# Chapter 1

# MORALE AND COHESION IN MILITARY PSYCHIATRY

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# INTRODUCTION

One of the enduring legacies of World War II military psychiatry was the recognition that the incidence of psychiatric casualties in various units had more to do with characteristics of the unit than with characteristics of the casualties themselves.[1] Present day writers might use the term *social support* instead of *group identification*, *group cohesiveness*, or *group bonds*, but nowhere in civilian life is the social group of such major and crucial importance in the life of the individual as it is for the soldier in combat.

This was apparent to Spiegel[2], a psychiatrist inadvertently assigned as an infantry battalion medical officer during the very first American combat action in North Africa in World War II. It did not take much first hand experience for him to puzzle not about why some men broke, but how so many could push on for so long in such miserable conditions. He rejected the notion that these men were peculiarly tough characters who loved to fight, and he noted that they expressed very little real hate for the enemy. Instead, Spiegel suggested that it was regard for comrades, respect for leaders, concern for their reputation with both of those groups, and an urge to contribute to the success of the unit that kept them fighting. These cohesive forces, which Spiegel called the basis for the X factor underlying good morale, "was something that often decided whether or not a man became a psychiatric casualty".[2(p116)]

Other psychiatrists came to similar conclusions from their experiences with casualties. Weinstein for example described the typical "combat-induced neurosis" case as "a frightened, lonely, helpless person whose interpersonal relationships have become disrupted . . . He had lost the feeling that he was part of a powerful group and had become instead a lonely and frightened person whose efforts to protect himself were doomed to failure."[3(p307)] A special commission of civilian psychiatrists headed by Menninger pointed to the nature of precipitating incidents as confirmation of the critical importance of "the soldier's position in the constellation of his social group, the combat team".[4(p369)] The actual event which finally overwhelmed the psychiatric casualty's defenses varied widely, but the common denominator, according to the commission, was not so much that they were the last straw in any quantitative way, but rather that they involved a sudden change in the soldier's relationship to his group. Somehow he had lost his place as a member of the team, whether it was he who changed or the team. In either case, alone, he was overwhelmed and disorganized.

Additional support for the assertion of Glass[1] that began this chapter came from some of the many pioneering survey studies of Stouffer and colleagues[5] in the Research Branch of the War Department's Information and Education Division. They questioned men from over 100 companies undergoing pre-D-day training and compared the subsequent nonbattle casualty (all medical losses except wounded in action and killed and action) rates of these same companies in Normandy. Their data showed a correlation of -.33 between nonbattle casualties and pre-invasion morale. For heavy weapons companies, the correlation was -.41. A division commander could in fact have used preinvasion morale scores to sort his rifle companies into thirds. The lowest scoring third ultimately suffered 62% more nonbattle casualties than the highest scoring third.

As a result of these World War II observations, morale, and group identification suddenly emerged as concepts of great importance to military medicine, but practitioners and students of warfare have known for more than 2,000 years that ". . .not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them".[6(p3)] Tolstoy, like Spiegel, used the term "an unknown quantity, x" to indicate ". . .the spirit of the army, the greater or less desire to fight and face dangers on the part of all the men composing the army... ."[7(p198)] *Morale*, *cohesion*, and *esprit de corps* are the terms that this century's military have given to this unknown X, and it is these terms that provide the frame of reference for this chapter.

The first part of this chapter will lay out in some detail the ways in which influential authors, civilian and military, have used these terms, provide consensus definitions, and propose a set of relationships among them. The next part of the chapter deals with the individual and organizational determinants of morale, and the final part of the chapter deal with methods of assessing morale in military units. Most of the examples and evidence are focused on land warfare, but the general principles

involved are applicable to sailors and airmen as well. Last, the chapter is predominantly descriptive rather than prescriptive. This is a consequence of my faith in the ability of my military mental health colleagues of the, Army, Navy and Air Force, to deduce specific advice appropriate to their particular situations from a comprehensive description of general truths.

## KEY CONCEPTS

### The Meaning of Morale

The term *morale* is one which has appeared in an ever-growing number of contexts, industrial, educational, and medical as well as military. Unfortunately, the term seems to have sharply different meanings in each of these contexts. In more recent applications it often seems to refer primarily to a person's sense of well-being, happiness, job or life satisfaction. The U.S. Army, for example, provides such a definition of morale in its *Field Manual on Leadership*:

> Morale is defined as the mental, emotional, and spiritual state of the individual. It is how he feels - happy, hopeful, confident, appreciated, worthless, sad, unrecognized, or depressed.[8(p228)]

Bartone[9] has argued, persuasively, that if morale is just a synonym for happiness or mood, then it probably serves no useful purpose. Earlier conceptions of morale, both military and industrial, included an element of mood or emotional state, but tied it closely to a goal-oriented group. Munson, for example, organized the Morale Branch of the U.S. Army General Staff during World War I, defining morale as the "determination to succeed in the purpose for which the individual is trained, or for which the group exists."[10(p97)] In his classic study of the Second Scottish Rifles, Baynes devoted 16 pages to the definition of morale, which he called "the most important single factor in war."[11(p1)] He concluded with the following dictionary definition:

> A confident, resolute, willing, often self-sacrificing and courageous attitude of an individual to the functions or tasks demanded or expected of him by a group of which he is a part that is based upon such factors as pride in the achievements and aims of the group, faith in its leadership and ultimate success, a sense of fruitful participation in its work, and a devotion and loyalty to the other members of the group. [11(p108)]

Others are more succinct. Grinker and Spiegel, for example, defined morale simply as "the psychological forces within a combat group which impel its members to get into the fight." [12(p37)] Leighton[13]

maintained that morale is the capacity of any group of people to pull together consistently for a common purpose. Lord Moran[14(p95)] described morale as "the ability to do a job under any circumstances to the limit of one's capacity." He contrasted the soldier with high morale, who does his duty without the constant threat of punishment, to those of the Peninsular War, who did their job "because the fear of flogging was greater than the fear of death."[14(p162)]

Shibutani[13] provided a picture of a military unit with high morale in his study:

