astray and to guide its membership in wrong directions. Until now, the peace activists in East and West—independent of their inclinations, their movements and the organizations they represent—have always discarded their ideological differences whenever it was a matter of closing ranks in the interest of peace and disarmament. It is easy to imagine how much these joint actions would lose in the way of effectiveness, if splits and discords were to arise within the peace movements as a result of these differences.

In this connection, discussions initiated by individuals and groups are a cause for concern. In the final analysis, their aim is to split the peace movement throughout the world so as to transform the forums of the peace activists into arenas of open ideological controversy and to replace the most important task which unites all mankind—that of preventing nuclear war—by a debate about issues which have nothing to do with this task.

The leaders of the Russell Foundation and of the movement for European nuclear disarmament are ... continuing to hold to their premise of "equal responsibility." We are firmly convinced of the fact that this premise serves to mislead and thereby to weaken and undermine the peace movement and that it is aimed at justifying the aggressive, militaristic policies of the United States and of NATO.

When asked about the participation of the peace committees of the socialist countries, the representatives of the West Berlin working group made it abundantly clear that this issue could to all intents and purposes not be resolved within the framework of the liaison committee. How then do they propose to initiate an East-West dialogue at the conference? They have told us that they plan to extend personal invitations to some personages of their own choosing in the socialist countries as "private individuals" and to extend mere observer status to them. This proves to us that the conference organizers are afraid of genuine opponents and that

they therefore wish to exclude the legitimate popular representatives of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries so as to be better able to conduct anti-socialist propaganda.

We feel that the thrust of the conference as envisaged by the organizers and the way it is being prepared tend to make a true and promising European dialogue impossible-one that would promote joint action by the forces of peace and that would be so badly needed in the present unsettled state of international affairs. On the contrary-this can only act as an incentive to the "cold warriors" to sow discord among the anti-war activists in Europe so as to halt their advance. It is self-evident that we will not participate in this questionable enterprise." (Tageszeitung, January 4, 1983)

Excerpts From the END Reply to the Zhukov Letter, January 1983

"In his letter, Mr. Yuriy Zhukov, the president of the Soviet peace committee, accuses us of aiming to confuse, demobilize and undermine the anti-war movement and to justify the aggressive, militaristic policies of the United States and of NATO.

The Berlin conference will bring together most, if not all, of the independent peace movements and we must insist on their having a right to follow their own agenda without having to ask other groups for permission which are beholden to one of the parties concerned. Of course all peace movements will wish to speak with representatives of the Soviet and East European peace movements even though they will be supporting the policies of their respective governments. Mr. Zhukov says we are "afraid of genuine opponents appearing" at our meetings. But he has already received an invitation to the Berlin conference on the same basis as all the other peace movements which supported the original call for European nuclear disarmament in April 1980. Speaking for the Russell Foundation: we would welcome a debate with Mr. Zhukov in any appropriate forum or would also exchange views with him in writing." (Ken Coates, Liaison committee secretary, *Tageszeitung*, January 4, 1983)

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attended the conclave, which opened with a demonstration protesting the denial by communist authorities of exit visas to 59 "unofficial" Soviet and East European activists who were invited to Perugia (59 seats were left symbolically empty).

Two days into the convention, an SCDP press conference was interrupted by outbreaks of "shouting, bursts of laughter, and protests," according to the Milan *Corriere Della Sera* (July 20). SCDP delegate Grigoriy Lokshin's explanation of the origins and positions of the SCDP (a "totally independent and democratically elected" movement) was greeted with boos. Sylin, in reply to persistent questions as to why the SCDP approved of Soviet SS-20 counterdeployments and had never criticized Soviet policies, said there were no differences between the Soviet Government and the people, "Public opinion and official opinion are the same in our society," he said to laughter. "They are always the same. We have ways of establishing this link" *(New York Times*, July 20).

Moscow's View of the Peace Movement

Authoritative Soviet writings and speeches make clear that the global peace movement is a decisive element in what Moscow sees as the overall balance of international political, military, ideological, and social forces and that it is a powerful source of opposition to Western policies. CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev expressed his views clearly on this subject during the course of several CPSU Central Committee plenums staged to discuss preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress (Moscow, February-March 1986).

For example, soon after he became General Secretary, Gorbachev told one such gathering (April 23, 1985) that peace-

loving forces were uniting "ever more closely" and praised the role of antiwar and antinuclear movements, as well as that of "progressive, democratic detachments," Moscow's euphemism for the Soviet-backed front groups (Pravda, April 24, 1985). His sentiment was subsequently echoed by KGB Chief Viktor Chebrikov who, in a report to the annual Great October Socialist Revolution celebration in the Kremlin on November 6, 1985, praised both the antiwar movement, "unprecedented in its scope and mass character," as well as "public organizations" for actively supporting the peace struggle (Pravda, November 7, 1985).

Calls for pursuit of a pro-peace, "popular front" strategy were reiterated at the 27th CPSU congress in Moscow (February-March 1986). In his CPSU Central Committee political report to the session, Gorbachev made several references to the need for unity in the antiwar movement and urged cooperation between noncommunist peace activists and Soviet peace organizations. He declared that the cause of socialism was advanced by the "growth of the new massive democratic move-ment[s] of our time, including the antiwar and antinuclear move-ment."

He expanded this idea by singling out the "rise of mass democratic and antiwar movements" as a "powerful counterweight to the aggressive policies of imperialism" (Pravda, February 26, 1986). The CPSU program adopted at the con-gress further emphasized Soviet views on the role of the peace movements in the "struggle for peace," declaring that the "anti-war movements of the broadest peoples' masses on all con-tinents" had become a "long-term and influential factor of public life" (Pravda, March 7, 1986).*

In April 1986, then-SCDP Chairman Zhukov explained in International Affairs that the role of antiwar movements was stressed in the program because it has a "significant effect on global developments." Zhukov underscored the importance Moscow attached to the movements when he noted that the traditional three "main forces" of "international development" (traditionally referred to in Soviet ideological writings as the "world revolutionary process")—the socialist countries, the inter-national communist movement, and the developing countries—had been joined by a "fourth force," the "international democratic peace movement," including religious organizations and pacifist groups uniting scientists and physicians.

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*The language enshrined as party doctrine in the new party program approved at the 27th CPSU congress was the result of long and difficult negotiations and debate directly involving the top party leadership. The need to revise and update the last party program, approved under Nikita Khrushchev in 1961, provided the impetus for the new draft. The CPSU has rewritten the party program only three times since the founding of the party in 1903.