April 1916: The Easter Rising and its Echoes in Egyptian, Indian, and Zionist Nationalist Thought, Part II: India

Irish Stamps Honoring Gandhi

Yesterday we looked at echoes of the Easter Rising of 1916 on Egyptian nationalism.Today we'll look at influences in Indian nationalism and Zionism.

India and Ireland
It is easy to forget today that many supporters of Irish Home Rule were Protestants rather than Catholic, from rebel leader Wolfe Tone to Parliamentarian Charles Parnell. Yesterday we mentioned W.B.Yeats, Lady Gregory, and G.B Shaw, all Protestants from the Anglo-Irish ascendancy. Anglo-Irishmen had long been involved in the British Army (including Wellington, though he didn't identify with Irish causes (he notoriously responded to being called Irish by saying being born in a stable did not make him a horse), and the Administration of the Raj,

But not all the Irish in India were defenders of the status quo. Alfred John Webb (1834-1908), a Dublin Quaker and supporter of Irish Home Rule, in 1894 in Madras became the third non-Indian presiding officer of the Indian National Congress, which led the independence movement. Margaret Gillespie Cousins (1878-1954), a Protestant from Boyle in County Roscommon, was a supporter of Home Rule  and women's suffrage who had founded the Irish Women's Franchise League before moving to India, where she co-founded the Women's Indian Association. In 1922 she became the first female magistrate in India. She is credited with writing the tune of the Indian National Anthem Jana Gana Mana (the words are by the poet Tagore).

But the Irish in India were not the only influences of the Irish on India. Michael Davitt (1846-1906) was an Irish republican and agrarian reformer, founder of the Irish National Land League, who was an early advocate of nonviolent resistance; Gandhi would explicitly cite him as an inspiration for his own movement.

Gandhi supported the movement for Irish independence but predictably deplored the violence of the war of independence. Many Indian nationalists saw parallels between the massacre on Bloody Sunday at Croke Park in Dublin on November 21, 1920, when Black & Tans killed 14 civilians at a Gaelic football game, and the far bloodier Amritsar massacre of 1919, when hundreds were killed. Ironically, the perpetrator of Amritsar, Col. Reginald Dyer, was himself of Irish background.

This article cites a number of Gandhi's speeches and writings referring to Ireland.

As this is running late, I'll deal with Zionism in a Part III tomorrow.

Genesis of a Quagmire: The Debate Over Advancing to Baghdad, 1915: Part VI: Nixon Gets the Go-Ahead

This will conclude my series on Britain's disastrous decision to advance to Baghdad in October 1915, which would lead to the siege and disastrous surrender at Kut. Earlier parts concentrated on introducing the players in Mesopotamia/Iraq (Part I), the Indian Government and High Command (Part II), and the divided coalition Government in London (Part III), particularly the India Office and War Office. Part IV and Part V traced the debate over occupying Baghdad from the beginning to the October 6, when Sir John Nixon had been ordered not to advance beyond Kut though General Charles Townshend was already at ‘Aziziya, more than halfway to Baghdad (see map at bottom.)

Part V ended with Nixon pleading not to have to withdraw from ‘Aziziya, but his October 6 plea about Townshend's advance used the assurance, "Navigation difficulties have been overcome," to say that Townshend had been able to advance by land routes and towing barges, temporarily overcoming the lack of shallow-draft river steamers. London instead assumed all navigation difficulties had been solved. The debate in London shifted to reinforcing manpower, while Nixon still lacked steamers. This added a bit to the growing divergence in the debate between what was wished for politically and the military realities on the ground.

All the political forces in London (War Office and India Office), the campaign (Gulf Political Agent Percy Cox), and India recognized the propaganda value of taking Baghdad. India was nervous that Turkey and Germany might succeed in persuading the Amir of Afghanistan to attack India, virtually denuded by the export of Indian troops to France, Egypt, East Africa and Mesopotamia. A fall of Baghdad would also, it was argued have an affect on Persia/Iran, officially neutral but with parts of its territory occupied by Russian, Ottoman, and British troops and much of the rest under local or tribal forces, while the teenaged Ahmad Shah Qajar was well-advanced on his way to becoming the last of his dynasty.

The lure of Baghdad, as I have suggested elsewhere, had as much to do with the popularity of the 1,001 Nights as with the actual military value of an Ottoman provincial city.  It was the capital of Harun al-Rashid, not of Halil Pasha and Baron von der Goltz. But it was a potent lure. Percy Cox argued that for the Muslim world, and Persia in particular, the fall of Baghdad would be second only to the fall of Constantinople. And London was in the process of figuring out how to get its vulnerable troops off Gallipoli without disaster. So the temptation of taking Baghdad loomed even larger.

General Nixon had become even more confident that Townshend could take Baghdad with one quick push. (As we saw last time, Townshend begged to differ and was overruled.) Though the word "cakewalk" certainly existed at the time, I can't find anyone using it, depriving us of the wonderful ironies in which a French general in the 1950s and and an American general in the 1960s referred to a "light at the end of the tunnel" in Vietnam.

In Nixon's defense, he was consistent in saying that while he could take Baghdad with his existing troops (though he was wrong), he could not hold on to it against a Turkish counteroffensive without at least one, and preferably both, of the Indian divisions in France.

Another complication that would reveal itself in the days after October 6, and would be criticized by the subsequent investigating commission, was the tendency of many of the principals (particularly in the India Office and the Indian Government) to communicate by "private" telegrams not shared with other responsible ministries or the field commanders. Thus there were private conversations the content of which many of the principals had not seen.

On October 7, Nixon reiterated that he could not retreat from his present position without disaster, but would not advance without assurance of reinforcement. Also on the 7th, Secretary of State for India Austen Chamberlain asked Nixon how much additional force he needed, not just to take but to hold Baghdad, and also informed the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, that the Cabinet was eager to take Baghdad and asking Hardinge (note: the Viceroy, not the field generals, though Nixon had been asked  a similar question) if one division would be sufficient. Cable traffic for the next day or two centered on whether one or two divisions would be required, as command wanted to assure success without weakening other fronts.

On October 9 Chamberlain telegraphed Hardinge in a private message,

Private. Hope to give you definite information as to possibility of reinforcement in a few days.Meanwhile Nixon should maintain his present position and be prepared to advance if reinforcements asked for can be sent to him. Please instruct him accordingly.

 On the same day, Nixon complained again about the transport problem, but the aforementioned  misunderstanding persisted, and the complaint seems to have made no impression.

On the 11th, Townshend informed his troops they were not to advance until further orders.

Sir Thomas Holderness

But other things were happening in the meantime. An "Inter-Departmental Committee" had been set up by Prime Minister Asquith to resolve the debate and to consider the issue of advancing to Baghdad. Chamberlain named his own deputy, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India Sir Thomas Holderness, as its Chairman. It included representatives of the India Office, War Office, Admiralty, and Foreign Office. On October 11, it delivered a report that was at best inconclusive and raised questions about taking Baghdad before reinforcement.

The Holderness Committee report, inconclusive as it was, went before the War Committee of the Cabinet (then widely known as the Dardanelles Committee) on October 14, 100 years ago today. Chamberlain, not normally a member, was in attendance. They had before them reports from the General Staff (very likely, as we have seen, echoing Lord Kitchener's views), favoring an advance on Baghdad but also requiring an additional two divisions. But apparently Lord Kitchener himself, unlike virtually everyone else, did not feel that holding on to Baghdad was essential and favored occupying it, destroying military supplies and withdrawing.

The Dardanelles Committee's recommendation of sending two Indian divisions from France was soon overtaken by events: the recall of General Sir Ian Hamilton from command on the Dardanelles, but the Indian Government remained uncomfortable with the idea of taking Baghdad if it had to then be evacuated.

On October 21 the War Committee issued a detailed study which suffered from the deficiencies that plagued the Mesopotamia campaign: poor intelligence and underestimating their adversary. The War Committee estimated that for at least the next few months Nixon would face no more than 9,000 Turkish infantry. Within a month at Ctesiphon, they would face twice that number. The British had a disdainful attitude towards their immediate opponent Nureddin Pasha and seem to have been unaware that Baron von der Goltz was now on the scene, with Halil Pasha in support in Baghdad.

