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Motion to Dismiss

Stockholm District Court
Department 1
B 12885-10: Åklagaren ./. Julian Assange

1. Julian Assange moves that the warrant be immediately withdrawn.

2. Since the arrest matter was last reviewed (by Svea Appeals Court 16 September 2016, supplement 110) the following has transpired:
– Questioning of Assange has been completed.
– The questioning was carried out under unsatisfactory conditions.
– Almost six months have since gone by without anyone being able to see an end to this case.
– The US has now openly declared its intention of arresting and imprisoning Julian Assange.
3. That a questioning of Assange has taken place affects the assessment of whether there’s still probable cause.
4. All new events, together with circumstances known previously, lead in any case to the conclusion that the principle of proportionality must now weigh in favour of Julian Assange.

5. Questioning of Julian Assange could finally take place in London 14 and 15 November 2016.
6. The questioning, however, took place in a completely unsatisfactory way, which affects both the evidence evaluation and the assessment of proportionality.
7. The questioning also took place too late, more than six years after the incidents in question which led to the suspicion of crime. Even this strongly affects both the evidentiary evaluation and the assessment of proportionality.
8. Despite these shortcomings, Julian Assange chose to carry on with the questioning. He felt compelled. A strong motive was that Assange wanted to help push the case forward and clear his name.
9. During the questioning Julian Assange submitted a thorough and detailed account of the actual sequence of events between himself and the plaintiff.
10. A new review of the matter of probable cause should therefore be undertaken. The testimony of Julian Assange should be compared to the material the prosecutor has chosen to use as the basis of her motion for arrest, and other known conditions.
11. Such an analysis shows that there is no longer probable cause for the alleged suspicion of crime.

12. Julian Assange assumes this part of the motion will be confidential. The account is therefore submitted in a separate document, see supplement 1.
13. In summary, supplement 1 shows that probable cause no longer exists. The arrest should therefore be withdrawn already for that reason.
14. In any case, it is obvious that the prosecutor can longer count on a conviction. A prosecution will lead to an acquittal. I wish thereby especially to refer to the two very recent precedents which the Supreme Court announced 13 April 2017 regarding evidence evaluation in sex crime cases.
15. That the suspicion of crime has been weakened affects, together with other circumstances, even the assessment of proportionality. In this regard, the following applies:

16. When the questioning was conducted in London, Julian Assange had been at the embassy since 19 June 2012, which had made him ill.
17. From the attached doctor’s certificate (should be marked confidential) written immediately prior the questioning (supplement 2) it can be seen that Julian Assange was not in sufficient health to participate in a police questioning. This doctor’s certificate was sent to the prosecutor 11 November 2016 via email with the following cover text: Attached sent for your information, a doctor’s certificate, sent to Ecuador, showing Julian Assange’s current medical condition for Monday’s questioning. This certificate may not be made public but shall be marked confidential. Otherwise, reference to the doctor’s certificates we’ve previously submitted to the court. Julian Assange is not cancelling Monday’s questioning.
18. I was also denied access to the questioning, but the reason is still not clear. Julian Assange was therefore represented at the hearing by an Ecuadorean attorney, Carlos Poveda, who is newly appointed and not at all familiar with the case. The Swedish prosecution was, however, represented by a Swedish prosecutor and a member of the Swedish police.
19. As I was denied access, I do not know exactly what happened at the questioning. I have, however, been informed that Julian Assange was not served with a formal notification of suspicion of a crime, which in such case is yet another serious shortcoming, see RB 23:18.
20. To shed light on why I was denied access and why, in such case, Julian Assange was not served with a formal notification, I have asked Carlos Poveda to account for what happened at the questioning. Poveda does not speak English but he has sent a statement in Spanish, sworn under oath, to me (supplement 3).
21. After the questioning, the prosecutor did not contact me for almost four months. In the middle of March 2017 I received a document entitled ‘Protocol of the Questioning of Julian Assange 14-15 November 2016’. The translation did not include an explanation of why I was denied access.
22. Therefore, on 23 March, I wrote to the prosecutor and included the statement from Carlos Poveda, asking that it be added to the investigation and translated into Swedish, for the sake of clarifying why I was denied access and why Assange was not served with notification.
23. In a letter dated 3 April 2017 Marianne Ny clarified that she has no intention of having Carlos Poveda’s statement translated.
24. In a letter dated 6 April 2017 I demanded the Prosecutor-General review that Marianne Ny did not obtain a translation of the statement of Carlos Poveda. The Prosecutor-General has not replied.

25. The status of the preliminary investigation is therefore, from the perspective of the defence, currently the following:
26. The defence challenges whether Assange has been served notice of suspicion according to RB 23:18, and needs to consider the significance of why I was denied access to the questioning, and even that the questioning was conducted despite Assange not being sufficiently in good health to participate in a questioning. This assessment cannot be accomplished until Poveda’s statement has been translated. If even the Prosecutor-General will not accede to a translation at the expense of the State Mr Assange himself will pay for the translation.
27. The following shall be added to the above.
28. No 24-18 notification has taken place. As we know, prosecution may not take place until this has happened and until the defence has had reasonable time to prepare.
29. As presented in the confidential supplement to this motion, Julian Assange claims there is no longer probable cause for suspicion of crime. It is the strong opinion of the defence that the prosecutor should immediately close down the preliminary investigation. One cannot, on objective grounds, expect a conviction.
30. But there has been no indication from the prosecutor that she plans to close the case. The only word I have received is that the translation has taken several months and that one now awaits new investigatory procedures.
31. As far as I can see, the prosecutor plans to continue with the investigation. In such case, one must count on the preliminary investigation, given the above, going on for a long time, a matter to be weighed in assessing proportionality.

