Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 DARKNET, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND EXTREMISM: ADDRESSING INDONESIAN COUNTERTERRORISM ON THE INTERNET It is not a novel fact that social media opens doors for extremist groups in Indonesia. A number of studies and investigations have continuously reported the role of social media and online activism to support terrorist and extremist groups for either, general or particular, interest. Most analysts quickly point out that the most important function of social media is propaganda—posting images, texts and ideas, to attract people to join or justify their causes, although several reports stress on more specific purposes. The historical linkages to on-line radicalization are well documented. Moreover, although the mechanism of radicalization is understood, security forces continue to struggle to counter radical ideologies. In June 2015, Greg Barton wrote, “IS is masterful at both messaging and engaging one-on-one, we must become just as good in doing both.”1. One of the reasons for the lack of success in countering radical extremisms is the over analyzation of the narrative. Most extremist movements carry a relatively simple message. A message easily understood by the target audience and more easily adopted. Global Public Policy Watch (2014) argues that social media is primarily used by Indonesian extremists for recruitment, especially the young population who is increasingly targeted through campaigns and messages on Facebook and Twitter.2 For example, Twitter in Indonesia produces approximately 15 per cent of the global messaging traffic after the United States and Brazil3. Therefore, understanding and countering the militant narrative on Twitter gains strategic importance. An effective counter narrative consists of photo(s), video(s), and 140 characters only. Not more, not less. With Indonesia being predominately Muslim, it can be argued the Islamic narrative will hold stronger resonance within the Islamic world as the sheer volume of messaging traffic allows to generate larger volume traffic compared to the jihadist messages. However, this will require active operational and policy actions across the media landscape. 11 https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/CVE-Summit/Documents/Panel-1- Professor-Greg-Barton.PDF; 11 June 2015 2 http://globalpublicpolicywatch.org/2014/06/24/extremist-social-media-use-in-indonesia-research-analysis/ 3 http://digitalsport.co/indonesia-twitters-voice-is-the-peoples-voice Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 1 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 The Institute of Opinion (2014) notices that extremist groups appropriate their provocative messages as well as carry out a narrative warfare with opposite ideologies.4 In the wake of Islamic State (IS), social media is also utilized to mobilize support from the Indonesian jihadist movement to participate in global jihadist movement by being a fighter in Syria or only by becoming “online supporters”5 to strengthen jihadist narratives. In its most recent study, the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) found that social media usage among Indonesian IS supporters did not change the group's recruitment patterns, but helped it spread its message more widely. In other words, jihadists are predictable. IPAC concludes that by examining particular characteristic of new communication technology adoptions among extremist groups from the period of Jemaah Islamiyah in early 2000s until current IS epoch6 has evolved in sophistication. The use of encryption and darknet applications has become common practice. While the analysis is important to understand how social media is a vital tool for global terrorism, the analysts fail to address the Internet as a whole medium. This implies that it is not only social media that enables extremist groups to expand their activism in much wider networks, but there are other media on the Internet as well. However, there is a cyber-sphere that is overlooked by previous studies: the darknet or darkweb. Recent investigations have shed some light that this invisible space within the Internet is fundamental to support terrorist activities. Despite that, only few studies examine darknet within the issue of terrorist movements, especially in the Indonesian context. Therefore, it is the objective of this paper to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the Internet as intermingled networks (including social media and darknet), as a medium of extremism—in order to offer a policy recommendation in Indonesian counterterrorism efforts. Darknet and Its Operations To grasp the concept of darknet, we could imagine the cyber space as an iceberg. Everything that appears on the surface, or which can be indexed by search engines like Google, resembles the tip. As the tip, what we can see is actually just a small part. However, below the surface of the water, there are up to 80 per cent times bigger than what is above the water that is invisible and untraceable for the browser. As a record, on January 2006, the deep web 4 http://www.instituteofopinion.com/2014/07/indonesia-and-social-media-an-open-door-for-extremism/ 5 http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/indonesia-malaysia-and-the-fight-against-islamic-state-influence/ 6 http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/10/IPAC_24_Online_Activism_Social_Media.pdf Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 2 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 contained somewhere in the proximity of approximately 900 billion pages of information. In contrast, Google, the largest search engine, had indexed just 25 billion pages.7 Although darknet or darkweb is frequently used, interchangeably with deep web, technology experts usually distinguish between these two. Darknet