On October 23, 1915, despite divided counsels, uncertainty about whether Baghdad could be held for long (no one then questioning that it could at least be captured), and only the vaguest commitment to (eventual) reinforcements, the Cabinet instructed the Viceroy to instruct Nixon, "Baghdad advance."

Baghdad would not be captured. Townshend would fall back to Kut and be besieged and relief was frustrated by the very lack of river transit the Cabinet thought had been resolved. Within six months, Townshend and his troops would surrender to the Turks in the worst defeat since Yorktown and the largest surrender of British Empire troops in history up to then (exceeded only by the surrender of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942). I'll continue the tale next month on the anniversary of the Battle of Ctesiphon.

Anyone wishing to consider modern parallels is of course free to do so, but it clearly was no cakewalk.

Map 8, FJ. Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. II

Genesis of a Quagmire: The Debate Over Advancing to Baghdad, 1915: Part V: India Halts Nixon

This is Part V of a series of six.The first three parts of this current series on Britain's disastrous decision to advance to Baghdad in October 1915, which would lead to the siege and disastrous surrender at Kut, concentrated on introducing the players in Mesopotamia/Iraq (Part I), the Indian Government and High Command (Part II), and the divided coalition Government in London (Part III), particularly the India Office and War Office. Part IV traced the debate over occupying Baghdad from the beginning to the point where General Sir John Nixon ordered General Charles Townshend to advance from Kutn al-‘Amara to ‘Aziziya, despite having instructions not to advance beyond Kut without clearing it with the Government of India. Since in what follows you may not be able to tell the players without a scorecard, please read those if you haven't already. You'll also find photos of all the principal players  in Parts I-III.

Map 8, FJ. Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. II

On October 3, with Townshend already en route to  ‘Aziziya but encountering transport delays, Nixon telegraphed that he felt the retreating Turks were concentrating at the ruins of Ctesiphon, but that he could open the road to Baghdad and take the city with his existing forces, He conveyed his intention to concentrate at ‘Aziziya (which Townshend had already been ordered to do anyway).

Townshend had never been enthusiastic for the advance beyond Kut. Also on October 3, from aboard a steamer on the Tigris he signaled Nixon's headquarters at Kut that

"you will see . . . that there is no more chance of breaking up the retreating Turkish force . . . They have also probably been reinforced from Baghdad . . . If I may be allowed to express an opinion I should say that up to the battle of Kut our object has been the consolidation of the Basra vilayet and occupation of the strategic position of Kut . . .If Government does not consider that the occupation of Baghdad is yet politically advisable owing to doubt of the Dardanelles situation [Gallipoli] and consequent possibility of any small force we might put into Baghdad being driven out again by superior forces from Anatolia, and so obliged to retreat along an extremely long line of communications infested by hostile or semi-hostile, and o news of retreat actively hostile, Arabs,then we should on all military grounds occupy ourselves with consolidating our position at Kut. The plan of entering Baghdad on the heels of a retreating and disordered force was upset by the sudden fall of water rendering our progress in ships of great difficulty and toil and extremely slow. On the other hand, if Government were to desire to occupy Baghdad then I am of the opinion that methodical advance from Kut by road by two divisions or one army corps, or one division closely supported by another entire, exclusive of line of communication troops . . . is absolutely necessary unless great risk is to be incurred. It is absolutely impossible to send laden ships up river now.

The coming campaign would give rise to many questions about Townshend's military judgment, but it's hard to fault his reasoning here. The fall in the river was delaying his advance, and he recognized, as even Nixon did, the risks of occupying Baghdad with only a single division.

But by this time, Nixon was obsessed with the lure of Baghdad. He had his Chief of Staff send Townshend the following reply, as quoted in the official history [punctuation from the official history];

Your (telegram) . . . does not seem to take into account the appreciation of the situation in my (telegram) which I sent you last night [footnote: referring to Nixon's October 1 telegram  to India] . . . . The Turkish force there (i.e., at Ctesiphon) is inferior in numbers and moral [meaning morale] to the force you successfully defeated at Kut, and the position is not nearly as strong. It is the Army Commander's intention to open the way to Baghdad, as he understands another division will be sent here from France* and he would like to know your plan for effecting this object with the force you had at Kut plus maybe four squadrons and a R.H.A. [Royal Horse Artillery] battery.

 *The official history adds a footnote to the statement about a division from France, "Apparently he had received private information concerning this, as no official information to this effect by this date can be traced in the records." Though promises would be made in coming days the additional division seems to have been mostly something Nixon hoped for but had not been promised officially.

Townshend would later claim that he doubted a division from France could arrive in time, but that he felt he had done his best and been overruled by his superior officer. He later claimed that he remained unconvinced, but nevertheless in his response to Nixon he said:

My information I consider, points to a different estimate of the hostile force being concentrated at Ctesiphon . . . you did not mention the arrival of a division from France and that makes all he difference in your appreciation. I will wire my plan to-morrow morning as it requires some careful thought . . .

Meanwhile, Nixon's October 3 telegram announcing his decision to concentrate at ‘Aziziya and move on London set off alarm bells at the India Office in London. On October 4, before seeing the telegram, the Military Secretary, General Barrow (See Part III) wrote a minute urging caution about any advance to Baghdad without reinforcements. The Secretary of State for India, Austen Chamberlain, supported the suggestion of the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, to withdraw the Indian divisions from France and create a reserve in India. Hardinge, as we have seen, felt India had been stripped bare of troops and feared the Germans and Turks might succeed in efforts to persuade the Amir of Afghanistan to attack India.On the 4th Chamberlain wired Harding asking about Nixon's intentions, and emphasizing that "if, owing to navigation troubles, there is no probability of catching and smashing the retreating enemy, there is no object in continuing the pursuit."

On the same day, Nixon telegraphed asking if an additional division would be provided from France so that he could hold Baghdad once taken. Note that the day before he had assured Townshend such a division was on the way.

On October 5, Townshend reached ‘Aziziya.

Also on the 5th, Chamberlain cabled Hardinge that the Cabinet was appointing a committee to consider the advance.but warning "Kitchener can hold out no hope  of reinforcements from Europe or Egypt."

The same day, Sir Percy Lake, Chief of Staff, India, cabled n assessment that Turkish forces in India were estimated at 7500 infantry, 600 cavalry and 28 guns, and that while Nixon had earlier said he did not expect the Turks to be reinforced, developments in the Balkans and Gallipoli could allow the Turks to reinforce in Mesopotamia. Lake argued that unless Nixon could be assured that an additional division could be withdrawn from France by the end of October, Nixon would not be authorized to go further. This was approved by the Commander-in-Chief, India, Beauchamp Duff, and the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge. Nixon was ordered by Lake to stop his advance:

No reinforcements can at present be spared from India, so that unless the Secretary of State can arrange for the despatch of an Indian division from France you cannot advance to Baghdad. This being so, we see no advantage in an immediate forward concentration at Aziziya which can hold no advantage to us except as a step to Baghdad. Chief considers you should not advance in strength beyond Kut el Amara until it is certain that we may expect reinforcements from France which we consider very doubtful.

But Townshend was already arriving at ‘Aziziya.

On October 6, the Political Department of the India Office generated a two-page memo, "Advance to Baghdad: Political Considerations." Beginning by quoting a telegram from Percy Cox saying that in terms of influencing events in Persia and Afghanistan the fall of Baghdad would be second in importance only to the fall of Constantinople itself, it discussed all the political ramifications, but also recognized that an occupation of Baghdad followed by withdrawal might have a negative effect.

On the 6th as well, the Government of India wired the India Office in London notifying them that Nixon had been ordered to halt but emphasizing the advantage of taking Baghdad and the dangers if it were taken and then abandoned, urging that one or both Indian divisions be withdrawn from France, and increasing the estimate of Turkish infantry available from 7,500 to 8,500.