> An organized group is characterized as having high morale when it performs consistently at a high level of efficiency, when the tasks assigned to it are carried out promptly and effectively. In such units each member is likely to contribute his share willingly doing what he believes to be worthwhile and assuming that his associates will do their part. When necessary, the men help one another without even being asked. Mutual encouragement is commonplace, and those whose zeal is exemplary are singled out for praise. The few who do not share the prevailing orientation feel pressures to comply: those who fail repeatedly to live up to expectations are scorned as "slackers," and efforts may be made to expel them from the group. The successful completion of each transaction occasions no surprise; it is the expected thing. Members of such groups usually place a high evaluation on themselves. They often develop a strong sense of identification with each other; they develop pride in their unit, become conscious of its reputation, and take pleasure in displaying emblems of belonging to it. [15(p4)]

Motowidlo et al[16] attempted to summarize definitions of both industrial psychologists and military writers by arguing that most definitions include some aspects of satisfaction, motivation, and group membership. While the industrial model has certainly become relevant for peacetime garrison armies,[17] job satisfaction must be taken in a very relativistic way in the wartime situation. Evonic[18] also provided a tripartite view of morale similar to that of Motowidlo et al[16] but more easily applicable to armies in combat as well as armies in garrison. Evonic's three dimensions are concern for the orga-

nizational aim, commitment to the group's identity, and personal factors related to self-confidence.

Smith[19] and Gal and Manning[20] came to similar three-component views, with the former relying on interviews of Australian infantrymen, and the latter relying on factor analyses of survey data from Israeli and American combat arms soldiers. Motowidlo et al[16], Evonic[18], Smith[19], and Gal and Manning[20] also have in common a view of morale as an individual-level attribute, rather than something which is characteristic only of groups, as the quotations from Leighton, and from Grinker and Spiegel[12] might imply. It is this view I adopt in this chapter, considering morale as a characteristic of individuals, albeit only individuals in goal-oriented groups. Groups "with high morale" would then simply be groups a large proportion of whose members have high morale. We thus arrive at a working definition of morale applicable in both wartime and peacetime, emphasizing membership in a group and willing participation in the group's work: *Morale is the enthusiasm and persistence with which a member of a group engages in the prescribed activities of that group.*

In this chapter I identify morale, so defined, with Spiegel's X-factor. Two other concepts, cohesion and esprit, often used uncritically as synonyms of morale, I view as major contributors to morale, but distinct from it and from each other. In the next two sections of this chapter, I will clarify these distinctions before turning to a wider ranging discussion of morale's determinants, in which cohesion and esprit are subsumed under the category of *group factors*.

**The Meaning of Cohesion**

The importance of group solidarity for effective military performance has been a staple of military doctrine for 2500 years. For most of this time it has been reflected in the elevation of close-order drill to near sacramental status, that is, physical unity was the explicit goal. As weaponry improved to the point where time-honored battle formations like the phalanx, the infantry square, and the line had to give way to dispersion, cover and concealment, the need for psychological unity became more apparent. DuPicq called this psychological unity *moral cohesion* and claimed that "As the ranks become more open, and the material cohesion of the ranks not giving confidence, it must spring from a knowledge of comrades, and a trust in officers ..."[21(p115)] He is more explicit in another place, where he says that which makes a soldier capable of obedience and direction in action includes: "Respect for and confidence in his chiefs; confidence in his comrades and fear of their reproaches and retaliation if he abandons them in danger; his desire to go where others do without trembling more than they." [21(p122)]

America's great combat historian Marshall made much the same observation in his summary of his World War II experiences: "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the presence or near-presence of a comrade."[22(p42)] Later, Marshall answers the question of what makes a soldier face death bravely: "Largely the same things that induce him to face life bravely—friendship, loyalty to responsibility and the knowledge that he is a repository of the faith and confidence of others."[22(p161)]

Military psychiatrists grappling with the "neuropsychiatric casualties" of World War II came to a conclusion remarkably close to Marshall's. The war forced them from a view of such casualties as unfortunate aberrations best explained by their own weakness and an unusually stressful incident, to seeing battle fatigue as a normal and natural consequence of extended combat, staved off by some better than others only by virtue of supportive relations to their unit and leaders. Little's[23] work on the "buddy" relationships of Korean War soldiers, Marlowe's[22] study of basic training, and Moskos'[17] observations in Vietnam have put more emphasis on the instrumental, pragmatic, and situationally specific aspects of primary group "bonding," but nevertheless reinforced the central role of these interpersonal relationships for both psychological well-being and military performance.

In the 1980's the U.S. Army recognized the risk of leaving cohesion development to the hardships of war and made an explicit and unprecedented attempt to foster cohesion. The most visible effort in this regard has been the Unit Manning System, which has shifted the whole basis of assigning and moving soldiers from an individual basis to one based on units of up to company size. This attempt to provide sufficient stability in interpersonal relationships for cohesion to flourish stemmed from then Chief of Staff Edward Meyer,[23] who defined unit cohesion as: "...the bonding together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, the unit, and mission accomplishment, despite combat or mission stress.

Like the military definitions of morale, this definition makes no mention of satisfaction or well-being, and explicitly includes commitment to mission accomplishment as well as commitment to the

unit. Unit cohesion should thus be seen as a contributor to morale, albeit a very important one, rather than a synonym or a related but independent concept. A second implication of this definition, and the reason that the word "unit" was appended, is that most of the academic literature on cohesion is based on a definition of cohesion entirely focused on interpersonal attraction with no consideration of the member's enthusiasm for chosen or assigned tasks.[24] Adding unit to cohesion directs attention to a group focused on a task.

A third noteworthy aspect of "unit cohesion," not so obvious in General Meyer's definition, concerns the size of the 'unit' involved. Little's[21] observations on the predominance of a 2-person 'buddy system' in Korea suggests that having just one other soldier to rely on goes a long way, and the seminal World War II papers repeatedly uses the term "primary group," defined as one characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. As Ingraham[25] has shown, even for the peacetime soldier, at least the single barracks dweller, this pretty much draws the upper bound at the company level.

None of this is to deny that soldiers may take great pride in, draw great strength from, and on occasion give their lives for organizations far larger than the 80-160 man company which comprises their everyday world. It is in fact just such feelings and actions which are the referents of the term esprit.

