

AN OTTOMAN GLOBAL MOMENT:  
WAR OF SECOND COALITION IN THE  
LEVANT

A Dissertation  
submitted to the Faculty of the  
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences  
of Georgetown University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
In History

By

Kahraman Sakul, M.A

Washington, DC  
November, 18, 2009

Copyright 2009 by Kahraman Sakul  
All Rights Reserved

**AN OTTOMAN GLOBAL MOMENT:  
WAR OF SECOND COALITION IN THE  
LEVANT**

Kahraman Sakul, M.A.

Dissertation Advisor: Gabor Agoston, Ph.D.

**ABSTRACT**

This dissertation aims to place the Ottoman Empire within its proper context in the Napoleonic Age and calls for a recognition of the crucial role of the Sublime Porte in the War of Second Coalition (1798-1802). The Ottoman-Russian joint naval expedition (1798-1800) to the Ionian Islands under the French occupation provides the framework for an examination of the Ottoman willingness to join the European system of alliance in the Napoleonic age which brought the victory against France in the Levant in the War of Second Coalition (1798-1802). Collections of the Ottoman Archives and Topkapı Palace Archives in Istanbul as well as various chronicles and treatises in Turkish supply most of the primary sources for this dissertation. Appendices, charts and maps are provided to make the findings on the expedition, finance and logistics more readable.

The body of the dissertation is divided into nine chapters discussing in order the global setting and domestic situation prior to the forming of the second coalition, the Adriatic expedition, its financial and logistical aspects with the ensuing socio-economic problems in the Morea, the Sublime Porte's relations with its protectorate – The Republic of Seven United Islands, and finally the post-war diplomacy.

This study demonstrates through the examination of the negotiations that led to the alliance with Russia and Britain (1799) –the Triple Alliance-, Ottoman-Russian Convention (1800), and the Treaty of Paris (1802) that the Ottomans were well-informed on European affairs and flexible as well as realistic enough to form an alliance with the traditional enemy Russia against the traditional friend France. This study also offers a unique opportunity to observe the way in which the Ottomans could wage war on the cheap and still mobilize its resources effectively owing to the reforms of Selim III and local notables –petty as well as great ayans such as Tepedelenli Ali of Yanya- in a time when the friend and the foe believed that the Sublime Porte was on the brink of collapse.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation could not be done without the moral support and encouragement offered in abundance by my advisor Associate Professor Gábor Ágoston, and committee members Professor Virginia H. Aksan and Associate Professor Catherine Evtuhov. This study grew out of a paper I prepared for the graduate course on Imperial Russia offered by Professor Evtuhov in Fall 2003. I owe her deep gratitude for introducing me to the world of Imperial Russia and invaluable comments which eventually made me think about expanding my paper into a proper dissertation topic.

“I wish to express my appreciation to Associate Professor Virginia H. Aksan who sent to me her various essays written on the topic, furnishing me with insight” reads the ‘Acknowledgements’ of my master thesis submitted in 2001. Present study shows that my gratitude grew even more over the eight years in between and I could not be happier for being in a constant state of indebtedness in such a way. She has suggested the present title of this dissertation which encapsulates the gist of my arguments: an Ottoman Global Moment.

I could never imagine the outcome of our brief introductory interview with Professor Ágoston in front of the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul on a shiny day of the summer of 2001. Many doctoral students around me have envied me for the path he opened and led me through over the years: “lucky you” was usually the closing remarks uttered by my friends in any conversation over the way in which Professor Ágoston carried out his responsibilities as an advisor with an unfailing dedication and congeniality. My friends are absolutely right that I have been luckier than many doctoral

students in terms of the stimulating and warm treatment I received from my advisor and committee members.

I owe a special debt to Georgetown community for the intellectual environment it offered to me. Department of History granted me non-service research fellowship for two subsequent years from Fall 2005 to Spring 2007 without which I could not undertake the painstakingly long research in the archives. The nine-month junior residential fellowship (September 15, 2008-June 15, 2009) offered in the final phase of my dissertation project by the Research Center For Anatolian Civilizations (RCAC) functioning under Koç University proved fruitful in many ways. Nine months of intense discussions with Byzantinists, Classicists, art historians as well as Ottomanists augmented my belief in comparative approach to history inspired by my advisor and the committee members. I would like to thank all 2008-2009 RCAC fellows and the RCAC staff whom proved to be great friends and colleagues. My special thanks go to the ‘Ottomanist group’ within the RCAC for tolerating my often sarcastic and spiteful remarks in our discussions without ever forcing me to give a presentation and run the gauntlet: Alyson Wharton, Amanda Philips, Fulya Ozkan, Leyla Kayhan Elbirlik, Seven Ağır, Tsameret Levy.

I am grateful to the staff of the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (İstanbul), Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi (İstanbul), the British National Archives (London, Kew), the RCAC library, Aptullah Kuran Library (Boğaziçi Üniversitesi), ISAM library (İstanbul) and the Lauinger Library (Georgetown University) for their kind help in providing me with books and journals. Turkuaz Sahaf and Antiquariat, established by Püzant Akbaş and Emin Nedret İşli, has proved to be of tremendous importance for the Turkish intellectual

community. The support of its owners and the staff –academic and otherwise- fed into this dissertation in many ways.

I am indebted to Professor Evangelia Balta who read through Chapter 5 and supplied me with insightful comments as well as many studies. Our discussions with Professor Rossitsa Gradeva and Professor Dror Ze’evi prompted me to elaborate some of my arguments. Professor Selim Deringil, Professor Scott Redford, and Assistant Professor Meltem Toksöz have always provided moral support. Ali Yayıoğlu, Başak Tuğ, Tolga Esmer and Associate Professor M. Aladdin Yalçınkaya have kindly sent me their dissertations. Mr. Gerasimos M. Vlachos provided generous feedback on the Ionian affairs. Eduard Sozaev –a publishing expert of Russian navy- has translated parts from Mordvinov which improved my arguments in Chapter 5 considerably. Ahmet Arslantürk and Emir Yener have supplied me with various studies during my research. Emrah Gürkan drew my attention to early examples of provisioning of foreign navies by the Ottomans. Assistant Professor Cengiz Kırılı and Metin Bezikoğlu have shared with me the transcriptions of two important documents. I am also indebted to my friends from İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi for their technical assistance in the preparation of the maps in this study: İsmail Erdem Ufuk and Onur Karahan.

I should also express my deep gratitude for “the historians’ gang:” Günhan Börekçi, Fatih Yeşil, Assistant Professor Gültekin Yıldız, and Veysel Şimşek have always been patient enough to listen to my far-fetched ideas about their studies as well as those of mine. Rarely do the students working on the same topic engage in a sincere friendship and cooperation. Fatih proved to be an exception.

All appreciation should go to those mentioned above without which this thesis would have remained incomplete. Needless to say, all errors and shortcomings in this dissertation are my own. Thanks are due to my all friends fortunately too numerous to cite here one by one for their support; Emel and Erkut Özbay proved to be exceptional hosts during my one-month stay in the DC for the oral defence of my dissertation.

I must express my deepest gratitude and appreciation for my family. My mother Gülçin Şakul and my brother Kaan Şakul provided the familial love and affection which is all a doctoral student can ask for in the last phase of his studies.



*TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER*

*UĞUR ŞAKUL*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1	
Introduction .....	1
A description of the study: approaches, sources, and methods .....	1
A New Order in Search of Obedient Subjects and International Legitimacy .....	9
The general setting .....	9
The intellectual background .....	16
The imagined Ottoman absolutism .....	23
Russian absolutism as viewed by the Ottomans .....	30
Chapter 2	
Ottoman Diplomacy and the System of Alliances .....	49
Introduction .....	49
Ottomans and the Revolutionary Wars .....	53
Ottoman neutrality .....	53
Ottoman-French alliance .....	55
Opening of the Adriatic frontier: the demise of Venice .....	59
Renewed French proposals for alliance .....	62
The French invasion of the Ionians Islands .....	65
Ali Paşa and the French in Corfu .....	69
The Morea and the French threat .....	71
The Egyptian expedition .....	74
Ottoman-Russian Alliance .....	79
The treatise of Atıf Efendi .....	82
Conclusion of the Ottoman-Russian alliance .....	85
The Büyükdere and Bebek Conferences .....	86
Articles .....	89
The matter of subsidy .....	90
Reactions to Ottoman-Russian alliance .....	91
Conclusion .....	93
Chapter 3	
The Expedition .....	96
Introduction .....	96
The composition and strength of the Russo-Ottoman fleet .....	99
The Russian Black Sea fleet .....	99
Ottoman naval reforms .....	101
The mobilization of the Ottoman navy .....	104

Galleons (Kalyon) .....	107
Frigates (firkateyn) and corvettes (korvet) .....	108
An evaluation of the composition of the joint fleet .....	110
Mobilization of manpower .....	112
An account of the expedition .....	117
Occupation of the ‘Venetian Dalmatia’ and Ali Paşa of Yanya .....	117
The first phase of the Expedition: occupation of Islands .....	123
Zante .....	128
Cephalonia .....	129
Leukas and confrontation with Ali Paşa .....	131
The second phase of the expedition: the siege of Corfu .....	134
Initial engagements .....	137
Thwarted attack on Vidos .....	140
Ali Paşa’s arrival at Butrinto .....	144
The escape of Le Generaux and Rivoli .....	145
Ushakov-Ali Paşa Meeting .....	146
Arrival of the Albanian troops .....	149
Ottoman-British cooperation .....	150
Fall of Vidos and the surrender of Corfu contested .....	156
Capitulation of Corfu .....	163
Faltering relations .....	165
Sharing the booty .....	165
Garrisoning Corfu .....	168
A story untold: Ottomans fighting in Italy .....	172
Renewed requests for military assistance .....	172
Failure of communications .....	174
Operations in Italy: Ancona and Naples .....	176
A renewed French attack? .....	180
Logistical problems of the combined fleet .....	184
Albanian mercenaries in the service of the court of Naples .....	187
Disorders at Palermo .....	189
Narratives of mutiny .....	193
End of the expedition .....	200
Conclusion .....	202
 Chapter 4	
Finance .....	206
Introduction .....	206
Financing war .....	207
Revenues .....	213
Treasury bonds (esham) .....	213
The Imperial Mint and the Campaign Treasury .....	218

The New Revenues (İrad-ı Cedid) .....	219
Confiscations, forced borrowings, donations, budgetary savings .....	220
Foreign sources of revenue: ‘The French money’ .....	222
Expenditures .....	225
Cash substitutes .....	229
Ottoman pricing policy .....	233
Instruments of fund transfer .....	237
Freight payments .....	243
Conclusion .....	254
 Chapter 5	
Logistics .....	255
Introduction .....	255
Ottoman military logistics: a historical background .....	257
Introduction of the central provisioning and the galley .....	261
Organization of provisioning in the expedition to the Ionians .....	264
Supply problems .....	266
Articles on provisioning in the Treaty of Ottoman-Russian Alliance .....	273
Making sense of figures, quantities, and prices .....	275
Wine .....	276
Arak .....	283
Olive oil .....	285
Hardtack biscuit .....	290
On other provisions .....	296
Bulgur/hınta yarması (cracked wheat) .....	296
Chickpeas and beans .....	297
Clarified/purified butter .....	298
Vinegar .....	299
Salt .....	300
Firewood .....	300
Lentils and rice .....	301
Olive .....	302
Onion .....	303
In lieu of conclusion .....	305
 Chapter 6	
The Contractual Empire .....	310
Introduction .....	310
The politico-fiscal and administrative setting .....	312
The case of Ali Paşa .....	314
The rise of provincial households .....	318
The population of the Morea and the Avarız-hane .....	321

The petite ayans and the system of apportioning .....	323
The official depiction of the province of the Morea in the statutes of the province ...	328
The Household of Mustafa Paşa and the state of military preparations of the Morea .	331
Concrete cases and problems .....	337
The activities of the petite ayans in the war: Ebubekir Efendi and voyvodas .....	337
Bargaining with the subjects .....	345
Beyond the rhetoric of poverty and desolation .....	352
Hardtack Diplomacy .....	359
Provisioning of the Russian reinforcements .....	361
Conclusion .....	372
Chapter 7	
Running the Adriatic frontier .....	375
Introduction .....	375
The Ottoman presence in the Ionian Islands .....	378
Garrisoning Corfu .....	379
The diplomatic representative: Mustafa Reşid Efendi (Korfu Nazırı) .....	387
The Ottoman Squadron: Patrona Şeremet Mehmed Beg .....	389
How to run the Adriatic frontier .....	391
Winning the hearts of the Ionians .....	391
Debts over the transportation of the French POWs .....	393
Election of the archbishop .....	394
The Ushakov Constitution and the sending of the Ionian delegation to İstanbul .....	395
The Russo-Ottoman Convention (Korfu Muahedesi) .....	398
The Diploma (Nişan-ı Hümayun) .....	404
The Flag .....	408
Legal status of the Ionians –the former Venetian subjects .....	410
The Ionian trade .....	413
Dispute over the tribute .....	418
Disorders in the Ionians .....	420
Conclusion .....	427
Chapter 8	
Conclusion of Peace .....	429
Introduction .....	429
The Preliminary Treaty of Paris .....	431
The Treaty of Paris .....	449
Conclusion .....	461

Chapter 9	
Conclusion .....	464
Appendix A: Provisioning of the Russian fleet .....	474
Table I: Cash substitutes .....	474
Table II: The hardtacks baked under the supervision of Ebubekir Beg of Kordos .....	475
Table III: The hardtacks baked under the supervision of Ebubekir Beg of Kordos .....	476
Table IV: Russian provisions for H.1214 .....	477
Table Va: Provisions sent from the Morea to six Russian frigates ( H. 1215/25 May 1800-13 May 1801) .....	477
Table Vb: (H. 1215) Provisions sent from İstanbul to six Russian frigates .....	478
Table VIa: Provisions sent from the Morea to the six Russian frigates (29ZA1215- 30M12161/3 April 1801-12 June 1801) .....	478
Table VIb: Provisions sent from İstanbul to the six Russian frigates (29ZA1215- 30M12161/3 April 1801-12 June 1801) .....	479
Table VIIa: Provisions sent from the Morea to the Russian squadron of six warships in 13 June - 12 July 1801 (H. 1216) .....	480
Table VIIb: Provisions sent from Istanbul to the Russian squadron of six warships in 13 June - 12 July 1801 (H. 1216) .....	480
Table VIII: One-month provision of the Russian frigate <i>Navarşin</i> given in İstanbul (September 1801) .....	481
Table IX: Three-month provisions delivered to the Russian squadron of three ships in İstanbul (February 1802) .....	482
Table X: Three months' provisions for the consumption of the Russian reinforcements of 3,000 troops sent from the Naples to Corfu (1217/4 May 1802 – 22 April 1803) ..	483
Table XI: Nine months' provisions for the consumption of the Russian reinforcements of 3,000 troops deployed in Corfu (7 December 1802-1 September 1803) .....	484
Table XII: Provisions delivered to the Russian frigate in İstanbul on its voyage from the Naples to the Black Sea (1803) .....	485
Table XIII: One-month's provisions delivered to the Russian frigate "Sen Mişel" (St. Michel ?) (13 July 1803) .....	485
Appendix B: Provisioning of the Ottoman fleet .....	486
Table I: Breakdown of the pays of the Ottoman fleet and squadrons patrolled in the Adriatic .....	486
Table II: Summertime provisions (H. 1214/5 June 1799 – 25 May 1800) .....	487
Table III: Wintertime provisions (H. 1214) .....	487
Table IV: Summertime provisions (H. 1215/25 May 1800 – 14 May 1801) .....	488
Table V: Provisions handed over to Ebubekir Beg .....	488
Table VIa: Wintertime provisions (H. 1215) .....	488
Table VIb: Wintertime provisions (1215): the first half (for three months) .....	489

Table VIc: Wintertime provisions (1215): the second half (for three months) .....	490
Table VII: Summertime provisions of the Ottoman squadron of 569-crew (H. 1216) ...	491
Table VIIIa: The manpower source of the new Ottoman squadron of 1,100-crew and their pay .....	491
Table VIIIb: Summertime pay of the Ottoman squadron (1,100-crew) (H. 1216) .....	492
Table VIIIc: Wintertime pay of the new Ottoman squadron (1,100-crew) (H.1216) ...	492
Table IX: Wintertime provisions for the Ottoman fleet of seven ships (H. 1216) .....	493
Table X: Wintertime provisions of the Ottoman squadron (1,100-crew) (H. 1216) .....	493
Appendix C: Ottoman and foreign currencies .....	494
Appendix D: Foreign observations .....	497
Excerpt 1: Poqueville on the court of Tripolitsa (the winter of 1798-99) .....	497
Excerpt 2: Gell on the court of Tripolitsa (1804) .....	500
Excerpt 3: Gell on the court of Tripolitsa (January 1805) .....	502
Bibliography .....	504

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration I. The flag of the Republic of the Seven United Islands .....	410
Map I. The Borders of the Ottoman Empire, Venice, and Dubrovnik .....	59
Map II. Ottoman naval operations in the Adriatic, Italy, and Sicily .....	118
Map III. Organization of the provisioning of the Russo-Ottoman combined fleet .....	267
Map IV. The Morea, the Adriatic Sea, and the Venetian Gulf by Katib Çelebi .....	268
Plan I. The fortress of Corfu in the Ottoman siege (1716) .....	139
Plan II. The Ottoman siege of Corfu (1716) .....	141
Plan III. The siege of Corfu by Mahmud Raif Efendi .....	142
Plan IV. The attack on Vidos .....	158
Plan V. The attack of Corfu .....	159



## LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: Cash-substitutes .....	230
Table 5.1: wine provisions of the Russian fleet (1798-99) I .....	277
Table 5.2: wine provisions of the Russian fleet (1798-99) II .....	278
Table 5.3: olive oil provisions of the Russian fleet (1798-99) .....	285
Table 5.4: quantity of hardtack ordered to be delivered to the joint fleet in H. 1213 ....	291
Table 5.5: hardtack production by Ebubekir Efendi (1798-1800) .....	295
Table 5.6: six-month rations of an Ottoman and Russian seamen .....	307
Table 6.1: Ottoman exports to Russia (1800-1806) .....	357

## ABBREVIATIONS

### Islamic Months

M = Muharrem

S = Safer

RA = Rebiyyü'l-evvel

R= Rebiyyü'l-ahir

CA= Cemaziye'levvel

C= CEmaziye'l-ahir

B= Receb

Ş= Şaban

N= Ramazan

L= Şevval

ZA= Zi'l-kade

Z= Zi'l-hicce

H= Hegira

### Journal Titles and Publishing Houses

*IJMES = International Journal of  
Middle Eastern Studies*

*IJTS = International Journal of Turkish  
Studies*

*İÜEFTE = İstanbul Üniversitesi  
Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*

*SEER = South East European Review*

*TAD = Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-  
Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü*

*Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi Tarih*

*TED = İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat  
Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*

TTK = Türk Tarih Kurumu

TTV = Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal  
Tarih Vakfı.

### Measures and Currency

ak = Akçe

kt = Kantar

kl = Kile

ky = Kıyye

krş = Kuruş

pr = Para

### Ottoman Documents

A.ADV.DVE= Bab-1 Asafi Defterleri  
Düvel-i Ecnebiye

A.AMD = Bab-1 Asafi Amedi Kalemî  
Dosyaları

A.SKT = Bab-1 Asafi Sadaret  
Kethüdalığı Dosyaları

BOA = Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi

C.AS= Cevdet Askeriye Kataloğu

C.BH = Cevdet Bahriye Kataloğu

C.HRC = Cevdet Hariciye Kataloğu

HAT = Hatt-1 Hümayun Kataloğu

İE. HRC = İbnü'l-emin Hariciye  
Kataloğu Kataloğu

İE. İkts = İbnü'l-emin İktisad Kataloğu

MAD = Maliyeden Müdevver

nd = no date

TSA = Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### A description of the study: approaches, sources, and methods

This dissertation cuts across different strands in Ottoman studies: diplomacy, the business of war, social reform and Ottoman political households. The examination of war and diplomacy suggests that there were moments of integration and exclusion in the history of Ottoman-European relations. A careful reader will be quick to realize the willingness of this study to employ a comparative approach in order to place the Ottoman Empire in the greater context of the changing world as captured in the title of this work. Most of the statements made about the place of the Ottoman Empire after the Crimean War were also observable in the period under discussion. The recognition of the Sublime Porte as a European state with due guarantees for its territorial integrity, internationalization of the Black Sea, an acute sense of the necessity of survival policies, and even the matter of foreign loans were all part and parcel of Ottoman-European relations during the reign of Selim III. Russo-Ottoman alliance (1798-1807) and the conquest of the Ionian Islands from the French by a joint Russo-Ottoman fleet (1798-1800) constitute the concrete case study of this dissertation. An analysis of this case offers some explanations for the resilience of the Ottoman Empire which was believed to be on the verge of collapse by the friend and foe. Thus, a second consideration of this study is the running of the empire on a provincial basis in the turbulent years of Napoleonic wars with certain suggestions about political households and the inadequacy of the paradigm of ‘center-periphery.’

There are certain themes recurring throughout this dissertation: the contrast between official diplomacy of the imperial centers and the diplomacy-on-the-spot carried out by the imperial functionaries such as Nelson, Smith, Ushakov, Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Paşa, and Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg, save the ambassadors at foreign courts. This was related to the constant failures of communication between the imperial capitals and the warzones. These two factors defy any structural explanations to history. Therefore, chapters on war and diplomacy (II, III, VII, VIII) are written in narrative style with a descriptive tone so as to capture the vividness of the moment and bring back the ‘real Ottoman persons’ in Ottoman studies at the expense of confusing the reader with many names. Nevertheless, it has more merits to mention the names such as Abdülkadir, Mahmud Raif, Şeremet, Ebubekir Efendi, Hüseyin Şükrü and many others rather than resorting to the all-encompassing terms such as “the Ottomans” or “the ruling elite” since such terms misrepresent the Ottoman Empire as an ‘Oriental Despotism’ devoid of real persons who took decisions, carried out orders, and improvised their own policies on certain occasions. Thus historical personas will feature in our narrative style. There is, nonetheless, a structural approach to the period under discussion which is visible on the chapters on finance, logistics, and the administrative-fiscal culture in the provinces (IV, V, VI).

Ottoman documents resided in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA, İstanbul) and Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi (TSA, İstanbul) as well as manuscripts of certain reform treatises form the solid base for the arguments of this dissertation. A detailed and creative analysis of the documents on the provisioning of the joint fleet and the related

problems made it possible to test the impact of the war especially in the Morea (chapters V, VI). It is hoped that my approach to these dry documents relating the banal and routine facts of provisioning will encourage future researchers to utilize such documents for transcending the limits of conventional military history and addressing the greater problems of Ottoman studies. Documents on diplomacy (chapters II, VII, VIII) were consulted to revise many established views on the history of Ottoman diplomacy of this age. Reports of Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg and Mahmud Raif Efendi make it possible to reconstruct the operations of the Ottoman fleet in the Adriatic (chapter III) while an account book of the extraordinary revenues and expenditures pave the way for a discussion of Ottoman war finances (chapter IV). Due recognition is given in the footnotes if a document was used previously. Several approaches and conclusions of earlier researchers are also heavily cited in the footnotes. Therefore, the footnotes of this study are intended to present a supplementary text to the body text with a view to accommodate a discussion of historiography. Each chapter is organized independent of each other with separate introductions and conclusions as well as full references provided in the footnotes. This will help the reader focus on his/her own area of interest in this study.

Ottoman Sultan Selim III sent a letter in late September 1798 to Feth Ali -the Tipu (Tipoo) Sultan of Mysore- in order to dissuade him from allying himself to Napoleon against Britain. He related how the French invaded the venerated land of Egypt “by treachery and deceit, notwithstanding the observance of long subsisting friendship” with the object of subduing all the Muslims in the world so as to erase the name of

Muhammad's religion and nation from the world. It was well-known that the ultimate object of 'these infidels' was to send troops to India through Suez. Wherever they had roamed, they had violated the international law, preying on dominions, killing people, and pillaging like bandits. The new administration of France was based on absolute freedom and, refuting all sects, religions, God, prophets, it aimed at destroying all kings in the world. The Frenchmen were such 'plunderers and liars' that they even overran the dominions of the Pope who was their ally and killed all the priests. The populace of the Venice were like 'these evils' in having a republic. They professed neutrality and friendship towards France to no avail. They suffered even more than the Pope at the hands of the French; the government of Venice was now erased from the surface of the earth. After recounting the 'misdeeds' of the French in a fashion similar to the European monarchs, Selim boasted that Corfu and the Ionians were retaken from the French by the Muslims sent in giant ships with all the prominent French officers taken prisoner. He, consequently, asked Feth Ali to communicate to the Porte whatever grievances he held against the British so that Selim would remove them to Ali's satisfaction.<sup>1</sup>

This correspondence and many other cases examined in this dissertation capture the 'Ottoman global moment:' a moment that required the Sublime Porte to produce new responses to the world around it. Chapter II is a re-assessment of Ottoman diplomatic responses to the 'contagious' European turmoils after 1792. It takes issues with the

---

<sup>1</sup> H. Bayur, "Maysor Sultanı Tipu ile Osmanlı Padişahlarından I. Abdülhamid ve III. Selim Arasındaki Mektuplaşma", *Bellekten* XII/47 (1948), pp. 643-50. Turkish translation of Persian letter from Selim to Feth Ali, dated 7 June 1799; another letter to the same effect was sent to Ali on 23 September 1798; that is, in the days when negotiations with Russia and Britain were in progress. Ali's answer to this letter is retained in English in M. Martin (ed.), *The Despatches, minutes and correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley during his Administration in India* (London, 1837), v. 5, p. 24, no. XX.

uncritical acceptance of the Ottoman presentation of the French ‘treachery’ with a ‘stab-in-the-back’ rhetoric that is also visible in the aforementioned letter of Selim to Feth Ali. It rather argues that the Ottomans displayed a ‘benign disinterestedness’ and pursued neutrality during the First Coalition wars. The revival of ‘the Greek Project’ forced the Porte to conclude the Franco-Ottoman alliance of 1797, which was not ratified by Paris. The French occupation of the Ionian Islands rang the alarm bells for both Selim and Paul who had pacifist leanings as opposed to Catherine II. The impetus for a Russo-Ottoman alliance was not the loss of Egypt, but the demise of Venice and fall of Malta. While the Ottomans realized the French designs on Egypt by late spring 1798, they had already become aware of the formation of a whirlwind in their southwest flank as they got wind of the Treaty of Campo-Formio (17 October 1797). Seemingly Napoleon underestimated the Ottoman pragmatism and resilience, and overestimated the Ottoman hatred for the Russians. The Ottoman-Russian alliance signified the Ottoman participation in a European coalition which was an unprecedented development.

Chapter III examines the Russo-Ottoman expedition so as to stress the forgotten contribution of the Ottoman Empire in the War of Second Coalition based on the Ottoman archives. It also provides for the first time a case study that tests the outcomes of naval reforms of Selim. This chapter questions the assumptions about the Ottoman unwillingness to participate in the system of alliances through many examples. Due emphasis is given to Ali Paşa of Yanya in order to reach a more nuanced understanding of his role in his early career on the Adriatic frontier at the time of the expedition.

Chapter IV takes us from the heat of the war and diplomacy to the world of Ottoman finances. A review of the system gives us many insights about reforms, economy, war, and center-periphery relations. Comparisons with its allies suggest that the Porte had to spend as less as possible on war. This chapter reviews certain fiscal mechanisms in which the great and *petite ayans* played a crucial role, and analyzes the financial obligations undertaken to support the Russian navy, which has hitherto been escaped the attention of historians. Consequently, it outlines the nature of the Ottoman war finance on the example of the Ottoman-Russian joint expedition to the Ionians through concrete examples.

Chapter V provides an opportunity for grasping the functioning of the empire through an in-depth analysis of the provisioning of the Russo-Ottoman combined fleet. While the provisioning of Ottoman navy is like a blank page in Ottoman studies, supplying of a foreign navy makes the topic all the more challenging. Needless to say, provisioning of a foreign navy was unconventional if not unprecedented in Ottoman history and an examination of the subject is necessary to comprehend the role played by the Porte in the alliance. This chapter also shows the indispensability of petty *ayans* to the functioning of the empire. We will attempt to make sense of the figures concerning the provisions for the province of the Morea so as to view center-periphery relations from this light. This chapter also leads us to two unexpected conclusions about the Ottoman navy: several naval reforms envisioned by the 1804 naval regulations were already put in practice by the time of the expedition. On the other hand, official rations of the Russians supplied by the Sublime Porte were larger than those of the Ottomans. This is a clear



evidence of the value of comparative history in evaluating the outcomes of certain military reforms: the naval reforms thoroughly renovated the facilities in Ottoman dockyards, revised the command structure and introduced the common kitchen to the warships. Nevertheless, the 1703 regulations seem to have remained in effect.

Chapter VI turns to the topic of the nature of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. This chapter argues that the empire was characterized by the contractual relations particularly in the sphere of economy and military which required an all-encompassing network of households including great and petty *ayans* as well as appointed governors and local notables. This framework enables us to contextualize several problems retrieved from the archives that shed light on the central concerns of the periphery and the ‘peripheral’ concerns of the center on the example of the province of the Morea. Diplomacy once again enters the picture, though in a quite unusual way; seemingly banal disputes on the Ottoman standards of hardtack between the two allies give us the opportunity of realizing the priorities of the locals as well as the centrality of the provisions in the diplomacy of the Napoleonic Age; hence, ‘the hardtack diplomacy.’ This chapter also focuses on another Ottoman rhetoric that was common to Ottoman reformers: tales of exasperation and desperation in the face of internal and external problems. This self-portrayal of the ruling elite presented the Russians as always nagging and murmuring, and the subjects as always shirking and procrastinating. The examination of a petty *ayan*, Ebubekir Beg of Górdos, suggests that *ayans* actually had more intricate relations with the Porte. Ebubekir Beg attended the deliberations on the organization of

provisioning in İstanbul even though he was a minor figure in the provincial administration.

Chapter VII narrates the Ottoman attempts to control the Adriatic frontier after the conclusion of the expedition. It brought the Ottomans back in the Adriatic the presence of whom was totally ignored in the related literature. The focus will be on the nature of the Porte's relation to the Republic. This chapter argues that the reign of Alexander I signalled a major change in Russian policy towards the Adriatic to the dismay of the Ottomans since he saw a valuable military base in Corfu against the French. This ran counter to the Ottoman frontier policy in this region based on creating a buffer-protectorate to keep in check the French aggression as well as to suppress the unruly local populations by taking advantage of the demise of Venice.

Our discussion of the Ottoman global moment concludes with Chapter VIII that offers a detailed examination of the signing of peace with France after which the Ottomans once again adopted neutrality. This chapter, together with Chapter II, draws a different picture of the performance of the Ottoman diplomats. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire regained Egypt but its rights of suzerainty over the Ionian Republic were not explicitly stated. The process of opening of the Black Sea to international trade was also set in motion with many political and economic ramifications in the future.

## **A New Order in search of obedient subjects and international legitimacy**

### The general setting<sup>2</sup>

In 1786, the populace of İstanbul welcomed the crowded embassy sent by Feth Ali of Tipu, the ruler of Mysore in India. Rumors had it that Feth Ali would like to trade the port town of Mangalor on the Indian Ocean for Basra for expanding the commerce of his realm, which actually proved to be true. The dynasty of the Tipus was renowned for the successful wars it had waged against the British in the 1780s thanks to its army organized along the Western model. A contemporary Ottoman account, Cabi, narrated that the Indian envoy ‘came all the way from India to İstanbul in a palanquin on the shoulders of the soldiers so as to show the discipline of the army of his sovereign.’ Feth Ali was believed to boast Sultan Abdülhamid I in his letter that he had made use of the British prisoners to drill his soldiers in firepower tactics in accordance with the Islamic principle of due reciprocity (*mukabele-i bi'l-misl*). The populace rumored that he had offered the Ottoman sultan a military mission in order to reform the Ottoman army and help defeat the Russians. The palace was impressed by the Indian regiment that performed drill in Kağıthane; unfortunately, Abdülhamid had to turn down the offer since

---

<sup>2</sup> For general information on the reign of Selim III consult S. J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: the Ottoman Empire Under Selim III, 1789-1807*, (Harvard University Press, 1971); Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* (London: John Murray, 2005), pp. 383-412; Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (ed.), *History of the Ottoman State, Society, and Civilisation* (İstanbul: İrcica, 2001), v. 1, pp. 63-77; Virginia Aksan, “Selim III” in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (second edition), v. 9, pp. 132-134; S. Shaw, “The Transition from Traditionalistic to Modern Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Reigns of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839)”, *The Turks* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), v. 4, pp. 130-149; Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Bu Mülkün Sultanları. 36 Osmanlı Padişahı* (İstanbul: Oğlak Yay., 2004), pp.429-447; Reşad Ekrem Koçu, *Osmanlı Padişahları* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2004), pp. 424-469; F. Babinger, “Nizam-I Djedid” in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (second edition), v. VIII, pp. 75-76; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Nizam-ı Cedid” in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, v. 6, pp. 309-318.

the Janissaries would never accept this sort of drill and training. Nevertheless, the show drill impressed the heir-apparent Selim ‘who dreamt of revenge day and night.’<sup>3</sup>

Selim’s birth was regarded as a fortuitous event since no prince had been born since 1725. Therefore he was given a careful, thorough education and was raised as the potential savior of the empire. His uncle Sultan Abdulhamid I (1774-89) granted him a degree of freedom in social interaction, whereas seclusion in the Topkapı Palace had been the norm for the princes in Ottoman political culture. Given this freedom, the young prince began forming his own circle of reformers and corresponded with Louis XVI of France concerning statecraft, social institutions and military arts in Europe. His freedom of movement was restricted when his name was involved in the alleged plot of the Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Pasha against Abdulhamid I in 1785. Remarkably, he might be considered one of the rare heir-apparents in Ottoman history whose signature appeared on international treaties.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> M. A. Beyhan (ed.), *Cabi Ömer Efendi, Cabir Tarihi (Tarih-i Sultan Selim-i Salis ve Mahmud-ı Sani)* (Ankara: TTK, 2003), v. I, pp. 4-7, 18. The envoy was permitted to go to İstanbul from Basra with a retinue of 300 men only. The letter of Feth Ali recounted the victories over Britain but did not offer military assistance to the Ottomans. It did not narrate how the Tipus created the new army either. Feth Ali, nevertheless, really offered an exchange of the aforementioned towns, see Bayur, “Maysor Sultanı Tipu”, pp. 628-34. Cabi is a crucial source of information on the rumors circulating in İstanbul.

<sup>4</sup> The first known example of a ‘double treaty’ in Ottoman history is the Ottoman-Venetian treaty (1446), signed by both Sultan Murad II and the heir-apparent Mehmed II (the conqueror). It was a period of turmoil in which the Ottomans were faced with the danger of expulsion from the Balkans because of the successful Hungarian and Serbian thrusts. Selim II, son of Süleyman the Magnificent, was also required to put his signature in the Ottoman-Polish treaty (1564) –two years before his accession to the throne, see D. Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomacy Relations (15<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Century). An Annotated Edition of ‘Ahdnames and Other Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 72, 80; this time, the reason seems to have been the old age of Süleyman. According to Cabi Russia demanded the heir-apparent Selim to sign the ratification of Russo-Ottoman convention that recognized the Russian annexation of the Crimea (*Aynalıkavak Tenkihnamesi*). Old age of Abdülhamid I was the reason for the demand. Other contemporary sources are silent about the incidence. If Cabi is correct, then the case of Selim III differed from the cases above in the sense that the treaty he signed was not a treaty of trade privileges (Capitulations), but was of a more political quality, Beyhan (ed.), *Cabi Tarihi*, v. I, pp. 7-8; compare with A. Öğreten (ed.), *Mustafa*

Acceding to the throne at the age of 28 after four sultans of advanced age, his reign meant for his subjects the beginning of a new era. With the self-esteem of a great reformer, Selim undertook major reforms known as the *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Order) with the aim of restructuring the Ottoman statecraft and military institutions that ultimately had long-term repercussions in the political, social and economic configuration of his empire. The Ottoman Empire was caught between the wars with Russia and the Habsburg Empire as well as local uprisings such as those of the Wahhabis, Serbians, and Pazvandođlu of Vidin throughout the Balkans and the Arabian Peninsula. The dramatic changes brought about in European continental politics by the French Revolution in 1789 made it possible to conclude the Treaty of Svishtov ( August 4, 1791) with the Habsburg Empire with minimum loss of territory despite the military defeats. However, Russia fell on the exhausted Ottoman armies to gain the upper hand in negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of Jassy (January 9, 1792) in which the Ottoman Empire reaffirmed the Russian annexation of the Crimea.

Peace provided the opportunity for Selim to introduce his *Nizam-ı Cedid* reform program which was shaped by numerous reform proposals submitted by several statesmen and intellectuals. The tangible results of the program were seen in the spheres of the military and diplomacy. The overwhelming costs of the new army (reaching

---

*Kesbi, İbretnüma-yı Devlet (Tahlil ve Tenkitli Metin)* (Ankara: TTK, 2002), pp. 432-34 and M. İlgürel (ed.), *Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, Mehasinü'l-Asar ve Hakaikü'l-Ahbar*, (Ankara: TTK, 1994), pp. 100-07, 141-47.

23,000 men in 1807) required setting up of a separate treasury, *Irād-ı Cedid* (New Revenues), which meant an increased tax burden on an already impoverished people.<sup>5</sup>

The opening of new military technical schools and restructuring of the artillery corps were followed by the foundation of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army in 1794 on the European model with Western-style uniforms, equipment, and –most significantly– military discipline. While the first recruits in this army included Russian and Habsburg fugitives and prisoners of war, recruitment later relied on the Turkish peasants and tribesmen of Anatolia. The Balkans was excluded as an area for recruitment since the strong power brokers of the region were opposed to the reform program. The new army was organized as a provincial militia force rather than a professional standing army in the Western sense. The reorganization of the arsenal and the gunpowder works, the construction of the first military barracks on the outskirts of İstanbul, and the construction of about 50 state-of-the-art warships are among the successes of the reform program. Various works on military arts and sciences were translated from Western languages into Turkish laying the necessary infrastructure for the modern sciences: this signaled the coming of a new generation of engineers with Western-style thinking. In addition to the initial reform proposals, the advocates of reform penned many treatises, some in European languages, for propaganda purposes at home and ‘image-making’ abroad.

Another sphere addressed by the reform program was diplomacy. Because Selim reigned in the Napoleonic age, his fate was directly affected by the instability in European politics. As the political and military power of the Ottoman Empire diminished,

---

<sup>5</sup> Chapter 4 “Finance” offers an analysis of fiscal reforms.

the Sublime Porte discovered that modern international diplomacy was an increasingly valuable tool. A new class of bureaucrats with a Western mentality rose from the ranks of these diplomats, and these would shape and carry out the *Tanzimat* reforms in the next period of Ottoman history. The Ottoman alliances with Sweden (1789) and Prussia (1790) against Russia and the Habsburg Empire were followed by an Ottoman alliance with Britain and Russia (the Triple Alliance) against France when France invaded Egypt in 1798. Despite intense diplomatic pressure brought to bear on the empire during the First Coalition Wars (1793-95), the Sublime Porte declared neutrality for the first time in its history, determined to remain outside European political entanglements in order to carry forward its program of domestic reform. This resulted in the appointment of the first permanent ambassadors to London (1793), Berlin (1795), Vienna (1795), and Paris (1795); St. Petersburg was left out on the rumors concerning Russian military preparation against the Ottoman Empire in 1795.<sup>6</sup>

The first military action against France in the Second Coalition Wars (1799-1801) involved sending a joint Russo-Ottoman fleet against the French in the Ionian Islands in the Adriatic. This made the Ottomans a party to a coalition for the first time in history. The Ottomans declared neutrality for a second time during the Franco-British War in 1803 that broke out after the failure of the ‘Definitive Peace of Amiens.’ However, successive French victories in Europe, especially the humiliation of the Habsburgs in the Battle of Austerlitz (1805), persuaded the Ottomans to pursue a pro-French diplomacy.

---

<sup>6</sup> Chapter 2 “Ottoman Diplomacy and the System of Alliances” and Chapter 8 “Conclusion of Peace” discuss Ottoman diplomacy of the era in detail.

The renewal of alliance with Russia in 1805 did not prevent Selim from recognizing Napoleon as emperor of France in 1806. The Ottoman refusal to comply with Russian demands with regard to the Romanian principalities and to expel the French ambassador (Sebastiani) after 1805 resulted in a war with Britain and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-1812. The British responded to the Ottoman recognition of Napoleon by sending of a fleet to İstanbul in February 1807, a heavy political blow for pro-British Ottoman reformers, although the move was of little consequence in military terms.

Sultan Selim's internal opponents made use of the unsettled political conditions of the empire –the shifting international alliances and the ensuing revolts to form a coalition composed of local Balkan power brokers, İstanbul-based *ulema*, and the Janissaries. When Sultan Selim decided to dispatch *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops against the Serbs in 1806 Edirne refused to admit these troops, fearing the introduction of conscription in the Balkans. The sultan's opponents in the palace transformed this political conspiracy into an open revolt that cost Selim III his throne and life.

The decisive incidence took place in the fortresses along the Bosphorus when troops there, encouraged by sultan's opponents in the palace, mutinied on the rumors that they would be forced to wear the European-style uniform of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army. Often mischaracterized as the result of fanaticism, ignorance, and corruption that swept away all the westernizing reforms in bloodshed, the rebellion that toppled Selim III - commonly known as the Kabakçı Mustafa Revolt- was, in fact, the result of a political conspiracy carried out by a rival faction in the palace that, resenting the arrogance and



corruption of the reform committee, made use of the discontented Janissaries, the *ulema*, and the strongmen of the Balkans whose vested interests were threatened by the reforms.<sup>7</sup>

Unaware of the political conspiracy, Selim refrained from sending the *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops to suppress the uprising. The march of rebellious Ottoman troops to Istanbul on the secret invitation of the sultan's enemies created a snowball effect and the uprising turned into a revolt. The demoralized sultan complied with all the demands of the rebels including disbanding his *Nizam-ı Cedid* army and executing his reform entourage but could not save his throne. Sultan Selim was assassinated the following year in an attempted counter-coup orchestrated by his supporters Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, the local powerbroker of Rusçuk (Ruse), and the Grand Vizier Çelebi Mustafa Paşa.<sup>8</sup>

Ebbs and flows of diplomacy notwithstanding, economic depredations, extravagancy of his court, and most importantly the lack of a broad base of support for the reform agenda sealed the fate of the first great reformer Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. The reign of Selim has often been romanticized as a struggle of the 'luminous forces' of reform (*teceddüd*) against the 'religious reactionaries.' In fact, the technical

---

<sup>7</sup> For a criticism of misconception of the 1807 Rebellion as a bloody revolt claiming thousands of casualties see, K. Beydilli and İ. Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi ve Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Eseri*, (Ankara: TTK, 2001), p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> A new generation of Ottomanists shows genuine interest in the Ottoman political culture of this era and the nature of the reign of Selim see, F. Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına Osmanlı Kara Ordusunda Değişim, 1793-1826*, (Hacettepe Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009); T. Esmer, *A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790-1808* (The University of Chicago, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009); B. Tuğ, *Politics of Honor: The Institutional and Social Frontiers of "Illicit" Sex in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Anatolia* (New York University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009); A. Yaycıoğlu, *The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis, and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)* (Harvard University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2008); A. Yıldız, *Vaka-yı Selimiye or the Selimiye Incident: A Study of the May 1807 Rebellion* (Sabancı Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2008); B. Başaran, *Remaking the Gate of Felicity: Policing, Social Control, and Migration in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century, 1789-1793* (the University of Chicago, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2006).

schools and the printing house continued to operate, and the technical corps in the army was reinforced through new regulations by the succeeding sultans.

### The intellectual background

While the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms of Selim III are one of the well known episodes of the Ottoman history, they were not discussed in their proper context, which was the Napoleonic Age. What was so global about it was the new world order that was knocking on the ‘Sublime Porte’ –or, rather, breaking into the ‘Gate of Felicity.’ To be more precise, new imperial thrusts with all the political, military, economic, financial, and social implications were to unfold in the Levant beginning by the demise of Venice. The Porte increasingly felt the necessity of a new reconfiguration of state and society in order to mobilize material and human resources to meet the unprecedented challenges of the new age. Therefore, this study does not consider the reforms of Selim III as a mere ‘agenda’ of a limited number of state elites grouped around the Sultan, but as the *zeitgeist* of the age that influenced those ‘reformers’ as well as ‘the opponents’ regardless of their factional disputes in the state apparatus.<sup>9</sup> The mass of society also had an acute sense of the overwhelming change of the surrounding world and developed different attitudes about it, partly owing to Selim’s adoption of certain revolutionary instruments such as popular propaganda through brochures and pamphlets. Remarkably, each phase of the

---

<sup>9</sup> For a recapitulation of the conventional approach that presents *Nizam-ı Cedid* as a reform agenda of a tiny section of a ruling elite with a limited world view who were more interested in enriching themselves than reforming the empire see, A. Yıldız, *Vaka-yı Selimiye or the Selimiye Incident*. This study serves as a corrective in relating the details of the mutiny that ended in the dethronement of Selim III in 1807. It raises certain criticisms directed at the paradigm of ‘modernizers vis-à-vis conservatives’ without due recognition of the existing revisionist literature; in addition, the author is not totally free of modernist assumptions in her criticisms; on Selim’s ‘traditional’ methods of social control see, B. Başaran, *Remaking the Gate of Felicity*. The author, nevertheless, focuses on the early reign of Selim.

Janissary opposition to the reforming agendas beginning by the 1770s tended to be more radicalized, finally ending up in a civil war in the streets of İstanbul in 1808 in which the Palace had to bombard its own capital whereas the opponents did not hesitate to storm the Palace with ‘the quick-fire artillery,’ resembling the social strife ravaging Italy during the Napoleonic Wars: the result was the murder of two former sultans, Selim III and Mustafa IV with Mahmud II remaining the only male member of the dynasty.

The general term *nizam-ı cedid*, which the Ottomans had hitherto used to describe minor administrative and financial reforms, took on a new meaning by the time of Selim, the opposite of *nizam-ı kadim* –an ambiguous term signifying the traditional Ottoman system. According to its newer meaning, *Nizam-ı Cedid* usually refers to the Western-inspired reforms of Selim that set the stage for the later ground-breaking *Tanzimat* reforms. In its narrower sense, *Nizam-ı Cedid* refers to the establishment of the Western-style army with a separate treasury, *İrad-ı Cedid* (new revenues). In its widest sense, it described the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a modern absolutist state. The New Order actually reflected the shaping of a new conception of ‘ideal society’ as a prerequisite of creating the modern, rational, bureaucratic and, above all, central state. The ‘obedient army’ was to be its epitome only; it was a complementary ingredient – albeit, proved to be insufficient by itself to establish a ‘well-ordered police state.’<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Raeff provided the textbook case of how the ‘police state’ was constructed through charters, statutes, and ordinances in Russia on the model of Prussia. In Ottoman Turkish such ordinances were called *nizam-name*; lit, the book of order, hence *Nizam-ı Cedid* –the New Order. See, Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800* (Yale University Press, 1983); this line of argument is also visible in the following studies: Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid’den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*; G. Yıldız, *Osmanlı Kara Ordusunda Yeniden Yapılanma ve Sosyo-Politik Etkileri (1826-1839)* (Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2008); V. Şimşek,

There were many ‘non-political’ and ‘non-military’ developments that indicate the existence of this new Ottoman mind obsessed by regulating the order of things. As an accomplished composer, Selim encouraged Hampartzum Limonciyan and Abdülbaki Nasır Dede to develop new notation systems owing to which thousands of pieces of palace music (to be renamed ‘Turkish Art Music’ in the Republican era) were recorded and left to posterity. He also had books written on the definitions and rules of many modes and rhythmic patterns (*makam u usul*) of the palace music. He was certainly interested in inventing new composite *makams* in his own pieces as a composer. The mindset of Selim is best exemplified by the opening lyrics of *Suz-i Dilara Ayin-i Şerifi* that he composed as an overture in the performance of the whirling dervishes: “the days of the old vendors are past, new things are sold now in our bazaar.”<sup>11</sup> Mehmed Esad Galib Dede (1757-1799), best known for his celebrated *Hüsn ü ‘Aşk* that offers a new direction for the Ottoman literature, was one of Selim’s companions and the sheikh of the Galata Mevlevihane. Not surprisingly, he praised Selim’s rejuvenating reforms and

---

*Ottoman Military Recruitment and the Recruit: 1826-1853* (Bilkent University, unpublished MA thesis, 2005); M. Mert Sunar, *Cauldron of Dissent: A Study of the Janissary Corps, 1807-1826* (SUNY Binghamton, unpublished MA thesis, 2006).

<sup>11</sup> F. Salgar, “Müzisyen Sultan III. Selim” in *Vefatının 200. Yılında Bir Reformcu Şair ve Müzisyen: Sultan III. Selim Han* (exhibition catalogue) (İstanbul, 2009): 65-73; “The need for creating novelties manifests itself in designing new makams, and also bending some established rigid rules to some extent. The years when he was a prince and sultan are usually referred to as ‘the era of Selim III’ in the history of Ottoman music”, see E. Pekin, “Music At the Ottoman Court” in *Sultan Bestekarlar. Turkish Classical Music Composed by Ottoman Sultans* (İstanbul: Kalan Müzik) , p. 36. This album contains 47 pieces composed by several Ottoman sultans, including Selim III. Also consult to *Osmanlı'nın Sesleri. III. Selim* (İstanbul: Boyut Müzik). This album included 20 pieces composed by Selim III; Selim’s nickname as a poet was *İlhami* (inspirer). His poems are published in K. Yılmaz, *III. Selim (İlhami). Hayatı, Edebi Kişiliği ve Divanının Tenkitli Metni* (Edirne, Trakya Üniversitesi, 2001). This voluminous work also brings together the facsimiles and transcriptions of all essays and excerpts from several works written on Selim III in the Ottoman period. It gives the opportunity to undertake a study of the evolution of Selim’s romanticized image in history.

sought to legitimize the means of reforming. He contended that sources of information were countless and one should be open to receive the necessary information from the Pharaoh as well as from Moses. One would become an infidel otherwise since it would mean the denial of the divine plan that included both the pious and the impious.<sup>12</sup>

The formal *Nizam-ı Cedid* reform program instituted by Selim was carried out by a dedicated reform committee. Selim had formed a sort of advisory council to carry out the reform program. The rift between this ‘kitchen cabinet’ (*atabegan-ı saltanat*, or *ricali devlet* –the state elites- following Cevdet Paşa) and the official members of the government was a crucial element in sealing the fate of Selim’s reign since the latter group had to bear the political responsibility of implementation of these reforms, while the former entrenched their hold in politics and bureaucracy, and enriching themselves through the new treasury owing to the reforms.<sup>13</sup> Many treatises and essays were written in 1789-1807 in support of reforms.<sup>14</sup> First category of these works included the reform proposals submitted immediately at the request of Selim III after the War of 1787-1792. They had a sense of urgency regarding the necessity of military and administrative reforms.<sup>15</sup> The second category consisted of the ambassadorial reports written by the

---

<sup>12</sup> George W. Gawrych, “Mevlevism and the Nizam-ı Cedid”, *IJTS*, iv/1, 1987, pp. 103, 111; C. Dilçin, “Şeyh Galib’in Mevlevi-hanelerin Tamirine İlişkin Şiirleri”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları XIV* (1994): 29-76.

<sup>13</sup> Remarkably, the black list the rebels submitted to the palace in the rebellion in 1807 demanded the execution of a limited number of people -roughly ten names-, mostly from this inner circle, demonstrating that it was not a bloody revolt despite the general assumption. Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 87.

<sup>14</sup> For a seminal attempt to evaluate the entire genre of reform treaties written in 1774-1839 see, K. Beydilli, “Küçük Kaynarca’dan Tanzimat’a İslahat Düşünceleri”, *İlmi Araştırmalar* 8 (1999): 25-64; for a reassessment of the reform treatises written during the reign of Selim see, K. Şakul, “Nizam-ı Cedid Düşüncesinde Batılılaşma ve İslami Modernleşme”, *Divan İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi* 2/15 (2005): 117-150; also see, A. Yıldız, *Vaka-yı Selimiye or the Selimiye Incident*, pp. 164-80.

<sup>15</sup> Karal published the copy of a compilation that contained only the summary proposals see, E. Z. Karal, “Nizam-ı Cedide dair Layihalar”, *Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi*, I/6 (1942): 414-425; II/8 (1942): 104-111; II/11

permanent or temporary Ottoman ambassadors sent to the Western courts (London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna). These texts were well-organized presentations of the respective courts in terms of the functioning of the state apparatus, social and economic institutions as well as the military institutions. Although they shared the same audience as the first category –the ruling elite- they were not reform proposal but rather source of inspiration for and concrete models of reform.<sup>16</sup> The third category was composed of propaganda pieces written in French for foreign consumption as well as the polemical pieces in Turkish for domestic consumption. Both were written at a time when reforms were brought into a degree of fruition and aimed to popularize the reform program among the subjects and abroad.<sup>17</sup> The fourth and the final category included ‘complementary texts’

---

(1943): 342-351; II/12 (1943): 424-432; Öğreten provided a critical edition of this compilation. Comparison of the compilation with the original proposals suggested that the latter had a wider scope than suggested by the compilation see, Ahmet Öğreten, *Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Islahat Layihaları* (İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1989).

<sup>16</sup> Mehmed A. Yalçınkaya, *The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Embassy in Europe: The Embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London (1793-1797)* (University of Birmingham, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1993); Yalçınkaya, “Mahmud Raif Efendi as the Chief Secretary of Yusuf Agah Efendi, The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Ambassador to London (1793-1797)”, *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma Merkezi V* (1994): 422-434; İbrahim Küreli, *Abdurrahim Muhib Efendi'nin Fransa Sefaretnamesi (Küçük Sefaretname)* (İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1992); for Es-seyyid Ali Efendi, see İbrahim Küreli, “Esseyyit Ali Efendi'nin Paris Risalesi”, *İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi* 5 (1997): 172-197; U. İyigünler, *Mustafa Rasih Efendi'nin Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaretnamesi* (Kırıkkale Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1998); Sema Arıkan, *Nizam-ı Cedid'in Kaynaklarından Ebubekir Ratib Efendi'nin Büyük Layihası* (İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D thesis, 1996); Vahdettin Engin, “Mahmud Raif Efendi Tarafından Kaleme Alınmış İngiltere Seyahati Gözlemleri”, in *Prof. Dr. İsmail Aka'ya Armağan* (İzmir 1999): 135-162; F. Yeşil, *III. Selim Döneminde Bir Osmanlı Bürokrati: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi* (Hacettepe Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2002).

<sup>17</sup>A facsimile of Mahmud Raif Efendi's *Tableau des Nouveaux Reglements de L'Empire Ottoman* is produced with its Turkish original in Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi ve Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Eseri*; the French and Turkish texts of Küçük Seyyid Mustafa's *Diatribes de L'Ingénieur Séid Moustapha sur L'État Actuel de L'Art Militaire, de Génie, et des Sciences à Constantinople* are available in Beydilli, “İlk Mühendislerimizden Seyyid Mustafa ve Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Risalesi”, *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* XIII (1983-87): 387-479; *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi* or *Hülasatü'l-kelam fî reddi'l-avam* is also known with the title of *Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*. The manuscript was first published as a supplement to *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası (TOEM)*, 37, 42 (1328); for the transcription of this supplement see, Hüseyin Namık Orkun, *Türk Hukuk Tarihi-Araştırmalar ve Düşünceler-Belgeler* (Ankara 1935), pp. 402-447; another

that only came in the last years of Selim's reign. They portrayed the shortcomings of the reform program and tried to enlarge its scope so as to give us some hints of the possible reasons of the 1807 Revolt.<sup>18</sup>

The *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms were not solely based on Western inspiration. A new Islamic discourse, partially shaped by the Naqshbandiyya, Mevlevi, and Halveti orders, was as influential in establishing and carrying forward these reforms as were the Western concepts of state and society. Unlike many in the West, Ottoman intellectuals did not automatically equate modernity with secularism: thus reinforcement of the traditional sumptuary laws, which continued to regulate moral conduct in the empire, went hand in hand with modern policies of industrialization and the establishment of a conscript army.<sup>19</sup> In line with Ottoman pragmatism, the advisory council of Selim incorporated Islamic laws (*sharia*) and values into the reform program, making every effort to justify the adoption of a Western model of the absolutist state by redefining conventional Islamic notions. Within this context, Ottoman reformers invited the population to understand the Western idea of civic duty within the more familiar Muslim framework of

---

transcription was offered by A. Uçman, *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi* (İstanbul, 1976); the treatise was translated into English by William Wilkinson, *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia* (Londra, 1820), "Appendix", pp. 216-294; for the French translation see, *Tableau Historique Geographique et Politique de la Moldavie et de la Valachie* (Paris, 1821), "appendix", pp. 265-355; for the possible identification of the anonymous author with Vasıf see, Kemal Beydilli, "Sekbanbaşı Risalesi'nin müellifi hakkında" *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 12 (2005): 221-224; Ö. İşbilir (ed.) *Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair bir Risale: Zebire-i Kuşmani fi Tarif-i Nizam-ı İlhami* (Ankara: TTK, 2006).

<sup>18</sup> A. O. Çınar, *Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behic'in Sevanihü'l-Levayih'i ve Değerlendirilmesi* (Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1992); A. Sarıkaya, *Ömer Fa'ik Efendi, Nizamü'l-Atik* (İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished graduation thesis, 1979).

<sup>19</sup> Historians tend to believe that the enforcement of the sumptuary laws was a well-calculated policy to obtain the support of the *ulema* for reforms and the war effort. Making a clear distinction between 'modernizing' reforms and 'restorative' reforms, they think they are mutually exclusive. For an analysis see D. Quataert, "Clothing Laws, state and society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829", *IJMES* 29/3 (1997): 403-425.

serving state and religion (*din ü devlete hizmet*) and submission to the ultimate state authority (*ulu'l emre itaat*). Likewise, the principle of due reciprocity (*mukabelei bi'l-misl*), the Islamic formula justifying the adoption of Western military techniques, became a more general principle for the transfer of knowledge from Europe.<sup>20</sup>

Submission to the ultimate authority, was mobilized to enlist the support of the Muslim subjects for the creation of an Ottoman absolutism in the leadership of the ruling elite. Consequently, the reign of Selim was at the same time a search for a new interpretation of Islamic orthodoxy that would legitimize the reconfiguration of the empire after Western absolutism. In other words, the 'politicization of Islam', often attributed to the reign of Abdülhamid II, was already at work by the time of Selim III thanks to the influence of Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi movements.<sup>21</sup> Almost all of the names on the black list presented to the palace by the rebels were the disciples of Sheikh Bursalı Mehmed Emin Efendi, whom was exiled to Bursa after the revolt.<sup>22</sup> Remarkably, Selim

---

<sup>20</sup> For one of the earliest studies that drew attention to the principle of due reciprocity in its narrow meaning see, Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman 'Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II" in Heyd (ed.), *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization*, Scripta Hierosolymitana, v. IX, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1961), pp. 74-75; In Seyyid Mustafa's cyclical model of history, production of scientific knowledge and its transfer to other parts of the world in accordance with the principle of due reciprocity is the driving force of history. Societies and states undergo a continuous transformation in which science, learning, and industry travel throughout the world to find the place where they are received favorably. Therefore science and learning had been transferred from the Indians, Egyptians, and Persians to Greeks and Romans, who taught them to the Europeans, see Beydilli, "Küçük Seyyid Mustafa", pp. 434-435, 440 (Tr.), 458, 473 (Fr.); Behiç Efendi also utilized this principle to legitimize the Western learning.

<sup>21</sup> Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford University Press, 2001); Aksan saw the origins of the politicization of Islam in the policies of Mahmud II, see Aksan, "Breaking the Spell of Baron de Tott Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760-1830", *The International History Review*, XXIV/2 (2002): 253-277.

<sup>22</sup> This order, founded by Ahmad Sirhindi in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century in India reached İstanbul in successive waves beginning from the last decades of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. It was an urban order that found its followers from among the educated strata and it gained many supporters among the upper classes in İstanbul during the time of Selim when new convents were found throughout the city. In addition to those founded by



founded a Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi convent in the Selimiye Barracks at Üsküdar in 1805 and appointed *imams* to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps as opposed to the Bektaşî sheikhs of the Janissaries. This was a clear sign of his will to have religious orthodoxy in the new corps.<sup>23</sup> This brings us to the last principle, ‘service to religion and state.’ The new search for the obedient subject drew on the classical Islamic and contemporary Western ideals. Aksan detected the grassroots of this ‘etatist’ evolution in İbrahim Müteferrika and concluded that it already became evident by the treatises of Ahmed Resmi Efendi –the plenipotentiary who signed the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. She argued for certain parallelisms between the individual obligation of ‘serving the religion and state’ in the Ottomans and the emergent political culture in Europe.<sup>24</sup>

### The imagined Ottoman absolutism

One particular aspect of the reforms of Selim was the popular propaganda devised by the ruling elite to rally mass support for the cause of the New Order. Reinforced by the

---

Selim and Sammani-zade as mentioned above, two were founded respectively by Grand Vizier Mehmed İzzet Paşa (1795-1798), and İbrahim Nesim Efendi -one of the most outstanding and hated member of the kitchen cabinet who was also one of the first victims of the Kabakçı Revolt (1807). See B. Abu-Manneh, *Studies On Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century (1826-1876)* (İstanbul: the Isis Press, 2001), pp. 9-18, 40-4, 61.

<sup>23</sup> Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order was distinguishable for its political activism and religious revivalism. Putting the emphasis on the moral and religious well-being of the community, it demanded strict adherence to *shari‘a*. Its missionary zeal obliged sheikhs to carry out missionary activity among the political elite to achieve the ultimate goal of the order -bringing the Muslim community in line with *shari‘a*. The ideals of the order were incompatible with the Bektaşî order; while the ruling elite attached itself to the former order, the lower strata including the Janissaries adhered to the latter. Against the background of the British expansion in India, the adversity towards the non-Muslims that was already in the doctrine of the order gave way to open hostility, which resurfaced in İstanbul in the shape of resentment against the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants. Rift between the order and the Bektaşîs widened as the Janissaries failed to suppress the Greek Revolt while still having social intercourse with the Greeks, Abu-Manneh, *Studies On Islam*, pp. 25, 62-4; Heyd, “The Ottoman ‘Ulama and Westernization”, pp. 9, 64-68.

<sup>24</sup> V. Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808”, *IJMES* 25 (1993), p. 63 and “Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott”, p. 276. Also see, bkz. Aksan (ed.), *Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2004); Adil Şen, *İbrahim Müteferrika ve Usulü’l-Hikem fi Nizami’l-Ümem* (Ankara: Türk Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1995).

rising Islamic orthodoxy (the official Sunna Islam), the ruling elite put the Janissaries, the Bektashis, and the non-Muslim Ottoman merchants in the target. Especially the treatises of Sekbanbaşı and Kuşmani launched an overall attack on the Janissaries. Thus, the questioning of the Janissaries as a social phenomenon in addition to their martial qualities actually took start two decades before the abolition of the corps.<sup>25</sup> This illustrates the underlying idea of the military reforms: a means of reconfiguring the entire social-economic system rather than the limited object of raising a new corps modeled on the Western armies. All propaganda pieces for domestic and foreign consumption stressed the real or apparent popular support behind the new corps of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* since this would mean a symbolic approval of the new order of things under the reign of Selim.<sup>26</sup>

The kind of absolutism imagined by the reformers of this age was clearly illustrated in Behiç Efendi's reform proposal.<sup>27</sup> His treatise written in 1803 clearly indicates that he was well aware of the importance of industry in the rise of the West. Thus, he urged for a program of industrialization and 'nationalization' of the economy in his memorandum. He was in charge of running of the Beykoz paper factory in 1804-1805

---

<sup>25</sup> Ö. İşbilir (ed.) *Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair bir Risale*. According to Kuşmani Janissaries declared that they would rather go abroad and turn infidels than accept drill and discipline. Kuşmani admonished the *mollas* of negligence in teaching the Janissaries that other obligations looked like a drop in the sea when compared to *jihad*. He likened the state to a vessel and called for submission to the ultimate authority to make the vessel sail.

<sup>26</sup> Seyyid Mustafa boasted that even the European travelers admired the perfect order in the execution of the tactical maneuvers by the new troops. People so much admired them that the former opponents of the new troops had to enroll in the new corps under the public pressure. He hoped that the suppression of the Balkan bandits (*Dağlı eşkiyası*) by the new corps brought about public recognition (*kabul-i amme*), which, he believed would ease finding more recruits for the new corps and the restoration of order to the realm, Beydilli, "İlk Mühendislerimizden Seyyid Mustafa", pp. 437, 442 (Tr.), pp. 466-67, 479 (Fr.)

<sup>27</sup> Behiç Efendi was one of the outstanding figures within the Ruscuk Companions (*Ruscuk Yaramı*) who took shelter with Alemdar Mustafa Paşa of Ruscuk after the 1807 Rebellion, and planned a counterrevolution to put Selim III back on the throne. In the short regime of Alemdar, Behiç Efendi became one of the strongest men of İstanbul.

and Selim contemplated for a while to contract out the foundation of the textile factory – for producing broadcloth- in Azadlu to him.<sup>28</sup> His ideas covered a wide range of Ottoman institutions, including religious education, central and provincial administration, simplification of the language of the judiciary, introduction of municipalities, foreign language education, and economic development through promotion of the domestic production and export.<sup>29</sup>

Printing press had a central role in his ideas as the basic tool of dissemination of knowledge. It was yet to be the state to decide what should and should not be disseminated. Apparently, he was very keen on the importance of propaganda and control of information as suggested by his proposals to set up a secret intelligence agency and to launch anti-notable (*ayan*) propaganda among the provincial society. Complaining that the *shari'a* was not observed anywhere outside of İstanbul as a result of the ignorance and corruptness of the *ulema*, he proposed appointing two *muftis* and two sheikhs to oversee Rumelian and Anatolian judges and preachers (*va'iz*) in order to re-educate them with printed textbooks at their disposal. Furthermore two members of the *Meclis-i Şura* – to be the discussed below- should oversee their examination and appointment, guided by a new printed law code (*kanunname*) that was to regulate the public preaching in the mosques and the curricula. Needless to say, all preachers should focus on the matter of

---

<sup>28</sup> Çınar, *Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behic*, p. xii.

<sup>29</sup> He was described as a 'flippant' (*hoppa*) and 'a very odd-tempered' (*mizacı pek acayip*) person in the documents, which, Beydilli argues, might have been due to his European ideas. Many of his proposals were put into practice during the reign of Mahmud II. Unfortunately, his ideas on the military reforms are largely unknown to us since the manuscript we have is an incomplete copy of the original. Beydilli, "Islahat Düşünceleri", pp. 42-53; Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii; for an evaluation of the proposals see, pp. xxviii-xli.

submission to the state authority (*ulu'l-emr*). Advantages are manifold; students would benefit from cheaper printed books while the printing house, suffering from lack of demand, would profit from this enterprise.<sup>30</sup> In addition, 'ignorance and sedition' would be dissipated through teaching religion, which, in Behiç Efendi's vocabulary, meant the reinforcement of state authority through disseminating a new religious discourse in conformity with the needs of the state.<sup>31</sup>

The second step of re-imposing the central authority is the appointment of two governors to Anatolia and Rumelia who would administer according to the codified *shari'a* and *kanun* in order to restore the state authority that had collapsed after the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 in the provinces. They would root out the oppressor notables with the *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops under their command. Attachment of disciplined troops instead of mercenaries to their household would attract fresh recruits to the military service by displaying marches and drill. These governors were to be accompanied by financial directors (*defterdar*) who would assess the revenue sources usurped by the local notables. This should be coordinated with the launching of an anti-notable propaganda tailored to end their legitimacy which was based on their self-portrayal as the protector of the people against the oppression of the state.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Beydilli, "Islahat Düşünceleri", p. 43; for a seminal study of the history of printing in the Ottoman Empire see Beydilli, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishane ve Mühendishane Matbaası ve Kütüphanesi (1776-1826)* (İstanbul: Eren, 1985).

<sup>31</sup> *Muftis* and preachers should refrain from attending the balls given by the notables except on religious feasts and even then they should only converse on scholarly topics (*sohbet-i 'ilmiye*), Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, pp. 7-14.

<sup>32</sup> Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, pp. 14-25, 45-46.

A new Criminal Code should be prepared in simple Turkish and printed copies should be sent to provinces in abundance. A new Courthouse should be set up in İstanbul passing verdicts according to the Criminal Code. Different punishments should apply to civil bureaucrats, the military personnel, merchants and artisans, and the civilians. A kind of police force should be institutionalized including the representatives of different social strata to enforce law.<sup>33</sup>

Reorganization of the central administration should include setting up of a committee consisting of ten prominent members from among the ruling elite and retraining the central bureaucracy. This committee -*Meclis-i Şura*- would function as an interface between the central offices and the grand vizierate. All members would have the same status and responsibilities to foster equality and free discussion. Decisions forwarded from the offices would need the approval of the committee before their execution by the Grand vizier.<sup>34</sup> This proposal was an implicit criticism of the secret committee whose undefined nature and arbitrariness was a major factor in the rise of opposition to Selim.<sup>35</sup>

As for scribal offices in the Palace, Behiç Efendi disappointingly remarked that the scribal offices would have to close down in two decades because of the level of ignorance. The principal factor for the predicament of the central bureaucracy was the practice of confiscation that became an undesirable reality of the life of bureaucrats

---

<sup>33</sup> To enhance predictability and dissuasiveness he propagated for simple but harsh punishments such as cauterization with a brand iron in the forehead for common crimes and putting the criminal under yoke and severing his head by stretching his feet by oxen to punish novel crimes, Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, pp. 47-51.

<sup>34</sup> Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, pp. 17-20.

<sup>35</sup> Beydilli, "Islahat Düşünceleri", pp. 44-45.

because of the wars with Russia with the result that their sons chose to be *ulema* to escape pauperization. He proposed the establishment of a seminary in which the palace scribes would learn their profession and take examination after a certain period of time.<sup>36</sup> Secondly, they should be subjected to periodic examinations and rotation in the provinces to learn their country as well as read books on the history of the Turks and Europe, geography and politics that were to be translated and printed.<sup>37</sup> Another school was to train civil bureaucrats with a curriculum including courses on Turkish, Arabic, Persian, translation techniques, mathematics, geometry, arithmetic, geography, and history. A third school should be founded for teaching Western languages only to Muslims would translate into Turkish all kinds of books from European languages written on a variety of topics, both of a technical and non-technical nature in accordance with the principle of due reciprocity.<sup>38</sup>

Inspired by the ambassadorial accounts of Ebubekir Efendi and Mahmud Raif Efendi he stressed the necessity of close surveillance of the city population through municipalities. He suggested the appointment of a superintendent to İstanbul (city mayor), who would register all the inhabitants, shops and shopkeepers, merchants, and the riffraff and issue an identity card. Introduction of passport to control the population

---

<sup>36</sup> Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, pp. 26-36.

<sup>37</sup> Interestingly he noted in the margins that politics meant the affairs of *siyasiyya* and related measures, and not falsehood and tricks as commonly presumed so as to give us an insight about the popular perception of modern politics at the time. We will discuss *politika* in Ottoman context in Chapter II, see Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, p. 37; on the conception of *politika* by the Ottomans in this era see Beydilli, "Dış Politika ve Siyasi Ahlak", *İlmi Araştırmalar* 7 (1999): 47-56.

<sup>38</sup> Following Seyyid Mustafa, Behiç Efendi also applied the principal of due reciprocity to legitimize the Western learning. Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, pp. 38-39; it should be noted that Mahmud II was content at the beginning to establish only a translation bureau in 1821 instead of schools, see Beydilli, "Islahat Düşünceleri", p. 47.

movement within the city is another measure. *İmams* would be responsible to inform the superintendent about the inhabitants of their neighborhoods, which would have actually turned them into *apparatchiks*. One of his interesting proposals is the establishment of a secret police organization for a closer surveillance of especially the non-Muslims living in the vicinity of Galata and Beğoğlu, unemployed vagabonds, and ‘the traitors disseminating false rumors in coffeehouses and barbershops’ (Janissaries).<sup>39</sup>

Behiç Efendi’s ideas on city surveillance, conspicuous consumption, and industrialization all link to ‘the non-Muslims question.’ He remarked that the Muslim peasants and artisans in provinces were longing for entering into households for upward mobility while the non-Muslims chose luxurious trade for the same reason, causing a decrease in domestic production and increase in luxurious consumption with further social problems. Thus, he accused the *zimmi* (non-Muslim Ottoman subjects) merchants of obstructing the industrialization in the country because of their vested interests in the current system. Likening the *zimmi* merchants to worms that ate a thousand-year-old tree from within so as to kill it, Behiç Efendi excluded the *zimmi* merchants from the ‘nationalization’ of economy. His complains about the violation of the sumptuary laws by the non-Muslim subjects suggest the extent to which the measures taken against luxurious consumption were related to the policy of suppressing the *zimmi* merchants. He proposed founding different factories for each imported item from India and Europe such as paper, textiles, clocks, mirrors, and metalwork in addition to the establishment of two state

---

<sup>39</sup> Çınar points out that a similar institution was created in 1826 in İstanbul, see Çınar, *Sevanihü’l-Levayih*, pp. xxxiii, 51-56.

factories for producing the uniforms and official dresses of the bureaucrats, and horse harnesses so that the conspicuous consumption that ‘became the second nature’ of the state officials would be restricted.<sup>40</sup>

In the true spirit of a mercantilist, he suggested that the administration of these factories should be entrusted with Muslims for lifetime and if they violated the rules and regulations they should be dismissed with no further punishment. The state should discourage importation even when domestic production could not be achieved due to the lack of raw material. Market price should determine the price of the raw material and the final product. To further encourage private initiative total profit should be distributed among the masters for a period of ten years. Patent, price labels, and quality control should all be introduced to protect the copyright and the consumer.<sup>41</sup>

#### Russian absolutism as viewed by the Ottomans

A police state in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century was qualified by the efficient means of social control and mobilization of resources. These means included the control of violence by a fulltime professional army as well as the control of taxation by a rational and extensive bureaucracy. Ottoman studies have overlooked the place of Russia in the history of Ottoman reforms as a source of inspiration as well as a concrete model for the Ottoman reformers. Ottomans, contrary to their European counterparts, accepted Russia

---

<sup>40</sup> He argued that ‘these traitors’ sold their merchandise eight times of its real value and that they had a feigned loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. Industrialization was not to their interest. He recounted that after the domestic production of enamel surpassed the European production in quality, the *zimmi* merchants suffered a great loss. Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, pp. 57-58, 63-65.

<sup>41</sup> He criticized the wage discrimination that privileged the French workers to the frustration of the Muslim and non-Muslim workers. Çınar, *Sevanihü'l-Levayih*, pp. 70-74; Beydilli regarded Behiç Efendi as the first thinker playing with the idea of national economy because of his mercantilist ideas, see Beydilli, “İslahat Düşünceleri”, p. 49.



as part of Europe on the basis of religion, albeit the least civilized nation of Christendom before the reforms of Peter the Great. In this sense, they followed the Muslim tradition; Persians and the Indian Muslims dubbed the Russians the “Uzbeqs” of Europe.<sup>42</sup> The pro-reform group argued that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops were established to defend İstanbul against the Russians whom were longing to conquer the city and turn the Muslims into *reaya*. However, they presented Russia as a model to emulate as well.

Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals had thus developed two main themes about Russia over the course of the century. The first theme was centered on Russia’s transformation as a result of a long series of reforms. This theme presented Russia as an exemplar case of successful westernization and it can be traced back to İbrahim Müteferrika who was the first author to focus on the Russian achievements in the age of Peter the Great.<sup>43</sup>

İbrahim Müteferrika was not the essential source on Russian achievements despite the general assumption among the Ottomanists.<sup>44</sup> Ottomans had multiple sources of information on Russia and this led to the emergence of different views about Russia. Among these sources of information we can count narrative sources such as reform treaties, chronicles, ambassadorial reports, war-related memoirs as well as espionage

---

<sup>42</sup> S. F. Dale, *Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600-1750* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 78-100.

<sup>43</sup> Adil Şen (ed.), *İbrahim Müteferrika*, pp. 189-191.

<sup>44</sup> Among other examples see M. Aktepe (ed.), *Mehmed Emni Beyefendi (Paşa) ’nın Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaret-namesi* (Ankara, TTK, 1989). Emni Efendi was sent to St. Petersburg in 1740. He had valuable and detailed observations on the achievements of Peter the Great such as the canal on *Neva-Ladoga*, the Tsar’s grand tour in Europe, and his unstable state of mind (Peter once cannonaded the river in which he was almost drown, pp. 57-8). Interestingly, he observed that Russians became arrogant since “they had changed their traditional appearance and adopted the Frankish style thanks to the efforts of Petro, pretending to have in-depth knowledge in warfare and to surpass the Christian States”, p. 69.

activities mostly carried out on the frontier zones. Direct experience is one of the most interesting aspects in the image-making process. Ottoman prisoners in Russia and embassies sent to Russia had a firsthand knowledge. For instance, Vasıf Efendi who was one of the most influential official chroniclers in Ottoman history had been sent to the court of Catherine II as a high-ranking prisoner after he was captured by the Russian army. There, he had an official meeting with Catherine II who sent him back to İstanbul as a peace negotiator. He became one of the prominent voices of reform and wrote one of the two harshest diatribes against the opponents of reform –*Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*; not surprisingly, the author of the other diatribe, Kuşmani, also had first-hand knowledge of Russia as a veteran of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 1803. Ottoman ambassadors such as Mehmed Emni Beyefendi, Necati Efendi, and Mustafa Rasih Efendi had not limited themselves to military and political aspects of Russia in their ambassadorial reports.<sup>45</sup> They, rather, focused on a wide range of topics: court politics, city administration, street lighting, markets, economy, taxation, serfdom, crops, land-tenure

---

<sup>45</sup> Kapıcıbaşı Nişli Mehmed Ağa was sent to St. Petersburg in 1722. Although he did not mention the reforms of Peter the Great, he described several fortresses and Tula. He provided valuable information on the secret meeting with Tsar in the Admiral's residence in which Peter drank 'barley juice' in honor of the Sultan and the others drank *çay*. Peter regretted that 'God gave him four sons only to take them back' and that 'he was already too old to have another.' He grabbed Mehmed by his hand and caressed his back, showing geniality. Peter described on a map his military operations in the Caucasus which was why Mehmed Ağa was actually sent. Mehmed Ağa was the honour guest of one of the Tsar's informal processions which included forty sledges in the shape of vessels of different sizes accommodating the ruling elite who 'masqueraded' to entertain Mehmed Ağa. Peter was in a black sailor dress and took of his Muscovite fur cap several times to greet the Ottoman deputation. The Admiral adopted a 'strange dress' (*ucube*) and shouted "Ağa, ağa" in honour of Mehmed. Catherine I, with 15 ladies-in-waiting, sat in a glass kiosk fixed to the aft of her own sledge-vessel, greeting Mehmed politely. There was another sledge pulled by six bears. *Petro Androviç*, the former Russian ambassador to the Porte donned a turban, which Mehmed mentioned disapprovingly, F. R. Unat, "Kapıcıbaşı Nişli Mehmed Ağa'nın Moskova Sefaretnamesi", *Türk Tarih Vesikaları* II/12 (1943), pp. 465-69. Mehmed's ambassadorial report was published in a series of articles in the same journal: II/10 (1942): 284-299, II/11 (1943): 352-371, II/12 (1943): 462-473.

system, mines and harbors and so forth. Apparently, those who had direct experience of Russia tended to have more radical views of reform.

The Ottomans certainly did not approve absolutism uncritically. Şehdi Osman Efendi, the envoy sent to Russia in 1757, drew a realistic picture of Russian absolutism with mixed feelings. Russian soldiers were so disciplined that they would not abandon the place they stood guard even when fire broke out without the orders of their officer at the expense of burning to death. The bread the regular recruit ate was inedible; yet, they ‘withstood the agony, utter poverty and destitution until they perished’ (*bu kadar azaba ve fakr u fakaya bizzarur geberince tahammül ederler*). They were so submissive that “the timar-holder” (*sahib-i timar*: noble) could sell the children of ‘the registered *reaya*’ (*defterlü reaya*: serf) as he wished. Interestingly, he associated the obedience of the society with the rule of law (literally, security of person and possession). Under the reign of Catherine II, Russians could lead their lives ‘without the slightest scratch.’<sup>46</sup> Mustafa Rasih Efendi, the next Ottoman envoy sent to the Russian court in 1792, had similar observations as his predecessor; though, he was more correct in his definitions: the noble was a “farm-owner” (*malikane sahibi*) and serf was a “captive” (*usera*).<sup>47</sup> Necati Efendi, another Ottoman POW who fell captive in the Crimea in 1771 and found himself in St Petersburg, also observed that ‘the *muqataa*-owner sold their *reaya*’ –*muqataa* being any fiscal unit that was farmed out. After praising the performance of the Russian army, he

---

<sup>46</sup> F. R. Unat, “XVIII. Asır Osmanlı Tarihi Vesikalarından: Şehdi Osman Efendi Sefaretnamesi”, *Türk Tarih Vesikaları* I/4 (1941), p. 317.

<sup>47</sup> Uğur İyigünler, *Mustafa Rasih Efendi'nin Rusya Sefareti*, p. 52. The reader should consult to the facsimile of the text given in the Appendix since the transcription the editor provided suffers from various errors.

described the desperate conditions of Russian soldiers in a manner to criticize the Ottoman soldiers. The conscripted *reaya* would never see his hometown again and serve in return for 4 *akçe* a day and a three-days' ration of 3 *kıyye* (~4 kg) of rye bread. Should they happen to survive the long term of service in the army, they would be disbanded without pension and end up begging in the streets: “such is Russia’s mercy to her soldiers” said Necati Efendi (*askerine merhameti bu gunedir*).<sup>48</sup>

Commissioned by Selim to write a voluminous account of Russo-Ottoman wars, Ahmed Cavid Beg claimed that the rank-and-file of the European armies were guile enough (*sade-dil*: lit., simple-minded) to be duped into submission by the mere bestowal of ‘honours and awards.’ They were almost ‘slaves for treatment with favor’ (*iltifat esiri*) by their officers and kings; that was how Ahmed Cavid understood the military code of honor. According to him, “in submission and obedience to their officers with sincerity, they are opposite of our soldiers and when the officer of the Franks tell them to ‘halt’, they stand still until the Doomsday” (*zabitanlarına gönülleriyle ita ‘at ve inkiyadda bizim*

---

<sup>48</sup> Erhan Afyoncu, *Necati Efendi, Tarih-i Kırım (Rusya Sefaretnamesi)* (Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1990), p. 49; This contrasts with Mehmed Aga who, in 1723 stunned by the desperate conditions of the Cossack returning from operations in Kazan (*Ejder*) naked and on foot, could not help pitying them and wishing a long life to the Sultan and the Sublime Porte in gratitude of the better conditions they provided for the Ottoman subjects. Mehmed shared his tobacco with the *Hetman* upon the latter’s request. He asked Mehmed to persuade Peter to stop the ongoing war. Hasan Çavuş, who accompanied a certain Mustafa Ağa sent to Moscow the previous year, also related to Mehmed the desperate conditions prevailing in Russia. Two of his servants had perished and Mustafa could not even find shroud for a proper funeral, Unat, “Kapıcıbaşı Nişli Mehmed Ağa’nın Moskova Sefaretnamesi”, *Türk Tarih Vesikaları* II/10 (1943), pp. 287, 296-97; The rigid discipline of the Prussian army appalled Ahmed Resmi Efendi in the 1760s, see Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), p. 145; Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi, envoy sent to Vienna in 1792, also emphasized the security of life and property in the Habsburg Empire in his voluminous reform treatise that served as the major inspiration and model for Selim. In the same vein, some treatises criticized the wide-scale confiscations –that became more systematic because of the wars with Russia-, and political executions (*siyaseten katil*) that did not require court verdict, see F. Yeşil, *III. Selim Döneminde Bir Osmanlı Bürokrati*; Çınar, *Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behic*; Sarıkaya, *Ömer Fa’ik Efendi, Nizamü’l-Atik*.

*askerin aksi olur ve Frengin zabiti dur dediği yerde haşroluncaya dek taş gibi dururlar*).<sup>49</sup> Necati Efendi refused to define those Muslim troops ‘perished in desertion’ in Russo-Ottoman wars as martyres: ‘the soldiers at present are servants of favors and bonus money’ (*ihsan ve kerem kulu*). They refused to obey the orders and to fight without their pay and food, deserting on the first occasion at the face of the enemy after pillaging the army camp.<sup>50</sup> Viewed from this light, it is not surprising that Selim opted for the Anatolian Turkish peasantry for his new army who were deemed as *başı-bağlı* (lit., fastened by the head) as opposed to *başı-bozuk* (lit., loose-headed: irregular troops, mercenaries).<sup>51</sup> Osman Efendi, mentioned above, provided examples in which he favored individual sagacity and martial qualities over the Russian *esprit de corps*: on the way back İstanbul 8 men from among his retinue beated up 150 Russian ‘soltats’ in the fortress of Podol’ in a fight broke out over the matter of Muslim prisoners who had taken refuge with the Ottoman deputation.<sup>52</sup>

What accounted for the well-ordered nature of state and society in Russia was the monopolization of violence for the Ottoman observers of Russia and they provided many interesting examples to illustrate that point. The Ottoman ambassador Mustafâ Rasih

---

<sup>49</sup> Adnan Baycar (ed.), *Osmanlı-Rus İlişkileri Tarihi (Ahmed Cavid Bey'in Müntehabatı)* (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2004), p. 744; Necati Efendi amusingly recounted that the actors and the actresses in the *komedyâ* he watched in the *Opera* were very happy for receiving rounds of applause instead of *bahşiş* (monetary gifts): ‘clapping hands by the audience passes for giving gold pieces....[actors] don’t know what is a present and they even become sad by such offers. What an undepletable treasury this applause is!’, Afyoncu, *Necati Efendi. Tarih-i Kırım*, p. 33.

<sup>50</sup> Afyoncu, *Necati Efendi. Tarih-i Kırım*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>51</sup> Hakan Erdem, “Recruitment for the ‘Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad’ in the Arab Provinces, 1826-1828”, I Gershoni-U. Woköck (eds.), *Histories of the Modern Middle East: New Directions* (Boulder, 2002), 189-206; N. Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1973), pp. 94-5.

<sup>52</sup> Unat, “Şehdi Osman Efendi Sefaretnamesi”, *Tarih Vesikaları* 1/5 (1941), pp. 395-398.

Efendi who was sent to St Petersburg in 1792 immediately after the war with Russia noted that an ordinary Russian peasant (*miçok/mujik*) possessed no weapon apart from an axe to cut firewood.<sup>53</sup> He discredited the rumours concerning a possible outbreak of revolt in Russia by remarking that even the soldiers did not carry arms during peace in Russia. He considered arms as the “means of power” (*edevat-ı iktidariyye*) and praised the state monopoly of its production in Russia.<sup>54</sup> He observed that the Russian officials boasted that all Russian subjects knew their due place and did not cross the line against the state. Mustafa Rasih obviously associated the order and discipline in Russia with the monopolization of means of violence.<sup>55</sup> He was obsessed by the Russian means of social control as well. He speculated that no other European country could equal Russia in addiction to prostitution, alcohol and gambling. In his opinion it was a state policy to keep Russians busy with such social illnesses so that they would not interfere with politics (*devletlerine da'ir ve hadd ve vazifesi olmayan mevadda sohbet*).<sup>56</sup>

Vasıf Efendi also pointed out the submissive nature of the Russian serfs, hoping that it would serve as an example for the unruly Ottoman subjects. Although the Russian serf led the life of a prisoner in chains, he never stopped praising the tsar for his

---

<sup>53</sup> İyigünler, *Mustafa Rasih Efendi'nin Rusya Sefareti*, pp. 25, 31.

<sup>54</sup> İyigünler, *Mustafa Rasih Efendi*, pp. 46, 58; lack of monopolization of means of violence in the Ottoman Empire was also taken up as a topic by Seyyid Mustafa. According to him, the Sublime State was a kind of “*l'état de guerre*” since even the *ulema* carried arms because of the principle of *jihad*. He might be regarded as the first Ottoman ‘theoretician’ of the conception of ‘the nation in arms’ (*musellah millet*) which would become the overriding principle of the Young Turks under the influence of Colmar F. Von der Goltz’ (Goltz Paşa) doctrine of *volk in waffen*. For Mustafa’s ideas see, Beydilli, “İlk Mühendislerimizden Seyyid Mustafa”, pp. 437, 442 (Tr.), 466-67 (Fr.); for a presentation of Mustafa as the pioneer of Ottoman scientificism see B. Burçak, “Modernization, Science and Engineering in the Early Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 44/1 (2008): 69-83. For a critique of this approach, see K. Şakul, “Nizam-ı Cedid Düşüncesinde Batılılaşma ve İslami Modernleşme”, pp. 128-29.

<sup>55</sup> İyigünler, *Mustafa Rasih Efendi*, pp. 25, 36-37.

<sup>56</sup> İyigünler, *Mustafa Rasih Efendi*, p. 36.

generosity and sacrificed his blood and sweat for the Tsar in war and peace. Conversely, the Muslim subjects of the Sultan deserted the army on the first occasion even though the principal duty of a Muslim was to sacrifice his life in war. Vasif dealt with Peter the Great to illustrate the military reform process, which, he claimed to learn about in his days of captivity in Russia.<sup>57</sup> He pointed out that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army also adopted uniform, watchword, linear formations and full-time service just like the Russian army. In order to illustrate the necessity of these innovations he recounted high rates of desertion in the army because of the lack of uniforms and the infiltration of spies to the army camp as no system of password was employed. These innovations were so efficient that even Jazzar Ahmed Paşa began to support Selim's reform program after witnessing the new troops' resilience on the battlefield.<sup>58</sup>

Behiç Efendi focused on another aspect of Russia, which was industrialization, especially in the textile sector. He suggested the foundation of two state factories for producing the uniforms and official dresses of the bureaucrats, and horse harnesses so that the conspicuous consumption that 'became the second nature' of the state officials would be restricted. The administration of these factories should be entrusted with Muslims for lifetime and if they violated the rules and regulations they should be dismissed with no further punishment –a veiled criticism of policy of confiscation and banishment.<sup>59</sup> Behiç Efendi used the example of Russia to refute the claims of non-

---

<sup>57</sup> Uçman (ed.), *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*, pp. 79-80.

<sup>58</sup> Wilkinson, *An Account of the Principalities*, pp. 250-53, 261-63, 274; Uçman (ed.), *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*, pp. 53-5, 59-63, 66-9, 72-3, 81-6.

<sup>59</sup> Çınar, *Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behic*, pp. 63-64.

Muslims that there was no raw material in the Ottoman Empire of the quality needed in textile industry (broadcloth production); Russia was colder in climate and poorer in material culture in comparison to the Ottoman Empire. According to Behiç, Peter the Great transformed a group of savages into a human society by promoting science and industry:<sup>60</sup>

The Muscovites, the vilest nation of all the Franks, were originally a base and despicable nation. This beast-like nation was the poorest in terms of capital, population, arable land, and other goods compared to other states. Some eighty years ago, the person who designated himself as Tsar -an inquisitive, clever and crafty infidel- inquired about the order of the neighboring states and recruited foreign experts on applied sciences, geography, political science, art of fortification and navigation and especially competent artisans and craftsmen. Through their services he and his successors managed in a matter of 30-40 years to educate the Muscovite nation, the unintelligent beast, which was incapable of learning the simplest matter in ten years even when the stick was administered. Astonishingly Russia is now almost equal to those states with a history of 500 years.

He pointed out that Russia achieved industrialization in textile sector despite its harsh climate. Thus, the Ottomans would be even more successful in establishing a textiles industry in the mild climate of Bosphorus. But he saw it imperative to recruit foreign workers, preferably the industrious Hungarians rather than the ‘greedy’ English or ‘lazy’ Spanish. If Russia advanced remarkably in a matter of decades despite its ‘beast-like and slavish’ subjects, why not the most advanced nation of the world of Islam? After all, continued Behiç Efendi, even a desert Bedouin was smarter than the

---

<sup>60</sup> “*Cemi-i milel-i Efrencin erzeli olan Moskov taifesi fi’l-asl zelil ve hakir ve mal ve reaya ve ziraat ve harasete şayan arazi ve sair eşya cihetiyle kaffesinden fakir bir taife-i vuhuş-misal olduğundan....seksen-yüz sene mukaddem içlerinden Çar namıyla zuhur iden şahs mütecessis ve zeki ve şeytan-menis bir kafir-i ceri olduğundan etraflarında olan devletlerin hal ve şiar ci-gunegi-i nizam-u-etvarlarını taharriye sarf-ı eşkar iderek ve ulum-ı riyażiyeden olan funun-ı hendese ve coğrafya ve siyaset-i mülk ve hasanet-i kala ve ilm-i derya maddelerinde mahir ve ba-husus imal-i emtia ve eşyaya kadir nice nice erbab-ı ulum ve ashab-ı sanayii birer takrib ile itma ve igna ve celb ile iltifat eyliyerek başlarına tokmak ile darb olursa pek kolay bir maddeyi on yılda öğrenmeğe istidattan beri hayvan-ı bi-izan olan Moskov milletini otuz kırk sene zarfında terbiye ile zu-funun itmek ve halefleri dahi ol esere iktiza ile sürüb gitmek mulabesesiyle müddet-i yesirede sair beşyüz senelik devletlere tariz derecesini kesb itdiği beis-i hayretidir.”, see Çınar, *Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behic*, pp. 67-68.*



cleverest European.<sup>61</sup> Behiç Efendi's ideas were taken seriously by Sultan Selim to the extent that he was put in charge of the Beykoz paper factory a year after writing his memorandum. The government even contemplated for a while to contract out the foundation of the textile factory –for producing broadcloth- in Azadlu to him.<sup>62</sup>

The Ottoman ambassador Rasih Efendi noticed the economy politics in Russia such as populating empty lands with peasants. He was concerned about the fact that Russia was trying to encourage Muslims to settle in the former Ottoman lands through several means. It provided credits to artisans and free land to peasants. It founded mosques, appointed Muslim judges and recruit *ulema* from among the Muslim prisoners. Mustafa Rasih was disappointed by the fact that even some Muslims left İstanbul for these Russian lands in 1793.<sup>63</sup>

All these observations and comments on Russia were obviously a call for reform in the Ottoman Empire. There were various tangible results of the increasing awareness of Russia as an enemy to admire and an ally to draw on. The new troops of Selim received their first military drill from the Russian Prisoners in 1792. Russian officers and military engineers were even to be found in the town of Yozgat (central Anatolia) to train the Ottoman troops. An Ottoman prisoner who learnt the cavalry drill in Russia was appointed as an officer to the cavalry troops of the new army and put in charge of

---

<sup>61</sup> “*medenisi şöyle dursun edna bedevisi ta 'ife-i Efrencin en a 'kalından müsta 'idd'*”, Çınar, *Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behic*, p. 68; for a more detailed analysis of his novel proposals such as copyrights see Beydilli, “İslahat Düşünceleri”, pp. 44-5.

<sup>62</sup> Çınar, *Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behic*, p. xii.

<sup>63</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, p. 155.

overseeing the production of the harnessing equipment as well.<sup>64</sup> The location chosen for the military barracks of the new army was close to the entrance of the Straits, presumably to defend İstanbul against a possible Russian attack. Reorganization of the navy and the imperial dockyards was also meant to counter-balance Russia in the Black Sea as many Ottoman observers of Russia drew attention to the Russian achievements in naval reforms and the increasing Russian presence in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

This brings us to the second theme about Russia which was built around the Ottoman fear of loss of İstanbul to Russia and *reaya*-ization at the Russian hands. By the 1780s, Catherine II began to play with the idea of resurrecting the Byzantine Empire with İstanbul being its seat. This scheme was known as the Greek Project and has still been the subject of many scholarly debates. While Russian historians rejected the existence of the project from the outset, Western scholars have regarded it as pure rhetoric. However, recent studies showed that the project was real and Catherine II was about launching a new campaign on the Porte prior to her death in 1796 with the intention of conquering İstanbul. What is debated today is not so much whether or not it existed as its content.<sup>65</sup> It is striking that the Ottoman reformers cleverly exploited the two controversial images of Russia as a model as well as an enemy for their own means; that is, rallying popular support for the reforms of Sultan Selim.

---

<sup>64</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, pp. 66, 93-94.

<sup>65</sup> Hugh Ragsdale, "Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project", *SEER*, 66/1 (1988): 91-117; Simon Dixon, *Catherine the Great. Profiles in Power* (Longman, 2001), pp. 156-177.

Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador sent to Vienna in 1794, related the recent war with Russia with the Greek Project. According to him, conquest of İstanbul preoccupied Catherine II's mind to the extent that she sketched out various plans to reach her goal. She was planning to recruit able seamen from all over the world and attack İstanbul with thousands of ships from the direction of the Black Sea with the intention of killing off the Muslims in the city after a hasty invasion. Ebubekir Ratib urgently called for a naval reform in the hands of foreign experts. He saw it necessary to found several dockyards on the example of those in Russia and Sweden. In fact, the Ottomans decided to establish a permanent embassy also in St Petersburg, but the rumors concerning the Greek Project was important in the deterioration of Russo-Ottoman relations as we will see in the next chapter. Ebubekir Ratib was one of the most influential figures of the Ottoman reformers and his proposals about the naval reform in the face of the Russian threat did not go unnoticed. Roughly 15 dockyards were established along the costs of the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean. In a short period of time the Ottomans constructed over 50 battleships. Ironically, the Ottoman navy renovated under the guidance of the French apparently against the Russians actually joined the Russian navy to fight the French in the Adriatic the details of which we will examine in Chapter III.<sup>66</sup>

Mustafa Kesbi is another figure who also consternated over a possible Russian attack on İstanbul particularly after the annexation of the Crimea. Blaming the European states for supporting Russian reforms throughout the century, he anticipated that their

---

<sup>66</sup> Yeşil, *III. Selim Döneminde Bir Osmanlı Bürokrati*, pp. 145-150.

policy would backfire since Russia had no qualms to violate ‘the rules of Europe’ in pursuing an expansionist policy. Through bribing a Greek waiter working in the Russian Embassy, he learnt that Repnin, who visited İstanbul during the Ottoman recognition of the Russian annexation of the Crimea, had declared to the ambassadors in a ball that Russia would conquer *Çağrat* (Tsargrad) in a short while by dispatching on ships the ‘disposable’ Kalmuks and Tatars to Sinop in a diversionary operation and landing the Russian troops on the northern shores of İstanbul for a quick march on the defenseless city.<sup>67</sup>

Vasıf Efendi tried to rally popular support for reforms by capitalizing on the prevalent fear of a Russian invasion of İstanbul. Vasıf claimed that Sultan founded this army to defend İstanbul against a Russian attack as the location of its barracks on the hills of Bosphorus indicated. The Sublime Porte, he maintained, had learned from some Russian prisoners that a former Ottoman *zimmi* (non-Muslim subject), rose to prominence in the court of Catherine owing to his wealth and deceitfulness. He proposed to Catherine that she prepare a navy in the Black Sea to storm İstanbul. Once the aqueducts of the city were demolished by cannon fire it would be possible to take the city within a couple of days. According to him all the Ottoman *zimmis* and trading communities in the Archipelago as well as the Greeks in İstanbul would welcome the Russian troops whereas

---

<sup>67</sup> Öğreten (ed.), *Mustafa Kesbi, İbretnüma-yı Devlet*, pp. 432-34. Kesbi also cited from the memorandum of the Swedish ambassador submitted to the Porte on the strength and organization of the Russian army as of 1736-37 as well as the cost of that campaign to Russians in terms of ruble, pp. 453-56; relying on Kesbi’s narrative, Öğreten also mentioned the possible relation between the establishment of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* barracks along the Bosphorus and the perceived Russian menace for İstanbul, pp. xxiv-xxv; Uçman is possibly the first Turkish scholar who drew attention to this subject, Uçman (ed.), *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*, pp. 1-9.

the Ottoman troops would be unable to resist because of their lack of discipline and incompatibility. In return, Catherine promised to appoint this *zimmi* the king of İstanbul just like she had appointed a king over Poland. As noted previously, Catherine's 'timely' death prevented the execution of this plan but Russia was determined to put in practice a similar expedition plan in 1812 in case that the Ottomans refused to come to terms in the negotiations of Bucharest in the same year. Eaton, a British who served Catherine and believed in the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire, also testified to the existence of this plan in the late 1780s.<sup>68</sup>

Arguably, Vasıf aimed at addressing the defeatist attitude among the populace. Wittman, who participated in the expeditionary land force sent to Egypt against Napoleon as a member of the British mission, acutely observed this attitude among the Ottoman troops. He criticized them for their general belief that a series of Russian victories over the Ottomans would end in an ultimate annihilation of the Ottomans in the vicinity of

---

<sup>68</sup> Wilkinson, *An Account of the Principalities*, pp. 227-231; Uçman (ed.) *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*, pp. 37-43; William Eton, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire* (New York: Arno Press, 1973 [1798]), pp. 453-54; during the upheavals in the late 1820s in relation with the Greek Revolt and the Egyptian crisis, similar rumors were once again circulating in the streets of İstanbul. According to a spy report, a prominent Greek merchant was overheard in Asmalımescid (Beğoğlu) saying "for instance, if a child is put in prison and someone else confiscates the house the child inherited from his father, will that child not be the rightful possessor of that house when he grows up? In the same manner, İstanbul originally belonged to the Greeks. This place is now the house of their father and thus it fell to their lot according to the custom. But they face great enemies [he thought Russia and France fixed their eyes on the city]. Although they can't do anything right now, this place is always theirs and they are not asleep. They communicate with all sides [Russia and France] (*Ve meselâ bir çocuk habs iken o çocuğun babasından kalma evini birisi zor ile alsın sonra o çocuk büyüdükdən sonra o ev ana düşmez mi? İşte İstanbul dahi fi'l-asl Yunanilerin idi, şimdi burası babalarının evidir ve rajonca buraları anlara düşer, lâkin karşularında büyük düşmenler var, ne vakit olsa burası onlarındır. Ve şimdi her ne kadar bir şey yapamazlar ise de uyumuyorlar her bir tarafla mektublaşıyorlar*), Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Cevdet Hariciye (C.HRC) 2500. I am grateful to Assist. Prof. Cengiz Kırılı for sharing with me the transcription of this document.

İstanbul that would compel the Ottoman sultans to reside in Damascus.<sup>69</sup> Notably, Ottomans and Russians were allies against Napoleon at that time but the Russian fear continued to haunt the Muslim populace of the Empire. According to Vasıf the resistance of the Janissaries against drill and discipline prompted the Sultan to establish the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps troops in order to protect the fortresses along the Straits. He concluded that at a time when the new troops proved their worth against the French at Alexandria, Cairo, and Acre so as to cause fear in the hearts of the enemies it was inappropriate to question the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms.<sup>70</sup>

The contemporary Ottoman writings reflected the popular fears of ‘*reaya*-ization’ at the hands of the Russians that went hand in hand with the fear of loss of İstanbul. There were many rumors that Russia would invade İstanbul and force the Muslims to pay polltax (*cizye*). Polltax is the Islamic head-tax levied on non-Muslims and it gradually became the defining aspect of the *reaya* status whereas the term originally denoted all tax-paying subjects regardless of religion. By the period under discussion, *cizye* and *reaya* were thus two words that indicated an inferior social status in the Ottoman setting. Therefore, the possibility of *reaya*-ization at the hands of the Russians must have been dreadful for the Muslim Ottoman public. Vasıf Efendi reminded his readers that when the Russians had conquered the Kazan khanate, they turned its Muslim subjects into *reayas*

---

<sup>69</sup> W. Wittmann, *Travels in Turkey, Asia-Minor, Syria, and Across the Desert into Egypt During the Years 1799, 1800, and 1801 in Company with the Turkish Army, and the British Military Mission* (Gregg International Publishers Limited, 1972 [1803]), p. 233; Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid’den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, p. 221; A. Süslü, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunu Paylaşma Projeleri, 1807-1812”, *Bellekten*, XLVI/187 (1983): 745-805; Trandafir G. Djuvara, *Türkiye’nin Paylaşılması Hakkında Yüz Proje (1281-1913)*, [Pulat Tacar trans.] (Ankara, 1999).

<sup>70</sup> Wilkinson, *An Account of the Principalities*, pp. 232-239; Uçman (ed.), *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*, pp. 43-45.

and that the Crimean Muslims could not escape the same fate and became the Russian *reaya*.<sup>71</sup> He was not alone in drawing attention to the threat of *reaya*-ization. Mustafa Kesbi also alluded to the same allegory when complaining from the treatment of the Tatars as *reaya* by the Russians.<sup>72</sup>

It is interesting that another possible Muslim model for the Ottoman reforms actually caused hatred in İstanbul: reforms of Şahin Giray in the Crimea. In an audience with the Reisü'l-küttab (Reis Efendi) Es-Seyyid Mehmed Hayri Efendi, the Russian ambassador argued that the military reforms carried out in the Crimea should not have caused the dismissal of Şahin Giray from the office. Reis Efendi, however, tried to justify his dismissal by referring to the employment of foreign officers (Russians) and adoption of the Russian uniforms in a Muslim army. The Russian ambassador, in return, reminded him of Baron de Tott and of his men employed in the Ottoman Dockyards and the Arsenal in the 1770s. Embarrassed by the spiteful remark, the Reis Efendi claimed that those men were prisoners kept in the Dockyard whereas he was at a loss to know 'in which capacity Tott Beg-zade was used.' Historian Vasıf did not differ from the Reis Efendi in his thoughts on Şahin Giray; he had confiscated the religious endowments, dispensed with Islamic conventions, levied new taxes that were 'unjustifiable by tradition and by reason', and finally imposed 'Frankish' uniforms on the Muslim troops who were forcefully recruited under the appellation of *sekban*. Vasıf's comments on Şahin Giray

---

<sup>71</sup> İlgürel (ed.), *Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, Mehasinü'l-Asar ve Hakaikü'l-Ahbar*, p. 11.

<sup>72</sup> Öğreten (ed.), *Mustafa Kesbi, İbretnüma-yı Devlet*, p. 73.

indicated that the reforming ruling elite could adopt the anti-reform discourse of their opponents as well depending on the situation.<sup>73</sup>

It is against this background that the two rival empires formed an alliance against the common threat of France, sending shockwaves to Paris. The crucial change on the Russian side that facilitated the conclusion of an alliance with the Sublime Porte was the enthronement of Paul I whose basic concern was the consolidation of Russia's power through a policy of non-intervention and domestic reforms –not much different from Selim's. Convinced that Russia was in need of urgent reforms, Paul was resolved to instill a new ethos in corrupt nobility and the absentee officers based on medieval notions of chivalry. He dreamt of transforming them into an obedient service aristocracy who would not aspire to political power unlike in the days of Catherine II. Due to his chivalric notions, it was only with delight that the Orthodox Tsar would take the offer to be the Grand Master of the Catholic order of the Maltese Knights after the French invasion of Malta which would inevitably draw him into the Mediterranean affairs.<sup>74</sup> Therefore,

---

<sup>73</sup> İlgürel (ed.), *Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, Mehasinü'l-Asar*, pp. 11, 21; Feyzullah Efendi, for instance, related that the Janissaries thought of asking for mercy of the sultan and announcing their readiness even to don the hat at a moment of desperation during the street fights in the 1808 Rebellion. According to Feyzullah, 'God forbid' the Sultan had only demanded them to accept drill and discipline while they 'took the path of infidelity' by the thought of donning the hat, Beyhan, *Saray Günlüğü*, p. 261.

<sup>74</sup> Obviously the law of succession was his single most important reform. Although it did not prevent his own murder, the principal of succession by the oldest son stabilized succession in Russia and preventing the enthronement of the female members until the end of the Romanovs. Apart from some improvements in serfdom, he undertook major reforms in the military at the expense of frustrating the nobility. Nevertheless, despite his resentment to Catherine the Great, he did not abandon her mother's policies of religious toleration and censorship. See C. J. Tucker, *The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I* (Syracuse University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1965), pp. 18-24; H. Ragsdale, *Tsar Paul and the Question of Madness* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 63-74; also see the "Conclusion" by Ragsdale in Ragsdale (ed.), *Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign* (University of Pittsburgh, 1979), pp. 171-179; C. Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700-1800* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 207, 232.



increased military presence of France in the eastern Mediterranean compelled Paul to follow a more interventionist policy. He never gave up his major objective of gaining recognition as the arbiter of European affairs and restitution of the status quo ante in Europe –principle of autocracy. Thus rather than changing his foreign policy objectives, he changed allies as he saw fit. Cultivated by old chivalric notions he based his policy of renunciation of territorial aggrandizement on the concept of justice. He aimed to curb the expansionist ambitions of France by entering into alliances with Britain, the Habsburg Empire, and the Sublime Porte. Frustrated by his own allies' expansionist agendas in Malta and Italy, he later drew closer to France and lent military and diplomatic support to the weak kings of Italy as well as the Ionian Republic –the joint protectorate of Russia and the Ottoman Empire. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that Paul would have been satisfied by the settlement of 1815.<sup>75</sup>

While Ottoman studies viewed the diplomacy of Selim III in a negative light – shaped by ignorant and inexperienced ambassadors, indecisiveness in policy-making and so forth-, Paul's diplomacy fared no better in Russian studies.<sup>76</sup> Consequently, the Russo-

---

<sup>75</sup> Tucker argued that Paul's foreign policy was not a radical break from that of Catherine II as suggested by his retention of Bezborodko, S. Vorontsov and A. Razumovski in office. What accounted for the changes in foreign policy, she maintained, was Napoleon, see Tucker, *The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I*, pp. 40-45, 316-320, 331; McGrew, *Paul I of Russia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 320.

<sup>76</sup> There are two conflicting views of Paul. Ragsdale points out that the traditional school that remained faithful to ambassadorial accounts and memoirists who participated in Paul's assassination dismissed him on the grounds that he was mentally ill and that his reign represented a rupture between the preceding and the following reigns. On the other hand those historians who have based their studies on the archival material concluded that his foreign policy was rational and constructive, see Ragsdale, *Tsar Paul and the Question of Madness*, pp. xi-xiv, 85; Tucker, *The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I*, pp. iii-vi, 1-4; Alexander I followed Paul's Italian policy, which points to the reasonability of Paul's policy, N. Saul, "The Objectives of Paul's Italian Policy", in Ragsdale (ed.), *Paul I*, p. 40; McGrew criticized Paul I as a poor negotiator in the sense that he offered his cooperation as a starting-point and never clarified what he hoped to gain for Russia from this cooperation, see McGrew, *Paul I of Russia*, pp. 320-21; Ragsdale argued that Paul was

Ottoman alliance received little appreciation in both sides. Next chapter will examine the path that led to the conclusion of this alliance which outlived the Second Coalition itself that was formed against France (1798-1802).

---

not mad but 'bizarre' and 'his conduct was radically imprudent', see Ragsdale, *Tsar Paul and the Question of Madness*, pp. 202-203.

## CHAPTER II

### OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY AND THE SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES

#### Introduction

This chapter narrates the unfolding of the events that ushered a ‘new era’ (*tarih-i cedit*) in which the Ottomans could not ignore European affairs anymore. Adopting this point of view, the celebrated Ottoman historian and statesman Cevdet Paşa labeled the formation of the Russo-Ottoman alliance (1798-1806) ‘one of the oddities of diplomacy of the age.’ Especially the events in 1797-1798 in the Mediterranean basin –the revolutionary wars in Italy, the French occupation of the Ionian Islands, Malta and finally of Egypt- had profound effects on Europe as well as the Ottoman Empire.<sup>1</sup> We will deal with Ottoman diplomatic responses to these hazardous developments after 1792.

According to the conventional view on Selimian diplomacy ‘the Ottoman response’ was one of ‘selling the mouth of a diplomat’ or ‘uttering vague words in diplomatic language that was just invented in İstanbul.’<sup>2</sup> This paradigm, embodied by the voluminous work of Cevdet Paşa, argued for the Ottoman’s discovery and adoption of the hypocritical diplomacy of the Europeans although ‘the Turks disliked hypocrisy.’<sup>3</sup> According to him after the French Revolution Europe witnessed the emergence of a new sort of diplomatic language that recognized no principles, which caught the Ottomans unguarded as they

---

<sup>1</sup> For the citation see, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet* [new edition] (İstanbul, 1309), v. VII, p. 9; for the expression ‘new era’ see v. VI, p. 286.

<sup>2</sup> “İstanbulda yeni icad olunan diplomatik diliyle bazı müphem sözler serdedip, diplomat ağzı satmak.” This is a rephrase of Cevdet Paşa’s views on Ottoman diplomacy by Beydilli, see K. Beydilli, “Dış Politika ve Siyasi Ahlak”, *Divan İlmi Araştırmalar* 7 (1999): 48-56.

<sup>3</sup> Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 285. For a recent recapitulation of this paradigm and the discussion of the emergence of *politika* (in the sense of falsehood and outright lies) see Beydilli, “Dış Politika ve Siyasi Ahlak.”

were naïve about *realpolitika* of the Revolutionary wars.<sup>4</sup> The Ottoman dumbfounded diplomacy sometimes bordered on ‘imbecility’ in the secondary literature largely because of over-reliance on foreign sources, or an uncritical acceptance of Ottoman rhetoric in official language.<sup>5</sup> In the period under study, the grand rhetoric of the Sublime Porte was shaped by the ‘stab-in-the-back’ discourse towards France. Accordingly, the Porte always favored its traditional friend over other powers even after the Revolution, but it cheated the Porte by snatching Egypt like a bandit. While the Ottomans always leaned towards France, Napoleon once again misled the Ottoman diplomacy after 1804 and sold out the Porte in Tilsit (1807). This rhetoric in Ottoman documents seem to have been imported in a wholesale manner into Cevdet Paşa’s chronicle written in late 19<sup>th</sup> century and well entrenched in Ottoman studies from then on.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> In fact, Cevdet Paşa used the expression cited above when he recounted the Reis Efendi’s efforts at avoiding the French and the Russian advances to broker an alliance with the Porte in late spring of 1798. He used a similar expression to describe the Ottoman efforts to remain neutral after the Second Coalition wars: “*Ol asrın diplomatları beyninde müstamel olan tabirat-ı mübheme ile dil-nüvazane cevablar virmişler...*” (They [the ministers of the Porte] gave soothing responses by using dubious words that were in use among the diplomats of that age), *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, p. 220; for his astonishment at the French pretensions of friendship with the Porte after the Egyptian Expedition, see v. VI, p. 332; his views are rendered in English by Shaw, S. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807* (Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 247-256.

<sup>5</sup> Italinski’s evaluation of Ottoman diplomacy in his letter to Czartoryski dated 4 February 1805 is meant to be a compliment to the Porte: “The Turks are really ignorant for sure, but when it comes to neighborly relations, they know their interests as clearly as the most diligent of governments.” A. Gosu, “The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition and the Sublime Porte” in K. Karpat and R. Zens ed. *Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, personalities and political change* (University of Wisconsin, 2003): 199-237; For a classic case of the former approach and its correction see, R. Davison, “Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered” *Slavic Review* 35 (1976): 463-83 as well as J. C. Hurewitz, “Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Reevaluation of the Origins of the Problem” *World Politics* 14 (1962): 605-32; we will mention many other studies for the second attitude in the following pages besides the works of Cevdet Paşa and Beydilli.

<sup>6</sup> Compare his afore-mentioned Ottoman realization of *politika* in the 1790s and its ‘rediscovery’ once more in 1811 on the eve of peace with Russia: “In short the ministers of the Sublime Porte were deceived for many times by the lies of Napoleon until then, but they also learnt how to deceive from their own deception and they employed this new art against him, following the principle of due reciprocity; that means, they hoodwinked the French diplomats by employing a mocking language” *El-hasıl vükela-yı Devlet-i Aliye ol vakte kadar Napoleon’un yalanlarına pek çok aldandılar lakin aldana aldana aldatmağı dahi öğrendiler ve*

This chapter contends that the Sublime Porte never fully trusted France, but preferred to pretend a ‘benign disinterestedness’ in its approach to the Revolution in order to maintain its neutrality during the First Coalition wars. As the policy of neutrality became unsustainable by 1795, it oscillated between France and other powers until when rumors of yet another ‘Greek Project’ decided upon the unrealized Franco-Ottoman alliance of 1797. The French occupation of the Ionian Islands rang the alarm bells for both the Sublime Porte and Russia as they saw in it a clear menace towards the Balkans which caused a rapprochement between the traditional foes. Thus the impetus for a Russo-Ottoman alliance was neither the fall of Malta (for Russia) nor loss of Egypt (for the Porte), but the demise of Venice for the both powers. Therefore, the general assumption that the Porte hastily allied itself with Britain and Russia in a state of panic and terror after the fall of Alexandria is simply untrue.

In the eighteenth century the Adriatic frontier was largely stabilized after the Ottoman-Venice peace in 1716. The destruction of Venice, however, as a result of the French aggression in the region made the Ottomans and the French neighbours in the Adriatic after the latter annexed the Ionian Islands and the ‘Venetian Dalmatia’ by the Treaty of Campo Formio (17 October 1797). The Ottoman policies of controlling this frontier ranged from cautious diplomacy to armed intervention. It signed with Russia –

---

*bu malumat-ı cedideyi evvel-be-evvel anın hakkında sarf ile mukabele-i bi'l-misl kaidesine riayet etdiler yani bu esnada Fransa diplomatlarını lisan-ı istihza ile epeyce avutup aldattılar.*), the citation is from C. Neumann, *Araç Tarih Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet'in Siyasi Anlamı* (İstanbul: TTV, 1999), p. 141. (*Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. IX, p. 269). Neumann offers a useful analysis of Cevdet Paşa as a historian and a statesman based on his chronicle that recounted the history of Ottoman Empire in 1774-1826, see especially Neumann, pp. 131-144; Aksan also dealt with the Ottoman discovery of the European balance of power in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, serving as a critic and corrective to many assumptions held on Ottoman diplomacy, see *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783* (Leiden: Brill, 1995).

equally threatened by the French presence on the edge of the Balkans- an alliance against Napoleon (1799 to 1807) in Istanbul on 3 January 1799, sending shock waves to France.

Russo-Ottoman alliance has been overshadowed by the French occupation of Egypt in traditional Ottoman historiography. Russian historiography, on the other hand, has considered it as an anomaly in Russian history and glossed over the Ottoman participation in the joint Russo-Ottoman expedition to the Ionian Islands.<sup>7</sup> As for Western historiography, historians of the Napoleonic wars have often overlooked the Russo-Ottoman alliance despite the fact that it launched the Second Coalition in the winter of 1798-99.<sup>8</sup>

We will start with an overview of Ottoman diplomacy prior to the conclusion of alliance with Russia and go on to discuss the new era ushered by Campo Formio with a view to show that while the Porte became aware of the Egyptian Expedition by late spring of 1798, it was the French invasion of the Ionian Islands and the coastal strip of Dalmatia which laid the groundwork for the alliance with Russia. A last section will analyze the conclusion of the treaty of alliance.

---

<sup>7</sup> However Ushakov has been a celebrated figure in numerous Russian novels and two Soviet films. During World War II the Soviet government instituted an order of Ushakov as well as an order of Kutuzov, see J. L. McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic. The Genesis of Russia's First Balkan Satellite* (University of Wisconsin, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1965), p. 247.

<sup>8</sup> N. Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807* (The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 75-76.

## Ottomans and the Revolutionary Wars

### Ottoman neutrality

It is an oft-quoted anecdote that when the Austrian chief dragoman complained from the liberty with which the French revolutionaries wore their tricolor cockades in İstanbul in an audience held in 1793, Raşid Efendi, the Ottoman *Reisü'l-küttab* (Reis Efendi), argued against the former that the Porte would not interfere with the Revolutionaries even “if they put baskets of grapes on their heads.” This has been understood as the Ottoman disinterestedness in European affairs in general and the French revolution in particular until the invasion of Egypt.<sup>9</sup> Raşid’s argument was not so much about the Ottoman ignorance of Europe as the ongoing dispute with the Prussian and Austrian embassies on the true interpretation of the policy of ‘neutrality.’ On another occasion, the dragomans of these states once again protested to Reis Efendi that the toleration of the Revolutionaries ran counter to the Porte’s policy of neutrality. The Reis Efendi, drawing on the notion of state succession, told that all the French residing in İstanbul were the guests of the Porte by reason of trade treaties (Capitulations) and that

---

<sup>9</sup> Cevdet Paşa ascribed the toleration of the Revolutionaries in İstanbul to the Porte’s traditional leniency towards the French, which is a mistaken assumption as we will see in this chapter. The response of Raşid Efendi was first recorded by Cevdet Paşa in his voluminous history see, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 183, also see p. 280. It was rendered in English in B. Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (London: Norton, 1982), p. 52; for a good criticism of Lewis on his interpretation of the incidence see, Fatih Yeşil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman Eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi’s Observations”, *Bulletin of SOAS* 70/2 (2007): 283-304. Yeşil also draws attention that Raşid Efendi identified the French threat on the Morea much before the Egyptian expedition; Soysal also drew similar examples in which Raşid tried to repulse the Prussian and the Austrian embassies with responses in the same vein, İ. Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri (1789-1802)* (Ankara: TTK, 1964), pp. 115-16.

any sort of intervention with their dress would violate neutrality insofar as it connoted disapproval of their conduct in the same manner of their adversaries.<sup>10</sup>

Prussia and the Habsburg Empire exerted diplomatic pressure on the Porte to take a neutral stance since they were at war with France. Britain entered the fray only in February-March 1793, while Russia remained aloof to Revolutionary wars. France, on the other hand, did not even have an accredited ambassador at the Porte. The last ambassador of the French monarchy, Choiseul-Gouffier left İstanbul in December 1792, but his replacement, *citoyen* Semonville, appointed by the Revolutionary government was not recognized by the Porte under the pressures of Berlin and Vienna. Descorches (the former Marquiz de Saint-Croix), the extra-ordinary French ambassador, did not arrive in İstanbul before June 1793.<sup>11</sup> Selim's first experimentations with the system of alliances were the treaties signed by Prussia and Sweden; yet these alliances did not save the Ottoman Empire from defeat in the last war with Russia and the Habsburgs. Convinced in the need of peace at home to carry out an extensive reform program, Selim was inclined to pursue a policy of neutrality also in the first Coalition Wars.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Yasemin Saner-Gönen, *The Integration of the Ottoman Empire Into The European State System During The Reign of Sultan Selim III* (Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1991), pp. 68-69. She used HAT 12489 minutes of the audience with the Austrian and Prussian dragomans. It is not clear if the Ottomans formally declared neutrality during the First Coalition Wars, or they merely exhibited a neutral stance, but documents favor the first view as they insistently stress the Ottoman neutrality (*bi-tarafî*). Saner-Gönen suggests that the Ottomans must have declared neutrality under the pressure of the Prussians and the Habsburg embassies –rather than British and the Russian embassies- who were at war with France at that time. For a discussion of the problem refer to Saner-Gönen, pp. 120-21; her arguments seem to have been acknowledged in the secondary literature, C. Finkel, *Osman's Dream* (London, 2005), pp. 395-97.

<sup>11</sup> *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 183; Soysal, *Türk-Fransız Diplomasi*, pp. 114, 117; V. Aksan, "Choiseul-Gouffier at the Sublime Porte, 1784-1792, *Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History IV* (İstanbul: Isis, 1992): 27-34; the ambassadors in İstanbul including Gouffier labeled Semonville as a 'Jacobin', Beydilli, "Ignatius Mouradgea D'Ohsson (Muradcan Tosuncuyan). Ailesi Hakkında Kayıtlar, Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Layıhası ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu", *İÜEFTD* 34 (1984), p. 285.

<sup>12</sup> K. Beydilli, *1790 Osmanlı Prusya İttifakı (Meydana Gelişi-Tahlili-Tatbiki)* (İstanbul, 1981); the Sublime Porte had declared its ports neutral as well. The detention of a French warship as a price by the British fleet



## Ottoman-French alliance

Ottoman-French relations were directly shaped by the Revolutionary wars. The Porte refused to recognize the Republic and its ambassadors. On the other hand, it continued to honor its former treaties with France and held secret audiences with Descorches, promising him to recognize the Republic as soon as it received formal recognition from a European state. In times of low prospects for victory, France sought to conclude an offensive alliance with the Porte so as to divert the armies of its enemies. The Porte, on the contrary, never dismissed the French overtures out of hand, causing confusion among diplomatic circles that regarded such flirtations as an infringement on neutrality as mentioned above. Despite a series of secret audiences with Raşid Efendi, Descorches largely failed to accomplish his mission.<sup>13</sup>

Following the threads of Cevdet Paşa's history Ottomanists have assumed that until the conclusion of the treaty of Campo Formio the Porte had seen in the Revolutionary regime a potential ally against St. Petersburg and Vienna to whom it was never to trust.<sup>14</sup> However, this did not reflect the real interests of the Porte at stake at that time. The Porte strictly followed neutrality in the First Coalitions and after its dissolution

---

off the island of Mikonos and the French retaliation (the Nemesis affair) was a major concern for the Porte. For the details see, M. A. Yalçınkaya, *The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Embassy in Europe. The Embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London (1794-1797)* (The University of Birmingham, unpublished dissertation, 1993) pp. 78-92; E. Kuran, *Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri, 1793-1821* (Ankara, 1968), pp. 17-19; M. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri, 1580-1850* (Ankara, 1974), v. I, pp. 58-61; Ottoman neutrality benefitted the French most as revealed by continuous French demands to send imperial decrees on the subject to the provinces on a regular basis, BOA, A.AMD 40/40 (1797/98) memorandum of the Grand-vizier; İsmail Ferruh Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador to London, uses new loan words such as *korte* (court), *kopya* (copy), *Parlamento* in his correspondence on the Mikonos affair, A.AMD 40/4 (5L1212/23March1798) from Lord Grenville to the Ottoman Embassy; A.AMD 40/5 (5L1212/23March1798), from İsmail Ferruh Efendi to the Porte.

<sup>13</sup> *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 193; Soysal, *Türk-Fransız Diploması*, pp. 115-131.

<sup>14</sup> *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 280.

in 1795 it seriously –albeit, unwillingly- considered to ally itself with France in reaction to Russo-Habsburg and Anglo-Russian treaties. Nevertheless, Franco-Ottoman alliance was not a foregone conclusion. In fact, when Selim heard that a European peace will be concluded through the mediation of Denmark and Sweden, he suggested three policies to follow: Ottoman mediation for restoration of general peace, recognition of the Republic, or forming an alliance with France. A secret meeting was held by the ruling elite in the Sublime Porte in which the participators discussed which course to take. All agreed that whichever measure was to be taken, it should conform to the “current international law” (*kavaid-i düvel-i meriye*). Accordingly, should the Porte recognize the French ambassador, this would antagonize Russia, which had already started a naval build up in the Black Sea, while opening formal negotiations for an alliance with France would offend the other powers. Thus the Porte should announce its willingness for mediation to the embassies and it would send a plenipotentiary to Paris upon invitation by at least by one power.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, encouraged by the French-Prussian negotiations, the Porte allowed Dechorches to move to the *Palais de France* and fix the Republican coat of arms on its door, although it continued to treat him as a simple French merchant.

Verninac replaced Descorches and arrived in İstanbul in April 1795. As a number of European states including Prussia recognized the Republican regime in France, the Porte kept its early promises and officially gave its recognition to the Republic by accepting Verninac as the Republican ambassador. The obvious sign of this change of

---

<sup>15</sup> The attendants in the meeting are: the Grand-vizier İzzet Mehmed Efendi, *Kethüda* (İbrahim Nesim?, Yusuf Ağa?), Firdevsi Efendi (the Reis Efendi), Reşid Mustafa Efendi, Raşid Efendi (the former Reis), A.AMD 40/35, Selim’s note: “*Elbette ya tavassuta veyahud Françelü ile ittifaka veyahud Françelü’nün elçisini kabule dair bir tedbir lazımdır. Düvel halini bilür adamlar ile müzakere olunub çaresi bulunmak.*”

policy was the appointment of Ebubekir Ratib Efendi as the new Reis Efendi in June 1795. Upon the final partitioning of Poland between Prussia, the Habsburgs and Russia, the Porte grew lenient to seek an alliance against a possible encroachment by St. Petersburg and Vienna. Austro-Russian treaty (January 1795) explicitly mentioned ‘the Greek Project.’<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, Anglo-Russian treaty also distressed the Porte. Therefore it demanded clarification from Britain through Yusuf Agah Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador to London, whether or not the treaty was also applicable to the Porte as the exemption of Britain from lending military assistance to Russia in its wars with “Asiatic states” led to some confusion. Britain assured the Porte that the treaty was applicable to the Porte which was not an Asiatic state as it had territories in the Balkans. Thus, the British ambassador presented the treaty as a restriction on any possible Russian assault on the Porte.<sup>17</sup>

Verninac, on the other hand, had clear instructions to incite the Porte to declare war on Russia so as to spare Poland from further partitioning and to secure the appointment of an Ottoman permanent ambassador to Paris. On the advice of Verninac, Polish refugees also sent a representative, Oginski, to the Porte to offer an offensive alliance against Russia.<sup>18</sup> Paris, however, grew reluctance for an Ottoman alliance as it felt itself secure enough after signing the treaty with Spain. Verninac largely differed from Paris on the advantages of having an alliance with the Porte, and continued the negotiations with Ebubekir Ratib Efendi -the Reis Efendi- on his own initiative. Although

---

<sup>16</sup> H. Ragsdale, “Russian Foreign Policy, 1725-1815” in *The Cambridge History of Russia* (Cambridge, 2006), D. Lieven (ed.), v. II: “Imperial Russia, 1689-1917”, p. 513.

<sup>17</sup> E. Kuran, *Avrupa’da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu*, p. 19; Yalçınkaya, *The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Embassy in Europe*, pp. 92-95.

