Hizbullah Joins Iranian Hajj Boycott

Hizbullah has announced that its members will be forbidden  to attend this year's hajj, which begins this weekend. Earlier this year Iran announced that it would boycott the hajj, following last year's carnage in a stampede and the deepening war of words between Riyadh and Tehran.

After a smaller disaster left hundreds dead in 1987's hajj, Iran boycotted the hajj for three years.

Beware the "Sunni-Shi‘ite Conflict" Narrative: the Houthis from a Local Rebellion to Geopoliticization

In January, I noted that although the Yemeni Houthis are certainly radical in their rhetoric, Zaydi Islam traditionally is not, and that while technically Shi‘ite in that their Imams must be descended from ‘Ali, they have never identified with the Twelver Shi‘ism of Iran, nor has it generally considered them genuinely Shi‘a. The same is true of the ‘Alawites of Syria, yet today both ‘Alawites and Houthis are loosely aligned with Iran's geopolitical goals (though the links between the Houthis and Iran have more often been asserted than demonstrated).

Iran has been partly responsible for this, but the readiness of the West to accept the narrative of an "ancient" enmity between Sunnis and Shi‘ites, some sort of inexorable clash, has also helped reinforce a regime narrative on the part of Sunni majorities who want to paint non-Sunni minorities as Iranian-backed fifth columns. This narrative has already led to a tendency to paint the conflicts in Iraq and Syria not as complex fractures along complicated lines but as a Sunni-Shi‘ite dichotomy. (The only reason this oversimplification has not been extended to the equally complex conflict in Libya is that there are no Shi‘ites to speak of in Libya.)

The danger is that the more the world accepts the dualistic view, which to some extent reinforces both the Iranian and Saudi regimes' dueling propaganda, the more the various regional conflicts with their complex historical, social, economic, ethnic (and yes, sometimes sectarian) roots, the more these local conflicts are merged into a regional general war, and the sectarian dualism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

On the Houthis, let me note that back in 2009 I was already blogging about border clashes between the Saudis and the Houthis, though accusations about Iranian support were just beginning.

I keep hearing the war in Yemen, which is complex (consider the role of ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih, old friend of the Saudis, new friend of the Houthis), described in simplistic ways which see broad geopolitical motives behind people fighting for quite different motivations (power, tribe, ideology). If one side misinterprets the motivation of their adversary, disastrous results are inevitable.

‘Ashura in an Age of Sectarian Strife

Yesterday I failed to note the occurrence of ‘Ashura, the 10th of Muharram, the great day of mourning among Shi‘a. (‘Ashura also has a role in Sunni Islam, but a much less prominent one.)

Given the high levels of sectarian violence in Iraq and Syria, it is perhaps worth noting that tensions were high and that at least five died in eastern Saudi Arabia. Many ‘Ashura processions around the world took on a particularly anti-ISIS coloring,

It is perhaps worth reminding outsiders that while the Sunni-Shi‘i split dates from the first Islamic century, periods of actual sectarian violence have been fairly rare historically. Unfortunately, sectarian divisions are at an unusually virulent level now.

Apocalypse Now? Part II: Rafidi, Safavi, Sufyani

In Part I of this post, we discussed the growing use of end-times imagery by both sides in the conclict between ISIS and its adversaries, particularly Shi‘ites, and looked in some detail at the term Dabiq, chsen as the name of ISIS' English propaganda magazine. In Part II I want to discuss other terms on both sides of the debate.

And I should note that I'm only discussing historical and eschatological terms here, not conspiracy theories, though there are plenty of those. (ISIS was created by the US according to some, or by (inevitably) Israel ("Caliph Ibrahim" is secretly Jewish, naturally). That's an entirely different sort of fixation.

