Zeppelins in the Middle East: Part I: Military Use in Libya and the Improbable Tale of "Das Afrika-Schiff"

Graf Zeppelin at the Pyramids, 1931

(This replaces an earlier version of this post which was corrupted.)

The great age of luxury Zeppelin travel was a brief one in the 1920s and  1930s, memorably concluding with the Hindenburg disaster in 1937. The rigid dirigible airship, designed by Count (Graf in German) Ferdinand von Zeppelin in the 1890s, originally was used for military applications through World War I; Count von Zeppelin died in 1917,and the Zeppelin company was taken over by Dr. Hugo Eckener. Barred by the Versailles Treaty from building military Zeppelins, Eckener eventually won the right to build Zeppelins for civilian transport, and created the idea of these luxury liners of the sky for European and American elites, that could carry people across the Atlantic in comfort faster than a ship, at a time when heavier-than air aircraft were not yet ready to carry passengers so far.

Dr. Eckener's gem was the Graf Zeppelin, named for Count von Zeppelin and intended to demonstrate the Zeppelin's capabilities as the airborne version of a luxury liner. As the Weimar Republic struggled to recover from World War I, she became a major showpiece for the reputation of German aeronautical engineering. Later that year she made her first Transatlantic trip, to the US. She would make other high-profile flights, including a round-the world-flight in 1929, but here I wish to discuss her two visits to the Middle East, in 1929 and 1931.

But those trips, including photos, will appear in Part II of this post. Here in Part I, I want to discuss military Zeppelins in the Middle East.

Earlier Zeppelins in the Region

But first, a few words about military Zeppelin use in the Middle East prior to the golden age of luxury Zeppelin travel.  During the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912, Italy became not only the first country to drop an aerial bomb from a heavier than air airplane, but probably also the first to use dirigibles for bombing. (Some use "Zeppelin" for all rigid dirigible airships, others only for the German products).

Italian Dirigible Bombing in Libya

During the bombing of Libya in 2011 I noted this on this blog, and posted this photo of Italian dirigibles dropping bombs on Turkish positions in Libya.

L59: "Das Afrika-Schiff"

At least as far as I am aware, the next use of a Zeppelin over the Middle East was an abortive German attempt to relieve its beleaguered forces in  German East Africa (Tanganyika, now the continental part of Tanzania) during World War I. General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck's force in German East Africa was caught between British forces in Kenya and South African forces under General Jan Smuts. (Film buffs may note that this campaign is the context of the great, fictional, Bogart-Hepburn movie The African Queen.)

Determined to resupply their forces n East Africa, the Germans sent Zeppelin L59 to Bulgaria (a German ally) in November 1917. Its ambitious mission was to overfly British-occupied Egypt and Sudan without being detected, carrying some 25 tons of weapons and supplies to von Lettow-Vorbeck's Schutztruppe. Because hydrogen would be unavailable in East Afrika, it was intended to dismantle her there,  cannibalizing her parts to supply troops, including making her skin into tents. (The narrative which follows is based on numerous published and online accounts of the mission.)

Postwar German Brochure

It would be a dangerous mission: her top speed would be only 50 mph, making her a sitting duck for British fighters based in Egypt, Sudan, or Kenya. The Zeppelin, whose production designation from the Zeppelin works was LZ 104, was redesignated the L59 in German Naval service. Her sister ship, L57, had originally been chosen for the Africa flight, but crashed and burned during trials.

The Zeppelin works' Dr. Eckener himself piloted her to Jamboli airfield in Bulgaria, a German ally, where  command was handed over to KapitanLeutnant (Lieutenant Commander) Ludwig Bockholt of the German Navy.

Ludwig Bockholt

Bockholt, earlier in 1917, had drawn attention when, in command of Zeppelin L23,  he had lowered a prize party from the Zeppelin to capture the Norwegian sailing ship Royal, still the only incidence in history in which a Zeppelin captured a surface ship. So he may have seemed the right man for a daring mission.

Zeppelin LZ 104/L59

After two false starts,she took off on November 21, 1917. She passed across Turkish airspace (allied with Germany) and headed out over the Mediterranean. Over Crete she encountered a thunderstorm and, as was standard practice, retracted her radio antenna to avoid lightning strikes. Meanwhile in East Africa, von Lettow-Vorbeck had suffered a defeat and was withdrawing into rough terrain where the Zeppelin could not land (he eventually crossed into Portuguese East Africa/Mozambique. The German Colonial Office tried to recall the L59 but with her antenna retracted she missed the signal.