<sup>18</sup> Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2005) [Nilüfer Epçeli trans.], pp. 104-105.

known for his pro-French leanings, the new Reis Efendi was opposed to an offensive alliance and he, rather, demanded a defensive alliance with the participation of Spain, Batavia (Holland), Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia in the proposed Ottoman-French alliance. Consequently, the alliance with France was signed by Verninac and Ebubekir Ratib with the consent of Selim on 24 May 1796. This was a defensive treaty in which the two powers guaranteed their territorial integrity and secured 30,000 troops and 20 warships in 4 months if one of the parties came under attack. The Porte also stipulated that it would not be involved in any war with Britain. Finally, it gave certain privileges to French merchants in the Black Sea, which had hitherto been closed to foreign shipping.<sup>19</sup> The new regime of *Directoire*, nevertheless, did not ratify the treaty to avoid any future commitment to the Porte especially when the future was replete with uncertainties.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> Yeşil provides the most comprehensive analysis of Ebubekir Ratib's career as the Ottoman envoy in Vienna and later Reis Efendi. Yeşil, *III. Selim Döneminde Bir Osmanlı Bürokrati: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi* (Hacettepe Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2002), pp. 202-213; Soysal, *Türk-Fransız Diploması*, pp. 134-145.

<sup>20</sup> There was some confusion concerning its ratification. Yeşil established that it was actually signed by the powers, see Yeşil, *III. Selim Döneminde Bir Osmanlı Bürokrati*, pp. 212-13.

## Opening of the Adriatic frontier: the demise of Venice

Map I. The Borders of the Ottoman Empire, Venice, and Dubrovnik



Notes: TSA, E. 4004/7. The legend: “The borderlines of the Sublime State are shown in green color. The borderlines of Venice are contoured by yellow color, and the borderlines of Dubrovnik are contoured by blue color.” The four Dalmatian towns shown in yellow are Butrinto, Preveza, Parga, and Vonitsa from left (top) to right (bottom).

It is a famous story that Selim III was infuriated with Seyyid Ali Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, for letting himself be duped by Talleyrand about the destination of the French navy bound from Toulon. In his letter that arrived later than the news of the French invasion of Alexandria, Ali Efendi allegedly assured the Porte that the final destination of the navy was Malta. However, this assumption was an unfortunate result of confusing Talleyrand’s views on the advantages of the conquest of Malta for the

Porte with Ali Efendi's own ideas.<sup>21</sup> It should also be remembered that France was quite successful at that time in camouflaging its naval operations by launching a campaign of disinformation. It was just as successful in concealing the ultimate destination of the Brest fleet in 1799. Neither the foreign embassies in İstanbul nor the Ottoman embassies in Europe could get wind of the Egyptian expedition. Therefore, Ali Efendi's ultimate failure in predicting the French designs should be ascribed to French propaganda which was geared to cloud the expedition. While the British feared the possibility of a French attack to Ireland, the Russians were overwhelmed by the rumors that the French were conspiring with Ali Paşa of Yanya (Janina) and Pazvantoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin against Russia. Thus, St Petersburg and İstanbul were concerned with the French

---

<sup>21</sup> Karal largely remained under the influence of his French sources in having a low-opinion about Ali Efendi at the expense of distorting his reports sent from Paris some of which he published. Ali Efendi, however, actually remarked that "the secret mission of the afore-mentioned general [Napoleon] has become obvious and evident as such *for the time being*" [italics are mine]. (...*ceneral-i mumaileyhin memuriyet-i haffiyesi bu veçhile şimdilik bariz ve zahir olduğundan...*) Karal, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1797-1802)* (İstanbul, 1938), pp. 82, 159 [document IV]. Soysal followed Karal in ignoring the phrase 'for the time being' and misinterpreted Ali's report, see Karal, *Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız*, p. 212; When interpreting another report of Ali [doc. VIII, pp. 175-77], Karal mistook Talleyrand's views in an official proclamation for Ali's point of view. Talleyrand claimed that France displayed its loyalty to the Porte by eliminating one of its enemies and setting free the Muslim prisoners in Malta. Karal transcribed only the first half of Ali's report since 'the remaining few lines were irrelevant to the subject.' Fortunately enough, he provided a facsimile of the document. In the second part, Ali Efendi laboriously summarized the news in the papers that asserted that Napoleon headed to either Alexandria or Alexandretta, whereas Nelson, unable to find him in Alexandria, had to sail to Sicily. He was unequivocal about the uncertainty of the final destination of the French navy (...*ceneral-i mersum dahi kangı mahalde olduğunun sıhhati na-malum olmağla...*). Grand-vizier's memorandum on the report vituperated the French for attempting to deceive Ali Efendi who "could not receive the news on Egypt as yet." (...*efendi-yi mumaileyh el-yevm Mısır maddesinden haber alamadığından Françelu bazı vesail ile kendiyi hala taglit üzere oldukları işbu tahriratundan dahi zahir idüğü...*). However, news of the fall of Alexandria reached to Paris only by September. What really infuriated Selim was Ali Efendi's inability to learn about the Egyptian Expedition despite the late date of his report -29 August 1798 (17RA213) as opposed to Karal's wrong date of 23 Reşş 213 (such a month does not exist in Hegira calendar). Karal, nevertheless, attributed Selim's fury to Ali Efendi's allegedly persistent naivety about the destination of the French navy. Selim's singular reaction was: "what an ass the man is" (*Ne eşek herif imiş*). Sultan's harsh reaction seems to have misled historians who repeated Karal's mistake, see B. Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," *Journal of World History* 1/1 (1953), p. 121; According to the Ottoman declaration of war, Ali Efendi informed the Porte that Talleyrand had 'shamelessly' declared Malta as the final destination of the navy in the audience, M. Herbette, *Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi "Moralî Esseyit Ali Efendi" (1797-1802)* (İstanbul, 1997) [E. Üyepazarcı trans.], p. 201.

occupation of the Ionians, for Napoleon could use them as a stepping stone to invade the Balkans.<sup>22</sup>

Ali Efendi was attentive about the rumors of a possible French attack on Ottoman realms. For instance, in his report dated April 1798, he discredited the rumors that the French navy was going to attack İskenderun (Alexandretta) on the coast of Syria. He believed the *Directoires* were disseminating such false news to hide their real intentions. The French navy was likely to go to Italy since ‘the ignition of the flame of liberty’ (*şerare-i serbestiye alev-gir*) in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would require the intervention of Vienna soon. The French were likely to occupy Malta on the way to Sicily. Ali Efendi, however, was of the idea that the Toulon fleet would join forces with the Algiers that declared war on Britain and go on to wrest Gibraltar from the British.<sup>23</sup>

This should not mislead us to think that the Ottomans unsuspected their ancient friends of any sort of aggression. They, on the contrary, always found the revolutionary France untrustworthy. Ali Efendi identified the ‘Jakobins’ with ‘malice and sedition’

---

<sup>22</sup> “Sir Mark Wood, a British member of parliament, predicted to Henry Dundas in April 1798 that the Toulon fleet headed east, and listed “Constantinople, the Black Sea, and Caspian, and so to Persia” as the first possible route”, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 59, 60. Henry Dundas was the secretary of war.

<sup>23</sup> HAT 142/5882 (23L1212/10Apr1798) from Ali Efendi to the Porte. Karal quoted it partly with arbitrary simplifications of language and unstated omissions as usual in his studies. For instance, while he mentioned the Alexandretta option in the text, he omitted it when quoting the memorandum of the Grand-vizier: “*Fransalunun Tulon tersanesinde donanma tedarikatı havadisı eracıf nev’inden olduğu...*” Nevertheless, the memorandum actually reads: “*Françelunun İskenderun İskelesine göndermek üzere Tulon tersanesinde...*” This seems to have been one of the factors that misled him to conclude the Porte did not foresee the Egyptian Expedition, see Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 62. Soysal quoted the memorandum in complete, but remained faithful to Karal’s interpretation, see Soysal, *Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız*, p. 208; Ali Efendi passed on the rumors in full. Accordingly, the French were to march on India via the route of Baghdad, Persia and Candahar to oust the British out of India. Another rumor maintained that the French would invade Malta and Sicily to make the ‘sedition of liberty’ gain ground (...*fitne-i serbestiyeti başa çıkarmak...*). Ali Efendi also related the rumors that Napoleon was appointed as the commander-in-chief to the Toulon fleet consisting of 15,000 troops and roughly 50 scientists including those who knew Turkish and Arabic.

(*fesad u fitneye salik*). Although he would be accused of misleading the Porte with his reports a few months later, Grand-vizier agreed with Ali Efendi at that time on the falseness of the rumors concerning İskenderun. He, however, advised precaution with regard to ‘the malicious nature’ of the French:<sup>24</sup>

their disposition has revealed that their villainous hearts are instilled by malignancy and malice. Although they could not expose the malignancy imbued in their hearts till now, all independent states in general and the Sublime Porte in particular are required to take the course of circumspection and prudence.

What really made Ottomans discontented was the French military presence in Italy and Adriatic after 1795. They closely scrutinized the Toulon fleet, for they saw a threat in it for the Morea and Albania.

#### Renewed French proposals for alliance

A new French ambassador was in İstanbul by October 1796 with renewed plans for yet another offensive alliance with the Porte. He had bold plans to exhibit the solidarity between the two powers:

The Republic of French has sent a number of cannon. On the day of my reception at the Sublime Porte I will have these cannon fixed on their wagons at the head of the procession with their gunners, holding slow-burning matches in their hands, following from behind. The gunners are composed of cavalry and infantry soldiers; I will have trumpets and drums playing until the procession reaches to the Imperial Palace, for the horse artillery and foot gunners need them respectively to keep pace. The infantry will hold bare swords in hand with bayonets hanging on their shoulders. I will have these soldiers and their officers march in mixed formation with the Janissaries, who are assigned to lead the procession, so as to make known forever the union and affection of the French and the Ottoman. [That the infantry walk with bare swords in hand with the bayonets hanging on their shoulders is meant to be a declaration to friend and foe alike of the preparedness of the nation of France to protect the nation of Islam from its enemies by means of weapons.] I will thus arrive at the Sublime Porte and then to the Imperial Palace with such gorgeous ceremony and pomp.

Aubert Dubayet, the French Ambassador at İstanbul<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> “*Ancak Françelünün mizaclarına nazaran zamir-i habaset-semirlerinde bu makule bazı melanet ve fesad merkez olub her ne kadar şimdiye dek rekz-i zamirleri olan habaseti meydana çıkaramamışlar ise dahi el-haletehu hazihi cemi müstakil devletlere ve hususan Devlet-i Aliyeye göre her halde merasim-i hazm u ihtiyata riayet lazimedden idüğü...*” HAT 142/5882 (23L1212/10Apr1798) from Ali Efendi to the Porte.

<sup>25</sup> Dubayet brought along 3 flying-artillery pieces, 2 howitzers, 8 wagons of ammunition, 100 explosive bombs, and a staff of 75 soldiers; A.AMD 40/50 (22C1211/23Dec1796), the draft minutes of the audience



The Reisü'l-küttab Mustafa Rasih Efendi –the last envoy sent to St. Petersburg- kindly turned down Dubayet’s proposal for the procession. By the collapse of the First Coalition, the Porte also lost hope for the restitution of balance of power in Europe in near future. As a matter of fact, four of those states who remained neutral in the First Coalition, either lost their territories or existence.<sup>26</sup> Atıf Efendi, Mustafa Rasih’s successor in the post, reflected on this situation in his famous treatise on the necessity of participating in a general alliance against France when he marked that the sheer vastness of the Empire precluded the Porte to protect all its realms simultaneously from an outside attack.<sup>27</sup>

Particularly, Napoleon’s recent victories in Italy and the growing French appetite for Dalmatia posed a great danger for the Sublime Porte. Dubayet proposed a last draft for an offensive alliance several weeks before France and the Habsburg Empire concluded the Treaty of Campo Formio. The terms of the treaty proposed by Dubayet

---

of Aubert Dubayet- Mustafa Rasih Efendi. “*Fransa Cumhuru bu defa çend kıta tob irsal itmişler. Divan-ı Hümayunuma azimetim günü bu tobları pişgahda arabalarıyla çekdirüb ve her tobun verasında yanmış fitiller derdest olarak neferatını dahi yürütüceğim. Topcuların bazıları atlu ve bazıları piyade soltat olmağla atluları beher hal tranpate ile yürütmek iktiza ideceğine binaen saray-ı hümayuna varıncaya dek derun-ı alayda tranpeteler çalınub ve piyade askeri yürütmek için muzıka tabir olunur tabılları dahi çaldıracağım ve piyade soltatların ellerinde uryan kılıçlar ve omuzlarında uçları harbelü soltat tüfengleri olacaktır. Ve işbu soltat ve zabıtları olan çend nefer ofıçyalları pişgahda yürümeğe için maiyetime tayin buyurulan ortalar neferatı olan Yeniçeriler ile mahluten tertib ideceğim ki Osmanlu ve Fransalunun ittihad ve muhabbeti dahi daima malum ola. Ve piyade soltatların ellerinde uryan kılıçlar [ve omuzlarında harbelü tüfengler olması dahi Fransa milleti millet-i İslamiyeyi edevat-ı] harbiyye ile düşmanlarından muhafazaya [kıyam üzere olduklarını dosta ve düşmana ilan içündür] işte Divan-ı Hümayuna böylece bir alay-ı azim ile azimet ve mukaddemce Bab-ı Aliye dahi bu debdebe ve heyet ile vüruda müsaraat ideceğim.”* Words in brackets are conveniently crossed in the draft.

<sup>26</sup> Saner-Gönen, *The Integration of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 118-20; Ottoman declaration of war clearly stated the point that France had invaded many ‘free’ and independent republics and city states that declared neutrality just like the Sublime Porte, Herbette, *Fransa’da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, pp. 199, 202.

<sup>27</sup> HAT 274/16130 (nd.; April 1798?) Atıf Efendi’s memorandum; this memorandum was brought to the attention of Ottomanists for the first time by Cevdet Paşa and used extensively in almost all studies on Ottoman diplomacy of the era, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 285, its reprint is on pp. 394-401.

signaled for the Porte the diminishing room for maneuver. According to the first article, were Paris and Vienna to fail to conclude peace, the Ottomans would send 100,000 troops to Trieste and Fiume so as to join with the French army so that the two allies could cut off the Habsburg army deployed in Dalmatia and Istria from the interior and could march on Vienna. A French fleet of 12 warships was to be put under the Ottoman Grand Admiral and wait at the Dardanelles only to be used against Russia in the Black Sea in the case of a possible Russian declaration of war; it goes without saying that its operations were to be subjected to Napoleon's discretion (art. II, III). After the war, the provinces of 'Albanya', 'İstirya' and 'Dalmaçya' might either be converted into tributary republics of the Sublime Porte or put under direct Ottoman rule, provided that the Porte would appoint Christian *Directoires* (*müdir*) and abstain from interfering with their religion (art. IV).<sup>28</sup> The Grand-vizier neatly explained to Selim that Dubayet followed in the footsteps of his predecessors in enticing the Porte to violate its declared neutrality in the 'European War' (*Avrupa muharebesinde saltanat-ı seniyyenin ihtiyar-kerdesi olan bi- tarafılık mesleği*). According to him the French had ill-intentions and Dubayet must have submitted the draft with the prediction of its refusal which the French could use as a pretext for their future aggression against the Porte.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> HAT 170/7225-A (8R1212/30Sept1797) draft treaty of alliance proposed by Dubayet. The draft also hinted at the possibility of selling 100,000 French-made muskets with bayonets at a fixed price to the Ottomans.

<sup>29</sup> HAT 170.7225 (nd.) the memorandum of the Grand-vizier İzzet Mehmed Paşa: "...*bunu Devlet-i Aliye kabul itmez. Biz dahi adem-i kabulü ser-maye idinüb şu hareketi bu muameleyi ideriz. Devleti Aliye sual itdikde 'ne yapalım? Şerayitmizi kabul itmediniz' diriz demek için bir nev mukaddime olmak Françelünüñ fesad-ı miyetine nazaran baid olmadıđı...*" Selim's note: "*Benim vezirim! Hafıce söyleşilsün. Reis Efendi bu maddelere gayet dikkat eylesün.*" (My vizier! Let a secret consultation be held. Tell the Reis Efendi to give his full attention to these matters).

## The French invasion of the Ionians Islands

With an army of 35,000, Napoleon dealt a fatal blow to Piedmont in spring 1796 and routed a series of Habsburg armies forcing Vienna to sign preliminary peace terms at Leoben in spring 1797 that paved the way for the Treaty of Campo Formio.<sup>30</sup> The Ottomans were kept informed on the Anglo-French war in the Mediterranean. One of the concerns of Dubayet was to persuade the Porte to sign a treaty of alliance with Spain. On 23 December 1796, Dubayet informed Mustafa Rasih Efendi that the Spanish navy consisting of 22 large galleons (including the legendary 140-gun four-decker, *Santissima Tirinidad*) was going to join the French navy in Brest. He also stressed that the French had recovered Corsica from the British navy, which had to retreat to Gibraltar.<sup>31</sup>

In a couple of weeks after its conclusion, the Porte learnt the signing of Campo Formio through the correspondence of İbrahim Afif Efendi, Ottoman ambassador to Vienna. The Porte let the foreign embassies know about the treaty by sending an informatory note.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> A copy of the treaty in Turkish is recorded in A.AMD 40/30 (catalogue date: H. 1212/1797); for a concise history of the Revolutionary wars refer to D. G. Wright, *Napoleon and Europe* (Longman, 1996), pp. 10-15; for Napoleon's Italian campaign of 1796-97 also see Harold Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples (1734-1825)* (London, 1956), pp. 278-296; for a case study of the influence of Napoleonic wars on Piedmont see M. Broers, *Napoleonic Imperialism and the Savoyard Monarchy 1773-1821. State Building in Piedmont* (Lewiston, 1997).

<sup>31</sup> A.AMD 40/50 (22C1211/23Dec1796), the minutes of the audience of Aubert Dubayet-Mustafa Rasih Efendi. An interesting debate on Corsica occurred between the two. Mustafa Rasih pointed out that the British had construed evacuation of the island by their own decision, but then gave up the idea. Dubayet refused the argument by indicating that the French victories in Italy cut off the British supply lines and it had to hand over Corsica to France due to lack of supplies.

<sup>32</sup> According to Cevdet Paşa it was unprecedented for the Porte to learn about a European affair before the foreign embassies in İstanbul, and this was a concrete outcome of having permanent embassies in Europe. However, he gave the date of arrival of the official news as 6 November, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 379. İbrahim Afif Efendi sent the unofficial news on the conclusion of the treaty 3 days ago, A.AMD 39/46 (13CA1212/3Nov1797). He followed the whole process leading to Campo Formio and sent various reports on it. His correspondence dealt with the newspapers and the rumors. According to the newspapers France took Mantua after a long siege and gave it to the Cisalpine Republic. Russia was going to reinforce its army

The treaty had detrimental effects on the Ottoman-French negotiations of an alliance. Therefore, France attempted to deceive the Porte that the treaty entrusted Tyrol, Trieste, and Venice with France for a specified period of time (*ber-vech-i emanet*) while Corfu was to be returned to Venice after the containment of the British encroachments in the region as announced by the French brochures. The French embassy claimed that Paris also reached an understanding with Vienna to restore Poland, ban the Russian warships from the Black Sea as well as put an end to its domination of the Principalities.<sup>33</sup> The Ottomans, nevertheless, were keenly aware of the implications of the treaty and closely scrutinized the developments leading to Leoben and Campo Formio.

According to the correspondence of the *voyvoda* of Wallachia, Vienna was bound to make peace immediately with France because of the disorders in Hungary. It was obvious that Napoleon would ‘provoke and ‘seduce’ (*tahrik ve ifsad*) the whole Italy as long as he headed the Italian army. The ‘new *Directoires*’ (*yeni müsteşarlar*) of France did not approve of Napoleon’s operations in Italy and they were likely to eject him from

---

in Italy by the next year whereas France was going to recruit volunteers in Venice. As they could find no volunteers, the French would resort to forced recruitment just as they had already done in Padua. British-French peace talks came to a standstill because of a number of issues: the debates on the status of Ireland and Gibraltar, the recognition of the Republic, freedom of using cockades in Britain by the French nationalities, ceding of Portsmouth and Belmont (?) to France, and extension of a loan of 500 million livres to France in 15 years. In addition, the papers also mentioned the negotiations of Britain with the Sublime Porte, Sardinia, and ‘Little Spain’ (The Two Sicilies). The rumors had it that Ionian Islands were given to France and Count Cobenzl returned to Vienna from Udine after signing the treaty of Campo Formio. The British naval victory over the Dutch (Camperdown, 11 October 1797) was another rumor. The most interesting one, however, was about the outbreak of a rebellion in St. Petersburg that resulted in the imprisonment of Paul and his eldest son (Alexander); For Camperdown see, P. Padfield, *Nelson’s War* (Kent: Wordsworth Editions, 2000), pp. 96-107.

<sup>33</sup> The Reis Efendi pretended to be satisfied with the news and warned the dragoman that there were Russian agents in the French Embassy, who could disclose the accord reached with Vienna concerning Russia. Selim’s note on the memorandum reads: “Let me see you, Reis Efendi, serving the state and religion in such hard times by using them by intricate tricks.” (*göreyim Reis Efendi şunları kullanub leta’ifu’l-hiyel ile böyle vakitte din ü devlete hizmet eylesün*), HAT 256/14667 (nd.) the memorandum of the Grand-vizier.

the country so as to “declare and show the whole world that the Republic of France did not aim at violation and subversion of the world order” (*Fransa Cumhuriyunun muradı ihlal ve ifsad-ı nizam-ı alem olmadığını amme-i düvele ilan ve izhar için*). The Habsburg Emperor, on the other hand, did not give up his claims over some of the Venetian provinces. The rumors had it that Russia and Prussia would also send delegates (Prince Dipen [?] and Lucchesini) to the peace talks.<sup>34</sup>

The Porte learnt the invasion of the Ionian Islands through the correspondence of Ali Paşa of Yanya (Janina) to the Port and the letter of Gentili, the French commander at Corfu, to Aubert Dubayet. The news was so profound that the French ambassador brought Gentili’s letter to the dragoman of the Imperial Council at night. Gentili informed in his letter that he invaded Corfu on the orders of Napoleon and was waiting instructions from Paris. Gentili also told that Napoleon authorized him to request money and supplies from the Porte to ease the acute supply shortages in Corfu. He requested from the Porte 3 months’ provisions with the necessary money as he was left with only 40 days’ provisions. He pointed out that the Porte could appoint a superintendent to Corfu to oversee the provisioning of the French troops from the Morea and Yanya –the Porte would actually take the advice a year later and install a superintendent in the island to oversee the supplying of the Russo-Ottoman fleet that expelled the French from Corfu!

---

<sup>34</sup> A.MD 39/21 (16S1212/10Aug1797) from the *Voyvoda* of Wallachia to the Porte. He also mentions the mutinies of Spithead (16 April-15 May 1797) and of Nore (12 May-13 June 1797) that broke out in the British navy. London had to increase the pay of the sailors to quell the rebellion (*fitne ve isyan*). Russia called back its navy to prevent the spread of this mutiny to its own sailors. Girolamo Lucchesini (1751-1825) served as the Prussian ambassador in Vienna (1793-97) and had audience with Napoleon in Bologna in 1797; Catherine II sent a Russian squadron to the assistance of the British navy in North Sea in 1796, which would help the British to deal with the mutiny. Paul overcame his initial hesitation and did not recall it, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 53; for these mutinies refer to the relevant section “Narratives of mutiny” in Chapter III.

In addition, he needed 30,000 *kuruş* to cover the three months' pay of his 2,000 troops.<sup>35</sup> Reminding that Gentili sent the letter 20 days ago, Dubayet urged a prompt answer from the Porte and delivered a copy of the proclamation published in Corfu in several languages in a likely effort to make assurances concerning the French good will. What he did not know was that the Porte had already had a copy of it through the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch.<sup>36</sup>

The Porte regarded the French occupation of 'Venetian Islands' as an 'overwhelming affair' (*umur-ı muazzama*) and was quick to realize that Gentili implied the annexation of the Ionian Islands rather than a temporary occupation when he wrote "the people of Corfu all of whom are Greeks...favor the protection of a strong nation that is capable of guarding their freedom." (*Rum taifesinden ibaret olan Korfa ahalisi....serbestiyetlerini hıfza kadir bir millet-i kaviyyenin zir-i himayesinde*).<sup>37</sup> The Grand-vizier Mehmed İzzet Paşa was convinced that France had the intention of destroying Venice and annexing the Ionians; the Porte, thus, should not decline Gentili's requests all at once. Upon the permission of Selim, he convened a council the next day.<sup>38</sup>

The consultative council advised the Porte to lend Gentili 30,000 *kuruş* for the pays of the troops and an additional sum of 20,000 *kuruş* to buy veal and 3,000 *kile* of provisions from Ali Paşa of Yanya (5 *kile*/128 kg per man a month). The Porte, however,

---

<sup>35</sup> A.AMD 39/12 (1S1212/26July1797) draft memorandum. The memorandum is recorded in HAT 171/7331 (1S1212). The translation of Gentili's letter is in HAT 1192/46903-C (1S1212).

<sup>36</sup> A.AMD 39/12 (1S1212/26July1797).

<sup>37</sup> HAT 1192/46903-C (1S1212/26July1797) from Gentili to Aubert Dubayet. Gentili wrote that he invaded Corfu with a force of 2,000 French and a flotilla of 2 warships, two oaring vessels and several boats manned by Venetian sailors. He claimed that the occupation received popular support in Corfu (*kemal-i memnuniyet ve süruriyet*).

<sup>38</sup> HAT 171/7331 (Catalogue date: 1S1212/26July1797) the memorandum of the Grand-vizier. Selim's handwriting reads "Have it discussed. This matter requires much attention" (*Bu gayet dikkat olunacak maddedir*).

should be alerted about the subversive French activities in the Morea. According to the council Ali Paşa should be forewarned by a secret letter not to allow the French to stay in the town more than 3 days when they came to Narda to load the provisions. Also, measures should be taken in the post stations to facilitate communication between Gentili and Dubayet.<sup>39</sup>

### *Ali Paşa and the French in Corfu*

Ali Paşa regularly corresponded with the Porte through his men who represented him before the Porte. According to Ali Paşa, France first seduced Venice to “join and submit to its novel rite/religion” (*kendü ayin-i cedidelerine ilhak ve itba ittirdikten*) a joint Franco-Venetian force occupied Corfu with 2,500 troops, 4 French and 8 Venetian ships. After the subjugation of the Corfiotes, the French were “seeking after practicing the rites of their own invention” in Preveza and its surroundings as well (*ihтира‘ eyledikleri ayinin icrası kaydında*). The Porte deemed it necessary to send additional secret letters to him so as to calm him down by assuring that the developments in the Adriatic was under the close scrutiny of the Porte. Accordingly, he would be told that since both France and Venice were republics the former annexed the latter which was why the French also occupied the Venetian islands. He was, thus, expected to keep the border region under his grip and prevent the populace from dispersal and mixing with the French and the Venetians.<sup>40</sup> These measures, approved by Selim, are direct expressions

---

<sup>39</sup> HAT 176/7673 (nd.) memorandum of the Grand-vizier. For its draft see, HAT 220/12179 (catalog date: 5S1212/30July1797).

<sup>40</sup> “Fransalu Cumhuriyetlerine celb itmişler ve mezkur adalar Venedik adalarından olmak hasebiyle ol adalara gelmişler. Bu suretde sen mukteza-yı dirayet ve sadakatın üzere her halde basiret üzere olarak ol havaliyi ve hududları muhafazaya dikkat ve reaya ve berayayı teferrükden ve Fransalu ve Venediklü ile ihtilattan

of the Sublime Porte's concerns about the contagion of the Revolution, which, though forgotten frequently, burst into the outer world in the form of revolutionary wars rather than the Revolutionary principles.<sup>41</sup>

An oft-neglected aspect of the prudent diplomacy pursued by the Porte was the extension of loans to the French embassy that could not receive fresh funds from Paris due to ongoing wars in Europe. As of 16 July 1797, the French embassy owed 324,000 *kuruş* to the Porte (equaling 1.5% of the central revenues) –including those loans made by the former ambassadors as well. Dubayet requested some 70,000 *kuruş* more to cover the expenses of his embassy, apart from the sums to be sent to Corfu. The Porte took the decision of lending him 50,000 *kuruş* “as times and circumstances require to be expedient

---

*vikayet idesin*”, HAT 176/7673 (3S1212/28July797). Ali's intermediaries in İstanbul were his ‘steward to the Gate’ (*Kapu Kethüdası*) and (*Kapu çukadarı*)—his official representatives. He gives the date of the French occupation of Corfu as 1 July. Alternative dates are 27 and 29 June 1797.

<sup>41</sup> “It is of course tempting to adopt the missionary language of the revolutionaries themselves and to see the French Revolution in ideological terms, bringing liberty, equality, and fraternity to the European continent. Perhaps in the long term there may be some truth in that view. At the time, however, many Europeans, the peasants in their cottages as well as the nobles in their chateaux, saw the Revolution through the actions of the politicians, administrators, and soldiers... They awaited with trepidation, the arrival of the next demand for requisitions, the next order of billeting yet more hungry and undisciplined troops within their communities. They believed the worst of the rumors that presaged the arrival of the French, the image of the revolutionaries as bandits, and atheists, defiling churches and profaning shrines. They viewed the Revolution not with gratitude but as a conquered people view its conquerors and in the manner of that conquest they saw little evidence of liberty and none of fraternity.” A. Forest, “The Revolution and Europe” in F. Furet and M. Ozooof (eds.), *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution* (Harvard University Press, 1989) [A. Goldhammer trans.], pp. 115-24; also see Ozooof, “Equality”, “Fraternity”, and “Liberty” pp. 671-83, 694-703, 716-25 in the dictionary; for a good summary of revisionist criticisms of the conventional interpretation of the French Revolution as a class-based and hence inevitable historical phenomenon see, K. M. Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), “Introduction”, pp. 1-10 and “Inventing the French Revolution”, pp. 203-23; Nelson “hated the French for their atheism, their attempts to overthrow all established order, for the atrocities they had committed against their own people and their armies had committed through Europe”, Padfield, *Nelson's War*, p. 115; for the destructive effects of French revolutionary armies in Italy see, Broers, *Napoleonic Imperialism*, pp. 183-222; for similar observations in the case of Egypt see, J. Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East* (Palgrave, McMillan, 2008); the celebrated French field-Marshal Suvorov who was dispatched to Italy “deplored the vandalism perpetrated by Berthier in Rome and drew attention to the way the French concealed their crimes through the distortion of language using paranymys like *gagner* or *republicaniser* where ‘outright thievery’ would have been more in order”; notably, “Thugut understood the war in purely in dynastic terms”, see C. Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West* (London: Routledge, 1981), pp. 214-15.



on the opportunities to reconcile and win his heart” (*Hasbü'l-vakt ve'l-hal telif ve celb-i kulublarını müstelzim halatın istihsaline bakılmak*). Seyid Ali Efendi should, nevertheless, mention these loans in passing to the Directors of France, ‘always in a reconciliatory fashion’ (*her halde telif ve taltif-balleri*).<sup>42</sup>

### *The Morea and the French threat*

Campo Formio troubled the Ottomans, for it left to victorious France only the barren Ionian Islands while the most fertile lands of former Venice went to the Habsburgs. It was all the more astounding since Venice was not even at war with France. The governor of the Morea Hasan Paşa, thus, viewed the partitioning of Venice as an outcome of a conspiracy and drew attention to its possible repercussions in the Ottoman realms. He contemplated that these two powers secretly agreed to occupy the old Venetian dominions of the Morea and Crete. The French disbanded the Venetian troops in Corfu at once since they feared that these troops would take side with the Ottomans because of the Ottoman-Venetian peace (1716) in the intended attack on Ottoman realms.<sup>43</sup> He also pointed out that a French ‘pamphlet’ (*risale*) was sent to Corfu by Bonapart (*Panopardi*) that stated:

prostrating ourselves before the Sublime Porte as though we were its subjects is a source of shame and humiliation for our state. Fraternity and equality that have been in practice among the Frenchmen require all the soldiers to be aware of this shame attached to our state. It should be known whether or not they are content with it. If not, our solidarity requires the saving of the dignity of France by eliminating such insults.<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> A.AMD 39/10 (nd.; catalogue date: 21M1212/16July1797) draft memorandum.

<sup>43</sup> HAT 168/7123 (29Dec1797–8Jan1798) from Hasan Paşa to the Porte; Lewis, “The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey”, p. 120.

<sup>44</sup> HAT 168/7123 (29Dec1797–8Jan1798) from Hasan Paşa to the Porte “*Devlet-i Osmaniye 'ye reayası misillü serfuru ve inkiyadımız devletimize mucceb-i ş'en ve noksan olub Françelü beyninde bir kaç senedenberu mamul ve cari olan merasim-i yekciheti ve tesavi iktizası devletimizde olan bu nakiseyi askeri taifesi dahi bilmek ve buna cümlesi razı mıdır değil midir bilinmek ve razı olmadıkları suretde namus-ı Françeyi böyle naksayısdan [sic.] tahlis eylemek ittifak iktizasındandır.*”

Hasan Paşa did not realize that the context was about Egypt, or it was so obvious that he did not need to explain it since France filed complaints about the mistreatment of the French merchants in Alexandria at that time. Hasan Paşa regularly sent spies to the Ionian Islands and Venice to keep an eye on the ‘state of the dissidents (*ahval-i muhalifeyn*: the French and Venetian Jacobins?). His spies informed him that the Frenchmen did not have any clue about the rumors concerning an impending French attack on the Ottoman Empire and that the Venetians were responsible for the dissemination of such rumors. Hasan Paşa also assured the Porte that the letters sent out by the ‘dissidents’ to Mani and the Morea failed to seduce the subjects of the Sultan. The French, nevertheless, were reinforcing Corfu although they always declared themselves ‘the best and most devoted friends of the Sublime Porte.’<sup>45</sup>

The Porte made known its concerns to Gentili through Ruffin on the spread of seditious activities from Corfu to the Morea. After the publication of Napoleon’s famous letter to Mainotes in several newspapers, the Porte expressed its official point of view to the French embassy, which held that the person of Napoleon was responsible for the wickedness (*fesad*) and not the Republic. Dubayet had to admit the Porte’s veiled condemnation by confirming “the afore-mentioned General is a capricious man who does

---

<sup>45</sup> HAT 168/7123 (29Dec1797–8Jan1798). According to Hasan Paşa, by the end of December 1797, 12,000 French troops were transported to Corfu by 13 ships on several occasions. At the time of writing down his report, they were sent to garrison other islands. The garrison of Corfu had 40,000 troops; E. Z. Karal, “Yunan Adalarının Fransızlar tarafından işgali ve Osmanlı-Rus münasebatı 1797-1798” *Tarih Semineri Dergisi* I/2 (1937), p. 117; B. Lewis, “The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey”, p. 120.

not really heed the Republic” (*pek de cumhuru ısga itmez hodrey bir adamdır*). He assured the Porte that he would have Paris reprimand him.<sup>46</sup>

Hasan Paşa’s report sheds light on the popular fears in the province of the Morea as a result of Campo Formio. It appears from the report that the ‘people’ (*ahali*) of the Morea viewed the demise of Venice in a different light. They were frightened by the ‘duplicity’ of the French, whom, they believed, had entered the Venetian territory only as a guest (*ber-vech-i müsafereten*), but then they annexed the country. Now that they were neighboring the borders of the Sublime State and that they were building up military strength in the region, the ‘people’ of the Morea requested Hasan Paşa’s permission to send their petition notarized by the judge (*mahzar*) to the Porte. The petition recounted that the French invaded the Ionians by the terms of Campo Formio and that it was likely to attack the Morea with its ally, the Habsburgs. Thus, the Porte should deploy 2,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry in conjunction with the principle of ‘due reciprocity’ (*mukabele-i bi’l-misl*) so that the province could escape the fate of Venice. The Governor, however, refrained from publicizing the news and refused to forward the petition to the Porte. While he warned them not to bring up the matter again, he communicated to the Porte that their concerns were not ‘so unreasonable’ (*pek de abes*

---

<sup>46</sup> Karal, “Yunan Adalarının Fransızlar tarafından işgali”, p. 119; this was the famous mission of the Stephanopouli brothers to Mani. They were Corsicans whose ancestors had migrated from Mani. Napoleon is said to have propagated through them that he also had Maniote roots, W. Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea* (London, 1823), pp. 197-98. According to Hobhouse, some of the Maniotes such as Kalomeros had taken refuge in Corsica in 1676 because of Ottoman military operations in the Morea and Napoleon declared to the Maniotes that the bearers of his famous letter were also Spartans by descent (ancient Maniotes); nevertheless, Greeks widely believed him to be a Maniote as well according to Hobhouse who printed a copy of the letter, see Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces...* (Philadelphia, 1817), v. I, pp. 198-99. Cevdet Paşa recorded that the French were also propagating for a Jewish state in Jerusalem, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 282.

*değil*), considering the recent developments, and submitted the matter of sending reinforcements to the discretion of the Porte.<sup>47</sup>

The Porte was gathering information on the Adriatic through local functionaries and the Orthodox Patriarchy. The bishop of Patras (*Balyebadra Metropolitidi*) communicated on 27 February 1798 that the French warships sailed to Toulon loaded with Venetian loots and that the Ionians hated the French since they plundered the churches and the monasteries in Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia. He also maintained that the French were planning to hand over Corfu to the Habsburgs in April 1798. The bishop of Kılaverta corresponded to the Patriarch that the French garrison in Zante was tiny and the French were expedient on looting the Ionians as was the case in Venice. He gave his assurances that the rumors about the seditious activities in the Morea should be dismissed as the province was in ‘perfect order.’ (*kemal-i asayiş derkar*).<sup>48</sup>

### The Egyptian expedition

Naples, Florence, Lisbon, Brazil, Morocco, Algeria, England, Ireland, India... A list of possible destinations of the Toulon fleet is definitely more exhaustive than our short list if we, for instance, take into consideration of Tsar Paul’s disproportionately magnified fears of a French attack to the Black Sea. Ottomanists usually ignore the fact that “only after Malta had been captured did Egypt of the Mamelukes appears [sic.] as a likely target”<sup>49</sup> by which time it was already too late for the Sublime Porte to reinforce

---

<sup>47</sup> HAT 168/7123 (29Dec1797–8Jan1798) from Hasan Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>48</sup> HAT 247/13930 (after 27 February 1798); for the maltreatment of the Ionians by the French see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 50-67.

<sup>49</sup> L Rossi, “Napoleon’s Own Rendering of his Expedition to Egypt and Holy Land” in A. Shmuelevitz (ed.) *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801* (İstanbul: Isis, 2002), p. 193; the plan to launch the Egyptian expedition was not devised before mid-February 1798; George John Spencer

Egypt. “The loyal friend Chabbot” (*dost-ı sadık Şabo*) –the newly appointed French General of Corfu- officially informed Emin Hasan Paşa, the governor of the Morea, the occupation of Malta by Napoleon, who was reputed for his victories in Italy, after a 12-hour siege. Chabot especially remarked that he was instructed to inform the Porte on the French victory by Napoleon who regarded the Porte as a ‘loyal friend.’<sup>50</sup> Meanwhile, the French ambassador of the Republic of Cisalpine –a French creation- to Vienna presented İbrahim Afif Efendi on the instructions of the French with a bag of documents about the negotiations of Rastadt (held on the future of the German principalities) by the end of May.<sup>51</sup> As of 17 July, İbrahim Afif Efendi was not sure whether or not the negotiations of Rastadt were successful, but he was surely concerned about the rumors that Napoleon set a course for the Ottoman realms after reducing Malta with the British fleet in chase.<sup>52</sup>

---

coined the idea that the French navy might be bound for the Black Sea as late as May, B. Lavery, *Nelson and the Nile: The Naval War against Bonaparte 1798* (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 101. Henry Dundas wrote to Spencer on 9 June about Egypt as a possible destination, accepting that “it may be whimsical but I cannot help having a fancy of my own on that subject.” Although he changed his mind by the end of June and declared İstanbul as the object of Napoleon, the British had already ordered a squadron to the Red Sea to check any French attempt to descend via the Nile with their navy from Alexandria (Lavery, p. 102). Nelson was convinced that Napoleon headed to Egypt only after learning on 22 June the fall of Malta; “none of the thirty rendezvous nominated by Nelson and St Vincent were east of Malta” while Nelson’s squadron had three months’ provisions. These prove how Nelson was unprepared to meet the French east of Malta (Lavery, pp. 126, 101); also see, P. Padfield, *Nelson’s War*, p. 114.

<sup>50</sup> HAT 246/13906 (catalogue date: 30M1213/14July1798) from General Chabbot to Emin Hasan Paşa. The catalogue date is probably wrong, or the governor must have forwarded the official proclamation quite late since Malta fell on 10 June 1798.

<sup>51</sup> A.AMD 40/21 (after 20 May 1798) from İbrahim Afif Efendi to the Porte.

<sup>52</sup> A.AMD 41/5 (3S1213/17July1798) from İbrahim Afif Efendi to the Porte; In his correspondence dated 10 July 1798, the voyvoda of Modavia (*Aleksandiri Panas-zade*) pointed out that the final destination of the Toulon fleet was unknown, while there were varying rumors that it was bound for Cadiz (as also Ali Efendi believed), Malta, or the Two Sicilies. He communicated to the Porte that Napoleon left Toulon with 150 ships and anchored at Leghorn by the end of May. A British fleet of 26 ships of the line and a couple of frigates entered the Mediterranean under Nelson on 10 June. According to Aleksandiri the ‘authorities’ believed that the French navy could not withstand the firepower of the British, should the two navy run into each other since the former was composed of Venetians, Genoese, and various elements who were incompetent in seamanship. He acquired this information through his men in Vienna, HAT 249/14089 (26M1213/10July1798).

While the Porte was suspecting a French attack on the Adriatic frontiers, a French newspaper claimed that the Toulon fleet would attack Egypt. The Porte found the news credible since the French preparations in Toulon were more substantial than those in Brest, ruling out an attack on England. Talleyrand's denunciation of the news in the audience with Ali Efendi did not much impress the Porte which convened a secret meeting to discuss the matter. All in the meeting agreed that France had ill-intentions about Egypt even before the Revolution and that İskenderiye (Alexandria), Dimyat (Damietta), and Reşid (Rosetta) should be reinforced in advance since the distance hindered a last minute military build-up in the country. They were, however, also concerned about a possible Mamluk opposition against any Ottoman military build-up since they were 'apprehensive and timid by nature' (*ötedenberu muvesvis ve mütevahhiş adamlar olmağla*). Accordingly, they decided to induce the Mamluks to send a 'mahzar' (communal petition notarized by the judge and sent through the Governor) to the Porte seeking for military assistance. According to the plan, Ahmed Erib Efendi was to be sent to Egypt on an ostensibly routine visit. After delivering the regular correspondence to the Governor, he was to pay a secret visit to Ali Beg, the former *Sipahiler Ağası*, and deliver him the written instructions that explained the necessity to fortify Egypt against the impending French threat. Through the services of *Çavuşlar Kethüdası*, the matter should be negotiated by İbrahim Beg –the *Şeyhü'l-beled*- and his adversary Murad Beg. Aware of Murad Beg's bad-tempered nature (*haşin*), the Porte feared he might oppress the French consul in Alexandria after learning the news. Therefore, he should be handled with utmost care and induced to ask reinforcements from the Porte through *mahzar*.

Furthermore, the Porte also decided to send the copies of the newspaper to Alexandria by merchants in order to rally popular support against the French that would ease the implementation of the plan; it goes without saying that no one should know the Porte's involvement in the distribution of the newspaper. Unfortunately, the 'clandestine' activities of the Porte proved futile as Napoleon invaded Alexandria while Ahmed Erib Efendi was on the way.<sup>53</sup>

After the audience of Atif Efendi (Reis Efendi) with Ruffin on 19 June, the Porte realized with no doubt that the final destination was Egypt. Although Ruffin insisted that he received no official correspondence stating the ultimate target of Napoleon, he did not deny the rumors in the newspapers and the debates in the French parliament about Egypt. Pressed by the Reis Efendi, he stated his concerns about Napoleon's intentions 'off-the-record.' Accordingly, a certain Venture, one of the former dragomans in the French embassy in İstanbul, was appointed to the fleet in Toulon, for he knew Arabic and

---

<sup>53</sup> *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, pp. 283-84, 290-91; Ottoman scribes always had a middle name which was given during their training in the office; ironically, the middle name of the scribe who was deemed fit for this 'clandestine' activity means 'shrewd'; it seems one of the *Riyales* (rear admiral) was in Alexandria when the French arrived. Karal mistook the rank for the name of the ship (*Riyale adındaki harp gemisinin...*). Nevertheless, the letter of Ebubekir Paşa, the Governor of Egypt, reveals that when the French navy was sighted, the *Riyale* sent the vice-captain Emin (*Mülazım*) with presents to *L'Orient*, the French flagship, the day before the French landing, but they were detained by the French. Nevertheless, the French sources claimed that the 'Turkish officer' was sent back to Alexandria with proclamations in Arabic. According to the story, he was presented with the proclamation in Arabic on the flagship, but as he did not know the language, the French read it to him in Turkish: "at every disobliging mention of the Mamluk beys, the visitor leaped with joy; he requested more copies of the proclamation to distribute, consumed quantities of coffee and sweets, and left with a letter from Bonaparte to his commander." Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt* (Pen&Sword, imprint, 2005), p. 60; One of the French letters intercepted by the Ottomans also recounted the story in a very similar way: "*Beylerin zulmüne dair olan her ibarede memnuniyet gösterüb onu neşir için bir kaç nushasını talep...*", Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, pp. 73-74; The pleasure he took at the French condemnations of the Mamluks and his alleged immediate release with the proclamations were apparently French propaganda; Ebubekir Paşa, the governor of Egypt, pointed out that the French navy anchored out of range of the *Riyale*, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 165; Soysal gave the name of the *riyale* as İdris Beg, Soysal, *Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız*, p. 221; Ottoman declaration of war also stated that the Porte arrested the French consuls and merchants in retaliation of the Ottoman merchants and warships held in detention with the crew in Egypt, M. Herbette, *Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, p. 203.

Turkish, which lent credence on the rumors in the newspapers in his opinion. He then sought to palliate the Porte by drawing attention to the long-standing complaints of the French merchants about their harassment in Alexandria customs. Although the Grand Admiral Hasan Paşa undertook a punitive campaign to Egypt in late 1780s, the humiliation of the French continued without hindrance, illustrating the Porte's inability to exert its authority over Egypt. Thus, Ruffin was of the idea that if Napoleon set out to invade Egypt as rumored, it would be probably for punishing the Mamluks and cutting off the British from India. After all, the trade treaties (Capitulations) gave France the right to defend themselves with arms against the attacks of the North African corsairs and this might apply to the case of Egypt as well; that said, the Porte should not mistake a possible French attack for a declaration of war on the Ottomans. Furious, as he was, Atıf Efendi notified Ruffin about the mistreatment of Ottoman merchants in Marseilles because of the Revolutionary Wars. But the Porte never contemplated of invading the French town on the pretext that Paris had no power over the town. Consequently, he made it clear that the case of Egypt was totally different from the North African appendages as the former was regarded within the imperial dominions (*havass-ı hümayun*) and its revenues were largely reserved for the upkeep of the Holy Cities. Therefore, France should forward any complaints about Egypt to the Porte as required by 'the regulations of law of nations and current usages practiced and observed by the states' (*hukuk-ı milel kavaidi ve beyne'd-düvel mer'i ve muteber olan muamelata nazaran*).<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, pp. 320-23. Ruffin also related the rumors about a possible bartering of Egypt for the Ionian Islands; Talleyrand's famous instructions on Egypt dated 11 May reached Ruffin only on 29 June. Soysal confirmed the audience with Ruffin's official report sent to Paris, see Soysal, *Fransız İhtilali ve Tük-Fransız*, pp. 208-210; Karal quotes from Cevdet Paşa the date of the audience wrong as 17 June



A cursory overview sufficiently proves that official line of argument had already crystallized before the invasion of Egypt on both sides as revealed in Ruffin's audience with Atıf Efendi. In other words, the Porte's incessant condemnations of the French invasion as an unprecedented act of crime did not so much reflect its astonishment at the incidence as its determination to present the case as one of violation of international law. Consequently, the news of the fall of Alexandria must not have been as shocking as we usually assume for the Porte under the light of the evidence.<sup>55</sup> Now we can focus on Ottoman-Russian alliance against this background.

### **Ottoman-Russian Alliance**

While the Sublime Porte was preoccupied by the developments we briefly outlined above, Kochubei, the Russian ambassador to the Porte, was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Vasili Tomara was sent to İstanbul as the extra-ordinary ambassador by the autumn of 1797. St. Petersburg, however, was not well-informed on

---

1798, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 67; in his report dated 21 April 1798, Ali Efendi mentioned the speech of Eschasséaux addressing the parliament of "500s" (House of Commons) on 14 April. Unconvinced by Talleyrand's assurances, he went to theatres on 'espionage.' The Porte, finally, resolved to send new instructions to Ali Efendi upon his last report in which he was told about the last meeting with Ruffin and asked to obtain further clarifications from Talleyrand: if the rumors about the Egyptian expedition were disseminated on purpose as part of disinformation policy, France should let the Porte know it secretly, and, if not, Talleyrand then should have the newspaper publish an official denial of the rumors. Should France attack Egypt, not only the Muslim subjects of the Porte but all Islamic states would unite against France. On 21 July Ali Efendi communicated to the Porte that he raised these questions during his audience with Talleyrand and on 25 July he sent to İstanbul the newspaper that published Talleyrand's official denial of Poultier's essay. The lateness of these dates illustrate the duplicity of Talleyrand, see Karal's analysis of the document, Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, pp. 65-66, 82-84, [document III] pp. 154-57; for Eschasséaux' speech see, Herbet, *Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, pp. 193-96.

<sup>55</sup> French violation of international law is also stressed in the Ottoman declaration of war, see Herbet, *Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, pp. 199; Tükin is the only Ottomanist who doubted that the Ottomans were shocked by the Egyptian Expedition as early as 1947, Tükin, *Boğazlar Meselesi* (İstanbul, 1999) second edition [Bülent Aksoy ed.], p. 110 footnote 160 [first edition: İÜEF Tarih Bölümü, 1947]; for a recent recapitulation of this conventional view see Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, p. 410: "Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1798 shocked the Ottomans profoundly just as the appearance of the Russian fleet in the Aegean in 1770 had."

the developments in the Mediterranean due to a likely interruption of communications across the Balkans because of the Porte's military operations against Pazvantoğlu Osman of Vidin and of the change in ambassadors in İstanbul.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, the Reis Efendi was stunned by the ignorance of the Russian court when its ambassador shared the outdated intelligence on the subversive activities of the French in the Morea which the Porte had already known about thoroughly. This was all the more surprising for the Reis Efendi since the Russian ambassador had urged for a secret meeting at the former's residence on a December night to pass on this piece of information which had been published in all newspapers months ago. In order to 'spare him from embarrassment', Reis Efendi contented himself with telling the ambassador about the Porte's deliberation on the matter with the French embassy and appreciated the goodwill of Paul.<sup>57</sup>

Unsatisfied by the Porte's response, Fonton, the dragoman of the Russian embassy, officially asked to be informed on Ottoman military preparations against a

---

<sup>56</sup> Kochubei in fact remained in İstanbul until after the end of the year. Saul draws attention on the interruption of communications and offers possible explanations such as unexpectedness of Napoleon's invasion of the Ionians and secrecy surrounding the process of Campo Formio, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 54-55 (footnote 6), 57-58 (footnote 17).

<sup>57</sup> Karal was unaware of the fact that Russian intelligence was outdated due to the breaking of communications with St Petersburg and did not appreciate the Ottoman intelligence gathering in the region of earlier dates. Thus he criticized Reis Efendi for ignoring the importance of the Russian intelligence, ascribing his calmness to his reservations about a rapprochement with Russia. This document he published also proves that the Porte had known the French activities in the Morea long before Hasan Paşa's report that we have mentioned previously since the Reis Efendi told the ambassador that he had already discussed the matter with Dubayet, Karal, "Yunan Adalarının Fransızlar tarafından işgali", p. 119, Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 59. For the reasons above, he mistakenly attributed the Ottoman convictions of a possible French attack on the Morea and Albania to Russian warnings, contradicting himself in various ways, *Fransa-Mısır*, pp. 59, 66; Tükin's analysis of the same document (HAT 7173: 5Dec1797) once again displays Karal's arbitrary omissions without forewarning the reader; i.e., Kochubei also expressed his views on Franco-Habsburg peace treaty. He coined the idea that the *Directoires* did not want to recall Napoleon, whereas the Papacy and the Two Sicilies might like to divert his attention to Ottoman realms in order to save their own realms from his rapacity, Tükin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 97-99; Paul learned the French invasion of the Ionian Islands only in October 1797, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 56.

possible French attack on Albania and the Morea.<sup>58</sup> The news of the presence of an Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea worried Paul who was afraid of the possibility of a Franco-Ottoman alliance against Russia. Thus, by 15 February 1798 Paul ordered the sending out of an observation fleet of 12 ships of the line from Sevastopol.<sup>59</sup>

Before mid-March 1798, Paul I assured the Porte that the reinforcement of the borders and sailing out of the Black Sea fleet was intended against France and not the Ottoman Empire. The *voyvodas* of Wallachia and Moldavia had already warned the Porte about Russia's intentions of sending a fleet to the Mediterranean against the French. A consultative committee convened under the Grand-vizier to decide on the official reply to be given to the Russian embassy concerning the military preparations against France. The members thought that Russia should have known the Porte's intention to protect its realm against a possible French attack since it had already been told to the British embassy. After long debates, it came to the conclusion that Russia would use any Ottoman response as a pretext to propose to send its Black Sea fleet through the Straits. It was also resolved not to give any pretext to the French to attack the Ottoman realms despite indications of French belligerence.<sup>60</sup>

As the Porte sensed Russian intentions in the Mediterranean it found the explanation of Kochubei concerning the Black Sea fleet unconvincing and demanded

---

<sup>58</sup> For the facsimiles of HAT 7228 and HAT 7228-A see, Karal, "Yunan Adalarının Fransızlar tarafından işgali", pp. 127-28; Tükin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, p. 101.

<sup>59</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 58-59.

<sup>60</sup> Tükin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 103-104 (HAT 7229). The committee decided to profess its friendship both with Russia and France and its determination to defend its realms against any attack. Selim approved of the decision by writing down, "*Fransız nakz-ı ahd eylemedikden sonra Rusyalunun gemi geçirmesi bize muzır olmakla imparator bize zararı tecviz eylemesi memul değildir. Takriri mucibince cevab olunsun*" (Unless the French violate the peace, passage of Russian ships is detrimental to us. It is not conceivable that the Emperor would like to approve of inflicting any harm on us. Let it be replied in accordance with the memorandum.)

clarifications. Kochubei, thus, related the suspicion in St. Petersburg of the existence of a Franco-Ottoman alliance against Russia in a similar manner to Franco-Spanish alliance concluded against Britain.<sup>61</sup>

By May 1798, the Porte was forwarded the official Russian proposals for uniting the Black Sea fleet with the Ottoman navy against the French. While the Porte was convinced that this was a defensive measure on the part of Russia, Selim was hesitant about Russian overtures. The Porte, however, insisted on the necessity of ‘inspiring confidence in and showing favor to’ Russia in return for its overtures for a rapprochement with the Porte (*temin ve taltifi lazım gelür*).<sup>62</sup> What accounted for the Porte’s changing mood towards Russia were no doubt the reports of Ali Efendi and the French invasion of Venice. The treatise penned by Atıf Efendi, Reis Efendi, -probably in April- is well-known to Ottomanists, for its clarity of argument on the necessity of entering the anti-French alliance that was likely to be formed in the near future.<sup>63</sup>

#### *The treatise of Atıf Efendi*

Atıf Efendi neatly summarized the official point of view concerning the ongoing wars and revolutionary France. Members of the First Coalition glossed over the revolutionary regime and sought to take advantage of it for expanding their own interest. It appeared after the war that the French repudiations of territorial gain were false so

---

<sup>61</sup> *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, pp. 282-83; Tükin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 104 (HAT 3913). The Prussian ambassador also warned the Porte that it should be alerted against the Franco-Austrian alliance; In April, Paul decided to offer military support to Selim against Pazvantoglu who he thought a French accomplice, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 60.

<sup>62</sup> *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, pp. 283. Russia informed the Porte that it mobilized 12 ships of the line and a number of other warships in the Black Sea; Tükin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, p. 107. Both historians relied on HAT 15450.

<sup>63</sup> HAT 274/16130 (nd.) Atıf Efendi’s treatise; *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 285, its reprint is on pp. 394-401; Soysal, pp. *Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız*, pp. 206-208.

much so that they even occupied Venice although it was a neutral state with overt inclinations to France. By drawing on the cases of weak German principalities and tiny Italian states, Atıf Efendi came to the conclusion that France had no respect for treaties and aimed to export its republican regime to outside world in order to feel secure at home. While it created puppet republican regimes in weak states in an outright manner, it attempted at subversion of the subjects of the stronger states with whom it always pretended to cultivate friendship. He argued that those states who had closer relations with France suffered more from the ‘unheard-of mischief and sedition’ (*misli na-mesbuk fitne u fesad*). Obviously, these are clear allusions to the dangers involved in remaining neutral or drawing closer to France. He argued against those who believed that a new coalition would not fare better than the first one. According to him, the new coalition should have the ultimate object of destroying the revolutionary regime and set aside the selfish interests of different courts. It should not only fight the French on the borders but also entice counter-revolutionaries (*taraf-gir/hilaf-gir*) in puppet states in Italy who would ‘massacre’ the French and their accomplices in order to restore the old regimes as well as Venice. Therefore, it would be possible to separate Spain from France and relieve Britain of its isolation.<sup>64</sup>

“Is the Eternal Sublime Porte also in a perilous situation as are the other states?” Atıf Efendi’s answer was unequivocal. The Porte favored France in spite of its neutrality and at the expense of frustrating other European states during the First Coalition wars. It even saved France from famine by allowing exportation of large quantities of grain to France.

---

<sup>64</sup> HAT 274/16130 (nd.) Atıf Efendi’s treatise.

France and its generals, however, responded by carrying out clandestine and open subversive activities in Ottoman realms. The French allusions to the regime of the Antiquity (*kudema-ı Yunaniyenin keyfiyet-i idaresini tezekkür*) in the Ionian Islands and four Dalmatian towns were obvious signs of their ‘malicious minds.’ Furthermore, it was not out of question that ‘a gross conspiracy’ (*bir fesad-ı azim*) might lie behind the preparations in Toulon. Therefore, Atıf Efendi proposed to enter the coalition that was to be formed in near future against France if only it did not repeat the mistakes of the First Coalition.<sup>65</sup>

Consequently, his division of foreign states into two as natural allies/foes on the basis of geography and temporary allies/foes with regards to politics led the way for forming an alliance with the traditional enemy of Russia against the traditional friend of France.<sup>66</sup> Atıf Efendi’s views were strikingly similar to Paul’s in terms of despising the selfish interests of the European courts and applauding the common interest against Revolutionary France in a likely anti-French coalition.

Historians of imperial Russia have for a long time contended that the Russian Black Sea fleet was dispatched to Istanbul at the request of the Ottomans.<sup>67</sup> Paul,

---

<sup>65</sup> HAT 274/16130 (nd.) Atıf Efendi’s treatise; the motives of sending grain and favoring France can also be found in the latest instructions sent to Ali Efendi that demanded the publishing of an official denial of the news concerning the Egyptian Expedition as we mentioned previously.

<sup>66</sup> HAT 274/16130 (nd.) Atıf Efendi’s treatise; according to Atıf, Russia and the Habsburgs were the natural enemies of the Porte because of geo-strategic realities of the Balkans, while France was a natural friend, for it did not want the strengthening of the Porte’s rivals. Studies have emphasized this last section of the treatise following Cevdet Paşa’s analysis to the exclusion of Atıf Efendi’s views on the revolutionary France. Tukin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 108-109; Soysal, *Türk-Fransız Diplomasi*, p. 207.

<sup>67</sup> Goriainow, S., *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles* (Paris, 1910), p. 4 (Turkish trans: *Rus Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi*, Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu and Ishak Keskin eds. [Istanbul: Ötüken, 2006] - reprint of the original translation by Macar Iskender and Ali Reşad, *Devlet-i Osmaniye-Rusya Siyaseti* [İstanbul, 1331], p. 49); McKnight repeats the assertion that the Ottomans sought help officially in July 1798, see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 39; Selim clearly stated that Russia had offered alliance to the

nevertheless, was totally committed to war against France on his own means if necessary by early May. He promised to outfit more warships in the North Sea to enable the British to chase after the Toulon fleet with more warships. He gave clear orders to vice Admiral Ushakov to engage the French navy, were it to enter the Black Sea, showing that as late as 24 May he seriously conceived of the Black Sea as the final destination of the Toulon fleet. Decisive orders of sailing to İstanbul were sent on 5 August to Ushakov without a definite Ottoman request for aid.<sup>68</sup>

### Conclusion of the Ottoman-Russian Alliance

While the official negotiations for an Ottoman-Russian alliance were opened on 28 July 1798, the treaty of alliance could only be concluded on 23 December 1798, long after the combined Ottoman and Russian fleet set sail for the Adriatic. A detachment of the Russian Black Sea fleet had already laid anchor in Büyükdere on September 5. Long debates over each of the proposed articles accounted for the prolongation of the negotiations.<sup>69</sup> Notably, the Porte gave written guarantees of safe return to the Black Sea without which the Russian fleet refused to enter the Straits. This hesitation cast doubt on the belief of the Ottomanists that the immediate dispatch of the Russian fleet was meant to be a *fait-a-compli* to press the Porte into the alliance. Ushakov received on

---

Porte: “*ittifaka anlar talibdirler*” (they sought after the alliance), Karal, *Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları-Nizam-ı cedid 1789-1807* (Ankara, 1988), p. 58.

<sup>68</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 59-61. As early as April Paul was prepared to give the Ionian Islands to the Habsburgs, the Two Sicilies, or the Ottoman Empire in order to facilitate the formation of an anti-France coalition.

<sup>69</sup> The initial draft delivered by the Russians did not mention the French aggression and Egypt in the prologue on the grounds that the Russo-Ottoman alliance should not be limited to the cooperation against France. They, instead, proposed to mention France by name in the secret articles. The Ottomans, nevertheless, convinced them to address the French aggression by implication in the prologue as well, Tuğın, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 112-113 (HAT 1798; HAT 15109: the Russian draft for a treaty of 12 articles; HAT 13876).

9 September a new order in which Paul listed the objectives of the expedition as Egypt, Crete, the Morea, and ‘the Venetian Gulf.’ This revealed that Paul put the priority on Egypt and did not even mention Malta by name.<sup>70</sup>

### *The Büyükdere and Bebek Conferences*

Two conferences were held with the potential allies to discuss the destination of the expedition. News of the Battle of Nile had already reached in İstanbul when the first conference was convened on 8 September at Büyükdere. At this conference it was established that the Ottomans prepared 19 warships except light vessels as opposed to 11 Russian warships that were present that time in İstanbul. The Ottomans offered that two-thirds of the fleet should sail to Adriatic with the remaining one-third to be sent to Rhodes since Nelson needed a flotilla of light vessels to burn the French ships inside the harbor. They could also sail to Malta or Sicily in coordination with Nelson. Ushakov, however, was totally opposed to split the combined fleet into two, and he proposed to sail to Adriatic. Smith pointed out to Reis Efendi that Nelson could not destroy the

---

<sup>70</sup> Despite Saul’s contention, Tomara and Ushakov must have known Paul’s interest in Malta as the matter was brought up at the Büyükdere Conference. While, Paul did not learn the fall of Malta before 25 August, the two Russian agents surely knew it in İstanbul and must have predicted Paul’s reaction against the French aggrandizement. Lieutenant Tizenghausen arrived at the head of the advanced scout in İstanbul on 2 September 1798, the same day Ruffin, French *charge d’affaires*, was shut in the Seven Towers. Saul saw a direct correlation between the two events, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 64-7; for the details of the written guarantee Tugin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, p. 115 (HAT 5729); Selim ordered the summoning of a consultative committee to decide upon declaration of war on France unanimously. He also advised the postponement of formal declaration of war until war preparations and negotiations were completed. In the meantime he advised not to break off relations with France so as to deceive it; after all “the infidels have been cheated us for six years. What if we cheat them for six months and take care of preparations as much as possible” (*Altı senedir kafirler bizi iğfal eyledi. Biz dahi altı mah kadar onları iğfal eyleyüb mümkün merteye işimize baksak*), Karal, *Selim III. Ün Hattı Hümayunları* (Ankara, 1942), p. 54.



whole French fleet after the Battle of Nile since he did not have light vessels in his fleet and he requested the dispatch of light vessels to Alexandria.<sup>71</sup>

The Ottomans were also opposed to separate the Ottoman and Russian fleets as they found it improper to give the Russians a free hand in the Adriatic. Thus, the Ottoman negotiators were resolved to reconcile Tomara and Smith in the next conference to be held at Bebek by insisting on sparing some of the Russian and Ottoman warships for Alexandria.<sup>72</sup>

In the following Bebek Conference, Tomara repeated Ushakov's views expressed in the previous conference by proposing that the Russo-Ottoman fleet should sail to the Adriatic in order to recover the Ionians and cut off the route of a possible French relief force. It would also be possible to prevent the French to send reinforcements to Italy. Accordingly, Nelson should be sent light vessels and informed about the destination of the combined fleet. Should Nelson insist on reinforcement –or ask for the replacement- of his fleet, the allies could then give the matter some thought upon his future request. Smith actually agreed with Tomara in principle and put forth Nelson's correspondence dated September 2 in which he requested the sending of light vessels and bomb-ketches with 10,000 land troops to Alexandria. According to Nelson, Napoleon was planning to march towards Jerusalem with the support of the French fleet

---

<sup>71</sup> Reis Efendi conferred with Smith while Ushakov and Tomara met with other Ottoman officials. Smith also paid a visit to Ushakov aboard his ship, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 31; FO 78/20, Smith to Grenville, Sept. 8, 1798; C. Tükin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 115-16; HAT 13814-A the minutes of the Büyükdere Conference. It was convened in the mansion of İsmail Ferruh Efendi, who was the second permanent ambassador sent to London. Saul, however, did not mention the Bebek Conference and gave the impression that all decisions were taken in the Büyükdere Conference, which he misdated as 9 September, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 66.

<sup>72</sup> HAT 266/15426 (nd.: 9 September 1798 ?) the memorandum of the deputy Grand-vizier; K. McCranie, "The Operations and Effectiveness of the Ottoman Navy during Napoleon's Invasion of Egypt, 1798-1801" in Shmuelevitz (ed.) *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801*, p. 156.

in Alexandria. Were the French fleet to be burnt, he could not receive naval support while the fall of Alexandria would cancel out the possibility of the arrival of a French relief force.<sup>73</sup>

Ushakov revised Tomara's views by giving his consent to the split of the combined fleet into two. His latest instructions that arrived the previous day were likely to account for his change of mind. As mentioned previously, Paul, upon learning the French landing on Alexandria, required Ushakov to act in coordination with the Ottomans and the British, putting Egypt on the top of the list of possible destinations of the expedition. Ushakov now argued that one-third of the combined fleet should cruise in the vicinity of Rhodes and to join the main fleet in the 'Venetian Gulf' in case that it ran into a stronger French fleet. He believed that Napoleon had fortified Alexandria after the Battle of Nile to deter any attempt at burning the remnants of his navy. Thus, Ushakov saw it obsolete to send a detachment of light vessels to Alexandria. Moreover, Tomara doubted that the detachment of warships that was to escort the light vessels could anchor at Alexandria because of the winter storms. The Ottoman Port Commander (*Liman Reisi*) shared his concerns by stating that the detachment would have to anchor 20 miles away from the harbor of Alexandria in winter, failing to offer an effective

---

<sup>73</sup> HAT 270/15756 (29RA1213/10Sept1798) the minutes of the Bebek Conference. İsmet Begefendi, the former *Kazasker* of Rumeli, and Reisü'l-küttab Atif Efendi were the negotiators in the conference. However, the steward of the Imperial Dockyards (*Tersane-i Amire Emini*), the Port Commander (*Liman Reisi ve Nazırı*), and the representative of the Grand Admiral (*Kapu çukadarı*) were also present in the meeting. Two copies of the minutes were sent to the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa and Mahmud Raif Efendi who was appointed the diplomatic representative to the Ottoman fleet; Tükin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 116-17. Tükin claimed that Ushakov maintained his unyielding position. He relied on the documents HAT 13910 and 13814-A. Unfortunately, I have not consulted these documents; Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, pp. 4-5.

protection to the light vessels. Relying on this information, Ushakov promised only a few frigates to accompany the light vessels and urged them to anchor at Rhodes.<sup>74</sup>

The Ottomans also argued that the detachment should anchor at Rhodes and communicate with Nelson to finalize the plans for an attack on the French fleet in the harbor of Alexandria. It, however, should sail to Alexandria upon encountering a French fleet, rather than joining the main fleet in the Adriatic.<sup>75</sup> Finally, the negotiators decided the destination of the expedition as the Ionians relying on the Ottoman intelligence that the French were concentrating their forces in Ancona either to invade the Balkans or reinforce the army in Egypt. A detachment of light vessels including bomb-ketches and four Ottoman and Russian frigates were to be sent to Nelson under Captain Sorokin.<sup>76</sup>

#### *Articles*

The Russo-Ottoman alliance was finally signed on 23 December 1798 for a period of 8 years (art. XIII). By that time, the combined fleet had already reduced all of the Ionian Islands except for Corfu. The treaty had 14 articles in addition to 13 secret

---

<sup>74</sup> HAT 270/15756 (29RA1213/10Sept1798) the minutes of the Bebek Conference; it seems in-depth knowledge of the Port Commander on the harbor of Alexandria was influential in the shaping of the final decision. He pointed out that the frigates could have anchored at 5 miles away from the shore had it not been for the French invasion. Furthermore, the season of Nile would be over in a month after which it would be impossible to remain outside of the harbor; Saul emphasized the role of Tomara in the decision upon the destination. Tomara was of Greek origin and familiar with Turkish and the Ottoman concern with Balkan unrest. He was also an atypical Russian diplomat in terms of his ability to take initiative, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 67; the minutes, however, does not suggest an over-bearing of Tomara. Actually, when he requested the concentration of land troops in the ports close to the Ionians, the Ottoman negotiators asked him his choice of port. He replied that he was not familiar with the Adriatic coast and that he had to consult a map. Nevertheless, he pointed out the importance of sending anti-French proclamations to the Ionians.

<sup>75</sup> HAT 270/15756 (29RA1213/10Sept1798) the minutes of the Bebek Conference. The Ottoman negotiators pointed out that Hasan Kapudan, the governor of Rhodes (*mutasarrıf*), had 2 ships including the intercepted French postal ship bound for France, which brought the total number of the warships to a minimum of 5 with those to be detached from the combined fleet.

<sup>76</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 65-6; the Ottomans prepared the demanded 10 *şalopes* (a type of schooner) at Ortaköy after the first conference and two gunboats were under construction in the Imperial Dockyards.

articles as well as a special act for the provisioning of the Russian fleet.<sup>77</sup> The treaty reconfirmed the treaty of Yaş (Iasi) (art. II) and recognized territorial integrity of the two empires (art. III). It embodied the general principles of acting in unison against the common foe, refraining from concluding separate peace, and sharing all information and intentions concerning plans of war and conditions of peace (art. I, IV, VII, VIII; secret art. VIII, IX). The Tsar and the *Padişah* repudiated all claims to territorial gains and invited the Habsburg Empire, Britain, Prussia, and other powers to join the alliance (art. XII; secret art. XII).

Secret article I put forth the reason of the two sovereigns to decide upon forming an alliance; France was violating the entire existing order so as to change the world (*taklib-i düvel*). It subjugated various parts of the world either by force or through disseminating ‘the seditious principles they invented’ (*ihтира itdikleri usul-ı fasideleri sirayetiyle*). Following articles arranged the passage of the Russian ships through the Straits in detail (art. II, III, IV).<sup>78</sup>

#### *The matter of subsidy*

Major reason for the prolongation of the negotiations was the dispute over the Russian demand for subsidy. Russia customarily demanded subsidy when it put its

---

<sup>77</sup> C.HRC 4232 (26B1213/3Jan1799) the treaty of Ottoman-Russian alliance; HAT 1351/52804 includes the secret treaty and the special act; HAT 1351/52808 retains the public treaty; also published by Cevdet Paşa without the secret articles, see *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, pp. 304-311; G. Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1900), v. II, pp. 24-27; *Muahedat Mecmuası*, (Ankara, 2008), v. I, pp. 16-28; Articles on provisioning will be dealt with in Chapter V on provisioning.

<sup>78</sup> For the refutation of Gorianow's assertion that Russia acquired a permanent right to passage through the Straits, see J. C. Hurewitz, "Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Reevaluation of the Origins of the Problem" *World Politics* 14 (1962): 605-32 and "The Background of Russia's Claims to the Turkish Straits: A Reassessment", *Bellekten* XXVIII/111 (1964): 459-503; Tukin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, p. 94; for a recent recapitulation of Gorianow's claim see, A. B. Shirokorad, *Rusko-Turetskie Voyny 1676-1918 gg* [Turkish trans.: Ahsen Batur [trans.] *Rusların Gözünden 240 Yıl Kıran Kırana Osmanlı-Rus Savaşları. Kıırım, Balkanlar, 93 Harbi ve Sarıkamış* (İstanbul, 2009), p. 270].

troops into the service of a foreign country without territorial claims. Nevertheless, Ottomans were upset by the Russian demand and refused to comply since it was Russia who offered an alliance against France.<sup>79</sup> Finally, Britain intervened in the negotiations and agreed to pay the subsidy. Ottomans, on the other hand, was obliged to provide all the necessary provisions and military supplies for the Russian fleet.<sup>80</sup> The British subsidy, however, seems to have been offered for the Russian armies to be sent to Europe in the negotiations in December 1798 with no mention to the operations of the Russian Black Sea fleet. By contrast, the Ottoman acceptance to pay cash substitute for some of the provisions might be regarded as a sort of subsidy.<sup>81</sup>

#### *Reactions to Ottoman-Russian alliance*

The decision to form an alliance with Russia was taken unanimously by a committee specially convened for that purpose on the advice of Selim III. The main reason for the sultan's insistence on 'unanimous vote' was presumably to preclude any possible popular reactions against the alliance. In a personal correspondence Selim was

---

<sup>79</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 60-63; for the Turkish point of view see, Soysal, alluded the Russian insistence on subsidy to the financial difficulties it went through, see Soysal, *Türk-Fransız Diploması*, pp. 261-63; Karal believed that public article VI regulated the payment of subsidy to Russia in compensation for Ottoman military assistance that could not be provided due to the geographical constraints and military inferiority, see Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 100. He qualified this demand as "ugly", Karal, *Selim III'ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları-Nizam-ı cedid*, p. 58.

<sup>80</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 68; McKnight pointed out that Tomara was worried about the supply system and obtained a written guarantee in the form of a convention, which was incorporated in the treaty of alliance. He maintained that the Porte agreed to send out orders to the Morea and Albania instructing the local authorities to supply the combined fleet. His implication that the Porte entrusted the provisioning system with the strong men of the Balkans such as Ali Paşa is a mistaken assumption. He is also certainly wrong when claiming, "the Porte would pay, through Tomara, 600,000 *kuruş* every three months, beginning retroactively on September 1, toward the support of the Russian squadron." This sum was to be paid annually in 4 installments retroactively on September 1, but only 3 installments were paid as will be seen in the chapter on war finance. McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 39 (relying on Miliutin, *Istoria voyny 1799 goda...*, v. I, p. 71).

<sup>81</sup> C. Duffy, *The Russia's Military Way to the West*, p. 208; Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 73; refer to Chapter V "Logistics" for a discussion of the matter.

praised for accepting the Russian fleet to İstanbul by realizing the acuteness of the situation immediately unlike ‘the mass of people’ (*avam-ı nass*).<sup>82</sup> Admiral Ushakov boasted in his letters to Paul I that huge crowds of Muslims cheered the Russian fleet as they entered the Bosphorus. Ruffin, who passed his decades as an accomplished diplomat in İstanbul, was stultified at the sight of the Russian warships. He ascribed this “inexplicable phenomenon” to Selim’s alleged call for aid against the Janissaries.<sup>83</sup> A confident of Ebubekir Ratıb -the Reis Efendi who was banished to Bozcaada (Tenedos) after his project of the Ottoman-French alliance (1797) failed- informed the latter about the arrival of the Russian fleet with great anxiety and astonishment.<sup>84</sup> Poqueville –the renowned French prisoner- recorded in his prison notes from the Seven Towers occasional fights that broke out between the Russian soldiers and the inhabitants of İstanbul. In a visit to the Süleymaniye mosque complex, the *medrese* students assaulted Tomara and the envoys of the Two Sicilies and Sweden.<sup>85</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> The committee was composed of Yusuf Ziya Paşa (Grand-vizier), Mustafa Aşır Efendi (the Şeyhülislam [the Grand Müfti]), Ahmed Esad Efendi (the *kazasker* [military judge] of Rumeli), the former *kazaskers* of Rumeli (Veli Efendi-zade Mehmed Emin Efendi, İbrahim İsmet Efendi, Mehmed Arif Efendi, Hulusi Ömer Efendi, Ahmed Şemsüddin Efendi, and Mehmed Salih Efendi (the former *kazasker* of Anadolu), Karal, *Selim III. Ün Hattı Hümayunları*, p. 60.

<sup>83</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>84</sup> Yeşil, *III. Selim Döneminde Bir Osmanlı Bürokrati*, p. 231.

<sup>85</sup> Poqueville’s various claims should be taken with a grain of salt. As a French prisoner of war he wished to see the Russo-Ottoman alliance shattered on every occasion. His account is more valuable in terms of illustrating the ‘social psychology’ of the French POWs in the Seven Towers who happened to hear bits and pieces of the gossips in the town in their forced seclusion. According to his story, Selim had three students hang and 30 students bastinadoed. He fantasized that a frustrated Paul at the incident was on the brink of declaring war on the Ottomans. He maintained that the Muslim inhabitants of the town were offended by the Russians who rode horse in the town and they killed various Russian soldiers on another occasion. Ottoman sources mentioned neither of the latter cases, whereas non-Muslims could not ride horse in the town, see Poqueville, *Travels Through the Morea, Albania, ...* Translated from French (London, 1806) pp. 147-150; in fact, Tomara and his entourage spitted inside the mosque and incensed the students. Since Paul threatened those countries that did not support his cause against Britain, the Porte feared his anger and bastinadoed some of the students besides those exiled from the town (March 1801), *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, p. 115; Gell noted that British and the ‘Turks’ were the only ‘nations’ in the civilized world

## Conclusion

“Russo-Ottoman alliance marked the beginning of the war of the Second Coalition against France, and Russia entered the Napoleonic wars through the Straits.”<sup>86</sup> Notably, contrary to the established view, Russia entered the second coalition because of the French occupation of the Ionian Islands rather than the occupation of Malta by Napoleon en route to Egypt. Actually, Paul used the Ionian Islands as a rallying power even before the capture of Malta, which he learnt not before than 23 July 1798.<sup>87</sup>

The very fact that the Russo-Ottoman alliance lasted longer than the coalition until the outbreak of Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-1812 shows the plausibility of such an alliance. Despite the mutual antagonism common interests forced the two empires to form an unusual alliance. Seemingly Napoleon underestimated the Ottoman pragmatism and resilience, and overestimated the Ottoman hatred for Russians. Napoleon could use the Ionian Islands as military bases for invading the Balkans and menacing Poland. Russia, viewing the Balkans as her exclusive prerogative, could not tolerate the French

---

who abhorred spitting and that the latter were reluctant to accept the Europeans in the mosques lest they spit on the floors, Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea*, p. 11; on various occasions Russian officers – as well as other Europeans- were customarily allowed to visit the mosques of İstanbul. For an example of permitting Russian officers to visit mosques in the city see, HAT 253/14389 (catalogue date: 1216/14May1801-3May1802).

<sup>86</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 69; Ottoman-British negotiations started on 28 July 1798 resulted in the conclusion of a treaty comprising 13 articles by which Britain joined the Ottoman-Russian alliance on 5 January 1799. For the act of adherence see, Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, 1956), pp. 72-77; HAT 1351/52807; Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, pp. 307-311. First four articles can also be found in HAT 33/1606 (nd.); The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies joined the alliance on 21 January 1799. For the treaty with the Two Sicilies, Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, pp. 313-17. For the list of presents sent by Ferdinand IV to the Ottoman negotiators see, A.AMD 40/47; While the Habsburg Empire fought in the Second Coalition wars, it did not join the alliance since it saw it contrary to its interests in the Adriatic.

<sup>87</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 59-62, 73-74.

existence in the islands. The Ottomans outmaneuvered France in terms of diplomacy by forming an alliance with the traditional enemy against the traditional friend that came as a result of ‘a natural conjunction.’<sup>88</sup>

The Ottoman-Russian alliance signified the Ottoman participation in a European coalition which was an unprecedented development. Diplomacy was in fact another sphere that the Ottoman reform program dealt with, for, reigning in the Napoleonic age, Selim’s fate was directly affected by the instability in European politics. Posing a neutral stance in the First Coalition Wars (1793-1795) and entering a European alliance in the Second Coalition Wars (1799-1801) were novelties in Ottoman history.<sup>89</sup>

While the Ottomans realized the French designs on Egypt by late spring 1798, they had already become aware of the formation of a whirlwind in their southwest flank as they got wind of the Treaty of Campo-Formio (October 17, 1797). Hasan Paşa, the governor of the Morea, pointed out that France left all the fertile lands of Venice to the Habsburgs, and spared the rocky islands of the Adriatic for itself, which it was likely to use as the stepping-stone to invade the Morea and Crete.<sup>90</sup> Karal, nevertheless, contended

---

<sup>88</sup> McGrew, *Paul I of Russia, 1754-1801*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) p. 290; C. J. Tucker, *The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I* (Syracuse University, unpublished dissertation, 1965), pp., 212-215; to give an idea about the extent to which Russia was alarmed by the French presence in the Ionians, Paul instructed Tomara to offer the Sultan 70,000 troops against Pazvantoglu, a potential ally of the French, see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 21-24.

<sup>89</sup> For a typical assessment of Selim’s reforms in diplomacy as a mixed blessing see, T. Naff, “Reform and Conduct in Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-1807”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 83/3 (1963): 295-315; Naff, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns and Trends” in Naff and R. Owen (eds.), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Ill.: Carbondale, 1977), pp. 88-107; Hurewitz, “The Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy: the Conversion from Unilateralism to Reciprocity in the Nineteenth Century”, *Bulleten* 25 (1961): 455-66; Yalçinkaya pointed out Reisü'l-küttab Raşid Efendi’s indispensable role in following this policy see, A. Yalçinkaya, “Türk Diplomasisinin Modernleşmesinde Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi’nin Rolü” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları XX* (2001): 109-133.

<sup>90</sup> HAT 168/7123 (nd., 29Dec1797-8Jan1798) Hasan Paşa mentioned the French military activities “in mid *Receb*” which corresponded to the dates above; Napoleon’s correspondence to the Directoire, dated



that the French propaganda for an independent Greek state was tailored to conceal the plans for the Egyptian Expedition, but this seems to have been a misguided point of view.<sup>91</sup> It is hoped that this chapter has established the flaws in the legacy of Cevdet Paşa and Karal in studies on Ottoman diplomacy, which is repetition of the official rhetoric of the age: uncritical confidence put in the traditional friend of France and entering in alliance with Russia as a last resort due the unsuspected French treachery.

In the next chapter, we will focus on the Russo-Ottoman expedition to the Ionian Islands which was the concrete outcome of the alliance and try to analyze the Ottoman contribution to it, for it was underrated in secondary literature.

---

August 16, 1797 illustrates the significance of the Ionian Islands “...the occupation of these four beautiful islands will be for us a means of either supporting or undermining the Ottoman Empire.” See, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 9-10; E. Z. Karal, “Yunan Adalarının Fransızlar tarafından işgali”, p. 111.

<sup>91</sup> Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 56.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **THE EXPEDITION**

#### Introduction

This chapter aims to achieve a basic goal: illustrating the forgotten contribution of the Ottoman Empire in the War of Second Coalition based on the Ottoman archives. Although a member of the coalition, its military operations in the Adriatic and in Italy were left unstudied. The former resulted in the occupation of the Ionian Islands, whereas the latter, in spite of its doubtful intrinsic value, illustrated the Ottoman membership in the coalition.

The Mediterranean sphere of Second Coalition Wars was characterized by the involvement of many navies and amphibious operations beginning by the French invasion of Malta and Egypt. It saw the mobilization of the French and Spanish navies on one side and that of British, Russian, Ottoman, Neapolitan, and Portuguese navies on the other. The French naval presence in the Mediterranean was by no means over after the Battle of Nile. Moreover, the likelihood of a huge collision of these navies preoccupied the contemporaries particularly in May-July 1799 when Admiral Bruix entered the Mediterranean at the head of the French-Spanish navy of considerable strength.

The mainstream view on the war in the Mediterranean is biased towards the British and French navies and it relegates the Russian and Spanish navies to a secondary status, while dismissing the others as auxiliaries. Studies on the role of the Russian navy in the Napoleonic wars have enriched our understanding of the topic, but they often

belittle the role of their Ottoman allies, representing its navy as more of a liability than an asset and its relations with Ali Paşa as a sign of concrete weakness under the impression of their sources.

It is hoped that this chapter will show the Ottoman military contribution through a detailed analysis of the war in Adriatic as well as the tangible results of the naval reform of Selim without which one just wonders how it could have been possible for the Ottomans to maintain a fleet in Egypt and send another one beyond its waters to Adriatic and Italy for many years. For instance, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had only a couple of ships of the line with several frigates, while Portugal was not in a better position.<sup>1</sup> Both powers therefore became dependent on the British navy, while Russia could follow an independent course of action in the Adriatic, often at the expense of antagonizing Nelson. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, tried to restrain the Russian influence in the region by committing its fleet to joint naval operations that were not originally part of the alliance such as sending detachments to Italian coasts. Both Admiral Ushakov and Admiral Abdülkadir Beg were given freedom of action by their respective courts. Thus, Abdülkadir was able to join Nelson and Ushakov in the decision to sail to Naples and then to Malta although the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa was totally opposed to it.

Turkish historians saw unwillingness on the part of the Ottomans to participate in the system of alliance and attributed this policy to its apparent weakness. This chapter

---

<sup>1</sup> A. B. Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition, 1798 to 1801* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 75-80.

shows that there were times when the Ottomans liked to see the Russian fleet also in Egypt as a measure against Napoleon's Syrian expedition, and other times when it willingly sent its fleet to Nelson with a view to oppose the French-Spanish navy in a distant zone.

In the first section we will review the composition and strength of the Ottoman-Russian joint fleet and the Ottoman mobilization as a prelude to our discussion of the expedition. In the second section we will analyze the expedition from the Ottoman point of view emphasizing the peculiar place of Ali Paşa and stress the fact that Ottoman military commitments brought the final victory with the possible help of the British. In the last section we will turn to their operations in Italy so as to vitiate the common assumption that the Porte was forced to join the anti-French coalition for pragmatic reasons –the Egyptian expedition- with little interest in the general aims of the anti-French coalition.

## **The composition and strength of the Russo-Ottoman fleet**

### The Russian Black Sea fleet

The Russian fleet sent to İstanbul equaled the half of the Black Sea fleet and it consisted of 16 warships including six ships-of-the-line, seven frigates, and three smaller ships with a crew of 7,406 men, 1,663 of them being soldiers. The total number of the guns reached to 794. Six of the seven frigates mounted up to 15 guns more than the standard frigate of 32-38 guns so that they could engage the first rate ships. However, these additional guns made the ships heavier, which were already heavily constructed to accommodate the additional guns. Thus, they were harder to handle in the famous storms of the Greek coast, whereas the recoil of these heavy guns would inevitably loosen the ships' timbers.<sup>2</sup> The treaty of alliance put the number of the Russian fleet as 12, exclusive of light ships. The breakdown of the capital ships are: an 84-gun ship (the flagship of Ushakov), 2 of 74s, 3 of 70-gun, 6 of 50-gun. The last category actually corresponded to the mounted frigates.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> J. L. McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic. The Genesis of Russia's First Balkan Satellite* (University of Wisconsin, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1965), p. 26; N. Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807* (The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 88-89; Selim's official diary also recorded 5 ships of the line, omitting the one returned to the Crimea, as well as 10 frigates and smaller ships, S. Arıkan, *III. Selim'in Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi Tarafından Tutulan Ruzname* (Ankara, 1993), p. 287; Cevdet Paşa claimed there were 5 galleons, 6 frigates and a number of smaller ships, Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet* [new edition] (İstanbul, H. 1309), v. VI, p. 6; Ushakov wrote to Tomara on 19 September 1798 [new style] that he needed 7,492 rations per month, R.N. Mordvinov (ed.) *Admiral Ushakov* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1952-56), v. 2, doc.# 97; according to Anderson Ushakov had under his command *Sv. Pavel* (84), *Bogoyavlenie Gospodne* (72), *Sv. Troitsa* (72), *Maria Magdalena* (68), *Zacharii i Elizaveta* (74), *Sv. Petr* (74), *Grigorii Velikia Armenii* (50), *Sv. Michail* (48), *Soshestvie Sv. Ducha* (44), *Sv. Nikolai* (46), *Kazanskaya Bogoroditsa* (46), *Navarchia Vosnesenie Gaspodne* (40), *Stchastlivyi* (32) and 3 small crafts, R. C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853* (Liverpool, 1952), p. 367.

<sup>3</sup> C.HRC 4232 (26B1213/3 January 1799), secret article I.

The Black Sea fleet was short of funds for supplies and ships were in a bad state of repair. Most of the ships were veterans of the last Russo-Ottoman War of 1787-1792, while only two of them were less than fifteen years old. All of the ships-of-the-line and the frigates under Ushakov's command had serious construction flaws since they were constructed out of green fir which was prone to rotting. Only a few of them had copper sheaths that protected their bottoms so as to extend the period of service. As a matter of fact, two of the ships under Ushakov's command had to return to Sevastopol because of the storm on the way to İstanbul, while many ships had serious leaking problems.<sup>4</sup>

In short, the Russian Black Sea fleet was not fit for long-term service in the stormy waters of the Adriatic basically because it was originally designed to protect the Black Sea coasts from a possible Ottoman attack in wartime which put the priority on increasing the aggregate firepower of the fleet as opposed to capability of keeping to sea at wintertime.<sup>5</sup>

The level of competency of the Russian crew was also dubious. Most of the officers under Ushakov's command were experienced commanders, serving under him in the last war with the Ottomans, while the crews "were probably among the best seamen Russia had yet produced."<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, Mitchell drew attention to the fact that the

---

<sup>4</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 29, 121; Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 78-79, 88-89. These two ships re-joined the united fleet only on 17 September 1798 in İstanbul, McKnight, p. 35. Copper sheaths may not have been the top priority for the Black Sea fleet, since only one kind of timber boring and fouling worms was discovered in the Black Sea, *teredo navalis*, for more information on the affects of weeds and worms see T. Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy* (I.B. Tauris, 2008), p. 70.

<sup>5</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 26, 29.

<sup>6</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 78-79; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 27.

Black Sea fleet laid on anchor in wintertime with the seamen living on the shore. Thus, he maintained, Ushakov's forces were largely untrained due to the inactiveness of the Black Sea fleet.<sup>7</sup>

### Ottoman naval reforms

By the time of the expedition, the Ottoman naval reforms were still in a nascent form. Notably, the Ottoman ships were far superior to Russian ships in the allied fleet in construction and design by all accounts including Ushakov himself. It is ironic that the humiliation at Çeşme (1770) served as the catalyst for a set of naval reforms that produced these French-design ships to the astonishment of Ushakov who saw them at an inspection tour on 12 September.<sup>8</sup> The construction of the first regular barracks for the skeleton crew and the establishment of a naval school were among the first steps towards the creation of a new navy. The naval program of Selim III was more comprehensive and it ranged from technological/technical improvements such as the implementation of a dry dock in the dockyards and the commissioning of ships of the latest design to the introduction of a system of seniority in the officer corps as well as a new provisioning system in the ships.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> D. Mitchell, *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power*, (New York: McMillan, 1974), p. 107.

<sup>8</sup> For a comprehensive understanding of the Ottoman naval history in the eighteenth century, see Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey* and A. Yusuf Alperen, *Osmanlı Denizciliği (1700-1770)* (İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2007); Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 67, 78-79.

<sup>9</sup> For the technical aspects of the naval program see Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey* and other reforms see Shaw, "Selim III and the Ottoman Navy" *Turcica* 1 (1969): 212-241; A. İ. Gencer, *Bahriye'de Yapılan Islahat Hareketleri ve Bahriye Nezareti'nin Kuruluşu (1789-1867)* (Ankara, 2001), pp. 30-96; Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı* (Ankara, 1943), pp. 425-26.

By the year 1800, the Ottoman navy was composed of 44 warships and 2,329 guns, ideally requiring a crew of 20,495 men.<sup>10</sup> The Straits gave the Ottomans the advantage of keeping their navy intact as opposed to the Russians, who had to have various fleets in the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and later on in the Far East. Speaking in Mahan's terms, the Ottomans had the 'fleet unity' whereas the Russians did not.<sup>11</sup> Having a unified navy required the construction of the kind of ships that could keep to all seas so that the Ottomans could send fleets in action to the Black Sea or the Mediterranean depending on the situation. Thus, the Ottoman ships in the combined fleet were suited better for service in the Adriatic with their coppered bottoms and all-purpose quality as opposed to the Russian Black Sea fleet.

Major weakness of the Ottoman navy was training –of the gunners and sailors– and the shortage of manpower. While the reforms of the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa, the childhood friend and brother-in-law of Selim III, produced tangible results, the elimination of these problems would have required keeping of the ships and the crews in permanent commission with prohibitive costs. The navy, rather, customarily sailed to the Mediterranean every spring to patrol the Ottoman coasts against piracy, while maintaining a skeleton crew of 3,000-4,000 at the barracks in İstanbul during

---

<sup>10</sup> The composition of the navy was: 19 galleons (+ 60-gun), 14 frigates (32-gun – 50-gun) 11 corvette (22-gun – 26-gun). Cevdet Paşa listed 61 warships for 1801/02: 4 three-deckers, 20 galleons, 22 frigates, 15 corvettes. Both lists are available in the appendix of Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey*. Also see, Karal, "Selim III Devrinde Osmanlı Bahriyesi Hakkında Vesikalar", *Tarih Vesikaları* 1/3 (1941): 203-11.

<sup>11</sup> A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston, 1890), Chpt I "Discussion of Elements of Sea Power", pp. 25-89.



wintertime.<sup>12</sup> When Ushakov wanted to attend in the gunners' drill, Selim III did not grant permission since all the expert gunners had already been sent to the siege of Vidin against Pazvandođlu Osman under the command of the Grand Admiral. Fearing that the gunners' drill without drill-masters would lead to a scandal, Selim limited Ushakov's visit with an inspection tour in which the vice-Admiral realized the fine quality of the ships.<sup>13</sup>

Foreign observers presented contradictory accounts on the state of the Ottoman navy, for their observations were bound to suffer from time and space constraints.<sup>14</sup> Such contradicting accounts might also be related to the immaturity of the naval reforms by the time of the expedition. For instance, the standardization of the calibers would not be undertaken until 1805, although there was a clear tendency towards that end even before

---

<sup>12</sup> Admiral Smith claimed that the Ottoman navy sent to Egypt lacked heavy weather canvas and rather had sails of light cotton, which prevented them from sailing in winter see, K. McCranie, "The Operations and Effectiveness of the Ottoman Navy during Napoleon's Invasion of Egypt, 1798-1801" in A. Shmuelevitz (ed.), *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801* (İstanbul: Isis, 2002), p. 161; The fleet sent to the Adriatic was likely to have heavy canvas as they spent the whole winter on sea. This also casts doubt on the assumption that the Ottomans stayed away from the sea in wintertime. Attempts were undertaken at expanding the size of the crew so as to include a corps of marine riflemen as well by 1805, Shaw, "Selim III and the Ottoman Navy", pp. 229-39. A study on the register logs kept between 1775-79 revealed that the Ottoman navy consisting of around 15 capital ships and 6,500 men spent seven months at sea patrolling coasts of the Aegean, Rhodes, and Syria with an average speed of 2 - 4.5 sea miles during cruising, see Şenay Özdemir, "Osmanlı Donanmasının Bir 'Seyir Defteri' ve XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Denizciliğine İlişkin Bazı Gözlemler", *TAD* 24/37 (2005): 113-163.

<sup>13</sup> BOA, HAT 14638; Selim also doubled the money to be distributed among the Russian officers to 10,000 krş.

<sup>14</sup> Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour...*, v. I (London, 1819), p. 31; Gell testifies to the fine quality of the Ottoman squadron in the Adriatic as well as the cleanliness and good-order of the ships, Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea* (London, 1823), pp. 6-7; Hobhouse totally contradicts them on these points, Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces...* (Philadelphia, 1817), vol. II, pp. 297-98; Pouqueville, as a French POW, understandably disparaged the Ottoman fleet fighting against the French but was impressed by the Imperial Dockyards, Pouqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania,...* (London, 1806), pp. 147, 156; McKnight also presents a very negative view of the fleet in terms of discipline, desertion rates, and ignorance of the sailors, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 37.

the reign of Selim III. While the 1805 regulation definitely reduced the types of caliber to five and dropped the huge cannon named *kantar* from the list of equipment,<sup>15</sup> it seems it only formalized the ongoing process of standardization that had already started since the Ottoman fleet sent to the Adriatic did not have anymore “self-destructive huge cannon” firing “200-pound marble balls.”<sup>16</sup> But, convinced of the several advantages of a galleon with heavy ordnance, the Ottomans equipped the galleon *Anka-i Bahri* in 1806 with four pieces of *kantar* gun presumably as a measure against the heavily gunned Russian fleet of the Black Sea in the face of the coming war with Russia. This actually provides further evidence to the peculiarities of the naval warfare in the Black Sea and the adaptability of the Ottoman navy to different circumstances.<sup>17</sup>

#### The mobilization of the Ottoman navy

After the news of the French invasion of Egypt reached İstanbul, the Porte decided to send the navy to Çanakkale (the Dardanelles) for protection against a possible French attack. By 3 September 1798, the Porte commissioned three galleons, three frigates, and three corvettes in addition to 10 *şalopes* –the French *chaloupe*-, or sloops.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> BOA, C.AS 39493.

<sup>16</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 37. In spite of McKnight’s assertion that the Ottoman ships lacked proper logbooks and naval equipment, by the year of 1796-97 the ships were issued with navigational tools such as compasses, sounding leads, and hourglass as well as a guidebook -Piri Reis’ *Kitab-ı Bahriye*- while the captains were obliged to keep logbooks, see Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey*, p. 83. Hobhouse, however, relates in 1810 that the Grand Admiral (Seyid/Çarhacı ?) Ali Paşa was struck by the fact that even a young midshipman in the British navy knew how to use a compass, for in Ottoman warships there was always an officer assigned to use the compass, Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania*, v. II, p. 294.

<sup>17</sup> BOA, C.BH 4726 (13 January 1807).

<sup>18</sup> TSA, E.4079/2. Galleons: *Şehbaz-ı Bahri* (‘Braveheart of the Sea’: 74-gun/850 men; Giridi İbrahim Kapudan), *Bahr-i Zafer* (‘Sea of Victory’: 72-gun/750 men; Eyubi Mustafa Kapudan), *Asar-ı Nusret* (‘Signs of Success’: 84-gun/800 men; İsmail Kapudan)

As of 8 December 1798, there were 39 Ottoman ships commissioned in the Mediterranean –in Egypt and the Adriatic. Besides the galleons *Bahr-i Zafer* and *Asar-ı Nusret* in Çanakkale, there were 4 galleons, 10 frigates, six corvettes, 18 sloops (*şalope*), and a dispatch boat (*kırlangıç*). It is possible that most of these except the promised 2 frigates and the sloops for Alexandria were commissioned to Corfu. When Bruix entered the Mediterranean at the head of a formidable French-Spanish navy in the spring of 1799, the Porte decided to reinforce the navy by outfitting 26 additional ships including a three-decker, 7 galleons, 2 frigates, 20 new bomb frigates (*bomba fırkateyni*-presumably larger bomb vessels), 2 corvettes, 12 sloops and a large dispatch boat.<sup>19</sup> Therefore in total the Porte put to the sea by 1799 a three-decker, 13 galleons, 12 frigates, 8 corvettes, 30 sloops, 20 bomb-frigates, and 2 postal ships.

Western sources are conflicting regarding the strength of the Ottoman fleet in the combined force. According to McKnight, it was composed of roughly six ships of the line, six frigates, and four smaller ships and 6,000 men.<sup>20</sup> Calculations based on the figures concerning the provisions suggest that there could not be more than 7,205 troops

---

Frigates: *Hüma-yı Zafer* ('Phoenix of the Victory': 50-gun/450 men; Abdülkerim Kapudan), *Şi'ar-ı Nusret* ('Hallmark of Victory': 50-gun/450 men; İskenderiyeli Ahmed Kapudan), *Şevket-nüma* ('Manifest of Majesty': 50-gun/450 men; Arnavud Abbas Kapudan)

Corvettes: *Salabet-nüma* ('Manifest of Firmness': 26-gun/150-200 men; Tunuslu Hüseyin Kapudan), *Necm-i Zafer* (200 men; Cezayirli Mehmed Kapudan), the new constructed one [*cedid-i nüzul-ı Tersane*] (Yenişehirli Halil Kapudan).

<sup>19</sup> BOA, A.AMD 41/43 (29C1213/8Dec1798); C.BH 7470 (14RA1214/16Aug1799); for the names of the captains see E.4079/2.

<sup>20</sup> Mcknight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 35.

in the Ottoman fleet as we will see in the next chapter.<sup>21</sup> The Ottoman documents, however, suggest that the number of ships sent on expedition to Corfu was 11 at least.<sup>22</sup> The map of the siege of Corfu drawn by Mahmud Raif Efendi<sup>23</sup> prior to the escape of the French galleon *Generaux* features the same number of Ottoman ships as well.<sup>24</sup> The

---

<sup>21</sup> Von Pivka, on the other hand, mentioned 28 Ottoman ships placed under the command of Ushakov including four ships-of-the-line and six frigates (Hüseyin Kapudan, Abbas Kapudan, Zeynel Kapudan, Süleyman Kapudan, Kerim Kapudan, Ahmed Kapudan) four corvettes (Mustafa Kapudan, Hüseyin Kapudan, Ali Bey, Mehmed Bey) together with fourteen gunboats, O. von Pivka, *Navies of the Napoleonic Era* (New York, 1980), p. 214; Anderson gave the breakdown of the Ottoman fleet as 6 battleships, 8 frigates, 8 corvettes and 14 gunboats. According to him, Abdülkadir had to leave behind 2 battleships, 2 frigates and 4 corvettes due to lack of men, Anderson, *Naval Wars*, p. 367.

<sup>22</sup> Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa clearly states that 22 *gomenas* (ship's chain-cable) were to be sent to the Ottoman fleet in Corfu, each ship getting two sets. He also pointed out that the ammunitions, supplies, and sailcloth were already sent to the fleet, HAT 164/6839 (15M1214/19Jun1799); Cevdet Paşa stated there were 6 galleons, 9 frigates and 4 corvettes, Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet* [2<sup>nd</sup> ed.], v. VI, p. 6.

<sup>23</sup> Mahmud Raif Efendi, known as İngiliz Mahmud, was sent to London (1793-97) as the secretary of the first permanent Ottoman ambassador at London, Yusuf Agah Efendi –another Moriote like Ali Efendi at Paris, he was the son of the famous Ottoman statesman Süleyman Penah Efendi who penned a detailed treatise on the Moriote rebellion of 1770 in which he propagated for educating select Albanian individuals in Turkish and use them to rule the Morea following the Spanish colonization model. Mahmud Raif wrote *Journal du Voyage du Mahmoud Raif Efendi en Angleterre, Ecrit par luy meme* (1797) –a description of Britain which was of great interest to Selim III- and *Tableau des Nouveaux Reglements de l'Empire Ottoman* (1798) –a propaganda piece seeking international recognition for Selim's reforms. He learnt French and English, geography, history, politics and law in London. He was appointed as the diplomatic representative (*müsteşar*) to the Russo-Ottoman joint fleet. In 1800, he was made responsible for the conduct of diplomacy with the British in Egypt. As a sign of the Porte's pro-British foreign policy he held the office of *reisü'l-küttab* for five years in 1800-1805. His murder by the mutineers of the Rumeli Fortress in 1807 signed the end of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* era. For the French original and Turkish translation of his observations in Britain see Vahdettin Engin, "Mahmud Raif Efendi Tarafından Kaleme Alınmış İngiltere Seyahati Gözlemleri", in *Prof. Dr. İsmail Aka'ya Armağan* (İzmir 1999): 135-162; for his second work cited above in French and in Turkish see, K. Beydilli and İ. Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi ve Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Eseri* (TTK, Ankara, 2001); M. A. Yalçınkaya, "Mahmud Raif Efendi as the Chief Secretary of Yusuf Agah Efendi, The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Ambassador to London (1793-1797)", *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma Merkezi V* (1994): 422-434; his competency in foreign languages and diplomacy is mentioned in contemporary foreign sources as well: "[the French captives] discovered a Turk, named Mahmoud Effendi, who spoke French and lived a long time in London: he was always abusing the French nation; and if perchance he was under the necessity of doing justice to certain individuals, he always added *but he had the misfortune to be a Frenchman*", Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania, ...*, p. 106; for Süleyman Penah's cited views see, V. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870. An Empire Besieged* (Pearson, Longman, 2007) pp. 189-91.

<sup>24</sup> TSA, E.9442. The map also shows 9 Russian ships (4 frigates, 4 ships-of-the-line as well as the flagship). Obviously, it does not reflect those Russian ships sent on patrolling the Italian coasts. This might also be the case for the Ottoman ships, if there were more than eleven ships in the fleet.

Ottoman ships dotted on the map are a combination of 6 frigates, 2 corvettes, and three ships of the *Kapudane* (admiral) Abdülkadir Beg, *Patrona* (vice-admiral) Şeremet Mehmed Beg, and *Riyale* Beg (rear-admiral) in descending ranks. Unfortunately only one of the frigates, *Mesken-i Gazi*, was mentioned by name in the map. The Russian map featuring the recovery of the little island of Vidos in front of Corfu provides us with some of the names of the Ottoman captains, but fails to record the names of the Ottoman ships. It depicts, however, only 4 frigates, two ships of the *Kapudane* and *Riyale* with a ‘large and a small Ottoman ships.’<sup>25</sup> On the basis of the evidence the Ottoman fleet dispatched to Corfu can be reconstructed as such:

*Galleons (Kalyon)*

- *Şehbaz-ı Bahri* (‘Braveheart of the Sea’: 74-gun/850 men) under the captainship of Giridi İbrahim Kapudan.<sup>26</sup>
- the galleon of Mehmed Beg, the Port Commander (*Liman Ağası*) and the *Patrona*.<sup>27</sup>
- the galleon of *Riyale* Beg, under the captainship of Ahmed Kapudan.<sup>28</sup> This was likely to be *Beşaretnüma* (76-gun/850 men) built in 1797-98 and assigned as the flagship of the rear-admiral.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> TSA, E.4004/5; the ‘large ship’ appears to have been *Hüma-yı Zafer* whereas the smaller one was most likely the vessel provided by Ali Paşa of Yanya. Refer to the section on the fall of Corfu for details.

<sup>26</sup> HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798); E.4079/2.

<sup>27</sup> HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798); HAT 162/6746 (1M1214/5Jun1799) mentions the galleon of the *Patrona*. It is not clear in the documents if *Patrona* Şeremet Mehmed Beg was the same person as the Port Commander Kürd Mehmed Beg. I regard them as the same person in this study.

<sup>28</sup> HAT 6513-J.

<sup>29</sup> For the technical aspects of this and the following ships refer to Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey*, p. 318 ff.

The names and types of the ships of *Kapudane*, *Patrona*, and *Riyale* are not mentioned in the afore-mentioned maps.

*Frigates (firkatern) and corvettes (korvet)*

- *Şehper-i Zafer* ('The Giant Wing of Victory': 50-gun/450 men) under the captainship of Zeynel Kapudan. It also participated in the siege of Ancona and patrolled in Trieste with *Bülheves*.<sup>30</sup>

- *Bülheves* ('Enthusiastic': 40-gun/275-men) under the captainship of Rodoslu Süleyman Kapudan. It accompanied *Şehper-i Zafer* on its expedition to Ancona and Trieste.<sup>31</sup> The ship is referred to in the Russian map by the name of its captain.

- *Mesken-i Gazi* ('Dwelling of the Holly Warrior': 50-gun/450 men). It is depicted on the map of Mahmud Raif Efendi.<sup>32</sup>

- *Şevket-nüma* ('Manifest of Majesty': 50-gun/450 men) under the captainship of Arnavud Abbas Kapudan.<sup>33</sup>

- *Şahin-i Derya* ('Falcon of the Sea': 50-gun/450 men).<sup>34</sup>

- *Hüma-yı Zafer* ('Phoenix of the Victory': 50-gun/450 men) under the captainship of Abdülkerim Kapudan.<sup>35</sup>

- *Salabet-nüma* ('Manifest of Firmness': 26-gun/200 men) under the captainship of

---

<sup>30</sup> C.BH 6937.

<sup>31</sup> C.BH 6937; HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798).

<sup>32</sup> E. 9442.

<sup>33</sup> E.4079/2; HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798).

<sup>34</sup> HAT 158/6617 (1N1213/6Feb1799).

<sup>35</sup> HAT 162/6746 (1M1214/5Jun1799; E.4079/2).

Tunuslu Hüseyin Kapudan.<sup>36</sup>

Besides these ships, there are others mentioned in the documents only by the name of the captain.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, numerous sloops and smaller boats joined the fleet as auxiliary forces such as six boats sent by Ali Paşa of Yanya, who was appointed at this time as the commander of the Castle of Lepanto (*Kıstel-i İnebahtı muhafızı*) under the command of *Salyaneli* Bekir Kapudan.<sup>38</sup> Lastly, Ottoman documents do not always give precise information as to the types of the ships; they sometimes refer to small types of frigates as corvette and occasionally use the term *fırkateyn* as a generic name of warship, which may account for the relative lack of reference to corvettes in the fleet.<sup>39</sup>

The ships identifiable by their names were all brand-new by the time of the expedition; thus, it is not surprising that the Russian officers were impressed by their stately disposition on the Straits.

---

<sup>36</sup> E.4079/2.

<sup>37</sup> the frigate of Fazlı Kapudan, HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798); Hasan Kapudan of Crete, Ahmed Kapudan of Alanya, and Seyid Hasan Hoca Kapudan, HAT163/6772 (5L1213/12March1799); the frigate of Hasan Beg, C.BH 6752; Of the ships we have identified, the Russian map mentions those of Hüseyin Kapudan, Süleyman Kapudan, Riyale, and Kapudane. Other names on the map -Cumali/Cemal Kapudan and Mehmed Beg- are unidentifiable. Among the captains of the frigates provided by von Pivka, the names of Zeynel, Süleyman, Ahmed Kapudan, Abbas Kapudan, and Kerim Kapudan can be found in Ottoman documents too as shown above. Nevertheless, it is hard to identify the remaining name of Hüseyin. He also cited the names of Hüseyin, Mustafa, Ali Beg and Mehmed Beg as the captains of corvettes, but with the exception of the first name they do not match the names given in the documents; According to Mordvinov there were four galleons, six frigates, four corvettes and 14 gunboats in the Ottoman fleet. He provided the same names for 4 corvettes as von Pivka (Mustafa, Hüseyin, Ali-Bey, Mehemet) and 6 frigates (Hüseyin, Abbas, Zeyner [sic.: Zeynel], Süleyman, Herim [sic.: Kerim], Ahmet). Mordvinov also counted 4 larger warships (86-gun ship of Kadir-bey; 80-gun ship of Patrona; the 76-gun ship of Riyale Ahmet-bey; Captain İbrahim's ship). Mordvinov, Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 111 dated 15 September 1798.

<sup>38</sup> HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798). As mentioned previously, von Pivka marked that there were 28 Ottoman ships, whereas McKnight gives the figure of 32 for the total of the combined fleet, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 38.

<sup>39</sup> For instance, a report on the occupation of Vido qualifies the *Leander* as a 'galleon' and the small corvette of *Brune* as a 'frigate', though many other documents describe them accurately, HAT 164/6842 (26N1213/3March1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi and Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

*An evaluation of the composition of the joint fleet*

By the time of the expedition, warships were divided into 5 categories on the basis of its firepower: first rate (three-deckers of 100 guns and more), second rate (ships of 80-100 guns), third rate (ships of 60-80 guns), fourth rate (frigates of 38 to 60 guns), and the fifth rate (frigates of 32-38 guns). The corvettes were not regarded as a ship suitable for joining the line of the battle.<sup>40</sup> The Ottomans, nevertheless, classified the warships in three categories according to the length: galleons, frigates (large-small), and corvettes (large-small). An overview of the composition of the joint fleet reveals the heavy presence of the ‘large frigates’ of 50 guns with a crew of 450 men. This may correspond to the so-called 50-gun ships –the fourth rates.<sup>41</sup>

By the late 17<sup>th</sup> century ship designers developed the 50-gun ship to combine the qualities of ship-of-the-line and a cruising frigate. The mainstream view in naval history holds that it became obsolete in time and gave way to the so-called ‘true frigate’ by the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>42</sup> Probably, the *Leander* was the most famous of that rate by the time of the expedition. This curious two-decker of 50-gun was part of the Nelson’s fleet and taken as a prize off Crete by *Le Genereaux*, a veteran of the Battle of Nile only to be brought to Corfu. While *Le Genereaux* would make its escape during the siege of the

---

<sup>40</sup> Lavery, *Nelson and the Nile*, p. 46.

<sup>41</sup> Henry Jervis and White Jervis defines the Ottoman frigates in the combined fleet as ‘caravellas’ which were “larger than frigates, with elevated poops, and carried 50 guns”, Henry Jervis and White Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu and the Republic of the Ionian Islands* (London, 1852), p. 166.

<sup>42</sup> For a recapitulation of the dispute refer to R. Gardiner, “The Frigate” in Gardiner (ed.), *The Line of Battle. The Sailing Warship 1650-1840* (Conway, 1992), pp. 27-45.



island by the joint fleet, the *Leander* fell into the hands of the Ottomans and Russians together with the corvette of *Brune*.<sup>43</sup>

Abdülkadir Beg defined *Leander* as a mediocre galleon and *Brune* a frigate –most likely on the basis of their length.<sup>44</sup> Ottoman 50-gun ships might be somewhat larger than its outmoded British equivalent since it carried 100 men more aboard. There is good reason to assume that the 50-gun ships answered the needs of the Ottoman Empire perfectly with its capacity to cruise in shallow waters –the Mediterranean coasts- and to mount heavy batteries to bear on coastal targets –the Black Sea.<sup>45</sup> From the outset the combined fleet knew that the expedition was going to involve amphibious warfare through a series of sieges since the French navy was effectively eliminated in Alexandria. Thus, the ships participating in the expedition were fit for that purpose. As a matter of fact this was the first amphibious operation that the Russian navy carried out without the support of its army, signifying its maturity. This view, nevertheless, glosses over the fact that Ottomans were quite experienced in amphibious warfare. It was the Ottoman land

---

<sup>43</sup> The *Leander* was one of the four 50-gun ships in the British navy by 1794 that carried the handy short-barreled carronades: 6 of 12-pdrs on the poop, 2 of 24-pdrs on the quarterdeck. It joined the battle of the Nile at the rear of the line with success and, in the lack of frigates, was assigned to carry Nelson's dispatches to St Vincent at Cadiz. After the fall of Corfu, the Russians took it on 3 March and returned it to the British. For the details see the following sections and Rif Winfield, *The 50-Gun Ship* (London: Chatham Publishing, 1997), pp. 57-8, 64, 69, 112; Lavery describes the *Leander* as a 50-gun ship built on an odd plan that attempted to combine the qualities of a cruising frigate and a ship-of-the-line, ending up failing in both tasks and giving way to the emergent 'true frigate' by the mid-eighteenth century, Lavery, *Nelson and the Nile*, pp. 109-110.

<sup>44</sup> HAT 164/6843-D from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

<sup>45</sup> The 50-gun (350-men) came into use again in the American War in the British navy since it was cheaper to build and man than the standard 74s (590-men). Besides it proved to be successful in serving as the flagship of small squadrons patrolling the shallow American coasts in the lack of a hostile navy. Nevertheless, it was at a great disadvantage when engaged in close combat with a ship-of-the-line in the battle. Besides, its sailing qualities were poor, for it was as high as a 74 but disproportionately shorter than it, Gardiner, "The Frigate", pp. 27-45.

troops that bore the brunt of the amphibious operations in Leukas, Cephalonia, and Corfu, while the Ottoman warships participated in all patrolling duties, the blockade that was carried out in the winter of 1798/99 in spite of the gales and storms, and the bombardment of Corfu.

### Mobilization of Manpower

One common and very significant aspect that should be stressed is the conspicuous presence of the Greek sailors in both fleets. Some of Ushakov's captains were Greek, including famous Metaxa who was appointed as the liaison officer with two signalmen to Abdülkadir Beg as he was fluent in Turkish and left a detailed account of the expedition. Most of the Greek sailors were actually the descendents of the immigrants from the Ionians and the Morea to the resentment of Ottomans. Nevertheless, Greeks and other Christian inhabitants of the mainland did not participate in sizable numbers in the expedition as auxiliaries by comparison to previous wars of Russia that had been waged on the Ottoman Empire itself. Those recruited were actually para-military forces who had served Venice and then France in the 'Venetian Dalmatia.'<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup> During the expedition to the Adriatic, "up to 58 Greeks served with Russian forces as regular, reserve, and volunteer officers, including eight captains, seven captain lieutenants, nineteen lieutenants, three ensigns and four warrant officers" see N. C. Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Thessaloniki, 1991), pp. 107-118; The Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa once refused to salute the Russian warships in reaction to the Ushakov's arrogance in handling matters in Adriatic saying that "I never can be a friend to a Russian and the few seamen they have are actually my master's subjects", McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 126; the secretary of Count Ostermann who was a former Ottoman Greek was put in service of the Ottoman ambassador Mehmed Emni Efendi in 1722. The ambassador suspected that Ostermann actually intended to insult the deputation by appointing a former Ottoman subject. He also noted that this Greek person, who had once served the voyvoda of Wallachia, provided valuable information to Ostermann on the Ottoman administrative and military system, M. Aktepe, *Mehmed Emni Beyefendi (Paşa)'nın Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaret-namesi* (Ankara: TTK, 1989), p. 52; I could not benefit from the work of Metaxas, which, I am convinced, is a valuable source on Ottoman-

As for the Ottoman navy, the Ottomans never kept a large number of crew in peacetime, but rather recruit able sailors in wartime from the western and northern coasts of Anatolia, the islands in the Aegean Sea as well as İstanbul and its vicinity around the Marmara Sea.<sup>47</sup> The Sublime Porte had always considered the islands in the Aegean Sea as its reservoir of manpower and developed a special relation with them in which these islands escaped direct Ottoman rule in return for supplying the Ottoman navy with the necessary manpower; the island of Ağrıboz (*Hydra*) was the most significant among them in this sense.<sup>48</sup> Western observers usually found it perplexing to have a multi-religious crew on board and some of them even attested to the existence of an Orthodox priest as well as a *müezzin* for calling the faithful to their knees or to prayer.<sup>49</sup> In 1790-91, 75 % of the marines in the navy were Greek as were half of the fighting men, including gunners.<sup>50</sup> The Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa brought up the issue to the attention of Selim in late 1795 and had his consent to implement his plan to revitalize the Muslim presence in

---

Greek relations if read through the lens of an Ottomanist, Metaksa [Metaxas], Egor, “Zapiski flota Kapitan-leitenanta Egora Metaksa” *Morskoi Sbornik* nos 8, 10-12 (1914), 1-5 (1915): 1-243.

<sup>47</sup> See Appendix B, Table VIIIa. According to the 1805 naval regulations, around 13,000 men were subject to serve regularly in the navy, but they could avoid the service by paying the cash compensation known as *kalyoncu bedeliyesi*, Y. Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi* (İstanbul: Alan, 1986), p. 215.

<sup>48</sup> Gell noted that Hydra had 360 vessels of different tonnage by early nineteenth century, making huge profits from the carrying trade, Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea*, pp. 401-402. Holland put this number at 300 with a tonnage ranging from 300 to 500. With a population of 25,000, they manned and equipped their vessels heavily and made a profit up to 50 %, Holland, *Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly, Macedonia, &c. during the years 1812 and 1813*, (London, 1815) pp. 424-25. Hobhouse observed that of 1,200 men serving on the *Selimiye* (120-gun), 200 were Greeks and it was them who made the ship sail, while the Turks undertook the task of fighting, Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces*, vol. II, pp. 297-98.

<sup>49</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 37. McKnight pointed out that there was a band of musicians on board as well which made the Ottoman fleet very noisy. By contrast, there was no doctor, no compass or any other technical equipment except the flag ship.

<sup>50</sup> Gencer, *Bahriye'de Yapılan Islahat Hareketleri*, p. 28.

maritime trade. Accordingly, the merchant vessels –most probably those of the *Kapan* merchants, a guild of major merchants involved in shipping goods to İstanbul with certain privileges- were required to form at least half of their crew from the Muslim stock. He pointed out that despite they were more trustworthy than the Greeks in the event of pirate attacks in spite of their inferiority in seamanship to the islanders from the Aegean.<sup>51</sup>

Documents consulted on the mobilization of manpower for the Ottoman fleet at the beginning of the expedition give fragmentary information as to recruitment.

Nevertheless, the mobilization figures prove that the Porte was by no means able to recruit “40,000 sailors and seagoing soldiers” in spite of the ongoing naval reforms.<sup>52</sup>

The Ottoman ships in the joint fleet were composed of the skeleton crew –the regular *kalyoncus* and *gediklis*-, and those hastily recruited *aylaks* and *levends* through pressed gangs in İstanbul, and in the ports visited among which Çanakkale and Hydra were the most prominent for that purpose.<sup>53</sup> Throughout the expedition, the Porte kept on sending new recruits to the fleet as a result of high desertion rates. As of 14 August 1799, the

---

<sup>51</sup> Çizakça, “The Kapudan Pasha and the Shipowners” in E. Zachariadou (ed.) *The Kapudan Pasha, his Office and his Domain* (Rethymnon, 2002), p. 206. The Grand Admiral also set the minimum number of the sailors according to the tonnage (ranging from 240 to 1,200 tons): 100 for the 50,000-*kile* ship, 50 for the 25,000-*kile*, 25 for the 10,000-*kile*. The ships should also be armed against piracy, be regularly caulked and painted by their captains and sail in convoys of at least three ships. Part of the 1804 naval regulations was the attachment of a merchant fleet to the navy which would train the naval personnel and alleviate the financial burden of maintaining the navy, Gencer, *Bahriye’de Yapılan Islahat Hareketleri*, pp. 86-87.

<sup>52</sup> Shaw, “Selim III and the Ottoman Navy”, p. 226. He probably refers to the number of men required by the available ships in the navy, which he puts at 20 ships of the line and 15 frigates by 1806.

<sup>53</sup> Pouqueville notes that people in the Greek maritime towns were pressed for the Ottoman fleet in the spring 1799, meanwhile the Morea had to provide 1,500,000 silver drachms (*kuruş*?) for war expenses, see Pouqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania, ...*, p. 91; for the naval ranks see Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, pp. 485-90.

Porte requested 1,500 troops to send to the fleet in Corfu.<sup>54</sup> 365 troops were sent from İzmir and its vicinity to Corfu on two ships with the necessary supplies on 2 September 1799.<sup>55</sup>

Ottoman recruitment strategy was sapped by fiscal considerations. The Porte was aware that most of the crews were unfamiliar with the sea and that it undermined the functioning of the navy. Nevertheless, their full-time commission as regulars (*gedikli*) in navy would be burdensome for the Treasury.<sup>56</sup> Thus, in the mobilization in the spring of 1799 against the French-Spanish navy, the authorities decided to recruit most of the men as ordinary mercenaries (*levend* and *aylak*) except 1,178 *gabıyar* (the regular sailors monitoring the rigging).<sup>57</sup> Orders went out to provinces for the recruitment of the crew for the navy in 1801 and 1802 record Greeks in curiously insignificant numbers. By the mid-August 1800, the Sublime Porte sent out the orders of recruitment to 144 districts, hoping to gather 215 *agas* (petty officers), 221 *alemdar* (standard bearers) and 10,494 men –*nefer*- (10,930 in total) before the spring of 1801. Of the troops, 192 were recorded as *mellah* –seaman- with 174 being Christian to be recruited from Karinabad, Aydos,

---

<sup>54</sup> C.BH 2855 (12RA1214/14Aug1799).

<sup>55</sup> C.BH 7156 (7R1214/8Sept1799); Of these troops, 80 *kalyoncu* were recruited from the islands of Kos (20), Sakız (Chios, 20), Midilli (Mytilene/Lesbos, 30), Kalonya (10), C.BH 9687 (23RA1214/25Aug1799); This figure also contained 30 *kalyoncu* and 50 *mellah* sent from Kızılhisar, C.BH 7156; troops were ready at Makri (close to İzmir) for the navy waiting for transportation ships, C.BH 9490 (mid-N1213/mid-Feb1799) decree sent to the Grand Admiral Hüseyin and Admiral Abdülkadir.

<sup>56</sup> For an assessment of the financial burden of naval reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II, see Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde*, pp. 208-234; M. Ursinus, “The *tersane* and the *tanzimat*, or how to finance a salaried fleet” in Zachariadou, *The Kapudan Pasha His Office and His Domain*, pp. 291-301.

<sup>57</sup> A.AMD 41/43 (29C1213/8Dec1798) the authorities attended to the meeting were the intendant of the Imperial Dockyards (*Tersane Emîni*), Selim Sabit Efedî –the steward of the Grand Admiral (*Kapu Kethüdası*)-, the Port Commander (*Liman Reisi*) as well as the unknown author of the memorandum.

İnos and Mudanya.<sup>58</sup> As of 27 February 1801, a navy composed of a three-decker, 4 frigates, 7 corvettes, 2 bomb vessels, and 34 sloops was dispatched to Alexandria under the command of the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa.<sup>59</sup> He communicated to Selim III that he had 17 ships (capital ships?) at his disposal and asked for outfitting of an additional 5-6 ships in İstanbul. Of these ships, he sent a galleon, 3 frigates and 3 corvettes to Corfu under the command of Patrona Şeremet Mehmed Beg.<sup>60</sup> The number of men to be mobilized for the navy by the spring of 1802 decreased to 6,870 as the French invasion of Egypt was over. This figure included 238 Christian *mellah*. Of 81 regions that were responsible to supply the troops, Midye, Tekfurdağı, Gelibolu, Mandos, Gönnye, Mudanya, Ayvalık, Sisam and other islands on the Aegean Sea provided the Christian recruits. These numbers may be misleading, for the documents do not specify the religion of each and every man to be sent from the provinces. For example, while the religion of 125 men asked from the Chios was not specified, they were no doubt Christians. It should be mentioned that all men received the same pay regardless of their religion in spite of

---

<sup>58</sup> C.BH 6941 (26RA1215/17Aug1800). The distribution of the districts by region is: Western Anatolia, the islands by the coast of Anatolia, Thrace, Marmara, İstanbul, Antalya, and Ankara as the easternmost district. The number of men requested from a district ranged between 20 and 300. Kütahya and Mytilene were to send 300 men each, and districts such as Selanik (and its vicinity), Teke (Antalya and its surrounding), Rhodes were to provide 200 men each. Çorlu and Tekfurdağı were among the places sending *mellah*.

<sup>59</sup> E.3172/19-20

<sup>60</sup> HAT 113/4514 Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa to the Sublime Porte. He advised the appointment of Şeremet as the new commander of the fleet in Corfu.

McKnight's assertion to the opposite. Probably, because of high desertion rates, the Porte obliged the districts to stand surety for the troops they sent.<sup>61</sup>

### **An account of the expedition**

The expedition can be divided into three phases. The first phase was shaped by the occupation of the islands forming a chain from south to north up to Corfu in a matter of a month, during which Ali Paşa of Yanya was commissioned with the conquest of the four towns of Preveza, Butrinto, Vonitsa, and Parga. The four-month siege of Corfu formed the second phase, while the last phase witnessed patrol duties along the Italian coasts and the failed expedition to Malta.

### Occupation of the 'Venetian Dalmatia' and Ali Paşa of Yanya

The role of Ali Paşa in the expedition has been only partly understood due to lack of studies on his relations with the Porte based on Ottoman documents. While Ali Paşa is believed to have seized the opportunity of the Porte's declaration of war to improvise an attack on the Dalmatian coasts on his own initiative<sup>62</sup>, the archival evidence show that he

---

<sup>61</sup> Documents are not clear about the difference between *nefer* and *mellah*. While some of the latter were recorded as Christian, no religion was specified for the former, but that does not have to mean that they were all Muslim. The difference remains to be explained since both categories were required to be competent sailors, see C.BH 1795 (26C1216/3Nov1801). McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 37. He also claims that the pilots of the Ottoman ships were Greeks and they served in the capacity of the captain.

<sup>62</sup> Jervis & Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu*, p. 164; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 98; Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 85-86; Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 102; Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, pp. 88-90; Zens also refers to the imperial order sent to Ali Paşa whom was at the time in the imperial army that besieged Pazvandoğlu Osman in Vidin, R. W. Zens, *The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin in the Age of Ottoman Social Change, 1791-1815* (University of Wisconsin, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2004), p. 146.

was commissioned by the Porte to oust the French from the so-called Venetian Dalmatia –Parga, Preveza, Vonitsa, Butrinto.<sup>63</sup>

Map II. Ottoman naval operations in the Adriatic, Italy, and Sicily



Notes: The Map is adapted from N. E. Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807* (The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 116.

Moreover, the Porte ordered Abdülkadir to support Ali Paşa with his fleet in the case that he failed to complete the conquest of these four towns prior to the fleet's arrival.