Still on October 6, Nixon sent another telegram arguing for an advance. In keeping with his tone of optimism, he continued to push for an advance, but one phrase he included would lead to a major misapprehension in London:

Navigation difficulties have been overcome by lightening ships and utilising them for towing laden barges and by marching troops with land transport . . . Enemy appears to be no longer retreating but has occupied Ctesiphon position and thereby constitutes a threat to us. Our information is that his troops, especially those locally recruited, are so demoralised by defeat at Kut al Amara in a position which they considered impregnable.They are now so near Baghdad that Nur-ud-Din will have difficulty making a determined stand with men who are close to their homes and wish to desert. I consider that there is every probability of catching and smashing the enemy at Ctesiphon as soon as 6th Division has fully concentrated at Aziziya and reinforced by drafts and cavalry now on their way from Basra. If on the other hand we retire from Aziziya to Kut the enemy and whole tribes will place their own construction on such a movement.

 He went on to argue that the enemy was weakened and vulnerable and that the opportunity  to take Baghdad should not be missed. It was typical Nixon: dubious intelligence, underestimating Nureddin's morale, and special pleading. But in the next stage of the ongoing debate between Nixon, India, and London, those far from the scene would seize on that one line near the beginning, "Navigation difficulties have been overcome."

The subsequent qualifying phrases indicate that Nixon meant that the navigation difficulties had been temporarily overcome during Townshend's advance to ‘Aziziya.by the expedients of using land transport for the troops (slower and more difficult than river transports) and towed barges.Nixon continued and would continue to complain of the lack of shallow-draft boats.

But in the debate between Nixon, the various ministries in London, and the Indian Government in Simla, "Navigation difficulties have been overcome" was read as meaning just that, and the focus would shift to the question of finding sufficient troops. Despite continuing reluctance on the side of the Indian Government, the weight of the debate was about to shift, in part due to the political arguments rather than the military caution, toward the "On to Baghdad" side of the scales.

We are beginning a three-day holiday weekend in the US, after which the tale will continue in Part VI.

Genesis of a Quagmire: The Debate Over Advancing to Baghdad, 1915: Part IV: "Mission Creep," 1915 Style

The first three parts of this current series on Britain's disastrous decision to advance to Baghdad in October 1915, which would lead to the siege and disastrous surrender at Kut, concentrated on introducing the players in Mesopotamia/Iraq (Part I), the Indian Government and High Command (Part II), and the divided coalition Government in London (Part III), particularly the India Office and War Office. Since in what follows you may not be able to tell the players without a scorecard, please read those if you haven't already. You'll also find photos of all the principal players.


Origins: The Lure of Baghdad

Even before Britain declared war on Turkey on November 5, 1914, it had moved Indian Expeditionary Force D to the Persian Gulf to protect the Iranian oilfields around Abadan, with orders to occupy Basra once war broke out. And indeed, as early as November of 1914 there was some discussion of a campaign to take Baghdad. At the time, the British position was far too weak to consider such a plan militarily. The Indian Army was already being dispatched to France, Egypt, Mesopotamia and East Africa. In peacetime the Indian Army consisted of a strength of seven infantry divisions and five cavalry brigades, but in the first six months had mobilized 10 infantry divisions and seven cavalry brigades, now deployed elsewhere in the Empire. The Government of India felt stretched thin, and potentially vulnerable to internal dissidence or outside aggression in the Subcontinent itself, given the activity of German agents operating in Iran. It was believed that the Turks and Germans had sent a joint mission to the Amir of Afghanistan to persuade him to attack India. Though Turkish hopes of an uprising by Indian Muslims were never realized, a new Afghan war against an India stripped of troops was a serious concern.  For this reason and others, the Government of India and the India Office in London would prove reluctant to approve overly ambitious plans.

But after the Ottoman flanking attack aimed at Basra in April 1915, repulsed at the Battle of Shaiba, it became clear that the defense of Basra might require occupying more territory beyond the initial forward lines around Qurna. In June of 1915, General Townshend's force had advanced to ‘Amarna. In a case of "mission creep" before that term existed, each new advance required a further advance to protect what was already held. Adding to this was the fact that each time the Turkish forces fell back, they retreated as much as 90 miles, thus offering the British an opportunity to take more ground.

The political and military leaders of the era were products of the Victorian and Edwardian eras, when the Lane, Payne, and Burton translations of the 1001 Nights were bestsellers. At least some of the exchanges in the debate to follow suggest they had in mind the Baghdad of Harun al-Rashid, not the Ottoman provincial capital of 1915. At leat one appreciation (by the British Political Agent in the Gulf, Sir Percy Cox) suggested that the importance of the fall of Baghdad would be second only in terms of prestige in the Muslim world to the fall of Constantinople, which by the Fall of 1915 the British had realized was unlikely.

Even the military men in the debate to follow acknowledged that Baghdad had little military significance.

But in addition to a limited number of reinforcements from a stretched-thin Indian Army, a problem that had plagued the expedition was a shortage of shallow-draft river transport. (There were few adequate roads and no railroad south of Baghdad.) The Royal Navy dominated the Gulf as a British lake, but once over the bar at Fao, only river steamers could carry food at troops. Once into he Tigris or Euphrates above the marshes, in he dry season, only very shallow-draft steamers could operate, and the Turks had armed gunboats on the rivers. The shortage was constantly complained about by the generals in command, but the demands of other fronts and a shortage of proper vessels meant the problem was not really solved until early in 1916, by which time Townshend had already been besieged at Kut.


The Debate Begins

When Sir John Nixon had arrived to take command in April of 1915, his instructions contained  a directive to report on the feasibilty of an advance to Baghdad and to provide a plan.. He did not immediately do so. Though Nixon seems to have favored advancing on Baghdad the campaign was suspended while Townshend was on sick leave in India, where he apparently discussed te issue with the Commander-in-Chief, India, Sir Beauchamp Duff.

On August 30, 1915, a month before the Battle of Es-Sinn and the occupation of Kut, General Nixon wrote a "Memorandum on an advance to Baghdad," which was still not the "plan" mentioned in his instructions.  It was an argument for the political considerations of advantages to  be gained by the fall of Baghdad, and it suggested that if Townshend could take Kut in a decisive battle, the Turks might retreat the whole 100 miles to Baghdad. He favored a quick advance to Baghdad and argued that a delay would allow the Turks to reinforce. (Remember this was a month before Kut fell.)

The August 30 memorandum for some reason did not reach Duff until September 9, though most communications were by cable. On September 6, Duff had written Nixon with instructions not to advance beyond Kut without first referring to India.  Nixon would later claim to the investigating commission that he did not know the Government did not want him to advance, but besides the September 6 warning, after reading the Nixon memorandum, Duff responded, "Unless we get back troops from France, Egypt or elsewhere, I fear that Baghdad, invaluable as its capture may be is out of the question."

Also in September, before Kut was yet in British hands, the Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, had similarly communicated with the India office that while he recognized the political value of Baghdad he could not support a campaign without withdrawing one or both of the Indian divisions from France. This was to become a persistent theme: even Nixon would say that while he could take Baghdad with one division he could not hold it without two.

Advance to ‘Aziziya: Fait Accompli?

Despite what appeared to be fairly clear orders not to advance beyond Kut without explicit approval, from India, Nixon did just that, at least in effect by ordering Townshend to pursue the withdrawing Turkish forces After the victory at Es-Sinn on September 28 and the occupation of Kut on September 29, Nixon ordered Townshend to pursue the defeated Turks While this was technically a pursuit rather than an advance, it seemed to go against the intentions of the Government of India that he receive permission before advancing beyond Kut.

Nureddin Pasha was withdrawing to already prepared defenses at the ruins of Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad. Townshend's advance hampered by the usual river transport problems, put him a good 48 hours behind Nureddin, so overtaking him was unlikely. But without conferring with Simla or London, Nixon authorized Townshend to proceed to ‘Aziziya, some 60 miles by land (more by water), and more than halfway between Kut and Baghdad. See map below.) As Townshend struggled upriver, reaching ‘Aziziya October 5 with some difficulty, Nixon meanwhile was cabling his hopes of taking Baghdad, increasingly obsessed with the idea, creating increasing alarm (verging on panic) in Simla and the India Office in London.