Route of L59 in Africa and After

At 5;15 AM on November 22, L59 crossed the African coast near Mersa Matruh. As the morning sun heated the Sahara below, the airship experienced considerable turbulence; the heat of the days and bitter cold of the desert nights also affected the crew adversely, some even experiencing hallucinations.

She passed over the Farafra and Dakhla oases on course to parallel the Nile from Wadi Halfa. On that afternoon, however, her forward engine seized up. She continued to make good time on her remaining engine, but the forward engine controlled the power to her radio transmitter, so she was from that point on unable to transmit, though she could receive with some difficulty.

While the loss of the transmitter made it impossible to contact Germany, it may have had another benefit: British Intelligence knew the Germans planned to make the attempt, but were unsure of the timing; British fighters in Egypt and stations in Sudan and Kenya were ordered to watch for and intercept her, and were listening for her radio transmissions. Her inadvertent radio silence may have helped her evade detection.

Sundown on the 22nd found L59 over Sudan; she had reached the Nile and was following it southward. the sharp drop in desert temperatures at night caused her hydrogen bags to lose buoyancy and she lost altitude.

At 12:45 AM on the 23rd, L59 finally received the German recall order. There was some debate as some preferred to go on, but Holbock decided to turn back. Meanwhile, about 3 am, her loss of buoyancy due to the cold caused her to stall and nearly crash in the desert, but control was regained.

Finally, about 125 miles west of Khartoum, L59 turned around and headed for home.he had passed over Egypt and half of Sudan, and now had to pass over them again without being detected.

There has been some controversy over the recall message. British Intelligence operative Richard Meinertzhagen would claim that it was a British ruse, broadcast in German naval code and claiming von Lettow-Vorbeck had surrendered. The British may have transmitted recall messages (though days later they were still looking for Zeppelin in East Africa, so they apparently did not know where it was. The recall message was not about a surrender, but a retreat, and the message recorded in L59's log reportedly matches the one sent by the German Navy. Meinertzhagen's recent biographers have called into question his once famous diaries, which appear to be full of fabrications.

L59 successfully avoided detection and reached the Mediterranean. She was not quite home free, having another loss of altitude after night fell and nearly crashed in western Turkey, which was at least friendly ground, but recovered, and landed back at Jamboli at 7:45 am on November 25. She had flown for 95 hours and 4,200 miles without landing, a Zeppelin record that would stand until the great ocean-crossing passenger Zeppelins of the 1920s and 1930s.

Since the original plan was to dismantle L59 once in Africa, and with Lettow-Vorbeck now in Mozambique, the Germans had no immediate plans for L59, so they decided to modify it to carry bombs and keep it in the Mediterranean theater. On March 11-12, 1918, she raided Italy, bombing Naples.

Its next mission was an attempt to bomb Port Said and the Suez Canal.later in March reached a point about three miles from the target, when contrary winds forced a retreat. Unfavorable winds also forced abandoning the backup target, Suda Bay in Crete.

On April 7, 1918, L59, still commanded by Bockholt, took off from Jamboli to bomb the British base at Malta. She crossed the Straaits of Otranto and headed towards Malta. The German submarine UB-53, running on the surface, witnessed her passing low overhead; the U-Boat commander estimated her altitude at 210 meters and reported he could see the details of the Gondola.

A bit after the Zeppelin passed over, the U-Boat commander reported hearing two explosions and then witnessing a giant flame descending into the sea. She was listed as lost to an accident since neither the Italians nor the British claimed to have brought her down; none of the crew of 21, including Bockholt, survived.

Some in the German Navy's Zeppelin service reportedly suspected that UB-53 might have mistaken L59 for an Italian airship and shot her down, then realized their error. This is unproven, and UB-53 herself went down after hitting a mine in Otranto in August 1918.

That's the strange tale of Zeppelins in wartime in the Middle East. Tomorrow, the luxury liners of the sky era: Graf Zeppelin's 1929 and 1931 visits to the region.

Some Good Stuff on Mali and Timbuktu

The war in Mali has produced a great deal of opinion, most of it rather ill-informed.  Here are several very different readings (two from the modern policy world and two more historical) that may help clarify matters:

Laura Seay, Mali is Not a Stan, at Foreign Policy, argues that comparisons to Afghanistan (in addition to some fairly obvious topographical differences) misreads the situation; the French were invited in, know the country well, and are not plunging into a quagmire.

Marc Lynch, at Foreign Policy's Middle East Channel, asked his readers, Is Mali Part of the Middle East?  The conclusion is no, but certainly the events in Mali have resonances in the Maghreb, as the Algerian gas plant attack showed.  My on approach on this blog is to be as inclusive as possible; when Mali affects events in North Africa, we can look at it, though that doesn't make it part of the Middle East. But historically, it is part of the greater trading area for North Africa (as the Indian Ocean is for the Gulf), and will occasionally demand attention.