## The Meaning of Esprit De Corps

Effective combat performance requires not only the existence of cohesive primary groups, but also that these be articulated with the larger military organization and thereby with the larger society. The Crusades, Imperial Japan, and revolutionary Iran provide examples where soldiers apparently fought because of a strong belief in the rightness of their country's cause, or simply a belief in their country, right or wrong. By and large however, observers have agreed that patriotism, ideology, and politics may be important, like high pay, in inducing modern Western youth to join the service, to remain in a peacetime force, and even to volunteer for combat, but are generally far from mind when the bullets start to fly.[4,9,20,21]

Soldiers nevertheless, in Kellett's[26] words, need to have some justification, however inchoate, to stimulate them to do something which so obviously conflicts with the urge to self-preservation. The enemy of course often provides some. As an anonymous GI said to Parks,[27] "Nobody that fires at me ain't my friend."[29(p. 49)] Ashworth's[28] study of the ubiquitous live and let live system which sprang up in the trenches of World War I suggests, however, that additional factors are at work in an aggressive hard-fighting unit.

Vertical, or hierarchical cohesion is one such factor. That is, soldiers bond not only with peers (horizontal cohesion), but also with the leaders they see every day. They identify with these small unit leaders and in the process come to accept these leaders' aims and goals as their own. The leaders, by virtue of their additional membership in groups beyond the squad, platoon, or company (e.g. the battalion, regiment, division, or corps), are of course subject to the same process of identification and thus in theory pass on to their subordinates the aims and goals of the service's higher leaders.

Armies enlarge the boundaries of this tacit and imperfect contract between soldier and primary group leader by the creation of a larger secondary group, still small enough to serve as a focus of identity yet large enough to escape sudden catastrophe at the hands of an enemy (or gradual enervation in the hands of a faint-hearted leader). The bond between soldier and this secondary group, in many armies a regiment, is an impersonal one, relating soldier to institution rather than soldier to soldier, as in the case of unit cohesion. Secondary groups provide a smaller cause, free of conventional politics and ideology, between the soldier and the great national cause.

By establishing relatively demanding expectations of combat behavior, and by linking the soldiers' self-esteem to the reputation of the unit, the secondary group provides additional motivation for enthusiastic participation in combat by its members. A regiment (or a brigade, division, squadron or wing) which does this successfully is said to have esprit. Esprit then is a higher order concept, paralleling cohesion at the primary group level, implying above all pride in and devotion to the reputation of a formal organization beyond the primary group, and along with cohesion, necessary for sustained effective performance of solders in combat.

## Related Concepts

To this point my discussion of morale, cohesion and esprit has relied heavily on the use of such terms by military writers. The use of the term and concept of *morale* by industrial / organizational psychologists was noted, but in large measure dismissed because of its heavy emphasis on job satisfaction versus my heavy emphasis on sustained

performance in combat, where job satisfaction has a very limited and relative meaning.

Similarly, in discussing unit cohesion, great care was taken to point out that the *cohesion* studied at some length by academic psychologists was quite different from the *cohesion* of military writers. *Esprit* seems to be a purely military concept, used in civilian contexts as a more or less explicit analogy to military esprit de corps. This is not to say that the civilian psychological literature has nothing to offer the military mental health professional interested in morale, cohesion, and esprit. In fact, two relatively recent concepts, *organizational commitment* and *social support*, bear a marked resemblance to morale and cohesion despite very different pedigrees.

Mowday and associates[31] never use the term *morale* in their extensive review of "Employee-Organization Linkages," but their definition of organizational commitment distilled from 10 different studies of civilian organizations is similar to my earlier definition of morale, in both denotation and connotation. Organizational commitment, they say, is the relative strength of an individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization. They go on to say that this involves something beyond mere passive loyalty to an organization and mere desire to maintain membership; it involves in addition a strong belief in the organization's goals and values and a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization.

Commitment is differentiated from job satisfaction in several ways: it is more global, and thus more stable in the face of day-to-day work experiences; it develops more slowly, and dissipates more slowly. Mowday and associates[31] also find it useful to discuss the determinants and consequences of organizational commitment on three levels: personal, work group, and organizational. A similar approach has been used in the next section of this chapter.

A second "civilian" concept of considerable value to the military mental health professional is that of *social support*. Perhaps ultimately traceable to the observations by Durkheim[32] and others[33,34,35] on the role of industrialization in the transformation of the dominant social order from one of *Gemeinschaft* (a highly personal community) to one of *Gesellschaft* (an impersonal, bureaucratic community), *social support* refers to the ways in which people's interactions with others in some way affect their vulnerability to physical and mental illness. On the one hand, the socially marginal person, or one who has lost his circle of intimates to death or dispersion, becomes substantially more prone to illness in all forms.[31] Conversely, membership in a network of significant others seems to provide far more protection from stress and illness than a purely mechanical summation of resources would predict.[37]

The nature, meaning, and measurement of social support are still subjects of some debate, but there appears to be some consensus that it involves both problem-solving and emotionally sustaining behaviors on the part of the supporters.[38] House[39] further splits these behaviors into instrumental support and informational support, depending upon the nature of the help provided, and emotional support and appraisal support (the former involves expressions of care and empathy, the latter involves feedback on personal performance).

The receiver of such support approaches life crises armed with confidence that he is cared for and loved, that he is esteemed and valued as an individual, that he is embedded in a network of mutual obligation.[40] The parallel with the soldier's overwhelming dependence on his primary group is too obvious to require much elaboration (See the quotes of Spiegel[2] and Marshall[22] above, as well as Bartemeir et al[4], and Shils and Janowitz[41]). I would suggest, as has Griffith,[38] in fact that it is precisely this social support literature that the military mental health professional should turn to in advising commanders on improving primary group relations.

## DETERMINANTS OF MORALE

Munson[8] began the U.S. Army General Staff's Morale Branch by providing himself an extremely large area in which to work: "Every physical thing entering into the environment of the soldier, and the expressed state of mind of every person with whom he comes in contact, affects his morale"[10(p51)] The essential truth of this assertion should not discourage the reader, the practicing military mental health professional, or the military leader interested in enhancing that precious commodity, for clearly, some things affect morale to a greater extent than others, and some are easier to change. In this section I will describe some of the most important determinants of morale, organize them in a rational framework, and illustrate their action with historical examples.

