More on Sykes-Picot: The Agreement as Written

As I noted in my first post on the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was concluded a century ago this month, "Sykes-Picot" has become a convenient shorthand for the entire constellation of agreements and understandings that contributed to the postwar settlement, agreements spread out from as early as 1915 to as late as 1939, or even later if we include the partition of Palestine. In coming days I'll be dealing with the actual agreements, but first let's look at the real Asia Minor Agreement negotiated between Sir Mark Sykes and M. François Georges-Picot in 1916 and what borders it actually envisioned.

Britain and France began discussions of a post-Ottoman settlement on November 23, 1915, with Georges-Picot negotiating with Sir Arthur Nicolson, soon replaced by Sir Mark Sykes,. At that time efforts by David Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel to promote a Jewish state in Palestine were already under way, and Sir Henry McMahon in Egypt was already committing Britain to support an independent Arab state in correspondence with Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Another round of negotiations took place in December, and in February 1916 Sykes visited Petrograd to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Segey Sazonov. Negotiations with the Zionists and the commitments to Sharif Hussein were known to Sykes.

Sir Mark Sykes

F. Georges-Picot

The basic text was ready by May. On May 9, French Ambassador to London Paul Cambon transmitted it in a letter to British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, who returned it  with approval on May 16. Signed May 19 and with a formal exchange of notes May 23, the precise date that should be "celebrated" as the centenary is a little slippery.

The agreement's text is below after the map. Although the agreement gives lip service to the idea of an "independent" Arab stste, it would be subordinate to British and French zones of influence, and both had zones in which they claimed direct control. Britain and France made a umber of guarantees to each other (Palestine would be under international control but with Britain controlling Haifa, Acre, a railway to Egypt and a future railway to Iraq.)

Both parties seemed to recognize that the agreement had potential conflicts, but it was a secret agreement, and intended to remain so. As I've tried to make clear, I'm not defending Sykes-Picot, which was imperialist arrogance at its worst; I'm simply saying that, except for a general role for France in Syria (but then including Mosul) and Britain in Iraq, the borders are not today's.. The status of Mosul and Palestine would be among the first things to change, and of course the whole disposition of Anatolia would change.

One thing that would speed the unraveling of the details of  Sykes-Picot was its sudden revelation by the Bolsheviks in November 1917, which we'll discuss in Part 3.

Text of Sykes-Picot Agreement

It is accordingly understood between the French and British governments:

That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab states or a confederation of Arab states (a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief.

That in area (a) France, and in area (b) great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.

That in the blue area France, and in the red area great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.

That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other allies, and the representatives of the Shariff of Mecca.

That great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (a) for area (b). His majesty's government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third power without the previous consent of the French government.

That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, or (b) area, or area (a); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (a), or area (b), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against french goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That in area (a) the Baghdad railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (b) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad and Aleppo via the Euphrates valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two governments.

That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (b), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times. It is to be understood by both governments that this railway is to facilitate the connection of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the Polygon Banias Keis Marib Salkhad Tell Otsda Mesmie before reaching area (b).

For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (a) and (b), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversions from ad valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two powers.

There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.

It shall be agreed that the french government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third power, except the Arab state or confederation of Arab states, without the previous agreement of his majesty's government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the french government regarding the red area.

The British and French government, as the protectors of the Arab state, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.

The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab states shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two powers.

It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two governments.

I have further the honor to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, his majesty's government are proposing to the Russian government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter and your excellency's government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be communicated to your excellency as soon as exchanged. I would also venture to remind your excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement raises, for practical consideration, the question of claims of Italy to a share in any partition or rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated in Article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the allies.

His Majesty's Government further consider that the Japanese government should be informed of the arrangements now concluded.

Rant: The Next Week will be Full of Op-Eds about Sykes-Picot: Almost All of them Will Get it Wrong

May 19th will mark the 100th anniversary of the "Asia Minor Agreement," or as it is universally known today, the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Brace yourself.