32. The US has now made it clear that it is its intention to arrest and bring Assange to the US in order to prosecute and imprison him there.
33. The CIA Director Mike Pompeo made a public appearance 13 April 2017 which began with a long speech. A transcript of the complete speech in English is attached (supplement 4). A great part of the speech was directed at WikiLeaks and Julian Assange. My own translation of that part of the speech is attached (supplement 5). In his speech, Mike Pompeo makes the following statements:
– WikiLeaks looks like a hostile intelligence service, sounds like a hostile intelligence service.
– They encouraged Chelsea Manning to steal specific secret information.
– It’s time to call WikiLeaks for what it is: a non-state hostile intelligence service.
– There is no doubt that the releases these past years have caused damage, great damage, to the national security of our country, and will continue to do this for a long time to come.
– They’ve pretended that our first amendment can protect them from justice. They might have thought so, but they are wrong.
– So we pose a decisive question: what can we do about this? What can and what should the CIA, the general intelligence community, the US, and our allies do for this challenge, never before seen, which these hostile non-state intelligence organisations pose?
– We have to realise that we can no longer permit Assange and his colleagues be given the opportunity to exploit freedom of speech against us. To give them this opportunity to crush us would be a perversion of what our constitution stands for. Enough is enough.
34. At a press conference on 20 April 2016 the US Attorney-General Jeff Sessions, in light of Mr Pompeo’s speech, answered the following question from a journalist:
‘Can you talk about whether it is a priority for your department to arrest Assange once and for all, and whether you think you can take him down?’
Jeff Sessions replied:
‘We are going to step up our effort and are already stepping up our efforts on all leaks. This is a matter that has gone beyond anything I’m aware of. We have professionals of the security business that have been in it for many years that are shocked by the number of leaks, and some of them are quite serious. So yes, it is a priority. We have already begun to step up our efforts, and whenever a case can be made, we will seek to put people in jail.’
35. Considering the statements of the US Attorney-General and the Director of the CIA, there can be no remaining doubt that the US has the intention of arresting and imprisoning Julian Assange.
36. In the English media, representatives of British authorities, in light of the actions of the US saying that it will try to get Mr Assange extradited from Great Britain, have stated that they will prioritise an extradition to Sweden rather than a request from the US (according to pertinent English rules).
37. The District Court must therefore assume that Mr Assange – in the event he is forced to leave the embassy – will be sent to Sweden. After that, one can count on the US – in accordance with the statements of Jeff Sessions and the CIA Director – demanding his surrender from Sweden.
38. In that the US made public its intention to arrest and imprison Julian Assange, the question of the arrest warrant comes into a new light. It is no longer possible to dismiss or trivialise the threat from the US. These recent events show that Assange has been right all along. He risks a long prison sentence for his work as a journalist at WikiLeaks. The alleged WikiLeaks source Manning was sentenced to 35 years.
39. The accusations, according to the US media, seem to be about WikiLeaks not only publishing material from their sources, but the US claims that Assange has also acted as an instigator, accomplice, or accessory to the alleged crimes of the sources, as well as Mr Assange helping Edward Snowden escape.
40. At earlier reviews of the arrest warrant issue, the threat of the surrender of Julian Assange has been trivialised or outright dismissed.
41. The Prosecutor-General, regarding the threat of surrender to the US, stated the following to the Supreme Court, supplement 6, page 8, paragraph 1, second last sentence:
‘To reach a judgement in this matter it is important, in my opinion, to establish the objective strength in JA’s reasons for refusing to appear in Sweden.’
And on page 9, paragraph 1:
‘With consideration thereto and when at the current time there is no written request for surrender of JA to the US from Sweden, I believe that JA’s reasons for refusing to appear in Sweden, purely objectively, are not of a strength to credit them with any relevance.’
42. The Prosecutor-General stresses that the objective strength of the threats is of decisive importance.
43. The Supreme Court backs the reasoning of the Prosecutor-General (verdict, paragraph 15, final sentence): ‘It can be added that no request has been made in Sweden’. The meaning of the Supreme Court verdict is that one believes (see paragraph 15) that Mr Assange – as the US had not demanded his surrender – is obligated to no longer use the protection of his political asylum in exchange for the review that would take place according to Swedish law should Mr Assange be sent to Sweden, whereupon the US demand him surrendered.
44. Even in the motivation section (see paragraph 14) the reasoning of the Prosecutor-General is adopted: ‘The Prosecutor-General has, however, explained that there has been no request for surrender to the Department of Justice from the US. Neither has there been anything in the case which hints that the US would be planning such an action.’
45. The objective risk for surrender in the spring of 2015 seems to have been depicted by the Swedish authorities as so low that it could not be ‘given any relevance’.
46. The Prosecutor-General, the Supreme Court, and the Secretary of Justice place decisive weight in their judgment on the Prosecutor-General’s point that there has been no surrender request from the US.
47. But, judging all aspects, this is a completely irrelevant argument. It is highly unlikely that the US would demand the extradition of someone who is not even in the country. Such a demand would, in addition, judging from previous experience, be dismissed by Sweden without reservation on the grounds that the person sought is not in the country (compare paragraph 53 below). The objective strength in the risk of surrender to the US must be decided by other criteria.
48. Thereto, the decisive significance is that the US now admits that it intends to arrest and imprison Julian Assange. And that, in contrast to the spring of 2015, there is proof of an objective risk that the US will demand Mr Assange’s surrender.
49. The analysis of the Prosecutor-General and the Supreme Court are herewith seen in a totally different light.
50. To use the words of the Prosecutor-General, it is now clear that the objective strength of Julian Assange’s reasons to refuse to appear in Sweden is so strong that it must be given relevance. Hereby, the following applies:
51. With his political asylum, Julian Assange has 100% protection from being surrendered to the US, as long as he remains in Ecuador’s embassy.
52. A Swedish review of a request from the US to surrender Assange from Sweden does not give him 100% protection. Sweden has, for many years, regularly granted applications from the US for surrender.
53. A review at the end of 2011 showed that Sweden had granted 4 of 6 requests from the US since 2000. The two that were not granted were for people who were not in the country. In practice, Sweden had – at the end of 2011 – granted all requests from the US.
54. Swedish legislation does not provide for any opportunities to render a decision in advance, see the statement of the Prosecutor-General page 8, paragraph 2, final sentence. The legislation, however, has no express hindrance.
55. Mr Assange has, over the years, repeatedly but in vain, attempted to get an advance guarantee from Swedish authorities. If he had been given such a guarantee, he would long ago have come to Sweden.
56. So in practice Sweden’s Supreme Court in May 2015 demanded that Assange reject his 100% protection in exchange for a protection that is much lower.
57. In light of the threat from the US which can today be proven, the reasoning of Sweden’s Supreme Court is clearly untenable.
58. As the US wants to arrest Assange, one must assume that the US will demand his surrender if he is sent to Sweden from Great Britain. The US cannot effect his surrender directly from Great Britain as, according to English law, a surrender to Sweden comes first. A request from the US would thereafter be reviewed according to Swedish law.
59. It is now – in light of the clear and present threat from the US – unreasonable of Sweden to demand that Mr Assange exchange a 100% protection for a judicial review that historically has meant surrender to the US.
60. In summary, it is now proven that objectively there is a great risk that the US will demand his surrender if he is sent to Sweden from Great Britain.
61. There is also a risk that he will really be extradited to the US if he leaves the embassy and thereby loses his political asylum to instead submit to Swedish law regarding surrender.
62. Julian Assange is therefore forced to continue to use his political asylum as it is the only safe way to protect himself from surrender to the US, where he risks many years in prison for his work as a journalist for WikiLeaks.
63. This conclusion is of great significance for various aspects of a review of proportionality. Hereby, the following applies:

64. That the threat of surrender to the US is now proven has, firstly, great significance for the question whether there exists a long-term hinderance to executing the warrant.
65. One has to assess how the case will be handled in the future, in the event the preliminary investigation continues and leads to court.
66. It is clear this must weigh in on the assessment of proportionality, see NJA 2015, page 261, paragraph 11. The significance of the Supreme Court’s reference to the doctrine is the following: a means of coercion shall cease when it proves to be without result. The coercion must be both necessary to achieve the desired goal and truly lead to this goal being achieved. Further, one must stop using coercion if it does not lead to the desired result.
67. The arrest cannot be executed for the foreseeable future because Mr Assange is forced to use his political asylum. Mr Assange has objective reasons for this. An arrest that cannot be executed must be rescinded, at least when the person sought has strong objective reasons to refuse to appear, which Mr Assange definitely has.
68. The Supreme Court pointed out, however, in its verdict (paragraph 11) that difficulties in executing a warrant must be weighed against the public interest in investigating the crime, and it concludes, in paragraph 13, that ‘criminality of the type in this allegation is such that there is a strong public interest that it be investigated’.
69. Even this argument has come into a new light since Mr Assange has been questioned. As is seen from the secret part of this motion, there is no longer, in the opinion of the defence, probable cause for the suspicion. Under all circumstances, the suspicion has been seriously weakened in light of his account of events with the plaintiff. By virtue of the questioning, the suspicion of crime has been, in all relevant aspects, investigated. There is no longer such a strong public interest to investigate the case that a long-term arrest is necessary. In any case, the remainder of the investigation can be carried out without an arrest, which in such case it should be observed that there is no way to force Mr Assange to Sweden for a trial as long as he is forced to use his political asylum, which he – as shown above – has strong objective reasons to do.
70. The only effect of a continued arrest is that Mr Assange can only use his political asylum inside the embassy. If the arrest is withdrawn, he can travel to Ecuador and use his political asylum in an entire country, something which would improve his life in a decisive way.
71. It is important to point out the obvious – namely that rescinding the warrant does in no way mean that the preliminary investigation is closed.
72. That Mr Assange can now prove that he has strong objective reasons to use his political asylum is of decisive importance even for the fact that he is considered ‘arbitrarily detained’ (which the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded) or if he can ‘voluntarily’ leave the embassy, which the Swedish courts concluded. Even this matter is ultimately decided by the objective strength of the threat of surrender to the US. Hereby, the following applies:

73. Julian Assange submitted a doctor’s certificate to the District Court in March 2016 (supplement 83). He gave the Svea Court of Appeals a further medical certificate, drawn up in June 2016 (supplement 7). His living conditions and medical status are the same or worse today.
74. Supplement 83 shows that Mr Assange’s living conditions are the following: he lacks the ability to go outdoors. The embassy lacks a courtyard and garden. There is no direct sunlight indoors. Mr Assange’s bedroom is 5.5 m2 and has room for a single bed and a small wardrobe. There is no room for a chair or desk. He has shared access to another room, approximately 25 m2. It is here that Mr Assange works and eats. The curtains are always drawn to prevent people from looking in. The continual police surveillance is visible from every angle and has been a continual reminder that he is under siege from the authorities. The surveillance cameras run round the clock. In the following regard Mr Assange’s situation at the embassy is worse than in an ordinary prison: he does not have access to adequate medical care, he cannot be outdoors without losing the protection he has had, and it is impossible to know how long this situation will stand.
75. This situation has been ongoing since 19 June 2012 – almost five years.
76. This situation is caused by attempts to execute the European Arrest Warrant, which in turn is issued on the basis of the arrest. There is a condition of causality between the arrest and Mr Assange’s living conditions.
77. As regards Mr Assange’s mental health, the following is found in supplement 83 (pages 22 and following):
‘Mr Assange’s mental health is highly likely to deteriorate over time if he remains in his current situation. Such highly stressful circumstances, with no end in sight, can lead to unpredictable and sometimes very destructive consequences for individuals. They may become very ill mentally and physically and carry out desperate acts to try and gain relief. It is urgent that his current circumstances are resolved as quickly as possible. At a minimum, it is recommended that his urgent medical complaints regarding the pain in his shoulder be investigated with appropriate equipment; and the dental surgery that has been prescribed be performed. The Embassy is not a medical setting. The only way Mr Assange can access either urgent medical care or investigations would be to place himself in the hands of the British authorities. Mr Assange is in an invidious position of having to decide between his physical health and the risk of being extradited to the United States. His inability to access proper medical care and assessment – without placing himself into the hands of the authorities – transforms each physical complaint no matter how simple into something that could have catastrophic consequences either for his health or his liberty. He lives in a state of chronic health insecurity. Mr Assange needs – at the bare minimum – access to fresh air, sunlight and exercise space on a daily basis. Mr Assange has been living under very restrictive conditions for over forty months. The unusual circumstances place Mr Assange in a precarious situation. The effects of the situation on Mr Assange’s health and well-being are serious and the risks will most certainly escalate with the potential to becoming life-threatening if current conditions persist.’
78. From the cited part of the medical certificate it can be seen that Mr Assange is in acute need of medical treatment for two physical ailments: pain in his shoulder, and toothache.
79. Svea Court of Appeals, in its decision of 16 September 2016 (supplement 110), accepted the description of Mr Assange’s living conditions and his physical and mental status, see ruling, page 5.
80. Mr Assange presumes the District Court will do the same. He has therefore not requested new medical certificates.

81. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) announced in its decision of 22 January 2016 (supplement 82) that Julian Assange is arbitrarily detained.
82. The UNWGAD therefore told Sweden to swiftly remedy the situation so Julian Assange got back his liberty (ruling, paragraph 100).
83. Great Britain asked the UNWGAD to reconsider its ruling, but this did not lead to any change. Sweden did not even appeal. The ruling of the UNWGAD stands.
84. Sweden has not yet, after nearly one-and-a-half years, acted on the ruling of the UNWGAD.
85. Sweden has a duty under the rule of law to carry out the ruling of the UNWGAD.
86. In this particular case, the responsibility lies with the prosecutor, as well as by extension the courts that deal with the detention issue.
87. That this is the case is due to the prohibition against ministerial rule, see supplement 101, paragraphs 22-27. I wish to especially refer to the three legal cases from the Supreme Court mentioned in paragraph 27 in supplement 101.
88. These legal cases show very clearly that it is the responsibility of the prosecutor and, by extension, the courts to implement the principle of proportionality in accordance with Sweden’s legal responsibilities.
89. At the most recent review in the Svea Court of Appeals, this viewpoint was in principle accepted, see the court’s ruling, page 5, paragraph 2 (supplement 110).
90. That the Court of Appeals, despite this, did not obey the ruling of the UNWGAD and rescind the warrant was because the court used the same view of the risk for surrender to the US used by the Prosecutor-General and the Supreme Court, ie that the objective risk for surrender to the US was so insignificant that Mr Assange could leave the embassy.
91. So they arrived at the conclusion that Mr Assange was not arbitrarily detained but instead lived at the embassy voluntarily.
92. As shown above, we are in a new situation. Mr Assange can now prove that there is an objective risk of surrender to the US. According to the reasoning of the Prosecutor-General and the Supreme Court, Mr Assange therefore has reason to use his political asylum. He cannot leave the embassy, for then there will be an objective risk that he is surrendered to the US.
93. Mr Assange is therefore arbitrarily detained. One can no longer claim that he lives at the embassy ‘voluntarily’.
94. It is therefore incumbent on the District Court to follow, not only for formal rule-of-law reasons but also for material reasons (the objective risk for surrender is now proven), the admonition of the UNWGAD and immediately free Mr Assange.

95. The conditions under which Mr Assange lives inside the embassy also constitute a deprivation of liberty according to case law from the European Court. (See the European Court’s ruling of 25 June 1996 in Amuur v France (case 17/1995/523/609); ruling of 6 November 1980 in Guzzardi v Italy (1980, Series 8 Number 39); and ruling of 9 April 2013 in Abdi v Great Britain (application 27770/08).
96. Mr Assange does not elaborate further here but refers to the part of the aforementioned supplements, see the appeal of 12 September 2014 to the Svea Court of Appeals (supplement 62) and motion of 17 October 2014 to the Svea Court of Appeals (supplement 8).
97. With earlier reviews (see, for example, the deliberation in NJA 2015, page 261, paragraphs 11-13) Mr Assange’s claim that he should be regarded as deprived of liberty according to European law was dismissed with the same reasoning: the threat of surrender to the US is so remote that Mr Assange is to be regarded as living in the embassy ‘voluntarily’.
98. Even the European legal analysis comes into a new light by virtue of it now being proven that the US intends to arrest and imprison Mr Assange. He must therefore be regarded as deprived of liberty by European law.