That will be the subject of Part V.

Map 8, FJ. Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. II

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Genesis of a Quagmire: The Debate Over Advancing to Baghdad, 1915: Part III: A Divided Government in London

This ongoing series on the British decision to advance to Baghdad a century ago leadng to the siege and surrender at Kut, began with a discussion of the situation on both sides in the Mesopotamia campaign in September/October 1915, and continued yesterday by introducing the key political and military players in the government of British India which had overall responsibility for the campaign,

Today's Part III introduces the politically divided players in London. Tomorrow we will look at the decision itself.

The Coalition

Herbert Asquith

Earlier in 1915 the general configuration of the wartime British Government which we have met in earlier installments on the outbreak of war and Gallipoli, had changed substantially. The Liberal Party Government of Herbert Asquith had been in office since 1908. Though he would remain Prime Minister until ousted by his fellow Liberal David Lloyd George in 1916, a range of political and military controversies had forced him to form a coalition government in may 1915, bringing Conservatives and Labour into the Government. This led to several key changes.

Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and champion of the Gallipoli campaign (and who, it is easy to forget given his later career in the Conservative Party, was a Liberal MP during World War I) gave up the Admiralty and was given the relatively powerless job of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. He remained on the Dardanelles Committee for the time being, however, though in November he would resign from the government to rejoin the Army. Replacing Churchill at the Admiralty was Arthur James Balfour, a Tory former Prime Minister (and future Foreign Secretary, as Middle East hands will be aware).

The reshuffle also brought Conservative leader Andrew Bonar Law to join the Cabinet as Secretary of State for the Colonies, and saw a Ministry of Munitions created under David Lloyd George, taking that task away from the War Office, which remained under Lord Kitchener. Sir Edward Grey retained the Foreign Office.

Perhaps most importantly, by bringing the Tories into the Cabinet, the coalition increased the likelihood that counsels would be split on certain controversial issues.

For the issues being considered in this series, the major divisions would be between the India Office and the War Office. Let's meet the players there.

The India Office in London

Austen Chamberlain

In addition to the Government of India, there was also the India Office in London, to which the Government in Simla reported. Though part of the Cabinet, the India Office was the primary liaison between the Cabinet, through His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, with the Indian Administration in Delhi and Simla.

Since the Tories entered the coalition in May of 1915, the Secretary of State for India had been Austen Chamberlain. He was the son of Joseph Chamberlain, a onetime major figure in the Liberal Party who split with the Liberals over his opposition to Irish Home Rule, and joined the Tories. Austen was also the older half-brother of future Prime Minister of Munich notoriety, Neville Chamberlain.

Sir Edmund Barrow

Another figure who will enter into our story in the coming days is the Military Secretary to the India Office, a post responsible for recruiting British officers for the Indian Army. At the time of these vents, this was General Sir Edmund Barrow. Barrow was a veteran of colonial wars dating back to the 1870s, and will play a role in our narrative.

The War Office: Kitchener

Kitchener

At the outbreak of the war in August 1914, the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, Lord Kitchener, who was on home leave when the war broke out, was kept in Britain and made His Majesty's Secretary of State for War, in charge of the War Office. The victor of Khartoum had governed Egypt, been Army Commander in India and Chief of Staff during the Boer War.

Kitchener was, without question, Britain's most famous living soldier. He was popular with the public, and the use of his image in recruiting (right), later famously copied in the US with Uncle Sam wanting YOU, reflected this.

Kitchener's public popularity was not generally shared among his fellow Cabinet ministers, who found him difficult to deal with, or with his military subordinates, who found the imperial hero imperious and intimidating in manner. In normal times, the Secretary of State for War worked closely with the senior military command, headed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) and the General Staff. Between the outbreak of war in August 1914 and the end of 1915 four different men held the CIGS position. With the Field Marshal and Hero of Khartoum as their boss they found the job frustrating.

Murray

In October 1915, the period we are discussing, the CIGS was the third of these four, Sir Archibald Murray who served only from September to December. A veteran soldier, he would later say that the only time he was able to freely report his views  to the Cabinet was when Kitchener was away visiting the Dardanelles. We'll meet Murray again, as in January 1916 he was named Commander in Egypt, where he would oversee the beginnings of the Arab Revolt. (Which he supported; discard the image of Murray in the 1962 film Lawrence of Arabia; in the real world he and Lawrence admired each other)

Kitchener had seen his powers reduced under the coalition. After the so-called "Shell Crisis" earlier in 1915, involving a reported shortage of artillery shells, Asquith had created a separate Ministry of Munitions under David Lloyd George. He was increasingly criticized for embarking on military adventures without consulting the General Staff, but he would again ignore divided counsels in the decision to go on to Baghdad.

Genesis of a Quagmire: The Debate Over Advancing to Baghdad, 1915: Part II: The Indian Government's Role

In Part I of this series on Friday, I introduced the debate, after the first occupation of Kut in Iraq at the end of September 1915, over whether to go on and take Baghdad. Despite divided counsels, the decision to try was made and eventually led to the surrender of a besieged force at Kut in 1916, a major British defeat. This series revisits the argument and the contending views.

In Part I we met the dramatis personae on the ground in Iraq, or Mesopotamia as it was called by the British: General Sir John Nixon, commanding the overall Mesopotamian  font, and General Sir Charles Townshend, commanding the 6th (Poona) Indian  Division, and their Ottoman counterpart, Nureddin Pasha, commanding what was called the Iraq Area Command of the Ottoman Sixth Army.

Field Marshal von der Goltz

At the time the decision was made in the early days of October to go for Baghdad, the British Chain of Command was complicated by the conflicting chains of command of the Indian Army on the one hand, and the War Office and Cabinet in London on the other. Nureddin's chain of command was not so complicated but was changing: General Feldmarschall Colmar Freiherr (Baron) von der Goltz, a Prussian officer in his 70s recalled to duty when the war began, who had trained the Ottoman Army before the war, had been dispatched to Baghdad. Baron von der Goltz took over the Sixth Army in Baghdad in the middle of October 1915. (Neither the War Minister, Enver Pasha,  nor the head of the German Military Mission, Liman von Sanders, liked the old Baron and reportedly sent him to Baghdad in part to get him out of Constantinople.) He would be Nureddin's immediate superior for the first part of the campaign, later to be replaced due to illness by Governor of Baghdad Khalil (Halil) Pasha, who after the war would take his victory as a surname: Halil Kut. (All photos from Wikipedia.)

But the British Indian force under Nixon and Townshend faced a far more complicated  chain of command in India and in London, divided in counsel, and full of personal and political rivalries, especially in London. Earlier this year, I noted the complicated command chain for the British Intelligence Section in Cairo, but Cairo didn't have to involve the Government of India as well. Today I want to deal with the players in India; tomorrow we will look at the deeply  divided counsels in London.

In India: the High Command

Nixon and Townshend were British officers in the Indian Army, and wile ultimately responsible to the War Office in London, their direct chain of command ran directly to the indian Army High Command. Though Delhi was the official capital of the Raj, Indian Governments since Victoria's day had spent the warmer months in the "summer" capital at Simla in the northern mountains just south of Kashmir. Though we are discussing events in October 1915, the exchanges were with Simla.

The Viceroy, Lord Hardinge

At the pinnacle of the Indian Government was the Viceroy of India. Holding that post in October 1915, and having occupied it since 1910, was Lord Hardinge (Charles Hardinge, First Baron Hardinge of Penhurst) a veteran diplomat whose grandfather had also held the post (then called Governor-General). His eldest son died on the Western Front early in the War. The Viceroy was the British King-Emperor's representative in India. Keep in mind that since 1877, when Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India, the British monarch (now George V) was also Emperor of India. The Viceroy of India had more real administrative authority in India, however, than the King did in Britain. He (they were all male) was not a constitutional monarch, but the effective ruler of India.