They're going to tell you that Sykes-Picot created the modern borders of the Middle East (only a few of them), that it is being overturned by ISIS (even less so), that it was ever really implemented /imposed (only in a limited sense),  and that all the problems of the Middle East stem from it (a bit more arguable), not to mention that the whole reason that the Middle East is such a clusterfuck mess today is because of Sykes-Picot (even more arguable).

Not because I approve of British and French diplomats carving up the Middle East while a) not asking the locals what they wanted and b) in the British case, promising the Promised Land to themselves, Jews, and Arabs at the same time. The fact is, though, that Sykes-Picot is not what you think it is because, as I've ranted before, and in fact more than once, Sykes-Picot, deplorable as it may have been, was never implemented as written.

Look at the map above. Does it look like today's Middle East? In addition to the British and French (pink and blue) zones, Zones A and B are areas of their influence. France controls Mosul, Kirkuk, and northern Iraq. Britain gets the rest of Iraq, plus southern Palestine, while northern Palestine and Jerusalem are internationalized. Russia controls Constantinople and the Straits, and Armenia. Italy gets its own pound of flesh. But that is not the postwar map of the Middle East.

The reason is simple: "Sykes-Picot" has become a convenient shorthand for "the entire postwar settlement of the Ottoman territories," not the original agreement.

My readers who have studied the history know this: even before the agreement the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, and soon after,the Balfour Declaration,  the Paris Peace Talks, the Treaty of Sèvres, the San Remo Conference, the Treaty of Lausanne, and other agreements.

I will be discussing the whole postwar settlement package in coming days. My goal is not to exonerate Sir Mark Sykes and M. Picot, but to place their colonial enterprise in broader context.

A Foreshadowing of the Great War in the Middle East: The Taba crisis of 1906

Though as we have seen in our posts on the origins of the Great War in the Middle East a century ago, the British hoped until the last minute to keep the Ottoman Empire from entering the war on the side of Germany and Austria, it was hardly a complete surprise. Given Germany's role in training the Ottoman Army, building the Baghdad railway, etc., they also had plans for the contingency of Ottoman belligerency. In fact, there had been a brief threat of war and a British ultimatum in 1906, in what came to be known as the Taba crisis, or sometimes, especially on the Turkish side, the ‘Aqaba crisis. It was largely forgotten until the 1980s, when in the wake of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, Israel and Egypt submitted a dispute over where exactly the border at Taba ran to international arbitration. Although this post draw on other sources as well, the arbitration decision handed down September 29, 1988, offers a good summary of the background to the 1906 crisis.

I've previously discussed the anomalous position of Egypt: still nominally an Ottoman province ruled by a hereditary Khedive, yet a de facto virtual British protectorate since 1882. (Later this month we'll see how Britain resolved the contradiction in December 1914.)

Before the British occupation of Egypt, the boundaries of Egypt and the remainder of the Ottoman Empire were somewhat fluid. Northwestern Sinai and the northern coast were generally administered from Egypt, while southern and southeastern Sinai were administered from the Hijaz. In the late 19th century the Ottomans considered the boundary to be, and many maps showed it as being, a line from Suez to Rafah, thus excluding most of the southern and eastern Sinai. Egypt however was allowed to garrison locations beyond this line to protect the pilgrimage trade.

After the British arrival in 1882 Britain wanted a buffer zone for the defense of the Suez Canal, A line beginning at Suez would allow Ottoman troops right up to the Canal. The British favored an Egyptian control of the entire geographical Sinai peninsula, seeing the "natural" frontier as running from Rafah to Taba, just short of ‘Aqaba. When, in 1892, the Khedival office passed to ‘Abbas Himi II, the Ottoman Sultan issued the traditional firman confirming him in office and stipulating the claimed line from Suez to Rafah. This was protested by Sir Evelyn Baring, soon to be Lord Cromer, on the grounds that previous firmans had specified Egyptian rights to garrison troops beyond this line. Constantinople assured Egypt it intended to maintain the status quo based on Egypt's right to protect the overland hajj route, but making clear ‘Aqaba would be Ottoman; Baring meanwhile instructed the Egyptian Foreign Minister that Britain recognized Egypt's authority "bounded to the east bya line running in a south-easterly direction from a point a short distance to the east of El Arish to the head of the Gulf of Akaba," but leaving the town of ‘Aqaba under Ottoman control.

