No, I'm Pretty Sure China's Only Aircraft Carrier is Not in Tartus

A few days ago I noted some doubts about some of the alarmist reporting about the Russian military buildup in Syria, but the hysterical reactions have not only not abated, they've become more shrill. Something close to an apotheosis of paranoid reporting may have been reached. On Saturday, the Israeli "defense and intelligence" (note the quote marks) website DEBKAFile  reported "A Chinese aircraft carrier docks at Tartus to support Russian-Iranian military buildup."

As US President Barack Obama welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping to the White House on Friday, Sept. 25, and spoke of the friendship between the two countries, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning-CV-16 docked at the Syrian port of Tartus, accompanied by a guided missile cruiser. This is revealed exclusively by DEBKAfile.

PLA Navy Liaoning CV-16

Now, anyone who has read it even sporadically knows that DEBKAFile has a solid track record of being sensationally wrong; I don't generally cite them here, though I did when they assured us in September 2011 that Qadhafi was still solidly in control in Libya the month before he died in a culvert by the side of a road. It's that kind of a track record. They like to imply they have access to Israeli intelligence, but if so they're being fed disinformation.

I have no access to any current classified intelligence, naval intelligence, or overhead image intelligence, so I must fall back on another form of intelligence: analyzing claims in the context of known facts. As John Adams put it, "Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence."

Let's start with some stubborn facts:

1. Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) Liaoning (CV-16) is not "A Chinese aircraft carrier"; it is China's only aircraft carrier (though a second is being built).
2. Laid down by the Soviet Navy as the Riga in 1988, renamed Varyag after Latvian independence and taken over by Ukraine with the fall of the Soviet Union, she was towed without operating engines to China and refitted.
3. Its home port is Qingdao in eastern China, though there has been speculation she will be used to enforce Chinese claims in the South China Sea.
4. To reach Tartus she would have to pass through the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal (or take the long way through the Strait of Gibraltar). This cannot be done unnoticed, even by civilian observers.
5. With the US expressing concern about four Russian Su-30 aircraft and 200 Russian Marines, it could neglect to note China's only carrier deployed to the Med?
6. When China itself defines the South China Sea territorial dispute as its primary naval power projection issue?

Now it's true there have been other reports that China might join Russia in supporting Syria, and a website that seems pro-Syrian-regime has reported that a "Chinese warship" transited the Suez Canal and Chinese military advisers are en route to Syria, but a "Chinese warship" (some of which have been showing up in odd places like the Bering Strait) is not the same as "China's only aircraft carrier."

If only DEBKAFile alone had reported this I'd have ignored it completely. But other media, especially on the political right, are picking up on it. Maybe there is a Chinese ship at Tartus, but if it's the Liaoning, I'll believe in teleportation.  Cue Twilight Zone theme: the "Philadelphia Experiment," anyone?

Two Interesting Takes on Chinese Migrants in Egypt

Since my daughter is ethnically Han Chinese, I have a certain interest, in addition to the natural interest as a historian and cultural observer, in the Overseas Chinese experience. When I first lived in Egypt in 1972 I knew of only two Chinese restaurants. There may have been some in Heliopolis or Maadi but the two downtown were not great, and the menus avoided pork dishes (though there may have been separate menus for Chinese patrons even then.) Today Chinese restaurants and even delivery are commonplace in Cairo, but also of interest is a growing ethnic Chinese population working in Egypt.

First, note a current New Yorker article by David Hessler, "Learning to Speak Lingerie: Chinese merchants and the inroads of globalization" about Chinese lingerie sellers in Egypt.  This in turn led me to this 2013 documentary about Chinese workers in Egypt, some of them Uighurs and other Chinese Muslims, and many of them undocumented:

The Saudis Show Their DF-3 IRBMs for the First Time

This happened two days ago but the first videos are turning up on YouTube: For the first time Saudi Arabia displayed its Dong Feng 3 (DF-3) missiles in a military parade at the Hafr al-Batin military base following maneuvers named Sayf ‘Abdullah (The Sword of ‘Abdullah).

The Chinese Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) were first acquired in 1987-88, towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, but they have never been publicly displayed before; the parade was presumably intended to send a message to Iran. The DF-3s have a range capable of reaching Tehran.


In Chinese service, the DF-3 carries a nuclear warhead, but the ones sold to the Saudis have conventional warheads. There has been speculation that the Chinese are replacing the DF-3s in Saudi service with newer solid-fueled missiles such as the DF-21. The Jane's article cited above notes that a 2013 photo showed the then-Deputy Defense Minister looking at a display case with three models of missiles, one of which appeared to be the more modern DF-25. Only the DF-3s (CSS-2s in NATO parlance) were shown in the parade, but again, that was their first public display despite being delivered some 26 years ago.