On more cultural issues, the African and Berber linguistics blogger Lameen Souag, at his Jabal al-Lughat blog, knows the territory well (one of his specialties is Songhay, the language group which includes the dominant language in Timbuktu). has two useful posts: "On Book-Burning in Timbuktu", and "Languages of Timbuktu," the latter of which seeks to clear up some confusion about the ethnicities and languages in the city.


http://lughat.blogspot.com/2013/01/languages-of-timbuktu.html

Timbuktu's Lost Libraries

All wars lead to some destruction of parts of the world's cultural heritage, but the deliberate burning of books and the destruction of works of art seems a particularly barbarous event. It is especially outrageous when it is done in the name of the very religion that created the books and art. Yet the Jihadis who burned the Ahmed Baba Institute in Timbuktu (having already destroyed most of the Sufi shrines in the area) have almost certainly burned far more Qur'ans than Western Islamophobes have ever dreamt of doing. When the Taliban destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan it was equally appalling, but at least they could claim to be destroying idols; in Timbuktu, the modern Vandals destroyed some of the most precious treasures of Islamic culture.

European Image of Mansa Musa

The golden age of Timbuktu was golden indeed, and the wealth of the 14th Century Emperor Mansa Musa was so vast that even the European map at left considered him one of the main points of interest in all of Africa.

The news is not all bad; locals managed to preserve at least some of the thousands of ancient manuscripts, though just how bad the losses are may take some time to appreciate. But the losses are certain to be profound, however much mitigated.

Some Useful Takes on Algeria and Mali

Today's a US holiday (Martin Luther King Day combined with the Presidential inauguration) so posting may be light but with Israel's elections tomorrow and Jordan's on Wednesday, it's going to be a busy week.

First off today I wanted to point you to several interesting takes on the events in Algeria and Mali that provide useful perspectives that differ a bit from the Western media's received wisdom.

• Natalya Vince, "In Amenas – a history of silence, not a history of violence" argues that much  of the commentary on the Algerian response has focused on Algeria's supposed violent heritage, compressing modern Algerian history into the war of independence and the troubles of the 1990s and ignoring everything in between. A useful antidote to much superficial commentary.

• The Mauritanian blogger who blogs at Dekhnistan offers "A Disaster 50 Years in the Making," arguing that the roots of the situation in Mali lie not just in the Libyan civil war or the rise of Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but in the years before French West Africa achieved independence, when nothing was done to alter colonial boundaries that combined Tuareg and Amazigh north with sub-Saharan south in such countries as Mauritania, Niger, Mali and Chad. While, farther east, we welcome the separation of Sudan and South Sudan, the specter of Al-Qa‘ida has become the primary focus in Mali.

• Related to the above, an article in Libération reminds us that not all of the northern rebels are Islamists, and that the Tuareg separatist group that started the whole affair the MNLA, are still in the mix: "Le Nord-Mali entre Touaregs et jihadistes" (in French). 


•  "How the French Air War in Mali Really Went Down" offers what appears to be considerable detail about the French (and other Western) operations over Mali in the current campaign.

The Life, and 222-Year Extended Afterlife, of the Maria Theresa Dollar

Maria Theresa as She Was

The Empress Maria-Theresa of Austria-Hungary (Kaiserin Maria-Theresia in German) was the only Empress in the Austrian Hapsburg dynasty as Holy Roman Empress and Archduchess of Austria; her 40 year reign (1740-1780) and 16 children guaranteed her a role in European royal genealogies and various 18th century wars.  But at least outside of the former Austria-Hungary, that is not how she is best known today. The standard silver coin of her reign, the Austrian thaler was considered a standard and stable unit of currency,and was coined throughout her reign. (The choice of "dollar" as the name of the currency of the new United States was certainly influenced by the reputation of the thaler.) Then she died in 1780. But her coinage did not.

As the Middle East Knows Her

As late as 2002, the Austrian mint struck a special production of coins with her image and the date 1780. They weren't counterfeit, and other mints across Europe had struck similar coins with the image of a long-dead Empress and the date 1780 during the 222 intervening years since her death, quite legally if the silver content was correct. Britain was the last to cease regular minting in the early 1960s. In Africa and the Middle East the Maria Theresa "Dollar" (riyal nimsawi or "Austrian riyal" in Gulf Arabic) was the standard "trade coinage" acceptable in the souqs of the whole region, the trusted silver coin. The long-dead Empress and her familiar buxom profile, the Hapsburg double eagle on the back, and the date of 1780 were more reliable than the coinage of local rulers, Ottoman Sultans, or colonial powers. The UK minted them since its Gulf dependencies long preferred them to Sterling. The British counterfeiting laws made counterfeiting Maria Theresa Thalers just as illegal as counterfeiting British sovereigns.