is a more particular part of deep web as it requires specialized tools to access, such as a web browser called The Onion Router (TOR). This browser features hidden websites and webpages with extension of “.onion” or “.i2p” or other top-level domains. Accessing these non-mainstream sites can only be done if we know their exact address and these cannot be found by typing the keyword(s). TOR was originally developed by the U.S. military as an alternate network running in parallel to the Internet. As noted in its homepage, the technological infrastructure of TOR prevents monitoring websites that users visit. The original purpose of this was to help people under oppressive regimes and without free speech to be able to communicate—giving them increased anonymity and the ability to bypass their national surveillance. Darknet sites provide not only protection by the anonymity, but they usually also include encrypted online communication between users. This makes it impossible for websites to track the user’s IP address or geolocation—a visitor will not know the identity of the host, and vice versa. It permits to develop/host hidden services such as web services, file exchange, blogging and chatting, all hidden from surveillance. Consequently, such an opportunity has attracted not only oppressed people but also criminals and terrorists who found through those network a new way of expanding their activities in a space outside of monitoring. Darknet and Terrorism Beyond a secret space, where the terrorist groups plan their attacks, the darknet is the vein of terrorist activities. Although it has been long assumed that terrorist attacks are organized in a secret network, solid evidence has only been attained in 2013. In August, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted encrypted communications between Al Qaeda chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Nasir Al-Wuhaysi, the head of Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Since 2007, Al-Qaeda has been using their own developed encryption software named Mujahideen Secrets for web and cellular communications in order to avoid the authorities' surveillance programs8. 7 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/09/the-darknet-a-short-history/ 8 http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/Executive_Cyber_Intelligence_Bi-weekly_Report_(E- CIBR)-2015-06-01961505614.pdf; Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 3 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 The NSA traced their online confab and found that it led to the bombing plan of U.S. embassies in 21 Muslim majority countries. Research from the Institute for National Security Studies reveals that, for about a decade, the communication between top figures of worldwide Al-Qaeda network “apparently took place in a part of the Internet sometimes called deepnet, blacknet, or darknet.”9 Not only do extremist groups and their supporters increasingly use social media, Internet penetration has also seen a highly increasing number of terrorist groups on the darknet. They grew from an estimated dozen in 1997 to over 6,000 by 2008 (Seib and Janbek, 2011). From a more contemporary record, Procysive Corporation, a cyber security and intelligence company, estimates that in 2010, darknet hosted “more than 50,000 extremist websites and more than 300 terrorist forums.” 10 These forums serve as a place to share intelligence, strategies, even killing methods (e.g. how to make bombs or slaughtering methods). The fora also provide information about where one can obtain illegal weapons. Darknet is also infamous as a haven for illegal trading and black markets. As analyst predictions go, the shutdown of The Silk Road11 by the FBI in 2013 did not stop the rise of black market activities in darknet. In contrast, the number of black market sites kept mounting exponentially post-Silk Road era. The booming of darknet markets is parallel with the number of extremist activism in darknet. That is, quite surely, because the black-market in the darknet is the key to the financing of these extremist movements. Recent investigations suggest that ISIS smuggled antiquities looted from ancient cities in Syria to sell them on a London-based black market website. ISIS fighters make millions of dollars selling these ancient statues and mosaics since the artefacts are worth up to US$ 1 million each. Besides that, various websites offer a channel to donate money to fund terrorism in the form of bitcoin, a cryptocurrency used in darknet. ISIS is one of the terrorist groups that benefits the most from these donations. On several occasions, the darknet has also become a medium for some terrorist organizations to sell human organs, probably of their captives, on online black markets.12 There exists a 9 http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=5574 10 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/09/the-darknet-a-short-history/ 11 The Silk Road is assumed as the pioneer of online black market in darknet that provides a various kind of illegal products, mainly drugs and weapons. It is said to be the largest and global-scale black market before it was shut down in 2013. 