

## The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium, and the Crusades

THE *DESTAN* (*Book of Exploits*) of Umur Pasha, an unusually rich Turkish source for the history of the Aegean world and the crusades in the period 1328–1348, has attracted the attention of Turcologists and Byzantinists from the time of its discovery and publication in 1929 by Mükrimin Halil Yinanç.<sup>1</sup> Recently, Paul Lemerle devoted a whole volume<sup>2</sup> to a detailed analysis of the information contained in the *Destan*<sup>3</sup> in light of the contemporary Byzantine and Western sources.

The present paper is an attempt at reinterpreting certain points in the *Destan* which have not received adequate attention. In the first part we shall examine the true nature of Umur's relations with Byzantium and the Latins, and his strategy in the face of the crusades. In the second part we will turn to the organization of his navy and army.

The fall of Acre (1291) did not bring an end to the crusader peril in the Muslim world. Western Christendom was still unchallenged on the seas of the Eastern Mediterranean, and had the advantage of being able to land at any time on the coasts, which had remained the boundaries between Islam and Christendom. The Christian predominance on the sea was acknowledged by the Mamluks.<sup>4</sup> In fact, in the period after 1291 a blockade ordered by the Pope of the eastern Mediterranean lands of Egypt, Syria, and Turkey seriously threatened to cut the supply lines of commodities vital to the Mamluks—arms, timber, iron, and most important of all, slaves. Since these materials were imported from Turkey, or through the Aegean Sea from the Black Sea, the islands of the eastern Mediterranean assumed an unusual importance in Western strategy. As a result of this new situation, the *udj* (frontier) Turcomans in Anatolia, dependent for their part on exporting their timber and slaves to Egypt, were brought into a closer relationship with the Mamluks.

The crucial development in the new period of struggle between Islam and Christendom was, in the first half of the fourteenth century, the rise of Turkish navies manned by sea *ghazis* (*ghuzāt fi'l-bahr*),<sup>5</sup> who were later to form the original core on which Ottoman sea power was founded. The emergence of sea *ghazis* can be seen as a continuation of the Turkish expansion towards the West. Turkish *azebs* (from Arabic *‘azab*), the fighting men on these flotillas, were identical in origin, motivation and organization with the frontier *ghazis*. One of the first results of this new set of circumstances was the shift to the north of the crusaders' main field of action, in the end leaving Egypt and Syria out of the actual struggle.

Anatolian Turks were not totally inexperienced on the sea before the maritime principalities—Menteshe, Aydın, Sarukhan, Karasi—came into being in western Anatolia in the fourteenth century. As early as the period 1080-1097, Turkish maritime principalities with their own shipyards and fleets had appeared on the Aegean and Marmara sea coasts. Though short-lived, they had the potential to become serious threats to Byzantium. Tzachas (Chaka), one of these Seljuk emirs based on Smyrna, grew so powerful on the sea that he even contemplated conquering Byzantium.<sup>6</sup>

These early Turkish maritime emirates soon disappeared as a result of the first crusade. It was only in the beginning of the thirteenth century, as a consequence of the Byzantine debacle of 1204, that the Seljukid state again gained access to the sea through the conquest of the area between Caria and Cilicia, which contained the important ports of Antalya (Satalia) and Alanya (Alaiye; Greek: Caloronos; Latin: Candelore) during the period 1207-1226.<sup>7</sup> The Seljukids soon had their own navy and arsenal at Alanya.<sup>8</sup> They nevertheless did not pursue an aggressive policy on the sea, choosing rather to develop commercial relations with Christian nations by granting capitulations.

In the second half of the thirteenth century this situation did not change, in spite of the expansion along the Mediterranean coasts of aggressive *ghazi* forces under the Karamanids in Isauria and Cilicia and the Hamid dynasty in Pamphylia and Lycia.<sup>9</sup> Apparently the Muslim pirates referred to in these waters were never able to organize themselves into the pirate flotillas that were to be seen later on in the Aegean. Perhaps this was because the Latins, by holding the strategic points, were able to prevent the Turks from establishing control of the

southern coast of Asia Minor. Christian fleets patrolled these waters continually from the time the Pope ordered the blockade of Islamic lands in 1291. In 1293 a Venetian fleet of twenty galleys succeeded in capturing Alanya from the Turks. Although the Karamanids soon took it back,<sup>10</sup> the Latin maritime states and the Hospitallers by that time had under their control a series of naval outposts ranging from the bay of Macri in Caria as far as Cilicia. The little island of Meis (Castello Rosso), for example, located only a few miles from the mainland, was transformed by the Hospitallers into a watchpost in constant communication with the main forces on Rhodes, thereby aiding in the prevention of Turkish raids. Following the Turcoman invasion of western Anatolia the large scale and successful raids of the Turks on the sea began.<sup>11</sup> Now, perhaps, the Turkish corsairs and seamen of the southern coasts of Anatolia shifted their activities to Caria and other Aegean ports. The first of the *ghazi* principalities of western Anatolia was founded by a certain Menteshe who apparently bore the official Seljukid title of *Sahil-Begi* (in Pachymeres *Salpakis*), lord of the coasts.<sup>12</sup> Conquering from the sea, he appears to have achieved control by 1269 of the entire coastal area of Caria, including the ports of Strobilos, Stadia and Trachia. Himself a seaman, he set up a strong maritime principality by organizing the Turcomans from the interior “who used to descend to the coastal plains for winter pastures.”<sup>13</sup> A contemporary Byzantine source, Pachymeres, explicitly states that Menteshe used the Carian ports for his sea raids. Further north at Anaea (Ania) in the Ephesus bay, a rallying point for Aegean pirates in this period, Turkish corsairs were firmly settled by 1278.<sup>14</sup>

Before the Turkish invasions of western Anatolia the greater part of Byzantine shipbuilding and naval forces were based in certain harbors along the Aegean, Propontide and Black Sea coasts. These locations were determined by the character of the forests in the mountains behind, where sailors, or corsairs, and those with shipbuilding skills were assembled. We find that Turkish fleets came into being in the same harbors as had existed under the Lascarids: Ania, Ephesus, Smyrna, Adramyttion (Edremid) on the Aegean; Karamides (Kemer?), Pegai (Kara-Biga), Cyzicus (Aydıncık), Cios (Gemilik) on the Propontide.<sup>15</sup> The dismantling of the Byzantine navy in 1284 had meant the discharge of these Greek sailors and unemployment for local craftsmen and traders. The seamen, turned corsair, were ready now not to fight but to cooperate with the new-comers.<sup>16</sup> Turkish begs

offered the native Greeks exactly what they needed—employment and economic activity at those port towns through booty raids. Over time, some of these ports developed from *ghazi* pirate bases into important commercial centers.<sup>17</sup>

While native Greeks formed the professional crew of the first Turkish *ghazi* ships, the fighting men were the same *ghazi* Turks that we see later on in Umur Beg's and the early Ottoman navies. Just as local Greek frontier lords, *tekvurs*, allied themselves with Turkish frontier begs in the interior, similarly many Greek notables and corsairs at these harbors must have joined cause with the *ghazi* begs. After all, they were to fight and to plunder the same enemies as before—the Latins occupying the Aegean islands, the Morea and mainland Greece.<sup>18</sup> Unquestionably, a conciliatory attitude on the part of these Turkish begs toward the local Greek population greatly facilitated the latter's participation and cooperation. The begs, in organizing the *ghazis* and the Greek sailors into successful sea-raiding forces, played a decisive role in creating a new and functioning society at these ports.

In the period 1280-1344 the Aegean was the site of a struggle to fill the vacuum created by the crumbling of Byzantine rule. The struggle took place between, on the one hand, the Italian maritime states with their overriding commercial interests and the Latin feudal lords perpetuating the traditions and heritage of the classic period of the crusades, and on the other hand the newly arrived Turks, impelled to expansion primarily by demographic and economic pressures. While the Turks were invading western Anatolia, the Genoese captured the east Aegean islands and contributed to the economic and political collapse of Byzantium.<sup>19</sup> The fierce rivalry between the two Italian states, Venice and Genoa, the unprecedented expansion of corsair activity, and the alienation of the native Greek population from their Latin masters prepared and eased the way for the Turkish explosion into the Aegean world. The domination of the Aegean, its islands and surrounding continental areas, became the most important international question of the first half of the fourteenth century and thus accounted for the shift of crusading activities into the Aegean.

Little is known about the sea raids of the Turks before Umur Beg, since our only sources are Western reports which recorded the raids but neglected to report their point of origin. It seems that Rhodes was in serious danger of being conquered by the Turks of Monteshe before

the Knights of St. John settled there.<sup>20</sup> The first real threat to the eastern Aegean islands, however, seems to have manifested itself in 1304, when Ephesus and its bay area came under the control of the Monteshe Turks under Sasa Beg, and soon afterward passed into the control of the Turks under Mehmed Beg of Aydın-ili.<sup>21</sup> Rhodes, Chios and Mytilene now came under Turkish attacks.<sup>22</sup> Mytilene was invaded and pillaged in 1307 by the Turks under "Khlamouz" (the Greek *Kalames*), obviously *Kalem Beg* of the Karasi Turks.<sup>23</sup>

In the period 1300-1329 the Genoese and the Hospitallers appeared to be the chief rivals of the Turks vying to replace the dissolving Byzantine rule in the eastern Aegean. A contemporary historian, Pachymeres, described the situation as follows: "Seeing that Andronicus II was neglecting the islands of Chios and Mytilene and since their occupation would make their own position untenable, the Italians asked the Basileus either to secure their proper defense himself, or to entrust the islands to them so that with the revenues derived from them they could build a fleet to defend them."<sup>24</sup> Chios was occupied by the Genoese Benedetto I Zaccaria in 1304, while Rhodes came into the Hospitallers' possession with the naval cooperation of a Genoese corsair (15 August 1308).