This 2003 article in Saudi Aramco World gives a good summary of the coin's career in the Gulf. An excerpt:

And wherever it was used, the coin was subjected to careful scrutiny. "Locals would count the number of pearls on Maria Theresa's oval brooch, or check the feathers on the imperial eagle. (These were the features that the names abu nuqta and abu reesh refer to.) Recipients would reject coins out of hand if they did not precisely match the original 1780 strike," explains Semple.

"Semple" is Clara Semple, whose book,  A Silver Legend: The Story of the Maria Theresa Thaler sounds fascinating,  though from its current Amazon listing appears to be unavailable, at least at my budget. A good review of the book in The Guardian, however, does open with a good story:

At Talh market in northern Yemen, I once watched an old man pay for a fresh clip of Kalashnikov ammunition with some weighty silver coins. Neither Yemeni or Saudi riyals, these reassuringly hefty discs were date-stamped 1780 and bore the image of a large busty woman on one side, an impressively feathery eagle on the other. They were silver dollars of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the woman was Maria Theresa, empress from 1740 to 1780.

Despite generous offers from the market-trader to sell me various machine guns, bazookas and even a tank ("only two days to deliver!"), I bought the money from him instead, paying a small premium to avoid some obvious forgeries. Little did I know that in some senses all the coins were forgeries, and a bright copy made in the sands of Talh the day before was at least as interesting as my supposed originals. Those, as Clara Semple points out in her intriguing book, could easily have been minted in Birmingham in the 1950s, or Brussels, London, Paris, Bombay, Rome or Vienna at some time in the previous two centuries - almost all had that 1780 date. As for rarity, around 400 million are known to have been issued in that period.

The review concludes:

These days the use as a trade currency is all but gone. Gold has replaced silver as the jewellery metal of choice and the American dollar as the currency. The generous bosom of Maria Theresa is only found in tourist bazaars and antique jewellery. To my intense pleasure, however, the last photograph in this delightful book is of that Yemeni market at al-Talh, a trader surrounded - just as I remember - with rifles, pistols and piles of Maria Theresa dollars. For a splendid moment I was back there, reliving my fantasy of becoming the first, and last, man to buy a T-64 Soviet tank with an 18th-century treasure trove.

 I'm not sure if he'd have been the first, and given the current situation in Yemen (the review is from 2006), I'm not sure no one has bought a T-64 with Maria Theresas by now. Silver is still silver.

There are earlier instances of currency strikes that continued long beyond the death of the monarch. One that may have endured even longer than Maria Theresa are the coins of Alexander the Great, though they were not copied with either the fidelity or the reliability of the content of their specie as the Maria Theresa. Bad copies of Alexander's  coins were still being circulated in Nabataea and Arabia (and even in Italy), areas he never even conquered, centuries after his death.

Heritage Destruction: Salafis Eradicating Timbuktu's Greatness

Somewhere, Ibn Battuta is weeping.

Although usually not within the purview of this blog, the takeover of the northern, Tuareg parts of Mali (the self-proclaimed "Azawad") first by the MNLA and more recently by radical Islamist groups this year, with links across the borders into Libya and Algeria, have forced attention to the ancient Islamic heritage of the reason. I've posted about Timbuktu's glorious past before, but now, following the fall first of Timbuktu and more recently of Gao to radical Salafist rebels of the Ansar Dine and MUJWA movements, that heritage is in danger. After destruction over the weekend of medieval Saint's tombs in Timbuktu, the Islamists have now destroyed an ancient door, kept closed for centuries, on one of Timbuktu's three great historic mosques, Sidi Yahya:

Among the tombs they destroyed is that of Sidi Mahmoudou, a saint who died in 955, according to the UNESCO website. In addition, on Monday they set upon one of the doors of the Sidi Yahya, a mosque built around 1400. Local legend held that the gate leading to the cemetery would only open on the final day at the end of time.

Local radio host Kader Kalil said that the members of Ansar Dine arrived at the mosque with shovels and pickaxes and yanked off the door, revealing a wall behind it. Kalil said that they explained they were doing so in order to disabuse people of the local legend and to teach them to put their whole faith in the Quran.

"Since my childhood, I have never seen the door on the western side of the mosque open. And I was born in 1947," said Kader, a longtime resident of the city. "When we were children, we were told that the door would only open at the end of time. These religious people want to go to the source, to show us that this is not true. .... Of course our population is not happy. The women, especially, are crying a lot."