A Chinese Description of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate

 Mondays generally being Mondays, I think it's worth starting the week with something a little different, and so today I start with a Chinese Tang Dynasty description of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate. This appeals to the medievalist trapped inside me (my doctoral dissertation was on early ‘Abbasid Egypt), and also is a useful reminder that even while early Arab geographers were writing early accounts of China, the Chinese were returning the favor.

I discovered the story through the wonderful Algerian linguistics blogger (and fairly recent SOAS Ph.D.) Lameen Souag, via this post on "Ya-chü-lo" (Kufa) and other confusing transcriptions," at his Jabal al-Lughat blog. Lameen's posts at that blog are usually about Arabic, Berber, and Songhay and other Saharan languages (his research field); his only real fault is he posts too rarely, though he also has a blog on الأصول التاريخية للدارجة الجزائرية ("Historical Sources of Algerian Colloquial Arabic"; posts are in Arabic and French), and is also a contributor to the Oriental Berber blog specializing in the Berber/Tamazight dialects of Libya and the Siwi of Egypt. So I guess I shouldn't complain.

Lameen's post is mostly commenting on some of the curiosities of the Chinese transcriptions of Arabic place names, but it served as well as my introduction to the description in question. Before I move on to that description, Lameen poses a question on a Chinese term that is supposedly a title of the Caliph; I have no ideas, but if any of my readers do, please go to Lameen's blog and post them. (Quote contains Chinese and International Phonetic Alphabet characters which may not display in all browsers)

mo-shou: 摩首 mwâśǝ́w – no idea what this alleged title of the caliphs might be; probably not Arabic, so maybe Persian? Any ideas?

Back to the Chinese source.  The source is a Tang dynasty encyclopedia called Tongdian, dated to AD 801, and the text describing the ‘Abbasid Empire is based on an account by a Chinese soldier, named Tu Huan, captured at the Battle of Talas in 751 AD. That marked the point where the Muslim Caliphate, just taken over by the ‘Abbasids, was expanding eastward into Transoxiana and encountered the armies of the Tang, engaged in the westernmost expansion of the Chinese Empire. The battle was in the Talas Valley in what is today Kyrgyzstan or perhaps just over the border with Kazakhstan. The Chinese soldier spent time as a prisoner in the Caliphate at a time Kufa was still the ‘Abbasid capital. (Al-Mansur founded Baghdad in 762 AD, the year Tu Huan returned to China.)

The original Chinese text is here. My knowledge of Chinese is virtually nil, confined to a few phrases  learned when adopting my daughter in Hunan, and no reading capability, but Lameen links to an English translation. I'm unclear about the copyright status of the translation, so I'll urge you to read it there, with this excerpt as bait:

During the Yung-hui reign period (650-56) of the Great T'ang, the Arabs (Ta-shih) sent an embassy to the court to present tribute. It is said that their country is west of Persia (Po-ssu). Some [also] say that in the beginning there was a Persian who supposedly had the help of a spirit in obtaining edged weapons [with which] he killed people, subsequently calling for all the Persians who came and, according to their rank as mo-shou, were transformed into kings. After this the masses gradually gave their allegiance, and subsequently Persia was extinguished and Byzantium (Fulin) was crushed, as were also Indian cities; [the Arabs] were everywhere invincible. Their soldiers numbered 420,000 and by this time their state was 34 years old. When the original king had died, his office passed to the first mo-shou, and now the king was the third mo-shou; the royal surname is Tu-shih.

The men of this country have noses that are large and long, and they are slender and dark with abundant facial hair like the Indians; the women are graceful. [The Arabs] also have literature that is different from that of Persia. They raise camels, horses, donkeys, mules, and sheep. The soil is all sandy and stony, unfit for cultivation and without the five grains. All they have to eat is the flesh of camels and elephants. After having crushed Persia and Byzantium, for the first time they had rice and flour. They solemnly worship a celestial spirit.

For Ta-shih,  which is the Chinese word given here for Arabs; itis derived from Tajik, though that word usually meant "Persian" in Central Asia, it originally derived from the name for the Arabic tribe of Tayy. (Early Syriac chroniclers usually called the Arab invaders Tayaye. For more, see here.