**Individual Factors**

Individual Factors include both biological and psychological needs. Good health, good food, adequate rest and sleep, clean dry clothes, washing facilities and protection from the elements are examples of the former and are regularly cited as causes of high morale.[11(p101),6(p171)] Satisfaction of these rather elementary needs is more the exception than the rule for combat soldiers. Holmes cites a World War I account as representative of 20th Century soldiering: "For most of the time the average private was tired. Fairly often he was so tired as no man at home ever is in the common run of his work."[43(p115)]

Complaints about food are also a common denominator among soldiers over the ages and around the world. Napoleon allegedly said that an army marches on its stomach, and British Brigadier Fergusson opined that "lack of food constitutes the single biggest assault upon morale."[44(p99)] It is not merely quantity of food which is so important to morale, but quality. Variety is an important consideration—within limits because unfamiliar food will generate its own list of gripes—and the preparation and consumption of food provide a momentary diversion from the grim business of war. A hot meal in the company of his comrades can work wonders for morale. In fact, a hot meal in a relatively safe environment has been high on the list of treatments for battle stress casualties ever since mental health professionals recognized the psychological nature of shell shock in World War I.

Bugs and dirt are staples of warfare in all but the coldest climes, and as a result a bath and clean clothes are among the most effective morale raisers. World War II infantry company commander McDonald summed it up: "It had never occurred to me that I could derive so much pleasure from a bath."[45(p119)]

If combat is so generally a dirty business fought by chronically tired hungry soldiers, it is difficult to put much credence in the assertion that rest, food, and clean dry clothes are important for morale, above some minimum, since the wide range of morale among units in every war is undeniable. Stouffer and colleagues[5] answered this paradox with the concept of relative deprivation. It is not so much the absolute level of physical discomfort that controls morale, they argued, as the relation of a soldier's discomfort to that of those around him, or more generally, to the level he has been led to expect.

No one disputes that war is hell, but one of the front line soldier's dearest beliefs is that war should also be the great leveler. Perceived violations of this tenet are sources of very bitter feelings, for example, the well-documented[5,46] friction between "tooth" (frontline combat) and "tail" (rear echelon support). Although "the delineation of front line" and "rear echelon" depends a great deal on who is doing the talking, every war seems to produce an abusive epithet for support personnel, for whom the front-liners envision a life of luxury amidst all the amenities they themselves are denied (and perhaps even amenities originally destined for soldiers further forward!).

Beyond the physical factors involved in morale, but still primarily at the individual level, are a number of psychological needs, the fulfillment of which plays a substantial role in the soldier's morale. In contrast to the physical needs, mere equality of deprivation will not suffice. High morale demands, for each soldier, a goal, a role, and reasons for self-confidence.

Conventional wisdom in the social sciences of the 60's and 70's was that, in Baynes' words, "the writer or speaker about war has more faith in causes than those who actually fight."[11(p99)] Pre-World War I views, on the contrary, held that patriotism, or an equally grand and glorious cause, was the sine qua non of effective military performance. Disillusioned World War I citizen-soldier-writers such as Sassoon[47] began the assault on this view, which ultimately collapsed at the hands of the psychiatrists and social scientists of World War II. Even Dollard,[48] studying perhaps the most idealistic Western soldiers of the 20th Century, the International Brigade of the Spanish Civil War, concluded that "...the soldier in battle is too busy to be constantly whispering, "My cause, my cause." He further noted that ideology serves mostly to get soldiers into battle.

The post World War II emphasis on primary groups and interpersonal obligations in the small combat unit served a useful purpose in countering an unrealistic belief in the "Great Cause" as motivator, but America's Vietnam experience in the 70's (and perhaps that of the Israelis in the Lebanon War of the 1980's) suggests that the pendulum may have swung a bit too far. Without the widespread agreement on the necessity for and the value of the war effort which underlay American involvement in the two world wars, morale plunged among U.S. soldiers in Vietnam.

Before 1969, morale in Vietnam was generally high, and local variations occurred against a back-

ground of widely shared if not universal acceptance of a latent ideology. Moskos[17] used this term to describe general acceptance of the worth of the social system for which the soldiers were fighting. Early in the war US soldiers shared a more or less firm belief in the American way of life and the need to stop communism.[17]

After 1969, despite a steadily diminishing role in the actual fighting, morale steadily declined as anti-war sentiment in the United States eliminated consensus on at least the first of these two very general beliefs. U.S. troops characterized themselves with the graffiti initials U.U.U.U. - the unwilling, led by the unqualified, doing the unnecessary for the ungrateful.[49] The counter-insurgency, non-territorial nature of that war denied them even short term goals—such as capture of a particular piece of terrain—which could have had a salutary effect.

Every bit as important as an objective or a goal is a role. Holmes[39] quotes a fellow Briton to the effect that "many a man behaves as a hero or coward, according as he is expected to behave."[43(p314)] Indeed, Gal's[50,51] studies of heroes in the Israeli Defence Forces are in full agreement, finding four distinct combat situations far more useful in explaining heroic battlefield behavior than any inborn or acquired characteristics of the heroes, with the exception of officer status—also an acquired role. Civilian studies of job satisfaction are relevant here also, for they consistently emphasize the importance of seeing oneself as a valued member of the work force (i.e., having an important role).[16] Suggested[16] cures for low worker commitment are increasing job scope or challenge or eliminating role conflict or role ambiguity.

Closely linked with the previous two factors, goal and role, is a sense of progress or at least a sense that the goal is attainable and the role is one that can be carried out. Malone[45] in fact argues that because of the importance of confidence, the key to building will (or morale) is building skill. Training thus has a central role in morale. The wise leader will ensure not only that training is realistic, but also that his soldiers grow accustomed to success because nothing succeeds like success in building confidence.

**Group Factors**

As indicated in the introductory portions of this chapter, much of the combat soldier's ability to endure the stress of combat depends not so much on the enemy as on the soldier's relationships with those around him. Grinker and Spiegel assert that "the ability to identify with a group and the past history of such identification are probably the most important .... components of good motivation for combat."[12(p41)] Out of the soldier's relationships with those in his primary face-to-face group grows what military writers have traditionally called unit cohesion, and social scientists have lately called social support. The soldier's relationships with others in his organization, but outside his primary group, provide the basis of esprit de corps. Both unit cohesion and esprit de corps can be powerful influences on morale. The following sections describe the determinants or components first of cohesion and esprit.

*Cohesion*

Stephen Crane referred to the comradeship of the small combat unit as a "mysterious fraternity born out of smoke and the danger of death."[53(p31)] In this definition, he will find few dissenters, but convinced of the importance of cohesion, both to mission accomplishment and individual survival, one might reasonably search for ways of fostering cohesion before battle itself (at least ensuring by conscientious preparations that smoke and danger will be effective in creating it). For example, George[54] points out that a common social background assists soldiers in developing close personal relationships, and conversely, heterogeneous ethnic, racial, class, even regional origins tend to inhibit the development of unit cohesion. Similarity in more personal characteristics (like age, personality traits, upbringing, and values) also plays a role, perhaps a much larger one.

