Ill Omens for the Holidays?

Turning and turning in the widening gyre   

The falcon cannot hear the falconer;

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere   

The ceremony of innocence is drowned;

The best lack all conviction, while the worst   

Are full of passionate intensity.

 Yeats, The Second Coming

On the very eve of the Winter Solstice and the seasonal feasts of multiple faiths, and in the bitter aftermath of the fall of Aleppo, in a single day we have seen the public assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, an apparent terrorist attack in which a truck plowed into a crowded Christmas Market in Berlin, killing 12 so far, and then (perhaps a retaliation?) a gunman in Zurich opening fire in an Islamic Center, wounding three people at prayer.

Just yesterday,  four gunmen in the Jordanian city of Karak killed nine, retreating into the city's famous Crusader castle, where they were killed.

Let us hope this is not an augury of worse to come.

On the Eve of Jordan's Vote

Jordan is far from being an ideal democracy, but it does have political parties and competitive elections, even if Parliament's power is circumscribed. Tomorrow, Jordan goes to the polls to elect a new Parliament. Curtis Ryan offers an overview at The Washington Post, and also POMEPS has a podcast with Ryan on the same subject. They provide a useful briefing before the vote.

Bone of Contention, Part IV: McMahon's October 24, 1915 Letter to Sharif Hussein: A Few Loose Ends

After a few days' hiatus, I need to provide my promised final installment in my series on the 100th anniversary of the McMahon letter to Sharif Hussein of October 25, 1915. So far, we have already covered the English and Arabic texts themselves in Part I and the decades of debate over meaning that followed in Part II. Part III dealt with the question of who wrote and who translated the disputed letter. Now, a few of the loose ends.

First, it seems important to emphasize that at no point in the letter, or in the entire Hussein-McMahon correspondence, does the word "Palestine" actually appear. Nor do "Jerusalem," "Holy Land," or similar equivalents. Given the whole vilayet dispute over what land McMahon meant to exclude, why couldn't he have been clearer if he, or the London authorities for whom he spoke,  intended to exclude Palestine?

Second, in the subsequent correspondence, Hussein and McMahon (or his Arabists and the Foreign Office) were to bicker back and forth over the question of Lebanon and the Syrian coast, which were understood to be the areas Britain reserved in the interests of its ally, France. During these negotiations the British kept the commitment vague but never explicitly  included Palestine in the excluded territories. Hussein, or his son ‘Abdullah, who may have written his father's letters, never raised the Palestine issue either. Perhaps neither side was thinking about it yet, but that would change.

Third, I want to mention a point raised by a colleague with far more knowledge of Persian than my smattering of basic grammar. As I noted in Part III, Sir Ronald Storrs in his memoirs suggests that at least the earliest correspondence with ‘Abdullah and later with the Sharif was translated by his "little Persian agent," named Ruhi. While he doesn't address the October 24 letter directly, my colleague notes that in Persian, the word velayet, cognate with Arabic wilaya and Turkish vilayet, can have an even more generic and ill-defined application, as in the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. That could be a genuine reason for the confusion, or the whole explanation given by Storrs could be an attempt to excuse a deliberately ingenuous phraseology, but it seems a valid point worthy of consideration.

Finally, there is the thorny question of Lieutenant Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi. In the discussion of the cases laid out by the Arab and British sides' presentations on the McMahon correspondence to the London Conference in 1939, quoted at length in Part II, the British argued that they had made clear to Faruqi, who, they thought, was authorized to speak for the Sharif, that Palestine was excluded, and that Faruqi had indicated that this would not be a sticking point. To this response, the Arab delegation's response essentially amounted to, "Who's Faruqi?" A century later, it's still not a bad question.

Let's start with who he said he was. He was a lieutenant in the Ottoman Army, only 24 years old, but an aide-de-camp to Fakhri Pasha, Commander of the XII Corps, Fourth Army. He was also by his account a senior official of the Al-‘Ahd (the Covenant) secret society of Arab Ottoman officers based in Damascus, which in turn merged with another Arab nationalist movement, Al-Fatat, which British Intelligence called the Young Arab Society. When Prince Feisal, Sharif Hussein's son, passed through Syria, these groups signed the "Damascus Protocol," promising to support Sharif Hussein under certain conditions.

He claimed to be a direct descendant of the second Caliph, ‘Umar, whose sobriquet was al-Faruq.

In late summer of 1915, Faruqi, who had reportedly been transferred to Constantinople to get him out of his political maneuverings in Damascus, deserted across the British lines at Gallipoli and by September had arrived in Cairo, where he fell in with a group of Syrian and other Arab nationalist including Rashid Rida, ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-Misri, and others. He also came to the attention of British Military Intelligence, led by Gilbert Clayton.

Presumably through the secret societies in Damascus, Faruqi was aware of the earliest rounds of negotiations between the Sharif and the British, and this convinced the British of his bona fides. Faruqi spoke little or no English so translation questions may be in play yet again, but the British certainly came to believe he spoke not only for the Damascus secret societies but directly for the Sharif. He reportedly told the British that 90% of Arab officers in the Ottoman Army were Arab nationalists, that Ibn Saud and other in the Peninsula backed Hussein, etc.

Up to this point the British had been coy in their courting of Sharif Hussein since they doubted he had support outside the Hejaz, but here was a defector claiming the whole Arab world was ready to throw off the Ottoman yoke. There seems little doubt that Faruqi's assurances helped propel the British to make the promises made in the October 24 letter.

Perhaps even worse, it has been suggested that in discussions with Mark Sykes, Faruqi seemed amenable to the outlines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Though Hussein had not seemingly heard of him, he gave Faruqi a position in 1916 as a negotiator, but both the British and Sharifians grew frustrated and dismissed him in 1917.

Did he ever speak for Hussein? Not at first, and not directly. Was he a complete fraud or, as this article puts it, "one of the greatest impostors in the history of international relations"? Well, he was at least the typical con man telling you what you want to hear.

Wikipedia gives his dates as 1891-1920, without sourcing, but that would make him only 29 when he died. Is it possible that all the legacies of the British multiple pledges in World War I and even Sykes-Picot are the legacy of one man who misrepresented himself and died before he was 30? Or did Faruqi have some real backing for his assertions? Or will we never know?

Bone of Contention, Part III: McMahon's October 24, 1915 Letter to Sharif Hussein: Who Wrote It and Who Translated It?

Continuing with our discussion of the 100th anniversary of the contentious, notoriously ambiguous letter of October 24, 1915 from Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein of Mecca spelling out the boundaries (or more accurately, exclusions from the boundaries) of a future Arab state, we have already covered the English and Arabic texts themselves in Part I and the decades of debate over meaning that followed in Part II.

As Elizabeth Monroe put it quite succinctly in her Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956:

As to Palestine, it is galling to think how easily McMahon could have devised some form of words intimating to the Sharif how several faiths held that land in reverence, and that there must be multilateral agreement about it.

But he didn't. The odd ""portions of Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo" exclusion is unclear about areas to the west of areas south of Damascus, given the ambiguity of the terms districts/wilayat, as we have discussed.

The ambiguity may have been intentional, a result of poor translation, or something else. Some historians, beginning with Emile Marmorstein,  have even suggested that the choice of "Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" is derived from a phrase in Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, a book many educated britons might know at the time but one not likely in Sharif Hussein's library. T.E. Lawrence's biographer Jeremy Wilson attributes the phrase to Lawrence, but Lawrence knew Gibbon well. Still, adding Amman, Maan, or Aqaba to the list would have clarified that Palestine was excluded though none of those towns (in 1915) were of significant size to rank with Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

This blog is not going to solve one of the historical mysteries of the past century in the Middle East of course. But in trying to discern the reasons for the confusion, two questions come to mind: who actually wrote the text of the October 24 letter, and who actually translated it into Arabic?

Who wrote the October 24 letter, and the Hussein-McMahon correspondence in general? Of course, the letter carries the signature of the High Commissioner for Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon.It is known that a draft was shared with Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary in London. McMahon took responsibility for the letter, but it is unlikely he was the primary writer.