12 http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/06/03/411476653/infiltrating-the-dark-net-where- criminals-trolls-and-extremists-reign Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 4 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 record of ISIS illegally exporting stolen oil below market price to some international traders facilitated by the websites on the darknet. A rising number of evidence point to the possibility of terrorist and extremist groups in Indonesia using darknet for various ends. On the darknet, activities of Indonesian extremist groups also saw increasingly connected networks with their global counterparts. Despite that, there are several particular events worth noting as following: For instance, a police report from the 2012 church bombing in Solo describes the jihadist group responsible for this case earning their funding clandestinely. They collect the donations, both from national and international donors, through bitcoins on the darknet. Furthermore, getting a stolen identity from darknet, the convict hacked a forex trading website (www.speedlineinc.com) to whip the points of the member. From these series of cybercrimes, the terrorist brought in money worth 7 billion rupiahs (around USD 600,000). This amount of money is spent to buy an asset to run a jihadist military camp and to finance the bombing attack. Aside from collecting money and supporting terror acts, the extremist groups made use of darknet sphere also to hold their organizational activities and maintain their international networks. According to Petrus Golose, Director of Operations, National Agency for Counterterrorism (BNPT), in the 2009 Marriott bombing, the suicide bomber was closely monitored by his jihadist peers via a video call application—most probably Skype. This is due to their anxiety that he would give up out of fear and run away. In a more thorough investigation, it was found that they were communicating and discussing through a secret network long before the bombing plan was executed. Surya Saputra, a senior police officer in Bogor, West Java, found a similar phenomenon in more recent terrorist acts, such as the 2010 attack on police in Solo and the 2011 bombing of the Cirebon police mosque. In those two violent events, the people involved in the case were meeting through an online religious discussion forum. They then bring the organization of the idea into a jihadist forum in darknet to acquire more knowledge in designing a well- planned bombing attack. Not only jihadist and religious-affiliated extreme groups, but the international anarchist network also uses Internet for helping them carry out their actions in Indonesia. A Greece- based anarchist group, 325.nostate.net, who was responsible for arson and bombing attacks in Greece, Chile and Argentina, is operating their Indonesian counterpart. In Indonesia, this Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 5 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 anarchist group was known on an Indonesian site, “Asimetris” (Asymmetrical), which in 2013, declared it was “sufficiently self-radicalized to join the hatred”. This international network claimed responsibility for a 2013 Jakarta fire in one of the hotel KTV lounges as well as several ATMs and bank bombings in Bandung and Yogyakarta. While these attacks were featured in the 325.nostate international website as its homage for “Indonesian comrades,” it is strongly believed that this anarchist group runs an anarchist forum as a place to manage its worldwide network. Although it is not yet certain whether the command chain within the network is centralized or fragmented, the example shows the cross-ideological applications of social media. These important findings show that the communication pattern between these extremist groups does not merely rely on the use of social media (such as Facebook, Twitter), nor messenger application (Skype, WhatsApp, Telegram). But, the extremist groups realize that they need a more secure and isolated space to discuss more serious and substantial matters (e.g. attacks plan, jihadist training and organization management). This fortifies the imperative nature of darknet, along with social media usage, and Internet as a whole, to the communication pattern among extremists. The use of all these online platforms mutually reinforces the extremist and terrorist activism to reach audiences beyond national or regional borders because of the interconnected nature that Internet builds. Therefore, to explain their communication network, it is essential we carefully examine how each platform is used to serve a particular end. Rethinking the Terrorist’s Use of Internet In general, terrorists use the Internet essentially to serve five different aims, in which each of them exploit various online platforms. From the case studies found across the globe13, we sum up the function of Internet for terrorist groups as following: Firstly, they use open sources available online to research issues such as vulnerabilities, counterterrorist efforts, and the selection of attack targets. This research could start in a surface web browser like Google, and then usually find more detailed information in darknet, particularly by exchanging knowledge in extremist and radical groups’ forums. It raises the question: What is the corporate liability and responsibility of online services, which after all, are commercial enterprises? 13 See e.g., Gabriel Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, U.S. Institute of Peace (March 2004), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr 116.pdf . Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 6 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 Secondly, the use of websites, chatrooms, e-mail, and other online devices to recruit new members. The recruitment, in most cases, is usually through social networking sites on surface web. Only after the new members have joined and take pledge, they are usually shown the way to connect to their global counterparts through dark web social networking sites (i.e. a Facebook-equivalent in dark net sphere). Thirdly, they use websites and online criminal activity to raise funds to support their efforts. As shown in the Solo bombing case, the cybercrime was carried out in surface web, but required support from dark net. The case of Islamic State usually features online black market also. Fourth, they use Internet communication techniques to plan and coordinate attacks and to maintain communication with each other. Usually held