The Turks, while invading and settling the mainland, must have realized that it was too risky for them to attempt to occupy the island without having first established full control of the sea. The Latins demonstrated their supremacy on the sea in the naval battle of 23 July 1319, in which a Turkish fleet from Ephesus under Mehmed Beg, a full ten galleys and eighteen smaller ships in strength, was surprised and destroyed by the allied fleet of the Genoese and the Hospitallers.<sup>25</sup> From then into the 1320s the Greek and Genoese corsairs were much more destructive to Venetian possessions and traffic in the Aegean than were the Turks. In the period 1307-1326, the Venetians succeeded in getting the emperor to agree to pay indemnification for the damages done by the Greeks.<sup>26</sup>

From 1318 on, cooperation between the Catalans under Don Alfonso Fadrique (vicar general 1317-1330) and the Anatolian Turks of Aydın and Monteshe enabled the latter to extend their field of action against the Venetians as far as Euboea and Crete.<sup>27</sup> The Catalan-Turkish cooperation was particularly damaging to Venetian interests on Euboea. The Turks, in their incursions in 1326, spared the lands of Fadrique on the island, and when their ships were seized, they took

refuge there and returned to Anatolia on his ships.<sup>28</sup> M. Sanudo Torsello, a contemporary of the events, speaks of a powerful Turkish fleet consisting of six galleys and thirty smaller ships threatening Euboea in 1327.<sup>29</sup> Again in the winter of 1327, Turks came in seven ships and pillaged the island of Aegina and Latin territories in the Morea. These incursions benefited Fadrique, who had his own plans to invade Euboea. At this time the Turks who raided the island were chiefly interested in enslaving the inhabitants for sale in Anatolia,<sup>30</sup> which in the long run seriously affected the cultivation of the land and the rate of income of the Latin feudatories.

Initial contacts among the Christian nations for a league against the Turks in the Aegean had begun under Venice's initiative as early as 1327, but it was not until 1332, when Umur conducted raids into Byzantine and Venetian possessions in the Aegean, that serious negotiations began.<sup>31</sup> At the start these negotiations included all the Christian nations in the Aegean area including the Byzantines and Martino Zaccaria.

The first step Venice had taken had been to conclude a truce with the Byzantine Andronicus II in October 1324. Until then Venice had expected to recover her position in the Levant through the restoration of a Latin empire in Constantinople. Andronicus II, meanwhile, mirroring the feelings of his subjects, had adhered to an anti-Venetian policy, consequently becoming increasingly dependent on Genoese support.<sup>32</sup> In 1322, however, Byzantine diplomacy began to take a completely different track. Aware of their overdependence on the Genoese and the growing Turkish danger, the Byzantines resumed the policy of neutralizing the West through the Unionist approach.<sup>33</sup>

The new Byzantine Emperor, Andronicus III (1328-1341), was determined to restore Byzantine rule in the eastern Aegean and push back the Turkish advance. He fought the battle of Pelekanon against the Ottomans on 10 May 1329, and saw reconciliation and alliance with Western Christendom as indispensable. For Venice, an Aegean League including Byzantium, was considered such a necessity that, with diplomatic efforts, she finally convinced the Papal and French courts not to insist on the Latin restoration and the Union for the moment. As Sanudo Torsello presented it, the Turkish threat in the Aegean posed the first and most urgent problem, to be solved by a general crusade. In effect, Venice formulated a new policy to mobilize Western Christendom for its own interests in the eastern Mediterra-

nean and substituted the "schismatic" Byzantines there with the Turks. This formula re-oriented its Levant policy in a completely new direction.

By 1317 the Zaccarias<sup>34</sup> were considered as the most effective power against the Turks, blocking their access to the sea through the possession of Chios and the castle at Smyrna, and, as such, their cooperation in any crusading plan was thought to be of crucial importance. The Dominican friar, Adam of Guillaume, in his plan for a crusade, suggested that crusaders occupy the peninsula of Aerythrea (Çeşme), which, together with Chios, would make an excellent base for the reconquest of Anatolia.<sup>35</sup> Philip of Taranto, planning for restoration of the Latin empire in Constantinople, recognized Martino Zaccaria as "king and despot of Asia Minor" with the islands of Lesbos, Samos, Kos, Tenedos, Icaria, Oenoufsai and Marmara.<sup>36</sup>

The crushing defeat of the fleet of Aydın-ili by the allied Genoese and Rhodian fleets off Chios (23 July 1319) seems to have been only a temporary setback for the Turks. The Smyrna castle, strongly garrisoned, resisted for two and a half years before Martino Zaccaria surrendered it to Umur Beg.<sup>37</sup> However, Martino, the *Destan* notes, was feasted (*toylama*) by Umur and then left for Chios, "which became *illik*, a place for him to stay." Lemerle suggested<sup>38</sup> that Martino, threatened in Chios by the machinations of Andronicus III, the energetic new emperor who was determined to restore Byzantine rule in the eastern Aegean,<sup>39</sup> thought it necessary to evacuate Smyrna and to bring its garrison to reinforce Chios. But there was something more to this move, since Chios under Martino now became *illik*, that is, in the terminology of the frontier Turks, "a part of the *Dār al-Islam*," as opposed to *yagılık*. Its defense was now a duty incumbent upon Muslims. In other words Martino now chose Umur's alliance and protection.<sup>40</sup> This explains why after 1329 Umur entered into hostilities with the Byzantines, attacking them on Chios, which had been put under direct Byzantine rule following the defeat and capture of Martino,<sup>41</sup> and in subsequent years mounting expeditions against Gallipoli and Thrace (1331) and Greek territories in the Morea (1332). The *Destan* clearly states<sup>42</sup> that hostilities between the Byzantines and Umur continued even after the Emperor concluded an agreement with Mehmed Beg, Umur's father, in the fall of 1329. According to Cantacuzenus,<sup>43</sup> Mehmed promised, apparently upon the pledge of a yearly tribute, not to attack the emperor's territory.

In fact, Umur acted independently, waging war against the Greeks, in alliance with the son of Sarukhan, who, like Umur, was in charge of the frontier region. Umur argued that it was against the orders of God to prevent the *ghaza*, Islamic Holy War.<sup>44</sup> This kind of tension was to be seen in the Ottoman state between Orkhan and his son Süleyman and later on between the frontier (*udj*) lords and the central government. Furthermore, Umur was informed, obviously through his Greek agents, about the preparations for a crusade among the Christian nations, and must have been well aware of the emperor's involvement in the negotiations for a league against the Turks.

In contradiction to his father's policy of reconciliation with the emperor, Umur, in alliance with the sea *ghazis* of Sarukhan, attacked the Greeks at Gallipoli and on the island of Samothrace, and landed in Thrace at Porou (1331 or 1332). In 1332 in his expeditions against Euboea and Bodonitsa in Thessaly, Umur joined Turks from western Anatolia in raiding Venetian possessions in the western Aegean. It is interesting to note that Byzantium joined the *ligua* against the Turkish *ghazi* princes, for which purpose Venice had opened negotiations with Byzantium as early as July 1332. The powerful fleet (40 galleys) of this first anti-Turkish league in the Aegean, in which Venice, Rhodes, Cyprus, Byzantium, the Pope, and the King of France took part,<sup>45</sup> destroyed the fleet (250 vessels) of Shudjā' al-Dīn Yakhshī-Khan, *emir* of Bergama,<sup>46</sup> of the principality of Karasi, in the bay of Adramyttion in September of 1334. The *Destan* relates how the Christian fleet made several attempts at landing in Smyrna which were repulsed by Turkish archers.<sup>47</sup>

In 1334 Umur succeeded his father in Birgi as Ulu-Beg, supreme ruler of Aydın-ili, marking a turning point in his career and putting directly under his command for the holy war all the forces of the principality. As a *ghazi* he felt it his first duty to subdue Philadelphia (Alaşehir), a Greek city in the interior near his capital. He lifted the siege of the city when it agreed by treaty to pay *kharadj*, tribute. Meanwhile, Byzantine diplomacy at this time had changed, seeking an alliance with the Turks against the Latins in the Aegean, a change obviously introduced by the shrewd "Domestikos" John Cantacuzenus and maintained by him as the cornerstone of his policies until the end of his career. In the face of the constant Genoese threat against Chios and the recent occupation of Mytilene by Domenico Cattaneo, seigneur of Phocaea, the Byzantine government sought a reconciliation with

Umur. Andronicus III met with Umur and his brother Hızır, who had accompanied him for the occasion, near the Çeşme (Aerythrea) peninsula, to negotiate. The emperor offered Umur a large sum of money (100,000 gold pieces in the *Destan*) to come to an agreement. The *Destan* is clear on the points discussed in the course of the negotiations: Umur rejected the offer and insisted on payment of an annual tribute for Chios and Philadelphia. In return, he said he was ready to guarantee a general peace with the Greeks and military aid against the enemies of the empire. The emperor finally agreed "to bestow Chios" as the *Destan* puts it, on Umur, which in actuality meant submission and payment of the annual *mal-i kharadj*,<sup>48</sup> or tribute money, thus, according to Islamic law, making the island part of Islamic territory. For the emperor this guaranteed protection of the island by Umur against any Latin intervention.<sup>49</sup> The agreement was "ratified by oath." Thus, the problem of Chios, Umur's main concern since Martino Zaccaria, was removed by the Byzantines, and was finally settled. What is more, at the end of the negotiations, which were, as the *Destan* suggests, conducted in a very friendly atmosphere, Umur and the emperor "became brothers." Further detail is given by the Greek sources, Gregoras and Cantacuzenus, from whom we know that Umur and Sarukhan-oghlu became allies of the emperor, and cooperated militarily with him in his efforts to reduce Phocaea to submission and to take back Mytilene from Cattaneo.<sup>50</sup>

For Umur the agreement was an important diplomatic achievement, since through it one of the members of the Christian League became his ally and his suzerainty rights over the island of Chios were now recognized. Threatened as he was by a crusade, it was a logical policy for Umur to restore peace with Byzantium.