McMahon (Seven Pillars)

McMahon did know something about defining borders: during his Indian days he had given his name to the "McMahon line" delineating the border between India and Tibet. But he was an India hand, and a third generation one at that, and knew little about the Arab world on taking up his position in Egypt. Like most serious diplomatic communications on which much was riding, the Correspondence, including the highly contentious October 24 letter, were likely cooperative products.

We have previously looked at the confusing welter of overlapping political and military authorities in Egypt alone, even if we exclude the rival Government of India and the Cabinet in London.

Ronald Storrs

The late Elie Kedourie and other historians have assumed that the likeliest candidate for the primary author is McMahon's "Oriental Secretary," that is, his chief Arab/Turkish specialist, Ronald Storrs. Storrs was unquestionably the key player in the opening rounds of feelers to Sharif Hussein and his sons before the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, and specifically says that he wrote some of the earlier overture messages to Hussein's son ‘Abdullah. In his Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs (the US edition is titled Orientations), he speaks in rather general terms of the ambiguities in the correspondence in ways that imply he was closely involved, and blames translation issues and a lack of knowledge of what London an India were doing:

Much play has been made by Arab and other critics with ambiguities, mutually incompatible undertakings, and "betrayals"; without entire justification but not without cause. Our Arabic correspondence with Mecca was prepared by Ruhi [elsewhere referred to as "my little Persian agent"], a fair though not a profound Arabist (and a better agent than scholar); and checked, often under high pressure, by myself. I had no Deputy, Staff or office, so that during my absence on mission the work was carried on (better perhaps) by others, but the continuity was lost. Husain's letters on the other hand were written in an obscure and tortuous prose in which the purity of the Hejaz Arabic was overlaid and tainted with Turkish idioms and syntax. Until Mark Sykes appeared in Cairo in 1916 we had but the slightest and vaguest information about the Sykes-Picot negotiations for the tripartite division of non-Turkish Turkey between France, Russia and England, later nullified (and divulged) by the fall of Russia; and there was far too little realization of Indian operations in Iraq and of Indian encouragement of Ibn Sa'ud. So far as we were concerned it seemed to be nobody's business to harmonize the various views and policies of the Foreign Office, the India Office, the Admiralty, the War Office, the Government of India and the Residency in Egypt. The Revolt, when it began, entailed the co-operation of at least three Military Commanders: the G.O.C.'s of Egypt, Iraq and Aden. After the withdrawal from Gallipoli the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, merged with the Egyptian, became the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under which, gathering up these threads with those of the Naval G.O.C. and the Sudan Government, was constituted the Arab Bureau, directed by D. G. Hogarth, of which T. E. Lawrence was a member.

While he neither asserts sole authorship nor specifically speaks of the October 24, 1915, letter Storrs clearly makes clear he was deeply involved. The mention of the Syrian towns has been ascribed to many hands, even Mark Sykes, who was not in Cairo (and note Storrs says Ciro was unaware of the Sykes-Picot talks).

Clayton

Others who certainly played a role were Gilbert Clayton, the intelligence chief in Cairo who would certainly have had input, as would his staff.Jeremy Wilson quotes D.G. Hogarth to the effect that T.E. Lawrence, still only a second lieutenant at the time, was much involved with the negotiations.

Wingate

Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army (Commander of the Egyptian Army, a separate post from the Commander of British forces in Egypt). was also an early advocate of the Arab Revolt and is known to have had some input, though not really in the chain of command.

All these men, and the whole Intelligence Section, likely had input, but the likeliest scenario would seem to be that Storrs wrote most of the correspondence, subject to approval by McMahon and Grey.

But what about the translation, which was to cause so much confusion? To repeat the Storrs quote I cited above:

Our Arabic correspondence with Mecca was prepared by Ruhi [elsewhere referred to as "my little Persian agent"], a fair though not a profound Arabist (and a better agent than scholar); and checked, often under high pressure, by myself. I had no Deputy, Staff or office, so that during my absence on mission the work was carried on (better perhaps) by others, but the continuity was lost.

Storrs does not apply these remarks specifically to the letter in question, but it is his explanation for the subsequent confusion. Are we to believe that based in Cairo, then as now the largest Arabic-speaking city, in a critical negotiation with an Arab leader, translations were done by a "little Persian agent" who was "a fair though not a profound Arabist," and "checked, often under high pressure, by myself." Are we really to assume no native speaker of Arabic was consulted, merely a Persian and an English Arabist?

I'm not a specialist on Storrs or the period, and it's not clear this is intended to apply to the Hussein-McMahon letters, though the introductory lines appear to imply just that;

Much play has been made by Arab and other critics with ambiguities, mutually incompatible undertakings, and "betrayals"; without entire justification but not without cause.

"Ambiguities, mutually incompatible undertakings, and 'betrayals'" certainly seems to suggest he's talking about the October 24 letter and its controversy. "Ruhi," the "Persian agent" was  (presumably) not a native Arabic speaker. This seems to be the only statement I can find on how the translation came about, and it sounds like an after-the-fact excuse. If I'm missing something, please post it in the comments and I'll note it here.

Part IV will look some of the loose ends of the story.

Bone of Contention, Part II: McMahon's October 24, 1915 Letter to Sharif Hussein: The Controversy Over Two Decades

The reasons for the dispute over the October 24, 1915 letter of McMahon to Hussein were implicit in Part I: Britain agreed, or appeared to agree, with the demands for Arab independence made by Sharif Hussein, subject to certain geographic reservations: the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, which had substantial Turkish populations, and the "portions of Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo." Reading that in English, one would naturally assume that it is excluding Lebanon (an exclusion Hussein would contest elsewhere in the correspondence), but did it also include Palestine, as Britain would insist? From the Peace Conference in 1919 through the London Conference of 1939, Arab spokesmen and His Majesty's Government would bicker for two decades (and in many books since) over what was promised to whom, and what was excluded. As we approach the centennial of what I called perhaps the most contentious single text in Modern Middle Eastern History (though UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 is arguably a close second) this is the second part of my series on the letter and its attendant controversy. It looks at the controversy itself. Tomorrow we'll try to discern how the letter was written, and by whom, and what was originally intended.

The critical issue was the use of the word "districts" in the original English text, which appears as wilayat in the Arabic text dispatched to the Sharif. A wilaya is usually  province, equivalent to the Ottoman term vilayet, derived from the Arabic. Part I contains the full text of the letter in English and also the Arabic text of the critically contentious passage.

The problem is if you substitute vilayets for "districts" in the English, multiple ambiguities occur. In Arabic, wilaya can vary in meaning from province to some smaller administrative district depending on the country, but from 1867's "Vilayet Law" onward, in Ottoman administrative practice it was the highest-level or first order administrative division. There was a hierarchy of other administrative districts brlow the level of vilayet, but vilayet was not a generic, vague term like "district" in English.

Here is where the problem arises. If you substitute vilayet for "district" in the reservation, you would get "portions of Syria lying to the West of the vilayets of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo." 

There was no "Vilayet of Damascus," but a "Vilayet of Syria" (or Sham), based in Damascus. There were no Vilayets of Homs or Hama, both of which were part of the Vilayet of Sham; there was a separate Vilayet of Aleppo and a Vilayet of Beirut. (The Islamic State which calls its provinces wilayat, does ironically have provinces named for these cities.) So what did "the district of Damascus," etc. mean: everything west of a line running from Damascus through Homs and Hama to Aleppo? That would mean the intention was to exclude Lebanon. Or, as the British would claim, everything west of the Ottoman vilyet of Syria/Sham, excluding all of Palestine?

This may seem like a lawyer's hairsplitting, until you realize that the whole history since 1915 of the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan can be argued to stem from this debate. Though, as I have noted in Part I, no one seems to have questioned why Britain had the right to promise captured Ottoman territory to anyone.

Ottoman administrative districts (Wikipedia)

Whatever McMahon, or those who wrote the letter he signed, may have intended to exclude in 1915, and McMahon later would be quoted as saying he didn't intend to exclude Palestine,  by the postwar era Britain insisted  that he, or a least His majesty's Government,  had intended to exclude all of Palestine as well as Lebanon. The 1922 White Paper (the "Churchill White Paper," issued by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, by now Winston Churchill), already was dismissive of the claim that McMahon's pledge included Palestine:

With reference to the Constitution which it is now intended to establish in Palestine, the draft of which has already been published, it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place, it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sharif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir. Henry McMahon's pledge.