Slideshow here. They have sworn to destroy every mausoleum in Timbuktu. UNESCO has put both Timbuktu and the Tomb of Askia in Gao on the Endangered List of heritage sites, which is unlikely to have much impact on the Ansar Dine. This French report shows video of some of the early destruction:


Destruction of tombs is often a Salafi demand: particularly in North Africa, where the Islamic cult of local saints is deeply ingrained, though Salafis have attacked Sufi tombs in Egypt and elsewhere, and when the Saudi Kingdom expanded into the Hijaz in the early 20th Century, many ancient tombs were destroyed by committed Wahhabis. While these monuments, and even the great mosques in Timbuktu, may not be as spectacular as the Buddhas of Bamiyan (destroyed by the Taliban), the destruction of Islamic monuments by those claiming to act in the name of Islam seems even more appalling somehow, though the destruction of heritage monuments is indefensible on any grounds.

As usual, one of the more perceptive commentators is kal at The Moor Next Door, whose latest post-fall-of-Gao analysis is here. MUJWA — the Movement of Unity and Jihad in West Africa — is something of a mystery; it seems to be a sort of offshoot from Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb, but with special emphases:

MUJWA’s propaganda during the Battle of Gao displays its intelligent exploitation of local grievances. A video released to regional media (and posted to the jihadist forums) shows the group’s effort to link its narrative to Songhai nationalist feelings; the video bears the name “Askia,” the name of a Songhai emperor with strong symbol power ... MUJWA has moved from former AQIM subcontractors, members and even drug runners to finding tactical support among members of the city other ethnic groups in the city, in the process projecting an image of ‘popular support’ which may or may not reflect sympathy with the Islamist groups per se as much as a perception of a common enemy.

It's a complicated story; two Twitter tweets (one from kal):

All this aside, this is a tragedy for Mali,for Africa, and for Islamic heritage in general.

The Moor on MUJWA

Kal at The Moor Next Door has a lengthy piece on the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), which has been playing a role in the events in northern Mali and whose exact relationship with Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is still a bit murky. An important piece I think for anyone interested in jihadist movements, the Maghreb, Sahara, or Sahel, etc.

And a reminder that his blog is a good resource for North Africa generally but especially for Algeria and Mauritania, as well as, increasingly, the whole Azawad separatist conflict.

The War Between the Sudans

 I haven't said anything yet about the nasty little border war that has simmered for the past couple of weeks on the still disputed border between Sudan and south Sudan, but with a new front being claimed west of the Heglig oilfield that has been the focus of most of the fighting to date, and African Union mediator Thabo Mbeki warnig that the two Sudans are "locked in a logic of war," perhaps I should.at least acknowledge what's going on.

I'm in no position to judge the rights and wrongs in the case; border disputes between countries that were once united, especially when fueled by oilfields along a still-not-fully-resolved border, usually are not a straightforward question. Since South Sudan's independence last July, little progress has been made in negotiations on the outstanding issues. Like much of the world, I have major reservations about the Khartoum regime due to Darfur and much else, and wish the new kid on the block well; but there seems to be some indication that South Sudan is responsible for upsetting a delicate balance here by occupying the disputed oilfield at Heglig. There are the usual ambiguities: are attacks in South Sudan carried out by local rebels or by Sudan? Whose claims are to be believed about aerial bombings, aircraft shot down, etc.?

The United Nations and the African Union are trying to bring things under control, and both have a lot invested in the peace process that saw the birth of an independent South Sudan. If I don't comment in greater detail for now it is because I fully acknowledge my own ignorance of the rights and wrongs in this case. I am confident of one thing: after decades of warfare starting as far back as the 1950s and with only brief respites, the last thing South Sudan needs after less  than a year of independence is another war. I hope they realize that.

Lameen Souag Starts a Blog on Algerian Darja (Colloquial Arabic)

I've linked several times to Lameen Souag's Jabal al-Lughat linguistics blog; Souag is the Algerian SOAS-trained language specialist who studies Berber and other Saharan/Sahelian languages and often discusses them in conjunction with Arabic. So who better to start a blog on the origins of Algerian darja (colloquial Algerian Arabic)? It's called   الأصÙ?Ù„ التاريخية للدارجة الجزائرية  (The historical sources of Algerian Darja) and is primarily in Arabic; only two posts so far. He explains at Jabal al-Lughat:

I've often talked about why it's not enough for developing countries to use English or French as a working language for research and leave the majority of their own citizens in the dark. So I'm putting my money where my mouth is (so to speak) and starting a blog in Arabic focused on dialect etymology, a subject rife with popular misconceptions: الأصÙ?Ù„ التاريخية للدارجة الجزائرية (Historical Origins of the Algerian Dialect). Some of this blog's readers may be interested.