in secret, the darknet has gained importance in establishing cells, linking up with like-minded extremists and as seen recently, planning and executing operations. In many cases, the use of encrypted mobile messenger application, such as new communications platforms like Zello or Telegram, can be found. Fifth, and lastly, various online platforms are undoubtedly used as a medium of propaganda (i.e. to promote their cause and justify their use of violence). In propaganda, as their principal objective is to spread their messages and to reach a wide scope of audiences, it is most effective to make use of popular social media, such as Facebook or Twitter. In term of social media usage for propaganda, it is interesting to recall Brachman’s notion of “jihobbyists”. Brachman (2008) contends that the rise of Web 2.0, characterized by its interactivity and user-oriented content, allowed individuals who have largely driven their own radicalization without direct assistance, training, or support “to move forward the Jihadist agenda”. This perspective was examined by Yannick Veilleux-Lepage (2014) in his study about the role of IS’ soft sympathizers through the act of retweeting their contents. In addition to increasing the exposure of IS’ message, these disseminators also seek to move forward this jihadist agenda by aiding IS to gain recognition and acceptance. In other words, they are actively engaged in an attempt to normalize IS’ narrative. Although this study demonstrates the phenomenon in IS’ western supporters, the similar tendency could also be observed within the Indonesian context, especially in the flow of Facebook posts. Contents and shared posts that display a supportive tone towards radical Islamic movements can easily be spotted on an Indonesian Facebook timeline. Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 7 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 Recently, these kind of posts exhibit the state building by the IS as a positive effort. For instance, infrastructure construction, the sharia law enforcement, or children’s school education that strongly oppose western values. These posts are usually completed with supportive captions, like saying that the IS is far better than previous corrupted government in Syria. These acts are considered as a form of “online jihad” where people who shared the IS ideology could also take part in the fight without undertaking any kinetic actions. While most of posts show passive support in which they only amplify the IS messages, there are some cases where people actively create content and convey propaganda. These kind of people are usually said to have been radicalized as they overtly say their intention to go to Syria to join the IS battle. In a recent article, an Australian journalist from The Intercept, published a leaked Australian intelligence report in which it warns authorities about two alleged pro-IS pilots. Ridwan Agustin and Tommy Hendratno were strongly suspected by the Australian Federal Police after the monitoring on their Facebook accounts showed some radical activities. First, both of them changed their profile name into the IS-style Arabic name: Ridwan Ahmed al- Indonesiy and Abu Alfatih Hendratno. Second, they were chatting on online Facebook messenger about their ideological views that supported IS movements. Third, they actively voiced these radical views in their status updates. Lastly, in particular, Ridwan Agustin was found in correspondence with Kustyanto, known as Abu Azzam Qaswarah Al Indonesy, one of three Indonesians trained to become members of ISIS. This kind of journalist exposure, regardless of it being newsworthy due to the controversial report, could actually be considered as counterproductive for counterterrorism efforts. Because, this leaked report could, in fact, raise the awareness among the extremist and radical groups about the increasing state surveillance. As they are increasingly aware that the open platforms, like Facebook and Twitter, are no longer secure sphere, they will be driven to look for a hardly undetected communication platform, such as the ones in darknet or encrypted messengers, like Telegram and Zello. On a different but relevant note, FBI assistant director Michael Steinbach convinces people how the U.S. government is facing some serious challenges in battling with terrorists online.14While the majority of ISIS’ recruitment is done on the surface web, the group has increasingly begun using the darknet for the purposes of planning, strategizing, and training. 14 https://medium.com/@CandiceLanier/isis-on-the-darknet-fundraising-networking-plotting-all-out-of-the- reach-of-law-enforcement-246c9d824c6a Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 8 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 This anxiety actually applies to many governments—particularly ones that are prone to be terrorist hotbeds—as this is the tendency in global terrorist movement. U.S. intelligence is particularly uneasy about not knowing how much terrorist activity takes place on the darknet—calling the predicament “troubling.”15 It becomes more crowded and convoluted, for the state, that Internet businesses, including social media, are now building platforms more consistent with the privacy desires of the public. Providing end-to-end encryption, to some degree, reduces the government’s ability to identify who a user is, and thus more difficult to trace the terrorist networks that use these means of communication. Citizen Rights vs. Citizen Protection: The Never Ending Struggle for Balance These matters regarding the use of Internet for extremist activism spring around a debate on Internet governance, including to what degree national security triumphs privacy. The more sophisticated manner in which extremist groups utilize the whole online platforms, both in surface web and dark web, has raised