But the letter mentions neither the Vilayet of Beirut or the Sanjaq of Jerusalem. By the time of the 1922 White Paper, it was already clear that Britain's various commitments during the War were not always reconcilable, as tensions between Zionist settlers in Palestine, buoyed by the Balfour Declaration, and the local Arab population, feeling McMahon had pledged Arab control of Palestine, were already rising.

As polemics increased between the two sides in Palestine, now under British Mandate, and White Papers and Royal Commissions proliferated, contention continued over the October 24, 1915 letter in particular, and the Hussein-McMahon correspondence in general.

George Antonius

George Antonius, a Lebanese-born Greek Orthodox who spent years working for the Mandate Administration before breaking with it, was a prominent Jerusalem intellectual (while his wife Katy would remain a prominent socialite in her later widowhood), became an outspoken advocate of the Arab cause. In the wake of the Arab General Strike and Revolt of 1936, he wrote that staple of Modern Middle East courses, The Arab Awakening, in 1938, a classic history of the rise of Arab nationalism (or, as some argue, at least the Hashemite version thereof). The book made the Hussein-McMahon correspondence a key part of its argument and marked one of the first, if not the first, publications of the full English text. It remains the classic statement of the Arab argument.

Antonius' role was not limited to his book. He served as Secretary to the Palestinian Arab delegation to the London Conference of 1939, convened in the last months before war broke out in Europe to try to find a solution for Palestine in the wake of the Peel Commission, the Woodhead Commission, and other efforts.

The London Conference (1939)

The London Conference involved a Zionist delegation appointed by the Jewish Agency and an Arab delegation including Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, and Yemen, plus the aforementioned Palestinian delegation. The Arab delegation refused to meet with the Jewish delegation so the British conducted separate talks. Unless you have been on another planet you are aware no solution was found.

The London Conference could deserve a post in its own right, but for our purpose here the important product was a "Report of a Committee Set Up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon [His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt] and The Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916," dated March 16, 1939, and setting out the two sides' position in detail. Antonius himself is said to have contributed heavily to the Arab Delegation's Brief, if not written it outright.

Annex A of the report is the Arab argument and Annex B the British response. These may be the best summaries of the two sides of the debate.  From Annex A (the Arab argument):

10. A good deal has been made of the possible constructions to be put upon the exact meaning of the word vilayet. The use of that word throughout the Correspondence calls for explanation. The word vilayet is the Turkish form of the Arab word wilaya. In Arabic, the word is used to denote a province, or region or district without any specific administration connotation. In Turkish, the word was borrowed from the Arabic to denote certain specified administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire with precise limits and boundaries. In a correspondence such as this which was conducted in Arabic, the word used was the Arabic term wilaya, and this use did not always necessarily correspond to a Turkish vilayet. For instance, the Arabic-text speaks of the wilaya of Mersin, the wilaya of Alexandretta, the wilaya of Damascus, the wilaya of Homs, the wilaya of Hama; and yet there were no administrative divisions in existence at any time in the history of these regions, which bore any of those designations. These phrases can only make sense if the word wilaya is read in its proper Arab significance of region or district without any reference whatever to administrative boundaries.

11. The English translation circulated by the United Kingdom Delegation shows the Arabic word ivilaya in its Turkish form of vilayet throughout. This is not only a misleading rendering, but it is also unjustified for another reason. The McMahon notes were issued from the Residency in Cairo in Arabic, and that Arabic text was itself a translation from an English original. In that English original the word used in several contexts was the word district, as is shown by the quotations in the White Paper of 1922 and in the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (Chapter II, paragraph 5). It would avoid unnecessary confusion if the United Kingdom Delegation could see their way to restoring the term district wherever it occurred in the original English text.

12. The British Government's contention is that Palestine was excluded by implication, when Sir Henry McMahon notified the Sharif that "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" were to be excluded from the area of Arab independence. This contention was publicly sponsored by Mr. Winston Churchill in 1922, when, speaking as the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he tried to argue that the word districts in that phrase was to be read as equivalent to vilayets; and that, since the "Vilayet of Damascus" included that part of Syria—now known as Transjordan—which lay to the east of the River Jordan, it followed that that part of Syria—now known as Palestine—which lay to the west of the Jordan was one of the portions of territory reserved in Sir Henry McMahon's phrase.

13. An examination of the text shows that the British Government's argument is untenable. In the first place, the word districts in Sir Henry McMahon's phrase could not have been intended as the equivalent of vilayets, because there were no such things as the "Vilayet of Damascus", the "Vilayet of Homs" and the "Vilayet of Hama". There was one single Vilayet of Syria of which Damascus was the capital and two smaller administrative divisions of which Homs and Hama were the principal towns. Sir Henry McMahon's phrase can only make sense if we take his districts as meaning "districts" in the current use of the word, that is to say, the regions adjacent to the four cities, and his reservation as applying to that part of Syria—roughly from Sidon to Alexandretta—which lies to the west of the continuous line formed by those four cities and the districts immediately adjoining them.

14. Again, in his third note dated the 14th December, Sir Henry McMahon refers to the regions which he wished to exclude as being in "the two Vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut". Had he had Palestine in mind, he would certainly have added "and the Sanjaq of Jerusalem". The fact that he did not goes to confirm the conclusion that the only portions of Syria which it was proposed at the time to reserve in favour of France were the coastal regions of northern Syria.

15. Lastly, in giving the pledge contained in his second note, Sir Henry McMahon stated that Great Britain recognised as the area of Arab independence all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca in which she was "free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France". Both in that note and in his subsequent note of the 14th December, he justified his exclusion of certain parts of Syria on the grounds of Great Britain's regard for French interests. If, then, Great Britain were to find herself at the end of the War free to act in respect of any portion of Syria which she had felt bound to reserve in favour of France, the reservation loses its justification and indeed whatever force it may have had when it was originally made; and that portion of Syria which was no longer destined to be included in the sphere of French interests—as was eventually the case with Palestine—must, in default of any specific agreement to the contrary, necessarily remain within the area of Arab independence proposed by the Sharif and accepted by Great Britain.

16. In a letter which appeared over his signature in The Times of July 23, 1937, Sir Henry McMahon declared that, in giving the pledge to King Husain, it was not intended by him to include Palestine in the area of Arab independence; and that he had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in the pledge was well understood by King Husain.

These declarations of Sir Henry McMahon's will not bear investigation. In the first place, Sir Henry's function was that of an intermediary charged with the task, not of framing policy, but of carrying out the policy laid down by his official chiefs and conveying it to the Sharif Husain in accordance with the instructions issued to him by the Foreign Office. Even if the intention behind the words used could be invoked as an argument to invalidate or distort the proper and ordinary meaning of the words he used, it is not Sir Henry's intention that might count but the intention of the responsible Minister— in this case, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—on whose instructions Sir Henry McMahon was acting. If intentions are to be taken into account despite the obvious and unmistakable meaning of the words used, then it would be necessary to search for such evidence as is available in the files of the Foreign Office to throw light on the Secretary of State's intentions. Some evidence on that point is already public in the speech which Viscount Grey of Fallodon delivered in the House of Lords on the 27th March, 1923. The relevant extracts from that speech are appended to this Memorandum, together with the remarks made by Lord Buckmaster on the same occasion. Viscount Grey makes it clear that, for his part, he entertained serious doubts as to the validity of the British Government's interpretation of the scope of the pledges which he, as Foreign Secretary, had given to the Arabs in 1915.

