The Coup that Couldn't Shoot Straight: Whatever Really Happened, Erdoğan Can Now Consolidate Control

It's no surprise that yesterday's failed coup (if that's what it was) in Turkey is being used by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as an excuse to purge not only the Army but the judiciary as well, perhaps clearing the way to achieve the strengthened Presidency he has been seeking. Given the haphazard execution of the coup, it is hardly a surprise that some have speculated it was staged, a burning-the-Reichstag moment. That may be overly conspiratorial, but it could hardly have worked so well for Erdoğan if he had scripted it. (One person suggesting it might have been staged is Fethullah Gülen on whom Erdoğan is blaming the coup.)

If we reject the idea it was staged, then we're left with having to explain the incompetence of the plot. The plotters seized the state television station according to the classic coup playbook, but neglected to seize private TV stations or cut social media for several hours, allowing  Erdoğan to rally support and retake the airport. It was a 1960s coup in 2016. The plotters seem to have been unaware of  Erdoğan's whereabouts, and lacked the support of most of the general staff. It's been suggested that the authorities knew it was coming and were prepared for it. Was this just a classic case of incompetence and military fuckup? Whatever it was, Erdoğan seems intent on capitalizing on it.

The Coups of Summer, Revisited

Back in 2010, I did a post called "Summertime Arab Coups of he 50s, 60s, and  70s: Was it the Weather?" As we noted yesterday, Egypt's coup in 1952 was on July 23; in 1958 the Iraqi Monarchy was overthrown on July 14. While noting that coups were no longer common in the Arab world (except for Mauritania, which upholds the tradition) one has to wonder why coups were so common in the hottest months:

This is not as frivolous as it sounds. Last year the North African blogger who calls himself The Moor Next Door took the time and trouble to actually do spreadsheets and graphs of all Arab coups and attempted coups, and sure enough, he found a lot in the summertime: in fact, he found seven in July and five in August. These were by far the most except for the outlier November, which also had seven. (See his post here; a spreadsheet of coups here; and graphs of the data here.)

It does make you wonder. The Free Officers' coups in Egypt and Iraq are not alone: the Ba‘athist coup of July 17, 1968 was the key to the long rule of Saddam Hussein; in Syria, Husni Za‘im was overthrown in August 1949; in July 1963 a Nasserite counter-coup was put down bloodily; in Iraq Bakr Sidqi, who launched the first modern Arab coup in 1936, was assassinated in August 1937; a July 1971 coup in Sudan succeeded until Egyptian troops intervened to restore Ja‘far Numeiri; Sultan Qaboos of Oman deposed his father in July 1970; and so on. Mauritania, the only Arab country that still has coups these days, has had them (among others in other months) in July 1978, August 2005, and August 2008.

 But at the time, I was limiting myself to the Arab world. If we expand to the rest of the region, the "Operation Ajax" Anglo-American backed coup against Mohammed Mosaddeq in Iran in 1953 occurred on August 19. The 1960 coup in Turkey was on May 27 and the 1980 coup on September 12, nicely bracketing the summer.

And of course, returning to the Arab world, we have the Definitely-Not-a-Coup of June 30-July 3, 2013.
So I return to the earlier question, was it the heat, or what?

The Coups of Summer: Why Were So Many Arab Coups in July?

For some reason this post has temporarily disappeared. I am attempting to retrieve it.

Mali Coup: Qadhafi Still a Problem for Africa, Even Posthumously

Yesterday's military coup in Mali would not at first glance be of concern to this blog: Mali is not part of the Middle East by any usual definition, and not part of the region covered by the Middle East Institute or The Middle East Journal. But it does border Algeria and Mauritania, and its large northern region is part of the Sahara, unlike the more populous Niger River Valley to the south. And this coup seems to have direct resonances to the overthrow last year of Col. Mu‘ammar Qadhafi of Libya. Ironically Qadhafi, who fancied himself the leader of Africa and regularly meddled below the Sahara, is still meddling despite being quite dead for some months now.

This particular coup seems to have been provoked by a Tuareg revolt in the north,which the (now apparently ousted) President failed to respond to adequately. The Tuareg revolt periodically, but this one has occupied considerable territory and apparently the Army felt their honor besmirched.

MNLA Emblem (Wikipedia)

Beyond the fact that the Tuareg are a Berber (Amazigh)-speaking people, speaking a language known as Tamasheq, what merits a mention of Mali here is that many of the Tuareg supporting the revolt are said to be tribesmen who formerly fought to support the lat Mu‘ammar Qadhafi in Libya. Qadhafi recruited not only Libyan Tuareg but Tuareg from Mali and Niger as well; on his defeat, these crossed into northern Niger, reportedly well-armed and equipped; the Malians among them eventually made their way home. They seem to provide many of the arms for the MNLA, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, The group seeks independence for Azawad.

Azawad (Wikipedia)

their name for the large Saharan region of Mali and the neighboring Tuareg areas in Mauritania and Niger. (MNLA website in French, here. General background on the revolt here.)

It's too early to know the implications of the coup for the Tuareg revolt, In another Middle Eastern resonance, however, the Mali government has of course invoked al-Qa‘ida to characterize their enemy, claiming that the MNLA is allied with al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a charge the MNLA strongly denies. The jury seems to be out on the relationship, but AQIM certainly has operated in northern Mali.