<sup>63</sup> HAT 175/7650 (1N1213/6Feb1799) From Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. He mentions that Ali Paşa, his son Veliyüddin Paşa, the two İbrahim Paşas of Avlonya and İskenderiye (Scutari) were ordered to raise 3,000 troops each. However, the Porte also ordered his other son Muhtar Paşa, the mutasarrıf of Ağrıboz, to keep ready 3,000 Albanian troops for the operations of the fleet. He should entrust these troops with the inspector sent from İstanbul, the çukadar Ömer who was to wait with this force in Narda and other suitable towns on the shore for the orders from the fleet, C.BH 8712 (nd.) to Muhtar Paşa. For Muhtar Paşa's positive response, see C.HRC 1383 (27CA1213/6Nov1798); Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet* [2<sup>nd</sup> ed.], v. 6, p. 6.



Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi, who was also charged with the provisioning of the Russian fleet, was sent to Ali Paşa as the special agent (*mübaşir*) with written instructions.<sup>64</sup>

Apparently, the Porte empowered him to enhance the coordination between the fleet and Ali Paşa. The Porte overtly considered the four towns falling within the *sancaks* of Karlıeli (Vonitsa), Yanya (Preveza) and Delvine (Parga and Butrinto), and contemplated that their “occupation and liberation at this moment bound to bring numerous advantages” (*bu aralıkda zabt ve teshiri nice fevaidi müstelzim olduğundan*).<sup>65</sup>

Ali Paşa informed the Porte on 31 October 1798 on the occupation of Preveza, Vonitsa, and Butrinto, sending 298 severed heads as the concrete signs of his victory.<sup>66</sup> Notably, Ali Paşa later acknowledged that he conquered Preveza by his own troops as well as the Tsamides (*Çam*) and gave the credit for the conquest of Butrinto to İbrahim Paşa of Avlonya and Mustafa Paşa -the former *mutasarrıf* of Delvine.<sup>67</sup> By managing to

---

<sup>64</sup> C.HRC 2024 (mid-R1213/late Sept.1798) Order to Abdülkadir Beg. Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi was one of the former *voivodas* of Galata and charged with the organization of provisions for the Russian fleet as well. His overlapping responsibilities seem to have confused the contemporary Russian sources and the secondary literature relying on them. Presuming that he was one of Ali’s functionaries, they considered that the Porte exclusively entrusted the provisioning of the combined fleet with Ali Paşa and the Albanian paşas which was not the case as will be revealed in the next chapter on provisioning, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 35; Tomara’s letter to Ushakov dated January 11, 1799 informing him that Ali Paşa should provide him with the supplies might account for this confusion, see Mordvinov (ed.) *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 3, doc. # 247 and doc. # 264 for Ushakov’s letter to Ali Paşa about food supplies.

<sup>65</sup> C.HRC 1262 (lateR1213/earlyOct1798) Order to Ahmet Paşa (the governor of the Morea), informing him on the appointment of Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi and on the orders sent to Abdülkadir to give military assistance to Ali Paşa.

<sup>66</sup> C.HRC 2024 (midR1213/lateSept1798) Order to Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg; C.HRC 1262 (lateR1213/early1798); Ali Paşa complained that the supplies and ammunition promised to him did not arrive and noted that lead bullets were never to be found in the region, A.AMD 41/31. (21CA1213/31Oct1798) From Ali Paşa. Ahmed Paşa communicated to the Porte that Ali Paşa besieged Preveza on 21 October and occupied the town the next day, HAT 164/6853 (3B1213/11Dec1798); the town was defended by 300 French and 600 local volunteers including Souliotes against Ali Paşa’s 4,000 troops, Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 113.

<sup>67</sup> C.HRC 1037 (20Z1214/15May1800) cadastral survey on ‘the four fortresses.’

seize these towns from the French before the fleet arrived in the region, Ali Paşa allowed Abdülkadir to concentrate his forces on the occupation of the Ionian Islands.

The first confrontations between Ushakov and Ali Paşa were centered on the occupation of Parga and Leukas. Following the traditional Ottoman practice, Ali Paşa offered peaceful surrender (*istiman*) to these towns but only Vonitsa took the offer and escaped devastation, while sacking of Preveza and Butrinto had been vividly illustrated in almost all itineraries of the time concentrating on Ali Paşa's 'exploits'. By the beginning of November, he laid siege to Parga as the inhabitants refused to surrender the French garrison and submit themselves peacefully. Parga was a special case because of the enmity reigning between Ali Paşa and the town. The inhabitants had good reason to doubt Ali Paşa's peaceful offers. As the main fleet arrived in the region, a delegacy of Pargiotes convinced Ushakov to fly the Russian flag as well as the *sancak* of Selim over the citadel in order to deter Ali Paşa from attacking the town.<sup>68</sup>

Obviously, Ali Paşa's sacking of Preveza and Butrinto did not leave a good impression on the Christian inhabitants of the region, who had fled to the Ionian Islands and spread the word. Remarkably, some of them were mercenaries and thereby recruited by Ushakov in the siege of Corfu, which reveals the complex realities of a frontier zone.<sup>69</sup> This was one of the reasons of the confrontation with the Russians over Leukas. The cadastral survey conducted in these four towns after their occupation clearly illustrates the contrast between the Ottoman outlook and romanticized views -both

---

<sup>68</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 96-99.

<sup>69</sup> Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, pp. 114-15.

contemporary and modern- on the scattered Christian populations of this mountainous region –the Suliots being the most famous of all.<sup>70</sup> While Ali Paşa’s war on the Souliotes is usually viewed as a manifestation of arbitrary violence exerted by a whimsical warlord, it was part of a clearly defined frontier policy on the part of the Sublime Porte that was to take shape by the ‘opening of the Adriatic frontier’ after the demise of Venice in 1797. This was best illustrated in the cadastral survey conducted on these towns.

The survey evidenced for the Sublime Porte the devastation Ali Paşa wreaked on the region, corroborating to a certain extent with the horrifying accounts in the itinerary literature. It recorded 332 households in Vonitsa, 411 households in Parga, 2,193 in Preveza and 70-80 households in the ‘bandit’ villages of Butrinto in addition to 56 individuals who took care of the fisheries and the cultivated plots in the vicinity of the town. Since Preveza and Butrinto were conquered by sword “most of the inhabitants were killed and persecuted, remnants of the sword fled” (*ekser ahalisi katl ve idam ve bakıyyetü’s-suyufu firar idüb*). The survey is not sympathetic either to the mountain villages of Butrinto populated by the ‘rebels and bandits’ (*usat ve hevayid*): “this time, meeting their punishment for their mischievous deeds, most of them perished; those who could escape the sword deserted and their villages were burnt.” The number of the

---

<sup>70</sup> C.HRC 1037 (20Z1214/15May1800) cadastral survey on ‘the four fortresses.’ Mehmed Şakir Efendi, who conducted the survey, described the fortresses, means of subsistence and revenue sources in these former Venetian towns. He had concrete suggestions on improving the revenue sources and reinforcing the fortresses. He stated that the *ayan* of the region should be inquired on the economic potentials of the new exploits, which is a clear recognition of the Porte’s dependence on the local elite to mobilize local sources. He noted that he would deliver the drawings of these fortresses to the Porte. The memorandum on the margins indicates that they were to be deposited in the School of Engineering (*Mühendishane*).

individuals who were liable to polltax did not exceed 500 in the fortress of Vonitsa and 550 in Parga.<sup>71</sup>

It recounts that 16 of the villages of Preveza known as *Sul* had remained within the borders of the Ottoman Empire after the peace with Venice in 1716. Nevertheless they had delivered none of the due taxes and been in a state of continuous rebellion since then. Now that Preveza was conquered, these villages that could raise roughly 10,000 musket-bearing men were deprived of their hide-out spots and would have to quit banditry (*şekavet*) and ‘accept the subjecthood with a little reproof’ (*raiyyeti edna güşmal ile kabul idecekleri*). He proposed to put these Souliote villages under the administration of Preveza for that purpose. Thus, the survey almost laid the moral groundwork for the subordination of the Souliotes in near future by Ali Paşa, although their suppression required more than a ‘twist of the ear’ in contradiction of the optimist expectations of the survey conductor.<sup>72</sup>

Consequently, Ali Paşa’s and the Porte’s interests converged to a great extent and his policy towards the unruly Christian subjects on the coast of Dalmatia was approved by the latter. For the very same reason, however, his relations with the Russian fleet in the region were bound to be contentious in so far as they did not agree on the definition of ‘refugee’ vis-à-vis ‘bandit.’<sup>73</sup> Throughout the expedition Ali Paşa regarded the Porte

---

<sup>71</sup> C.HRC 1037 (20Z1214/15May1800) cadastral survey on ‘the four fortresses.’ “*bu defa ceza-yı amellerini müşahede idüb bu muharebede ekseri helak ve bakiyyetü’s-seyf olan dahi firar ve gaybubet itmeğle hin-i muharebede karyeleri ihrak.*”

<sup>72</sup> C.HRC 1037 (20Z1214/15May1800) cadastral survey on ‘the four fortresses.’

<sup>73</sup> Some of the commanders of the mercenaries in Russian service had also served as *armatoloi* (local police force) on the main land for Ottomans and Venetians: Giannes Digones (Arta), Drakos and Georgios Grivas

as an arbitrator on many occasions. Therefore, the Porte often found itself reconciling him and the Russians with utmost care not to antagonize any side as we will see in the following sections.

#### The first phase of the Expedition: occupation of Islands

Allies disagreed from the outset on the proper stratagem to pursue in the Adriatic. British proposed to attack Corfu with the hope that its fall would precipitate the submission of other islands. Ushakov, by contrast, was determined to occupy them one by one starting with Cerigo (Gr: Kythera, Tr: Çuha) in order to secure the support of the Greek inhabitants. He was led by Spencer Smith to believe that there were 12,000 French in the Ionian Islands and that 8,000 of them were deployed at the fortress of Corfu, known to be a formidable fortress. Thus, he did not see it possible to force it into submission in the lack of land troops.<sup>74</sup> The Ottomans thought that the French garrison at Corfu was composed of 3,500 French troops, and seem to have agreed with Ushakov.<sup>75</sup>

The first part of the expedition, thus, was a combination of occupying the islands on the way to Corfu and seeking the active military and moral support of the Greek inhabitants. General Louis Chabot learnt about the Ottoman-Russian alliance in the beginning of October, but, doubting the credibility of the news, was taken by surprise when the news of the fall of Cerigo reached him at Corfu. Although he had only 3,500 troops, he scattered them by sending detachments to the islands and the coastal towns of

---

(Vonitsa and Xeromero), Chrestakes Kalogeros (Preveza), Andreas Stathas (Valtos), Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 150.

<sup>74</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 84; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 48.

<sup>75</sup> HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798) from Kapudane Abdülkadir to the Porte.

Parga, Prevesa, Butrinto, and Vonitsa. Most of the islands were incapable of supporting his strategy of war of attrition. Besides the lack of troops, many lacked strongholds, guns, gun-carriages, or gunpowder.<sup>76</sup>

The nature of popular support for the combined fleet was questionable. McKnight argues that it actually amounted to a revolt against the revolutionary French who had treated the Ionians belatedly, resorting to forced requisitioning, arbitrary extortions, and even confiscations -their disparaging attitude towards religion notwithstanding. For him, the revolt set the example for the Greek revolution of 1820. Saul, by contrast, uses the term cooperation instead of revolt, and remarks that cooperation was not a foregone conclusion. Apparently the Ionians shared in common only the hatred of French and ‘Turks’. After the French invasion inhabitants had also suffered from the embargo on British, thus they welcomed the joint fleet.<sup>77</sup> We will try to outline the Ottoman version of the expedition, highlighting the points of convergence and divergence between different versions.<sup>78</sup>

---

<sup>76</sup> Under the impression of Bellaires, Jervis & Jervis asserted Chabot’s disposition of the troops was correct, Jervis & Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu*, p. 165; Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 84; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 48-51; Pappas stated that the French garrison in the Ionian islands was composed of 3,290 French, 4,500 Greek auxiliaries and a few hundred Italian troops, Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 98; Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 90.

<sup>77</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 80, 84; the title of the second chapter of McKnight is “The Revolt of the Ionians”, pp. 48-100.

<sup>78</sup> McKnight offers a very detailed and useful account of the expedition. He heavily relies on Metaxa and Bellaire in recounting the military operations (J. P. Bellaires, *Precis des operations generales de la division française du Levant* [Paris, 1805]) as well as Russian documents, mostly reports of Ushakov to Tomara and St. Petersburg. Saul briefly sketches the expedition, but often proposes alternative views to McKnight, for more information on the military actions of the joint fleet see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 73-138; Jervis & Jervis also offers a good account of the siege, Jervis & Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu*, pp. 159-185.

The allied fleet lifted anchor and headed to Cerigo on 1 October with 32 ships.<sup>79</sup> The Sublime Porte, meanwhile, sent out orders to the coastal towns lying along the route. These orders instructed the locals not to interfere with the Russian warships when they entered the port to take water. They were asked to sell provisions at moderate prices and cooperate with the fleet in tracking down any possible Russian deserters at the stations. Russian soldiers were not to be arrested for any reason. They should also help the fleet take the necessary precautions in the event of an outbreak of epidemics. Remarkably, these orders were issued upon the request of Tomara and Ushakov, who were seemingly doubtful about the Ottoman cooperation at the initial stage of the expedition. Kalfaoğlu Aleksandiri was also assigned as interpreter to the Russian fleet to take care of the communication with the locals.<sup>80</sup>

As early as 31 August 1798, the Defterdar Efendi (Chief Treasurer) was informed that the fleet was about to spread canvas for the expedition. It was necessary to stock additional naval equipment such as masts and canvas in the designated stations, for the fleet might run into stormy weathers. The harbors of Anaboli (Nauplia) and İnebahtı (Lepanto) were designated as major stations.<sup>81</sup> The Porte also encouraged its subjects in

---

<sup>79</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 35-38.

<sup>80</sup> C.HRC 2660 (lateRA1213/early1798); the decree was sent to Rhodes, Mytilene, Chios, Crete, Hydra, Avlonya, Narda, İstanköy, İnebahtı, Bozcaada, Karlıeli, İskenderiye (Scutari), Delvine, Ülgün, Bar, Selanik, Morea, Trablusşam, and all the coastal districts along to Mediterranean shores of Anatolia and Rumelia; C.HRC 519 (earlyR1213/midSept1798).

<sup>81</sup> C.BH 9365 (21Ş1213/28Jan1799). Mustafa Paşa, the Governor of the Morea, was to supervise the preparations in Anaboli, while Ahmed Paşa, the commander of İnebahtı would take care of the second station. Proper orders to several islands for replenishing these stations were sent out only on 28 January 1799.

the Archipelago to attack French ships that might leave Alexandria, promising that they could have their prize in possession.<sup>82</sup>

Early in October 1798, Ahmed Paşa, the commander of İnebahtı, had learnt from his spies in Corfu that the news of the Battle of Nile demoralized the French troops and caused panic among the populace in Corfu. Such news raised the hopes of the Porte for a likely Greek support against the French.<sup>83</sup> The correspondence of Lalalı Mustafa (the Lalliotte) and Seydi Ağa also strengthened the conviction that the French position in the Ionian Islands was tenacious. They contended that they could have the Zantiotes detain the French garrison, counting on their good relations with Zante cultivated over grain trade. They thought it was feasible, presuming that there were only 200 French troops on the island. İstanbul instructed them to put their plan in action and encourage the islanders to accept the Ottoman rule. In the case that it did not materialize before the arrival of the fleet, they were to abandon the plan and support the fleet with sending land troops.<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> The provinces sent discouraging responses to such orders: the authorities in Crete asked for more troops to be sent to Kandiye (Candia) and complained from the ravaging plague, which caused many to perish or left the island. They requested their return by force, BOA, A.SKT 68/16 (29CA1213/8Nov1798). The *kadı* and the commander of Resmo (Rethymnon) pointed out that the only merchant ship at their disposal was already sent to İstanbul with no hope to employ any corsair ship. Hanya also declined in commissioning a corsair ship and asked for troops, C.BH 5946 (21R1213/2Oct1798). It seems, provinces were cautious about the promises of the Porte and found it wise to remain aloof to official piracy. One reason was likely to be the fear of forced requisitioning of their ship for the naval service. For an interesting example of the ways in which the Porte requisitioned such ships, see the case of the corvette built by a Swedish engineer under the supervision of Merabit-zade Hasan of Sakız (Chios), A.AMD 42/38 (1213/1798-99); McKnight, conversely, noted that more than 800 Ionian boats were taken in a month after Ottoman declaration of war, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 62.

<sup>83</sup> C.HRC 1262 (lateR1213/earlyOct1798). By 4 September 1798, the propaganda brochures in Arabic were already sent to Egypt, A.AMD 41/19 (3R1213/14Sept1798); dragoman of the Morea also assured the Porte that the people of Zante were lenient towards the Ottoman rule 'except for a few naughty men' (*birkaç yaramazdan mada*), TSA, E.3654/2.

<sup>84</sup> C.HRC 2025 (midB1213/lateSept1798). The letter sent to the Porte was in Greek. The Lalliottes were known to be fierce bandits. Like the people of Bardunia, they were also Greek-speaking Muslims. Gell



The fleet arrived at the island of Eğriboz (Hydra) in two days after sailing from the Dardanelles, where they stopped for 10 days to replenish their water stocks and find suitable pilots. 12 days after leaving the Dardanelles, the fleet managed to occupy Cerigo. McKnight pointed out that the occupation of the island was the first engagement of the Second Coalition Wars.<sup>85</sup> Moreover, he observed the emergence of a tactical pattern in the first phase of the expedition. Small detachments were sent in advance to the islands with a view to isolate the French garrison by securing popular support. The French were offered generous terms of surrender in order to avoid the delay of lengthy sieges and take full advantage of the French unpreparedness at Corfu. Mixed garrisons of Russian and Ottoman troops of equal number were left in each island always under a Russian commander on the secret advices of Tomara.<sup>86</sup> Apparent weakness, unpreparedness, and flawed strategy of defense on the part of the French, when combined with popular support for the expedition, brought about a fairly easy occupation of the islands in a matter of month in the order of Cerigo, Zante (Gr.: Zakynthos, Tr.: Zanta), Cephalonia (Gr.: Kefallonia, Tr.: Kefalonya), Ithaca (Gr.: Ithaki, Tr.: Küçük Kefalonya), Paxos (Gr.: Paxi, Tr.: Pakso) Leukas (Gr.: Lefkada, Tr.: Aya Mavra), and other smaller islands.

---

doubts the commitment of both people to Islam, for they bore both Muslim and Christian names, but he considered them the best people of the Morea, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea*, p. 349; Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania*, p. 36.

<sup>85</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 73-75.

<sup>86</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 75-76; Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 84. In case of Cerigo, the French Captain Michel resolved to put up a fight with his 86 men although he learnt the launching of the expedition only by the end of September. After warning the islanders to remain neutral, he retreated to Kapsali located on a mountainous terrain to be safe from the naval guns. A mixed force 550 troops had to engage in siege warfare for two days. Finally, they surrendered on parole on 11 October. After leaving a mixed force of 22 troops under the Lieutenant Konstantin Diamenti (of Greek origin), the fleet made a course for Zante, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 73-78.

## *Zante*

The joint fleet could not leave Cerigo for Zante before 17 October due to contrary winds. The town of Zakynthos was the only fortified place in the island, while the island was the most populous of all. The French garrison of roughly 450 men was resolved to resist the joint fleet. Nevertheless, the populace, who resented over the French ban on currant trade with Britain –the major export item of the island- rose up in arms against the French as they got wind of the joint fleet, declining the French pleas for neutrality. The French had to retreat to the fortress, leaving the ground for an easy landing. Consequently, the garrison surrendered on 25 October, a day after arrival of a detachment of frigates under the command of Captain Shostak. McKnight claimed that the Ottoman warships had to fly Russian flags to pacify the islanders who bred a hatred for the “Turk” and Ushakov had a difficult time to persuade them to accept Ottoman soldiers as allies.<sup>87</sup> Nevertheless, his French sources stood in contrast to the Ottoman sources.

As mentioned previously, some local Ottoman functionaries were convinced that a rebellion could bring down the French rule in the island and decided to entice their Zantiote neighbors to rise up in arms. Sources are silent about their relation with the rebels, but Ahmed Paşa communicated to the Porte that the islanders sent a delegation of 20 people to the fleet after the fall of Cerigo informing that they would soon capture the

---

<sup>87</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 77-82; he mentioned that 500 French prisoners were shared equally and depending on the testimony of Pouqueville, drew a very negative picture of their treatment by the Ottomans (p. 81). Depiction of the Ottoman warships with Russian flags was part of the French propaganda, whereas on this specific case Ushakov communicated this information to Paul I, probably to discredit the Ottoman ally in his eyes, as the Russian map depicts the Ottoman ships flying their own flag; Pappas puts number of the French troops at 500 and does not mention the Ottoman forces left on the island, Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, pp. 100-101.

French garrison of 200 troops and deliver them to the fleet. After the meeting with Ushakov, they also visited Abdülkadir Beg and accepted the Ottoman subjecthood (*raiyet*), which, in Ottoman political culture, corresponded to voluntary submission as opposed to forced subordination through conquest and required the granting of certain administrative and economic privileges and exemptions known as *istimalet*. Ahmed Paşa clearly stated that *istimalet* was bestowed on Zante and that the joint fleet hoped to occupy Cephalonia in the same manner. Thus, after leaving a mixed garrison consisting of equal number of Russian and Ottoman troops (30 each) a detachment was sent to Cephalonia in advance.<sup>88</sup>

### *Cephalonia*

350 French troops garrisoning Cephalonia was threatened by the populace who grew insubordinate to the French after learning the advent of the Russo-Ottoman fleet. The people of Cephalonia were known to be the most insubordinate of all Ionians. The proclamations of Ushakov and the Patriarch as well as their leader who was a former Russian officer gave the necessary shape and content to their cause. 150 men of the garrison sought to take refuge in Corfu but had to disembark on Leukas because of contrary winds only to be arrested by the rebellious islanders. The remaining 200 began a hasty retreat to the north as the boatmen denied them transportation to Corfu. After a

---

<sup>88</sup> HAT 164/6853 (3B1213/11Dec1798), the date belongs to the letter sent to Ahmed in reply. HAT 176/7678 (24C1213/3Dec1798) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte; Mustafa Paşa, the former governor of the Morea communicated that Cerigo was taken by granting *istiman* (conditional surrender) after a battle of five hours. The Zantiotes imprisoned the French and delivered them to the fleet and the people of Cephalonia and Ithaca followed the suit. Leukas resisted for a couple of days and the fleet sailed to Corfu by mid November, HAT 164/6844-A (5N1213/10Feb1799).

perilous journey amidst the hostile peasants, they were imprisoned and handed over to the vanguard squadron on 29 October.<sup>89</sup>

Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg testified that half of the French captives from Cephalonia -197 in total-was sent to Ahmed Paşa of İnebahti aboard the frigate of Fazlı Kapudan and a Russian frigate. The Russians got two bronze mortars and 18 barrels of gunpowder as booty.<sup>90</sup> In Ottoman version, the people of Cephalonia offered their submission to Süleyman Kapudan and to the Russian ship. When Abdülkadir arrived at Cephalonia on 2 November, the islanders had already handed over the French garrison of 197 soldiers. They paid a visit to the Kapudane during which they “wished a long life to the state and recounted the good fortune of the world-emperor.” In return, they were granted a written guarantee (*sened*) from both sides similar to those given in Cerigo and Zante. The biggest problem in the island was the animosity among the inhabitants. Cephalonia had 5 *kazas* (basic administrative district in Ottoman Empire), each seeking self-rule. In the negotiation with Ushakov, the commanders came to the conclusion that separation would only aggravate their strenuous relations between the *kazas* that were quarreling for the last hundred years. They decided with the consent of the delegates that each *kaza* would send a delegate –*kocabaşı*- to *Argostol*, the seat of the *metropolid*. This administration was to be implemented under the protection of 24 Ottoman and Russian

---

<sup>89</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 72-73, 85-87, 109; Poqueville also witnessed the arrival of the proclamation of the Patriarch in Tripolitsa, “...ridiculous crusading proclamation was printed and registered in the public records”, Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania*, p. 29; Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 101.

<sup>90</sup> HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798) from Abdülkadir to the Porte; the subject of the French prisoners in Ottoman lands is too complicated to deal with properly in this dissertation and its treatment deserves a separate study, which I hope to undertake in due time based on Ottoman documents.

troops of equal numbers. The islanders were also given Ottoman flags and letters of recommendation (*buyuruldu*) for protection from the corsairs of Algiers.<sup>91</sup>

*Leukas and confrontation with Ali Paşa*

Leukas was the only island except Corfu where the French garrison of 500 men was resolved for war. A squadron of four ships under Seniavin was sent to Leukas on 29 October. When he learned the resistance on the island, Ushakov sailed to Leukas from Cephalonia on November 8. According to Russian sources Seniavin met on his ship with the notables of the island who already revolted against the French, forcing them to retreat to the fortress. On the first day of November, he deployed 390 Russian and Ottoman troops in four different batteries he hastily built –one of them on the territory of Ali Paşa. The bombardment did not harm the fortress, as the batteries were too far away. Seniavin, nevertheless, refused Ali Paşa's offer for military assistance.<sup>92</sup>

Abdülkadir Beg, on the other hand, gave a different version of the event. He recounted that Abbas Kapudan's frigate was sent along with the galleon of Mehmed Beg, the Port Commander, in addition to a Russian galleon and a frigate with no mention to Seniavin by name. Ali Paşa of Yanya, who was appointed the commander of the Castle of Lepanto at this time, sent six small boats in assistance to the squadron. Abdülkadir communicated that Ali Paşa and Mehmed Beg were also present in the meeting held with the delegation of Leukas. According to him it was Mehmed Beg who set up the battery of two large guns in front of the gate of the fortress and manned them. The sandy shores

---

<sup>91</sup> HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798) from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

<sup>92</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 82-3, 103-4.

proved to be an obstacle for landing for which reason Mehmed Beg and İbrahim Kaptan (*Şehbaz-ı Bahr*) reconnoitered the island at midnight along with a Russian warship. After spotting suitable places for the new batteries, they erected a second battery outside the town, deploying 4 howitzers and 6 large guns. A third one was set up near the monastery by the town and the last one checked the entrance of the town. Abdülkadir stressed that Ottoman and Russian troops were mixed in these batteries, while Ali Paşa was also present in the town with his men.<sup>93</sup> After the surrender of the garrison on 16 November, İbrahim Kapudan entered the fortress along with a Russian officer and flew the banner (*sancak*) of the sultan next to the Russian flag, accompanied with a cannon salute from the fleet and the fortress.<sup>94</sup>

The confrontation in the occupation of Leukas evidently illustrated the strenuous relations with Ali Paşa. In fact, the Russians actually discovered Ali's previous correspondence with Mialet -the French commander of Leukas- in which he offered the French garrison safe-conduct to Corfu or Ancona in addition to 30,000 ducats in return for the surrender of the island to him. He also tried to incite the islanders to revolt against the French at the same time. In the lack of the relevant Ottoman documents, it is hard to judge whether or not his policy was encouraged by the Porte similar to that of Lalalı Mustafa's plans for a Zantiote uprising. Be that as it may, Leukas was of special importance to Ali Paşa since it was the closest island to the mainland and it might serve

---

<sup>93</sup> HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798) From Kapudane to the Porte. The French garrison finally accepted the offer to surrender and delivered the fortress on 16 November. The French casualties were around 30-40 men and there were no casualties in the fleet.

<sup>94</sup> HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798) from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

as the entrepot of his domain.<sup>95</sup> Thus, his frustration at Ushakov surely deepened when the Admiral distributed Russian flags to the merchant ships and flew their flags in the Ionian Islands as well in Parga. Ushakov was so distressed that he had to leave Seniavin with *Sv. Petr* (Seniavin) and *Navarkhia* (Admiral Voinovitch) at Leukas as a precaution against Ali before departing for Corfu.<sup>96</sup>

Ali Paşa met the Russian challenge on his own terms by requesting the intervention of the Porte. As early as November he requested from the Porte to cede the administration and defense of these four towns to his jurisdiction and condemned the presence of Russian soldiers and banners in the islands. The Porte, nevertheless, bid its time by adopting a reconciliatory role as reflected in the letter sent in response. A comparison of the official letter penned in an eloquent style and the draft written in a crude manner to guide the scribe in penning the original letter discloses the concerns and fears of the Porte about Ali Paşa as well as Ottoman phraseology. The guide-draft reads:<sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup> The contradictory information on Ali Paşa's presence on the island can partly be explained by the fact that the island was separated from the mainland –the territory of Ali Paşa where he waited at the head of his troops- by a small channel that could be easily traversed at low tide, Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, pp. 102-103; Abdulkadir likened the fortress situated between the land and the island to the Tower of Leander, following the Ottoman literary convention of using the topography of İstanbul to describe a place, HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798) from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

<sup>96</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 101-106; Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 85-86; Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 102; D. F. White, "The Russian Navy in Trieste. During the Wars of the Revolution and the Empire", *American Slavic and the East European Review* 6:3/4 (1947), p. 28.

<sup>97</sup> "Rusya devleti ile Devlet-i Aliye şimdi müttefiktir. Donanma-yı Hümayun ile bi'l-ittifak ahzolanun mahallere müştereken şimdilik adam vaz iderler. Ve iki devletin bayrakları açarlar. Nizam-ı ittifak budur. Buna muhalif olan muameleden ittika idesin. Ve fetholunan mahallerin temliği matlub olunmuş. Sen şöylesin böylesin. Senden bu babda diriğ muamelesi tecviz olunmaz. Lakin bunlar feth-i cediddir. Mülk-i şahanedan olur. Tiz elden ahara temlik olamaz. Kaide-i devlete mugayirdir. Ba-husus bu maddelerde düvel-i müttefikler ile bazı şerait vardır. Bunlar şimdi devlet tarafından zabt olunur. Siz hemen mukaddem

Russian state and the Sublime Porte are allies. They put men to the places together with the imperial navy where they occupied together. And they unfurl the flags of both states. This is the terms of alliance. Refrain from actions contradicting this. And the holder-rights of the conquered places were demanded [by you]. You are such and such. Withholding it from you cannot be deemed proper. But these are the new conquests. [And so] They are treated as the royal possession. They cannot be assigned to another person right away. It is against the law of the state. Especially, there are some stipulations on these issues with the allies. They should be occupied by the state now. As written to you previously, you should instantly focus on conducting the land survey and protecting the subjects therein; and observing the usages of communication and respect with the Russian admiral and the Kapudane Beg; and refraining from mistreatment of the subjects through any sort of impositions. Saying “what we expect from you is this and that”, expressed by the Grand-vezier and the ferman sent to him [...].

The original letter explained the deal with Russia as sketched out in the draft to Ali Paşa who was “famous among the great Begs of the Begs for his reason, comprehension, sagacity, and intuition” (*sen mirimiran-ı kiramdan akl ve dirayet ve gayret ve feraset ile şöhret-şiarlarından olub*). Given his qualifications, the Porte maintained, he should prevent any rupture with the main fleet. When the fleet arrived at Corfu, Ali sent one of his functionaries to negotiate with Abdülkadir and Ushakov on the state of the people of Leukas and Parga.<sup>98</sup> But it remained unsolved for Ali Paşa, who grew uncooperative for many months in the second phase of the expedition.

#### The second phase of the Expedition: the siege of Corfu

The second phase of the expedition comprised the protracted siege of Corfu that lasted four months (November 1798 – March 1799). There were several explanations for the lengthy siege. General Chabot was determined to defend the island which had very

---

*tahrir olduğu vechle tahrir ve reayasının himayesine dikkat ve Rusya amiraliyle ve Kapudane Beg ile rüsum-ı muhabere ve müra'ata dikkat birle ve reayaya bir güne teklif ile barid muamele izharından ittika ve müba'adet birle senden memulümüz olan şu bu diyerek efendimizden ifade ve efendimize gelen ferman”*  
C.BH 1089 (mid-C1213/late-Nov1798) imperial edict in draft to be sent to Ali Paşa.

<sup>98</sup> HAT 7652 (13C1213/22Nov1798) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte.



strong fortifications in spite of their dilapidated state. With two citadels –the Old and New- and three lines of fortification, the fortress of Corfu was formidable especially for a fleet without the support of land troops. The attitude of the Corfiotes towards the French occupiers was as hostile as else where and the number of the French troops did not exceed 2,500-3,000 with limited provisions. However, Chabot firmly believed that reinforcements would arrive immediately from Ancona. Actually, a small corvette, *La Brune*, which would eventually be the prize of the Ottomans after the occupation of the island, slipped past the Russian ships and informed Chabot on the imminent arrival of 3,000 reinforcements from Ancona. The relief force that left Ancona on 8 December could only reach the northern coast of Corfu at the beginning of January and had to return after failing to communicate with Chabot.<sup>99</sup>

Ushakov, on the other hand, overestimated the strength of the French garrison and the fortress. Thus, he thought it unwise to engage in siege warfare when he lacked sufficient numbers of land troops and demanded reinforcements from Russia. Until then he was resolved to limit the military operations with a naval blockade. Regular bombardment of the fortress only began on 12 December, but it did not inflict so much harm on the French as it came in regular salvoes the timing of which the French were quick to figure out to take shelter. There is some reason to think that Ushakov had an amphibious war in mind rather than a naval blockade as revealed by the minutes of the

---

<sup>99</sup> Jervis & Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu*, p. 167; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 33; Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, pp. 104-105.

Bebek Conference on September 10. He demanded from the Porte to provide the fleet with light field guns and to make ready Albanian mercenaries on the Adriatic shores.<sup>100</sup>

The first squadron sent from Zante under the command of Captain Selivachev reached Corfu on 4 November with Patrona Şeremet Beg. This was reinforced by Poskochin's four ships from Cephalonia. Riyale Beg was also part of this squadron, who sent to Cephalonia an alarming report drawing attention to apparent French commitment to a stiff defense in Corfu and rumors of the preparation of a relief force in Ancona. He maintained, however, that the Corfiotes offered their loyalty to the fleet and he was patrolling with 11 ships at the entrance of the harbor.<sup>101</sup> Mustafa Paşa also testified their submission to the fleet since they “were offended by the false religion of their own invention and other uncompromising and wicked attitudes [of the French]” (*ihtirakerdeleri olan ayin-i batıllarından ve sair na-mülayim hareket-i bagiyanelerinden dilgir olduklarından*). Thus, they were granted *istimalet* in a similar manner to other islands.<sup>102</sup>

On 19 November, Abdülkadir Beg negotiated with Ushakov and both commanders decided to sail to Corfu and wrote Ali Paşa to prepare 10,000 troops, for siege warfare might be necessary.<sup>103</sup> This might be a further proof that the fleet did not

---

<sup>100</sup> HAT 270/15756 (29RA1213/10Sept1798) the minutes of the Bebek Conference. These cannon –the so-called quick-fire artillery (*sûrat topu*)- were delivered to the fleet. 10 quick-fire guns firing shots of 1.92 kg (1.5 *kıyye*) were delivered to the fleet: 6 guns were given to Russians with 1,500 balls as opposed to 4 guns and 1,000 balls given to the Ottoman fleet, C.BH 747 (5R1213/16Sept1798), C.BH 11460 (6R1213/17Sept1798); on the fring practice of the Russians, Jervis & Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu*, p. 170.

<sup>101</sup> HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798) from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

<sup>102</sup> HAT 164/6844-A (5N1213/10Feb1799) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>103</sup> Riyale marked in his report the reinforcement of the earthworks in front of the fortress and the preparation of *Generaux*, *Leander*, *Rivoli* (32-gun), and a corvette. Moreover, he related the rumors that a

expect to engage in a siege war in Corfu. The vanguard fleet was patrolling between the mainland and Corfu to intercept any cargoes destined to the French and they took four small vessels sent from Ancona. The interrogation of the French captives –reaching 150 together with those in the vessels- revealed the substantial preparations in Ancona for the defense of Corfu, for the French realized that they could not hold to Ancona without the possession of the island. Thus, the fleet was watching out the two straits that led to the island. Any relief force would have to land on the desert shores of the island only to be exterminated at the hands of the Corfiotes.<sup>104</sup>

#### *Initial engagements*

The main fleet arrived at Corfu on 20 November. In a week, a camp was established at Gouvia on the coast to gain a foothold and a battery was constructed on Mount Olivetto targeting the new citadel (F on Plan I). The French undertook a sortie on 27 November, but were repulsed by 300 Russian and 240 Ottoman troops including some Albanians.<sup>105</sup> A sortie force of 300 cavalry went out on storming the battery, but

---

squadron of 2 galleons and several corvettes were fitted out in Ancona ostensibly to head to Egypt with 10,000 troops, HAT 161/6798 (9C1213/3Nov1798) from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

<sup>104</sup> The French vessels seized are: a xebec with 16 guns, a boat with 4 guns and two unarmed boats, HAT 7652 (13C1213/22Nov1798) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte. For the facsimile of the document see Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi ve Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Eseri*, p. 111. Ushakov informed his allies that Paul sent him presents in appreciation of his loyal services and that 2 galleons would be sent from the Crimea; Mahmud Raif could join the fleet only during the occupation of Zante. He was stuck in *İşkoroz* when he learnt the fall of Cerigo because of adverse weathers, HAT 176/7678 (24C1213/3Dec1798) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte; HAT 158/6589 (6CA1213/16Oct1798) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte.

<sup>105</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 116; HAT 6751 (16C1213/25Nov1798) From Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte. For a facsimile of the document see bkz. Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 112; Mustafa Paşa, the former Governor of the Morea, related that the battery accommodated 600 Ottoman and Russian troops as well as 20 pieces of cannon, HAT 164/6844-A (5N1213/10Feb1799) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

the braves, who monitored the prey [the French], did not show them the courtesy of bullets and shots, but fell upon them, making 50 of the infidels prey to sword including their swine commander, while others raced with each other to retreat to the fortress like a flock of pigs.<sup>106</sup>

Suffering from the French retaliations, the Corfiotes asked for protection by construction of a battery near the monastery of St. Pantaleone on a height southwest of the fortress (close to G on Plan I). On 1 December, the French overran the battery defended by the Corfiotes. A coordinated attack on Olivetto caused substantial casualties among the allies, claiming as much as one-third of the defenders.<sup>107</sup> Relative French success illustrated the inefficacy of the volunteers rallying to the joined fleet and made Ushakov even more reluctant about investing a full-scale siege. This was noticeably the first serious clash of the Ottomans with the French in the Second Coalition wars, if we conveniently ignore Mustafa Paşa's self-celebratory description of the early attack on Olivetto quoted above. Mahmud Raif Efendi's account of the skirmish is illuminating about the inherent tensions involved in the alliance. After a fierce fight, the French had to retreat to the fortress leaving more than 300 deads on the field. On the allies' side, roughly 20 Russians 'perished' and 10 Ottomans "drank the sweet water of martyrdom." For him, the melee signified the opening chapter of the ultimate victory and "the zeal and sagacity of the troops of Islam thus became obvious."<sup>108</sup>

---

<sup>106</sup> "...müterassıd adüvv-ı şıkar olan diliran gördüklerinde dane-i tob ve tüfekte iltifat itmeyüb üzerlerine hücum eylemişler olmağla başbuğları olan hunzır elli nefer kefere ile tume-i şimşir olub maadası reme-yi hunzır gibi birbirlerini müsabakat iderek derun-ı kaleye firar eylemişler olmağla..", HAT 164/6844-A (5N1213/10Feb1799) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>107</sup> The allied force on this occasion was composed of 1,500 Corfiotes, 310 Russian grenadiers, fusiliers, and artillery men 200 Ottoman marines, Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 109.

<sup>108</sup> HAT 7668 (24C1213/3Dec1798) From Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte. Mahmud Raif also observed that the native volunteers could not withstand the charge undertaken by 1,000 French with quick-fire artillery at the battery to the right of the fortress. 400 Russian and Ottoman troops returned the fire and

Plan I. The fortress of Corfu in the Ottoman siege (1716)



Notes: The British Archives (Kew), Public Records Office, MR-1-162-002.

*Thwarted attack on Vidos*

fought back the French to the fortress “knife to knife” for 1.5 hours. 300 French fell dead. 25 Ottoman and 35 Russian troops were injured. He used the word *telef* for ‘perish’ and the conventional expression of *şerbet-i şehadetî nuş* to describe the death of the Russians and Ottomans, respectively. Beydilli drew attention to the obvious dichotomy of perishing and martyrdom in this report, see Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 25; the facsimile of the report is on p. 114. The Porte decided to augment the motivation and zeal (*şevk ve gayret*) by sending encouraging letters; Jervis & Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu*, pp. 170-71.


The standard accounts of the expedition have portrayed the Ottoman fleet as relegated to a secondary role and Ushakov as an over-cautious admiral.<sup>109</sup> However, Mahmud Raif suggested the opposite by his dispatches and the map he drew presumably in late November. He explained that the Ottoman fleet anchored at the southwest of the fortress the first day, but then moved to the entrance of the Corfu along with Russian ships the next day as also shown in his map (21 November). They took position at both entrances of the harbor to bombard the fortress and prevent the escape of the *Generaux*. On 22 November, they occupied the small islet of Lazaretto (*Lazarte*) [Plan II, Plan III] to the right of the fortress with the Ottoman troops deployed in it with a few guns. According to Mahmud Raif, the initial investment at Corfu was part of a larger plan that also envisioned the occupation of the small island of Vidos through a night attack. There is no explicit mention to these early plans in the secondary literature that usually accuses Ushakov of reluctance at this stage of the siege. The allies wanted to deny the harbor to the expected relief force from Ancona by taking Vidos. Mahmud Raif communicated that its occupation was a matter of days and it was necessary to maintain an enveloping bombardment of Corfu.<sup>110</sup>

---

<sup>109</sup> The British were convinced that a small squadron was sufficient for a blockade of Corfu and they found Ushakov indifferent to the general goals of the Second Coalition. At one point Italinski (Russian ambassador at Naples) thought that “the Admiral must have been got at by the Austrians”, Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 82.

<sup>110</sup> Mahmud Raif is silent about the Russian hospital established on the isle, Jervis & Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu*, p. 167; HAT 6751 (16C1213/25Dec1798) From Mahmud Raif to the Porte. He pointed out that a Habsburg ship was intercepted when it left the harbor. The correspondence discovered in the possession of two French revealed that they sought help from Ancona. The Vidos was defended by 500 French and 30 guns. He also complained from the lack of provisions. Remarkably, Mahmud Raif misinterpreted the daring harassment of *Generaux* as attempts at escape. For the facsimile of the document


Plan II. The Ottoman siege of Corfu (1716)



Notes: The British Archives (Kew), Public Records Office, MR-1-162-001

see Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 112; Mustafa Paşa, the former Governor of the Morea, also explained that the fleet formed two separate lines upon its arrival to Corfu; one line took position at the exit called *Kasob* (Madona de Casoppo; Tr.: *boğaz*, lit., strait) and the other anchored rearwards, to the opposite side of the harbor, HAT 164/6844-A (5N1213/10Feb1799) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

Plan III. The siege of Corfu by Mahmud Raif Efendi



Notes: TSA, E.9442. The lower part of the plan depicts the fortress of Corfu and the positions of the Ottoman and Russian warships around the island of Vidos. The upper left part shows the coast of Rumeli and the Russian and Ottoman warships blockading the strait. The title of the plan in red ink reads “this is the picture of the fortress of Corfu. It came from Mahmud Raif Efendi the servant.” While Mahmud Raif is believed to have received training in geography in London, it was not certain if he learnt how to draw plans and maps. This plan is an evidence of his practical knowledge in drawing a map.

While 7-8 ships anchored at the strait situated at northeast to guard the entrance, inadequate numbers of land troops became the major preoccupation of the allies. His map features 8 ships: 5 Ottoman frigates, 2 Russian frigates and a Russian galleon. Mahmud Raif stated that the Corfiotes dreaded Ali Paşa and were likely to flee the island if his troops were to be used in the attack on Vidos. When the two commanders disputed the matter, Abdülkadir suggested the recruitment of 2,000 Tsamides Albanians (*Çam*



*Arnavudlari*). Assumed to be the mercenaries of Ali Paşa, they were, however, on good terms with the Corfiotes as their Christian neighbors. All these led the Ottoman admiral to believe that a force of Tsamides mercenaries could be raised in a couple of days for the attack on Vidos.<sup>111</sup>

The plans of attacking Vidos were not materialized in December for several reasons. The correspondence arrived from the Russian consul at Naples relieved Ushakov to a great deal. It turned out that King Ferdinand IV was encouraged by the operations of the combined fleet to enter the fray. Relying on the news, Ushakov was convinced that Ferdinand dispatched 40,000 troops to the border with Rome, ruling out the possibility of a French attack from Ancona.<sup>112</sup> In addition, Tsamides mercenaries did not show up in large numbers, for mercenaries habitually shied away from siege wars.

---

<sup>111</sup> HAT 176/7678 (24C1213/3Dec1798) From Mahmud Raif to the Porte; HAT 175/7650 (1N1213/6Feb1799) from Abdülkadir Beg; after the piecemeal performance of 10,000 Corfiotes in the redoubts, some of them were organized into a smaller force of 1,500 troops, Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 10; according to a contemporary account that recorded among other things the rumors circulating in İstanbul, Ali Paşa's father fell dead in the siege of Corfu in 1716 and was buried in the island. Ali Paşa was said to swear that he would not leave the resting place of his father under the infidel rule, see M. A. Beyhan (ed.), *Cabi Ömer Efendi. Cabi Tarihi (Tarih-i Sultan Selim-i Salis ve Mahmud-ı Sani) Tahlil ve Tenkidli Metin* (Ankara: TTK, 2003), v. I, p. 91.

<sup>112</sup> Meanwhile a letter from Nelson arrived on 1 December, complaining that he was kept uninformed about the operations in the Adriatic. Assuming the letters sent at Dardanelles and Leukas did not reach him, both commander sent him new letters on 2 December and inquired him on his plan of operations, HAT 176/7663 (24C1213/3Dec1798) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte; The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies undertook a premature attack with the help of Nelson on the French positions and briefly occupied Rome in November 1798, but the French under Championette managed to repulse the Neapolitan army, occupying Naples and forcing the Bourbon dynasty to flee to Palermo, A. Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, pp. 75-76.

Apparently, Albanian paşas were also slow to comply with the renewed orders to participate in the siege.<sup>113</sup>

*Ali Paşa's arrival at Butrinto*

Ali Paşa arrived at Butrinto on 9 December when the allies were planning a night attack on the tiny island of Vidos in front of Corfu. Ahmed Paşa, the governor of the Morea, contributed to the fleet with 10 boats on the request of the fleet and Selim Paşazade Mustafa Paşa participated to the siege with his brother with numerous troops.<sup>114</sup> Upon the news of the plans for attacking Vidos, the Porte instructed Abdülkadir to use the troops of İbrahim Paşa –the *mutasarrıf* of Avlonya (Vlone)- and Şehsuvar Paşa -the holder of the *muqataa* of Dıraç- on the assumption of their arrival at the warzone.<sup>115</sup>

By January, all the squadrons sent out on several duties were back in Corfu, including the one sent to Alexandria, making a total force of 12 ships-of-the-line and 11 frigates. Furthermore, it was certain by that time that no more Russian land troops would join Ushakov in Corfu. Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif accounted the scattering of the

---

<sup>113</sup> Around 300 Greco-Albanian troops turned up for recruitment, mostly recruited from Parga and Leukas at the pay of 10 *kuruş* a month with provisions, Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 110. This also shows the importance of the contested Parga and Leukas both for Russia and Ali Paşa.

<sup>114</sup> HAT 164/6827 (30B1213/7Jan1799) from Ahmed Paşa to the Porte. He relied on his correspondence with the fleet, Ali Paşa, and his own messengers sent to the fleet. Most of the correspondence was sent via İnebahtı.

<sup>115</sup> HAT 176/7678 (24C1213/3Dec1798) From Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte. Admonishing orders (*tekiden*) were to be sent to İbrahim Paşa to make sure that he sent the troops.

main fleet for the putting off the plans for attacking Vidos without which, they concluded, Corfu could not be besieged properly.<sup>116</sup>

Early in February, the allied fleet was likely to have noticed the shortage of man and foodstuff in the fortress. His informants told Mustafa Paşa that the French were left with a month's flour since all their hardtacks, wheat, and salted meat went bad. Their numbers, on the other hand, did not exceed 2,600 with the Jewish volunteers. They had the likely intention of defending the island of *İskolo Vido*, for they reinforced it with 400 troops and many cannons.<sup>117</sup>

#### *The escape of Le Generaux and Rivoli*

The month of February opened with the escape of *Genereaux* and *Rivoli* on the night of 5 February. Russian sources contend that these ships, slipping past the Russian ships near the fortress, made their escape to Ancona owing to the indifference of the Ottoman ships stationed at the northern exit to the channel. The Russian squadron sent in chase could not reach them. Understandably, the allies put the blame on each other for the incidence with a view to keep their military reputation untarnished.<sup>118</sup>

Abdülkadir communicated the infamous incident to the Porte in a hastily written note, accusing the Russians. The galleon 'Ceneros' (84-gun) cut anchor and slipped past the Russian galleons along with a small boat. The frigates of *Şehber-i Zafer* (Zeynel

---

<sup>116</sup> HAT 164/6842 (26N1213/3March1799) From Mahmud Raif Efendi and Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. An incomplete facsimile of the document can be found in Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 117.

<sup>117</sup> HAT 164/6844-A (5N1213/10Feb1799) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>118</sup> Jervis & Jervis, *History of the Island of Corfu*, p. 171; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 132-3. Paul was infuriated at the news and withheld the decoration of honor from all officers in the fleet except Ushakov and Pustoshkin.

Kapudan), *Hüma-yı Zafer* (Abdülkerim Kapudan) and *Bü'l-Heves* (Süleyman Kapudan) descended on *Generaux* immediately even before it came within gun range. While their engagement with *Generaux* continued outside the exit, the Russian ships sent in chase did not engage the French liner, instead dropping anchor near the exit. Although the Russians declined in chasing *Generaux*, *Şahin-i Derya* (Mehmed Beg) was sent together with a light boat at dawn in reinforcement. When the Ottomans reacted against Ushakov for the lack of cooperation, he told that he sent signals in warning but his ships could not reach after the French ship. After the dispute, he sent a large galleon to augment the Ottoman ships sent in chase. Ahmed Paşa was more detached when he related the case he learnt through his informants, briefly stating that each fleet sent three ships in pursuit.<sup>119</sup>

#### *Ushakov-Ali Paşa Meeting*

By 4 February, the fortress of Corfu was finally besieged in the classical manner as observed by Chabot. This was the underlying reason for dispatching *Generaux* to Ancona as a last call for help. The last sortie from the fortress was undertaken on 10 February against St. Pantaleone (facing G on Plan I) and Kastrades (J on plan I). After that date the initiative passed completely to the side of the allies.<sup>120</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup> Greeks watching the whole affair from the heights told Abdülkadir that the Ottoman ships took the light French vessel and lost on the horizon, fighting *Generaux*, HAT 158/6617 (1N1213/6Feb1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; Ahmed Paşa learnt through his informants that the French loaded all their valuables to these two ships and painted the sails in black before slipping the blockage late at night, HAT 164/6829 (9N1213/14Feb1799) from Ahmed Paşa to the Porte; *Rivoli* had slipped into the port from Egypt on 5 January, Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition, 1798 to 1801*, p. 90.

<sup>120</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, gave the figures of 600 troops and 3 guns, pp. 130-31. Ahmed Paşa noted the cease of the sorties and the starvation of the defenders, HAT 164/6829 (9N1213/14Feb1799). Mahmud Raif also observed by February that the French response was restricted to gun fire, HAT 176/7667 (1N1213/6Feb1799).

Cooperation between the two fleets tended to falter as the siege of Corfu dragged on. Ushakov was persuaded that the fortifications on the landside were more suitable for assault, which would require many land troops.<sup>121</sup> The possibility of a French relief force and the siegeworks under constructions made their presence urgent. Nevertheless, he adamantly refused to accept Albanian troops on the pretext of the aversion of the Corfiotes to them. Although Abdülkadir Beg, among other observers, blamed him for his lack of initiative he continued to support him to prevent any friction. Finally, he was persuaded in the necessity of the Albanian troops by February.

According to Russian and French sources Ali Paşa had double-dealings. When his attempts at bribing Chabot to seize Corfu came to naught, he moved to Butrinto and procrastinated to participate in the siege, bidding his time and waiting for the opportune moment to join the fray. On 8 February, Ushakov sent Metaxa to Ali Paşa to confer on the matter. This time fearing that the siege would succeed due to the fatigue of the defenders without his intervention, he proved to be eager to send his troops. He even met Ushakov over a dinner at the latter's flagship, prudently avoiding the Ottomans for the security of his life.<sup>122</sup> Nevertheless, the Ottomans presented a different account of Ali Paşa's relation with Ushakov, blaming the latter for refusing Ali's troops single-handedly until February.

---

<sup>121</sup> "...if the sea defences of the town were adequate, the landward fortifications were bad, their detached forts could be commanded from the high ground inland", see Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 90.

<sup>122</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 129-130. Metaxa never believed that Ali Paşa had an imperial edict decreeing him to conquer the coastal towns on the mainland, whereas he actually had as we have underlined above. This should warn us against the prejudicial nature of foreign sources.

Ushakov broached the issue to Abdülkadir, telling him the necessity of having Ali's troops to man the new batteries linking the positions of the allies. The Russian admiral proposed to employ 3,000 Albanians and promised to meet their pays and rations from his own pocket if necessary. A rough calculation revealed that these troops would cost 88,000 *kuruş* per month. Unable to figure out Ushakov's sudden change of mind, Abdülkadir saw no reason for the materialization of the plan since the Albanian paşas had been withholding their promised troops since the beginning of the expedition.<sup>123</sup>

Ali Paşa no doubt shirked his responsibilities to a great extent in the siege owing to the dispute over Parga and Leukas. His reluctance to recruit Tsamides was one the factors for the postponement of the attack on Vidos in December.<sup>124</sup> Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif informed Ali Paşa through Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi that Ushakov was finally persuaded to his participation in the siege, provided his troops would not interfere with the Corfiotes. The next day, Ali Paşa sent an initial detachment of 400 and made arrangements for a meeting with the Russian Admiral without the knowledge of Abdülkadir Beg.<sup>125</sup> In spite of the assertions to the contrary, Ali Paşa paid a visit to Abdülkadir to give a short briefing on his meeting with the Russian Admiral. Apparently,

---

<sup>123</sup> HAT 158/6617 (1N1213/6Feb1799) From Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. Abdülkadir urged new orders to be sent to Ali Paşa. The Porte thanked Ali Paşa for the troops he had already sent and demanded more for the siege. It also encouraged Abdülkadir, stressing that the escape of the French liner indicated the weakness of the defenders.

<sup>124</sup> HAT 175/7650 (6February1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. Ali Paşa raised several objections to the recruitment of the Tsamides, claiming that a week would be needed to ready them. Finally, he was induced to recruit some Tsamides on the condition that each would be paid 10 *kuruş* per month and that Ushakov had to allow Ali to supplement the missing ranks with his own troops.

<sup>125</sup> HAT 175/7650 (6Feb1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; this meeting took place on 13 February, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 130); Contrary to Abdülkadir, Mahmud Raif thought occupation of Vidos would be possible by using Ali's troops, HAT 176/7667 (1N1213/6Feb1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte.

he sought Ushakov's acquiescence to join the camp in Corfu at the head of his troops. The Admiral was opposed to his presence on the island and threatened him with a withdrawal from the siege if he set his foot on the camp. Consequently, Ali Paşa gave in and hinted at the possibility of sending his son along with the troops. After recounting the dispute, he made clear to Abdülkadir his intention of returning to Yanya after sending the promised troops. Abdülkadir Beg approved of the consensus but suggested him to stay in Butrinto. This in his opinion would facilitate the sending of more troops if needed, but Ali Paşa made no promises about his stay. Ushakov let Abdülkadir know that the meeting was held on the demand of Ali Paşa. Abdülkadir particularly assured the Porte that the Ushakov-Ali Paşa meeting did not give rise to any frustration on neither side.<sup>126</sup>

#### *Arrival of the Albanian Troops*

The Porte communicated to Selim with satisfaction that the Ushakov-Ali Paşa meeting mended the differences and ended the mutual animosity between them. In approval of the rapprochement, it sent a cushioning note to Ali Paşa "containing caresses, compliment, and encouragement" (*nevaziş ve iltifat ve teşvikatı havi*) and advised him to be on good terms with the Admiral. Thus, the evidence lead us to conclude that foreign sources were misinterpreting Ali's relations with the Porte and the combined fleet. After the meeting, the Porte expected the arrival of many Albanian troops to Corfu and took a decision to send funds to Abdülkadir so as to mete out some of the expenses of the

---

<sup>126</sup> A similar letter was to be sent to the fleet. The Porte asked Selim's consent to send 25,000 *kuruş* to Abdülkadir, 2,500 *kuruş* to Mahmud Raif, and 1,000 gold pieces to Ushakov, HAT 175/7650 (1N1213/6Feb1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; these were actually sent together with a jeweled sword for Abdülkadir, HAT 153/6429 (1N1213/6Feb1799) From Abdülkadir Beg to Porte.

Albanian troops.<sup>127</sup> In fact, Ali's son, Muhtar Paşa had arrived with his 3,000 troops at Butrinto in January.<sup>128</sup> By the first week of February, there were 2,000 mercenaries in Corfu, all sent by Ali Paşa and İbrahim Paşa –the *mutasarrıf* of Avlonya-, while İbrahim Paşa of İskenderiye and Şehsuvar Paşa failed to appear on the scene.<sup>129</sup> Ahmed Paşa estimated that Corfu was invested by 600 Russian and Ottoman troops as well as 6,000 Albanians by the next week.<sup>130</sup>

### *Ottoman-British Cooperation*

A curious Ottoman-British cooperation seems to have developed in the course of the expedition with unexplored repercussions in the final stage of the siege of Corfu. On 20 February, a Neapolitan minister arrived at Corfu with urgent requests for military help. Coupled with the escape of *Generaux*, the recent French successes in Italy increased the chances of an imminent relief force appearing in Corfu.<sup>131</sup>

*Markiz Mişro* (Micheroux), the envoy of King Ferdinand, came to Corfu aboard the corvette of Captain *Milör İstuart* (Major/Millord? Stuart) of Nelson's squadron, and

---

<sup>127</sup> HAT 175/7650 (1N1213/6Feb1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>128</sup> The Porte had ordered to Muhtar –the *mutasarrıf* of the *sancak* of Eğriboz- and his brother Veli(yüddin) Paşa -the *mutasarrıf* of the *sancak* of Delvine and the intendant of the Mountain Passes- to raise 3,000 together. An imperial edict was sent to Ali Paşa in appreciation of his son's efforts, C.AS 36500 (lateŞ1213/earlyFeb1799) edict addressing Ali Paşa. Its draft is CAS 7509 (lateŞ1213/ earlyFeb1799).

<sup>129</sup> HAT 153/6429 (1N1213/6Feb1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; İbrahim Paşa of İskenderiye was hard pressed by that time to raise 2,000 troops for the army of Cezar Ahmed Paşa, 'the defender of Akka.' (Acre), C.AS 44713 (earlyM1214/midJune1799) order to İbrahim Paşa.

<sup>130</sup> HAT 164/6829 (9N1213/14Feb1799) from Ahmed Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>131</sup> Mahmud Raif expressed that the French attack on Naples and the ensued rebellion (*halk arasında çıkan ihtilalden*) therein accelerated the siege of Corfu, HAT 158/6577-E (27N1213/4March1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte.



engaged in a series of negotiations with the allies.<sup>132</sup> He was actually sent to request military assistance from the combined fleet. By the time, the Porte and Naples signed a treaty of alliance and the former warned in advance Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif for a warm reception of Micheroux. The allies refrained from making any commitments to him in view of the ongoing siege, but Ushakov hinted at the possibility of sending a couple of ships to Naples after the occupation of Corfu.<sup>133</sup>

Prior to Micheroux' arrival, rumors concerning a pro-French rebellion reached the allies, who then inquired into the matter through the consul of Naples. He confirmed to their dismay the flight of Ferdinand to Palermo and the French occupation of the town of Naples. Moreover, most of the Neapolitans donned the *kokarta* (cockades) to their heads and also flew the French flag in many places such as Otranto, which was quite close to Corfu. The Russian quarter-admiral (*kuvanter-amiral*) (Seniavin?) turned back from

---

<sup>132</sup> HAT 158/6611-A (24N1213/1March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; the letters he brought from Nelson discredited the news of the fall of Malta that Mahmud Raif had already communicated to the Porte. According to *Milör*, the most of the Maltese supported the cause of the British and Malta was to fall in short time, HAT 164/6831-C (16N1213/21Feb1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte. He must have told the progress of Malta to Ushakov as well in which case Paul may have been justified in his resentment at Ushakov for the admiral's slowness to sail to Malta which resulted in the British conquest of the island with further diplomatic problems between Britain, Russia, and France.

<sup>133</sup> Abdülkadir asked the Porte how to proceed if Ushakov decided to send a detachment to Naples after the siege. Notes on the margin reveals that the matter would be negotiated with Tomara, HAT 158/6611-A (24N1213/1March1799); the allies did not let the courier dispatched by the Sicilian envoy in İstanbul to Ferdinand IV go to Otranto because of the French invasion and, rather, sent him to Messina aboard a light vessel along with a *çavuş* before mid-February. He was to be sent to İstanbul via land route when he was back to the fleet with correspondence of Ferdinand, HAT 162/6745 (15N1213/20Feb1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte.

Ragusa and Kattaro with calming news on 17 February that led him to conclude that the combined fleet was safe from a French attack from the direction of Ancona.<sup>134</sup>

Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif thought otherwise. Although no French ships remained in the ‘gulf of Venice’, the French might still contemplate a landing on the shores of Corfu by small boats “in accordance with the malice and craftiness instilled in their souls” (*derunlarında merkez olan şeytanet ve melanet muktezasınca*). Ushakov agreed that Muhtar Paşa should also be invited to Corfu with 4,000 – 5,000 troops in addition to Ali Paşa’s troops and the allies sent separate letters to Ali Paşa to this effect on 17 February.<sup>135</sup> Despite Abdülkadir’s urgent letters, Ali Paşa dragged foot and asked for a renewed edict ordering his son to Corfu. Thus, the matter was referred to the Porte.<sup>136</sup>

In the mean time, the fortress surrendered to the combined fleet and thereby Abdülkadir told Ali Paşa that Muhtar’s troops were no more needed in Corfu.<sup>137</sup> Ali Paşa as well confirmed that the siege gained momentum owing to the ‘rebellion in Naples’ (*Napoli ihtilali*). Upon the request of the allied Admirals, he sent 4,000 troops to Corfu to

---

<sup>134</sup> The Russian quarter-admiral learnt at Kattaro the arrival of a French squadron of three large French warships and a corvette that returned to Ancona after a brief stay. He, then, sailed to Ragusa to inquire into the whereabouts of that squadron, where he learnt the thwarted attempts at sending a relief force to Corfu that we mentioned previously. He ascribed the failure to the worn-out ships and storms. After returning to Ancona, the French redeployed the relief force against Naples. He heard that the French won a victory near Rome and drove back the Neapolitans down to *Kabora/Kapova*. As Ferdinand disregarded the cease-fire, the French pressed further south and invaded Naples. Mahmud Raif promised to get a copy of the Kapova cease-fire and send it to İstanbul, HAT 162/6745 (15N1213/20Feb1799) From Mahmud Raif to the Porte.

<sup>135</sup> HAT 162/6745 (15N1213/20Feb1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte.

<sup>136</sup> HAT 157/6536-E (5Z1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. This casts doubt on the soundness of Metaxa’s judgment that Ali Paşa decided to send troops to Corfu out of the fear that the French garrison would capitulate without his participation in the siege. Refer to *Ushakov-Ali Paşa Meeting*.

<sup>137</sup> HAT 164/6843-C (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

be stationed in the villages of *Karınçe* and *Mendirek* (*Mandracchio* –breakwater- on Plan I) adjacent to the fortress as well as ‘the redoubt of Canım Hoca.’<sup>138</sup> Complaining from the exorbitant expenses of his troops, he requested from the Porte the just division of the booty as previously decided in the negotiations resulted in the invitation of Muhtar Paşa to Corfu.<sup>139</sup>

The Porte also began to express concern over the conduct of the siege by that time, prompting Mahmud Raif Efendi to encourage both Admirals to take a more active course.<sup>140</sup> The Porte and Tomara decided to allow admirals to accept any French offer for surrender (Tr.: *istiman*; lit. conditional surrender) as was heard that they were inclined to it.<sup>141</sup>

According to the instructions, upon the French offer for a conditional surrender, the allies should discuss the issue with each other, including the delegates of Ali Paşa, and then enter into negotiations with the French. The imperial rivalry between the two allies was also observable in the discussions over the proper course to take with respect to a likely French surrender. In spite of the afore-mentioned consensus reached with Tomara, the Porte did not entirely trust him and sent Abdülkadir slightly different instructions; were Ushakov to claim that acceptance of conditional surrender (*istiman*) was contrary to Russian traditions, leaving the decision to Abdülkadir, he should also pretend the same and decline the French offer. Otherwise, he was allowed either to storm

---

<sup>138</sup> Canım Hoca was the Grand Admiral during the Ottoman siege of Corfu in 1716.

<sup>139</sup> HAT 158/6609 (nd., 1-4 March ?) from Ali Paşa to Mehmed Efendi.

<sup>140</sup> HAT 162/6745 (15N1213/20Feb1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte.

<sup>141</sup> HAT 164/6829 (9N1213/14Feb1799) from Ahmed Paşa to the Porte.

the fortress, capturing the French, or capitulate with them, providing safe conduct to their country without bearing their arms.<sup>142</sup>

Both the British and the Ottoman officers, especially the vice-Admiral (*Patrona*) Şeremet Mehmed Beg, began openly criticizing Ushakov's conduct of the expedition and he set out to re-erect the battery of St. Pantaleone on his own initiative.<sup>143</sup> By mid-February, the batteries of Olivetto and Pantaleone were linked by a continuous line of batteries and earthworks (from J to G on Plan I). Accordingly, the Ottomans were entrenched in the south while the Russians were deployed in the north.<sup>144</sup>

Ömer, the messenger who took the robes to be offered as gifts to the Corfiotes, took his time to converse with the Ottoman troops on the expedition during his six-day stay in the island and passed on some of these insider views to the Porte upon his return. According to his report, the Patrona grew uncomfortable over the inactivity of the fleet in front of the fortress and, as he was a “zealous and devout” (*gayur ve mütedeyyin*) person, proposed to Ushakov to attack the fortress. However, Ushakov curtly reminded him that he was the sole authority while Abdülkadir Beg also dismissed Patrona's proposal. Consequently, the Patrona attacked on the fortress on his own, constructing a battery on the island. Then, ‘an English captain’ who arrived at Corfu accused the Russian and Ottoman captains of “failing to honor the bread and salt of the Sublime Porte and

---

<sup>142</sup> HAT 164/6843-A (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>143</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 132; Abdülkadir related that the decision to erect the battery at *Pantalon* (St. Pantaleone) at the negotiations on 3 February. He described the site as an island-ish location (*ada kılıklı*) situated at the right handside of the fortress, HAT 153/6429 (1N1213/6Feb1799).

<sup>144</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 132.

procrastinating” (*Devlet-i Aliye'nin nan ve nemek hakkını icraya kasd itmeyüb imhal üzere*). Moreover, this captain charted the shores of the island the whole night, mapped out suitable places for landing and then he explained the plan of operation to the captains of the both fleets. This move forced Ushakov to enter the battle and sent a Russian ship to accompany the Patrona. Ultimately, they landed the troops first and were followed by the others in attacking the island and the fortress. The Albanians of Ali Paşa and İbrahim Paşa of Avlonya joined the fray together in storming the fortress of Corfu. Simplistic style of the story notwithstanding, this seems to have been the mainstream view among the Ottoman crews and it captures the tensions involved between the two allies.<sup>145</sup>

Although *tatar* Ömer did not disclose the identity of the ‘English captain’, he was obviously Captain Stuart who was suspected by the French to have lent a crucial support to the combined fleet during his visit. Saul, admitting the possibility, suggested that his presence on Ushakov’s ship together with Spiridon Foresti –the British consul- during the operation may have confused the French observers. Nevertheless Jervis’ account corroborates with what Ömer heard from the Ottoman marines particularly about the preparations made at night preceding the attack.<sup>146</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> The courier also pointed out that the English captain was still in Corfu during the storming of the fortress, HAT 275/16147-D (19ZA1213/24Apr1799) the report of *tatar* Ömer.

<sup>146</sup> Jervis & Jervis claim that ‘Commodore Stuart’ mentioned by Bellaire must have been Commander Lord William Stuart who arrived at Corfu on the brig *El Corso*, Jervis & Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu*, pp. 174-75; Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 89-90.

### *Fall of Vidos and the surrender of Corfu contested*

The fall of Vidos (1 March) and Corfu (3 March) completed the occupation of the Ionian Islands. Coupled with the imperial rivalries between the allies, each party claimed the credit for themselves. From the Russian point of view, Ushakov was finally exasperated by the capricious Ali Pasha, who failed to storm the city from the landside and resolved to undertake a major assault from the seaside with a force composed of mostly Ottoman troops. It maintains that the Ottomans were opposed to an assault on Vidos, predicting failure in the final negotiations. It was an unprecedented victory in the military history of Russia because for the first time the Russian navy had occupied an important land object independent of the army.<sup>147</sup>

There is a detailed report of the battle over Vidos penned by Mahmud Raif and Abdülkadir on the day of the occupation of Corfu, which draws a completely different picture of the battle.<sup>148</sup> Suspecting an assault on Vidos, the French reinforced the island by constructing batteries and created a line of defense by piling up olive trees and wood at the shores. Correspondingly, the island almost turned into a second fortress. After the joining of the detachments to the main fleet, the allies began a second round of negotiations and sketched out a plan of action that envisioned the leveling of the batteries by the artillery fire with the participation of the entire fleet as a prelude to a mass landing

---

<sup>147</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 89-91.

<sup>148</sup> He gives the number of redoubts as 6 but there were actually 5 (refer to Plan IV), HAT 164/6842 (26N1213/3March1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi and Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. A facsimile of the document is half-printed in Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 117; in his other report Abdülkadir stated that the final decision of attacking Vidos was taken in the negotiations on 27 February HAT 164/6831-A (24N1213/1March1799).

of the troops carried by the boats. Nevertheless, the Albanians declined the offer to take part in the general attack on the island, saying “we can’t march to the island” (*biz adaya yürüyüş idemeyiz*), which necessitated the assignment of 800 marine mercenaries (*kalyoncu levendatı*) and the same number of Russian troops at the bonus pay of 5 *kuruş*.

The Russian sources, to the contrary, contended that the Ottoman warships were dismissed to the outer line in the battle formation, for Ushakov always doubted the competence of his allies. After hours of bombardment, a landing force of 2,160 comprising Russians, Ottomans, and Albanians stormed the ramshackle batteries of the French defended by 650 men and 40 guns deployed in 5 hastily erected batteries. The defense of the west coast of Vidos, on the other hand, was entrusted with the French squadron of the bombship *La Frimaire*, and several armed galleys. The Russian ships were to attack the western coast of the Vidos, leaving the north to the Ottoman ships.<sup>149</sup> By contrast, the map drawn by the Russians (Plans IV and V) and the Ottoman sources tell a slightly different story.

---

<sup>149</sup> Jervis & Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu*, pp. 175-76; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 124.


Plan IV. The attack on Vidos



Notes: TSA, E. 4004/5



Plan V. The attack of Corfu



Notes: Reproduced from R. C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant 1559-1853* (Liverpool University Press, 1952), p. 170.

The Russian map portraying the assault on Vidos shows 8 Ottoman and 12 Russian ships that formed two lines standing close to each other. The legend in Ottoman also testified to this depiction. The map also confirms that the Ottoman fleet was mainly concentrated to the north of the island. Nevertheless, it features two Ottoman ships attacking to the west coast with the Russian ships (the last two ships stationed at the lower end of the vertical line to the left of the island). These ships are *Hüma-yı Zafer* and the light vessel sent by Ali Paşa. According to the Ottoman sources, by the dawn of Friday, *Hüma-yı Zafer* (depicted by the the name of its captain *Kirim* [Kapudan Abdülkerim]), a Russian frigate and a light vessel of Ali Paşa (*şalope*) attacked the battery located at the middle of the island. As the battery returned the gun fire with cannon balls and mortar shells, these ships dropped anchor and engaged in an artillery duel. They were joined by all the ships in the bombardment that lasted for 3 hours. After they wreaked havoc on the batteries, the boats transported the landing troops to the shores under musket and *sakuleta*<sup>150</sup> fire, which, nonetheless, inflicted no harm on the allied troops. The Ottoman *kalyoncus* were the first to disembark on the shores. The allied troops flew their *sancaks* and banners over the batteries they overran. The Russian map only portrays the positions of the ships to the exclusion of the boats used in the amphibious operation.<sup>151</sup>

---

<sup>150</sup> Known as saccoletta or langrage, this particular bomb shell was used in naval wars to damage the rigging and the sail of the targeted ship. It was a combination of scrap iron, bolts, and nails molded together in a cylindrical shape or put in small cloth bags so as to be thrown by mortars.

<sup>151</sup> The legend in Ottoman recounts that the French had 400 casualties out of a force of 800 men [Plan IV]; HAT 164/6842 (26N1213/3March1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi and Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. A facsimile of the document is half-printed in Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 117; for another

The French counteracted by sending the *Liyandır* (*Leander*) and *Burun* (*Brune*) that had to hurry back to take shelter under the fortress guns when several Ottoman and Russian ships descended on them. The battle resulted in the “destruction and perishing” (*helak ve telef*) of 500 French with around 200 captives. Ottomans had 15 injured and 10 martyres, whereas Russian casualties were somewhere between 5 to 10 as injured and ‘perished.’ Notably, no ships were harmed at the end of the day.<sup>152</sup>

Meanwhile the battery re-erected by the Patrona right to the fortress of Corfu was reinforced with 28 cannons, hurling balls at the walls of the fortress day and night. Patrona undertook the storming of the ‘large redoubt of Salvadore’ on the same day with his troops and the Albanians of Ali Paşa under his steward (*kethüda*) Mahmud. This may explain Patrona’s missing from the Russian map. They took three trenches until the sunset. When the defenders tried to explode the gallery of mine beneath the battery, the Ottomans exploded it backwards which sent sparks to the munition stores. The Patrona took the opportunity to storm the battery, succeeding in seizing it by the dawn.<sup>153</sup> It

---

report of the battle by Mahmud Raif, see HAT 164/6831-F (24N1213/1March1799). Here, he marked that the bombardment lasted for 4 hours; Selim was informed by a note inserted in the margins of another report that the assault started at 2 (Islamic hour) and Vidos was captured at 8 (Islamic hour), showing that the operation lasted for 6 hours, see HAT 163/6761 (5L1213/12March1799) from Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi to the Porte.

<sup>152</sup> HAT 164/6842 (26N1213/3March1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi and Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>153</sup> Jervis gave credit to the Russians for storming the redoubts on Corfu, Jervis & Jervis, *A History of the Corfu*, pp. 176-77; HAT 164/6842 (26N1213/3March1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi and Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; Ali Paşa was informed by Mahmud Ağa that he himself headed the troops in the battle in Vidos and Ali Paşa’s *binbaşı* (colonel) joined the Patrona in the storming of Salvadore, leading to the capture of 250 French, HAT 163/6762 (5L1213/12March1799) from Ali Paşa to the Porte; There is no mention to Patrona in the coordinated attack on San Abramo (*Avram*), San Rocco (*Rokkos*), and Salvadora (*Salvatore*) in McKnight (McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 138) and Pappas owing to their reliance on Russian sources. Pappas gives the number of the landing force attacking Salvadora as 850, 150 of which were Albanian irregulars and claims that the fierce contest lasted half an hour, which may indicate that the

should be mentioned that Mahmud Raif wrote in another report that battery of Salvadore was actually a small one, contradicting himself. Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi defined it as a fort-like redoubt (*manend-i kale el-kıyas tabya*), amusingly fulfilling his role as a middleman in a different context. Negligible at first sight, this and similar cases highlight the degree of rhetorical aspect involved in such documents, if we are not to ascribe this particular case to an unintended slip of pen.<sup>154</sup>

Admiral Abdülkadir is not praised as much for his leadership as for his conciliatory approach towards Ushakov at the expense of frustrating his subordinates, particularly Patrona Beg. While this view may contain bits of truth, it distorts a good deal of his activities in the expedition. He is said to have “anchored his ship to the rear far out of range of gunfire and kept his own polished guns quiet in order to avoid breaking the extensive collection of priceless crystal that decorated his luxurious cabin.” On the contrary, the Russian map and Mahmud’s map feature his ship anchored next to the Ushakov’s both in November and in March.<sup>155</sup> On the day of the assault on Vidos, Abdülkadir, together with the *kethüda* of Ali Paşa, stormed the place (redoubt?) called *Nisin/Tisin* (?) located at the seaside which Hüseyin Şükrü defined as the key of the

---

Russians participated to the attack in its last phase, Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, pp. 105, 110.

<sup>154</sup> HAT 158/6577-D from Mahmud Raif to the Porte; He also stated that this battery was the closest located to the fortress. HAT 163/6761 (5L1213/12March1799) from Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi to the Porte.

<sup>155</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 88. Saul relies uncritically on the accounts of Poqueville and Bellaire. Nevertheless, Poqueville did not witness the joint fleet and often resorted to distortions of facts out of his resentment over the Russo-Ottoman alliance as a French prisoner. According to him Abdülkadir was so afraid of the Russians that each and every night he took his ships out of the range of the Russian fleet! He also claimed that Abdülkadir offered to Ushakov to reduce Toulon and march on Paris! Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania, ...*, pp. 106-107.

fortress, resulting in the capture of more than 20 guns and 200 French. Furthermore, it seems the friction between Abdülkadir and Patrona was more apparent than real, as the former praised Patrona's valor in re-erecting Pantaleone and bombarding the fortress ceaselessly as well as in the seizure of Salvadore.<sup>156</sup>

### *Capitulation of Corfu*

The French were convinced that they were abandoned by Paris as no word had been heard from Ancona although a full month had passed after the escape of *Generaux*. Moreover, the fall of Vidos eliminated any hope for receiving reinforcement, for the allies were now in complete control of the entrance leading to the harbor. All these considerations prompted the French to express willingness to enter negotiations to surrender the fortress on honorable terms.<sup>157</sup> According to Russian sources, Abdülkadir argued for an outright attack on the fortress enticed by its defenseless state, nevertheless, his correspondence indicate that the Ottoman side did not dispute the surrender with the Russian ally.<sup>158</sup> Abdülkadir wrote on 4 March that a couple of French officers were sent

---

<sup>156</sup> HAT 163/6761 (5L1213/12March1799) from Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi to the Porte; Abdülkadir also praised the good service of Giritli Hasan Kaptan and others who stood with Patrona. We are also told that Alanyalı Ahmed Kapudan manned the first redoubts constructed in Corfu for 3.5 months, HAT 163/6772 (5L1213/12Mart1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>157</sup> Abdülkadir also remarked the French unwillingness to surrender until the fall of Vidos and Salvadore which caused substantial casualties, HAT 164/6843-A (5L1213/12March1799) from Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>158</sup> Mahmud Raif's decription of the surrender supports this view. According to him, "unfolding of the auspicious event in this manner brought about a great joy for all...all the officials of his highness and the soldiers of the Sultan had the greatest festival" (*maslahat-ı hayriyenin bu vechle husulü cümleinin beis-i kemal-ı süruru olub....bi'l-cümle memurin-i devletleri ve asakir-i padişahi ıyd-ı ekber itmiş...*), HAT 164/6831-E (29N1213/6March1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte. A small brigantine bound from Ancona with its load of provisions was taken when it entered the harbor on 6 March. In his other report on the negotiations, he also defined the conditional surrender as "an auspicious affair" (*maslahat-ı hayriye*)

to Ushakov and formally declared their intention of ceding the fortress on the condition of safe-conduct to France (*vire*) a day ago. Ushakov notified Abdülkadir, Mahmud Raif, Patrona, and Riyale on the French offer and suggested the opening of the negotiations, rather than wasting time with the siege. He proposed that it would be fair to demand the French to deliver the fortress with all the ammunition and equipment as well as ships in 24 hours. Upon the Ottoman approval, negotiations opened on 4 March aboard the ship of Ushakov with the participation of Abdülkadir, Mahmud Raif, Patrona, and 4 French delegates. After a debate of 8 hours, the French finally agreed to deliver the fortress the next day by dawn in return for being transported back to France.<sup>159</sup>

Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif were cautious as always to point out that Patrona and Riyale, accompanied by several captains, entered the fortress in procession together with the Russians –the Albanians were left outside lest they plundered the town; fixing the *sancak* of the Sultan and the Russian banner was saluted with gun fire from both fleets. The Riyale was sent via land route to İstanbul with the keys of the fortress as well as a long list of grievances about the Russian allies.<sup>160</sup>

---

assured the Porte that no words could describe the extent of effort they put in to conclude the negotiations. The document is printed in facsimile in Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 115.

<sup>159</sup> A copy of the treaty of capitulation can be found in Jervis & Jervis, *A History of Corfu*, pp. 179-85; HAT 164/6831-G (27N1213/4March1799) from Abdülkadir to the Porte; HAT 158/6577-E (27N1213/4March1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte; a copy of the treaty of surrender was sent, HAT 164/6831-H (27N1213/4March1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte; it is resided in TSA, E.4004/1 (13ZA1213/18Apr1799); HAT 158/6577 (29N1213/6Mart1799) from Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif to the Porte. It is half-printed in facsimile, Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 117.

<sup>160</sup> Abdülkadir also sent a list of recommendation, a separate list of casualties, and requested an imperial order arranging the administration and defense of the Ionian Islands, see HAT 163/6772 (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; the Riyale was sent to İstanbul on 11 March, HAT 162/6744 (11L1213/18March1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte.

The sheer number of the French troops (more than 2,000) to be transported to Toulon, and the lack of funds caused necessary setbacks in the prearrangements. Accordingly, the allies resolved to hire ships from the Habsburg merchants as well as the merchants of the Sultan (*reaya*) to be escorted by a couple of warships. Consequently, the first party could not set out to their voyage to Toulon before 28 March, while the remaining troops were sent to Ancona, rather than France, only on 3 April.<sup>161</sup>

### Faltering relations

#### *Sharing the booty*

Ushakov insisted on having the *Leander* (50-gun) and leaving the *Brune* (32-gun) to Abdülkadir, although the latter suggested referring the issue to İstanbul in his usual manner. The Ottoman admiral explained his stratagem by his desire to refrain from direct confrontation with his colleague. He rather followed the stratagem of restricting Ushakov by using Tomara.<sup>162</sup> He was cautious to state that his correspondence was meant to ‘inform on’, rather than ‘file complaints about’ the misbehaviour of Russians in sharing the booties; Russian officers were “grabbing whatever came their way” (*ellerine geçen şeyi ahzyledikleri...*). Correspondingly, Ushakov seized 20 guns along with their ammunitions. When he was asked to wait for the arrival of the instructions concerning

---

<sup>161</sup> HAT 164/6843-A (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; HAT 164/6843 (11L11213/18March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; HAT 157/6536-D (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; the money borrowed from the Corfiote merchants covered only the freights of the hired ships for the transportation of the French captives, leaving Abdülkadir in dire straits for meeting the bonus moneys of the Albanian mercenaries, HAT 157/6536-E (5Z1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>162</sup> Abdülkadir defined *Leander* as a mediocre galleon and *Brune* a frigate. Ushakov improvised a strange argument that he should have the *Leander* since he had more ships under his command, HAT 164/6843-D (5L1213/12March1799) From Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

the booty, he dragged foot, giving mere assurances for presenting İstanbul with a list of what he took.<sup>163</sup>

The Ottomans considered that the removal of these guns by Ushakov actually weakened the defense of the fortress by the seaside. Thus, the Ottoman gunners wanted to remedy the situation on 9 April by moving a piece of cannon from one redoubt to the battery by the port. This led to a serious quarrel between the Ottoman gunners and the Russian *soltats* who tried to obstruct the way. Agitated by the mistreatment of their fellows, the Ottoman regular seamen (*kalyoncu*) gathered around and only the timely intervention of the Patrona Beg eased the tense situation. Ushakov apologized to Patrona for the apparent misunderstanding of the *soltats*.<sup>164</sup>

The three-tiered competition between the Russians, the Ottomans, and Ali Paşa over the spoils was clearly visible in the battle. Ali Paşa contended that a French bomb-ketch in the harbor was taken by the light vessel he sent on the day of attack, but the allies seized it three days later.<sup>165</sup> When the Porte ordered its return to Ali Paşa at his request “to draw his affection” (*redd ü teslimi ile isticlab-ı hatırı*) after consulting with Ushakov. This was a rare occasion on which Abdülkadir confronted the Porte, presumably to save face vis-à-vis his subordinates. After he reminded the Porte of “how strictly he had been observing the ceremonies of alliance and union with him [Ali] and

---

<sup>163</sup> HAT 158/6577-E (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>164</sup> HAT 158/6577-A (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) Kapudane Beg to the Porte; tatar Ömer told that these cannon were of 15 and 16 spans in length. Ushakov dismissed the Ottomans when they wanted to inquire into the matter, HAT 275/16147-D (19ZA1213/24Apr1799) the report of *tatar* Ömer.

<sup>165</sup> HAT 158/6609 From Ali Paşa to Mehmed Efendi.



how hard he had been working not to give him [Ali] any cause to be offended since the launching of the expedition,”<sup>166</sup> he told that Ali Paşa’s claims were unfounded. It was the gun fire of Abdülkerim’s *Huma-yı Zafer* which devastated the bomb vessel, whereas the troops aboard the frigate of *Bü'l-heves* (Süleyman Kapudan) were first to board (refer to the Russian map: the bomb vessel is at the lower portion of the island to the left). As a sign of its capture, one of the sailors had to undon his red shawl to use it as a readymade banner upon which Abdülkadir embarked on the prize and took care of the prisoners. The vessel sent by Ali Paşa arrived later, when the Ottoman sailors joined the battle on Vidos. It approached the prize on the pretext of borrowing some ropes and cords, but the guards left aboard the bomb vessel dismissed Ali’s boat on the orders of Abdülkadir. Ushakov also sought to fly the Russian banner on the prize, claiming that it was positioned at the opposite of the Russian frigate. A resolute Abdülkadir refused him curtly on the grounds that the Ottoman troops took the prize on their own efforts. In furtherance of his argument, he remarked that the incidence occurred before the eyes of all captains, while the damages inflicted by the Ottoman balls on the vessel should speak for themselves. Ushakov suggested to Abdülkadir and Ali Paşa to deal with the matter of disputed prize ships after sending the French captives to Toulon.<sup>167</sup>

---

<sup>166</sup> “*merasim-ı ittifaka ve ittihadı ne derecelerde riayet ve bir hususda hatır-mande olmaması esbabının istihsaline ne gune sarf-ı makderet eylemekde*” HAT 157/6536-E (5Z1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. The Porte also instructed the returning of 3 merchant ships that had been seized by the French.

<sup>167</sup> HAT 157/6536-E (5Z1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

The documents indicate that the allies had already given written assurances to Ali Paşa on the fair division of the booty in previous negotiations in February. Ali Paşa had resentment for being subjected to an unfair treatment by the allies as reflected in his correspondence. Immediately after receiving the written assurances, he sent them to the Porte, asking for ‘an imperial order containing warning’ (*tenbihi havi*) to the Admirals to fulfill their promises. This shows the extent of the mutual distrust between them and further suggests that he regarded the Porte as an arbitrator on several matters. Accordingly, the booty was to be divided into 5 shares, seemingly, in conjunction with the Ottoman-Islamic tradition. The Russians were to receive 2 shares with the remaining to be shared equally among the Ottoman fleet and Ali Paşa.<sup>168</sup> The Porte, however, reminded that although Ali Paşa provided most of the land troops, İbrahim Paşa of Avlonya and other Albanian paşas who sent troops should also have their due share in the booty.<sup>169</sup>

### *Garrisoning Corfu*

On 17 March the two Admirals entered into negotiations at Ushakov’s request concerning the garrisoning of Corfu and the Albanian mercenaries. The Russian Admiral grew anxious over the presence of the Albanian troops in and around Corfu after the occupation. Moreover, Ushakov was scared by the rumors that Ali Paşa would amass

---

<sup>168</sup> Ali Paşa wrote this letter to Mehmed Efendi, his agent in İstanbul, and instructed him to present the written assurances (*senet*) taken from both of the Admirals as well as the related documents kept in Greek by his commanders Ali Zot and Mahmud Ağa, HAT 158/6609 From Ali Paşa to Mehmed Efendi.

<sup>169</sup> This order arrived on 7 April after Ali’s agents left the island and Ali returned to Yanya. Abdülkadir assured the Porte that he was carefully refraining from antagonizing any parties in the negotiations, HAT 157/6536-E (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

10,000 troops in Corfu and he proposed to inform the Porte on the dangers of their presence on the island. Abdülkadir, by contrast, disregarded the rumors as crafted by the riffraff and assured him that he would keep the Albanians in check. As the matter remained unsolved, they convened for a second time whereby the Ottoman ally argued that the Albanians had to stay in the island until the expected imperial edict concerning the defense and rule of the new acquisitions. Nevertheless, he proved uncompromising on the matter in view of the alleged threat of mutiny and plunder, and debated the removal of all the mercenaries from the island because of the animosity between them and the Ionians.<sup>170</sup>

Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif finally found the middle ground with Ushakov. Correspondingly, the allies decided to entice the Albanians to leave the island by offering handsome bonus moneys, while Ali Zot Ağa -the commander of Ali's troops- and Süleyman Beg -the commander of İbrahim's troops- were permitted to stay in the fortress with 20-30 Albanians each until the end of the negotiations on the fate of Corfu in İstanbul. This gesture was meant to eliminate the likely 'despair and languor' (*fütur ve meyusiyyet*) among the Albanians. The calculations based on the distributed rations showed that Ali Paşa sent 4,150 troops under the command of Ali Zot Ağa, whereas

---

<sup>170</sup> HAT 157/6536-E (SZ1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; HAT 6577-C (SZ1213/10Apr1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte. It is printed in facsimile in Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 116.

İbrahim brought 2,000 troops, requiring a bonus of 40,000 *куруş* in total to be raised by loans from the Corfiote merchants.<sup>171</sup>

While the allies were preoccupied with the prearrangements for the transportation of the French, Ali Paşa sent on 1 April Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi and Bedri Efendi to Corfu to claim his share in the booty as well as the bomb-vessel. The allies told his agents their decision concerning the mercenaries.<sup>172</sup> This was likely to frustrate Ali Paşa as he had been assured that his mercenaries would also be part of the garrison of Corfu.<sup>173</sup>

Ushakov initially alleged that the main fleet could take care of the defense of Corfu when he demanded the leave of the Albanians, but the Ottomans gradually realized that he also wanted to keep the Ottomans out of the island. After the occupation of Corfu, the Russians consented to the moving of Patrona to the citadel.<sup>174</sup> However, Ushakov was soon to demand Patrona to retreat to the ships with his troops. Ushakov was also concerned about the imminent arrival of new Ottoman troops assigned to guard the fortress. He suggested deploying 100 of them in other islands and dispatching the remaining to guard the Vidos. In the case that the combined fleet had to depart from Corfu, each fleet could leave 25 men and a couple of ships to protect the island. His

---

<sup>171</sup> Each mercenary was to be paid 5 *куруş*, the company commanders (*bölük-başı*) 10 *куруş*, the *agas* 100 to 200 *куруş* according to their rank, and the chief commanders 500 *куруş*, HAT 157/6536-E (5Z1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; HAT 164/6843 (11L1213/18March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; the Porte decided to send cushioning letters to ‘Ali Paşa and the Albanian Paşas’ concerning the dismissal of their troops, as ‘this was not a proper time to offend them’, C.AS 46254 (13L1213/20March1799) order to the Chief Treasurer.

<sup>172</sup> HAT 157/6536-E (5Z1213/10April1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>173</sup> HAT 158/6609 from Ali Paşa to Mehmed Efendi.

<sup>174</sup> HAT 158/6577 (29N1213/6March1799) from Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif to the Porte. It is half-printed in facsimile in Beydilli ve İlhan Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 117.

Ottoman colleagues told him that they would stay in the fortress until the dispatch of the expected clarifications from İstanbul.<sup>175</sup>

Mahmud Raif Efendi was particularly frustrated at Ushakov's stubbornness and offended by the "chilly treatment" he always received from the Admiral. Mahmud Raif asserted that the Ottomans had been strictly following the imperial orders emphasizing cooperation to prevent rupture with the Russians in spite of the 'undescribable sufferings' he had to bear. Patrona Beg, attempted to retreat to his ship at the negotiations on more than one occasion in protest of Ushakov's patronizing manners, each time deterred by the interposition of Mahmud Raif. He calmed him down by reminding him of the imminent arrival of clarifications from İstanbul. According to Mahmud Raif, Patrona played the most crucial role in the 'conquest of Corfu': "God is omniscient! The zeal, sagacity, and loyally-rendered services of Patrona Beg cannot be ignored in any way. The state of affairs would have been grave had it not been for his presence."<sup>176</sup>

Abdülkadir stressed that Ushakov "changed his temperament and was doing inappropriate things" (*tavrını tahvil ile dürlü dürlü işler peyda eylemekte*), while they – the Ottoman officials- tried hard to prevent any confrontation (*bürudet*) in conjunction with the imperial orders. He asserted that not even a smallest incident had happened owing to their perseverance in the last six months, and this should be reciprocated by the

---

<sup>175</sup> HAT 164/6818 (3M1214/7Jun1799) from Abdülkadir and Patrona to the Porte.

<sup>176</sup> "Hüda alimdir! Patrona Beg'in vuku 'a gelen gayret ve şeca 'at ve sadıkane hizmeti bir vechle inkar olunamaz. Bu adam dahi olmasaydı hal müşğil olur idi." HAT 6577-C (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte. It is printed in facsimile in Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 116.

Russians as well so as to calm down the rank-and-file (*asker taifesi*), who could not be expected to be as patient as the officers. Each time he was told this, maintained Abdülkadir, Ushakov improvised a number of excuses and pretexts.<sup>177</sup>

By April, no ‘soldier of Islam’ remained in the garrison of the fortress. Ushakov recruited around 600 *soltat* from among the Corfiotes and gained the loyalty of one-fifth of the populace. He, furthermore, fixed his own banners in front of the gates and assigned his own *soltats* to guard the fortress.<sup>178</sup> The Ottomans tried to compete with Ushakov in their own way. Petitioning was one of the symbols of the Ottomans subjecthood. Now that the Corfiotes were officially subjects of the Sultan, so they had a right to send petition to the palace. Abdülkadir had them send a petition to the Porte in which they praised the good conduct of Patrona and his troops in Corfu.<sup>179</sup> We will turn to the political and military arrangements concerning the Ionian Islands in the chapter on Ottoman-Ionian relations. Now, it is time to turn to a forgotten chapter of the wars of Second Coalition.

### **A story untold: Ottomans fighting in Italy**

#### *Renewed requests for military assistance*

Micheroux and Captain Stuart left Corfu on 11 March, leaving a consul in Corfu. He was assured that Mahmud Raif would keep him informed on the decision of İstanbul

---

<sup>177</sup> HAT 158/6577-A (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Kapudane Beg to the Porte.

<sup>178</sup> HAT 275/16147-D (19ZA1213/24Apr1799) report of *tatar* Ömer.

<sup>179</sup> HAT 157/6536 (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; the Admiral praised Patrona’s conduct on more than one occasion, maintaining that he was known as a ‘*reaya*-loving’ person among the Corfiotes so that they were “happy and grateful” for his conduct (*öteden beru reaya-perver olduklarından cümle ahali mahzuz ve teşekkür*), HAT 162/6746 (1M1214/5June1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

concerning Ferdinand's request for military assistance.<sup>180</sup> Barely a month passed before the reappearance of *Şövalyir* Mişro in Corfu on a Neapolitan frigate, bringing with him the courier bearing the ratification of the treaty of alliance with the Sublime Porte. He related that Ferdinand was in Palermo and had the full support of his subjects against the French, whom experienced major setbacks after the Habsburg declaration of war on France and the arrival of Nelson with 7 ships-of-the-line to Palermo with the intention of attacking Naples. Consequently, the French army was short of men and concentrated around Rome. He was appointed the diplomatic commissary to the combined fleet to negotiate the matter of military assistance that had been promised verbally by the main fleet during the siege of Corfu. Mahmud Raif expressed his pleasure that Ferdinand enjoyed the popular support against the French and safety from their attack in Palermo. Nevertheless, he was troubled by contradictory news concerning the second coalition wars in Italy. Ushakov informed Abdülkadir that he was tasked with the transportation of 12,000 Russian troops from Ragusa to *Manfradonya* (Manfredonia: east coast of Italy) in the vicinity of Ancona after which he would sail to the waters of Sicily.<sup>181</sup>

---

<sup>180</sup> Captain Stuart was entrusted with the official proclamation of the conquest of Corfu to be delivered to Nelson, HAT 164/6843-B (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; Ferdinand was promised full military support by Russia in November, naval protection by Britain and '10,000 Albanians' by the Sublime Porte in December, A. Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 76.

<sup>181</sup> Micheroux arrived on 12 April. He requested the necessary permits for his courier to go to İstanbul. According to him, Ferdinand appointed a Cardinal-general to the province of *Kilabar* (Calabria) who drew close to Naples with 24,000 troops as opposed to 2,000 French in the city. There were only 9,000 French troops between Naples and Rome, while none was left in Otranto, Brindisi, and Manfredonia –the immediate vicinity of Corfu. Ferdinand was anxiously waiting for the promised military support day and night. The letters came to the consul of the court of the Naples in Corfu from Brindisi two days prior to Micheoux' arrival contradicted him by explaining that Nelson ousted the French from Naples. Micheroux believed this recent news was true as he had left Palermo 13 days ago and suggested sending a courier to Brindisi for confirmation, HAT 158/6577-G (8ZA1213/13Apr1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the

Obviously Micheroux was drawing a rosy picture to receive the much needed military support from the Russians and the Ottomans. Our 'war reporter' Ömer the messenger heard a very different story about the war in Italy. When the French attacked Naples, half of the King's troops deserted to the French side which required Ferdinand to retreat to Messina and sought help from the combined fleet. Although Ushakov was inclined to go to Sicily and asked about the intentions of the Ottoman fleet, Abdülkadir refused to lend military support without imperial orders and thus restricted him.<sup>182</sup>

#### *Failure of communications*

What they did not know was that communications between İstanbul and Corfu were almost cut off in March because of the contrary winds. The Ottoman fleet regularly sent a courier once every 6 days especially after it besieged Corfu. Even though the *tatars* that brought the news of the conquest of Corfu raced with each other, they could reach İstanbul after an eight-day journey over land.<sup>183</sup> The arrival of Abdülkadir's communication on the occupation of the fortress of Corfu had preceded that of Ali Paşa's

---

Porte; Ferdinand actually appointed Cardinal Ruffo to Calabria who led a series of successive battles against the French and occupied Naples on 19 June, while 12,000 Russians promised to Ferdinand did not appear, Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples (1734-1825)* (London, 1956), pp. 372-91.

<sup>182</sup> HAT 16147-D (19ZA1213/24Apr799) the memorandum of *tatar* Ömer; İstanbul was apprehensive about the war going on in Italy, asking Mahmud Raif to keep the Porte informed on recent developments, HAT 162/6744 (11L1213/18March1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte.

<sup>183</sup> HAT 163/6762 (5L1213/12March1799) from Ali Paşa to the Porte; an *imam* in İstanbul recorded in his diary that the news arrived in the town on 17 March 1799 and that the messengers were presented with Russian sable furs, Beydilli, *Osmanlı Döneminde İmamlar ve Bir İmamın Günlüğü* (İstanbul, 2001), p. 201; another confusion in communications occurred in November since Mahmud Raif could join the main fleet only at Corfu because of the gales. He was given 3 *tatars* by the Porte to facilitate communication, HAT 176/7678 (24C1213/3Dec1798) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte; he had to land at Anaboli and after paying a visit to the Governor-paşa at Tirapoliçe, he went to Gastun, TSA, E.3654/2; Corfu was 2,000 miles away from St. Petersburg and it took 2-3 months for the correspondence to reach its destination, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 47.



correspondence about the fall of Vidos and Abdülkadir's letter on the French willingness to surrender. Confusion of the Porte increased as it received no correspondence after the afore-mentioned letter of Abdülkadir.<sup>184</sup>

With both sides unaware of the communications failure, Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif were longing for an imperial edict containing the arrangement on the defense and rule of the Ionian Islands, while the Porte was still trying to figure out if and how the two Admirals reinforced the fortress of Corfu against the French in Italy.<sup>185</sup> Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif were disappointed to learn that the Riyale who had been dispatched a month ago via land route did not reach İstanbul; neither did their subsequent reports on Italian affairs and 'misbehavior' of Ushakov.<sup>186</sup> Thus, the Porte was unlikely to learn before mid-April that Patrona Beg had to stay in the outer fortress and that the Ottomans could manage to place only a bunch of Ottoman officers, including the Albanians of Ali and İbrahim Paşa's in the town to save the face. Consequently, the Ottoman fleet would

---

<sup>184</sup> The *tatars* carrying the previous correspondence fell sick and arrived late at İstanbul. The deputy Grand-vizier (Abdullah Paşa?) assured Selim that the protection of Corfu would be debated with Tomara, HAT 164/6846 (3L1213/10Mart1799); HAT 246/13874 from deputy Grand-vizier to Selim. Grand-vizier Yusuf Ziya Paşa was sent to Egypt at the head of the army, leaving a deputy in İstanbul in his stead.

<sup>185</sup> HAT 157/6536B (8ZA1213/13Apr1799); Abdülkadir Beg was still complaining as of 14 May that the robes and decorations of honor to be distributed among the Ottoman captains, officers, and the troops had not arrived yet, although they were requested through Riyale Beg months ago. The Porte actually sent them prior to the date of correspondence, HAT 164/6821 (9Z1213/14May1799).

<sup>186</sup> HAT 164/6846 (3L1213/10March1799) from Kapudane and Mahmud Raif to the Porte; Mahmud Raif Efendi lamented about severe weather conditions due to which no messenger had arrived for 10 days as of 18 March. Riyale Beg, on the other hand, set out to his land trip on 12 March. HAT 162/6744 (11L1213/18March1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte; he must have been in İstanbul by April 13, as in the meantime a golden plume with 7 arms was prepared for him bearing 11 diamonds, 4 sapphires, 3 emeralds with its stone slots displaying a lattice work of golden and enamel, TSA, E.3459 (8ZA1213/13Apr1799).

not receive any orders about sailing to Sicily, or the arrangements on the protection of Corfu before late May.

*Operations in Italy: Ancona and Naples*

The Porte was contemplating to support the *Tiger* of Sydney Smith with 2 corvettes in its operations against the French in Acre, but before his departure from İstanbul he demanded each of the Ottoman and Russian fleets to send 2 three-deckers and 3 frigates. The Porte ordered Abdülkadir to consult on the matter with Ushakov; he was allowed in advance to send the ships, provided his Russian colleague did the same. Ushakov, however, did not comply with Smith's request and the two commanders wrote to Tomara and the Porte that the combined fleet was needed in the Adriatic because of the French invasion of the territories of the Two Sicilies.<sup>187</sup> The Porte's response to the British demand was an evidence of the Ottoman commitment to the Adriatic whereas one would expect the Porte to comply with the demand in order to save Acre.

The main fleet regularly sent mixed detachments of Russian and Ottoman warships to Italy, which has been remained an unknown story to Ottomanists. The 'Sicilian commander' of Otranto sent a letter on 18 April to the 'Sicilian' consul in Corfu

---

<sup>187</sup> The Porte assumed that should these ships be dispatched to Alexandria from the combined fleet, they would need four months' provisions which were to be procured from the Morea by Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi, HAT 164/6843-A (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir to the Porte; Abdülkadir was informed that a French squadron of 3 frigates and 2 corvettes was about to leave the harbor of Alexandria according to the papers intercepted by the Ottoman corsairs from a postal vessel bound for France, HAT 164/6843-A (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir to the Porte; At this time, St. Vincent was the commander-in-chief of the British navy in the Mediterranean. Based at Gibraltar, he divided his command into two: Keith (blockading Cadiz) and Duckworth (Port Mahon) were responsible for western Mediterranean, while Nelson and Sydney Smith were entrusted with the operation in the eastern Mediterranean, but they usually contested each others' authority, A. Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 82.

-which arrived only on 7 May- informing that the people of Otranto “took comfort” and “became glad at the extreme” (*kemal mertebe mesrur ve müteselli*) by the advent of 4 Ottoman and 1 Russian warships detached from the main fleet. They urged Ahmed Kapudan, the commander of the squadron, to stay in Otranto, who politely informed them that it was only possible on the orders of Admiral Abdülkadir Beg. The ‘Sicilian’ commander welcomed Ahmed Kapudan relating to him that the French escaped by boats after piking their cannons and throwing the gunpowder into the sea as they spotted the approaching Ottoman-Russian squadron in horizon. Consequently, the Sicilian commanders of Otranto and Brindisi sent letters to Abdülkadir requesting him to leave Ahmed Kapudan in Italian waters.<sup>188</sup> This incident casts doubt on the assumption that the commanders of the detachments were always Russians. Moreover, it carries with it a certain degree of irony that the Ottomans were back again in Otranto –this time, with the popular consent- some 300 years after their brief occupation of the town as the first step

---

<sup>188</sup> Selim ordered this news to be communicated to the Russian and Sicilian embassies, HAT 31/1470 (2Z1213/7May1799) from the Commander of the fortress of Otranto to his consul in Corfu; Ahmed Paşa, the governor of the Morea, informed the Porte that a merchant ship bound from Trieste to Zante sighted a Russo-Ottoman squadron of 13 ships heading for Ancona on 9 April and further related the recent victories of the Habsburgs and the Russians under *Sugrof* (Suvorov?) over the French armies in Italy, HAT 271/15829-A; this detachment occupied Brindisi early in May 1799 and bombarded Ancona, which could be occupied only on 12 November 1799 after a long siege. The Habsburgs pulled down the Russian flag and refused sharing the French ships taken in the harbor with the Russians, which was one of the reasons of Paul’s growing frustration with his allies, Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 91; the Russian commander Voinovitch attempted to seize the ships by force, Anderson, *Naval Wars*, p. 382; This incidence also sheds light on the sensitiveness of Abdülkadir and Mahmud on the issue of flying the flags of both Tsar and *Padişah* over the fortresses conquered in the Ionians in their reports; Baron Thugut delivered to İbrahim Afif Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador at Vienna, a letter of recommendation for Ömer Ağa in appreciation of his good conduct with his troops at the siege of Ancona. The Deputy Grand-vizier pointed out in a marginal note the details of the siege, but did not mention the rupture between the Russians and the Habsburgs, HAT 136/5593-G (28C1214/27Dec1799).

of the ‘conquest of the Red Apple’, which was thwarted by the unexpected death of Mehmed the Conqueror in 1481.

The main fleet was kept informed on the military and political developments in Naples, Messina and France by the British and Italian allies as well as through its own messengers. According to the recent news, no French remained south of Naples where they were also losing their popularity. Ottoman messenger Mehmed brought promising news from the warzones in Italy to the combined fleet. When the ‘perfect troops’ (*mükemmel asker*) sent by the Ottoman fleet “to the place called Garanod” (*Garanod nam mahale*), General *Rufo* employed some of them with his 12,000 Neapolitans in investing the border fortress of *Gatota* (Gaeta?), hoping to capture it in a few days.<sup>189</sup>

The expected news was soon to arrive at the Porte from the front. Abdülkadir, relying on a letter written in ‘Frankish script’ (*firegiyyü’l-ibare*), informed the Porte that the allied forces of Ottomans, Russians, and the Sicilians reached Naples and reduced the fortresses of *Madalina* (Maddalena) and *Karmina* (Carmine) where “they flew the flag of the Sublime Porte in the name of the Sicilian King.” Moreover, they also laid siege to the fortresses of *Kastlonove* (Castel Nuovo), *Ava* (Ovo), and *Sen Armo* (Sant’ Elmo) which were expected to surrender in a short time. The King thus recovered the immediate

---

<sup>189</sup> HAT 164/6818 (3M1214/7June1799) from Abdülkadir and Patrona to the Porte; after long deliberations Micheroux secured the sending of 450 Russians to Manfredonia under Captain Baillie (of Irish origin) with some Ottoman troops. On May 29, two Ottoman officers told Rufo that Abdülkadir was ready to land thousands of troops to support the siege of Naples which embarrassed Rufo, for he was a Cardinal using Christianity as a rallying force. He was nevertheless joined by “a small, fierce company of Turks” at Nola on 11 June, Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples*, pp. 379, 383.

vicinity of Naples. The commander of the Ottoman forces “recruited 600 Neapolitans and had them dress in the manner of Islam”, presumably because of his shortage of men.<sup>190</sup>

The treaty of capitulation of the Nuovo and Ovo castles was signed by their commandants, Cardinal-general Ruffo, Micheroux, the Russian and ‘Turkish’ representatives on 19 June and a three weeks’ armistice was signed by the French in Sant’ Elmo on 23 June. Ruffo was backed by the Russian and Ottoman representatives in his policy of toleration as the best means of pacification. Conversely, Nelson, with the approval of the court of Naples, annulled both of the treaties (of capitulation and of armistice) on the grounds that the town dwellers were rebels and should not have been granted generous terms of surrender. He was so determined to crash the ‘Jacobins’ that he even risked his marine force under Troubridge in the siege of Sant’ Almo, violating the basic principle of sparing the precious marines from ordinary land operations.<sup>191</sup>

---

<sup>190</sup> HAT 266/15490 (June-July?) from Abdülkadir to the Porte; “The main body of his [Ruffo] infantry bivouacked with the Turks at the foot of the Maddalena bridge, and some of these arranged between them to capture the castle of the Carmine that night as a pleasant surprise for the cardinal. The garrison was overpowered and massacred...” (Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples*, p. 384). This happened at the night of 13-14 June. Cardinal’s headquarters was also at Maddalena. Ruffo was appalled by the extent of the violent crimes and all sorts of excesses perpetrated against the ‘Jacobins’ both by the common folk and the irregular and unbridled troops: “Meanwhile the populace, and many outlaws who have come to fight for the King, besides eighty blasted Turks, are robbing and plundering without let or hindrance.”, Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples*, p. 389.

<sup>191</sup> Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples*, pp. 390, 394. The Queen, Maria Carolina –a daughter of Maria Theresa and sister of Maria Antoinette- was so angry at Ruffo’s policy of toleration that she recommended Nelson “to treat Naples as it were a rebellious city in Ireland which had behaved in such a manner. We must have no regard for numbers: several thousands of villains less make France the poorer, and we shall be better off.”, Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples*, p. 397. Nelson did not fully honor the treaty, imprisoning those ‘Jacobins’ waiting in transportation ships for their departure and hanging their leader Caracciolo. Sant’ Elmo surrendered on 11 July, Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples*, p. 403; Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, pp. 110-11.

*A renewed French attack?*

By the beginning of the summer, the Ottomans were preoccupied with the preparations for a likely clash with the French fleet that ran the blockade at Brest. For the Ottomans, the enemy would possibly attack Egypt, if not the Dardanelles, and the authorities, convening in urgent meetings, debated a series of measures including sending the Corfu fleet to Alexandria. Both the Porte and Tomara feared from a French attack on the Dardanelles and the latter insisted on strengthening the defence system of that strait. Although it appears to have been a misguided apprehension from our present knowledge, Russia always feared that the Crimea would come under a French attack throughout the Napoleonic wars and this was actually one of the considerations lying behind the alliance with the Ottoman Empire, while it would be resurfaced in the negotiations preceding the conclusion of peace in 1802 –opening of the Black Sea to international shipping- as we will review in the following chapters. Thus, the Grand Admiral also sent 7 ships to Dardanelles in advance and agreed with others to let Abdülkadir decide with Ushakov on the proper course of action.<sup>192</sup> In the case that Ushakov complied with Nelson's request,

---

<sup>192</sup> CHRC 2360 (nd., early June 1799) minutes of the meeting (*akd-i encümen*). Spencer Smith –the British ambassador- informed the escape of 26 French warships on 27 April to the Porte early in June. The information on the strength of the fleet is contradictory: Lavery stated that 19 ships departed from Brest on 1 April under the command of Admiral Bruix and, joined by the Spanish allies, it entered from the Gibraltar with a deterrent force of 33 warships (Brian Lavery, *Nelson and the Nile*, p. 288), while Rodger and Harold asserted there were 40-45 liners (Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 99; C. Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt* [Pen&Sword, imprint, 2005], p. 323); Those present in the meeting were the members of the 'kitchen cabinet': Hüseyin Paşa, İsmet Beg, Mehmed Şerif Efendi (the Treasurer of the Imperial Stir-up), Hacı İbrahim Efendi (the Treasurer of the New Revenues), Firdevs Efendi (The superintendent of the Grain Administration), the Kethüda Beg (İbrahim Nesimi? or Hüsrev? [the famous paşa of Mahmud II and *kethüda* of the Grand Admiral at that time]), the Reis Efendi, the Çavuş-başı Ağa, and the Grand-vizier. They started with discussing the possibility of a French-British engagement and resolved to strengthen the Dardanelles in the case that the British navy could not reach the enemy. A number of measures were

Abdülkadir should join him, provided he left a squadron at Corfu.<sup>193</sup>

He, nonetheless, demanded from Abdülkadir a detailed report on the activities of the Ottoman fleet in Italy, presumably for reaching a better judgment on how to use the navy against the French fleet in the Mediterranean. Abdülkadir wrote to the Grand Admiral on 5 June on the necessity of protecting Messina and taking of Ancona from the French. He remarked that 5 Ottoman warships were sent to Ancona along with an equal number of Russian warships, while 2,700 Albanians were to be sent to Naples against the French. Although the fleet should need repairings, he thought half of the fleet could anchor at Corfu until the arrival of a garrison force and with the other half patrolling in the vicinity of Messina in order to fight the French pirates in the Adriatic, as well as undertake amphibious operations, if necessary, targeting Manfredonia and *Parlete* (?). He drew the Grand Admiral's attention to the fact that Patrona would also have to return with his galleon should the fleet be called back, whereas he had clear instructions to stay in the fortress of Corfu with his crew until the Ottoman land troops arrived to guard the fortress.<sup>194</sup>

---

discussed ranging from keeping Mustafa Paşa in Makri (a gulf close to İzmir), rather than sending him to Alexandria in expectation of an assault on the Dardanelles, or deploying him in Rhodes with his land troops sent to Akka (Acre). Finally, he was authorized to make a decision after consulting with Smith in Acre and Admiral (*Kapudane*) Abdülfettah Beg, the commander of the Ottoman fleet there. The British engineer Koehler was entrusted with supervising the reinforcement of the Dardanelles. He was sent there with 10 field guns and a company of gunners.

<sup>193</sup> HAT 266/15490; Nelson, nevertheless, ignored the order of his superior Keith dated 27 June to join him against the French because of his own entanglements in the court of Naples, though never failing to criticize the Russo-Ottoman fleet for its 'inactivity' A. Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, pp. 86-87, 101.

<sup>194</sup> HAT 162/6746 (1M1214/5June1799) from Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. İbrahim Paşa of İskenderiye was to provide 1,500 troops and Mustafa Paşa, the former mutasarrif of Delvine, was to contract out 1,200 Albanians with the funds sent from İstanbul. Each mercenary was to receive a daily pay

Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa dismissed out of hand the military support lent by the combined fleet on the Two Sicilies as ‘the wandering of the fleet in the waters of *Frengistan*.’ He questioned the wisdom of sending the fleet in assistance to another state when “our own dominions’ were not clear off the enemy. He made it clear that he “cannot tolerate our navy leaving the dominions of Islam” as long as Egypt was under invasion. Therefore Abdülkadir’s request for 4 more galleons met with a negative response; according to the Grand Admiral “sending four galleons to *Frengistan* under the appellation of a navy” was a mistaken policy for the time-being, considering that Nelson by no means needed the help of the Ottoman navy and such cruises beyond Adriatic would not help keeping Russia’s attention out of Corfu either. Consequently, he argued for the reconcentration of the navy in Alexandria against the imminent threat of the French, rather than scattering it all over the Mediterranean.<sup>195</sup>

---

of 6 *para* with a cash substitute for rations (7 *para*). The company commander was to receive 20 *para*. The Porte also ordered Abdülkadir to recruit 300 “Albanian infidels who were not Souliotes” for the Russian fleet (*Sulozlu olmayan kefere Arnavutlar*); Selim III was inquisitive about the whereabouts of these troops, as he feared that the expected arrival of the Russian reinforcements would tip the balance to Russia’s advantage in the region (...*zira Rusyalunun askeri imdadına gelüb taraf-ı hümayunundan erişdirilmediği halde bazı mahzurat derkar olmağla...*), TSA, E.3453/1; the pays of the troops of İbrahim were to be met by the revenue to come from the ‘inheritance tax’ to be paid in return for the effects of İbrahim’s deceased father, which explains the laxity of İbrahim to hire these troops to a large extent, E3453/2. The document made it explicit that rushing these troops to Corfu would increase the dignity of the state ‘among the European states’ and ‘be proper for the magnificence and pomp of the Sultan’ (...*Avrupa düveli beyninde aşına-seza ve şan u şükuh-ı cihandarilerine reva bir haleti gayret-nüma olacağı...*).

<sup>195</sup> “...kendü memalîkimizde düşman gâilesi bertaraf olmaksızın donanmanın ahar devlet ianetine gitmekde mana nedir? Ama Rusyalu ile muvafakat eylemeleri hasebiyle gitmişler ise Rusyalu Korfa’dan alakayı kesmez ve kesdürülmesi güçdür. İngiltere amirali Nelson’un dahi bizim donanmamıza ihtiyacı yokdur. Bu suretde Mısır gâilesi böyle iken donanmamızın Memalik-i İslamiye’dan ayrılmasını hiç hoş göremem. İnşallahü Teala Mısır’dan düşman gâilesi bertaraf olduktan sonra donanmanın Frengistan’da gezmesinde beis yokdur. Şimdi 4 kalyonu donanma deyu Frengistan’a göndermek mucib-i zellidir.” HAT 157/6568 (25RA1214/27Aug1799) from the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa to the Porte; for Abdülkadir’s request see, HAT 164/6818 (3M1214/7June1799) from Kapudane and Patrona to the Porte.



The strong language he employed in his criticism was quite unusual in Ottoman tradition. He was perplexed by the seemingly contradictory actions of the French fleet which, after joining with the Spanish navy in the Mediterranean, sailed out from the Gibraltar. He dreaded that it would set a course for the Red Sea and attack Cidde (Jiddah) and the holy cities as a diversionary operation to save Napoleon in Akka. He also thought that the Porte and Tomara had already ordered the combined fleet to sail to Alexandria. Thus he was infuriated when he learnt by coincidence from his man returning from the Algiers that the fleet was sighted at Messina. This is yet another example illustrating the cumbersome nature of communications in the pre-telecommunication era. The Porte and Tomara had actually sent the orders to the fleet on 27 July, but they only reached their destination on 3 September, while the fleet had left Corfu for Messina on 6 August.<sup>196</sup>

---

<sup>196</sup> Hüseyin Paşa would be overwhelmed by the arrival of a British fleet from India to the Red Sea a year later to fight the French. A certain *Tomas* from Cyprus who served as the dragoman of Sydney Smith and later of Keith was actually spying for Hüseyin. He related to Hüseyin the conversation of Keith and the rear-admiral *Ricar* (Richard?) in which they construed to retain Alexandria for Britain by employing the Muslim Indian troops since they doubted the Porte's capability to defend Egypt. Hüseyin Paşa was convinced that the British would turn Suez and Alexandria into ports for the goods of India; otherwise, he maintained, the British would not have sent over 150 ships to the Red Sea just for the sake of the alliance. They did not hand over Malta to Russia either. He dotted on a map the British possessions of Gibraltar and the Cape of Good Hope as well as Suez and Alexandria so as to 'map out' the danger 'the Arabia' was exposed to. Unfortunately, the map is lost to us, see Uzunçarşılı, "İngiltere'nin Akdeniz Hakimiyeti Hakkında Vesikalar", *Tarih Vesikaları* I/2 (1941-42), document V, pp. 130-32; The French-Spanish navy under Admiral Bruix had the objective of relieving first Corfu, and then Alexandria and Malta, but managed to deceive the British that it was bound for Ireland or Portugal, Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, pp. 97-100; HAT 155/6513-J (nd.); Before learning the main fleet's departure from Corfu, the Porte had also decided to request Nelson to send 8-10 ships to Alexandria if he could not join the combined fleet in person in Egypt. Abdülkadir Beg also pointed out that the crews were asking for permission to return to İstanbul, HAT 157/6541 (29R1214/30Sept1799); late arrival of this order led to a series of events in Palermo and culminated in a serious mutiny among the Ottoman crews the story of which will be taken up in the following sections; Saul gave different dates for departure from Corfu (3 August) and arrival at Palermo (1 September), Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 118.

### *Logistical problems of the combined fleet*

The complications involved in the organization of provisioning needs to be tackled under a separate heading and we will rightly do so in the following chapters. Nevertheless, suffice it to say that tardy arrivals of the supply ships in the winter of 1798-1799 as well as supply shortages and lack of funds in the following summer caused great consternation to the allied Admirals.

In the days the ‘kitchen cabinet’ of Selim was holding sessions to discuss the destination of the enemy navy as mentioned previously, the allied fleet received an urgent note from Nelson calling them to his side against the French navy. He informed his colleagues that the French navy had already entered the Mediterranean and, joined by the Spanish navy, headed to Toulon. Remarking that he had the cooperation of the Portuguese fleet against the enemy, Nelson urged for a union with the combined fleet.<sup>197</sup> Thus, the main fleet was better informed on the whereabouts of the French navy than the Porte that was not sure about its final destination. Although they approved of his request, Ushakov and Abdülkadir could not respond to Nelson immediately due to logistical setbacks of the mainfleet; the Russian navy lacked provisions whereas the Ottoman mercenary seamen (*levend*) did not receive their due summertime pays. Furthermore, the Imperial Dockyards sent only a part of the equipments on the order list with the cables

---

<sup>197</sup> According to Nelson the combined navy of the enemy had 64 warships: French navy consisting of 19 large and 20 light warships was joined by 20 large and 5 light Spanish warships after passing through the Gibraltar into the Mediterranean. This obviously conflicted with the news passed on the Porte by Smith in the same days, HAT 164/6818 (3M1214/7June1799) from Abdülkadir and Patrona to the Porte; Nelson was soon to change his mind and decided to deal with the Neapolitan affairs, rather than helping Keith in encountering Bruix, Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, pp. 110-11.

and wires totally missing. Consequently, Abdülkadir emphasized that the Porte should send 4 more large warships to encounter the enemy navy, for the main fleet had already sent away 10 warships to Ancona. The Porte, however, did not have spare ships at hand to send to Abdülkadir and would rather write him to call back some of his ships from Ancona on the advice of Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa as we have reviewed previously.<sup>198</sup>

Of 500 troops to be sent to Corfu from Canik (Western Black Sea), 200 already deserted on the way to İstanbul. Thus, the Morea would have to make up for the deserters. This also accounted for the missing of the afore-mentioned cables of the ships (*gomena*) since they were to be sent along with these troops to the fleet.<sup>199</sup>

An oft-neglected aspect of the expedition was the ad hoc improvisations attempted in face of financial challenges although they present a great opportunity to grasp the critical importance of ‘unofficial foreign loans’ to war finances. The frigates of *Şehper-i Zafer* (Zeynel Kapudan) and *Bü'l-heves* (Rodoslu Süleyman Kapudan) were among the Ottoman frigates that participated in the siege of Ancona and patrolled in the vicinity of Trieste throughout the summer and autumn of 1799. When they were faced

---

<sup>198</sup> HAT 164/6818 (3M1214/7June1799) from Kapudane and Patrona to the Porte. Abdülkadir also asked for the appointment of 2 scribes and an interpreter to the fleet. The memorandum of the deputy Grand-vizier for the attention of Selim pointed out that no spare ships remained in the Dockyards to be sent to the Admiral and that the pays and provisions had been sent previously. He complained that the Dockyards did not make ready the new recruits to replace the casualties despite numerous ‘admonishing edicts’ (*tekidi havi ferman*) to that effect; the ship hired for their transportations had been waiting in the port for 1.5 months by the date of the submission of the document to Selim. We are told on another occasion that it was actually hired on 18 June, showing that this report could not have been brought to Selim’s attention before the first week of August 22. Pairs of cables –two sets for each ship- were to be sent along with the troops as of 19 June, HAT 164/6839 (15M1214/19June1799) from Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa to Selim.

<sup>199</sup> HAT 164/6839 (15M1214/19Jun1799) from Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa to Selim III; HAT 266/15490 from deputy Grand-vizier to Selim III.

with financial difficulties, they had to borrow 2,250 *kuruş* from a certain merchant (Lorenzo Gasparini) and sent the necessary bill of exchange to İstanbul.<sup>200</sup> These ships remained in Italian waters until spring 1800. Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa instructed İbrahim Afif Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna, to take care of the pays of the troops, provisions, and equipments. Upon the urgency of the matter the ambassador went to Trieste in person. He spent 42,296.5 *kuruş* on six anchors, provisions, and full year's pay of the troops at Trieste and Ancona. The sum was borrowed from an Austrian merchant (*Hoce Haris Aykonam?*) in return for a bill of exchange (*police temessükü*) to be collected in İstanbul.<sup>201</sup>

Sofalı İbrahim Ağa was appointed from *Şehper-i Zafer* to lead the Ottoman land troops in the Ancona siege during which 83 soldiers deserted. Fearing mass desertion, he sought to motivate his troops by distributing bonus money after negotiating with the Russian commander. Accordingly, he borrowed 10,000 Spanish real (*iryal-i İspanya direklisi*) and alleged that it was sent by İstanbul in recognition of their services.

---

<sup>200</sup> The loan was met from the Campaign Treasury by the intervention of the Grand Admiral, C.BH 6937 (8March-6April1800). It also contains the originals of two bills of exchange in Italian, which are hard to come by in the Ottoman archives; remarkably, the two frigates returned to İstanbul in June 1800, long after the bills of exchange. All the crews (more than 500) were rewarded in İstanbul with the injured men (31 in total) receiving pensions to be paid from the customs of İstanbul, C.BH 6802 (1S1215/24June1800); besides those sent along with the Ottoman ships, 820 Russians were landed at Naples and marched to Rome; they then participated in the siege of Ancona, Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Military Service*, p. 111.

<sup>201</sup> HAT 137/5606-D (23ZA1214/18Apr1800) from İbrahim Afif Efendi to the Porte; Anderson claimed that the 2 Ottoman ships left for İstanbul in May after a collision between the Ottoman sailors and Austrian soldiers see, Anderson, *Naval Wars*, p. 387.

However, he seems to have gone bankrupt as the Porte reimbursed him partially, paying only one-tenth of the loan.<sup>202</sup>

Abdülkadir also had to change 30,000 *kuruş* for foreign currency (of unspecified nationality) in Palermo from a merchant (*Antonyo Sotiro*) through the services of the Danish *charge d'affaires* in the town. When the Admiral was forced to leave Palermo in haste due to the mutiny in the fleet –as we will see shortly after- the Danish consul had to pay the related expenses (*poliçe masrafı*) and the interest on the bill of exchange (*akçe başı*). The Chief Treasurer, nevertheless, declined his demand for reimbursement on the grounds that the Porte's reimbursement policy did not cover the expenses and the interest related with the bills of exchange.<sup>203</sup>

*Albanian mercenaries in the service of the court of Naples*

According to the alliance with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies the Porte should deliver Albanian mercenaries in companies to its ally at request on the condition that the King took care of their transportation. It was not a novelty for the Albanians to find employment in Italy for various states, but it surely was for the Sublime Porte to organize

---

<sup>202</sup> CAS 7219 (9Ş1216/5Dec1802). 10,000 Spanish real was calculated at the parity of 1 real = 150 *para*, thus making 37,500 *krş* in total. İbrahim received 3,250 *krş* in total on several occasions. One wonders how the loan was paid back, if the Russian commander, who stood surety, did not have to foot the bill. İbrahim's misery is reflected in his petition: "this old and crippled servant of yours, drowned in surmounting debts, is in a miserable and decrepit state, loitering at the corners of khans (*bu mecruh-i alil kulları düyun-i kesireye müstağrik olub han köşelerinde sefil ve sergerdan ve halim perişan olmağla*). The Porte paid 750 *krş* upon this petition on the condition of "his abstainment from future requests" (*sair istidasından sarf-ı intizar ile*).

<sup>203</sup> The Porte finally decided to reimburse the Danish consul on 19 August, or almost a year later than the Palermo affair. He petitioned the Porte on 29 July 1799, C.HRC 2606 (28RA1215/19Aug1801); C.HRC 1574 (22RA1215/13Aug1801).

the enterprise.<sup>204</sup> Accordingly, the Porte decided to hire 2,700 Albanians on this occasion as mentioned in Abdülkadir's report above. Of this, 1,500 men were to be raised through the services of İbrahim Paşa of İskenderiye (Scutari) since he left a good impression with the Porte by sending 2,000 Albanians to Akka previously –his failure to show up in Corfu notwithstanding.<sup>205</sup> It is not clear if he accomplished this task as well, but Mustafa Paşa – the former *mutasarrıf* of Delvine- could hire only 800 Albanians of the remaining 1,200 troops and sent them to the combined fleet under the command of his brother.<sup>206</sup>

When Abdülkadir returned from Palermo in the midst of September, he found this force of 800 Albanians in Corfu waiting for transportation. As we will realize shortly after, the Ottoman fleet returned to Corfu in a state of rebellion and definitely was not to go back to Sicily neither to transport the Albanians nor to help out the 'Sicilian allies' with whom they had just fought a bloody battle. Abdülkadir, thus, demanded clarification as to their provisioning on the island. The deputy-Grand vizier suggested bleakly to Selim that the Albanians must have deserted before the arrival of Abdülkadir's correspondence

---

<sup>204</sup> Fleming emphasized the cosmopolitan nature of the Albanian population largely due to "the long tradition of Albanian mercenary activity." Most of these Albanians spoke Albanian and Greek as well as at least one European language in most cases. Some members of Ali Paşa's entourage received pensions from the king of Naples in recognition of their service with the king's army in the past. During Napoleonic wars various Khimariote captains maintained companies in Naples and replenished the ranks with new Albanian mercenaries, K. Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte. Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece* (Princeton, 1999), pp. 159-60, 179.