The overall chief of all the Armed Forces in India, including those deployed in the Middle East and East Africa during World War I, was the Commander-in-Chief, India. In October 1915, this was General Sir Beauchamp Duff, a Scots-born officer who had risen through Indian Army service.  When named to the post in 1914 it was unusual as the post usually went to an officer from the Regular British Army rather than the Indian Army, but he had served under Lord Kitchener, which helped his rapid rise. (I'm not certain in his specific case, but the British, in their insistence on pronouncing French any way they please, normally pronounce the old Norman name "Beauchamp" as "Beecham.")

General Sir Beauchamp Duff

Duff was a skeptic about Mesopotamia from the beginning, as will be seen. When the war broke out, Hardinge asked for advice about the Mesopotamian expedition and Duff opposed it. By the time the adventure played out in the surrender at Kut the next year, Duff became the scapegoat for the so-called Mesopotamia Committee investigating the debacle. (Townshend and his officers were by then in a Turkish prison and could not be publicly blamed; Nixon had been replaced.) Though Duff had correctly seen the unwisdom of the whole enterprise, it ruined his career, and in early 1918 he committed suicide.

Lt.-Gen. Sir Percy Lake

Second in command under the Commander-in-Chief, India, was the Chief of General Staff, India. The post was not merely a deputy to the Commander-in-Chief, but also the effective head of the Indian Army (while the C-in-C ran all the Indian Armed Forces). At the time we are dealing with this was Lieutenant-General Sir Percy Lake, a veteran of Afghanistan and Sudan, and Chief of Staff since 1912. In January of 1916, after Townshend became besieged, he would replace Nixon as the commander in Mesopotamia.

All of these reported to the India Office in London, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, with the War Office, Foreign Office, Admiralty and other Cabinet offices helping (?) to stir the pot in a complicated and difficult coalition government. Those players will be introduced tomorrow. By Wednesday I may actually be able to start telling the story, but you need to know the players first.

Genesis of a Quagmire: The Debate Over Advancing to Baghdad, 1915: Part I

It has been some time since we looked at the British campaign in Mesopotamia (Iraq) a century ago. But in the last days of September and first days of October 1915, or a century ago right now, the British government in London, the British government of India in its summer capital in Simla, and some of the commanders on the ground (not all) made a hasty decision that, over the six months that would follow, would lead to the surrender of a British Empire army. Even as Britain was realizing its failure at Gallipoli and preparing to withdraw its Australian, New Zealand, and British troops from that particular disaster, it was creating another along the Tigris. Gallipoli wasted lives and accomplished little, but the British were able to withdraw and evacuate in late 1915 and early 1916. But in Mesopotamia, or "Mespot" as the soldiers named it, they would blunder into a months-long siege and ultimately surrender an Army at Kut. In this current series I want to look at how the fateful decision to take Baghdad was made, largely on political grounds rather than military (in fact, the plan was to take Baghdad and then withdraw). I will leave it to your own conclusions what parallels might be drawn with later foreign decision making in Mesopotamia.

First we should review some of the background so far. Even before the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers, Britain had determined to use Indian Army troops to protect the oilfields and refinery around Abadan in Iraq, and to do so, determined to take the port city of Basra in Ottoman territory.

For those wishing to refresh their memories, past blogposts on the beginnings of the campaign:

October 1914: Anglo-Ottoman Maneuvering in the Gulf, Part I

1914: Pre-War Maneuvering in the Gulf, Part II:Contesting the Shatt and the Dispatch of Force "D"

First Fights on the Road to Basra, November 6-12, 1914

The British Take Basra, November 21-23, 1914

The Battle of Shaiba, Iraq, April 12-14, 1915 

After each stage the British would test Ottoman defenses and move forward up the Tigris. further securing their Basra operational base. After Shaiba, the Ottoman leadership did not try to recapture Basra: the bulk of the Turkish fleet (and some German and Austrian vessels, were concentrated in the Mediterranean defending the Straits, or in the Black Sea against the Russians. British naval supremacy in the Gulf remained unchallenged. But as the British moved upriver, the big Royal Navy combatants could not follow, only riverboats. The original goal of securing Basra soon faded under the lure of Baghdad. (Remember the 1,001 Nights were widely read in 19th and early 20th century Britain.)

Dramatis Personae

Gen. Sir John Nixon, upstaged by his hat

In April of 1915, General Sir John Nixon had taken over as overall commander of the Mesopotamian campaign. An Indian Army officer and veteran of the small colonial wars of the Victorian era, Nixon was considered experienced, but not in wars against a major power.

The Ottoman commander on the Iraq front at this time was Nureddin Pasha (Nurettin Paşa). A member of the Committee on Union and Progress (the Young Turks) and a veteran of the occupation of Yemen and the Balkan Wars, he also took up his Iraq in April 1915 after his predecessor committed suicide.

Nureddin Pasha

Mesopotamia, particularly southern Mesopotamia, was not a priority for the Ottoman Minister of War, Enver Pasha. Constantinople itself was threatened by the Allied Forces at Gallipoli, and Russian troops were on Turkish soil on the Caucasus Front. Nureddin, who would later play a major role in the Turkish war of independence, was a fighter but the priority given to other fronts meant he lacked resources, particularly the farther he was from Baghdad.

Townshend

General Nixon was the overall theater commander, but the commander of the army column advancing upriver was Major General Sir Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend, Commander of the 6th Indian Division, a veteran of war in Sudan (decorated at Omdurman), in India, and in the Boer War. In June his column had reached ‘Amara. In September the advance had been resumed.
 

 On September 28 1925 at Es-Sinn near Kut al-‘Amara on the Tigris, the British Indian Army defeated an Ottoman force and occupied Kut. I won't go into the tactical details of the battle here, which Wikipedia handles fairly well; on September 29, the expedition occupied Kut, a place that will forever be linked (and not in a good way), with Townshend's name.

The fall of Kut was not an unalloyed success. Though Nureddin had lost, he was able to retreat safely upriver to the ruins of Ctesiphon. Indian Army casualties had been higher than anticipated, supply lines from Basra were now stretched thin, as was medical support. But there was another temptation before Nixon and Townshend: Kut was only 100 miles downriver from Baghdad.

The Bulgarian Factor
In the debate about advancing further to Baghdad that was to follow, British and Indian government officials had to take into account some broader geopolitical and strategic factors.

After the failure of the Suvla landings and the August offensive in Gallipoli to make any progress off the beaches, it was obvious to most that the forces would eventually have to be evacuated. A Western success, even a limited one, against the Ottomans might redeem a bit of the failure of Gallipoli. But there was a major strategic shift in the making.

Even only a year into the Great War, it was probably easy to forget that the war had begun over the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Austria's demand for revenge against Serbia. Austria had been kept quite busy dealing with Russia in the east and, from earlier in 1815, with Italy, which had entered the war on the Allied side. But it had also fought on the Serbian front and the Serbian Army was in serious trouble.

Bulgaria had been neutral in the war. It had pan-Slavic sympathies with Russia, but had lost territory to Serbia in the Second Balkan War. But by the Fall of 1915 the Central Powers had successfully wooed Bulgaria with temptations of recovering lost territory from Serbia, Romania (which would soon enter the war on Russia's side), and Greece. Bulgaria's Tsar Ferdinand cut a deal and at the time we are discussing, was poised to enter the war and invade a weakened Serbia from the south as Austria-Hungary pushed in from the north.

1915 German or Austrian postcard

But there was a big implication for the Ottomans. A pro-Central Powers Bulgaria and a defeated Serbia could mean unimpeded rail connections between Berlin and Vienna and Constantinople. German assistance could flow directly overland, and that would be a boon to the Ottomans. The German-language "Bulgarien mit uns!" postcard, while a bit of a step down from the Hohenzollern motto "Gott mit uns," reflects this. Bulgaria's entry would eventually bring Romania and Greece unto the fight, and tie down an Allied landing force at Thessalonika.

So in the debate over the "On to Baghdad" question, the impending entry of Bulgaria on the other side was also a factor in the Anglo-Indian calculus.