important questions about whether the government is required to regulate darknet? Or is it a necessity that social media companies should be held liable for the extremist activities on their sites? All these questions could be contributive in constructing what qualifies an effective counterterrorism strategy in online sphere. The policy question should be relatively clear. The state has the responsibility to protect its citizens. Social media corporations such as Google, Yahoo, Facebook, Twitter and others have the corporate responsibility to prevent hate speech and the radicalization of the public. Whereas corporations claim the freedom of speech narrative as the ultimate defense, the spread of hate messages disqualifies the argument and requires rethinking the corporate policies to prevent the spread of on-line extremism. Internet Governance to Counter Extremist Narratives One of the reasons why IS gains wide support is because their narratives are very well-crafted in a sense that they represent themselves as Islamic fighters who struggle against the dominated western values. This narrative apparently works well, particularly for the right- wing Islamic groups. While setting out themselves against the West, particularly the U.S., the Islamic State, and other jihadist groups, cannily take advantage of western values of freedom to spread out their own narratives. Jihadist groups know that Americans, and in general, democratic countries, strongly believe in the holy-held shrine of freedom of speech. Therefore, they use it to create 15 http://www.cbsnews.com/news/intelligence-officials-warn-of-threats-on-dark-internet/ Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 9 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 and distribute their own messages, through western-created channels—that were created to facilitate any kind of freedom of expression, but ironically used in freedom by jihadist groups in an attempt to radicalize their publics. In this regard, the debate over who and how to counter the radicalization should be approached with a more critical perspective. One rough question we should perhaps pose is that whether the U.S.-dominated narratives have, in fact, contributed to the rise of radicalization. Is it still effective to put privacy, freedom of media, and freedom of speech in triumphant positions over global security? A rethinking of those two questions will actually implicate the way we view Internet usage for extremism. Let us take social media as an example. While social media are potential platform for spreading terrorist’s propaganda, they also play an important role in preventing terrorism acts and in de-radicalization campaigns. However, managing these double roles requires institutional efforts committed to counter radicalization and terrorism. Like it or not, social media and Internet content in general needs to be regulated—not limited or prohibited. However, of course, the devil is in the details. What kind of content is deemed harmful? Who has the rights to monitor? What is the most effective step to overcome radical messages? Monitoring Internet is a constant, 365-days-a-year/decade-long effort requiring funding and collective policy commitment, and of course, adequate law fundamentals. After all, businesses are held accountable and liable for security issues, as seen in the banking sector. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other social media platforms are registered businesses. They are commercial responsible entities with code of conducts and liabilities. For instance, Facebook, and other social media platforms, have patented a means to hand user data over to governments (United States Patent, 2013). There is a legal procedure where the Internet company should submit confidential users’ personal and activities data to the U.S. authorities with a court warrant. Even though in Indonesia this patent doesn’t apply, it surely has legislations against the spread of hate, discrimination and threat of violence on the Internet. This matter has been accommodated in 2008 Law of Information and Electronic Transaction, even though the law itself is widely seen controversial and inadequate. One of the legal cases regarding the issue of radicalism websites is the effort to charge for M. Fachry, the owner of Al-Mustaqbal.net, a site that contains a dense hate speech and provocation to support jihadist groups. While Indonesian prosecutors are faced with limited legal tools to prosecute online IS propagandists, this legal case could set a precedent. Nevertheless, both companies and individuals are held legally accountable for violating criminal and or civil legislations in most Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 10 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 countries. Hence, if the industry is unwilling or unable to conduct self-censor and self- righteous process effectively, a determination must be made if the all-encompassing liberties in fact protect the public or provide extremism a platform to spread violence, hate and terror. While social media and any other “visible” content in surface web could be monitored through a continuous surveillance mechanism, the activism in darknet remains an uneasy challenge. The nature of darknet that is anonymous and encrypted makes it hard to detect and trace the terrorist networks within it. Besides that, there are also some encrypted messenger applications that have opened up a hidden realm in which terrorists can “radicalize, plot and plan.” So far, Internet governance does not touch upon the darknet issue—nor the terrorism or cybercrimes that take place within its deep web. If there is a case that reveals the terrorist activity in darknet, that is because of the conventional investigations and interrogation conducted by the police. Even so, these investigations are not adequate to