<sup>205</sup> C.AS 44713 (earlyM1214/mid-June1799) order to İbrahim Paşa; Mehmed Beg of İlbasan was also ordered to help İbrahim in hiring mercenaries. For his curious attempt to keep the necessary funds forwarded to him for himself see the Chapter VI "The Contractual Empire"; C.BH 1522 (21S1214/25July1299) from İbrahim Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>206</sup> HAT 155/6513-C (23R1214/24Sept1799). Their rations were to be given by the fleet; Abdurrahman Paşa of Dukakin was also asked to send 1,000 troops to the service of the King in August 1800, while Osman Paşa also demanded him to join his army camp with 500-600 troops by October 1800, C.HRC 2915 (13C1215/1Nov1800).

by reason of which the court of Naples would accuse the Porte of failing to fulfil the terms of the alliance. If the Albanians were still in Corfu by any chance, the Porte then should tell the Sicilian envoy that the King should undertake their transportation to Sicily.<sup>207</sup>

### *Disorders at Palermo*

After the arrival of the news that King Ferdinand made ready the promised provisions in Messina and Palermo, the fleet could finally act on the Nelson's insistent calls for a union at Palermo.<sup>208</sup> After leaving a squadron in Messina on 13 August, the combined fleet arrived at Palermo.

The imperial edict calling the combined fleet to Egypt found the fleet at Palermo immediately after anchoring at the port. When Nelson, Ushakov, and Abdülkadir convened for a review of the current situation, Nelson and Ushakov dismissed the order

---

<sup>207</sup> HAT 155/6513-C (23R1214/24Sept1799). Were Ferdinand to tell he did not need the Albanians any more, then they should be sent to the army to fight in Egypt; Selim III complaining to the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa when the fleet was operating in Italian waters: "Kaptan Paşa!; rush the pays, provisions and the troops immediately [to the fleet]. Can we afford negligence in the present time? I have been writing on these matters for many times. Yet, time is still being wasted with various pretexts. I have written many times about the troops to be sent in assistance to Sicily. No one had gone yet, as I have heard. I don't want excuses. You should in any case find ways to have these matters taken care of." (*Kaptan Paşa! gerek mevacib gerek zehair ve gerekse asakir bir an evvel irişdirülsün. Böyle vaktde ihmal olur mu? Bunlar için bu kadardır yazarım. Yine şudur budur ile vakt geçiyor. Sicilya imdadına gidecek asakiri bu kadar yazdım. Daha kimesne gitmemiş. Cevab istemem. Şu işlerin birer tarikini bulub elbette ve elbette bir an evvel nizamını virdiresün.*), HAT 34/1653 (nd.)

<sup>208</sup> Abdülkadir pointed out that the Russian general *Sugor* (Suvorov?) also called Ushakov to Messina and Palermo because of his own supply shortages after recovering *Cenova* with 60,000 troops, HAT 155/6513-J from Abdülkadir to the Porte; Nelson remained in Palermo with 5 ships and sent detachments to Naples and Malta. He was receiving intelligence from Gibraltar, Malta and Genova, HAT 155/6513 M (4CA1214/4Oct1799) the report of *tatar* Hüseyin; Before leaving Messina for Palermo Ushakov learned the arrival at Palermo of a Russian squadron from the Baltic Sea under Vice Admiral Kartsov, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 119; Abdülkadir left in Corfu 2 frigates and a corvette, and probably took 8 ships along with him; with the ships he had to leave in Messina, he had at least 11 ships in the fleet. The squadron in Corfu, nevertheless, requested 5 ships to be sent back to Corfu, see HAT 155/6513 (5CA1214/5Oct1799), 155/6513-J.

on the grounds that it was not proper to leave the coasts of Italy for Egypt. However, Britain and Russia had not finalized the plans for a combined siege of Malta, which, in part, was due to severe communication problems that compelled Ushakov to act on his own initiative. Notwithstanding Nelson was still trying to keep the Russians out from the siege of Malta by enticing Ushakov to sail to Naples.<sup>209</sup> After a long debate with Nelson and Ferdinand IV, Ushakov was persuaded to go to Naples instead of Malta on 5 September.<sup>210</sup>

This triggered violent incidents in the town which immediately turned into an open mutiny in the Ottoman fleet. According to Ottoman regulations the crews were expected to serve for six months on the sea, whereas it had been a year after the launching of the expedition. Despite the fall of Corfu, the expedition was not called off; on the contrary, it was pushing further into western Mediterranean. Annoyed by the prolongation of the expedition, the Ottoman crews had already demanded their disbandment before the departure from Corfu, promising to serve for 30 more days in the fleet until the arrival of the orders. Poor state of communications once again determined the course of the events in the expedition. The Porte took up the matter as soon as the demand reached İstanbul. Selim also thought their return should be arranged in recognition of the fatigue and hardships they had been through during the expedition. Nevertheless, ‘the kitchen cabinet’ did not comply with his order since their return would in practice require the calling back of the fleet. This would amount to the abandonment of

---

<sup>209</sup> HAT 155/6513 (5CA1214/5Oct1799) from the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa to Selim.

<sup>210</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 118-19.



the allies and would insult the honor of the Sublime Porte. They feared that an offended Nelson would in no way sail to Alexandria to assist against the French assault on Akka; he could even return to Britain. Furthermore, the Russian fleet would have a free reign in the region by the return of the Ottoman fleet. When the demand reached to İstanbul, two-thirds of the ‘period of grace’ extended by the crews had already elapsed, meaning that they were bound to mutiny in 10 days. Thus, the Porte decided to send a squadron of 2 galleons and 2 frigates to support the allies as soon as the would-be mutineers arrived at the Dardanelles. The embassies of the allies should be forewarned so as to save face.<sup>211</sup> In other words, Abdülkadir was treacherously left on his own to deal with the ‘legitimized’ mutiny in order to incite Nelson and Ushakov to sail to Alexandria.

The imperial edict that urged for a reconcentration of the allied fleets in Alexandria surely was not the decree the Ottoman fleet was longing for. The fact that the allied admirals did not observe it and decided to sail to Naples instead only increased the discontent among the crews. Only 3 days after this decision, the Ottoman marines were involved in a series of fights with the Palermitans on different parts of the town which was celebrating a religious fest. The affray was only partly quelled before it flaired up

---

<sup>211</sup> HAT 239/13389 (nd.) From the deputy-Grandvezier to Selim; Hüseyin Paşa sent the order for return on 26 September –the very same day when Abdülkadir wrote his fleet should neither go to Naples with the Russians nor join the Ottoman navy in Alexandria because of the mutiny. This indicates that he was not still sure whether or not the Porte would allow the fleet’s return after learning the incident in Palermo, HAT HAT 155/6513-J; this order was sent with a speedy light vessel to Messina, which directly headed to its destination without stopping by Corfu as it was off the route with the result that it could not find the Ottoman fleet. The Grand Admiral, this time, had to send a *tatar* on a boat and a *çavuş* over land to spot the fleet, HAT 155/6513 (5CA1214/5Oct1799) from the Grand Admiral to the Porte; while the Porte was hoping that Nelson would go to Egypt –perhaps, an indication of his conviction of his superiority in command to Smith-, he made commitments to the court of Naples, Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 87.

again on 12 September, culminating in open mutiny. That night the mutineers literally seized the control of the Ottoman fleet and set out to the voyage back to İstanbul. Not mentioned in the secondary literature we rely on in this chapter is that 60 miles away from Palermo, the crews of the flagship were persuaded to obey the orders and act in unison with the Russian fleet so as to set the example for the other crews. When the fleet returned to the harbor of Palermo the same night, the crew of the Patrona's ship fired two guns and signalled the return to Corfu to the astonishment of poor Abdülkadir. It was accompanied by at least another ship (İbrahim Kapudan). By the morning Abdülkadir began a hasty pursuit with the remaining 6 ships, reaching to Corfu on 23 September – four days after Patrona.<sup>212</sup> The insurgent crew of the Riyale's ship forced their captain Ahmed Kapudan to drop anchor next to the Patrona's in the harbor of Corfu. On 25 September, the 'mercenary bandits' (*levend eşkıyaları*) of the Patrona numbering more than 200 deserted on boats to the main land only to be followed by the others with each ship losing 40-50 men to desertion. They did not forget to seize the pay chest of their respective ship. Therefore, Abdülkadir sent a note to Ali Paşa of Yanya, asking for their punishment.<sup>213</sup> Nevertheless, Abdülkadir knew by the summer of 1799 that Ali Paşa was encouraging desertion by recruiting the deserters of the fleet for the army of Egypt despite the clear orders of the Porte to the opposite.<sup>214</sup>

---

<sup>212</sup> HAT 155/6513-J (25 September 1799?) from Abdülkadir to the Porte; McKnight claims that 1,300 men deserted on that occasion, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 208-209; Rodger also confirms that the Ottoman marines were unpaid and mutinous, see, Rodger, A.B., *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 91.

<sup>213</sup> HAT 155/6513-G (25R1214/26Sept1799) from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

<sup>214</sup> HAT 266/15490.

Abrupt return of the Ottoman fleet to Corfu also caused anxiety in the town. The Russian commander of the fortress closed the gates as a precaution. According to *tatar Veli*, who was present in the town, the Corfiotes were as frustrated as the Ottoman fleet at the rudeness of the Russian commander.<sup>215</sup> They probably feared that this measure would jeopardize the security of the town by agitating a fleet in open mutiny at the harbor.

#### *Narratives of mutiny*

A reconsideration of the different accounts of the incident reveals the intense friction within the second coalition. Tensions between the Russian and Ottoman marines overlapped with those between British and the Russians whereas mutual hostility between the inhabitants and the Ottomans is manifest in the correspondence between the Porte and the Two Sicilies.<sup>216</sup> Remarkably, each party focused on a different phase of the disorders at Palermo.

Ushakov pointed out in his report submitted to the Porte that the conflict on shore leave between the Ottoman marines and the Sicilians was followed and intensified by rioting and retaliating incidents with the result that there were 14 killed, 53 wounded, and

---

<sup>215</sup> HAT 155/6513 M (4CA1214/4Oct1799) from *tatar Veli* to the Porte. According to *Veli*, the Corfiotes exclaimed “Why are you closing the gates and not letting in the Ottoman troops?” (*kapularını niçin kapayub Osmanlu askeri içeriye almazsın?*).

<sup>216</sup> Nelson’s letter to Earl Spencer on September 7<sup>th</sup>, 1799, Palermo; ‘...The Russian Admiral has a polished outside, but the bear is close to the skin. He is jealous of our influence, and thinks whatever is proposed, that we are at the bottom. The Turk, who is by no means a fool - on the contrary, has more natural sense than the other- is our brother; and I am sure there is not a thing that we could desire him to do that he would not instantly comply with. I make use of the word ‘we’, as both Sir William and Lady Hamilton have more merit in gaining the affection and implicit confidence of Cadir Bey and his officers, than I have”, *The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson with Notes By Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas*, (G.C.M.G, London: Chatham Publishing, 1988) [reprint of Henry Colburn’s edition in 1844-1847], v. 4 (September 1799-December 1801), p. 6; for a brief analysis of the strenuous relations between Nelson and Ushakov see Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 114-121.

40 missing from the Ottoman crew.<sup>217</sup> Saul, depending on the dispatch of Abdülkadir Beg to Ushakov, claims that the change of destination from Malta to Naples left little prospect of capturing booty and thus demoralized the Ottoman marines.<sup>218</sup> On the contrary, Ushakov communicated to the Port that the Ottoman marines were reluctant to go beyond the Ottoman waters. According to him, the Ottoman marines showed signs of insubordination as the fleet came to Messina on the grounds that such a long expedition was against the Ottoman regulations and that their families were left back without means of support. This was actually when they demanded their disbandment in a month. Ushakov stated that they also resented the patrolling duties along the Italian coasts. Therefore Ushakov had to promise to keep the combined fleet intact. According to Ushakov, the mutiny in Palermo coincided with the decision to sail to Naples instead of Malta, which the mutinous crew took it as a sign of Ushakov's indecisiveness. The affray between the Palermitans and the marines, on the other hand, lasted for several days. Three days after the first incidence the former sought revenge and killed many Ottoman marines in retaliation who were actually uninvolved in the initial affray. Ushakov put the

---

<sup>217</sup> HAT 13932-B (24 November 1799); this document contains: 1) the translations of two dispatches of Acton, the Prime Minister of the Two Sicilies, to their ambassador to the Porte on September 9 and 10, 1799; 2) the translation of the official account -written in the form of a declaration -of the incidence provided by the King of the Two Sicilies and sent to Ushakov on September 9, 1799; 3) the translation of the report of Prince Kutu (Kutov?), the commander of Messina, relating the incident that broke out in Messina to Acton in Palermo on August 26, 1799; 4) a list of the Ottoman and Palermitan casualties. It gives the names of the Ottoman casualties with the vessels they were deployed. A breakdown of the casualties by the ships is: Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg's ship (16 injured [2 Christians], 1 dead, 6 deserters); Patrona's ship (7 injured, 12 deserters); Riyale's ship (12 injured, 3 dead, 11 deserters); İbrahim Kapudan's ship (9 injured, 8 deserters); Abbas Kapudan's ship (3 injured, 1 dead, 3 deserters); Mehmed Beg's ship (3 injured); Hüseyin Kapudan's ship (3 injured [2 Christians/mellahs]). There were 9 more deads from other Ottoman ships.

<sup>218</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 109-119.

blame on the Ottoman marines for their indiscipline and credited the Russian patrols with saving many Ottoman lives in the second incident.<sup>219</sup>

Ushakov omitted his role in the outbreak of the mutiny as suggested by Acton's letter, the prime minister of the Two Sicilies. Despite the objections of Abdülkadir Beg, Ushakov insisted to hold a meeting with Italinski and the Ottoman captains on the Ottoman flagship with a view to discuss the official account of the first incidence sent by Acton on September 9. The court of Naples held the Ottoman marines responsible for the affray and demanded their due punishment as the King was also to punish those Palermitans involved in the melee. According to Acton the Ottoman captains were opposed to its announcement to the marines although they agreed with its conclusions. Ignoring the warnings, Ushakov had it read aloud to the marines and instigated the spiraling of the disorders as the Ottoman troops were convinced that the Russian enmity made it impossible to stay in Palermo.<sup>220</sup>

From the very first day (3 September according to Abdülkadir) the Ottoman fleet was distressed by the unwelcoming nature reigning in the town in Abdülkadir's opinion. The shopkeepers refused to take 'the comely Ottoman coin' (*sikke-i hasene-i Osmaniye*)

---

<sup>219</sup> HAT 13932-C (30March1800) from Ushakov to the Porte; grievances of the Ottoman sailors resembled those of the mutineers in Spithead and Nore. The pay of the British sailors (19-22 shillings) was not raised since the Commonwealth and this particularly afflicted those with families. The leaders of the mutiny were middle aged, married and had children. High bounty monies offered to the incompetent volunteers, embezzlement of provisions, unfair distribution of prize money were among other grievances, see P. Padfield, *Nelson's War* (Kent: Wordsworth Editions, 2000) pp. 73-96; in Ottoman currency the rate of pay was equal to roughly 15 *kuruş*, or two times the rate of an Ottoman sailor, see Appendix D for currencies.

<sup>220</sup> HAT 13932-B (10Sept1799) from Acton to the Sicilian ambassador to the Porte, in an attempt to belittle the role of the proclamation in the event, Acton claimed that the Ottoman marines found the proclamation reasonable after their initial reaction. To further discredit Ushakov, he pointed out that he barely escaped to his own ship from the angry crew of Abdülkadir's ship.

–the official name of the Ottoman coinage- when the Ottoman crews wanted to spend their summertime pay that they just received –thus, they were not unpaid at that time contrary to the common assumptions in foreign sources. The King had to intervene and spared three shops in the market for the shopping of the Ottomans. According to the deal struck with the Ottoman fleet, when the sailors took their shore leave, they were to visit the changers appointed by the King for exchanging their money with the ‘Frankish coin’ before shopping. Nevertheless, they picked up yet another fight with the Palermitans because of latter’s refusal of the Ottoman *kuruş* on 12 September, each side ending up with 10-15 dead and 20-25 injured until the intervention of Abdülkadir and the King.<sup>221</sup>

According to Abdülkadir, the responsibility lied with the Ottoman marines (*kalyoncu*) for this ‘needless’ fight, whereas their officers were totally innocent. What accounted for their aggressiveness was the sheer duration of the expedition. He remarked that they had been serving in the navy for 19 months by the time the fleet arrived at Palermo although they were recruited for a mere 3 months much before the launching of the expedition. Abdülkadir’s criticism of the Porte was thinly veiled when he reminded it of his previous report relating their demand for returning to İstanbul.<sup>222</sup>

Prince Kutov (?), the commander of Messina, wrote to Acton on August 26 that the Ottoman marines in Messina were also discontented because of the decision to send a combined squadron to Civita Vecchia (Tr.: *Citve*, to the north of Rome). Acton communicated to the Sicilian envoy in İstanbul that the mutineers in Palermo considered

---

<sup>221</sup> HAT 155/6513-J from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

<sup>222</sup> HAT 155/6513-J from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

the dispatch of squadrons to the coasts of Italy as a deliberate policy pursued by Ushakov to ruin the Ottoman vessels and decimate the Ottoman marines. While Prince Kutov was filing complaints with Ushakov at Palermo about the Ottomans left in Messina, the authorities in Palermo demanded from Abdülkadir Bey to prohibit the Ottoman marines from carrying arms during the shore leave whereas this demand was not extended to the Russian troops. Not surprisingly, the incident occurred in the following day, September 8, when the Palermitans celebrated their religious feast. Like Ushakov, he too put the blame on the insubordinate Ottoman marines for the incident and makes it clear that the Porte should not hold the Sicilian authorities responsible.<sup>223</sup>

The Sicilian ambassador presented to the Porte Acton's letters and demanded the punishment of the Ottoman marines, stating that the Sicilian government would also prosecute those Palermitants found guilty.<sup>224</sup> In response the Porte assured the ambassador of its disapproval of the incident, but refused to bear all the responsibility, for such incidents always occurred in port cities- hinting at the chaotic nature of Palermo in the Napoleonic wars? He was told that the Ottomans would not officially protest the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, for this would weaken the alliance, suggesting politely that

---

<sup>223</sup> HAT 13932-B (29Aug1799) from Prince Kutov to Abdülkadir, and HAT 13932-B (9-10Sept1799) from Acton to the Sicilian ambassador to the Porte. Acton also claimed that Ali Paşa, who had his own ambitions about the Ionian Islands, might have provoked the Albanians in the Ottoman fleet by distributing money among them. Acton probably referred to Ali Paşa's policy of recruiting the deserters of the fleet which also incensed Abdülkadir as previously mentioned; The Sicilian ambassador pointed out that unbridled insubordination and rudeness of the Ottoman marines compromised the lives of their captains (*...kapudanları dahi taifelerinin kemal mertebe itaatsizliği ve küstahlığı takribiyle bi-nefsihim muhatarada olub def-i mazarratlarına kadir olamadıkları...*) and even Abdülkadir Beg "had to stay in his ship as though he were a prisoner, totally bereft of exerting authority" at the disapproval of Ferdinand (*...sefinesinde esir misillü icra-yı hükümetden bi'l-küllüye aciz kaldığı...*), HAT 13932-A (25CA1214/25Oct1799).

<sup>224</sup> HAT 13932-A (24Nov1799) memorandum of the Sicilian ambassador.

his protest was inappropriate. Nevertheless, Selim III was totally embarrassed by the incident and frustrated by the mutineers.<sup>225</sup>

Notably, the British eyewitnesses showed the Ottomans as the victims and the inhabitants of Palermo as guilty. Lock, the British consul in Palermo, gave credit to Abdülkadir Beg for his moderation in preventing the bombardment of the city by the frustrated Ottoman marines. Abdülkadir Beg demanded due punishment and the Russian minister Italinski proposed to execute ten of the condemned ‘Jacobins’ in the sight of the fleet. However, the city council, according to Lock, rejected this ‘most sensible’ proposal ‘from a prejudice’ that a Christian’s life should not be ‘sacrificed for that of a Turk.’ The Ottoman admiral was so offended by this prejudice that he swore he would sink the first Neapolitan vessel he saw en route to İstanbul.<sup>226</sup>

Nelson sent a letter to Selim III on the request of Abdülkadir Beg to defend him and urged Smith, the British ambassador, to follow suit.<sup>227</sup> In his letter to the Sultan he removed all the responsibility for the incident from Abdülkadir and downplayed the scale of the incident.<sup>228</sup> Moreover, a certain British lady, Miss Knight, stated that “the Turks

---

<sup>225</sup> Selim wrote in the margin of the memorandum “I am embarrassed as well. May God correct them [the Ottoman marines]” (*Ben dahi mahcub oldum. Allah ıslah eylesün*), see HAT 13932.

<sup>226</sup> Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples*, p. 414. Lock reported the Ottoman casualties with exaggeration as 120 marines killed and 80 wounded including Abdükadir Bey’s nephew as opposed to roughly 15 Palermitan casualties. Ferdinand wrote to Ruffo “You may thank God that the Turkish squadron did not go straight to you since if what happened here last Sunday had happened in Naples, I doubt if the matter would have rested there, and it would have been much worse”, by which the King drew attention to the state of anarchy reigning in Naples, Acton, p. 414; for Nelson’s description of Naples as “a city of whores and fiddlers” see A. B. Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition*, p. 74.

<sup>227</sup> Nicolas edition, p. 8. Writing on 10 September, Nelson assured Smith that “the good order and remarkable cleanliness” of the ship of Abdülkadir Bey was admirable.

<sup>228</sup> From Nelson to J. Spencer Smith (10 September 1799) and from Nelson to Selim III [enclosed to the Captain Pasha] (10 September 1799), Nicolas edition, p. 8.



were so much irritated with the cruelty of the Sicilians, that they rose against their Admiral”, implying that the Palermitans were guilty.<sup>229</sup>

McKnight is likely to be aware of the problem with the eyewitnesses’ testimonies and thus content with giving the information that the inhabitants killed ten ‘Turks’ on the pretext that they were abducting a boy and an Ionian assaulted a ‘Turk’ for allegedly showing disrespect for his wife. Remarkably Acton, in his letters to İstanbul, related the same events. Referring to the dispatch of Tomara to Ushakov, McKnight concluded that the latter regretted the incident while the former was happy for increasing friction within the combined fleet.<sup>230</sup>

All these narratives are deeply imbued with the political interests of their respective authors. Clearly illustrating the competition between the members of the second coalition as they were, it should not surprise that the coalition was short-lived.

---

<sup>229</sup>Nicolas edition, p. 7.

<sup>230</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 183; Prime Minister Acton mentioned in his letter to the Sicilian ambassador at the Porte that on 7 September -the day after banning the Ottoman marines from bearing arms- three Ottoman marines insulted a married woman in Palermo in the presence of her husband: “...Palerme ahalisinden dihkani bir kimesne kendü ehli ile taşra tarlalarından avdet ile vürud-ı beldeye dühulunde üç nefer kalyoncu önüne çıkub karısı üzerine hücum itmiş ve üçünden biri karıyı zorlamağa başlamış olduğunu dihkani-i mezkur muayene eyledikde elinde bulunan av tüfengini mezkurun üzerine atmağa mecbur olmuş...” On 8 September, two drunken marines began to quarrel with each other in the tavern and one of them killed a man driving a cart outside the tavern on the pretext that the cart hit him. Meanwhile, some marines tried to abduct a 10-years-old boy by the shore and in the ensuing melee they killed 10 Palermitans and injured 17 of them: “...bir kaç nefer kalyoncu on yaşında bir oğlamı zor ile ahz idüb götürürler iken oğlan dad u feryad ile istimdada başladığından tıfl-ı mezkuru istihlas ve istirdad için avam-ı nassdan...”, HAT 13932-B (2CA1214/2Oct1799); Nevertheless, Lock contended that it was the boy who whipped the seaman’s legs for no apparent reason while he was bargaining at a stall, Acton, *The Bourbons of Naples*, p. 414.

### *End of the expedition*

Saul argues that departure of the Ottoman fleet did not weaken Ushakov's fleet thanks to the arrival of Kartsov whereas Tucker, referring to Italinski's letter to Suworov dated September 12, claims that it did.<sup>231</sup> Until January 1800, Ushakov continued to patrol the Italian coasts and maintain order at Naples. Meanwhile he tried to coordinate with Nelson the combined siege of Malta. Finally, he decided to send Kartsov with his Baltic fleet to Malta and he would take his Black Sea fleet back to Corfu for repairing because they were not in a condition to sail to Malta. However on 3 January he received the imperial decree ordering Ushakov to return to the Black Sea, for Paul was increasingly frustrated with his British and Habsburg allies. Yet Ushakov could not withdraw all his force from the Mediterranean because of the poor condition of his ships. He left Corfu with the main fleet only in July 1800, leaving some ships behind for one more year.<sup>232</sup> Nevertheless, the Russians continued to send squadrons to the Adriatic and the Ottomans continued to foot the bill of provisioning until they went to war in 1806.

The Ottoman fleet, on the other hand, reached to the Dardanelles on 3 November. Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa took certain measures to pacify the crews prior to their voyage to İstanbul.<sup>233</sup> Immediately after its return, a new squadron was sent to Corfu and

---

<sup>231</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 123; C. J. Tucker, *The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I* (Syracuse University, unpublished dissertation, 1965), p. 238.

<sup>232</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 123-125.

<sup>233</sup> HAT 156/6526-A (13C1214/12Nov1799) from Hüseyin Paşa to the Porte. He alleged to the crews that he had not passed on the news of mutiny to the Porte, but rather that he had pretended to the Porte that the fleet returned on his own orders in order to secure their favor with the Sultan. The Grand Admiral was permitted to return to İstanbul with the fleet from the Dardanelles on 12 November 1799, after organizing

the Ottomans continued to maintain squadrons often under Patrona Beg.<sup>234</sup>

This was the last expedition of *Uşak Paşa* (a Turkish abbreviation and synonymous with ‘servant’) who was already in his mid fifties. Paul never forgave him for failing to participate in the siege of Malta. *Kapudane* Abdülkadir Beg fared better at first, reaching the rank of Grand Admiral at his mid-60s for a short period of time. It seems he could never manage to go to pilgrimage as his insistent requests were rejected on different grounds: it was first the war with France, and then the unexpected death of the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa. Consequently, he was dismissed from the office (June 1804) prior to the 1805 naval reforms and banished to Bursa only to be appointed governor of Hanya (Crete) in January 1805.<sup>235</sup>

---

the reinforcement of the Dardanelles; the crews were rewarded in İstanbul in a ceremony held by the Grand Admiral, C.BH 6802 (1S1215/24June1800).

<sup>234</sup> The squadron comprised of the ‘small frigate’ of *Hediyetü’l-müluk*, the corvette of *Burc-ı Zafer*, the frigate of *Küşade-i Baht* and two light vessels, HAT 155/6513 (5CA1214/5Oct1799) from Hüseyin Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>235</sup> “This short and stocky man was already at his 60 during the expedition”, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 36; He petitioned the Porte in 1803 to receive the salary and allowances of the rank of *Kapudane* for the remainder of his life, arguing -quite ungratefully- that he was not granted bonus and gratuities in the former campaigns and that he was old. As Selim accepted the request he was granted: 7,500 *krş* annual salary and a daily allowance from the Imperial Kitchen of 4 *kıyye* of rice, 2.5 *kıyye* of clarified butter with 5 *kıyye* of mutton to be sent from the Head of Butchers, C.BH 3011 (1S1218/23Mayıs1803); His term of office is 18 June 1803 – 31 May 1804, Mehmed Ali Beyhan (ed.), *Cabi Tarihi*, v. I, pp. 92-93; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani* (İstanbul, 1308-1315), v. 3, p. 348.

## Conclusion

This chapter is intended to be a rather detailed account of the military operations simply because there is almost no study on the military activities of the navy of Selim. This is all the more surprising since his naval reforms have always been found the most successful among others. We will summarize some of our findings in this part.

A recent study evaluating the performance of the Ottoman navy in that era concluded that the navy of Selim was second to the British navy in the Mediterranean after the Battle of Nile. It was capable of undertaking independent amphibious operations in Egypt and indispensable to Russian and British allies in the eastern Mediterranean. While it could not fight at two fronts with full force at the same time (Adriatic and Egypt), “it participated in all major campaigns in the Levant between 1798 and 1801.” Despite its own shortage problems, it could supply the British navy with cordage, planks, masts, ropes and provisions particularly in the last phase of the war in Egypt.<sup>236</sup>

The degree of initiative both Admirals had to take is astonishing. There is good reason to assume that it did not totally stem from bad communications due to the distance between the imperial centers and the Ionian Islands. For instance, it was already March when the Sublime Porte finally sent Abdülkadir a copy of the treaty of alliance, hoping that it would serve as a guide to keep up the good relations and cordiality with the

---

<sup>236</sup> K. McCranie, “The Operations and Effectiveness of the Ottoman Navy” pp. 155-164. The author is more concerned with the Egyptian front, but his observations also hold true for the Adriatic front as we have seen.

Russians.<sup>237</sup> The treaty itself was signed many months after the launching of the expedition. Although the ultimate object was expelling the French from the Ionian Islands, Paul later urged Ushakov to join the siege of Malta for many times, but he oftentimes contradicted the orders. Nelson, on the other hand, sought to be the sole ‘liberator’ of the Ionians and was embittered when the combined fleet reached to the islands before he did. He constantly protested to the Ottomans and Russians that Egypt, and not Corfu, should be of prime consideration. London was willing to comply with Paul’s demands on the Russian participation in the siege of Malta. This time it was Nelson’s turn to contradict his sovereign. According to him, London failed to see the island’s strategic value. Therefore he was not cooperative in his relations with Ushakov.<sup>238</sup> We also reviewed Abdülkadir’s decisions that stood in contrast to his superiors. Thus, the fate of the expedition was not usually decided on by the imperial centers, but the actual men on the scene; that is, the military staff in our case.

As our overview of the expedition has illustrated for many times, imperial rivalries were never absent from the expedition. Ottoman apprehensions for getting equal treatment and Russian pretences for being the ‘liberators’ sometimes blur the written evidence on the expedition. It is hoped that this chapter has served as a corrective on certain points. To begin with, the Ottomans were not mere auxiliaries in the expedition as proved by textual as well as visual evidence. They took the initiative in reconciling the differences between Ushakov and Ali Paşa. While there may have been problems in the

---

<sup>237</sup> HAT 164/6843-A (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>238</sup> Tucker, *The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I*, pp. 225-26, 231; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 123.

command of the Ottoman fleet, it was by no means as acute as claimed by the Russians. They resented ‘pro-British’ Mahmud Raif and Patrona, suspecting the former of plotting with Nelson for a British participation in the siege. His correspondence with Nelson, however, were formal letters informing Nelson on the course of the siege. We have also seen that Abdülkadir also praised the qualities of allegedly insubordinate Patrona. Thus, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral after Abdülkadir filled the post of the Grand Admiral.

Western sources are mistaken to assume that Ushakov was inactive and over-cautious so much so that he contented himself with blockading Corfu and thought attacking Vidos only in late February. Nevertheless, Ottoman documents prove that the allies planned the invasion of Vidos in November, but could not carry it out due to the lack of land troops. Assumptions about Ali Paşa’s secret dealings with both Admirals also proved to have been mistaken. We should also once more draw attention to the fact that Ali Paşa acted on the orders of the Porte when he attacked the towns on the mainland and it was always the Ottoman officials –Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi, Mahmud Raif Efendi and Abdülkadir Beg- who coordinated his participation in the siege. It would be safe to conclude that what brought the ultimate victory was the participation of the Albanian mercenaries in the final stage of the siege.<sup>239</sup>

Mutual prejudices brought to the fore many quarrels. When the Ottomans mounted cannon in a church at Corfu during the siege, French guns, attempting to silence

---

<sup>239</sup> For a criticism of Russian sources for giving Ushakov the sole credit for the achievement see, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 91.

the Ottoman gun, demolished the church for which the inhabitants loathed the ‘Turks.’ Fights broke out among the Russians and the Ottomans during the siege of Corfu. As the Ottomans refused to assist the Russian gunners to load the guns in one battery, a fierce fight broke out in which two Russians were killed and two Ottoman marines took refuge with the French. Ottoman embitterment was such that the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Pasha refused to salute the Russian fleet later in İstanbul on the grounds that the Russian arrogance towards the Ottomans was unjustified since most of their seamen were actually Ottoman subjects.<sup>240</sup> Nevertheless, such incidents were sporadic and did not prevent the two fleets operate together for a year.

In the next chapter, we will focus on the financial facet of the expedition and hopefully realize that the Ottoman contribution to the Wars of Second Coalition was not limited to the dispatching a fleet to the Adriatic.

---

<sup>240</sup> Jervis & Jervis, *A History of Corfu*, p. 173; McKnight claims that deploying of the gun in the church was a ‘deliberate disregard for the sensibilities of the inhabitants’ without citing any source to substantiate this claim, see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 123.

## CHAPTER IV

### FINANCE

#### Introduction

This chapter opens with a discussion of the general nature of the Ottoman finance, war finance in particular, in a comparative perspective for grasping the financial situation of the Sublime Porte vis-à-vis its allies. This section also discusses the first ‘serious’ Ottoman attempt to make foreign loans. The following section examines the regular and extraordinary revenues that were put in use to finance the war against France. It suggests an alternative understanding of international borrowing under the headline of ‘foreign sources of revenue’ as well. By the same token, the third section is devoted to expenses in order to compare and contrast the place of the war on the Adriatic frontier with that in Egypt. We will examine the Ottomans methods of fund transfer and pricing policy so as to emphasize how the Ottomans managed to finance the war as cheap as possible. We will also realize the role of the great and petty *ayans* –Ali Paşa of Yanya and local powerbrokers in the Morea, respectively- in the whole process, which suggests the existence of a more integrative system than we usually assume in this particular period of Ottoman history. A last section focuses on the specific topic of freight payments since its role in Ottoman wars have usually been left in oblivion; this section will provide fresh evidences to otherwise well-known decline of Muslim shipping in the Mediterranean. It, nevertheless, also brought to fore another dimension of diplomacy that has hitherto been totally ignored: how to handle the disputes on freight payments when the ship-owners are non-Ottoman subjects.



## Financing the War

Studies on Ottoman military history reveal that the Ottomans made war on the cheap by Western European standards.<sup>1</sup> The Porte relegated a portion of its administrative power to the provincial power-holders –the timariots in earlier periods and the notables in the period under discussion- and made available vast financial resources to them in return for a number of services. In addition, the Ottomans expected various tasks to be fulfilled in return for several tax exemptions under the appellations of *ocaklık* and *yurt*.<sup>2</sup> While an analysis of the patchy structure of the Ottoman finances falls beyond the scope of this study, it should be stated that allocation of resources and delegation of power resulted in lower treasury revenues as well as lower military spending in comparison to the Ottomans' western foes. Even in the 'golden age' of the sixteenth century the average annual spending of the Ottoman central treasury was 118 metric tons of silver whereas this figure for Spain was 440 metric tons. Even 'the province of France' –as once Süleyman the Magnificent labeled it in his letter to Francois I- had an average annual revenue of 500 metric tons of silver. Although the revenues of the Ottoman

---

<sup>1</sup> Aksan provides an overview of Ottoman wars in various post-seventeenth century and reaches this conclusion, see, V. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870. An Empire Besieged* (Pearson, Longman, 2007). Ágoston is also of the same idea for pre-eighteenth century Ottoman wars, see G. Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan. Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 203.

<sup>2</sup> Nejat Göyünç, "Yurtluk-Ocaklık Deyimleri Hakkında", in *Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na Armağan* (İstanbul, 1991), pp. 269-77; no treatment of the subject in English exists, but for the operation of the system in Ottoman saltpeter plants see Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan*, pp. 109-110 and see İ. Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersane-i Amire* (Ankara: TTK, 2003) and A. Yusuf Alperen, *Osmanlı Denizciliği (1700-1770)* (İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2007) for its place within the Imperial Dockyards. Similar institutions existed in the West as well. For instance, as long as they provided the required amount of iron for the state factory, the Vyg community of the Old Believers in Russia had certain exemptions, see Robert O. Crummey, *The Old Believers and the World of Antichrist: The Vyg Community and the Russian State 1694-1855* (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).

Empire approached the levels of these states a century later, the portion the central treasury claimed in the total revenues did not change considerably in the course of time with a ratio of 29 % in 1527 and 24 % in the 1660s.<sup>3</sup> By the 1780s, the average annual revenue of the central treasury had already succumbed to a low of 88.5 tons of silver and rose to 138 tons in the reign of Selim III, though it is not certain how much of the total revenues this figure represented.<sup>4</sup> According to a recent research, though, only one-fourth of the gross tax revenues, or one-third of the net tax revenues accrued to the central treasury.<sup>5</sup> How did the state of Ottoman finances compare to that of its allies?

In 1796, Russia's gross revenues amounted to 73.1 million rubles, whereas the collection costs of 17.7 million (24.2 % of the gross revenues) reduced the net revenue to

---

<sup>3</sup> E. Özvar, "Osmanlı Devletinin Bütçe Harcamaları (1509-1788)" in M. Genç and E. Özvar (eds.) *Osmanlı Maliyesi, Kurumlar ve Bütçeler* (Osmanlı Bankası, 2006), pp. 210-12; for a concise description of revenue and expenditure bureaus of the Sublime Porte, see Cezar, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Mali Bürokrasi Tarihine Giriş. XVIII. Yüzyılda Bab-ı Defteri" *Toplum ve Ekonomi* 4 (1993): 129-160.

<sup>4</sup> This compares unfavorably to Russia's 1,300 and France's 3,000 metric tones of fine silver, see M. Körner, "Expenditure" in R. Bonney ed. *Economic Systems and State Finance* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) pp. 418, 420; My own calculation is based on the equation: 20,000,000 *krş* (the average annual revenue) x 6.9 grams of silver content of a *kuruş* [hereafter, *krş*]. Genç estimated the annual revenue in the 1790s at 20,000,000 *krş*, Genç, "Esham: İç Borçlanma" in Genç ed. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul, 2003), p. 190; Özvar has a slightly different figure for the year 1787-88, which is 132,4 tons of silver, see Özvar, "Osmanlı Devletinin Bütçe Harcamaları (1509-1788)", p. 220. Eldem warns that the intrinsic value of the Ottoman *krş* is hard to establish due to the lack of precision of purity and weight, see Eldem, *French Trade in the Eighteenth Century* (Brill, Leiden, 1999), p. 117, fn. 18; In any case Özvar's calculations based on the consumer price index tabulated by Pamuk exhibit a net loss of revenue by late eighteenth century, see, Özvar, "Osmanlı Devletinin Bütçe Harcamaları", pp. 222-23. He is cautious about his findings since he did not take account of the silver-gold parity as it changed little over time, p. 206. For gram-content of *krş* see Pamuk, "The Great Ottoman Debasement, 1808-1844: A Political Economy Framework", in I. Gershoni, H. Erdem and U Woköck (eds.) *Histories of the Modern Middle East, New Directions* (Boulder, 2002), pp. 21-36.

<sup>5</sup> Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships. The Islamic World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 165-66; some foreign observers of the Ottoman finances estimated that only one-fifth of the taxes (4 million of 20 million pounds sterling) was transferred to the Imperial Treasury. According to another estimate by 1789 annual revenues accruing to the center was 2.25 million pounds whereas the revenues of Great Britain and France were estimated at 16.8 million and 24 million, respectively. McGowan finds this estimates too low by as much as a third, McGowan, "A Perspective on the Eighteenth Century" in İnalcık and Quataert eds. *A Social Economic History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 714.

55.4 million rubles. The budget deficit resulted from expenditure of 78.2 million had to be covered by the emission of paper money –the *assignat*- that stood at 156.7 million rubles on paper by 1796. The national debt reached 215 million rubles the same year and it was on the rise.<sup>6</sup> Mustafa Rasih Efendi, the Ottoman envoy sent to St Petersburg after the war of 1787-1792, had observed with suspicion the functioning of paper money in his dim days in St Petersburg.<sup>7</sup> İbrahim Afif Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna, was more averse to the use of paper money in comparison to Mustafa Rasih. He was stunned by the sum of the loan requested by France from Britain in the peace negotiations in 1797: 500 million livres in 15 years. He could only presume that the sum was to be paid in paper money “*pankoçtil*” and remarked in the true spirit of a man of the ancient regime, “a thousand purses of it did not worth a *kuruş* in the period of crisis.”<sup>8</sup> By

---

<sup>6</sup> Bonney, “The Struggle for Great Power Status” in R. Bonney ed. *Economic Systems and State Finance* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), p. 368. Russia was particularly put at a difficult situation by the French invasion of the Low Lands, the prominent financier of Russia.

<sup>7</sup> Astonished by the widespread use of copper coins and paper money in Russia, Mustafa Rasih inquired into the matter. When he was told that 5 million silver rubles were deposited in the treasury to back the paper money in circulation, he was not convinced; he, rather, believed that there was no metal currency amassed to back the paper money. He was nevertheless impressed by the popular acceptance of *asganas* (assignat?) in Russia which enabled the state ‘to mint countless copper coins and print unlimited amount of paper money whenever it needed.’ Uğur İyigünler, *Mustafa Rasih Efendi'nin Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaretnamesi* (Kırıkkale Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1998), folios 11a-20b.

<sup>8</sup> Almost all rulers including Catherine II and Napoleon regarded the paper money as a necessary evil and tried to avoid circulating them, though often to no avail; A.AMD 39/46 (13CA1212/3Nov1797) İbrahim Efendi: “I have inquired about the Livre. It is worth half *kuruş*, as they say. I calculated it at 1 *para*. A million of it made 25,000 purses. At the rate of half *kuruş* it makes 500,000 purses! Those, who disseminated this gossip [the French request for the loan], either have no acquaintance with the nickel or do not know accounting. Or else, it is that [kind of] money circulating throughout Europe, but exists only in name. They are mere framed papers featuring big hallmarks, various writings, and numbers; but, in times of exigency a thousand purse of it would not worth a *kuruş*.” (*Livre'yi sual idim. Yarımşar guruş imiş. Çakerleri birer paradan hesab idim. Bir milyonu 25.000 kise itdi. Yarımşar guruşdan beş kere 100.000 kise ider. Bu sözü neşridenler ya budur ki çok akçe görmemiş yahud hesab bilmezler. Yahud Frengistan'da mütedakil ve müteda'ir cismi ma'dum lafzı murad bir akçedir ki bir parça çarcube kağıdı üzerinde büyük damgalar ve dürlü dürlü yazular ve Firengi rakamlar ile münakkaş pankoçtil tabir olunur evrakdan ibarettir ki vakt-ı ıztırablarında 1000 kiseligi bir guruş itmez.*) First part of İbrahim's calculation is wrong.

contrast, Mahmud Raif Efendi was deeply impressed by the wide circulation of bank notes in England during his term at the Ottoman Embassy in London.<sup>9</sup>

The Ottomans lacked a credit mechanism in the western sense whereby European states found alternative financial means for the war effort in banking systems and international loans supported by the control of maritime trade routes abroad and the flourishing local industries at home. To illustrate with figures, Britain's national debt amounted roughly to 240 million pounds by 1783 because of the American War of Independence. This was equivalent of more than twenty years' revenue; yet she could still find credit at just 3 percent interest rate.<sup>10</sup> However, interest rates in the Ottoman Empire ranged between 10-15 % in the eighteenth century and the available creditors were less in number.<sup>11</sup>

---

In fact, at the rate of a *para* [hereafter, *pr*], 25,000 purses would make 500 million livres, as opposed to his 'a million.'

<sup>9</sup> Mahmud Raif Efendi was well-informed on the finances of Britain. As of 1797, the budgetary revenues of Britain were equal to 22 million pounds sterling with half of it deriving from customs duties. 12 million of the budget was paid in interest on the national debt. From 1793 to 1797 the national debt rose from 240 million to 360 million. While the interest on the old debt was paid at the rate of three per cent, the new debt was charged 4.5-5 %. Citing from Pitt's speech addressing the Parliament, he pointed out that war with France was actually beneficial for the commerce of Britain, see M. A. Yalçınkaya, *The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Embassy in Europe. The Embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London (1794-1797)* (The University of Birmingham, unpublished dissertation, 1993), pp. 175-77.

<sup>10</sup> The French government inherited from the Seven Years War a debt of nearly two thousand million livres (roughly 80 million pounds) which ruined its credit and led to the summoning of the Estates General in 1789. C. Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 300; G. Parker, "Dynastic War" in Parker (ed.), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: the Triumph of the West* (Cambridge Uni. Press 1995), p. 89; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge, Mass.: B. Blackwell, 1990), pp. 74-5.

<sup>11</sup> For the Ottoman credit mechanisms see Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships*; Pamuk, "Osmanlı Devletinin İç Borçlanma Kurumlarının Evrimi, 1600-1850" in Pamuk (ed.), *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Kurumları* (Türkiye İş Bankası, 2007), pp. 133-147; Pamuk, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Paranın Tarihi* (İstanbul: TTV, 1999), pp. 84-95. In 1760, there were 65 money-changers in İstanbul who held the necessary licence (*gedik*) with an additional 70 individuals who were allowed to engage in financial dealings, see S. Kaya, *XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Toplumunda Kredi* (Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2003), p. 93; for a critical approach to the study of the topic in Ottoman case, see Cezar, "18. Yüzyılda Eyüp'te Para ve Kredi Konuları Üzerine Gözlemler" in T. Artan (ed.), *18. Yüzyıl Kadı*

Apparently, the Ottoman Empire still had the ability of reorganizing and redirecting its resources in wartime by the late 18<sup>th</sup> century at the expense of increasing the level of exaction from an already overtaxed population for financing the war. Employing the vocabulary of Tilly, the Ottoman Empire was an under-financed state due to the insufficient level of coercion –resource extraction-, which, in turn, undermined its capacity of “war-making and state-making as organized crime.”<sup>12</sup> The expedition to the Ionians was not an exception to the Ottoman wars of eighteenth century in the sense that doubling of central revenues owing to the extraordinary wartime extortions was followed by a drastic fall in the central revenues, for irregular revenues were not sustainable.<sup>13</sup>

Almost all allies including the Habsburgs and Russia contracted extensive loans and, in a sense, made war with France on British subsidies. Consequently, the Sublime Porte decided to borrow from Britain in substantial amounts in March 1799 to no avail. The Ottomans too officially applied to Britain to make a loan of a million *lira* (952,381 guinea) at the interest rate of 6 %, drawing on the example of the British loan lent on the Habsburgs in 1796-97. Although the ruling exchange rate for a guinea was 14 *krş*, the

---

*Sicilleri Işığında Eyüp'te Sosyal Yaşam* (İstanbul: TTV, 1998), pp. 15-32; also see Cezar, “Economy and Taxation: The role of sarrafs in Ottoman finance and economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” in C. Imber, K. Kiyotaki and R. Murphey (eds.), *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West*, v. I (I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 61-76; A. Salzmänn, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire. Rival Paths to the Modern State* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 110-16.

<sup>12</sup> C. Tilly, “War Making and State Making As Organized Crime”, in P. Evans, D. Reueschemeyer, T. Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, 1985); Aksan, “The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind”, p. 229 and “Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empires”, pp. 131-32 both in Aksan (ed.), *Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts* (İstanbul: Isis, 2004). Tilly argues that oppression (the improvisation of universal conscription system) and negotiation (financing the army by curbing the financial autonomies of local power brokers) were the means of creating the modern, rational, bureaucratic state, see Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*.

<sup>13</sup> Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, pp. 45-83; Ágoston, “Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826” in J. Black (ed.), *European Warfare, 1453-1815* (London, 1999), p. 143.

Porte expressed its readiness to offer 15 *krş* instead, which would make a loan worth 28,000 purses. While this almost equalled the average annual revenue of the Porte, it instructed İsmail Ferruh Efendi, its ambassador at London, to increase the amount to 40,000 – 50,000 purses by December 1799.<sup>14</sup> Selim boasted in his letter to George III that he did not have any foreign debts and that he would not have needed any to carry out his extensive reforms if only he had not had to send many armies and outfit a lot of ships to fight ‘such a [strong] nation as the French.’ Lord Grenville, however, declined the request in March 1800 on the grounds of budgetary strains.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the Ottomans had to wait for yet another ‘global moment’ to make their first foreign loan –the Crimean War.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Guinea was the British gold coin equivalent to 21 shillings; its name appreciated the gold mines in Guinea in West Africa. The Porte calculated that a *lira* was equal to 13 *krş* 10 *pr*. Should London agree to provide half of the loan in guinea with other half in *krş* (*kara krş*), the loan would make 28,000 purses and the Porte would offer 14.5 *krş* a guinea. But the Porte was ready to offer 15 *krş* a guinea if the loan was delivered in guinea, HAT 142/5895 (29B1214/27Dec1799); the Porte and the British ambassador Smith agreed in principle for a loan for a million *lira* early in March. While the Porte construed to pay it back with its customs dues, Smith recommended delivery of cotton, wool, and copper in return for the loan. He also offered to discount the cost of the supplies and ammunitions ordered from Britain from the amount of loan so as to convince London to the scheme. The order for the Arsenal, the Imperial Dockyards and the Ammunition Stores (*Cebehahe*) included items such as tin and zinc (*tutya*). They were to be carried by two ships and cost several thousand purses, A.AMD 40/67 (after December 1799).

<sup>15</sup> Uzunçarşılı gave the date of Selim’s letter as 2 August 1800, but this is probably a misdating, see Uzunçarşılı, “Türk-İngiliz Münasebatına Dair Vesikalar”, *Bellekten* XIII/51 (1949), p. 594-96; E. Kuran, *Avrupa’da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri, 1793-1821* (Ankara, 1968), p. 40; Kuran contended that the amount of the loan was a million sterling –it was actually slightly less. Yalçınkaya repeats this mistake see, M. A. Yalçınkaya, “İsmail Ferruh Efendi’nin Londra Büyükelçiliği ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1797-1800) in K. Çiçek (ed.), *Pax Ottomana. Studies in Memoriam Prof. Dr. Nejat Göyünç* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2001), p. 405; Lord Grenville expressed concerns about the debates in Parliament in the sessions over the budget and confessed that “it is obvious that we will have to resort to considerable coercion to collect [money] from the populace” (*hala akçe tedarikiçün Parlamentoda olan münazaa rana malumunuzdur. Ve tahsiliçün bu sene ahaliye külli cebritmeğe muhtac olacağımız aşıkardır*). He, however, promised to look into the matter after passing his budget from the Parliament. İsmail Ferruh confirmed to the Porte that there was stiff resistance in the Parliament against Grenville’s budgetary demands, HAT 959/41183-F (16L214/12March1800).

<sup>16</sup> The loans made in 1854 and 1855 totaled 7,150,095 sterling, while the total war expenses were 11,2 million sterlings, Şevket K. Akar and H. Al, *Osmanlı Dış Borçları ve Gözetim Komisyonları, 1854-1855* (İstanbul, 2003), pp. 14-16.

What accounted for the British refusal to extend loans to the Porte was likely the decision of Lord Grenville to limit the subsidies to 2 million pounds a year in reaction to incessant demands of German princes for subsidy. It was cheaper for Britain to spend 11 pounds 2 shillings a year for recruiting a soldier abroad than mobilizing and maintaining a British soldier in Europe at a cost of between 60-70 pounds. In the period 1793-1815 Britain distributed 10 % (65.8 million pounds sterling) of its total revenue as subsidies to its allies. As much as one-third (21.2 million pounds) of these subsidies were made in the period 1793-1801, while average annual expenditure of Britain was around 13.2 million pound a year in 1798-1801.<sup>17</sup>

According to an account book, in the period 29 November 1798 – 19 September 1799, the Porte was able to extract 16,413,028 *krş* (32,826 purses) in addition to its regular incomes.<sup>18</sup> The following is a brief description of Ottoman war finances in general and of the Ottoman-Russian naval expedition to the Ionians in particular.

## **Revenues**

### Treasury Bonds (*esham*)

One of the financial consequences of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774 was the implementation of a new fiscal instrument, *esham*, as a means of internal borrowing in 1775. Ottoman polity and land regime was characterized by the *timar* system, which was basically granting the right to taxation on a given piece of land to certain military and

---

<sup>17</sup> Bonney, “The Struggle for Great Power Status”, pp. 378-82, 387.

<sup>18</sup> For a detailed analysis study of this account book (BOA, KK 2383) see, F. Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına Osmanlı Kara Ordusunda Değişim, 1793-1826*, (Hacettepe Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009). I am grateful to Yeşil for letting me know of this document.

civil officials in return for state service. It differed from the similar landholding regimes in the former (Saljukids) and contemporary (the Mughals) states within Islamdom in that the land belonged to the patrimonial state and right of collecting certain agricultural taxes were not hereditary. By the seventeenth century, the timariot cavalry raised by this system decreased in importance in comparison to the musket-bearing infantry. Increasing firepower in warfare transformed the warfare into an expensive business. At this juncture shaped by marginalized timariot and need for new resources did the transformation of *timar* lands into tax-farms emerge as a convenient solution. In the course of the century the system expanded so as to include non-agricultural resources under the name of *muqataa* –fiscal units. In 1695, the Ottomans made another change to the system to meet the financial challenges of the protracted wars after the siege of Vienna (1683). Under the new system of *malikane* -tax-farms-, the annual tax revenue of a tax base was now put on auction for life-time rather than the previous term of 1-3 years. The Porte presumed that the buyer of the *malikane* would take care of protecting and developing the tax resource, for he would hold it for lifetime. On the contrary, it led to the emergence of absenteeism as the new rentier class sub-leased their revenue sources in the provinces to the highest bidder from the region.

In 1775, the Porte was faced with new financial challenges after the devastating war with Russia, save the substantial war indemnity that amounted to half of the central treasury revenues (7.5 million *krş*, or 4 million rubles). The solution was *esham*, the treasury bonds; that is, division of the annual revenue of a given *muqataa* source into lots/bonds to sell in auction to the highest bidder for lifetime. As each bond was sold at a



price (*muaccele*) roughly five times higher than its annual revenue, the state was able to increase the treasury revenues at least in the short-term. The new system of share-holding was rather based on customs and other urban revenue sources as opposed to agricultural revenue sources which were usually subject to the *malikane* system.<sup>19</sup>

It was already understood by the reign of Selim III that the *esham* system – the share-holding system- was working against the interests of the Ottoman fisc. The *esham*-holders could sell their bonds on the market after paying a small amount of fee (*kasr-ı yed*) with the result that the bonds ceased to return to the treasury after its holder deceased. Selim’s fiscal reform aimed at gradual elimination of the *esham* system by channeling them back to the treasury through certain measures. Selim set up a new treasury, the New Revenues (*İrad-ı Cedid*), and transferred those *muqataas* with an annual revenue of less than 5,000 *krş* to the new treasury as an initial step to dispense with the entire *esham* system. As the New Revenues was declared as the sole authorized buyer of the *esham*, the system would fade away in the long run since the new treasury was not to re-sell the returning *esham*. By the end of the eighteenth century, the *esham*-holders, whose total number did not exceed 4,000-5,000, were also obliged to deliver 50 % of the annual revenue of their *esham* to the Treasury in wartime (*cebelu bedeliyesi*: lit.,

---

<sup>19</sup> Y. Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi* (İstanbul: Alan, 1986), pp. 74-89, 104-110; Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi* (İstanbul: Dergah, 1985), M. Genç, “Esham: İç Borçlanma” in Genç ed. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2003), 186-196; Genç, “Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi”, in idem., 99-153; for a recapitulation of Genç’s findings with a seminal approach see A. Salzmann, “An Ancien Regime Revisited: Privatization and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire”, *Politics and Society* 21 (1993): 393-423.

cash substitution for combatant).<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, the Porte once again resorted to the sale of *esham* to finance the war with France.

*Esham* revenues constituted the largest percentage with 31.8 % in the extraordinary wartime budget in 1798-99. Especially the *muqataas* of the Spirits (*Zecriye Rüşümü*) and İstanbul Customhouse for Goods (*İstanbul Emtia Gümrüğü*) were crucial in the embodiment of the *esham* revenues.<sup>21</sup> The total revenue accrued from the *muqataa* fiscal units was equal to 5,225,169.5 *krş*. Of this sum, 1,762,913.5 *krş* were collected as the *cebelu* contribution from the existing *esham*-holders. In the period of 18 July - 8 October 1799, 150 *esham* of the Customs of the Goods brought 1,498,625 *krş*.<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that the Porte only allowed the non-Muslim subjects to buy the *esham* of the *muqataa* of the Spirits, thus creating new prospects for non-Muslim investors as pointed out by Cezar.<sup>23</sup> 30 *esham* of the revenue of the Spirits were actually sold at the price of six years' income, producing 229,000 *krş* until mid-September 1799: the 'Jewish community' delivered 63,000 *krş* in 2 November 1798 – 14 August 1799, while the 'Armenian community' bought *esham* worth 150,000 *krş* on 27 August 1799. The Porte also allowed the children of Hançerlioğlu, the executed voivode of Moldavia, to buy a single *sehm* (singular of *esham*) at the price of 16,000 *krş*, on 26 July 1799.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Genç, "Esham: İç Borçlanma", pp. 191-93.

<sup>21</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, pp. 196-99; KK 2383, 2a.

<sup>22</sup> KK 8323, 1b. Besides this sum, a certain *esham* buyer, Istaki, submitted 164,800 *krş* from the promised 500,000 *krş* between 11 October 1798 – 29 September 1799. Aleko and Dimitraki also promised to deliver to the Treasury 100,000 *krş* of which they paid 55,000 *krş* from 24 April 1799 until 6 October 1798, KK 8323, 1b.

<sup>23</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde*, 185.

<sup>24</sup> KK 2383, 1b.

The revenues derived from re-selling the returning *esham* amounted to 1,514,831 *krş* and 43.75 % of the total *esham* sold to finance the war. This proves that the Porte actually expanded the *esham* system by releasing new *esham* in the market and thus contradicting the prime motivation for Selim's financial reforms; that is, abolition of the whole *esham* system. The biggest portion belonged to the Istanbul Customhouse of Goods with revenue of 455,832 *krş*.<sup>25</sup> However, 350,000 *krş* (750 purses) of this revenue was transferred from the revenues of the *muqataa* of the Spirits since the revenues of the Customs of the Goods fell short of backing the new *esham*.<sup>26</sup> Other *esham* belonged to a number of *muqataas* in the Balkans including the salt works of Ahyolu, revenues of tobacco cultivation in Siroz, administrations of Üsküb and Filibe, *muqataas* of Manastır and Berkofce as well as the office of voivode of İzmir.<sup>27</sup>

While this brief analysis suggests that 180 *esham* from the Customs of the Goods and the *muqataa* of the Spirits sold at the price of six years' revenue, Cezar noted the sale of 150 *esham* from the two revenue sources at eight times higher a price than their annual revenue. This would theoretically yield 2,800,000 *krş*. But until the end of August 1799 they yielded only 905,500 *krş* of which 47 % accrued from those *esham* that had already been withdrawn from the market in accordance with the fiscal reform.<sup>28</sup> Presumably, the

---

<sup>25</sup> KK 2383, 1b.

<sup>26</sup> Y. Cezar, pp. 172-73. KK 2383 lists the transfer of 350,000 *krş* (750 purses) to the Customs of the Goods as *ber-vech-i ocaklık*, see 1b. We can also speculate that this transfer actually benefitted the Muslim bidders, who would otherwise have been excluded from the auction of the *esham* of the *muqataa* of the Spirits.

<sup>27</sup> KK 2383, 1b.

<sup>28</sup> Istanbul Customhouse of the Goods offered a hundred *esham* with annual revenue of five purses each with each full lot further divided into eight smaller lots to attract the minor investors as well. As for the

Porte then offered new *esham* at a lower price to meet the financial expectations of both the fisc and the bidders since by mid-October 1799 the total *esham* revenues –except for the cebelu revenues- totaled roughly 3.5 million *krş* as mentioned above.

### The Imperial Mint and the Campaign Treasury

Funds transferred from the Imperial Mint constituted the second greatest proportion of the extraordinary wartime revenues in 1798-99 with 28 % (4,600,000 *krş*). According to Yeşil's calculations, 21.7 % of the extraordinary revenues of the Imperial Mint were actually those forwarded from the religious endowments for the upkeep of the Holy Cities belonging to Selim's mother, the *Valide*, the queen mother.<sup>29</sup> Despite their fiscal exemptions, religious endowments were forced to contribute substantially to the war effort beginning by the Ottoman-Russian wars of the late eighteenth century to meet the financial challenges of war. Yusuf Aga, the steward of the queen mother and one of the most powerful men of the era, was ordered in March 1799 to transfer 2,000 purses from the afore-mentioned endowments to the Imperial Mint.<sup>30</sup> The percentage of this revenue source in the total extraordinary wartime budget is 8 %.<sup>31</sup> The Imperial Mint was the principal source of revenue for the Campaign Treasury (*Umur-ı Seferiye*) that met most of the expenses of the expedition to the Ionians together with the Treasury of the *İrad-ı Cedid*.<sup>32</sup>

---

revenues of the Spirits, the Porte offered in the auction fifty lots, each annually bringing 2,000 *krş*, see Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde*, pp. 172-73.

<sup>29</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, pp. 195-99.

<sup>30</sup> BOA, C.Saray 1712 (29N1213/6March1799). Yusuf Aga was the supervisor of the endowments founded for the upkeep of the holy cities.

<sup>31</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, p. 196.

<sup>32</sup> Refer to the Appendices A and B to see the role of the Campaign Treasury in the expedition.

### The New Revenues (*İrad-ı Cedid*)

The establishment of the Treasury of the New Revenues in March 1793 was the main instrument of Selim's financial reform. While Ottoman historians have attributed its creation to the expenses related with the new army, *Nizam-ı Cedid*, along the Western models, Cezar demonstrated that its basic function was the disposal of the *malikane* and *esham* system as well as the emancipation of the *timar* land regime for the benefit of the fisc. It was also hoped that the new treasury would serve as an emergency fund for future wars.<sup>33</sup> In 17 years after its implementation, the *esham* system inflicted a loss of 14,000 purses (7,000,000 *krş*) on the treasury until 1791. Still worse, the authorities calculated that this loss would be doubled in four years unless drastic measures were taken. While the first attempts to stop selling new *esham* were defeated because of the war with Russia (1787-1792), the fiscal reforms of Selim managed to ban the sale of *esham* in circulation to the third parties and declared the New Revenues the sole legitimate buyer in order to withdraw them from the market.<sup>34</sup>

Principal sources of the new treasury were composed of the revenues of the *malikane mukataas*, of *esham*, and of *timar* lands seized by the New Revenues. Next came the taxes on the Spirits (*zecriye*), cotton (*penbe*), wool (*yapağı* –the longer spring-shorn wool as opposed to *yün* shorter autumn-shorn wool), *istefidye* (a peculiar kind of small currant grown in the Morea), madder (*kökboya*), gall nut (*mazi*), and mohair. For

---

<sup>33</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde*, p. 159; the Sublime Porte thought that it needed to increase the annual revenues by at least 20,000 purses and have a campaign fund of 150,000 purses for the wars in future, V. Aydın, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Esham Uygulaması (1775-1840)* (Ankara Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1998), p. 200.

<sup>34</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde*, p. 171; Genç, "Esham: İç Borçlanma", p. 191.

the hegira year [hereafter, H.] 1213-1214, the regular revenue of the new treasury was 5,111,595.5 *krş*, but the total budget reached to 7,301,370 *krş* with the addition of extraordinary wartime revenues (2,189,775 *krş*).<sup>35</sup> The contribution of the New Revenues to the extraordinary wartime budget was equal to 3,620,000 *krş* in 1798-99, which constituted 22 % of the total extraordinary wartime revenues. Yeşil pointed out that the contribution of the New Revenues represented 49.5 % of its revenue for that year.<sup>36</sup>

#### Confiscations, forced borrowings, donations, budgetary savings

The Porte increasingly resorted to the policy of confiscation as a means of financing wars beginning with the war with Russia (1768-1774). By the end of the century, confiscation was already an established practice to the dismay of many reform-minded Ottoman authors. With an increasing sense of insecurity, they directed veiled and open criticisms at the policy of confiscation in their treatises written in support of Selim's reforms.<sup>37</sup> In theory, the policy of confiscation applied to those officials executed or those who died a natural death with no heir. Nevertheless, in the wars with Russia, the Porte gradually turned its attention to the effects of non-official individuals such as merchants and money-changers who had business with the state.<sup>38</sup> Especially, *ayan*, the local foci of power, were subjected to confiscation in a systematic and harsh manner, for Sublime Porte considered their wealth as accumulated through illegitimate means. Selim III was very keen on directing the revenues deriving from confiscation to the treasury of

---

<sup>35</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde*, pp. 162-63, 170.

<sup>36</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, pp. 195-99.

<sup>37</sup> K. Beydilli, "Küçük Kaynarca'dan Tanzimat'a Islahat Düşünceleri", *İlmi Araştırmalar: Dil, Edebiyat, Tarih İncelemeleri* 8 (1999): 25-64.

<sup>38</sup> A. Şahiner, *The Sarrafs of Istanbul: Financiers of the Empire* (unpublished MA thesis, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1995).

the New Revenues.<sup>39</sup> Generally, the Porte left a portion of the effects of the deceased official to his inheritors –less so in the case of *ayan-*, or else enforced an exorbitant inheritance tax to be paid to the Imperial Mint. Cezar suggested that the revenues from the estates should not have constituted a vital source of revenue in the period under discussion, for they were of a transient and irregular nature.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, Yeşil showed that the revenues coming from confiscations constituted roughly 8 % of the extraordinary wartime budget in 1798-99. The confiscated effects of Hançerlioğlu Konstantin, the *voyvoda* of *Eflak* (Walachia), singled out with a value exceeding 500,000 *krş*.<sup>41</sup> In spring 1798, roughly 1,200 purses were collected as inheritance tax and confiscations to be spent on the renovation of various fortresses.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> Cezar, “Bir Ayanın Muhallefatı Havza ve Köprü Kazaları Ayanı Kör İsmail-oğlu Hüseyin (Müsadere olayı ve terekenin incelenmesi)” *Bellekten* XVI/161 (1977): 41-78, esp. pp. 49-50.

<sup>40</sup> Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde*, pp. 110-11; Genç, “18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş”, in Genç (ed.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul, 2005), p. 220. For the redistributive function of the policy of confiscation, see Cezar, “Bir Ayanın Muhallefatı”; Confiscation was not a smooth process, functionaries appointed to the task were lenient to embezzlement of the sequestered estate, while the relatives of the deceased usually concealed his valuables, H. Doğru, “Öldürülen Hacı-oğlu Pazarı Ayanı Sarıklıoğlu ile Adamlarının Muhallefatı ve Tasfiyesi”, *Uluslararası Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri Sempozyumu* (Eskişehir Üniversitesi, 2005), pp. 157-169; A. Bizirlik, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Bir Osmanlı Valisinin Ölümü Ardından Gelişen Olaylar Üzerine” *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* XV (2000): 171-81; for an eye-witness account of the difficulties involved in confiscation, A. İ. Savaş (ed.), *Ebu Sehl Nu'man Efendi. Tedbirat-ı Pesendide (Beğenilmiş Tedbirler)* (İstanbul: TTK, 1999), pp. 30-54; S. Faroqhi, “Zeytin Diyarında Güç ve Servet: Edremit Ayanından Mürizade Hacı Mehmed Ağa'nın Siyasi ve Ekonomik Faaliyetleri”, Ç. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds.), *Osmanlı'da Toprak Mülkiyeti ve Ticari Tarım* (İstanbul: TTV, 1998), pp.82-101, translation of the original title *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (SUNY, 1998).

<sup>41</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, p. 196.

<sup>42</sup> The Porte was to collect 1,500 purses from these items of revenues to spare for the renovation of Anapa, Ahışa, Erzurum (Caucasus), Yergöğü (Giurgiu), Kili, fortresses in Bosnia, and castles of the entrance of the Black Sea. Kara Osman-zade Hüseyin Ağa (the powerful ayan of West Anatolia) bought the effects of his deceased cousin Kara Osman-zade Mehmed Ağa and paid 200,000 *krş* until the time of the register. Hasan Paşa of Zihne bought the *çiftlikat* (farms) of the deceased Muhsine Şefika Hanım for 50,000 *krş* İbrahim Paşa, the brother of the deceased Mahmud Paşa of İskenderiye (Scutari), was to pay his brother's debt of 75,000 *krş* to the Treasury. The Porte also confiscated the profits of certain *mukataa* and *esham* that belonged to Yusuf Paşa, the former Grand-vizier and the new governor of Cidde (Jiddah), for the year of H. 1211. This sum amounted to 94,130 *krş*. Kara Osman-zade Hüseyin Paşa also purchased the effects of his

The remaining of the extraordinary wartime budget consisted of the donations and forced borrowings (5.1 %) as well as budgetary deduction (4.85 %). Donations and forced borrowings expanded so as to include the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate, Muslim and non-Muslim merchants, as well as high bureaucrats.<sup>43</sup>

#### Foreign Sources of Revenue: 'The French Money'

Ottomans borrowed loan from foreign investors for the first time during the Crimean War, while attempts at getting foreign loans had a relatively long history. The Porte sought to find loans from Morocco and the Netherlands in the 1780s and from Britain during the wars of second coalition against France. Nevertheless, the confiscated French goods and capital in the Empire may also be considered an unofficial and forced foreign loan in the sense that the Porte accepted to return them in the treaty with France in 1802.<sup>44</sup>

Not included in the register of the extraordinary wartime budget is the confiscated French capital and property. A major result of the French invasion of Egypt was the confiscation of the property and capital belonging to French nationalities. Political retaliation notwithstanding, economic factors may also have accounted for the shaping of this policy. Orders were sent out to local authorities for the confiscation of the French

---

deceased father el-Hac Ahmed Ağa. The unpaid portion of the third installment totaled 235,000 *krş*, which indicates the exorbitant rate assessed on the effects. Of this sum, 70,602 *krş* was forwarded to the intendants of the fortresses of İsmail and Bender (Hasan Ağa and Mahmud Raşid Efendi, respectively). Lastly, 25,000 *krş* was paid as part of the inheritance tax of the effects of the deceased Kara Kethüda-zade, see C.AS 11577 (L1212/March-April1798).

<sup>43</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, p. 196; KK 2383, 1-2a.

<sup>44</sup> On Ottoman foreign loans, see E. Eldem, "Dış Borç, Osmanlı Bankası ve Düyun-ı Umumiye", in Genç and Özvar (eds.), *Osmanlı Maliyesi, Kurumlar ve Bütçeler*, pp. 95-113.



property immediately after the Porte declared war on France. An inspector (*mübaşir*) was to be sent to each locality to help the local authorities in the implementation of the policy.

Although the monetary value of the confiscated French property remains to be studied, it no doubt reached to substantial amounts.<sup>45</sup> It seems ‘the French money’ was especially crucial in the first year of the war. No less than 450,000 *krş* delivered as cash substitute to the Russians for the year H. 1213 was met from this source. A report on the matter stated that Kara Osman-zade Hüseyin Aga, the commander (*muhafız*) of İzmir, was put in charge of confiscating the French property in İzmir. His investigation revealed that the Frenchmen in the town transferred 60,000 *riyal* to the consul of the Netherlands. The French authorities in the town including the consul, chancellery, and the treasurer made a list of the French properties and submitted it to Hüseyin, the sale of which produced less than 60,000 *riyal*. With the help of the *mübaşir*, Hüseyin was in search of the concealed French property in İzmir.<sup>46</sup>

According to the account book of the Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg dated 7 February 1799, the total expenditure of the combined fleet until that date amounted to 78,342.5 *krş* of which as much as 37,759 *krş* came from the French property and capital seized in Zante and Cephalonia. Obviously, this amount only represented part of the cash spending of the combined fleet and thus shows the vital importance of the French prizes in unavoidable on-the-spot expenses. For instance, Ushakov used most of his share (10,122

---

<sup>45</sup> An Ottoman register that covers some of the imperial edicts sent out to provinces during 1798-1800 displays 314 orders most of which are about confiscation of the French property, see V. Turğut, 208 *Numaralı Mühimme Defterinin Transkripsiyon ve Tahlili 1798-1800 (H 1213-1215)* (Sakarya Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2006).

<sup>46</sup> A.AMD 41/37 (14C1213/23Nov1798).

*krş*) to buy 13,000 *kıyye* [hereafter, *ky*] of wine (1,788 *krş*: 7,27 *krş* per *ky*), beewax, olive oil (352 *krş*), 1,950 *kile* [hereafter, *kl*] of wheat (6,944 *krş*: 3.5 *krş* a *kl*) and beef (1,038 *krş*).<sup>47</sup> The French capital seized must have been greater since Corfu, wherein the real concentration of French troops and wealth was, had not been conquered at this time.

Another possible ‘foreign loan’ may have been found from the money-changers and other creditors who conducted business with the Porte. Kaya drew attention to the fact that Baruh, the *bazirgan* –official creditor- of the Corps of the Janissaries in 1768, had found credit from a number of sources including the foreign merchants in Istanbul in order to support the Janissaries at the front. This is obviously a major challenge to our conventional understanding of ‘foreign loans.’ The total credit Baruh distributed among the Janissaries might have reached as much as one-fifth of the total central revenues, though we lack the data as to what percentage the foreign loans stood at in this credit.<sup>48</sup>

The documents consulted do not reveal the exact amount of foreign resources used in financing of the Ottoman-Russian naval expedition to the Ionians. But it is safe to assume that the Ottoman fleet borrowed at least 69,750 *krş* on several occasions from foreign merchants in Italy as discussed in the chapter on the “Expedition.”

---

<sup>47</sup> BOA, C.HRC 7531 (2N1213/6Feb1799). The two fleets shared this sum equally; I use the equation 1 *kl* = 25.66 kg (wheat) and 22.25 kg (barley) throughout this study.

<sup>48</sup> Kaya, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Toplumı ve Kredi*, p. 21-43; Eldem also mentions that the French merchants in İstanbul lent lucrative loans to the local merchants and even to imperial dignitaries, see, Eldem, *French Trade*, pp. 55, 121; for a similar example from Cyprus, see K. Çiçek, “Diplomat, Banker ve Tüccar: 18. Yüzyıl Başlarında Larnaka’da Para Ticareti ve Yabancı Sermaye”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 20 (2001): 269-81.

## Expenditures

It is not an easy task to uncover the total expenditure spared for the expedition to the Adriatic because of the nature of the Ottoman war finances described above. We should point out from the outset that the extraordinary wartime budget was not the only source that supported the expedition to the Ionians. Nevertheless, the register of these extraordinary expenditures provides valuable information on the matter. Out of total extraordinary revenue of around 16 million *krş*, at least 795,731 *krş* was spent on the naval expedition to the Ionians with an additional and related spending on the fortifications of the Morea totaling 177,833 *krş*. 650,384.66 *krş* from this budget was spared for the costs of provisions and the freight payments, the latter holding a prominent place with 181,735.5 *krş*. The sum of cash sent to the combined fleet in the form of bonuses or cash treasury totaled 125,755 *krş*, while the travel cost of the messengers amounted to 19,591.5 *krş*.<sup>49</sup> According to Yeşil's calculations, funds forwarded to the viziers sent to the front held the fourth place with 18.9 % in the expenses met from this budget. Presents made to the British and Russian officers and troops as well as the travel expenses of the messengers claimed 4.4 % of the budget. The remaining 2.1 % went to the miscellaneous expenses.<sup>50</sup>

We should note from the outset that this is a very conservative calculation based on roughly 10 % of the entries concerning the expenses in the budget; only those entries with a direct reference to the expenses on the combined fleet entered the calculation. It

---

<sup>49</sup> This calculation is based on KK 2383, 2a-7b.

<sup>50</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, p. 199.

ignored the pays of the troops and the spending on the ammunitions since the register does not show what percentage of these expenses was related with the combined fleet. Nevertheless, Yeşil calculated that pays of the Ottoman troops constituted 26.3 % of the extraordinary wartime budget, whereas 23.6 % of the budget was spent on ammunitions, constituting almost the half of the budget. The percentage of the pays is all the more remarkable since it is confined to the pays of the mercenaries including those served in the combined fleet, leaving out the standing army. Cost of provisions, on the other hand, is only partly reflected in our estimate although it occupied the second place in the budget with a proportion of 24.5 %.<sup>51</sup> This is mainly due to the lack of details concerning the destination of the provisions in the relevant entries listed in the extraordinary wartime budget, whereas it goes without saying that not all the related costs were met from the extraordinary wartime budget.

All these lead us to conclude that the actual expenses involved in the naval expedition to the Ionians should have been much higher than our conservative calculation were we to take account of pays, cost of ammunition, and the total spending on the provisions. Sporadic data suggests that the expedition may have claimed a half of the total spending on the pays. The summertime pay spared from the extraordinary budget for the whole Ottoman navy was 477,828 *krş* and this was sent in 6 - 17 May 1799.<sup>52</sup> Ahmed Pasha, the governor of the Morea, related in a report that the Ottoman fleet in the Adriatic received on 7 July 1799 its summertime pay of 235,529 *krş* through bills of exchange

---

<sup>51</sup> Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına*, p. 199.

<sup>52</sup> KK 2383, 4b.

numbering eleven.<sup>53</sup> By contrast, the following wintertime pay of the navy was almost the half of the summertime pay -250,000 *krş*-<sup>54</sup>, for the Porte did not grant double pay in wintertime according to the regulations.<sup>55</sup> The Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa pointed out in a memorandum that the fleet received an extra wintertime pay at the beginning of the expedition.<sup>56</sup> If the pay of the fleet in wintertime equaled the half of the total as was the case with the summertime pay, the total pay it received in one year period of September 1798 – September 1799 could not have been less than 485,529 *krş*, including wintertime pay due for H. 1213 as well as summertime and wintertime pays of H. 1214. The Porte regularly sent squadrons to the region at least until the outbreak of war with Russia in 1807. Appendix B suggests that maintaining a squadron in the region in later years cost the Porte around 100,000 *krş* every year including the pays and the provisions of the crew.

Abdülkadir Beg calculated the total cash spending of the combined fleet as 78,342.5 *krş* until the end of January 1799. His memorandum of a later date put the total expenses spent for the needs of the Russian fleet, the provisions, gifts and bounties

---

<sup>53</sup> BOA, C.BH 9880 (19S1214/23July1799).

<sup>54</sup> KK 2383 3b: 50,000 *krş* was paid in 3-20 April, 1799, while the remaining were forwarded in two equal installments in 9-20 April, and in 20 April-5 June 1799.

<sup>55</sup> S. Shaw, “Selim III and the Ottoman Navy”, *Turcica* 1 (1969): 212-241.

<sup>56</sup> BOA, HAT 164/6835 (23CA1214/23Oct1799) Captain Paşa Hüseyin to the Porte. According to the custom, the crew received half of their six-month long wintertime/summertime pay in advance before going out on active duty. The quarter pay was to be distributed two months later on the sea with the remaining quarter to be paid upon their return to İstanbul. On the eve of the expedition, the Porte granted them their wintertime pay in full in order to secure their devotion to the expedition. Regular Ottoman troops were normally paid four times a year, each payment called *kıst*. Thus, each six-month period should include two *kısts*, while documents clearly stated that summertime pay actually included four *kısts* (*sayfiye dörder kıst mevacibleri*), see C.BH 943; HAT 247/13976.

distributed to the troops and the miscellanies as 173,020.5 *krş* by the end of May 1799.<sup>57</sup> The Kapudane, however, could only get 90,000 *krş* and urged the Porte to forward the necessary funds (83,020.5 *krş*) to cover the remaining expenses. Defterdar Efendi raised objections on the grounds that 70,000 *krş* sent to Abdülkadir for distributing among the Ottoman and Russian troops as well as the Albanians after the fall of Corfu were not reflected in his account, implying that the actual sum to be sent was much less. However, he proposed the sending of 50,000 *krş* to the fleet to alleviate the financial hardships. The deputy Grand-vizier approved the proposal, although he disagreed with the Defterdar that the bounty money recently sent should be reflected in the account, for it was sent out of Sultan's grace and could not be recorded as a spending item.<sup>58</sup>

The extraordinary wartime budget confirms the sending of 70,000 *krş* on 24 March 1799 in celebration of the fall of Corfu in addition to 15,000 *krş* sent on 15 March 1799 before the news reached Istanbul. Abdülkadir had received 32,500 *krş* on 14 January 1799.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, while the total cash sent to Abdülkadir from Istanbul until June 1799 was 160,000 *krş* (90,000 and 70,000 *krş* unmentioned by the Kapudane), the extraordinary wartime budget covered only 112,500 *krş* of this sum. This is another example suggesting that the extraordinary wartime budget did not meet all the expenses involved in the expedition by itself.

After the return of the Ottoman fleet to Istanbul after September 1799, expenses incurred by the expedition to the Adriatic must have decreased considerably. The total

---

<sup>57</sup> HAT 267/15610 (25Z1213/30May1799).

<sup>58</sup> HAT 267/15610 (25Z1213/30May1799).

<sup>59</sup> KK 8323, 2a, 3a.

budget spared for the upkeep of the navy in Alexandria and the tiny squadron of three ships in the Adriatic in the period 26 November 1800 – 19 November 1801 was 945,276 *krş*. As the bulk of the Ottoman warships was dispatched to Egypt to support the army at this date, most of the cash funds were forwarded to the navy (870,613.5 *krş*), while the fleet in the Adriatic received 72,172.5 *krş*.<sup>60</sup> Obviously, this figure did not cover the costs of provisions and ammunition.

In short, the amount of cash sent to the combined fleet was well over a million *krş* based on a conservative calculation made on the extraordinary wartime budget, the pay of the troops, and Abdülkadir's spending not reflected in that budget. Another item of cash spending involved in the expedition was the cash-substitutes delivered to the Russian navy.

#### Cash Substitutes

Cash substitutes delivered to the Russian fleet was a major preoccupation for the Porte. Table 4.1 displays the breakdown of the payment of compensation moneys to the Russian fleet. It should however be noted that it draws an incomplete picture regarding the cash-substitutes paid during the campaign years of H. 1213 and 1214 (1798-1800) as it shows only those figures I could retrieve in the Ottoman Archives.

---

<sup>60</sup> C.BH 6591 (1215-1216).

Table: 4.1: Cash-substitutes

H. 1213				
	Sum ( <i>krş</i> )	Source	Time period*	Date of order for payment
First installment	150,000	Imperial Mint: the French Money	12 Sept. – 11 Dec. 1798	22 November 1798
Second installment	150,000	Imperial Mint: the French Money	12 Dec. 1798 – 11 March 1799	5 January 1799
Third Installment	150,000	Imperial Mint: the French Money	12 March – 11 June 1799	27 March 1799
Fourth installment	?	?	?	?
H. 1214				
First installment	?	?	?	?
Second Installment	150,000	New Revenues: <i>esham mu 'accelat†</i>	13 March- 12 June 1800	29 April 1800
Third Installment	150,000	New Revenues: Campaign Treasury	13 June – 12 Sept. 1800	20 August 1800

Notes: (\*) Dates regarding installment periods are given in Rumi calendar (R) based on the solar system in Ottoman documents. The starting date of the first installment was R. 1 September 1212 which corresponds to H. 1 RA 1213, or 12 September 1798. This causes confusion in the tabulation of the figures and installment periods.

(†) The sum to be paid at the auction to buy the treasury bond on sale which was equal to no less than five-years' annuity of the bond (ie., a lot or share of a revenue source was farmed out at auction for life-time).

Sources: C.HRC 7916 (27March1799) for the year H. 1213 (15 June 1798 – 4 June 1799); C.HRC 2010 (20Aug1800) for the year H. 1214 (5 June 1799 – 24 May 1800).

The Sublime Porte had the obligation to deliver 600,000 *krş* annually to be paid in four equal three-month installments of 150,000 *krş* each. The first installment was to begin as of 12 September 1798 (H. 1 Rebiyyü'l-ahir 1213). However, the documents suggest that Ottomans paid 450,000 *krş* annually in three equal installments in the campaigning years. As the Russian Black Sea fleet operating in the Adriatic decreased to six ships of the line after the return of the fleet to the Black Sea, the compensation



money was reduced to 120,000 *krş* with the period limited to six months in a given year by H. 1215.<sup>61</sup>

Considering that the combined fleet had already set sail to the Adriatic in September, inevitable delays in delivering the cash-substitute were bound to occur. As a counter measure, order for the payment of the first installment was issued on 22 November 1798; that is, much before the conclusion of the treaty, yet long after the dispatch of the combined fleet. Orders for the delivery of the compensation moneys suggest that the Sublime Porte could not hand in the cash-substitute on time.<sup>62</sup>

Shortages of money as well as the protracted negotiations accounted for the disarrays especially in H.1213 (ending on 4 June 1799) when substantial naval operations took place in the Adriatic and culminated in the conquest of the Ionian Islands. The cash-substitute for H.1213 was met by the “French money” kept in the Imperial Mint, which was by no means a regular source of revenue. That indicates that financial motivations were as important as the policy of retribution in the confiscation of the French properties and capital in the Ottoman realms. The Chief Treasurer, Defterdar Efendi, requested the meeting of the expenses related to freight payments as well as the cash-substitutes by the Campaign Treasury (*Umur-ı Seferiye*) kept in the Treasury of the New Revenues. This suggests that the Campaign Treasury was already transferred from the Imperial Mint to the New Revenues by that time. Qualifying these two items of

---

<sup>61</sup> C.HRC 1586 (25Z1215/9.5.1801); orders for retreat to the Black Sea dated 3 November 1799, but Ushakov could not leave Corfu before 17 July 1800, see Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807* (The University of Chicago Press, 1970) p. 132; Tomara testified to the receipt of the first installment in November, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 40.

<sup>62</sup> C.HRC 7916 (20L1213/27 March 1799).

expenditure as “non-deferrable expenses of immediate nature”, he suggested the spending of the *esham muaccelati* in the Campaign Treasury to this end. Obviously, this was a more reliable source of revenue than the “French Money.” From H. 1214 on cash-substitutes were paid from the Campaign Treasury with the approval of Selim III.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, at least one installment in H. 1220 was met by the revenues of the custom duties, which was also another solid revenue source of the central treasury.<sup>64</sup>

As mentioned above, while the treaty of alliance envisioned the payment of 600,000 *krş* in four equal three-month installments, Ottoman documents never mention the delivery of the fourth installment in a given year. The allies presumably agreed to decrease the cash-substitute to 450,000 *krş* a year after the signing of the alliance, which may explain the contradiction. After Alexander sent reinforcements to Corfu to deal with the uprising towards the end of 1802, the Ottomans agreed to provide 10,000 *krş* a month per warship which cost 30,000-40,000 *krş* a month. On 28 January 1806 the Ottoman authorities met with the Russian ambassador to settle the accounts. It turned out that the Porte owed to Russia 389,351 *krş*.<sup>65</sup>

Lastly, the provisions of the combined fleet necessitated the allocation of enormous funds to the logistics. As noted previously, more than 20 % of the extraordinary wartime revenues were spent on the provisions. Although, it is not possible to make a precise calculation of the total costs incurred by the logistics, figures

---

<sup>63</sup> HAT 249/14090 (nd.) unsigned note to the Sultan (by the deputy Grand-vizier ?) to be dated to H.1214. It states that freight payments to Russian and Austrian captains cost 200 purses, while the three-month installment of cash-substitute equaled 300 purses (150,000 *krş*) at this specific time.

<sup>64</sup> C.HRC 1862 98ZA1220/28Jan1806).

<sup>65</sup> C.HRC 1862 (8ZA1220/28Jan1806).

and explanations given in the tables in the Appendices A and B lay out the details of the costs involved as well as the peculiarities of the Ottoman system of logistics.

#### Ottoman pricing policy

It should be noted that the revenues earmarked for the central treasury was not the sole source of financing the war. Provinces were obliged to contribute in kind and in cash to the war effort, which makes it all the more difficult to ‘digitize’ the total cost of Ottoman wars in terms of cash. Nevertheless, it is necessary to describe the pricing policy of the Ottomans prior to an assessment of the impact of war on local economies in the following two chapters.

The procurement of provisions appeared to be the task of the administration, not of the army and the fulfillment of the task fell on the state-appointed *kadıs* in the countryside, who held both judiciary and administrative powers in the *kaza*, the sub-provincial district. As will be discussed in the following chapter, there were some major changes to the Ottoman logistics in the second half of the eighteenth century owing to the growth of local notables. A number of *mubayaaacı* (state commissioner) were made responsible for the purchase and transportation of the grain including wheat, flour, barley, oats, and millet.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>66</sup> For a description of the system in the war with Russia (1768-74) see, Aksan, “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?”, p. 36; “Feeding the Ottoman Troops”, pp. 4-7, 9; “The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind”, pp. 226, 234, 238, all in Aksan (ed.), *Ottomans and Europeans*; for the functioning of the *mubayaa* system in the re-conquest of the Morea (1714-16), see Ertaş, *Sultanın Ordusu (Mora Fethi Örneği 1714-1716)* (Yeditepe, 2007).

It is arguable what constituted the ‘market’ for the grains since the Porte attempted to restrict the potential buyers by numbers and by purchasing priorities.<sup>67</sup> It seems ‘the market’ in the case of the Morea was shaped through the interplay between the private merchants who bought the grain at the ruling provincial price, the foreign merchants who offered higher prices than the prevailing regional price and the official *mubayaa* commissioners. In the lack of a ‘market’ in the modern and ideal sense –that is, a sphere in which rational customers and buyers, who were pre-informed on the conditions of supply and demand, freely engage in economic activity and determine the optimum price for a given good-, the Ottomans applied two different pricing policies: *miri* and *rayiç*.<sup>68</sup>

*Miri* price denoted the officially fixed or predetermined price. The Ottomans applied *miri* price to the purchasing of wheat and barley in the period under discussion. The appointed *mubayaa* commissioner would buy the specified amount of grain from the assigned locality at a predetermined price, which was 20 *pr* per *kl* for wheat and 10 *pr* per *kl* for barley. According to Güran, these fixed prices remained in force from the beginnings of the eighteenth century until the 1830s when they were increased five times.<sup>69</sup> These official prices were far from reflecting the actual ‘market’ prices and led

---

<sup>67</sup> Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri ve Fırınları. Zahire Ticareti (1740-1840)* (İstanbul: TTV, 2001), p. 145.

<sup>68</sup> Balta defines the market as “a network of transactional relations capable of differentiating the values he [the farmer] produced”, see E. Balta, “The Exploitation of Otherness in the Economic Advancement of the Rum Millet”, *O Eranistis* 24 (2003), p. 148.

<sup>69</sup> T. Güran, “The State Role in the Grain Supply of Istanbul 1793-1839”, *IJTS* III/1 (1985): 27-41 and his *19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Tarımı* (İstanbul, 1998), p. 19; for Selim’s reforms on the provisioning of İstanbul see, Lynne Marie Şaşmazer, *Provisioning Istanbul: Bread Production, Power, and Political Ideology in the Ottoman Empire, 1780-1807* (Princeton University, unpublished Ph.D, 2000); F. Yeşil, “İstanbul’un

to a number of abuses in the system.<sup>70</sup> *Miri* purchases of grain amounted to no less than forced requisitioning in the sense that no bargaining involved and the cost of production was totally ignored. By 1793, Selim dispensed with the *miri* system in which the contribution of grain amounted to a sort of annual tribute owing to the lower fixed prices. He established, instead, the Grain Administration (*Zahire Nezareti*).<sup>71</sup>

In the new deal signified by the foundation of the Grain Administration in 1793, the Porte applied both *miri* and *rayiç* prices depending on the circumstances. When the Porte opted for the latter price, the appointed *mubayaacı*-commissioner would negotiate the price with the *ayan* who actually controlled the agricultural produce of the countryside. In an attempt to preclude the potential confrontations in the process of negotiation, the Porte often appointed the commissioner from among the *ayans* so that their local knowledge and connections would facilitate the process. Owing to the new system, the annual grain consumption of Istanbul was approximately 3.6 million *kl* of which roughly 1.5 million was procured by the Grain Administration in the late 1790s.<sup>72</sup>

*Rayiç* price, on the other hand, is hard to define because of its flexibility. While it literally meant current price, it would be unwise to treat it categorically as the

---

İaşesinde Nizam-ı Cedid: Zahire Nezareti'nin Kuruluşu ve İşleyişi (1798-1839)", *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi* 15 (2004): 113-42.

<sup>70</sup> Thornton-Şaşmazer introduces a case from 1797 in which the Porte played with the idea of selling the grain to the bakers in İstanbul at the prevailing market price of 80 *pr* per *kl*, which is obviously four times the official price, pp. 164-65; the prices were 65-80 *pr* per *kl* for Black Sea grain in 1804 while the cost of the bakers totaled around 60 *pr* per *kl*, see p. 163.

<sup>71</sup> Aynural explicitly shows that buying grain at the officially fixed price (*miri*) was a forced requisition (*tekalif-i şakka*), Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri*, p. 73; Güran, "The State Role in the Grain Supply of İstanbul, p. 30; Seven M. Ağır, *From Welfare to Wealth: Ottoman and Castilian Grain Trade Policies in a Time of Change* (Princeton University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009) pp. 92-93.

<sup>72</sup> Şaşmazer, *Provisioning İstanbul*, p. 155; Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri*, p. 82.

prevailing local price, though this was sometimes the case. As a working definition, we can assume the *rayiç* price as the price that was determined through negotiation between the official commissioner and the locals which made it higher than the *miri* but lower than the prevailing local price.<sup>73</sup> *Rayiç* could be too low to satisfy the grain-holders. If the grain purchase was meant for the provisioning of Istanbul even the *rayiç* price could be as four times lower as the price demanded by the grain-holders.<sup>74</sup>

Notably, most of the information on pricing and provisioning is based on the studies on the provisioning of Istanbul. Therefore, definitions of *miri* and *rayiç* prices may be misleading in various ways. For instance, the Porte offered *miri* prices in the purchases of wheat, but was quite willing to employ *rayiç* prices under pressing circumstances. A commonplace assumption among historians is that *miri* pricing often included basic commodities while other goods sold in the bazaar at the prevailing prices except for the times of scarcity.<sup>75</sup> Strikingly, *miri* price also set the norm for wine purchases in the Ionian expedition although it was surely not a basic commodity. In the re-conquest of the Morea (1714-16), the Porte collected through the *kadis* the ruling prices in each *kaza* on the path of the army from Edirne to the Morea and moderated some prices so that they came close to the prices the Porte determined for the march from İstanbul to Edirne. The prices offered for the provisions ordered from the *kazas*

---

<sup>73</sup> Ağır, *From Welfare to Wealth*, pp. 92-93. Ağır points out that *rayiç* price had the connotation of moral and social acceptability.

<sup>74</sup> Aynural defines *rayiç* as a price lower than the market price and bordering on the fixed price, pp. 12, 50, 81. However, his definition of *rayiç* is based on the grain provisioning of İstanbul which witnessed the most rigorous state intervention in the pricing.

<sup>75</sup> In case of scarcity the state intervened and fixed the prices of goods in the bazaar through the services of the *kadı*. The policy of fixing prices on a large-scale was called *narh*, see Mübahat Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri* (İstanbul, 1983).

located far from the war zone were much lower. The wide discrepancy between the ruling prices in the *kazas* of the same vicinity and the Porte's attempt to standardize them cast doubts on "the market price" and explains the motivation of the center in shaping pricing policies.<sup>76</sup>

### Instruments of fund transfer

As mentioned previously the structure of the Ottoman finance was a patchwork of cash revenues shared between the central and local treasuries as well as non-cash revenues; that is, services rendered by the subjects in return for certain privileges and tax exemptions. Thus, it is impossible to calculate the exact costs involved in a given war. Even the figures concerning the military spending of the central treasury do not always represent cash spending. For instance, only one-fourth of the budget of 1701-02 was spent in cash while the remaining was assigned on specific expenses without ever entering the treasury. This practice, *mahsub* –deductions-, formed one of the three methods of payment –cash, *mahsub/havale*, bills of change- employed in the expedition. It is striking that these "deductions" (*mahsub*) claimed more than half of the central budget in 1692-93, which was likely to be the driving force for the introduction of the *malikane* system in 1695 in order to increase the cash flow to the treasury.<sup>77</sup>

*Mahsub* system envisioned the issuing of a promissory note that warrants the meeting of a particular expense with the specified source of revenue. Assignment of a

---

<sup>76</sup> Ertuş, *Sultanın Ordusu*, pp. 141-145.

<sup>77</sup> B. Çakır, "Geleneksel Dönem (Tanzimat Öncesi) Osmanlı Bütçe Gelirleri" in Genç and Özvar (eds.) *Osmanlı Maliyesi, Kurumlar ve Bütçeler*, p. 195; Özvar, "Osmanlı Devletinin Bütçe Harcamaları (1509-1788)", p. 234.

revenue base to a specific spending was also called *havale* –transfer or money order in modern sense. The bulk of the expenses on the Adriatic front including the provisions of the Ottoman and Russian fleets as well as the pays of the Ottoman crew were met either by *havale* or *poliçe* –bill of exchange. When the *havale* system was used, the Porte usually assigned the revenues from the dues on the Spirits and the poll-tax in the province of the Morea, the details of which will be discussed in the coming chapters.

The second instrument of fund transfer was the bill of exchange, the Ottoman *poliçe*, which in its textbook definition “is an order of payment issued by a trader (the drawer), to a correspondent (the drawee) in favor of a third party (the payee).”<sup>78</sup> The obvious advantage of bill of exchange lied in the fact that the drawer paid his debt to the payee by ordering a bill on the drawee without ever transferring currency from one city to another. In its basic form, of course, drawee should be indebted to the drawer. Bills of exchange were also endorsable to the order of another person, facilitating trade considerably.

Our limited knowledge on the functioning of the bills of exchange suggests that by the eighteenth century, the bills of exchange already became popular instruments of transferring funds from provinces to the Porte. A local functionary such as a tax collector would buy a bill of exchange and send it to his agent in Istanbul who would collect the equivalent amount from the correspondent of the drawer and deliver it to the Treasury,

---

<sup>78</sup> Eldem is the only Ottomanist who has devoted a proper analysis of the use of bills of exchange in the Ottoman context with reference to French trade in the Levant in the eighteenth century; see Eldem, *French Trade in the Levant*, especially chapters five and six for the functioning of the system and E. Eldem, “XVIII. Yüzyılda İstanbul’da Poliçe Tedavülü ve Kambiyo Kurları Hakkında”, *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi* (TTK, 1993), pp. 1671-1684.



thus completing the transaction of the remittance. Bills of exchange in the eighteenth century preponderantly belonged to the French *nation* in the Empire and the value of the traded bills might have reached up to 500,000 – 700,000 *krş* annually according to calculations of Eldem, who further argued that the low level of their endorsement between draft and payment was in fact an indication of their real function as an instrument of fund transfer from the provinces to Istanbul.<sup>79</sup>

Nevertheless, documents consulted on the financing of the expedition have clearly showed that there was no one-way flow of bills of exchange in the direction of Istanbul. The Porte regularly sent bills of exchange to the local functionaries who were expected to cash them in to pay for the provisions, or the troops. Unfortunately, it is not always clear from the documents if these bills of exchange were of foreign origin, and if so, by whom they were issued in the conspicuous lack of French merchants.<sup>80</sup> In some cases, they seemed to be genuinely Ottoman bills the existence of which has been disputed in the scholarship.<sup>81</sup>

The cases of the delivery of the summertime pays of the Ottoman squadron in H. 1215 and in H. 1216 shed light on the use of the bills of exchange in the direction of İstanbul to provinces. In the first case, Mehmed Beg, the commander of the squadron,

---

<sup>79</sup> Eldem, *French Trade*, pp. 145-47.

<sup>80</sup> Eldem points out that in the latter half of the century the non-Muslim merchants in İstanbul gained the upper hand in the market of the bills of exchange with Frenchmen constituted only 18 % of the drawers and 20 % of the drawees, whereas 45 % of the payees and 90 % of the takers were the Frenchmen, proving that they almost always ended up in the ‘home towns’ of Marseilles, Leghorn, Vienna and Amsterdam completing thus the final transfer of fund from the Levant, see Eldem, *French Trade*, pp. 170-71.

<sup>81</sup> Şahiner is of the idea that the Sublime Porte preferred to make transfers in cash. The use of bill of exchange was a precautionary measure against the brigandage and those issued by the money exchangers were preferred over foreign ones, A. Şahiner, *The Sarrafs of Istanbul*, pp. 50-51.

communicated to the Porte that the squadron was in urgent need of the summertime provisions and the pay. A meeting was held to discuss the matter, and those present in the meeting concluded that the crew did not really need money in the mean time as they were on active service on the sea. They, however, deemed it proper to forward the sum of 50,647 *krş* by means of bill of exchange. Ebubekir Beg was to cash in with those revenues of the Morea spared for the Campaign Fund (*Seferiye*) kept in the Treasury of the New Revenues.<sup>82</sup> The relevant order issued on 16 July 1800 explained the choice of the bill of exchange for fund transfer in terms of facilitating the process and coined this instrument of fund transfer “cash-like bill of exchange” (*nakid misillü police*). It was to be sent to Ebubekir Beg who would collect the amount from the *ayan* of the province through the services of an inspector (*mübaşir*).<sup>83</sup> Presumably, this agent was also responsible for taking the bill of exchange from İstanbul to the Morea. The correspondence of the *kadı* of Tirapoliçe (Tripolitsa) informed the Porte on 31 July 1800 that the order and the bill of exchange reached Ebubekir Beg.<sup>84</sup> By 24 August 1800 the pay of the crew was already in the hands of the crew in Corfu.<sup>85</sup> The aforementioned agent, Salih Aga –the *çukadar* of the *Kaimakam*- took the sum from Ebubekir Beg in return for a receipt (*makbuz*) and delivered the money to Ali Beg, the captain of *Hediyetü’l-Müluk*, who was sent to Görδος (Corinth) for that purpose. The agent

---

<sup>82</sup> C.BH 943; HATT 247/13976. Those present in the meeting were: Hacı İbrahim Efendi –the accountant of the Treasury of the New Revenues-, Sadullah Efendi –the chief scribe of the Galleons (*Kalyonlar başkatibi*)-, the steward of the Imperial Dockyards (*Tersane-i Amire Emini*), and the deputy of the Grand Admiral (*Kapudan Paşa Vekili*). The sum of pay was calculated not before 28 June 1800.

<sup>83</sup> C.BH 520 (23S1215/16July1800), C.BH 1003 (27C1215/15Nov1800)

<sup>84</sup> C.BH 9730 (9RA1215/31July1800).

<sup>85</sup> C.BH 9810 (3R1215/24Aug1800).

probably took back all the documents to İstanbul along with him. The authorities completed the whole transaction on 20 September 1800 by submitting a voucher (*ilm-u-haber*) to the *Kalyonlar Ruznamçesi*, relying on these documents. Thus, the paperwork related with the transfer of the summertime pay took roughly two months, while the actual transaction was completed in a matter of month.<sup>86</sup>

In the second case, the crew of the squadron reaching 700 men under the command of Patrona Mehmed Şeremet Beg was to receive 44,769 *krş* as their summertime pay for H. 1216. The Patrona received this sum from Tepedelenli Ali Paşa of Yanya together with a single bill of exchange and submit him a voucher (*sened*) in return. İnce Mehmed Çavuş, the *Çavuş* of *Divanhane*, who was this time appointed from İstanbul as the agent (*mübaşir*) to oversee the transportation of the provisions, was the mediator of the transaction and took the bill of exchange back to İstanbul. The Porte delivered this sum to the money changer of Ali Paşa.<sup>87</sup>

The use of bills of exchange was not confined to the transactions between İstanbul and the provinces, but they were used in fund transfers from one province to another. For instance, Süleyman Paşa, the governor of Bagdad sent 219,500 *krş* by means of two bills of exchange to the governor of Damascus to be spent on the *jihad* against Napoleon in 1801.<sup>88</sup> As mentioned above, the “genuine” bills of exchange used in trade were of smaller amounts on the basis of Eldem’s calculations. The fact that only two bills of

---

<sup>86</sup> C.BH 8440 (1CA1215/20Sept1800).

<sup>87</sup> C.BH 10893 (27CA1216/5Oct1801); Half of the wintertime pay of the squadron in the Adriatic in H. 1219 was also paid by means of bills of exchange, worth 32,650 *krş*. The sum was delivered through Seyid Zekeriya Efendi, the *kadı* of Tirapoliçe, to the fleet in Anavarin (Navarino), see HATT 113/4533.

<sup>88</sup> Şahiner, *The Sarrafs of Istanbul*, p. 50.

exchange were issued to transfer such a large amount of money is an evidence of the nature of the *police*; that is, a fiscal and non-commercial instrument of fund transfer between İstanbul and provinces as well as between provinces.

Apparently, the bills of exchange did not always function as smoothly as suggested in these examples. For instance, İsmail Taif Efendi (the procurer-general of the Ottoman fleet in the Morea), received an initial sum of 75,000 *krş* as bills of exchange to take care of the provisions of the Ottoman fleet during the expedition. These bills of exchange were to be converted into cash by the *ayan* using the poll-tax revenue and the revenues of the *muqataas* of the Morea. However, he could only cash in 32,694 *krş*. The remaining 42.350 *krş* could not be produced by the *voyvodas* of Mezistre (Mistra) and Kartina, both of whom ran away to get rid of their financial obligations.<sup>89</sup>

A last example on the use of the bills of exchange among many others is the preparation of *bulgur* (cracked wheat) in Selanik for the Russian fleet in H. 1214. The Porte sent the necessary funds for buying, transporting, and baking the wheat to Selanik through bills of exchange, worth for 41,586.5 *krş*. As the demand of the Russian fleet for *bulgur* decreased, the Porte sent orders to return the funds in excess to İstanbul by means of bills of exchange.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup> C.BH 6705 (12B1215/29Nov1801). For details refer to chapter 6.

<sup>90</sup> C.HRC 7008 (22C1214/21Nov1799).

## Freight payments

Transportation of the ammunition, supplies and the troops required a great deal of organizational capability especially in a naval expedition. It goes without saying that freight payments in these expeditions claimed a substantial portion of the war budget.<sup>91</sup> What is interesting in the expedition was the transformation of freight payments into a diplomatic subject since most of the merchant vessels hired by the Porte belonged to non-Muslims of foreign nationalities whom were usually Greeks sailing under the Russian flag. Although there is not enough studies on eighteenth century Ottoman warfare, the Ottoman re-conquest of the Morea serves as a good example to illustrate the changing nature of military transportation in the course of the eighteenth century. The re-conquest of the Morea from Venice had required the organization of a large-scale naval campaign during which 75-80 % of the merchant vessels used in military transportation not only sailed under the Ottoman flag but also belonged to the Muslims subjects.<sup>92</sup>

Trade privileges granted by the Ottomans to the ‘most favored nations,’ known otherwise as the ‘Capitulations’, explicitly prohibited non-Ottoman merchants from engaging in domestic trade. This precluded from the outset using foreign merchant ships as carriers between Ottoman ports. The Sublime Porte, nevertheless, hired foreign ships for the transportation of foodstuff to Istanbul in times of emergency. While it is difficult to trace the evolution of this practice into a full-fledged engagement in coastal shipping

---

<sup>91</sup> For the sake of comparison, in the expedition on the Morea (1714-16) the Porte paid at least 370,742.5 *krş* for the freight, whereas provisions cost 2,760,292 *krş*. Ertaş, *Sultanın Ordusu*, pp. 287, 290.

<sup>92</sup> Ertaş, *Sultanın Ordusu*, p. 116. He relates that the Sublime Porte was not willing to hire non-Muslim Ottoman captains, although it also hired Venetian vessels on some occasions, p. 242.

on the part of the non-Ottomans, by the mid-eighteenth century the French ships – *caravane*- dominated the *caravane maritime* in French, or maritime caravanning (coastal shipping) between Ottoman ports.<sup>93</sup>

Presumably, the Porte conceived of using foreign ships in military transportation as an appropriate precaution against the harassment of the enemy in wars with Russia whose warships patrolled the Aegean islands in wartime (1768-1774 and 1787-1792).<sup>94</sup> When the Russian blockade was likely to engender famine in İstanbul, the Porte permitted French ships to carry Ottoman wheat to the capital on the conviction that the Russian navy in the Aegean Sea would not dare intercepting a neutral merchant vessel at the Dardanelles. It is also true that many Ottoman merchants thought it wise to carry their merchandise on foreign ships in order to avoid the danger of piracy.<sup>95</sup> Besides the lucrative freights involved in carrying merchandise between the Ottoman ports, buying goods at an Ottoman port at the low custom rates and selling it at another Ottoman port was a breaching of the exclusive rights of Ottoman merchants. Thus many Ottoman non-Muslim merchants found it convenient to adopt the French nationality in order to

---

<sup>93</sup> Eldem, “Capitulations and the Western Trade”, in S. Faroqhi (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, v. 3 (Cambridge, 2006), p. 322. For early examples of carrying the provisions of official purchase to İstanbul aboard the French ships see Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri ve Fırınları*, pp. 18-25.

<sup>94</sup> Russian sources claim that the Russian squadron captured or destroyed as many as 365 ‘Turkish’ ships in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774, S. Soucek, “The Strait of Chios and the Kaptanpaşa’s Navy” in Zachariadou (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha*, p. 160.

<sup>95</sup> Ottoman grain merchants frequently asked for permission from the Porte to hire foreign ships, see, Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri*, p. 20. Most of the charterers of the French caravans were Muslims, see D. Panzac, “International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18<sup>th</sup> Century”, *IJMES* 24/2 (1992): 186-206.

counterbalance the disastrous effects of the disadvantageous competition with the foreigners in foreign trade and coastal shipping.<sup>96</sup>

While it seemed like a perfect solution to use French ships for transportation to escape the fleets of the Russian enemy, the situation was exactly the other way around in the period under discussion as the old friend became the new foe and vice versa. Nevertheless, the danger posed by French piracy should not have been threatening enough to prompt the Porte to use foreign ships in transportation as a precaution when the Mediterranean was brim with British, Russian, and Ottoman fleets. Therefore, the dominance of foreign vessels in military transportation during the expedition must have been linked to the unavailability of Ottoman merchant ships –Muslim and non-Muslim- in adequate numbers.<sup>97</sup>

A brief description of the organization of naval transportation of the supplies and provisions as well as troops is necessary to understand the kind of diplomatic problems it

---

<sup>96</sup> Arrival of a French ship loaded with 17,000 tons of wheat in the summer of 1772 increased the popularity of the Frenchmen among the inhabitants of İstanbul, see, Eldem, *French Trade*, pp. 59, 108, 111, 291. In the same year 60 French and 9 British ships carried wheat from Macedonia to İstanbul, Panzac, “International and Domestic Maritime Trade”, p. 206, footnote 45; Ottoman merchants had to pay the internal customs (5 %) in addition to a bunch of taxes and dues, whereas foreign merchants paid only 3 % under the capitulations and sought to avoid the internal customs when engaged in coastal shipping, see Bağış, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayrimüslimler* (Ankara: Turhan, 1998), pp. 65-67.

<sup>97</sup> For a comparative analysis of Ottoman ships with Western ships see, D. Panzac, *Commerce et navigation dans l'Empire Ottoman au XVIIIe siècle* (İstanbul: Isis, 1996); Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships*, pp. 123-31. It is true that Muslim ship-owners gradually retreated from the Mediterranean to the capitulation-free Black Sea in the course of the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, non-Muslim merchants tried to mend their losses due to the 1740 Capitulations by flying the flag of a ‘most favored nation.’ A typical Ottoman ship in the 18<sup>th</sup> century was of 150 tons, operated by 15 sailors with man-to-ton ratio of 1/10 – a productivity rate slightly lower than French shipping, but certainly higher than the Venetian and Ragusan. By the time of the expedition, a tendency to make small ships was observed in the Black Sea which is why the judge of İnebolu fixed the minimum tonnage at 6,000 *kl* (150-165 tons - Çizakça’s calculation). Nevertheless, the ships owned by the *Kapan* merchants –a guild of major merchants with certain privileges- seem to have been much larger, ranging from 240 tons to 1,200 tons, Çizakça, “The Kapudan Pasha and the Shipowners” in E. Zachariadou (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha*, pp. 207-208.

caused during the expedition and in the afterwards. The Porte made a contract prior to the hiring of the ship specifying the quantity and the type of the cargo as well as the freight and the demurrage. The duration required for the loading of the cargo was not included in the demurrage, whereas the Porte undertook to pay 1% of the freight for each extra day of waiting time as the demurrage. An Ottoman functionary with the title of *mübaşir* – inspector- was sent with the ship on some occasions.<sup>98</sup> Upon the signing of the contract, the pilot would receive two-thirds of the freight and had to return to Istanbul after the delivery in order to get the remaining one-third after the delivery. The cost of freight depended on the type and weight of the load. By contrast, during the re-conquest of the Morea (1715), the freight was decided on the basis of the distance rather than the load, whereas half of the freight was paid in advance.<sup>99</sup>

A series of documents examined in the following suggest that different measures of weight were used in the calculation of the freight: *kıyye* (1.282 kg) for wine and *arak*, *kantar* (56.44 kg) for the hardtack biscuit, and *kile* (25.66 kg) for other provisions. The Porte paid 5 *pr* freight for a *ky* of *arak* which cost just 7 *pr*. A *kl* of a given provision except for the hardtack had the additional freight cost of 15 *pr*. The freight of a *kt* of

---

<sup>98</sup> Aynural points out that captains of foreign nationalities generally wanted a *mübaşir* to accompany the voyage as an overseer so that they would avoid the responsibility on the occasion of a missing or adulterated cargo in İstanbul, see, *İstanbul Değirmenleri*, p. 18.

<sup>99</sup> Ertaş, *Sultanın Ordusu*, pp. 107-116. He points out that the rate of freight changed according to distance; i.e., 14 *akçe* a *kl* (Eğriboz-İstanbul), 30 *akçe* a *kantar* [hereafter, *kt*] of hardtack (Eğriboz-İstanbul), p. 113; Aynural also contends that the rate of freight depended on the distance rather than the kind of grain. He gives the freight in 1799 as 15 *pr* a *kl* for wheat (Eğriboz to İstanbul), 8 *pr* a *kl* for barley (Balçık to İstanbul) and in 1795-96 as 30-35 *pr* a *kl* for unspecified type of grain (Jaffa-Istanbul), see Aynural, pp. 25-26. His conclusions are based on the examples of the transportation of the state grain to İstanbul. The destination in the documents I consulted is İstanbul/Tekirdağ-Morea (Golos, Argos, Anavarin), which may explain the same rate of freight as given for Eğriboz-İstanbul, see Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri*, pp. 26-27.



hardtack biscuit cost 45-100 *pr* whereas the official price of hardtack was 170 *akçe* (56 *pr* 2 *akçe*) a *kt*.<sup>100</sup> Apparently, the freight of the *arak* and wine cost the highest. By contrast, the transportation of ammunition and equipment was likely to be more costly than the provisions; the Porte paid 15 *pr* a *ky* for the freight of ship's cables (*gomena*) sent to the Ottoman fleet on a Cretan vessel.<sup>101</sup>

The Porte alternatively hired some merchant ships for a specific period of time instead of one-time transportation. For instance, the Porte hired on contract the captain *Dimitri Albiretdil* of Russian nationality for an initial period of three months in the summer of 1801 at the monthly price of 1,100 *krş* with the first three months' rent given beforehand in İstanbul. Among other tasks, this ship carried the French troops back to France from Egypt and upon its return to Alexandria it transported a detachment of the Artillery Corps back to İstanbul with their equipments. For a total period of 9 months three weeks, the Porte paid 10,706.5 *krş* on the contract. When he finally returned İstanbul, the captain requested the payment of the remaining 806.5 *krş* with a petition sent through the Russian embassy.<sup>102</sup> Another Russian merchant ship hired by the Porte for the transportation of the French troops belonged to Michel Sacardanna (*Mikel*

---

<sup>100</sup> When hardtack was carried together with other grains its freight was calculated in terms of *kl* and decreased to 33 *pr* a *kl* at least in one case, see C.BH 5071 (23L1218/5Feb1804). Murphey suggests that the freight payment cost 15 % to 25 % of the intrinsic value of the goods shipped, freight charges being assessed as a fixed percentage of the value of the goods subject to adjustment to the distance. Ship's overall length was also taken into consideration in calculating the cost of leasing, R. Murphey, "Provisioning Istanbul: The State and Subsistence in the Early Modern Middle East" *Food and Foodways* 2 (1988): 217-263.

<sup>101</sup> Among many examples see C.BH 1182; C.HRC 5848 (23RA1217/24July1802). The reason for different rates of freights is not clear.

<sup>102</sup> C.BH 11328 (4L1216/7Feb1802). Yusuf Agah Efendi, the first Ottoman ambassador at London, was in charge of hiring the ship. His name is frequently mentioned in such documents. The Kapudan Paşa Hüseyin paid 6,600 *krş* of the rent.

*Iskardana*). In the petition he sent through the Russian Embassy, he related that he was commissioned to transport General Menou and his troops to Marseilles from Egypt, but he had to lay anchor off Cephalonia due to the stormy weather where he had to replenish the provisions. Referring to the contract, he claimed that the Porte undertook to meet all the expenses during the voyage and presented the list of provisions that featured Menou's signature. The Porte accepted the petition and paid the requested 1,219 *krş* from the Campaign Treasury.<sup>103</sup>

Delayed departures due to late loading/unloading were also commonplace and prompted the captains to demand demurrage. In both cases, ambassadors were involved in the process. Captain Konstantin Milisi had a contract to carry 2,000 *kt* of hardtack from Golos to Corfu at the freight of 2 *krş* (80 *pr*) a *kt* and received the two-thirds in advance. However, his ship was stocked with 1,600 *kt* of hardtack and 22 *kt* of it appeared to be missing at the delivery to Ahmed Nazif Aga in Corfu. The captain had his petition presented through the Russian Embassy in which he refused to bear any responsibility as there was a *mübaşir* aboard the vessel overseeing the whole process. Thus, the Porte had to pay the total freight for 1,600 *kt* of hardtack.<sup>104</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> C.HRC 3365 (17Z1216/20Apr1802). The cost of provisions was 2,011 livre 6 solid. Freights were paid with the revenues of the Central Treasury until the 1790s after which time it was shouldered by the Imperial Mint, Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri*, p. 19.

<sup>104</sup> C.HRC 3581 (5S1215/28Jun1801). In this case, lack of standard measures may have accounted for the missing. Captain Panayi Kalika Anizov of Russian nationality carried 1,700 *kt* of hardtack from Gemlik to the Russian fleet. He delivered his load to Doroşenko (A Russian officer?) with 6,483.5 *ky* missing and spoiled. The Porte was to choose between paying the remaining one-third of the freight in full as demanded by the captain, and deducing the value of the missing and spoiled hardtacks from the unpaid freight. Unfortunately, the decision is not clear, but the Russian Embassy was involved in the dispute in any case, see C.HRC5265 (6M1215/30May1800).

Even when no apparent problem occurred concerning the delivery, late payment of the freight was quite common in which case the captains sought the involvement of their respective embassies.<sup>105</sup> A petition submitted by the consul of the Republic of the Seven Ionian Islands indicates that the Porte hired several Ionian merchants for military transportation. One of these merchants, Captain *Yerasimo Metaksa* of Corfu, was hired for three months by the Grand Admiral through the services of Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg. He received the rent for the first month, 2,300 *krş*, in Abukir and sailed to Istanbul to have the remainder upon the end of his contract in November 1801 with the order of the Grand Admiral. The Porte authorized the Defterdar to investigate the matter on 6 January 1802 and the necessary orders for the payment were issued by February. Considering that the term of his contract expired on November 6, the captain received the money with a delay of at least three months.<sup>106</sup>

We will focus on the diplomatic disputes concerning the incomplete deliveries of supplies made to the Russians in Chapter VI. Tekfurdağı was one of the towns that failed to meet its quota of hardtacks (5,500 *kt*). This quantity was to be sent in two shipments. Hasan Aga, the Intendant of the Customs (Gümrük Emini), hired Captain *Banali Bina* of Corfu in mid-October 1803 to transport 2,500 *kt* hardtack at the freight of the usual 2 *krş* a *kt*. After delivering his load with 45 *kt* missing on 18 January 1804, he arrived at Istanbul on 29 February 1804. According to his petition presented by the consul of the Ionian Republic, he was detained in Tekfurdağ for 45 days until the hardtacks were made

---

<sup>105</sup> A contract signed with a British captain stipulated the unloading of the cargo in eleven days and the delivery of the payment in seven days, Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri*, p. 19.

<sup>106</sup> C.HRC 1557 (1802).

ready and kept for another 41 days in Corfu for unloading. He demanded extra payment for his detainment in Corfu on the calculation of 1% of the freight per extra day. As an act of goodwill he renounced any claims for demurrage in Tekfurdağ, which he calculated as 14 days and treated 31 days as the normal waiting time (*istalya*).<sup>107</sup> Nevertheless, the Porte refused the request, for no contract was signed with the captain whereas the imperial order in his hand did not mention the demurrage. Moreover, the delivery was made to the Russians and they were responsible for the delay in unloading the ship. According to the consul, the Porte had assured the captain that the load was ready in Tekfurdağ, which misled the captain to assume an on-time loading rendering the arrangement of the contract a waste of time. The consul also purported in an attempt to augment his argument that even if the Porte treated the detainment in Corfu within the limits of normal waiting time, it should pay demurrage for 45 days spent unnecessarily in Tekfurdağ. He also wanted the Porte to pay the remaining one-third of the freight in full, disregarding the missing hardtacks. The Russian dragoman, *Miran*, was also involved in the process and tried to find the middle ground by suggesting a discount by one-fifth on the requested sum of 3,750 *krş*. Unfortunately, the outcome is not clear, but the captain had not received any payment five months after he arrived at İstanbul.<sup>108</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup> C.HRC 230 (11R1219/20July1804).

<sup>108</sup> C.HRC 230 (11R1219/20July1804). The total freight was 5,000 *krş* and two-thirds of it, 3,333 *krş*, was paid at beforehand. But the freight decreased to 4,910 *krş* in proportion to the reduction in the load due to the missing quantity. A further deduction of 63 *krş* was made as a penalty for the incomplete delivery. The Porte calculated a *kt* of hardtack at the official price of 56 *pr*. The Porte, thus, calculated the debt as 1,512.5 *krş*, not including 2,050 *krş* of demurrage. The captain, on the contrary, demanded 3,715 *krş*, for he refused any responsibility for the missing quantity.

The second shipment from Tekfurdağ fared no better. Captain *Nikola Kalika* had a contract to carry 3,000 *kt* of hardtack to Corfu, but his small ship could accommodate only 2,300 *kt*. Most of the problems actually arose over the missing quantities in the delivery for which the captains had to pay compensation. According to Mustafa Reşid, the Ottoman agent in Corfu, the captain came to Corfu with 36 *kt* spoiled and 66 *kt* missing. The Russian consul in Tekfurdağ put an explanation regarding the missing 700 *kt* on the back of the contract. Mustafa Reşid doubted the sincerity of the consul as his note was not accompanied with an explanatory note from the *kadı* and the official purchaser (*mubayaacı*) in Tekfurdağ. Count Mocenigo and Benakis, the Russian commander and consul in Corfu –both of Greek origin-, convinced Mustafa Reşid to give up his insistence on the payment of the penalty for the huge missing by signing the back of the contract in confirmation of the integrity of their colleague in Tekfurdağ. Mustafa Reşid, this time, demanded 600 *krş* in compensation of 66 *kt* of hardtack missing from the actual shipment, calculating the price according to the market value in Corfu (9 *krş* a *kt* of hardtack). The captain could leave the island only after accepting its deduction from the unpaid portion of the freight upon his return to İstanbul. He was already paid 4,000 *krş* as the two-thirds of the freight of 3,000 *kt* of hardtack, but the freight of the actual shipment (2,234 *kt*) was 4,468 *krş*, decreasing the unpaid portion of the freight to 468 *krş*. Nevertheless, the captain seemed to be indebted to the Porte because of the missing quantity. The Consul of the Ionian Republic claimed an exemption from the penalty since the missing only constituted the 3% of the shipment and requested the payment of 468 *krş*. Defterdar proposed two options to solve the problem: confirmation of the deal

reached at Corfu by the Porte, or recalculation of the missing at the official rate of 170 *akçe* (56 *pr*) in which case the Porte would have to pay 374.5 *krş* to the captain. The office of the Grand-vizier instructed the adoption of the second option on the grounds that the first option would definitely cause them “murmur” (*zirildi*).<sup>109</sup>

The acceptable duration of waiting in the port may have been decided upon bargaining during the conclusion of the contract. For instance, Captain *Yerasimo Kalupar* of Cephalonia was contracted to transport barley at the freight of 15 *pr a kl* to el-Ariş. His contract ruled out any right to demurrage if the vessel was unloaded in five days after the arrival at the port of al-Ariş. He was, however, detained for 46 days and demanded 2,300 *krş* for demurrage on the calculation of 1% of the freight per each day. Added to the unpaid portion of the freight, the total sum the Porte owed raised to 3,863.5 *krş*. The Porte, nevertheless, rounded it down to 3,500 *krş* and ordered its payment from the Campaign Treasury in the spring of 1802 despite the decrials of the consul of the Ionian Republic. The Porte’s justification of its policy is somewhat arbitrary. The consul was told that the discount was negligible, implying that he should not make too much of it.<sup>110</sup>

In the summer of 1800 three Russian vessels as well as an Austrian vessel were hired for transporting the troops of Tayyar Paşa and the cannon wagoners to Jaffa on the usual freight ration of 15 *pr a kl*. The duration of the contract was 41 days and upon its expiration the Porte accepted to pay the demurrage in the usual manner. Two of the ships were detained from 29 extra days whereas the others had to waste 24 more days in the

---

<sup>109</sup> C.HRC 5827 (15CA1219/22Aug1804). There was no regulation exempting the missing load up to 3 % of the shipment from fine to my knowledge.

<sup>110</sup> C.HRC 8141 (27S1217/29Apr1802). Yusuf Agah Efendi was in charge of hiring this ship.

ports. After long negotiations, the Captains agreed to renounce demurrage for the first 13 days after the expiration of the contract. As usual with the freights, the account was not settled before the end of the year.<sup>111</sup>

A major problem between the Ottomans and the Ionians arose over the Ottoman debts to the Ionian merchants. The Ottomans undertook the transportation of 2,300 French POWs to Toulon and Ancona in 10 ships hired from the merchants. The cost of freight, 24,055 real (78,178.5 *krş* 30 *pr*), was borrowed from the Ionian merchants through the mediation of Admiral Ushakov. The Republic's extraordinary envoy to İstanbul sent a petition to the Porte on October 22, 1800 for the payment of the debt.<sup>112</sup> The Porte paid 30,000 *krş* in three instalments in February 1801, February 1802 and in February 1803 in addition to 23,000 *krş* it had initially sent to Admiral Ushakov. However, by the end of November 1804 it still had to pay 44,000 *krş*. The Ionian envoy finally agreed to receive 10,000 *krş* instead as a compromise but the Porte could not even deliver this reduced sum of money. Embarrassed by the complaints of the envoy, it decided to solve the matter once and for all and paid the money from the treasury revenues, later to be compensated from the tribute the Republic would pay.<sup>113</sup>

---

<sup>111</sup> C.Maliye 478/19489 (28B1215/15Dec1800). Yusuf Agah Efendi and Halil Efendi, the superintendent of the Customs were in charge of hiring these ships. 375 troops were transported with 14,000 *kl* of ammunition and 27,000 *kl* of barley and hardtack. Total freight was 15,375 *krş* with a demurrage of 1,961 *krş*. Captains of Russian nationality: Marko Vitali, Konstantin Milisi, Ispiro Kalsiko and the Austrian captain is Antonyo.

<sup>112</sup> C. Hariciye 1277 (27Nov1800); 1 real is equal to 3 *krş* and 10 *pr* in the document. C. Hariciye 3365 (April 10, 1802) gives the value of 2,011 livres 6 sols as 1,219 *krş*. Antonio Tomaso Lefcochilo was nominated officially as *Inviato Extraordinario presso la Sublima Porta* (Extraordinary Envoy to the Sublime Porte) with the duties of Ambassador but without the official title the Treaty of 1800 did not allow the Republic to appoint ambassadors. It could only have consuls charged with overseeing commercial activities of the Ionians.

<sup>113</sup> C. HRC 2052 (27Nov1804).

## Conclusion

This chapter was intended to outline the nature of the Ottoman war finance as it was displayed in the Ottoman-Russian joint expedition to the Ionians through concrete examples. Our conclusions can be summarized as in the following: the Ottomans made war on the cheap by comparison to its allies. War finance was not totally taken care of by the central treasury, but shared with the provinces. Great and *petite ayans* were crucial in the running of the system. Wars with Russia were as important in the transformation of the fiscal system as were the impacts of the changes made to the system early in the century. In the same vein, the war with France obviously hampered Selim's financial reforms aiming at the elimination of the entire *esham* system (shareholding) as more and brand new bonds were offered in the market. We have also realized that the use of bills of exchange was more widespread; unlike the assumptions, it was not only meant to be a one-way fund transfer to İstanbul. Even the pays of the troops were sent through bills in which a huge network including great and petty *ayans* as well as their money changers in İstanbul. Finally, we have examined a neglected topic, the freight payments, which enabled us to observe the changing nature of geopolitics –one of losing subjects with further political ramifications in the Levant in future.

After this brief review of the nature of Ottoman war finance in general and the financing of the war in Adriatic in particular, it is now time to turn to the provisioning of the expedition.