In Part II, we'll look at the debate itself.

September 9, 1915: Second Tangistani Attack on Bushire

In my ongoing recounting of some largely forgotten sidelights of the centennial of the First World War in the Middle East, we have several times looked at the circumstances surrounding the British occupation of the Iranian port of Bushire (Bushehr) and its hinterland in 1915. In July we discussed the first attack on the port by Tangistani rebels, and in August the occupation and destruction of the Tangistani base at Dilwar (Part I and Part II). The final act of the Tangistani conflict took place in September, culminating in a battle at Bushire on September 9, 1915, a century ago today. The earlier posts describe the essential background.

Once again this narrative is largely drawn from the India Office Records digitized through the Qatar Digital Library, mainly "Report from General Sir J E Nixon, K C B, Commanding IEF 'D', on the action at Bushire, 9th September 1915," as well as official histories.

In August he British Indian Army garrison at Bushire, originally made up of the 96th Berar Infantry, was reinforced with elements of the 11th Rajputs and a squadron of the 16th Cavalry. Brigadier General H.T. Brooking was the new garrison commander, backed up by a naval force headed by the Senior Naval Officer, Gulf, Captain Drury St Aubyn Wake, who was introduced in the earlier installments.

Delvari with Tangistani fighters

During August the Tangistani rebel, led by the charismatic local Khan, Ra'is ‘Ali Delvari, had been probing the British defense lines at Bushire. On September 3 they launched an attack which was quickly beaten back, but in the fighting  Ra'is ‘Ali was killed, reportedly assassinated by a traitor among his own men.

Thus by the time of the main attack on September 9, the Tangistanis had lost their leader.Though the British considered Ra'is ‘Ali as little more than a brigand Iran today honors him as a hero of anti-colonial resistance, and his house is now the Delvar Ethnological Museum.

The main attack came on September 9.The British reported the enemy advancing through nullahs (wadis or ravines, an Indian term), and across the mashila or low-lying tidal area between the Bushire peninsula and the mainland. Fortunately for the British, a Naval Landing Party and a unit of Royal Marines from HMS Pyramus were shore for training purposes.

During the early fighting, the Indian troops found themselves struggling to advance, but Brooking ordered naval gunfire from Juno and Pyramus and sent in his reserves, including the Royal Marines and Gurkhas he had held back finally breaking the lines with a bayonet charge The 16th Cavalry were then sent forward on to the mashila in pursuit.

Map of the Battle

Brooking reported 43 enemy dead on the battlefield, 14 wounded and four non-wounded prisoners. British losses included a British major and second lieutenant killed and another second lieutenant died of wounds, two Indian cavalry officers, two seamen, and 25 Indian rank and file dead, and multiple wounded.

Te death of Ra'is ‘Ali ended the immediate Tangistani threat, though tribal resistance to the British occupation would continue throughout the war.

February 3 and 4, 1915: The Turks Attack the Suez Canal

For several days now, I've been dealing with the preparations for the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal. A century ago yesterday and today, the attack came. The Turkish plan depended heavily on the element of surprise, but as we have seen, due to aerial reconnaissance, British knew where the Ottomans were advancing. Ottoman hopes for a rising in Egypt against the British also failed.

Excerpts from the British Official History are available online from the Australian Light Horse Studies Centre, while the Official Naval History is excerpted here; as a result I will let those works tell the bulk of the story, interspersing my own comments occasionally

FROM the 31st January onwards the British troops stationed along the Canal expected the attack at any moment and, having had ample warning of its approach, awaited it with confidence.

The dispositions of the enemy, so far as they could be discovered, were on the 1st February as follows:

At Bir Habeita, 6 miles east of Serapeum, at least 2,500 infantry and apparently two guns; at Moiya Harab, 30 miles to the south-east and in a position such that they might be intended either to reinforce the former body or to strike at the 1st Sector in the neighbourhood of Shallufa, about 8,000 men; further north, at Bir el Mahadat, 10 miles E.N.E, of El Ferdan, about 3,000 men. On the other hand, trenches which had been dug by the Turks 5 miles north-east of Qantara now seemed to have been evacuated, and behind, at Bir ed Dueidar, only about 300 men could be seen, though the palm grove of this oasis was certainly large enough to conceal many more. In rear, on the northern Sinai route at Bir el Abd, 40 miles east of the Canal, and at El Arish on the Palestine frontier ; on the southern route at Nekhl ; there appeared to be further considerable forces.

No move by the Turks was detected on this day but for a slight advance opposite Ismailia Ferry Post, as a result of which the bridgehead there and Bench Mark Post, 2 miles to north of it, were reinforced. A little further north small bodies of the enemy in the desert east of El Ferdan were scattered by the fire of H.M.S. Clio from her station near Ballah.

Ottoman advance on the Canal

On the morning of the 2nd February it was discovered by patrols from Ismailia Ferry Post that there had been a further advance opposite that point during the night. Small detachments which moved out from the bridgehead made contact with the enemy and were in action till about 3.30 p.m. A high wind, which had grown stronger as the day wore on, whipped up the sand till the troops found themselves almost in darkness, and aerial reconnaissance became impossible. The enemy showed no immediate intention of coming to close quarters. He apparently entrenched himself in the evening 22 miles south-east of the British defences.

A French naval officer, Enseigne de vaisseau Potier de la Morandière, thus describes the reconnaissance from the Ferry Post:

On the hills, ten or fifteen kilometres from the Canal, we could see numerous traces on the sand of the columns which had moved "forward during the night. But in the plain there was nothing. The desert, in its high light, looked like a smooth cloth, but was in "reality cut by numerous depressions in which troops could be hidden. The first patrols which moved out were met by rifle fire. They were reinforced; then artillery was sent out to their support. At my side was a battery of Indian mountain artillery, commanded by a young English officer, the only European in it. He had just been ordered to go forward. A sharp command and, in a few seconds, before we could see how it was done, the guns which had been in position were packed on the mules and the column was on the move.

Meanwhile there had sprung up a sand storm which hid everything from view. I went out on to a dune with the English colonel in command of the post. But there it was even worse. Even to keep one's eyes open was horrible torture. And to think that people were fighting out in that. In the evening the detachments came in, one after another, the officers cursing the sand, the wind and the enemy, who had fallen back before them. Then quiet fell and we began to think there had been a false alarm.

Not only at the Ferry Post but on the whole twenty mile front from Deversoir to El Ferdan the British outposts were in touch with the enemy during the day. The Clio again came into action, driving the groups on which she fired out of range.

It was now more than ever certain that the attack would fall upon the central hector, though still unknown whether its main weight would be directed north or south of Lake Timsah. In view of the enemy's activity in front of El Ferdan further reinforcements were brought up to that point: an armoured train with four platoons of New Zealand infantry, and two platoons to support the 5th Gurkhas in the post on the east bank. In that part of the sector between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah there were now the following troops:-

19th Lancashire Battery R.F.A. (T) (four 15-pdrs.);
5th Battery Egyptian Artillery (four mountain guns and two maxims);
1st Field Company East Lancashire Royal Engineers (T) (two sections);
22nd Indian Infantry Brigade, less 3rd Brahmans (62nd and 92nd Punjabis, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles);
2nd Q.V.O. Rajputs;
Two Platoons 128th Pioneers (escort to the Egyptian battery);
137th (Indian) Field Ambulance.

Of these there were six companies on the east bank; two of the 92nd Punjabis in the Tussum Post, two of the 92nd in that of Serapeum, and two of the Gurkhas at Deversoir. On the west bank were eleven posts each held by two platoons, [The total number of posts between the two lakes was twelve, but No. 1 Post on the left, which was protected by the large lagoons at the southern end of Lake Timsah, consisted of a half platoon only. It manned an observation post on a dune known as Gebel Mariam, just west of the point where the Canal channel enters the lake.], each platoon on a frontage of some 600 yards and finding three sentry posts 200 yards apart. In reserve at Serapeum were three companies. At the first sign of the attack a company of the 62nd Punjabis was ordered up from here to the danger point, mile-post 47.4, a little south of Tussum, and this company was subsequently reinforced by six platoons of the 2nd Rajputs.