99. A new proportionality assessment as of today’s date shall, in summary, take into consideration at least the following circumstances:
a. Julian Assange was deprived of liberty in Great Britain during 7-16 December 2010.
b. Julian Assange had between 16 December 2010 and 19 June 2012 restrictions in the form of electronic surveillance with an ankle bracelet, a duty to report daily to the police, and not being allowed to be outside his residence at specific times.
c. Until 13 March 2015, the prosecutor refused to question Mr Assange. This meant that the questioning of Julian Assange was first conducted on 14-15 November 2016, more than six years after the alleged incident.
d. Mr Assange’s defence has suffered irreversible damage because of this delay. His testimony has been negatively affected. Memory fades with time. He can never get a fair trial. The plaintiff and her oral evidentiary support have been heard in close proximity to the incident; the plaintiff has been heard many times.
e. The questioning was conducted under unsatisfactory conditions: Julian Assange was not sufficiently healthy to participate in a police questioning, I was denied access to my client, and it is unclear whether Julian Assange was served with the notice of suspicion.
f. The preliminary investigation would seem to be continuing for a long time. No 23:18 serving of notice has taken place despite almost seven years having passed. No indication is given whether the prosecutor intends to close the preliminary investigation.
g. Julian Assange has resided at the Ecuador embassy in London since 19 June 2012 under difficult living conditions, which have resulted in physical and mental illness.
h. It is now established that there is a tangible risk that the US will apply to have Mr Assange surrendered from Sweden. In such case, there is a risk that Sweden will surrender him to the US where he risks a long prison sentence for his work as a journalist for WikiLeaks. Mr Assange is therefore justified in using his political asylum. He has objective reasons to ‘refuse to appear in Sweden’. His residence at the embassy, his living conditions, and his physical and mental health should therefore be taken into consideration when assessing proportionality. The view that he can ‘voluntarily’ leave the embassy is no longer valid. He is to be regarded as arbitrarily detained according to the ruling of the UNWGAD and deprived of liberty according to the case law of the European Court.
i. The arrest cannot be executed for the foreseeable future. Therefore it has no effect and shall be rescinded (Supreme Court ruling, paragraph 11, with its reference to the doctrine).
j. There is no longer a strong public interest to investigate the alleged crime because the investigation after the questioning of Assange is in all regards completed and because the suspicions have been seriously weakened.

100. In summation I should like to cite the following:
a. A member of the Supreme Court wanted to rescind the warrant already two years ago. He said especially that ‘it’s been unclear for a long time when an extradition to Sweden will take place’.
b. It is now established that an extradition cannot take place for the foreseeable future. In addition, two more years have passed. It is therefore obvious that the warrant must be rescinded.
c. Even the Secretary of Justice suggested in the deliberation that the warrant be rescinded.
d. The majority of the Supreme Court also stressed that the time factor was decisive. In the ruling, paragraph 18, it is said that ‘this has taken a long time’. In paragraph 19 it is stressed that ‘there are therefore no reasons to cancel the ruling’.
e. Even the Svea Court of Appeals was of the same line of thought in its most recent ruling (supplement 100): it says: ‘the long time for this arrest must be weighed into the assessment of proportionality’. The court concluded its ruling by pointing out that the arrest still seemed effective ‘as a way to achieve a questioning of Assange’. The questioning has now taken place and the arrest should therefore now be withdrawn.
f. As shown above, several new factors have occurred after the previous reviews, most importantly Mr Assange has been questioned and the threat from the US has manifested in a definitive decision from US authorities that it is its intent to arrest Mr Assange and put him in prison.
g. An extradition to Sweden can therefore not take place for the foreseeable future.
h. The statute of limitations, should charges not be brought, expires 17 August 2020. Should charges be brought, the statute is extended to 30 years according to BrB35:6 paragraph 3.
i. It is obvious that Swedish authorities do not have the right to detain Mr Assange until 17 August 2040!
j. Everything points to the time being right to now withdraw the arrest of Julian Assange.

‘Stockholm som ovan’

Per E Samuelson

Assange: Case Closed

Reprinted from Rixstep.

So Julian Assange finally got to submit his statement to the elusive Marianne Ny. Things rolled pretty fast there for a while – it took only 74 months. But now it’s been done.

Sabotaged at the last minute again by the bizarre Gothenburg prosecutor who deigned to reopen an investigation that had already been closed by a far sharper prosecutor, Assange was left, on the cold November day in question, without his legal counsel. The eminent Per E Samuelson, one of Sweden’s leading jurists and on retainer by Assange, was left outside the Ecuador embassy and not allowed entrance, this because – yes – Marianne Ny refused to put him on the attendee list.

Samuelson’s been over many times to London to visit with Assange in that embassy; Marianne Ny couldn’t be bothered. She sent her new assistant Ingrid Isgren instead.

Assange’s statement was devastating. A 19-page summary of his harassment at the hands of Ny, it ended by quoting his only response to all coming questions: that the response was already in the statement itself.

Assange understood the implications (and dangers) of proceeding without Samuelson, but decided to push forward anyway. After all, he’d waited only six years for the opportunity.

This site’s ‘JA/WL‘ resource shows to what extent we’ve covered this case. We have published over 800 articles over the years. Certainly the case got a lot of attention because of the name ‘Assange’, but the more one looked into it, and looked into the country of Sweden itself, the more one picked up that stench that everyone assumes is coming from Denmark.

Sweden is a transformed country, and not transformed in a good way. Once a model society that only had the climate to complain about, it’s become a blithering mess, with one government replacing another, and things only getting worse. One has to wonder if this is by design.

The contradictions in Swedish society are mind-blowing, to say the least, and over these past years, we’ve seen voice after voice be silenced in one way or another for trying to speak out – Pär Ström, Pelle Billing, Oscar Swartz, and others. No one has been allowed to contradict or even question the ruling narrative.

It’s quite clear now that the reason Assange has been so smeared and harassed inside the insidious ‘duckpond’ is that he made the country’s egregiously arrogant (and very sloppy) journalists look bad. Newspapers that cannot go to print without a flood of typos. Articles gleaned from sophisticated counterparts in the global media, but watered down to a few choice vacuous paragraphs of a few hundred words. The overriding idea that thinking in itself can be a dangerous thing.

One remembers, for example, the words of the Bonnier legal reporter who, when asked what she thought about the Assange case, said ‘nothing – and I encourage the Swedish people to do the same’.

The country’s come along way from the rebellious days of Olof Palme, who dared call a spade a spade, and never shrunk from power, always ready to speak truth to it. Today, Sweden is like a Nordic 51st state of the union, closely aligned with US neocon policy through and through. It was Sweden who helped the CIA abduct two of the country’s legal residents to the torture chambers of Egypt, a deftly calculated move, timed for the mid-winter break when most officials and most journalists would be enjoying their six weeks of paid leave. This is the Sweden that is so dangerous today.

Sweden’s former prime minister is author of a book so poorly written that a kindergarten girl could probably do better. He had it removed from print and public libraries prior to his run for office. (This site translated and published the two most important chapters.)

Sweden’s current prime minister is a man who didn’t want to be prime minister. In fact, his job had been to find the party candidate instead. His predecessor in the party was let go because the feminists in the party thought his mustache was too ‘masculine’. When no replacement candidate could be found, the current PM was asked to run for the office, and he initially refused, and it took some doing to get him to change his mind.

A woman who had long been the country’s by far most popular politician was called home from Brussels to add meat to the party ticket, but it didn’t take long before she too was up to her eyeballs in corruption. Yet another former PM candidate was – yet again – caught with her fingers in the cookie jar and forced to resign from her cabinet position.

And so forth. Sweden of today is not the Sweden of old. When we at this site saw Rick Falkvinge announce Assange’s coming trip to our country, we expressed our fears. What we found in the early morning of Saturday 21 August 2010 was terrifying. All autumn long, as the story and the case would not go away, we learned, more and more, about the country we’d called home, a country we thought we had every reason to be proud of.