17. In the second place, leaving aside for a moment the question of the underlying intention and turning to the text itself, it will be found that the words used throughout the Correspondence can only be interpreted as meaning that Palestine was not, directly or indirectly, excluded from the area of Arab independence. The phrase "districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo", as stated in paragraph 13 above, could only have meant the districts adjacent to those four cities. It is also obvious that the Sharif Husain understood that the portions of Syria to be reserved were those lying immediately to the west of those four cities and no more. In his note of the 5th of November, 1915, he speaks of the Vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut and "their maritime coasts"; while in his note of the 1st of January, 1916, he describes the regions proposed for exclusion as "the northern parts and their coastal regions", and, lower down in the same note, as: "Beirut and its coastal regions which we will overlook for the moment on account of France." Moreover, Sir Henry McMahon himself, in his note of the 30th of January, 1916, speaks of those portions of Syria which were to be excluded as "the northern regions", thereby showing that, at the time at any rate, he did not differ from the Sharif in regarding tic reservations as applying only to the northern coastal regions of Syria.

18. Lastly, there is the evidence provided by the Sharif's subsequent actions in regard to Palestine, which shows that he had always understood that part of Syria to have remained within the area of Arab independence. No sooner was the Balfour Declaration issued than he sent in an immediate protest to the British Government to ask for an explanation. This action and other actions taken by the Sharif in subsequent years may be held to fall outside the scope of the present Committee's investigation, which is understood to cover only the examination of the text of the McMahon Correspondence. But they are historic; I facts nevertheless; and in the light of those facts, Sir Henry McMahon's declaration that he had every reason to believe the contrary loses its force and indeed appears meaningless.

19. The contention that the British Government did intend Palestine to be removed from the sphere of French influence and to be included within the area of Arab independence (that is to say, within the area of future British influence) is also borne out by the measures they took in Palestine during the War. They dropped proclamations by the thousand in all parts of Palestine, which bore a message from the Sharif Husain on one side and a message from the British Command on the other, to the effect that an Anglo-Arab agreement had been arrived at securing the independence of the Arabs, and to ask the Arab population of Palestine to look upon the advancing British Army as allies and liberators and give them every assistance. Under the aegis of the British military authorities, recruiting offices were opened in Palestine to recruit volunteers for the forces of the Arab Revolt. Throughout 1916 and the greater part of 1917, the attitude of the military and political officers of the British Army was clearly based on the understanding that Palestine was destined to form part of the Arab territory which was to be constituted after the War on the basis of independent Arab governments in close alliance with Great Britain.

This is  rather full explication of the Arab side of the argument. Annex B summarizes the British response:

18. As regards (i), the view of His Majesty's Government has always been that the phrase " portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo " embraced all that portion of Syria (including what is now called Palestine) lying to the west of inter alia the administrative area known as the "Vilayet of Syria". 19. It is true that there were no Vilayets of Homs or Hama, but it is also true that both Damascus and Aleppo were the capitals of Vilayets, and the reference to Damascus should alone have sufficed to establish Sir Henry McMahon's meaning. The additional mention of Homs and Hama was evidently made because al-Faruqi* had mentioned them and to ensure that the intervening territory of which they were the most important towns should not be excluded from the area consigned to Arab rule. Obviously no reference was intended to non-existent Vilayets.

*Note: Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi was an Ottoman Army lieutenant and defector who persuaded British officials he could speak for the Sharifian cause, which the Sharifians would subsequently deny. The British cite him frequently in what follows. We'll return to him in a later part.

20. It is also true that the official Turkish name for the Vilayet of which Damascus was the capital was "Vilayet of Syria", but there should have been no misunderstanding of this phrase, especially as the writer of the letter had already found it necessary to use "Syria" (even though there was a Vilayet of that name) in order to describe comprehensively a vague geographical area evidently including the Vilayets of Syria and Beirut, the independent Sanjaq of Jerusalem, the Province of the Lebanon, and part of the Vilayet of Aleppo.

21. It may be worth adding at this point that the phrase "districts of Damascus, etc." would hardly have been desired by the Sharif to be taken to mean small areas immediately surrounding the towns in question (as one of the Arab spokesmen argued, if the Lord Chancellor has correctly understood him, at the first meeting) since if this had been the case the territory in which the Arabs would have been denied independence would have been brought much further east than on a more liberal interpretation of the phrase. The non-Arab territory would in fact have reached eastwards almost to the outskirts of Damascus and the other towns, and have covered substantial portions of Transjordan and considerable sections of the Hejaz Railway.

22. Nor is it denied that in one sense there was no territory east of the Vilayet of Aleppo and that if the letter of October 24th, 1915, was to be interpreted by the Sharif on the lines suggested by His Majesty's Government the area of Arab independence would not reach the Mediterranean, although the fact that it would not do so was not mentioned in the letter.

23. As regards the first point, it must be remembered that Sir Henry McMahon was not attempting to define with any great accuracy the eastward limits of the territory which he was excluding from the area of Arab independence, and he clearly used a phrase to define in a general way a stretch of territory lying along the Mediterranean coast some of which might lie outside, and some of which might lie inside, the "districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo", but all of which lay to the west or in the western parts of those districts.

24. As regards the second point, the Lord Chancellor does not feel that it is possible to base any conclusions on the fact that the exclusion of access to the Mediterranean for the Arab area of independence was not specifically mentioned by Sir Henry McMahon. If the areas which he defined as lying outside that area were so situated that access to the Mediterranean was denied there was no necessity to say so in so many words.

25. The Lord Chancellor has taken note of the argument based upon the fact that in his letter of December I4th, 1915, Sir Henry McMahon only referred to the possible exclusion from the area of Arab independence of the two Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut, and these two only, without any mention of the Sanjaq of Jerusalem or of other areas. But it seems clear that in referring to these two Vilayets, Sir Henry McMahon was merely replying to a point raised by the Sharif in his letter of November 5th, 1915, and it does not seem possible to draw any particular conclusion from this circumstance.

26. This no doubt leads to another point made by one of the Arab spokesmen: that seeing how much importance the Sharif attached throughout the correspondence to the Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut, and to the Vilayets of Mesopotamia, the Sharif would unquestionably have referred in even stronger terms to Palestine (or the Sanjaq of Jerusalem) had he had the slightest suspicion that it was being excluded from the area of Arab independence. This may well be the case, but surely the opposite conclusion can equally well be drawn, that the Sharif understood and accepted the fact that because of its special position as a country interesting all the world Palestine was a territory which had to be reserved for special treatment.

27. The same considerations apply to the fact that in his letter of January 1st, 1916, the Sharif referred to "the northern parts and their coasts". It is possible in this case again to conclude that Palestine was accepted by him as lying outside the area of Arab independence. But in any case, the words "northern parts" or "northern coasts" could legitimately be taken by the reader of a letter written in the Hejaz as meaning the whole Mediterranean coast.

28. The foregoing arguments with regard to the specific reservation are offered in order to show that in regard to each point of criticism it is possible to find a probable reason for what: Sir Henry McMahon had in mind. But the Lord Chancellor would not for a moment wish to suggest that this passage in the letter which Sir Henry McMahon sent on October 24th, 1915, on the instructions of His Majesty's Government was clear or well-expressed, or that any of the other territorial references (on either side) were clear or well-expressed, or that it is upon such arguments that His Majesty's Government rely in the presentation of their case.

29. The best explanation which His Majesty's Government can give as to what was meant by the phrase "districts of Damascus etc." in the letter of October 24th, 1915, is that the phrase was borrowed from al-Faruqi and used in the same wide and general sense as that in which he himself used it, i.e. as one which covered the Syrian hinterland southwards to the Gulf of 'Aqaba.

30. But although His Majesty's Government consider that the specific reservation should have sufficed to exclude Palestine, they attach less importance to this point than to the general reservation.

31. The wording of the general reservation is, in view of His Majesty's Government, perfectly clear. It limits the area to which Sir Henry McMahon's pledge was to apply to:

"... those portions of the territories therein (i.e. in the area claimed by the Sharif) in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, F

In other words, the pledge did not extend to any territory in which Great Britain was not free to act without regard to French interests on the date on which the letter was despatched, i.e. on October 24th, 1915. 32. It must also be made clear, since the point has been raised by the Arab members of the committee, that, in the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, any subsequent developments which may at later dates have modified the extent of the area in which Great Britain was free to act without detriment to French interests are irrelevant to a consideration of the extent of the area to which the pledge applied on October 24th, 1915 and has continued to apply ever since.