ISIS, like many jihadi movements before it and some Sunni Islamists, routinely uses Rafidi, a Sunni disparaging term for Shi‘ites. It means "Refuser," as in those who refuse to acknowledge Abu Bakr as the successor to the Prophet, and by extension, the dynasties of Caliphs recognized by Sunnis. In Part I I said they refused to acknowledge the Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Rashidun). A commenter took me to task, noting that ‘Ali is one of the four Rashidun. This is true of course, but in Sunnism he is the fourth Caliph, elected after three successors; in Shi‘ism he is the First Imam,  and the other three Rashidun are seen as usurpers.

Another common slur used by Sunnis (Arabs in particular) is Safawi (Persian Safavi.), after the Iranian dynasty usually known in English as the Safavids. Iran was only partially and sporadically Shi‘ite until the Safavids in the 16th Century AD made it Iran's official religion. The Sunni Ottomans fought a series of wars with the Shi‘ite Safavids, and so when used against Shi‘ites, particularly against Arab Shi‘ites, the term also has the connotation of "Persian," and hence foreign, alien, non-Arab.

Though many Sunni Arabs forget or don't know it, Shi‘ism was Arab long before it put down roots in Iran. Of the 12 Imams, only one is buried in Iran, ‘Ali al-Rida (‘Ali Reza) in Mashhad. Four Imams are buried in Saudi Arabia all in Medina), and six in Iraq (‘Ali in Najaf, Hussein in Karbala, two in Kazimiyya in Baghdad, and two in Samarra.) The 12th, of course, is in occlusion, but he disappeared in Samarra.

Other, stronger disparaging terms may be used against Shi‘ites, or more commonly against more heterodox or esoteric movements like the ‘Alawites, Yazidis and others whose Islamic identities are denied, such as Murtadd (apostate).

But if all the terms used so far have been used by Sunni Islamists, some Shi‘ites with an eschatological bent (and Shi‘ism with its expectation of the return of the Twelfth Imam has a strong eschatological predilection), have applied to ISIS or explicitly to its "Caliph Ibrahim," another term, discussing whether he might be the expected Sufyani,

The Umayyad Caliph who presided over the martyrdom of the Third Imam Hussein ibn ‘Ali was Yazid ibn Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan. Yazid is the greatest villain in the Shi‘ite narrative, and the entire Umayyad dynasty, and particularly the descendants of Abu Sufyan (who until his conversion was the Prophet's greatest adversary) are excoriated in the Shi‘ite tradition. Shi‘ites never use the name Yazid or Sufyan, except as curses.

So it is perhaps unsurprising that Shi‘ite eschatology evolved the idea of a descendent of Yazid
id who would appear (in Syria!) in the end times to fight against Imam Mahdi, the Sufyani. He is distinct from the Dajjal, and is generally believed to be a direct literal descendant of Yazid.

"Caliph Ibrahim" has declared his descent from the tribe of Quraysh, and many Shi‘ites are wondering
if he is the Sufyani. Shiachat has a forum topic on whether ISIS or al-Baghdadi is the Sufyani; this strange Nostradamus/Prophecy site picks upon the theme; and other s appear to be vetting Baghdadi's Qurayshi line.

Obviously, if people on both sides think they're living in the end times, it can mean trouble. I'm not trying to be alarmist, but I thought the growing evidence of these themes deserved attention.

Apocalypse Now? Dabiq, Rafidi, Safavi, Sufyani: The First Century AH Returns With a Vengeance, Part I: Dabiq

At times the growing chaos in the Middle East must seem almost apocalyptic, and it's hardly surprising that some fundamentalist evangelical Christians are seeing signs of Armageddon, though hardly for the first time. Outside the Islamic world, many may have overlooked the growing apocalyptic discourse among radical Sunni and radical Shi‘ite theorists who are also playing the apocalypse game.

Hardline Shi‘ites since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 have been talking about the imminent return of Imam Mahdi, and Ayatollah Khamene'i  has sometimes endorsed the idea that the return of the Twelfth Imam was imminent. Sunnism has been less end-times oriented, at least since 1979, which corresponded to 1400 AH, and led to a self-proclaimed Sunni Mahdi seizing the Haram in Mecca.