Syria: Trapped in the Web of Geopolitics

The Russian and Chinese vetoes of the Security Council Resolution on Syria and the closing of the US Embassy in Damascus are further reminders that, more than any other "Arab Spring" case, Syria's agony is caught up in the complex geopolitics of the region. Like the Lebanese civil war a generation ago, the Syrian conflict is exacerbated, and perhaps fueled and funded on both sides, by regional players. With growing signs that the new Egypt will be estranged from, if it does not entirely abandon, its traditional strategic alignment with the US (and less overtly, Israel), some no doubt see Syria as a way to rectify the balance; lose one from "our" camp, win one from "theirs." That's bipolar, Cold War kind of thinking, but it's true that Syria's role as Iran's one Arab ally, and as the bridge through which Iran supplies Hizbullah in Lebanon, means the outcome of the struggle has implications far beyond the boundaries of Syria. As was the case in Lebanon during the war years, that is not good news for the ordinary people on either side of the struggle, since it tends to prolong the conflict. Unlike Libya, where Qadhafi had few friend left near the end (well, okay, Burkina Faso, but they're no match for NATO), Iran and arguably Russia have an investment to protect in Syria, while the West sees a chance to alter the balance.

I am not an advocate of Western intervention in Syria, not from any lack of horror at the humanitarian toll if the conflict continues, but due to the lack of practicality as well as the danger of escalation. In Libya, where most of the population and economic resources were on the Mediterranean, with NATO airbases in Sicily, southern Italy and Cyprus and French and Italian aircraft carriers in the Med, the logistics were easy. In Syria,where the major cities are inland, one would have to operate from eastern Turkey or enter from the sea via the Latakia corridor, or else overfly Lebanese airspace.  Logistically it would be a problem, and while Turkey is actively working against the Asad regime, use of Turkish bases would further complicate the geopolitical tangle.

For all the Western outrage about the vetoes, Russia and China are no doubt acting in what they perceive  to be their own interests, or those of their client. (Bear in mind that the overwhelming majority of US vetoes in the Security Council have been on resolutions involving Israel.)

The Syrian tragedy will go on, UN resolution or no, until something changes either the balance on the ground (where there are signs of gradual strengthening of the rebels) or a transformation of the geopolitical mosaic. An Israeli attack on Iran could make the Syrian civil war (or whatever you choose to call it) part of a much larger regional struggle, in which anything could happen.

Headlines You Don't See Everyday: "Chinese Sufis in Yemen"

Following a link to a new blog called Even Unto China, which seems devoted to Chinese and East Asian links to the greater Islamic world, and clearly takes its name from the hadith of the Prophet, Itlib al-‘Ilm hatta al-Sin (Seek Knowledge, even unto China), I was struck by a post — a tantalizing one since it doesn't go into much detail, but includes photos of an old manuscript — carrying as a title four words I don't think I've ever seen together before: "Chinese Sufis in Yemen."

China and the UAE

In a way this isn't news at all, since anyone who's been paying attention knows that China has been focusing closely on building up its presence in the Gulf. Still, reinforcing what we already know, here's a piece in this morning's The National of Abu Dhabi about China's concentrated interest in the UAE.

Admittedly, though, it's way down the web page from the lead, the Jonas Brothers' concert in Abu Dhabi. (And yes, with a 10-year-old daughter, I do know who they are.)

Somehow I think China's role in Abu Dhabi will last longer than the Jonas Brothers.

India, China Stepping Up Training in Afghanistan?

An interesting piece in The National datelined New Delhi and indicating that India and China are both looking at increasing their training presence in Afghanistan, looking towards the day the US withdraws.

India has, of course, long had an involvement in Afghanistan, usually either covert or at least mostly under-the-radar, since it clearly sees a need to offset Pakistani influence in the country. China is a bit less obvious, but it is certainly concerned with the role the Taliban and Al-Qa‘ida have played in encouraging radicalization of China's Uighur (East Turkestani) separatists in Xinjiang.

It's a reminder that the Great Game in Central Asia is still very much afoot, and will be when the US leaves as well.

Halford Mackinder, please call your office.

The Chinese Navy Visits the Gulf

A Chinese naval contingent is visiting Abu Dhabi. China had already projected naval power in the region by patrolling the Gulf of Aden against Somali pirates to protect Chinese shipping.

In the Middle Ages, Arab traders sailed from Basra to the Guangzhou region regularly. Today, China is beginning to return the favor.

Admiral Mahan, please call your office.