Few if any modern armies make much of an effort to create homogeneous units around any of these variables. The traditionally regional recruiting of regiments in European armies often created distinctly homogenous units, but shifting demographics and population centers have largely rendered this practice a thing of the past. American forces have also become more heterogeneous since 1917, in part for the same reasons, but in large measure as a result of deliberate attempts to avoid inequities in the risks and benefits of military service to segments of the population.

Shared experiences while in the military thus become the glue which holds the work group together. Combat experience itself has of course long been recognized as the primary force in bonding soldiers. The presence of an enemy, with the capacity and intent to kill or injure, produces strong pres-

sure to unite in a common effort.  As Grinker and Spiegel[10] describe it:

> Friendships are easily made by those who might never have been compatible at home, and are cemented under fire.....Such powerful forces as antisemitism, anticatholicism or differences between Northerners and Southerners are not likely to disturb interpersonal relationships in a combat crew.... The camaraderie is so effective that even the arbitrary distinctions imposed by the military caste system, probably one of the most rigid social devices in the world, are noticeably weakened. [12(p22)]

What can the division mental health staff do to facilitate this process of bonding which the enemy accomplishes so readily (but so painfully)? To begin with the obvious, the first prerequisite for cohesion is opportunities for interaction -i.e., the primary group must remain intact and in close contact long enough to accumulate a significant body of common experience. Until very recently, the U.S. Army's replacement system, which achieved relatively stable unit-strength at the cost of stable personal relationships, was a serious impediment in this regard.

The supersession of the assembly-line-style individual replacement system with a unit system similar to that of most other Western armies seems to have reversed this trend.[42,55,56] The more time people are together, the greater the chance they will discover, invent and experience commonalities, including a shared understanding of the group's history.  This occurrence is a natural phenomenon of groups, and increases with the number of roles and settings in which members know each other and feel comfortable interacting. Which activities are not so important as who participates - the more people, the more varied the settings and the longer the group remains stable, the more the members have in common, and the higher the resulting cohesion.

An important consideration here, however, is the distinctiveness of the group's common experiences. Being in the Army is of course an experience common to all the members of any platoon, but because it is not an experience unique to the squad it is not as effective in inducing cohesion as more limited experiences, for example, having gone through basic training together, won the company basketball title, or simply survived a bitter night together "downrange."  Establishing a "them" also helps in defining an "us," so threats from outside the group, even in friendly competition, are particularly effective common experiences.

The examples given above also illustrate two other important aspects of cohesion-enhancing experiences: (1) The unit must derive some feeling of success or accomplishment, and (2) the more interdependence among the members that is necessary for success, the greater the payoff in cohesion. Malone argues that successful mission accomplishment leads to high morale more often than vice versa.  In his words, "Practice doesn't make perfect. What makes perfect is perfect practice." [52(p89)]

Malone also differentiates three kinds of teamwork, illustrating each with a sports analogy, in encouraging military leaders to train for interdependence.  The simplest kind of teamwork he says is like a bowling team - individual scores are simply added together.  A relay team is slightly more complicated - there is a necessary sequence involved, and there is a brief moment at the start of each leg when team members must interact. The battlefield, he contends, requires above all teamwork of the sort displayed by a successful football team - in which every member has a different job, but each is dependent on everyone else.

Common experiences do not have to take place only in officially sanctioned military activities to build cohesion (although I would argue that leaders as well as followers have to be involved if unit cohesion is to result).  Ingraham in fact points out that drug use and heavy drinking "facilitate the bonding between isolated individuals who find themselves living together largely by chance rather than choice and who are held in place by a number of specific environmental structures, both physical and social."[27(pxviii)]  Sanctioned alcohol-centered events have long been a military custom, precisely because they are felt to enhance unit cohesion. Ingraham provided an explanation of how this happens, at the same time extending it to the nonsanctioned abuse of both drugs and alcohol by off-duty soldiers:

> Alcohol is particularly helpful in generating distinctive, memorable episodes involving brawls, "broads," and bad news that the participants can recall and recount as evidence for the meaningfulness of their relationship and what they have been through together....Illicit drug use creates two large superordinate oppositional categories:  user and nonuser, or "we" and "they."  These explicitly defined categories cut across cliques, build stable perimeters despite unstable personnel, and engender a sense of group identity.[27(p65)]

Drinking bouts and drug use are certainly not being suggested here as useful techniques for pro-

moting unit cohesion. On the contrary, since unit leaders are seldom included in the "we" generated by such activity, unit cohesion is in fact decreased, even while interpersonal bonding among junior soldiers is increased. I cite alcoholic and drug use here primarily as evidence for the importance of creating distinctive and memorable experiences for all unit members; sense of membership in an accepting and protective group is a strong enough need that they will build their own if the organization does not provide it.

Whatever the nature of the common experiences which build unit cohesion, they are successful in doing so only to the extent that they provide soldiers with confidence in the ability and determination of their peers and their leaders to protect them in combat. This concept is related to my earlier argument that the cohesion so widely cited by World War II and Korea conflict observers as crucial to soldier endurance bears a very strong resemblance to what the mental health field now calls social support. Central to this concept is the individual's conviction that he is firmly embedded in a network of mutual obligation." This confidence that in times of difficulty one has someone who is willing and able to help is at the heart of unit cohesion. Indeed, I would argue that confidence that others *can* help (that is, have the ability and training to provide effective assistance, for example in staying alive) is at the heart of what Gross and Martin[57] called instrumental cohesion.

Affective cohesion, on the other, hand is based on confidence that others in the group *will* help if the need arises. Moskos,[17] for example, argued from his observations in Vietnam that it is not altruism, born of intrinsic interpersonal attraction that leads a soldier to risk his life for another, but a recognition that his own self-interest, his own survival, depends on his ability to make others willing to help him in his own time of need. The strong interpersonal ties characteristic of the small combat group, in the words of Kviz, "develop secondarily to the collective pursuit of survival in a highly stressful situation."[58(p219)]

A Korean War study by Clark (as noted by Watson[59]) suggests that soldiers can and do distinguish between likability and military dependability, choosing different colleagues with whom to perform a risky mission and to go on leave. More recently, Tziner and Vardi[53] reported on an Israeli armor corps experiment in constructing tank crews at the end of basic armor training on the basis of sociometry. It quickly became clear that high-ability soldiers were selected far too frequently and

low ability soldiers far too infrequently to maintain the program.