But hey, the end times are back with a vengeance. Now that "the Caliphate" claims to have been "restored" by people the Caliphs would probably have executed quickly, the apocalypse has also made a comeback. Others have noted this already (see for example here and here). There's some danger in putting too much emphasis on this, and it's hard to be certain how seriously those using this language genuinely believe it and to what extent they're using it to rally the base. I thought it worth some comment, however.

There are moments when an education in early Islamic history and a modern career in defense and policy issues suddenly converge. Back during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s I was working full-time on Middle Eastern defense issues and simultaneously teaching a course in the Theology Department at Georgetown on the Development of Islamic Religious Thought. When someone would suggest that the combination of military matters and theology didn't mesh well, I would note that you wouldn't understand the war communiques without understanding the first century of Islam. Iraq called its campaign "Saddam's Qadisiyya" after the Arab defeat of Sassanian Persia, while Iran named many of its campaigns "Karbala'' after the martyrdom (in Iraq) of the Third Imam. In short, Saddam used First Century AH imagery to portray it as an Arab-Persian War, while Iran was seeking to portray it as a Shi‘ite-Sunni War. Neither, however, at the time, except from some extreme Shi‘ites eventually disavowed by Khomeini, explicitly saw it as an end-times war. I suspect ISIS, too, is using the jargon like an Evangelical preacher warning the End is Nigh, or as a recruiting tactic than a doctrine. But what the recruits believe may be another matter.

There is also a longstanding practice among jihadis of this sort of anachronistic terminology, such as the frequent use of "Crusaders" (Salibiyyin) to describe the Western presence in the Middle East.

Today, we find ISIS calling its English-language magazine Dabiq, after a battle expected in the last days between "the Romans" and the believers. and thus a sort of Sunni version of Armageddon; they and other jihadis routinely refer to Shi‘ites as either Rafidi, (those who reject, as in rejecting the authority of Abu Bakr and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs), or (especially for the Iraqi government and army), Safawi, after the Safavid dynasty that made Iran officially Shi‘ite in the 16th century and thus equivalent to calling Iraqi Shi‘ites "Persians").

Not to be outdone or out-apocalypsed,  there has been some debate in Shi‘ite religious forums about whether Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ("Caliph Ibrahim") might be the Sufyani, sort of Sunni antichrist figure in Shi‘ite end-times tradition who will appear before the coming of Imam Mahdi.

Except for Safawi, all these terms derive their meanings or implications from events in the first century of the Hijra. Let's talk a bit about each. Today's Part I will deal with Dabiq.

Dabiq


Dabiq, ISIS' magazine, is a professional-looking, well-edited magazine, well laid out with color photos, like a glossy travel magazine (except for beheadings).

It has been compared (usually favorably) to Al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula's similarly slick Inspire. You can even find issue 1 at Internet Archive. Issue two, with the suitably apocalyptic Noah's Flood on the cover, doesn't seem to be at internet Archive but can be found on many sites, such as here, though jihadi website browsing may attract questions.

But why Dabiq? Students of Islamic history may assume it has something to do with the locality known as Marj Dabiq (the Meadow of Dabiq), which took its name from the nearby Syrian town of Dabiq,  near the Turkish border 44 km northwest of Aleppo, and played a major role twice in Islamic history. First, in AD 717, it was the site where the Umayyad Army under Maslama b, ‘Abd al-Malik, brother of the Caliph Sulayman, prior to invading the Byzantine Empire by land and sea and threatening Constantinople. Secondly, it was the site of the Battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516, when the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks and brought Egypt and the Levant under Ottoman control.