Sweden passed long ago from the realm of the objectionable, and through the realm of the unreasonable, and right into the domain of the ludicrous. Sweden of today is not only a caricature of itself, it is more – it is a caricature of a caricature of itself, defying reason, and defying excuse or explanation, and unworthy of forgiveness. No country has gone out of its way so much to bring on such ridicule.

Once was a time when it was a matter of pride to travel into the world with a Swedish passport. Today, one would rather that others didn’t know one’s country of origin. The country’s been sold out – politically, socially, financially, and most importantly: judicially. A closer look at the actual mechanics of the Swedish judicial system reveals a Mickey Mouse regime, with sitting Supreme Court justices with extreme issues with alcohol, and at least one case of sexual molestation of minors. One finds a system that still hasn’t discovered trial by jury, but uses political appointees to adjudicate, and these appointees, when given rudimentary tests in Jurisprudence 101 by the University of Stockholm, were found to fail miserably, getting 2/3 of their answers wrong. Then it was also found that many of these appointees have criminal records of their own, that the system has never considered checking criminal records, and that the people in charge of this mess say they don’t feel it’s even necessary. So it wasn’t much of a departure for Assange to say that, what he’d seen, Swedish justice was a mess.

Riots and vandalism are rampant. Assassinations happen anywhere. No one can be safe. Terrorist bombings in downtown shopping centres. Murders in refugee camps. Graft galore in the country’s Refugee Industrial Complex.

Homes for the elderly outsourced to commercial interests headquartered in the Cayman Islands. Pensioners abandoned in the corridors or outside in the freezing cold, left to die.

The country with notoriously high taxes unable to give back to pensioners, ranked now as the second poorest in the EU.

Soup kitchens in downtown Stockholm, capital of the world’s most famous utopia.

A housing shortage that merits an entry in the Guinness Book of Records. Over half the population living not in homes of their own but in flats. Access to rental flats being sold on the black market. Black market real estate so common it’s more or less accepted.

Sweden is what Tumblr would look like if it was a country, quipped the famous vlogger ‘Angry Foreigner’, himself a refugee from Bosnia, in a YouTube clip that went viral.

Since 2006, it’s been legal for Swedish media to disguise propaganda as real news, and it’s no longer necessary to give equal time to opposing views. Swedish media concentrate on filtering out anything that threatens the official narratives. Any media outlet that would dare include ‘uncomfortable’ stories is immediately branded ‘racist’ and shunned by the Swedish people as a whole. WikiLeaks once made the mistake of linking to such a site, where the article in question was merely an aggregate of links published elsewhere in the ‘politically correct’ media, and they were roundly told off. The very same article, word for word, was reprinted at an Anglo-Russian site, and there wasn’t a single word of protest. The hold that the country’s MSM have on the citizenry is frightening.

This is an MSM who will search in desperation for teapot tempests at home and ignore the real hurricanes abroad. The Bonnier media, to this day, will still not inform the citizenry on the atrocities taking place in Donbass, and only come with sweeping evasions when people want to know who took care of the million refugees from the area.

And so forth.

And into this witches brew steps one Julian Paul Assange on Wednesday 11 August 2010, completely unaware, as most people were, of what’s happened to the Queendom of Svea. And, as the infamous SMS messages now show, he’s exploited to the max by two egotistical women, behaving like groupies, incapable of or perhaps uninterested in understanding the bigger picture and the horrific ramifications of their irresponsible behaviour. When confronted on Riddargatan on the ‘Monday after’, outside the offices of his attorney Leif Silbersky, by Expressen’s blonde ‘roaming reporter’, and asked if he suspected a conspiracy, Assange said that it was an array of conspiracies rather than merely one, and one had to wonder even back then if he knew how right he was, and why. From the groupies who turn from rivals into co-conspirators, to the hyena journos who are willing to sacrifice anyone for the sake of a big scoop, to the politicians who want to show the US how high they can jump, to the military who had their own troops in Afghanistan and secretly believe in US worldwide hegemony, it’s indeed a stinky witches brew.

There isn’t much Marianne Ny or her superiors can do at this point. There isn’t much of Assange’s interview that needs to be translated, as for two full days, the answer to each and every question asked was the same.

The Assange case is not officially closed, but the evidence, as such, has been submitted. The full police protocols, as submitted by Marianne Ny to the courts in Sweden for the purpose of issuing that Red Notice, are published by this site and were taken as documentation by the British courts. And finally, the world has Julian Assange’s own version of events, this after a six year wait. Finally.

The truth will out, the truth wins out. What happens from this point forward is judged in that light.

The truth will out, the truth wins out. Let no journalist ever again speculate into what the protocols say. Six months of digging and the people at Flashback have the actual documents. The sleaze printed by rags such as the Daily Mail, Sweden’s Aftonbladet and Expressen, and perhaps above all the toxic Nick Davies of the Guardian, can stand no more. Yet more: these documents are an indictment of the ‘news organisations’ who’ve printed deliberate inaccuracies all along or even worse: refused to print anything at all. Nick Davies’ account of the protocols was maliciously skewed; both Aftonbladet and Expressen had copies early on and printed nothing. Bloggers had copies but arrogantly kept the information to their Smeagol selves.
 – The Assange Police Protocol: Translator’s Note

UN rejects UK appeal on Assange

30 November 2016: Today, the United Nations rejected the United Kingdom’s attempt to appeal the UN’s February ruling in favour of Julian Assange.
The decision of 5 February 2016 therefore stands, and the UK and Sweden are once again required to immediately put an end to Mr Assange’s arbitrary detention and afford him monetary compensation.

Earlier this year, the United Nations concluded the 16 month long case to which the UK was a party. The UK lost, appealed, and today – lost again. The UN instructed the UK and Sweden to take immediate steps to ensure Mr Assange’s liberty, protection, and enjoyment of fundamental human rights. No steps have been taken, nearly one year on, jeopardising Mr Assange’s life, health and physical integrity, and undermining the UN system of human rights protection.

Despite initially being given two weeks to appeal the 5 February ruling, the United Kingdom waited until after the first appeal period expired, and instead submitted an appeal for review on 24 March, which the United Nations now found inadmissable.

As a member of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Kingdom must now respect its commitments.

From the UN press release:

The UN expert group also considered four requests for review of previous opinions, submitted by the Arab Republic of Egypt, the State of Kuwait and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Working Group concluded that the requests did not meet the threshold of a review as enshrined in paragraph 21 of its methods of work, and that they were thus not admissible.

Reactions in Sweden

At time of writing, there is no response from the website of Marianne Ny or from the prosecution authority’s Twitter account, and no mention whatsoever in Swedish media.

Ten Years Ago Today

Today, 4 October 2016, marks the 10-year anniversary of WikiLeaks: it’s ten years ago today that the famous domain was registered.

Updated Date: 2015-10-27T17:08:53Z
Creation Date: 2006-10-04T05:54:19Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2018-10-04T05:54:19Z
Registrant ID: CP-13000

A press conference was held in Berlin, hosted by Sarah Harrison and featuring journalists John Goetz and Stefania Maurizi, who both talked of their experience working with the organisation. Julian Assange, who at the last minute canceled an appearance on the embassy balcony, spoke via video link, even as supporters gathered outside.

October Surprise?

Online followers of Roger Stone, Alex Jones, and Jesse Rodriguez saw how the trio hyped the event to speculate that today would mark the release of the ‘October Surprise’ documents incriminating Hillary Clinton – especially Alex Jones, who had earlier interviewed Roger Stone and was sorely disappointed. Rodriguez, producer of ‘Morning Joe’, also speculated that the ‘October Surprise’ would come today.