Great Games and Small, India and Afghanistan: The Often Neglected Player

Yesterday's major suicide bombing attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul was a reminder of a fact that is generally clear enough in the strategic vision of the regional country players but is often forgotten in Washington: India is still, as it has been for centuries, a player in Afghanistan. In our Western tendency to divide the world, while we consider Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India all part of South Asia in some sense, we tend to shrug India off as separate from the Muslim World and thus not really a player in the "Great Game" in its modern incarnation. The locals don't make that mistake. Pakistan sees India as its primary strategic enemy, and India accordingly sees a strategic value in counterbalancing Pakistan's interest by supporting, first the pro-Soviet, and now the pro-Western, regime in Afghanistan. That makes the pro-Taliban elements hostile to India, though they and al-Qa‘ida were already so over the Kashmir issue, which actually is a major one for some of their ideologues. Kashmir moves many Pakistanis deeply, but also the radicals of al-Qa‘ida.

Nothing I've said here is news to the regional specialists, but oddly it's possible to read serious pieces about the "AfPak" theater, as it's now called, that barely mention India (or China). The fact that the world's two most populous countries, both of them with fast growing economies and both of them with nuclear weapons, border Afghanistan and Pakistan is not, actually, a peripheral geopolitical consideration. Obviously, whoever bombed the Indian Embassy in Kabul was aware of that.

China and the Middle East

Occasionally, commentary and events seem to coalesce to make a theme particularly timely. Sometimes, they seem to be almost insistent because a whole lot of postings/links/comments seem to center on a single theme. Current case in point: China and the Middle East.

In June MEI published my colleague and MEJ Book Review Editor John Calabrese's Policy Brief, "The Consolidation of Gulf-Asia Relations: US Tuned in or Out of Touch?", which I plugged previously. This is, if not John's primary scholarly focus, certainly one of them. He knows it as well as anybody, I think.

This week, China launched its first Arabic-language television news service, which, since already on Monday Marc Lynch posted a good summary on the subject, I didn't note specifically, figuring if you're reading me, you've been reading Marc Lynch a lot longer. And Lynch alluded to a lot of other issues relating to this, including the whole Uighur/Central Asian issue, in passing.

Then, synchronicity and coincidence being what they are, an old acquaintance from a long time back — who, since he hasn't authorized me to quote him, I will simply call "Larry," since that's his name — and who spent a career in international banking mostly in Bahrain and Hong Kong, and thus might be considered informed on the subject, sent me a message saying:

I hope the appearance of John's article on the website is a harbinger of the Institute focusing on this issue - perhaps with a speech (maybe at the annual conference) and maybe with a focus in the Journal.

Okay, I'm starting to feel like there's an emerging theme. Over at the Blog Jihadica there's a post on a new issue of the "Islamic Turkistan Journal" on events in Chinese Turkistan. (Excuse me, Xinjiang.)

Then I got a submission for the Middle East Journal on the subject of Kuwait's relations with the Far East. Confidentiality means I can't identify the author.

Then, yesterday, my wife sends me a link to this article, "The Rise of a New Silk Road," dealing with China and the Middle East.

Okay, Okay, I get it. China and the Middle East is a major issue. As it happens, China and the Middle East are intertwined in my own life as well: my daughter is Chinese; and as you've already figured out I've spent a little time around the Middle East.

So I've done the post. Whatever higher power is loading me down with input on East Asia and the Middle East, here it is.

UPDATE: Don't miss comment #1 below, which is extended, anecdotal, and far more informed on the subject than I am.

India Takes Possession of its First Israeli Phalcon

Some may recall a major spat between Israel and the United States back in 1997-2000 over the Israeli agreement to sell its Phalcon airborne warning and control system — essentially the functional equivalent of the US AWACS — to China. It became a major issue and ultimately Israel cancelled the deal. The US strongly objected to Israel transferring this capability to China.

Well, virtually the same defense package — Israel's Phalcon system mounted in a Russian Il-76 — has just been delivered to India.

Indian purchases of Israeli defense exports are increasing, and the Indian and Israeli space programs are increasingly cooperating: in 2008 Israel launched a satellite using an Indian launch vehicle capable of polar orbit from India's launch site, and last month India launched its own spy satellite using Israeli technology, reportedly as a means of improving its space-based surveillance following the Mumbai terrorist attacks.

One doesn't need an advanced degree in geopolitics to see the growing Israeli-Indian cooperation as a response to Pakistan's missile programs, nuclear programs, and the growing concerns about Pakistan's stability. The fact that the Phalcon sale to India, while delivered a bit later than anticipated, did not encounter the strong American opposition that the proposed sale to China had, is also of interest.