While the usage refers to the Syrian town of Dabiq, it does not directly relate to the events of 717 or 1516, though both reflect the towns role as a border region, just as today it is near the Turkish-Syrian border.  Rather it refers to a tradition of the Prophet concerning the last days, of which this version from the Sahih Muslim hadith collection offers a fairly full account:

Abu Huraira reported Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: The Last Hour would not come until the Romans would land at al-A'maq or in Dabiq. An army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the people of the earth at that time will come from Medina (to counteract them). When they will arrange themselves in ranks, the Romans would say: Do not stand between us and those (Muslims) who took prisoners from amongst us. Let us fight with them; and the Muslims would say: Nay, by Allah, we would never get aside from you and from our brethren that you may fight them. They will then fight and a third (part) of the army would run away, whom Allah will never forgive. A third (part of the army). which would be constituted of excellent martyrs in Allah's eye, would be killed and the third who would never be put to trial would win and they would be conquerors of Constantinople. And as they would be busy in distributing the spoils of war (amongst themselves) after hanging their swords by the olive trees, the Satan would cry: The Dajjal has taken your place among your family. They would then come out, but it would be of no avail. And when they would come to Syria, he would come out while they would be still preparing themselves for battle drawing up the ranks. Certainly, the time of prayer shall come and then Jesus (peace be upon him) son of Mary would descend and would lead them in prayer. When the enemy of Allah would see him, it would (disappear) just as the salt dissolves itself in water and if he (Jesus) were not to confront them at all, even then it would dissolve completely, but Allah would kill them by his hand and he would show them their blood on his lance (the lance of Jesus Christ).  Sahih Muslim 6924

So there you have it: the original hadith (there are multiple versions) seems to assume the Romans (that is, the Byzantines) will still control Constantinople down to the end times, at which point Dabiq or perhaps  al-A‘maq (which the geographer Yaqut in his Mu‘jam al-Buldan says is nearby), there will be a great battle between the Romans and the Muslims, complete with the Dajjal (the Antichrist figure in Muslim eschatology) and the return of the Prophet Jesus. In some versions, the (Sunni) Mahdi also plays a role.

It is, in short, the equivalent of the biblical Battle of Armageddon in he Book of Revelation.

A Reminder that Even in an Age of Sectarian Division . . .

. . . there are mixed families with a sense of humor:

So Who Killed Hasan Lakkis?

Lakkis (Al-Manar TV)

Last night's assassination of senior Hizbullah military figure Hasan Lakkis (اللقيس) was the latest direct attack on Hizbullah and Iranian interests in Lebanon. Just before it, Hizbullah keader Hasan Nasrallah had blamed the bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut on Saudi Arabia, but Hizbullah quickly and reflexively blamed Israel for Killis. What is interesting is that Israel, instead of declining comment as it usually does in such cases, flatly denied the accusation and said it was likely Sunni elements.

That underscores the increasingly complex situation in Lebanon (though it doesn't mean Israel didn't do it), where Hizbullah is deeply embroiled in both the conflict with Israel and the civil war in Syria, as well as broader regional sectarian rivalries. Discussing suspects quickly takes on a  Murder on the Orient Express feel: everyone has a motive. Even if we leave out conflicts within Hizbullah or with other Shi‘ite elements, reasonable suspects would include Israel; Syrian rebels; Lebanese Sunnis; Saudi Arabia; Jordan; Turkey; France; and the US. If he had been killed by a drone I'd put the US first (though Israel has used them this way in Gaza), but he was shot at close range, so I think the US is probably off the hook on this one, though unlikely to send flowers.

I'm not sure it matters, or if we'll ever know for sure. For decades, Hizbullah mostly limited itself to Lebanon and Israel, or to US targets in the region. By throwing itself openly into the Syrian conflict it has found itself with a whole spectrum of new enemies, and further destabilized Lebanon, which more than ever seems to deserve the title Michael Hudson used in his 1968 (several wars ago) book, The Precarious Republic.

Sectarianism Breaks Out in Egypt and Lebanon

The growing threat of sectarian conflict in the Arab world has seen two new outbursts: an anti-Shi‘ite pogrom in a village in Egypt, and the bloody clashes between the Lebanese Army and a Salafi sheikh's followers in Sidon, Lebanon.