As for the Byzantines, the alliance with Umur, providing as it did valuable military aid, became an instrument of Andronicus III's policy of restoration of Byzantine sovereignty throughout the empire, not only in the Aegean but also in such distant provinces as Acarnania and Albania. It was unfortunate for the Byzantines that they should plunge into a civil war after the death of Andronicus III (1341), and that Cantacuzenus should use the aid supplied by his "faithful friend," Umur, during the course of the civil war for himself.

Umur was on the way to creating a Muslim empire in the Aegean, making local Christian governments his tributaries or his allies. The information given in the *Destan* on these relations is often dismissed

or misinterpreted in Lemerle's book. We should keep in mind here that while the Christians considered the annual tribute as an insignificant sacrifice in return for freedom from the recurrent Turkish raids, the Muslims saw the *kharadj* payment as equivalent to submission to the Muslim state and becoming a part of the *Dār al-Islam*.<sup>51</sup> While his alliance with the Catalans had facilitated his expeditions to Greece, his alliance with the Byzantines opened for him the whole Balkan region, since he could now leave his ships in friendly territory with confidence; for they would be protected while he made his prolonged raids into the interior. Furthermore, because of the rivalries between the Christian governments in the area, especially between Venice and the Catalans and between Genoa and the Byzantines, it was possible for Umur to undo attempts of Venice and the Papacy to maintain a common front.

With his military power growing as a result of the *azebs* now flocking to his flag,<sup>52</sup> Umur benefited from his alliance with Cantacuzenus to become a decisive force in the Balkans between 1341 and 1345. It is true that, content with finding employment and booty for his *ghazis*, he did not seek territorial gains. Nevertheless, he played a crucial role in the Balkans,<sup>53</sup> first in checking the Bulgarians in their moves against the Byzantines in 1341, and then, upon the death of Andronicus III (1341) and the outbreak of civil war in Byzantium, in supporting Cantacuzenus against his rivals in Constantinople.<sup>54</sup> It is worth mentioning that his unwavering support of "his friend" Cantacuzenus, so crucial in the latter's struggles against his rivals in the capital and the Bulgarians and Serbs outside, was ultimately designed to ensure the defeat of the pro-Latin and pro-Rome government in Constantinople.<sup>55</sup>

In 1343 envoys from Constantinople were in Italy urging the formation of a crusade against Umur, the chief supporter of which since 1341 had been Venice, which was hard-pressed at Euboea and the Cyclades by Turkish raiders.<sup>56</sup> At the same time negotiations for the union of the Latin and Greek churches were actively resumed between Byzantium and the Pope. Basic to any understanding of the real issues in the Aegean at this period was the fact that Venice, a power claiming domination on the sea, was seriously considering displacing the Genoese at Phocaea and Chios.<sup>57</sup> Venice was concerned about the possibility that Chios might fall into the hands of its enemies.<sup>58</sup> Lastly, while Cantacuzenus's Byzantine rivals were fa-

voring the idea of cooperation with Stephan Dushan, Venice was suspicious of the latter's plans for the conquest of Constantinople.<sup>59</sup>

As a measure of Turkish power in the Aegean it is interesting to note that for the crusade, Venice now planned a fleet of thirty galleys, each carrying two hundred soldiers.<sup>60</sup> Umur at the time was in Aydın-ili. Cantacuzenus tried in vain to inform him about the attack of the crusading fleet, but it was already too late, as the crusading fleet of twenty galleys, supplied by the Pope, Venice, and the King of Cyprus and the Hospitallers, had made a surprise attack on the castle in the port at Smyrna and captured it and the port on 28 October 1344.<sup>61</sup>

The Pope saw the occupation of the port of Smyrna as the beginning of further Christian advances against the Turks.<sup>62</sup> For a brief moment the Christian successes generated universal enthusiasm in the West "reminiscent of the time of the great European Crusades."<sup>63</sup> It turned out to be a passing fervor, however, shared only by the remnants of medieval chivalry, as represented in the person of the French dauphin, Humbert, whose crusade in 1345 ended pitifully. The Pope was powerless to put a stop to the conflicts between the major powers of Europe, France and England on the one hand, and Hungary and Venice on the other. The important consequence of the crusades of 1344 and 1345 was to highlight the Turkish threat to Europe and to make Turkish advances to the West the chief concern of the later crusades.<sup>64</sup> For Umur, the occupation by the crusaders of *Smyrna inferiores*, that is, both castle and port, as well as the destruction of his naval base there,<sup>65</sup> made it impossible for him to continue his overseas expeditions. Now, and only with the cooperation of the principalities of Sarukhan and Karasi, Umur had to go overland to the Dardanelles and pass from there to Thrace across the straits.<sup>66</sup>

The fall of Smyrna seems to have had extensive repercussions in the Islamic world. Ibn Battuta,<sup>67</sup> who visited the Aydın principality in 1331 or 1332, speaks of the fall of Smyrna castle (28 October 1344) and the death of Umur (May 1348), events of which he presumably heard later during his return journey through Syria in 1348. Eretna, the powerful emir of central Anatolia, had sent Umur two experts in making catapults with which to batter away the walls of the castle now in Christian hands.<sup>68</sup> Later on in 1402 when Timur captured Smyrna, he apparently aimed to present himself as the only Muslim ruler capable of protecting the Muslim world against the Crusaders.<sup>69</sup>

Even though it did not prove to be a bridgehead for further attacks by the crusaders,<sup>70</sup> the occupation of *Smyrna inferiores* was a blow to Umur's image as the champion of *ghaza* in the Islamic world. His end while besieging the Smyrna castle in May 1348 is described in the *Destan* as a martyr's death. Long after, he was remembered by Ottoman *ghazis* as the first conqueror of the Balkans and was considered as the spiritual leader of the *ghaza* in Rumeli.<sup>71</sup>

One of the consequences of the fall of Smyrna in 1344 was that Byzantine Chios, until then under Umur's protection, was now at the mercy of the Latins. In 1346 Humbert II of Viennois, "the captain general of the Christian army against the Turks," sought the consent of the Byzantine government in Constantinople to occupy it as a base for military operations, but the Genoese fleet, under the admiral Simone Vignoso, made a surprise attack and captured the whole island first (15 June - 12 September 1346). Genoese control was soon also reestablished in the old Genoese colonies on the mainland of Old and New Phocaeas.<sup>72</sup> A further success in curbing the activities of Turkish *ghazis* in the Aegean was the defeat by a Christian navy of an allied fleet from the Turkish maritime states near the island of Imbros in the spring of 1347.<sup>73</sup>

At that point, Hızır, the new ruler of Aydın-ili, tried to prevent a renewed crusader attack by offering peace. Disappointed in its efforts to conclude a final peace treaty and thus to see the end of the Christian coalition, the first Turkish embassy to appear at a papal court returned empty-handed.<sup>74</sup> The preliminary agreement concluded on 18 August 1348, in either Smyrna or Ephesus now became void, and the Pope led the allies to join in a new league against the Turks in January 1351. Hızır had become aggressive, allowing his sea *ghazis* to raid Venetian possessions in the Aegean and preparing land and sea forces for an attack upon Christian Smyrna.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, by granting capitulations to the Genoese, who were at war with the Venetians, he made for himself a new Christian ally.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, the granting of capitulations (*ahdnâme* or *shurût*) to a Christian state signified more than a simple agreement of guarantees for trade and for merchants. On the part of the Muslim state, the capitulations signified principally that it recognized the grantee as a friendly nation and that possibilities for other kinds of cooperation existed.<sup>77</sup>

In the end, Hızır's goal of neutralizing the Christian coalition was realized when the Pope, observing that Venice had withdrawn from taking any part in the defense of Smyrna, notified the Grand Master

of the Hospitallers in September 1351 of the dissolution of the league. Before long, Venice had established friendly relations with Hızır, who allowed the Venetian-Catalan fleet to pass the winter of 1351-1352 at Ephesus and began to negotiate a trade agreement with the Duke of Crete (20 June 1353).<sup>78</sup>

Despite the Latin presence at Smyrna, the Turkish maritime principalities continued their raiding activity in the Aegean during the period 1353-1390. Reactivating their traditional alliance with the Catalans of Athens, these Turks renewed their activity, especially after 1360, the year of the Ottoman onslaught on Thrace. Western sources tell us how in 1359 or 1360 a large Turkish fleet, apparently from Aydın, appeared off the coast of Megara, suffering a serious defeat at the hands of the allied Christian fleet of Venetians, Hospitallers, the Despot of the Morea and the bailie of Achaea. The Turkish survivors took refuge with the Catalans in Thebes.<sup>79</sup> Again in 1363 the seaborne Turks from Anatolia arrived in Thebes at the invitation of their ally Roger de Lluria, vicar-general of the Catalans, threatened the principality of Achaea, and cooperated with de Lluria in overwhelming the forces sent by the Aragonese king. This is probably the same group of Turks who is said to have attacked the island of Amorgos, a possession of the Venetians, in that same year. At any rate, the Pope, alarmed by the presence of these Turks in Greece, urged the local Latin rulers in 1364 to form a united front.<sup>80</sup> Venice had been endeavoring since 1362 to bring a great coalition against the Ottomans that would include Byzantium, Bulgaria, the emperor of Trebizond, Cyprus, the Hospitallers, and even the Genoese. Venice aspired to lead this small crusade and claimed possession of the island of Tenedos, but this sufficed to alienate the Genoese totally from participation in it. On the other side, the Greek insurrection in Crete in 1363 and the general restlessness of the Greek peasants, heavily exploited in other Venetian possessions of the Aegean, led to the eventual estrangement of Venice and Byzantium. Under the circumstances, Venice abandoned the idea of an anti-Turkish coalition and "in order to be relieved from the heavy burden of defense" chose to follow a conciliatory policy with the Ottoman sultan.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, the Republic showed mistrust of Amadeo VI of Savoy's preparations for a crusade against the Ottomans at this time, since the Genoese ships were to join the crusade and the Venetian designs for Tenedos might be jeopardized.