1. The sand storm continued into the night. The Indian sentries, peering into the darkness, their faces screened in their puggarees and the breeches of their rifles wrapped round with rags, saw and heard nothing till 3.25 a.m. on the 3rd February, when an observation post at Tussum heard troops passing south-east of the post and towards the Canal bank. A moment later loud shouting and howling broke out south of the post. [The noise, in defiance of strict orders, was made by irregulars, "the Champions of Islam," calling upon Allah and adjuring the attackers to die for the faith.] Major T. R. Maclachlan, who was in command, moved a machine gun and half a platoon down to the southern flank of the post to rake the east bank. The shouting thereupon ceased and the enemy replied with ineffective machine-gun fire. 

Still there was nothing to be seen. Then the moon, only two days past full, emerged from the clouds, and dark masses were discerned moving slowly down the gullies on the east bank towards the water. Presently these masses were discovered to be pontoons and rafts carried by squads of men. At 4.20 a.m. the Egyptian battery, which had moved to this point the previous day and dug in on the top of the high west bank in order to obtain a field of view, opened fire, with good results, for it was soon observed that the two foremost pontoons had been abandoned. With the assistance of rifle fire from the 62nd Punjabis and 128th Pioneers at Post No. 5, the battery checked most of the attempts of the enemy to carry his craft down to the water.

It is not clear whether the Turks had intended to make their first crossing at this point or whether the other detachments moving on the Canal had been slightly delayed in the darkness by the rough ground. At all events, within a few minutes gangs carrying pontoons appeared upon the east bank on a frontage of a mile and a half from a short distance north of the point of the first attempt. The rapid fire of the defenders caused most of the craft to be abandoned on the bank, while the pontoons which reached the water were quickly holed and sunk.

A captured pontoon

Three pontoons only crossed the Canal, under cover of heavy machine-gun and rifle fire now opened by the enemy from the sand-dunes close to the east bank. To the south, a boat-load of Turks landed opposite mile-post 43.3, on the front of Post No. 6. The party was instantly charged with the bayonet by a small body under Major O. St. J. Skeen, 62nd Punjabis, and all killed or wounded. The other two boat-loads landed at the original point, opposite mile-post 47.6. This party was at once attacked by Captain M. H. L. Morgan and Lieut. R. A. FitzGibbon with small detachments of the 62nd Punjabis and 128th Pioneers from Post No. 5. [Both officers were wounded, the latter mortally, though, after being hit, he ran a considerable distance with a message to the Egyptian battery of which he commanded the escort.] Six Turks were killed and four wounded; about twenty escaped and hid under the west bank, where they were later rounded up and captured by a party of the 2nd Rajputs. The small parties which made these gallant attacks were the only Turks to cross the Suez Canal, save as prisoners, in the course of the war. Six months later a few raiders swam the Canal near Qantara and placed sticks of dynamite on the railway line. These, however, were probably native smugglers, who had taken Turkish pay when their peacetime occupation was gone.

The Fighting in the Tussum-Serapaeum Sector

The fire from the east bank was intense and well directed, and casualties among the defenders began to mount up. But as the light improved it was seen how roughly the enemy had been handled. His iron pontoons, rafts 2 and other abandoned material littered the east bank, along which also lay many dead. His surprise crossing had been a complete failure. The pontoons were of the German service pattern, of galvanized iron, each capable of holding about 20 men. There were also a number of rafts, subsequently found to consist of a light wooden framework filled with empty kerosene tins. They were 15 feet long by 12 feet wide and equipped with long-necked crutches to enable them to be rowed across.

Yet the Turkish command had by no means abandoned hope. At dawn an attack was launched against Tussum Post, and the enemy artillery began to shell the British positions, the warships in the Canal, and merchant shipping moored in Lake Timsah. The Hardinge and Requin in turn opened fire upon parties of Turkish infantry in the desert, as they became visible, and by the time it was daylight the action was general. It was now discovered that the Turks were holding a trench 200 yards south of Tussum Post, facing westward. Enfilade fire from the machine guns in the post practically destroyed this party. It was next found that a larger body of the enemy, some 350 strong, had made a lodgement in the British day trenches east and south of the post. At 7 a.m. a counter-attack from the southern flank of the post, led by Captain H. M. Rigg, 92nd Punjabis, recaptured a portion of these trenches and took 70 prisoners. At 11 a.m. a further counter-attack was carried out against the day trenches by Lieut. J. W. Thomson-Glover, 35th Sikhs, attached 92nd Punjabis, from the northern end of the post. This was completely successful, though not until 3.30 p.m. were the whole of the trenches regained. In all 7 Turkish officers and 280 other ranks were captured or killed and a quantity of material taken in these trenches.

Br.-General S. Geoghegan, commanding the 22nd Indian Brigade, observing at 6.30 a.m. that there was no sign of an attack south of Serapeum, decided to collect at that point sufficient troops to clear the Turks still in front of or south of Tussum Post out of the trenches and sandhills. Two companies of the 2/10th Gurkhas with their machine guns moved up from Deversoir to Serapeum, where six platoons of the 2nd Rajput had also been collected. Crossing by the ferry, two platoons of the Rajputs with the two companies of the 92nd Punjabis from the post on their right, began at 8.40 a.m. to advance up the east bank towards Tussum. As this movement continued, the enemy broke in surprisingly large numbers from hummocks and sandhills in the neighbourhood of the point from which his southern boat-load had crossed during the night. But at the same moment a considerable Turkish force came into the open some three miles to the north-east, deployed, and, supported by two batteries,' began to advance in the direction of Serapeum Post. The force which carried out this attack was afterwards found to have been the 74th Regiment, 25th Division; the other two regiments of that division, the 73rd and 75th, having already been committed to the attack against Tussum Post and the Canal immediately south of it. Behind the 7th Regiment the 28th of the 10th Division, Djemal Pasha's reserve, also advanced, though how nearly it approached the Canal is not clear.

Against this superior force the British counter-attack was unable to continue. The Rajputs, pushing on along the bank, came under heavy fire and lost the officer commanding the detachment, Captain R. T. Arundell, before they were brought to a standstill. The Punjabis were concentrated on the right to face the Turkish attack, and six platoons of the 2/10th Gurkhas moved up into support, the whole detachment on the east bank being now under the command of Lieut.-Colonel F. G. H. Sutton, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. But the little force held its ground and its determined front brought the enemy's attack to a standstill, nowhere nearer than 1,200 yards to the British line. A second cause of the failure on the part of the Turks to press the attack was probably the fire of the French warships Requin and D'Entrecasteaux, of which more will be said later.

The abandoned pontoons lying along the Asiatic bank constituted a certain danger, as there was a possibility of their being again employed after the fall of darkness, should the enemy re-establish himself in force upon the bank. About 7.45 a.m. Br.-General Geoghegan requested Lieut.-Commander G. B. Palmes, R.N., in command of T.B. 043 at Deversoir, to destroy these. The torpedo boat moved up the Canal, firing two rounds from its 3-pdr, into each pontoon. 3 Feb. Lieut.-Commander Palmes then landed to see if any still lay behind the east bank, and succeeded in blowing up two more with gun-cotton. Finally he almost walked into a trench full of Turks, but succeeded in regaining his dinghy.

While the attacks on Tussum and Serapeum were in progress, another Turkish force, advancing from the southeast, threatened Ismailia Ferry Post, on the other side of Lake Timsah. [This force consisted of the 68th regiment, 23rd Division.] This attack was never seriously pressed, the enemy's advanced troops entrenching some eight hundred yards from the defences. On the other hand his artillery, well handled, speedily became menacing. It appeared that the two field batteries were in action in support of the infantry, while from far out in the desert a 15-cm. howitzer battery also opened fire.