Since diglossia and dialects are a frequent subject here, so may some of this blog's.

And at least a few of you may well find his other links of interest:

I've written up a finding first posted here - Songhay words in El-Jadida, Morocco - as part of a recently submitted article on sub-Saharan loanwords into North African Arabic. (There aren't many, but more than you might think: one of them, شطة Å¡aṭṭa "Cayenne pepper" from Hausa cìttÄ?, has even made it into Modern Standard Arabic via Egyptian dialect, and another, Ù?ابÙ?ية kÄ?bÅ«ya "pumpkin" from Hausa kàbÄ“wÄ?̀, is quite widespread in Algeria.)

MNAMON have posted a video of my talk about Libyco-Berber at Pisa - if you can stand the poor delivery, the content may be interesting. Among other things, I discuss the question of where LB fits into the Berber family tree.

He's amply demonstrated his linguistic qualification to blog on Algerian darja. It should be interesting, especially if he can post frequently.

The Moor on Mali

Now that Mali has intruded itself into our consciousness (the Algerians, Mauritanians etc. were already quite aware of it) and multiple and rival revolutionary groups have been appearing, it's hard to tell the players without a scorecard. To help interpret the mysteries of MUJWA and other groups, The Moor Next Door offers a primer of sorts.

"Azawad": Will Algeria be Drawn Into the Mali Conflict?

The proclamation of an independent "Azawad" by Tuaregs who, with their Islamist allies (or rivals?) have taken northern Mali in the wake of the coup in Bamako (where the coup-makers are now standing down) has raised concerns throughout the Maghreb, but most intensely in Algeria. Seven Algerian diplomats were reportedly kidnapped in Gao, but now have reportedly been released. The kidnappers were supposedly from the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA in its English acronym, MUJAO in its French), an offshoot that broke from Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Though the diplomats are now said to be free, Algeria is talking tough and saying it cannot accept the breakup of Mali, and there is growing concern that the northern extension of Mali could become a new rogue state aiming at destabilizing the region. Algeria has already had to face raids by AQIM from across its southern border. There were reports even before the kidnappings that Algerian special forces might intervene in Mali (report is in French).

But unsurprisingly, it's kal at The Moor Next Door who has a lot more about the Algerian buildup and the possibility of Algerian intervention. His article, quoting various Algerian reports, seems to suggest that Algeria might intervene in cooperation with the MNLA, the Tuareg force that initially won the north and then found its Islamist rivals pushing it out of the cities. But Algeria is also pledged to the unity of Mali, and cooperation with the MNLA might seem to contradict that goal. Kal's analysis was written before the diplomats' release, so the likelihood of an immediate Algerian intervention may now be much reduced.

There is still considerable confusion about the roles of the Tuareg MNLA, the Islamist Ansar Eddine, and MUJWA in the occupation of the north but they clearly have fallen out among themselves. Al-Jazeera English did score an unusual first with a report on the Ansar Eddine from Timbuktu (and where did they get the tanks?):

Fall of Timbuktu to Rebels a Reminder of the City's Onetime Greatness

The name "Timbuktu," to many Westerners,has long been synonymous with remoteness, isolation, a bit of mystery, Those attributes do not so much reflect the city's history as they do a particular Western concept of it, perhaps inspired by the fact that from the Mediterranean one had to cross the great Sahara to reach it, or even just by the somewhat magical sounds of the name itself. At an earlier time, in the Islamic world and the Mediterranean, the name of Timbuktu evoked fabulous wealth, a city rumored to abound in gold. That was never really the case either. But Timbuktu was once both a great entrepot where the Saharan caravan trade met the Niger River Valley, and a center of Islamic learning, the greatest university center south of the Mediterranean coastal cities.

On Sunday, Timbuktu became the latest front in Mali's war, when Tuareg rebels of the MNLA took the city in the wake of the recent coup in Mali. (See my earlier post here.) But soon after, the MNLA's erstwhile allies, the Islamist Ansar Eddine, reportedly pushed the MNLA out. Now there are reports that Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has joined Ansar Eddine in Timbuktu. The Moor Next Door tries to make sense of it, with many useful links.

I'm not going to try to sort out the tribal and religious factions in Mali, because despite being a blogger and being based in Washington, I still resist pontificating on things about which I know absolutely nothing at all. Which is the case here.