Assange promised a series of releases over the next ten weeks, but it’s not known if there’ll be any ‘October Surprise’.

At 08:00 AM today, Flashback’s ‘Okynne’ (‘Mischief’) posted the following.

‘WikiLeaks themselves describe what today’s press conference is all about. But other people are talking about the big release, preferably about Hillary Clinton, so I’d expect to soon be reading reports saying that WikiLeaks is a bluff because there are no big releases today.’

Less Than Two Weeks Remain

After a six-year wait, Julian Assange is finally to be questioned on 17 October. Meanwhile, Marianne Ny’s dedicated troll is trying to defend her Alamo.

‘The prosecutor claimed that it was illegal to question Assange at the embassy, and that’s evidently not true. But there’s nothing to indicate this was a direct lie on her part, and not just lack of knowledge. Now we all know it’s legal. An interview has been scheduled.’

Forum veteran ‘the saint’ comments.

‘Can’t you hear how that sounds? Lack of knowledge? So we have a high-ranking prosecutor who claims she doesn’t know that she can question suspects abroad, this despite the fact that it’s routine procedure?

‘What does that tell us about Marianne Ny? What more does she not know? How can a high-ranking prosecutor be so lacking in knowledge?

‘But this can explain how she’s been able to drag her feet for the past six years. The question should instead be why no one’s yanked on her ear before the Supreme Court intervened. And before you say anything: yes they did. But that it took so long brings shame on Sweden.’

Stone on Sweden

Oliver Stone spoke with Erik Augustin Palm about his new movie on Edward Snowden, and he didn’t have any words of praise for a country he once respected.

‘Sweden of today is a grave disappointment. The Europe I knew as a young man was different. There was neutrality. There were sovereign nations. And there wasn’t any EU. People owned their own thoughts. They were free. Today people are frightened of the US. Now they talk about Sweden joining NATO because the Russians are coming.

‘There’s something wrong with Sweden – it’s no longer the country I once respected.’

No Debate

On 17 December 2010, in the wake of their interception of the Swedish police documents in the Assange case sent by Swedish attorney Björn Hurtig to Jennifer Robinson then at FSI, the Guardian published a series of articles, one of which was written by Esther Addley. 17 December 2010 is a long time ago – nearly six years – but one thing sticks out immediately when revisiting.

Mr Justice Ouseley, the head of the administrative court who rejected the appeal against Assange’s bail, acknowledged the dispute in his judgment: “There is a debate, which may yet be had elsewhere, over whether the warrant is a warrant for questioning or a warrant for trial.” He was proceeding, he said, on the basis that it was an extradition warrant for trial. A charge by the requesting country is a prerequisite for a valid EAW.

Say what you want about Assange or WikiLeaks, but there is no debate. A UK court magistrate should know that before making an official statement. The facts of the matter are as follows.

Many in the world around have commented negatively on Swedish legal procedures, and with good reason. Sweden has indefinite detention, prosecutors are not bound to issue charges before beginning an investigation, suspects can be kept in indefinite detention with restrictions, completely incommunicado if they wish and for as long as the “state” wishes. Courts must formally approve extensions on detention on a regular basis, but this is a rubber stamp process. At least one suspect in recent years was held in indefinite detention for over three years before being released – that’s to say before the prosecutors admitted they had no case. Prosecutors can engage in “wild goose chases” if they so wish, a strategy that’s often been used to attempt to implicate people they know to be innocent, this only to save face. The wheels of justice can grind excruciatingly slowly in Sweden.

That being said, there are certain rules that do exist. There are rules that normally must be obeyed.

As in other countries, crimes are divided into two major categories: felonies and misdemeanours, where the former are considered the more serious. And some crimes, usually the felonies, are further categorised as “crimes against the state”, what Claes Borgström called crimes calling for “public prosecution”, which is a direct translation of the Swedish term allmänt åtal. In these cases, the “state” is the formal plaintiff.

The rules change somewhat here. Victims don’t file complaints – the state does. With ordinary crimes, a victim can withdraw a complaint, but victims cannot withdraw complaints when the state is the plaintiff. Only the state can.

This is not to say that a victim cannot make an investigation disappear. On the contrary: all a victim has to do is change the testimony; if this is done in a convincing manner (and it often is) then the police investigator will of course close things down.

Swedish prosecutors are given free rein to conduct their investigations however they want. They can let a case file sit and collect dust on their desks however long they want; they simply need to tell the courts that they’re working hard, and the rubber stamp is applied to an extension on the detention of the suspect.

This can also be considered to be what’s happened over the years in the Assange case. No one really looked at Marianne Ny’s submitted documents. Courts take prosecutors at their word.

It can take prosecutors a long time to complete an investigation and arrive at a decision whether to take a case to court. The “rule” is that a prosecutor must take a case to court if the assessment is that a case can be “proven”. A prosecutor may not take a case to court if the assessment is otherwise.

That “rule” is theoretically very strict, and prosecutors can theoretically suffer dire consequences if they defy this rule, but in practice it’s very difficult to prove malfeasance. Recent judicial scandals in Sweden serve to demonstrate this.

The cases of Catrine da Costa, Billy Butt, and above all Thomas Quick are ample proof that the above rule can be treated with defiance.

(Sweden also allows what may be referred to as “free evidentiary evaluation” (fri bevisvärdering), meaning prosecutors – and courts – can mix together several forms of “evidence”, such as hearsay, that aren’t even permitted in more stringent national judicial systems.)

The case of Catrine da Costa depended on the testimony of four year old girl recalling events that happened when she was but one and one half years old. The case of Billy Butt depended on hilariously concocted testimony and the defendant’s “singular appearance” (Butt is an Indian, and the Court of Appeal conjectured that no Swedish girl would have willingly had sex with someone who looked like him). The eight cases of Thomas Quick depended solely on confessions by a drugged-out mental patient trying to stay in prison for his own protection.

In all three cases, the prosecutors knew up front that they had no case and they pursued them anyway. They never suffered consequences.


A cornerstone of the Swedish judicial process is the formal serving of notice of coming prosecution. Prosecutors must meet with suspects in person to turn them into defendants.

The suspect is formally “served”: the suspect is told there will be a court case – and for the first time, the prosecutors have to go “all in”: they must at this point share all “evidence” with the suspect (and the suspect’s attorneys).

There is also something called slasken, which is the body of evidence the prosecutors have accumulated but will not be using in court. This slasken need not be shared with the defence. The prosecutors are also legally able to destroy the slasken.

(This one of the reasons Assange attorneys Thomas Olsson and Per E Samuelson have pushed so hard to get the notorious SMS messages put into court records – as once there, they are a matter of public record and cannot be removed by a prosecutor. Those who have seen the messages claim those messages contain decisive exculpatory evidence, with former Assange attorney Björn Hurtig going so far as to say they make the cast “moot”.)

Rolling the dice

But once the prosecutor makes the decision to prosecute, the Rubicon has been crossed. Alea iacta est. The die is cast. There is no turning back. The defence now has the complete case to be used by the prosecutor, and the case will now go to trial.

To reach this stage in a Swedish criminal judicial process, a prosecutor must meet with the suspect, serve notice to the suspect, and share all evidence.

The suspect may at this point make a statement, which is put into the official record.