## CHAPTER V

### LOGISTICS

#### Introduction

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the provisioning of the Russo-Ottoman combined fleet with the emphasis on 1798-1800. While the subject of the provisioning of the navy has remained in oblivion for the most part in Ottoman studies, supplying of a foreign navy in addition to the Ottoman navy in our case makes the topic all the more worth examining.<sup>1</sup> An overview of the transformation of Ottoman supply system will be followed by a brief discussion of naval reforms of Selim with a view to show that most of these reforms were already put in practice by the time of the expedition. A study of the supply system reveals once again the indispensability of *petite ayans* to the functioning of the empire. Relevant articles of the Treaty of Russo-Ottoman Alliance will lead the way for a discussion of provisioning items one by one. In this section, the emphasis will be on local prices, various pricing policies, quantities

---

<sup>1</sup> I have already dwelled on the supplying of the Russian navy by the Ottomans, see K. Şakul, “Diplomatik Bir Mesele Olarak İaşe: Rus Donanmasının Osmanlılar Tarafından İaşesi (1799-1806)” in Feridun M. Emecen (ed.) *Eskiçağ’dan Modern Çağ’a Ordular –Oluşum, Teşkilat ve İşlev-* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2008), pp. 387-410; provisioning of a foreign navy was not unprecedented in Ottoman history. In the heydays of Ottoman-French alliance against the Habsburgs, navies of both powers undertook joint operations with the French warships supplied by the Ottomans on several occasions. The French Admiral St. Blancard met the Ottoman fleet off Corfu in 1537, receiving biscuit, wine and other provisions. After wintering in Ottoman waters, he sailed to İstanbul to replenish his stores and receive fresh funds, Ernest Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant, ou, Correspondances, mémoires et actes diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de France à Constantinople et des ambassadeurs, envoyés ou résidents à divers titres à Venise, Raguse, Rome, Malte et Jérusalem, en Turquie, Perse, Géorgie, Crimée, Syrie, Egypte, etc., et dans les états de Tunis, d’Alger et de Maroc* (Paris: Impr. Nationale: 1848-60), v. I, pp. 340 ff. and 371 ff. In 1552, Paulin de la Garde had orders from Henry to join the Ottoman navy under Sinan Paşa at the gulf of Naples. Although he could not make the rendezvous, he found the Ottoman navy with his 24 ships off Chios, see Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, v. II, p. 232; Camillo Manfroni, *Storia della Marina Italiana* (Roma: Forzani E C. Tipografi Del Senato, 1917), v. III, pp. 380-82.

as well as the problems in preparation and delivery of the foodstuff. We will attempt to grasp the meaning of the figures for the province of the Morea and to assess what they might say on center-periphery relations. One of the curious conclusions we reach in the chapter is the discrepancy between the official rations of Ottomans and Russians: the latter had far larger rations than the former. This reminds us of a vital aspect of warfare. How did the Ottoman official rations compare to other contemporary states? Although this is beyond the scope of this chapter, we have provided some figures that might suggest some conclusions and one may directly consult to the conclusion section if not interested in the topic.

## Ottoman military logistics: a historical background

Ottoman system of logistics and the *menzilhane* system—a series of billets lying along the path of the marching army—, was a reality of the past by the period under discussion. It was a system meant for the provisioning of the *Kapıkulu* troops -the stipendiary imperial troops such as the Janissaries, the technical corps, and the armored *sipahis*. The larger part of the army composed of the provincial troops of the timariots and the mercenaries was left on their own means during early campaigns. Although limited in scope and magnitude, it worked effectively in an era when wars were relatively of a short duration. Be that as it may, it still required an organization on a greater scale which the European counterparts of the Ottomans lacked to a great deal.<sup>2</sup>

Ottomans levied irregular taxes under the name of *avarız-ı divaniye* or *tekalif-i örfiye*, otherwise known as the *avarız/avana* to the contemporary Western observers of the Ottoman Empire. In order to supply the marching army at the *menzils* and at the theatre of war, the Ottomans developed certain instruments such as *nüzul*, *sürsat*, and *iştira*.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> For an overview of Ottoman military provisioning see K. Şakul, “Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi Üzerine Bir Literatür Değerlendirmesi”, *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, 1/ 2 (2003): 529-571; G. Veinstein, “Some Views on Provisioning in the Hungarian Campaigns of Süleyman the Magnificent” in H. G. Majer (ed.), *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte in memoriam Váncsó Boskov* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986); C. Heywood, “The Ottoman Menzilhane and Ulak System in Rumeli in the Eighteenth Century” in Heywood (ed.), *Writing Ottoman History: Documents and Interpretations* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Heywood, “Some Turkish Archival Sources for the History of the Menzilhane Network in Rumeli during the Eighteenth Century” in Heywood (ed.) *Writing Ottoman History*; Heywood, “The Via Egnatia in the Ottoman Period: The Menzilhanes of the Sol Kol in the Late 17<sup>th</sup>/Early 18<sup>th</sup> Century” in Heywood (ed.), *Writing Ottoman History*.

<sup>3</sup> For general information on Ottoman supply system see, R. Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700* (University of California Press, 1999); C. Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman military campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606* (Wien: VWGO, 1988). For a recent study on *avarız* focusing on the case of the province of Karaman see Süleyman Demirci, *The Functioning of Ottoman Avarız Taxation: An*

*Nüzul* was based on *avarız-hane* system in which “tax collection was based on the amalgamation of a number of household units whose number depended on the wealth of the households concerned.”<sup>4</sup> Each *avarız-hane*, the tax household, could include different number of real households depending on the wealth of the taxpayers, though the amount of the tax assigned to all *avarız-hane* was the same. *Nüzul* required the collection and transportation of the specified amount of wheat and barley to the assigned place under the supervision of the *kadı* of the *kaza* with the transportation costs being covered by the local inhabitants. Studies show that *nüzul* was used for the stocking of strategic depots as opposed to *menzils*, that is, billets on the way of the marching army.<sup>5</sup> Those *kazas* remained distant from the war zone were often required to pay compensation money (*bedel*) in lieu of their contribution in-kind. In the course of the seventeenth century, the *nüzul*-in-kind subsided in favor of cash-compensation.<sup>6</sup>

*Sürsat* was an obligation on the subjects to bring and sell at the fixed price the specified amount of provisions at the nearest billets. It was a tax-in-kind fell on those villages along the *menzil-hane* system including those subjects exempt from the *avarız* and, by extension, the *nüzul*. The *kaza* was obliged to collect the required provisions and hand them over to the *Nüzul Emini*, the state commissioner, who would pay for them,

---

*Aspect of the Relationship Between Centre and Periphery. A case study of the province of Karaman 1621-1700* (İstanbul: Isis, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> Finkel, “The Provisioning of the Ottoman Army During the Campaigns of 1593-1606” in A. Tietze (ed.), *Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen/Relations Habsbourg-Ottomanes* (Vienna, 1985), pp. 107-24.

<sup>5</sup> Güçer, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler* (İstanbul, 1963), pp. 70-75; Finkel, *Administration of Warfare*, pp. 160-62.

<sup>6</sup> For the transformation of these taxes see A. Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi* (İstanbul, 1985), pp. 157-61. The transformation of the whole military and fiscal system is recapitulated in İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700”, *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 283-337.

except for transportation costs, to the *kadı*.<sup>7</sup> The name of the tax *sür-sat* (bring-and-sell) suggests that it was a beneficial means of trade for the subjects. However, logistics of each Ottoman war remains to be studied separately to decide if the official rhetoric was the deviation or the norm.<sup>8</sup> *Sürsat* levies were also commuted into cash payment and by the end of the seventeenth century its collection in cash became a commonplace practice so as to overcome financial challenges faced in the long series of wars after the second siege of Vienna (1683).<sup>9</sup>

*İştira* was the purchase of provisions on the spot either at the ruling (*rayiç*) or fixed (*miri*) price depending on the situation. In some cases, the quantity to be sold was fixed, whereas in other cases the subjects determined the quantity. Thus, it should be considered an irregular tax when the price and quantity were fixed. Some studies prove that the Ottomans actually paid higher prices in *iştira* in comparison to *sürsat*. The army employed *iştira* purchases in the warzones that remained beyond the reach of the *menzilhane* system such as Hungary, Bagdad and eastern Anatolian plains.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Finkel draws attention to McGowan's interpretation that differed from Güçer and İnalçık. McGowan suggested that *avarız* was an irregular cash tax of the sixteenth century and *nüzul* was levied as its in-kind surrogate, which is why they were never levied on the same district at the same time. When *nüzul* was also converted into cash, he maintained, the Ottomans introduced *sürsat* as the new irregular levy in kind. For this discussion see Finkel, *Administration of War*, pp. 132-33; McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe. Taxation, trade and the struggle for land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 106-10.

<sup>8</sup> Aksan, "Ottoman Military Matters:" review article, *Journal of Early Modern History* 6/1 (2002): 52-62.

<sup>9</sup> Güçer, *Hububat Meselesi*, pp. 81-94; Finkel, *Administration of Warfare*, p. 141.

<sup>10</sup> His analysis on saltpeter works in which *mubayaa* and *iştira* "refer to purchases made at fixed prices, always well below the market price" led Ágoston to conclude "...there is little point in searching for general definitions of these terms. Instead we should always try to interpret them according to the given situation." G. Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 122-23; studies of Finkel and Güçer show the contrast between the wars on the eastern and western fronts. For the Ottoman logistics in the former front in the seventeenth century also see Ö. İşbilir, *XVII. Yüzyıl Başlarında Şark Seferlerinin İaşe, İkmal ve lojistik Meseleleri*, (Marmara

On the eve of the eighteenth century, then, most of the irregular taxes levied to support the military logistics were already substituted by cash in the increasingly cash-driven Ottoman economy. The Porte, however, developed a new system of contributions in kind to supply its army, which was called *mubayaa*. Meaning “buying” or “purchasing” literally, neither *iştira* nor *mubayaa* were regular taxation by definition. Nevertheless, *mubayaa* combined a wide selection of contradictory applications so much so that the subjects often regarded the compulsory *mubayaa* contributions at the ruling or fixed prices as oppressive and ruinous for their well-being. To begin with, the quantity and quality of the grain to be delivered was determined by the Porte, while the pricing policy was subject to change depending on the exigencies of war, constraints of time, and the quantity and the quality of the grain.<sup>11</sup>

Changes made to the system of provisioning ran parallel to those witnessed in the administration of the Empire owing to the rise of the *ayans* and the implementation of the *malikane* system, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The logistics appear to have been more centralized at first glance in that the *mubayaaacı*, the commissioner/commissar, was appointed from the Porte to make the official purchases from the producers. The Porte, nevertheless, usually opted for a local *ayan* to fill the post, probably because a local functionary was better suited to manage the system as

---

Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D, 1997); M. İnbaşı, *Ukrayna'da Osmanlılar, Kamanıçe Seferi ve Organizasyonu (1672)* (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2004).

<sup>11</sup> M. Y. Ertaş, *Sultanın Ordusu*, pp. 119-121. A contemporary Western observer defined *iştira/mubayaa* as in the following: “İştira is tax imposed upon agricultural and wealthy provinces such as Salonica, Volo, Varna and others to supply a proportion of wheat amounting to about one-twelfth of the entire produce, to the Porte, at an arbitrary or rather nominal price”, see Emerson, *History of Modern Greece...*, v. I (New York, 1828), pp. 293-94.

opposed to an appointed functionary with little or no knowledge on the local conditions. Provisioning of the combined fleet clearly illustrated this fact as we will see in the following. While co-ordination between the *ayan*, *kadı*, and the state was immensely important for a smooth functioning of the system, Aksan's studies on wars with Russia and the contemporary Ottoman observers have demonstrated how vulnerable the system was to a number of abuses: subjects could hide their grains in reaction to low prices, whereas the commissioner could adulterate the grain to make up for the lack of the funds made available to him by the center and it goes without saying that captains could steal from their load and sell it at higher prices to the foreign merchants.<sup>12</sup>

#### Introduction of the central provisioning and the galley

As for the provisioning of the navy, the obvious development was the introduction of a system of central provisioning. Until the 1790s, no common meals were served to the crew at regular hours, by which reason the crew maintained their own stoves on any available spot on the deck, frequently causing fires, or else confusion and disorder in the battle. Starting by 1794, each ship was installed a cook room often known as galley and given a salaried cook with a team so as to serve common meals.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870* (Longman, 2007), pp. 65-83; Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-83* (Leiden: Brill, 1995); Aksan, "The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply, and Command in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774" in Aksan (ed.), *Ottomans and Europeans: Conflicts and Contacts* (İstanbul: Isis, 2004), pp. 173-191; also see her "Feeding the Ottoman Troops on the Danube, 1768-1774", pp. 209-223 and "Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War", pp. 223-39 in the same compilation. For Ottoman logistics in eighteenth-century campaigns also see Ertaş, *Sultanın Ordusu (Mora Fethi Örneği 1714-1716)* (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2007); A. Nimet Kurat, *Prut Seferi ve Barışı (1123) 1711* (Ankara: TTK, 1951); Hakan Yıldız, *Haydi Osmanlı Sefere: Prut Seferi'nde Organizasyon ve Lojistik* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006).

<sup>13</sup> The French influence on the naval reforms is also manifest here. In the British navy, the galley occupied the space under the quarterdeck, or the middle deck on many three-deckers. In the Ottoman navy, however,

This also necessitated the abandoning of the custom of distributing the rations to each man separately. In the new system of provisioning, the victuals sufficient for six months were delivered to the second *Hoca* of the ship who was charged with overseeing the cooking of the rations in return for receipts.<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that the 1804/05 regulations were actually under way by the time of the expedition as suggested by the appointment of *hocas* from among the students/graduates of the Naval School to undertake the education and training of the crew at sea in addition to a number of duties. The first *hoca* served in the capacity of a liaison officer –keeping registers and using the signal flags-, while the third *hoca*, *Jurnal Hocası*, kept the ship’s daily log called *jurnal*. In addition, we see the full implementation of the new supply system, whereas it is said to have gradually replaced the old system in two decades.<sup>15</sup>

The 1701 Law on Navy (*Bahriye Kanunnamesi*) had entitled each Ottoman seaman to six months’ provisions of 112.89 kg (2 *kantar* [hereafter, *kt*]) of hardtack, 51.32 kg (2 *kile* [hereafter, *kl*]) of rice, 25.66 kg (a *kl*) of lentils, and 3.84 kg (3 *kıyye* [hereafter, *ky*]) of olive oil. Captain, however, had an allowance for 903.18 kg (16 *kt*) of hardtack, whereas this figure was 564.49 kg (10 *kt*) for the assistant captain (*mülazım*

---

following the French system, there was a separate bread oven made from brick and a hanging charcoal stove. The former was installed at the forecastle, close to the places the officers slept, see Hobhouse *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces...*, v. I, pp. 297-98. For more information on the accommodation in the warships of the age, see B. Lavery, “Ships Fittings” in Gardiner (ed.), *The Line of Battle*, pp. 137-145.

<sup>14</sup> Shaw, “Selim III and the Ottoman Navy”, pp. 220-24; K. Beydilli and İ. Şahin (eds.), *Mahmud Raif Efendi ve Nizam-ı Cedid’e Dair Eseri* (Ankara: TTK, 2001), p. 77; Gencer, *Bahriye’de Yapılan Islahat Hareketleri*, pp. 42-45.

<sup>15</sup> Shaw, “Selim III and the Ottoman Navy”, p. 224. These regulations are also described in Gencer, *Bahriye’de Yapılan Islahat Hareketleri*, pp. 43-9.



*kapudan*) for the same period of six months. Moreover, each ship had a daily allowance of 3.84 kg (3 *ky*) of olive oil for lighting.<sup>16</sup>

The new regulation stipulated the serving of pilaf on Monday and Friday evenings as opposed to soup on other evenings, while olive salad would be regularly provided at the breakfasts. Ottoman documents consulted have revealed that the quantities of rations fixed by the 1701 regulation were still the norm by the time of the expedition. The British sources on Ottoman rations give the same figures for the quantities of rice and lentil as the Ottoman sources with the exception of olive oil which is recorded as 3.5 *ky* in the former sources. They also mention a cheese ration of 3 *ky*, about which the Ottoman documents are silent.<sup>17</sup> The historian Kethüda Said provides a breakdown of certain rations for each man per diem: 128.28 grams (40 *dirhem*) of olive; 64.14 grams (20 *dirhem*) of onions; 32.7 grams (10 *dirhem*) of vinegar; 16.035 grams (5 *dirhem*) of salt. If his figures are correct, this will translate into six months' rations as such: 22.65 kg (17.7 *ky*) of olive, 11.32 kg (8.85 *ky*) of onions, 5.66 kg (4.42 *ky*) of vinegar, and 2.83 kg (2.21 *ky*) of salt.<sup>18</sup> As will be discussed in detail in the following sections, the quantities of the rations delivered to the Ottoman fleet in the course of the expedition are similar to these figures, while the Sublime Porte seems to have been more generous towards the Russian fleet.

---

<sup>16</sup> Alperen, *Osmanlı Denizciliği*, pp. 274-75.

<sup>17</sup> Shaw, "Selim III and the Ottoman Navy", p. 220. He claimed that cheese came from the Principalities, p. 232. Kethüda Said Efendi put the figure of rice ration at 3.5 *ky*, see Ahmed Özcan, *Kethüda Said Efendi Tarihi ve Değerlendirmesi* (Kırıkkale Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1999), p. 81.

<sup>18</sup> Özcan, *Kethüda Said Efendi Tarihi*, p. 81. His figure of 175 *dirhem* as the clarified butter ration for six months is obviously wrong.

### Organization of provisioning in the expedition to the Ionians

The expedition to the Ionians was basically a naval expedition in which the Ottoman *mubayaa* system was in full practice to supply the combined fleet. The difference as opposed to other Ottoman expeditions lied in the participation of a foreign navy in the expedition which was a novelty in Ottoman history.

Regular provisions procured to the Russian fleet consisted of hardtack biscuit, olive oil, salt, vinegar, *arak/raki* –the Turkish vodka-, wine, and firewood with occasional shipments of clarified/purified butter, crushed wheat, chickpeas and beans (fresh/dried?). In comparison, the lists of provisions for the Ottoman fleet regularly featured olive, rice, lentil and onions in addition to those procured to the Russian fleet such as hardtack biscuit, olive oil, salt, vinegar, and firewood with the obvious exception of wine and *arak*. While the Russian fleet was to be supplied in three installments in a year, the Ottoman fleet received the provisions in two installments of six-month long each which were *sayfiye* (summertime) and *şitaiye* (wintertime) following the Ottoman regulations.

The Morea and İstanbul were the main suppliers of the combined fleet. There were two Ottoman agents in charge of provisioning of the Russian fleet. The agent in İstanbul was Memiş Efendi, head of the tobacco customs. He was responsible to procure the firewood from the Ağa of İstanbul, *arak* from Şarköy, the hardtack biscuit from the state hardtack bakery and other items from the markets of İstanbul. These provisions were transported to Anavarin (Navarino) –or, Değirmenlik (the Milos Island) defined as the harbor of Argos in documents- in the Morea mostly by foreign vessels with an

Ottoman official, inspector (*mübaşir*), on board. In addition to the agent in İstanbul, two commissaries (*nüzl emini*) were appointed to the Morea. They supplied the other provisions in the Morea and delivered them to the combined fleet along with those items sent from İstanbul, mostly from the port of Ottoman Balye Badra (Patras). Occasionally, provisions were delivered to the Russian consul in Balye Badra and stocked aboard a Russian warship sent for that purpose in return for an invoice.

Hüseyin Şükrü Bey was appointed the commissary to the Russian fleet at the beginning of the campaign, but soon replaced with Ebubekir Bey, the *ayan* of Görδος (Kordos; Corinth).<sup>19</sup> İsmail Taif Efendi was, on the other hand, the commissary overseeing the procurement of the provisions for the Ottoman fleet until the end of November 1800. He was also replaced with Ebubekir Beg afterwards.<sup>20</sup> Ebubekir Beg was a *petty ayan* in the province of the Morea -not to be confused with the great *ayans*. The Porte possibly deemed it appropriate to charge a local functionary with the provisioning of the joint fleet in reaction to the long delays in the supply system at the beginning of the expedition when it was headed by the appointed officials from the center. A third Ottoman agent, Mustafa Reşid Efendi, was appointed to Corfu upon the conclusion of the campaign with the title of the superintendent of Corfu (*Korfa Nazırı*). One of his duties among others was the storage and distribution of provisions sent to Corfu on account of the recurrent problems involved in the complicated system of

---

<sup>19</sup> Hüseyin Şükrü Beg was once a voivode of Galata and appointed to his new post on 15 October 1798, BOA, C.HRC 4814 (5CA1213/15Oct1798) and received an allowance of 2,500 *krş* to cover the travel expenses, BOA, C.BH (12413 (6CA1213/16Oct1798).

<sup>20</sup> İsmail Taif was also in charge of overseeing the renovation of the castle of the Morea, C.BH 2149 (11B1215/28Nov1800), C.BH 6705 (12B1215/29Nov1800).

logistics. In June 1801, Mehmed Ragıb Beg, one of the agas of Anaboli (Nafplion), took over Ebubekir's commissariat duties concerning the Russian fleet.<sup>21</sup>

While İstanbul and the Morea were the main bases of supply, other regions were also drawn into the system of logistics. For instance, Kara Osmanzade, the *Muhassıl*<sup>22</sup> of Aydın and one of the most prominent *ayans* of Anatolia, organized the delivery of the chickpeas. Some of the wine sent from the Aegean islands whereas Şarköy was the main supplier of *rakı* –as is today in Turkey. Places such as Selanik (Salonica), Bursa, and Silivri also contributed in the delivery of the hardtack biscuit.

Russia dispatched a number of warships from the Baltic fleet to reinforce the Russian Black Sea fleet in the Mediterranean in the period 1799-1807. The Ottomans, however, seems to have raised some objections to supplying the detachments from the Baltic fleet as we will see in the following.

### Supply problems

The supplies were never ready on time during the expedition. As we have realized in our discussion of the expedition, the combined fleet was particularly pressed by supply shortages in the summer of 1799 and had to join with Nelson in Palermo quite late.<sup>23</sup>


---

<sup>21</sup> C.BH 9923 (5S1216/17June1801); BOA, A.SKT 68/34 (25B1213/2Jan1799) Mustafa Paşa, the Governor of the Morea to the Porte.

<sup>22</sup> *Muhassıl* literally means tax collector. After the official abolition of the office of *ayan* in 1775 in reaction to their low-performance in the war with Russia (1768-1774), various official titles were bestowed to former *ayans* as they were indispensable to the running of the Empire and *muhassıl* was probably the most common title held by the *ayans*.

<sup>23</sup> Ushakov frequently complained about delay of food delivery by Turkish authorities and low quality of this food. On 25 June 1799 (new style) two Russian frigates (*Sv. Nikolay* and *Schastlivii*) arrived from Nikolaev with food and other supplies for Ushakov's squadron at Büyükdere, see R.N. Mordvinov (ed.), *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 3 "Voенно-Morskoe Izfatel'stvo" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1952-56), doc. # 24.

Map III. Organization of the provisioning of the Russo-Ottoman combined fleet



Notes: The map is adapted from E. Dümen, *Denizde Yıllar Boyu Anadolu Türkleri 1081-1922 (Onsekizinci Yüzyıl)* (İstanbul: Dz.K.K Basımevi, 1993), p. 4.

Map IV. The Morea, the Adriatic Sea, and the Venetian Gulf by Katib Çelebi



Notes: The Map of the Morea, the Adriatic Sea, and the Venetian Gulf from *Cihannüma* İbrahim Müteferrika. *Kitab-ı Cihannüma li-Katib Çelebi*, pp. 77-78 (Konstantiniye, hegira 1145 [1732]). Courtesy of Turkuaz Antiquariad, İstanbul.

What accounted for long delays was the paradoxical situation of dispatching the combined fleet long before reaching an agreement over the terms of the intended alliance. The Russian fleet was stocked with a six-month provision before it sailed to Istanbul on 24 August; yet, it ran short of money for buying supplies and for paying the crew by September.<sup>24</sup> Two parties seem to have had a mutual understanding concerning the provisioning of the fleet before the signing of the treaty as revealed by the delivery of the

<sup>24</sup> N. Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807* (The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 63, 67.

first installment of the cash-substitute to the Russian fleet at the end of November 1798 and appointment of Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi to the Morea as the commissary for the Russians provisions in mid-October. On 8 September, necessary regulations were made to load the Russian fleet with 1,334 kg (1,040 *ky*) of beef and 1,000 cabbages prior to its departure from Istanbul.<sup>25</sup> Kalfaoğlu Aleksandiri, the interpreter appointed to the Russian fleet, was entrusted with a *firman* before the departure of the fleet from İstanbul ordering the districts lying along the route to sell the necessary supplies and provisions to the fleet at moderate prices.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the Porte took certain measures to facilitate the transportation of the supplies and provisions. After they delivered their initial loads to the combined fleet, the cargo ships were to be re-loaded at the appointed harbors without having to report to İstanbul empty for the freight payment.<sup>27</sup> These measures, it seems, did not forestall logistical problems since the joint fleet was already in the Adriatic at this date.

Besides, large quantities of provisions had to be procured and delivered to the joint-fleet in wintertime without any early preparations. By November 1798, Ushakov was complaining to Tomara that “in all history he could not find an example of a fleet reduced to such extremity”, and constantly harassing Abdülkadir Beg on the issue.<sup>28</sup> The

---

<sup>25</sup> C.HRC 7322 (1R1213/12Sept1798), the superintendent of Water (*Su Nazırı*) was to procure the cabbage from the Customs.

<sup>26</sup> C.HRC 519 (mid-R1213/mid-September 1798).

<sup>27</sup> C.BH 9364 (19C1213/29Oct1798), firman handed to Captain Bürdam carrying crushed wheat and hardtack to Anavarin for the Russian fleet.

<sup>28</sup> Mordvinov's compilation contains various correspondences of Ushakov and Tomara attesting to supply shortages at this period: Ushakov's letter (26 November 1798 [new style]) to Governor of Morea with a request to deliver foodstuff to the Russian squadron (doc. # 183); Ushakov's order to a junior Lieutenant Mavro Mikhaili to go to Governor of Morea to speed up delivery of food (doc. # 184); Ushakov's letter

winter of 1798-1799 was unusually severe in south Europe, while the Sublime Porte also had to take care of the expedition to Egypt. After the surrender of Corfu Kapudane Abdülkadir Beg sent Seyyid Hasan Hoca Kapudan to İstanbul along with the Riyale Beg to provide firsthand knowledge on the supply problems and help the Porte reorganize the system accordingly.<sup>29</sup>

The combined fleet was overwhelmed by the acute supply shortages particularly in the first months of 1799 as the cargo ships spread canvas from İstanbul in November 1798 could reach Anavarin only by the end of February 1799 due to winter weather after a trip of three months.<sup>30</sup> In the beginning of the month, Abdülkadir was disgruntling that the cargo ships were not arriving. No provisions due from the Morea reached to the Ottoman fleet except for 4,119 *kt* of hardtack while there was no sign of the supplies due for the Russian fleet except the rumors that they were about to arrive in a couple of days. This was also the time when the Albanian mercenaries also began to arrive in Corfu, putting another strain on the crumbled supply system. Ali Paşa undertook the provisioning of his own troops, but he struck a deal with Abdülkadir in which the fleet was to pay each of his troops a daily cash substitute of 7 *para* [hereafter, *pr*] (for 300 *dirhem* of flour) for the days he could not feed his Albanians. İbrahim Paşa of Avlonya was also obliged to procure provisions for his own troops, but Abdülkadir Beg had to

---

(dated 2 December 1798) to Abdülkadir Beg with a request to speed up delivery of food to Russian squadron (doc. # 209); Ushakov's request on delivery of 700 *kt* of biscuits from Morea (repeated several times in December: docs. # 211, 234), see R.N. Mordvinov (ed.) *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2-3 "Voenno-Morskoe Izfatel'stvo" (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1952-56) ; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 122.

<sup>29</sup> BOA, HAT 163/6772 (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. His title, *hoca*, suggests that Seyyid Hasan was responsible for the organization of provisioning in one of the ships.

<sup>30</sup> HAT 153/6429 (1N1213/6Feb1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.



donate a daily cash substitute of 6 *pr* to each of İbrahim's troops as he failed to keep his men provisioned on a regular basis because of the distance: a monthly expense of 9,500 *krş* [hereafter, *krş*] suggested that İbrahim sent 2,111 mercenaries. Nevertheless, boats were sent to İbrahim Paşa to load the promised corn wheat.<sup>31</sup>

The Porte, on the other hand, sent speedy vessels to force out the cargo ships from the harbors in which they took shelter and tried to rush additional provisions from various places in the Balkans. Relying on the reports from the Morea, the Porte estimated that the province sent 10,000 *kt* of hardtacks until early March.<sup>32</sup>

Because of these long delays in delivery, the Russian navy demanded compensation money instead of the last two installments of olive oil and wine due for the hegira year [H.] 1213. Long distances also hindered healthy communication with Istanbul and St Petersburg, which often did not know whereabouts of the combined fleet. Papers sent from the fleet usually caused confusion on the matter of provisioning as their dates were past. While the Ottoman fleet was operating in the vicinity of Sicily, Abdülkadir sent a report and complained from the lack of provisions. However, his signed receipt of a later date proving the delivery of the cargo had reached İstanbul before his complaints. This cargo, carrying the provisions for the Ottoman fleet, was actually sent in March

---

<sup>31</sup> HAT 153/6429 (1N1213/6Feb1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>32</sup> HAT 153/6429 (1N1213/6Feb1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. Selim wrote down on the document "Seen. Show utmost care to the matters of recruitment and grains" (*Manzurum olmuştur. Asker ve zehayir hususuna gayet ihtimam u dikkat idesiz*); Mahmud Raif marked that two light vessels (*çamlıca*) loaded hardtack arrived at Corfu, HAT 164/6831-C (16N1213/21Feb1799); in the mean time the fleet was struggling to obtain the provisions to be furnished by the Morea, Galos, Ali Paşa, and İbrahim of Avlonya, HAT 162/6745 (15N1213/20Feb1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte; a couple of store ships sent from İstanbul reached at Corfu by the beginning of March, HAT 164/6831-H (27N1213/4March1799) from Mahmud Raif to the Porte.

1799 from İstanbul, but did not reach the joint-fleet before mid-summer, which caused a great confusion in the relevant correspondence at the frustration of Selim III.<sup>33</sup>

As mentioned above, lack of provisions was one of the reasons for the combined fleet's failure to respond quickly to Nelson's call for assistance against Admiral Bruix. In his report sent from Palermo, Abdülkadir brilliantly sent message home by describing the way in which the Sicilian ally provisioned the Ottoman fleet. The provisions furnished by the court of Naples to the Ottoman fleet were so abundant that it could have fed the two fleets even if their stores had been totally empty. These provisions included thehardtack of the 'super best' quality (*hasü'l-has*), vermicelli (*şehriye*), *kuskuma* (kind of boiled wheat?), olive oil, and sardine fish. Pointing out that the provisions sent from İstanbul and the Morea had appeared to be missing in quantity, he begged the attention of the authorities to these setbacks.<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> HAT, 266/15490 (nd.), deputy Grand-vizier to Selim III. It should be dated to the summer 1799. Selim's frustration is reflected in his hand-note on the margin of the memorandum: "*Subhanallah! Herifler zahiresizlikten ve askersizlikten feryad ideyorlar. 'Şuradan gitdi' dimenin faidesi nedir? Hem bu kağıtların tarihleri atik! Bu kadar vakitdir nerede imiş? Elbette asakir ve zehair erişdirsün. Donanmamızı biz ifna idüb düşmenlere rezil ideyoruz. Böyle dikkat ve ikdam olmaz.*" [For God's sake! Chaps are crying out for the lack of provisions and troops. What is the use of saying 'already sent'? Dates on these papers are old, also! Where have they been till now? Send troops and provisions in any case. We ruin our navy and embarrass it in front of the enemies. This is not what careful attention and perseverance is supposed to mean.]; Selim III: "*Bu adamların zehairi için kaç defadır yazdım. Şimdiden mülahaza ve tedarükdür olunsun. Sonra sıklet çekilmesün*" [I have written to you for so many times for the provisions of these men. Take precautions and make them ready in advance. No scarcity should be suffered.], HAT 34/1665 (nd.).

<sup>34</sup> He also confirmed the arrival of 50,000 *krş* for the summertime pays of the crews on 3 September, HAT 155/6513-J (nd.; early September) From Abdülkadir to the Porte; As of 14 August, orders sent out to the provinces to raise 1,500 troops to supplant the Ottoman fleet which had received the equipments except for spare masts and yards. The stores of the Imperial Dockyards ran out of all the equipments and no money could be found to make purchase due to "shortage of cash" (*fikdan-ı nükud*), C.BH 2855 (12RA1214/14Ağustos1799) From the Chief Treasurer to the Porte; HAT 156/6524-G (19RA1214/21Aug1799).

### Articles on provisioning in the Treaty of Ottoman-Russian Alliance

The text of the treaty<sup>35</sup> has several articles on logistics due to its unquestionable significance in executing such a naval expedition: articles V, VI, IX, and X of the public treaty and articles V, VI, and XI of the secret treaty regulated the rules and methods of provisioning together with a special act provided by the Ottomans. Should one of the allies come under attack, the other side would have to either provide military assistance -by joining forces or opening a new front for diversion- or give financial support (article V), the choice of which would depend on the decision of the party under attack (article VI). The military assistance should be provided within three months after the request, or, otherwise it should be substituted as cash and paid in installments during wartime (article VI). The Power receiving military assistance should procure military supplies in proportion to the number of the troops put into its service and supply the provisions either in kind or in cash at the negotiated price beginning from the day the allied troops entered its territory (article IX). The ally under attack should make available the dockyard facilities for the allied fleet when it needed to see repair at its own expense calculated at the market price (*rayiç*); moreover the fleet sent in assistance could stay in the harbors in wintertime (article IX).

Secret article V regulated the provisioning of the Russian Black Sea fleet to be dispatched to the Adriatic. According to the article, Russia was to deliver the list of the items of foodstuff to the Sublime Porte and the quantity should be calculated according to the number of the Russian ships and troops. The Porte was responsible for supplying

---

<sup>35</sup> Refer to chapter 2 for the references of the treaty.

the Russian fleet beginning from the date it entered the Bosphorus until it returned to the Black Sea after the restoration of peace. The Russians were to receive the provisions in three equal installments. After the loading of the first four-month provisions aboard the fleet, subsequent installments should be delivered in a timely fashion so that Russians would always have provisions sufficient for at least two months. The Porte undertook to supply the Russian fleet with clean and best-quality provisions. Furthermore, it was to give cash substitute (*nakden bedel*: i.e., cash-substitute) in compensation of those items not listed by the Russians. The cash substitute was specified as 1,200 purses (600,000 *krş*) in the treaty with regard to the number of the Russian troops for the beginning of the expedition. This sum was to be delivered to the Russian ambassador in İstanbul in three equal installments. The first four-month installment for both the provisions and the cash substitute was to begin from the month of September 1798; that is, the date of arrival of the Russian fleet in İstanbul.

To the dismay of the Sublime Porte, Paul I offered for several times to dispatch Russian troops to the Balkans to help Ottomans eliminate Pazvandoğlu Osman of Vidin and check any possible French advancement. The Porte seems to have ruled out that possibility by the secret article VI by which the dispatch of the Russian troops was bound by the request of the Ottomans. Upon call for help, Russia was to send 75,000-80,000 troops to be provisioned by the Ottomans from the time on they embarked on the right bank of the Dniester. This army was to be supplied and provisioned as regulated in article V and in the special act prepared for that purpose, while the mode of provisioning-in kind or in cash at the market price- was open to future negotiations.

Both parties agreed to keep the special act secret. According to the article XI, were one of the allies to fight in a distant theatre of war beyond the reach of the other ally, military assistance would be substituted with cash. In that case, 3,000 purses (1,500,000 *krş*) should be delivered annually to support a force composed of 12,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry- 100 *krş* for an infantry soldier and 150 *krş* for a cavalry soldier.<sup>36</sup>

### **Making sense of figures, quantities, and prices**

What follows is a discussion of major provisions provided for the joint fleet with a view to make sense of the quantities and prices as a background for an analysis of center-periphery relations and diplomacy. It is hoped that what appears at first as a series of banal and repetitious documents concerning themselves with the quotas, quantities, and prices of provisions will shed light to the scope and magnitude of the organization of provisioning. The focus will be on the period 1798 - 1800 when the number of ships and troops were at its highest in the Adriatic front without losing sight of the remainder of the period which lasted until 1807.

---

<sup>36</sup> HAT 260/15008 (9CA1213/19Oct1798) from deputy Grand vizier to Selim. The proposed form of secret article VI had caused consternation to the Porte since it demanded the payment of 16,000 purses of *krş* in return of 70,000 – 80,000 troops to be sent to the Balkans against the French upon the request of the Porte. The Ottomans feared that Russia might demand territory should the Porte fail to make the payment due to a financial crisis. Russia would send its armies to the Balkans in the case of a French attack on Albania. Thus, it was necessary to have an alliance with Russia to bring certain limitations to a possible Russian invasion. Selim expressed his views, “If I could be certain that they [the Russians] will bring and take their soldiers according to our will, I should not dwell on the matter of the supply fund.” [in Hurewitz’ translation], Hurewitz, “The Background of Russia’s Claims”, p. 479 fn.50; HAT 260/15008 (9CA1213/19Oct1798) from the deputy Grand vizier to Selim: (...*Bana kalsa ısrar eyledikleri halde bezl-i tayınatı kabul idelim. Anlar dahi askeri istediğimiz vakit getirüb ve gitsünler didiğimiz vakt götürceklerine sened virme misillü ittifaknameye tekidlü derc olsa yani istersek asker geliüb istemezsek gelmeyeceklerini idrak eylesem bezl-i tayınatda tavakkuf eylemem...*). Hurewitz misdated the document as 20 November 1798; for the initial Russian draft of the treaty see Tukin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 112-13.

## Wine

Wine was delivered only to the Russians in the combined fleet. Ushakov demanded the cash compensation of wine due for the last two installments of H. 1213 (ends in May 1799).<sup>37</sup> Ebubekir Beg actually paid 72,536.5 *krş* 16 *pr* based on the calculation of 4 *pr* a *ky* in compensation of 725,364 *ky* wine to the Russians in the summer of 1799 at the earliest. The obvious reason for the late payment was insufficient funds at Ebubekir's disposal spared for the provisions due for H. 1213. Thus, he had to await the arrival of fresh funds for buying the provisions of H. 1214. The quantity of wine to be given in each installment in H. 1213 was 465,248 kg (362,682 *ky*), summing up to 1,395,745 kg (1,088,046 *ky*).<sup>38</sup> Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi also sent 59,778 kg (46,600 *ky*) of wine to the two Russian warships dispatched to Alexandria, bringing the total to 1,455,523 kg.<sup>39</sup> The quantity of wine demanded from the Morea was so great that the functionaries in the Morea were afraid of running out of barrels and decided to ask the Russian fleet to provide empty barrels for stocking wine.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> C.HRC 5148 (11ZA1214/6Apr1800).

<sup>38</sup> C.HRC 1798 (15M1215/8Jun1800); The Porte issued the necessary order in January 1799, but the figures are slightly different; 54,402 *krş* were to be given in compensation for the last two wine installments of H. 1213. Based on the calculation of four *krş* per *ky* as stated in the order, 1,046,803 kg (816,030 *ky*) of wine could be purchased, see, C.HRC 7773 (11M1215/4Jun1800). I rely on the figures given by Ebubekir Beg since he pointed out that the Russians delivered an official note upon the receipt of wine.

<sup>39</sup> C.HRC 1212 (5RA1214/7Aug1799) Hüseyin Şükrü to the Porte. He bought the wine at 7 *akçe* [hereafter, *ak*] a *ky* and sent them presumably in the summer of 1799. On 30 May 2718 *krş* was forwarded from the extraordinary wartime budget to buy wine for these ships, BOA, KK 2383, 5a; in a letter to Captain A.A. Sorokin (commander of the Russian squadron sent to Egypt) dated 18 November 1798, Tomara wrote that Ottoman had hired vessels to deliver him food for 4 months (per 1,000 portions), 11,200 *ky* of "raka" (Turkish vodka), 46,600 *ky* of red wine and 2,500 *ky* of vinegar, see doc. # 173 in Mordvinov (ed.), *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2.

<sup>40</sup> TSA, E.3654/2 from the dragoman of the Morea to the dragoman of the Porte.

A study of viniculture in Mount Athos based on the 1764 census carried out by the Ottomans has demonstrated that average wine production per *stremma* (1000 m<sup>2</sup>) in seven monasteries of Mount Athos was around 155 kg, while in two other monasteries it reached to 225 kg with a low of roughly 65 kg in the remaining three monasteries. Figures for the late 17<sup>th</sup>-century Cycladic islands and Santorini are 150 kg and 128 kg, respectively.<sup>41</sup>

**Table 5.1: wine provisions of the Russian fleet (1798-99) I**

Number of the monasteries at Mount Athos	Wine production per <i>stremma</i> (average) in 1764	Vineyards <i>Stremma</i> (1000 m <sup>2</sup> ) in 1764	Wine provision in H. 1213	The hypothetical size of the vineyards <i>stremma</i>	Wine Exports to Russia (1800-1806)
11	65 kg	1,729.5	1,455,523 kg	22,392.66	14,589,708 kg
7	155 kg			9,390.47	
2	225 kg			6,468.9	

*Notes and Sources:* The data on the monasteries are adapted from Evangelia Balta, “Evidence for Viniculture”, p. 11, Table 2; for export figures see, Murat Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Rusya Ticari Münasebetleri* (Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2002), p. 235; C.HRC 1798 (15M1215/8Jun1800).

Table 5.2 displays the details of a hypothetical calculation that has the potential to show the magnitude of the enterprise in the first year of the campaign, which may explain the failure in this respect as well. The quantity of the grape needed to produce that much wine would be at least two times the quantity of the wine produced;<sup>42</sup> that is, 2,911,046 kg. According to 1716 survey of the Morea, a *dönüm* (919.3 m<sup>2</sup>) of land in Anavarin

<sup>41</sup> Evangelia Balta, “Evidence for Viniculture from the Ottoman Tax Registers: 15<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> Century”, *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 5 (2001): 1-12.

<sup>42</sup> In the mountainous parts of the Cilicia a kg of grape yielded 0,68 liters of grape juice in the Antiquity. This finding is supported by other studies on ancient and modern viticulture, see Ümit Aydoğdu, *Dağlık Kilikya Bölgesinde Antik Çağ’da Zeytinyağı ve Şarap Üretimi: Üretimin Arkeolojik Kanıtları* (İstanbul: Efe, 2009), p. 69. I use the simple equation of a kg of grape = 0.5 kg of wine in my calculation.

produced a weight of grapes that varied between 200 and 300 *ky* (256-384 kg). Thus, between 7,269 and 10,904 *dönüm* of vineyards would have been needed to grow the necessary grapes to supply the Russians with wine. In Anavarin slightly more than 1,000 *dönüm* was devoted to viticulture in 1716 (giving a grape yield of 256,000 kg – 384,000 kg).<sup>43</sup> We should bear in mind that cereals were the main agricultural product, claiming the larger portion of the cultivable land in the Morea.<sup>44</sup>

Table 5.2: wine provisions of the Russian fleet (1798-99) II

Wine due for H. 1213	Grape needed	The hypothetical size of the vineyards needed	Grape produced in a <i>dönüm</i> of land in Anavarin (1716)	Land devoted to viticulture in Anavarin (1716)	Total grape production in Anavarin (1716)
1,455,523 kg (1,134,646 <i>ky</i> )	2,911,046 kg	7,269 – 10,904 <i>dönüm</i> (919.3 m <sup>2</sup> )	256 kg – 384 kg	1,000 <i>dönüm</i>	256,000 kg -384,000 kg

Sources and Notes: Zarinebaf et al., *A Historical and Economic Geography*, p. 179; C.HRC 1798 (15M1215/8Jun1800).

<sup>43</sup> Zarinebaf et al., *A Historical and Economic Geography of Ottoman Greece. The Southwestern Morea in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century* (Athens, 2004), p. 179; the average production on one *dönüm* of vineyard was 300 *ky* in southwestern Peloponnese in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, see E. Balta, “The viticulture in the kaza of Tripolitsa (16<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Centuries)”, *Oinon istoro* [History of the wine] VI, 125-143. She cited Stefka Parveva, “Agrarian Land and Harvest in South-West Peloponnese in the Early 18<sup>th</sup> Century”, *Etudes Balkaniques* 1 (2003), pp. 96, 112; According to 2003 figures Şarköy produced 21,000 metric tones of wine a year which is 1/3 of the total wine production of Turkey in the same year, see <http://sarkoymyo.nku.edu.tr/bolumler/sarap-uretim-teknolojisi-ve-bagcilik.html>

<sup>44</sup> Disproportionate to the land it occupied, viticulture yielded high incomes for the peasants. Balta observed that in the 16<sup>th</sup>-century Tripolitsa viticulture was the primary source of income. She pointed out that Mantinea, Tegea and Tripolitsa was renowned for their wines, Balta, “The viticulture in the kaza of Tripolitsa (16<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Centuries)”, pp. 125-143; Yaşar also has the same observation on the 16<sup>th</sup>-century *Benefşe* (Monemvasia). In terms of taxes paid on viticulture, Monemvasia ranked the last after Koron, Kalamata, Mezestre in wine production in spite of its famous Malmsey wines, F. Yaşar, “Viticulture and wine production in Ottoman Monemvasia in the sixteenth century” in I. Anagnostakis (ed.), *Monemvasian Wine-Monovas(i)a-Malvasia* (Athens, 2008), p. 294.



The figures for the remainder of the period (May 1800 through the end of 1806) indicate that the Porte supplied at least a total of 743,569 kg (579,645.5 *ky*) of wine to the Russians, notwithstanding the exact quantity must have been greater, for these figures are fragmentary as shown in Appendix A. It should also be noted that it is not certain as how much of this quantity was substituted with cash and there is no need to run the risk of making too much of the quantitative data by citing these figures in detail. Suffice it to say for the sake of our discussion that wine deliveries considerably decreased after Paul called off the Adriatic campaign in late 1799. It, however, increased sharply as Alexander I, his successor, dispatched new ships and fresh troops to the Ionians by the end of 1802.<sup>45</sup>

A broad overview of the fluctuating prices reveals the flexibility of the Porte in that manner. Mehmed Emin Efendi, the Secretary of the Tax-farm bureau of the Spirits (*Zecriye Mukataası Katibi*), informed the Porte in the autumn of 1800 on the regional price fluctuations in wine. Wines produced in the vicinity of the Dardanelles (*Boğaz Hisarları*) sold for 6-8 *pr* (18-24 *ak*) a *ky*, whereas the official price (*miri*) for wine in the Morea was merely 7 *ak*. He added that the people of the Morea, nevertheless, raised it to 4 *pr* (12 *ak*).<sup>46</sup> As mentioned in the previous chapter, the imposition of an officially fixed price on wine is quite uncommon, for it was not a basic commodity.

The needs of the Russian fleet may well have accounted for this increase in the price, given the enormous quantities involved as shown in the table above. As mentioned

---

<sup>45</sup> Table 5.1 clearly shows that the quantity of wine the Porte had to deliver was roughly equal to one-seventh of the total Ottoman wine exports to Russia in 1800-1806.

<sup>46</sup> C.BH 1075 (2C1215/21Oct1800).

previously, the Porte paid 4 *pr* (12 *ak*) per *ky* of wine to the Russians when Ushakov requested the substitution of wine with cash in H. 1213. The fact that the Porte reverted to the former policy of offering 7 *ak* a *ky* in later years implies that the initial increase was either a response to a possible shortage of wine in the province occurred in 1798-1800, or a well-calculated measure to protect the local economy in the face of the enormous quantities needed to be shipped from the Morea. By the same token, reverting back to the former pricing might have been linked to the diminishing amounts of wine ordered from the Morea.<sup>47</sup> Be that as it may, the inflated price of 4 *pr* was still lower than the reigning price of 7 *pr* provided by Dodwell for Athens in 1806.<sup>48</sup>

The wine procured from the Dardanelles to the Russian fleet in September 1800 also cost 4 *pr*, which is, this time, below actual prices prevailing in the region.<sup>49</sup> A probable abundance of wine in the region may account for the low offer in the sense that low official price would not inflict much harm on the local economy due to the availability of wine. In late 1801, the Secretary of the Tax-farm bureau of the Spirits bought a *ky* of wine in İstanbul at the price of 7 *pr* (21 *ak*) for the consumption of the Russian frigate *Navarşin* (420 crew) anchored at Büyükdere.<sup>50</sup> Admiral Ushakov tried to

---

<sup>47</sup> Refer to the Appendix A to see the prices in different years.

<sup>48</sup> Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour...*, v. II (London, 1819), p. 498. Dodwell also cited the price of a *ky* of grape as 2 *pr*, whereas the Porte paid 28 *pr* in İstanbul in 1800, see C.HRC 6152 (7C1215/26Oct1800); Poqueville remarked that the Muslim crew of the ship that took him from the Morea to İstanbul in 1799 admired Pazvandoğlu Osman since “he only fought to relieve the people from the taxes of territorial productions; and particularly from that of wine, which amounted to 4 paras per ocque.” He, probably mistook the official price of wine for the surtaxes, Poqueville, *Travels Through the Morea, Albania, ...* translated from French (London, 1806), pp. 10-12.

<sup>49</sup> C.BH 1075 (2C1215/21Oct1800).

<sup>50</sup> This was the famous Russian frigate *Navarkhia* under the command of Voinovitch that took the Queen of Naples and her entourage from Ancona to Trieste in 1800, see D. F. White, “The Russian Navy in Trieste. During the Wars of the Revolution and the Empire”, *American Slavic and the East European Review* 6:3/4

ease the shortage of wine in early 1799 by making a purchase of 16,676 kg (13,000 *ky*) of wine on the spot with the booty plundered from the French POWs in the Ionians. He paid 7.27 *krş* per *ky*; that is, almost twice as much the price the Porte offered in compensation of the undelivered wine due for H. 1213.<sup>51</sup> In short, price of wine ranged between 7 *ak* and 21 *ak* depending on the regional variances in quality and availability.

Contemporary Western observer who were on the “little tour” in the Peloponnese generally found the local product of the Morea inferior to the wine of the Archipelago, which actually affirms the remarks of the afore-mentioned Ottoman secretary and may explain the lower official prices offered for the local wine. The inhabitants seem to have favored the wine of Mistra, and that of Saint George, in Corinth. Nevertheless both “are of only a light body, and possess a disagreeable flavour, from the turpentine with which they are purified.”<sup>52</sup> Holland described the wine of Ithaki as the best wine in the region, for it was not impregnated with turpentine “as is done with the wines of continental Greece”<sup>53</sup> while Dodwell agreed with others on the resinous and pungent quality of the wine of the Morea.<sup>54</sup> Notwithstanding the low-opinion of Western observers, the

---

(1947), pp. 26-9; C.HRC 324 (3B1216/9Dec1801), C.BH 2391 (22B1216/2Dec1801). This seems to be the regular price for wine in İstanbul. Two Russian warships lying on anchor at Büyükdere were stocked with wine bought at the same price in June 1803, C.HRC 271 (2RA1218/22Jun1803). In total, 6,256.5 *krş* was spent on wine and *arak*.

<sup>51</sup> C.HRC 7531 (2N1213/6Feb1799) Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>52</sup> Comstock, *A History of the Greek Revolution* (New York, 1828), pp. 353-54, quoting Emerson’s observations, dated 1825.

<sup>53</sup> Holland, *Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly, Macedonia, &c. during the years 1812 and 1813*, (London, 1815), p. 52.

<sup>54</sup> Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographic Tour*, v. I, p. 144. He was on the little tour in the Morea in 1805. For his other remarks on the superiority of the wine of the Archipelago and the Ionians over that of the Morea, see Dodwell, vol. I, pp. 8-9; Gell noted the high quality of wine in Phonia: “the wine was exquisite, having the flavour of Burgundy, the production of vines cut down and covered up in the cold winter of the

Russians seem to have enjoyed their wine as their complaints were less about the quality than delays in delivery.<sup>55</sup>

It is not easy to ascertain the wine allowance per Russian soldier in the fleet by relying on the Ottoman documents that more often than not mention only the number of ships in most cases. However, if we divide the wine allowance for the *Navarşin* by the number of the crew, it appears that the Russians asked for roughly 7 kg of wine for each man for a month, and actually received around 17 kg instead, since the Porte sought to compensate the missing quantity of *arak* with extra delivery of wine.<sup>56</sup> The Russian reinforcements deployed in Corfu by 1802 to restore the disorder in the Ionians also received a monthly allowance of wine equal to little more than 10 kg each.<sup>57</sup> The provisioning list for the flagship *Sv. Pavel* submitted by Ushakov on 11 October 1798 put the official monthly allowance of red wine at 9.5 ‘glasses’ in substitution of 56 ‘glasses’ of beer, which is far below the levels the Ottomans undertook to deliver.<sup>58</sup> It is worth reminding that wine allowance was sometimes substituted with cash, but when provided in kind, officers and the rank-and-file must have received different quantities. By comparison, Nelson’s flagship *Vanguard* was stocked with a six-month ration of “7 tons of wine and a similar amount of spirits” prior to its commission in the Mediterranean in

---

mountains, yet possessing all the advantages of a hot summer” see W. Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea* (London, 1823) p. 375, for his similar observation on the wine of Fenari see p. 119.

<sup>55</sup> Yaşar pointed out “the sweet fortified wines with higher alcohol content became popular, such as porto, Malaga, Madera, marsala, which replaced the Malmsey wines.” F. Yaşar, “Viticulture and wine production in Ottoman Monemvasia in the sixteenth century”, p. 95.

<sup>56</sup> C.BH 2391 (22B1216/2Dec1801). See Table VIII in Appendix A.

<sup>57</sup> C.HRC 7863 (16Z1216-10RA1217/19Apr1802-11July1802); C.HRC 6057 (27CA1218/14Sept1803).

<sup>58</sup> Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

search of Napoleon.<sup>59</sup> That meant that each man aboard the ship -590 crew- had wine and spirit allowances of 11.86 kg each for six months –not even close to that of Russians!

### Arak

*Arak* was probably the most shocking item together with wine to see on an Ottoman list of provisions. It is all the more striking when one knows that the funds mobilized to buy these provisions were coming from the Campaign Treasury founded by Selim III to support the cause of  *Jihad* . Şarköy (a village in modern Tekirdağ) was the main supplier of *rakı* for the Russians under the supervision of Memiş Efendi in İstanbul and a number of local officials including the *kadı* of Şarköy. In November 1798 the Porte bought 600 barrels of 384.8 kg (300 *ky*) each to transport the ‘Turkish vodka’ to the Russian fleet.<sup>60</sup> Thus, at least 230,904 kg of *arak* must have been delivered to the Russians for H. 1213, while the total quantity of *arak* to be supplied in H. 1214 appears to have been 349,829 kg (272,707.5 *ky*).<sup>61</sup> Accepting the rough figure of 7,200 men given for the strength of the Russian fleet in the expedition, each man should have had 48.58 kg of *arak* in H. 1214 –or 4.04 kg per month. Obviously, this calculation ignores the differences in the rations of the officers and the rank-and-file. Other calculations made on

---

<sup>59</sup> Lavery, *Nelson and the Nile*, p. 59.

<sup>60</sup> C.BH 9489 (C1213/Nov1798); by the same token, Mustafa Rasih Efendi, the Ottoman envoy sent to St Petersburg in 1792, defined vodka as ‘*arak*’ in describing the state monopoly on the production and distribution of vodka: “for instance, if a tavern-keeper sells a hundred *kıyye* of *rakı* a month, he will buy that much *rakı* from the state *rakı* distillery, paying at different rates determined officially according to the quality. The officials of the distillery enter the registers the name of the tavern, its location, the quantity it bought as well as the time it took to sell this quantity.” (*mesela bir meyhaneci bir mahda meyhanesinde yüz vukıyye arak fūruht ider ise yüz vukıyye enva’ına göre arakı fī mirisi olan kaç akçe ise ol-mikdar akçeye miri arak karhanesinden mübayaa ider ve ol meyhanenin ismini ve meyhanenin mahallini ve mübayaa eylediği arakın mikdarını ve ne mikdar müddetde fūruht idecek idüğünü arak karhanesi nezzar ve ammali mazbatalara kayd iderler.*), U. İyigünler, *Mustafa Rasih Efendi’nin Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaretnamesi* (Kırıkkale Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1998), p. 19, folio 22a.

<sup>61</sup> C.HRC 7947 (28CA1214/23Apr1800); C.HRC 2000 (15Ş1215/1Jan1801).

the lists of the frigate *Navarşin* and of the Russian reinforcements in Corfu reveal an average monthly consumption of 3.5 kg and 3.84 kg respectively.<sup>62</sup> Russian regulations made a monthly allowance of 3.444 liters (28 *charka* X 0.123 liter) of vodka per sailor on *Sv. Pavel*.<sup>63</sup>

Usual delays in delivery also occurred in the case of *arak* deliveries. The last installment of H. 1214 reached the Russian navy only by mid-September 1800 (mid-1215). However, the delay was mainly because of the news of a possible retreat of the Russian fleet to the Straits which prompted the Porte to hold back the transportation ship at Şarköy. Confusion over the timing of the Russian fleet's voyage back to the Black Sea may have also accounted for several delays in the deliveries of various provisions occurred during the campaign.<sup>64</sup> By H. 1215 the *arak* allowance drastically decreased to one-fourth of the previous quantities.

Official price offered was 7 *pr a ky* and an additional 5 *krş* for the barrel. In 1801, the Secretary of the tax-farm bureau for the Spirits (*zecriye mukataası katibi*) had to pay 22 *pr a ky*, but the Porte only partially reimbursed him, paying 12 *pr* including the cost of the freight, which was 5 *pr*.<sup>65</sup> There is no information in the documents consulted concerning the market price of *arak*, which makes it difficult to assess the impact of *arak*

---

<sup>62</sup> See Tables VIII, X, and XI in Appendix A.

<sup>63</sup> Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97; monthly rations of the Russian officers for all provisions were as in the following: the junior officers (twice as much the rank-and-file's rations), the captain-lieutenants commanders- (thrice as much), captains of the second rank (four times as much), and captains of the first rank (five times as much).

<sup>64</sup> C.HRC 2000 (15Ş1215/1Jan1801); C.BH 10442 (29M1215/22Jun1800); C.BH 8681 (24RA1215/15Aug1800).

<sup>65</sup> C.BH 2391 (22B1216/2Dec1801). In 1802, the Porte bought a *ky* of *arak* at 8 *pr*, C.HRC 7863 (16Z1216-10RA1217/19Apr-11July1802).

purchases on the local economy. In 1798, the Porte ordered 600 barrels from the barrel-makers as it could not find enough of it in the shops. When they asked 7 *krş* for a barrel of 384 kg, the Porte, blaming them as wartime speculators, insisted on the former price of 4,5-5 *krş*. The barrel-makers finally accepted to deliver only 300 barrels at the slightly modified price of 5 *krş* 10 *pr* a barrel, but the Porte later forced them to deliver 600.<sup>66</sup> Figures from later years put the cost of a barrel as 5 *krş*<sup>67</sup>, which may indicate a return to the fixed price once the dearth of barrel was over in the market, if not a result of the practice of rounding which was commonplace in the calculations of the financial bureau.

### Olive oil

Table 5.3: olive oil provisions of the Russian fleet (1798-99)

Olive oil imports to Russia (1803, 1804, 1806)	Total quantity of olive oil delivered to the Russian fleet in H. 1214	Number of trees needed	Fruit-to-oil ratio in the Morea in 1716	Number of olive trees in Anavarin in 1716	Hypothetical quantity of olive oil produced in Anavarin in 1716
144,301.2 kg	172,797 kg (134,703.5 <i>ky</i> )	16,874 – 33,749	7.5:1	8,500	43,520 kg – 87,040 kg

Sources: C.HRC 1212; Zarinebaf et al., p. 198; Murat Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Rusya Ticari Münasebetleri*, p. 235.

The Morea had to provide 172,797 kg (134,703.5 *ky*) of olive oil just for the Russian fleet in 1799-1800. The 1716 cadastral survey of the Morea reveals that the fruit-to-oil ratio was 7.5:1. Zarinebaf's calculations based on this survey shows that trees in

<sup>66</sup> C.BH 9489 (C1213/Nov1798).

<sup>67</sup> C.HRC 2442 (23ZA1215/7Apr1801); 103 barrels of 388.6 kg (303 *ky*) each. A barrel of 411.8 kg (321 *ky*) for vinegar cost twice as much. Also see, C.HRC 324 (3B1216/9Dec1801), C.AS 42067 (5S1216/17June1801). A barrel of unspecified capacity for *çerviş* fat (suet -an inferior quality of fat in comparison to purified butter) was 4 *krş*, C.HRC 1642 (1215/1801).

Anavarin in heavy harvests yielded sufficient olives to result in 5.12-10.24 kg (4-8 *ky*) of oil half of which were retained locally. So 8,500 trees recorded in Anavarin in 1716 would thus have produced between 43,520 and 87,040 kg of oil in “on” years.<sup>68</sup>

Depending on this information we can reasonably assume that roughly 16,874 and 33,749 olive trees would be needed to supply the Russian fleet with the olive oil, not mentioning the olive oil allowance of the Ottoman troops.<sup>69</sup>

According to the Ottoman regulations concerning the logistics, each mariner was entitled to receive 3 *ky* of olive oil for a period of six months.<sup>70</sup> The Ottoman fleet was composed of 7,205 troops at most and received 33,096 kg (25,800 *ky*) of olive oil for the six-month summertime period in 1799.<sup>71</sup> By extrapolation, it should have received twice as much in the one-year period of September 1798 – September 1799, which would amount to 66,192 kg. Should the Ottoman regulations apply to the Russian fleet, the

---

<sup>68</sup> Zarinebaf et al. *A Historical and Economic Geography*, p. 188. There are not enough studies on olive cultivation in the Ottoman lands. Balta, however, calculated that the olive oil production of Crete in the aftermath of the Ottoman conquest in the mid-seventeenth century was 2,500 metric tones. In the related cadastral surveys, the Ottomans assumed that each tree would yield 5 *ky* of oil annually and claimed one-fifth of it as the tax, or its monetary value, 3 *ak*. After 1705, the olive cultivators were obliged to pay one-seventh of the yield, see E. Balta, “Olive Cultivation in Crete at the time of the Ottoman Conquest” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 20 (2000): 143-164. Gülsoy, who conducted a study on the Ottoman conquest of Crete, has estimated the number of the olive trees and the oil produces as 666,105 trees and 1,904,067 liters, respectively, cited in Balta, “Olive Cultivation”, pp. 148, 150. Also see E. Gülsoy, *Girit'in Fethi ve Osmanlı İdaresinin Kurulması (1645-1670)* (İstanbul: TATAV, 2004); By comparison, Faroqhi extrapolated the data for the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century on Edremit (northwest Anatolia) with a view to estimate the olive oil production of the 19<sup>th</sup>-century Edremit. Accordingly, she figured out that each tree yielded 20-25 kg of fruit and 4-6 kg of olive was needed for a liter of oil. Based on this calculation, 17,500 trees belonged to the *ayan* of the town was likely to produce 87,500 – 109,000 liters of olive oil, Faroqhi, “Zeytin Diyarında Güç ve Servet”, pp. 91-92. For similar figures see, F. Doğan, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Zeytinyağı (1800-1920)* (Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2007).

<sup>69</sup> By the 1820s at least, Edremit was one of the olive oil providers of the navy. Mürîdzade, the *ayan* of Edremit, sold 23,230 *testi* (jug) of olive oil to the Imperial Dockyards, Faroqhi, “Zeytin Diyarında Güç ve Servet”, p. 92. A *testi* = 9 *ky* (11.52 kg), Doğan, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Zeytinyağı*, p. 169.

<sup>70</sup> Alperen, *Osmanlı Denizciliği*, pp. 274-75.

<sup>71</sup> HAT 266/15490; I figure out the number of the troops by dividing 14,410 *kt* of hardtack by 2 *kt* based on the official calculation of two *kt* of hardtack allowance per troop for six months.



quantity of olive oil would support as many as 22,450 Russian troops, whereas there were actually around 7,200 Russian troops in the combined fleet. This leads us to the conclusion that a Russian mariner was entitled to three times as much the provisions as was an Ottoman troop. For instance, the Russian frigate *Navarşin* demanded 1.7 kg of olive oil per person a month, exceeding three times the Ottoman norm of 0.5 kg per seaman a month.<sup>72</sup>

Olive oil was in scarcity in the Morea in the period 1798-1800 which resulted in late deliveries. Russian fleet had not yet received their olive oil allowance from the year H. 1213 by mid-1214, as revealed in an order dated January 1800.<sup>73</sup> The delivery was likely to take place before April 1800. In the meantime the Governor Mustafa Paşa communicated to the Porte that olive oil due for H. 1214 was ready to be sent and that he could also send cash in its stead depending on Ushakov's will.<sup>74</sup>

Due to shortages, the Porte had to make changes to the official price, which was 23 *pr*. After the news of scarcity reached the Porte, it raised the price of the olive oil belonging to the second and third installments of H. 1213 to 25 *pr* and sent the necessary funds.<sup>75</sup> Hüseyin Şükrü, however, had to pay 27 *pr* a *ky* for the olive oil due for H. 1213, using some of the funds spared for the next year's provisions.<sup>76</sup> His successor Ebubekir Beg had instructions to offer 23 *pr* a *ky* for the olive oil due for H. 1214. His account book shows that he actually paid that much to buy at least one of the three installments

---

<sup>72</sup> See Table VIII in Appendix A.

<sup>73</sup> C.HRC 7773 (11M1215/4June1800).

<sup>74</sup> CHRC 5148, (11ZA1214/6Apr1800).

<sup>75</sup> C.HRC 7773 (11M1215/4June1800).

<sup>76</sup> C.HRC 1212 (5RA1214/7Aug1799).

due for H. 1214 which was equal to 57,633.6 kg (44,928 *ky*) of olive oil.<sup>77</sup> Nevertheless, the Porte paid 30 *pr* for a *ky* of olive oil in the winter of 1800.<sup>78</sup>

There is a sharp decrease in the quantity of the olive oil allowance of the Russian fleet as was the case with wine allowance after the conclusion of the campaign. For the years H. 1215 and H. 1216 the total quantity of olive oil supplied to the Russians was 24,486 kg (19,088 *ky*). This figure should be taken with a grain of salt as more studies are needed that make full use of the archival documentation. On the other hand, olive oil conveniently dropped off from the list of provisions submitted by the Russians to the Porte after 1801.<sup>79</sup>

The Porte's pricing policy in olive oil purchases exhibits certain similarities with that of wine purchases. A rise in the price in response to the news of scarcity was followed by the implementation of the regular official price upon the end of scarcity in the province as well as upon a sharp reduction in the quantities of provisions. For instance, the Porte ordered Ebubekir Beg to offer a lower price than 23 *pr* in the olive oil purchases due for H. 1215 upon the news that the scarcity was over in the Morea. He was expected to use the money he thus saved to close the deficit caused by the high spending on the olive oil in H. 1213.<sup>80</sup> By December 1800, the provisions of the Russian fleet were ready except for the olive oil due to the scarcity. The Governor Mustafa Paşa and Ebubekir Beg contradicted the early news about the abundance of the olive oil and argued

---

<sup>77</sup> C.BH 3273, no. 14.

<sup>78</sup> C.BH 11485.

<sup>79</sup> Refer to Appendix A for the figures.

<sup>80</sup> C.HRC 7773 (11M1215/4Jun1800).

for a rise in the price accordingly in the autumn of 1800. Although the Porte initially refused the request, it then complied with it and increased the price to 28 *pr* as it was convinced to the prevalence of dearth in olive oil after examining the truth of the matter. Finally, this order was countermanded since the quantity in question was just 14,408 kg (11,232 *ky*), or one-fourth of what had been given only in one installment during the expedition.<sup>81</sup> Dodwell noted that the price of olive oil in Athens was 26 *pr* in 1806<sup>82</sup>, which was slightly higher than the official fixed price of 23 *pr* including the cost of the barrel.

What accounted for the elimination of olive oil from the list of provisions is not clear. But if the Russians asked for the olive oil no more in later years, it must have been due to constant shortages, rather than the quality of the local product, for Poqueville observed that “the oil of the Morea is rather green, but of a delicious taste, and without any smell.”<sup>83</sup> We should also note that the export of olive oil was prohibited according to the Ottoman regulations, although the Sublime Porte occasionally permitted olive oil exports as shown in Table 5.2. It seems olive oil was abundant in the years 1803, 1804, and 1806, for considerable amount of olive oil was exported to Russia. It is most likely that the Russian regulations did not issue the sailors with olive oil, as the provisioning list of *Sv. Pavel* did not make room for olive oil.<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>81</sup> C.BH 2240 (10S1215/27Dec1800); C.HRC 7773 (11M1215/4June1800).

<sup>82</sup> Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour*, v. II, p. 98.

<sup>83</sup> Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania*, p. 88.

<sup>84</sup> Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

## Hardtack biscuit

Hardtack biscuit was the main provisioning item for all navies since it was impossible to have a regular supply of fresh bread on the sea despite the existence of bread ovens in most of the Ottoman ships following the French system. According to Shaw, the Porte set aside 143,000 *krş* to spend on the baking of the annual supply of bread by the first decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>85</sup> while 1,210 – 2,420 tons (50,000 -100,000 *kl*) of wheat was needed annually for the production of hardtack biscuit by the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>86</sup> Documents are confusing with regard to the exact amount of the hardtack delivered to the combined fleet especially for the period 1798-1800. While the two allies reached an agreement to allocate 1,875,049 kg (33,222 *kt*) of hardtack to the Russian fleet annually in three installments, deliveries usually lagged behind the time schedule. It is clear from Table 5.4 that the Morea was not alone in supplying the hardtack to the combined fleet.

---

<sup>85</sup> Shaw, “Selim III and the Ottoman Navy”, p. 232.

<sup>86</sup> Çizakça, “The Kapudan Pasha and the Shipowners”, in E. Zachariadou (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha, his Office and his Domain* (Rethymnon, 2002), p. 203. Çizakça’s own calculation (1 *kile* = 24.255 kg).

Table 5.4: quantity of hardtack ordered to be delivered to the joint fleet in H.1213

Sender	Quantity ( <i>kantar</i> )	Receiver
Tekfurdağı	2,500	Russian
Bursa	2,500	Russian
İzdin (Lamia)	3,000	Russian
Livadye (Livadhia, Boiotia)	3,000	Russian
Hayrabolu	3,000	Russian
Bebek state bakery of hardtack (İstanbul)	3,000+*	Russian
The Morea	15,000	Ottoman and Russian
Yenişehir (Larissa)	4,900	Ottoman (for summertime)
Selanik	5,000	Ottoman (for summertime)
	41,900+ (2,364,836 kg)	

Notes: (\*) Two shipments were sent from the Bebek hardtack bakery, but the quantity of the first is not mentioned in the sources.

Sources: BOA, MAD 9028, p. 22.

We usually lack the exact figures concerning the total production of hardtack within the empire in a given year, which makes it difficult to ascertain how much of the total production this quantity represents. The total quantity of the hardtack ordered by the Sublime Porte in H.1213 (mid-1798-mid-1799) was no less than 13,319,840 kg (236.000 *kt*), while 5,126,275 kg (90.827 *kt*) of it was likely to be delivered to the army, navy, and the castles in the same year.<sup>87</sup> Table 5.4 suggests that almost the half of the deliveries in

<sup>87</sup> BOA, MAD 9028, p. 6.

H. 1213 were made to the combined fleet.<sup>88</sup> The Russian ships in the combined fleet should have received at least 959,480 kg (17,000 *kt*) of hardtack from the allotment for H.1213 according to Table 5.4, notwithstanding the delays in delivery some of which resulted from winter storms preventing the cargo ships reach their destination for 4 months until September 1799.

Ebubekir Efendi, who was later appointed as the commissary overseeing the procurement of the provisions to the Russian fleet, was in charge of the preparation of the hardtack in the Morea. He oversaw the baking of 1,693,200 kg of hardtack (30,000 *kt*) in H.1213 and H. 1214 (September 1798 to June 1800) to be delivered to the joint-fleet, the castles, and the army.<sup>89</sup> He sent 1,335,370 kg (23,660 *kt*) of it to the combined fleet in 21 shipments and the remaining to the castle of Grdos and the Rhodes. Out of the hardtack he sent to the combined fleet, the Russians received 970,994 kg (17,204 *kt*) and the Ottomans 364.320 kg (6,455 *kt*).<sup>90</sup>

The province of the Morea was actually expected to procure 1,128,800 kg (20,000 *kt*) of hardtack annually for the consumption of the joint fleet with the Russian ships receiving half the quantity. Nevertheless, the load was lowered by 5,000 *kt* after the

---

<sup>88</sup> For the sake of comparison, the state's initial request for the hardtack in 1769 –the first year of the war with Russia- stood as 16,932,000 kg (300,000 *kt*).

<sup>89</sup> BOA, C.BH 3273 no. 1, the account book of Ebubekir Beg. Besides Ebubekir, a number of local authorities were also involved in the baking of hardtack such as Mustafa Beg and his brother Sleyman Beg (the *Arnavut-zades* –a prominent *ayan* family of the Morea)- as well as Abdi Aa. Ebubekir organized the baking of the hardtack in three orders of 10,000 *kt* each in H. 1213 and H. 1214 -the last two belonged to the latter date. Bulgar-olu family was also in charge of preparing hardtack for the navy in the Dardanelles. Documents reveal that this family had a long history in the hardtack business.

<sup>90</sup> C.BH 3273 no. 22 (25C1216/2Nov1801) the account book of Ebubekir Beg; Grdos received 1,000 *kt* of hardtack and the Rhodes had 3,366 *kt* bringing the total shipment to 28,046.5 *kt* out of 30,000 *kt*. The breakdown of the lacking 1,953.5 *kt*: spoilt (1,160 *kt*), available (702.5 *kt*), missing (91 *kt*), C.BH 3273. no.1.

inhabitants of the province informed the Porte on the scarcity of wheat through petitions.<sup>91</sup> This scarcity may have resulted from the harsh winter in the Morea described by Poqueville, if not a deliberate attempt to evade the obligation on the part of the populace.<sup>92</sup> Thus, the province delivered 15,000 *kt* of hardtack in H.1213 as shown in Table 5.4. Next year, Ahmed Paşa, the Governor of the province, asked for another reduction of 5,000 *kt* for the year H. 1214. Memiş Efendi, who was in charge of the provisions to be sent from Istanbul to the Russians, argued against Ahmed Paşa's proposal due to the importance of hardtack supply for the fleet. The request was rejected and the province had to deliver 20,000 *kt* of hardtack in H. 1214 under the supervision of Ebubekir Beg.<sup>93</sup> Thus, the Morea was to deliver 1,975,400 kg (35,000 *kt*) of hardtack in H.1213-1214.<sup>94</sup> The first installment of H. 1214 was delivered to the Russian fleet on time thanks to the hardtack sent from Bursa.<sup>95</sup> Ebubekir could not deliver the second installment of H. 1214 (11,794 *kt*) before the end of that year (spring 1800), while 2,480 *kt* of hardtack from the second and third installments of H. 1214 (ending on 24 May 1800) were left undelivered as late as 18 January 1801.<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup> C.HRC 8889 (24Ş1214/21Jan1800); petitions were sent by the sub-provincial districts (*kaza*) of Arkadiye, Fener (Fanari), Modon, Koron and Tiripoliçe.

<sup>92</sup> The winter of 1798-1799 was exceptional in its severity in southern Europe, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 120.

<sup>93</sup> C.BH 280 (CA214/15Oct1799).

<sup>94</sup> Ebubekir Beg undertook the baking of 30,000 *kt* of the total quantity, whereas Abdi Ağa, the *Defter Kethüdası* of the Morea, was to prepare 6,111 *kt* (C.BH 3273 no 17). The actual delivery of Ebubekir (20,046.5 *kt*) and Abdi Ağa's delivery add up to 35,000 *kt*.

<sup>95</sup> C.HRC 5148 (11ZA1214/6Apr1800) Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>96</sup> As of the same date Ebubekir delivered 19,668 *kt* of hardtacks from these two installments, see C.BH 114 (3N1215/18Jan1801) firman sent to the Morea; C.HRC 1798 (15M1215/8June1800).

According to the Ottoman regulations each sailor would get 128 kg (2 *kt*) of hardtack for a six-month cruise, while this figure is usually regarded as the average consumption rate per person a year in the literature.<sup>97</sup> It appears from the figures that the hardtack was the only provision among other prominent provisions in which the Ottoman regulations were followed in the provisioning of the Russian fleet. Each man aboard the frigate *Navarşin* received 19.2 kg of hardtack for a month in 1801, while each of the 3,000 troops sent as reinforcement to Corfu in 1802 was entitled to a hardtack allowance of 19.6 kg a month.<sup>98</sup> Official Russian ration of biscuit per sailor on *Sv. Pavel* was 20.39 kg (45 pounds).<sup>99</sup> The Ottoman fleet received 813,300 kg (14,410 *kt*) of hardtack for the six-month summertime period in 1799. Thus, the total quantity of the hardtack sent for the consumption of the Ottoman troops during the campaign could not be less than 1,626,601 kg (28,820 *kt*).<sup>100</sup>

Based on the Ebubekir Efendi's account book, at least 1,693,200 kg (30,000 *kt*) of hardtack was produced in the Morea in H. 1213 and H.1214 (covering the period 15 June 1798 - 24 May 1800). The baking of this quantity of hardtack required the availability of 1,924,500 kg of wheat (75,000 *kl*).<sup>101</sup> That amount of wheat would have fed 15,000 people in a year.

In the lack of precise data about the population and production capacity of the Morea in late eighteenth century, it is hard to tell the implications these figures had for

---

<sup>97</sup> Zarinebaf et al., *A Historical and Economic Geography*. 194-95; Alperen, *Osmanlı Denizciliği*, pp. 274-75.

<sup>98</sup> These calculations are based on the figures given in the Tables VIII, X, XI in Appendix A.

<sup>99</sup> Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

<sup>100</sup> HAT 266/15490.

<sup>101</sup> Refer to Tables II, III in Appendix A for the necessary calculations.



the province. The Ottoman cadastral survey of the Morea dated 1716 shows that the quantity of grain required to sow a field in Anavarin ranged between 60 kg of seed to 160 kg of seed per hectare with a seed-to-yield ratio of 1:5 to 1:6. According to this calculation, 2,000-5,345 hectares of land would be needed to produce the quantity of the wheat used in baking the hardtack delivered to the Russian navy alone during the expedition. According to Zarinebaf's calculations around 400 hectares of land were devoted to grain cultivation in Anavarin in 1716.<sup>102</sup> This shows the magnitude of the enterprise of supplying the joint-fleet with the hardtack.

**Table: 5.5: hardtack production by Ebubekir Efendi (1798-1800)**

Ottoman imports of the Russian wheat (1800-1806)	Total quantity of the hardtack baked in the Morea by Ebubekir Efendi in 1798-1800	Quantity of flour required	Hypothetical number of individuals it may feed in a year	Size of land to be cultivated*	Total land under cultivation in Anavarin in 1716
226,319,273.5 kg	1,693,200 kg (30,000 <i>kt</i> )	1,924,500 kg of flour (75,000 <i>kl</i> )	15,000	2,000-5,345 hectares	400 hectares

Notes: (\*) this calculation does not include the 20 % loss that occurs during the conversion of wheat into flour with a view to figure out the minimum size of land.

Sources: C.BH 3273, no. 17; Zarinebaf et al., pp. 194-95; Murat Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Rusya Ticari Münasebetleri*, p. 212.

It is hard to tell the real market value for a *kt* (56.44 kg) of hardtack. The price of a *kt* fluctuated between the seemingly fixed official price of 170 *ak* and 345 *ak*. When the Porte sold hardtack on the market for some reason, it asked for higher prices than the fixed official price though. These prices ranged from 780 to 1,320 *ak* per *kt*. When

<sup>102</sup> Zarinebaf et al., *A Historical and Economic Geography*, pp. 194-95.

Russians had to buy wheat on the spot with the prize money exerted from the French POWs in the spring of 1799, they paid around 420 *ak a kt*, which is roughly 7 times higher than the price Ottomans offered for wheat. At any rate, even though the Porte did not strictly follow the fixed official price, it certainly offered prices lower than those reigning on the market.<sup>103</sup>

#### On other provisions<sup>104</sup>

There are certain provisions on which there is not enough information during the campaigning period of 1798-1800. It is almost certain that they were stocked aboard the warships in that period; thus, silence of the documents may be attributed to the relative lack of problem involved in their supply to the combined fleet in the campaigning period of 1798-1800. These provisions, however, constantly appeared on the lists of provisions to be sent from İstanbul and the Morea in later years.

*Bulgur/hinta yarması* (cracked wheat). This provision was only given to the Russian fleet. Ottomans seemed to use these words sometimes interchangeably. The former meant boiled and pounded wheat whereas the latter was the simple cracked/crushed wheat.

*Bulgur* was supplied from İstanbul, Selanik, and the Morea to the Russians, while no allowance was made for it to the Ottoman fleet. In H. 1214, Emin Beg, the *mubayaacı* (the official purchaser) of Selanik, was put in charge of boiling 624,699 kg (486,981 *ky*) *bulgur* with the funds forwarded by the Porte. Upon the news that Russian fleet had 288,322 kg (224,760 *ky*) of *bulgur* from Russia, the quantity to be supplied from Selanik

---

<sup>103</sup> HAT 267/15610.

<sup>104</sup> Refer to the Appendices A and B for the figures, prices, and the sources.

decreased to 336,377 kg (262,221 *ky*). The Porte paid 40 *pr* a *kl* (25.66 kg) of wheat – a quantity that yielded 16.5 *ky* (21 kg) of *bulgur* after boiling- and offered a mere 3 *ak* (a *pr*) a *ky* of *bulgur* for the boiling, transportation and the sack.<sup>105</sup> If this sack was the same kind of sack as the one used for loading cracked wheat, 3 *ak* seems to be quite low a sum to cover these expenses.<sup>106</sup> The usual cost of a *ky* of *bulgur* ranged between 7-8 *pr* (21-24 *ak*). A *kl* of wheat also produced 16 *ky* of cracked wheat and the cost of a *kl* of wheat for the cracked wheat was around 80-90 *pr*. Thus, it is probable that the two terms actually denoted the same thing and the Ottomans used them interchangeably.<sup>107</sup> Dodwell noted that a *ky* of flour was 4.5 *pr* in 1806 in Athens, which was at least twice as much the Porte offered in the case of *bulgur* and cracked wheat.<sup>108</sup> Each sailor on *Sv Pavel* had monthly ration of 6.79 kg (15 pounds) of groats.<sup>109</sup>

*Chickpeas* and *beans*. Chickpeas were supplied to the Russian fleet in H. 1213 and 1214. The Porte spent from the war budget 27,054.5 *krş* on chickpeas on 29 May 1799 and 5,410.5 *krş* on 27 August 1799.<sup>110</sup> As mentioned previously, the supplier of the chickpeas was Kara Osman-zade el-Hac Hüseyin, the great *ayan* of Western Anatolia holding the official title of *muhassıl* (tax-collector) of Aydın. The quantity he was to procure was at least 294,002 kg (229,188 *ky*). The product of Aydın, Saruhan, and Muğla was to be shipped from the ports of Kuşadası and İzmir. An order dated 17 July 1800 cancelled the order for the chickpeas and demanded Hüseyin to send the profit to the

---

<sup>105</sup> C.HRC 7008 (22C1214/21Nov1799).

<sup>106</sup> C.HRC 2442 (23ZA1215/7Apr1801) gives the price for a sack of 65 *kl* for the cracked wheat as 39 *pr*.

<sup>107</sup> Refer to the Appendices A and B for the figures and prices.

<sup>108</sup> Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour*, v.II, p. 498.

<sup>109</sup> Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

<sup>110</sup> KK 2383, 5a, 7a.

treasury after selling the chickpeas on the market. By September 1800, however, the Russian fleet received 135,131 kg (105,341 *ky*) of chickpeas.<sup>111</sup> The cost of 22,333 *ky* of chickpeas was 4,466 *krş*, or 7.9 *pr* a *ky* in 1801, which might be the reason for its replacement with the beans which cost around 4.8 *pr* per *ky*. Meanwhile the Ottomans exported from Russia 10,263 kg of chickpeas and 179,613 kg of beans in 1800-06.<sup>112</sup> Ottoman beans were stocked in the sacks of 73 *kl* each, bought at the price of 39 *pr*. Thus, the cost of the sack was quite prohibitive as was the case with the barrels.<sup>113</sup> The cost of a *ky* of beans ranged from a low of 4.8 *pr* to 8 *pr* and a Russian sailor had a monthly allowance of around 4 kg of beans. Russian documents also mention similar figures: 4.5 kg.<sup>114</sup>

*Clarified/purified butter.*<sup>115</sup> Its quantity was usually half the quantity of olive oil with a higher price ranging from 28 *pr* (1801) to 50 *pr* (1803). Dodwell observed that it was 2 *krş* (80 *pr*) a *ky* in Athens in 1806. Wide discrepancy might be a consequence of rapid inflation reigning in the Empire.<sup>116</sup> In some cases, *çerviş* fat –kind of suet- was given to the Russian fleet as a substitute, for it was cheaper (28-30 *pr* a *ky*). During the campaign, the Porte delivered to the Ottoman troops in the combined fleet as much as 65,710 kg

---

<sup>111</sup> C.HRC 3256 (10RA1215/12Aug1800), C.HRC 3063 (25R1215/15Sept1800), C.HRC 2011 (24CA1215/13Sept1800), C.HRC 2000 (15Ş1215/10Sept1801).

<sup>112</sup> Murat Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Rusya Ticari Mınasebetleri*, p. 212.

<sup>113</sup> C.HRC 2442 (23ZA1215/7Apr1801), C.BH 3273 no. 15.

<sup>114</sup> Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

<sup>115</sup> Purified butter was the most common butter used in cooking. It was made of milk and probably salted for conservation purposes, see Marianna Yerasimos, *500 yıllık Osmanlı Mutfağı* (İstanbul: Boyut, 2007), p. 13.

<sup>116</sup> Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour*, v. II, p. 498.

(51,224 *ky*) of purified butter.<sup>117</sup> Each man on the board was seemingly entitled to around 3.50 – 3.75 *ky* (4.4 – 4.8 kg) of purified butter for six months on the basis of the information tabulated in Appendix B. By contrast, the Russians had a larger allowance of purified butter, and it grew even larger after the omission of olive oil from the list of provisions. While the original list submitted by the frigate *Navarşin* in 1801 showed a monthly allowance of 2.7 kg of purified butter and 1.7 kg olive oil a man, 3.3 kg of purified butter was delivered in the end in compensation of the undelivered olive oil. This would have made 19.8 kg for six months. Russia demanded 3.2 kg (2.5 *ky*) of purified butter a month for each of the troop sent as reinforcement to Corfu in 1802.<sup>118</sup> Monthly ration of a sailor aboard *Sv. Pavel* was also 2.72 kg.<sup>119</sup> Foreign observers did not praise the quality of the purified butter used in the Empire. Dodwell remarked on the butter in Athens that it was “only eatable to Turks and Greeks.”<sup>120</sup>

*Vinegar.* Vinegar was a necessary precaution against scurvy which was quite common among the crews in all navies. It also helped sweeten bad water stocked in the vessels.<sup>121</sup> It was to be supplied from İstanbul for both of the fleets. The vinegar ration of six months for each man in the Ottoman fleet was 5.66 kg (4.42 *ky*), while each man on the frigate *Navarşin* received a monthly ration of 1.39 kg (1.09 *ky*) of vinegar, which would have

---

<sup>117</sup> HAT 266/15490.

<sup>118</sup> Calculations are based on the figures given in the Tables VIII, X, XI in Appendix A. Fidan notes that 6,947,010 kg of clarified butter was imported from Russia in 1800-1806, Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı-Rusya*, p. 219.

<sup>119</sup> Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

<sup>120</sup> Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour*, v. II, p. 499.

<sup>121</sup> Finkel, *Administration of War*, p. 191; scurvy took a big toll on the British sailors until 1795 after which the navy was regularly issued with fruit juice to deal with it, see J. Black, *A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society 1550-1800* (Hampshire, 1991), p. 38.

translated into a six-month allowance of 8.37 kg. Russia asked a ration of 40.96 kg (32 *ky*) of vinegar for each soldier sent as reinforcement to Corfu for six months.<sup>122</sup> The Russian sailor aboard the *Sv. Pavel* had a monthly allowance for 42 ‘glasses’ of vinegar.<sup>123</sup> Various prices for a *ky* of vinegar are 2 *pr* (6 *ak*, 1803), 7.5 *ak* (1801), and 3 *pr* (9 *ak*, 1801, 1802, 1803), depending on the quality and availability of the product. On the other hand, in 1801, the Porte bought the vinegar for the Ottoman fleet at 5 *pr* a *ky*, excluding the barrel. A barrel of 411.8 kg (321 *ky*) for vinegar cost 10 *pr*.<sup>124</sup>

*Salt.* Salt was provided to the Russian fleet both in the Morea and in Istanbul. Its price ranged between 1-4 *ak*.<sup>125</sup> Daily consumption of salt per person in Europe in the early modern era was 20-30 grams. The Russian troops had indeed a daily allowance of 22 grams of salt supplied by the Ottomans.<sup>126</sup> By contrast, this figure was 13-14 grams for the Ottoman sailors.<sup>127</sup> The Ottomans exported to Russia 1,779,980 kg of salt in 1806, whereas it once imported from Russia 14,112 kg of salt in 1800.<sup>128</sup>

*Firewood.* Firewood was usually supplied from the Morea. It was necessary for cooking aboard the ship. A *çeki* of firewood (250 kg) was bought at 40 *pr* (a *krş*) to 60 *pr*. In H.

<sup>122</sup> Calculations are based on the Tables VIII, X, XI in Appendix A and Tables IV, VII in Appendix B.

<sup>123</sup> Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

<sup>124</sup> C.HRC 324 (3B1216/9Dec1801), C.AS 42067 (5S1216/17June1801); C.BH 3273 nos. 2, 4, 8, 10, 18. 410,193 kg of vinegar were exported to Russia in 1800-06, see Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı-Rusya*, p. 235.

<sup>125</sup> C.BH 3273 no. 14.

<sup>126</sup> Finkel, *Administration of War*, p. 190; my calculation is based on the Tables VIII, X, XI in Appendix A. Figures for *Sv Pavel* are also similar: 679.5 grams per sailor a month (22.65 gr. per diem), Mordvinov, *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

<sup>127</sup> My calculation is based on the Tables IV, VII, X in Appendix B. These tables reveal, though, the Ottoman troops received “Wallachian salt” (*tuz-ı Eflak*), which may explain the difference in quantities.

<sup>128</sup> Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı-Rusya*, pp. 219, 223, 238.

1214, 1,569,750 kg (6,279 *çeki*) of firewood was supplied to the Russian fleet at the price of a *krş* a *ky*.<sup>129</sup>

*Lentils and rice.* These two items were given only to the Ottoman fleet and they were dispatched from İstanbul. In turn, the Ottoman navy did not receive chickpeas and beans. Filibe (Plovdiv) was the main provider of rice for the navy whereas lentils came from Egypt.<sup>130</sup> During the expedition (September 1798-September 1799), the Ottoman fleet got 369,760.5 kg (14,410 *kl*) of lentils. An Ottoman mariner was entitled to get 4.2 kg of lentil a month by Ottoman regulations. The Porte bought a *ky* of lentil at 8 *pr* in 1801 and this is the only information on the price of lentils in the consulted Ottoman documents.<sup>131</sup> As for the rice, Ottoman regulations stipulated that each Ottoman mariner receive 2 *kl* of rice in a six-month campaign period, which was equal to a monthly allowance of 8.5 kg. The Ottoman fleet received 369,760.5 kg (14,410 *kl*) of rice for the consumption of the troops during the six-month summertime period in 1799. Thus, for the duration of the expedition, it must have received twice as much, which is 739,521 kg (28,820 *kl*). The price of a *kl* of rice was around 5 *krş* (8 *pr* a kg) in 1801, which, quite interestingly, makes it slightly more expensive than beans and chickpeas.<sup>132</sup> Nevertheless, the Porte paid as much as 17 *pr* for a *ky* of rice later in the year.<sup>133</sup>

---

<sup>129</sup>C.BH 3273 no. 14.

<sup>130</sup> Shaw, "Selim III and the Ottoman Navy", p. 232.

<sup>131</sup> C.BH 11485. The Ottomans bought 3,386 kg of lentils from Russia in 1804 only for once in the period 1800-06, Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı-Rusya*, p. 212.

<sup>132</sup> HAT 266/15490; calculations are based on the figures in the tables in the Appendix B; Poqueville observed that the best rice in the Morea was cultivated in Argolid, see Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania*, p. 87.

<sup>133</sup> C.BH 11485.

*Olive.* Olive was delivered to only Ottoman troops in the combined fleet and it was one of those provisions to be procured in the Morea. Shaw stated that the annual consumption of olive in the navy was 24,000 *ky* and it all came from Midilli (Lesbos); but, that much quantity of olive could have fed only 1,500 troops, which is quite a low figure even for the peacetime navy.<sup>134</sup> For the six-month summertime period in 1799, the Ottoman fleet received 69,319.3 kg (54,037.5 *ky*), which brought the total of olive delivery to 138,638.6 kg (108,075 *ky*) in the campaigning period of September 1798-September 1799. Thus, each Ottoman seaman had a monthly allowance of roughly 1.6 kg of olive if there were around 7,200 troops in the fleet.<sup>135</sup> Ebubekir sold the excess amount of the olives and purified butter in order to buy other provisions in short supply in 1801, thus giving us an idea of the market price of olive in the Morea. Accordingly, a *ky* of olive sold for 8 *pr* on the market.<sup>136</sup> But, the Porte once paid 10 *pr* for a *ky* of olive in 1801.<sup>137</sup>

---

<sup>134</sup> Shaw, "Selim III and the Ottoman Navy", p. 232.

<sup>135</sup> HAT 266/15490; calculations are based on the figures in the tables in the Appendices A and B.

<sup>136</sup> C.BH 3273 nos. 4 and 8. A *ky* of purified butter sold at the price of 50 *pr*. Dodwell pointed out that Salona had the best olive of the Morea and had the privilege of supplying the Seraglio with olive. He also noted that the crop was taken every alternate year, which may have accounted for the scarcity of olive oil during the expedition. See Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour*, v. I, pp. 149-50. Poqueville gives the following information on olive cultivation in the Morea: "The respect of the people for these [olive] trees is so great, that they surround and pay them a sort of worship at a time when they are loaded with fruit; and to cut of a branch would be a crime that would meet exemplary punishment...[olive] trees blossom generally in March, and the olives are collected in October and November, by beating the trees with long poles...", Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania, ...*, pp. 87-8. The method of beating causes the fall of the flower of the tree so that it does not bear fruit the next year; hence "on" and "off" years, which is still the case in Turkey. According to Hobhouse, 24 September - 6 April was the period of watering of the olive trees in Athens. Watering was "effected by raising a low mound round 8 or 9 trees, and then introducing the stream through dykes, so as to keep the roots and part of the trunks under water for the necessary length of time. Each owner waters his grove for 30 or 40 hours, and pays a *pr* a tree to the Waiwode, or to him who has farmed the revenue from that officer.", Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces*, v. I, pp. 295-96.

<sup>137</sup> C.BH 11485.



It is possible that the Russians did not have a taste for olive which may have accounted for its absence in the provisions for the Russian fleet. In fact, Russia imported only 76,890 kg of olive from the Ottomans in 1800-06 so as to lend some credence to this view.<sup>138</sup> It appears that olive salad constituted the proper breakfast of the Ottoman mariners. While there is no information on the olive salad, it was presumably prepared with olive oil and onions.<sup>139</sup>

*Onion.* It was supplied from Istanbul and delivered to the Ottoman fleet only. For the six-month summertime period in 1799, the Ottoman troops in the combined fleet received 65,711.4 kg (51,225 *ky*) of onions, which suggests, by extrapolation, that the quantity of the total delivery during the campaign was 131,422.9 kg (102,450 *ky*). This means that each Ottoman mariner had a monthly allowance of 1.5 kg (1.2 *ky*). The Porte paid 4.5-5 *ak* for a *ky* of onions in 1801.<sup>140</sup> The Russian provisioning list for *Sv Pavel* made no mention to onions.<sup>141</sup>

Finally, the Ottoman documents do not deal with certain provisioning items such as water, fruits, meat, and cheese presumably because they could be procured on a daily basis from the port towns the fleet visited regularly. In the outgoing imperial edicts local authorities and the officers of the fleet had always been reminded of stocking fresh water in ports and harbors. There are also several entries for the costs of water barrels and

---

<sup>138</sup> Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı-Rusya*, p. 230.

<sup>139</sup> Beydilli and Şahin (eds.), *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 77.

<sup>140</sup> HAT 266/15490; calculations are based on the figures in the tables in the Appendices A and B; C.BH 3273 nos. 2, 4, 8, 10, 18.

<sup>141</sup> Mordvinov (ed.), *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

freight payments for water transportation to the Ottoman navy in war budget.<sup>142</sup>

Poqueville entertained the idea that the cargo ships loaded with orange in Anavarin would deliver their load to the combined fleet.<sup>143</sup> Notably, the Russian provisioning list for *Sv Pavel* suggests that the meat rations of the Russian fleet were taken care of by Russia as it recorded 6.34 kg (14 pounds) of salted beef.<sup>144</sup>

---

<sup>142</sup> KK 8323.

<sup>143</sup> Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania*, p. 88; Shaw mentions that each seaman had a ration of 3 *ky* of cheese for a six-month cruise, but contradicts himself by citing from the 1805 regulations the highest quantity of cheese ration for the rank of Kapudane as 2.5 *ky*, Shaw, “Selim III and the Ottoman Navy”, pp. 232, 236.

<sup>144</sup> Mordvinov (ed.), *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

### In lieu of conclusion

This chapter has laid the groundwork for a concrete discussion of Ottoman policies concerning pricing, troops' allowance for provisions as well as the immensity of quantities in a relatively small theater of war in comparison to Egypt.

Apparently, basic consideration of the Porte in pricing was finding the equilibrium between the quantity required and the availability. As long as the quantity in question was negligible, the Porte insisted on the lower officially fixed prices on the grounds that it would not harm the local economy. On other occasions, it modified its offer with respect to the ruling prices on the market with the result that Dodwell's figures for the ruling prices in Athens for the year of 1806 were not much different from the prices the Porte offered several years ago. One exception is obviously the hardtack biscuit, the official price of which was ridiculously low owing to its wheat ingredient. The Porte acknowledged the unrealistic nature of the official price by marketing the hardtack at much higher prices when it had to sell hardtack for some reason.

As for the quantities, the Porte apparently fell short of meeting the quotas in some of the provisions during the expedition, which forced it to offer cash compensation. We will devise some possible explanations for these failures in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that the maxim of warfare has it that cash compensation does not really compensate for the lack of provisions in the heat of war.

One intriguing aspect of provisioning of the combined fleet remains to be explained. While the provisioning of the Ottoman troops followed the official Ottoman regulations, provisions of the Russians –except for the hardtack- were almost twice and

sometimes thrice as much the Ottoman provisions. The Russian list of provisioning of the flagship presented by Ushakov suggests that official rations allowed for the sailors were much larger than the official Ottoman rations in the navy. Therefore, it appears that the notoriously meager rations of the Russian land troops did not apply to the Russian navy.<sup>145</sup>

One interesting example is the stocking of the renowned *Tiger* of the commodore Sydney Smith with provisions before departing from Istanbul for Kudüs (Jerusalem) during Napoleon's march on Syria. Among those provisions which the British were entitled to -but the Russians were kept off- were honey, sesame oil, grapes, candle, milk, coffee, eggs, nuts, quince, plums, pomegranate, *kadayif*, fish, and soap.<sup>146</sup> Apparently, the British army and navy is said to have been well-provendered by the time of Napoleonic Wars. In addition to roughly 14 tons of wine and other spirits procured to the *Vanguard* (Nelson's flagship) for 6 months, there were 90 casks of beer, 200 tons of water, 11.5 tons of beef, 12.5 tons of pork, "plus cheese, oatmeal, peas, flour, suet, raisins and molasses in wooden casks of various sizes" as well as 14 cwt of candles, 40 tons of

---

<sup>145</sup> C. Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West. Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power 1700-1800* (London, 1981), p. 130. J. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar. Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 175-192; Philip J. Haythornthwaite, *Weapons & Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars* (London, 1996), pp. 110-15.

<sup>146</sup> C.HRC 6152 (7C1215/26Oct1800); *kadayif* is a kind of sweet pastry. The Porte paid 46 *pr* a *ky* of sesame oil. It is obviously more expensive than purified butter, and *çerviş* butter. A *ky* of honey cost 59 *pr* which favorably compares to 30 *pr* given in Dodwell for Athens in 1806, see, Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour*, v. II, p. 498. In total, the Porte paid 6,793 *krş* for one-month provisions of the British warship.

wood and coal and three bales of slops to clothe the crew, making a total of 971 tons including its equipments as well.<sup>147</sup>

Table 5.6: six-month rations of an Ottoman and Russian seamen

Provisions	Ottoman fleet	Russian fleet*	<i>Sv Pavel</i>
Biscuit	112.89 kg (2 <i>kt</i> )	115.2 – 117.6 kg	122.3 kg
Rice	48.43 kg (2 <i>kl</i> )	.....	.....
Lentil	24.21 kg (a <i>kl</i> )	.....	.....
peas	.....	.....	27.18 kg
beans	.....	4 kg	.....
Clarified butter	3.50 – 3.75 <i>ky</i> (4.4 – 4.8 kg)	19.2 - 19.8 kg	16.3 kg
Olive oil	3.84 kg (3 <i>ky</i> )	10.2 kg	.....
Olive	19.2 kg (15 <i>ky</i> )	.....	.....
Onions	9.6 kg (7.5 <i>ky</i> )	.....	.....
Vinegar	4.8 kg (4.5 <i>ky</i> )	8.37 – 40.96 kg	252 glasses
Salt	2.4 kg (1.875 <i>ky</i> )	3.8 - 4 kg	4 kg
<i>Arak</i>	.....	3.5 – 3.84 kg	20.66 litre
Wine	.....	7.11 – 10..6 kg	57 glasses or 336 glasses of beer
Salted beef	.....	.....	38 kg

Notes and Sources: All the data used for calculations are tabulated in Appendices A and B. For the last column, see Mordvinov (ed.), *Admiral Ushakov*, v. 2, doc. # 97.

(\*) these figures were retrieved from the Ottoman documents. When there is a hyphen, the first figure refers to the list of provisions belonging to the frigate *Navarşin*, and the figure after the hyphen represents

<sup>147</sup> Lavery, *Nelson and the Nile*, p. 59.

the rations of the Russian reinforcements stationed in Corfu. Figures of rations due for the expedition (1798-1799) sometimes differed from those tabulated quite radically. For these figures refer to the text.

A contemporary authority observed that “aboard ship each group of six men should receive four gallons of beer, two pints of spirit or four pints of wine per day;”<sup>148</sup> that is, 3 liters of beer, 183 grams of spirit or 366.5 grams of wine. In the Peninsular War the daily ration of the redcoats consisted of 454 gram (1 lb) of meat, 454 gram (1 lb) of biscuit or 681 (1.5 lbs) of bread or rice, 550 gram (one pint) of wine or 183 gram (1/3 pint) of spirit.<sup>149</sup>

The 1791 Law on Navy clearly demonstrates some of the in-built drawbacks of the Ottoman logistics. Referring to the established practice of ‘stealing’ two *ky* of each *kl* of lentil and other grains during the delivery to the navy by the authorities, the law defined the ‘legitimate’ margin of stealing as one *ky* per *kl* –being the net weight of the grain. It also forbade the captains and the officials to donate their hardtack allowance to their families in the form of flour and bread in wartime to prevent them from living on the crew’s hardtack at sea. The law also acknowledged that “the oil master of the Imperial Dockyards” (*Tersane-i Amire Yağcibaşısı*) was not content with the official rate of 7 % deduction in the olive oil deliveries and often adulterated it with other types of oil. As a solution, the law confirmed the same official rate as abiding for the oil master, obliging him to deliver olive oil unmixed to the *hoca* of the ship appointed by

---

<sup>148</sup> Philip J. Haythornthwaite, *Weapons & Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars*, p. 110, quotes from R. W. Adye *The Bombardier and Pocket Gunner* (London, 1802), pp. 225-26.

<sup>149</sup> Haythornthwaite, *Weapons & Equipment*, p. 110.

the captain after deducting the weight of the skin bag.<sup>150</sup> All these inherent problems reflected in the Ottoman laws warn us against the dangers involved in rough calculations we made concerning the provisions.

In the next chapter, we will focus on the problems arouse over the logistics in the provinces with particular reference to the Morea and the surrounding provinces in addition to the diplomatic disputes over the issue with Russia.

---

<sup>150</sup> Şen and Yeşil, *Nizamnameler*, in publication. I am grateful to Fatih Yeşil for allowing me to see the manuscript; one of the reasons for the mutinies at Spithead and Nore was the ‘official stealing’ of the provisions. The provisioning system in the British navy allowed the ships’ pursers to keep for their own profit two ounces in every pound of the sailors’ nominal rations, P. Padfield, *Nelson’s War* (Kent: Wordsworth Editions, 2000), p. 78.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE CONTRACTUAL EMPIRE

#### Introduction

The Ottoman Empire had transformed in the eighteenth century into a more flexible establishment in which contractual relations gained an unprecedented significance in cash flow to the central treasury and manning the army. This was only possible through an extensive network of households encompassing the whole Ottoman world from the Balkans to North Africa. Hathaway proposed a ‘household paradigm’ in which she presented these households as a unit of analysis in Ottoman studies.<sup>1</sup> The category of local notables and their households should not be restricted to the native well-to-do locals. In the case of the Morea (and Epirus) it was a fluid category and included (1) localized administrators appointed from the Ottoman center with the ‘outsider’ troops within their retinues- the Governor-pašas of the Morea; (2) local *petite ayans* of Muslim and non-Muslim stock who did not necessarily have to hold an office - Ebubekir Beğ of Gördos and Arnavud-zade brothers; (3) the great *ayan* households –Ali Paşa of Yanya.

This chapter will emphasize the contractual nature of the Ottoman Empire by focusing on the challenges faced in the Morea during the Adriatic expedition. It tries to

---

<sup>1</sup> Hathaway, “Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History” in A. Singer (ed.), *Mediterranean Historical Review* 19/1 (2004): 29-53; Hathaway, “The Household: An Alternative Framework for the Military Society of Eighteenth Century Ottoman Egypt” in K. Fleet (ed.), *Oriente Moderno* 18/1 (1999): 57-66; Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt. The Rise of the Qazdağlıs* (Cambridge, 1998); For the application of Hathaway’s household paradigm to North Africa see T. Shuval, “Cezayiri Garp: Bringing Algeria Back into Ottoman History”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 22 (2000): 85-114; Shuval, “Households in Ottoman Algeria” *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 24/1 (2000): 41-64; A. Moalla, *The regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814: army and government of a North African Ottoman eyelet at the end of the eighteenth century* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); on Bosnia see M. R. Hickok, *Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth Century Bosnia* (Leiden: Brill, 1997).



contextualize several problems retrieved from the archives through a discussion of the new political, fiscal, and administrative setting of this contractual system based on households and the expense-apportioning on local level.

Excessive demands of the Porte with respect to provisions constitute the second section of this chapter. We will see the culture of bargaining at work in the petitions of the subjects as well as in the correspondence of the local authorities. Seemingly routine and repetitious as they were, these grievances actually implied very central concerns of the periphery. After citing some examples illustrating various matters subject to bargaining, we will try to unravel the real interests at stake underlying the whole bargaining process. We will concentrate on diplomacy at a different level in which bargaining was at the stage this time for the provisions so as to emphasize the centrality of such seemingly routine matters to the alliance with repercussions on the Morea. This section will argue that what appears to be banal and peripheral at first sight actually occupied the decision-makers in the center.

## The politico-fiscal and administrative setting

“My sultan, you are pointing out that I have been granted larger authority [*ruhsat*] than my predecessors and that I should act with confidence in executing the office in complete freedom. That is fine! But, the peninsula of the Morea is composed of twenty *kazas*. The owners of sixteen of them are evidently known. All in all, only four *kazas* belong to the peninsula [province]. It needs not mentioning that the course of the events in sixteen *kazas* is not determined by the governor. The subject of the sublime edict just reached is the inspection of the accounts of the Hacı Hasan Ağa, the *voyvoda* of Kartina, concerning the *muqataas* of the poll-tax and the accounts of Yanni the Mad, the *kocabaşı* of Kartina. If I set about to deal with it today in conjunction with the decree, they will produce a contradicting decree in a matter of less than ten days. Also, the lady who owns the *muqataa* will be annoyed. What is the solution to this my sultan?”

Mustafa Paşa, the Governor of the province of the Morea.<sup>2</sup>

The solution of Mustafa Paşa was pretty straightforward: issuing of a *ruhsat-name* instead of an *emr-i ali*. With the consent of all interested parties, the investigation of the matter should be left to his just discretion by means of a *ruhsat*. Donating him with absolute authority on the matter, *ruhsat* would invalidate any *tenbih* to the contrary from the outset that the *voyvoda* and the *kocabaşı* would seek from İstanbul to acquit themselves. It is clear that Mustafa Paşa used *emr-i ali* (the sublime decree) and *tenbih* (advice) interchangeably to mean *ferman*, the imperial edict, which is said to have bear

---

<sup>2</sup> “Pek güzel! Lakin cezire-i Mora kaza itibarıyla yirmidir. Onaltısının ashabı malum. Şunda dört kaza cezirenindir. Onaltı kazada rüyet-i maslahat valinin istediği vakitte suret bulmak mertebesinden haric olduğu tarif istemez. İşte şimdi zuhur iden emr-i ali Kartina voyvodası Hacı Hasan Ağa'nın uhdesinde olan mukataat cizyelerinin hesabı rüyetidir. Ve Kartina Kocabaşısı Deli Yani'nin hesabı maddesidir. Mazmun-ı emr-i ali üzere bu gün mübaşeret eylesem 10 güne kalmaz başka suret emir getürürler. Ve mukataa sahibesi tarafından iğbirar derkar olur. Buna çare nedir sultanım? İşe şüru olunmaksızın evvela el-emr agah buyurub münasib görülür ise hesab maddesi ber-vech-i hakkaniyet rüyetimize ruhsat hükmü alınub gönderilmek kabil midir? Ki tarafeyni gadr ve himayeden ari hakkaniyet vechle hesablarına feysal virilüb hakikatı arz ve inha oluna. Bu maddeye cenab-ı şerifden re'y-i sa'ibane ve tedbir-i sakıbane isterim. İşe mübaşeret eylediğimizde yine başka suret tenbih gelecek ise kerem idüb bizi ol-tarafda lisana getürmeyün. Eğer tarafımıza ve hakkaniyetimize havaleye her taraf razı olur ise azizim ruhsatname almağa muhtacdır. Sözüñ dost-doğrusu budur. Heman ne vechle iktiza ider ise tizcek cevab irsalinize muntazırım. İfşa ve istişaresi münasib olanlar ile müzakere buyurub neticesini aceleten tahrir himmetleri mercudur.” BOA, C.HRC 7283 (15ZA1218), the private letter of Mustafa Paşa to the deputy grand-vizier (?); the date of the letter 23RA1216/3Aug1801.

no authority in the provinces in the period under discussion by all contemporary western accounts.

It is not always easy to define the center and the periphery as units of analysis in historical studies especially when the subject is an empire that resembled a patchwork of power-holders in varying degrees: the main actors were the Sublime Porte, ‘the local notables’ of the Arab lands and the power-brokers of the Balkans, both largely known as the *ayan*. Hourani coined the term ‘local notables’ as a compliment to the Ottomans by drawing attention to the Ottomanization of the local mediators in Arab provinces, but historians of the Middle East found in the term a good excuse for conducting ‘regionalist’ studies with no reference to the general framework of the empire.<sup>3</sup> *Ayans*, by contrast, have become a generic word for describing any strongman in the Balkans with dubious intentions and equivocal policies with little to offer to the understanding of the petty *ayans* who ran the empire on everyday basis.<sup>4</sup>

The political, fiscal, and geographical configuration of the empire was based on an amalgamation of local households and paşa households. They were the tangible results of the new political economy emerged in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. These households were political, military and economic enterprises, serving in the capacity of rulers, trading companies, and landlords in the case binary of great *ayans* such as Ali Paşa of Yanya.

---

<sup>3</sup> See E. Toledano, “Some General Comments on the State of Ottoman Studies” [www.2.h-net.msu.edu/logsearch](http://www.2.h-net.msu.edu/logsearch), Nov. 4, 2002; Hathaway, “Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History”, pp. 29-53.

<sup>4</sup> For a recent recapitulation of the problem refer to D. Khoury, “The Ottoman centre versus provincial power-holders”, pp. 135-56; F. Adanır, “Semi-autonomous forces in the Balkans and Anatolia”, pp. 157-85; B. Masters, “Semi-autonomous forces in Arab Provinces”, pp. 186-208; all in S. Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey, v. 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*, Part III: “The Centre and the Provinces.”

Therefore, they defy any simplistic scheme in which the Sublime Porte represents ‘the center’ and the *ayans* and the subjects in the provinces constitute the ‘periphery.’<sup>5</sup>

Neither İstanbul nor provinces were monolithic entities. When Mustafa Paşa reminded the Sublime Porte about his weak position vis-à-vis the *kazas*, he did not mean that most of the *kazas* refused to submit to the authority of the legitimate governor of the province, but referred to the fact that these provinces simply fell outside of the premises of his jurisdiction as the governor of the province. Therefore, he sought to obtain a *ruhsat* authorizing him on this specific task lying outside of the premise of his office and forestall a possible reproach of the “lady-owner” of the *muqataa*, who was probably Beyhan Sultan, the beloved sister of Selim III. One of the wealthy princesses in Ottoman history, Beyhan Sultan (1765-1824) seems to have farmed the *muqataa* through the *voyvoda* she appointed, Hacı Hasan Ağa.<sup>6</sup>

### The case of Ali Paşa

Throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century, war on the fronts and rebellions in İstanbul had repercussions in the provinces. For instance, the Patrona rebellion (1730) was influential

---

<sup>5</sup> Esmer also has similar observations on the inadequacy of the center-periphery approach, drawing attention to the indispensable role of *ayans* in the functioning of the empire. He, rather, focuses on the culture of violence and competing definitions of social justice through an examination of the career of Kara Feyzi, a relatively petite power broker of the late 18<sup>th</sup> century in Bulgaria see, T. Esmer, *A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790-1808* (The University of Chicago, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009).

<sup>6</sup> T. Artan, “From Charismatic Leadership to Collective Rule: Introducing materials on the wealth and power of Ottoman Princesses in the eighteenth century”, *Dünyü Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi* 4 (1993), p. 63; the female members of the imperial dynasty had substantial holdings in the Morea. The Greek chronicler Panayis Skouzes (1777-1847) recounted the popular belief that Haseki Hacı Ali, the tyrannical *voyvoda* of Athens, was able to purchase the town at auction as *malikane* (life-time tax farm), allegedly thanks to his lover –Esma Sultan (1726-1788), one of the daughters of Ahmed III see, J. Strauss, “Ottoman Rule Experienced and Remembered: Remarks on some local Greek chronicles on the Tourkokratia” in F. Adanır and S. Faroqhi (eds.), *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 210.

in the final triumph of the Faqari political-military faction over the rival Qasimi faction in Egypt. Revolts of Ali Bey in Egypt, Zahir al-Umar in Palestine, and the whole province of the Morea were encouraged by the presence of the Russian navy in the Mediterranean in 1770.<sup>7</sup> Most of the foreign observers and the relevant literature agreed that Ali Paşa of Yanya had double dealings with the French and the Porte, though there is no consensus on whether or not he had a secret agenda for independence from the Porte.<sup>8</sup> By and large these views on Ali Paşa are flawed in various ways. Recent research, for instance, has corrected his image as an indifferent Muslim. By contrast, the contractual nature of his relations and the bargaining process involved in it is still regarded as an open defiance of the Sublime Porte by the local power-brokers.<sup>9</sup>

It is deplorable that even a recent treatment of Ali Paşa failed to assess the significance of the Napoleonic wars ensuing on the Adriatic frontier in the career of Ali.<sup>10</sup> It is not much stressed that the territories he ruled over were exposed to a fierce

---

<sup>7</sup> For a discussions of such parallelisms, see Hathaway, “Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History”, pp. 29-53; Finkel, *Osman’s Dreams: the story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (John Murray, 2006), pp. 408-09.

<sup>8</sup> For a good analysis of the literature see, F. Anscombe, “Continuities in Ottoman centre-periphery relations, 1787-1913” in A. C. S. Peacock (ed.), *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World (Proceedings of the British Academy)* (Oxford, 2009) [to be published in November 2009].

<sup>9</sup> According to Anscombe new findings on Ali’s religious inclinations point to his stereotypical image, Anscombe, “Continuities in Ottoman centre-periphery.” Among others two works are influential in romanticizing the career of Ali Paşa, Richard Davenport, *The Life of Ali Pasha, of Janina, Vizier of Epirus, Surnamed Aslan, or the Lion* (London, 1822); William Plomer, *The Diamond of Jannina: Ali Pasha, 1741-1822* (1936 and 1970).

<sup>10</sup> “Ali’s immediate aggression against the French troops in *his* lands at the time of the outbreak of this war against the French had indicated his desire to please the Porte, rather than any specific animosity toward the French” [italics are mine] see, Katherine Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha’s Greece* (Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 75, 109. To begin with, the coastal towns in Dalmatia was not within the territories he governed, while Ali’s reports we mentioned on the French activities prior to Ottoman-French war showed his genuine concerns about the French aggression in the Adriatic. While her main argument that ‘the West’ belittled the political hegemony of Ali Paşa by employing an oriental discourse centered on certain motives allegedly proving his wickedness, cruelty, and

competition among France, Russia, and Britain throughout the Napoleonic wars while the Adriatic frontier became a major battle ground after the fall of Venice. It is unfortunate that even the studies aiming at the deconstruction of the Orientalist image of Ali Paşa exclusively relied on the travel literature and the diplomatic memoirs in outlining Ali Paşa's career. The Porte's interests coincided with Ali Paşa's ambitions in the Napoleonic period; namely, safeguarding a frontier region vis-à-vis external threats and internal 'troublemakers' (Suliotas, Khimariotes, etc.). As we saw in the chapter on expedition, he organized the campaign on the Dalmatian enclaves on the orders of the Sublime Porte and supplied most of the troops against France in the Adriatic. Later on he alternated his favor between France and Britain after the Tilsit with the implicit approval of the Porte, emerging as the major power-broker in the region in the 1810s. Throughout the expedition he considered the Porte an arbitrator.<sup>11</sup>

Households always had official representatives (*kapu kethüdası/çuhadarı*) and numerous 'friends' in İstanbul who coordinated their relations with the Porte. This aspect of household politics seems to have been unknown to foreign observers. We have seen that Ali Paşa was represented as a sort of mutinous magnate who allegedly avoided meeting with the commander of the Ottoman fleet for his personal safety. Often escaped the attention of the foreign observers was the fact that the Porte sent Hüseyin Şükrü Beğ

---

irrationality is plausible, her portrayal of Ali as a shrewd man exploiting this image to further his goals needs more elaboration. Some of her arguments also need major revisions: i.e. the 'atypical' quality of Ali Paşa without ever defining the typology of an Ottoman paşa and the assertion that he was stronger politically than the Porte (Fleming, pp. 10, 18, 23, 176-77 and elsewhere).

<sup>11</sup> Anscombe emphasized the geopolitical context that brought about cooperation between the Porte and Ali Paşa, Anscombe, "Continuities in Ottoman centre-periphery"; also Virginia Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged* (Harlow: Longman, 2007), pp. 214-59; H. Sezer, "Tepedelenli Ali Paşa İsyanı" (Ankara Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1995).

from İstanbul as an emissary inspector (*mübaşir*) to Ali Paşa with instructions to coordinate his relations with the combined fleet and İstanbul.<sup>12</sup> The relations among the members of the upper echelons of the ruling elite (inclusive of great *ayans* as well as İstanbul-based *efendis* and *paşas*) of this time might be closer than we usually assume. Mehmed Şerif Efendi wrote a letter to Ali Paşa on 1 October 1799 advising him prudence in his relations with Russia regardless of their arrogance; because both faith and reason recommended taking a prudent course, handling the Russians would not run against the principles of ‘bravery, dervish-hood, and Islam.’ Thus, he would not suffer any popular accusations that he could not cope with the Russians. Conversely, should he take the path of egotism and lead to any sort of grave situation, the whole world would blame him saying, “He does not have any brains and his loyalty to the Sublime State is sham and ostentatious.” Mehmed Şerif Efendi was the army treasurer during the humiliation at Maçin (1791) who also presented one of the famous treatises of reform in 1792.<sup>13</sup> He explained that he was forced to spell these ‘blatant words’ by virtue of his loyalty to Ali Paşa whom he had decided to support after witnessing his bravery at the battle of Maçin. He gave further assurances to his good will by conveying that he was one of those who regretted for the Porte’s failure to appoint Ali Paşa with full authority to suppress the

---

<sup>12</sup> Poqueville, unaware of the imperial edict ordering Ali Paşa to attack on the Dalmatian towns, thought of Ali’s troops in Butrinto as a precaution against the combined fleet, lest they attacked his dominions. Poqueville, however, marked that Ali may well have sought to bid his time by dealing with the French secretly in 1797 and that whatever the reason for the French failure to reconcile Ali, it was unfortunate for “It was impossible to guard such a number of scattered points; and if he had been allowed to occupy them, he might have declared himself independent, or at least have caused a diversion by the confusion which he would create in the principal point threatened by the coalition”, Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania* (London, 1806), p. 172.

<sup>13</sup> For his treatise see, E. Çağman, “III. Selim’e sunulan bir ıslahat raporu: Mehmet Şerif Efendi Layihası”, *Divan: İlmî Araştırmalar* 7 (1999): 217-33.

Mountain bandits that ravaged south Bulgaria.<sup>14</sup> Such intimate relations between İstanbul-based elites and the provincial great *ayans* are certainly surprising from a conventional point of view.<sup>15</sup>

### The rise of provincial households

While it is out of the scope of this chapter to indulge in the *çiftlik* debate, these private estates were of crucial importance for the great households of the Balkans and Anatolia to derive their source and power.<sup>16</sup> Ali Paşa also acquired hundreds of *çiftliks* on

---

<sup>14</sup> “...Rusya devleti ile Devlet-i Aliye-yi ebediyü'l-devamın hali tarif kabul itmeyüb ale'l-husus şimdiki vaktde ne güne dikkat ve ihtimam olunacak maslahat idüğü edna teemmül ile malumunuzdur. Hasbe'l-maslaha mukabere ve tagallüb itseler dahi mümaşaat itmet lazımdır. Tedabir-i hakimanenin icrası şerren ve aklen memduh olub yiğitliğe ve dervişliğe ve müslimanlığa hiç zararı yokdur. 'Bak şunlarla başa çıkamadı ve galib gelemedi' deyu hiç kimesne sizi tayib itmez. Ananiyet davasına düşüb ve nefsini kabardub nezu billahi-teala bir güne vahamete sebeb olursanız ol vakt cemi alem sizi tayib idüb 'hiç aklı yoğ imiş ve Devlet-i Aliye'ye sadakatı yapma ve gösteriş imiş' dirler. Huda hakkıyçün pek fena netice vireceğini cezme ve tahkik itdim. Ana binaen haddim değil iken böyle acı sözleri mukteza-yı sadakatimden ve gayretimden yazdım. Sizin ve evladlarınızın fenalığını ister isem kendümde ve evladlarımda bulayım. Dağlı gibi filan gibi bazı işler oldukça 'niçün Ali Paşa hazretlerini müstakilen tayin itmezler?' deyu feryad idenlerdenim. Devlet-i Aliye'ye vücudunuzun lüzumunu bildiğimden ve Maçın vakasında yiğitliğinizi ve gayretinizi gördüğümden tarafdarlığınızı iltizam itmişimdir. Vallahu'l-azim gayri vechle değildir. Allah u azimü'ş-şan habib-ekremi hürmetine kalbinizi su'î zanndan [?..] idüb sözlerimin tesirini halk eyleye amin. *Fi gurre-i C sene 214*” C.HRC 8282 (1C1214/1Oct1799).

<sup>15</sup> For instance Tayyar Mahmud Paşa, the head of the great *ayan* dynasty Caniklizades of North Anatolia, was the archenemy of Selim III and fled to the Crimea. He, nonetheless, returned to İstanbul after Selim's deposal in 1807 and briefly served as the deputy Grand vizier owing to his clientele relations with the 'center.' He met his death following the dethronement of Mustafa IV in 1808 by yet another great *ayan*, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa of Rusçuk (Ruse), who became the new Grand vizier through his own intricate relations with the 'center.' These examples call for a reassessment of the center-periphery dispute centered on the “the Deed of Agreement” (1808) in which the Sublime Porte supposedly acknowledged the rights of the *ayans*, while the observance of the agreement by Mahmud II is another subject of debate. For more information see Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870*, pp. 241-265; for new approaches to Ottoman political culture of this era see, F. Yeşil, *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına Osmanlı Kara Ordusunda Değişim, 1793-1826*, (Hacettepe Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009); A. Yayıoğlu, *The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis, and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)* (Harvard University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2008); A. Yıldız, *Vaka-yı Selimiye or the Selimiye Incident: A Study of the May 1807 Rebellion* (Sabancı Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2008); Esmer, *A Culture of Rebellion*.

<sup>16</sup> There is a vast literature on the *çiftlik* debate. The debate revolved around the origins and the nature of the *çiftliks*. Original view was that the local magnates usurped the state lands and converted them into market-oriented and export-oriented large holdings so as to facilitate the integration of the empire into the world system. This was criticized on the grounds that the origins of the *çiftliks* were marginal lands and



which he built an extensive network of clients; notably, the phenomenon of *çiftlikization* did not only refer to appropriation of indebted villages, or state lands but also all kinds of contractual relations between Ali Paşa and the peasants.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, Ali Paşa's territories were also an amalgamation of scattered and diversified fiscal units including towns, ports, fisheries, and villages under the administration of smaller *ayans*, and as such fitted into the general Ottoman politico-fiscal culture.

As was discussed in greater detail in the chapter on "Finance" dissolution of the prebendal land system (*timar*) also set in motion other changes with necessary financial consequences: the rise of the tax-farming (*iltizam*) in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the introduction of the life-term tax-farming system (*malikane*) on certain revenues by the end of the century, its gradual expansion so as to include agricultural revenues (*malikane-muqataa*), and finally, the shareholding system (*esham*) after mid-century. Caused by protracted and disastrous wars, these changes transformed the configuration of the provinces.

Long gone was the age of the prebendal warrior-administrators of the countryside and the stipendiary household troops stationed in the towns, all headed by the members of the household of the Sultan. The Sultan's household gradually gave way to the

---

most of them retained the character of the typical small peasant holdings, see Y. Nagata, "Ayan in Anatolia and the Balkans during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: A Case Study of the Karaosmanoğlu Family" in Anastasopoulos ed. *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire* (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005) 269-90; G. Veinstein "On the Çiftlik Debate" in Ç. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds.), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (Albany, 1991); İncalcık, "The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlords and Tenants" in J.-L. Bacque-Grammont and P. Dumont (eds.), *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris: Leuven, 1983); McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Empire: Taxation, Trade, and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge, 1981); Y. Nagata, *Some Documents on the Big Farms (Çiftliks) of the Notables in Western Anatolia* (Tokyo, 1976).

<sup>17</sup> D. Dimitropoulos, "Aspects of the Working of the Fiscal Machinery in the Areas Ruled by Ali Paşa" in Anastasopoulos and E. Kolovos (eds.), *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflicts, Transformation, Adaptation* (Rethymno: University of Crete, 2007), pp. 62-72.

perfect/complete households (*mükemmel kapu-halkı*) of paşas –perfect in the sense of embodying both mercenary troops and the scribal entourage so as to enable the paşa to run the province at his own expense.<sup>18</sup> This was best symbolized by the abandonment of the *devşirme* levies - forced-recruitment of mostly Christian boys for the sultan’s household. By the 18<sup>th</sup> century, paşas were coupled with a new class of rulers with their own households who claimed a share in the political and fiscal configuration of the empire. Sometimes labeled as “new Ottomans,” these *ayans* were not non-existent in previous centuries, but only by the 18<sup>th</sup> century did they gain prominence in the provinces with the institutionalization of their role as *ayan*, which is best described as the transformation of “*ayan*-hood as natural leadership” into “*ayan*-ship as a formal office.”<sup>19</sup> An imperial decree dated 1726 allowed for the appointment of local power-holders as provincial governors, launching the ‘age of the ayans.’<sup>20</sup> Their role as intermediaries in the provincial administration was all the more crucial in an age of imperial administration that was shaped by the inflation of efendi in the center and of

---

<sup>18</sup> M. Kunt, *The Sultan’s Servants: the Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government 1550-1650*, (Columbia University Press, 1983).

<sup>19</sup> Yaycıoğlu, *The Provincial Challenge*, p. 41. Ali Yaycıoğlu has developed a promising model to explain the functioning of the Empire in this century; by focusing on the *petite ayans*, whose role as local functionaries had hitherto been neglected in Ottoman history, he argues for the existence of a more integrative political culture in the Empire than usually assumed among the Ottomanists; a classic study on the origins of the *ayans* is İnalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration” in Naff and Owen (eds.), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (London, 1977): 27-52; Ö. Ergenç, “Osmanlı Klasik Dönemindeki ‘Eşraf ve A’yan’ Üzerindeki Bazı Bilgileri”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3 (1982): 105-118.

<sup>20</sup> The provinces were expedient on taking advantage of the decree. For instance, the Janissary Kahya Hüseyin al-Dimyati appointed one of the members of his retinue the *sancakbey* (district governor) in Egypt in 1727; appointment of a client to beylicate was seemingly a novelty, see Hathaway, “The Household: an alternative framework”, p. 62 fn. 13; Akdağ labeled the century ‘the age of *ayan*-ship’, but there is no consensus on when it started (the 1730s?, the last quarter of the 17<sup>th</sup> century?), see M. Akdağ, “Osmanlı Tarihinde Ayanlık Düzeni Devri, 1730-1839”, *TAD* 8/14-23 (1963), p. 51; this catchy appellation was rendered in English by McGowan, “The age of the ayans, 1699-1812” in İnalcık and Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 639-758.

paşa in the provinces, although they did not necessarily have to be state functionaries.