tackle this issue. In fact, Indonesian authorities may not have deeply mapped out the terrorist communication network within the dark web. Therefore, the Indonesian government should really consider to develop an integrated policy to address the extremism that is spread online, both in surface and deep web. Towards A Counterterrorism Strategy on the Internet Indonesia has emphasized on a hard approach to countering the threat of terrorism. The counterterrorism approach is primarily conducted through the lens of law enforcement, with the Indonesian Police remaining the main institution in charge of counter-terror operations. In particular, within the police corps, is the elite counterterrorism unit, Detachment-88, which has captured hundreds of terrorist suspects since the period of Jemaah Islamiyah group. But the tactical response, the tip of the spear, is not enough. The battle is over ideology and group identity. Terrorism expert, Rohan Gunaratna, writes, “The national security agencies and law enforcement authorities should monitor and dismantle over 60,000 platforms (Twitter, Facebook, blog sites, Instagram and other social media sites) promoting the IS message.”16 Stressing on hard approaches to countering terrorism might appear effective to disrupt terrorist plots. As evidence suggests, the number or terror attacks significantly decreased from 2006 to 2013. However, it should also be noted that the law enforcement is only most effective to tackle the traditional terrorist threats. The rise of Internet opens up new ways to 16 https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/CVE-Summit/Documents/Panel-1- Professor-Rohan-Gunaratna-paper.PDF; 11 June 2015 Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 11 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 expand terrorist activities, therefore, counter-terrorism agencies should also adapt themselves to these changes accordingly. Internet provides the perfect medium for terrorists to recruit, promote their ideology, and attract financing. Research has shown that young populations are at greatest risk of being targeted to be radicalized. Hence, the use of social media by radical groups to recruit, raise funds, and spread propaganda messages should not be taken lightly. An integrative counterterrorism strategy should be taken into consideration within a policy design. This strategy needs to address a range of objectives that are attained by diverse online platforms, from social media to darknet. Understanding the use of Internet among extremist groups and how their communication patterns affect public discourse in Indonesia is an essential condition towards an effective counterterrorism strategy—integrated and holistic. It is a good idea for the government to complement their counterterrorism responses with counter-radicalization strategies focusing on soft approaches. The rising influence of social media and the popularization of IS ideologies via the Internet highlights the need for states to be innovative in using modern communications to counter the growing threat of radicalization. Governments thus need to drive the debate on the Internet and through social media to ensure that their positive messaging is heard above the extremists’ messaging. The law enforcement will not be sufficient without prison management. A number of evidences show that the rapid and wide spread of supports for extremism comes from convicts in prison. Thus, access to Internet and mobile technology for the prisoners should be limited. Also, the government should focus on society engagements of their ex-prisoners to minimize the probability of recidivism. As for preventing and minimizing the clandestine terrorist activism in darknet, it requires the use of technology to “strike back.” Indonesia could use the software that allows for better cataloguing of information in deep web. Government counterterrorism agents should also be equipped with analytical as well as technical skills in monitoring and mapping out terrorist communication. Undoubtedly, there needs to be an integrated cooperation with private institutions as well as publics. At some points, the government would require the Internet companies to provide technological institutions. International cooperation would also be needed to call for obligation of tech firms to unlock secret chats among jihadists—as most of them lies in the United States. Collective intelligence, such as involving hacktivism, is also an idea worth trying. The state could ask for the help from hacktivist groups who also share concern about Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 12 of 13  Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum Asian Series Commentaries Vol. 30 - 2015 terrorist and extremist groups. Unlike government agencies who are likely unfamiliar with darknet, they clearly know how to infiltrate this underground net. In essence, Indonesian authorities should take into full account an integrated and holistic approach to effectively counter the threat of extremism in online realm. Note. In the light of the 14 January 2016, attacks against the Sarinah shopping complex highlighted the use of darknet applications. Understanding, exposing, exploiting, and countering the radical narrative presented by ISIL has become of critical importance. Aulia Nastiti holds a Master’s degree in Cultural Studies from Universite de Lyon. She studies the issue of Media Policy to Address Cultural Discourse and Online Activism. Andreas Wimmer, the Director of DAfz, obtained his Master’s Degree at the Rajaratnam School for International Studies. Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position the DAFZ. Commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from the DAFZ. Recognition must be given to the author or authors and the DAFZ. Please email to the editor at: editor@dafz.org Page 13 of 13