All the above is eminently available information. Yes, it’s going to be found in Swedish, but certainly Justice Ouseley could have tasked someone in the United Kingdom with finding that information, instead of – like the silly British armchair anthropologists of old – simply proceeding on conjecture, on a guess. As Ouseley stated himself:

A charge by the requesting country is a prerequisite for a valid EAW.
 – Justice Ouseley

The EAW is a very important piece of legislation. Proper application could have been carried out with due diligence and the greatest of ease. But Ouseley says he’s “proceeding on the basis”. Such behaviour is simply not worthy of a British court justice.

On the fence

Marianne Ny stayed on the fence throughout the spring of 2011 when the British court proceedings were underway. Encouraged by Paul Close of the Crown Prosecution Service to not move her case forward, to not question Assange in the UK, as Close feared her case would fall apart, Marianne Ny had to offer substance to Ouseley’s “basis” while at the same time defending herself on the home front in the Swedish media, as everyone in Sweden knows the basic rules of legal procedure as outlined above.

Many pundits have claimed that Marianne Ny hasn’t needed to meet with Assange at all, as he’d already been questioned once (30 August 2010). But this is not the case. That questioning concerned a single misdemanour count (filed by Anna Ardin) whereas Marianne Ny’s new complaint in the case of Anna Ardin had four counts. And no prosecutor had served Assange a notice of prosecution. The “rape” case (Sofia Wilén) had been reopened by Marianne Ny two days after the 30 August questioning.

This is not to say that Assange couldn’t have been “served” all these years. Of course he could have been. Marianne Ny’s reluctance to commit to a decision may be due to how she understands it would limit her options: with no prospect of getting Assange into a Swedish courtroom for the foreseeable future, this would give the defence unlimited time to study the case, with Marianne Ny unable to do anything herself. Keeping her options open, Marianne Ny can keep on doing whatever she wants with the case files and the direction she’s going.

One thing is certain: the decision by Justice Ouseley was incorrect and not worthy of the British courts. “A charge by the requesting country is a prerequisite for a valid EAW”, Ouseley correctly noted.

But there was no such charge. And there still isn’t.

Black Friday

16 September 2016: a black Friday. Lauri Love lost in his struggle to stop his current extradition process, and Julian Assange lost in his appeal to quash Marianne Ny’s arrest warrant. The forces of light have been defeated by the forces of darkness, at least for now. Both Love and Assange will appeal today’s rulings.

Westminster Magistrates Court

As reported by the Courage Foundation, judge Nina Tempia granted the US request to extradite Love from the UK, or more specifically:

I will be extraditing Mr Love, by which I mean I will be passing the case to the Secretary of State.

Sarah Harrison, director of the Courage Foundation, responded.

This is a very disappointing ruling, not just for Lauri and his family but for everyone who was angry about what happened to Gary McKinnon. Clear assurances were given that legal changes would prevent the McKinnon situation from happening again and frankly, if the forum bar can’t help Lauri Love, it’s very difficult to understand how it could ever help anyone. This is not what the public was led to believe at the time and it’s not something we should stand for.

Wrangel Palace

The Svea Court of Appeal today published the verdict in the appeal of Julian Assange, after a one-week delay. The full verdict in English is available online.

Assange is to be questioned by Ingrid Isgren and Cecilia Redell on 17 October.

Press Release: Assange Files Appeal to Enforce UN Findings

9 August 2016

This morning, Julian Assange filed an appeal at Sweden’s Court of Appeal of Svea, arguing that Sweden must comply with the UN’s February 5th findings that his deprivation of liberty is unlawful and that Sweden must release and compensate him immediately for the harm caused.

Despite never having been charged with any offence, while visiting the United Kingdom police seized his Australian passport and imprisoned him on Sweden’s request. Mr. Assange has been deprived of his liberty since December 7, 2010–first in isolation in Wandsworth prison, then under house arrest and for the last four years in an embassy surrounded by police. For six years now, his rights have been severely violated, as have the rights of his children. WikiLeaks started its publication of US diplomatic cables on November 29, 2010, a week before Sweden and the UK arbitrarily imprisoned him.

A representative of Mr. Assange’s legal team said “The proceedings will test whether Sweden complies with its binding treaty obligations and whether it acts in good faith under the UN human rights system.”

On May 19 this year, the FBI and US Department of Justice informed a federal court in the United States that “prosecutive efforts” remain underway against WikiLeaks. The alleged offences include espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, electronic terrorism and general conspiracy.

Mr. Assange has already previously been found to be innocent in Sweden of the only remaining allegation. Police records show that the alleged ‘complainant’ stated that the police “made it up” and placed her under duress. Mr. Assange has been deprived of his liberty for a period that far exceeds the maximum penalty of the alleged offence. He has never been charged. The formal stage of Swedish matter is “preliminary investigation”.

Last week WikiLeaks released twenty thousand emails showing election rigging in the US democratic primary process. The President of the US Democratic Party and three other senior executives resigned as a result.


Assange case fact-checker:
UN press conference and information about the Assange UN decision:
Donate to the legal defence fund:

On the Occasion of Julian Assange Celebrating His 45th Birthday Within the Confines of the Ecuadorean Embassy in London

Today, 3 July 2016, on the birthday of the greatest truth-teller of our times, it might be appropriate to congratulate and celebrate with Julian Assange (and his friends and his cat).

But is is also appropriate to review the persecution he has endured now for so many years. And no one is more suited to that task than the United Nations, as per their ruling from 4 December 2015.

Their description of the conditions of Julian Assange’s persecution unequivocally places the Swedish prosecutor Marianne Ny in a category solely her own, forever displacing Claes Borgström as the country’s (perhaps the world’s) most incompetent (and most heinous) jurist ever.

The Ruling of the United Nations

The Working Group is convinced once again that, among others, the current situation of Mr. Assange staying within the confines of the Embassy of the Republic of Ecuador in London, United Kingdom, has become a state of an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The factual elements and the totality of the circumstances that have led to this conclusion include the following:

  1. Mr. Assange has been denied the opportunity to provide a statement, which is a fundamental aspect of the audi alteram partem principle, the access to exculpatory evidence, and thus the opportunity to defend himself against the allegations;

  2. the duration of such detention is ipso facto incompatible with the presumption of innocence. Mr. Assange has been denied the right to contest the continued necessity and proportionality of the arrest warrant in light of the length of this detention, i.e. his confinement in the Ecuadorian Embassy;

  3. the indefinite nature of this detention, and the absence of an effective form of judicial review or remedy concerning the prolonged confinement and the highly intrusive surveillance, to which Mr. Assange has been subjected;

  4. the Embassy of the Republic of Ecuador in London is not and far less than a house or detention centre equipped for prolonged pre-trial detention and lacks appropriate and necessary medical equipment or facilities. It is valid to assume, after 5 years of deprivation of liberty, Mr. Assange’s health could have been deteriorated to a level that anything more than a superficial illness would put his health at a serious risk and he was denied his access to a medical institution for a proper diagnosis, including taking a MRI test;

  5. with regard to the legality of the EAW, since the final decision by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Mr. Assange’s case, UK domestic law on the determinative issues had been drastically changed, including as a result of perceived abuses raised by Sweden’s EAW, so that if requested, Mr. Assange’s extradition would not have been permitted by the UK. Nevertheless, the Government of the United Kingdom has stated in relation to Mr. Assange that these changes are ‘not retrospective’ and so may not benefit him. A position is maintained in which his confinement within the Ecuadorian Embassy is likely to continue indefinitely. The corrective UK legislation addressed the court’s inability to conduct a proportionality assessment of the Swedish prosecutor’s international arrest warrant (corrected by s. 157 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, in force since July 2014). The corrective legislation also barred extradition where no decision to bring a person to trial had been made (s. 156).