We've talked about the curious fact that Egyptian Salafis and even the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have a strong streak of anti-Shi‘ite rhetoric, despite the country that Egypt's Shi‘ite minority is minuscule.

Today is the 15th of the month of Sha‘ban, and the night before is celebrated in Muslim tradition (Sunni and Shi‘i) as a nignt when God's mercy is at its most forgiving, a night for prayer and repentance. In a village in Giza Governorate, a small group of Shi‘ites were gathered privately in a private home, with an Egyptian Shi‘ite figure and spokesman named Hasan Shehata attending. A mob, learning of the gathering, surrounded the house, dragged the worshippers out, killed Shehata and three others and injured more, destroying several houses in the process. Zeinobia has details and photos, including some bloody ones. While the lynch-mob killed its victims, police reportedly looked on without intervening.

The fighting in Lebanon is on a larger scale and involves the Lebanse Army, but is also sectarian in inspiration. At least 16 Lebanese soldiers have died in a confrontation between the Army and the supporters of raidcal Salafi leader Ahmad al-Assir in Sidon. Qifa Nabki offers some background on Assir's gamble, which is quickly turning against him; he's denouncing the Lebanese Army as instruments of Iran and Hizbullah. But in a country that has already postponed Parliamentary elections and witnessed fighting in its north and east as the war in Syria echoes inside Lebanon, it adds another front in southern Lebanon.

Hizbullah and Palestinian Backlash: Paying the Price for Syrian Intervention

Hizbullah used to justify its continuing armament by insisting it was resisting Israel. Now, it's reportedly told Hamas, which claims to be doing the same thing, to get out of Lebanon immediately.

And in a Palestinian refugee camp at Ain  al-Hilweh in Lebanon, Palestinians burned humanitarian aid sent by Hizbullah, protesting the latter's role in Syria.

Of course, Lebanon has been feeling the impact of the Syrian civil war for some time. With Hizbullah's open engagement on the side of the Syrian regime, we're likely to see more blowback in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, Qifa Nabki considers the risks and calculations Hizbullah is taking.

The Worsening Situation in Iraq

Disturbing headline at The Independent: "'The civil war in Iraq has already begun': Politician claims conflict has started and warns it will be ‘worse than Syria.’" So saith, allegedly at least, a "senior Iraqi politician," identity and sectarian affiliation unstated.

Hyperbole, I hope, but sectarian clashes are worsening and the UN says the death counts are up; also the potential conflicts between the central government and the Kurdish Region are intensifying.

While it's pretty bloody hard for anything to be "worse than Syria," there are also already enough synergistic interactions between Syrian Jihadis/Iraqi Jihadis, Syrian Sunnis/Iraqi Sunnis/Lebanese Sunnis, Syrian Kurds/Iraqi Kurds/Turkish Kurds, and Syrian Shi‘ites/Iraqi Shi‘ites/Iranian Shi‘ites/Lebanese Hizbullah, that just the headline is enough to give one pause, to put it mildly. The possibility of the Syrian conflict metastasizing into a regional sectarian war is everybody's nightmare scenario. Let's hope this is a worst-case scenario. Please.

If the Sheikh al-Azhar's Looks Could Kill ...

Methinks the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar is not amused ...

What's in a Name? In Parts of Iraq, Your Name Might Get You Shot

Here's an interesting recent piece from the Iraqi news site Niqash, called "What's in a Name? Iraqis at Risk for Having 'Dangerous' First Names." At least in Mosul and Ninawa province, parents of newborns are increasingly giving their newborns names that don't reveal their sectarian affiliation since Sunni-Shi‘ite violence is a continuing threat. And it's not just newborns:

Thamer also points out that in Ninawa a lot of people have two identity cards – one with their real name and another with a fake name, depending on where they live or work or which areas they need to pass through. This is because some neighbourhoods or localities in Ninawa are inhabited by mostly Sunni Muslims and others are populated by mostly Shiite Muslims.