Between 1330 and 1337, while Umur was making his spectacular sea expeditions from Smyrna, the Ottomans, fighting against the Byzantines in Northwest Asia Minor, were also making important conquests (Nicaea, 2 March 1330; Nicomedia, 1337). Their most significant advances had come during the period 1329-1334, when Umur was engaged in hostilities with the Byzantines as well. Though our sources give no hint of an alliance or actual cooperation between Umur and Orkhan in the period, circumstances made them natural allies in this and in the following period, 1342-1346, when Umur gave his strong support to Cantacuzenus against his rivals in Constantinople.<sup>82</sup> The efforts of the latter to secure military aid from Orkhan failed; instead, with the cooperation of Ottoman troops, Cantacuzenus was able to wrest all the Black Sea ports except Sozopolis from the hands of his enemies. The marriage of his daughter Theodora to Orkhan (June 1346) cemented Cantacuzenus's alliance with the Ottoman principality, the strongest of the Turcoman states. Once in full power in Constantinople (3 February 1347), however, Cantacuzenus turned, or at least appeared to turn, to a policy of cooperation with the Latins against the Turks, offering to continue the Byzantine alliance with the Pope and Humbert in 1348.<sup>83</sup> Cantacuzenus's new policy was actually intended primarily to thwart the plans of Stephan Dushan, the Serbian king. Dushan was seeking Venetian cooperation for the conquest of Constantinople.<sup>84</sup> Under the circumstances, Cantacuzenus had to maintain close relations with the Ottomans, the only source from which he could expect substantial military aid. It was this situation that prepared for the Turkish settlement in Europe.

While the Turks of Aydın-ili were effectively neutralized by the capture of the castle of Smyrna, which the Pope had decided to keep as a check upon them, the Ottoman Turks were becoming more and more involved in Balkan affairs, especially after they had firmly established themselves in Karasi-ili, facing Thrace.<sup>85</sup>

#### THE ORGANIZATION OF UMUR'S NAVY & ARMY & HIS EXPANSION POLICY

The first part of this paper is an outline of the political activities by which Umur built up his power from 1330 to 1344. This power was based on the influx of Turcoman forces and their engagement in overseas expeditions. In other words, a navy serving his overseas raiding was the key to the spectacular growth of Umur's power in the

Aegean, a growth which eventually brought about the shift of the crusades from Syria and Egypt to the Aegean. The *Destan* provides us with a first-hand description of Umur's navy. As the earliest and most detailed source on the forces of a *ghazi* principality, this description can be a key to understanding how the *ghazi* principalities in western Anatolia, including that of the Ottomans, rose to power.

Already by 1319 Umur's father, Mehmed Beg, had a rather strong fleet based at Ephesus, as is disclosed in a report from Rhodes to Pope John XXII; it included ten war galleys and about eighteen smaller ships.<sup>86</sup> As was seen earlier, this fleet was destroyed by an allied fleet of the Genoese and Hospitallers on 23 July 1319.

After the capture of Smyrna, Umur's navy, which was based there, exhibited spectacular growth in size within a short period, and in the years 1330-1334 it became a major power in the Aegean world. In 1330, for the first major overseas expedition against the Byzantines, Umur mustered a fleet consisting of seven galleys, fourteen *kayık* and seven *igribar* (for types of ships see *infra*). Joining him on this expedition was his brother Hızır of Ayasoluk (Ephesus), whose fleet numbered twenty-two ships, all *kayıks* or *igribars*. The rich booty collected during this successful attack was divided between the two brothers and their Turcoman *ghazis*.<sup>87</sup> In the subsequent large scale expeditions against Morea, Bodonitsa (Mundenitsa), and Euboea in 1332, Umur's fleet had grown to 250 ships. It was 170 in the expedition against Greece in 1333, 270 in that against Morea in 1335, 350 in his expedition to the mouth of the Danube in 1341, and 300 in his expedition to Thrace to aid John Cantacuzenus in 1343.<sup>88</sup>

Flotillas of other *ghazi* begs, that of his brother Hızır at Ephesus, that of Orkhan, from Mentеше, and especially those of Timur-khan and of Süleyman, princes of the Sarukhan and Karasi principalities north of Umur Beg's territory, must have joined with the fleet of Umur on his several major expeditions.<sup>89</sup> These princes, who had appanages on the sea frontier lands, were naturally eager, like Umur himself,<sup>90</sup> to distinguish themselves by leading *ghaza* activities on the sea. Urged on by Turcoman warriors eager for booty, these begs of the frontiers in western Anatolia, and later those in the frontier regions of the Ottoman state, often differed with the policies of the central government, which chose to remain faithful to the agreements it had entered into and to encourage peaceful relations with Christian nations, for the benefit of both the trading interests of its subjects and



the customs revenues of its treasury. The decision of Umur and the princes of Sarukhan and Monteshe to attack Byzantine Gallipoli was made in spite of the efforts of Umur's father Mehmed Beg to prevent them. Mehmed Beg, the ruler of Aydın-ili, had signed a peace agreement with Andronicus III in 1329. By Islamic law such agreements made with the "infidels" were to be observed in good faith, but perpetual *ghaza*, though it might be temporarily deferred under certain conditions, was also a stipulation of Islamic law. The sea *ghazis*<sup>91</sup> from the coasts of Monteshe (Caria) must have been particularly anxious to join Umur, since the Hospitallers on Rhodes deterred their activities in that direction and since the Beg of Monteshe in the interior at Milas, as well as the Hospitallers themselves, seemed now to be more interested in developing commercial relations profitable for both sides than in engaging in warfare.<sup>92</sup>

The *Destan* tells us that Umur's ships were built at the Smyrna (Izmir) arsenal under the supervision of a Khodja Selman, a captain, and obviously Umur's top advisor in naval operations.<sup>93</sup> The types of ships mentioned in Umur's navy are the *kadırga*, the *kayık*, and the *igribar*. Also called the *trireme*, *kadırga*, from the Greek *χαιτεργον*, the armed war galley,<sup>94</sup> was the basic warship of Mediterranean navies until the seventeenth century. A rowing vessel which did not usually require special dockyards for its construction, the galley had a shallow draught. Easy maneuverability, speed and invisibility from great distances were features which made it especially useful as a pirate ship.<sup>95</sup> The strength of a navy was measured by the number of galleys in it. In 1329 Umur had only one galley, but later "a number of them." From 1332-34 the number increased rapidly.<sup>96</sup> The bulk of Umur's navy consisted of smaller swift rowing vessels, *igribar* and *kayık*, well suited to the tactics of his fighting men,<sup>97</sup> the seizure of merchant ships and raiding along the coastland and islands. These smaller vessels tried to avoid encountering Christian fleets on the high seas. During a raid these light ships were drawn up onto the shore and guarded by a small force of *azeb* while the main body went inland.<sup>98</sup> Throughout the period 1330-44 no mention is made of a sea battle between Umur Beg and the Christians, either in the *Destan* or in Western sources, and it is certainly an exaggeration to speak of Turkish control of the Aegean in this period. The Christian victory over the fleet of Yakhshi-Khan in 1334 was a severe lesson for the sea *ghazis*.<sup>99</sup>

The fighting men in Umur's navy, the *azebs*, were essentially the same people as those who filled the ranks of the *ghazi bölüks* (companies) in the interior, motivated by the same hope of making booty a means of livelihood as well as becoming a *ghazi*, a warrior for Islam. The word *azab* means in Arabic "unmarried," thence a young man, not settled, looking for a job, a wanderer. The term must originally have been used indiscriminately for such men of whatever background, but already in the first half of the fourteenth century it had become a term used in the maritime provinces specifically to indicate the soldiery organized as a marine corps by the begs.<sup>100</sup> As was the case later on with the Ottoman navy at Gallipoli, there must have been among them some Greek or Italian or Catalan converts; the *Destan* emphasizes that the *azebs* were all Muslims. Originally volunteers from the common people in quest of *ghaza* or booty, the *azebs* were regimented by the begs into a special military organization. In all the Turkish principalities, including the Ottoman, the *azeb* bore a distinctive red cap called a *çibuk-börk* or *kızılörk* (later on to be the headgear of the heretical Turcomans of Anatolia), differentiating them from the immediate retinue of the *beg*, *nöker*, who wore a white cap, *ak-börk*, a symbol of nobility among Turco-Mongol peoples. Armed with the powerful Turkish bow, well known for the force of its impact, the *azebs* had the reputation of being excellent archers, praised as such in Umur's *Destan* as well as in contemporary Western sources.<sup>101</sup> In essence light footmen, the *azebs* of Umur would mount horses when engaged in raiding.<sup>102</sup> Umur's *azebs* were proud to belong to the troops of this famous *ghazi* leader, calling themselves Umurdja Oghlanları, the Young Warriors of Umur, a label that harks back to the original spirit of martial brotherhood of the frontier Turcomans.<sup>103</sup> Like Osman Ghazi, the founder of the Ottoman state, Umur exhibited the charismatic leadership in the frontier warfare, which was the most essential ingredient for the formation of large-scale *ghazi* forces on the frontier.