A reasonable conclusion is that soldiers are well aware of their dependence on others for survival in combat. Their attraction to their combat group is very much dependent not only on the willingness of the group to help them survive but also on their ability to do so. A perception that the group is short of either one will lead the soldier to devalue membership in the group and participation in the group's activities (ie, low morale).

Leaders, even more than peers, must generate this double dose of confidence because in combat it is the leader more than anyone else who can spell the difference between certain death and the rush of victory. Being technically and tactically proficient is a value that is drummed into leaders incessantly, though they are not told as often how important it is for their soldiers to see and know their leader's talents. If they doubt his knowledge they will hesitate to commit their lives to his judgment - they will not act as a cohesive unit. They may be willing to die if they must, but no one wants to sacrifice his life to ignorance.

Yet it is not enough that a leader merely be technically proficient. If he is to inspire confidence his subordinates must see not only that he will not waste their lives through incompetence, but also that he will not waste them through indifference. As Grinker and Spiegel[10] put it, combat soldiers:

> ....have given up most of their selfish interests for the sake of their group. But they do this for their buddies and for the leaders on a personal basis, out of affection and loyalty. They can only be paid back on a personal basis. The leaders must return the loyalty and affection in kind.[12(p46)]

Two Israeli studies[51,61] have confirmed these World War II views. Solomon and colleagues[61] found that although lack of affective support from officers or peers was associated with feelings of loneliness, only lack of such support from officers was related to combat stress reactions. Gal[51] showed that soldiers' trust in their commanders depended on three qualities: (1) professional capability (technical competence), (2) credibility as a source of information, and (3) the amount of care and attention that commanders pay to their men. The last of these qualities need not imply a popularity contest, nor is it incompatible with fair but firm discipline. In fact, soldiers most often view discipline as Oldenquist who points out, "If a social group does not impose its

rules on me and hold me responsible to it, I know it does not accept me as a member."

Care and attention, including explicit acknowledgement of one's skills, abilities, and accomplishments as of vital importance to the morale of others. Napoleon is said to have counted on soldiers fighting "long and hard for a bit of ribbon".[63(p255)] Medals, promotions, a mention in the dispatches—all have become common since plundering ceased to be acceptable military behavior (although gallantry awards were well-known even in Roman times). Like any selective reward, the distribution of medals will produce complaints of inequity. Few soldiers ever turn them down however, because in Mauldin's words, "Civilians may think it's a little juvenile to worry about ribbons, but a civilian has a house and a bankroll to show what he's done for the past four years."[64(p113)]

Medals are of course only one form of recognition, and as Mauldin's words imply, are likely to be more important when looking back on military service than as incentive to heroic action (Medal-hunters are frequently very unpopular with their peers and subordinates who occasionally murdered them with fragmentation grenades ["fraggings"] in Vietnam.[65]) Less dramatic forms of recognition often have immediate effects on morale however, because they reassure the soldier that he is valued as a person, a person whose life will not be thoughtlessly expended.

The last component of unit cohesion I will discuss is the need for clear and meaningful group missions. In some ways this component is simply another way in which good leaders can demonstrate to their units that they care—by seeing that their efforts and the risks (and losses) they incur are for something undeniably worthwhile. Certainly the discipline problems, wholesale drug abuse, and fraggings of the U.S. Army in Vietnam came primarily in the latter years of the war, when it was clear that America had made the judgment that their task was not worth pursuing. Interpersonal bonding at the small unit level could not overcome the quite rational desire not to be the last one killed in an effort without glory or thanks.

On a lesser scale, in the interests of "security," leaders will sometimes fail to provide their soldiers with the why's and wherefor's of an operation, expecting them to undertake it because they are well-trained or well-disciplined. If the leader has had ample opportunity to prove to his men that he would not ask what was not important, he may succeed. If not, he may find he has quite unnecessarily brought on a crisis in command.

### *Esprit de corps*

Leaders are also links by which primary groups are integrated into a larger, secondary group, and by which the values and directions of that larger group and the parent organization are impressed on the primary group.[58] High levels of esprit mean that soldiers' loyalties go beyond their primary face-to-face peers and immediate leaders. This is an important step if morale is to be maintained in combat, for hard fighting will result in losses, no matter how good the unit.

If the will to fight depends solely on personal loyalties, it will wither as ties are severed by death and wounds, despite the bitterness toward the enemy initially produced by the loss of buddies. For this reason, most Western armed forces have attempted to instill loyalties to a secondary group larger than the company but smaller than, for example, the Army. For navies this is often a ship, or a type of ship (e.g., submarines). In the more technical branches, it is often a profession (e.g., the Medical Corps). For the combat arms soldier it is most often a regiment.

The United States has been a notable exception in this regard, at least since World War II, though it has of late revived the idea, at least on paper, in concert with efforts to change the replacement system focus from individual to small "packages." Other Western armies, ironically, have been fighting a losing battle with cost-conscious governments to maintain their regimental systems. Admittedly not the cheapest way to fill an organizational structure, these systems are designed to assure that replacements arriving at any small combat group already share a significant body of common yet distinctive experiences with those they are joining. With luck, these commonalities serve as a skeleton upon which cohesion-building small group experiences can build.

Although no longer tactical units in combined arms armies, regiments are both symbolic and administrative. Significant features of such systems have been distinctive names, colors, messes and dress, territorial affiliation and recruitment. The Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the Gordon Highlanders, and the second Scottish Rifles are familiar names even to Americans, whose units Bidwell[59] decried as "soulless things known by letters and numbers."[67(p139)] Other features have included fixed home bases, unit training (even basic entry-level training), unit rotation (to the regiment's overseas area of responsibility), long service, and return assignments. Museums, bands, veterans associations,

honorary ranks and publications are other frequent props the effect of which, ultimately, is to link the soldier's self-esteem to the reputation and expectations of the regiment.

Military mental health professionals are admittedly not in position to modify most of these esprit-producing activities, structures, and policies, which prevent potential stress casualties in combat. Psychiatrists are important beneficiaries, however, and should thus be knowledgeable and vocal opponents of the ever more frequent attempts to replace these old-fashioned customs with more modern centralized, and less expensive practices that mistakenly trade off peacetime economy for combat effectiveness. They can also be alert for ways to incorporate these esprit-building regimental trappings into available secondary groups like army divisions.