So Colonel Qadhafi, though dead these five months, is still making trouble in continent of which he once declared himself king; some, like this Economist article, go even farther and link the outflow o former Libyan arms to issues much farther afield, like the Boko Haram in Nigeria. link

Qadhafi: still dead, and still a troublemaker..

Bayan Raqm Wahid

Though military coups are rare lately, they were once common enough in the Arab world that the phrase "Bayan Raqm Wahid" — communique number one — is actually a cliche in Arabic to mean a military coup. So it's not surprising that when the protesters heard that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces had issued "Bayan Raqm Wahid" today, and it appeared to indicate that the Armed Forces were stepping in, it's easily understood why the crowds thought the end was near. The Supreme Military Council rarely meets, and hasn't met publicly since 1973, and quite visibly neither Mubarak nor Suleiman was at the meeting as shown on Egyptian TV. Then Lt.Gen. Sami Enan, the Chief of Staff [clarification: I'm told it was the Cairo regional commander], went to Tahrir, told the protesters the Army supported their legitimate demands, and told a --porter that "it's over," the impression grew.

CIA Director Leon Panetta seemed to think so, too, when he told Congress it was likely Mubarak would go tonight. President Obama seemed to expect more, too. Given tyhe close communications between the US and the Egyptian military, one wonders if the Armed Forces themselves thought Mubarak would do more. That's why everyone is wondering if there will be a communique number two. It certainly does look like the Army thought it had persuaded someone of something, and then Mubarak offered half measures.

For those with Arabic, here's the announcement and scenes of the military council meeting.

Where Will They Put the February 10 Bridge?

Cairo already has a July 26 Bridge and an October 6 bridge. Where will they put the February 10 bridge, if this turns out to be what it increasingly looks like?

More on the Supreme Council

I'm seeing reports that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has only publicly announced meeting three times: 1967, 1973, and today.

Note that the official statement said that "the military" convened the Supreme Council, not that the Commander-in-Chief (Mubarak) did.

I think the Army is in the driver's seat.

Summertime Arab Coups of the 50s, 60s and 70s: Was it the Weather?

I'm working on a post for tomorrow which will note the 52nd anniversary of the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq (the July 14 revolution), and last July 23 I reflected on Egypt's comparable moment; which raises another issue: why have so many Middle Eastern coups occurred in the summertime? Is it the heat, or what? Admittedly, coups are mostly a thing of the past in the Arab world today. Syria, which had something like 20-plus coups and attempts between 1949 and 1970, has settled down to being run by Asads for the past 40 years. Other than Mauritania, which keeps the tradition alive, the last successful Arab coup was Sudan's in 1989, 21 years ago. But in the golden age of coups, a lot were in summertime.

This is not as frivolous as it sounds. Last year the North African blogger who calls himself The Moor Next Door took the time and trouble to actually do spreadsheets and graphs of all Arab coups and attempted coups, and sure enough, he found a lot in the summertime: in fact, he found seven in July and five in August. These were by far the most except for the outlier November, which also had seven. (See his post here; a spreadsheet of coups here; and graphs of the data here.)

It does make you wonder. The Free Officers' coups in Egypt and Iraq are not alone: the Ba‘athist coup of July 17, 1968 was the key to the long rule of Saddam Hussein; in Syria, Husni Za‘im was overthrown in August 1949; in July 1963 a Nasserite counter-coup was put down bloodily; in Iraq Bakr Sidqi, who launched the first modern Arab coup in 1936, was assassinated in August 1937; a July 1971 coup in Sudan succeeded until Egyptian troops intervened to restore Ja‘far Numeiri; Sultan Qaboos of Oman deposed his father in July 1970; and so on. Mauritania, the only Arab country that still has coups these days, has had them (among others in other months) in July 1978, August 2005, and August 2008.

So is it the heat, or is all this coincidence?

Those Qatari Coup Rumors

After my post yesterday about nothing much happening in August, a commenter rightly noted that the Gulf and Arab blogosphere has been somewhat abuzz about rumors of a possible military coup in Qatar over the last week. These rumors started to spread a day or so before I left DC, and I didn't comment because at first at least they seemed to be concentrated in sources that, when it comes to Qatar, need to be approached with caution: mostly Saudi media such as elaph.com, who share the Kingdom's antipathy toward the Qatari government, (some of elaph's reporting here and here, in Arabic), and some sensational websites. Once it was picked up by the pro-Israeli news aggregator MEMRI it gained a new lease on life. The basic story was that a series of dismissals and retirements of senior Qatari officers stemmed from a failed coup, or perhaps a discovered plot. There were hints the Chief of Staff was involved and indications that differences over foreign policy, probably involving Iran, were involved.

I didn't post then because of the suspect nature of the sources and because I was leaving town. I thought at the time and still think this needs to be approached cautiously. Apparently the US intelligence community is being dismissive, and while there have certainly been occasional plots in Qatar — a well-known one early in Sheikh Hamad's reign in the mid-90s aimed at restoring his deposed father, and rumors of dissidence in the military and arrests in 2002 — there isn't much history of military coups in the Gulf, usually because the Rulers pre-empt long before any plot can mature. I suspect if anything is behind these stories, it's another such case. It will probably become a little clearer over time, though this is one story where Al-Jazeera won't be leading the story. My conclusion: worth watching, but consider the sources. And since I already have a category called "coffeehouse gossip," I'm including this under that rubric.