Most of the people with two identity cards are truck or taxi drivers, Thamer notes. Every day Sunni Shiite drivers must pass through Shiite Muslim dominated areas and vice versa.

Take Siddiq for example. He is a Sunni Muslim and his real first name is Abu Bakr – in scripture, the latter was a close companion of the Prophet Mohammed but whether he was a meritorius individual is something that Shiite and Sunni Muslims disagree on.

Siddiq’s younger brother was a taxi driver like him; he was killed by extremists while driving the road between Mosul and Baghdad. “He was just a taxi driver and he was only murdered because his name was Umar,” Siddiq tells sadly.

 And there was a post-2003 rush to change names for another reason:

“People were obsessed with changing their names,” the employee remembers. “And especially those who were named after Saddam or those who had very Baath names.” And by this, he means names that were particularly Arabist or nationalist in nature. At the time, the rush for name changes caused his department to put more restrictions on the practice in an attempt to maintain some order and their records correctly.

Spillover: The Fighting in Lebanon

The fighting in Tripoli (the Lebanese one) that broke out over the weekend is pretty universally seen as a spillover from Syria: sectarian in its origins, involving Sunni Islamists and ‘Alawites. One of the best assessments I've seen to date is this one by Emile Hokayem at Foreign Policy. Lebanon's fate seems to be to echo the conflicts of its neighbors, but most inevitably Syria's. The potential of a protracted civil conflict in Syria to spill over into a regional conflict is real; in Tripoli, it's already happening.

A Bloody ‘Ashura: Is Sectarian Violence Spreading?

For years,we have become somewhat inured to sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi‘ites in Iraq. In Bahrain, government officials have sought to portray the protests as an Iranian-backed plot, and have thus fueled Sunni-Shi‘a tensions there. Sectarian tensions are always present to some extent in eastern Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, and sectarian attacks, especially against Shi‘ite mosques and worshipers in Pakistan have been a growing problem..

Yesterday, on ‘Ashura, the holiest day in Shi‘ite Islam, a crowded Shi‘ite shrine in Kabul was attacked. As many have noted, despite Afghanistan's ongoing conflicts, Sunni-Shi‘a conflicts have  been largely absent. Yesterday, however, that changed, and 55 people died.

Even in Egypt, which has only a minority Shi‘ite population of uncertain size, a group of Shi‘ites who, under Husni Mubarak were not allowed to celebrate Shi‘ite feasts, decided to test the waters and pray at the Sayyidna Hussein mosque, a shrine to the Prophet's grandson whose martyrdom is marked on ‘Ashura, and itself a foundation of the Fatimid period (969-1171 AD), when Egypt was ruled by a Shi‘ite dynasty. (Al-Azhar itstelf, today one of Sunni Islam's bastions, was also a Fatimid foundation. They were dispersed and arrested, As the Minister of Awqaf (Islamic Endowments) put it, "We were surprised to find them inside, performing barbaric and unreligious rituals. Security forces forced them out."

Egyptian Shi‘a of course, are not being killed, just restricted. But the growing sectarian tensions elsewhere (and Egyptian suspicions of Iran),  may be added to the outright violence in Iraq, Pakistan, and now Afghanistan, and the endemic tensions in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Playing the Sectarian Card

Marc Lynch notes the fact that the Saudi intervention in Bahrain and today's crackdown are part of the regime's effort to frame the issues in Bahrain as a Sunni-Shi‘a rivalry rather than an issue of democratic reforms. Among his points:

The Bahraini regime responded not only with violent force, but also by encouraging a nasty sectarianism in order to divide the popular movement and to build domestic and regional support for a crackdown. Anti-Shi'a vituperation spread through the Bahraini public arena, including both broadcast media and increasingly divided social media networks. This sectarian framing also spread through the Arab media, particularly Saudi outlets. The sectarian frame resonated with the narratives laid in the dark days of the mid-2000s, when scenes of Iraqi civil war and Hezbollah's rise in Lebanon filled Arab television screens, pro-U.S. Arab leaders spread fears of a "Shi'a Crescent", and the Saudis encouraged anti-Shi'ism in order to build support for confronting Iranian influence.