Lack of suitable offices in sufficient numbers resulted in ever-shortening terms of service of the governor paşas in the provinces.<sup>21</sup>

### The population of the Morea and the *avarız-hane*

Researchers have agreed on neither the size nor the composition of the population of the Morea in early modern era.<sup>22</sup> McGowan, based on Ottoman tax registers, claimed that the population decrease in 1700-1815 was 13 % in the province, exhibiting a stark contrast with the situation in other provinces.<sup>23</sup> Mustafa Paşa, the governor of the Morea in 1803, estimated that there were just 60,000 non-Muslims in the province, exclusive of the Greek inhabitants of the region of Mani that amounted to 8-10,000 people.<sup>24</sup> The Muslim population of the province, in his opinion, was just about 7,000.<sup>25</sup> He probably based his estimate for the non-Muslims on official poll-tax registers. McGowan's study on the subject reveals that poll-tax payers in the province of the Morea decreased towards

---

<sup>21</sup> The *ayan* did not pose a unified block as the intermediaries throughout the empire, neither were they always representatives of local interests, as Hourani once posited, see D. Khoury, "The Ottoman centre versus provincial power-holders", p. 155.

<sup>22</sup> After the Venetian conquest in late seventeenth century, the Venetians estimated that the population had decreased from 200,000 to 86,468 in the 1700s. Gordon gives the highest figure of 400,000 for the Napoleonic period although he maintains that this figure actually represented a decline in the population, J. L. McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic. The Genesis of Russia's First Balkan Satellite* (University of Wisconsin, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1965), p. 2; Comstock's estimate is 450,000 while P. J. Green, Esq., the British Consul at Patras, put the Greek population at 416,000 as opposed to the Muslim population of 16,500; the latter is obviously too low an estimate for the year of 1823, Comstock, *History of the Greek Revolution...* (New York, 1828), pp. 8-9. Relying on Poqueville, Hobhouse also gives the figure 400,000 for Greeks, exclusive of the Maniotes, with 15,000 Muslims and 4000 Jews, see Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces...*, v. I, p. 196.

<sup>23</sup> Zarinebaf, nevertheless, warns us against this assumption as Anavarin's population remained stable during the eighteenth century. Kiel, also, thinks that the sharp decline in the population of the province in the seventeenth century was followed by a slow recovery in the following century, see Zarinebaf et al., *A Historical and Economic Geography of Ottoman Greece. The Southwestern Morea in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century* (Athens, 2004), p. 16.

<sup>24</sup> BOA, HAT 98/3911 (6Jun1803) from Mustafa Paşa to the Sublime Porte.

<sup>25</sup> HAT 169/7177 from Mustafa Paşa to the Sublime Porte.

the end of the eighteenth century: 78,754 (1720/21), 70,650 (1740/41), 62,969 (1787/88).<sup>26</sup> By contrast, a Muslim account of the Greek Revolt put the figure for the Greeks at 150,000 and the Muslims at 50,000.<sup>27</sup>

Any population increase would decrease the burden on the subjects owing to the nature of *avarız-hane*. As described previously, *avarız-hane* distributed the tax-payers into nominal tax households with a standard rate of taxation according to their wealth and status. The number of the poll-tax payers in the Balkans below the Danube-Sava line increased by half in the course of a century.<sup>28</sup> This might have implied the availability of more tax-payers in each *avarız-hane* to shoulder the tax burden in general. This trend, however, was not observed in the Morea. While the *avarız* tax household was no more the main criterion for levying on irregular taxes, the population of the Morea also seems to have declined by the end of the century.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, p. 100; in 1645 there were 37,000 poll-tax payers, while the Venetians also counted 38,000 tax-paying families in 1700. For the same year, another Venetian source gives the population as 176,844, Balta, "Settlement and Population in the Morea in 1645", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* XXIV (2004): 53-63.

<sup>27</sup> Ahmet Aydın, *Mir Yusuf Tarihi*, (Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2002), p. 25. Mir Yusuf, a local functionary of the province, drew attention to the contrast between the official records and the reality by juxtaposing them: the former cited 56,416 poll-tax payers whereas he gave the figures cited in the text by relying on his own private records.

<sup>28</sup> Figures for Athens and its vicinity as well as Narde are 19,800 (1740/41) and 22,272 (1787/88). The same trend of increase could also be seen in Thessaly and Macedonia. McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, pp. 82, 100.

<sup>29</sup> McGowan's findings demonstrate that the number of *avarız-hanes* steadily declined in the course of time: 18,066 tax-houses ( in 1640: 17 *kazas*), 11,545 (1650: 17 *kazas*), 11,194 (1662: 23 *kazas*), 9,984 (1677: 23 *kazas*), 831 (1688: 4 *kazas*), 3,422 (1755: 26 *kazas*, not counting 4 *kazas* with exemption), 3,049 (1786: 27 *kazas*, not counting 4 *kazas* with exemption), see McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Empire*, p. 118.

### The petty *ayans* and the system of apportioning

The new political and fiscal configuration of the empire was based on a set of contractual relations emanating from İstanbul and stretching to the provinces in which bargaining was both inevitable and legitimate. Contractual relations were basically financial and military; they included those (1) between the Treasury and the *ayan* -as the leasers of tax-farms-; (2) between the absentee holders of the *muqataa* revenues and the *ayan* as the sub-leasers; (3) between *ayan* and his community. Correspondingly, the *ayan* gradually gained the status of a negotiator for his community since he was chosen with the consent of the local people with whom he had to go over the account books he kept in front of the *kadı* every six months. Only then the *kadı* would grant him the necessary official documents certifying his accomplishment in the task.<sup>30</sup>

The implications of the new configuration of center-periphery relations, which may be coined the *tevzi* (apportioned allocation) system, has become a focus of attention only in terms of its fiscal implications for the Ottomanists, who often considered the system seriously flawed as the Porte did not have the necessary local knowledge to audit these account books and thus was bound to fail in its attempts to eliminate the corruption.

A seminal approach is suggested by Yaycıoğlu, who has argued that the system

---

<sup>30</sup> İstanbul, however, had developed certain checks and balances to minimize the degree of exactions. It limited the number of the account books kept for the purpose with two so that taxes and expenses would be apportioned among the subjects every six months, or two times a year. These account books were to be submitted through the *kadı* to the treasury for auditing. Furthermore, the election of the *ayan* by the local community was subjected to the ratification of the Sublime Porte by the 1760s. The Porte could not enforce the last regulation in the face of the war with Russia, but it imposed its right of ratification in 1778, and replaced *ayan* institution with a similar one in 1786 only to revive it in 1791. According to Yaycıoğlu, in 1786 the Porte sought to replace the *ayan* with the so-called 'stewards of towns' (*şehir kethüdalari*), the representatives of the artisans, who were of more humble origins, in order to curb the power of the former, see Yaycıoğlu, *The Provincial Challenge*, pp. 159-160.

principally aimed to meet the local expenses by local revenues through active participation of local communities represented by the local elite. He has pointed out that although much of the local spending was related with the costs of the appointed Governor and his entourage as well as the quartering of the messengers sent back and forth from İstanbul, these local committees also had to take care of the maintenance of public buildings and facilities such as the court building or the bridges. Although local communities had always played a role in local affairs, the *tevzi* system institutionalized the local participation in which the *ayan* were accountable for their spending before the local communities that chose them as the community delegates and representatives. Thus, contractual relations that could be observed between center and periphery as a result of fiscal transformation also shaped the political culture within a given province through the *tevzi* system and the Ottoman Empire evolved into a more participatory and integrative polity.<sup>31</sup>

The province of the Morea in late 1790s was shaped by a free floating administrative framework that embodied *kazas* under the jurisdiction of the Governor with his seat at Tripolitsa and various “free” districts that had certain exemptions and immunities (*serbestiyet*; lit., freedom). A free district could be a large farm(s) the revenues of which were assigned to high officials. Such large tract of lands had originally formed the biggest fiefs under the *tımar* system. Coined *has* and *zeamet*, these fiefs had always been earmarked for the viziers. Apart from such fiefs, the royal demesne (*havass-ı*

---

<sup>31</sup> Yaycıoğlu, *The Provincial Challenge*. For a detailed discussion of the *tevzi* system and the related literature see especially his Chapter III: “Communalization of Authority in Provincial Governance: Community Overseers”, pp. 121-189.

*hümayun*) and the imperial waqfs bestowed on the family members of the sultan were also free from the intervention of the Governor and exempt from some of the extraordinary taxes. As they served as sinews or appanages for the ruling elite, absenteeism was the norm. The situation was no different in tax-farms since the *esham*-holders of the *muqataa* revenues were usually based in İstanbul. Therefore, the local elite –*ayan*- appeared as the perfect sub-lesers in the provinces in view of their influence and local knowledge. In case of the Morea, these men were the Muslim *voyvodas* and the Christian *kocabaşıs* who administered the *muqataa* revenues, as well as the *mültezims* - the farmer of the tax revenues of the *iltizam* lands- who might be a Muslim official such as *kadı* or *voyvoda*, or a Christian primate, the *kocabaşı*.<sup>32</sup>

By the time of the expedition, *iltizam*, rather than *malikane*, was the basic landholding pattern in the Morea, while the system of *muqataa* as a means of revenue collection was extended so as to cover the taxes on the spirits, salt, silk, olive oil, mills, tithes and various pasture taxes besides the poll-tax. The payment of taxes as well as the meeting of certain expenses incurred by the quartering of troops, imperial messengers and the Governors had increasingly become a communal responsibility as they were demanded in lump-sums (*maqtu*). The lump-sums were raised through apportioning the burden among the communities in the meetings held every six months with the

---

<sup>32</sup> For a discussion of the term ‘local elite’ or *ayan* as inclusive of both Muslim and Christian primates see, A. Anastasopoulos, “The Mixed Elite of a Balkan Town: Karaferye in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century” in Anastasopolous (ed.), *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 259-268.

participation of the delegates of every community who negotiated and organized the allocation of the taxes and the expenses among the *kazas*.<sup>33</sup>

The last cadastral survey of the Morea was conducted in 1715 in the aftermath of the re-conquest of the province, which formed the basis of taxation.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, the *ayan* had a good portion of manipulative power in the reassessment of tax rates and allocation of the burden.<sup>35</sup> The universal result of a cash-driven fiscal system was peasant indebtedness in the early modern era, and the peasants of the Morea were no exception to the rule, neither were the local elite in their capacity of money-lenders, who usually prepaid these taxes only to charge interest on them during apportioning and always included in the account various service fees,<sup>36</sup> hence, the saying “the country labours

---

<sup>33</sup> D. Papastamatiou, “Tax-farming (*İltizam*) and Collective Fiscal Responsibility (*Maktu*) in the Ottoman Southern Peloponnese in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century” in E. Kolovos e al. (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire, The Balkans, the Greek Lands: Towards a Social and Economic History. In Honor of John C. Alexander* (İstanbul, Isis, 2007), pp.289-307.

<sup>34</sup> The Laws of the Morea of 1792 and 1812 declared the regulations undertaken in 1786 in force until a new survey of land would be conducted “by the grace of God.”

<sup>35</sup> Papastamatiou, “Tax-farming (*İltizam*) and Collective Fiscal Responsibility (*Maktu*)”, p. 292. He raises the question of whether extending loans was an investment strategy or capital formation method on the part of the *ayan* (in his case, the *mültezim* –the tax farmer). He gives the example of Panagiotis Benakis, the *kocabaşı*, who by paying the due taxes in advance drew the province into his sphere of influence, p. 299. Benakis, was one of the leading figures of the rebellion of 1770 and beheaded in the afterwards. His son Liberan Benaki took refuge in Corfu and entered in Russian service as consul-general, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 70. Their abandoned mansion in Kalamata was still impressive when Gell visited Kalamata, Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea* (London, 1823), pp. 214-15; Yaycıoğlu encapsulates the situation in a telling way: “Possibly they were both - a sort of - administrator and - a sort of - businessman. Their enterprises united both these functions, which we call in modern times, administration and business. They were governors, deputy-governors, superintendents or overseers. But at the same time, they were creditors, contractors, land lords, *çiftlik* managers, merchants and realtors”, Yaycıoğlu, *The Provincial Challenge*, p. 250.

<sup>36</sup> Sarıkhoğlu, *ayan* of Hacıoğlu Pazarı (Bulgaria) extended loans to artisans and merchants of Muslim Turkish stock at the interest rate of 35 %, H. Doğru, “Öldürülen Hacı-oğlu Pazarı Ayanı Sarıkhoğlu ile Adamlarının Muhallefatı ve Tasfiyesi”, *Uluslararası Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri Sempozyumu* (Eskişehir Üniversitesi, 2005), pp. 157-169; Müridoğlu Hacı Mehmed Ağa, the *mütesellim* of Edremit prepaid the cash compensation of the seamen levy (*kalyoncu bedeliyesi*) on the village of Mihaliç which cost him 45,000 *kuruş* [hereafter, *krş*] and he charged an interest of 25 %, S. Faroqhi, “Zeytin Diyarında Güç ve Servet: Edremit Ayanından Müridzade Hacı Mehmed Ağa'nın Siyasi ve Ekonomik



under three curses: the priests, the kocabasis, and the Turk.”<sup>37</sup>

It is amusing to realize the extent of the effort spent by the itinerants touring in the Greek lands to comprehend the administrative structure of the land, which was definitely confusing owing to the multi-layered division of land and administration as well as of fiscal units.<sup>38</sup> The Porte was no less confused than the itinerants and its confusion is best reflected in several Laws of the Morea (*kanunname*), all condemning the oppression of the Governor *paşas* appointed to the province and the *voyvodas* that compelled:

the inhabitants of each *kaza* to seek ways to obtain a free status as that of Patras so as to find a safe haven. And even those *kazas* under the supervision of grand princesses are striving to obtain decrees granting freedom and immunities with the result that only 5-6 *kazas* remained to shoulder the oppressive exactions of the Governors while other *kazas* remain like detached from the Morea. Meanwhile, the subjects of the *muqataas* of the grand princesses that were privileged by the granting of freedom are suffering from the oppression of their appointed *voyvodas*. At present, one part of the Morea is devastated by the oppression of the Governors and the remaining part is ruined by the exactions of the *voyvodas*.<sup>39</sup>

---

Faaliyetleri” in Ç. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds.) *Osmanlı Toprak Mülkiyeti ve Ticari Tarım* [Turkish trans.: Z. Altok trans., İstanbul: TTV, 1998], pp. 87, 90.

<sup>37</sup> Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea*, pp. 65-66. ‘Oppressive *kocabaşıs*’ is a very fashionable motive in the itineraries on the Greek lands.

<sup>38</sup> Prevalence of this effort renders the task of citing each work impracticable. The reader may refer to the bibliography of this work. I cite two of them to illustrate the point: Emerson, who wrote a history of the Greeks in the 1830s, noted that the land of Greeks “consisted of 5 pachaliks 2 vaivodalics, and *an infinite number of governments entrusted to officers of inferior rank*” [italics are mine]. The part in italics must have been seemed to him an intelligent way of summarizing the administrative confusion, Emerson, *The History of Modern Greece...* (London, 1830), v. I, p. 283. Hobhouse tackled the problem by referring to the *kazas* as “cantons” four of which were “governed by a Greek codja-bashee, or elder”, Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces...* (Philadelphia, 1817) v. I, p. 192. Usually, itinerants thought of Vostitsa, Sinano, Caritene and Vasilico as *kazas* ruled by the *kocabaşıs*.

<sup>39</sup> “...her bir kazā ahālisi birer vechile semt-i selāmeti cüst-ı cuyā zāhib olarak Balya Badra kazāsı misillü serbestiyetnāme tahsiline ve ba’zı kazālar selātin-i ‘izām hazerātının ‘uhdelerinde olmağla anlar dahî istiklāl ve serbestiyet üzere emirler ısdārına destres olub Mora vālılerinin zulmiyyelerini tahmîl idecek fakat beş altı kazā kalub mā’dāsı Mora’dan müfrez gibi olmağla serbestiyetnāme tahsiliyle mümtaz olan selātin-i ‘izām mukāta’atı re’āyaları dahî taraflarından mansub voyvodaların zulm ve sitemine ibtilā ile el-hālet-i hāzihî Mora’nın bir tarafı vālılerin zulmuyle ve taraf-ı diğeri voyvodaların gadr ve te’addî ve sitemiyle harāb ve vîrān...”, The Law on the Morea, 1792, in Yeşil and Şen (eds.), *Nizamnameler* (in publication).

### The official depiction of the province of the Morea in the statutes of the province

The statutes (*kanunname*) of the Morea dated 1792 and 1812 are good sources that contour the framework of the negotiation and bargaining both on the provincial level and the imperial level. Until the late 1780s, it was the task and ‘privilege’ of the governor of the province to oversee the collection of the poll-tax (*cizye*). He often collected the poll-tax at higher rates by introducing various service fees. When the amount could not be raised in full, he earmarked the amount collected as the service fee and passed the missing part for the poll-tax, purporting that it fell in arrears. Consequently, each governor accused his former colleague for embezzling the poll tax. When a messenger or inspector arrived in the province, even the most modest Governor multiplied the actual expenses of lodging and the victuals by three in the provincial expense books to embezzle the collected amount. As the populace could not pay these sums in full, the Governor staged the same scenario on the arrears. Thus, the subjects found themselves in a constant state of indebtedness and they tried to transfer their poll-tax obligation from the jurisdiction of the province to that of the *muqataa* of their own *kaza*. Their avoidance of the governor’s “cruel levies” (*tekalif-i zulmiyye*) through such arrangements increased the burden of the remaining *kazas*.

In response to the complaints of the populace, the Porte set the service fee in the poll-tax at one *kuruş* per tax-payer to eliminate the imposition of arbitrary rates, which failed to produce the expected results. Thus, the Porte transformed the revenues of the poll-tax and the extra-regular taxes (*avarız*) of the province into a *muqataa* in 1786 in order to deprive the governor of the right to these revenue sources. Instead, the governor

of the Morea was to be paid a fix income (*hazeriyye*) to manage his household.

Amounting to 90,204 *krş*, this was to compensate for the loss of his revenue accrued from the fees on the poll-tax and “cruel levies.” Unable to interfere with the poll-tax, the extra-regular taxes (*avarız*), and the revenues of the *muqataas*, the governor crafted new fees to double his income by resorting to “unthinkable injustices and oppression” according to the Law. Consequently, the province was left with a couple of *kazas* as all others attained free status as described above, though the new oppressors were the *voyvodas* this time.

Laws of the Morea attempted to end corruption on the local level by a series of measures. First of all, the status of those *kazas* that gained immunities after the 1786 regulation was declared unlawful and they were cancelled. All these *kazas* were to be reverted back to their former status as *kazas* of the province regardless of their fiscal definition as *muqataa*, farm (*çiftlik*), waqf, or appanage (*has*). Neither the status of their holders was to preclude their returning to the provincial administration since all the subjects of the Sultan were equal and it would not suit the Sultan’s compassion to protect some while ill-treating the others. Governor’s authority should encompass all of the *kazas*.

The governor would reach Tripolitsa without delay when appointed to the post so as to minimize the burden of quartering especially on Gördos, Anaboli, Ayapetros, and Tripolitsa. He would make do with his assigned income and the *voyvodas*, as opposed to the governor’s household agents, should raise this money by apportioning the related expenses among the populace on the basis of their wealth. The *voyvodas* should not be elected from among the Albanians and those known to be oppressors. A *kaza* should have

no more than one *kocabaşı*. This was hoped to check the power of these primates who acted in unison with the Governor, *voyvoda*, and *ayan* in exploiting the poor. By the same token, these Laws also endeavored to curb the influence of the official interpreter of the province by forbidding his intervention in the matters irrelevant of his office. Each *kaza* was to keep a record of its poll-tax, extra-regular taxes, occasional levies imposed by imperial edicts, and expenses of the imperial messengers. The *ayan*, the local elite (*vücuḥ-ı belde*), *kocabaşı* and the elders of the flock (*reaya ihtiyarları*) were responsible of keeping an account of all the local spending as well as apportioning them with moderation every six months, free of the encroachment of the *voyvoda* and the Governor. The leasers (*malikane*-holders) would receive a signed copy of the account through the *voyvoda*. The Governor would have his own signed copy sent from the *kaza*. Both the leasers and the Governor had to send their own copies to İstanbul so that the Porte would have a chance to cross-check the expenses during auditing the local accounts.

The so-called mercenary pay (*sekban ulufesi*), which existed only on paper, would not be entered in these accounts anymore and all the garrison troops were required to stay in their appointed posts as were the *tumar*-holders.

These laws draw a clear picture of the fiscal and administrative framework of the province, the role of the populace, of the local elite, and of the Governor appointed from İstanbul. The rhetorical aspect of the texts leave the impression that the Porte was well aware of the corruption and oppression ravaging the Morea, but could do nothing beyond warning the local functionaries to make do with their official allowances. Both of the statutes mentioned the need for a new cadastral survey to revise the tax rates in order to

end the injustice in taxation, but it was never undertaken in the span of two decades lying between the 1792 Law and 1812 Law, which repeated the former almost in verbatim.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, both dates coincided with the end of two disastrous wars with Russia, which, in the lack of accompanying land and tax surveys, suggests that it had become something of a bureaucratic tradition to issue these Laws after each war. If Yaycıoğlu is right in his evaluation of the *tevzi* system, then it is possible to consider the periodic issuance of these Laws as an official policy tailored to back the local populace in the fulfillment of their role by providing them with moral support and the necessary guidelines to determine what was just and what was not in fiscal and administrative dealings on a local level.

#### The Household of Mustafa Paşa and the state of military preparations of the Morea

Poqueville and Gell left us with colorful depictions of the court of Tripoliçe in 1799 and 1804, respectively. Rather than rephrasing their accounts in an inevitably redundant manner, we retain them in the Appendix D for quick consultation. We, instead, dwell on Mustafa Paşa's own account of his arrival to the Morea with his household in 1803 after his appointment as the governor for a second time, which, together with the accounts of Poqueville and Gell, testifies to certain problems focused in the Laws of the province. As we have previously mentioned, the Governor-paşas had relatively brief terms of office in this period. In 1797-1804, the governors of the Morea were Hasan Paşa, Mustafa Paşa, Ahmed Paşa, and once more Mustafa Paşa. It is usually held that the policy

---

<sup>40</sup> F. Tayfur, *Osmanlı Belgeleri Işığında 1821 Rum İsyanı ve Buna Karşı Oluşan Tepkiler* (Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2003), pp. 76-84.

of rotating the governors impeded their familiarization with the province in question.

Nevertheless, Ahmed Paşa seems to have been natives of the Morea or Epirus, whereas Mustafa Paşa was already the governor of Aleppo and seems to have had good relations with the Grand vizier Yusuf Ziya Paşa.<sup>41</sup>

Mustafa Paşa decided to take up his post in the Morea in 1803 with a retinue of more than 2,000 men because of the bandits (of Mani, Bardunia, and Lalla) ravaging the countryside as well as the rumors of an impending French attack on the Morea.<sup>42</sup> Upon his decision to supplant his household, those men, who had previously served his father and himself, joined him from İstanbul as well as other places en route to the Morea.

When he arrived at Selanik, he sent out orders to the Morea concerning the suppression of the banditry so as to provide an explanation for his large household, albeit obliquely.

Upon his arrival at Yenişehir-i Fener, he issued orders to disarm the civilians regardless of religion; the orders maintained that it was against the will of the Sultan to bear arms in

---

<sup>41</sup> Poqueville related that the *Defter-kiaya* [*defter kethüdası*], ‘the receiver of the finances’ was brother-in-law of Ahmed Paşa, but he made everything to preclude his appointment as the governor of the Morea for which reason Ahmed Paşa hated him. When he died, his young wife entered the *harem* of Ahmed Paşa as she was likely to be Paşa’s niece. Moreover, the brother of the deceased replaced him in the office of comptrollership while the inspector (*kapucubaşı*), sent by the Porte, confiscated the estate of the deceased. Eventually, Poqueville and his friends were also taken to İstanbul by this ‘drunkard’ inspector, Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania*, pp. 92-94.

<sup>42</sup> HAT 169/7177 (7M1218/29Apr1803) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte. The estate (*çiftlik*) of Yusuf Agah Efendi, the first permanent ambassador to London (1794-97), also suffered from banditry. His estate was known by his name (*Yusuf Agah Efendi çiftliği*) and located 1.5 hours away from Tirapoliçe. The bandits set alight his estate, kidnapping nine of his peasants. They descended to the outskirts of Tirapoliçe, kidnapping many people; Poqueville came across a Muslim man near Tirapoliçe, who spoke with him in French as he had spent some years in Marseilles and Paris. He had a country-house in the vicinity, see Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania*, p. 18. This bears to mind many questions. Is it possible that he might have served in the embassy of Paris given that Morali es-Seyyid Ali Efendi was also from the province; or, did he have some sort of relation to Yusuf Agah? What is certain is that both of the permanent ambassadors appointed to London and Paris were from the Morea, and, it seems, the choice of the Porte was not coincidental. May be it deemed the Moriote Muslims to be more familiar with Western culture and languages.

those villages and towns that were not located on the frontiers of the empire.

Nevertheless, ‘both the prominent ones (*vücuḥ*) and the archons of the non-Muslims (*reaya kocabaşıları*)’ assured him in Tripoliçe that they had already cracked down on the bandits. He was told that maintenance of such a large retinue under one vizier was difficult even in times of war and asked to reduce the size of his household. Insistent grievances compelled Mustafa Paşa to decrease his retinue by 500 men although he was much concerned with the confusing news.<sup>43</sup>

The merchants in the Morea received letters from their business associates in Italy and France about French naval preparations against Britain, contrasting the rumors that the two rivals were about to enter into negotiations. Thus, Mustafa Paşa refused to dismiss more men from his household on the pretext of fighting banditry. He was aware that his household of 1,500 men was still six to seven times larger than those of former governors. He anticipated that the Porte would reprimand him for keeping a large retinue after receiving the likely petitions from the province. While he was contemplating of sending explanations in advance so as to draw attention to the menacing French, the timely arrival of the instructions of the Grand vizier relieved him for he urged Mustafa for increasing the size of his retinue in anticipation of a French assault.<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> HAT 169/7177 (7M1218/29Apr1803) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte. He assured the Porte that he meted out the expenses of victuals from his own pocket during his journey, paying 3-3.5 *krş* to a *kile* [hereafter, *kI*] of barley.

<sup>44</sup> HAT 169/7177 (7M1218/29Apr1803) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte. The words of Mustafa Paşa elucidate his clientele relations to the Grand Vizier Yusuf Paşa. He defined himself as ‘the apprentice’ (*çırak*) and ‘the dependent’ (*etba*) of Yusuf Paşa which denoted his protégé status. He was “the slave son of a slave of the Sublime Porte” (*Devlet-i Aliye'nin kul oğlu kulu*) who “was born into this ephemeral world naked and owed whatever he possessed” to the Sultan (*fi'l-asl bu alem-i faniye uryan gelüb her neye malik*

The major problem was the lack of sufficient troops to defend the province. Mustafa Paşa succinctly relayed this problem in his report. Mehmed Paşa, who was about to arrive from Hanya (Crete) to the Morea in exile, had a retinue of 80 – 100 men. The Muslim population of the province, on the other hand, did not exceed 7,000. Moreover, only half of 4,000 Muslim males could compose of a fighting force. While he had 1,500 men, one-third of them were not combatants, but servants and scribes (*karakullukçu makuleleri*), bringing the total fighting force to 3,000. An additional force of 700 – 800 *timar*-holders could be brought in from the *Rumeli* to clear out the mounds of the fortress of Anaboli without incurring any expense. The Porte, nevertheless, should decide upon the commissioning of either these timariots from the Balkans, or those of the districts of Mezistre and the Morea, while enlisting the labor of the peasants was another option.<sup>45</sup>

Gell and Poqueville described abundantly the wretched state of the defenses of the Morea as well as the poverty of its defenders.<sup>46</sup> The archival documentation attested to their rich observations on the matter. The fortresses of the Morea and the castle of

---

*olmuş*). Thus, he was “one of those slaves ready to sacrifice their lives in the name of the Sultan and the religion of Muhammad” (*uğur-ı hümayunlarına ve din-i Muhammediye feda ider kullarından*).

<sup>45</sup> HAT 169/7177 (7M1218/29Apr1803) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte; after the *timar* system fell into disuse, the Porte began to use *timar*-holders as an auxiliary labor force in public works such as road construction and fortress renovation.

<sup>46</sup> “The aga [of the Janissaries of Modon] seemed wretchedly poor, though the governor of the place, and his house scarcely in a less filthy and ruinous condition than that of our commandant at Navarino: so far is it from the truth that the Turks live in ease and affluence, while the Greeks were condemned to filth and penury.” Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea*, p. 43; “A law was passed after the second conquest of the Morea which compelled every Turk to have a habitation in some of the fortresses of the country. I imagine that they were bound to these residences, and keep in them a constant supply of such provisions as were best suited to the purpose. Every Turk ought, upon this supposition, to owe personal service to some fortress in his neighbourhood, and in fact nominally belongs to the garrison. The houses have fallen into decay and provisions ceased to be prepared, as there seemed no necessity for them”, Gell, p. 20; “The principal bulwarks of the Morea are Naupli di Romania on the gulf of the Argos, Coron, Modon, Navarene, the fort of Castel-Tornese, Patras, and the castles of the gulph of Corinth. These places have garrisons even in time of peace, if the name of garrisons can be given to a few miserable hordes called spahis and cannoneers.”, Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania*, p. 47.



Lepanto had 2,141 native defenders (*yerlü neferat*) with an annual pay of 50,835 *krş*. The town of Lepanto had an additional 657 troops whose yearly salary cost 13,749 *krş*. Apparently, none of them were paid for two years from July 1796 to June 1798 as the inspection of their muster rolls on the spot was still in progress.<sup>47</sup>

The garrison of İnebahtı had sent one of their ranks as deputy (*salyaneci*) to İstanbul whom petitioned the Porte to receive the pays in arrears in İstanbul. Relevant Ottoman regulations, however, prohibited the delivery of the pays to the deputy in İstanbul without the completion of the inspection of the muster rolls. After the renewal of the rolls, the soldiers were to be distributed new pay certificates (*berat*) on the spot. This was a measure against the embezzlement of the pays of the ‘paper recruits’ by the chosen deputies. ‘Paper recruits’ denoted those men whose name existed on the outdated muster rolls in spite of their absence in the garrison for some reason which was a universal phenomenon in the armies of the day. Thus, poor Salih, the deputy and the head of the bombardiers of Lepanto, was ‘agonizing in the corners of khans of İstanbul for 11 months’ as of April 1798, while the Porte adamantly refused to deliver the sum to him before the arrival of the renewed muster rolls.<sup>48</sup> It seems that the Porte compromised the defense of the Morea by keeping the garrisons unpaid when it most expected a French aggression in the region unless the renewal of the muster rolls per se should be considered as a military precaution in itself against the French.

---

<sup>47</sup> BOA, C.AS 22564 (4ZA1212/20Apr1798); for the sake of comparison, in 1744 the eleven fortresses of the Morea had 2,326 native troops with an annual salary of 54,975.5 *krş*, C.AS 25641 (20CA1157/1Jul1744).

<sup>48</sup> C.AS 22564 (4ZA1212/20Apr1798).

Notably, the annual sum of 64,584 *krş* for 2,798 men in the Morea was a considerable expense by comparison to the sums spared for the native troops (*yerl  neferat*) of ‘the five fortresses’ of Hotin, Bender, Akkirman, Kili, and İsmail (*kıla-ı hamse*). The Porte paid these most important garrisons of the empire 1,359,386.5 *krş* in three years from summer 1796 to summer 1799.<sup>49</sup> In the period of 29 November 1798 – 19 September 1799, the Sublime Porte spent 177,833 *krş* on the fortifications of the Morea.<sup>50</sup> From the midst of 1796 to the summer of 1798, the Porte earmarked 1,500 purses (750,000 *krş*) for the renovation of a number of fortresses lying on the frontiers such as Anapa, Ahısha (in Caucasus and Georgia), Yerg g  (Giurgiu), Kili, Erzurum, Bosnian fortresses as well as those protecting the entrance of the Black Sea.<sup>51</sup> This suggests that the Porte invested substantially in the maintenance and upkeep of the defenses of the Morea although it fell short of bestowing an effective protection on the province as implied by the report of Mustafa Pařa and foreign observers.<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>49</sup> C.AS 38399 (22B1214/19Jan1800). This sum was spared as *ocaklık* from several *mukataas*. The *ocaklık* revenues accrued to the treasury of *İrad-ı Cedid* (New Revenues) which paid the garrisons in cash. The document provides a detailed breakdown of the revenue sources of these fortresses for this three-year period. The calculations showed that the Porte paid roughly 30,000 *krş* more than the specified sum and it had to be returned to the *İrad-ı Cedid*, as the regulations left the surplus of the *ocaklık* revenues to the new treasury of Selim III; another detailed list of the same sort covering the period summer 1798-december 1803 shows that a surplus of roughly 1,500,000 *krş* from the *ocaklık mukataa* revenues spared for the fortresses was transferred to the new treasury, C.AS 30333 (22ZA1217/15Apr1803); In April 1802-April 1803, Hotin had only 887 native troops receiving 67,358.5 *krş* 12 *para* [hereafter, *pr*], C.AS 49502 (28M1220/28Apr1805); the number of troops fluctuated slightly over the years, some figures are: Hotin (1,243 in 1796-97; 1,224 in 1797-98), Bender (1,366 in 1796-97; 1,250 in 1797-98), Akkirman (607 in 1796-97; 610 in 1797-98), Kili (407 in 1796-97; 393 in 1797-98), İsmail (1,845 in 1796-97). The annual pay of these native garrisons were well over 300,000 *krş*, C.AS 45381 (15Z1212/31May1798); in 1795-96 their pay amounted to roughly 450,500 *krş*, C.AS 48251 (24C1211/25Dec1796).

<sup>50</sup> This calculation is based on KK 2383, 2a-7b.

<sup>51</sup> C.AS 11577 (L1212/29March-17Apr1798). This sum surely does not represent the total cost of the reinforcement of these fortresses, but hints at the magnitude of the work.

<sup>52</sup> “*It being war time during my residence, the province of the Morea, though protected by a strong fleet, was considered as threatened, and was defended by six thousand troops. I saw these miserable men arrive;*

## Concrete cases and problems

### The activities of the *petite ayans* in the war: Ebubekir Efendi and *voyvodas*

It is no surprise that most of the problems arose over the delays in money transfers, or misappropriation of these funds spared for the campaign logistics as a result of in-built drawbacks of the whole system. The basic tools of funding the logistics were the *havale* system and the bill of exchange (*poliçe*) as described in Chapter IV. In the first and more common method, the Porte assigned certain revenue sources to the local functionaries who were in charge of the logistics. These functionaries and the loci of power administering the assigned revenue sources inevitably quarreled over the timing and amount of the money transfer. The usual pretext for the negligence of the orders was the alleged or real spending of the assigned revenues on another task of an immediate nature.

At the beginning of the expedition the Sublime Porte decided to handle the provisioning of the Ottoman and Russian fleets separately and appointed two commissars from İstanbul to the Morea. While Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi was in charge of the provisions of the Russian fleet, İsmail Taif Efendi was to take care of the provisions of the Ottoman

---

*they had been collected in the different towns of the empire, and came without arms, and in a state of starvation. I might add that they were without officers and quite ignorant of order, but I derived most amusement by seeing the cavalry defile, as it was impossible to tell to what country they belonged...Each man on being enrolled for active service, received a certain sum for his bounty and pay, out of which he was obliged to arm, clothe, and support himself; the government being responsible only for the supply of provisions, which consists of a pound and a half of bread for each man per day, and which is sometimes changed for boiled wheat; to this supply they add olives and cheese, but very seldom meat. We may thus easily conceive the state of a soldiery without controul, a military chest, or daily pay. If we add, as has been partly stated, that these soldiers are armed only with a fowling piece without a bayonet, and that some of them, even in the infantry, have nothing but pistols; that all are obliged to cast their own bullets, make their own cartridges, which they carry in a square box, in which is a small jar of oil for cleaning the gun; if consider the empire which is supported by such defenders, what a contemptible idea must we have of its power!”, Poqueville, *Through the Morea, Albania*, pp. 47-8.*

fleet. Nevertheless, the Porte decided to combine the commissariat services in the person of a local strongman presumably because of the blunders in logistics in the course of the expedition. Ebubekir Beg, the *ayan* of Górdos/Kordos (Corinth), replaced Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi in overseeing the provisions of the Russian fleet. Not many days passed before another decree arrived from the Porte informing his appointment also as the commissariat-general to the Ottoman fleet, replacing İsmail Taif. This second appointment disappointed him all the more so as he had requested to be excused from the first appointment even before knowing about the second.<sup>53</sup>

As early as January 1799, Ebubekir was complaining from the multitude of his duties. He was put in charge of procuring bread and barley to the troops deployed in the castle of Anaboli (Nauplia) and those fresh troops to be dispatched to the Morea against a possible French attack. In addition, he was responsible for the baking of thehardtack biscuits of the combined fleet. He was also expected to supervise the reinforcement of the castle of Górdos in particular and the castles of the province in general with Numan Efendi, the chief accountant (*Defter Kethüdası*) of the Morea. When the Porte ordered him to pay cash compensation of the provisions of the afore-mentioned troops dispatched to the province, he asked to be relieved of this duty on the grounds that it would not let him fulfill his other duties. The Governor Mustafa Paşa suggested the appointment of Arnavud-zade Mustafa Aga of Tripoliçe to the provisioning of the fortress guards.<sup>54</sup> This

---

<sup>53</sup> BOA, C.BH 12008 (19M1216/1July1801) Mustafa Paşa to the Sublime Porte; He was appointed to his new post in June 1800, C.BH 2149 (11B1215/28Nov1800) The Porte to Mustafa Paşa; C.BH 11651 (19B1215/6Dec1800) Sublime Porte to Mustafa Paşa.

<sup>54</sup> BOA, A.SKT 68/34 (25B1213/2Jan1799) Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

suggestion may have accounted for İsmail Taif's appointment as the supervisor over the superintendants of the fortresses under renovation.<sup>55</sup> The Porte finally absolved him from his duties concerning the Russian fleet in the summer of 1801 and appointed Mehmed Ragıb Bey, one of the *agas* of the castle of Anaboli (*sağ kol ağası*), to the post.<sup>56</sup>

A brief overview of Ebubekir's commissariat activities enables us to monitor the details of the financial aspects of the expedition. On 5 July 1800 Ebubekir communicated to the Porte through Ömer Efendi, his agent in İstanbul, that the Porte owed him 70-80,000 *krş*. A breakdown of the accumulated debt illustrates the way in which the Ottoman military financing worked and the extent to which it was vulnerable to abuses. Hüseyin Şükrü Beg, the former functionary in charge of the provisioning of the Russian fleet, passed on the funds to Ebubekir with a deficit of 27,000 *krş*. As we saw in the previous chapter, he actually had to use some of the funds spared for the hegira year [H.] 1214 in H. 1213 to buy olive oil at a slightly higher price than usual. The Porte ordered 10,000 *krş* to be forwarded by Binbaşı Hüseyin Ağa, the *voyvoda* of Mezistre (Mistra), and 17,000 to be sent by the Haseki Ali Ağa, the *voyvoda* of Kartina. These two local officials were to transfer this amount of money from the tax revenues from the dues on the Spirits (*zecriye emvali*) that were assigned for the purchase of provisions of the Russians due for H. 1214. Unable to comply with the orders, these two officials ran away and left Ebubekir unpaid. In addition to the budget deficit, he had to spend 15-20,000 *krş* to cover the freight payments, while the Porte had not yet sent 5000 *krş*, which was the

---

<sup>55</sup> C.BH 6705 (12B1215/29Nov1801).

<sup>56</sup> C.BH 9923 (5S1216/17Jun1801), C.BH 3273 no. 15 (6S1216/18Jun1801).

official cost (*miri*) of the cracked wheat demanded from the province. The Porte had already sent *kaimes* (treasury bills) with a total value of 25,000 *krş* to partially cover his expenses, but they were left unsold due to the lack of demand.<sup>57</sup>

When Haseki Ali Aga failed to transfer the money, he was arrested by Mustafa Paşa. In the trial, he confessed that he had collected 17,118 *krş* 35 *pr* from the dues on the Spirits. Nonetheless he managed to escape from the prison before submitting the money. Documents are not clear how he was seized and executed, but in any case the *kadı* of Tripoliçe was ordered to seize his effects to pay his debts in December 1800.<sup>58</sup> That was the situation Ebubekir found himself after taking over the funds for the supply of the Russian fleet from Hüseyin Şükrü.

The situation was no less dim with the funds spared for the provisioning of the Ottoman fleet. The Porte had decided to transfer to İsmail Taif an initial sum of 75,000 *krş* by means of bills of exchange at the beginning of the campaign to buy the necessary provisions. The money for the bills was to be matched from the *muqataas* and the polltax revenues of the province. He spent 47,728.5 *krş* on provisions with 27,274.5 *krş* remained available. The Porte ordered him to return the unspent funds to the central Treasury when it replaced him with Ebubekir Beg. However, it turned out that İsmail Taif could only collect 32,694 *krş* from the bills of exchange. Of the unpaid bills, 16,900 *krş* were to be

---

<sup>57</sup> C.HRC 8983 (12S1215/5July1800).

<sup>58</sup> C.HRC 7701 (9Ş1215/26Dec1800); Haseki Ali Aga was seemingly the voivode of Kartina but also had administrative power over a number of *kazas*. The distribution of the dues on the Sprits by *kazas* is: Kartina (2,250 *pr*), Fener (1,010 *pr*), Arkadya (1,578 *pr*), Kalaste (2,525 *pr*), Andurusa (1,600 *pr*), Anavarin (467.5 *pr* 15 *akçe* [hereafter, *ak*]), Keraste (583.5 *pr*), the *kaza* of *Emlak-ı Hümayun* –the royal demesne- (2,333 *pr*), Beş (3,303 *pr*), Anderce (1468.5 *pr*), 17,118.5 *krş* in total, see C.BH 1190 (10Ş1215/27Dec1800) order to the Governor Mustafa Paşa.

forwarded by the former *voyvoda* of Binbaşı Hüseyin from the *muqataa* and the polltax revenues of Mezistre, while 25,450 *krş* was to be met by late Haseki Ali –names that should sound familiar to us by now. As the cash yielded by the bills of exchange fell short of covering the expenses, İsmail Taif owed 3,292 *krş* to the sellers of the provisions.<sup>59</sup> The Porte decreed the transfer of 25,000 *krş* to Ebubekir Beg from the inheritance of Haseki Ali to cover the deficit in the funds he took over from İsmail Taif Efendi.<sup>60</sup> The financial yoke on the shoulders of the two fugitive *voyvodas* seems to have sealed their fate.

Almost a year later, Ebubekir Beg submitted his account book to the Porte upon his relief from his commissariat duties. By that date neither of these transfers did take place. Ebubekir lamented that he had no powers to obtain from Ali's inheritance 17,000 *krş* which the deceased owed to Hüseyin Şükrü. Although Mustafa Paşa claimed that the trial established the fact that Haseki Ali had collected the dues on the Spirits in the *kazas*, the Porte now doubted it and ordered Mustafa Paşa to open an investigation on the matter. By 1806, the Porte was still trying to obtain this sum of money from the *kazas* that were supposed to pay their dues on the Spirits to Haseki Ali.<sup>61</sup>

Until December 1800 total funds forwarded to Ebubekir reached 175,130.5 *krş* 36 *pr*. Of this sum, 55,880 *krş* 12 *pr* was handed down by Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi in cash and 94,255.5 *krş* 24 *pr* was assigned from the revenues of the dues on the Spirits, while the remaining 25,000 *krş* was sent from the *esham*; these *esham* were probably those afore-

---

<sup>59</sup> C.BH 2149 (11B1215/28Nov1800) The Porte to Mustafa Paşa; C.BH 6705 (12B1215/29Nov1801).

<sup>60</sup> C.BH 1190 (10Ş1215/27Dec1800) order to the Governor Mustafa Paşa.

<sup>61</sup> C.HRC 1862 (8ZA1220/28Jan1806).

mentioned *kaimes* İsmail Taif could not sell. He spent 106,364.5 *krş* 30 *pr* on salt, olive oil, firewood and on the freights of the hardtack and the purified butter. Although a surplus of 68,771 *krş* 6 *pr* should have remained in this calculation, he could not receive the afore-mentioned sum of 27,118.5 *krş* to be forwarded by the fugitive *voyvodas*. Furthermore, he had 15,559.5 *krş* 12 *pr* to receive for the cost of provisions due for H. 1213. After these deductions and the money he had recently spent for the Russian provisions he was left with a surplus of 973.5 *krş*, 20,000 *kıyye* [hereafter, *ky*] of olive and 5,683 *ky* of salt.<sup>62</sup> Meanwhile, he needed around 4,000 *krş* to buy more provisions for the Russians and asked for the transfer of this sum from an available *mukataa* source in the Morea. The Porte, however, advised him to sell the surplus olive and the salt to raise the necessary funds as the war going on in Egypt claimed all the available resources. Ebubekir's account book recorded that he complied with the order.<sup>63</sup>

The provisions sent for the wintertime consumption of the Ottoman fleet on 6 September 1799 were stored in the Morea as the fleet abruptly returned to Istanbul after the mutiny in Palermo. The Porte, however, sent a squadron of three warships to the Adriatic to be supplied with these provisions in the stores. When İsmail Taif was dismissed, he handed over the provisions at his disposal to Ebubekir Beg.<sup>64</sup> In 1801, the local functionaries in the Morea were faced with major difficulties in supplying the

---

<sup>62</sup> C.BH 3273 no. 15 (6S1216/18Jun1801) account book of Ebubekir. Figures are slightly different in no. 14 and no. 3 where the total expense was given as 101,864.5 *krş* 10 *pr*. The difference between the two figures can be explained by the miscellaneous spending (5,133 *krş*). As usual with the Ottoman fisc, this was rounded down to 4,500 *krş*; no. 16; C.BH 12008 (19M1216/1Jun1801).

<sup>63</sup> C.BH 3273 no 15 (6S1216/18Jun1801); C.BH 12008 (19M1216/1Jun1801) also attests to the shortage of money in the Campaign Treasury and ordered the transfer of 10,000 *krş* from the dues on the Spirits and *mukataa* revenues in the Morea.

<sup>64</sup> C.BH 7024 (15Z1214/10May1800); see Appendix B, Table III.



Ottoman and Russian fleets. Ebubekir had to sell some of the surplus provisions to buy the others in short supply to continue provisioning the fleets and pay compensation money for the absent provisions.<sup>65</sup> As usual, Ebubekir wanted the transfer of funds from the collected dues on the Spirits from the *kazas* of Kılaverta and Górdos.<sup>66</sup> Unfortunately, we do not know how the Porte settled Ebubekir's account, but he was summoned to İstanbul after his relief from his commissariat duties and held meetings with the decision-makers over the logistics as we will see in the following.

An overview of the tables in the Appendices A and B will reveal the complicated nature of the Ottoman military finance, while a couple of examples will suffice it to illustrate the point. The Porte was indecisive about replacing the squadron in the Adriatic with another one which caused delays in the sending of the provisions and the pay of the crew. In March 1801 Tepedelenli Ali Paşa related to the Porte that the commander (*başbuğ*) of the fleet Şeremet Mehmed Beg had complained from the lack of provisions except for olive and hardtack and that he had sent rice and money to the fleet at the request of the commander.<sup>67</sup> Towards the end of 1801 Şeremet Mehmed Beg submit to the Mustafa Paşa a list of provisions for the wintertime period, but the governor was unprepared since no orders had reached him from the Porte to make the necessary arrangements. The Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa had to intervene and supplying of the fleet was “recommended and commissioned to” (*tavsiye ve sipariş*) Mustafa Paşa.

---

<sup>65</sup> C.BH 3273 nos. 2, 4, 8, 10, 18; see Appendix B, Tables VIa, b, c.

<sup>66</sup> C.BH 12008 (19M216/1Jun1801); C.BH 3273 nos. 1 and 12.

<sup>67</sup> C.HRC 6877 (nd.), C.BH 1652 (6ZA1215/21March1801). The details of the payment of the salaries of the crew through bills of exchange can be found in Chapter IV.

Ottoman officials of the same rank usually used this expression when they had a request from one another.<sup>68</sup>

The Porte found itself in a difficult position vis-à-vis the loci of power who tried to shirk their financial responsibilities. The *Mutasarrıf* of İlbasan received 28,000 *krş* to recruit Albanian troops for the campaign on Egypt in 1799. When the Porte demanded him to return the money to the Treasury after the cancellation of the order, the *Mutasarrıf* sought to keep the money since the Porte asked him this time to recruit troops to send to the Naples.<sup>69</sup> In 1806, the commander of İnebahtı (Lepanto) Vanlı Mehmed Paşa was ordered to deliver 10,000 *krş* to Mehmed Nuri Beg of Gördos -the brother of Ebubekir- who was in charge of buying the necessary wheat ingredient to bake the hardtacks of the Russian fleet.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, both Nuri Beg and the spokesman, the delegate sent by ‘the poor souls of the Morea’ (*Mora fukarası vekili*) to the Porte, complained that Mehmed Paşa was refusing to pay the money even though two years had elapsed after the initial order. Finally, the Porte discounted this sum by 3,000 *krş* and ordered its payment from the revenues of the dues on the Spirits in the Morea, for Mehmed Paşa refused all the accusations.<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>68</sup> C.BH 1878 (22N1216/26Jan1802).

<sup>69</sup> C.BH 1522 (21S1214/25July1799).

<sup>70</sup> Gell noted of Nuri Beg in 1805: “*At Corinth who was the natural governor of the place at the time of our visit, called Nouri Bey, had a finer house than the Pasha, a large harem adjoining, and three or four European carriages; yet was in no danger of losing either his head or his estate, unless his ambition led him to accept a higher office, and to pillage his pashalik till the discontented people complained of his conduct at Constantinople*”, see, Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea*, p. 274.

<sup>71</sup> C.AS 33682 (17R1221/4July1806), BOA, İE.HRC 16116 (3B1222/6Sept1807), C.HRC 3196 (19L1221/30Dec1806), BOA, C.Maliye 273/11244 (20Ş1223/11Oct1808).

Several merchant vessels and warships from the fleet had accidents in the dangerous waters of the Morea and the Adriatic with their cargoes often becoming a bone of contention. The ship of the Russian captain *İspiro Rak* (?) sank off the Benefşe coast with its cargo of olive oil (9,000 *ky*) and olive (14,000 *ky*) to be delivered to the Ottoman fleet in H. 1213. Hasan Beg, the *voyvoda* of Benefşe, rescued the cargo and stored them in the town. The Porte ordered Hasan Beg and the *agas* of Benefşe the payment of the cost of this cargo, 5,900 *krş*, to the central treasury (*Hazine-i Amire*). After many years this sum was not forwarded to Istanbul. Hasan Beg claimed that he had previously assigned his troops' pay (kept in Tripoliçe) to the payment of the olive oil, 4,500 *krş* (20 *pr a ky*), during the term of the former governor and begged for exemption from paying the sum for the olive (1,400 *krş*: 4 *pr a ky*). The investigation revealed that the sum he paid allegedly for the olive oil was actually a looming debt from a previous transaction. The Porte was totally convinced that Hasan Beg and his accomplices, the *agas*, took advantage of the dismissal of the former governor to avoid their financial obligations and embezzle the funds. In November 1805, it ordered the new governor Seyyid Osman Paşa to deduct the necessary sum from Hasan's salary, but by January 1806, this sum had not yet reached Istanbul which the Porte attributed to the negligence of its orders by the governor and Arnavud-zade.<sup>72</sup>

### Bargaining with the subjects

Petitioning was the ultimate instrument of the subjects in bargaining with the center in the empire. Petitions coming from the inhabitants of the districts that had to

---

<sup>72</sup> C.Maliye 65/2978 (17L1220/8Jan1806).

contribute to the system of logistics are indispensable to the understanding of the center-periphery relations in the Empire. Organization of the hardtack illustrates well the functioning of the empire through bargaining process. The Morea and other places mentioned in the previous chapter were required to supply the hardtack to the combined fleet. Many *kazas* -sub-provincial districts- had to send wheat and flour contributions to the designated spots for baking the hardtack. The Porte was to pay 170 *ak* per *kantar* [hereafter, *kt*] (56.44 kg) of hardtack to cover various expenses such as transportation, sack, and baking (i.e., firewood and workmanship). This sum was not only low but also given in two installments; first installment was forwarded in advance and the last -and usually the larger one- upon the delivery. These meager funds were not always paid in cash, but usually forwarded to the *kaza* from a tax revenue resource in the vicinity, or paid through bills of exchange, the *poliçe*. Unsurprisingly, the system was lopsided when so many middlemen were involved in the transfer of the funds.

*Kazas* often complained from the excessive load and asked permission to share their load with the *kazas* in their vicinity that were exempt from contributions. At the beginning of the expedition, Bergos was designated as the baking center of 10,000 *kt* hardtack with the flour contributions from Misivri and Ahyolu. The *Bostancıbaşı* of Edirne, who was the supervisor, suggested the baking of half of the quantity in Misivri and Ahyolu on the grounds that most of the bakeries were already close. In a later correspondence he also requested the inclusion of the *kazas* of Aydos, Karınabad, and

Yanbolu in the baking of the required hardtack. His request, however, was rejected.<sup>73</sup> Low official prices might account for the *Bostancıbaşı*'s concerns. The official price (*miri*) for a *kil* (25.66 kg) of wheat/flour was only 50 *ak* including the cost of transportation and the sack while only half of it was to be sent in advance. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Porte had to raise the official price to 120 *ak* in the Morea in the same year when it was pressed hard. Therefore, the *Bostancıbaşı* was probably trying to reduce the costs of transportation and baking by suggesting a reorganization of the whole process.

Although *Bostancıbaşı* suggested the baking of some of the hardtacks in Ahyolu, the *kaza* could barely deliver the wheat contributions demanded by the Porte, save the baking of the hardtacks. They had sent their contribution of 3,500 *kl* wheat to Edirne with great costs since the town was far away from the district. When the Porte asked for a second round of contributions of the same quantity, the *kadı* of Ahyolu demanded the inclusion of the *kazas* previously exempt from contributions. The Porte complied with the request this time.<sup>74</sup>

Besides requests of a just distribution of contributions among all *kazas*, the local communities also applied to the Porte to pay compensation money (*bedel*) for the quantity of the wheat they failed to deliver. The *kaza* of Livadye (in the *sancak* of Eğriboz) sent a deputy, *Yanaki Istamo*, as a petitioner to the Porte in 1804 to settle the accounts of the *kaza*. In the period of H.1211-1217 (July 1796- April 1803) Livadye

---

<sup>73</sup> C.BH 9986 (28RA1213/9Sept1798). The required hardtacks were to be delivered to the army and the navy.

<sup>74</sup> BOA, A.AMD 41/58 (23Ş1213/30Jan1799).

failed to deliver 23,525 *kl* of wheat (H. 1211-1215) out of the quantity it should contribute for the consumption of Istanbul. It also sent 3,000 *kt* of hardtack to Corfu in H. 1213 and paid 12,000 *krş* in compensation of the same amount of hardtack requested in H. 1215 (4 *krş* per *kt*). Thus its debt reduced to 6,925 *kl* after subtracting the wheat necessary for this quantity of hardtacks as well as the wheat it shipped to the castle of Lepanto. As many years lapsed, the Defterdar admitted the impossibility of receiving the debt in kind and instead demanded the payment of a modest sum based on the calculation of a *krş* per *kl* of wheat, which was lower than the official rate of compensation money for the wheat (3 *krş* 40 *ak*). As for the recent failures of contributions from the years of H. 1216 and H. 1217, the Porte set the compensation money of a *kl* of wheat as 60 *pr* (1.5 *krş*), which is still a relatively low price for compensation. The Defterdar thought of this solution as beneficial for both the Treasury and the *kaza*.<sup>75</sup>

Many *kazas* failed to send the wheat contributions to Ebubekir Beg, who needed to bake the hardtacks for the combined fleet in H. 1213 and H. 1214. This forced the Porte to offer 75 *ak* and 120 *ak* to cover the transportation costs in these years, respectively. By January 1799, Abdurrahman Beg of Selanik who was in charge of official purchase at the administered price (*rayiç mübayaası*) in Golos, as well as Seyid Hüseyin Efendi, the deputy *nakibüleşraf* of Yenişehir-i Fener (Larissa/Fanari/Volos) were still trying to gather the necessary wheat for baking 20,000 *kt* of hardtack from the *kazas*

---

<sup>75</sup> C.Maliye 31/1443 (8S1219/19May1804). Although no voucher was found in the records for the delivery of the wheat to the castle of Lepanto, the Porte accepted the deputy's claims to the contrary on the condition that the *kaza* would send their own copy of the voucher to the Porte; C.AS 35360 (11M1215/4Dec1800) confirms the shipment of 2,957 *kt* of hardtack from Livadye to the combined fleet.

in the vicinity including Tırhala, Çatalca, Ermiye, Velsin, Kokoş, and Pılatmane. By the end of March, it was certain that some *kazas* would not deliver their wheat contributions.<sup>76</sup> As late as 1803, a considerable portion of the compensation moneys for the undelivered contributions from those years were left unpaid. Yenişehir (Larissa), Ermiye (a village in Thessaly) and the other *kazas* in the vicinity owed 64,332.5 *krş* in compensation of the undelivered wheat amounting to 19,299.5 *kl*. The Porte initially asked for 3 *krş* 40 *ak* in compensation of a *kl* of undelivered wheat, it had to discount it by 5,000 *krş*. Apart from this debt, the *kazas* of Çatalca (Karditsa, Thessaly), Velsiye (Velestina/Veleston?, a village in Thessaly), Bilatomna (Platamon, Thessaly) and Ermiye had to pay 18,300 *krş* as compensation money for the undelivered load of 5,600 *kl* of wheat. Although the Porte decreased this amount by 3,000 *krş*, only 3,882.5 *krş* were forwarded to Istanbul as late as March 1804.<sup>77</sup>

In 1803 Selanik was to send 2,300 *kt* of hardtacks to the Russian fleet. The Russian consul at Selanik, nevertheless, filed a complaint with the Porte accusing the local authorities with corruption. Despite his protestations, the local officials loaded the cargo with only 1,917 *kt* of hardtacks baked six years ago and attempted to evade the responsibility by deliberately avoiding submitting to the consul the voucher upon the completion of their duty.<sup>78</sup> The Russians refused to accept the delivery which caused a diplomatic dispute. The *kadı* of Selanik communicated to the Porte that the town had had 2,309 *kt* of the hardtack, but on the orders of the Porte it had to spare 265 *kt* of it for the

---

<sup>76</sup> A. SKT 69/5 (23L1213/30March1799).

<sup>77</sup> BOA, C.İktisad 42/2058 (18Z1218/30March1804).

<sup>78</sup> C.HRC 6057 (27CA1218/14Sept1803).

consumption of 600 soldiers sent to the Governor of Cairo. Thus the town had actually sent 1,917 *kt* of hardtacks to the Russians. He maintained that they were of the best quality with the exception of 126 *kt* of moldy hardtack that went bad in the stores of the town before loading aboard the merchant ship with the Austrian flag.<sup>79</sup>

The Porte grew furious about the missing and spoilt hardtacks of Selanik. It blamed the local authorities for deceiving the Porte, “the Salonicans took the path of cheating in their usual manner by giving inedible hardtacks”<sup>80</sup> despite their earlier promises of supplying the best quality hardtacks. In fact, Selanik had already owed 2,692 *kt* of hardtack as it could bake only 2,300 *kt* of hardtack out of the original order of 5,000 *kt*. The Porte, by contrast, owed to the Russian fleet 4,609 *kt* hardtacks including those from Selanik and other parts of the Empire. It was impossible to make up for the missing quantity from İstanbul since the town did not have enough even for the Ottoman navy in 1804. In March 1804, the Porte punished Selanik by ordering the delivery of all the missing hardtacks including those undelivered hardtacks as well from the other parts of the empire.<sup>81</sup>

In May 1804, local official Selim Beg –who was in charge of the baking of the newly ordered hardtacks- and Ali Arif Efendi –who was responsible for the missing and spoilt hardtacks- sent a petition through the court of Selanik asking for a reduction of the load. They argued that the town should be excused from making up for the rejected shipment (1,917 *kt*) on account of the poverty of the town dwellers. Undelivered quotas

---

<sup>79</sup> C.HRC 5407 (9R1219/18July1804).

<sup>80</sup> C.HRC 272 (20ZA1218/2March1804).

<sup>81</sup> C.HRC 272 (20ZA1218/2March1804); C.HRC 5407 (9R1219/18July1804).



of certain *kazas*, they maintained, accounted for the missing quantity of 2,692 *kt*. The *kazas* of Karaferye, Virini (a village on the banks of Maritsa near Dedeğaç), Avrathisari (Marulia, north of Selanik) and Yenice-i Vardar (Giannitsa, west of Selanik) did not send their specified wheat contribution to Selanik despite the efforts of the local authorities. Claiming that they were stricken with poverty, these villages once again refused to send their contribution after recent orders arrived at Selanik to deliver these missing hardtacks (2,600 *kt*). They stated that Selanik met its own wheat with which they managed to bake 2,000 *kt* of hardtack and promised to bake an additional 692 *kntr* when the villages of Aynaroz (Athos) and Kesendire (Kassandra), the Sidrekapsi (Sidero-kavssia) mine, and Leftehor send their wheat contributions to the town.<sup>82</sup> On 18 July 1804, the Porte refused to engage in any bargaining with Selanik, pointing out that the town had already been informed in May on the exemption of Kesendire and Sidrekapsi and instructed to secure the wheat contributions from the other districts mentioned. The Porte warned the local authorities in a clearly manner to “stop dreaming of the deduction of the inedible hardtacks from their debt.”<sup>83</sup>

Consequently, the Porte tried to ascertain whether the grievances of the local authorities and the subjects were fabricated or genuine at first place. It was responsive to what it deemed a solid complaint whereas it had no hesitation to defy the “cheaters” and “the opportunists” as defined by the Porte on its own terms.<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> C.HRC 1788 (21M1219/2May1804).

<sup>83</sup> C.HRC 5407 (9R1219/18July1804).

<sup>84</sup> See Chapter V for the Porte’s accusation of the barrel-makers as wartime speculators for asking higher prices for the *arak* barrels.

## Beyond the rhetoric of poverty and desolation

In Ottoman historiography studies on the military provisioning have not adequately addressed the question whether or not it was beneficiary for the local economy. Historians working on the subject for earlier periods have provided contradicting answers to the question as every front and war had its own peculiarities in terms of geography, agricultural abundance, and the duration of the war. As Aksan suggested bleakly many studies should be devoted to the subject in order to reach even a rough estimate whether warfare meant economic prosperity, or devastation.<sup>85</sup>

---

<sup>85</sup> Aksan, "Ottoman Military Matters"; Murphey is of the idea that Ottoman system of logistics was actually beneficial to local economies except for the times of scarcity and famine in the early modern era. The imperial army, he maintains, was boosting the local economy by often buying its supplies on the market price. Although this was sometimes the case, warfare was as ruinous for the provinces in the Ottoman Empire as was in Europe, as suggested by the works of Hungarian scholars, Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700*, chpt. V on provisioning; for an introduction to Hungarian scholarship in Ottoman studies see G. David-P. Fodor (eds.), *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Suleyman the Magnificent* (Budapest, 1994); Fischer-Galati-Kiraly (eds.), *Essays on War and Society in East Central Europe, 1740-1920* (New York: Boulder, 1987); Kiraly-Bak (ed.), *From Hunyadi to Rakoczi War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary* (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982); Brummett drew attention to the large-scale corruption and misappropriation of the funds and grains as inherent drawbacks of the system even in the so-called "Golden Age", which were likely to undermine economic life of the provinces. Finkel and Veinstein, on the other hand, contributed to the debate by pointing out the delays and setbacks reflected in the documents extant from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the Ottoman logistics was limited to the supply and provisioning of the relatively small standing and stipendiary forces to the exclusion of the larger provincial troops, Brummett, "Reviews", *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 24/1 (2000): 42-4; G. Veinstein, "Some Views on Provisioning in the Hungarian Campaigns of Süleyman the Magnificent" in H. G. Majer (ed.), *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte in memoriam Vanco Boskov* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986), pp. 177-85; Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606*; Finkel, "The Provisioning of the Ottoman Army During the Campaigns of 1593-1606" in A. Tietze (ed.), *Habsburgisch-Osmanische Beziehungen* (Wien: VWGO, 1985), pp. 107-24; Ágoston, "The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System in Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" in G. David and P. Fodor (eds.), *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 195-228.

Genç offered a broad framework to explain the possible impacts of war on economy in his seminal study devoted to the subject.<sup>86</sup> There are two ideal models in which a state could obtain war materiel and provisions. It could buy the materials of war through market mechanisms by the cash revenues collected by means of just taxation, which would lead to an expansion in the sectors associated with warfare in terms of production and employment, whereas non-military sectors of economy, by contrast, would undergo depression. If pre-war economy was characterized by full-employment, this would mean diminishing welfare due to the changing composition of military and non-military sectors in wartime. Thus, the post-war economy would gear to reverse this composition so as to adapt to the civilian needs and thereby increase the general welfare.

In the opposite case, the state could obtain all the necessary supplies, provisions, and services as tax-in-kind –that is, without paying in cash, in which case relevant sectors would lack the motivation for expansion. However, this would not bring about an expansion in non-military sectors since the nature of goods and services required by the state in wartime were of the same kind needed for civilian purposes. It was also difficult to direct the resources from military to non-military sectors especially in the pre-industrial age shaped by low degree of mobility. Consequently, a general depression of economy with diminishing rates of productivity and real production would create a vicious circle in which economic recession would reduce the volume of goods and services devoted to warfare with ever-low prospects for victory; thus, wars of defeat

---

<sup>86</sup> Genç, “18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş” in Genç (ed.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul, 2003), pp. 216-17.

would accompany economic recession. Genç warns us that no state would fit in one of these models in an absolute sense, but rather the relation between war and economy would be determined by the inclination of a given state towards one of these extreme cases.

How does this apply to the case of the Morea? It would be gratifying if we had precise records on the population and production capacity of the Morea for the purpose of reaching concrete conclusions on the interaction of war and society. In the lack of these, we have to make do with circumstantial evidence to engage in an intelligent speculation. As described in the chapter on “Logistics”, *avariz* was the basic instrument of resource extraction in the Ottoman Empire. Labeled as *avania* by almost all contemporary Western observers who happened to be in the Morea in the first decade of the nineteenth century, *avariz* was not only a sort of tax but also a punishment on account of low official prices. The level of coercion was bound to increase in the recent wars with Russia and France in view of the increasing demands of warfare. The system was all the more prohibitive for the producer who produced more since it tended to impose on him larger contributions with the likely result of decreasing levels of production in the Morea and other provinces in the vicinity by the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>87</sup> Some of the

---

<sup>87</sup> For a similar statement about the relation between smuggling and system of official purchase (*mubayaa*) during the Napoleonic era in the vicinity of Antalya see Faroqhi, “Exporting Grain from the Anatolian South-west” in Anastasopoulos (ed.) *Provincial Elites*, p. 304: “...the people who enjoyed exemption from extra-ordinary taxes still were obliged to deliver grain for the *mubayaa*. Payment was made according to two different schedules: one, the so-called *miri*, was so low as to be confiscatory in practice, but even the so-called *rayiç*, while somewhat higher, still lay below the market price. Presumably this system, while ensuring the supplies needed for court, army and capital, explains the relatively low level of agricultural production throughout the Empire. As, at least in principle, if not necessarily in practice, all grain not needed for own-consumption or seed could be subjected to the *mubayaa*, there would have been few

examples we have seen above reflect this aspect of the system; many districts complained that they were still expected to donate more contributions, although they had fulfilled their obligations previously. This picture, thus, seems to prove that the Porte came close to the second model. Nevertheless, this is only the one side of the coin.

There is some reason to doubt the acuteness of the situation in the province. A close analysis has shown that supply shortages occurred especially in export products of the province such as wine and olive oil as well as wheat, which was the basic subsistence commodity. This may caution us against the danger of taking all these grievances at their face value. All the news concerning scarcity, shortage, and poverty reaching to İstanbul may have been mere pretexts to evade official purchases in favor of exporting trade which was obviously more lucrative.

The Ottoman Empire experienced a general economic growth in the eighteenth century until war with Russia (1768-1774).<sup>88</sup> We may reasonably assume that the population and production capacity of the Morea followed this general trend, while the rebellion of 1770 definitely caused major setbacks in the social and economic life of the province as suggested by the figures cited above.<sup>89</sup> While the wars of the Second Coalition no doubt increased the level of extortion in the province, eye-witness accounts

---

*resources available for investment, and even less incentive. The high prices of the Napoleonic era, with which we are concerned here, were the exception that proved the rule.*”; Balta also draws attention to “the lack of capitalistic relations” in Ottoman agricultural economy in which the “surplus remaining after covering the needs of subsistence, local consumption and the State taxes, was traded with the mediation of representatives of the Ottoman regime or by the big landowners, most of whom belonged to its body”, Balta, “The Exploitation of Otherness in the Economic Advancement”, *O Eranistis* 24 (2003), pp. 148-49.

<sup>88</sup> Mehmet Genç, “18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş”, pp. 211-25.

<sup>89</sup> Approximately, 10,000 Greeks fled from the Morea to Western Anatolia and took refuge with the Kara-Osman dynasty, one of the greatest *ayan* dynasties of the age, see Kiel and Alexander, “Mora” in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, v. 30, 280-85; Poqueville, *Travels Through the Morea, the Albania...*, p. 36.

drew a positive picture about the production capacity of the Morea. Poqueville observed in 1799 that:

The soil being light and marly, partaking of the nature of turf, and abundantly rich with decayed vegetable substances, renders all the valleys peculiarly fruitful in pasturage and wood. From Calamata to Andreossa, almost every spot is cultivated; the vines efforts the most delightful grapes... They sow wheat and almost every kind of grain, without paying any attention to the goodness of the seed. The rice of the Argolide is much esteemed.<sup>90</sup>

A recent study based on the Ottoman documents on rural tax-farms has shown that between 1731 and 1769 the revenues from rural tax-farms seem to have increased substantially in Görδος by 88 %, in Manafşe (Monemvasia) by 195 %, and in Tripoliçe (Tripolitsa) by 242 %. While those in Anavarin and its dependencies decreased slightly, those from Modon and Koron decreased sharply. Relying on this data, Zarinebaf concluded that the *reaya* of the province of the Morea came to control more land in the course of the eighteenth century than they did in 1716.<sup>91</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> Poqueville, *Travels Through the Morea, the Albania*, p. 87. He further pointed out that while the equipments employed in tilling the land generally resembled those used in the Antiquity, women of the Morea did not work on the fields except in Laconia (southeast Peloponnese). The Turkish peasants he saw in the valley around Calamata (southern Peloponnese) suffered from premature age due to labor and misery, but bread in the Morea was of fine quality, see pp. 14, 86; Balye Badra (Patras, northwest Peloponnese) and its vicinity were flourishing at the expense of Anaboli (Nafplion/Napli, western Peloponnese) and Koron (Koroni, southern Peloponnese) as the new entrepot of the peninsula when Hobhouse visited the peninsula in 1809-1810, Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces...*, v. I, p. 186; among many travelers Dodwell also attested to the extensive cultivation around Patras, Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographic Tour* (London, 1819) v. I, p. 116; In 1805, Dodwell recounted that regions around Koron were uncultivated despite the irrigation, the fertility of the land and the climate as was Gastoni (Gastouni, across Zante) due to depopulation, Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographic Tour*, v. II, pp. 321, 363; In 1804, Gell noted Turkish as well as ruined Greek villages with cultivated fields and innumerable olive trees lying along the road from Navarino to Modon, while the plain of Arcadia (central Peloponnese) was full of cultivated lots and groves, Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea*, pp. 36, 178.

<sup>91</sup> Zarinebaf et al., *A Historical and Economic Geography*, pp. 37-39, 195; by contrast, Balta observed that the Greeks could not make profits in the agricultural sector of the economy since prior to the independence of Greece (the Morea), “the large estates were the prerogative of Ottoman Muslims. They amounted to 9.8% of the population, yet owned 58% of the land”, see Balta, “The Exploitation of Otherness”, p. 149.

The British embargo during the Napoleonic wars may have put an end to this lucrative trade of the Morea in olive oil, grain, and wine with Dalmatia, the Ionians, and Western Europe. The deterioration of foreign trade in the Levant coincided with the increased level of coercion for war contributions. These factors may well have affected production levels of these three export items in the Morea, with adverse effects on the supply system. Table 6.1 gives the Ottoman exports of wheat, wine, grape, and olive oil to Russia in the period 1800-1806.

Table 6.1: Ottoman exports to Russia (1800-1806)

wine	14,589,708 kg
grapes	5,700,947.5 kg
currants	3,628,738 kg
Olive oil	144,301.2 kg
olives	76,890 kg
wheat	5,000,000 kg +

Notes and Sources: Data –except for wheat and currants- are taken from Murat Fidan, *XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Rusya Ticari Münasebetleri* (Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2002), pp.230, 235. Olive oil and wheat were among those items prohibited for export. Figure for wheat are from the 1780s, see, Eldem, *French Trade*, p. 109. For currants, see Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces*, v. I, pp. 186-87.

Enormous smuggling trade notwithstanding, even the official data tabulated above hints at substantial production levels in grape, currants, and wine. Low figures for olive oil and wheat were no doubt due to the frequent bans on their export except for the years of abundance. These data suggest that the Morea may not have undergone a depression in

agricultural production despite the exceptionally harsh winter of 1799<sup>92</sup> and the extortionate quotas of contributions demanded from the province in 1799. If this was the case, we can only speculate that export trade must have alleviated the hardships experienced in the province.<sup>93</sup> It should be noted that the Revolutionary wars and the suppression of Venice in 1797 eliminated the French and Venetian shipping from the Mediterranean and benefitted the Greek maritime trade.<sup>94</sup>

Having said this, the problems reflected in the petitions and reports should not be dismissed out of hand, as many of them were also addressed in the Ottoman laws of the Morea.

---

<sup>92</sup> Pouqueville witnessed the severity of the winter in 1798 in Tirapoliçe and noted that the old people of the town had not remembered such harsh winter conditions in their life, see *Travels Through the Morea, the Albania*, p. 106.

<sup>93</sup> Dodwell marks that 1.28 kg (a *ky*) of grape sold for 2 *pr* in 1806 in Athens, whereas foreign merchants offered 14-18 shillings per cwt (50.80 kg) of grape in the region in 1809; that is almost 6-7 times higher a price, see Appendix C for exchange rates; Hobhouse gives the figure 8,000,000 pounds (5,000,000 kg) for the whole currant export from the Morea in 1809-10, relying on the testimony of Poqueville. Wandered in the peninsula in 1812-13, Holland, on the other hand, marked that Patras (the Ottoman Balye Badre) and Vostitsa (the Ottoman Vostiçe) exported annually 5,000,000 pounds (2,267,961 kg) of currants. Hobhouse was of the idea that the traditional trade of the Morea with Italy handled by Dutch and Danish merchant ships was likely to be diverted to Malta, Sicily, Britain and the USA by the first decade of the nineteenth century. This trade, according to him, was consisted of eight cargoes of maze, two cargoes of wool, 5-6 cargoes of olive oil, 1-2 cargoes of silk, cotton, leather, vermillion and gall-nuts. The exports of the Morea were larger than its imports by one-fifths in terms of monetary value, Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces...*, v. I, pp. 186-87. The monetary value of its exports was 4,097,750 *kry*: two million spared for Istanbul, a million went to the Governor of the province with the remaining left to the rich Greek merchants. Among the import items of the Morea were coffee, tea, indigo, cochineal, sulphur and manufactured goods of England and France carried by the convoys of 30-40 vessels. Also see, Holland, *Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly, Macedonia, &c. during the years 1812 and 1813*, (London, 1815), p. 433.

<sup>94</sup> Panzac, "International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18<sup>th</sup> Century" *IJMES* 24/2 (1992), p. 204.



## Hardtack Diplomacy

Russians found the hardtacks given in H. 1213 inedible and instead demanded wheat with the necessary baking expenses so that they could bake their own hardtacks in Corfu. As it is understood that the bakeries on the island were already too busy, Istanbul ordered Ebubekir to make the necessary arrangements to prepare 16,611 *kt* of hardtack that amounted to the half of the annual hardtack allotment for the Russian fleet. However, the Porte sought to alleviate the hardships due to scarcity of wheat by increasing the official price for the wheat -the primary ingredient of the hardtack- from 50 to 120 *ak*.<sup>95</sup> In return for providing the necessary amount of wheat-ingredient and 5,000 *kl* of crushed wheat, the Porte absolved the petitioning *kazas* from their obligation to supply the castles which would have obliged them to provide an additional 1,283,000 kg (50,000 *kl*) wheat and 445,000 kg (20,000 *kl*) of barley. This would have brought the total load of the province to 2,566,000 kg (100,000 *kl*) of wheat and 890,000 kg (40,000 *kl*) of barley in the year 1799-1800.<sup>96</sup>

As mentioned previously, after the conquest of Corfu, the two allies took necessary measures to store the provisions in the island so as to ease the logistical constraints. Abdülkadir Beg stored the provisions in Corfu and entrusted them with Ahmed Nazif Efendi –one of his scribes- before he returned to İstanbul. The cargo ships

---

<sup>95</sup> 128,300 kg (5,000 *kl*) of crushed wheat was ordered in addition to the wheat ingredient for the hardtack, see C.BH 77 (11Ş1214/8Jan1800), C.BH 3273 no. 1.

<sup>96</sup> The *kazas* with the obligation of providing 890,000 kg (40,000 *kl*) of wheat ingredient were Yenişehir (19,720 *kl*, exempt from the cost of sack), Tırhala/Trikkala (11,500 *kl*), Çatalca/Karditsa (5,000 *kl*, can deliver only 3,000 *kl*), Ermiye and Kokoş [villages in Thessaly (2,850 *kl*, can contribute 712,5 *kl*), Bilatanya/Platamon (500 *kl*), the *muqataa* [tax-farm] of Kokoş (902 *kl*, has only 4-5 villages that could give 500 *kl*), see C.HRC 8889 (24Ş1214/21Jan1800).

sent to Corfu found these stores unattended and in a desolate state due to winter weather. Thus, Ottoman and Russian authorities in the region agreed that Ebubekir should move to Corfu and oversee the delivery and storage of provisions on the spot. However, the governor Mustafa Paşa, Memiş Efendi, and the former commissary Hüseyin Şükrü Beg advised the appointment of an aga from the Morea as Ebubekir was needed in the province to take care of the logistics.<sup>97</sup> Authority over the stores in Corfu seems to have been contested by the two allies. Once, the Russian fleet forcefully seized the hardtacks stored in Corfu for the Ottoman fleet on the pretext of urgent orders calling them back to the Black Sea. Ottoman authorities in Corfu were all the more offended since the Russian fleet had recently been stocked with the provisions sent by Ebubekir.<sup>98</sup>

One intriguing conflict over the “hardtack affair” occurred upon the return of the joint fleet from Palermo because of the late arrival of the hardtacks due for H.1214. Ushakov held the local authorities responsible for the delays. The governor Mustafa Paşa, returned the insult by accusing the ‘obstinate’ Admiral for his uncompromising stance. The paşa contended that he had kept the hardtacks in the stores until the combined fleet returned to Corfu. Upon hearing their return, he rushed 9,463 *kt* of hardtack to the island without even waiting for the necessary orders from İstanbul so as to prevent any possible Russian grievances, thus completing the delivery of the second and third installments of H. 1214.<sup>99</sup>

---

<sup>97</sup> C.HRC 7773 (11M1215/4June1800); C.BH 3273 no.21 (20R1216/10Sept1800).

<sup>98</sup> HAT 156/6520-B (1S1215/24June1800) report of messengers Mehmed and Mustafa.

<sup>99</sup> C.HRC 5148 (11ZA1214/6Apr1800) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

### Provisioning of the Russian reinforcements

A major conflict broke out over the provisioning of the Russian troops in Naples and in Corfu during the rebellion in the Ionians. Tsar Alexander took the initiative to restore the order in Corfu by sending reinforcements to the Ionians which increased the number of Russian troops from 600 to 3,000 in 1802. The Ottomans acquiesced at the Russian policy and agreed to supply the Russian reinforcements since their presence in Corfu was confined to a three-month period. Nevertheless, they did not leave the Ionians after the termination of three months, as the rebellion persisted for more time. This made the Porte grow suspicious about the Russian intentions concerning the Ionians and procrastinate in supply and provisioning of the Russians.

On 6 April 1802 the two allies met at the residence of the Reisülkütab in order to discuss the measures to suppress the uprising in Corfu. The ambassador informed the Ottoman authorities that Count Mocenigo was appointed to Corfu to restore order and that the Russian detachment in Naples would be redeployed on the island under Mocenigo. Reminding the Reisülkütab of the shortages and delays in the supply and provisioning during the expedition to the Ionians, he urged for a change in the organization of logistics. As the combined fleet had been distressed in spite of the efforts of Hüseyin Şükrü Efendi in the last expedition, he suggested that Abdullah Beg, the *voyvoda* appointed to Prevesa, should also assist in supplying the warships to be sent to restore order in Corfu. The Reisülkütab was less of the idea of resorting to force and rather proposed a peaceful solution. Should they use arms, availability of provisions in the fleet would not help to restore order in Corfu. He, moreover, asked the ambassador

whether or not Prevesa had any extra grain to yield, or any stores to keep the provisions sent. He was probably trying to gain time to let the matter go by directing such a strange question, considering that the town was in the hands of the Ottomans. The ambassador, nonetheless, affirmed that Prevesa did not have provisions and it was necessary to bring them from outside. He also made the point that the military measures he proposed would not cause resentment among the Corfiotes as it was not meant to be an all-out campaign over the population.<sup>100</sup>

The ambassador also stated that the Porte had not paid the cash-substitutes due for the last six months for the needs of the Russian fleet, which was at that time anchored in Naples. He actually had private reasons for bringing up the issue since he had to borrow the necessary money from the money-dealers on interest to support the fleet. This must have been ruinous for him, as the Porte would not probably pay compensation to cover the accumulated interest on the loan. The Reisülkütab and İsmet Beg Efendi admitted the delays in the delivery of cash-substitutes and promised to discuss with their superiors to send the provisions to Corfu for storage.<sup>101</sup>

The Porte calculated the total cost of three-month' provisions for the need of the Russian fleet in the Naples for the period September-December 1802 immediately after the meeting with the Russian ambassador only to find that it was over 70,000 *krş* with an

---

<sup>100</sup> HAT 259/14932 (3Z1216/6Apr1802) minutes of negotiations with the Russian Ambassador.

<sup>101</sup> HAT 259/14932 (3Z1216/6Apr1802) minutes of negotiations with the Russian Ambassador.

additional cost of 30,000 *krş* for freight and miscellaneous spending.<sup>102</sup> When the matter was forwarded to the Chief Treasurer, the Defterdar Efendi, three months later, he raised certain objections to the provisioning of the Russian fleet anchored at the Naples. He hinted that the Porte was only responsible for the supplies of the Russian squadron when it was deployed in the Adriatic. As they left their duty in the Adriatic to transport 3,000 Russian troops from the Naples to Corfu, the Porte should not be obliged to supply the squadron. He stated quite spitefully that the Russian troops in Naples were serving Russian interests and the King of Naples should foot the bill since they were at his service. He was also concerned about the financial aspects of the undertaking. The Campaign Treasury was in dire straits at present and virtually unable to buy and deliver the provisions in the short term. He remarked “devastation caused by the provisioning of the Russians in the last four years has known no limits; provisions just given to the crews of the Russian ships that stopped by İstanbul in the last 5-6 months had cost more than 50-60,000 *krş* up to now. This [policy] serves nothing but the ruining of the Treasury.” Finally, should the Porte complied with the demand in the final analysis, he maintained, it should only deliver thehardtack from those baked and stored in the Morea whereas the Russians should buy the other provisions with the money they owed to the Porte from previous transactions.<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>102</sup> C.HRC 4708 (includes the circulars between 6L-15Z1216/9Feb-18Apr1802); three-month periods were mid-December 1801-8 February 1802, 9 Feb-18April 1802, 19 April-11 July 1802, also see HAT 259/14932 (3Z1216/6Apr1802), C.HRC 78631 (16Z1216-10RA1217/19Apr1802-11July1802).

<sup>103</sup> C.HRC 7863 (includes the circulars in the period 16Z1216-10RA1217/19Apr1802-11July1802); Defterdar Efendi claimed that Russia owed roughly 126,000 *krş* to the Porte.

In consequence, the Porte decided to send the hardtacks from those baked and stored in Arhos (Argos) and ordered the local authorities in the Morea to buy the specified quantities of salt, wine, and firewood, while Memiş Efendi was to buy *arak*, vinegar, beans, crushed wheat, and purified butter in İstanbul in July 1802.<sup>104</sup> Memiş Efendi bought the supplies until October 1802.<sup>105</sup> Nevertheless, Russians had not yet received salt and firewood from the Morea by August 1803 except for the compensation money for wine. They were pressing the local authorities especially for the delivery of *arak* and vinegar.<sup>106</sup> The Porte sent the order for the delivery of the hardtack only on 28 July 1802, albeit the agents appointed to the two merchant ships that would carry the hardtacks could not have left İstanbul before 5 August 1802.<sup>107</sup> Benaki, the Russian consul in Corfu, nevertheless, did not accept the hardtacks delivery amounting to 175,811 kg (3,135 *kt*) on the grounds that it was below the standards. He, instead, demanded 192,450 kg (7,500 *kl*) of wheat in compensation in order to bake bread.<sup>108</sup> Meanwhile, the governor of the Morea found it beyond his means to provide the wheat due to scarcity in the province. The Porte thus contemplated of giving compensation money, but the Russian ambassador insisted on its substitution with wheat in a meeting held by the Defterdar Efendi and other Ottoman authorities.<sup>109</sup>

---

<sup>104</sup> C.HRC 7863 (includes the circulars in the period 16Z1216-10RA1217/19Apr1802-11July1802).

<sup>105</sup> C.AS 38721 (9C217-1B217/7-28Oct1802).

<sup>106</sup> HATT 98/3911 (15S1218/6June1803) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>107</sup> These agents were el-Hac Süleyman Aga and Ebubekir Aga who received 500 *krş* to cover their expenses on the journey on that date, C.HRC 2516 (1R1217/5Aug1802). Captains were *Firavandi* of Russian nationality and *Yorgaki*, C.HRC 5848 (23RA1217/24July1802).

<sup>108</sup> HAT 176/7656 (nd.), HAT 124/5158 (nd.); C.HRC 4982 (7CA1218-28C1218/25Aug-15Oct1803).

<sup>109</sup> HAT 176/7666-B (nd., prior to 25 August 1803). Azmi Efendi, the superintendent of the Morea (*Mora Nazırı*) and Ebubekir Beg a notable of the Morea were present in the meeting.

In the meeting, the ambassador broached a curious debate on the standards of the Ottoman hardtack, which sheds light on the petty diplomacy that has been oft-neglected as the history of diplomacy usually concerns itself with ‘rivalries’ and ‘questions’ of greater magnitude. The Russian ambassador suggested that the Ottomans should use 3.5 *kl* of wheat for baking a *kt* of hardtack and buy a *kl* of wheat at the price of four *krş* on the market. The Ottomans adamantly objected on the basis of the Ottoman regulations concerning the hardtack, which specified the amount of the wheat ingredient to be used for baking a *kt* of hardtack as 2.5 *kl*. The Ottomans did not fail to stress that 2 *ky* of the wheat used was left over after baking according to their own “recipe.” After long discussions, two options emerged as viable: the hardtacks rejected by the Russians were to be sold at the price of six *krş* a *kt*, yielding total revenue of roughly 30,993 *krş*. Should the Porte buy the wheat ingredient at the administered bargain price (*rayiç*) of 2.5 *krş* from the wheat market of İstanbul (*Kapan*), this would leave an excess sum of 2,285 *krş* to the benefit of the Treasury. According to the second option, the Russians were to buy the wheat ingredient at four *krş* on the market in which case the sale of the rejected hardtacks would not meet the expense and the people of the Morea would have to make up for the remaining deficit of 9,370 *krş*.<sup>110</sup>

These plans may have been resulted from the lamentations of the Governor Mustafa Paşa. Bothered by the protests of the Russian officer sent to the Morea to track down the missing provisions, he pleaded for the exemption of the Arnavud-zade brothers

---

<sup>110</sup> HAT 176/7666-B (nd., prior to 25 August 1803); the quantity of the hardtacks to be sold was 5,165.5 *kt*. Dodwell gives the price of a *ky* of flour as 4.5 *pr* in Athens in 1806, Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographic Tour*, v.II, p. 498.

from the collection of the wheat in compensation of the rejected hardtacks, which, he maintained, would be ruinous for them. Apparently, the only available candidates to foot the bill in the Morea were the Arnavud-zade brothers and Abdi Aga, for they were in charge of the hardtack in Tripoliçe. Mustafa Paşa, however, pointed out that Arnavud-zade brothers were the only “dynasty” left in the Morea besides Ebubekir Beg of Görδος who was present in the afore-mentioned meeting- and his brother. Were the Arnavud-zade brothers and Abdi Aga to be held responsible for the defective hardtacks, he would have to imprison them and confiscate their property to raise the necessary funds for the buying of the wheat. The only solution, as he saw it, was buying 15,000 *kl* of wheat in the Morea instead of the demanded 7,500 *kl*; a third of it was to be bought from the Muslims. The total cost of 7,500 *krş* were to be raised by selling 1000 *kt* of the rejected hardtacks so that the remaining 2,000 *kt* of these hardtacks could be put in the stores as were the remaining 7,500 *kl* of wheat for preventing future shortages in provisioning.<sup>111</sup>

Finally, the ambassador was persuaded, on account of the scarcity in the province, to accept 38,755 *krş* in compensation for the rejected hardtacks, 8,511 *krş* coming from the people of the Morea.<sup>112</sup> As late as March 1804, the matter was left unsolved as the money that should come from the sale of the rejected hardtacks had not yet reached İstanbul from the Morea. Upon the frequent protests of the ambassador, the Porte first contemplated of charging the money from Ebubekir Beg who was in İstanbul at that time,

---

<sup>111</sup> HAT 98/3911 (15S1218/6June1803) from Mustafa Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>112</sup> C.HRC 4982 (7CA1218-28C1218/25Aug-15Oct1803); the Russian consul had actually accepted only 125 *kt* of hardtack on the grounds that the remaining did not match the sample hardtack at his disposal. Thus, 38,755 *krş* were to be paid for the remaining 3,010 *kt* hardtack, meaning that the Porte offered roughly 12 *krş* compensation for a *kt*, while it was to sell for 6 *krş* a *kt* of hardtack on the market. The total quantity of hardtacks to be sold was equal to 5,040.5 *kt* (5,165.5-125 *kt*).



but finally was resolved to deliver the money from its own coffers.<sup>113</sup> An undated document, on the other hand, suggests that the Porte actually bought the wheat at the administered price in İstanbul and delivered to the Russian ambassador, thus “cutting short the Russians’ mournings” (*sızıldıları kesdirilmiş idiği*).<sup>114</sup>

As late as the autumn of 1803 the provisions and the wheat substitute for September-December 1802 were not completely delivered, although ten months passed after the due date. Furthermore, the rebellion could not be quelled in three months which compelled the Russians to demand more provisions from the Ottomans for an extra period of nine months in addition to 30,000 *krş* cash substitute a month for three warships. In a meeting held by the kitchen cabinet of Selim III on the matter, they were convinced that no agreement existed that committed the Porte to continue with supplying the Russian reinforcements once the initial three-month period expired. In addition, complying with the Russian demand was too costly and unnecessary as it was not certain when the Russian reinforcements were going to leave the Ionians. Upon the Ottoman inquiries, Fonton, the Russian interpreter, brought the official answer that claimed that the decision to deploy Russian reinforcements in Corfu for a period of three months was taken 18 months ago with the consent of the Porte. As the order could not be restored within three months, the Ottomans should keep sending provisions for an additional period of nine months. Fonton also curtly stated that upon the end of nine months the Porte might ask for the removal of the reinforcements from the Ionians. But, it should

---

<sup>113</sup> C.HRC 7283 (15ZA1218/26Feb1804).

<sup>114</sup> HAT 124/5158 (nd.)

also take notice of concentration of French forces in Ancona, hinting at a likely French attack on the Ionians in the near future. Fonton's veiled threats and presentation of Russian reinforcement of Corfu as a Russian grace extended towards the Ottomans at the Porte's will frustrated the Ottomans.<sup>115</sup>

The Ottomans were faced with a paradox. Should the Porte demand the removal of the Russian reinforcements, Russians would put the blame on the Ottomans in case of a French attack to the Ionians. Were the Porte to acquiesce at the extension of the term of service of the Russian reinforcements, they could use it as a pretext to stay on the island for an unspecified period of time living on the Ottoman provisions. Selim ordered the matter to be further debated and solved without "giving a cause for nagging" (*zirildi çıkarılmayarak*).<sup>116</sup>

The kitchen cabinet informed Selim that Ushakov did not return the unspent money that had been forwarded to him by the Porte during the campaign. As a readymade solution, the Porte could tell the Russians to use this fund amounting to 120,000 *krş* to buy the necessary nine-month provisions. The demanded provisions for the nine-month period of 7 December 1802 – 1 September 1803 actually cost 280,000 *krş*, superseding by far the extra funds that had supposedly remained at the disposal of Ushakov. The Ottomans seemed to have accepted to supply the Russians with nine-month provisions,

---

<sup>115</sup> HAT 176/7656 (nd.).

<sup>116</sup> HAT 176/7656 (nd.).

but it is not certain as which provisions were really procured and which ones were substituted with cash.<sup>117</sup>

While the Ottomans were trying to solve out the confusion led by the rejected hardtacks that had fallen in arrears from the initial three-month period, delays in the delivery of the nine-month hardtack allowance signaled the arrival of a new diplomatic crisis at the door. The Porte was to deliver 530,818 kg -9,405 *kt* - of hardtack for a period of nine months according to the calculations made in September 1803.<sup>118</sup> This quantity could feed 3,135 troops for nine months according to the Ottoman regulations –an allowance of roughly 169 kg (3 *kt*) for nine months for each troop.

Of this quantity, İstanbul was to send 900 *kt*, 400 *kt* of which fell into the sea while passing by Dolmabahçe! Silivri had to send 900 *kt*, while the biggest quotas fell into the lot of Tekfurdağı (Tekirdağ) and Selanik. By March 1804, it appeared that Tekfurdağı failed to meet its quota (5,500 *kt*) with 700 *kt* missing, whereas 1,605 *kt* of hardtack out of a total of 1,800 *kt* due from Istanbul and Silivri was undelivered. Selanik, on the other hand, caused a diplomatic scandal by sending 1,917 *kt* of spoilt hardtacks instead of 2,300 *kt*, which were rejected by the Russians as previously mentioned. The total quantity of hardtack to be delivered stood at 4,906 *kt*. The Russian ambassador

---

<sup>117</sup> C.HRC 6057 (27CA1218/14Sept1803), Selim's advisors calculated that the cash-substitute that had been paid to the Russians for the initial three-month period was 120,000 *krş* since there were four, rather than three, Russian warships coming from the Naples, each ship getting 10,000 *krş* a month, see HAT 176/7656 (nd.); C.BH 290 (27L1220/18Jan1806).

<sup>118</sup> C.HRC 6057 (27CA1218/14Sept1803).

demanded the delivery of 3,382 *kt* of hardtack and compensation money for the remaining.<sup>119</sup>

The correspondence of Mustafa Reşid, the superintendent of Corfu, further complicated the matter. It took eleven days to unload the cargo ship, but the load of hardtack weighed only 1,511 *kt* with 399 *kt* missing, while 7 *kt* went bad due to moisture in the ship. Mustafa Reşid, together with the Austrian and Russian consuls, interrogated the Austrian captain to no avail. As the captain's log book did not record any stormy weather that might have spoiled the load, the captain had to bear the responsibility for the missing hardtacks. The captain could not substitute the missing hardtacks in kind due to constant shortage of hardtacks in Corfu and had to pay in cash in compensation. Thus, they took recourse to the court of commerce in Corfu in order to assess the value of the hardtack which the court established as 11 *krş* 25 *pr* a *kt* after examining the sample provided by Mustafa Reşid. In the end poor captain could only pay 3,000 *krş* of the required 4,638 *krş* 15 *pr*, the remaining to be deduced from the freight after returning to İstanbul.<sup>120</sup>

Nine months later Mustafa Reşid communicated to the Porte that after Russians rejected the delivery, the hardtacks were left in the stores almost for a year as no orders arrived from the Porte despite his numerous reports. These stores needed renovation, but there was no available place to move the hardtacks, as all the stores and dysfunctional churches were filled with the Russian provisions and ammunitions. As a solution,

---

<sup>119</sup> C.HRC 6057 (27CA1218/14Sept1803).

<sup>120</sup> C.HRC 9196 (1M1219/12Apr1804) from Mustaf Reşid Efendi to the Porte.

Mustafa Reşid had to sell 600 *kt* of spoilt hardtacks –now seven years old- at the price of seven *krş* a *kt*.<sup>121</sup> It is puzzling that the hardtacks rejected by the Russians could be sold at quite a high price. This casts doubt on the dispute over the hardtack standards of the two allies, notwithstanding the acute shortage of grain in the Ionians that has been attested in all sources.

The Ottomans had to continue to supply the Russians deployed in Corfu by sending nine-month provisions of similar quantities until the outbreak of war with Russia. In July 1806, Seyyid Osman Pasa, the governor of the Morea, received a firman ordering him to send wheat to Corfu in compensation of the hardtack.<sup>122</sup> The order dated 30 December 1806 addressed Mehmed Pasha, the new governor of the province, and instructed him to keep the wheat bought for the Russians for the consumption of the Ottoman army guarding the province since Russia attacked the Ottoman borders.<sup>123</sup> Thus was the end of the hardtack diplomacy.

---

<sup>121</sup> C.HRC 3845 (7ZA1219/7Feb1805) Mustafa Reşid to the Porte.

<sup>122</sup> C.AS 33682 (17R1221/4July1806).

<sup>123</sup> C.HRC 3196 (19L1221/30Dec1806).

## Conclusion

The chapter opened with the correspondence of Mustafa Paşa in order to elucidate the complexities of the Ottoman politico-fiscal and administrative apparatus that also confused the contemporary Western observers. It is only unfortunate that some modern-day historians still continue to mystify the Ottoman political culture at the expense of distorting the evidence available:

“[...] In none of the cases we have examined in the *ahkam defterleri* was the crime an act of a single individual. They were more often than not committed by an association of some higher-ranking officer with simple soldiers... The Ottoman military in the provinces (not only the Morea) was, however, a part of a governmental structure. So, in a way, the state itself, represented by its military, acted in a Mafia-like way, whereas at the same time, when represented by the imperial council, its agents and other institutions (like the *şeyhülislam*), it served as a law enforcement body which fought against Mafia-like structures which another part of the same state’s officials had established.... To what degree this Mafia-like substructure of the Ottoman military in the Morea contributed to the discontent common in the peninsula which made a revolution ever more likely cannot be discussed here but remain an open question awaiting further research.”<sup>124</sup>

In furtherance her point about the ‘Ottoman sopranos’, the author cited a similar example that we have seen in Mustafa Paşa’s letter – one of bombarding the Porte with contradicting petitions by rival factions. Süleyman Penah Efendi penned a report on the activities of the Russian spy Georgios Papazoli (Tolstoy’s Hacı Murad) in the Morea prior to the revolt in 1770 but the deputy *kadı* of Tiraboliçe did not forward it to the Porte to avoid the wrath of the Governor-*mütesellim* and the *ayan* of the province. As the latter were accused of negligence of the grave situation in the report, the deputy feared that should the report be sent to the Porte these men would also send a counter petition; thus he told Süleyman Penah –in author’s translation- “the two of us might become the victims of an accident” as a consequence. Misinterpreting the commonplace expression

---

<sup>124</sup> A. Vlachopoulou, “Like the Mafia? The Ottoman Military Presence in the Morea in the Eighteenth Century” in Anastasopoulos and Kolovos (eds.), *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans*, pp. 134-5.

“*kaza-keş*” (to suffer mishaps/to endure the consequences), the author thought the Governor, *ayans*, and their *kocabaşı* accomplices would murder them in perfect conjunction with the ‘Ottoman mafia culture.’<sup>125</sup>

This chapter concluded with the narration of the ways in which the Ottoman decision-makers portrayed themselves as caught in the crossfire of the ‘central’ concerns of the periphery and the ‘peripheral’ concerns of a ‘murmuring and nagging ally’ (*zırıldı*: crying of a baby, and *dırıldı*: chattering, nagging). The activities of a *petite ayan*, Ebubekir Beğ of Görδος, as the procurer of provisions (*nüzul emini*) of the combined fleet, the nature of the household of the Governor Mustafa Paşa, and a discussion of Ali Paşa of Yanya as well as numerous cases concerning the financial challenges posed by the Adriatic expedition to the Morea were our concrete subject matters. The chapter questioned the ‘center-periphery’ dichotomy, and suggested that *ayans* actually had more intricate relations with the Porte. Ebubekir Beg attended the deliberations on the organization of provisioning in İstanbul even though he was a minor figure in the world of great *ayans*, while Ali Paşa maintained personal and intimate contacts with high-ranking bureaucrats in the Porte.

We have overviewed that shortages in provisions were commonplace in export items. This brought to mind the possibility that the export trade may have accounted for

---

<sup>125</sup> One can cite many factual errors of Vlachopoulou; for instance, she mistook the *kadı* of Tirapoliçe Mirza-zade Mehmed Said Efendi for Şeyhülislam “who was at Tripoliçe (Gk. Tripoli) at that time.” The initial receiver of the report Sarım İbrahim Efendi was not “a high-ranking bureaucrat in the *defterdarlık*” at that time, but an official serving in an unknown capacity in the Morea. He forwarded it to aforementioned Mirza-zade, whom, in return, finally passed it on to his deputy. All these transactions seem to have confused the author, Vlachopoulou, “Like the Mafia?”, p. 133; see A. Berker, “Mora İhtilali Tarihçesi veya Penah Ef. Mecmuası”, *Tarih Vesikaları* 2/7 (1943), p. 67. Süleyman Penah Efendi was the father of Yusuf Agah Efendi, the first permanent ambassador to London.

supply shortages, at least partly. This chapter also suggested that the Porte generously acknowledged the shortcomings of its politico-fiscal and administrative system as revealed in the Laws of the Morea and various other documents. The case of Ebubekir Efendi, the grief of Mustafa Paşa over the impoverishment of the local *ayan* dynasties, and various local complaints about the large household of Mustafa Paşa as well as heavy impositions provided ample evidence on the functioning of a contractual empire to which bargaining and *petite ayans* were indispensable.

The question remains, though, whether the *ayans* were always willing to take up official posts:

The acceptance of an office seems to be considered as an acknowledgement of the right of Sultan to summon the person so employed to Constantinople; and as many parts of the Turkish empire are governed by the natural lords of the soil, these personages refuse the title of Pasha and the honour of the tails, which the Porte endeavours to force upon them, that they may not be summoned to give an account of their administrations.<sup>126</sup>

There are as many examples that support Gell's insightful observation as those that contradict it, which might be attributed to the lack of a unified *ayan* consciousness, or as Yayıoğlu put it:<sup>127</sup>

If we see a pattern, it would be that the provincial power-holders, either by entering into the imperial establishment or by preferring to remain outside (*hariç*), did not, in fact, want to be full and unconditional servants of the Sublime State. Rather they preferred to perform their governorship or viziership on their own terms. What should we call this process: the *Ottomanization* of the provincial elite or the *provincialization* of the imperial state? It seems that these two trends coexisted hand in hand.

---

<sup>126</sup> Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea*, pp. 273-74.

<sup>127</sup> Yayıoğlu, *The Provincial Challenge*, p. 266.



## CHAPTER VII

### RUNNING THE ADRIATIC FRONTIER

#### Introduction

This chapter will try to highlight the Ottoman inclusion in the Ionian affairs as it has been conveniently forgotten in the second-hand scholarship. The first section is a brief overview of the Ottoman agents in the Ionian Republic whom have hitherto been left in oblivion in the literature. The second section is an analysis of ‘how to run the Adriatic frontier.’ It deals with the promulgation of the Republic after the signing of the Russo-Ottoman convention (1802) and the ensuing problems. The focus will be on the nature of the Porte’s relation to the Republic. It tries to put this relation in a perspective by referring to the Ottoman juridical terminology.<sup>1</sup>

This chapter argues that the reign of Alexander I signalled a major change in Russian policy towards the Adriatic. The burgeoning Republic was now considered as a Russian military base –a consideration which was not so much an expression of Russian expansionism as a political commitment of Alexander I against the often exaggerated French threat in the south-eastern front. Nevertheless, local Russian agents and officers did not lack the desire of championing the religious cause against the dreadful yoke of the Ottomans.

As usual with frontier zones, imperial interests and local realities of the Ionians were in conflict. For the ordinary Ionian, the Ottomans were barbarous infidels whereas

---

<sup>1</sup> Also see my “Ottoman Attempts to Control the Adriatic Frontier in the Napoleonic Wars” in Andrew Peacock (ed.), *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World* (Proceedings of the British Academy) (Oxford University Press) [to be published in November 2009].

Russia was the champion of the Orthodoxy. They hoped that Paul I would keep away the Ottomans and liberate them from both the French and the old nobility whom they regarded as collaborators with the former oppressive Venetian rule.<sup>2</sup> Yet, Paul was against territorial aggrandizement and favoured the restoration of the *status quo ante* in the region under the Russian protection and Ottoman suzerainty. However, Russia failed to present a common front against the Porte. Poor communications between St. Petersburg and its agents in the Ionian Islands forced the latter to take the initiative.

It is often forgotten that Tomara was of Greek origin with his own network of prominent figures in the Adriatic. His chief agent in Corfu was Liberan Benaki, the Russian consul-general. As we have already mentioned, he was the son of the famous kocabaşı Benaki who was the main supporter of the Greek rebellion in 1770. Tomara also dominated the foreign policy of the Ionian Republic through Theotokis, the president of the senate. Most of the Ionian consuls he appointed to several Ottoman ports were of men of influence in the former Venetian rule. He, thus, effectively prevented the British from establishing contact with the Republic. His aristocratic biases that favoured the reinstatement of the rule of the nobility and inclination to cooperate with the Porte frustrated Ushakov who found some reason to escape Tomara's surveillance in Paul's

---

<sup>2</sup> Clara J. Tucker, *The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I* (Syracuse University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1965), pp. 40-45, 316-320, 331; Roderick E McGrew, *Paul I of Russia, 1754-1801* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 320-21.

orders to extend his operation to Italy. In the end, Tomara defeated Ushakov's 'liberal' provisional constitution with the help of the Porte.<sup>3</sup>

The Porte, on the other hand, was prudent enough to send a diplomatic representative to Corfu, Mahmud Raif Efendi, who knew French and English, while the Russian admiral Ushakov was left alone with no knowledge of diplomacy and no skills in foreign languages.<sup>4</sup> Thus Ushakov often contradicted the official Russian policy of favouring nobles since he realized that the exclusive rule of the hated nobility could not maintain order in the Republic, and he supported the limited participation of the notables in the parliament.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, Istanbul and St. Petersburg considered the nobility their natural allies, while suspecting that the ordinary populace was affected by revolutionary ideas.

---

<sup>3</sup> N. Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807* (The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 102-104; Saul does not explain the rupture with a 'Russian vis-à-vis' non-Russian' dichotomy, neither do we aim to do so; the point in case is the great advantage Russia could procure from its Greek subjects in diplomacy and local knowledge as well, whereas historians usually emphasize the role of the 'merchant Greek' in Russian foreign trade to the exclusion of Levantine diplomacy. After the French Revolution most of the staff including many dragomans as well employed at the French Embassy deserted to the Russian Embassy in Istanbul which may have been one of the factors that made the Russo-Ottoman alliance possible, see A. Gosu, "The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition and the Sublime Porte" in K. H. Karpat and R. W. Zens (eds.), *Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes* (The University of Wisconsin, 2003), p. 223.

<sup>4</sup> For the statement about the contrast between the two allies in terms of their diplomatic approach see J. L. McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic. The Genesis of Russia's First Balkan Satellite* (University of Wisconsin, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1965) pp. 211-212, 235.

<sup>5</sup> Tucker, *The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I*, pp. 225-26, 231.

## The Ottoman presence in the Ionian Islands

On 26 March 1799 the Sublime Porte made an official announcement to the British and Habsburg Embassies on the liberation (*teshir*) of Corfu. The fortress of Corfu, which was renowned in ‘all Europe’ by its strength, was conquered through a successful siege which forced the French to sue for peace.<sup>6</sup> The new propaganda machine, *brochure*, was at work again. Many proclamations containing the news of ‘the conquest and liberation of Corfu and the defeat of the French’ were published in French and sent out to Acre, for ‘the accursed Bonaparte’ was attacking the town ‘with substantial numbers of the French infidel.’<sup>7</sup>

Contemporary and current literature on the Ionians is of conflicting nature in terms of its political status and the presence of the Ottoman Empire in the Ionian affairs.<sup>8</sup> While the Ionian Islands were considered as an independent state or a protectorate of Russia, its status as an Ottoman dependency as well as the Ottoman military and

---

<sup>6</sup> BOA, C.HRC 4779 (19L1213/26Mart1799).

<sup>7</sup> BOA, HAT 156/6519-C (27ZA1213/2May1799) to the governor (*muhassıl*) of Cyprus. 30 brochures were sent to Cyprus to disseminate in Egypt and 10 proclamations were sent to Cezar Ahmed Paşa. The decree pointed out that many such proclamations had already been sent to the region.

<sup>8</sup> The Republic of Seven United Islands was a joint-protectorate of the Ottomans and the Russians. An example from recent literature will suffice to show the confusion in the literature: “...*the seven islands were to be established as an independent republic, at first placed under the sovereignty of Russia, then under the immediate protection of England*”, K. Fleet, *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha’s Greece* (Princeton, 1999), p. 73. Fleet exclusively relies on the 19<sup>th</sup> century literature including Bellaire (*Precis des Operations Generales de la division française du Levant* [1805]), Jervis (*History of the Ionian Island of Corfu and of the Republic of the Ionian Islands* [1852]) and Lunzi (*Della Repubblica Settinsulare* [1863]). Her bibliography does not include Saul’s study that could have served as a corrective for her many points; Among the travel literature, Dodwell exemplifies the confusion well: Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour...*, (London, 1819), v. II, p. 259, “*it was declared a free state under the title of “republic of Seven Islands”, whilst their fortresses were garrisoned by the soldiers of the Emperor, the Venetian form of government was abolished, and a new constitution was promulgated under the auspices of Alexander.*”

diplomatic presence in Corfu are totally ignored.<sup>9</sup> To begin with the latter, the fortress commander Mustafa Aga, the superintendent Mustafa Reşid Efendi, and the Ottoman fleet commander were the main Ottoman agents in the Republic. While the Ottoman fleet in Corfu was maintained by the Porte, expenses of the fortress commander and the superintendent were to be met by the Ionian senate.

### Garrisoning Corfu

After the fall of Corfu, both the Ottoman and Russian flags flew over the citadel to symbolize the equal status of the allies, who agreed to deploy the same number of troops in the town until reaching a decision on the political status of the Ionians. Russian officers, however, were opposed to the Ottoman military presence within the city walls on the pretext of protecting the Corfiotes from potential Ottoman aggression. Those persecuted by Ali Paşa during the occupation of the four towns from the French had taken shelter in the Islands.

As mentioned in the chapter on the expedition, the Ottomans had put Patrona Şeremet Beg in command of 300 sailors in Corfu throughout the summer 1799. Ushakov's refusal to admit them into the citadel put another strain on the already tense relations within the combined fleet. Mahmud Raif and Abdülkadir induced the Corfiotes to send a petition on the good conduct of Patrona, whom the Ionians described *reaya-*

---

<sup>9</sup> Cabi Ömer Efendi whose work reflected the rumors circulating in İstanbul was also at pains to understand the status of Corfu immediately after its conquest from the French. He explained to his readers that Corfu witnessed a tug of war between many states: "...Korfa dahi, devleteyn miyanında bir nesne olmağla...", see M. A. Beyhan (ed.), *Cabi Ömer Efendi. Cabi Tarihi (Tarih-i Sultan Selim-i Salis ve Mahmud-ı Sani) Tahlil ve Tenkidli Metin* (Ankara: TTK, 2003), v. I, p. 91.

*perver* (*reaya-lover*) that is, well disposed towards the Christians.<sup>10</sup> Mahmud Raif Efendi, the Ottoman diplomatic representative in Corfu, strongly recommended the appointment of an able fortress commander to Corfu with a number of disciplined troops under his command. This officer should also be capable of “attracting the people to the Ottoman side and reconciling them with the Ottoman rule”, which, in his opinion, was of the utmost necessity.<sup>11</sup> Russians and Ottomans agreed to garrison Corfu with 2,100 troops with each party including the Ionians providing equal number of troops. The Ottomans decided to contract out the so-called ‘sons of the conquerors’ (*evlad-ı fatihan*) - a military organization established in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century from among the pastoralists around Selanik. 300 of these men were commissioned in late May.<sup>12</sup> Ushakov suggested deploying 100 of them in other islands and dispatching the remaining to guard the Vidos. His Ottoman colleagues, however, insisted on their deployment in the fortress of Corfu until the dispatch of the expected clarifications from İstanbul.<sup>13</sup> In late August 1799, orders were sent out for the recruitment of the remaining 400 troops from among the *evlad-ı fatihan* under the command of Mustafa Aga.<sup>14</sup>

The Ionians undertook the supplying of Ottoman and Russian fortress guards at Corfu. Accordingly, each troop was entitled to flour, *bulgur*, salt, and firewood as well as

---

<sup>10</sup> HAT 162/6746 (1M1214/5Jun1799); HAT 157/6536 (10May1799) Abdülkadir Beg’s correspondence to the Porte on the approval of the good conduct of the Ottoman marines by the Corfiotes; McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 124-25.

<sup>11</sup> HAT 158/6577-B (13May1799); ‘...*celb ve te’lif-i ahali ve beraya maddesi cümleden akdem idiği.*’

<sup>12</sup> BOA, C.AS 23408 (18M1800/11Jun1800); the usual calculation of the expenses involved is: 12 *kuruş* [hereafter, *krş*] (bonus) + 16.5 *krş* salary for 6 months + 9 *krş* compensation money= 37.5 *krş* and additional sums to cover cooking utensils, tent, and barley.

<sup>13</sup> HAT 164/6818 (3M1214/7Jun1799) from Abdülkadir and Patrona to the Porte.

<sup>14</sup> HAT 265/15371 (nd.); el-Hac Mustafa Aga was the former tax comptroller of Tirhala (*defter nazırı*), C.AS 25418 (2Feb1801).

8 *para* [hereafter, *pr*] as compensation money for buying the remaining victuals. Ushakov, nevertheless, made it plain to Tomara that the cash substitute would fall short of covering the expenses due to the high prices prevailing in Corfu. Tomara advised him to bargain the issue with the *kocabaşıs* (the primates) of the Ionians. Upon learning this, the Porte also urged Mustafa Aga to demand exactly the same amount of cash substitute and the rations the Ionians would deliver to Ushakov after negotiations. This was no less related to financial challenges than was to political considerations of reciprocity. The Porte contracted out the troops for six months (*mirili*), but hoped to continue to deploy them after the termination of this period on a monthly basis (*sekban*) in the afterwards. Mustafa Aga had instructions to demand the payment of the cash substitute in lump sums to him directly so that he could use part of it to pay the monthly salaries of these troops in their future employment 10 *krş* a month per man, saving the treasury from further expenses. It goes without saying that he was to conceal the scheme from the Russians.<sup>15</sup> Mustafa Aga, nevertheless, thought that these ‘mercenary-cum-recruits’ would not accept to remain in service after the initial six-month term. These troops would indeed petition the Porte to rush the orders for disbandment towards the end of their term. No reply coming, 12 of them already deserted by late spring 1800. Therefore, by June 1800, the Porte ordered the hiring of 150 additional men for six months from among the ‘sons of

---

<sup>15</sup> HAT 265/15371.

the conquerors' through the services of their officer Selim Beg in Selanik. It seems that these fresh troops could not be send before the next spring.<sup>16</sup>

Frictions with the Russians and the Corfiotes were a common occurrence particularly after Borozdin's arrival to Corfu with Russian reinforcements immediately after the departure of the Ottoman fleet for İstanbul after the mutiny in Palermo. Borozdin was totally against the presence of the Ottomans on the island in spite of his explicit orders. When Mustafa Aga arrived at Corfu with some 250 men in January 1800, the Russian general did not allow him to enter the fortress. After Ushakov's return to the island, Mustafa Aga was admitted into citadel with a retinue of 50 people, bringing the total number of the Ottoman troops in the citadel to 300, including the first party sent in early summer.<sup>17</sup> It seems that the Ottomans could not match 700 troops as agreed, but sent around 500 men in two parties, which together with Patrona's sailors brought the total number of the Ottoman troops to around 1,200 in 1799-1800. With the arrival of another Ottoman squadron, this rose to 3,300 in and around Corfu the next year. In fact, the Sublime Porte had hoped to deploy 1,500 'sons of the conquerors' in Corfu and pressured Tomara into giving his consent to no avail. Should Tomara fail to convince Ushakov to 'abandon his improper conduct' (*salik olduđu etvar-ı gayr-ı layıkadan dahi*

---

<sup>16</sup> C.AS 23408 (18M1215/11Jun1800); C.AS 5896 (4Z1215/18Apr1801); C.HRC 572 (7N1215/22Jan1801); for the details of the transformation of the Ottoman recruitment system from voluntary mercenaries to a more compulsory/involuntary recruits from the mid eighteenth century on see, V. H. Aksan, "Ottoman military recruitment strategies in the late eighteenth century" in E. J. Zürcher (ed.), *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia 1775-1925* (London, I.B. Tauris/Palgrave Macmillan, 1999): 21-39.

<sup>17</sup> Patrona Şeremet Mehmed Beg arrived with a squadron of 3 ships the same month, see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 206-210; the former Russian commander of Corfu had also refused to receive the Ottoman marines returning from Palermo, HAT 155/6513-M (4Oct1799).



*feragat*), the deputy Grand vizier was resolved to complain from both of them to the Tsar.<sup>18</sup>

During the negotiations with the Ionian deputation over the constitution, the Porte complained that Mustafa Aga had to stay a few days in his ship when he arrived at Corfu as the Russian commander did not allow him into the citadel. Furthermore, the senate did not procure the promised provisions after he took up his residence in the citadel. The deputation agreed to send a letter to the senate through Mustafa Aga on the issue.<sup>19</sup> One just wonders how the Porte would have managed to deploy 1,500 troops in Corfu when the tense situation reigning on the island and the financial challenges described above are taken into consideration.<sup>20</sup>

Financial problems and the language barrier haunted Mustafa as his correspondence suggest. He communicated to the Porte that the senators offered him in the negotiations a daily allowance of 20 *krş* for his retinue of 50 individuals and 7 *krş* for his private expenses whereas a minimum amount of 100 *krş* was necessary to manage his affairs since the constant shortage of foodstuff in Corfu put a major strain to his finances. This also proves how low the pay of the Ottoman fortress guards was; it was just around 40 *krş* for six months as mentioned previously. As a last resort he asked the Porte to

---

<sup>18</sup> HAT 164/6818 (3M1214/7Jun1799) from Abdülkadir and Şeremet to the Porte; Ushakov was ordered in July 1799 to cooperate with Tomara and the Porte in restoring order in Corfu, which directly increased the influence of Tomara's agent in Corfu Benaki, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 104.

<sup>19</sup> HAT 175/7601.

<sup>20</sup> Negotiations with Tomara on the details of garrisoning Corfu started in March and revolved around the number of the troops as well as meeting of their expenses, HAT 158/6577-E (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir to the Porte.

undertake the necessary expenses.<sup>21</sup> In a seemingly later correspondence he complained that he was a poor and an ailing man with no familiarity with the language and manners of the Corfiotes, which left him with no choice but ask to be excused from the post.<sup>22</sup> In June 1801, the Porte informed Mustafa that the Corfiotes had offered the replacement of Ottoman and Russian troops in the town with native troops as it was beyond their means to provision the foreign troops. Therefore, Mustafa was required to disband the Ottoman fortress guards and to continue to stay in the town.<sup>23</sup> As for his political activities, Mustafa Aga was said to have sent reports to Tomara that often contradicted Admiral Ushakov on the affairs of Corfu.<sup>24</sup>

We are lucky that Dodwell paid a visit to Corfu during the term of Mustafa Aga. He recounted that Mustafa and Patrona received him in the citadel ‘with great civility’ on 28 April 1801 whereby they introduced him to the ‘modern’ Ottoman hospital that accommodated 40 patients. Some of these patients got injured in the fight broken out the previous day between the Ottoman troops and the Corfiotes. According to Foresti, on the market day when the Ottoman sailors were permitted to land with their arms, a Corfiote and a sailor quarrelled over the improper conduct of the latter with the former’s wife. In the event, 17 sailors out of 200 and half that number Greeks were killed which compelled the former to barricade themselves in a coffee house. Spiridon Foresti –the famous

---

<sup>21</sup> C.HRC 648.

<sup>22</sup> C. HRC 643.

<sup>23</sup> C. HRC 1770 (13June-11July1801); A document suggests that he was withdrawn after Mustafa Reşid Efendi was sent to Corfu, see below.

<sup>24</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 125, 220; it should be mentioned in passing that Ushakov by-passed Tomara and directly corresponded with St Petersburg after May 1799, for he thought his later instructions on operating in Italian waters relieved him from his subordinate status to Tomara, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 103.

British agent at Corfu- took the credit for restoring tranquillity and pointed out that the Ottomans were conducted to the fortress under the protection of the Russians. Patrona restrained those sailors remained in the ships. Foresti attributed the street fight to the “insolent and overbearing behaviour” of the Ottomans. Finally, the senate had to pass “a general pardon as thousands of armed men collected round the walls of the city panting with the desire of dyeing their sword in the Moslem blood.”<sup>25</sup>

We could not find any report of Patrona on the incident, but Mustafa Aga’s correspondence of a later date testified to the uneasy relations with the Corfiotes in the heydays of the rebellion ravaging the islands. When the second Ottoman squadron arrived at Corfu, the troops demanded shore leave to do laundry and for other necessities. The senate asked the squadron to proceed with their orders immediately to patrol in the region, for the landing of the Ottoman sailors might fuel the rebellion which persisted throughout the Ionians. Patrona, after patrolling for more than a month around Ancona, returned to Corfu only to find the Corfiotes shut the gates when the squadron came close to the island by 15 miles. According to Mustafa, they even took up their arms to put up a fight with the Ottomans. Thus, the squadron had to anchor in front of the *Canım Hoca* fountain –named after the celebrated Grand Admiral who commanded the navy in the siege of Corfu in 1715. This was not the first time that the Ottomans were denied entrance, but this time four ringleaders rallied the sailors for a mutiny and demanded either to land on Corfu or return to the Dardanelles. Unable to restrain them, Patrona tricked 200 *levends* into landing on the uninhabited island by the harbor area (Vidos?)

---

<sup>25</sup> Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour*, v. I, pp. 29-31.

where they finally agreed to deliver their arms after suffering hunger for two days. The four ringleaders met their punishment and those found untrustworthy were sent to Rumelia. Upon learning the incident Selim could not help exclaiming “What a terrible affair! The presence of our ships thereof only inflicts harm” (*Bunlar ne fena şeylerdir! Bizim gemilerin anda olmaları zarardan ma‘da bir fa‘idesi olmayor*).<sup>26</sup>

The Ottoman hospital mentioned by Dodwell is an interesting case since we have assumed that the Porte took the initial steps for introducing a military hospital (*ispitalye* after the German *spitalle*) in a modern sense towards the end of Selim’s reign. Accordingly, first experimentations with *ispitalye* is said to have taken place within the modern barracks of Levend at the outskirts of İstanbul under the guidance of foreign military doctors. Kapudane Abdülkadir and Patrona Şeremet actually informed the Porte on the Ottoman *ispitalye* in Corfu as early as June 1799. When Patrona took up his residence within the citadel, he arranged a barrack-like building as an *ispitalye* and assigned to each room servants, cloth-washers, and workers -presumably from among the Corfiotes. It is all the more striking that this hospital also accommodated civilian Corfiotes besides the Ottoman *marinars* in separate spaces, if we do not misinterpret the expression ‘*ibadullah*’ (...*hasta olan ibadullah ve marinar taifelerine başka başka mahaller ve yüksek kerevetler mevzu‘en...*) Each patient was entitled to a wooden divan (bedstead), mattress, two quilts, a pillow, two upper sheets, four shirts. Doctors and surgeons treated them two times a day and determined their diet according to their illness. While some received *söğüş* (boiled meat or, conversely, vegetable –usually tomato- with

---

<sup>26</sup> HAT 258/14841 (27CA1216/5Oct1801) from Mustafa Ağa to the Porte.

no dressing –an ironic concession to the modern times!), the others ate vermicelli soup (*şehriye çorbası*); obviously, “the soldiers of Islam were at rest, taking off their caps to pray for the continuation of the life and reign of the Sultan (*asakir-i İslam rahatda devam-ı ömr ü devletlerine baş açub duada*).<sup>27</sup>

Patrona replaced the British flag unfurled at the castle of Zante by the inhabitants with the flag of the Republic of the Seven Islands with the help of the British consul. He came back to Corfu two days later. Meanwhile, a British warship under Captain *Milord* came to Corfu to undergo repairing. After its completion, it sailed with *Tiz Hareket* and *Hediyetü'l-müluk* in search of French ships.<sup>28</sup>

#### The diplomatic representative: Mustafa Reşid Efendi (Korfu Nazırı)

The Ottomans found it expedient to appoint a consul to Corfu in order to supervise the application of the constitution in addition to the Commander of the fortress of Corfu in September 1801.<sup>29</sup> Mustafa Reşid Efendi, the former comptroller of the tax-farms of Bursa, was appointed to the post with the official title of the Superintendent of Corfu (*Korfa Nazırı*) and given a Greek interpreter.<sup>30</sup> The Porte charged him with

---

<sup>27</sup> HAT 164/6818 (3M1214/7Jun1799) from Abdülkadir and Şeremet to the Porte. The triumphant language of the report is another indication of the *cedidist zeitgeist* which is also observable in various works written in Turkish and French for propaganda purposes. Evidence such as this report should warn us against the danger of dismissing these *cedidist* works as insincere propaganda of pure rhetorical nature. For another interesting and oft-neglected evidence of this *cedidist zeitgeist* see, T. Artan and H. Berktaş, “Selimian Times: A Reforming Grand Admiral, Anxieties of Re-possession, Changing Rites of Power” in E. Zachariadou (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha*, pp. 7-45.

<sup>28</sup> HAT 258/14841 (27CA1216/5Oct1801) from Mustafa Aga to the Porte; refer to the section on the Ionian uprising for more information.

<sup>29</sup> HAT 176/7671 (nd.), the deputy Grand-vizier pointed out that Mustafa Aga would fail to perform this duty as he was not versed in the details of the constitution; another document suggests that Mustafa Reşid actually replaced Mustafa Aga by an order dated 9 October 1801. He was given a Greek interpreter, Yorgi, BOA, C.Maliye 655/26814 (27M1217/30May1802), C.HRC (5ZA1216/9March1802).

<sup>30</sup> C. Maliye 200/8283 (6Sept1801); C. HRC 1277 (27Nov1800).

collecting intelligence on and around the Ionian Islands regarding the French and the Russians while his official task was seemingly to oversee the storage and distribution of the foodstuff sent to the Russian troops in Corfu by the Ottomans.<sup>31</sup> As may be remembered he was the main Ottoman agent who took care of the spoilt hardtacks in Corfu that suddenly turned into a major diplomatic affair between the two allies.

Most of the reports he sent to İstanbul were on the financial problems he faced in the island and the problems arose with the Russians over the matter of provisioning. The Ionians were to pay his salary, as was the case with Mustafa Aga. But the rebellion in the islands that broke out because of the quarrels over the political status made it impossible to raise the money from the Ionians. Thus, the Porte undertook to pay his salary until the suppression of the rebellion and sent 3,000 *krş* for the period November 1801-May 1802, hoping the rebellion would be over by the spring. By the advent of May, however, the Porte understood that it had to continue to pay the salary and increased it from 400 *krş* to 1000 *krş* on the orders of Selim in appreciation of his services in the quelling of the rebellion. Mustafa Reşid was still in dire straits because of the high costs of living in Corfu.<sup>32</sup> By April 1804 his salary was in arrears for 10 months, which forced him to make loans on interest from the Russian consul Benaki (3,000 *krş*), and the banker

---

<sup>31</sup> HAT 172/7432 (11Feb1805).

<sup>32</sup> C. Maliye 655/26814 (27M1217/30May1802) his interpreter received 100 *krş* a month; early in January the Porte construed paying his salary through Minas, the money-changer of Ali Paşa of Yanya in İstanbul. 3,000 *krş*, equivalent of his six-month-pay was delivered to Minas and the bill of exchange was sent to Ali Paşa. The cancelled part of the draft memorandum reveals that the Porte had initially decided to forward a larger sum (6,000 *krş* for 6 months) from the Morea, but dropped the plan for some reason, HAT 176/7716 (15N1216/19Jan1802).

Manendi (4,000 *krş*).<sup>33</sup> Ironically, Benaki was the son of the famous *kocabaşı* Benaki who was the main instigator of the uprising in the Morea in 1770, as mentioned previously. He reported to the Porte in February 1805 that he had to sell over 32 metric tons of biscuit sent for the Russians in order to pay off his debt to the banker while the Russian consul was continuously teasing him for the debt. Feeling abandoned by the Porte, Mustafa Reşid begged in the name of God and the Prophet to receive his 13,000 *krş*, equal of 13 months' pay.<sup>34</sup> Mustafa Reşid Efendi seems to have stayed in the island at least until February 1807.<sup>35</sup>

The Russian ambassador to Istanbul advised to the Porte to use Mustafa Reşid in restoring the order in the Republic during the rebellion on the grounds that he had amicable relations with the Corfiotes.<sup>36</sup> Seemingly, the Ottoman consul was more active in the Ionian affairs than the Ottoman fortress commander, while the Ionians shirked their financial obligations and alienated both of the Ottoman representatives in Corfu to a large extent.