Whenever he planned a large-scale expedition, Umur sent special messengers inviting "*ghazis*" to come to Smyrna and take to the sea. As the expeditions proved to be extremely successful, bringing "endless booty in slaves as well as gold, silver and cloths," the invitation would be answered by crowds of *ghazis* "filling all the hills and plains around Smyrna."<sup>104</sup> While his army was only 3000 men strong in the expedition to Chios in 1330, transported in fifty ships at

an average of sixty men per ship, by 1343 its numbers had risen to 15,000 accompanied by an equivalent increase in the number of ships.<sup>105</sup>

As for the oarsmen, they appear generally to have been Muslim Turks, who had the reputation for being the strongest rowers in the Mediterranean. We know, however, that following his expedition to Chios in 1330, Umur placed one-fifth of the captives, his share of the enslaved, in the ships as oarsmen.<sup>106</sup> The crew in charge of navigation (*komi*, etc.) were mostly Greeks or converts, as was the case with the Ottoman navy later on.<sup>107</sup>

Frequent assertions are made in the *Destan* that the Christians were superior in their arms; among those mentioned are the pike (*harbe*), arbalest (*chekre*), cross-bow (*zenberek*), musket (*tüfenk*), and cannon (*kara-bughra*). The Turks were impressed in particular by the heavy armour of Western soldiery.<sup>108</sup> For their part, Umur's soldiery made use of the arbalest and the cross-bow as early as his first expedition in 1329.<sup>109</sup> In 1344, in besieging the castle of Smyrna, which had been captured by the Crusaders, the Turks used stone-hurling catapults.<sup>110</sup> In addition, an Arab expert from "the Maghreb" made for them a "strange, small catapult" which destroyed the fortified towers and ships of the Crusaders.<sup>111</sup> It is interesting to note that Eretna, the Mongol ruler of central Anatolia, also sent two experts to construct catapults for Umur's siege of the castle. Umur's troops were familiar with the elements of siege warfare, such as trench digging and the climbing of walls with ladders. It becomes clear that, as a result of their cooperation with the Mongols, the Byzantines and the Catalans, and as a result of their confrontations with European soldiery, the frontier Turks appear to have become acquainted with the up-to-date military technology of the time.<sup>112</sup>

In dealing with the history of the *ghazi* principalities of western Anatolia, we must be sure to take into account the *ghazi* begs' own perception of their power in order to understand not only how they were able eventually to found well-organized states on the model of Islamic sultanates but also how they dealt with Christian powers, crusaders, or Italian maritime states. Most of the time our Western sources like the modern historians who have only followed them uncritically gave an oversimplified or misleading interpretation of the actions of the *ghazi* states.

It is true that the basic concern of the begs placed on the frontiers was to provide livelihood or booty (*doyum*) for their *ghazis*.<sup>113</sup> Thus

it was a necessity that booty raids from the frontier areas be organized almost every year, and, after all, Allah had ordered that the *ghaza* be conducted unceasingly on the frontiers of Islamic world so long as this aggressive policy did not endanger the Islamic community. Umur's ready cooperation with the Catalans and later with John V Cantacuzenus can be explained by the fact that they conveniently furnished him with an opportunity to "feed" (*doyurmak*) his *ghazis*.<sup>114</sup> Specifically, this type of cooperation provided him with bases for dangerous operations in distant lands and overseas, where previous raiding parties, lacking refuge amidst a hostile population, had perished.<sup>115</sup> Though Cantacuzenus claims that it was out of friendship to him that Umur agreed to come whenever he needed help against his rivals, the fact is that most of the time Umur acted like a mercenary chief, and although, unlike many others, he was honest and trustworthy, he always demanded an area in which his soldiers would be free to make booty raids. In 1337, when friendly relations were reestablished, Andronicus III hired two thousand of Umur's *azebs*, who, having performed admirably for the emperor in Albania, returned home laden with rich booty.<sup>116</sup>

The taking of *ghanima*, or booty, which was the fruit of the *ghaza*, Islamic holy war, was much esteemed in Islam; indeed, the *ghaza* was the most meritorious way of acquiring property.<sup>117</sup> Islamic religious law contained an elaborate chapter on how booty was to be distributed among *ghazis*, one-fifth being set aside as the share of the "Commander of the Believers."<sup>118</sup> So it is no wonder that after each of Umur's expeditions, there is to be found in the *Destan* a rather ostentatious description of the spoils and of their distribution.<sup>119</sup> Slaves, the young and handsome being of the most value and bringing the most profit, get special mention,<sup>120</sup> along with gold, silver and cloths. Umur sometimes gave his legal share of the booty to the poor and to his soldiers, and he always gave generous gifts to his relatives and followers, thus living up to the image of the ideal *ghazi* leader as described in the *Kutadgu Bilig*, an eleventh-century Turkish *Fürstenspiegel*,<sup>121</sup> one who led his people on successful raids and generously gave away whatever were his own proceeds. His expedition to Kilia at the mouth of the Danube in 1341, a typical booty-seeking enterprise, yielded "countless slaves, girls and boys, as well as material goods, so that the whole of the Aydın-ili was filled with wealth."<sup>122</sup> Reference is made in the *Destan* to three cases of piracy

on the open sea, evidently the most spectacular ones when Umur captured merchant ships. The first incident occurred in 1329 when he attacked a convoy of five coques off the island of Tenedos. In 1332 or 1333, on his way back from Monemvasia, he overpowered a coque "laden with pearls, rubies, gold and silver, as well as cloths." He captured the abandoned ship, and after pillaging, burned it.<sup>123</sup> Six or seven years later he captured near Euboea "a big coque laden with about one hundred boxes of rubies." But the main sources for booty remained the incursions to the Aegean islands and the coastal areas in Greece, Macedonia and Thrace.

On various occasions Umur agreed to abstain from pillaging a land in return for a yearly tribute, a practice in perfect conformity with Islamic law. While the tribute-paying country regarded it simply as a form of ransom, for the Muslims it meant much more, bringing that country under Islamic sway and placing it in the *dār al-Islam*, the Abode of Islam.<sup>124</sup> It was a tremendous feat for Umur to compel a Christian prince to pay tribute (*kharādj*), and the *Destan* recorded it as such.<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, such agreements were useful in neutralizing that prince and in securing a base for operations in remote overseas lands; thus, they became an important instrument in Umur's attempt to establish his supremacy in the Aegean. He exploited the new situation to further expand his power by finding constant employment for an increasing number of *ghazi azebs*, who joined and extended his field of action and influence. On the other hand, several local Christian governments found such agreements expedient, for their part, not only in neutralizing Umur and saving their possessions from the raids of the *ghazis*, but also in giving them the opportunity to use his force against their rivals, as, for example, the Genoese and Catalans of Athens against the Venetians, Byzantium against its Balkan invaders, and later, Cantacuzenus against his rivals in Constantinople.

It has been observed that, once he became the head of the emirate of Aydın-ili in 1334, Umur appears to have felt himself more responsible for the general interests of his state, and therefore he changed his policy towards Byzantium. Indeed, profiting from the rivalries between Christian governments and passing himself off as an indispensable ally for all parties, Umur actually appears to have pursued a well-planned policy aimed at achieving supremacy in the Aegean world. But even in the period before 1334 when he was only beg of the Smyrna frontier area, his conduct was not solely determined by the

quest for booty, but also by a concern for the security of his territory and the maintenance of a free passage to the sea and thence to Greece, so vitally important for his *ghazis*. To counterbalance Venetian naval supremacy and to discourage a crusade he must have seen the need for a policy of cooperation, or at least neutrality, with the Genoese and Byzantium.

## NOTES

1. *Düsturnâme-i Enverî*, Istanbul: Türk Tarih Encümeni Külliyyati, no. 15, 1929; in his introduction Yinanç for the first time drew attention to important points contained in the *Düsturnâme*.

2. *L'émirat d'Aydın, Byzance et l'Occident, Recherches sur "La Geste d'Umur Pacha"*, Bibliothèque Byzantine: Etudes no. 2, Paris 1957.

3. It is translated into French by Irène Mélikoff-Sayar, *Le Destan d'Umur Pacha (Düsturnâme-i Enverî)*, Bibliothèque Byzantine no. 2, Documents: no. 2, Paris 1953; Lemerle relies on this translation, which is based on two manuscripts, with improvements over Yinanç's edition; on the work see Mélikoff-Sayar, 27-38.

4. See D. Ayalon, "Bahriyya," *ET*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 945-46; as a defense measure, the Mamluks completed the demolition of all fortresses on the Syrian coasts and stationed Turcomans, who were both warlike and cheap to hire, along the coasts to maintain guard; see D. Ayalon, "The Wafidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom," *Islamic Culture*, XXX (1951), 89-104. Ramon Lull (1305) counted it as one of the advantages which the Christians had over the Muslims; see A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, London, 1938, 81.

5. See Al-ʿUmārī, *Masālik al-Absār*, ed. F. Taeschner, *Al-ʿUmārī's Bericht über Anatolien*, Leipzig, 1929, 43-52.

6. S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor*, Berkeley, 1971. Index: *Tzachas* and *Abu'l-Kasim*.

7. See Barbara Flemming, *Landschaftsgeschichte von Pamphyl-ien, Pisidien und Lykien im Spätmittelalter*, Wiesbaden, 1964, 1-8.

8. For a description of the dockyard, see R. M. Riefstahl, *Turkish Architecture in Southwestern Anatolia*, Cambridge, Mass., 1930.

9. Flemming, *op.cit.*, 27-92.

10. *Ibid.*, 62-63.