The deprivation of liberty of Mr. Assange is arbitrary and in contravention of articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 7, 9(1), 9(3), 9(4), 10 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It falls within category III of the categories applicable to the consideration of the cases submitted to the Working Group.

Consequent upon the opinion rendered, the Working Group requests the Government of Sweden and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to assess the situation of Mr. Assange, to ensure his safety and physical integrity, to facilitate the exercise of his right to freedom of movement in an expedient manner, and to ensure the full enjoyment of his rights guaranteed by the international norms on detention.

The Working Group considers that, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, the adequate remedy would be to ensure the right of free movement of Mr. Assange and accord him an enforceable right to compensation, in accordance with article 9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

4 December 2015

December 10, 2015: The Silence

A week Saturday it will be two months since Stefania Maurizi released the FOI documents that turned the case of Assange in Sweden on its head – or more accurately: put it out of its misery, once and for all.

Stefania’s documents showed, in black on white, beyond a shadow of doubt, that Sweden’s chief prosecutor Marianne Ny has been lying to Assange and his attorneys, and lying as well to both Swedish and international media.

The documents also showed that neither Marianne Ny nor Great Britain took the allegations seriously – although they took the threat of WikiLeaks seriously. Their ‘cat and mouse’ game, ongoing since September 2010, was meant to ‘contain’ Assange – to ‘neutralise’ him. Or even better: keep him locked away. Somewhere, anywhere.

In one of the letters, Paul Close of the Crown Prosecution Service repeated his admonition to Marianne Ny to not question Assange in Great Britain, as her case would fall apart.

This was at the same time Marianne Ny was telling TIME Magazine that questioning suspects abroad is illegal according to both Swedish and British law.

And only a few months later, Carl Bildt was telling Assange attorney Jennifer Robinson that it’s also unconstitutional.

That Marianne Ny and Carl Bildt couldn’t understand they’d be exposed sooner or later: it’s staggering. Of course it’s not illegal to question suspects abroad: EU member states have something called ‘Mutual Legal Assistance’ precisely for this purpose.

Yet even more incriminating: during the same time Assange was asking (over and over again, ultimately over thirty times) to be questioned, only to be ignored by Marianne Ny, the same Swedish prosecution authority questioned 44 (forty-four) other people in Great Britain, whereof 18 (eighteen) as suspects, in criminal investigations.

But Carl Bildt, Marianne Ny, and Sweden stuck to their story that questioning suspects abroad is either illegal or unconstitutional or both.

Sweden’s media have never challenged this claim.

At one point, Ivan Johnson (@figaropravda) poked deeper into the matter, and got Carl Bildt’s office to retract and admit their claims were not true. And yet the charade continued.

There are so many anomalies in the Assange case that people at large have long ago tired of giving Sweden any benefit of the doubt. The FOI tranche of 19 October should have ended the charade once and for all. Or so one would think.

But as with the publication of the report from the state crime lab five years earlier, which embarrassingly showed that Anna Ardin had supplied the police with fabricated evidence, Swedish media as a whole gathered their covered wagons in a circle and kept to a total blackout. The people of Sweden have still not, two months later, heard of these developments, much less had a place to discuss them.

Members of the Flashback forum have for the longest time been reporting that their journalist friends, who otherwise are eager to talk about almost anything under the sun, fall into complete silence when asked about the Assange case or why they’re not allowed to write about it. They admit that it stinks to high heaven, but they dare say no more.

There’s also evidence of ‘Sweden the state’ being able to censor their own media. When Marianne Ny first talked to TIME, several news sites in the country scooped the interview; yet one day later, they’d all either changed their articles or made them disappear.

Sweden’s media have at least a responsibility to report on Stefania’s FOI documents, this especially as they otherwise report on the most unnecessary trivialities in the Assange case. They could have attempted to analyse the documents, even if they wanted to dismiss their relevance. For the news of these documents spread across the globe like wildfire, with several hundred articles appearing within hours, all the way from the Americas to the British Isles to Assange’s own Australia.

Sweden’s media could have at least been expected to comment on this tremendous development. But they chose instead to do nothing – to report nothing at all. And this, if anything, should convince even the most cynical observer that there must be something very very wrong.

For should one mainstream site – just one – break the blackout, it’s game over for Marianne Ny and Sweden.

The Silence

So in an attempt to get to the bottom of the matter, Assange in Sweden contacted the following people ten days after the FOI release.

  • Henrik Alexandersson, former salaried assistant to MEP Christian Engström in Brussels. Henrik’s often written about what’s wrong with the Assange case, but not now.

  • Stefan Wahlberg, editor-in-chief of Dagens Juridik, Sweden’s leading site for judicial matters. Stefan’s enjoyed a comfortable reputation, and the site’s reported several times on the case. Stefan’s been been contacted several times.

  • Svante Thorsell, an active attorney in Sweden who’s previously been outspoken about the case.

  • Anne Ramberg, general secretary of Sweden’s bar association. Anne’s previously been outspoken about the case as well.

One week ago, two sites representing Sweden’s ‘alternative media’ were also contacted.

Only Svante Thorsell has replied. Svante replied the same day. Since then: nothing more.

It is great,
I will study the material with interest.

There is, in our minds, nothing at all that can explain the blackout without pointing a finger at an increasingly corrupt Sweden. There are over 150 news sites in the country, and yet there’s still total silence. The same mechanisms, once used to redact the story of Marianne Ny’s fiasco with TIME, are evidently in play again.

Common with Interrogations Abroad

From Sweden’s Journalisten (The Journalist) 9 November 2015.

Swedish prosecutors have for several years refused to interview Julian Assange in Great Britain. They’ve claimed that ‘it’s uncommon for Swedish prosecutors to interview suspects abroad’.

The Journalist can today show that this is a misleading claim.

Since 2010, and all the way forward and into the spring of 2015, prosecutor Marianne Ny has refused to interview Julian Assange in Great Britain. Since 2012, Julian Assange has resided at the Ecuador embassy in London.

This past August, The Journalist reported that 44 (forty-four) people were interviewed by Swedish prosecutors in Great Britain between 18 November 2010 [the date of Marianne Ny’s most recent warrant against Assange] and 31 March 2015 [when Marianne Ny finally began negotiations with Ecuador].

Julian Assange had, during this period, repeatedly requested to be interviewed, but Marianne Ny refused to contact Mutual Legal Assistance in Great Britain.

Karin Rosander

Karin Rosander, director of information at the Swedish Prosecution Authority, told The Journalist that those statistics were ‘misleading’.

‘It’s very unusual for a Swedish prosecutor to interview suspects abroad. On the other hand, it’s not unusual to question witnesses abroad. I doubt whether the facts cited in the article really come from Great Britain. It’s likely that they register all requests [suspects and witnesses] under Mutual Legal Assistance.’

But documentation now obtained by The Journalist shows that this is not true – it is not at all unusual for Swedish prosecutors to conduct interrogations with suspects abroad.

Of the 44 interviews, 16 were with suspects and 28 with witnesses. It’s about every third month that a Swedish prosecutor travels to Great Britain to question a suspect in a Swedish criminal investigation.

This according to data provided by the British Home Office.

The Journalist has sought the Swedish Prosecution Authority for comment.

This is the first mention in Swedish media of any one of a number of critical ‘anomalies’ in the case of Assange in Sweden. Others, involving how Marianne Ny and Paul Close of Great Britain’s Crown Prosecution Service deliberately circumvented Assange’s requests to be interviewed, all the way back to December 2010, are still being blacked out.