While this strategy may work in the short term it's quite dangerous in the long term, with possible destabilizing effects not only in the Gulf states but in Iraq and Lebanon, where sectarian identities already run high. The demonstrators did not portray this as a sectarian issue; the official media did. Claiming that the demonstrators are agents of Iranian influence may drive the reform movement in that direction, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Playing the sectarian card may boost further support from conservative Sunni states, but in the long run I suspect it is playing with dynamite.

Iran Arrests Jundullah Leader

Iran claims to have arrested the leader of Jundallah, the Army of God, a Sunni opposition movement that has long carried out attacks in Baluchistan and other parts of southeastern Iran and which I've mentioned previously through the link above. Some of the stories: The National (Abu Dhabi); BBC English (Middle East); Al Jazeera English; and for an Iranian viewpoint, Press TV.

I know little about Jundallah, but I know that Iran has claimed for years that the US has been supporting it and now is saying the captured leader trained at a US base in Afghanistan. I have no idea if that is true and do not assume, as some might, that anything bad someone asserts about the US is true, but I also recognize that there has been, at least prior to Al-Qa‘ida and the occupation of Iraq, a tacit assumption among some in the US' intelligence establishment that Shi‘ism posed more of a threat than Sunnism. It will be a problem for us, however, if we not only did support Jundallah but if its leader can document that in an Iranian show trial.

The biggest issue is not that it would harm our relations with Iran, which are pretty much so far below Dante's ninth circle of hell at the moment that mild alleviation does little, but it could hurt our relations with Shi‘ites elsewhere, particularly in Iraq, where the political situation on the eve of elections and with renewed sectarian clashes is in flux. Iraq may be the reason for the emphasis on the arrest. See: the US is supporting Sunni terrorists and undermining the national unity of the state. Blame the US for fomenting what, at best, they may have been covertly backing.

Whether through our own blunders or Iranian successes, the US is once again drawn to the brink with its Iraqi allies/clients. That would serve Iranian goals far more than any positive local reception gained from friendly relations and a cat got down from a tree by US soldiers. We need to be careful here.

The whole story on which this post is predicated may, and perhaps likely will, prove either peripheral, exaggerated, false or not worth the effort. But there are subtle prejudices coming out of their divisions, but they don't take you closer to Pike's Peak.

Bombing in Zahedan: Jundallah Again?

UPDATE: There's been an armed attack on Ahmadinejad's campaign office in Zahedan, as well.

The bombing of a mosque in Zahedan, in the southeastern Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan, has reportedly killed 15 people and wounded another 50. Worshippers were gathered at the Amir al-Mohini Mosque for the observance of a Shi‘ite holiday marking the death of the Prophet's daughter Fatima. This is being blamed on Jundallah ("Army of God"), a shadowy Sunni movement active in southeastern Iran, where there is a fairly substantial Sunni minority in the majority Shi‘ite country. It is perhaps best known for a series of attacks in February 2007, but has been a persistent if low-level nuisance for some time. (For some background on Jundallah here's a Wikipedia entry; Pakistan has on occasion handed over arrested guerrillas to Iran, and Iran has charged that the US and Saudi Arabia support Jundallah, though the latter seems a bit more likely than the former.

So far as I am aware anyway, Jundallah's operations have been limited to Sistan and Baluchistan (one province despite two names), and particularly Zahedan, areas close enough to allow infiltration through the largely empty border areas with Pakistan and Afghanistan. It would be a mistake to see this as either a major indicator of Sunni dissidence in Iran generally or as a genuine threat to the regime. It is a regionally-based problem, but the bombing of a mosque is likely to lead to an intensified crackdown.