11. *Ibid.*, 71-72.
12. *Ibid.*, Index: *Malik al-Sawāhil*.
13. See Paul Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche, Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasien im 13.-15. Jh*, reprint: Amsterdam, 1967, 24, 32.
14. *Ibid.*, 33.
15. H. Ahrweiler, *Byzance et la mer*, Paris, 1966, *Index*.
16. Before the Turks came, the islands and harbours of the eastern Aegean sheltered a number of Greek and Latin corsairs. Venice tried to stop the unprecedented extension of their activities by imposing an indemnification upon the Byzantine emperor. A Venetian report dated 1278 mentioned ninety of these Greek corsairs; see Wilhelm Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant*, I, trans. F. Raynaud, Leipzig, 1936, 443; in 1278 on the Carian coasts a Greek corsair by the name of Nicetas was cooperating with a certain Saladinus, obviously a Muslim corsair, see Wittek, 46.
17. On Ephesus and Palatia during this period, see Heyd, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 540-44; Clive Foss, *Ephesus after Antiquity: A Late Antique, Byzantine and Turkish City*, London, 1979, 141-80; for the ghazis in Anatolia, see P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1938, 16-32, and E. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, Venice 1983.
18. Since 1273 the Palaeologi were employing corsairs based at Ania and Rhodes against the Venetians. For the Greeks' hatred of the Venetians, see the report of 1278 summarized in Heyd, I, 442-43. Seeking employment, many Greek sailors, however, went over to the Venetians, see. A. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins*, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, 64.
19. Recent studies on the early Palaeologi leave no doubt on this point; in addition to Laiou, D. Geanakoplos, *The Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959; U. V. Bosch, *Andronikos II Palaiologos*, Amsterdam, 1965.
20. A. de Vertot, *Histoire des Chevaliers Hospitaliers*, II, Paris, 1737, 101; A. Luttrell, "The Hospitallers at Rhodes," *A History of the Crusades*, III, ed. Kenneth Setton, Madison, 1975, 283.
21. Wittek, *op. cit.*, 37-45.
22. J. Delaville Le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes (1310-1421)*, reprint: London, 1974, 5-12; H. Prutz, *Die Anfänge der Hospitaliter*, Munich, 1908; A. Luttrell, *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West (1291-1440)*, London, 1978.
23. Wittek, *op. cit.*, 19, 21, 29.
24. I quote Paul Lemerle's translation: *L'émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident*, Paris, 1957, 91, note 5.
25. See D. Le Roulx, *op. cit.*, 8-10; Lemerle, *op. cit.*, 30-31.
26. For the agreement between the emperor and the Genoese on Chios, see F. Dölger, *Regesten*, IV, nos. 2259, 2349, 2506; compare it with the words of Sanudo on the crucial role the Genoese and the Hospitallers played in keeping the Turks away from the Aegean; Laiou, "Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks," *Speculum*, vol. 45 (1970), 380; idem, *Constantinople*, 234-37, 267-75; for the Venetian blockade of Pera as a retaliation for the attacks of the Genoese corsairs in 1328, see Heyd, I, 485; Laiou, *ibid.*, 301.
27. D. Jacoby, "Catalans, Turcs et Venetiens en Romanie," *Studi Medievali*, series III, vol. 15 (1974), 247; K. Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens*, London, 1975, 27, 34; E. A. Zachariadou, "The Catalans of Athens and the Beginning of the Turkish Expansion in the Aegean Area," *Studi Medievali*, ser. III, vol. 21, fasc. 2 (1980), 821-838, states that the Aydin-Catalan alliance goes back to 1304.
28. Jacoby, *op. cit.*, 252.
29. *Ibid.*, 253-54.
30. Jacoby, p. 253. A great number of Greeks from Turkey were sold as slaves in Crete in 1363: see F. Thiriet, *Régestes des délibérations du sénat de Venise*, I, Paris, 1958, 410; one of the reasons for the shift in the population of the islands was the oppression of the Latin feudatories, and some of the Greek villeins even chose to go to Turkish lands in Anatolia, apparently upon obtaining *aman*, amnesty guarantees. In addition, the plague of 1348 disastrously aggravated the situation: see Thiriet, *op. cit.*, I, nos. 210, 214.
31. A. Laiou, "Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks: The Background to the Anti-Turkish League of 1332-1334," *Speculum*, 45 (1970), 374-92.
32. A. Laiou, *Constantinople*, 200-83.
33. The emperor, though under the pressure of intensely anti-Latin public opinion, was forced to drop the anti-unionist policy in 1327; Laiou, *ibid.*
34. R. Lopez, *Genova Marinara nel Duecento: Benedetto Zaccaria Ammiraglio e mercante*, Messina-Milano, 1933.
35. A. S. Atiya, *Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, London, 1938, 65-66. C. Dukas Limpidares, in a letter to Charles of Valois, promised

the cooperation of native Greeks in the liberation of western Asia Minor from the Turkish invasion: see U. V. Bosch, *Andronikos II Palaiologos*, 147, note 6.

36. A. Laiou, *Constantinople*, 319.

37. See P. Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 54-58; the Turkish conquest must certainly have been before the Byzantine expedition to Chios in autumn 1329. Under the Lascarids Smyrna was the main port city of the empire in the Mediterranean and its naval base. Later on under the Palaeologi the Genoese were granted important administrative and fiscal privileges in Smyrna (Treaty of Nymphaion, 1261) and its ties with Byzantium slackened. Smyrna was besieged by the Turks in 1300. The fortress of Smyrna up the hill, Palaion-Kastron, was taken by Mehmed Beg, father of Umur, from the Genoese in 1317: see H. Ahrweiler, "L'histoire et Géographie de la région de Smyrna entre les deux occupations turques (1081-1317)," *Travaux et Mémoires, Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilization Byzantines*, I, Paris, 1965, 1-204.

38. *Op.cit.*, 57.

39. For Andronicus's expedition see Bosch, *op.cit.*, 113-116.

40. Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 48-50, misinterpreted Umur's relations with Martino and Byzantium for this period. In couplet 144 the expression *illik oldu* is translated by Mélikoff (p. 51) as *la paix conclue*. It means actually for a land to come under Islamic sovereignty. It corresponds to the Arabic term *dar al-Islam* as opposed to *dar al-harb*, see "Dār al-<sup>h</sup>ahd," *Et*<sup>2</sup>, 116; also see M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, Baltimore, 1960, 155-74; a contemporary source, Ahmed Aflakī, *Manākib al-<sup>c</sup>Arifīn*, ed. T. Yazıcı, Ankara, 1961, II, 950, said: "Umur Pasha moved against Sakız-Adası (Chios) and conquered it. They took so much mastic (as booty) that no one can tell. Umur Pasha submitted the island to tribute (*kharadj*) and made it his own source of income (*khassa*)." Export of mastic, much in demand in Islamic countries, brought a large revenue, hence the Byzantine concern to maintain its control of the island. The sale of mastic brought to the *Mahonesi* a revenue of 10,068 gold ducats in 1379, and 6732 in 1498; see Ph. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese*, Cambridge, 1958, 125, 268, 385.

41. Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 54-58. He maintains that the statement in the *Destan* on Umur's attack on Chios at this time may be a confusion with the Turkish attack of 1304. Umur's attack is dated by Lemerle, 59-62, at the end of 1329 or early 1330.

42. Turkish text 25; Mélikoff, verses: 376-90.

43. Lemerle, 67; Bosch, 159, but confusing Sarukhan's territory with Mehmed's.

44. The *Destan*, Mélikoff, verses: 382-86. Lemerle, 61, 67, has drawn attention to the disagreement between Mehmed and Umur. However, I cannot share his opinion that this caused a great deal of tension between the two and resulted in Hızır's disagreement with his brother. That Hızır did not participate personally but sent his ships to the expedition against Chios in 1330 was quite normal. Afterwards he came back to Smyrna to take his share of the booty. As to the fact that Mehmed Beg sent a mentor to his son to persuade him to give up the expedition against Gallipoli, the *Destan* gives the impression rather that Mehmed thought it too dangerous. After his return from the aborted expedition, perfect harmony was restored between them. The next year Umur fought the Greeks in the Morea. Here again I think the erudite Byzantinist has tried too hard to find evidence in the text that Umur's soldiers were unwilling to fight the Greeks because of the existence of an agreement. Lemerle's method seems to me not entirely consistent, for while most of the time he relies on the *Destan* as a *detailed, well-informed* and *excellent* source, he is inclined to dismiss it or force interpretations from it whenever it might be in contradiction with his own hypotheses. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *The Travels*, II, trans. H. A. R. Gibb, Cambridge, 1966, 446, who visited Smyrna about this time, presents Umur as a prince "continually in *djihad* (Holy War). He had war galleys with which he used to make raids on the *environs of Constantinople the Great*."

45. In the *Destan*, Mélikoff: verses 835-38, each of them supplied ten ships, while, according to Western sources, Rhodes ten, Cyprus ten, and the Emperor six: see Lemerle, 98.

46. Yakhshi-Khan, son of the beg of Karasi, was at the head of the sea *sandjak* of the principality, a position similar to that of Umur in Smyrna.

47. The *Destan*, verses: 835-50. Lemerle, 100, thinks this attack took place at the end of 1334.

48. Verses 1025-1026; Lemerle's interpretation of the expression *malin alup* is inaccurate (p. 106). It meant: Umur accepted and received *kharadj*. *Mal-i Kharadj* or simply *mal* is widely used in this sense in Turkish during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Philadelphia was under the protection of the Germiyan principality and

paying *kharadj* since at least 1314, see Himmet Akın, *Aydın Ogulları*, Istanbul, 1946, 40; cf. P. Schreiner, "Zur Geschichte Philadelphias im 14 Jahrh.," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, vol. 35 (1969), 385-401. Because of rivalry over Philadelphia relations between Aydın and Germiyan became hostile, which explains the attempt of the ruler of Germiyan to establish friendly relations with the Christian league toward the winter of 1333: see F. Thiriet, *op.cit.*, I, 31, no. 39. Thiriet's identification of *Carmagnano* with *Karaman* is evidently not correct; also see the information supplied by a newly discovered Greek source on Umur's siege of Philadelphia: Matoula Couroupou, "Le siège de Philadelphie par Umur Pacha d'après le manuscrit de la Bibliothèque patriarcale d'Istanbul, Panaghias 58," in H. Ahrweiler, ed., *Geographica byzantina*, Paris, 1981, 67-77, and E. Zachariadou's note, *ibid.*, 78-80. Walter Kaegi drew my attention to this recent publication.

49. Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 114, completely missed the point.

50. See Lemerle, 110-113. For Sarukhan-oghlu's alliance, necessary for Phocaea, see, *ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

51. That the *Destan* stresses the dependent position of the Byzantine emperor is not without interest, see verses: 1055-1070.

52. In 1342 his army which landed in Thrace numbered 20,000: see Lemerle, p. 150; in the *Destan* it is 15,000, but his regular forces seem to be no more than 6000. For the growth of his fleet and army see *infra*.

53. It is to be remembered that the Ottoman conquest followed the same methods in its initial phase.

54. For these developments now see Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 144-229.

55. It is rather naive to take at face value the statements of Cantacuzenus asserting that Umur's behavior toward him was motivated simply by his faithfulness to him, cf. Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 145-77.