Djinguereber Mosque

Timbuktu, though, is another matter (though I've never been there). When I originally posted on the Mali coup I noted that, though Mali is not considered part of the Middle East these days, its Saharan regions had long been linked to the trans-Saharan trade, and the late Col. Qadhafi's meddling and Tuareg policies had spilled over into the Sahara and Sahel. But the links go even deeper, for long before Timbuktu became a symbol in European imagery for the remote and mysterious (and before the author of a children's book discovered that it rhymed with "Kalamazoo"), Timbuktu was known throughout the Arab world for its wealth, its gold, and its reputation as a major center of Islamic learning. It was echoes of that reputation which made Europeans want to find the city, and the difficulties of doing so gave birth to the image of one of the most remote places on earth.

But Timbuktu's original fame was not for its remoteness, but for its key location at the intersection of major trade routes across the Sahara. Located only a few miles from the upper Niger, it also provided access to the cultivable lands to the south.

European Image of Mansa Musa

In 1324 AD, the Emperor Mansa Musa of Mali made a famous pilgrimage to Mecca. Musa ("Mansa" is a Mandinka title meaning roughly, Emperor) was enormously rich in gold, and famously gave so much gold away that his hajj actually distorted prices throughout the Mediterranean basin. Musa added Timbuktu to the Mali Empire and proceeded to build its great mosques and its famous Islamic university; the reputation of his wealth soon combined with the reputation of Timbuktu's university and mosques to make its name familiar throughout the Arab world, though it was never Musa's capital. Ibn Battuta visited it and described it (but then, he went just about everywhere.)

By the time the Europeans got there finally, in the 1800s, the glory days had faded, but three of the medieval mosques still stand and the great University of Sankore still survives as the University of Timbuktu.

Azawad (Wikipedia)

The Tuareg rebels may, indeed, be tugging Timbuktu and other cities such as Gao back into a North African orbit rather than a sub-Saharan one, especially if they were to succeed in breaking the northern, desert region they call Azawad off from the rest of Mali.

Though Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya are certainly concerned about the events in Mali and worried about the possible role of AQIM among the Tuareg, so far the issue has been in the hands of the Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS), which has been pressuring the new junta to restore the elected government. While the junta has delayed a promised return to the constitution, the rebels have taken Gao, Timbuktu and other cities of the north.

For more on Timbuktu's history, see the Timbuktu Foundation website,  and the Timbuktu Wikipedia article. To follow events in Mali see the links in The Moor Next Door's piece linked by me above.

Mali Coup: Qadhafi Still a Problem for Africa, Even Posthumously

Yesterday's military coup in Mali would not at first glance be of concern to this blog: Mali is not part of the Middle East by any usual definition, and not part of the region covered by the Middle East Institute or The Middle East Journal. But it does border Algeria and Mauritania, and its large northern region is part of the Sahara, unlike the more populous Niger River Valley to the south. And this coup seems to have direct resonances to the overthrow last year of Col. Mu‘ammar Qadhafi of Libya. Ironically Qadhafi, who fancied himself the leader of Africa and regularly meddled below the Sahara, is still meddling despite being quite dead for some months now.

This particular coup seems to have been provoked by a Tuareg revolt in the north,which the (now apparently ousted) President failed to respond to adequately. The Tuareg revolt periodically, but this one has occupied considerable territory and apparently the Army felt their honor besmirched.

MNLA Emblem (Wikipedia)

Beyond the fact that the Tuareg are a Berber (Amazigh)-speaking people, speaking a language known as Tamasheq, what merits a mention of Mali here is that many of the Tuareg supporting the revolt are said to be tribesmen who formerly fought to support the lat Mu‘ammar Qadhafi in Libya. Qadhafi recruited not only Libyan Tuareg but Tuareg from Mali and Niger as well; on his defeat, these crossed into northern Niger, reportedly well-armed and equipped; the Malians among them eventually made their way home. They seem to provide many of the arms for the MNLA, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, The group seeks independence for Azawad.

Azawad (Wikipedia)

their name for the large Saharan region of Mali and the neighboring Tuareg areas in Mauritania and Niger. (MNLA website in French, here. General background on the revolt here.)

It's too early to know the implications of the coup for the Tuareg revolt, In another Middle Eastern resonance, however, the Mali government has of course invoked al-Qa‘ida to characterize their enemy, claiming that the MNLA is allied with al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a charge the MNLA strongly denies. The jury seems to be out on the relationship, but AQIM certainly has operated in northern Mali.

So Colonel Qadhafi, though dead these five months, is still making trouble in continent of which he once declared himself king; some, like this Economist article, go even farther and link the outflow o former Libyan arms to issues much farther afield, like the Boko Haram in Nigeria. link

Qadhafi: still dead, and still a troublemaker..