The dispute over the Sinai border led directly to the crisis of 1906. By this time the Ottomans had completed the Hijaz railway as far as Ma‘an in what is now Jordan. A spur line to ‘Aqaba was under consideration; that would give the Ottomans a rail outlet on the Red Sea, freeing them from dependance on the Suez Canal.

In December of 1905 Cromer learned from intelligence sources that in response to Egyptian plans to build a barracks near the claimed border, The Ottoman government was ordering additional troops to the region and planned to establish a guardhouse to prevent this.

The British ordered their Inspector for Sinai, in effect the British officer in charge of the frontier, W.E. Jennings-Bramly (Bramly Bey) to the region with five Egyptian troops to set up tents at Umm Rashrash, the site of the present Israeli port of Eilat. He did so on January 10, 1906. He met with the local Turkish commander at ‘Aqaba, Rushdi, who after consulting Damascus informed Bramly that he was in Ottoman territory and that Turkey was planning to set up border posts at Taba and Kuntilla, two places with water sources on what the British considered their (that is, Egypt's) side of the line.

Confronted with Turkish demands and orders not to provoke, Bramly retreated to his headquarters at Nakhl by January 14. The Director of Intelligence in Cairo, Captain R.C.R. Owen,  ordered the Egyptian Coast Guard Steamer Nur al-Bahr to the area, with Sa‘ad Bey Rifa‘t, who had governed ‘Aqaba for Egypt prior to 1892, and 50 troops,  with orders to land at Ras al-Naqb near Umm Rashrash and possibly at Taba. On January 23 they reported to Bramly that there were Turkish forces at Taba and they had threatened to fire on the Egyptians if they attempted to land. Instead the Egyptian force settled in just offshore, off Fara‘un Island.

Now things began to escalate. The Ottomans also put a force at Ras al-Naqb and began building up troops in the area. Bramly was told to hold his position but not initiate hostilities.  But with the two sides confronting each other, Owen dispatched the Assistant Director of Intelligence in Cairo, o replace Bramly on February 14. Bramly returned to Nakhl and his duties governing Sinai.

HMS Diana

Meanwhile the British Ambassador to the Sublime Porte proposed a joint border demarcation, but this was rebuffed. Diplomacy was, in British style, backed up by gunboats: the protected cruiser HMS Diana was dispatched to the Gulf of ‘Aqaba. As diplomatic exchanges continued in both Constantinople and Cairo for the next several weeks, the Ottoman position not only remained firm: at one point it hardened,  proposing a line from al-‘Arish to Ras Muhammad at the southern tip of Sinai, thus claiming the whole of eastern Sinai.

The situation worsened. When a British agent went ashore at Rafah from HMS Minerva, local Turkish authorities ordered him out and the British reported the Ottomans were destroying the border posts. On May 3, the British had had enough of negotiation and dispatched an ultimatum: the Ottomans must agree to demarcate the line along the Rafah-Taba route or Britain would take military action: not necessarily in this remote area, but by seizing Turkish islands in the Aegean.

It was 1906, not 1914. The Young Turk Revolution was two years in the future. The "Sick Man of Europe" was still quite ill. France and Russia rushed to Britain's support, but Germany held back from backing the Ottomans. The Sultan's government was in a corner, and on May 14,  the Ottomans agreed to a joint demarcation.

That took place during the summer of 1906 and created the present border between Egypt and what are now Gaza and Israel. Taba, today a major resort town, would be the subject of the 1988 arbitration mentioned earlier.

Ironically, when the First World War actually broke out, the British decided it would be too costly to erect defenses along the Rafah-Taba line, and decided to defend the eastern approaches to the canal much closer to that vital artery of Empire.