At 8.15 a.m. these guns, which had been directed against the Hardinge but had hitherto been shooting short, began to straddle the ship. First a ricochet carried away the wireless aerial. A few minutes later a high explosive shell struck the forward funnel, another the base of the after funnel; next a shell from one of the heavy howitzers burst over the fore part of the ship, causing casualties to the guns' crews. The steering gear was damaged and the fore stokehold rendered untenable. It was only too evident to Commander Linberry that the heavy guns had his range exactly. If he remained where he was there was considerable risk that his ship, unarmoured and highly vulnerable, would be sunk in the channel. At 8.45 a.m., therefore, the Hardinge slipped and proceeded to anchor in Lake Timsah, outside the fairway. The heavy howitzers fired only three or four rounds more at her, then switched to another target.

The artillery defence of Tussum now fell largely upon the Requin, [The Requin, whose specially dredged berth had been long chosen, had made preparation for the defence of the Sector by placing numerous range-marks in the desert. Her role was, in fact, that of a floating battery.], the only warship in the area, except the armed tug Mansourah and T.B. 043, both armed with light guns. She was searching for the enemy's field artillery and shelling small groups of infantry in front of Ismailia Ferry Post with her 10-cm. guns when she came under the fire of the 15-cm howitzers which had previously engaged the Hardinge.

She could not find the enemy battery, the shooting of which became more and more accurate. Presently it straddled the ship and the situation became uncomfortable. The crews of the 10-cm. guns, which had no protection, were moved beneath the shelter of the steel deck, and a bigger head of steam raised in case the ship should have to shift her moorings. One 27.4-cm. turret gun alone remained in action, at first without effect. But at 9 o'clock a puff of smoke was observed in the desert, corresponding with the fall of a big shell near the ship. It was estimated that the Turkish howitzers were firing from a point 9,200 metres distant. Fire was accordingly opened with the turret gun at ranges varying from 9,000 to 9,500 metres. After the third round the heavy howitzer fire ceased suddenly and was not resumed, a serious danger to the Canal being thus removed.

The Requin did further good work opposite Tussum and Serapeum, aided by the cruiser D'Entrecasteaux. The latter had received orders to move up and replace the disabled Hardinge. Subsequently these orders were cancelled, as the flagship Swiftsure was on her way down from Qantara to carry out that task. The D'Entrecasteaux therefore moved about three-quarters of a mile north of Deversoir and then received the wireless message: "Repulse the attack on Serapeum." She could see Requin's shells bursting east of that point and she herself at once opened fire with her 14-cm. guns. The crossfire from the heavy guns of the two French ships was now therefore directed upon the area of the Turkish deployment. It was probably in great measure owing to the moral effect of the melinite that the Turkish troops could not here be induced to advance.

The enemy had now been definitely repulsed between Serapeum and Tussum. His artillery continued to shell the west bank intermittently till 2 p.m., when fire ceased. The silence that followed indicated that the action had been broken off, and bodies of Turks were soon seen moving eastward, to be hastened on their way by the 24-cm. gun of the D'Entrecasteaux, firing at extreme range. The force under Lieut.-Colonel Sutton which had carried out the counter-attack now withdrew to its former position north of Serapeum. About half an hour later a small body of the enemy occupied the ridge which it had evacuated, but was shelled off it by the British artillery.

Opposite Ismailia the enemy's artillery persisted longer, numerous shells falling in the bridgehead and camp, though 3 Feb. without causing any casualties. But at 3.30 p.m. the Requin apparently silenced a battery firing on the shipping in the Timsah, and here, as further south, the action now died down.

Reinforcements of the 31st Indian Brigade, which began to arrive at Serapeum at 4.30 p.m., were not required, but they were retained in positions of close support at various points in view of the possibility that the offensive would be renewed. Major-General A. Wallace, commanding the 11th Indian Division, took over command of the front between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah. The Swiftsure had now taken up the former berth of the Hardinge, the Ocean had also moved to this part of the front, and the Hardinge had been sent to replace the Swiftsure at Qantara.

Further reinforcements for the front at Ismailia, consisting of Headquarters 2nd Australian Brigade, with the 7th and 8th Battalions Australian Infantry, arrived in the town during the evening. All was ready for the fresh attack which, it seemed probable, would have to be met in the morning. The night passed quietly, save for some musketry fire from the east bank south of Tussum Post.

Elsewhere the attacks on the Canal had been of minor importance, nowhere pressed with energy sufficient to give Major-General Wilson a moment's inquietude or uncertainty as to the enemy's real plan. In the Suez sector the enemy did not come to close quarters. Fire was exchanged between a small detachment and the post on the east bank at El Kubri, after which the Turks withdrew.

Against El Ferdan, the northernmost post of the 2nd Sector, the infantry attack was equally feeble. There had been some firing on this part of the front before dawn, and daylight discovered two lines of trenches dug about two and a half miles from the Canal. On these the Clio opened fire.

Soon after 9 a.m. two Turkish field guns began firing on the railway station, making good practice and securing several direct hits. The Clio located and engaged these guns within less than half an hour, whereupon the Turks turned their attention to her, continuing to do remarkably pretty shooting. She was hit twice and had some small damage done to one of her guns, but she sustained no casualties among her crew. By 10.30 a.m. she had silenced the Turkish guns. During the afternoon she had further practice against bodies of the enemy seen falling back towards the northeast.

At Qantara, in the 3rd Sector, there was a rather stronger attack, between 5 and 6 a.m., upon two piquets furnished by the 89th Punjabis. The machine guns and rifles of the piquets caused heavy loss to the enemy when he came up against the British barbed-wire defences, and he was driven off without difficulty. Thirty-six prisoners were subsequently brought in here and 20 dead found outside the wire. These figures did not represent the whole of the enemy's losses, as he carried off further dead and wounded in his retirement.

These feint attacks had all been conducted with so little resolution as to fail completely in their object. There were known to be further detachments of the enemy in the Suez Sector in the neighbourhood of posts other than at El Kubri, but they did not appear within machine-gun range of Baluchistan, Gurkha or Shallufa.

Although the British pursued  into Sinai, the Turkish withdrawal proved to be rapid and nearly complete.

Suez Canal Notes: Auchinleck and the 62nd Punjabis at Suez 1915

Badge of the 62nd Punjabis

Tomorrow, February 3, marks the 100th anniversary  of the Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal in 1915. I'll be narrating the battle tomorrow, but I thought I'd anticipate it with a vignette of one Indian Army Regiment that distinguished itself in the battle, the 62nd Punjabi Regiment.

This regiment's lineage traced to an Indian Army unit formed in 1759, and which had served under Arthur Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington) in one of his first great victories, at Assaye in 1803.

It arrived in Egypt in December 1914. As fate would have it, the 62nd happened to be deployed near the Tussum Post on the Canal, at the site of what would be the only point where Turkish pontoons actually reached the west bank of the Canal. Only three pontoons made it across.

Two landed at mile 47.6, and a third at milepost 43.3. The Turks (actually Syrians of various ethnicities from the 23rd Homs and 25th Damascus Divisions. The 62nd Punjabis attacked and killed or captured the Turks who made it ashore. Naik Safdar Ali and Sepoy Sher Khan of the 62nd rushed forward; Safdar Ali was killed and Sher Khan badly wounded; both won the Indian Order of Merit.

Naik Safdar Ali (source)

The next day, the 62nd was instrumental in pushing the Turks back from British trenches they had occupied on the east bank of the Canal, Havildar Muhammad Azim distinguished himself and won yet another Order of Merit.

The 62nd went on to fight hard in Mesopotamia, One of its British captains at the Canal battle was getting his first taste of combat, but not his last: Captain Claude Auchinleck, better known in World War II as Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (and to his men as "the Auk"), commander in the early stages at El Alamein and the last British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. Captain Auchinleck is standing at far right in this photo from Egypt in December 1914 of the officers of the 62nd Punjabis:

The 62nd Punjabis later became the 1st Battalion, 1st Punjab Regiment, and  at Partition in 1947 were allocated to the new Pakistani Army. Today, as the ist Battalion, the Punjab Regiment of the Army of Pakistan, they are said to enjoy the oldest unit lineage of any Indian Army regiment still in existence.