33. Now, if there is anything which is certain in this controversy it is that Great Britain was not free in October, 1915, to act in Palestine without regard to French interests. It may be perfectly true that under the influence of Lord Kitchener and others His Majesty's Government before and after the outbreak of the war were anxious to restrict the French claims on the Levant coast if they could find a legitimate means of doing so. But there is a great difference between desiring an object and attaining it. It can be stated as a fact that at the time of the Correspondence France claimed the Mediterranean littoral as far south as the Egyptian border and as far east as Damascus, and it was not until the Spring of 1916 that these extreme claims were modified as the result of discussions culminating in the so-called "Sykes-Picot" Agreement.

34. As has been stated, the Sharif must have realised the possibility and even the extreme probability of the existence of a French claim to Palestine, even if he did not know of it for a fact, and in view of the circumstances, and of the extensive British and religious interest in Palestine, the wording of the "McMahon pledge" ought surely to have suggested to him and to any other reader of the letter that Palestine was excluded from, or, to say the least, not clearly included in, the area of Arab independence.

35. There are some further points which must be noted in connexion with the Correspondence. In paragraph 2 of the Sharif's letter of November 5th, 1915, and in the fourth paragraph of Sir Henry McMahon's reply of December 14th, 1915, it is made clear that many important details regarding the territorial situation were left over for a later settlement.

36. Furthermore, in his letter of January 1st, 1916, the Sharif agrees to leave for future consideration the French occupation of "Beirut and its coasts". Whatever may have been meant by this phrase—and it might well be argued that the " coasts" of Beirut extended as far as the Egyptian border—it clearly excluded the coasts of Palestine as far south as the limits of the Vilayet of Beirut, i.e. as far south as a point just north of Jaffa. This in itself amounted to a provisional acceptance of a reservation of nearly half of Palestine.

37. The "Sykes-Picot" Agreement of May, 1916, has already been mentioned, as has also the fact that the claims of France at the beginning of the War extended over the whole of Palestine, as well as to Damascus and Aleppo. In this connexion it must be remembered that Sir Mark Sykes was definitely sympathetic towards the Arab cause and he must clearly have negotiated the agreement in the belief that the reservations in the pledge of October 24th, 1915, justified his concluding an agreement in the form which it eventually assumed. His Majesty's Government have no doubt that he was right.

38. Moreover, Sir Mark Sykes secured a great concession from the French negotiators as regards the Sanjaqs of Hama, Damascus and Aleppo, which, as a result of what al-Faruqi had said at a slightly earlier period, His Majesty's Government had reason to suppose were vital to the Arabs. It was an exceedingly difficult task to obtain this concession from the French Government and it was genuinely believed at the time that the arrangements would (to quote from an official report of the period) "adjust the fundamental divergencies of Arabs and French regarding Syria."

39. In the agreement Palestine was admittedly to be international. The Sharif of Mecca was, however, to be consulted, and the form of government was to be agreed upon with (amongst others) his representatives. These points are generally overlooked, but if they are taken into account it is difficult to see how the agreement can fairly be represented as a breach of faith with the Sharif. Moreover, as has already been emphasized, His Majesty's Government were not, in 1915, in a position to give the sovereignty of Palestine to the Arab people. They had to consult their Allies and other countries having interests in that territory just as they are now obliged to consult the members of the League of Nations.

So the two sides differed drastically in their interpretations, according to their own self-interests. But why was the language so ambiguous? Deliberately, to mislead, or through incompetent translation or ill-defined intent? Who wrote the letter (it wasn't McMahon)? Who translated it? Who was the mysterious Faruqi the British cite several times? Stay tuned.

Bone of Contention: McMahon's October 24, 1915 Letter to Sharif Hussein: Part I: The Text Itself

This coming Saturday marks the 100th anniversary of what is at least arguably the most contentious single text in Modern Middle Eastern History, or at least in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict: Sir Henry McMahon's letter to Sharif Hussein of Mecca dated October 24, 1915.

We have looked at the Hussein-McMahon correspondence previously, here, and here. On August 30, 1915, Hussein had written McMahon again, this time rather insistently asking for assurances about the borders within which Britain was prepared to recognize an independent Arab state, an issue on which McMahon had been evasive in the earlier exchange. On October 24, 1915, McMahon (British High Commissioner in Egypt), replied. Superficially, at least, his response seemed to reassure Hussein, but the specific exceptions listed by McMahon would haunt Anglo-Arab relations down through the birth of Israel. At the core lay a fundamental question: did the October 24 letter include or exclude Palestine from the area of the proposed Arab state? If it included Palestine, how to reconcile that with the subsequent Balfour Declaration about a Jewish National Home in Palestine and the Sykes-Picot agreement with France? As many clever titles about "Twice-Promised Land" or "Much-Promised Land" have implied, did the British promise Palestine to the Arabs, the Jews, and themselves? This, I suppose, could be called the "perfidious Albion" interpretation.

Or did one hand not know what the other was doing, given all the conflicting British authorities? Or was it a case of bad translation in which the Arabic and English texts didn't match? Or did the British deliberately keep the language ambiguous?

The issue was debated time and again in the various British White Papers and studies on Palestine between 1922 and 1939, and famously in George Antonius' 1938 pioneering Arab nationalist work The Arab Awakening, which I imagine many readers of this blog had to read in school.

This post will be in several parts because even after a century there are still disputed questions:

1. Who wrote the disputed language? It certainly wasn't McMahon, who was an India hand. Mark Sykes, Ronald Storrs, Gilbert Clayton, and even T.E. Lawrence have been mentioned by various historians. It may have been a composite of the Intelligence Section in Cairo, soon to be the nucleus of the famous Arab Bureau.
2. Who translated the original English into the Arabic sent to Hussein?
3. Did McMahon understand the same thing that London intended about the pledge?
4. Was it perfidious Albion, incompetence, confusion, or what that led to decades of argument over the wording?
5. And finally, in our present hopefully post-Imperialist age (Niall Ferguson notwithstanding), what right did Great Britain have to promise the land to anybody at all, themselves, the French, the Hashemites of Mecca, or the Zionist movement,  as opposed to its actual inhabitants?

Before we address these issues, we need the text in front of us. Here is the official English text of the letter minus the flowery opening and closing salutations:

I have received your letter of the 29th Shawal, 1333, with much pleasure and your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction.

I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the time had not yet come when that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.

I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction:-

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interest of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:-

1. Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.

2. Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.

3. When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

4. On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

5. With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.

I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions, and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letter which I have omitted to mention, we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.

It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings which, thanks to the clearness of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without trouble or mishap in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present sad war. May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples!

I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger, Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Ibn Uraifan, and he will inform you of the various matters of interest, but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in this letter.
(Compliments)

(Signed) A. H. McMAHON.

Now to the trouble-making part. McMahon, or whoever wrote the letter he signed, does not define the borders of the independent Arab state: instead it defined some are excluded from Sharif Hussein's claims:

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

Subsequently, it notes that France also has claims in some of these regions. But what does "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" actually mean? It seems on the surface, in English, to exclude Lebanon, not Palestine. But the Arabic is different:

إن ولايتي مرسين واسكندرونة وأجزاء من بلاد الشام الواقعة في الجهة الغربية لولايات دمشق الشام وحمص وحماة وحلب لا يمكن أن يقال أنها عربية محضة. وعليه يجب أن تستثنى من الحدود المطلوبة

مع هذا التعديل وبدون تعرض للمعاهدات المعقودة بيننا وبين بعض رؤساء العرب نحن نقبل تلك الحدود

The term "districts" in English has been translated as ولايات , wilayat, basically "provinces," singular wilaya, Turkish vilayet. But there was no Turkish Vilayet of Damascus, or Homs, or Hama; only Vilayets of Syria and of Aleppo and Beirut (See Map Below). Britain would later claim they meant west of the entire Vilayet of Syria, but that isn't what the text says. The discrepancy, deliberate, inadvertent, or a consequence of poor translation choices, would prove to be a ticking time bomb.

Not So Much a Cold Peace as a Quiet Peace

Just a reminder: postings will be sparse during my current two week vacation.