Are the Libyan Rebels Targeting Black Africans?

Mao famously said that a revolution is not a dinner party, and Lenin may have said that you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs (the attribution is fuzzy on that one). I wouldn't have chosen to dine with either of those gentlemen, but all wars are ugly, and a civil war can be the ugliest of all, so there's little surprising about reports of abuses by the victors in the wake of the fall of Tripoli. What is a bit more disturbing is a growing number of reports that the rebels have particularly singled out dark-skinned Libyans and sub-Saharan Africans for vengeance. Over the past few days, reports have emerged that not only armed mercenaries are being targeted, but all sub-Saharans, even ordinary migrant workers.  Amnesty International has called attention to the problem, and it is being reported upon by the general media, although some skilled observers are a bit cautious about how extensive the problem really is.

Qadhafi's many African adventures  led him to recruit soldiers from Mali, Chad, and Niger, many of whom served in the Libyan Army long before the revolution broke out. Since February there have been multiple reports that he was flying in mercenaries from a number of Saharan and Sahelian countries, paying them large sums to put down the rebellion. That many of the rebels want vengeance against these mercenary forces is understandable, if contrary to the laws of war.

But not every sub-Saharan African in Libya was a hired mercenary. Plenty were simply immigrants looking for work in the oilfields or other sectors. If they are being targeted solely because they are foreign, or worse, solely because of the color of their skin as some stories are suggesting, that does not augur well for the free Libya the rebels say they seek. Let's hope these prove to be isolated instances in the heat of victory and not signs of a deeper xenophobia or racism on the part of the victors.

There are also questions about the attitude towards the Tuareg, the nomadic, Berber-speaking tribesmen who roam southwestern Libya and neighboring countries. Algeria has also announced that it allowed some 500 Libyan Tuareg to enter Algeria as they were being pursued by rebel forces. The Libyan Tuareg were reportedly fighting on the regime's side, and there is no direct assertion that they were driven out solely because they are Tuareg, Other Tuareg originating from Mali and Niger who had been fighting for Qadhafi are reportedly returning to their home countries, which find it somewhat disturbing to have bodies of armed men with military training crossing their borders, even if they are coming home.

Yossi Melman on Lieberman in Africa

Ha'aretz' Yossi Melman has an interesting piece today on Avigdor Lieberman's tour of five African nations, suggesting that despite a lot of publicity about development and health and water issues, defense sales may be a major theme. He notes:

On a level that is even more secretive, there is the hope of developing intelligence ties and cooperation in the effort against international jihadist elements, and especially countering the activities of Iran in some of these African countries. This only becomes obvious when the composition of the delegation is analyzed carefully: in addition to the Foreign Ministry officials accompanying Lieberman, there is a delegation from the Defense Ministry's foreign assistance department, Sibat, and also a group of representatives of the intelligence community, including a Mossad official from the Tevel wing, which is responsible for the organization's foreign ties. Similarly, along with representatives from civilian industrial and development firms, there are agents from the country's defense firms.

The Foreign Ministry and the Israel Export Institute believe that there is at least another $1 billion worth of business potential in Africa, in addition to the $3 billion that Israeli firms already export in goods and services to the continent. Lieberman began his trip in Ethiopia, where he met with the country's prime minister and its foreign minister, putting the emphasis on the civilian assistance that Israel provides. The assistance comes in the form of biotechnology and agriculture, advanced water-purification technologies, and medical assistance in combating AIDS. The Foreign Ministry funding these projects out of its own budget, at the cost of several hundred thousand dollars a year.

But Ethiopia is also a key strategic state for Israel, with a long tradition of friendship and cooperation between the countries in military and intelligence matters. Ethiopia's importance lies in its being situated on the Horn of Africa,near a number of Arab states, and overlooking the sea routes to Eilat and the Suez Canal. Moreover, in recent years Iran has been increasingly active in the area, as have been Al-Qaida agents, particularly in nearby Somalia. Naturally these are issues that were discussed during Lieberman's meetings, even though they were not mentioned in the media briefings.

Besides Ethiopia, Lieberman visited Kenya, Nigeria, and is headed to Ghana and Uganda. No Israeli Foreign Minister has been to any country south of the Sahara except Ethiopia since 1991.

Israel is believed to have had longstanding covert links with Ethiopia (and, it is said, Ethiopia's rival Eritrea), but Lieberman attempts to be exploring new relationships with the sub-Saharan region. The defense link is particularly important: Israel is a major arms exporter, though this is not generally publicized; it has sold arms to a number of African coutnries in the past, and appears to be seeking to revive that market.