#### The Ottoman Squadron: Patrona Şeremet Mehmed Beg

The Ottoman fleet returning from Palermo reached the Dardanelles on 3 November 1799 with its mutinous crew.<sup>37</sup> As decided previously, a new squadron of two frigates and a corvette with a crew of 700 men was immediately sent to Corfu under the

---

<sup>33</sup> C. HRC 9196 (12Apr1804) 7 months passed before he received his salary from İstanbul at a cost of 3 purses (1500 *krş*).

<sup>34</sup> C. HRC 3845 (7Feb1805).

<sup>35</sup> C. Maliye 19/887 (14Jul1807).

<sup>36</sup> HAT 259/14932 (6Apr1802).

<sup>37</sup> Refer to Chapter III.

command of Patrona Şeremet Mehmed Beg.<sup>38</sup> This squadron patrolled in the region until late 1801. The Porte reinforced this tiny squadron with a new squadron of two frigates and a corvette as a countermeasure against a possible French attack from the direction of Italy. Thus the new squadron had the specific orders to patrol in the vicinity of Ancona. By the summer of 1801, the Ottoman fleet in the region, thus, was composed of 3 frigates, 3 corvettes, and a galleon sent from Egypt. The first squadron was called back the same year as it had been on active service for almost two years (autumn 1799 – autumn 1801); its crew had already decreased to 569.<sup>39</sup> Patrona Şeremet Mehmed Beg, however, remained the commander of succeeding squadrons until spring 1804 and throughout 1806, while Riyale Hüseyin Beg replaced him in 1804/05 in the region as the commander of the squadron.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> The squadron comprised of the ‘small frigate’ of *Hediyetü'l-müluk* (24-gun/200-men; Nasuh-zade Ali Kaptan), the corvette of *Burc-ı Zafer* ((24-gun/200 men; Ülgünlü Ömer Kaptan), the frigate of *Küşade-i Baht* (38-gun/300 men; *Liman Nazırı* –the Port Commander- *Patrona-ı sabık* Kürd Mehmed) and two light vessels, HAT 155/6513 (5CA1214/5Oct1799) from Grand Admiral to the Porte, HAT 162/6738-A (24CA1214/24Oct1799) from Grand Admiral to the Porte. There is some confusion in Ottoman documents whether Kürd Mehmed Kaptan –the former Patrona- and Şeremet Mehmed Beg were the same person, but McKnight clearly stated that Şeremet arrived with 3 ships in January 1800 to Corfu relying on Russian sources (McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 208 and footnote 17). This proves that they were the same person; HAT 155/6513 (5CA1214/5Oct1799) from Hüseyin Paşa to the Porte.

<sup>39</sup> C.BH 5911 (24Z1215/8May1801); refer to appendix B Tables IV-X for the details of their provisioning; the second squadron of 1,100 men consisted of *Şahin-i Derya* (frigate: 50-gun/425-men; Patrona), *Bedr-i Zafer* (frigate: 50-gun/425-men), *Tiz Hareket* (small frigate: 32-gun/200-men), C.BH 1165.

<sup>40</sup> In 1803 Patrona Şeremet had *Hediyetü'l-müluk* as his flagship and *Mürg-i Bahri* (corvette: 22-gun/120-men) under his command. It is not clear whether there were any other ships in the squadron, C.BH 11800; by 1804, Şeremet already rose to the rank of Kapudane, as the former Kapudane Abdülkadir replaced the deceased Hüseyin Paşa as the new Grand Admiral. On 28 January 1804 Şeremet was called back with the squadron. The new squadron to be sent to Corfu was composed of 2 frigates and 2 corvettes, but one of these frigates, *Civan-ı Bahri*, was driven ashore in the storm together with one of the corvettes, C.BH 1865, HAT 4533; In 1805, Riyale had a galleon and *Şevketnüma* (frigate; 50-gun/450-men; Captain 51 Ömer Beg) under his command and he asked for a corvette if he was to spend the winter in Corfu. On the way back to İstanbul, they took shelter in Uzunada because of the storm on 4 November, but *Şevketnüma* hit the shores as the storm deprived it of its anchor. The Porte ordered its dismantling in the afterwards, C.BH 1747 (7L1220/29Dec1805); In 1806 Kapudane Şeremet commanded the squadron until he was called back in March 1807, C.BH 8861; the squadron had left İstanbul with four warships, but two of them had to



Dodwell observed the “great order and neatness throughout the Turkish ships, which may be said, in point of cleanliness, to vie with English vessels.” Interestingly, he realized that a portrait of Lord Nelson hang on the wall of the cabinet of Patrona.<sup>41</sup>

## **How to run the Adriatic frontier**

### Winning the hearts of the Ionians

The Ottomans were attentive to winning the hearts of the Ionians as they were well aware of the military support they had provided to Russia against the Ottoman Empire throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Over 4,000 Greeks and Albanians served in the Ionian units between 1799 and 1807, many of which fought against the Ottomans after 1806 at Ruscuk and Vidin.<sup>42</sup> We have seen the growing tensions in the combined fleet because of Ushakov’s improvisations in the administration of the Ionians particularly after the fall of Corfu. As early as mid-February, Mahmud Raif Efendi expressed concerns about the lack of orders defining the new administrative configuration and defence of conquered islands in view of the renewed French assaults on the Two

---

return so Kapudane actually had two ships: *Ziver-i Bahri* (galleon; 68-70-gun/700-men) and *Hediyetu'l-müluk*, HAT 114/4572 (29Z1221/10March1807); Selim attributed such accidents to the inattentiveness of the authorities, HAT 4951.

<sup>41</sup> Dodwell, p. 31; for Gell’s observations on Şeremet, see “Excerpt 3” in Appendix D.

<sup>42</sup> N. Pappas, *Greeks in Russian Service in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Thessalonica: Balkan Institute, 1991), pp. 325-37; at least 6,500 “Greeks” (Orthodox Christians) served in the armies of Russia, France, and the Kingdom of Naples in 1807. Many more served in French and the British armies in the 1810s. For their contribution to the Greek Revolution see P. Stathis, “From Klepths and Armatoloi to Revolutionaries” in A. Anastasopoulos and E. Kolovos (eds.), *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation* (Rethymnon: University of Crete, 2007); The Porte sent 35 capotes (*kaput*: military cloak) and 25 *biniş* (long cloaks worn by certain dignitaries) to Corfu to be distributed among the *kocabaşı* and other *reaya* who assisted in siege, C.AS 46254 (13L1213/20March1799).

Sicilies.<sup>43</sup> It is striking that the copies of the alliance treaties with Russia and Britain were not sent to the combined fleet before 12 March. Under these circumstances, the allied commanders and their staff had to depend on their own reason and discretion to shape the alliance on-the-spot.<sup>44</sup> After the quarrel over the requisitioning of some ammunitions and artillery of Corfu by the Russians, both Abdülkadir and Mahmud Raif were convinced that finalizing the post-war status of Corfu (*muhafaza sureti*) was the only means to restrain the Russian officers in the fleet.<sup>45</sup>

Officially, St Petersburg and İstanbul wanted to present themselves as “liberators” of the Ionians from the hated French. The Ottomans enlisted the support of the Greek Patriarchate to reconcile the Ionians with the Ottoman cause. In order to secure the cooperation of the Ionians, the Porte printed and distributed 400 copies of the Orthodox Patriarch Gregory’s Greek language proclamation that incited the Orthodox fervour

---

<sup>43</sup> HAT 6831-B (15N1213/20Feb1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte. A facsimile copy of the document is retained in K. Beydilli and İ. Şahin (eds.), *Mahmud Raif Efendi ve Nizam-ı Cedid’e Dair Eseri* (Ankara: TTK, 2001), p. 115; Selim was informed that the matter would be taken up with Tomara on 23 February 1799; Mahmud Raif grew nervous as no correspondence arrived from İstanbul on the matter although the Riyale had been sent a month ago along with the necessary communications, HAT 6577-C (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Mahmud Raif Efendi to the Porte. It is in facsimile in Beydilli and Şahin (eds.), *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 116.

<sup>44</sup> HAT 164/6843-A (5L1213/12March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte. The Porte regularly instructed its admiral to maintain civility with his counterpart, and increase the mutual affection (*hüsn-i imtizaca riayet ve tezayüd-i dosti ve muhabbetin ifasına*). As a gesture, Abdülkadir was to tell Ushakov that he could send his correspondence to İstanbul with the Ottoman *tatar* messenger. Abdülkadir was also ordered to detain any French courier who might appear in Corfu en route to İstanbul carrying correspondence on the question of POWs or any other miniscule issues.

<sup>45</sup> The Porte informed Selim, “Ushakov did not have a subtlety of intellect and quite haughty as he was of the military ranks” (*umur-ı harbiye takımından olub dirayeti olmadığı ve ru’unetlice olduğu*). Thus, Tomara was asked to notify Ushakov that neither Sultan nor the Tsar would approve any rupture in the combined fleet. Both admirals would be told that the arms and ammunition of the fortress should not be looted as booty, see HAT 158/6577-A (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Kapudane Beg to the Porte; the Porte sent Ushakov a jeweled box and a letter after the fall of Corfu, HAT 157/6536-D (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; Selim was also urging the Porte to reach a decision with Russia on the protection and administration of Corfu: “*benim vezirim, ol tarafın muhafazası elzem olmağla söyleşilüb rabita verile*”, HAT 164/6843 (11L1213/18March1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

against the Catholic French.<sup>46</sup> As may be recalled from the chapter on the expedition, each island was granted written guarantees of self-rule after the occupation since the Ottomans considered their conquest as voluntary submission (*istimalet*).

#### Debts over the transportation of the French POWs

A major problem between the Ottomans and the Ionians arose over the Ottoman debts to Ionian merchants. The Ottomans undertook the transportation of French 2,300 POWs from Corfu to Toulon and Ancona and the cost of transportation were borrowed from the Ionian merchants through the mediation of Ushakov. The Ottomans hired 10 ships from the merchants with a freight cost of 24,055 real (78,178.5 *krş* 30 *pr*). The Republic's envoy<sup>47</sup> in Istanbul sent a petition to the Porte on 22 October 1800 for the payment of the debt.<sup>48</sup> The Porte paid 30,000 *krş* in three instalments in February 1801, February 1802 and in February 1803 in addition to 23,000 *krş* it had initially sent to Admiral Ushakov. However, by the end of November 1804 it still had to pay 44,000 *krş*. The Ionian consul finally agreed to receive 10,000 *krş* instead as a compromise but the Porte did not even deliver this reduced sum of money. Embarrassed by the complaints of

---

<sup>46</sup> Similar proclamations (*nasihatname varakları*) were printed in Turkish, Arabic, and French to rally Muslims against the French and to demoralize the French troops in Egypt, see Beydilli, *Mühendishane ve Üsküdar Matbaalarında Basılan Kitapların Listesi ve bir Katalog* (İstanbul: Eren, 1997), p. 16.

<sup>47</sup> The Convention allowed the Republic to appoint consuls charged with overseeing commercial activities of the Ionians in the Ottoman Empire. Antonio Tomaso Lefcochilo, who was within the Ionian delegacy sent to İstanbul, was nominated officially as extraordinary envoy to the Sublime Porte (*Inviato Extraordinario presso la Sublima Porta*) with the duties of Ambassador but without the official title. The Ottomans used the word *elçi* both for an envoy and ambassador.

<sup>48</sup> C. HRC 1277 (27Nov1800); 1 real is equal to 3 *krş* and 10 *pr* in the document.

the consul, it decided to solve the matter once and for all and paid the money from the treasury revenues, later to be compensated from the tribute the Republic would pay.<sup>49</sup>

### Election of the archbishop

Ottoman documents show how the Porte made use of the network of the Patriarchate for information gathering and rallying local support in the Islands. The Ottomans were concerned that Russia would impose its hegemony through ‘politics of religion’ since the Ionians ‘were a fanatical community’ (*muta‘assıb bir taife*) and vulnerable to manipulation by their co-religionists (*mezheb vesilesiyle haklarında tahakküm ve istila husulü mümkün*).<sup>50</sup> Therefore, the election of archbishop was one of the battlegrounds between the Ottomans and the Russians where the Patriarchate was actively involved in favour of the Porte since the Ionians fell within the premise of the jurisdiction of the Patriarch after the conquest.

A *Protopappas* had been in charge of the religious affairs of Corfu for the last five centuries, but the Ottoman suzerainty brought the Republic within the Orthodox Patriarchate of İstanbul. At the request of the Corfiotes, Patriarch Gregory raised Corfu to an archbishopric with the encouragement of the Porte. An election was held in June 1799, and the *Protopappas*, Giorgio Calichiopoulo-Manzaro, was elected metropolitan. In this election, Abdülkadir Beg managed to prevent the appointment of the Russian candidate as the metropolitan. Despite Tomara’s opposition, the metropolitan of Yanya interfered

---

<sup>49</sup> C. HRC 2052 (27Nov1804); this may well have been a calculated policy on the part of the Porte in reaction to the dispute over the tribute. See below for the details.

<sup>50</sup> HAT 238/13221. According the official language, the metropolitan went to Corfu and, ‘as required by his obligations of subjecthood and loyalty’ (*fariza-yı zimmet-i raiyyet ve sadakat*), assured the community heads (*ruesa-yı millet*) about the affection and compassion of the Sultan for them (*haklarında derkar olan şefkat ve merhamet-i seniyye*) for which the Corfiotes praised his majesty, HAT 176/7661.

with the process of election on the orders of the Porte.<sup>51</sup> Manzano's sudden death necessitated another election in which Ushakov secured the election of his candidate (Count Pietro Bulgari). The Patriarch, however, annulled his election allegedly on canonical grounds. In the fresh election on 8 February 1800, Ushakov's candidate was defeated.<sup>52</sup>

#### The Ushakov Constitution and the sending of the Ionian delegation to İstanbul

The Ushakov constitution, envisioning the foundation of a republic on the Ionian Islands, was declared in May 1799. It appealed to the peasants and the notables because it meant the end of the political supremacy of the old nobility. Ushakov thought that an exclusive rule of the nobility could not maintain order, for the majority of the inhabitants were as opposed to the nobility who had vested interests in the legacy of Venetian rule as to the French. The nobility, thus, found Ushakov's provisional constitution too liberal, resembling the republican ideals, and successfully sought İstanbul's support to have another constitution that would restore the legacy of the old Venetian rule. Tomara supported the Ottoman view for he believed compromise was necessary for good relations between the two powers. Moreover he was an aristocrat unlike Ushakov and thereby saw the Ionian nobility as the natural allies of Russia, who should not be lost to the Ottomans.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> HAT 172/7378 (2Jul1799); also see H. Uzunçarşılıoğlu, "Arşiv Vesikalarına Göre Yedi Ada Cümhuriyeti", *Bellekten* I/34 (1937), pp. 635-636.

<sup>52</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 218.

<sup>53</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 150-158, 193-94; ironically, Count Antonio Capodistria, father of Agostino Capodistria, the president of Greece in 1831, was the most influential pro-Ottoman deputy that was sent to İstanbul, see p. 174

As early as 10 April 1799, the Ionian nobility sent a petition to İstanbul relaying their concerns about Ushakov's motives concerning the constitutional basis of the islands. The Porte took a decision to invite one of the petitioners in order to discuss the matter in İstanbul even before the proclamation of the Ushakov constitution in May.<sup>54</sup> Later, it sent a list of nobles and ordered their dispatch as delegates. The imperial decree reached Corfu at the time when 300 Ottoman fortress guards arrived at the island. Ushakov raised objections to both the deployment of these guards in the island and the dispatch of the delegates. In the meeting with the members of the senate that was inaugurated on 23 April, he gave his consent to their dispatch, provided that half of the delegates (3 members) would be of its own election. İstanbul ordered Abdülkadir in the same decree to tell Ushakov that the former administration of the Ionians would be restored. After long deliberations, the senate defeated Ushakov's proposal for a small deputation of his own selection and opted for a larger deputation that represented all of the islands.<sup>55</sup>

Ushakov elected 6 of the delegates, whom Abdülkadir Bey blamed as "*yakobin*" as early as 3 July. In spite of Ushakov's insistence, the senate chose only four senators for the mission, while the remaining eight were commoners. The Ushakov's deputation was headed by Count Orío (*Ayamavralı Angelos Oriyoz*) and Count Gerasimo Cladan (*Derasimo Klade*). Abdülkadir Beg's pro-Ottoman party was headed by Count Antonio

---

<sup>54</sup> HAT 157/6536 (5ZA1213/10Apr1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte.

<sup>55</sup> HAT 162/6746 (1M1214/5Jun1799) from Abdülkadir Beg to the Porte; on 23 April, the Russian and Ottoman admirals created a constitutional assembly of 83 members. Ushakov received the help of Spiridion Theotokis, Angelo Orío, and Antonio Capodistrias, see Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 97-8.

Capodistria (*Konto Anton Mari di Kapdistriye*) and Count Tommaso-Antonio Lefcochilo (*Kont Anton Soma Lefkokulo*).<sup>56</sup>

Abdülkadir informed the Porte that the deputies he sent would relate the details of how the Russians and the ‘Jacobins’ acted in unison and caused disorders. The deputation was also to present the Porte with an account book of the revenues of the Ionians and the measures to be taken to ‘save the Ionians from subjugation to Russia.’<sup>57</sup>

Twelve deputies arrived in İstanbul but Tomara chose only two of them to send to St. Petersburg as the Ionian deputation. As Orio and Cladan, who were pro-Ushakov, were sent to St. Petersburg, the Ottomans decided to acknowledge only the pro-Ottoman Capodistria and Sicuro as the Ionian deputation in İstanbul. When the deputies arrived in St. Petersburg in December 1799, Vice-Chancellor Panin informed them to their dismay that Tomara had the sole authority over the negotiations concerning the political status of

---

<sup>56</sup> HAT 176/7672 (29M1214/3Jul1799) from Abdülkadir to the Porte. A transcription of the document can also be found in Uzunçarşılı, “Arşiv Vesikalarına Göre Yedi Ada Cümhuriyeti”, pp. 636-37. Memiş Çavuş –the *çavuş* (inspector/agent) of the Porte- accompanied the Ushakov’s deputation in their naval trip to İstanbul, while the other deputation was sent over land in the escort of Mehmed Hoca and Muhammed Çavuş; According to Abdülkadir the ‘Jacobin’ deputation involved: Niccolo Mercuno –commoner- (*Korfulu Nikoli Markodi*), Niccolo Stae –senator of Cerigo- (*Çerikoz Toro Nikoli Sitayi*), Gerasimo Cladan (*Kefalonyalı Zatori Derasimo Klade*), Paolo Cladi –commoner- (*Zanteli Zatori Pavli Klade*), Orio (*Ayamavralı Angelos Oriyoz*), *Zotridos Rakos Zicorcis* (?) in addition two other persons sent İstanbul earlier by Ushakov. As for his own deputation, it was composed of Antonio Capodistria (*Konto Anton Mari di Kapdistriye*), Tommaso-Antonio Lefcochilo (*Kont Anton Soma Lefkokulo*), *Konta Simyolo Rudo*, Niccolo Sicuro (*Zantalı Konta Nikola Sagiyo*), *Zantalı Reviran Gayta*, *Kefalonya konsolosu*. Because of the complexities in rendering foreign names in Arabic script we were unable to match some of the names with those mentioned in McKnight: Vlassopoulos of Corfu, Teodoro Sicuro, Count Eufemio Loverdo). Only four of these names were senators and despite Abdülkadir’s reservations, some of the deputies in the Ushakov’s list supported the cause of Kapodistria such as Niccolo Stae whom was not an aristocrat, see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 194-96.

<sup>57</sup> HAT 176/7672 (29M1214/3Jul1799); the deputation also prepared an account of Ushakov’s exactions in Corfu. They met the Grand Admiral by mid-August, see HAT 175/7653 (18RA1214/20Aug1799) from the Grand Admiral to the Porte. While Saul claimed that the deputations did not reach İstanbul before October, they were in İstanbul in September according to McKnight. They set about their journey early in July and should have been in İstanbul by August. But it seems unnecessary delays occurred on the way, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 98-9, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 194.

the Ionian Islands, making it clear that the fate of the Islands would be decided in İstanbul. Remarkably, the British ambassador to the Porte, Smith and later Elgin, also encouraged the pro-Ottoman deputies in İstanbul because the old nobility was seeking the British protection for her role in Ionian commerce; thus pro-Ushakov party was totally outmaneuvered in İstanbul. Even Tomara did not support the Ushakov constitution as he was convinced that it alienated the nobles from the Russian cause.<sup>58</sup> Consequently, Ushakov's provisional constitution (May 1799), which favoured the notables over the nobles, was considered scandalous by the imperial centres.<sup>59</sup>

#### The Russo-Ottoman Convention (*Korfu Muahedesi*)

The allies refused to ratify Ushakov's provisional constitution and agreed on the preparation of another constitution in İstanbul by the active involvement of the Ionian deputies sent to the Porte. The new constitution was to restore the legacy of old Venetian rule.<sup>60</sup> The negotiations took a long time because of the diploma affair that will be described below. It has been assumed that the Porte made a *fait-a-compli* by presenting the imperial diploma during the ceremony of ratification of the convention and constitution in November 1800. However the minutes of the negotiations held earlier in the spring reveal that the diploma was a bone of contention between Tomara and the Ottoman plenipotentiaries even then.<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 194-199; Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 98-101.

<sup>59</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 66-68, 144-149.

<sup>60</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 150-158, 193-94; Count Antonio Capodistria, father of Ioannis Capodistria –elected governor of Greece (1828-1831)- was the most prominent pro-Ottoman deputy, see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 174; Uzunçarşılıoğlu, “Arşiv Vesikalarına Göre Yedi Ada Cümhuriyeti”, pp. 635-36.

<sup>61</sup> HAT 175/7599 minutes of the negotiations.



As the negotiations dragged on, the British ambassador tried to be involved in the negotiations. He proposed to negotiate the constitution in Corfu with the participation of the British, Russian, and Ottoman representatives as well as the senate in the case that the senate objected its negotiation in İstanbul. Nevertheless, the Ionian deputation assured the Porte that the senate donated them with full negotiating powers and refused the British proposal. It appears that the Porte sought the involvement of Russia and Britain in the negotiations in order to secure their recognition of the subjugation of the Ionians to the Porte, whereas the pro-Ottoman deputation seems to have had reservations about their involvement. After refusing the proposal rather curtly, they demanded the preparation of the constitution immediately in İstanbul.<sup>62</sup>

When the Ottomans inquired into the details of the former aristocratic rule in the islands, the deputies described it as in the following which gives an idea as how inappropriate they must have found the Ushakov constitution:<sup>63</sup>

There were two basic principles in the administration practiced during the Venetian rule. One is that the senators were to be nobles and the rabbles were not allowed to intervene. The other principle was that if an aristocratic dynasty ceased to exist, a new dynasty replaced the vacant position in the senate, provided that neither the head of the dynasty, nor his father, nor his grandfather was an artisan. In short, the administration of the republic was similar to that of Dubrovnik.

---

<sup>62</sup> HAT 175/7601.

<sup>63</sup> HAT 175/7601; “*Venedik vaktinde cari olan nizamda iki nev kaide vardır ki birisi senato erbabı asilzadegan zümresinden olub esafil-i nasa müdahale itdirilmez ve diğeri asilzadegandan bir hanedan münkariz olur ise ol-hanedan muattal olmamak için kendüsü ve babası ve büyük babası ashab-ı hureften olmayan birisi anın yerine nasb ile hanedan itibar olunur. Hasılı keyfiyet-i idare-i cumhuriye Dubrovnik Cumhuriyetine müşabihdir.*” The Ottoman advances tailored to imply the Ottoman approval of the former Venetian rule sound quite amusing for a modern student of the topic. The Ottoman representatives, Reis Efendi and İsmet Beğefendi, broached the issue by asking, “Would it not be nice if the Venetian times were to apply to [the present], and what was the mode of government like in those times?” (*Venedik vaktine tatbik olunsa güzel olmaz mı ve ol-zaman suret-i nizamları ne vechle idi ?*.)” The deputation gave the description above upon this question.

Satisfied with the description, the Ottomans instructed them to submit a draft of the new administrative system along these lines. The deputation had hesitations whether the Russian and British ambassadors would recognize their entitlement to prepare the constitution and asked the help of the Porte to secure their consent. Accordingly, they were to present the draft to the Porte, which would pass it on the Russian and British after the necessary adjustments so that it would have a control over the whole process.<sup>64</sup>

Widespread banditry was another issue taken up in the negotiations. According to the deputies the declaration of general amnesty by Ushakov accounted for the pillage and plunder that went on without hindrance. As a gesture of good will, however, they offered the inclusion of an article concerning repatriation of the bandits. The Porte, in turn, denounced the rumours that Ali Paşa was preparing to attack Corfu, assuring the deputation about the Porte's authority over its governor-paşa.<sup>65</sup>

The Russo-Ottoman Convention was signed on 3 April 1800. The Republic of Seven United Islands was inaugurated in two ceremonies held in St. Petersburg (18 October 1800) and İstanbul (6 November 1800). The prologue of the convention declared the liberation of the Ionians from 'the administration that attempted at popularizing the

---

<sup>64</sup> HAT 175/7601; the Ottomans warned the deputation not to include in the 'internal regulation' (constitution) anything that resembled the French system and wanted them to clean off the seeds of sedition and those 'seeds that might have already taken root' after the inauguration of the constitution: (*Fransız usûlüne muvafık bir nesne olmamak ve bade't-nizam Fransızın neşreylediği tohum-ı fesaddan adaların tahlisiyle tathir olunanlardan maada bazı rişe-gir olmuşları var ise anlar dahi...*).

<sup>65</sup> According to the Porte the rumors claiming "Ali Paşa of Tepelen will storm Corfu and do such and such" were groundless (*Tepedelenli Ali Paşa Korfu'ya hücum idecek ve şöyle eyleyecek böyle eyleyecek yollu*); Ali Paşa "cannot dare undertaking that sort of operations which run against the will and consent of the Sublime State" (*Devlet-i Aliye'nin izn u rızasına mugayir bu makule harekata cür'et*), HAT 175/7601. The Porte blamed Orío for the dissemination of such rumors. He submitted a list of damaged property belonging to Preveza and asked for financial compensation. Although the Porte ascribed the length of the list to its false nature, it promised to send an inspector to the region to take care of the list. This inspector must be the one we saw in Chapter III who surveyed the Dalmatian towns.

malicious intentions of abrogating the existing rules and regulations of the entire world.’ It stipulated that the new republic was to be subject to the Porte in the same manner of the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik), and Russia would guarantee the constitution and the integrity of the new Republic (arts. I-IV). Four coastal towns on the Dalmatian coastal strip were ceded to the Ottomans with several exemptions and privileges similar to those enjoyed by the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (arts. VIII-X). Following the Ragusan example, the new republic was to pay 75,000 *krş* to the Ottoman Empire once every three years (art. IV). However, this was a symbolic amount, equalling less than one percent of the senate’s revenue.<sup>66</sup>

In Ottoman eyes, the Ionian Republic was little different from Dubrovnik and the Principalities - a “buffer protectorate.”<sup>67</sup> The definition of the power relations between the Porte and the Principalities as suzerainty is a 19<sup>th</sup> century invention and notions of tributary, protection, vassalage, and autonomy actually reflected different aspects of the same reality in Ottoman juridical and political terminology. The differences between the

---

<sup>66</sup>HAT 176/7677 (8ZA1214/3Apr1800) the Russo-Ottoman Convention. The convention contained 12 articles with a prologue and epilogue. İbrahim İsmet Efendi –the *kazasker* of Rumeli- and Ahmed Atif Efendi –the Reisül’-küttab- represented the Ottoman side, while Tomara signed the treaty for the Russian side. Tomara was addressed as ‘the chevalier of the first rank of the order of St. Anna and the commandant of the independent order of St Jean de Jerusalem’ (*Santa Ana tabir olunur tarikin rütbe-i evvelisi kavalyiri ve Sen Jan de Jeruzalem tabir olunur tarik-i müstakilin komandolari*). Saul gave the date of the convention as 2 April 1800 (Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 99), whereas McKnight recorded it as 1 April; the sum equalled to 5,000 pounds sterling (18,750 francs) according to McKnight, see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 223-34; for the text of the convention, Stefanos Xenos, *East and West: A Diplomatic History of the Annexation of the Ionian Islands to the Kingdom of Greece...between 1799 and 1864* (London, 1865), pp. 219-22.

<sup>67</sup> This term is suggested by Panaite in order to avoid the confusion created by the uncritical application of the Western terminology, see Viorel Panaite, “Wallachia and Moldavia From The Ottoman Juridical And Political Viewpoint, 1774-1829” in A. Anastasopoulos and E. Kolovos (eds.), *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850*, p. 43. For the case of Ragusa see Panaite, *The Ottoman Law of War and Peace: the Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 154-55.

Ottoman tributaries in their relations with the Porte lay above all in the historical, geographical, political, diplomatic, and military circumstances of the time.<sup>68</sup> The wording of the articles of the Russo-Ottoman Convention concerning the political status of the Ionians as well as the tribute largely derived from Ottoman-Islamic law and thereby resembles the wording of similar arrangements for other tribute-payers. The procedure of tribute-paying, the grant of an imperial diploma and a banner, and the bestowal of robes of honour on the Ionian delegation all symbolized the subjugation of the Republic to the Porte in Ottoman political culture.<sup>69</sup>

However, both the Ottomans and the Russians took advantage of the terminological confusion in order to achieve real political goals related to the Ionian Republic.<sup>70</sup> From the Western or Russian perspective, the convention made the Ionian Islands virtually an independent state, like Ragusa, as it denied any real authority to the Porte and granted many privileges to the Ionians.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, the Ottomans considered that the status of the Principalities, the Ragusan Republic, and the Ionian Republic was regulated by Islamic law according to which the tribute they paid brought about mutual rights and responsibilities in different degrees. Consequently, the definition of the political status of the Ionian Republic as identical with Ragusa signified virtual

---

<sup>68</sup> For more information on the case of the Principalities, see Panaite, *Ottoman Law of War and Peace*, pp. 472-73.

<sup>69</sup> Panaite, *Ottoman Law of War and Peace*, p. 356; Panaite does not deal with the Ionian Republic.

<sup>70</sup> One of Selim's counselors (Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa?) favored the implementation of the *beglik* model (the Principalities) over the Ragusan model in the Ionian Islands, assuming that Corfu was conquered by the Ottoman troops rather than by the Russian fleet, TSA E.4004/4 (nd.) unsigned letter. This shows that power struggle between the allies cannot be reduced to the field of terminological differences, albeit, they provided a great leverage in diplomacy.

<sup>71</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 224.

independence for Russia, but submission for the Porte because of the incompatibility of the Western and Ottoman terminologies. The feudal terms ‘vassal’ and ‘suzerain’ were unknown to the Ottoman political terminology until the conclusion of the Russo-Ottoman convention.<sup>72</sup> The Ottomans considered the term vassal meant *tabi*‘ (political subject/dependent), *mahkum* (subject to a judge or ruler; that is, legally bound), and *mahmi* (guarded/protected), while they took suzerain to mean *metbu*‘ (sovereign/liege-lord), *hakim* (judge/ruler), *hami* (protector).<sup>73</sup> Furthermore, the constitution was a mere *nizam-ı dahili* (regulations concerning domestic affairs) as defined in the Article II of the Convention, while the afore-mentioned tribute was *cizye* (poll-tax) and the Republic was *cizye-güzar* (poll-tax payer). The Republic should pay the tribute by a special envoy sent to the Porte, which symbolized the acknowledgement of allegiance on the part of the Republic in the same manner as the Principalities and Ragusa. Conversely, Russia considered the tribute a symbolic one, tailored to exempt the Ionian merchants from capitation (*haraç/cizye*) and all other Ottoman taxes.<sup>74</sup>

---

<sup>72</sup> The Russo-Ottoman Convention serves as a correction to Panaite’s statement that the Western term “suzerainty” entered the Ottoman documents by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 in a study on the terminological problems in the literature on the Principalities, see Panaite, “Wallachia and Moldavia” and *Ottoman Law of War and Peace*, pp. 472-73. For the relevant article of the Convention refer to fn. 73.

<sup>73</sup> “[Devlet-i Aliye] *Cumhur-ı mezkurun sujereni yani hakim ve hami ve metbu ve Cumhur-ı mezkur dahi Devlet-i Aliye’nin vasalı yani tabii ve mahkum ve mahmisi olmakdan naşi işbu himaye merasimi canib-i Devlet-i Aliye’den tamamıyla Cumhur-ı mezkur hakkına icra oluna.*” Article I of the Convention HAT 176/7677 (3Apr1800); another reference to suzerainty is “...*vücut ve asil ve erkan ve sergerdelerinin kadr ve itibarları tezayüdü için lazım gelen vasallık istikmali emirlerine müsaade-yi seniye...*”, C.HRC 2050 (25Oct1800) order sent to the Poll-tax Bureau [*Cizye Kalemi*]; Cevdet Paşa also defines the power relation between the Porte and the Ionian Republic as a suzerainty, see, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, p. 51.

<sup>74</sup> “*Cumhur-ı mezkur canib-i Saltanat-ı Seniye’ye tabiiyetini işaren ve Devlet-i Aliye’nin metbuiyet ve himayetini itirafen tezayüd ve noksan kabul itmeme şartıyla ber-vech-i maktu üç senede bir kere 75,000 guruş cizye edasına muteahhid olub işbu virgü Dubrovniklünün virgüsü teslim olundukça vaki olan rüsum gibi Cumhur-ı mezkur tarafından dahi resmen elçiler irsaliyle Hazine-i Amire’ye teslim oluna. Ve meblağ-ı merkumdan mada Cumhur-ı mezkur ahar bir güne virgü veda itmeye. Ve reayası Dubrovnik Cumhuri*

### The Diploma (*Nişan-ı Hümayun*)

The Ottomans tried to entrench their hold in the Islands through several means the most important of which was the granting of an imperial diploma (*menşur/nişan-i ali*) to the Ionian deputation. While it is not acknowledged in the literature, the “constitution” was limited to the organization of the internal administration of the Republic from the Ottoman point of view. The regulation of its foreign affairs, by contrast, should be handled by the bestowal of an imperial diploma in conjunction with the Ottoman politico-judicial culture.<sup>75</sup> Alarmed, Russia demanded that the diploma should be identical with the one presented to Ragusa, but the Ottomans rejected the demand on several grounds. Ragusa had obtained its diploma five centuries earlier with certain privileges. It had been an independent republic before the Ottoman rule unlike the Ionians. Moreover, it was a Catholic state, whereas Ionians were of the Orthodox belief, implying that the new Republic naturally fell within the orbit of Ottoman sovereignty.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, the diploma

---

*reyası misillü Memalik-i Mahruse-yi Hakaniye’de cizye ve tekalif-i sairenin mecmuundan muaf ve müsellemlen olmağla...*” Article IV of the Convention HAT 176/7677; for the Russian perspective see, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p, 224. On the ceremony of tribute-paying as an acknowledgement of allegiance, see Panait, *Ottoman Law of War and Peace*, pp. 208-210.

<sup>75</sup> The diploma was appended to the Russo-Ottoman Convention together with the constitution on 3 April 1800, see HAT 176/7671 (13C1215/1Nov1800), BOA, Bab-ı Asafi Defterleri Kataloğu, A.DVN.DVE 105/1 Yedi Adalar Ahkam ve Berat Defteri , no. 4, p. 3-5 (hereafter A.DVN.DVE 105/1); C. HRC 1988 (3Apr1800); C. HRC 4691(3Apr1800); C.HRC 2050 (25Oct1800) all of them contain the text of the imperial diploma (*nişan-ı şerif-i alişan*); for a detailed analysis of different types of Ottoman documents such as diploma (*nişan*), capitulations/treaties (*ahdname*), see D. Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Century). An Annotated Edition of ‘Ahdnames and Other Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 3-86.

<sup>76</sup> HAT 175/7599 minutes of negotiations of the Russo-Ottoman convention. Tomara complained bitterly from the Ottoman *fait a compli* –the diploma dispute. He claimed that Paul was accusing him of being too lenient towards the Porte. He brought up the issue of Ali Paşa’s confrontation with some Russians in Prevesa and insisted on appointing a Christian governor to these towns. The Ottomans, however, claimed that a Muslim governor was better suited to keep these towns free from outside intervention which was meant to be Ali Paşa. They also pointed out that the expense of the upkeep and maintenance of the fortresses of these towns would inevitably exceed the revenues to be accrued from them.

presented to the Ionian Republic laid down obligations although such diplomas usually only granted privileges. It stated that the republic was a vassal state of the Ottomans and thus it should not aid the enemies of the Porte in any war. It should not shelter the Greek subjects either. On the other hand, it acknowledged the titles of the Ionian nobles, referring to them as “*beg*” and “*knez*”.<sup>77</sup> Such arrangements concerning the political duties of the tributaries and titulature were common in the relations between the Porte and the tributaries.<sup>78</sup> Russians, nevertheless, considered the diploma a violation of the agreement and this caused a rupture with the Porte for five years.<sup>79</sup> Russian reservations about the diploma were based on the fact that it gave the Ottomans a legal pretext to interfere with the Ionian affairs. When the Russo-Ottoman war broke out in 1806, the Porte demanded the Ionians remain neutral, as stipulated in the diploma.

By 1800, Paul’s interest in the Ionian Islands was waning as a result of his frustration with his allies. Therefore the Ionian deputies in St. Petersburg were largely neglected. His indifference was best illustrated by the ratification of the Convention only in late August although it had been signed in the beginning of April. In reaction to the diploma crisis Paul neither ratified nor rejected the Constitution and the diploma although he ratified the Russo-Ottoman Convention.<sup>80</sup> Thus, “by the terms of the Convention Emperor Paul was the guarantor of a constitution which he did not ratify.”<sup>81</sup> The Ottomans were confused when no ratification of the constitution appeared from the

---

<sup>77</sup> C.HRC 2050; A.DVN.DVE 105/1, no.4, pp. 3-5.

<sup>78</sup> Panaite, *Ottoman Law of War and Peace*, pp. 340-51, 378.

<sup>79</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 221, 225-27.

<sup>80</sup> Paul signed the ratification on 26 August. According to McKnight the Porte ratified the convention and the constitution on 6 November 1800, McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 226, 241.

<sup>81</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 37.

correspondence of Paul in November 1800. Tomara explained the situation in a rather unsatisfactory way for the Ottomans. According to him, Paul refrained from interfering with the ‘internal arrangements’ of the islands and left the decision upon the mode of government to the deputies of the Republic. Tomara hinted –or, at least the Porte thought him hinting- that no ratification of Paul was needed to inaugurate the constitution while an imperial decree disclosing the Ottoman approval would suffice to ratify the constitution. The Porte, however, feared that the ratification of the constitution only by one side might compromise its legitimacy in the eyes of the other –Russia- which might use it as a pretext to question its validity in the future. Therefore, the Porte resorted to its usual weapon of petition; it staged the submission of a petition by the deputation that requested the granting of the necessary imperial decree. This was hoped to arm the Ottoman ratification with additional power. On 1 November the delegates submitted the petition requesting the approval of the ‘domestic regulations’ and the Porte decided to grant it upon their ‘insistence;’ the Porte also hoped to show by this manoeuvre that its decree was the outcome of a unanimous opinion formed by the Ionians on the constitution.<sup>82</sup> Nevertheless, the constitution would have to undergo major revisions in 1803 due to widespread disturbances in the Ionians.

The Ionian delegacy sent to Istanbul had several goals in mind in addition to the establishing of the rule of the nobility in the Republic and the annexation of the Venetian Albania. The expansion of Ionian commercial links into the Levant through obtaining

---

<sup>82</sup> HAT 176/7671 (nd.) the memorandum of the deputy Grand vizier; HAT 176/7671-A (13C1215/1Nov1800) the petition of the Ionian deputation.



commercial privileges as well as protection against the Barbary corsairs and Ali Paşa were indispensable to the welfare of the burgeoning Republic.<sup>83</sup> These were legitimate demands of a tributary state from the perspective of the Porte. In return, it considered the expatriation of the refugees from the mainland and the prevention of the recruitment of the Ionians by foreign powers, that is, Russia, as a prerequisite to the stabilisation of this frontier zone.

The ceding of the four towns to the Ottoman Empire caused consternation on the part of the Ionians who were dependent for the grain on the mainland, as the Ionians produced only a third of the food consumed in the islands.<sup>84</sup> Through occupying these towns, the Porte hoped to extend its authority over the traditional foes, namely, the warlike tribes of the Tsamides (*Çam*), the Souliotes (*Suli*), and the Khimariots (*Hımar*). One of the issues the diploma raised was the question of fugitives. From the early Ottoman centuries onwards, these towns had served as a hiding place and a passageway to the Ionian Islands for the unruly inhabitants of the Venetian Albania. The diploma

---

<sup>83</sup> HAT 258/14875 (7Sept1799) suggests that Ali Paşa was involved in piracy. His ships attacked on two Ionian vessels; in another interesting case of piracy, Tunisian corsairs preyed on 3 Sardinian ships. Upon the request of the king of Sardinia, one of the Russian ships within the Baltic squadron that just arrived to reinforce Ushakov had actually escorted these ships. Nevertheless, the Tunisian captain Muhammed Reis did not show respect to the Russian flag and took these ships to Tunis as his prizes with the Russian warship in chase. Although the sailors were released, the Russian captain could not get back the ships and their load as they had already been sold. When Tomara was involved in the matter, the Porte ordered the returning of the ships and goods. The Tunisians were told that even though there was no treaty between Sardinia and the Porte, the Sardinian ships flying Russian flags should be respected. As of 6 April 1802, the matter was unresolved, C.HRC 5647 (earlyCA1215/20-29Sept1800) decree to the governor of Tunis; HAT 259/14932 (3Z1216/6Apr1802) minutes of the audience with Tomara.

<sup>84</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 95, 175, 225.

strictly prohibited the Ionians from hiding the fugitives, while the Ionians adamantly denied such accusations.<sup>85</sup>

The agreement reached with the Porte on the towns was actually a favourable one; drawing on the example of the Principalities, the Convention (art. 8) forbade Muslims to live in there, while their inhabitants had full religious freedom.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, in order to prevent outside intervention, the diploma restricted the right of owning property in the four towns to Ottoman subjects (Christians), the people of the towns, and the subjects of the Republic. Thus, when Mocenigo attempted to buy the fishing enclosure and the land in Butrinto from its former owner who resided in Corfu, Ali Paşa, who managed the enclosure as a tax-farm, strongly opposed this, basing his arguments on the diploma.<sup>87</sup>

### The Flag

The granting of a banner was another symbol of the Porte's relationship with its tributaries. The Ionian flag was designed in İstanbul with the consent of St. Petersburg in such a way that it represented the subject status of the new republic. The Ottomans stipulated that the flag would be a modified version of the lion of St Mark, which was the symbol of Venice. It should not feature any symbol of the French Republic in the French

---

<sup>85</sup> For Ali Paşa's persecution of these fugitives, see P. Stathis, "From Klepths and Armatoloi to Revolutionaries", pp. 167-79.

<sup>86</sup> HAT 176/7677.

<sup>87</sup> C. Maliye 22780 (12S1219/23May1804); the Porte farmed out the fishing enclosure and its vicinity to Ali Paşa at the annual payment of 10,000 *krş*. This facility had been given to a Corfiote merchant (Golemi ?) in the form of *çiftlik* in Venetian times. As Ali Paşa got wind of the deal between the former owner and Mocenigo, he requested the permission of the Porte either to 'lure' the merchant to deliver the relevant deeds and documents or to expropriate the farm. It is not clear, though, how it might be possible for the Treasury of the New Revenues to confiscate a fishing enclosure that was in the possession of its subject as a *çiftlik* and farm it out to Ali Paşa when the diploma clearly stated that 'the subjects will retain their possessions they had prior to the conquest' (*kable'l-feth yedlerinde mazbut olan arazi ibka olunmak*).

flag such as a pillar and bouquet. Thus the flag featured seven arrows instead of pillars, representing the seven islands. Furthermore, in order to symbolize the Ottoman status as the protector, a red strip contouring the margins was added to the flag and the hegira date 1214 (1800) was put on the upper left as the date of the liberation of the islands from the French rule.<sup>88</sup> Paul approved the design of the flag and proposed that the hegira date should be written against a background in red to increase the degree of symbolism, which would become a subject of mockery among the Ionians.<sup>89</sup>

In the summer of 1800 the dispute over the design of flag occupied the Porte and the Ionian deputation. The matter stemmed from the Habsburgs' decision to continue to use the Venetian flags in the ships of its former Venetian subjects, which necessitated the design of a new flag for the Ionian Republic. The Ionian deputation proposed different versions to the Porte. The Ottomans refused the one with an ocean blue background on the grounds that it rather looked "greenish" and thus was improper –presumably, in terms of religious sensitivities. The Ottomans proposed another flag featuring the St. Mark lion against a deep-blue background contoured with a red strip. The deputies, nevertheless, added seven columns to it in order to symbolize the unity of the islands. This time, the Ottomans objected that such flags were supposed to be as plain and simple as possible whereas the proposed flag bordered on 'picture' (*tasvir suretini kesb ideceği...*).

---

<sup>88</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 96-104; "sütun nişanı Fransız bayrağına müşabih olmamak için suret-i diğere ifrağı kendülere tenbih..." HAT 175/7600 (late summer 1800) a transcription of the document and the Ionian flag could be found in İ. H. Uzunçarşılıoğlu, "Arşiv Vesikalarına Göre Yedi Ada Cümhuriyeti", pp. 632-33, 640; HAT 165/6904 (28Nov1800).

<sup>89</sup> HAT 176/7662 (summer of 1800). The transcription of the document can be found in Uzunçarşılıoğlu, "Arşiv Vesikalarına Göre Yedi Ada Cümhuriyeti", pp. 636-37; the stamp of the Ionian ambassador features only the lion of St Mark with seven arrows, see C. HRC 5178 (10Aug1803), C. HRC 1244 (12Aug1804) McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 241-42.

Consequently, the deputies tried to find the middle ground by revising the flag offered by the Ottomans. Accordingly, that flag featured the hegira date that symbolized their subjugation as well as ‘the other decoration required by their religion’ (the cross?). It had a sky blue background and contoured with a red strip.<sup>90</sup>

Illustration I. The flag of the Republic of the Seven United Islands



Notes: BOA, HAT 175/7601.

Legal status of the Ionians –the former Venetian subjects

After the Campo Formio, both Paris and Vienna demanded trading privileges (Capitulations) for their new subjects living on the former Venetian realms.<sup>91</sup> Apparently, as late as 4 March 1798 the Porte did not apply the treaties on trade privileges with

<sup>90</sup> HAT 175/7600 (late summer 1800); the flag that was agreed upon actually has a deep blue background.

<sup>91</sup> BOA, A.AMD 39/75 (25Ş1212/12Feb1798) from Porte to İbrahim Afif Efendi, ambassador to Vienna; Cevdet Paşa mistakenly stated that the initial demands were accentuated in late Ramadan –a month later-, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 281.

France to the new French subjects in the Ionian Islands and of the Dalmatian coasts.<sup>92</sup> This partly stemmed from political concerns on the part of the Porte as it was reluctant to recognize the demise of Venice. But it was also true that the Porte was concerned about the repetition of the İzmir affair in which a terrible fight between the Ionians and the town dwellers the previous year had compelled the Porte to ban the Ionians from the town.<sup>93</sup> Presumably, hostile relations of the ‘Western Hearts’ (the corsairs of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers) with the Ionians was of major concern to all parties as well. Vienna urged the Porte to send imperial decrees to North African appendages banning them from attacking those former Venetian merchants who became the subjects of the Emperor after Campo Formio. When the matter was brought up to the attention of Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa, he argued against the idea of sending imperial decrees to that effect before negotiating the matter with the authorities of North African appendages. The decree should be sent only after securing their consent to honor the relevant articles of Campo Formio. This shows how the ‘powerless *fermans*’ –a fashionable motive of traveler literature- functioned in regulating the relations of the Porte with the provinces. İbrahim Efendi was to explain to the court of Vienna that this decision did not mean a rejection of its demand.<sup>94</sup> As of May 1798 -that is, just two months before the invasion of

---

<sup>92</sup> Ruffin reminded the Porte of the fifth article of Campo Formio which declared the Ionian Islands and the four Dalmatian towns (Vonitsa, Butrinto, Parga, Preveza) as territory of France, HAT 241/13522 (16N1212/4March1798) from French *charge d'affaires* to the Porte.

<sup>93</sup> *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 281.

<sup>94</sup> A.AMD 39/75 (25Ş1212/12Feb1798) from Porte to İbrahim Efendi. A protocol (*mazbata*) was prepared that envisioned the inducing of the North African appendages to stop attacking the former Venetian subjects and İbrahim Efendi was provided with a copy so as to submit it the Viennese court; Ali Efendi's report reflects the tensions between the Porte and the Algiers. He describes the Algerian envoy sent to Paris upon the Algerian declaration of war on Britain as ‘the Jew who stays in Paris allegedly as ambassador’

Alexandria- the Porte had not yet sent out the demanded orders that recognized the Ionians as French subjects to the dismay of Talleyrand. Harassed by the Minister's incessant instructions, Ruffin reminded the Porte that the Ionians were likely to accuse the French consuls in İzmir, Crete and the Morea of laxity for the delay of the decree.<sup>95</sup>

The legal status of the former Venetian subjects in the Ottoman Empire was very complicated for all sides. The French and Habsburg claims notwithstanding, there were many Ionian refugees who fled their homes because of the French invasion. Prior to the Egyptian Expedition, the Porte allowed those Ionians who had married and stayed in the Morea to live in the province as long as they had sureties. Those single ones, however, had to be expatriated. After the declaration of war on France, the Porte made a u-turn by acknowledging that the Ionian refugees became French subjects under compulsion. Thus, Mustafa Paşa, the governor of the Morea, was ordered to distribute the head-tax documents to those Ionians who wanted to be Ottoman subject and send those who wanted to serve with the navy to Admiral (*Kapudane*) Abdülkadir Beg. Furthermore, the Porte decreed that the Ionian refugees in İstanbul were not to be subjected to the same (mis)treatment as were the French and that they were either to serve in the Ottoman fleet bound for the Adriatic or to be sent to their countries upon their will.<sup>96</sup>

---

(...*guya elçi olarak Paris'de mukim bir nefer yehudin...*), HAT 142/5882 (23L1212/10Apr1798) from Ali Efendi to the Porte.

<sup>95</sup> HAT 246/13902 (15Z1212/31May1798) from Ruffin to the Porte; Cevdet Paşa related that the Porte finally decided to issue the necessary decrees with employing a careful language so that the decree would not mean the recognition of the partitioning of Venice, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VI, p. 281.

<sup>96</sup> C.HRC 367 (earlyR1213/midSept1798) from Porte to Mustafa Paşa. Decrees of the same kind were also sent to İbrahim Paşa of İskenderiye (Scutari), Şehsuvar Paşa, the holder of the *muqataas* of Dıraç and Tiran, C.HRC 1491 (1B1213/9Dec1798), C.HRC 2320 (23CA1213/2Nov1798).

After the foundation of the Republic, the Porte exempted those refugees who had not already been listed in the head-tax registers from paying the capitation.<sup>97</sup> However, the local officials usually ignored such orders and demanded its payment from all the refugees.<sup>98</sup> The refugees became a bone of contention between the Republic and the Porte since the Ionian consulates allowed them to fly the Ionian flag by distributing patents as though they were Ionian subjects. The Porte, however, prohibited the issuance of patents to those refugees who had moved to the Ottoman realms before the date of the granting of the imperial diploma, and ordered the local officials to protect the immigrants from the transgression of the Ionian consulates.<sup>99</sup> The Porte and the Republic, however, cooperated against those Ionians who flew the Ionian flag without the patent as they caused trouble to both sides.<sup>100</sup>

### The Ionian trade

Finally, we should mention the commercial privileges granted to the Ionian Republic as another facet of Ottoman-Ionian relations. In 1783, a Russian decree had permitted foreign vessels to fly the Russian flag and Ionians profited from trade with Russia as carriers for Russian imports and exports. By the fall of Venice, certain limitations on the trade of the Ionian Islands came to an end. But the Ionian trade suffered considerably from the British embargo during the French occupation. Thus, the expulsion

---

<sup>97</sup> C. HRC 4836 (20Jan1799).

<sup>98</sup> C. HRC 1313 (28March1801).

<sup>99</sup> C. HRC 3067 (mid-October 1801).

<sup>100</sup> C. HRC 7774 (27Feb1804).

of the French also meant new prospects for the expansion of trade.<sup>101</sup> According to the treaty, the new Republic would pay 6 to 9 % customs to the Ottomans like Dubrovnik and had the right to participate in the Black Sea trade.

The Black Sea trade was predominately Russo-Turkish, but most of the Ottoman, Austrian, and Russian ships were really Greek and Italian.<sup>102</sup> The opening of the Black Sea to international trade was one of the major concerns of the Ottoman reformers in this era. Backed by Russia even the minor European states such as the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and Denmark sought to enter the Black Sea, which the Ottomans had traditionally considered as an internal sea indispensable to the provisioning of İstanbul.<sup>103</sup> As a measure the Ottomans revised the commercial privileges given to foreign merchants and allowed the merchants of a number of minor European states to enter the Black Sea with their own flag to prevent them from flying the Russian flag.<sup>104</sup> On 22 August 1799, Ottomans and Russians agreed upon a new tariff that would replace the previous one granted in 1783. The new tariff modified the prices of the goods to increase the custom revenues of the Porte.<sup>105</sup> By October 1801, the Porte expanded the Russian tariff so as to

---

<sup>101</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 70.

<sup>102</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 177-78. 4,184 Ottoman merchants entered the Black Sea in 1780-1846. 2,420 of them were Muslim (73%), see İ. Bostan, "İzn-i Sefine Defterleri ve Karadeniz'de Rusya ile Ticaret Yapan Devlet-i Aliyye Tüccarları, 1780-1846" in İ. Bostan (ed.), *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), p. 333.

<sup>103</sup> Bostan, "Rusya'nın Karadeniz'de Ticarete Başlaması ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 1700-1787" in İ. Bostan (ed.), *Beylikten İmparatorluğa*: 285-325.

<sup>104</sup> Beydilli, "Karadeniz'in Kapalılığı Karşısında Avrupa Küçük Devletleri ve 'Miri Ticaret' Teşebbüsü," *Bellekten* LV: 214 (1991): 687-755.

<sup>105</sup> C. HRC 5963 (22Aug1799). The document explained the reason for the renewal of the tariff as increasing the customs revenues. The new tariff system aimed at standardization in different customhouses of the empire by listing the ruling prices of the goods and the related dues on them. The tariff was to be valid for 14 years. As the actual revenues decreased in relation to the increasing prices, the Ottomans called



include Sweden and the Republic, which favoured the Ionian merchants by reducing the customs duties to 3 % for the exports and imports, and to 5 % for the goods they bought and sold within the Ottoman borders.<sup>106</sup>

The figures suggest that the Ionian merchants benefited immensely from the new arrangement after which the number of Ionian ships in the Black Sea rose to 100 (in 1804) from 37 (in 1803).<sup>107</sup> Within a couple of years, the Republic opened consulates throughout the Mediterranean islands as well as in important commercial towns such as

---

for a renewal in 1793 even before the termination of the tariff, but Russia did not accept it. Thus, it could only be renewed in 1801. Among others, the Russian tariff was the most advantageous and caused many problems between the Porte and other foreign states trading with the Ottoman Empire. For the details see M. Fidan, “Osmanlı-Rus Ticari Rekabetinin İki Devlet Arasında Yapılan Antlaşmalara Yansıması”, *Tarih Dergisi* 44 (2006): 65-122. This study also includes all of the Russo-Ottoman trade agreements in 1700-1862; for an analysis of the British tariffs see, M. Kütükoğlu, “Tanzimat Devri Osmanlı-İngiliz Gümrük Tarifeleri”, *TED* 4-5 (19734/75): 335-93. She concluded that the reduction of the custom dues in percentage was compensated by the increasing volume of foreign trade which prevented a treasury loss; Kütükoğlu remarked that the earliest tariff she could date was the British tariff (1794/95), correcting the conventional date of 1838 (the ill-famous British-Ottoman convention). Fidan viewed the Russo-Ottoman trade agreement of 1783 as a tariff agreement, see Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri, 1580-1850* (Ankara, 1974), v. I, p. 70, fn. 33; Fidan, “Osmanlı-Rus Ticaret Rekabetinin”, p. 76; for the tariff agreements with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (1801 and 1851) see, Ş. Turan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile İki Sicilya Krallığı arasındaki ticaretle ilgili Gümrük tarife defteri”, *Belgeler* IV/7-8 (1967): 79-167. Turan related the preparation of the tariff registers to the trade agreement with France in 1740 (p. 82).

<sup>106</sup> A.DVN.DVE 105/1, no.709, p. 93; C. HRC 4554 (27Oct1801) the tariff agreement with the Republic. C. Maliye 64/2912 (13-23Apr1802); C. HRC 4384 (after August 1802); decrees were sent out to provinces in order to instruct the local authorities about the commercial privileges of the Ionians before the ratification of the convention as the dates of several correspondence suggest, C.HRC 4137 (earlyC1215/20-29Oct1800) order sent to Candia (Crete) and reply of the *kadı* of Candia 7Ş1215/24Dec1800, other replies from Resmo (Rethymnon) and Hanya were dated 24 December 1800, while the reply of the *kadı* of Bozcaada (Tenedos) 18 November – 17 December 1800, C.HRC 290; a similar order was sent to Ali Paşa of Yanya in late October (C.HRC 4044); such orders were sent as afar places as Anapa, C.HRC 2155 (1S1216/13Jun1801); G. Vlachos, M. *ΕΠΙΤΑΝΗΣΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ: Ο Κανονισμός της Ναυτιλίας (1803/1805)* [*The Merchant Marine Regulation 1803/1805 of the Ionian Republic*] (Athens, 2005).

<sup>107</sup> HAT 176/7749 (1803-1804), 100 Ionian ships in addition to 150 Habsburg ships and 150 Russian ships engaged in the wheat trade in the Black Sea on this particular time.

İzmir, Salonica, Aleppo, Acre, and Alexandria.<sup>108</sup> However, the local Ottoman officials resisted the extension of the privileges of Russian merchants to the Ionians, for it would cause a loss in their revenues. The Ionian merchants not only complained from the arbitrariness of local officials but also argued that the new tariff had allowed them to participate in the domestic maritime trade without having to pay the higher internal customs.<sup>109</sup> This, coupled with the demand for capitation under force despite the Porte's prohibition, was the most common problem the Ionians faced in the Ottoman realms.

The petitions submitted to the Porte by the Embassy of the Ionian Republic shed light to the problems arouse in the customhouses. The Ottoman officials usually demanded extra fees, raising the official tax from 3 % to 10-12 %.<sup>110</sup> The new regulation seems to have caused confusion on both sides. While the Ottoman officials usually ignored the differences in the taxation of foreign trade and domestic trade, the Ionian merchants indiscriminately referred to the tariff in order to escape the much higher internal customs.<sup>111</sup> The Narde customhouse, for instance, used the new afore-mentioned regulation on domestic trade as a pretext to raise the total taxes and fees to 20-25 % under

---

<sup>108</sup> A.DVN.DVE 105/1, no.709 provides the necessary information on Ottoman-Ionian trade in 1799-1807. The exports and imports carried by the Ionian vessels were olive oil, dried raisins, iron, wine, vinegar, dried figs and oranges, and salted fish.

<sup>109</sup> The taxation rates in customhouses ranged between 6.6 % and 20-25 % instead of the official 3 %. C. HRC 4384; C. HRC 5118 (15Apr1803); C. HRC 1244 (12Aug1804), C. HRC 1252 (25Oct-4Nov1804); C.HRC 5178 (10Aug1803).

<sup>110</sup> C. HRC 5118 (15Apr1803); C. HRC 1244 (12Aug1804); C. HRC 1252 (25Oct-4Nov1804).

<sup>111</sup> The internal custom dues were *amediyeye* (due paid at the destination point in domestic trade), *reftiye* (due paid at the point of departure in domestic trade), *masdariye* (due paid at the Ottoman port in foreign trade), *müruriye* (transit due), Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz*, v. I., p. 62; C. HRC 4384, the Eğriboz customhouse taxed the Ionian merchant Giovanni Raimondo for the exports he brought on the ratio of 6.6 % instead of 3%; C. Maliye 63/2891 (July-August 1805), *Nikoli Karoni* from Ithaca even refused to pay the 3 % tax for the iron, wool, and caviar he brought to Chios.

several headings including gratuity, stamp fee, receipt money, and customs duties despite the imperial order forbidding such abuses.<sup>112</sup>

The Ottoman suzerainty was also meant to protect the Ionian merchants from the raids of the Barbary corsairs, who resumed their operations in the Adriatic as the ban on conducting piracy in the region was virtually lifted after the fall of Venice. There were at least 10 Barbary corsairs operating in the Adriatic, not mentioning the French privateers and Epirote pirates, all haunting the Ionian merchant shipping in the region.<sup>113</sup> Protection against the Barbary corsairs was one of the major concessions the Ionian delegacy got in Istanbul. Notably, orders sent to the Deys of Algiers and Tunis induced them to respect the Ionian flag as stipulated by the diploma. Nevertheless, Ottoman documents reveal that piracy continued to be a problem in this vulnerable frontier zone, causing protests of the Ionian envoy and the Russian ambassador.<sup>114</sup> One interesting case is that of Captain *Istemanelo* (Stamatelos Pagonis) from Cephalonia who had murdered the Muslim merchants embarked on his ship in İzmir and was arrested in the port of Balyebadra (Patra) with the 6 sailors on the ship. The Porte ordered that all his possessions on the ship be confiscated and sold for 20,000 *krş*, which was to be sent to Şeremet Beg in Corfu as the winter pay of the Ottoman marines in the Adriatic.<sup>115</sup>

---

<sup>112</sup> C.HRC 5178 (10Aug1803).

<sup>113</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 232-33.

<sup>114</sup> A.DVN.DVE 105/1 for similar cases; C. HRC 3428 (20Jul1804) for the Ionian vessel taken by the Tunisians; C. HRC 4986 (7-16Sept1804).

<sup>115</sup> C. BHR 9421 (25Oct1802).

### Dispute over the tribute

The dispute over the tribute between the allies exemplified the conflicting power struggle between the allies. Russia was strict about the implementation of the Ragusan model, as it understood it. For instance, it managed to halve the amount of the Ionian tribute, arguing that the tribute of Ragusa had also been decreased.<sup>116</sup> In late November 1804, the Porte was expecting the payment of 37,500 *krş* by the Ionian Republic as tribute in the near future.<sup>117</sup>

The Porte forgave the tribute of Ragusa for three years upon the republic's request as it faced financial depredations because of the Napoleonic wars. When the Ionian envoy brought only the half of the tribute in 1803, the Porte did not accept it. Italinski, who replaced Tomara in İstanbul, claimed that Tomara and the Porte had agreed on the reduction of the Ionian tribute, following the example of Dubrovnik. Curiously, the Russian and Ottoman minutes of the negotiations conflicted with each other on the subject. Tomara had already sent the good news to St Petersburg and the Ionian islands. According to Italinski, the news had helped quelling the rebellion in the islands and the Porte should not dispute over the issue any more. It was true that Tomara and Mustafa Reşid Efendi met at Küçükusu on 25 June 1802 to discuss the matter. Mustafa Reşid only

---

<sup>116</sup> HAT 175/7655.

<sup>117</sup> C. HRC 2052 (27Nov1804); the Ionian envoy submitted the tribute in the presence of Selim III on November 28, 1804, M.A. Beyhan (ed.), *Saray Günlüğü (1802-1809)* (İstanbul, Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2007), p. 160. According to the correspondence of the Ottoman consul in Corfu, the Ionians were requesting a further reduction in the tribute as late as 3 November 1807; that is after the Treaty of Tilsit (8 July 1807), see H. Baha Öztunç, *Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti* (Gazi Osman Paşa Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2007), pp. 39, 78. While Öztunç adhered to the views of Karal and Uzunçarşılı in approaching Ottoman-Ionian relations, he provided a Turkish translation of the Ionian Constitution, though with many flaws as he admitted.

accepted to evaluate the Russian ‘pledge’ for revising the tribute (*rehin-i kabul*). There should not have been a misunderstanding since Tomara made several official inquiries for the final decision of the Porte after this audience. Thus, the Porte was confused by the contradicting minutes of the audience.<sup>118</sup> It concluded that Tomara and the dragoman Fonton were bribed by the Ionians to arrange for this *fait-a-compli* and ascribed Italinsky’s insistence on the subject to his pretensions to take the credit for the reduction of the tribute; in Ottomans’ point view, such pretensions of protecting the non-Muslims were the outcomes of ‘the nature of the Franks’ (*tabiat-ı Efrenciye iktizası üzere*).<sup>119</sup>

It was impossible to extend a one-time exemption to the Republic as Russia mistakenly thought that the Ionian tribute was halved on a permanent basis. The Porte pointed out that the original tribute was already too low to meet the sums the Porte had to spend on the Ionian affairs which amounted to a thousand purses (500,000 *krş*). Italinsk, however, reminded that the tribute was meant to stress the status of the Republic as the Porte’s tribute-payer (*cizyegüzar*) and it should not be considered as a sort of war indemnity (*intikam*: lit., revenge). For the Ottomans, the acceptance of the request would be a sign of humiliation (*tedenni*) for the Porte, whereas rejection would lead to Russian ‘naggings’ (*zırıldı*). Italinski, nevertheless, maintained that what mattered for the Porte’s honour and dignity was the payment of the tribute as a symbolic gesture of submission and not the amount of the sum; after all the ‘deduced sum was insignificant for the

---

<sup>118</sup> HAT 7601-B (15L1218/28Jan1804) the memorandum of Italinski. Mustafa Reşid was the ‘reisü’l-küttab of the Imperial Stir-up’ (*Rikab-ı Hümayun*), serving as a deputy to the Reis Efendi Mahmud Raif who was in Egypt.

<sup>119</sup> HAT 175/7655; HAT 256/14628 (15CA1218/2Sept1803) draft memorandum.

Sublime Porte which was among the Greatest States' (...*düvel-i muazzamadan olan saltanat-ı seniyye indinde cüz'iyat makulesi...*).<sup>120</sup>

### Disorders in the Ionians

The Ionian peasants, notables, and the Russian officials in the Ionian Islands were totally frustrated with the new constitution and pejoratively called it “the Byzantine Constitution.”<sup>121</sup> It is worth noting that Ottomans systematically portrayed the supporters of the Ushakov’s provisional constitution as “Jacobins” to manipulate St. Petersburg<sup>122</sup> and sought the participation of Russia in the preparation of the new constitution in order to prevent any Russian objection in the future as mentioned above. Ottomans officially regarded the disturbances as ‘sedition and rebellion’ (*fitne u ihtilal*).<sup>123</sup>

Both the new constitution and the afore-mentioned diploma became a major concern to the Russian officers as well as the commoners, causing various riots and disorders, especially in Zante and Cephalonia. Ottoman officials in Corfu suspected that the Russian officers were the main instigators of these upheavals.<sup>124</sup> Tomara, the Russian ambassador to İstanbul, represented official Russian policy as opposed to the political

---

<sup>120</sup> Italinski also made it explicit that the Republic was a buffer state protecting the Porte and its occupation by another state would have cost the Ottomans much more than a thousand purse of *krş*, see HAT 7601-B (15L1218/28Jan1804) the memorandum of Italinski; HAT 256/14628 (15CA1218/2Sept1803) draft memorandum.

<sup>121</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 223-24.

<sup>122</sup> McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 169-173, 194-199; İstanbul was convinced that the political dissention was the work of “the gang whose repulsion and destruction would be preferable as it dared perpetrating deceitfulness and wickedness at the time it emerged in France”, namely, the Jacobins (*mukaddema Fransada hin-i zuhurunda enva-ı mekyara ve mefaside tasaddileri takribiyle def u kahrları iltizam olunan gürühdan...*), HAT 176/7716 (15N1216/19Jan1802).

<sup>123</sup> HAT 176/7671 (1800-1801); HATT 175/7601 (1800-1801); for an introduction to the topic of Ottoman mutinies as a new topic of scholarly interest see, J. Hathaway (ed.), *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 8/1-2 (2002) [special issue].

<sup>124</sup> HAT 156/6520-B (24Jun1800).

improvisations and experimentations of Russian officers such as Ushakov, Borozdin, and Tizenghausen. In a letter addressing the Ionian senate, he asserted that the disorders stemmed from the populace's ignorance about the Russo-Ottoman Convention. Assuring the senate that the Republic was fully recognized as a state in the Convention, he urged the senators not to be concerned about the diploma since the international status of the Republic was guaranteed by all the European powers. He tried to appease the Ionians by claiming that the political status of the Republic was far superior to that of Ragusa, while the four towns had more privileges than the free towns in Germany.<sup>125</sup>

The official memorandum delivered to Britain reflected the Ottoman official outlook, the senate had invited some of the public representatives to negotiate their demands for a change of constitution, but they seized on the opportunity to overhaul 'the internal regulations' and opted for 'the abominable manner of delivering the administration of the country to the rabble' (*idare-yi mülkü avam-ı nassın yedine tagviz itmek suret-i mekruhesi*).<sup>126</sup> The Porte obtained a list of the dissenters who were invited to the senate –probably, through Mustafa Reşid Efendi at Corfu- and concluded that most of the names on the list were from "the gang of the rabbles" (*avam-ı nass güruhundan*). With the necessary commentaries, the list was forwarded to Tomara with a memorandum.

---

<sup>125</sup> HAT 175/7602 (13RA1215/4Aug1800); Tomara may have sent the letter independent of the Porte. He mentioned Ali Paşa with the words, "True, the nature of the person, who neighbours the afore-mentioned region [the Dalmatian towns], is well-known and it appears from his misdeeds that the ordinary precautions taken by the Sublime State about him are unfruitful" (*Vakı 'a havali-yi mezkureye hem-civar olan zatın tabiatı malum olub Devlet-i Aliye'nin dahi muma-ileyh hakkında bir vaktten beru imal eylediği tedabir-i adiyeye müsmir ve kar-gir olmadıkları muma-ileyhin hareket ve sekenatından malumdur.*) Certainly, these are not the words the Porte would have approved in an official letter addressing the Ionian senate.

<sup>126</sup> HAT 144/6033 (catalogue date: 7N1216/11Jan1802) the copy of the memorandum to be delivered to Elgin, requesting the dispatch of British warships to Corfu.

Part of the draft of the memorandum was curiously omitted which highlighted the magnified fears of the Ottomans. According to this part, the rebellion would spread to Albania and the Morea unless it was suppressed; however, the Porte did not see it possible to send force to Corfu ‘under the existing circumstances’ as long as it was not absolutely necessary; thus, it requested from Russia to transfer troops from Naples to Corfu.<sup>127</sup>

The arrival of a *tatar*-messenger on 28 February carrying an imperial edict that required the restoration of the overhauled administration in the Republic caused much public anxiety.<sup>128</sup> After continuous negotiations, the rebels handed back the senate to the senators on 7 March as willed by the decree. Mustafa Reşid Efendi seems to have taken an active role in the negotiations. During the negotiations, the president of the senate, Spiridion Theotokis, and the Russian consul joined forces to make substantial amendments to the constitution, whereas Nelson and Mustafa Reşid were opposed to the scheme. Theotokis claimed that the letter of the Porte addressing him did not make any specific mention to the restoration of the constitution, which he took to mean that he could make any changes to it. Mustafa Reşid, thus, demanded a new decree from the Porte requiring Theotokis to negotiate with the consuls.<sup>129</sup>

The situation grew so critical at one point that the Ottomans had to invite the British ships to put down the uprising in Zante, where the mob flew the British flag in

---

<sup>127</sup> HAT 176/7711 (nd.) the draft of the memorandum to be delivered to Tomara.

<sup>128</sup> HAT 176/7716 (15N1216/19Jan1802). This correspondence included separate letters addressing the head of the senate, the British and Russian consuls, the imperial decree and the letter of the Patriarch.

<sup>129</sup> HAT 176/7675 (14Apr1802), Mustafa Reşid describes the inhabitants of Zante as ‘untrustworthy and trickster.’ The details of the process could be found in this correspondence.



protest of the Ottoman suzerainty. This case well illustrated the incompatibility of the interests of the imperial centers and their local agents. Colonel Callander, the British advanced scout from Malta, declared Zante a British protectorate on his own initiative. Another British officer Ricketts, however, drove out Callander from Zante as London did not approve Callander's attitude. Tomara believed that the Ionians were divided into four parties –the British, the French, the Russian, and the supporters of the Ionian Republic. According to him, the British party was composed of the Jacobins who had the backing of Spencer Smith and Callander –‘the mischief-maker’ (*müfsid*). The party was headed by the Zantiote *Kıladi* (Cladan ?) who was the ‘member of the group called minor and of the most reprehensible free-mason’ (*minör tabir itdikleri takımdan olmağla farmasondan eşne*). He was furious with Smith as he heard that he had hidden Callander in his ship after the restoration of order in Zante.<sup>130</sup>

Prior to the ratification of the Treaty of Amiens (27 March 1802), the Russian ambassador implied to the Porte that both Russia and Britain would favour the giving of the Ionians to the Naples should Napoleon refuse the present Russo-Ottoman arrangement about the Ionian Republic. He hinted that the alternative candidates to the Naples were the Habsburgs and Sardinia. This was the time when Paul I, embittered by the British occupation of Malta and the maltreatment of Russian auxiliaries in Italy by the Habsburgs, drew closer to France. Thus, the Porte feared that Russia would use the

---

<sup>130</sup> HAT 144/6033 (11Jan1802); HAT 176/7711 (1801-1802); Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 165-66; we overviewed that Patrona participated in this operation. According to Mustafa Reşid, Patrona sailed from Koron and was patrolling around Leukas in March, HAT 176/7675 (11ZA1216/15March1802); HAT 259/14932 (3Z1216/6Apr1802).

disorders in the Republic as a pretext to hand over the Ionians to a minor power within the sphere of Russian influence.<sup>131</sup> In order to counterbalance the Russian domination of the Republic, the Ottomans hoped the presence of the British navy would tip the balance in favour of the Porte in the power struggle with the Russians who, the Porte suspected, backed the “mob of Jacobins.” Furthermore, the British troops could also be deployed in the Morea after suppressing the rebellion in the Ionian Islands against the menacing French.<sup>132</sup> Mustafa Reşid, nevertheless, suspected that the British squadron of 3 ships did not take orders from the command of the British ambassador. Therefore, it was necessary to have Admiral Keith order the squadron to winter in Corfu.<sup>133</sup> It is very striking that the Porte and the British ambassador agreed in principle on transferring 3,500 British troops in Egypt to Corfu to help the restoration of order. The Reis Efendi saw it necessary to station them in the Morea until Russia affirmed their deployment in Corfu. Furthermore, the British troops could be transferred to the Morea after the rebellion was over in the Ionians. As St Petersburg consented to their embarkation on Corfu, Admiral Keith set sail for the destination, but London re-routed him to Malta upon hearing about the imminent arrival of Russian reinforcements from Naples to the island. Upset by the news, the Reis Efendi suspected that Keith must have feared embarrassment by a possible obstruction of his mission in Corfu by the Russian officers. Considering any French attack would have

---

<sup>131</sup> HAT 176/7665 (nd.; prior to the Treaty of Amiens).

<sup>132</sup> HAT 261/15092 (1801-1802); HAT 176/7712 (13Feb1802).

<sup>133</sup> HAT 176/7675 (11ZA1216/15March1802); the British squadron was headed by Captain Martin arrived in March 1802, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 166.

to be sea-bound, Reis Efendi asked the British ambassador to reinforce the British squadron at Corfu.<sup>134</sup>

The Porte took a number of measures to end the disorders, ranging from a general amnesty to using the services of the Orthodox Patriarchate to pacify the Islanders.<sup>135</sup> It instructed Mustafa Reşid to cooperate with Russian, British, and French consuls to restore the order. He was to approve minor amendments to be made to the existing constitution, but also make plain that the Porte would not approve in any case the rebellion against the senate that had the universal recognition. His instructions about seeking the help of Patrona are cancelled in the draft memorandum, which indicated an Ottoman unwillingness to resort to force for political considerations.<sup>136</sup> This was one of the issues debated with Tomara during the negotiations over the deployment of the Russian reinforcements in Corfu. The Porte suggested that Russia should seek French approval to station these forces in Corfu, for the ‘secret articles’ of the Russo-French treaty prohibited the deployment of foreign soldiers in the Ionians on a permanent basis. Although Russian reinforcements were to be withdrawn after the suppression of the

---

<sup>134</sup> HAT 261/15092 (nd.) the memorandum of the deputy Grand vizier. Selim approved this measure: “The British warships should be present in that vicinity in any case” (*Elbet o semtlerde İngiltere sefineleri olmak lazımdır.*) Reis Efendi also pointed out that Keith’s mission to Corfu might have been called off in order to protect Malta and Minorca against the French. It is not clear if this Reis Efendi was Mahmud Raif or the aforementioned deputy Reis, Mustafa Reşid –not to be confused with his namesake in Corfu.

<sup>135</sup> HAT 176/7716 (15N1216/19Jan1802), the Porte warned Mustafa Reşid (at Corfu) that the French *charge d’affaire* who was about to arrive at Corfu was a Jacobin. Mustafa Reşid was instructed to tell him that the French ambassador to İstanbul disapproved the demands of the rebels. For the details of this Russian reinforcement, refer to Chapter VI; Mocenigo arrived at Corfu on 16 August 1802, Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 168; the letter addressing most probably Forresti also stated that the rebellion broke out because of the malicious motivation of the Jacobins to appropriate the Republic. They annulled the ‘internal regulations’ and handed the administration over to the scum (*Yakobin güruhu umur-ı cumhuru kendülere celb u hasr fikr-i fesadiyla bu esnada Korfuda ihtilal...dahili nizamı feshedüb idare-i umur eşhas u esafil yedlerinde ibka olunmuş...*), HAT 176/7712 (catalogue date: 10L1216/13Feb1802).

<sup>136</sup> HAT 176/7716 (15N1216/19Jan1802).

rebellion, France might misinterpret the Russian policy. Tomara, however, assured the Porte that Napoleon had already demanded from Paul to crack down on the rebels.<sup>137</sup>

Towards the end of the rebellion, the Ionians submitted a petition to the Porte, requesting its permission to stationing of a peace-time Russian force of 600 troops, as, the Ionian envoy indicated, the native troops were untrustworthy because of their seditious nature. Conversely the Porte thought that these Russian troops were ‘the seeds of sedition’ for the future disturbances in the island. Convinced that the envoy submitted the petition on the orders of Russia, the Porte resented the request, assuring that it was strong enough to protect the Republic-its dependent and tribute-payer (*tabi ve cizye-güzarı*). Consequently, Tomara convinced the Porte to allow these Russian troops to stay in Corfu.<sup>138</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup> HAT 259/14932 (3Z1216/6Apr1802) minutes of the audience with Tomara; such ‘articles’ were secret only in name since they were published even in the news papers.

<sup>138</sup> HAT 176/7666-A the petition of the Ionian envoy. According to him, the agreed sum of 75,000 *kara krş* (low quality *krş*?) to maintain the local troops could barely be collected due to impoverishment of the Ionians; the deputy Grand-vizier explained the situation to Selim by indicating that “Russians have been addicted to the taste of Corfu” (*Rusyalı Korfunun lezzetine alışmış olduğu...*) Uzunçarşılıoğlu, “Arşiv Vesikalarına Göre Yedi Ada Cümhuriyeti”, pp. 637-38.

## Conclusion

For the most part mutual distrust accounted for the competition between the allies as revealed in the liberal use of the word ‘jacobin.’ The Ottomans were completely convinced that Russia had their own political ambitions in the region and always tried to involve Britain in Ionian affairs, going as far as accepting the deployment of the British troops in the Morea. Tomara, however, viewed Britain as the main supporter of the ‘Jacobins.’

The Ottoman attempts to settle this frontier was not limited to the presence of a number of Ottoman officials in the Ionian Islands. ‘Modern’ techniques such as print propaganda, the granting of a constitution (*nizamname* or *nizam-i mülkiye*) and designation of a flag were blended with more traditional ones including the bestowing of an imperial diploma (*menşur-i ali*, or *nişan-i alişan*) symbolizing the vassal status of the Republic and granting of commercial privileges.

Ottoman frontier policy in this region was based on creating a buffer-protectorate to keep in check the French aggression. Such a protectorate seemed viable due to the lack of a unanimous Ionian policy in Russia and Paul’s general lack of interest in Ionian affairs. Nevertheless, the Tsar’s assassination on 24 March 1801 meant a shift in Russian policies. Appreciating the strategic value of the Islands for the Third Coalition Wars, the new tsar Alexander I heavily reinforced Corfu, with around 10,000 Russian troops before the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit. Thus, as we saw in the active Russian encroachment in the revision of the commercial privileges, of the constitution, and of the

tribute, Russia increasingly became the dominant power in the Ionian Republic by the reign of Alexander I.

As the Third Coalition was formed against Napoleon, Russian military preparations in the region increased to an alarming level for the Porte. Ottoman intelligence scrutinized the growing Russian military presence in Corfu supported by thousands of Ionians and Souliotes, who highly esteemed Russia for its military victories. Recruitment of the Christian Albanians as well as the Ionians in the Russian navy throughout the Napoleonic wars embittered the Ottomans, who kept a close eye on such Russian activities through Ali Paşa and other Ottoman local governors. To the dismay of the Ottomans, Russia offered each recruit twice as much the Porte.<sup>139</sup> The Ottomans unofficially made known their reservations over the recruitment issue to the Russian ambassador on a continual basis.<sup>140</sup>

Consequently, two years after its ratification, the Ionians modified the constitution so as to secure a limited participation of the notables under the guidance of Mocenigo.<sup>141</sup> Widespread disturbances in Corfu coincided with the enthronement of Alexander with major implications in foreign policy of Russia. Alexander was more interested in strengthening the Russian position in the Ionians in comparison to Paul as revealed in stationing Russian troops in Corfu and the reduction of the tribute of the Republic.<sup>142</sup>

---

<sup>139</sup> HAT 159/6635 (15Aug1805) and HAT 175/7610 (15Aug1805): the correspondence of İbrahim Paşa of Avlonya on the Russian offer of 20-25 *krş* a month.

<sup>140</sup> HAT 151/6372 (16Sept1805) The report of Hüseyin Kapudan from Corfu; HAT 176/7680.

<sup>141</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, p. 170; for the details of the rebellion and the new constitution see McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, pp. 191-245.

<sup>142</sup> Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean*, pp. 172-75.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION OF PEACE

#### Introduction

Relatively short period of 1800-1802 has a very complex nature for Ottoman diplomacy in terms of protracted peace negotiations and annulled treaties, often leading to confusion among the Ottomanists to a considerable extent. It has been held that Talleyrand duped Ali Efendi into signing the Paris preliminaries (9 October 1801) only a week later than the London preliminaries (2 October 1801) with the help of Ali's dragoman Codrika who is said to have been sold out to the French. The assumption that the latter treaty brought more advantages to the Ottomans than the former has not been much questioned. In complete dismissal of the system of alliances, the Ottoman refusal to ratify the Paris preliminaries has been ascribed to the Porte's subjugation to the will of its allies. Confusion also arose over the question whether or not the Ottomans were invited to the general peace conference that was to be summoned at Amiens as decided in the London preliminaries. It has been believed that, incensed by the signing of the 'Definitive Peace Treaty of the Amiens' without the participation of the Porte, Selim concluded a separate peace with France.<sup>1</sup>

While it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze this process in detail, we should briefly underline some of the misconceptions and misjudgements that are commonplace in secondary literature. The Ottoman objects in diplomacy were the establishment of the *status quo ante* which required the returning of Egypt as well as the

---

<sup>1</sup> Refer to relevant footnotes for the full reference of these either faulty or incomplete views.

international recognition of the Ionian Republic as a tributary-state of the Porte, and of the Ottoman acquisition of the four Dalmatian towns. In a nutshell, the Ottomans signed the Paris preliminaries (9 October 1801) with France with the full knowledge of the signing of the Preliminary Treaty of London (2 October 1801). The preliminaries of Paris stipulated that France restore Egypt to the Porte as well as the recognition of France as one of the guarantors of the Ionian Republic. France was also granted trade privileges in the Black Sea. Because of the protests of its allies, the Porte rejected the Paris preliminaries and instead ratified the London preliminaries as it needed to continue the alliance to get the Russians out of the Ionians and the British out of Egypt. Upon the invitation of Britain the Porte empowered Ali Efendi to attend in the negotiations to be held in Amiens. Nevertheless, France did not admit him as the Ottoman plenipotentiary since it sought to conclude a separate peace with the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the Porte appointed Mehmed Said Galib Efendi as the new plenipotentiary. As the Amiens was signed before his arrival, he signed a separate treaty with France in Paris that rather looked like an alliance treaty and delivered an act of adherence that signified the Ottoman recognition of the relevant articles of Amiens.

Consequently, the Ottoman Empire regained Egypt but its rights of suzerainty over the Ionian Republic were not explicitly stated. The process of opening of the Black Sea to international state was also set in motion with many political and economic ramifications in the future.



## The Preliminary Treaty of Paris

In January 1800 Kléber signed the Convention of El-Arish with Sydney Smith and the Grand vizier Yusuf Paşa for the evacuation of Egypt, but both British and Russians rejected and insisted on unconditional surrender of the French army in Egypt. In March 1800, the French defeated the Ottoman army at Heliopolis (*'Ayn-Şams*) and suppressed the Cairo revolt. By mid-June Kléber was assassinated. In March 1801 the British landed in Aboukir. Shortly after, Grand Admiral Hüseyin arrived with 7,000 troops at Egypt. Yusuf Paşa crossed the Sinai desert with 25,000 troops in mid-April. The British brought in Egypt sepoy via Red Sea in May. By September 1801, the French evacuated Egypt.

During the negotiations in Egypt prior to the signing of El-Ariş, Ali Efendi was also instructed to open negotiations with Talleyrand in Paris in late 1799. In the meetings with Napoleon and Talleyrand on 29-30 January 1800, Ali Efendi officially demanded the evacuation of Egypt as a precondition of entering into negotiations, whereas the French sought to retain Egypt until the conclusion of peace lest the British or the Russians invaded the country seizing on the opportunity.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> BOA, HAT 141/5844-D (nd.), minutes of negotiations of Ali Efendi with Talleyrand and Napoleon, dated 29-30 January 1800. Napoleon intimidated Ali Efendi that the Porte would remain alone in its war against France in a short while as Britain and Russia were trying to conclude peace with France, referring to the negotiations leading to the London preliminaries. Napoleon also expressed willingness to trade Egypt with Corfu in the negotiations. Ali Efendi seemed unimpressed by anti-Christian and pro-Islamic views expressed by Napoleon in simple Arabic. He amusingly noted that Napoleon misused the word *müzmin* ('chronic' as in 'chronic disease') to mean *mümin* (believer) in his speech in Arabic. Ali Efendi reciprocated by saying 'well said!' (*isabet oldi!*) with the connotation that Napoleon was definitely a *müzmin*. This is only one example whereby Napoleon and Talleyrand tried to dupe Ali Efendi by flattering him. Apparently, their pretensions to duping Ali Efendi have been uncritically accepted by many historians. Karal published the document without the memorandum of the deputy Grand vizier which gave the date '3 and 4 Ramadan.' In a report dated 5CA1215/24Sept1800 (HAT 140/5817-A) Ali Efendi marked that the

After this first round of negotiations failed as a result of uncompromising stances of the two powers, Talleyrand initiated the second round by advising Napoleon on 8 August to evacuate Egypt and recognize the Ionian Republic on the condition that France would be one of the guarantor states. For him, this would effectively put the Ionians under the protection of France and Russia, whereas its subjugation to Porte would be a mere symbolic gesture.<sup>3</sup> The new round of negotiations were to take place against a background of the British rejection of el-Ariş, assassination of Kléber and the formation of the league of neutrals under the auspices of Paul.<sup>4</sup> Assassination of the French general was one of the main topics of the Talleyrand-Ali Efendi meeting as both men suspected

---

negotiations in case took place in ‘the Ramadan of the previous year’ which suggests that the date should be 29-30 January 1800 rather than February 1800, see E. Z. Karal, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1797-1802)* (İstanbul, 1938), p. 129 and Appendix, doc. IX, pp. 178-184.

<sup>3</sup> Napoleon sent a letter to Selim III along with Sebastiani in which he requested the appointment of Ali Efendi as the plenipotentiary to sign a peace treaty in Paris see, İ. Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri (1789-1802)* (Ankara: TTK, 1964), pp. 315-17, Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 131.

<sup>4</sup> Failure of El-Ariş (24 January 1800) is another example of faulty communications of the age that we have stressed many times in this study because of their crucial influence on war and diplomacy. Yusuf Paşa occupied el-Ariş, executing many French soldiers after the signing of the convention since the ship that carried the news of the conclusion of el-Ariş did not reach him because of the storms. A prudent Kléber did not resume the hostilities and the exchange of the ratifications of the convention took place on 31 January (Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali*, pp. 291-92, 296-97). Contrary to Karal’s claim, Smith did not have time to send the text of the el-Ariş to London (Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 127). In mid-December 1799 (that is, before the conclusion of el-Ariş) London had instructed Keith to send a letter to Kléber that required him to accept unconditional surrender as his intercepted correspondence revealed the French hardships in Egypt. Prior to Kléber’s reception of this letter on the night of 17-18 March, London had already changed its mind and instructed Lord Elgin in İstanbul to accept el-Ariş with minor changes. However, neither Lord Grenville (the British prime minister) nor Elgin informed Keith on the policy change and his orders to send the letter was not countermanded. Kléber had actually restored many places to the Ottomans and, according to Cevdet Paşa, wanted to deliver Cairo to Yusuf Paşa a day before the arrival of Keith’s letter since 45 days’ grace as stipulated in the convention was over, but the Paşa rescheduled the occupation to the next day, for he believed that ‘Wednesday’ was an inauspicious day to carry out such ceremonies (Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet* [new edition] (İstanbul, H. 1309), v. VII, p. 72). Herold contradicts Cevdet Paşa by claiming that Kléber actually warned Yusuf Paşa to stay in el-Ariş until the arrival of ratification from Britain. This famous letter and the news of Napoleon’s coup motivated Kléber to storm the army of the grand-vizier Yusuf Ziya Paşa. Once again the state of communications decided upon history and caused an unnecessary protraction of war in Egypt for one more year, C. Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt* (Pen&Sword, imprint, 2005), pp. 354-56.

that the murder was carried out on the initiative of the other side.<sup>5</sup> Menou, who replaced Kléber, effectively signed the letter of death for the el-Ariş convention by stipulating its ratification by Paris on the orders of Napoleon. His conviction in the imminent arrival of a French relief force protracted the war in Egypt for one more year until the signing of a convention resembling el-Ariş on 27 June 1801.<sup>6</sup>

In both rounds of negotiations the two sides tried to keep to their original arguments. The Porte endeavoured to reach a preliminary agreement with France through the services of Ali Efendi, but Napoleon actually sought to sign a definitive peace. After the failure of el-Ariş, Selim came to believe that the Porte did not have to seek the approval of its allies to sign a preliminary treaty with France that would secure the evacuation of Egypt and argued that adherence to alliance should be observed only in concluding the definitive peace treaty. Napoleon, on the other hand, required Ali Efendi to show his credentials that authorized him to sign a peace treaty. He also sought written guarantees that the Porte's allies would not undertake an invasion of Egypt and that its alliances did not deprive the Porte of the ability to conclude separate peace with France.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> According to Ali Efendi, Kléber, agitated by Napoleon's escape from Egypt, sent two letters to the Directors of France blaming Napoleon. One of these letters was intercepted and published in British newspapers and the other found Napoleon in France as the 'consul' of France. Pointing out that Kléber's assassination took place immediately after the arrival of Napoleon's letter reprimanding him for signing el-Ariş, Ali Efendi suspected that Napoleon must have appended secret instructions for his assassination in this letter. Obviously, Ali Efendi was conditioned by Ottoman political culture in coining this suggestion, HAT 140/5817-A (5CA1215/24Sept1800); Talleyrand related to Ali Efendi that the assassin had confessed that Yusuf Paşa was the instigator of the incidence. Ali Efendi curtly stated "it was not the trait of the Sublime Porte to craft such murders" (*bu misillü sanat ile katl Devlet-i Aliye'nin şiarından olmadığı*), see Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, appendix, doc. XI [audience with Talleyrand, 24 September 1800], pp. 131, 188-190; Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali*, p. 318.

<sup>6</sup> Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt*, p. 356; Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali*, pp. 299-301, 318.

<sup>7</sup> Shaw mistakenly claimed that Ali did not have the credentials to conclude peace with France, Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Harvard University Press,

There is a common assumption that Talleyrand managed to conclude the preliminaries with Ali Efendi by hiding from him the conclusion of the London preliminaries (2 October 1801). This assumption is seemingly based on the fact that the latter was more advantageous for the Porte in comparison to the former: France accepted evacuating Egypt and recognized the post-war status of the Ionians in the London preliminaries (arts. V, VIII). The treaty of Paris (9 October 1801), however, declared France one of the guarantors of the Republic (art. II) and promised France the same privileges and exemptions of ‘the most favored nation’ in the article which also required the restoration of Egypt to the Porte (art. I).<sup>8</sup> Russia and Britain did not accept the settlement on the grounds that the London preliminaries had already secured the restoration of Egypt and the French recognition of the Ionian republic; thus, the Porte should not make additional concessions to France such as extension of trade privileges so as to open the Black Sea to French shipping and guarantor rights over the Ionians.

---

1971), pp. 271-74; M. Herbet, *Fransa’da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi: Morali Esseyit Ali Efendi (1792-1802)* [Turkish trans.: Erol Üyepazarcı (trans.), İstanbul, 1997], p. 164; Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali*, p. 291; Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, appendix, doc. X, pp. 185-87. This document contains the minutes of the audience with Talleyrand dated 15 September 1800, but Karal erred that the meeting took place in August. His statement that ‘Napoleon refused to evacuate Egypt unless its evacuation became a preliminary condition to the conclusion of peace’ (*Napoleon...Mısır’ın tahliyesi meselesi sulhe esas olmayınca, Mısırın tahliyesine razı olmayacağını bildirmiştir*) is obviously wrong. The Ottomans used the word *esas* for preliminary. The minutes clearly show that both sides wanted to keep the negotiations secret. This casts doubt to the claim that France pressured the Porte to act independent of its allies since the latter was willing to do so as a matter of fact.

<sup>8</sup> HAT 141/5835-A the Paris preliminaries; the prologue of the text gives the date of conclusion as 1C1216/9Oct1801 and 17 Vandemiere 10. It features the stamp of Talleyrand. The Turkish and French versions were exchanged with the former sent to İstanbul and the latter delivered to Talleyrand, HAT 141/5835-H (2C216/10Oct1801) from Ali Efendi to the Porte; HAT 141/5835-F (nd.) contains a slightly different copy of the treaty; for the copies also see, Testa, *Recueil Des Traités de la Porte Ottomane* (Paris, 1864) v. I, p. 95; Herbet, *Fransa’da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, pp. 203-07 (containing the draft proposed by Ali Efendi); Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, appendix 16; Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, pp. 135-36; Ali Efendi recommended ‘Panayotaki’ (Codrika) –his dragoman– to the Porte for his loyal services, HAT 141/5835-G (2C216/10Oct1801). Kuran, *Avrupa’da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri 1793-1821* (Ankara, 1968), p. 34 fn. 40.

Therefore, the Paris preliminaries have often been considered another occasion in which Talleyrand duped poor Ali Efendi.<sup>9</sup>

It is not easy to explain this enigmatic situation at first sight. In fact, the Paris preliminaries did not contradict the credentials and instructions of Ali Efendi. He had clear instructions to conclude a preliminary treaty with France that stipulated the unconditional evacuation of Egypt, recognition of the Ionian Republic and of the Ottoman conquest of the Dalmatian towns as well as restoration of confiscated possessions and goods. Nevertheless, he was also allowed to accept three more conditions if necessary: recognition of the present regime of the Republic of France, provided Russia also recognized it; restoration of all French exemptions and privileges given before the war; acknowledgement of France as one of the guarantors of the Ionian Republic.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Herbette, *Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, pp. 171-72; Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali*, p. 320; HAT 165/6877 (nd.) from Tomara to the Porte. He suggested that peace with France should depend on four principles: rejection of granting any trade privileges to France, unconditional surrender of Egypt, recognition of the post-war status of the Ionians and the Dalmatian towns, acceptance of the Russian mediation.

<sup>10</sup> HAT 141/5844-F (catalogue date: 13ZA1214/8Apr1800) conditions of preliminaries sent to Ali Efendi; HAT 141/5844-E (catalogue date: 13ZA1214/8Apr1800) credentials of Ali Efendi; Ali Efendi's chief interpreter Panayotaki Codrika was in the pay of Talleyrand according to Tomara. He may have passed on Ali Efendi's real credentials to Talleyrand during the negotiations. Herbette pointed out that Codrika later confessed his treachery, see Herbette, *Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, pp. 140, 167. He stayed in Paris and worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His later confessions might be motivated by his career considerations in France as well. Soysal mentioned Tomara's claim without citing a source (*Türk-Fransız Diploması*, p. 323). Kuran cited Soysal on this matter (*Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu*, p. 35). Jorga asserted "Kodrikas paid his alleged treason with his head" (N. Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* v. 5 [Turkish trans.: Nilüfer Epçeli (trans.), İstanbul, Yeditepe, 2005], p. 130). Karal is the harshest in his assessment of Codrika. Writing in the aftermath of the War of Independence that was, in practice, fought against Greece, he bordered on xenophobia: "...the interpreter of Ali Efendi was a Greek with the name of Kodrika. As with all Greeks, Kodrika did not comprehend the meaning of loyalty either. Thus he would easily believe in French promises and cheat his lord the most" see Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 61 fn. 1; Cevdet Paşa, and Uzunçarşılı did not give any information on the topic, nor do the Ottoman documents consulted in this study; Gosu noted that "the Russians also bought information about Ottoman-French relations from a source within the Ottoman Embassy in Paris", A. Gosu, "The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition and the Sublime Porte" in K. H. Karpat and R. W. Zens (eds.), *Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes* (The University of Wisconsin, 2003), p. 223 fn. 126.

Furthermore, minutes of Ali Efendi-Talleyrand negotiations testify that Ali Efendi knew the related articles of the London preliminaries prior to the conclusion of the Paris preliminaries contrary to the assumptions in the secondary literature.<sup>11</sup>

Talleyrand and Ali Efendi met for two times on 3<sup>rd</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> March in which they agreed upon the final text and decided to meet for a last time the next day to sign the treaty. Talleyrand, nevertheless, delayed the scheduled meeting. While Ali Efendi worried over the delay, the signing of the London preliminaries was declared in Paris. Talleyrand sent a new version of preliminaries that was allegedly revised after the London preliminaries, demanding Ali Efendi to accept or reject it in an hour. This modified version completely ignored the ceding of the Dalmatian towns to the Porte (art. II) and made major amendments to article I. Stultified by this unexpected ultimatum, Ali Efendi managed to get a summary of the London preliminaries from Talleyrand. Finding Talleyrand untrustworthy, he acquired another copy sent to a 'Frank' in Paris through his infamous interpreter Codrika. Ali Efendi copied out the related articles of this unofficial text and sent it back to Talleyrand upon which the latter gave up his insistence on article II.<sup>12</sup> Ali Efendi ascribed Talleyrand's insistence on the omission of the French

---

<sup>11</sup> Uzunçarşılı assumed that Ali signed the Preliminary Treaty of Paris under the pressure of the French. He, however, wrongly suggested that the treaty followed the guidelines of the London preliminaries. He also ignored the appointment of Ali Efendi as the plenipotentiary to Amiens and only mentioned Galib Efendi. According to him, the Ottoman rejection of the Paris preliminaries indicated that the Porte was a 'political toy' of the Great Powers, see İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, "On Dokuzuncu Asır Başlarına Kadar Türk – İngiliz Münasebatına Dair Vesikalar" *Belleten* XIII/51 (1949), pp. 600-1; it is interesting that in an earlier article he did not misjudge the nature of the Paris preliminaries, though he still ignored Ali Efendi's aforementioned appointment, see Uzunçarşılı Oğlu, "Amedi Galib Efendi'nin Murahhashı ve Paris'ten Gönderdiği Şifreli Mektuplar" *Belleten* I/2 (1937), pp. 360-62.

<sup>12</sup> HAT 141/5835-D unofficial text of London preliminaries. The related articles are 8 (French recognition of the Ionian Republic), 9 (varying grace periods for evacuation of the occupied territories in 'Asia meaning India' -6 months-, 'Africa and the New World' -3 months-, 'Europe' -1 month), 10 (exchange of

recognition of the Porte's conquest of the Dalmatian towns to the 'blunder' made in the London preliminaries by reason of which it failed to mention the subjugation of the Ionian islands and these towns to the Porte.<sup>13</sup>

Remarkably, in his memorandum that announced the conclusion of the London preliminaries to Selim, the deputy Grand vizier Abdullah Paşa also noted that the Paris preliminaries was signed as a complementary to the London preliminaries. According to him the latter required the evacuation of Egypt and the recognition of the Ionian Republic while the former laid out the details of these two stipulations. Content with the news, Selim ordered the dispatch of the ratifications immediately and of messengers to the Grand vizier Yusuf Paşa and the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa, both in Egypt.<sup>14</sup>

Apparently, the Porte was satisfied with the Paris preliminaries but the strong opposition of its allies compelled it to make major revisions in the first two articles of the Paris preliminaries. Unimpressed with these revisions, Elgin also objected art. 4 that opened the Black Sea to French shipping, for this would grant France the status of 'the most favored nation.' According to him, the Porte should not have signed separate preliminaries with France since the London preliminaries also included the Ottoman

---

POWs) and 11 (restoration of confiscated goods and ships in the Mediterranean to their former proprietors in a month after the ratifications). For the minutes of these negotiations see, HAT 141/5835-B (2C1216/10Oct1801). In the negotiations over art. I (Egyptian question) of the Paris preliminaries, Ali Efendi acted with the conviction that acceptance of French demands (trade privileges of the most favored nation) was necessary to end the hostilities. He also assumed that the British must have taken account of Ottoman priorities in Egypt in the concurrent negotiations in London that culminated in the London preliminaries.

<sup>13</sup> HAT 141/5835-J (2C1216/10Oct1801) from Ali Efendi to the Porte.

<sup>14</sup> HAT 141/5835 (nd.) the memorandum of the deputy Grand-vizier Abdullah Paşa.

Empire (arts. V, VIII on Egypt and the Adriatic, respectively). All these led Elgin to urge the Porte to dismiss the Paris preliminaries entirely.<sup>15</sup>

The ‘kitchen cabinet’ reviewed the situation for several times since Elgin threatened to leave İstanbul unless the Paris preliminaries were rejected. The Porte argued that the British should have taken written guarantees in advance from France in London that Napoleon would accept the direct relevance of the two articles of the London preliminaries (on Egypt and the Ionians) with the Porte. This would have ruled out any French pressure to sign separate preliminaries with the Ottomans in Paris. Despite its sound reasoning, this argument could not change the overall situation in practice in the world of power politics.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the committee advised ‘out of necessity’ (*hasbe’l-zarur*) the rejection of the Paris preliminaries in favor of the London preliminaries. It concluded that this policy was likely to cause a French invasion of Albania and the Morea. Acceptance of the London preliminaries, however, would secure the diplomatic cooperation of Britain and Russia in the forthcoming negotiations at Amiens. Should these negotiations fail to restore the peace, their military assistance against the common

---

<sup>15</sup> HAT 141/5848 (nd.) the memorandum of the deputy Grand-vizier Abdullah Paşa on the meeting of the ‘secret cabinet.’ The meeting was held at the residence of Abdullah Paşa with the participation of İsmet Efendi, Kethüda Beğ, the Reis Efendi (Mahmud Raif Efendi), Hacı İbrahim, Atif Efendi. The memorandum explicitly states that the revisions in the first two articles were undertaken to secure the consent of Elgin. A transcription of the document can be found in Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, doc.12; Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, pp. 139-42.

<sup>16</sup> For the transcription of the document see Uzunçarşılı, “Türk-İngiliz”, pp. 601-604. The Porte presumed that the French consented to the inclusion of the articles on the Ionians and Egypt in the accord reached with the British because of the British involvement in both topics. Thus, France did not treat the London preliminaries as the basis to conclude peace with the Porte; anonymous author of a memorandum also marked that the London preliminaries did not make any specification for Ottoman participation in the conference at Amiens. Thus, Britain had no option but try to convince France with arguments for Ottoman participation in the definitive peace treaty to be concluded at Amiens. The anonymous author also noted that the Porte was unwilling to reject the Paris preliminaries, HAT 950/40835-B (written prior to Galib’s departure from İstanbul in late March 1802).



enemy would also continue and the British navy could then be ordered to the Adriatic. This suggests that the Ottoman policy-making was based on risk calculation within the system of alliance whereas the secondary literature offers a simplified version that regarded the Ottomans as a pawn on the chessboard, moved by the Great Powers.<sup>17</sup>

Elgin suggested that his appointment as the plenipotentiary to Amiens might save Ali Efendi from the likely humiliation caused by the rejection of the Paris preliminaries. London, nevertheless, offered the Porte either to authorize the British plenipotentiary to represent the Ottomans in the Amiens or to deliver written guarantees that it would accept the relevant articles of the peace to be concluded at Amiens. Both the Ottomans and Russians rejected the offer and the Porte appointed Ali Efendi to the Amiens. He was instructed to consult with the Russian plenipotentiary on the negotiations on Adriatic and with his British counterpart on the Egyptian question.<sup>18</sup>

As we have mentioned previously, the Porte had made do with revising the first two articles of the Paris preliminaries before resolving to reject it entirely. Abdullah Paşa officially informed Paris about the ratification of the Paris preliminaries with these

---

<sup>17</sup> HAT 141/5848; for such depictions see, Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, pp. 137-39; Uzunçarşılı, “Türk-İngiliz”, p. 600.

<sup>18</sup> HAT 141/5848. Elgin insisted on having an official letter that guaranteed the Ottoman acceptance of the results of the Amiens. But the Ottomans rejected on the grounds that this would require submission of a similar letter to Russia because of the alliance. The Porte was also hesitant about being represented by a foreign and non-Muslim plenipotentiary whose priorities would not have been those of the Ottomans in the negotiations. The Porte, instead, offered to deliver a signed memorandum to this effect. The Porte determined the peace conditions with the allies in İstanbul and put them in the instructions of Ali Efendi that was to be sent along with his credentials. The allied plenipotentiaries were also informed about these instructions; HAT 141/5854 (catalogue date:15B1216/21Nov1801) the memorandum of the deputy Grand vizier; HAT 142/5880 (nd.). Both contain Selim’s approval of the dispatch of these instructions; Süslü is certainly wrong in his assessment that Britain did not recognize the Ionian Republic and that the Porte was not invited to Amiens, see A. Süslü, “Rapports Diplomatiques Ottomano-Français” *Belleten* 47/185 (1983), p. 243; Jorga did not mention the rejection of the Paris preliminaries, but noted that the Porte sent Galib Efendi as the plenipotentiary, Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* v. 5, p. 130.

revisions on 14 November 1801. This letter signaled the changing rhetoric of the Porte. Although it was actually satisfied with the Paris preliminaries, this letter alleged that the Porte had ratified the relevant articles of the London preliminaries before the arrival of the Paris preliminaries to İstanbul. It marked that the latter made no reference to the former and contained such stipulations that it looked like a definitive peace treaty rather than a preliminary treaty. Furthermore, news of the British occupation of Alexandria had not reached Paris by the date it was signed and this actually made the ratification of the treaty inappropriate according to the current diplomatic conventions. Nevertheless, the Porte ratified the articles of the Paris preliminaries that did not contradict the London preliminaries in order to show its goodwill towards France. Abdullah also informed Paris about the appointment of Ali Efendi to Amiens.<sup>19</sup> This change of rhetoric can also be seen in a memorandum of Abdullah Paşa on Ali Efendi's appointment in which he maintained that Ali Efendi was unaware of the conclusion of the London preliminaries when he signed the Paris preliminaries 8 days later. Interestingly, it was actually

---

<sup>19</sup> Ali Efendi had also objected to French demands concerning trade privileges in the negotiations, arguing that the preliminary treaty was not supposed to include such details by definition, HAT 141/5835-B (2C1216/10Oct1801); Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali*, pp. 322-26. Napoleon sent Sebastiani to İstanbul 12 days earlier than the dispatch of this letter to cow the Porte into ratifying the Paris preliminaries. He arrived at İstanbul on 26 November only to find a furious Tomara who claimed that Codrika, the interpreter of Ali Efendi, was a French spy and that the Paris preliminaries would never to be ratified. The Reis Efendi also let him know about the letter sent to Paris and disclosed to Sebastiani on 28 November that the Porte ratified the preliminaries with the revisions under the pressure of its allies. Sebastiani stated that peace would not be restored until the full ratification of the Paris preliminaries. In the second meeting on 1 December, he demanded official audience with Selim to communicate Napoleon's private message to him in person. This was against the Ottoman rules of protocol and he was only permitted to meet Selim unofficially outside the palace through a staged coincidence on 8 December. He left İstanbul on 25 December with Selim's letter to Napoleon and arrived at Paris on 27 January 1802. Napoleon repeated the official French arguments that the Egyptian expedition was not undertaken against the Porte and that peace would restore the friendship between the two powers and increase the welfare of the two nations by expanding trade. In response, Selim expressed in a vague and casual manner his wish for concluding an immediate peace.

Abdullah Paşa who had informed Selim a couple of weeks ago about the Paris preliminaries in an affirmative manner as mentioned above. This, coupled with Ali Efendi's own reports and the meeting of the 'kitchen cabinet', suggested that Ali Efendi's ignorance was alleged and the so-said disadvantages of the Paris preliminaries for the Porte had only rhetorical value in the game of power politics.

We should bear in mind that the Porte had agreed to open the Black Sea to French shipping as early as 1797 in the treaty of Ottoman-French alliance despite it was not put in practice since France refused to ratify the treaty. The capitulatory regime foresaw the treatment of all states with trade privileges as 'the most favored nation.' Thus, when the Porte had promised Britain to grant the right to trade in the Black Sea on the eve of the formation of alliance, it implicitly accepted the application of this right to other states as well.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the Porte hoped to neutralize the Russian influence in the Adriatic by securing the British protection over the Ionian Republic. In addition to letters sent by the Porte, Selim also sent a private letter to King George and requested him to include a clause in the peace treaty that would recognize Britain as one of the guarantors of the Ionian Republic.<sup>21</sup> It should be remembered that this was the time when considerable

---

<sup>20</sup> Ali Efendi also reminded Talleyrand that the French merchants would have the privilege to enter the Black Sea because of this custom and considered his insistence to include the restoration of the French privileges in the preliminaries unnecessary, HAT 141/5835-B (2C1216/10Oct1801). Nevertheless, he was not sincere as revealed by the Porte's later policy of treating each European state enjoying capitulations as a separate case in terms of their claims for trading in the Black Sea. For an examination of each case, see Beydilli, "Karadeniz'in Kapalılığı Karşısında Avrupa Küçük Devletleri ve 'Miri Ticaret' Teşebbüsü," *Bellefen* LV: 214 (1991): 687-755.

<sup>21</sup> Abdullah Paşa, the deputy Grand-vizier, wrote a letter to Cornwallis, the British plenipotentiary to the Amiens, asking his cooperation with Ali Efendi. The Porte also delivered four signed memorandums to Britain on Ottoman acceptance of the two relevant articles of the London preliminaries, cooperation of Cornwallis and Ali Efendi, Ottoman request of British protection over the Ionian Republic, and prohibition of the Maltese from attacking the Ottoman shipping. The two signed memorandums delivered to Russia

disorders ravaged the Ionians and the Porte sought the deployment of British troops in Corfu. Thus, inclusion of France among the guarantor states might even be beneficial for the Ottomans as long as it secured international recognition of the Ottoman suzerainty over the Ionian Republic.

What Ali Efendi did not know was the signing of the preliminaries between Russia and France on 8 October. By this treaty, Napoleon promised entering negotiations with the Porte for a definitive peace in İstanbul through Russian mediation. The two powers also agreed upon the recognition of the Ionian Republic and removing foreign troops from Corfu as well. Considering that Talleyrand did not keep the London preliminaries from Ali Efendi, his unexpected impatience in the final phase of the negotiations should better be attributed to the French dedication to annul the Russian mediation and the İstanbul option.<sup>22</sup> Although Codrika's imagined or real treachery was based on the assumption that he joined forces with Talleyrand to encourage Ali Efendi to refuse Russian mediation in the negotiations, no historian to date has ever suggested the likely relation between the Ottoman and Russian preliminaries, both signed in Paris.<sup>23</sup>

---

also urged Russian cooperation at Amiens and banning of the Maltese attacks on the Ottoman shipping, HAT 141/5869-B draft letter to the King of England. It noted down that the letter addressing Hawkesbury (British minister of Foreign Affairs) was dated 17B1216/23Dec1801; HAT 141/5869-A and C contain the drafts of the memorandum to be sent to Britain through Lord Elgin; HAT 142/5880-A Abdullah Paşa's letter to Cornwallis.

<sup>22</sup> The changing mood of Talleyrand in the last meeting was not mentioned in the related literature and can only be realized in Ali's reports.

<sup>23</sup> For this assumption see, Herbet, *Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, p. 167; Talleyrand had communicated to Ali about the French acceptance of the Russian mediation in April 1801, but at that time there was no decision to conclude the peace in İstanbul, Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali*, pp. 318-19; In fact, Ali Efendi had some reason to resent the Russian envoys (Kalichev, and later Markov). He pointed out that he met with Kolichev for three times and communicated to him through his interpreter Codrika for many times, but he failed to provide the professed assistance. His successor Markov ran into Codrika in the office of Talleyrand presumably in early October and asked him if Ali Efendi accepted his mediation in the

When Mehmed Seyyid Galib Efendi later replaced Ali Efendi as the new plenipotentiary in Paris, Markov complained to him that Ali Efendi had avoided him before contacting Talleyrand in early January in his new capacity as the plenipotentiary to the Amiens conference. Remarkably, Markov had already failed to inform Ali about the conclusion of Franco-Russian peace on 8 October 1801 and its relevant clauses about the Ottomans (Russian mediation of Franco-Ottoman peace to be concluded in İstanbul) which would have obviously dissuaded Ali from signing the Paris preliminaries. Strikingly, Talleyrand was in such a hurry to conclude the preliminaries with Ali Efendi that when the French secretary miswrote Napoleon's name on the final text, Talleyrand had the treaty rewritten on an ordinary paper available in the room rather than delaying the ceremony to the next day as would have been normally required by the lack of spare paper of fine quality. Galib Efendi criticized Markov obliquely by remarking that his correspondence concerning the conclusion of the Franco-Russian peace had arrived at İstanbul 10 days after the news of the London preliminaries. Thus, the Porte appointed Ali Efendi as the plenipotentiary to the Amiens conference with the approval of Tomara.<sup>24</sup>

---

negotiations with Talleyrand. Ali Efendi communicated to him that he waited for the new instructions necessitated by Paul's murder and that the negotiations dragged on. On another occasion, Markov refused to receive him in his residence pretending that he was out. Ali Efendi doubted that Markov would prove to be of greater help than Kolichev, and claimed that his assistance was not needed anymore since Franco-British negotiations in London entered the final phase, HAT 141/5835-C (2C1216/10Oct1801) from Ali Efendi to the Porte. Ali Efendi's remarks about the rumors of conclusion of the preliminaries with Russia and Spain as of 10 October 1801 further prove that he did not know about the signing of the preliminaries with Russia; Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, p. 135.

<sup>24</sup> HAT 136/5596-H (6S1217/8Jun1802); HAT 136/5596-G (7S1217/9Jun1802) minutes of negotiations with Markov; for Ali Efendi's explanation of the 'paper issue' see HAT 141/5835-H (2C1216/10Oct1801). Obviously, he did not realize Talleyrand's real intention in opting for the ordinary paper instead of the postponement of the ceremony.

Art. 15 of the London preliminaries did not make an explicit reference to Ottoman participation in the negotiations at Amiens.<sup>25</sup> It rather stipulated the exchange of the ratifications in 15 days and the appointment of British (Lord Cornwallis, Jenkinson) and French (Joseph Bonaparte) plenipotentiaries to Amiens. In the end, the plenipotentiaries of Spain (Don Joseph Nicolas and Azzava) and Batavia (*Röcar Jan İskimmelpennik*) were also present in the negotiations whereas the Ottomans could not succeed to participate.<sup>26</sup> Napoleon's insistence on concluding a separate peace with the Porte accounted for this diplomatic failure for the most part.

---

<sup>25</sup> As a matter of fact, art. 15 was not even among the articles Ali Efendi and Talleyrand discussed in the negotiations after Ali had the copies of the London preliminaries.

<sup>26</sup> HAT 950/40827 (catalogue date: 15S1217/17Jun1802) the texts of the treaty. It contains the correspondence of the British and French governments concerning the question of Malta (13 Mart 1804 – 13 Mart 1805). This contradicts the conventional view that the Porte was ill informed on the European diplomacy of the time. Notably, it recorded the provisions of the treaty in simple Turkish; for instance, art. VIII “*Bahr-i Sefidde vaki Yedi Adaların cumhur olduğunu Fransız devleti anlaya*” First two letters are from Otto (the French ambassador at London) to Lord Hawkesbury (the British minister of Foreign Affairs) dated 23 May 1217 (in *rumi* date) and the latter's response, respectively; the third and fourth letters are from the British ambassador at St Petersburg (Lord *Sin Alinz?*) to Hawkesbury (23 April 217 and 7 May 217); the fifth and sixth letters are from Lord Hawkesbury to his ambassador at Paris (*Antonyo Meri Aşkor?*), dated 5 June 217 and the latter's response (17 June 217); the unknown author of this voluminous report (the Voivode of Wallachia?) pointed out that he found it unnecessary to translate the remaining 38 letters on the question of Malta [from the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens to 13 February 1804]. He translated 34 more letters on the launching of the hostilities (11March1804-24May1805): 1) 5 June 1217, from Hawkesbury to his ambassador at Paris; 2 and 3) 28 February, from Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth (*Vitvers*) (Paris?) and the latter's response (5 March); 4) 10 March, from General *Andre Rozi* to Hawkesbury; 5) 12 March, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 6) 15 March, his response; 7) 14 March, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 8) 17 March, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 9) 21 March, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 10) 22 March, from Hawkesbury to Whitworth; 11) 3 April, from Hawkesbury to Whitworth; 12) 4 April, from Hawkesbury to Whitworth; 13) 7 April, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 14) same date from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 15) 9 April, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 16) 14 April 218, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 17) 17 April, from Hawkesbury to Whitworth; 18) 13 April, from Hawkesbury to Whitworth; 19) 18 April, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 20) 18 April, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 21) 20 April, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 22) 23 April, from Hawkesbury to Whitworth; 23) 23 April, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 24) 25 April, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 25) 20 April, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 26) 29 April, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 27) 2 May, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury and to Talleyrand; 28) 4 May, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury: official note of Talleyrand, the reply of Whitworth, follow-up note of Talleyrand; 29) 4 May, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury containing the note of Talleyrand; 30) 7 May, from Hawkesbury to Whitworth; 31) 9 May, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 32) 12 May, from Whitworth to Hawkesbury; 33) 10 May, from Whitworth to Talleyrand; 34) 10 May, from Whitworth to Talleyrand.

Talleyrand had sent a letter to Reis Efendi on 6 January 1802 from Lyon that contained veiled threats of invading ‘the Rumelia or any other part of the Well-protected Domains’ unless the Paris preliminaries were ratified. He asserted that the treaty was not contrary to the London preliminaries and that its ratification would not sour the Porte’s relations with Britain and Russia since they supported the conclusion of the Ottoman-French peace. Consequently, Talleyrand officially informed about French rejection of Ali Efendi’s appointment as the Ottoman plenipotentiary to the Amiens and of mediation of a third power since no mediation was needed to eliminate ‘the embitterment between two brothers’ (*iki karındaşın beyninde bürudet vuku*).<sup>27</sup>

Ali Efendi attributed Napoleon’s objection to his participation in the negotiations held at Amiens to Sebastiani’s influence. Returned to Paris by late January 1802, Sebastiani pressured Ali Efendi to sign a separate peace in Paris, claiming for several times that the Porte would ratify any peace concluded with France regardless of how and where it was signed. Thus, he suspected that Sebastiani told the same to Napoleon, deceiving him on the official view of the Porte.<sup>28</sup> His suspicion was justified when

---

<sup>27</sup> Talleyrand made it clear that Napoleon would use his influence for the continuity and stability of the Ottoman empire if the Porte ratified the Paris preliminaries; otherwise, he would inflict harm on the Ottomans by using any possible means (...*aleyhine hasbü’l-vakt mümkinel-vuku olan kaffe-i ahvali ika’ zımnında mecmu nüfuzunu imal*). He demanded the Porte to choose between France and ‘the natural enemies of the Porte who entertained an insincere friendship after the emergence of some temporary extraordinary circumstances by misfortune.’ Obviously, he implied the Ottoman ‘misinterpretation’ of the Egyptian Expedition as an aggression against the Porte (*Devlet-i Aliyenin tabii düşmanları olub şimdilik zuhura gelmiş fevkalade bazı halatın tesadüfine mebni dostluk izhar idenler*) HAT 140/5808-F (6Jan1802/2N1216) from Talleyrand to the Reis Efendi; İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı Oğlu, “Amedi Galib Efendi, p. 361; Shaw’s assertion that Ali and Talleyrand reached an agreement was obviously not true, Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 281.

<sup>28</sup> HAT 248/13981 (23ZA1216/27March1802) from Ali Efendi to the Porte. Sebastiani put considerable pressure on Ali for the signing of a separate peace treaty. He once told Ali that the negotiations at Amiens came close to an end and thereby he should hurry to accept Talleyrand’s proposals before its conclusion. A

Napoleon insisted that the Porte's written instructions brought to Ali Efendi by Sebastiani required the signing of a separate peace treaty in Paris. He also maintained that Britain and France agreed to exempt Portugal and the Sublime Porte from participation in Amiens in the aftermath of the London preliminaries. Therefore he asked Ali Efendi to communicate to Hawkesbury (British minister of Foreign Affairs) that he would not go to Amiens and instead enter into negotiations in Paris. Napoleon charged Elgin for the Ottoman rejection of the Paris preliminaries. Blaming him for contradicting the official British policy, Napoleon assured Ali Efendi about the British approval of a likely Franco-Ottoman peace treaty. He also warned him to keep distance from Markov and Jenkinson. Ali Efendi proved to be intractable about going to Amiens, challenging Napoleon's views about his instructions by remarking that the conclusion of a separate peace in Paris was

---

few days later, by contrast, he warned Ali that the negotiations stalemated which, for him, also required Ali to sign the treaty in Paris. Ali had a terrible fight with Franchini (*Frangini*), the elder brother of the dragoman Franchini of the French Embassy at İstanbul who would accompany Galib Efendi to Paris later. The elder Franchini was appointed as dragoman in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the intervention of Sebastiani. He paid a visit to Ali and threatened him that he should better accept the French proposals or Napoleon would dispatch 70,000 troops from Italy to Rumelia. He also added that the British were not in a position to protect the Porte. Ali is unequivocal about his judgment on the French interpreters who studied at the Language School: 'this newcomer spendthrift' (*nevzuhur bir sefih*) had the nickname of 'dandy' (*telli bebek*) because of his extravagant oriental dresses. This 'reckless man had just finished the school where he had learned a few Persian verses, but yet presumed that he had an insightful mind in foreign affairs' (*Bu sefih henüz mektebden çıkmış bir kaç Farsi beyit talim itmekle umur-ı hariciyede sahib-i yed-i tuli zu'umna zahib olduğundan*). Enraged by his unwarranted rudeness, Ali warned him in strong language: "Well my friend! You will learn later only if you have a brain and comprehension what France and Paris come to mean and what kind of an art the international politics is. You better not dare overstepping and uttering those words which are just hearsay in any case. As I have been in Paris for the last five years I am not in need of your warnings and advices -praise be to God! I said it once! Don't you ever talk about it again, or you'll suffer!" (*Bak dostum! Sen Fransa ve Paris ne demekdir ve devletler politikası ne sanattır 'akl ve izanın var ise bundan sonra öğreneceksin. Haddin olmayan bu makule tabirat ki semm-i hilafdır ictinab itsen güzel olur. Beş sene Parisde meksim takribiyle Allahu'l-hamd ve'l-menna senin ihtar ve nasihatına ihtiyacdandır berriyim. Bunu bir söyledik! bir daha lisana getürme! mutazarrır olursun!*). Ali was sure that Sebastiani put these words in Franchini's mouth since 'such delusions were generally observed among the men of sword.' Note the common prejudices about the 'men of sword' (*askeri taifesi*) among the Ottoman ruling elite. We have seen similar views on Ushakov in Chapter III.



contingent upon the approval of Britain and Russia according to his official instructions. He, thus, insisted on negotiating the French proposal for a separate peace with his British and Russian colleagues. He also expressed his doubts about the deal reached with the British on the exception made for Portugal and the Porte.<sup>29</sup>

While Ali Efendi is believed to have been effectively isolated from the British and Russian diplomats in Paris by France, his hitherto neglected correspondence with Cornwallis and Jenkinson contradict this point. Prior to his meeting with Napoleon we mentioned above, Ali Efendi had met with Jenkinson for several times and received a letter from Cornwallis. This correspondence revealed that the French had also confused his British colleague by telling him about the alleged Ottoman willingness for concluding a separate peace without mediation. This led Cornwallis to believe that Ali Efendi had received new instructions from the Porte since the copy of Ali's instructions sent to him by the Porte was clear about the Ottoman intentions to attend the negotiations at Amiens. Ali Efendi, in response, assured him about his willingness to go to Amiens and related that he refused Napoleon's suggestion to contact Hawkesbury. Ali Efendi, fearing that Cornwallis might be duped by the French to exclude the Ottomans from the negotiations at Amiens, asked Jenkinson to convince Cornwallis to his participation in the conference. Nevertheless, Cornwallis rejected the French arguments that the peace of Portugal should set the precedence for the Ottoman peace and requested Ali to join him at Amiens

---

<sup>29</sup> HAT 137/5618 (15L1216/8Feb1802) minutes of Napoleon-Ali Efendi meeting. Napoleon warned Ali Efendi that the Porte needed the friendship of France against the Habsburgs and Russia. For him "the Tsar was a just man for the present but his ministers, particularly Markov, were bereft of ingenuousness" and might seduce the Tsar to change the course of diplomacy. The British were also undeniably "stubborn" as revealed in their refusal to turn in the Mamluks to the Porte.

immediately. This casts doubt on the suggestion that Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte agreed to exclude the plenipotentiaries of other states from the conference at Amiens. At least until mid-February, Cornwallis was willing to see Ali Efendi at the conference.<sup>30</sup>

Ali Efendi seemed to refrain from contact with Markov for several reasons. Apparently, the secondary literature has exaggerated the role of the French and Ali's flattered haughtiness in explaining this situation. Ali's correspondence reveals that Markov was actually isolated in Paris as a result of his involvement in a scandal concerning espionage. Ali Efendi believed that one of the reasons for Napoleon's obstinate rejection of any mediation was his annoyance at Markov and Jenkinson. He also sensed the increasing friction between Britain and Russia during his conversation with Jenkinson who told that Russia would not participate in the conference at Amiens.<sup>31</sup> By

---

<sup>30</sup> Herbert misinterpreted the whole situation. Ali Efendi sent a copy of his letter addressing Cornwallis to Talleyrand. Herbert thought that Ali Efendi, by so doing, wanted to embarrass Talleyrand who lied to him about the applicability of the case of Portugal to the Porte in signing a separate peace treaty. He thus showed that he learnt from his previous mistakes concerning the preparations of the Egyptian Expedition, Herbert, *Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, p. 174. For Ali's activities see pp. 154-175; Ali Efendi also met Jenkinson in Paris in January -when Talleyrand and Napoleon were still at Lyon- to inform him about his appointment to the conference at Amiens. While he complained to İstanbul about Jenkinson's real or apparent uncooperativeness, he promised Ali his support for having the French recognition of his appointment to Amiens, HAT 137/5603 (23N216/27Jan1802) from Ali Efendi to the Porte; HAT 240/13430 (27L1216/2March1802) from Ali Efendi to the Porte concerning his correspondence with Cornwallis; HAT 237/13175 (5L1216/8Feb1802) contains the letter from Cornwallis to Ali Efendi dated 8 February 1802.

<sup>31</sup> One of the domestic servants of Napoleon spied on the visitors and the affairs of Napoleon's residence and sold them to the highest bidder. After his arrestment, it turned out that Markov's name appeared on the customer list kept by the servant. Napoleon loathed him in front of other ambassadors for his dealings. 'Dumbfounded' by such a treatment, Markov isolated himself from diplomatic circles with the excuse of 'feigned illness', HAT 240/13430 (27L1216/2March1802); Ali Efendi saw Markov in a dinner he attended on invitation. When Markov asked if Cornwallis sent a letter in response to Ali's correspondence, Ali Efendi lied to him by replying in negative, HAT 137/5603 (23N216/27Jan1802).