## ASSESSING MORALE AND COHESION

Most leaders know a great deal about the status of their unit and its cohesiveness. They gather impressions, talk, listen, observe and monitor the kinds of problems unit members are having and can pretty well gauge whether their unit is militarily cohesive and effective. However, even the best leader can be blindsided, communications systems may fail, the press of other work may lead to inattention to danger signals, and the actual status of unit military cohesion may be misrepresented or misinterpreted. For this reason the good unit leader should have the same kind of checklist for cohesion and cohesion related issues that he uses for his weapons system, supplies, and combat gear. As a prime beneficiary of good morale and cohesion, mental health professionals can and should provide advice and assist the leaders both in drawing up such a list, and in periodically using it to assess their unit.

The definition of military unit cohesion was presented earlier in the Chapter: The bonding together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, the unit, and mission accomplishment. This definition clearly has three major components, each potentially independent of the others and requiring attention in the assessment process: (1) horizontal bonding, binding members of the same leadership level (ie, soldiers with soldiers, noncommissioned officer (NCO) with NCO, officer with officer); (2) vertical bonding, binding unit members of different ranks (soldier to squad and platoon leaders, commanding officer to soldiers and NCOs); and (3) personal commitment to unit and army missions and values. Leaders at all levels have three major means of gathering information about these three facets of unit cohesion: personal observations, traditional morale indicators, and outside observers. Each facet has its pluses and minuses, but together they can provide a reasonably accurate snapshot of unit cohesion to the leader who wants to know.

**Horizontal Bonding**

Key questions to be answered in any assessment of horizontal bonding are:

1. Do unit members (NCOs and officers as well as junior enlisted) have confidence in their peers?

2. Do unit members have a sense of loyalty or commitment to their peers?

A good leader (note that none of the actions discussed are meant to be restricted to company commanders) finds the answers to these questions by making first-hand observations, asking unit members (and members of other co-located units), and checking official records. The sort of things he looks for and asks about are:

- Formal and informal requests for transfers out or into the unit (don't forget the most informal request of all - the absent without leave).
- Reenlistments, and the reasons for reenlisting or not reenlisting.
- Incidents of vandalism, theft of personal belongings or fights in the barracks or work areas.
- Large numbers at daily sick call, especially when disposition is return to duty.
- Off duty friendship patterns (Do members choose to play with the same people they work with? Do race, language, gender, or other common features count for more than assignment when it comes to choosing friends? Do the sides in informal ball games reflect work units? Do squads, sections, platoon have social get-togethers? [fishing or hunting trips? volksmarches? concerts? ballgames? and so forth]).

- Unit collections for soldiers in the hospital, with a death in family, a new baby, a new spouse, or birthdays.
- Personal assistance. (Do unit members with personal difficulties, ranging from having debts to being out of shape, get any help from peers? Do peers feel any sense of responsibility to help?)
- Personal socialization. (Do unit members know each other's families, or do they view this as a silly question?)
- Attempts by unit members, or subunit members, to make their work group special in some way (nicknames, attire, rituals, jargon).
- "Initiation rites" or spur-winning requirements for newcomers.
- Humor. (Are unit members able to laugh at themselves and their difficulties or is work a grim struggle?)

**Vertical Bonding**

Key questions for vertical bonding are similar to those in the preceding section, except we are now talking across rank groups rather than strictly about peers:

1. Do the unit's soldiers have *confidence* in their NCOs and commissioned officers? Similarly, do the officers and NCO's have confidence in each other and in their soldiers?
2. Do the unit's soldiers have a sense of *loyalty* or commitment to their NCO's and officers? Do the NCOs and officers have similar feelings of loyalty and commitment to their soldiers?

Finding the answers to these questions is generally much harder than assessing horizontal cohesion because the leader's own relationships with his unit members are a central issue. In most cases, however, relations between subunit leaders and followers are not only easier to assess objectively, but also tend to reflect the leader's own situation as well because he sets the example. Once again he must make first-hand observations (in fact, the very act of making them tends to increase vertical cohesion!); solicit the opinions of others, both inside and outside the unit, and pay attention to the unit's own records. He should be looking for:

- Technical competence in leaders. Soldiers will not have confidence in leaders who are not themselves experts in the subjects they teach. NCO's should be leading the way on skills qualification tests, as well as setting the example for fitness and appearance.
- Put-downs. Rarely will a unit member make disparaging remarks about a higher ranking unit member (in your presence!), but in low-cohesion units many in the chain of command will freely and frequently "put down" those under their supervision.
- Communication flow. In a high cohesion unit, the commanding officer will hear about problems, gripes, snafu's from those involved, not outsiders. Likewise, information that he puts out to subordinate leaders will get all the way down to the newest private.
- Personal data. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants will know at least all their squad leaders well enough to tell you their first names, their wives' names, whether they have kids, their hobbies and interests, and so forth. Squad leaders will be able to tell you these things about their squad members. The commanding officer should know this information about at least the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. Do the privates know his name, and the names of those in their chain of command?
- Social interaction. How often do the unit's leaders, including the commanding officer, simply chat with subordinates about their lives, in and out of the workplace?
- Availability. How busy is the commanding officer's office during "open door" hours? Lots of traffic may mean the junior leaders are not generating the same trust and confidence in their subordinates that he is.
- Inspector General complaints, congressional, inquiries, and so forth. By definition these actions indicate lack of trust in the chain of command.
- Language. Who are junior enlisted talking about when they say "we?" When subordinate leaders bring problems to the commanding officer for advice and help, do they say "we have a problem in our unit" or "Private _____ has a problem in my unit?"
- Spouse and family member contact with unit leaders. Do spouses see leaders as a source of help in time of need? Do they even know who the unit leaders are, or how to contact them? Conversely, are there any attempts being made to keep families in-

formed about unit activities, post or Army "bennies," opportunities, etc.?

- Outside activities of unit leaders. Are unit leaders so busy being students, teachers, coaches, club members, moonlighting, and so forth. that unit members have a hard time seeing themselves as top priority?
- Decision sharing. Do unit leaders solicit input from their subunits when they have a decision to make which affects them (ie, does the leader attempt to make the decision "ours" rather than "his"?)

