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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

1 September  
30 October 1953

RELEASE AS SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM:

2003

SUBJECT: PEFORTUNE, Essential Elements.

1. Planning and execution of PEFORTUNE must include effective coverage of the following elements. Detailed planning for each must be consolidated and action advanced with highest priority.

a. Establishment and implementation of military aid agreements with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.

b. Provision of evidence of Communist domination of the Guatemalan Government. This is expected to include material now in the hands of State and CIA as well as material obtained through discovery of synthetic cells and caches in Honduras and El Salvador, plus documents obtained from files of the Guatemalan Communist Party.

c. Preparation for a possible conference of Foreign Ministers or the OAS.

d. Provision of biographical data on Latin American diplomats who may become involved in this case in the OAS or UN.

e. Application of economic pressure.

f. Application of diplomatic pressure.

g. Application of psychological pressure.

h. Control of communications within Guatemala.

i. Control of power within Guatemala.

j. Subversion and control of Guatemalan military leaders.

k. The military plan.

1. The consolidation period. This will include provision of political advice to the new government, establishment of favorable control over Guatemalan labor, and guidance for Guatemalan PP activity.

cc to Pres Hqs

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PB FORTUNE

The urgency for effecting a change in the Government of Guatemala, while effective opposition still exists and before the cancer of Communism has spread and established itself still more firmly in this Hemisphere, is further aggravated by the approaching coffee harvest and the concurrent necessity for at least threatening some economic pressure before this year's crop is sold in December. While other action will be necessary, it is recognized that only through military action can a new and stable government, friendly to the United States, be established promptly. It is agreed that RUFUS is the only individual with the background, ideals, following and organization who can satisfactorily effect this change through armed action. However, during the past year the Government of Guatemala and the Communist elements within the country have strengthened their position, while that of at least some of the opposition elements has deteriorated.

1. The probability of military success will be greatly strengthened if plans are revised to include:

a. Capture of Guatemala City from within, rather than from without by an attack which would be dependent upon possibly unreliable guerrilla forces from the interior. Original planning called for the capture of Puerto Barrios by assault, the establishment of a provisional capital in that city, and a subsequent attack on Guatemala City by guerrilla forces. The capture of the capital can be accomplished if the officers of its garrison are converted, subverted, abducted or assassinated concurrently with other effective measures. Although the purported organization of 50,000 anti-Communists in cells may still be intact, the effective participation of an appreciable percentage

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of this group in organized formal military action is too uncertain at this time to permit sound planning to place too heavy dependence upon them as members of a guerrilla army. Unless there is a decided re-stimulation of anti-Communist elements coupled with strong indications of initial success on D-Day, it is possible that many elements would not rise to form such a guerrilla army. It also appears that some of these elements could be utilized more effectively in types of action which do not call for sustained combat courage in the face of organized troops.

b. Establishment of the new provisional government in the capital rather than in a remote point such as Puerto Barrios as originally proposed. The announcement from the capital of a new government with appreciable Armed Forces backing, coupled with the announcement of strong forces moving on the capital from outlying districts, would carry with it assurance of success and would give the necessary courage to rise to many of the civilian components who might be unwilling otherwise to take the initiative. A provisional government established in the capital would also command more respect and permit more open support from other governments than one precariously established at a remote point.

c. Capture of the communications and public utilities facilities at the very outset of the action. Capture of the Government Radio Station in Guatemala City is an important element in enabling the new provisional government to call its people quickly to arms

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and to solicit the support of other governments. Plans should insure at a minimum the denial of all communications facilities (including military air), throughout the country, to the Guatemalan Government.

2. The probability of military success can be further strengthened if RIFUS can count on the support of a major proportion of the Armed Forces. A softening-up campaign to precede armed action should therefore shake the faith of the Army in its Government and in its own future under that Government by:

a. Playing up the known fact that the Government is arming civilians and placing more reliance on the Communists than on its own military.

b. Effecting mutual defense and military assistance pacts with neighboring countries.

c. Providing material and military training missions to neighboring countries.

d. Withdrawing military missions to Guatemala and extending and stiffening the arms embargo.

The non-political Guatemalan Armed Forces are quite likely to turn against a government which, by its own premeditated actions, is weakening its military and forcing the strengthening of its neighbors, and at the same time is arming its own pro-Communist civilians. Individual officers who remain loyal to the Government must be eliminated by other means.

3. The probability of military success can be further strengthened

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through the employment of PW designed to strengthen the will of the opposition, break the faith of and create dissension among present supporters of the Government, and discredit the Government with the Democratic World. PW should include at least the threat of a conference of OAS or of Foreign Ministers to consider evidence that Guatemala constitutes a threat to Hemisphere security through its support of international Communism. This conference should be held in November and sufficient convincing, incontrovertible evidence must be provided, by fabrication if necessary.

4. The probability of military success may be further strengthened through bringing to bear, or threatening, certain economic pressures. Some economic pressure is feasible and can be effective. The threat of other economic pressures can be equally effective.

5. The probability of military success can be greatly strengthened through the delivery of materiel to RUFUS by the following secure means:

a. Delivery of materiel now at DIBOHALO to the Free Port of New York for pick-up and delivery by [ ] ships.

b. Purchase and delivery of additional materiel through the Free Port of New York, [ ] , to RUFUS.

This materiel (cost approximately \$460,000) to be purchased for RUFUS by [ ] with money delivered to RUFUS through foreign sources and turned over by him to [ ]. [ ] will make his military base at [ ] available to RUFUS.

6. Any probability of military success depends upon continued

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support of RUFUS and his group, as a minimum:

- a. With a payment of \$10,000 in the immediate future to satisfy present debts and commitments.
- b. With \$10,000 monthly regular payments from 1 September 1953 until D-Day which will permit RUFUS to hold his present organization together.

The payments listed above are considerably lower than the figures presented by RUFUS, but are believed to be sufficient to maintain an effective resistance group, and not so high as to attract undue attention to the maintenance of such a group. Such payments can be made through foreign sources so that they cannot be attributed to any U. S. source. Other payments for the purchase of transport and other items of special equipment may be necessary.

- c. With the expenditure of further sums at the time military action is initiated and during the establishing of the new government. In the thirty days prior to D-Day as much as \$250,000 may be required. Money requirements during the period in which the new Government is establishing itself can be handled on an overt loan basis.

All action taken must be carefully planned in detail, timed to perfection, and faultlessly executed. Support of all interested groups must be prompt and complete.

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Direct Support to RUFUS

- a. To maintain cadres in field for 6 months, until D-30
- b. FI and FP activities
- c. Cash to satisfy present debts
- d. During 30 days prior to D-Day
- e. Additional arms
- f. Planes

Contingencies  
prep. FP activity