Jacky Hugi recently had a piece at Al-Monitor cleverly entitled "Egypt and Israel: a lover and his mistress." He led by noting the four regional countries not invited to Egypt's recent Suez Canal festivities: Turkey, Syria, Qatar, and Israel. President Sisi's government sees the first three as hostile, but it actually maintains close security and intelligence links with Israel. While the lover and his mistress imagery only goes so far, it's also true that Egypt doesn't publicize (for a domestic audience at any rate) the closeness of its cooperation with Israel on issues such as Gaza, Sinai, and Hamas, though they're well enough known to outside players. In the early years of the peace treaty some Israelis complained of a "cold peace"; what has evolved is instead a quiet peace, hence the lover-mistress analogy.

The Jordanian-Israeli peace also generally is kept to a low profile inside Jordan. But recently both Jordan and Israel participated in the international Red Flag exercise in Nevada, and according to a military website at least, after ferrying two flights of Israeli F-15s to Spain and on to Lajes in the Azores. Israeli aerial tankers also ferried a flight of Jordanian F-16s on the same route. Again, that the two countries cooperate on security and intelligence matters is no secret, but this sort of close cooperation gets as little domestic publicity in Jordan as in Egypt.

Linguistic Notes II: An Extremely Early Arabic Inscription in Greek Letters

My second linguistics post tonight will be more erudite than my first, but perhaps less popular, with no four letter words more objectionable than "will" and "four," But it's important.

Lameen over at the Jabal al-Lughat blog calls our attention to  a discovery of "Old Arabic in Greek letters, in 3rd/4th century Jordan."

In linguist-speak he notes

There are a fair number of Arabic names transcribed in Greek at this period in various sources, but this seems to be the only known attempt to write Arabic text in Greek letters until much later. Most contemporary Arabic inscriptions were instead written in the Safaitic script, which does not indicate vowels. A text like this thus enables us to see much more clearly how the Arabic of the nomads of 3rd/4th century Jordan was pronounced. It confirms two crucial points. In Arabic, case is usually indicated only by final vowel choice; in this inscription, accusative case (-a) is clearly marked, but the Classical nominative and genitive (-u, -i) are not transcribed, suggesting that this dialect had dropped final short high vowels and thus developed a case system like that of Geez. Also reminiscent of Geez is the fact that intervocalic semivowels elided in Classical Arabic were unambiguously pronounced - thus 'atawa rather than 'atā for "he came". There may well be more material like this out there in the deserts on the Syrian-Jordanian border; let's hope research on the Syrian side becomes possible again soon.

Many of the pre-Islamic inscriptions this early are in Old North Arabian, Arabic's presumed immediate ancestor, but Old North Arabian has the definte article h- while this inscription uses the article al-, unique to true Arabic.

The emergence of Classical Arabic is a fascinating topic for another day but for those of you seriously interested the article is "New Epigraphica from Jordan I: a pre-Islamic Arabic inscription in Greek letters and a Greek inscription from north-eastern Jordan," by A. Jallad with A. al-Manasser.

A part of the inscription:

Will Jordan's King Fly an ISIS Raid Personally?

There is speculation in the Arab World tonight that King ‘Abdullah II of Jordan might personally fly a bombing raid against ISIS. He has openly vowed revenge for the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot, and during his military career before ascending the throne ‘Abdullah flew Cobra attack helicopters, and later headed Jordan's much-respected Special Forces.

Although this Daily Caller piece says several Arab newspapers are reporting this, they link only to this piece in the Kuwaiti Al-Nahar (link in Arabic).

I guess we'll know soon enough.

Just When You think ISIS Can't Get Any Worse...

My Suez Canal attack post is taking some time but will be up soon.

The Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, Da3ish) keeps finding new ways to give savage barbarism a bad name. The apparent burning alive of a Royal Jordanian Air Force pilot, apparently weeks before they offered to trade him, is a new low, though these have shown themselves to be people who kill without hesitation, behead innocent people, kidnap minority religious women (Yazidis) and systematically rape and enslave them (and publish their religious justification for rape and enslavement), in the name of a religion whose holy book always refers to God as "the compassionate, the merciful."

They are enemies not just of Western civilization, but of Islamic civilization as well. And while they must be defeated, it's not American boots on the ground. The Middle East needs to find its own  way out of this one. These people threaten the Islamic world first of all. Now they have pissed off the Royal Jordanian Air Force. A small force, but one of the best trained and most cohesive in the Middle East. That may be a mistake.

And of course beyond the executions, rapes, enslavements, and burnings alive, last week they also blew up the ancient wall of Nineveh. (Why? It's not Shi‘ite, Christian, or Jewish.)

This image is making the rounds, and deserves both applause and a bit of comment (warning: both image and language are not safe for work/NSFW):

Amen to the sentiment. There is, however, an obvious difference. The nun or the ra painted on your house in ISIS territory will get you killed or ethnically cleansed. The middle finger, if painted in ISIS territory, no doubt will too, if it could appear, but it's not really "the international sign for 'fuck you'," (there are far too many available gestures), though it may be getting there. A post for another day.

But nobody dies when we give ISIS the finger, good as it may feel. Saying "Fuck you!" ("international symbol" or not) may make us feel good, but it doesn't stop the beheadings, rapes, enslavement of female minorities, etc. ISIS is not deterred by the power of the US and its coalition partners, so I'm pretty sure the raised middle finger won't send them running for cover.

I keep profanity at a minimum here and I think it's been a year or more since it's appeared, but one of the utilities of four-letter words is that they allow us to proclaim our frustrations when we can do nothing. It relieves our anger. In a grotesque atrocity like this one, "fuck you" is not just required, it's inadequate. The obscenity of the act cannot be matched by any verbal obscenity of which I am aware. When you are dealing with genocidal fucking motherfucking fucks, there is no polite way of saying it.

A usually demure Facebook friend a while back, after an ISIS atrocity, posted the comment "waste these fuckers." But despite the multinational bombing campaign, (Since they engage in rape and forced marriage of Yazidis and other enslaved women, "fuckers" literally appropriate), ISIS is still prospering. The Royal Jordanian Air Force, however, is probably thinking along the same lines right now, and has some chance to waste these fuckers. But language alone is just a release.

It's tempting to say "this time they've gone too far," but that's where they started. Sorry to those offended by the profanity, but what was your first reaction to this obscenity? If I say "Fuck ISIS" are they going to run for cover when allied aircraft are already hitting them daily? Does saying "Fuck you!"  or even "كس أمك" make them run for cover? No, though it lets off steam. I'll gladly say both  to these evil people, but it won't deter them. It just makes us feel good.

So fuck ISIS, but the more appropriate response is not "Fuck ISIS" but "Fuck our inability to do anything about ISIS." But "Fuck ISIS" makes us feel good.

I have not seen and will not watch the video. But Arab readers seem to agree, and #fuckisis seems big on Twitter:

Food Fights Revisited: Now, Egypt Aims for Biggest Plate of Koshary

Egypt, having no other problems to preoccupy it at the moment, is planning to break all records with an eight-ton dish of koshary;

The restaurateurs have invited a panel of judges from the Guinness Book of World Records to Egypt on November 22 to witness the creation of this record-breaking koshary dish.

According to the website of the Koshary and Egyptian Food Festival, the dish will be 10 meters wide, 1.2 meters high, and is estimated to weigh eight tons.

The signature Egyptian dish consists of pastas, rice, lentils, chickpeas and sauce and was traditionally a staple of street food carts, though now there are upmarket restaurants featuring it.

This follows a string of earlier efforts we've covered on this blog;

Back in 2009, Lebanon announced that it had broken the Guinness records for largest plates of hummus and tabbouleh, The following year the Israeli Arab town of Abu Ghosh fought back with a hummus that beat the Lebanese. In no time the Lebanese struck back with 10 tons of hummus. (It was getting a little silly; Haaretz had a headline referring to the "peas process.") (Video link here.)

10 tons of hummus

Hopes that food fights would replace actual wars were disappointed.The Arab uprisings seem to have abated the silliness for a time, but sure enough, in 2012 Jordan raised the stakes: a 74.75 kilogram falafel.