56. Thiriet, I, nos. 92, 93, 96, 115, 142, 147, 149, 160.

57. See Thiriet, nos. 171, 182.

58. See Lemerle, 187, note 3.

59. Thiriet, no. 189.

60. Thiriet, no. 142.

61. For the event see Delaville Le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, 92-95; P. Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 180-203; K. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, I, Philadelphia, 1976, 191-93.

62. In his letter to Humbert of Viennois: see Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 189, note 4.

63. N. Iorga, *Philippe de Mezières, 1327-1405, et la croisade au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris, 1896, 43-44.

64. See Iorga, *op.cit.*, 42-46; A. S. Atiya, *op.cit.*, 301-302; and Setton, *op.cit.*, 223.

65. For the burning of Umur's ships see Cantacuzenus, cited by Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 190; Iorge, *op.cit.*, 42.

66. The *Destan*, Mélikoff, verses: 2277-2365, confirms Cantacuzenus; see Lemerle, 4-17.

67. *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, 447; in his letter to the Pope, Hughes IV, king of Cyprus, claimed that the Sultan of Egypt, hearing of the fall of Smyrna, declared that he would destroy all Christian princes: see Iorga, *op.cit.*, 45.

68. The *Destan*, verses: 2091-2094.

69. See Nizāmeddin Shāmī, *Zafernāme*, ed. F. Tauer, Prague, 1956, Text: 421-22; notes, p. 179: "Of the Muslim rulers of Anatolia no one had been able to conquer it."

70. For the difficulties of the Pope in finding even the necessary funds to maintain a Christian garrison there, see Setton, *op.cit.*, 220-23.

71. See *Düsturname-i Enverî*, ed. M. Halil, Istanbul, 1929, Text: 83.

72. Setton, *op.cit.*, 206-07; P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese*, 86-124; the Byzantine government had to recognize Genoese rule over the island in return for an annual tribute of 500 hyperpers in 1363: see W. Heyd, *op.cit.*, I, 502. In reaction to the Byzantine plans to restore their naval power and sovereignty in the eastern Aegean and Pera, the Genoese passed to the offensive. Following their successes against Chios and the two Phocaeas, they extended the territory of Pera and surrounded it with strong walls (see W. Heyd, *op.cit.*, I, 499). Venice then began to consider an attack against its rival. Already in May 1348 Giustiniano Giustinian, captain of the Venetian squadron in the coalition fleet, was ordered to go to protect Venetian merchant ships in the Levant (Thiriet, *op.cit.*, I, no. 211). Soon afterwards Venice withdrew all his ships from the Christian fleet in view of a war against the Genoese.

73. Lemerle, *op.cit.*, p. 202.

74. The ambassador's name, rendered as *Essedin Balaban*, must be 'Izz al-Dīn Balaban; about this time, a certain *Balaban* of Genoa informed Al-'Umārī about the principalities in western Anatolia; he

was apparently a Genoese convert and probably the same as Essedin Balaban. For this embassy see J. Gay, *Le Pape Clément VI et les affaires d'Orient*, Paris, 1904, 89; and now, Setton, *The Papacy*, 216-20.

75. Andrea Dandolo's letter, dated 7 October, 1350, cited by Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 234.

76. Instructions to the Genoese ambassadors dated 26 May 1351: see Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 232; E. Zachariadou, "Sept traités inédits entre Venise et les émirats d'Aydın et de Menteşe, 1331-1407," *Studi Preottomani e Ottomani, Atti del Convegno di Napoli*, 1974, 1976, 237. Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 233, using the instructions given to the ambassadors of Genoa, showed that the date of the agreement was some time after the spring of 1351. The ambassadors should go to "ad altum locum (Alto Luogo, Ephesus) qui ille ominis Ihalabi." Melek Delilbaşı, "Türk Hükümdarlarına Ait Yunanca Ahidnâmeler ve Nâmeler," Thesis, Dil ve Tarih, Coğrafya Fakültesi, Ankara, 1980, 62-67, suggests that the treaty was made between 1346 and 1348 with the Genoese of Chios. According to this document the Genoese promised to pay a tribute; in return Hızır should give military aid whenever requested. In the treaty (provision 20) concluded in 1403 between the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman I and the Christian league, a reference is made to the tribute of 500 ducats paid yearly to the lord of Alto Luogo: see G. T. Dennis, "The Byzantine-Turkish Treaty of 1403," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 33 (1967), 80; also see F. Thiriet, "Les relations entre la Crète et les émirats turcs d'Asie Mineure au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle (1348-1360)," *Actes du XII<sup>e</sup> Congrès Internl. des Études Byzantines*, II, Beograd, 1964, 217.

77. See "İmtiyâzât" (H. Inalcık), *EI*<sup>2</sup>, IV, 1179.

78. M. Villani, cited by Heyd, I, p. 543, note 4; now see Zachariadou, *op.cit.*, 237; the negotiations took about two years, between 1351 and 1353. Hızır did not agree to turn against the Genoese: see Thiriet, *op.cit.*, 218.

79. Setton, ed., *The Crusades*, III, 204.

80. Thiriet, *Régestes*, I, p. 107, no. 412; Setton, *op.cit.*, 457-59.

81. Iorga, *Philippe de Mezières*, 202-72; Thiriet, *op.cit.*, 109; Setton, *op.cit.*, 249-57.

82. For this period see P. Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 145-74, 204-17.

83. See R. J. Loenertz, "Ambassades grecs auprès du Pape Clément VI (1348)," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XIX (1953), 178-96; Lemerle, 224-26; K. Setton, *op.cit.*, 212-15.

84. K. Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, I, Gotha, 1911, pp. 386-87, 396; Thiriet, *op.cit.*, no. 189.

85. Lemerle, 219-22. The area of Bergama and Troy facing the Dardanelles appears to have been organized as a frontier *sandjak* under a branch of the Karasi dynasty, first under Yakhshi Khan and then under Süleyman Beg.

86. See letter of A. de Schwarzburg to Pope John XXII, dated 3 September, 1319 in D. Le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers*, 365-67.

87. The *Destan*, Text, ed. M. Halil, p. 22; Mélikoff, verses: 250-55; Lemerle, 58-61, cf. my note 41.

88. The date of the Gallipoli expedition may be 1331 or 1332; see Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 63-74. I prefer the date 1333 for the expedition to Greece since in the *Destan* its account occurs just before that of the death of Mehmed Beg, which took place on 9 January 1334. As to the number of ships, the figures in these expeditions are partly confirmed in Byzantine or Western sources: by 1332, 72 ships in Cantacuzenus, in 1342, 200 in the same source, 300 in Gregoras, see Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 52, 72, 82; cf. D. Le Roulx, *op.cit.*, p. 92.

89. Perhaps this can explain why Umur had only 110 ships on his later expedition to Greece. In 1331 or 1332 he planned his daring attack on Gallipoli in a meeting with the princes of Sarukhan and Menteshe. The latter, Orkhan by name, though obviously the prince of Menteshe, is often confused with the Ottoman ruler Orkhan (1326-62).

90. Umur, the second son of Mehmed Beg, was to become Ulu-Beg, ruler of Aydın-ili, upon his father's death in 1334. For the structure of these principalities, particularly the way in which territory was divided up among members of the dynasty, see Halil Edhem, *Düvel-i İslamiyye*, Istanbul, 1927, 272-330; H. Inalcık, "Osmanlılarda Saltanat Verâseti Usûlü," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 92. See its translation in this volume.

91. A contemporary Arabic source, *Al-<sup>c</sup>Umarî, Masâlik al-Absâr*, 45, calls them *ghuzat fi'l-bahr*, sea *ghazis*.

92. Cf. E. Zachariadou, "Sept traités . . .," 229-40.

93. Hodja Selman seems also to be the principal source for the accounts of Umur Beg's expeditions in the *Destan*, see Text, 57; Mélikoff, verse 1865.

94. H. Kahane and A. Tietze, *The Lingua Franca in the Levant*, Urbana, 1958, Index: *Kadırğa*; S. Soucek, "Certain Types of Ships in Ottoman-Turkish Terminology," *Turcica*, VII (1975), 234-35; for an



Ottoman description of *kadırğa* Piri Reis, *Kitab-i Bahriyye*, ed. and trans. P. Kahle, II, p. XXIV, XXXVII.

95. Colin H. Imber, "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI (1980), 215. As described in Ottoman sources, "a standard galley had twenty-five thwarts on each side and three oarsmen to each thwart." In addition to the oarsmen, totalling about 150, a galley could hold a crew of up to 150. Crowded with such a large crew, a galley had a limited capacity for victuals and water barrels and had therefore to stay near the shore to continually refurbish its supplies: Imber, *op.cit.*, p. 216; for Venetian galleys see E. Fasano-Guarini, "Comment naviguent les galères," *Annales, Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, XVI (1961), 279-96.

96. In the projects for crusades drawn up in the first decades of the fourteenth century, ten to twelve galleys were thought enough to clear the Eastern Mediterranean of corsairs: see Atiya, *Crusades*, 56, 120; Mas Latrie, *Histoire de Chypre*, II, 118-25. But during the negotiations with Pope John XXII on the size of an allied Christian fleet to bring against the Turkish sea forces in the Aegean, Venice asserted that a fleet of twenty-four galleys (Rhodes four, Venice ten, and Byzantium ten) would be totally inadequate, and that even forty galleys, as was suggested later in 1334 (Rhodes ten, Venice ten, Byzantium six, Cyprus six, and the Pope and the King of France together eight) would not be sufficient. However, during negotiations with the King of France in 1332, Venice had suggested that twenty or thirty armed vessels could neutralize the Turkish sea forces: see Laiou, "Marino Sanudo Torsello," 386. In the *Destan*, the Christian navy which attacked Smyrna in 1334 and defeated Yakhshi is described as thirty ships strong; Western sources put the number at twenty: see Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 96-98. Evidently Venice must have had in mind the whole allied fleet of the Turkish maritime principalities in the Aegean, for after the destruction of the naval forces of Yakhshi, of the Karasi dynasty, in 1334, the Venetian Senate decided in 1339 that twelve war galleys were sufficient to guard the Gulf and Romania. In the project for a crusade submitted to Pope Clement VI in 1342, the Senate proposed that thirty galleys in good condition would be sufficient. When finally in 1344 the Christian allies attacked and captured the harbor fortress of Smyrna, their fleet numbered twenty-four galleys.