## Commitment

The U.S. Army has long recognized the significance of instilling in your soldiers *values* it holds in esteem, e.g., readiness, loyalty, discipline, punctuality, courage, physical fitness, and above all mission accomplishment. Military unit cohesion implies widespread success in this process, so that every unit member holds a similar set of values and behaves accordingly. These behaviors, which all members of the unit exhibit and expect of others in the unit, are the unit *standards*. Although it is the commanding officer who most often makes these standards explicit, a highly cohesive military unit requires some degree of personal commitment to them by every unit member. Important questions for the leader are:

- Do unit members (all ranks) know what his values and priorities are?
- Do the members of his unit act as if they shared them?

In practice, the extent of vertical bonding in the company will play a large role in the personal commitment of lower ranking unit members to unit and army ideals and goals. The following are checks on vertical bonding as well as on personal commitment:

- Can unit members (all ranks) state the unit's general mission, and more importantly, the missions and goals of upcoming exercises and other unit actions? A good starting place is the commanding officer himself.
- Can unit members tell you why their own job is important to unit success?
- Do unit members show pride in being in the army, and in this unit in particular? Do they wear the uniform and unit crest properly? Do they rush to take it off as soon and as frequently as possible? Is there anti-Army

graffiti in the unit areas? Are salutes and greetings rendered freely and with enthusiasm (in both directions)?

- What kind of a reputation does the unit have around the post? Do members have respect and status because of membership? Do they realize this?
- Are disciplinary actions increasing, decreasing, higher than sister units? Are they for military infractions or criminal infractions (ie, acts punishable in civilian courts as well as in military courts)?
- Do unit members know anything about the unit's history? Do they hold onto any myths about the unit's recent or distant past?

## Command Climate

No action takes place in a vacuum, and many good intentions never result in actions at all because of circumstances beyond the control of the parties involved. Leaders at every level of the army can have a powerful effect, for better or worse, on the ability of their subordinate leaders to build militarily cohesive teams. They thus have the obligation to ask themselves, in any assessment of unit cohesion, whether they are encouraging, or even allowing, subordinate leaders to follow the advice they get in their manuals on leadership and team building. Indeed, unless the leaders lose sight of the fact that they themselves are central figures in the vertical bonding process, they will have largely answered this question in their assessment of the unit's vertical bonding. There are, nonetheless, a few items that deserve close inspection by themselves, because they may on occasion conflict with other worthwhile activities or goals:

- Intra-unit turbulence. Reducing the frequency of permanent change of station moves, or restricting the range of units to which a soldier might be reassigned is perhaps necessary for cohesion, but it is not sufficient. It is stability in face-to-face relationships which is most important in this regard. Continual cross-leveling and reshuffling of junior leaders thus makes team building just as difficult as continual permanent changes of station.
- Unit goals, priorities, values, standards. Making these clear-and consistent across levels of authority is every leader's responsibility. Remember that what the boss checks on is what's important as far as subordi-

nates are concerned, regardless of what is said or published. Are there standard operating procedures, directives, guidelines, and so forth that conflict with stated priorities or values?

- Loyalty. Does the boss reward subordinate leaders for being loyal to their soldiers? Or is his idea of a "team player" one who gives an enthusiastic "yes" to all his ideas?
- Equitable benefits. Does the boss see to it that accomplishment of unit objectives results in benefits for all, even when the contributions of some are clearly greater than others?
- Subordinate credit. Is the boss careful to ensure that subunit leaders get proper (or maybe more than proper) credit from their men when rewards are handed out, or even when simple SNAFU's are straightened out.
- Success. Does the boss actively seek out tasks on which his unit can succeed. Does he fight off unreasonable demands from higher HQ?
- Unit individuality. Does the boss allow your subunits to differentiate themselves? Is standardization so important to him that he prevents subunits from developing their own identities?
- Perceived lack of organization. How often do plans get changed? Are sufficient reasons provided for subunit leaders to dispel perceptions of disorder? Does the benefit always justify the price, which is the undermining of unit members trust and confidence in their leaders?

Like everybody else, leaders tend to see their world as they would like it to be, not always as it is. Therefore, it becomes especially important for them to check their views constantly against those of others they respect and trust. These might include fellow commanders, the sergeant major, respected senior NCOs outside the unit, chaplains, or medics. Some of these folks will know of questionnaires and other team building techniques that may be of additional help. One example, found in the *Unit Climate Profile Commander's Handbook*,[68] is an 82-item questionnaire designed for use by unit commanders in assessing their unit's psychological readiness. It comes with directions for scoring and some guides to interpreting the 21 "climate areas" assessed.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

One constant in the ever-changing nature of warfare over the centuries has been the recognition that success on the battlefield involves more than the appropriate disposition of men and weapons. Whether this unknown factor X be called soul, spirit, heart, or morale, it refers to the enthusiasm and persistence with which soldiers carry out the prescribed activities of their unit. Since World War II we have known that it is crucial not only to success, but also to survival itself. Determinants of morale include both individual and group factors. Among the former are biological needs such as adequate food, sleep and protection from the elements, although most frequently it is the relative rather than the absolute satisfaction of these needs which is important for morale. Other individual needs are psychological, and not so negotiable as the physical. High morale demands a goal, a role, and a reason for self-confidence.

Perhaps the most critical determinants of individual morale are group factors, unit cohesion and esprit de corps. Confidence in the ability and willingness of peers and leaders to protect in combat and a feeling of obligation to do the same for them are the heart of unit cohesion. Military activities, field exercises especially, provide opportunities to observe the abilities of one's unit, but other shared experiences, including the purely recreational, can confirm for the soldier that his comrades are willing to stick by him. A perception that the group is short on either ability or willingness puts the soldier at risk to become a stress casualty.

When soldiers' loyalties and confidence go beyond their immediate work group, we speak of their esprit de corps. This impersonal sort of bonding is important because combat means casualties, and if the will to push on depends solely on personal loyalties, it will wither as casualties mount. To the extent that small unit leaders are seen as typical of the larger organization some of the confidence and loyalty they generate will accrue to the organization as well. However, most Western armies have made deliberate efforts to instill loyalty to a secondary group large enough that its members do not all know each other, but small enough that all can share a body of distinctive experiences. The regiment is the best example. By extending this

network of mutual obligation in which the soldier functions, his morale can withstand better the loss of close friends because replacements are already in the network. The military mental health profes- sional must form a strong partnership with unit leaders in maximizing these elusive qualities well before the first battle or soldiers will pay the price in combat casualties.

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