Egypt is late to the party but it has one thing going for it: I don't think these other countries know how to make koshary.

Senior Administration Official: "Saudi Arabia has an extensive border with Syria"

Oh God. We're really fuc screwed over if the intelligence community can't afford a map when laying out a "strategy" (really more a package of tactics, but that's another post.) From a White House Press Release called "Background Conference Call on the President's Address to the Nation" 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:  I guess I would just add one thing on the coalition question -- and I think this is important to really focus on, which is to say, in discussions with governments in the region, notably the Saudis and the Jordanians, what is clear is that we have a very common view of this threat.  And this is really quite unusual. 

ISIL has been I think a galvanizing threat around the Sunni partners in the region.  They view it as an existential threat to them.  Saudi Arabia has an extensive border with Syria.  The Jordanians are experiencing a destabilizing impact of over a million refugees from the Syrian conflict, and are profoundly concerned that ISIL, who has stated that their ambitions are not confined to Iraq and Syria, but rather to expand to the broader region.

Let's run that by again: Saudi Arabia has an extensive border with Syria.  

It does?

Oh please oh please oh please let this "Senior Administration Official" have to explain to the King of Jordan what he or she meant as they erased Jordan from the map. Please tell me it's not really this bad.

The Silence of the Arab Regimes

The New York Times has taken note of a phenomenon I had been planning to talk about soon anyway, so I'll use their piece as a takeoff point for my own comments: "Arab Leaders Silent, Viewing Hamas as Worse Than Israel."

As Israel's current operation in Gaza grows into something much longer and deadlier than Cast Lead six years ago, there has been much international condemnation, from Europe, the UN, and human rights groups. The US is less critical and the US Congress openly supportive (and the US is resupplying Israel with munitions in the midst of the operation), but there has been considerable criticism in the media and academia.

But two sources of pressure that helped bring previous Gaza interventions to a ceasefire are absent here. First, domestic support in Israel is higher than in some previous interventions, with polls showing overwhelming support among Israeli Jews, and Israeli peace activists increasingly facing confrontations with supporters of the war.

But even more striking is the fact that, while there has been much sympathy expressed toward Gaza in the Arab "street," the Arab regimes have been mostly silent. Egypt did make a ceasefire proposal early on, which Israel accepted (and which some suspect was negotiated beforehand) and Hamas rejected. But after the Hamas rejection, Egypt essentially washed its hands of the situation. And Egypt, of course, shares a border with Gaza, and by keeping the Rafah crossing closed, is complicit, at the very least, with maintaining the siege of Gaza. It allows humanitarian supplies in, but doesn't allow those under bombardment out.

The other country with diplomatic relations with Israel, Jordan, is also part of the broad Sunni alliance that opposes the Muslim Brotherhood, and which also includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At least there is evidence that the Jordanian street (with its substantial Palestinian component) is restive and supportive of Gaza civilians, if not Hamas.

The Egyptian "street" is another matter. Some of Egypt's talk-show hosts have been so virulently anti-Hamas that Israel has been quoting them in propaganda broadcasts into Gaza. Though Field Marshal Sisi rose to power under the Morsi Presidency, he and his supporters have vowed to crush the Muslim Brotherhood, and of course, Hamas was formed from the Gaza branch. And most indications are that the sentiment is widely shared among secular Egyptians.

With Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis and the UAE forming a solid front against Hamas, and Libya, Syria, and Iraq preoccupied with other matters, Hamas has few friends: Qatar, Iran and Hizbullah, and the latter two are tied down in Syria and Iraq. Whereas the Hamas leadership in exile were once welcomed in ‘Amman, and after that in Damascus, today they are stuck in distant Doha.

I have left out one Arab regime: the Palestinian Authority. Despite the recent reconciliation between Hamas and the PLO under Mahmoud ‘Abbas, and very vocal criticisms by ‘Abbas, and threats to take Israel to the International Criminal Court,the Palestinian Security Forces kept the West Bank largely quiet during the first two weeks of the campaign. Only in the last ten days or so have demonstrations in the West Bank led to open clashes, but ‘Abbas has largely kept the West Bank, if vocal, nonviolent.

We can only speculate whether the post-Arab Spring anti-Muslim Brotherhood alliance encouraged Israel to launch the present campaign; but it has surely encouraged it to seek a more thorough destruction of Hamas' military capabilities than it did in earlier incursions.

7:45 AM, June 5, 1967: Operation Moked

Forty-seven years ago this morning, Israel launched a "pre-emptive" surprise attack against Arab airfields, virtually destroying the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces on the ground. It was the opening salvo of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Though long known as the "Six Day War," the war's outcome was essentially decided by noon on the first day. The remaining days were spent by the Israeli Army proceeding to occupy Gaza, Sinai, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, enjoying total air superiority over the Arab states.

Each year since 2009 I've talked about various aspects of the 1967 War, and I refer you to all of those earlier posts. Almost everything in the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967 owes something to that conflict; we are still trying to untangle the world it created. To the Arab nakba ("catastrophe") of 1948 was added the naksa ("setback") of 1967.

I belong to the school that thinks Nasser was on the verge of making a concession that would have avoided war but kept some of the gains he made in the escalating crisis (he was about to send his Vice President, Zakariyya Mohieddin, to the US and the UN), but we may never know for sure; in any event he was not given the chance to step back from the brink. This year's post will address Operation Moked ("Focus"), the Israeli surprise attack that opened the war.

I won't address motivation here, though there is some evidence that Moshe Dayan, who became Defense Minister only days before, believed that Israel had an opportunity that was likely to be lost over time, and so favored going to war once Nasser gave the Israelis a pretext. But that's an argument for another post.

While much of the world talks of a Six Day war, Ezer Weizman, who had only recently given up command of the Air Force to become Deputy Chief of General Staff, called the chapter in his memoirs "two and half hours in June," He says that on June 5, "At about ten o'clock in the morning I phoned [his wife] Re'uma: 'We've won the war!' She was considerate enough not to say what she thought of her husband going mad under the tension. She only said, 'Ezer, are you crazy? At ten o'clock in the morning? You've finished the war?' The war had five and a half days to run, but those were days when the Israeli Air Force had unchallenged control of the skies over Egypt and the Levant.

Air Force Commander "Motti" Hod

The Israelis knew that on June 5, 1967, they had precisely 196 operational combat aircraft, many of them aging. The Arab states challenging them had 500 or more, and much larger, less trained, armies. A first strike to alter the balance was seen as the proper opening blow. Weizman's successor as Air Force Commander, Mordechai "Motti" Hod, along with Dayan and the senior leadership, decided on a fairly desperate gamble. Of those 196 operational aircraft, only 12 (some accounts say as few as four) were held in reserve for combat air patrol over Israeli airspace. All the rest were devoted to taking out the Arab air forces: much depended on a single roll of the dice. And Egypt, the largest of them all, was the first order of business.

Tensions had been running high for weeks. Since surprise attacks often come at dawn, Egyptian pilots had been flying combat air patrols at dawn. But many senior officers did not arrive at their desks until nine AM. At the time, Egypt was on Summer Time but Israel was not. So 7:45 AM in Israel was 8:45 AM in Egypt, and the dawn patrols had returned to refuel the aircraft and allow the pilots to have breakfast. Most of the Air Force was on the ground. Many senior commanders were just arriving at work.

Egyptian air defenses were still rather poor. The concrete aircraft shelters and blast revetments found on most Middle Eastern air bases today (as a result of 1967) were unknown. Egypt had some SA-2 SAMs, but these were effective against aircraft at altitude; for low-level attack they were limited to anti-aircraft artillery. To make matters worse, Egypt's Defense Minister and Nasser's number two man, Field Marshal ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amer and several other senior officers were flying to the Sinai front to meet with troops there, so Egyptian air defenses scaled down their vigilance lest they accidentally shoot down their own boss.

Both sides were using far less advanced aircraft than today. Israel's were mostly French (the US did not sell aircraft to Israel until 1968), with some older British; Egypt's were mostly Soviet by this time, with some older British. Israel did have, and used with effect, a runway-cratering bomb that appears to have been an ancestor of the French Durandal.