97. For these, see I. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı*, Ankara, 1948, 457, 468; Imber, *op.cit.*, 260-69.

98. This was a risky operation; on several occasions the Christians seized the ships left under the guard of a small force, and the raiders returning to the shore found themselves in desperate straits. This happened in 1326 in Euboea, see D. Jacoby, "Catalans," *op.cit.*, 251.

99. See Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 89-100.

100. Later on *azeb* was replaced in this meaning by the Persian term *Levend* or *levant*, see M. Cezar, *Levendler*, Istanbul, 1965.

101. For Turkish bow, see Atiya, *op.cit.*, pp. 81, 82, 108; in 1334 the Crusaders failed in an attempt to land at Smyrna because "wherever they went to land the Turkish soldiery repulsed them with their arrows," see *Destan*, Mélikoff, verses: 843-44, 1947-2125; also see Walter Kaegi, "The Contribution of Archery to the Conquest of Anatolia," *Speculum*, 39 (1964), pp. 96-108.

102. Horses were brought along on the expeditions, most probably in separate transport ships (*at-gemisi*): the *Destan*, verses: 490, 1216, 1249-52.

103. We shall see that later on in the Ottoman Empire frontier *ghazis* were named after their respective leaders as *Mihallu*, *Evrenozlu*, *Malkoçlu*, *Turahanlu*, etc. For the *ghazi* companionships, see P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1936, 24-29, 34-40; for *nökership* (*comitatus*) see H. Inalcık, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, III-IV (1979-80), 451-52.

104. As in the expedition to Kilia in 1341, see the *Destan*, verses: 1209-1306; Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 129-43.

105. Cantacuzenus gives 29,000 transported on 300 ships and speaks later in 1345 of 20,000 cavalymen: see Lemerle, 150, 206, cf. my note 52.

106. See the *Destan*, verses: 359-60.

107. See "Gelibolu," (Inalcık), *ET*<sup>2</sup> II, 985.

108. It is not, in fact, certain whether these details come from Enverî, who composed the part of the *Destan* dealing with Umur's exploits in 1464 on the basis of an original. The original text he used followed the oral traditions including the accounts of Selman, a companion of Umur. Enverî might have updated his source in his descriptions of the fighting and of the arms used. On the other hand, Lemerle, comparing this source with the Latin and Byzantine ones, showed that Enverî followed his source faithfully even down to the smallest details. For the Christian arms see especially the chapter in

the *Destan* concerning the capture of Smyrna in 1344, Mélikoff, verses: 1866-2108. As for the cannon, the *Destan*, verses: 2050-54, says the Christians “fired the kara-bughra” and burned down the Turkish tents. This might be a catapult hurling Greek fire. But Greek fire is known in the *Destan* as *naft* or *napht*. However, it is certain that the Turks became familiar with firearms towards the end of the fourteenth century. Dubrovnik ships calling at Ephesus during the last decades of the fourteenth century were armed with bombardes: see D. Petrović, “Firearms in the Balkans . . .,” *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, eds. V. Parry, M. Yapp, London, 1975, 177. The word *kara-bughra* is used for cannon in Central Asia in later periods. For the spread of firearms see A. Angelucci, *Documente inediti per la storia delle armi da fuoco italiana*, Turin, 1869, and Bruno Thomas, *Gesammelte Schriften zur historischen Waffenkunde*, 2 vols., reprint Graz, 1969. The Ottoman Turks became familiar with guns around 1380: Petrović, *op.cit.*, p. 175.

109. The *Destan*, Mélikoff, verse: 253.

110. The *Destan*, Mélikoff, verses: 2009-10.

111. *Ibid.*, verses: 2001-04, 2089-90.

112. Perhaps because it was new to the Turks, the *Destan* gives a detailed description of the tactics of “la petite grenouille,” applied by Cantacuzenus during the siege of Peritheorion (Buru) in 1343: see Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 168.

113. Even the Ottomans, with their well-developed financial resources in the fifteenth century, forced local populations to support *azebs* to be sent to the imperial army. There is no comprehensive study on the Turkish mercenaries in the service of Christian governments in the fourteenth century; for their importance see S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor*, Berkeley, 1971, 134, 182, 234, 403, 404. Even in Rhodes the commander of *Turcopouloi* was one of the highest commanders of the Hospitallers.

114. “When he had *fed* his soldiers in those two countries”: the *Destan*, Mélikoff, verse: 1117. *Doyurmak* or *doyum olmak* also meant to make booty in the vocabulary of the time.

115. See P. Wittek, “Yazidjioghly ‘Ali on the Christian Turks of Dobruja,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 14 (1952), 639-88.

116. See Lemerle, *op.cit.*, 109-113.

117. This is why the Ottoman Sultans preferred to endow pious foundations with the booty from the *ghaza*.

118. See M. Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 118-32. It is interesting to note that the Byzantine emperors divided their war booty in the same proportions.

119. This is an element common to all of the historical literature written under the Ottomans, the popular *ghaza* books, the *gesta et vita* literature, as well as the court historiography.

120. For the importance of slaves in Islamic society see my “Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire,” *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds*, eds. A. Ascher, T. Halasi-Kun and B. Király, New York, 1978, 25-52.

121. See H. Inalcık, “Kutadgu Bilig’de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri,” *Reşid Rahmeti Arat İçin*, Ankara, 1966, 269-71.

122. The *Destan*, Mélikoff, verses: 1300-1306.

123. *Ibid.*, verses: 695-710.

124. See “Dār al-‘ahd,” (Inalcık), *El<sup>2</sup>*, II, 116.

125. See especially the case with the Byzantine emperor: the *Destan*, Mélikoff, verses: 1050-80.

## A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: The Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II regarding Djem Sultan

### A REVIEW OF THE TURKISH SOURCES

When modern historians refer to the Ottoman sources on Djem Sultan they usually give priority to Saʿdeddīn, who submitted to Sultan Murad III in 1584 his *Tād̲j al-Tawārikh*, a history of the Ottoman Empire to the end of Selim I's reign in 1520.<sup>1</sup> The principal source, however, on which Saʿdeddīn drew his information, is a biography of Djem, *Wākīʾat-i Sulṭān Djem*,<sup>2</sup> written by one of his intimates who accompanied him in his exile to his death. It is a simple and faithful story, and undoubtedly, the most detailed and reliable account of Djem's life. It was written in the year 920/1514 when Selim I, son of Bayezid II, had recently overcome his rival brothers. The author concealed his name.

A modified version of the same work with a new title, *Ghurbetnāme-i Sulṭān Djem*,<sup>3</sup> was made under Süleyman I. The author of this work provides a completely different story about Djem's death, and inserts, quite awkwardly, a long controversy on Islam and Christianity which supposedly took place between Djem and the Pope. Otherwise, the work is simply a copy of *Wākīʾat*.

Saʿdeddīn's second source on Djem Sultan was Idrīs' *Hasht Bihisht*. Saʿdeddīn added to *Wākīʾat*. Idrīs' account on Djem's death. Hakīm al-Dīn Idrīs al-Bidlīsī wrote, upon Bayezid's order, a general Ottoman history down to the year 915/1509. It appears that Idrīs' main source on Djem was Mustafa (Muṣṭāfa Pasha), who was grand vizir at the imperial council when Idrīs was writing his history.<sup>4</sup> In 1489-90 Mustafa, then a *kapıdjı-başı*, was sent to Pope Innocent VIII as an ambassador.<sup>5</sup> Here is a summary translation of what Idrīs tells us about Djem Sultan:

The Grand Master of the Hospitallers (*hakim-i Rodos*) sent Djem Çelebi to the Pope, who is the leader of the Kings in

Europe and head of the Christians. The Pope guarded him in Rome, and saw to it that no one Muslim or non-Muslim could have contact with Djem. He made this matter the means to establish friendly relations with Bayezid, the Sultan of Ghāzīs, so that hostility was replaced by agreement between Islam and Christendom. Since the city of Rome was too far away no news had been received for a long time about Djem's life or death. The Sultan, *who is compassionate*, became distressed. He, therefore, decided to send Mustafa to Rome in order to ascertain the truth of the situation. To quote directly from Idrīs: 'Mustafa Paşa, who is now a vizir of high esteem, was at that time a *hād̲jīb al-hudjd̲jāb* at the Sultan's palace and a loyal man to whom the Sultan entrusted all his important affairs, open or secret.' After the hazards of the trip on land and sea he reached Rome. By relating the messages of the Sultan, he was able to bring the Pope into a conciliatory mood. The Pope permitted him to see Djem in the palace where he was kept confined (*"mahbūs ve mazbūt"*). He heard from Djem's mouth his complaints of homesickness and his request of forgiveness from his elder brother and Sultan of Islam. After that Mustafa brought up with the Pope the matters which the Sultan had entrusted him to negotiate. And he consolidated with the Pope by documents and oaths which are acceptable according to the Christian practice the ties of agreement and compact. The most important point on which both sides agreed to honor their pledge was to keep Djem guarded and not to let him fall upon Islamic territories as long as the Sultan and Pope lived. In return the Sultan promised to never attack him and to consider the Pope one of the rulers with whom the Sultan was in compact and agreement. This sworn agreement remained intact for a period until the time when the French King *rebelled* against the Pope, occupied several countries in Italy, and planned an Invasion of Muslim lands. He demanded Djem from the Pope. 'Since the Pope considered himself in religious and worldly affairs the highest authority (*khalīfe* = caliph) and successor to Jesus Christ he always rejected the request of the king in order not to infringe upon the agreement solemnly sworn with the Sultan.' Then, the French King