The first wave took off from various Israeli bases and proceeded out over the Mediterranean skimming close to the water. In a carefully coordinated move the aircraft assumed formation in Egyptian airspace and began their attack.. The Wikipedia numbers generally track with others: 183 IAF aircraft destroyed 197 Egyptian aircraft and eight radar stations. A second wave (9:30 AM) was also aimed at Egypt, but after the Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces chose to enter the fray, the third wave (12:30 PM) turned against those air forces and Iraq's, hitting the Iraqi base at H3 just east of the Jordanian border.

By a bit past noon most of the Arab air forces were gone, and a great many runways cratered. It was a stunning blow, and made the remaining five and a half days of the war inevitable. By the end of the war Israel had destroyed 452 Arab aircraft, 79 in dogfights and the rest on the ground; it lost 46. It destroyed 338 Egyptian aircraft, most on the first day; 61 Syrian (out of perhaps 100 at most); 29 Jordanian; 23 Iraqi (at the H3 base); and one Lebanese.

Some relevant video:

V

The Politics and Logistics of the Pope's Holy Land Visit

Pope Francis I's visit to Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel beginning tomorrow has already stirred some controversy, though the Vatican seems intent on avoiding political controversy.As I noted earlier today, the visit marks the 50th anniversary of Pope Paul VI's then-unprecedented visit to the Holy Land in January 1964 (videos at my earlier post), and Paul's meeting then with the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Athenagoras I. The current Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholomew I, will be meeting with Francis in Jerusalem.

The three-day trip is shorter than the visits of John Paul II in 2000 or of Benedict XVI in 2009. Francis has a packed three-day schedule meeting political religious figures in Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel (in that order). One result is that unlike all three previous papal visits, he is not visiting Nazareth, and this has annoyed Christians in Galilee, which has many religious sites associated with Jesus' life. But that is only one of many controversies already sparked by the trip even before it begins.

The Pope insists on traveling in an open vehicle, so Israeli security is going to be tightened; this has already led to complaints by Palestinian Christians that they won't be able to get close to the Pope, and by shopkeepers in Jerusalem's Old City that they won't be allowed to open. There is also concern about radical Jewish extremists who have defaced Christian churches recently. This is especially sensitive because the Pope is celebrating a Mass in the Cenacle or Upper Room, traditionally identified with the site of the Last Supper, which shares the same structure with the Jewish sitte venerated as the Tomb of King David and with a mosque. (Pilgrims might wonder why the Gospels don't mention that yhe Last Supper was upstairs over David's yomb, but perhaps few pilgrims notice this, or the Gothic architecture.) Jewish groups have protested the planned service.

Papal trips usually involve meeting with local Catholic prelates, and another controversy has erupted over the plan by Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Bechara Rai to visit Jerusalem with the Pope. No Maronite Patriarch has visited Jerusalem since before 1967, when Israel took East Jerusalem from Jordanian control. Rai's predecessor, Cardinal Sfeir, joined other Papal visits only for the Jordanian leg. Rai has said he will not meet with Israeli officials, and the Vatican has said the decision was Rai's personal initiative, not Rome's.

 Much of the criticism in Lebanon has been in the media; one reason may be that all parties in Lebanon are struggling to find a compromise candidate for President (who must be a Maronite); even Hizbullah has not raised a major fuss.

There has also been comment on the fact that the Vatican is referring to the "State of Palestine" and to Mahmud "Abbas as "Prsident of the State of Palestine, The Vatican recognizes the UN General Assembly's recognition of Palestine. On this visit the Pope will be visiting the Palestinian Authority before Israel; he arrives in Jordan on a Saturday, the Israeli Sabbath, so the calendar partially determined the order, but he will helicopter directly from Amman to Bethlehem rather than going via Israel.

From Vatican Radio, the official and very packed itinerary:


Pilgrimage of His Holiness Pope Francis in the Holy Land on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the meeting in Jerusalem between Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras .(May 24 – 26, 2014) – Program, 27.3.2014

Saturday, May 24, 2014
08:15 Departure from Rome Fiumicino Airport for Amman
13:00 Arrival at the Queen Alia International Airport in Amman
13:45 ARRIVAL CEREMONY in the al-Husseini Royal Palace in Amman
COURTESY VISIT TO THEIR MAJESTIES THE KING AND QUEEN OF JORDAN
14:20 MEETING WITH THE AUTHORITIES OF THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. Discourse of the Holy Father
16:00 HOLY MASS at the International Stadium in Amman. Homily of the Holy Father
19:00 Visit to the Baptismal Site at Bethany beyond the Jordan
19:15 MEETING WITH REFUGEES AND DISABLED YOUNG PEOPLE in the Latin church at Bethany beyond the Jordan. Discourse of the Holy Father

Sunday, May 25, 2014
8:15 FAREWELL FROM JORDAN at the Queen Alia Internal Airport in Amman
8:30 Departure by helicopter from the Queen Alia Internal Airport in Amman for Bethlehem
9:20 Arrival at the helicopter port of Bethlehem
9:30 ARRIVAL CEREMONY at the presidential Palace in Bethlehem
COURTESY VISIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE
10:00 MEETING WITH THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY – Discourse of the Holy Father
11:00 HOLY MASS in Manger Square in Bethlehem. Homily of the Holy Father
REGINA COELI PRAYER. Allocution of the Holy Father
13:30 Lunch with families from Palestine in the Franciscan convent of Casa Nova in Bethlehem
15:00 PRIVATE VISIT TO THE GROTTO OF THE NATIVITY IN BETHLEHEM
15:20 GREETING OF CHILDREN FROM THE REFUGEE CAMPS OF DEHEISHEH, AIDA AND BEIT JIBRIN at the Phoenix Center of the Deheisheh Refugee Camp
15:45 FAREWELL FROM THE STATE OF PALESTINE at the helicopter port of Bethlehem
16:00 Departure by helicopter from the helicopter port of Bethlehem for Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv
16:30 ARRIVAL CEREMONY at Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv. Discourse of the Holy Father
17:15 Transfer by helicopter to Jerusalem
17:45 Arrival at the helicopter port of Jerusalem on Mount Scopus
18:15 Private meeting with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople at the Apostolic Delegation in Jerusalem. Signing of a joint declaration.
19.00 ECUMENICAL MEETING on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the meeting in Jerusalem between Pope Paul VI and Patriarch Athenagoras in the Basilica of the Holy Sepulcher. Discourse of the Holy Father
20:15 Dinner with the Patriarchs and Bishops and the Papal suite at the Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem

Monday, May 26, 2014
8:15 VISIT TO THE GRAND MUFTI OF JERUSALEM in the building of the Great Council on the Esplanade of the Mosques. Discourse of the Holy Father
9:10 VISIT TO THE WESTERN WALL in Jerusalem
9:45 Laying a wreath at Mount Herzl in Jerusalem
10.00 VISIT TO YAD VASHEM in Jerusalem. Discourse of the Holy Father
10:45 COURTESY VISIT TO THE TWO CHIEF RABBIS at Heichal Shlomo Center in Jerusalem, next to the Jerusalem Great Synagogue. Discourse of the Holy Father
11:45 COURTESY VISIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL at the Presidential Residence in Jerusalem. Discourse of the Holy Father
13:00 PRIVATE AUDIENCE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL at Notre Dame Center in Jerusalem
13:30 Lunch with the Papal suite at Notre Dame Center in Jerusalem
15:30 Private visit to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople at the building next to the Orthodox church of Viri Galileai on the Mount of Olives
16:00 MEETING WITH PRIESTS, MEN AND WOMEN RELIGIOUS AND SEMINARIANS in the church of Gethsemane at the foot of the Mount of Olives. Discourse of the Holy Father
17:20 HOLY MASS WITH THE ORDINARIES OF THE HOLY LAND AND THE PAPAL SUITE in the room of the Cenacle in Jerusalem. Homily of the Holy Father
19:30 Transfer by helicopter from the helicopter port on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem to Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv
20:00 FAREWELL FROM THE STATE OF ISRAEL at Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv
20:15 Departure from Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv for Ciampino Airport in Rome
23:00 Arrival at Ciampino Airport in Rome