March, Ali Efendi was fully convinced that Napoleon would never let him to attend the negotiations at Amiens and requested new instructions.<sup>32</sup>

### The Treaty of Paris

The Porte sent a new plenipotentiary, Mehmed Said Galib Efendi –‘the father of modern Turkish diplomacy’<sup>33</sup>- rather than sending new instructions to Ali Efendi. Meanwhile, as the treaty of Amiens was signed on late March 1802, Talleyrand suggested the re-opening of the negotiations, sending Ali a draft treaty and asking him to bring his own draft. The French insistence on obtaining the status of ‘the most favoured nation’ once again constituted the bone of contention in the negotiations. The French sought to ensure that they would not be denied any extra-privileges that might be given to Russia and Britain in future; in practice, this would mean the expansion of French trade into the Black Sea and having the right to open consulate in Suez in case that the British be granted the same right. Ali Efendi challenged Talleyrand by arguing that the French privileges were already expansive and that ‘friendship’ would require dropping this

---

<sup>32</sup> It is not really clear how Ali Efendi would have managed his affairs in Amiens even if Napoleon recognized his plenipotentiary powers. He lacked funds by December 1801 as prices rose steeply in Paris after the advent of thousands of British who wanted to take advantage of the peace to see the post-revolution France. Furthermore, Ali also lacked an interpreter by January since Codrika was sick and moved to the residence of a doctor outside the Paris. The dragoman demanded his passports to no avail since Talleyrand was at Lyon running the negotiations for the peace of Luneville. Thus, Ali asked for a new interpreter to attend in the negotiations at Amiens along with him, confessing that he found it hard to read and write in French. He suggested the appointment of the interpreter working in the London Embassy. Otherwise, he maintained, he would have to wait until the arrival of an interpreter without engaging in any conversation. This proved the conviction that he knew little French (prologue of the translator Üyepazarcı in Herbette, *Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi*, p. XXIII); for his related reports see, HAT 249/14081-B (27B1216/3Dec1801), HAT 137/5603 (23N1216/27Jan1802), HAT 137/5646 (31Jan1802).

<sup>33</sup> Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the preparer of the Edict of Gülhane that launched the ‘westernizing’ Tanzimat era, was one of the pupils of Galib Efendi. Galib served as Reis Efendi for three times for short durations in 1806, 1808 and in 1814. He was also the plenipotentiary who signed the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 with Russia, Uzunçarşılı, “Amedi Galib Efendi”, pp. 357-63.

demand since its acceptance was harmful to the Porte. When Ali Efendi met Markov despite the French objection, the Russian diplomat intimidated that he would not accept any treaty concluded without his involvement. According to him, Ali should have declined Talleyrand's invitation until the Porte learnt about the Amiens and dispatched new instructions. He also argued that Ali should refuse Jenkinson's mediation since the British plenipotentiary arguably did not have such instructions.<sup>34</sup>

The rivalry between British and Russian diplomats over the issue of mediation and the French stubbornness concerning the status of 'the most favoured nation' and the trading rights in the Black Sea compelled Ali Efendi to suggest to the Porte that the extraordinary envoy to be sent to Paris should have the necessary instructions to act in complete freedom in negotiations, independent of Markov and Jenkinson. Particularly, after his last meeting with Markov, Ali Efendi came to believe that Markov's opposition would delay the conclusion of Franco-Ottoman peace unless the new plenipotentiary had the necessary instructions.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> Ali Efendi confessed to Markov that his credentials did not allow him to conclude peace in Paris. He, nevertheless, asserted that his instructions let him signing the treaty in Paris. Thus, he contradicted his former arguments he used against the French. He also contradicted his earlier arguments on the Black Sea prior to the Paris preliminaries. HAT 257/14765-A Talleyrand's proposed draft. Ali Efendi accepted arts. I and III that were on the renewal of previous treaties between the two states and returning of the confiscated goods. He, however, made a mistake by rejecting the ratification of only the relevant articles of the Treaty of Amiens (art. II), on the basis of the principle of equality. He claimed the Treaty of Amiens required its full ratification by the Porte. Talleyrand, surprised by this unexpected demand, agreed to it. This was described as a 'blunder' in the memorandum submitted to Selim. This error would be revised by Galib Efendi later. This indicates that Ali Efendi did not fully comprehend the Amiens as it was signed only a week ago; HAT 257/14765 (13Z216/16Apr1802) the minutes of the negotiation with Talleyrand that was likely to take place on 5<sup>th</sup> or 6<sup>th</sup> April. It also included his meeting with Markov to discuss the negotiations.

<sup>35</sup> Ali Efendi received the news of the appointment of an extraordinary envoy on 21 April by the official letter sent by the Porte on 11 March. Ali's new dragoman *Aleksan* carried this letter with another one addressing Talleyrand who, according to Ali Efendi, was happy that the envoy was sent on special mission. Ali Efendi was relieved with the news. But he worried that the letter did not totally absolve him from

Galib Efendi was given alternative credentials and instructions that enabled him to attend the conference at Amiens or sign a separate treaty in Paris as he saw fit. Major concern of İstanbul was the dreadful likelihood of being the only state to remain in war with France and this would happen inevitably if Amiens was to be signed before Galib Efendi reached the destination. In this case, Napoleon was likely to add more claims to the list in the negotiations prior to the signing of a separate treaty, the complex issue of British and Russian claims for mediation notwithstanding. Consequently, the Porte considered the appointment of Galib Efendi as a ‘weak precaution’ (*tedbir-i zaif*), but felt compelled to send him as it understood that the negotiations carried out by its unrecognized plenipotentiary Ali Efendi would not lead to the conclusion of peace.<sup>36</sup> Galib Efendi had clear instructions to sign peace with France with the British approval were the Treaty of Amiens not signed at the time of his arrival. British and Russian mediation was to be negotiated with all sides including France. He should, however, act

---

attending the negotiations with Talleyrand, HAT 257/14765-B (27Z1216/30Apr1802) from Ali Efendi to the Porte.

<sup>36</sup> Uzunçarşılı, “Türk-İngiliz”, p. 601; Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali*, pp. 329-31; Galib gave the date of departure from İstanbul as 31 March 1802 (27Z1216) despite the contradictory dates in the secondary sources, HAT 136/5596-G (7S1217/9Jun1802) minutes of the meeting with Markov; Selim had initially thought of appointing Atıf Efendi –the author of the famous treaty that analyzed the First Coalition Wars and supported the alliance with Russia. He then changed his mind and appointed Galib Efendi for no apparent reasons. Nevertheless, Galib Efendi mentioned in one of his reports to İstanbul that it was actually him who had penned the proposed preliminaries that Ali Efendi had offered to Talleyrand, HAT 143/5981 (nd.) the credentials of Galib Efendi; also published incompletely in Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, appendix, doc. XIII, pp. 194-99. For its analysis see pp. 139-40; the anonymous writer of the memorandum mentioned previously defined Galib Efendi as a “man of dignity and learning” (*zat-ı muteber ve maarif-perver*) “qualified by full comprehension” (*dirayet-i kamile ile mevsuf*).

independently in carrying out the negotiations if the peace between France and Britain was concluded before his arrival.<sup>37</sup>

Galib Efendi learnt about the conclusion of peace at Amiens (25 March 1802) only on 21 April when he was still in Bucharest. This meant that he would negotiate a separate treaty with France and present an act of adherence to the Treaty of Amiens as stipulated by art. XIX.<sup>38</sup> After the news reached İstanbul, the Porte required him to ‘expedite the signing of the treaty immediately after arriving at Paris without wasting a single minute as required by his instructions’ (*dakika-yı vahide fevt itmeyerek talimatınız muktezasınca imza-yı ahidnameye süirat*). He should not allow the negotiations to bog down by ‘minor issues’ such as the details of the act of adherence. Thus the treaty should include the preliminaries of peace (returning of Egypt and the Porte’s suzerainty over the Ionian Republic) and the renewal of the past treaties between the two powers; it should make a stipulation to ensure that all the details concerning trade would be negotiated later in İstanbul. The Porte felt depressed by the realization that no state but itself was now left

---

<sup>37</sup> He had the instructions to do his best to exclude the matter of ‘privileges’ from the treaty, HAT 143/5981 (nd.) the credentials of Galib Efendi; also published incompletely in Karal, *Fransa-Mısır*, appendix, doc. XIII, pp. 194-99. For its analysis see pp. 139-40.

<sup>38</sup> Galib Efendi learnt the news from the newspapers received by the *voyvoda* of Wallachia who sent its Turkish translation to him 3 days after he left Bucharest. In his conversation with the French ambassador to Vienna, he uttered that the Porte would have a positive outlook about the treaty as it also included the Ottomans, see his letter published in Uzuçarşılı, “Amedi Galib Efendi”, p. 368; Galib Efendi was confused at Rusçuk (Ruse) by the unconfirmed news that French signed separate treaties in Paris both with Britain and the Sublime Porte on 13 March. Ali Efendi’s report arriving on 21 June clarified the matter, HAT 140/5811 (18Z1216/21Jun1802); HAT 169/7218-G (nd.) copy of the letter sent by the Porte to Galib Efendi. The news of the Amiens reached İstanbul first from Vienna and London. Article XIX confused the Porte as it did not state whether the act of adherence should signify the Ottoman involvement in the treaty in its entirety or it should cover only the relevant articles. For Galib’s report concerning the articles the act of adherence should include as well as his new instructions sent after the Amiens, see HAT 169/7218-A. A draft of the act of adherence is retained in 1196/46965-A; Testa gave a wrong version of the act that stated the full Ottoman adherence to the Amiens, see Testa, *Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane* v. II (Paris, 1864-1911), p. 140. The Ottomans had sent different versions of it to Galib just in case. See the following footnote.

in war with the French and urged Galib Efendi to conclude peace in 3 days with the ratifications to be exchanged in İstanbul in 40 days to save time.<sup>39</sup> It also sent the copies of Galib's instructions to Ali Efendi and ordered him to conclude peace with France in case that Galib was stuck on the way to Paris for some reason.<sup>40</sup>

At the time of the conclusion of peace at Amiens, the British and the Russians agreed in St Petersburg to co-mediate the Ottoman-French peace. Should the French object to the British mediation, Russia would be the mediator and guarantor of the peace in Paris; Britain would also declare itself the guarantor of the Franco-Ottoman treaty in its own treaty with France. Galib Efendi worried that Britain might also demand the Porte to be the guarantor of the Franco-British peace for the sake of reciprocity. In this case he was planning to refuse it on the pretext that the Porte did not join the conference at Amiens and that the European affairs were “multifarious and miscellaneous” (*kesir ve mütenevvi*).<sup>41</sup> France, however, dismissed out of hand any British and Russian

---

<sup>39</sup> HAT 169/7258-G (nd.). Should the French refuse to sign the treaty without submission of the act of adherence to the Amiens, Galib Efendi would only include in the prologue of the treaty the statement that the Porte accepted those articles related to the Porte in the Amiens. In the third option, the Porte would give an act of adherence ensuring the Ottoman acceptance of the relevant articles without defining them. In the fourth option, the relevant articles would be mentioned in the act. The omitted option allowed Galib to present an act of adherence that would ensure Ottoman acceptance of the Amiens in its entirety except for the one on religious arrangements (presumably, the clauses regarding the knights of Malta). The Ottoman reluctance to deliver an all-inclusive act was explained to the Russian dragoman Fonton with reference to the contentious matters such as Malta that endangered its ratification. The Porte clearly wanted to forestall any possibility of entering war as a result of the failure of the Amiens. As predicted, the accord failed in a year, but the Porte stayed out of the Third Coalition Wars, HAT 139/5767 ( nd.) draft correspondence to be sent to Galib Efendi; HAT 169/7218-B the draft of the act of adherence; Galib was informed about the British pressure for the delivery of an act. He was sent the copies of two different versions of the act to be given to the British Embassy in İstanbul if necessary. These versions were similar to the third and fourth options above, HAT 169/7218-E draft correspondence to be sent to Galib Efendi.

<sup>40</sup> It is interesting that the Porte desperately wished that Ali Efendi had already signed the treaty by the time this correspondence reached Paris, HAT 169/7218-D (catalogue date: 8M1217/11May1802) draft letter to Ali Efendi.

<sup>41</sup> HAT 143/5981.

interference with the conclusion of the Franco-Ottoman peace. Meanwhile, the Porte officially informed St. Petersburg about the French resoluteness about signing a separate peace and their rejection of Russian mediation. It asked Kochubey to make the necessary changes in the instructions of Markov. In response, Kochubey notified the Porte that Russia withdrew its claims to mediate the Ottoman peace. The Porte also hoped the British would not object to conclude a separate peace in Paris since it had already signed the Treaty of Amiens.<sup>42</sup>

The Ottomans attached great importance to the Treaty of Amiens, which, they deemed, would be an international acknowledgement of the subjugation of the Ionian Republic to the Porte. However, the recognition of the Ionian Republic in the Treaty of Amiens was a mixed blessing for the Porte because of the wording of the article IX, which failed to mention the Ottoman suzerainty (*metbuiyet*) and the Ottoman annexation of the four coastal towns.<sup>43</sup> The Porte instructed Galib Efendi to no avail to rephrase the article so as to take account of this. He was also to try to change the word “pre-war” (*kable's-sefer*) with “present” (*el-haletehu hazihî*) in the clause concerning the territorial integrity in art. VIII. This was also likely to be a measure to strengthen the Ottoman suzerainty over the Ionian Republic. Galib Efendi, nevertheless, pointed out that a third

---

<sup>42</sup> HAT 137/5600 from Kochubey to Reis Efendi dated 15 April 1802 (old style?); HAT 139/5767 ( nd.) draft correspondence to be sent to Galib Efendi; HAT 139/5778 (15ZA1216/19March1802) letter sent to Kochubey concerning the matter of mediation and his notification; its copies were retained in HAT 139/5783 and HAT 139/5781.

<sup>43</sup> HAT 949/40822-A, HATT 950/40827 (17Jun1802).



party could not interfere with the wording of a peace treaty signed between two parties; such corrections could only be made in the Franco-Ottoman peace treaty.<sup>44</sup>

The Franco-Ottoman peace treaty was signed on 26 June 1802 in Paris. Regulations concerning the restoration of peace and renewal of the past treaties, trade privileges in the Black Sea (arts. I, II, III) were followed by the declaration of the Ottoman recognition of the relevant articles of the Treaty of Amiens. Galib Efendi failed to convince the French to insert a clause in the article that made explicit mention to its subjugation to the Porte (art. IV). Other articles are about the mutual guarantees for territorial integrity (art. V), the matter of confiscated goods [to be resolved in future negotiations in İstanbul] (art. VI), custom regulations (art. VII), exchange of prisoners (art. VIII), mutual bestowal of the status of ‘the most favored nation’ (art. IX), and ratification (art. X).<sup>45</sup>

Galib Efendi did not actually have much room to manoeuvre in the negotiations.<sup>46</sup>

When he met Napoleon the first time, the French Consul implied that he intended to form

---

<sup>44</sup> HAT 169/7218-A.

<sup>45</sup> HAT 1194/56910 retains the drafts proposed by Talleyrand and Galib Efendi as well as the original treaty. A detailed analysis of this document would be highly interesting in order to show the priorities of the two sides; HAT 140/5807-B includes the Turkish translation of the prologue and the epilogue of the French ratification of the treaty. Presumably in the lack of a better alternative, Galib Efendi was addressed as the “*Amedi* of the Imperial Council and the Director of the Presidency of Affairs” (*Amedi-yi Divan-ı Hümayun ve Riyaset-i Umuriyenin Müdürü*). Created in 1777, the *Amedi* Bureau processed all written transactions of the Reis Efendi (G. Bayerle, *Pashas, Begg, and Effendis: A historical dictionary of titles and terms in the Ottoman Empire* [İstanbul: Isis, 1997], p. 7). Galib sent the French ratification to İstanbul on 6 August, HAT 137/5659 (6R1217/6Aug1802) from Galib Efendi to the Porte. The French ratification gives the date of the treaty as 24 Safer 1217 (26 June 1802) and 6 Mesidor 10 (25 June 1802); Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, v. VII, pp. 161-62.

<sup>46</sup> Uzunçarşılı, “*Amedi Galib Efendi*”, p. 372 (transcription of his correspondence from Paris to the Porte). He went along with Ali Efendi to his first meeting with Talleyrand on 3 June. Other negotiations with Talleyrand and *Dötaryo* took place on 9 June (HAT 136/5596-F), 11 June (HAT 136/5596-E), 15 June (HAT 136/5596-D), 16 June (HAT 136/5596), 21 June (HAT 137/5596-B), 25 June (HAT 136/5596-A; HAT 141/5842-A).

an alliance with the Porte by the treaty that would declare France the guarantor of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He also made it clear that the Porte was technically in war with France and the peace would not be concluded without France having the same privileges in the Black Sea as Russia. Galib Efendi realized in the negotiations that Napoleon had already secured the Russian acquiescence on the matter of privileges. According to Galib “the haughtiness of this fellow and his present power and sovereignty in Europe does not need mentioning; his will has influence with all states and he is capable of carrying out his desire in everywhere.” This, together with the rumours that the French troops in Ancona would be dispatched to the Morea, ‘devastated his mind’ even before arriving at Paris.<sup>47</sup>

Galib Efendi was instructed to be on good terms with Markov before leaving İstanbul. In their first meeting, Markov claimed that his instructions required him to act in the capacity of ‘facilitator’ of the Franco-Ottoman negotiations especially on the matter of trading rights in the Black Sea. Paul instructed Markov to back Galib Efendi should the Ottoman plenipotentiary object to the expansion of French trade into the Black Sea; otherwise, Markov was to acquiesce to the granting of this privilege to France. However, it appeared that Markov either did not receive the new instructions that annulled the Russian mediation or pretended to be ignorant about them. He urged Galib to share his

---

<sup>47</sup> “...herifin derecei nahveti ve elhatü hazihi Avrupada rütbei nüfuz ve istiklali tarîf kabul etmez; her Devlete kelâmî müessir ve her tarafta dilhahım icraya muktedir olup Rusya İmparatoriyle dahi uyuşmuşlar” Uzunçarşılı, “Amedi Galib Efendi”, p. 377 (transcription of his correspondence from Paris to the Porte); in the meantime, Selim secretly ordered the navy to the Morea because of these rumors. He did not issue official orders in order to avoid any ‘misunderstanding’ that the navy was sent against the French. He was afraid of any friction with France on the eve of the conclusion of peace. He advised Hüseyin Paşa to avoid communication with the British warships in the region for the same purpose, Karal, *Selim III’ün Hattı Hümayunları* (Ankara: TTK, 1942), p. 87.

instructions and expressed his willingness for attending in the negotiations. Galib was polite enough to advise him to confer with Talleyrand to overcome the French opposition whereas he actually resented Markov's claims for mediation and his leniency towards the French demands regarding the trade privileges in the Black Sea.<sup>48</sup> In the aforementioned meeting with Napoleon, Galib was prudent not to dismiss openly the Russian mediation, but he implied that this controversy actually involved Russia and France rather than the Porte.

In fact, the whole matter revolving around the Black Sea was rather a political one as opposed to commercial interests. Galib reminded Markov that he had accepted the French demands concerning the Black Sea after conferring to him in the meeting dated 9 June.<sup>49</sup> In this meeting, Markov pointed out that the Porte had already promised to Britain certain trade privileges in the Black Sea during the formation of alliance. Thus, it was only natural that the French would demand to be treated on equal footing with the British. His veiled support for the French claims could only be attributable to the recent rapprochement between Russia and France. In an unofficial conversation, the British deputy-ambassador at İstanbul, Stratton, disclosed that Britain intended to nullify the

---

<sup>48</sup> Galib Efendi and Markov met for three times on 8, 9, and 21 June. Galib was frustrated with Markov's suggestion that he needed not to hurry entering negotiations with Talleyrand since the Amiens ended the hostilities between the Porte and Paris. According to Markov, Galib, rather, should wait until the arrival of new instructions from İstanbul, which, he seemingly hoped, would make necessary revisions after learning about the conclusion of the Amiens so as to enable the Russian diplomat to participate in the negotiations. At any rate, Galib believed that Markov was trying to delay the conclusion of Franco-Ottoman peace. Markov told Galib that he was obliged by his court to deliver some correspondence to his Ottoman colleague in the first meeting, but the next day he could not produce them, claiming that they were 'lost.' HAT 136/5596-H (6S1217/8Jun1802), HAT 136/5596-G (7S1217/9Jun1802) minutes of negotiations with Markov.

<sup>49</sup> The last meeting with Markov took place a week before the signing of the Franco-Ottoman treaty. Convinced that the treaty was already signed, Markov criticized Galib Efendi's dismissal of Russia's role as the 'facilitator.' HAT 136/5596-C (21Jun1802) minutes of Galib Efendi-Markov meeting.

French claims in the Black Sea by not demanding the Porte to fulfill its promise. The expansion of the French trade into the Black Sea would strengthen the weak French navy, whereas the British commercial interests in the Black Sea were negligible. Therefore, the Porte should not grant trade privileges in the Black Sea to any power in his opinion. The Porte assured him that should it have to comply with the French demands despite its resentment, it would grant the privilege first to Britain in order to fulfill its promise to its ally.<sup>50</sup> The Porte also informed Galib Efendi about this conversation. Unaware of the conclusion of the treaty, it was urging Galib in desperation as late as mid-July to accept the French demands concerning trade privileges in the Black Sea. He was to induce the French to accept an official memorandum assuring the French that the privileges would be granted in near future in İstanbul. In case of refusal, he was to arrange the matter as a separate article (*madde-i münferide*) that would necessitate a separate ratification. As a last option, he was also allowed to consent to its inclusion in the treaty proper.<sup>51</sup>

The French resoluteness on the matter also stemmed from political considerations as stated explicitly by Napoleon and Talleyrand for many times in the negotiations. Talleyrand did everything to give the treaty the appearance of an alliance treaty. During the negotiations with Ali Efendi and Galib Efendi, the French referred time and again to the promise given to Britain on the Black Sea and argued that the dismissal of similar French demands would mean their humiliation.

---

<sup>50</sup> HAT 139/5767 (after the Treaty of Amiens) draft letter addressing Galib Efendi.

<sup>51</sup> HAT 140/5818- E and F (15RA1217/16July1802) draft instruction to be dispatched to Galib Efendi in response to his letter dated 10 June complaining from the French resoluteness about the Black Sea. Selim's order: "write to him to conclude the matter at once by permitting trading in the Black Sea" (*Karadeniz ticaretine ruhsat virilüb bir saat akdem maddeyi kat' eylemesini yazasız*); also HAT 140/5818-G (23RA1217/24July1802) draft letter addressing Galib Efendi.

This treaty had a certain aspect that actually made it a kind of treaty of alliance – albeit not much accentuated by the students of the topic. It included a secret article that supplemented article V which secured the mutual recognition of territorial integrity of both states. The secret article freed the Porte from any obligation to enter war against a third party fighting with France.<sup>52</sup> It should be remembered that after the French rejection of the treaty of Franco-Ottoman alliance (1797), the new regime of the *Directoires* spent considerable efforts to revive the treaty unsuccessfully. Talleyrand once told Galib Efendi that ‘France could not stand any phrase defining Britain as the ally of the Sublime Porte’ and that the negotiations at Amiens had been stuck for more than 6 weeks because of the British insistence to insert such a phrase into one of the clauses. According to him, only France could be referred to as ‘the ally of the Sublime Porte’ in such treaties since it was the ‘natural and genuine ally of the Sublime Porte.’ Notably, the first article of the draft proposed by Talleyrand contained the clause “let the alliance, trade, and shipping be revived by the two powers as in the past.”<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> Soysal is the only historian who defined this treaty as a treaty of alliance with regard to art. V probably because the version he used included the secret article (Testa, v. II, p. 140 ff), Soysal, *Fransız ihtilali*, pp. 336-37; Cevdet Paşa’s version does not include the secret article (Cevdet, v. VII, pp. 323-24) nor does HAT 140/5808-E; Uzunçarşılı was aware of the existence of the secret article, but he could not locate it, see Uzunçarşılı, “Amedi Galib Efendi”, p. 404; The Turkish ratification of the secret article made it clear that a related promissory note (*temessük*) in Turkish was delivered to Talleyrand on the day of signing of the treaty that required a separate ratification of the secret article, BOA, C.HRC 6310 (25RA1217/26July1802) copy of the ratification of the secret article; C.HRC 5820 copy of the promissory note for art. V.

<sup>53</sup> HAT 136/5596-F (7S1217/9Jun1802) minutes of the negotiation with Talleyrand; (*berr ve bahrde tarafeynden cari olan ittifak ve emr-i ticaret ve amed-şüd-i sefayin kemafti’s-sabık tecdid ola*). The French claimed that the expression *amed-şüd* denoted merchant ships and that they would have opted for the phrase *geşt-ü-güzar* if they had meant warships. Galib refused the argument since both phrases meant the same thing in Ottoman documents, HAT 1194/56910; the French claimed that the word ‘alliance’ actually referred to the phrase ‘the natural alliance’ that had been inserted in all official correspondence for 300 years. Galib objected its insertion in the clause and reminded that there was no treaty of alliance between

Talleyrand also attempted to change the wording of the article about the French trade privileges in the Black Sea so as to allow the French warships to enter the Black Sea. He replaced the word “merchant” (*tüccar*) with the phrase “all French ships without exception” (*ale'l-ıtlak Fransa sefinesi*) in the related clause. Galib Efendi argued against him since “this phrase can be stretched like wet leather so as to include the warships” (*yaş deri gibi çekdikce uzayub sonra ceng sefinesine dahi şamil olur*). Talleyrand told Galib that he would not let him return to İstanbul before exchanging the ratification and concluding a treaty of alliance. Talleyrand also claimed the Russian tariff for the French merchants and right to open consulates on the shores of the Black Sea.<sup>54</sup> His insistence suggested that he actually sought to neutralize all Russian gains from its alliance with the Porte by making the treaty resemble the rejected Franco-Ottoman alliance (1797). Talleyrand took his thinly veiled attempt to absurd lengths such as deploying two French frigates in the Black Sea or in İstanbul allegedly to help the Ottoman navy protect the

---

the two powers in history, HAT 136/5596-D (19S1217/21Jun1802) minutes of the negotiation with *Dötaryo* (Talleyrand was sick at that time).

<sup>54</sup> HAT 136/5596 (14S1217/16Jun1802) minutes of negotiations with *Dötaryo* and Talleyrand; The French also objected to the word “consul” (*konsolos*) as it denoted Napoleon in French usage and instead inserted “merchant consuls” (*tüccar konsolosları*). Galib rejected the inclusion of this matter in a treaty of peace since matters concerning tariffs and consuls were arranged in trade treaties. He argued that inclusion of such a clause would not secure the application of the Russian tariff to the French as the tariff had many clauses that were impossible to be cited one by one in the peace treaty, HAT 136/5596-B (19S1217/21Jun1802) minutes of negotiation with *Dötaryo*; Galib related the negotiations to Markov who expressed his support for Galib’s decision to turn down these demands and, to the dismay of Galib, assured him that he would also bring up the matter in his meeting with Talleyrand the next day (22 June). As Galib could not tell Markov ‘you better not’ (*hiç karışdırmanız*) asked him to conceal the Russo-Ottoman cooperation from Talleyrand whereas Markov thought its disclosure to Talleyrand was useful for the Ottomans. Markov accepted Galib’s advice, but also suspected that Galib never mentioned the Russian mediation to Talleyrand in the negotiations. Galib assured him that he broached the issue although the Tsar was not insistent on the matter of mediation; Talleyrand, however, curtly refused any Russian claim for mediation. Markov also requested Galib Efendi not to mention “Russia” in the clause that arranged the application of the privileges of other nations to the French, HAT 136/5596-C (21Jun1802) minutes of Galib Efendi-Markov meeting.

French merchants from ‘pirate attacks’ in the Black Sea. It goes without saying that Galib Efendi remained speechless.<sup>55</sup>

### Conclusion

The inclusion of article IV that recognized the relevant articles of the Amiens (on Egypt and the Ionian Republic) could be regarded as an Ottoman success although it fell short of meeting the expectations of the Porte. It should be mentioned that Talleyrand was opposed to include even a clause that referred to the Amiens.<sup>56</sup> Galib Efendi was to exchange the act of adherence that formalized the Ottoman recognition of the relevant articles of the Treaty of Amiens with an official note that secured the French recognition of the Ottoman inclusion in the Amiens. Before the exchange, however, he was instructed on negotiating the revision of article VIII of the Amiens so as to include the addition of a clause that explicitly stated the cession of the four Dalmatian towns to the Porte.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> Talleyrand expressed his frustration over Galib’s determined resistance on the phrase ‘French ships with no exception’, remarking that France did not seek to dispatch warships to the Black Sea by taking advantage of the proposed phrase. He reminded that Russian warships passed through the Straits although Russia did not have precedence over France in terms of friendship with the Porte. Galib explained that the related article in the Russo-Ottoman alliance ‘limited the passage of Russian warships through the Straits to wartime with no such permission to be granted after the conclusion of peace. No Russian warship was to descend through the Strait of İstanbul from now on.’ (*Lakin bu madde ancak sefer müddetine münhasır olup hitam-ı seferden sonra müruruna ruhsat yokdur. Bundan sonra Rusya devletinin sefayin-i harbi İstanbul Boğazından mürur itmez*), HAT 136.5596 (14S1217/16Jun1802) minutes of negotiation with Talleyrand; for the last demand of Talleyrand see HAT 141/5842-A (23S1217/25Jun1802).

<sup>56</sup> Talleyrand made it clear that no treaty signed with a third party could form the basis of the Franco-Ottoman peace as the two traditional friends needed neither the written nor the oral mediation of any other power to mend their differences, HAT 136/5596-F (7S1217/9Jun1802) minutes of the negotiation with Talleyrand; Galib Efendi objected to enter negotiations without the French approval of referring to the Amiens and showed article 2 of the draft treaty that Talleyrand had proposed to Ali Efendi. As mentioned previously, this article secured the French acceptance of the relevant articles of the Amiens, HAT 136/5596-E 9S1217/11Jun1802) minutes of the negotiation with Talleyrand.

<sup>57</sup> HAT 169/7218-F; HAT 139/5774 (nd.) included the draft of the imperial edict to be issued for the act of adherence. These instructions and the act of adherence were sent along with the orders to expedite the negotiations that we have reviewed above. Copies of the act of adherence were given to British, French, and Russian embassies in İstanbul.

Although Talleyrand sent word to Galib through the Prussian ambassador Lucchesini that he would exchange the Ottoman act of adherence with his own written assurances on the day of the signing of the treaty, Galib could only manage to receive a signed copy of the written assurance; the original was to be delivered later. Talleyrand delayed the delivery until the ratification in September.<sup>58</sup> Galib suspected that his negligence stemmed from the problems arose over the certain articles of the Amiens if not from mere forgetfulness and indecisiveness of Talleyrand. At any rate, he had a very low opinion about Talleyrand whom he defined as “an incomprehensible infidel who never notes down anything.”<sup>59</sup> Galib Efendi was exhausted by Talleyrand’s seemingly infinite proposals that undid the previous settlement reached in the last negotiation each time. Therefore, Galib demanded him to put his sign on the ultimate version agreed upon on the night of 25 June in order to prevent him coming up with new proposals the next day.<sup>60</sup>

Despite its short span of life, the Treaty of Amiens brought the longest peace “in the twenty years that the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars lasted.”<sup>61</sup> Therefore, the Sublime State never felt secure on its south-west frontiers with incessant wars and threats

---

<sup>58</sup> HAT 136/5596-A (24S1217/26Jun1802) the minutes of the negotiation with Talleyrand, dated 25 June; Talleyrand had not delivered the written assurance as of 5 September. Galib was hoping to leave Paris in a week as Napoleon promised him its delivery in a few days, HAT 137/5598 (7CA1217/5Sept1802) from Galib Efendi to the Porte.

<sup>59</sup> (*Anlaşılmaz bir kafir olduğundan ve bir nesneyi kaydetmediğinden*). Here, Galib actually referred to Talleyrand’s sharp oscillations in proposing contradictory clauses in the negotiations. He attributed this to his indecisive set of mind, HAT 138/5663 (25RA1217/26July1802). He also complained from Talleyrand’s negligence of the act of adherence in his meeting with Napoleon, Uzunçarşılı, “Amedi Galib Efendi”, p. 403 (minutes of the meeting with Napoleon, dated 25 July 1802).

<sup>60</sup> HAT 136/5596-A (24S1217/26Jun1802) the minutes of the negotiation with Talleyrand, dated 25 June.

<sup>61</sup> A. Horne, *The Age of Napoleon* (New York, 2004), p. 20.



of occupation. As late as 1803, rumors of another French expedition to Egypt were prevalent.<sup>62</sup> The Porte never ceased to argue that its recognition of the Islands as a republic in the treaty was linked to their subjugation to the Porte, as the Ionian Islands had been neither independent nor a state prior to the conclusion of the Russo-Ottoman Convention.<sup>63</sup> The question of Ottoman suzerainty continued throughout the Napoleonic wars, as the Ionian Islands changed hands from one power to another. After the Treaty of Tilsit, Talleyrand promised the Ottoman ambassador that he would leave the Ionian Republic to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>64</sup> By 1812, however, Corfu was under French control, while Zante and Cephalonia were occupied by Britain. Rumours concerning the possibility that the two powers would give the Ionian Islands to Russia alarmed the Porte, for Russia was likely to provoke the Greeks of the Morea and Anatolia against the Ottoman rule, taking advantage of their shared Orthodox faith and the oppression of Ali Paşa of Yanya.<sup>65</sup> The Ottoman recognition of the British annexation of the Ionian Republic in 1815 came only in 1820 when the latter gave back Parga to the Ottomans.<sup>66</sup> Even then, the Ottomans considered Britain and Russia usurpers on the grounds that they had taken control of the Ionian Republic without the consent of the Porte, its rightful protector, from the Third Coalition Wars onwards.<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> A curious balloon accident in Bosnia in 1803 alarmed the Porte which suspected that the French engaged in aerial reconnaissance in Dalmatia. For the details see, K. Şakul, "Gökten çadır düştü", *Toplumsal Tarih* 117 (September 2003): 30-34.

<sup>63</sup> HAT 176/7675 (nd.).

<sup>64</sup> HAT 143/5946 (23Jul1806).

<sup>65</sup> HAT 966/41292 (5Feb1812).

<sup>66</sup> C.HRC 742 (4Feb1818); BOA, A.AMD 42/32 (1820).

<sup>67</sup> HAT 1239/48176-P (1818-20?).

## CHAPTER IX

### CONCLUSION

Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, viewing the dethronement of Selim III in 1807 in retrospect, was disappointed by the ‘ignorance’ of the revolting populace of İstanbul who failed to appreciate Selim’s major undertakings. He found it hard to understand why people did not support the reforms of Selim III even though his reforms would have been beneficial for both state and society in the long run.<sup>1</sup> What he overlooked was the erratic system of alliances which was confusing not only for the masses but also for the rulers. In the final analysis this accounted for the failure of Selim.

Paul was already murdered in a violent palace coup in March 1801 because of his recent rapprochement with Napoleon against Britain. Any state -be it the Dutch, Russia, the Danes or the Porte- that remained neutral was considered a French accomplice in the eyes of the British. The neutral Danes were heavily punished by Nelson at the Battle of Copenhagen (1801) for entering the Second League of Armed Neutrality (following the first one in 1780-83) formed by Paul that eventually brought his own end. Nelson already anchored at Reval by May 1801 to secure Russia’s cooperation. Tsar Alexander I opened negotiations with Britain for a new arrangement.

King Ferdinand oscillated like Selim III on the eve of the Third Coalition. He first signed a treaty of neutrality with France, but then concluded an alliance with the Habsburgs in a few days and approved the deployment of a Russo-British force in southern Italy. Deposed by Napoleon after the French victory at Austerlitz, he once again

---

<sup>1</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet* [new edition], v. VIII, p. 184.

fled to Palermo in haste. The Russian fleet was virtually locked up in the Mediterranean after 1807 as Britain and the Sublime Porte denied passage through Gibraltar and the Straits, respectively. The cost of the rapprochement with France was the end of the Russian Mediterranean adventure in total disaster; the Russian fleet had to stay in the ports of Venice and Trieste until 1810 while some of them joined the French in Toulon. After selling their ships to the French, the Russian crews had to undertake a difficult land journey to Russia from Trieste in the same year.<sup>2</sup>

Selim III was one of the victims of this global moment. Only the poor state of the Russian Black Sea fleet and difficulties of communication prevented a coordinated Russian attack on İstanbul from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles in 1807. While the Black Sea fleet could not undertake the planned landing on the outskirts of İstanbul, Seniavin was dissuaded from forcing the Dardanelles by Admiral Duckworth whose fleet was heavily battered during the passage from the Straits back to the Mediterranean. Selim III survived the British attack on İstanbul but the populace, already heavily armed against the British, was further embittered by the rumors that it was actually Selim who had invited the British and Russians to the city. This was presumably a distorted version of the news of a possible Russian attack on İstanbul. These, combined with the food shortages as a result of the turbulences in the Balkans and the Russian blockade of the Dardanelles, sealed the faith of Selim in a rebellion commonly known as the Kabakçı Mustafa Rebellion (1807).

---

<sup>2</sup> D. F. White, "The Russian Navy in Trieste. During the Wars of the Revolution and the Empire", *American Slavic and the East European Review* 6:3/4 (1947), p. 40.

This dissertation has examined *an* Ottoman global moment.<sup>3</sup> What was so global about it was not so much the region –it was still the Levant- as was the way in which the events unfolded, turning the orders of things in war, diplomacy, state and society upside down. We should rather think in terms of moments of exclusion and inclusion, trends of universalism versus localism with no value judgments attached to them. For instance, the reign of Selim III seems to have been more open to Western influence in using hundreds of foreign experts, maintaining permanent ambassadors at foreign courts, sponsoring propaganda pieces in foreign languages, and even employing foreign architects and gardeners. Mahmud II, by contrast, refused to use foreign officers in his army until his humiliation at the hands of the Russians. Nevertheless, he proved to have been more successful in the reconfiguration of the empire than his cousin in the end.

While it is too early to engage in meaningful comparisons between the two Ottoman monarchs, this study nevertheless obliges us to entertain some observations regarding future research. Remarkably, the second alliance with Russia coincided with the reign of Mahmud and was once again related with the Morea and Egypt. Therefore, a comparative study of the two alliances with respect to these provinces promises fruitful results. Although it is beyond the aims of this study, we should mention that the Greek independence movement may have isolated the Ottomans from European affairs on the

---

<sup>3</sup> For an evaluation of the Ottoman Empire within the global setting see, V. Aksan, “The Ottoman Military and State Transformation in a Globalizing World”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27/2 (2007): 259-272, DOI 10.1215/1089201X-2007-004; for a general introduction to the topic of ‘global moments’ see C. A. Bayly, “The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760-1830”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26: 2 (1998): 28-47 DOI 10.1080/03086539808583023; Bayly, “Distorted Development: The Ottoman Empire and British India, circa 1780-1916”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 27/2 (2007): 332-44 DOI 10.1215/1089201X-2007-009.

eve of the reforms of Mahmud II until the advent of another global moment, the Crimean War. This may explain the misdating of the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire within the European context to the second half of the nineteenth century.

The conventional narrative reads that the Ottoman Empire became a European power only after the Crimean War. However, the global moment we have studied witnessed parallel developments: recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a European power (discussions concerning the Russo-British alliance in 1795), the need for foreign loans, the question of the Black Sea, guarantees of territorial integrity, the critical need for survival policies, and finally search for a new identity typified by the Muslim obedient subject as outlined in the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms –as opposed to Ottomanism of the *Jeune* Turks after the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. The Ottoman Empire was already a member of the European coalitions long before the Crimean War, allying itself to France and Russia at the same time. This should serve as a warning for the Ottomanists against the danger of victimization of the Ottoman Empire as a powerless and naïve polity dragged into the system of alliance against its own will; the Porte regained Egypt through substantial military and diplomatic efforts.

This period also witnessed somewhat ironically the last Ottoman conquest in the West -the Ionian Islands and the four Dalmatian towns. Ottoman suzerainty over the Ionian Islands was not explicitly mentioned in the peace treaties of Amiens and Paris which preoccupied the Ottoman decision-makers to a great deal throughout the era. However, the four Dalmatian towns were ceded to the Ottoman Empire under certain conditions. In order to entrench its hold over the Ionian Islands, the Porte resolutely

utilized its traditional politico-legislative concepts that characterized its power relation with Ragusa and the Principalities at the expense of frustrating Russia. However, it also drew on the European feudal models of vassalage-suzerainty to the same end. The amalgamation of the old and the new saw the issuing of an imperial diploma (*nişan*) and the imposition of the polltax (*harac*). Mutual misunderstandings arose over the nature of a constitution, the flag, and the imperial diploma. What followed was an uprising in the Ionian Islands in reaction to the reincarnation of the old Venetian regime under the tutelage of the Ottoman Empire. Disenchanted masses, labeled as “Jacobins” indiscriminately by the British and the Ottomans, asked for a more broad-base political participation following the Revolutionary ideals.

One of the aspects of this global moment was the contempt held in common about the revolutionary France by all monarchs. The French Revolution burst into the outside world in the form of war and destruction whereas its definition as a bourgeois revolution based on the three principles was a reality of a later period. The French Revolution as perceived in the 1790s influenced the Ottoman decision-makers of the day in the shaping of the foreign policy of the Sublime Porte. By focusing on the Ottoman apprehensiveness on the disputes over the nature of the constitution, the design of the flag and the real intentions of the dissenters, we had the opportunity to realize how central the French Revolution was on the shaping of the Porte’s outlook at this global moment. Due to poor communications between the Adriatic and the imperial centers, there emerged a discrepancy between the official diplomacy led by the imperial centers vis-à-vis the

pragmatic diplomacy improvised by the Ottoman and Russian officials in the joint fleet which had interesting and decisive consequences over the relations with Ionian Islands.

There is a general conviction that the Russo-Ottoman alliance was a last-minute resort on the part of the Sublime Porte due to the loss of Egypt. The Ottoman decision-makers nevertheless realized the disadvantageous position of the neutral states in the wars of the First Coalition and hastened to enter the system of alliances after 1795. They first tried to form an alliance with France against the Russian threat directly targeting Istanbul. After the French rejection and the accession of Tsar Paul I to the throne, the Porte drew closer to Russia and Britain. What accounted for this move was the fall of Venice. While the conventional narrative claimed that the Ottomans were caught unguarded by the invasion of Egypt, this study has demonstrated the direct link between the fall of Venice and the increasing Ottoman suspicions about its traditional friend. For the Ottomans, the Jacobins were radicals who aimed at changing the world order in Europe as well as in India. The Egyptian Expedition was only part of the process in which the French military and political presence in the Levant increased enormously; as a matter of fact, availability of Venetian ships and sailors was crucial in the realization of the Egyptian Expedition. The Sublime Porte, thus, monitored the French activities in Italy and the Ionians even before the departure of the French navy from Toulon, anticipating a French attack for the adjacent Ottoman provinces such as the Morea or Albania. Paul I shared the fears of Selim III. Both monarchs believed in the necessity of domestic reforms and grew discontented about the power vacuum in the Adriatic.

This dissertation stands as the first concrete study of the battle performance of the Ottoman navy in the Napoleonic wars as well. An examination of the subsequent phases of the operations of the joint Ottoman-Russian navy has provided additional evidences of the Ottoman willingness to participate in the common cause against France. The reformed Ottoman navy was undeniably the main instrument of Ottoman political will on the edges of the empire as well as beyond the Ottoman waters.

We usually take it for granted that the Ottomans were more interested in the political aspect of the Capitulations (*imtiyazat*) in contrast to the European states that never lost sight of the economic benefits of these commercial privileges. This line of argument maintains that this stark contrast was best exemplified in the 1740 Capitulations that were to remain in force perpetually with no requirement of renewal by the succeeding sultans. However, the Ottomans cancelled the French capitulations after the invasion of Egypt quite decisively. A close analysis of the negotiations in Paris has revealed that disputes over the capitulations stemmed from political considerations of France. Nowhere in the negotiations did Talleyrand base his arguments on the so-said irrevocability of the 1740 French capitulations. He, rather, claimed the status of the ‘most favored nation’ in order to counterbalance Britain and Russia in the Levant and the Black Sea. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries, on the other hand, used this issue together with the trading rights in the Black Sea as a political leverage during the negotiations in Paris. A burgeoning awareness of economic considerations on the part of the Ottomans is also observable in Behiç Efendi’s ideas, the Grand Admiral Hüseyin Paşa’s proposals for privileging the Muslim merchant-sailors as well as in the arguments improvised by the



Ottoman plenipotentiaries in Paris. As most of the ships used in the transportation of the foodstuff for the joint fleet were foreign ships, any problem that arose in the process such as smuggling, delay in cargo or in payment of the freight turned into a diplomatic issue. Ottoman demand on reciprocity in the granting of the capitulations was also a new development in reconfiguring of its relations with the European states. Nevertheless more studies are needed for a better judgment about the changing place of the capitulations on the thinking of the Ottoman policy-makers.<sup>4</sup>

Determined to nullify the Russo-Ottoman alliance, Napoleon tried everything to give the Treaty of Paris the appearance of an alliance resembling the one France refused to ratify in 1797. At one point Talleyrand even demanded to deploy French warships in the Black Sea. The British ambassador, by contrast, hinted that London would not demand the Porte to fulfill its promise concerning the opening of the Black Sea to British merchandise lest France used it as a pretext to demand the same privileges.

This dissertation approaches the Ottoman Empire from a second perspective besides war and diplomacy which is the politico-fiscal and administrative setting of the empire that provides some explanations for the resilience of the empire despite the ongoing turmoil in the Balkans and elsewhere. Elimination of Venice suddenly turned the region into an arena of international competition. The main contestants for hegemony over the region were France, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Britain and Tepedelenli Ali Paşa of Yanya. The literature on great *ayans* usually ignores the fact that the age of *ayans*

---

<sup>4</sup> For a good study that traces back this new mindset of the Sublime Porte, see İsmail Hakkı Kadı, *Natives and Interlopers: Competition Between Ottoman and Dutch Merchants in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century* (University of Leiden, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2008).

coincided with the age of Napoleonic wars. The ever-growing French threat in the Balkans –often disproportionately magnified by the Sublime Porte, *ayans*, and Russia- seems to have created a room for maneuver for the great power brokers of the Balkans. Although this was misinterpreted by the contemporary and modern-day observers as an attempt to gain independence, these great *ayans* –on the example of Ali Paşa- usually entrenched themselves in the frontier zones and developed a symbiotic relationship with the Sublime Porte not much different from the one between the frontier *gazi* lords and the House of Osman in the early periods of Ottoman history. While the related literature on Ali Paşa generally focuses on his later career, the present study has put the emphasis on his earlier career and suggested that his rise was contingent upon the reopening of the Adriatic frontier.

Apart from Ali Paşa, we have also dealt with the activities of relatively minor *ayans* whom were indispensable for the functioning of the Ottoman Empire. It would be more appropriate to argue that the period of 1774-1826 was characterized by the devolution of political, administrative, and fiscal power from İstanbul. Devolution of power gave rise to a contractual system which we have discussed through an analysis of finance, provisioning, and the ensuing problems. While particular conclusions we have drawn can be found in the separate conclusions of these chapters, the single most important result of our analysis is the resilience of the Porte in fighting France and its capability to mobilize its material resources to that end. The Morea was hit the hardest among the Ottoman provinces, for it bore most of the burden of provisioning of the joint fleet. Dealing with the case of the Morea showed how the bargaining process between the

Sublime Porte and the province worked as a function of the contractual empire. It has also given an idea about the worsening conditions in the Morea preceding the Greek independence movement. Further studies remain to be done on this period in order to reach more nuanced conclusions about the impact of the Napoleonic wars on the Greek Revolt.

Selim's reforms proved to have been incapable of (re)concentrating power in the Ottoman court despite his trained army. Mahmud II, by contrast, achieved this goal by marginalizing the Janissaries and co-opting the *ayans* through peaceful means in the period of 1812-1826 which is one of the most understudied eras of Ottoman history. Mahmud's success without an army in this period was partly due to the elimination of the great *ayans* of the Balkans through natural causes (death). Nevertheless, the reasons for the relative weakness of the new generation of *ayans* vis-à-vis İstanbul beg for explanation. It seems to have resulted from the restoration of international peace after 1815 that no doubt curbed their freedom of action in the Balkans as well as certain fiscal-administrative changes Mahmud did to the system.

It is hoped that this dissertation is found useful not only by the Ottomanists but also by the historians of Russia and Europe as an initial step towards an understanding of Ottoman responses at home and abroad in the preliminary phase of the imperial thrusts into the Levant, which ultimately resulted in the British hegemony over the region.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> For the background of the British hegemony in the Levant, see A. Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution: Collected Essays*, v. 1 (London: F. Cass, 1993) [ed. by Edward Ingram].

## APPENDIX A

### Provisioning of the Russian Fleet

Table I: Cash Substitutes

H. 1215				
?	20,000 <i>куруş [krş]</i>	New Revenues: Campaign Treasury	13 Nov. – 12 Dec. 1800	3 February 1801
?	60,000 <i>krş</i>	New Revenues: Campaign Treasury	13 Dec. 1800 – 12 March 1801	18 April 1801‡
?	60,000 <i>krş</i>	New Revenues: Campaign Treasury	13 March – 12 June 1801	27 May 1801§
H. 1216				
	60,000 <i>krş</i>	New Revenues: Campaign Treasury	13 June – 12 Sept. 1801	15 August 1801**
H. 1220				
?	60,000 <i>krş</i>	<i>Emti 'a Gümrüğü††</i>	?	28 January 1806

Notes: (‡) the date of the receipt submitted by the Russian ambassador upon the completion transaction (C.HRC 1586), but see the following notes.

(§) this is given as the date of the order for the payment of the cash-substitutes for the period 13 Dec. 1800 – 12 June 1801 (C.HRC 1303), but the cash substitute for the period 13 March – 12 June 1801 may have been delivered before 13 May 1801 as the Russian ambassador presented the official receipt to the Porte in recognition of the completion of transaction (C.HRC 1586).

(\*\*) Russian ambassador presented his official receipt in confirmation of money transfer on 24 July 1801 (C.HRC 1303) before the issuance of the order for the payment (C.HRC 1303). Thus precaution is necessary in approaching these dates, as it is not clear whether or not the submission of the official receipt by the Russian ambassador really meant the completion of the transaction.

(††) Customs for goods and commodities.

Sources: C.HRC 1586 (13May1801) for the year H. 1215 (25 May 1800 – 13 May 1801); C.HRC 1303 (15Aug1801); C.HRC (28Jan1806) for the year H. 1220.

Table II: The hardtacks baked under the supervision of Ebubekir Beg of Kordos

H. 1213 for the consumption of the combined fleet	Hardtack ( <i>kantar</i> [ <i>kt</i> ])	Flour(*) ( <i>kile</i> [ <i>kl</i> ])	Cost of transportation of flour ( <i>akçe</i> [ <i>ak</i> ])	Cost of baking ( <i>kt</i> X 30 <i>ak</i> )	Cost of the sack ( <i>ak</i> )	Total cost	Cost of a <i>kt</i> of hardtack
	10,000	X 2.5 = 25,000	X 75 = 1,875,000	300,000	15 x 10,000 sacks = 150,000	2,325,000 <i>ak</i> = 19,375 <i>krş</i>	232.5 <i>ak</i>

Notes: Date of the order for al payment (*ale'l-hesap*) of 10,000 *krş.* in advance is 21 April 1799. Order for the payment of the remainig 9375 *krş* is dated 25 September 1799.

(\*) the Ottoman word *hinta* means wheat, while *dakik* is reserved for flour. Although documents may sometimes use the two words interchangeably, I use exact translations in the text as well as in the tables; thus, flour here actually denotes *dakik*.

Sources: C.BH 3273 no.17.

Based on tables II and III:

64.15 kg (2.5 *kl*/50 *kıyye* [*ky*]) of flour/wheat = 56.44 kg (1 *kt*/44 *ky*) of hardtack with a loss of 12.1 % of flour in baking.

Balta follows the formula in bread-making, using large allowances in her calculation to be on the safe side:

-20% for the conversion of wheat into flour and +30% for the conversion of flour into bread.

2.56 kg (2 *ky*) should be subtracted from this to find the actual flour ingredient in hardtack since the Ottomans claimed that much flour left over after the baking process (HAT 176/7666-B):

61.5844 kg (flour) = 56.44 kg (hardtack) with a loss of 8.4%.

The data from İstanbul for the year of 1799 suggest that 100 *kl* of wheat gave 85.98 *kl* of flour (Balta, "The Bread in Greek Lands", *TAD XVI/27* [1992-94], p. 216). Thus the loss in conversion into flour was just 14.02%. In 1778, the bakers of Ruscuk (Ruse) informed the Porte that 100 *ky* of flour was needed to bake 80 *ky* of hardtack; that is, a *kt* (44 *ky*) of hardtack required 55 *ky* (slightly more than a *kl*) of flour:

70.55 kg (flour) = 56.44 kg (hardtack) with a loss of 20% during the baking process.

Nevertheless, the Porte ascribed the bakers' calculation to their alleged greed and insisted that 2.5 *kl* of flour is sufficient to produce a *kt* of best quality hardtack. The imperial edict

sent to Ruse reconfirmed the official cost of baking as 30 *ak* (C. AS 39621 [25S1192/25March1778]).<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, the official recipe seems to have allowed only a minimum loss of 8.4% in the baking process whereas Balta's calculations and the bakers of Ruscuk allowed for a 20% loss. This allowance was 14.02 % in İstanbul in 1799. Thus, mixing the flour with bran or chaff seems to have been necessary to keep to the official recipe of baking hardtack, especially when 2.56 kg should be left over after the process.

Table III: The hardtacks baked under the supervision of Ebubekir Beg of Kordos

H. 1214 for the consumption of the Russian fleet*	Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	Flour ( <i>kl</i> )	Cost of transportation of flour ( <i>ak</i> )	Cost of baking ( <i>kt</i> X 30 <i>ak</i> )	Cost of the sack ( <i>ak</i> )	Total cost	Cost of a <i>kt</i> of hardtack
	10,000	X 2.5 = 25,000	X 120 = 3,000,000	300,000	15 x 10,000 sacks= 150,000	3,450,000 <i>ak</i> = 28,750 krş	345 <i>ak</i>

Notes: (\*) Besides Ebubekir, Abdi Ağa also oversaw the baking of 6111 *kt* of hardtack in the Morea with a total cost of 19,006.5 krş (374 *ak* per *kt*). The date of the order for the payment of the total cost of 16,611 *kt* -47.756,5 krş- is 20 August 1799. Ebubekir sent 11,794 *kt* of hardtacks due for the second shipment of H. 1214 in seven boats. But, 2480 *kt* of hardtack from the second and third shipments of H. 1214 -22,148 *kt*- were still missing by 18 January 1801.

Sources: C.BH 3273 nos. 1, 17; C.HRC 1798 (15M1215/8Jun1800); C.BH 114 (3N1215/18Jan1801).

<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Metin Bezikoğlu for kindly giving to me the transcription of this document.

Table IV: Russian provisions for H.1214

Provisions	Quantity	Cost
Olive oil	134,703.5 <i>ky</i> (3 <sup>rd</sup> installment)	X 23 <i>para</i> [ <i>pr</i> ]
Bulgur	262,221 (total)	
Chickpeas	229,188 <i>ky</i> (at least)	
<i>Arak</i>	90,902.5 (2 <sup>nd</sup> installment) + 90,902.5 (3 <sup>rd</sup> installment)	

Notes: Total funds spared for the olive oil, wine, salt, and firewood was equal to 150,000 *krş*. The vessel hired for the transportation of the arak due from the second installment was still at Şarköy by 23 April 1800, whereas the vessel carrying the arak due from the third installment delivered its load to the Russians on 21 September 1800 with 7,002.5 missing according to the invoices in Russian. Lack of standard measures may have accounted for the missing quantity. As a matter of fact, another invoice in Russian of the same date gives the quantity delivered as 81,339 okka (*ky*), the Porte admitted the first invoice with the figure 83,900 *ky*.

Sources: C.HRC 7773 (11M1215/4Jun1800); C.HRC 7947 (28CA1214/23Apr1800); C.HRC 2000 (15Ş1215/1Jan1801).

Table Va: Provisions sent from the Morea to Six Russian frigates ( H. 1215/25 May 1800-13 May 1801)

Provisions	Quantity	Prices per unit of weight	Total prices	Freight and miscellaneous expenses
Olive oil	11,232 <i>ky</i>	23 <i>pr</i>	258,336 <i>pr</i>	
Salt	4,070 <i>ky</i>	1 <i>ak</i>	1,356 <i>pr</i>	
Wine	94,554 <i>ky</i>	7 <i>ak</i>	220,626 <i>pr</i>	
Firewood	523 <i>çeki</i>	40 <i>pr</i>	20,920 <i>pr</i>	
Hardtack	2,480 <i>kt</i>	From Ebubekir	.....	
Total			501,238 <i>pr</i> = 12,530.5 <i>krş</i> 18 <i>pr</i>	4,483 <i>krş</i> 25 <i>pr</i> + 1,970 <i>krş</i> 20 <i>pr</i> = 6,454 <i>krş</i> 5 <i>pr</i>

Notes: These provisions were given as the on-fourth of the annual shipment. Ebubekir delivered them in January 1800 to the Russian consul residing in Balyebadre (Mencaki?). It is not clear which ones were given in kind or substituted as cash. The kadı of Tirapoliçe gives slightly different figures: olive oil (6,458 *krş* 16 *pr*), salt (33 *krş* 37 *pr*), wine (5,515 *krş* 26 *pr*), firewood (523 *krş*), adding up to 12,530 *krş* 39 *pr*.

Sources: C.HRC 2117 (4CA1215/23.9.1800); C.BH 3273 no. 3 (16RA215/7Aug1800) and no. 5 correspondence of the kadı of Tirapoliçe, Es-Seyyid Mehmed Salih Efendi (3Apr1801).

Table Vb: (H. 1215) Provisions sent from İstanbul to six Russian frigates

Provisions	Quantity
Cracked wheat	40,581 <i>ky</i>
Chickpeas	27,054 <i>ky</i>
<i>Arak</i>	22,725 <i>ky</i>
Clarified butter	5,000 <i>ky</i>
Vinegar	5,072 <i>ky</i>

Notes: These provisions were given as the on-fourth of the annual shipment. The Porte ordered the master of the hardtacks (Peksimedci-başı) to deliver 2,000 *kt* of good quality hardtack to Memiş Efendi.

Sources: C.HRC 2117 (4CA1215/23Sept1800); C.HRC 6756 (23R1215/13Sept1800).

Table VIa: Provisions sent from the Morea to the six Russian frigates (29ZA1215-30M12161/3 April 1801-12 June 1801)

Provisions	Quantity	Prices per unit of weight	Total prices	Freight and miscellaneous expenses
hardtack	1,810 <i>kt</i>	From Ebubekir	....	2,262 <i>krş</i> 20 <i>pr</i>
Olive oil	4,112 <i>ky</i>	23 <i>pr</i>	2,364 <i>krş</i> 16 <i>pr</i>	
Salt	1,396 <i>ky</i>	1 <i>ak</i>	11 <i>krş</i> 25 <i>pr</i>	
Wine	26,726 <i>ky</i>	7 <i>ak</i>	1,559 <i>krş</i>	
Firewood	162.5 <i>çeki</i>	40 <i>pr</i>	162.5 <i>krş</i>	
Total			4,097.5 <i>krş</i>	598.5 <i>krş</i> 16 <i>pr</i> + 2,262 <i>krş</i> 20 <i>pr</i> <i>pr</i> = 7,071 <i>krş</i> 38 <i>pr</i>

Notes: These provisions were loaded at the Port of Değirmenlik and entrusted to the Russian officer *Kavalyer Antonyo Vangyelif*. Mincaki (?), the Russian consul at Balyebadre, was also involved in their delivery to the Russian fleet. The Porte owed to Ebubekir 6,092 *krş* 38 *pr* after subtracting from the total costs 979 *krş* that had remained at his disposal after the above-mentioned shipment of one-fourth of the provisions.

Sources: C.BH 3273 no. 11 correspondence of the kadı of Tirapoliçe (15M1216/28May1801); no. 15 (6S1216/18Jun1801).



Table VIb: Provisions sent from İstanbul to the six Russian frigates (29ZA1215-30M12161/3 April 1801-12 June 1801)

Provisions	Quantity and price	<u>FREIGHT</u>	TOTAL COST
Hardtack	1,450 <i>kt</i> : from the office of the hardtacks ( <i>miri peksimethane</i> )	5,000 <i>krş</i> : 3,333 <i>krş</i> (two-thirds) paid beforehand and one-third to be paid after the delivery in İstanbul to the captain Civani di Prasipoli of Korfu**	7,759 <i>krş</i> (cost of provisions) + freight = 12,759 <i>krş</i>  The account is settled on 30 May 1801
Cracked wheat	13,920 <i>ky</i> (214 sacks) 870 <i>kl</i> wheat X 80 <i>pr</i> = 1,740 <i>krş</i>		
Beans	22,333 <i>ky</i> (304 <i>çuval</i> ) 12 <i>krş</i> per 100 <i>ky</i> = 2,680 <i>krş</i>		
<i>Arak</i>	8550 + 22,725 <i>ky</i> (previously sent) = 31,275 <i>kl</i> X 7 <i>pr</i> = 5,473 <i>krş</i> 15 <i>pr</i>		
Clarified butter*	2,056 <i>ky</i>		
Vinegar	1,928 <i>ky</i> X 7.5 <i>pr</i> = 119 <i>krş</i> 82 <i>pr</i>		

Notes and Sources: C.BH 3273 no. 15. (\*) C.HRC 1642 records suet (çerviş yağı) of the same quantity as the clarified butter (1,442 *krş*: 30 *pr* per *ky*) together with a barrel bought at the price of 4 *krş*.

(\*\*) C.HRC 5102 (28ZA1215/9Apr1801).

In his petition dated 29 May 1801 Memiş Efendi confirmed that he had received 5,000 *krş* beforehand (*ale'l-hesap*) and that all the expenses were met from the Campaign Treasury. He marked that he paid 39 *pr* for each sack -518 sacks in total- to put the cracked wheat and beans (65 *kl* and 73 *kl*, respectively). He bought 103 *arak* barrels of 303 *ky* at 5 *krş* each and 6 vinegar barrels of 321 *krş* at 10 *krş* each. Miscellaneous expenses such as hiring of the porters and boats for carrying the provisions to the vessels, and scale dues totaled 119.5 *krş*. C.HRC 2442 (23ZA1215/7Apr1801) shows chickpeas of the same quantity instead of beans with a lower cost of 4,446 *krş*. Cheaper price may have accounted for its replacement of the beans.

Table VIIa: Provisions sent from the Morea to the Russian squadron of six warships in 13 June - 12 July 1801 (H. 1216)

Provisions	Quantity	Prices per unit of weight	Total prices	FREIGHT AND MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES 4,175.5 <i>krş</i> (167,030 <i>pr</i> ) + 1,384.5 <i>krş</i> * freight
Hardtack	923 <i>kt</i>	From Ebubekir's quota		
Olive oil	3,744 <i>ky</i>	23 <i>pr</i>	86,112 <i>pr</i>	
Salt	1,355 <i>ky</i>	1 <i>ak</i>	451 <i>pr</i>	
Wine	31,503 <i>ky</i>	7 <i>ak</i>	13,507 <i>pr</i>	
Firewood	174 <i>çeki</i>	40 <i>pr</i>	6,960 <i>pr</i>	

Notes and Sources: C.BH 3273 no. 15 (6S216/18Jun1801); C.BH 6804 (8B1216/14Nov1801); the official receipt (*tezkire*) was given on 7 June 1801, C.HRC 4910 (22ZA1217/25Jan1803); receipt and copy (*tezkire ve suret*) for the payment in advance (*ale'l-hesap*) were prepared on 11 June, C.BH 10800 (29M1216/11Jun1801). Mehmed Ragıb Beg learned the departure of the Russian fleet from Korfu to İstanbul even before buying the provisions in the table and needed instructions to transfer 4,175.5 *krş* (*havale*) in midst September. By mid-November he was told to turn it in to the Imperial Treasury. The hardtack, however, was sent in early September aboard the ship of Captain Ispiro of Cephalonia (of Russian nationality), C.BH 6804 (8B1216/14Nov1801).

Table VIIb: Provisions sent from İstanbul to the Russian squadron of six warships in 13 June - 12 July 1801 (H. 1216)

Provisions	Quantity and prices	FREIGHT	TOTAL COST
Beans	9,018 <i>ky</i> X (480 <i>pr</i> per 100 <i>ky</i> ) = 1,082 <i>krş</i> 8 <i>pr</i>	33,475 <i>ky</i>	5,998 <i>krş</i> **
Cracked wheat*	13,524 <i>ky</i> : 795.5 <i>kl</i> X 90 <i>pr</i> = 1,789.5 <i>pr</i>	2,000 <i>krş</i> : 1,333 <i>krş</i> (downpayment two-thirds)	
Suet ( <i>çerviş yağı</i> )	1,666 <i>ky</i> X 28 <i>pr</i> = 1,166 <i>krş</i> 8 <i>pr</i>		
Vinegar <i>Arak</i>	1,690 <i>ky</i> X 7.5 <i>ak</i> = 105.5 <i>krş</i> 5 <i>pr</i> 7,575 <i>ky</i> = 1,325 <i>krş</i> 5 <i>pr</i>		

Notes and Sources: C.HRC 324 (3B1216/9Dec1801).

(\*) The figure of 13,524 *ky* is taken from C.AS 42067.

(\*\*) The total cost includes 130 *krş* for 26 *arak* barrels (5 *krş* each), 60 *krş* for 6 vinegar barrels (10 *krş* each), 305.5 *krş* 16 *pr* for 322 sacks for the beans and the cracked wheat as well as 36.5 *krş* 6 *pr* to cover the boat rent, pay of the porters, and scale dues. 5,000 *krş* was paid in advance (*ale'l-hesap*) with 998 *krş* to be paid later, C.AS40144 (1216).

The Porte informed Mehmed Ragıb Bey on 17 June 1801 that the provisions were sent aboard the ship of Captain Gorgi Balyano of Corfu and instructed him to deliver them to the Russian fleet, C.AS 42067 (5S216/17Jun1801). Order of registering the shipment information in the Prime Accountancy (*Baş Muhabe*) is dated 27 June 1801, C.İkts 41/2005 (15S1216/27Jun1801). All these suggest that the provisions reached the Russians quite late.

Table VIII: One-month provision of the Russian frigate *Navarşin* given in İstanbul (September 1801)

Provisions	Quantity demanded by Russia	Quantity given and prices	TOTAL	
Beans	1,398 <i>ky</i>	1,398 <i>ky</i> X 5 <i>pr</i> = 174 <i>krş</i> 30 <i>pr</i>	1,593 <i>krş</i> 18 <i>pr</i>	
Cooked bulgur ( <i>matbuh</i> )	2,097 <i>ky</i>	2,097 <i>ky</i> X 7 <i>pr</i> = 366 <i>krş</i> 39 <i>pr</i>		
Olive oil	560 <i>ky</i>	Replaced with clarified butter		
Clarified butter	280 + 540 = 840 <i>ky</i> (of the best quality)	(840 <i>ky</i> X 35 <i>pr</i> ) + (240 <i>ky</i> X 39 <i>pr</i> ) = 1,080 <i>ky</i> = 969 <i>krş</i>		
Salt	219 <i>ky</i>	160 <i>ky</i> x 38 <i>pr</i> = 4 <i>krş</i> 30 <i>pr</i>		
Vinegar	258 <i>ky</i> (of the best quality)	(258 <i>ky</i> X 3 <i>pr</i> ) + (200 <i>ky</i> X 3 <i>pr</i> ) = 34 <i>krş</i> 14 <i>pr</i>		
Hardtack	6,298 <i>ky</i>	?		
Firewood	60 <i>çeki</i>	?		
Wine	2,336 <i>ky</i>	5,614 <i>ky</i> X 7 <i>pr</i> = 39,298 <i>pr</i>		1,082.5 <i>krş</i>
<i>Arak</i>	1,173 <i>ky</i>	334 <i>ky</i> X 12 <i>pr</i> (including 5 <i>pr</i> transportation cost) = 4,008 <i>pr</i>		

Notes and Sources: C.HRC 324 (3B1216/9Dec1801); C.BH 2391 (22B1216/2Dec1801), Russian invoices define *Navarşin* as a “fregat” but Ottoman documents mistakenly recorded it as the captain’s name. *Navarşin*, 420-crew, dropped laid anchor at Kumkapı on its way up to the Black Sea. The Porte ordered Memiş Efendi, the intendant of the Customs of the Tobacco (*Duhan Gümriüğü Emini*) to deliver these provisions on 1 September 1801. The invoices reveal that 2,400 *ky* of wine was delivered on 22 September, and the remaining 1,350 *ky* only on 29 September. Memiş Efendi spent 1,593 *krş* excluding the cost of wine, firewood, hardtack, and arak. Receipt and copy (*tezkiye ve suret*) for this sum was prepared on 9 December 1801. Miscellaneous expenses of 43 *krş* 25 *pr* are included in that sum, C.HRC 324 (3B1216/9.12.1801). On 25 September 1801 Memiş Efendi was instructed to increase the price of the clarified butter and vinegar. Thus, it is unlikely that the delivery was complete before this date, C.BH 2391 (22B1216/2.12.1801).

Table IX: Three-month provisions delivered to the Russian squadron of three ships in İstanbul (February 1802)

Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Beans ( <i>ky</i> )	<i>Bulgur</i> ( <i>ky</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Salt ( <i>ky</i> )	<i>Arak</i> ( <i>ky</i> )	Wine ( <i>ky</i> )	Firewood ( <i>çeki</i> )
2,550	3,600 (600 of the best quality + 3,000 of mid- quality)	14,620	8,000	2,000	7,200	33,000	300
X 3 <i>pr</i> = 191 <i>krş</i> 10 <i>pr</i>	(18.5 <i>krş</i> per 100 <i>ky</i> ) + 3,000 of mid- quality (16.5 <i>krş</i> X100 <i>ky</i> ) = 606 <i>krş</i>	(11,620 X 22 <i>ak</i> ) + (3,000 X 22 <i>ak</i> )= 2,689 <i>krş</i> 13 <i>pr</i>	X 38 <i>pr</i> = 7,600 <i>krş</i>	X(42 <i>pr</i> per <i>kl</i> ) = 64 <i>krş</i> 27 <i>pr</i>			
11,327 <i>krş</i> 10 <i>pr</i> (176 <i>krş</i> miscellaneous expenses)							

Notes and Sources: C.HRC 4708 (6L-15Z1216/9Feb-18Apr1802). The Porte ordered the delivery of three months' provisions to these three warships anchored at Büyükdere on their way back to the Black Sea in February 1802. The Aga of İstanbul, the Intendant of the Spirits (*Zecriye Katibi*) and the Intendant of the Customs of Tobacco, Memiş Efendi, were in charge of the provisioning. As usual with the Ottoman practice, the authorities determined the cost on the basis of previous examples. In this case, the provisioning of the *Navarşin* formed the framework of reference against which the authorities assessed the costs, C.HRC 4708 (6L-15Z1216/9Feb-18Apr1802). In addition to these provisions, the Porte ordered more supplies to deliver to these ships on 2 May 1802. These are 1,800 *ky* of *arak* (540 *krş*: 12 *pr* per *ky*), 200 *çeki* firewood, 3,000 *ky* of bulgur, and 120.5 *kt* of hardtack, C.HRC 7863 (16Z1216-10RA1217/17Apr-11Dec1802); also see C.BH 8260 (23Z1216/26Apr1802) on the *arak* delivery from Şarköy and C.BH 12605 (2M1217/5May1802) on bulgur and beans. As for the dates of deliveries: the Russians received clarified butter and vinegar on 28 February, salt on 2 March, bulgur of 11,620 *ky* and the beans on 22 March. Other provisions were delivered to Captain Lipondeviç on 6 April and 10 April according to the invoices in Russian, C.HRC 4708 (6L-15Z1216/9Feb-18Feb1802) and C.HRC 6448 (25March1802). It is ambiguous why this ship was stocked with three months' provisions on its voyage back to the Russian naval bases in the Black Sea.

Table X: Three months' provisions for the consumption of the Russian reinforcements of 3,000 troops sent from the Naples to Corfu (1217/4 May 1802 – 22 April 1803)

<i>Arak (ky)</i>	9,000 X 3 m = 27,000	X 8 <i>krş</i> = 25,088 <i>krş</i>	66,068 <i>krş</i>	71,540 <i>krş</i> + 28,460 (estimated miscellaneous expenses) = 100,000 <i>krş</i>
Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	16,000 X 3 m = 48,000	X 3 <i>pr</i> = 144,000 <i>pr</i> (3,600 <i>krş</i> )		
Beans ( <i>ky</i> )	10,500 X 3 m = 31,500	(80 <i>pr</i> / 100 <i>kl</i> ) 151,200 <i>pr</i> (3,780 <i>krş</i> )		
Bulgur ( <i>ky</i> )	16,000 X 3 m = 48,000	X 7 <i>pr</i> = 336,000 (8400 <i>krş</i> )		
Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	7,000 X 3 m = 21,000	X 39 <i>pr</i> = 819,000 <i>pr</i> (20,475 <i>krş</i> )		
Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	1,045 X 3 m = 3136	X 8 <i>krş</i> = 25,088 <i>krş</i>		
Salt ( <i>ky</i> )	1,500 X 3 m = 4,500	X 1 <i>ak</i> = 4,500 <i>ak</i>	5,472 <i>krş</i>	
Wine (r/w) ( <i>ky</i> )	25,000 X 3 m = 75,500	X 7 <i>ak</i> = 535,500 <i>ak</i>		
Firewood ( <i>çeki</i> )	216 X 3 m = 648	X 60 <i>pr</i> = 38,880 <i>pr</i> (972 <i>krş</i> )		

Notes and Sources: HATT 98/3911 (15S1218/6Jun1803); C.HRC 6057 (27CA1218/14Oct1803).

According to the memorandum submitted to Selim III on 6 August 1803 wine was compensated by cash, whereas salt and firewood were delivered neither in kind nor in cash compensation. The Russians pressed the local authorities in the Morea for *arak* and vinegar.

Table XI: Nine months' provisions for the consumption of the Russian reinforcements of 3,000 troops deployed in Corfu (7 December 1802-1 September 1803)

Provisions	Monthly allowance	Nine months' allowance	Price per unit of weight	Total price		Total cost
Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	1,045	9,405	175 <i>pr</i>	97,576.5 <i>krş</i> 5 <i>pr</i>	<u>FROM THE MOREA</u> 1,853,280 <i>pr</i> = 15,444 <i>krş</i>	207,245.5 <i>krş</i> + 22,754.5 <i>pr</i> (freight and cost of barrel) = 280,000 <i>krş</i> = 560 purses
Wheat ( <i>kl</i> )	2.5 <i>kl</i> per <i>kt</i> of hardtack = 23,512.5 <i>kl</i>					
Salt ( <i>ky</i> )	1,500	13,500	1 <i>ak</i>	13,500 <i>ak</i>		
Firewood ( <i>çeki</i> )	216	1,944	40 <i>pr</i>	233,280 <i>ak</i>		
Wine ( <i>ky</i> )	25,500	229,500	7 <i>ak</i>	1,606,500 <i>ak</i>		
Bulgur ( <i>ky</i> )	1,600	144,000	7 <i>pr</i>	1,008,000 <i>pr</i>	<u>FROM ISTANBUL</u> 5,769,000 <i>pr</i> = 144,225 <i>krş</i>	
Beans ( <i>ky</i> )	10,500	94,500	8 <i>pr</i>	756,000 <i>pr</i>		
Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	7,000	63,000	50 <i>pr</i>	3,150,000 <i>pr</i>		
Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	16,000	144,000	2 <i>pr</i>	288,000 <i>pr</i>		
<i>Arak</i> ( <i>ky</i> )	9,000	81,000	7 <i>ak</i>	567,000 <i>pr</i>		

Notes and Sources: C.HRC 6057 (27CA1218/14Sept1803). It is not clear whether they were delivered in kind or substituted into cash.

Table XII: Provisions delivered to the Russian frigate in İstanbul on its voyage from the Naples to the Black Sea (1803)

Provisions	Quantity	Prices per unit of weight	Total prices	Total cost
Bulgur	6,094 <i>ky</i>	8 <i>pr</i>	1,218 <i>krş</i> 32 <i>pr</i>	3,637 <i>krş</i> 3 <i>pr</i> (miscellaneous expenses 35 <i>krş</i> )
Clarified butter	1,883 <i>ky</i>	50 <i>pr</i>	2,353 <i>krş</i> 30 <i>pr</i>	
Vinegar	115 <i>ky</i>	3 <i>pr</i>	8 <i>krş</i> 25 <i>pr</i>	
Salt	418 <i>ky</i>	2 <i>pr</i>	20 <i>krş</i> 36 <i>pr</i>	

Notes and Sources: C.HRC 9305 (24L1217/17Feb1803). Memiş Efendi was in charge of provisioning of this frigate anchored off Büyükdere and he requested the payment of the total cost by 17 Şubat 1803. The basis for the calculation was the costs of provisioning of another Russian frigate in May 1802 that was destined for the Black Sea from the Naples. It cost 1,658 *krş* 40 *pr*. Figures suggest that the provisions tabulated are for a two-month period.

Table XIII: One-month's provisions delivered to the Russian frigate "Sen Mişel" (St. Michel ?) (13 July 1803)

Hardtack	Beans	Bulgur	Clarified butter	Salt	Vinegar	Firewood	<i>Arak</i>	Wine (red/white)
6,000 <i>ky</i> (136 <i>kt</i> 16 <i>ky</i> )	1,333.5 <i>ky</i>	2,000 <i>ky</i>	800 <i>ky</i>	200 <i>ky</i>	250 <i>ky</i>	60 <i>çeki</i>	1,120 <i>ky</i>	3,360 <i>ky</i>

Notes and Sources: C.HRC 1272 (23RA1218/13July1803). The prices and the total cost are not available.

## APPENDIX B

### Provisioning of the Ottoman Fleet

Table I: Breakdown of the pays of the Ottoman fleet and squadrons patrolled in the Adriatic

Hegira Years	Summertime (a)	Wintertime (b)
H. 1213		
(1) H. 1214	235,529 <i>krş</i>	27,796 <i>krş</i>
(2) H. 1215	50,647 <i>krş</i>	28,878.5 <i>krş</i>
(3) H. 1216	i. 44,769 <i>krş</i>	ii. 76,310.5 <i>krş</i>

Notes and Sources: (1) C.BH 9880 (19S1214/23July1799) for (a). (b) HAT 164/6835 (23CA1214/23Oct1799). This sum comprised of 400 troops of two corvettes in the squadron. The crew was to be paid quarter pay since they had already received their half pay and the first quarter pay. But the Grand Admiral suggested the payment of wintertime pay instead, in order to prevent a possible mutiny. According to his plan, the crew was to get 26,139 *krş*, while two captains (*süvar*) and two second captains (*mülazım*) received 1,000 *krş* as bonus (*atıye*). The second captain of the frigate Küşade Baht was to be paid 657 *krş* salary.

(2) C.BH 520 (23S1215/16July1800), C.BH 1003 (27C1215/15Nov1800), C.BH 9730. (9RA1215/31July1800), C.BH 9810 (3R1215/24Aug1800), C.BH 943, HAT 247/13976 for (a). C.BH 2198 (21L1215/7March1801), C.BH 3563 no. 1 (26March1801), C.BH 1003 (27C1215/15Nov1800) for (b). This is for the Ottoman squadron of two corvettes and one frigate with paper strength of 700. The actual number of the crew was 592. (a) was paid by means of bills of exchange to be paid with those revenues in the Morea spared for the Treasury of the New Revenues. C.BH 1003 gives the figure of 57,244.5 *krş* (b) was forwarded from the Imperial Treasury (*Hazine-i Amire*) and sent to the Morea in cash with an agent (*mübaşir*).

(3) C.BH 10893 (27CA1216/5Oct1801) for (a/i): the number of the crew of the squadron fell to 569 due to long-time of service. 37,630 *krş* was to be paid to 569 crew including mercenaries (*levends*), officers, and the regulars (*gedüklü*), while 7139 *krş* was spared for the salaries of captains and second captains. This sum was forwarded from the Campaign Treasury by means of bills of exchange sent to Ali Paşa of Yanya as described in chapter IV. 200 troops were recruited from İzmir to replenish the crew and their pay -6,157 *krş*- should also be added to this sum, C.BH 5892, C.BH 3563 no. 1 (26March1801). C.BH 5911

(24Z1215/8May1801) for (a/ii): This is the pay of the new squadron of two frigates and a corvette with a crew of 1,100 sent to the region. C.BH 10115 (12Ş1216/18Dec1801) for (b). This sum was forwarded from the Campaign Treasury. The details can be found in Table VIIIa.



Table II: Summertime provisions (H. 1214/5 June 1799 – 25 May 1800)

Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Lentils ( <i>kl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Olive oil ( <i>ky</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Olives ( <i>ky</i> )	Salt ( <i>ky</i> )
14,410	14,410	7,205	25,612	25,800	51,225	25,612	54,037.5	6,776

Notes and Sources: HATT 266/15490 (nd: should be dated to June-August 1799) Memorandum of the deputy Grandvizier. Decision to buy these provisions was taken five months prior to the memorandum. Halil Efendi, the intendant of the Customs (*Gümrük Emni*) was put in charge of purchases except for the hardtacks. According to the intendant's report, clarified butter, salt, vinegar (18,427 *ky*), onions (15,000 *ky*) were loaded on a Russian merchant vessel and sent to the Ottoman fleet in 8-17 March 1799. Lentils (5,615 *kl*) and vinegar (3,085 *ky*) was sent aboard the ships of Hacı İsmail and Kırımı Mustafa Beg. In March-April 1799, olives (54,037.5 *ky*) and olive oil (25,850 *ky*) was stocked on a Russian merchant ship in Mythelen. In April-May 1799 Captain Sorandi (*Sorandi Reis*) was dispatched to İzdin to load 6199 *kl* of rice for the fleet. The deputy Grandvizier sent orders every other day to Selanik and Golos, reminding them to send their contributions of 5,000 hardtacks each. He also sent two investigators (*çukadar*) to inquire into the delays. The deputy assumed that these hardtacks must have reached the Ottoman fleet by now, but as a further measure he also ordered the shipment of 3,000 *kt* hardtack from Tekfurdag just in case. According to him there were still 6,000 *kl* of rice, 1,600 *kl* of lentils, 4,000 *ky* of vinegar and 800 *kt* of hardtack to be sent. The ship hired turned out to be too small to accommodate this load, which required the hiring of another ship. But the authorities in the Imperial Dockyard found its weather-side (*orsa*) weak. Thus, the Porte hired the vessel of Pavlo of Moscow (*Moskovlu Pavlo*) two days prior to the date of the memorandum. As mentioned in the chapter on Logistics, all these delays infuriated Sultan Selim III. There is an inconsistency in the deputy's figures concerning the missing quantities.

Table III: Wintertime provisions (H. 1214)

Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Olive oil ( <i>ky</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Olives ( <i>ky</i> )	Salt ( <i>ky</i> )
3,000	4,000	25,470	25,000	25,461	50,000	12,025

Notes and Sources: C.BH 7024 (15Z1214/10May1800). Sent as the wintertime provisions of the Ottoman fleet, these provisions were stocked in the Morea after the return of the fleet to İstanbul in fall 1799. An Ottoman squadron of three ships sent to the region and it was supplied from these stores. This squadron was composed of the *Küşade Baht* (300-crew frigate), *Hediyetu'l-Müluk* (200-crew corvette) and *Burc-ı Zafer* (200-crew corvette) under the command of Şeremet Beg (Kürt Mehmed Beg), who was appointed to office of the intendant of the Port (*Liman Nazırı*) after he participated in the expedition to the Adriatic with the rank of *Patrona*. This person must have been *Patrona* Şeremet Mehmed Beg as mentioned previously, HAT 163/6774 (10CA1214/10Oct1799), HAT 164/6835 (23CA1214/23Oct1799), C.BH 3563 nos. 1 and 2. The squadron was dispatched from İstanbul with two months' provisions and the Captain Paşa stocked it with the remaining four months' provisions for wintertime period (H. 1214) in Çanakkale in October 1799, HAT 162/6738-A (24CA1214/24Oct1799). It patrolled in the Adriatic from the fall of 1799 until the end of 1801. (see below).

Table IV: Summertime provisions (H. 1215/25 May 1800 – 14 May 1801)

Ships	Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Lentils ( <i>kl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Olives ( <i>ky</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Salt ( <i>ky</i> )	Olive oil ( <i>ky</i> )	Firewood ( <i>çeki</i> )
<i>Küşade Baht</i> (300-crew)	600	600	300	1,125	4,500	2,250	1,125	562	1,100	200
<i>Hediyetu'l-Müluk</i> (200-crew)	400	400	200	750	750	1,500	750	375	750	90
<i>Burc-ı Zafer</i> (200-crew)	400	400	200	750	750	1,500	750	375	750	90
Total quantity	1,400	1,400	700	2,625	10,500	5,250	2,625	1,312	2,600	380

Notes and Sources: C.BH 7024 (15Z1214/10May1800); C.BH 1011 (24CA1215/13Oct1800).

The hardtacks were to be supplied by the Arnavud-zade brothers. Lentils and firewood were to be bought by İsmail Taif Efendi and sent aboard the ship hired by Ebubekir Beg to the fleet. The remaining provisions were to be sent from the stores in the Morea under the supervision of the governor of the Morea. An order draft reveals that the Porte ordered the delivery of these provisions in May-June 1800, see C.BH 2149 (11B1215/28Nov1800, C.BH 1003 (27C1215/15Nov1800).

Table V: Provisions handed over to Ebubekir Beg

Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Olives ( <i>ky</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Salt ( <i>ky</i> )
1,019	1,819.5	39,662.5	19,741	21,770	10,683

Notes and Sources: C.BH 2149 (11B1215/28Nov1800); C.BH 3273 no.8 (11B1215/28Nov1800). No. 8 gives the quantity of the clarified butter as 1,578.5 *ky*. These provisions were bought by İsmail Taif Efendi in the Morea and handed over to Ebubekir Beg after his appointment as the Commissar of the Ottoman fleet.

Table VIa: Wintertime provisions (H. 1215)

Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Lentils ( <i>kl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Olives ( <i>ky</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Salt ( <i>ky</i> )	Olive oil ( <i>ky</i> )	Firewood ( <i>çeki</i> )
1,184	1,184	592	2,294	8,880	4,440	3,330	1,110	2,276	357

Notes and Sources: C.BH 2198 (21L1215/7March1801). These provisions were provided for the tiny Ottoman squadron of three ships with a crew of 592. The fleet received the provisions in two shipments as shown in the TableS VIb-c. Mustafa Paşa related in his correspondence that the squadron was only halfly stocked with provisions before departing from İstanbul. İsmail Taif Efendi made up for some of the missing provisions. As of 16 March 1801, this tiny squadron ran out of stocks as it had been on active service for the last 18 months. Thus, Mustafa Paşa took the initiative and sent from the stores (Table V) half of the wintertime provisions to Başbuğ Mehmed Beg –the commander of the squadron- (Table VIb) without waiting for the orders of the Porte, C.BH 3273 no.2 (1ZA1215/16March1801).

Table VIb: Wintertime provisions (1215): the first half (for three months)

	Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Olives ( <i>ky</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Salt ( <i>ky</i> )	Olive oil ( <i>ky</i> )
Quantity	500	300	1,000	10,000	2,000	2,000	5,000	500
Prices	....	X 5.5 <i>krş</i> = 1,650 <i>krş</i>	From the stores	From the stores	X 1.5 <i>pr</i> = 75 <i>krş</i>	X 5 <i>pr</i> = 250 <i>krş</i>	From the stores	X 25 <i>pr</i> = 500 <i>krş</i>
Total cost	2,475 <i>krş</i>							

Notes and Sources: All of these provisions were sent in kind as opposed to cash compensation. Price of rice does not include the cost of transportation and sack. Price of onions does not reflect the cost of transportation. Cost of barrels is not involved in the price of vinegar whereas the price of olive oil also includes the cost of barrels, C.BH 3273 no.2 (1ZA1215/16March1801); no.8 (26ZA215/10Apr1801); no.4 (5ZA215/20March1801). No. 4 gives the total cost as 2,655.5 *krş*.

C.BH 3273 no.4 gives the price of olive oil as 337.5 *krş* without the cost of barrels. C.BH 3273 no.1 calculates the total price of rice as 1,500 *krş* -a *kl* sells for 200 *pr*- and that of olive oil as 275 *krş* -22 *pr* a *ky*. It records the total cost as 84,000 *pr* (2,100 *krş*).

The stores in the Morea ran out of vinegar, onions, rice and olive oil at this particular time. Ebubekir Beg had to sell some of the provisions handed over to him by İsmail Taif Efendi to buy the missing provisions. The provisions he had to sell at the ruling local price (*rayiç*) are: 9,662.5 *ky* of olive (8 *pr* a *ky*), 578.5 *ky* of clarified butter (50 *pr* a *ky*). He bought vinegar, onions, rice and olive oil of the quantities shown at the table at moderate prices (*fi'at-ı mutedile*), C.BH 3278 no. 8. He had to transfer 272 *krş* 5 *pr* from the funds for the Russian provisions in order to buy these provisions. All these provisions together with 500 *kt* hardtack were loaded on the ship of Captain Eyub sent by Başbuğ Mehmed Beg, the commander of the squadron, to Kordos, C.BH 3273, no. 2 and no. 8, no. 10 (10M1216/23May1801), no. 18 (5S216/17Jun1801).

Table VIc: Wintertime provisions (1215): the second half (for three months)

	Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Firewood ( <i>çeki</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Olive oil ( <i>ky</i> )
Quantity	684	884	1294	357	2440	1330	1776
Prices	From the <i>Arnavud- zades</i>	4,645 <i>krş</i>	X 45 <i>pr</i> = 1,455 <i>krş</i> 30 <i>pr</i>	X 60 <i>pr</i> = 535.5 <i>krş</i> (in cash)	X 5 <i>ak</i> = 101 <i>krş</i> 26 <i>pr</i>	X 5 <i>pr</i> = 161 <i>krş</i> 10 <i>pr</i> (without barrels)	X 27 <i>pr</i> = 1,198 <i>krş</i> 32 <i>pr</i> (in cash)
Total cost	8,097 <i>krş</i>						

Notes and Sources: The bill submitted by Yakub Hodja, the hodja of the ships of Captain Eyub, in after the delivery indicates that all of the hardtacks (Table VIb-c) were delivered by *Arnavud-zades*. Provisions provided in kind are: clarified butter (294 *ky*), onions (2,440 *ky*), vinegar (1,330 *ky*), rice (300 *kl*). Provisions substituted as cash are: rice (584 *kl*: 5 *krş* per *kl*), olive oil (1,776 *ky*), and firewood (357 *çeki*), C.BH 8173 (27M1216/9Jun1801); C.BH 8093 (1R1216/11Jun1801: from the kadı of Tirapoliçe). C.BH 3273; no. 10 (10M1216/23May1801), no. 13 (23S1216/5July1801: from Ebubekir), no. 18 (5S216/17Jun1801: from Mustafa Paşa).

C.BH 3273 no. 1 gives the information that 300 *kl* of rice was bought at 5 *krş* 30 *pr* a *kl* and sent to the squadron, whereas cash compensation of the remaining quantity of 584 *kl* was calculated as 5 *krş* a *kl*. The same document also records the vinegar as 1,290 *ky* with a cost of 161 *krş* 10 *pr*.

C.BH 3273 no.18 calculates the olive oil at the price of 22 *pr* a *ky* with the total cost of 9,095 *krş* 12 *pr*. When the freight (1,108.5 *krş* 30 *pr*) and the miscellaneous expenses (353.5) added, the Porte's debt to Ebubekir Beg rose to 9,560 *krş* 29 *pr*. He urges the Porte to assign the revenues from the dues on the Spirits (*zecriye rüsumu*) of the kazas of Kılaverta and Kordos to the payment of this debt. The freight of the hardtack cost 940.5 *krş* 9 *pr* (55 *pr* a *kt*), whereas the freight of other provisions cost only 168 *krş* 10 *pr*, C.BH 3273 nos.10, 13, 18; CBH 8093.

Prime Accountancy (Baş Muhasebe) calculated the total cost of the wintertime provisions as 14,105.5 *krş*: 2,312.5 *krş* –rather than 2,475 *krş* in Table VIb- + 9,560 *krş* 9 *pr* –Table VIc- + miscellaneous expenses, C.BH 20008 (19M216/1Jun1801); C.BH 3273 no.12 (5S1216/17Jun1801). C.BH 3273 no.1 gives the total cost as 14,075 *krş* 22 *pr*.

Table VII: Summertime provisions of the Ottoman squadron of 569-crew (H. 1216)

Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Lentils ( <i>kl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Olives ( <i>ky</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Wallachian salt ( <i>ky</i> )	Olive oil ( <i>ky</i> )	Firewood ( <i>çeki</i> )
1,136	1,138	569	2,204	8,535	4,267	2,133	1,066	2,207	357

Notes and Sources: C.BH 3563 no.4. The hardtack was sent from the Morea. Olive oil was provided by the Master of the Oil (Yağcıbaşı) and firewood was procured by İstanbul Agası, while the others would be supplied by Yusuf Agah Efendi.

Table VIIIa: The manpower source of the new Ottoman squadron of 1,100-crew and their pay

Troops	Number	Daily pay ( <i>ak</i> )
Regular sailors with their officers ( <i>gedüklüyan ve zabitan</i> )	200	7,726
Palace troops/marines ( <i>bostancıyan-ı hassa</i> )	200	3,200
From merchant vessels	200	3200
Boatmen ( <i>kayıkçıyan-ı iskeleha</i> )	200	3,200
Waiters of wine houses ( <i>Hadim-i şerbethane-ha</i> )	200	3,200
Estimated regulars ( <i>gedüklüyan ber-vech-i tahmin</i> )	100	1,800
Total	1,100	22,326 (186.05 <i>krş</i> )

Notes and Sources: C.BH 5911 (24Z1215/8May1801). The Porte reinforced the tiny squadron of two corvettes and a frigate with a new squadron of two frigates and a corvette as a countermeasure against a possible French attack from the direction of Italy. Thus the new squadron had the specific orders to patrol in the vicinity of Ancona.

Table VIIIb: Summertime pay of the Ottoman squadron (1,100-crew) (H. 1216)

Ships	Troops	Daily pay ( <i>ak</i> )	Total sum
<i>Şahin-i Derya</i>	425	8577	X 354 days = 7,903,404 <i>ak</i> = 65,861.5 <i>krş</i> + 2800 <i>krş</i> + 7649 <i>krş</i> = 76,310.5 <i>krş</i>
<i>Bedr-i Zafer</i>	425	8577	
<i>Tiz Hareket</i>	250	5172	
Daily pay in total	1100	22,326	

Notes and Sources: C.BH 5911 (24Z1215/8Mayıs1801). The figure 2,800 *krş* corresponds to the extra pay for 100 troops (shown in the last row of Table VII) needed for the summertime in addition to their regular annual pay of 5,200 *krş*. The figure 7,649 *krş* comprised of the salaries and allowances of the three captains (5,300 *krş*) and of the second captains (2,349 *krş*).

Table VIIIc: Wintertime pay of the new Ottoman squadron (1,100-crew) (H.1216)

Ships	Troops	Daily pay ( <i>ak</i> )	Total sum
<i>Şahin-i Derya</i>	425	7,056	X 354 days = 6,431,826 <i>ak</i> = 53,598.5 <i>krş</i> 6 <i>pr</i> – 1,116.5 <i>krş</i> 6 <i>pr</i> = 52,482 <i>krş</i>
<i>Bedr-i Zafer</i>	425	7,056	
<i>Tiz Hareket</i>	250	4,057	
Total	1,100	18,169	

Notes and Sources: C.BH 5911 (24Z1215/8Mayıs1801).

Table IX: Wintertime provisions for the Ottoman fleet of seven ships (H. 1216)

Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Lentils ( <i>kl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Olives ( <i>ky</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Wallachian salt ( <i>ky</i> )	Olive oil ( <i>ky</i> )	Firewood ( <i>çeki</i> )
4,500	4,500	2,250	8,770	36,900	18,450	13,093	4,364	8,450	1,507

Notes and Sources: C.BH 3563 no. 4 ve no. 5. The Master of the Oil (*Yağcıbaşı*), the Aga of İstanbul, and Yusuf Agah Efendi were in charge of supplying these provisions except for the hardtacks. On 27 October 1801 the Porte informed Patrona Şeremet Beg on the organization of the provisioning of the fleet. Çukadar Süleyman was sent to the Morea to oversee the transportation of the hardtacks to be provided by Ebubekir Beg and the Arnavud-zade brothers in early November 1801, C.BH 8019. On 31 December 1801 the orders concerning the provisioning of this fleet were countermanded upon the correspondence of the Grand Admiral, Hüseyin Paşa in which he related that he gave permission to the two ships in Alexandria and the tiny squadron of Mehmed Beg to return to İstanbul. He decided to leave the new squadron (1,100-crew) sent that summer in Corfu for the whole winter against the menacing French in Italy, C.BH 1461 (19C1216/27Oct1801), C.BH 10115 (12Ş1216/18Dec1801).

Table X: Wintertime provisions of the Ottoman squadron (1,100-crew) (H. 1216)

Hardtack ( <i>kt</i> )	Rice ( <i>kl</i> )	Lentils ( <i>keyl</i> )	Clarified butter ( <i>ky</i> )	Olives ( <i>ky</i> )	Onions ( <i>ky</i> )	Vinegar ( <i>ky</i> )	Wallachian salt ( <i>ky</i> )	Olive oil ( <i>ky</i> )	Firewood ( <i>çeki</i> )
2,200	2,200	1,100	4,488	19,960	8,800	5,920	2,200	4,804	707

Notes and Sources: C.BH 1878 (22N216/26Jan1802).

## APPENDIX C

### Ottoman and Foreign Currencies

#### Ottoman currency

1 *krş* = 40 *pr* = 120 *ak*.

1 *pr* = 3 *ak*.

#### French currency

1 livre = 20 sous = 240 denier.

1 sous = 12 denier.

By 1795, Franc replaced livre. A Franc contained 4.5 grams of silver, which slightly lower than the silver content of a livre 4.505 grams); hence,

1 Franc = 1 livre 3 denier.

#### British currency

1 pound sterling = 20 shilling = 240 pence.

1 shilling = 12 pence.

#### Exchange rate of livre and franc

Pouqueville gives the following equations for 1798-99 (Poqueville, *Travels Through the Morea*, pp. 12, 24, 114-16):

1 *krş* = 1 livre 13 sous (33 sous).

15 *pr* = 13 sous.

10,000 *krş* = ~6000 Franc.

1 asper = 9 Franc denier.

Based on these equations,

1 *krş* (40 *pr*) = 33 - 34.6 sous.

1 franc = 1.66 *krş*.

#### Exchange rate of pound sterling

Pamuk's calculations based on mostly the market rates for İstanbul are in the following (İnalçık and Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 964-69):

1798: 1 pound-sterling = 16 *krş*.

1805: 1 pound-sterling = 15-17 *krş*.

Mahmud Raif Efendi, secretary of Yusuf Agah Efendi -Ottoman ambassador to the Porte (1793-1797)- observed the exchange rates in the following (Yalçınkaya, *The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Embassy*, p. 177):

1 guinea = 21 shillings = 15 *krş*.



1799: 1 guinea = 14-15 *krş*.

1799: 1 *lira* = 13 *krş* 10 *pr*.

The British ambassador Smith gave the exchange rate in one of his reports to Grenville as in the following (Yalçinkaya, “İsmail Ferruh Efendi’nin”, p. 385):

1 pound = 13 *krş*.

According to McKnight ( McKnight, *Admiral Ushakov*, p. 39) 1 pound-sterling fluctuated between 10-16 *krş*, and in 1798 600,000 *krş* equaled 55,000 pounds; hence 1 pound-sterling = 10.9 *krş*.

Dodwell gives the following equation for 1806 in the Morea, admitting that the value of *krş* varies according to the exchange (Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour*, v. II, 494):

1 *krş* (40 *pr*) = 1 shilling 7 pence (19 pence).

Based on this equation:

1 pence = 2.1 *pr* and 1 pound = 12.6 *krş*.

Gell’s figures are in the following for the 1810s (Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea*, p. 104):

1 *krş* = 14 pence and 1 pound sterling = 21.875 *krş*.

Hobhouse gives the following equation for the 1810s (Hobhouse, *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces*, v. I, 220):

1142 pound-sterling = 20,000 *krş*; hence, 1 pound-sterling = 17.5 *krş*.

Holland notes for the years 1812-13 that 1 pound-sterling = 20 *krş*. (Holland, *Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania*, p. 479).

Rate of exchange given by Pamuk for 1810 is 1 pound-sterling = 19 *krş* 90 *ak*.

According to Emerson 1 pound is 4 *krş* (v. I, 290), which is quite a low rate even for the mid-century, when the rate was 7-8 *krş*. The *krş* lost 40 % of its silver content between 1700 and the late 1760s and a further 50 % between the late 1760s and 1808; in practice, while the *krş* had 18.1 gram silver content in 1696, this fell to 4.6 by 1810 (Pamuk in İnalçık and Quataert [eds.], pp. 964-69).

#### Exchange rate of Venetian ducat

1 gold piece = 5 *krş* 30 *pr* (C.BH 11124/5March1788).

1794: 7 *krş* (Pamuk in İnalçık and Quataert [eds.]).

1799: sequin/*bundugi* = 7.5 *krş* (Panzac, “Maritime Trade”).

1800: 8 *krş* (Pamuk in İnalçık and Quataert [eds.], pp. 964-69).

Exchange rate of the Spanish real

According to Sofalı İbrahim Ağa, the commander of the Ottoman troops participated in the recovery of Ancona from the French in 1799-1800:

1 Spanish real (*İspanya ıryal-i direklisi*) = 150 *pr* (3 *krş* 30 *pr*) (C.AS 7219).

Exchange rate of Ruble

1792-94: 200 *ak* = 66 *pr* = 1 *krş* 26 *pr* 1 *ak* ( İyigünler, *Mustafa Rasih Efendi*, folio 12a).

## APPENDIX D

### Foreign Observations

#### **Excerpt 1: Poqueville on the court of Tripolitsa (the winter of 1798-99)**

Excerpts from Poqueville, *Travels Through the Morea, Albania, ...* Translated from French (London, 1806).

The pacha or vizier who then had the chief command in the Morea, was named Mustapha. At the foot of the stairs by which we ascended to the hall of the divan, where he presided, we saw a beautiful horse richly caparisoned, and held by two African slaves. We crossed a long gallery filled with guards and officers of the household [sic.], who were habited and decorated in the most ludicrous manner. At length we were presented to the pacha, whom we found surrounded by all great men of his province: he was sitting at the corner of a sofa, smoking mechanically a *narguillet*, or Persian pipe. Appearing as if recovering himself from a profound contemplation, he invited us, by his drogman [sic.], to sit down. The Vechil of Tripoli, intendant of the Bey of Navarin, prostrated himself at his feet, kissed his sleeve, and retired to the extremity of the hall in a suppliant attitude. He afterwards inquired our names and quality, said a few words about Egypt, and then dismissed us. We were conducted to one of the wings of the palace which used to be the harem; but which was unoccupied, as the pacha kept no women: here were appointed for us a chamber, a guard, and a Greek as an attendant. Ali-Cahouas was extremely well-treated, and our Albanians with their captain was lodged in the stables... In this place we passed a whole month; communicating only with the pages of the pacha, and the officers of his household. The seraglio, or palace of the pacha, seemed capable of accommodating twelve hundred men: it is a vast house built of wood, upon a square plan; and divided in half by an aisle of buildings, which also forms two courts. On the ground-floor are the stables, and above them the apartments of his highness and his attendants. A vast corridor projecting over the court, leads to the different apartments; and the Albanese who compose the guard of the pacha, sleep beneath this kind of shelter. The harem, and the prison {p. 21} for criminals, are to the north (or back) of this square building.

The palace is encumbered with a numerous train of domestics: this was the luxury of the Romans; and it prevails among the Turks, who have succeeded them in the possession of these beautiful countries. Among these domestics are preparers of coffee, lemonade, sherbet, &c. purveyors of pipes, confectioners, bathers, taylor, barbers, hussars, pages, and other minions of the pacha; besides buffoons, musicians, players of marionets (an obscene kind of gesticulation with music), exhibitors of the magic lantern, dancers, an Imaun, and lastly the executioner. This last personage is like the right-hand of the pacha; as he always accompanies his master, and is the only person who has the privilege of sitting down in his presence...

In the palace they quit their beds before sun-rise, to attend the prayer that precedes the ablutions; and afterwards pipes and boiled coffee are distributed. Sometimes the vizier gets on horseback, and goes to see the *jerid* (a sort of review); or employs himself with public audiences. Afterwards he administers justice in person; and

pronounces the sentences of various kinds, as he is invested with absolute power. At noon prayers again take place, and are followed by dinner. At three in the afternoon they again go to prayers; which are succeeded by military parades, music, &c.: they then enter the *semanlic*, or the *Andronitis* of the Greeks, which means the apartments of the men. The pacha receives visits; when they pour him out sherbet for his recreation, and relate tales from the *Thousand and One Nights*; while his buffoons make grimaces, the visitors occasionally singing verses from the *Coran*. At sun-set they again resort to prayers, take supper, and smoke afterwards. In the course of an hour and a half they assemble to pray for the fifth and last time; and as soon as this is terminated, a retreat is announced by music.

In order to raise our spirits, or perhaps rather to shew their own talents, the pages of the vizier regaled us with a concert in their way. The sweetness of their romances, and a certain melan- {22} choly charm excited by their *tumbeleks* or *cynbals*, flutes, violins, *tambourines*, drums, pipes, &c. produced upon us the most agreeable impressions: they imitated the voices of women in their singing, but in dancing to the sound of *castanets* they made figures which were disgusting to those unacquainted with their manners.

The ordinary council of the Pacha, which assembles every Thursday, consists of a *Kiaya*, his *Vice-Beglier-Bey*, the *Lieutenant of Finances*, the *Comptroller*, and some *Cadis*. At this period Russia kept an agent at *Tripolitza*, who had a consular voice in the assembly. At these meetings they deliberated on the *firman*s which were issued by the *Porte*; on the demands of the *Beys* or *Commandants* of the place; and discussed the different modes of administration, on which depended the completion of the views of the governors.

The common guard of the Pacha consists of four hundred *delis*, or horsemen clothed in the Hungarian manner; with felt caps similar to those of the French hussars, bound round the neck by a turban. Their arms are a *saber*, a brace of pistols, and *poniard*. On making a charge, they fix the bridle to the pommel of the saddle; and hold a pistol in the left hand, and the *saber* in the right: they observe no order, but act according to the impulse of the moment.

Some *Arnouts* or *Albanians* (an uncommonly warlike people; who are in the service of all the *Pachas*) form the infantry. They guard the palace-gates; where one of them sits down to watch with a stick in his hand, while the rest sleep in an obscure spot rendered inaccessible by the smoke of tobacco.

They always keep a horse saddled, with an *equerry* in waiting: not, as some travelers have asserted, with a view to accommodate their prophet if he should pass; but for the use of the Pacha, whenever he is obliged to make an excursion to a spot where a fire has broken out; on which occasion he is not only obliged to appear in person, but to be among the first that arrive.

I shall conclude my account of the interior of the palace of the Pacha, with observing, that a Turkish kitchen would not hold a distinguished place among those of modern epicures. Except the *pilaw*, their dishes consist merely of mutton *spoiled* in various ways, stinking ragouts, starch scented with musk or rose-water, and pastry made of oil or fat sweetened with honey.

{23}...The place of pacha being only temporary, Mustapha, whose period had expired, was deposed, and banished to Lepante: while Achmet, who had formerly been governor of the Morea, was re-appointed to that important situation; and as he had a household, and a number of women, we were taken from the harem and sent to lodge in the town, at the house of the Greek who served us, without even being required to give our parole.

{26}...The changing of a Pacha is an event of the first importance to the inhabitants of Tripolitza. An account of the ceremonies {27} which take place on this occasion, will doubtless be thought interesting.

Mustapha Pacha, whose reign had just expired, modestly quitted Tripolitza, and in a dress conformable to his degraded situation, had, without the least bustle, taken the road for Lepante, where he was to be left at his ease to reflect on the vicissitudes of fortune. As soon as he had gone, the Greeks began to furnish the seraglio for his successor; this occupied them for nearly a month, as it was necessary almost to rebuild the palace, the officers of the disgraced vizier having in their discontent combined their efforts to despoil it. Hence it was necessary to supply new mats, carpets, sofas, fuel, and every article of provisions, and to make arrangements for anticipating the wants of his highness, during six weeks from the day of his installation; for the custom is, that a new Pacha and his hoshold [sic.] must be maintained forty days, in order to give him time to recover from the fatigues of his journey; and thus it often happens that they prolong a period which they would wish never to terminate. The Turkish noblemen on the other hand, had set off to pay their compliments to the new vizier at Naupli, in Romania, the place of his birth, and where he resided *pro tempore*. On this occasion they presented him, as much through fear as from duty, with a number of fine horses, and there appeared amongst them a rivalry in point of flattery, because the first periods of a reign are, in general, not the most pacific.

The Pacha, who was about to arrive, was stated to be a tyrannical character, and having been dismissed from the place which he was appointed to re-occupy, he was full of resentment; he bore the character of astonishing knowledge and address in the administration of affairs, and had been distinguished at an early period of his life, by a spirit of sagacity and penetration peculiar to the Turks of the Morea, who have the title of *Turcoe belingues*. Notwithstanding the obscurity of his origin, this man was attached by his alliances to the greatest families in the country.

He made his solemn entry amidst the sound of cannon, and was preceded by a barbarous band of music, and a banner of three tails, the emblems of his power. A number of buffoons dressed in skins, from which, as well as from their pointed caps, hung in innumerable foxes' tails, made part of the procession, and amused the populace with their grimaces, contortions, and guttural acclamations; one of them threw about a zin, or Arabian instrument, commonly called a Chinese drum; they made their horses rear, leap, and fall upon their knees; they turned themselves towards the tails of the animals, and occasionally passed themselves under their bellies while they were in full gallop.

{28} Next came a body of foot-soldiers, having on the left arm an antique shield, which they struck with a curved saber. From time to time they stopped and made attempts at attack and defence; but the awkwardness with which they handled their weapons clearly proved that they knew nothing of the art.

The Albanians followed these soldiers, and marched without order, or preserving the least degree of rank. They often hit each other in the eyes with the barrels of their muskets, which they carried on their shoulders, and they sang the praises of the Pacha in the manner of a litany, or tale.

The artillery of the town next appeared, wearing conical caps, as big as bee hives, this being the only distinctive mark of their profession. The corps of cavalry, in the midst of which was a flag, occupied the whole width of the street; they preceded, surrounded, and followed the Vizier, near whose person were his two sons, (Whose physiognomy was as enchanting as that which represents Apollo,) and several of the most distinguished Turks. The Pacha rode a most beautiful horse, which was caparisoned with a tiger's skin, and a profusion of gold trappings; he advanced slowly, while from the terror which operated upon him, his head was agitated by a convulsive motion, and he held firmly by his beard to keep it steady. The people ran before him, prostrated themselves, and made incessant shouts as a testimony of their happiness at an event which afterwards cost them dear.

...The Pacha being informed of our captivity, ordered us before him the day after his arrival. Towards midnight they came for our persons: and being ignorant of the customs, we were not without alarm, particularly as we had heard such exaggerated accounts of the severity of the personage before whom we were to appear. We therefore took up what we possessed, and putting a good face upon the matter, repaired to the seraglio...

We were at first introduced to the drogman [sic.], M. Caradja, who was the interpreter, the master of the ceremonies, and the negociator between the Pacha and the Greeks, and foreigners upon all occasions, He was surrounded by twenty-four Codjabachis, or chiefs of provincial districts, and a Greek from Mistra, in the uniform of a Russian officer...

### **Excerpt 2: Gell on the court of Tripolitsa (1804)**

Excerpts from W. Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea* (London, 1823).

141} ...The Pasha was ready to see us. The walk was short; for in the next street we turned through an arched gateway into a large square court surrounded by long low galleries of wood, which ran in front of corresponding chambers, above a range of what appeared to be stables. In five or six places were horses richly caparisoned fastened to stakes or pillars of wood, all ready for mounting. In divers places were fires round which sate companies of Albanians. Here and there were groups of Turks in all sorts of coloured dresses, yellow, blue, red, and green; some were richly embroidered: and as we proceeded, the Tartars with their high cylindrical caps crowned with yellow cushions passed disdainfully by us, as if in haste to set out with despatches to all parts of the kingdom.

{142}...Nothing can be more striking than a Turkish palace, where, though every thing bears the appearance of decay, there is an air of grandeur left, which transports an European in to the fairy land of the Arabian Nights. Two Bostangis, persons found in all situations, though their name implies attendance on the imperial gardens, conducted us into the presence-chamber, a large saloon exactly like all we had yet seen, but with better windows, and crimson sofas and curtains, where, passing a crowd of long-robed officers who fell back as we advanced, we made our {143} obeisances in our own fashion, and were invited to sit on the divan near His Highness, who pronounced only the words "Well come" in a grave and solemn manner. Giannettachi who entered with us was also welcomed: coffee and pipes were brought in; the latter longer and with finer amber heads than usual, and the former served in porcelain cups held in others of filigree work, set with precious stones, which we were afraid of examining for fear of being taken for rustics. When this was over, after another welcome, Giannettachi was ordered to come near as interpreter, for though the Pasha spoke Greek perfectly, it was not the etiquette of a court to understand one syllable of it, and a person was dispatched in search of the great dragoman, Gligorasko. We could not help remarking to each other, in English, the unfortunate choice we had made in selecting a telescope for our new acquaintance; for we observed with horror that His Highness was stone blind on one side, and scarcely saw with the other. The present, however, was made; and having a red morocco-case, whence being taken, the whole length of its plated tubes was displayed, the effect was so good that the Pasha applied it immediately to his best eye, quite regardless of the focus, and pretending to look out of the window with it, pronounced it at once "Pek guzel," quite beautiful....

{145)...in the mean time Gligorasko, whose duty it was to have attended us to the presentation, arrived agitated and trembling to such a degree, that, if the old Pasha could have seen it, he was more an object of compassion than anger....The Pasha, however, knew his man, and seemed to pardon his present neglect, telling him that he was very well known to be in the pay of Buonaparte, and that nothing but positive proof was wanting to hang him up like a dog.

{146}...We were regaled with sweetmeats, wiped our mouths with embroidered napkins, and our divinities were revered by perfuming with the smoke of incense, in the way practiced by the Greeks to the pictures of saints; after which mark of distinction, we retired through the same throng of courtly slaves in the chamber, to the insolent and rapacious chiboukshis or pipe-lighters, boys on the stairs, who beg in loud tones for money as we passed on to the more stately starvelings in the inner court and the rougher and more boisterous tenants of the outer. All these people were to be appeased with a bakshish, or present, according to custom...and even in the palace of a Pasha a para is worth picking up.

{147}...It is not to be supposed that the Pasha was always surrounded by that number of officers and ministers which we found assembled in his chamber.

We had a proof that much of the scene was got up to astonish the strangers; but the horses standing ready caparisoned in the first court, being supposed a necessary appendage to the state of a great man, are probably always in waiting.

### A secret meeting at night with Mustafa Paşa

{156}...we went directly to the palace of the Vizier. We found his courts in solitude, {157} his gallery empty, and his audience-chamber dark; but passing through a small door at the upper end of it, we saw him without his turban, in a smaller chamber, sitting smoking at a comfortable fire. He had on his head only a red velvet cap. His robes were of the same colour, and his long white beard was finely displayed on his breast. He received us with great courtesy, and spoke without any sort of difficulty in Greek, now we were no longer received in state. (*Upon the rumors of an imminent French attack on the Morea, Mustafa Paşa asked Gell's opinion on the state of the castles at the entrance of the gulf of Lepanto, and whether they could resist a fleet*)...I was enabled to assure him that it was not generally in a state to oppose a resistance {158} for half an hour; and that I saw no means of making it tenable without more guns, and more suitable ammunition than balls of all sizes, and large pebbles, which I had seen in heaps...

### **Excerpt 3: Gell on the court of Tripolitsa (January 1805)**

Excerpts from W. Gell, *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea* (London, 1823).

(*The ship of which Gell was a passenger anchored under the island of Sphacteria (Sphagia) close to the New Fort at Navarino in January 1805 and met Patrona Şeremet*)

{p. 5}...[we] proceeded to anchor under the island of Sphacteria, of Sphagia, in very deep water; where we found Sheramet Bey, the second Admiral, or Capitan Bey, of the Turkish navy, with three ships under his command. We had scarcely anchored, when, instead of waiting for the ceremony of a visit from our commander, he immediately with great good humour came on board our little vessel. He was of course received with the honours due to his rank; but a large Newfoundland dog was not easily pacified, after seeing the long robes, and furred pelisse of our visitor. He spoke, through his interpreter, very highly of the English, and expressed his sense of the services which had then recently been rendered by them to his nation. He offered every assistance we might stand in need of; and only retired when he observed we were going to dinner, complimenting our captain, by saying, that the weather was such, that nothing but an English ship could have outlived the gale. He added, that he had observed us at sea, from the height of the old fortress, and that the English called that sailing, which he called coming under-water...

(*Gell paid a second visit to Patrona the same month*) {p. 24}...He received us with the greatest kindness, gave us pipes, and coffee with sugar in it, which he knew to be the custom of Europeans, also small spoons with marmalade; after which we drank a draught of the coldest water, and wiped our mouths as we were desired, though ashamed to do, on napkins of muslin embroidered with gold and flowers, in which operation the honour exceeded the pleasure. He presented to us also some of the little balls of perfumed wood which he said the English were fond of, and which are used to create a very agreeable odour in smoking with tobacco...



{25} [...]As we wished for a boat, in order to proceed to the ruins, the Admiral ordered one of his to convey us; and Anastasio attended to tell us the names of the places we were to see from the top of the towers. I had scarcely time to sketch two of the Admiral's people, who are here represented just in the attitude they were in at the moment, and may serve as a tolerable specimen of the Levantine sailors, one being a Greek, and the other a half Frank, which he is anxious to show by wearing an old hat. Sheramet Bey seemed much entertained at my drawing, and asked me if I would take it to England, where {p. 26} he said they had so many sailors it would be of no use. I observed the crew were in some places sitting on the deck in little parties, conversing between the guns, and that the whole bore a great appearance of order and cleanliness. (*the Patrona returned the visit by end of January*) {p. 28} ...In the afternoon, Sheramet Bey came ashore, and our host gave him coffee and pipe. He said many kind things of the English, and praised our manufactures, shewing us a brace of short English pistols which he always carried in his belt, concealed in his benisse or robe behind, as it is thought unbecoming a person of such high dignity to wear arms in Turkey. We were witnesses of his authority; for after drinking his coffee he went upon the beach, ordered {p. 29} a carpet to be spread on the sand, and sent for the commandant of the fortress, who had displeased him by some neglect. He treated him with the utmost indignity, and threatened him with the loss of his head. The poor man, who was in the wrong, trembled from head to foot, and was glad to promise amendment. Sheramet soon after composed himself, and returned to the house.

(*Gell and Antoni Bey, the chief of the Mainotes, were visited by the commander of the Turkish squadron and his officers at Maina*) {p. 271} [...] We received a visit from the commandant of the Turkish squadron and his officer. The Bey came to meet them and treated them with {p. 272} pipes and coffee, as we had been the hosts...Our Turks invited us to come on board their ships, and asked the usual questions on the motives of our journey into their country, with the usual demonstrations of surprise, that we did not find it more entertaining and less trouble to look for old ruins in our own country. They spoke Greek perfectly, and expressed great delight at the whiteness of our linen, and the shining blackness of our shoes; not that the Greeks wash well, but that we happened to have shirts which were washed in England. The shoes did not procure us quite so much applause when they learnt from Mustapha (*Gell's guide*), that our servants spit upon them every morning, and then rubbed them with a brush, made of hog's bristles, both of which were profanations in the opinion of our {p. 273} Mussulman friends, though they did not express half the disapprobation they felt. They evidently, by their questions and remarks to Mustapha, conceived an idea, and ended by confirming it, that the English possessed some peculiar virtue of spitting a shining liquid for shoes, which would render useless any recourse to Messrs. Day and Martin. We visited their ships, which were as usual very clean, and exhibited all the appearance of regularity.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Sources

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [BOA] (İstanbul)

Bab-1 Asafî Amedi Kalemî Dosyaları (A.AMD)  
Bab-1 Asafî Sadaret Kethüdalığı Dosyaları (A.SKT)  
Bab-1 Asafî Defterleri Düvel-i Ecnebiye (A.ADVN.DVE)

Cevdet Askeriye Katalođu (C.AS)  
Cevdet Bahriye Katalođu (C.BH)  
Cevdet Hariciye Katalođu (C.HRC)  
Cevdet Maliye Katalođu (C. Maliye)  
Cevdet İktisad Katalođu (C. İktisad)

Hatt-1 Hümayun Katalođu (HAT)

İbnü'l-emin Hariciye Katalođu (İE. HRC)  
İbnü'l-emin İktisad Katalođu (İE.İkts)

Maliyeden Müdevver (MAD)

Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi

Evrak (E)

The British National Archives (Kew)

PRO FO 78/20  
MR-1-162-001  
MR-1-162-002

## Secondary Sources

- Abu-Manneh, Butrus, *Studies On Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century (1826-1876)*, İstanbul, the Isis Press, 2001.
- Acton, Harold, *The Bourbons of Naples (1734-1825)*, London, 1956.
- Adanır, Fikret, "Semi-autonomous forces in the Balkans and Anatolia", in S. Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey, v. 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*, pp. 157-85.
- Afyoncu, Erhan, *Necati Efendi, Tarih-i Kırım (Rusya Sefaretnamesi)*, Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1990.
- Ágoston, Gábor, "Information, ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry", V. Aksan and D. Goffman (eds.), *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Most Powerful Empire': Ottoman Flexibility and Military Might", G. Zimmar and D. Hicks (eds.), *Empires and Superpowers: Their Rise and Fall*, Washington, DC, Society for the Preservation of the Greek Heritage, 2005.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Guns for the Sultan. Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "A Flexible Empire: Authority and Its Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers", *IJ TS* 9/1-2 (2003): 15-31.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System in Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" in G. David and P. Fodor (eds.), *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe*, pp. 195-228.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826" in J. Black (ed.) *European Warfare, 1453-1815*, London, McMillan, 1999, pp. 118-44.
- Ağır, Seven M., *From Welfare to Wealth: Ottoman and Castilian Grain Trade Policies in a Time of Change*, Princeton University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009.
- Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet* [tab-ı cedid], 12 vols., İstanbul, 1309.
- Akar, Şevket K. and H. Al, *Osmanlı Dış Borçları ve Gözetim Komisyonları, 1854-1855* İstanbul, Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2003.
- Akdağ, Mustafa, "Osmanlı Tarihinde Ayanlık Düzeni Devri, 1730-1839", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 8/14-23 (1963): 51-61.
- Aksan, Virginia H., *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged*, Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 2007.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "The Ottoman Military and State Transformation in a Globalizing World", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27/2 (2007): 259-272, DOI 10.1215/1089201X-2007-004.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "War and Peace" in Faroqhi (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Turkey, v. 3*, pp. 81-116.
- \_\_\_\_\_, (ed.), *Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts*, İstanbul, The Isis Press, 2004.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empires", in Aksan (ed.) *Ottomans*

- and Europeans, pp. 131-32.
- \_\_\_\_ “The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply, and Command in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774” in Aksan (ed.) *Ottomans and Europeans*, pp. 173-191.
- \_\_\_\_ “Feeding the Ottoman Troops on the Danube, 1768-1774” in Aksan (ed.) *Ottomans and Europeans*, pp. 209-223.
- \_\_\_\_ “Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War” in Aksan (ed.) *Ottomans and Europeans*, pp. 223-39.
- \_\_\_\_ “Ottoman Military Matters” review article, *Journal of Early Modern History* 6/1 (2002): 52-62.
- \_\_\_\_ “Breaking the Spell of Baron de Tott Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760-1830”, *The International History Review*, XXIV/2 (2002): 253-277.
- \_\_\_\_ “Ottoman military recruitment strategies in the late eighteenth century” in E. J. Zürcher (ed.) *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia 1775-1925*, London, I.B. Tauris/Palgrave Macmillan, 1999, pp. 21-39.
- \_\_\_\_ *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783*, Leiden, Brill, 1995.
- \_\_\_\_ “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808”, *IJMES* 25 (1993): 53-69.
- \_\_\_\_ “Choiseul-Gouffier at the Sublime Porte, 1784-1792, *Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History* IV, İstanbul, The Isis Press, 1992, pp. 27-34.
- \_\_\_\_ “Selim III.” In *Encyclopedia of Islam* (second edition), v. 9, pp. 132-134.
- Aktepe, Münir (ed.), *Mehmed Emni Beyefendi (Paşa) ’nın Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaret-namesi*, Ankara, TTK, 1989.
- Alperen, A. Yusuf, *Osmanlı Denizciliği (1700-1770)*, İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2007.
- Anastasopoulos, Antonis (ed.) *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire: Halycon Days in Crete V: a symposium held in Rethymnon I*, Rethymnon, 2003.
- \_\_\_\_ “The Mixed Elite of a Balkan Town: Karaferye in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century” in Anastasopolous (ed.) *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 259-268.
- \_\_\_\_ and E. Kolovos (eds.) *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflicts, Transformation, Adaptation*, Rethymnon, University of Crete, 2007.
- Anderson, Roger C., *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853*, Liverpool, University Press 1952.
- Anscombe, Frederick, “Continuities in Ottoman centre-periphery relations, 1787-1913” in Andrew C. S. Peacock (ed.), *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World (Proceedings of the British Academy)*, Oxford University Press, 2009 [to be published in December 2009].
- Arıkan, Sema, *Nizamı Cedid’in Kaynaklarından Ebubekir Ratib Efendi ’nin Büyük Layihası*, İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1996.
- Artan, Tülay, “From Charismatic Leadership to Collective Rule: Introducing materials on the wealth and power of Ottoman Princesses in the eighteenth century” *Dünü*

- Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi* 4 (1993): 53-94.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and Halil Berktaş, “Selimian Times: A Reforming Grand Admiral, Anxieties of Re-possession, Changing Rites of Power” in E. Zachariadou (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha His Office and His Domain*, Rethymnon, 2002, pp. 7-45.
- Aydın, Ahmet, *Mir Yusuf Tarihi*, Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2002.
- Aydın, Veli, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Esham Uygulaması (1775-1840)*, Ankara Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1998.
- Aydoğdu, Ümit, *Dağlık Kilikya Bölgesinde Antik Çağ'da Zeytinyağı ve Şarap Üretimi: Üretimin Arkeolojik Kanıtları*, İstanbul, Efe, 2009.
- Aynural, Salih, *İstanbul Değirmenleri ve Fırınları. Zahire Ticareti (1740-1840)*, İstanbul, TTV, 2001.
- Bağış, Ali İ., *Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayrimüslimler*, Ankara, Turhan, 1998.
- Baker, Keith M., *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Balta, Evangelia, “Settlement and Population in the Morea in 1645”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları XXIV* (2004): 53-63.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “The Exploitation of Otherness in the Economic Advancement of the Rum Millet”, *O Eranistis* 24 (2003): 139-160.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “The viticulture in the kaza of Tripolitsa (16<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Centuries)”, *Oionon istoro* [History of the wine] VI: 125-143.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “Olive Cultivation in Crete at the time of the Ottoman Conquest” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 20 (2000): 143-164.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “Evidence for Viniculture from the Ottoman Tax Registers: 15<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> Century”, *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 5 (2001): 1-12.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “The Bread in Greek Lands during the Ottoman Rule”, *TAD XVI/27* (1992-1994): 199-224.
- Başaran, Betül, “III. Selim ve İstanbul Şehir Siyaseti, 1789-1792”, N. Levy and A. Toumarkine (eds.), *Osmanlı'da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza*, İstanbul, TTV, 2008, pp. 116-134.
- \_\_\_\_\_ *Remaking the Gate of Felicity: Policing, Social Control, and Migration in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century, 1789-1793* (the University of Chicago, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2006.
- Baycar, Adnan (ed.), *Osmanlı-Rus İlişkileri Tarihi (Ahmed Cavid Bey'in Müntehabatı)* İstanbul, Yeditepe, 2004.
- Bayerle, Gustav, *Pashas, Beks, and Effendis: A historical dictionary of titles and terms in the Ottoman Empire*, İstanbul, The Isis Press, 1997.
- C. A. Bayly, “Distorted Development: The Ottoman Empire and British India, circa 1780-1916”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 27/2 (2007): 332-44 DOI 10.1215/1089201X-2007-009.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760-1830”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26: 2 (1998): 28-47 DOI 10.1080/03086539808583023.
- Bayur, Hikmet, “Maysor Sultanı Tipu ile Osmanlı Padişahlarından I. Abdülhamid ve III. Selim Arasındaki Mektuplaşma”, *Belleten* XII/47 (1948): 617-654.

- Berker, A., "Mora İhtilali Tarihçesi veya Penah Ef. Mecmuası", *Tarih Vesikaları* 2/7 (1943): 63-80, 2/8: 153-60, 2/9: 228-40, 2/10: 309-20, 2/11: 385-400, 2/12: 473-80.
- Berkes, N., *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1973.
- Beydilli, Kemal, "Sekbanbaşı Risalesi'nin müellifi hakkında", *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi* 12 (2005): 221-224.
- \_\_\_\_ "Dış Politika ve Siyasi Ahlak", *İlmi Araştırmalar: Dil, Edebiyat, Tarih İncelemeleri* 7 (1999): 47-56.
- \_\_\_\_ "Küçük Kaynarca'dan Tanzimat'a Islahat Düşünceleri", *İlmi Araştırmalar: Dil, Edebiyat, Tarih İncelemeleri* 8 (1999): 25-64.
- \_\_\_\_ *Mühendishane ve Üsküdar Matbaalarında Basılan Kitapların Listesi ve bir Katalog*, İstanbul, Eren, 1997.
- \_\_\_\_ "Karadeniz'in Kapalılığı Karşısında Avrupa Küçük Devletleri ve 'Miri Ticaret' Teşebbüsü", *Bulleten LV*: 214 (1991): 687-755.
- \_\_\_\_ "İlk Mühendislerimizden Seyyid Mustafa ve Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Risalesi", *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi XIII* (1983-87): 387-479.
- \_\_\_\_ *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishane ve Mühendishane Matbaası ve Kütüphanesi (1776-1826)*, İstanbul, Eren, 1985.
- \_\_\_\_ "Ignatius Mouradgea D'Ohsson (Muradcan Tosuncuyan) Ailesi Hakkında Kayıtlar, Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Layıhası ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu", *İÜEFTD* 34 (1984): 274-314.
- \_\_\_\_ *1790 Osmanlı Prusya İttifakı (Meydana Gelişi-Tahlili-Tatbiki)*, İstanbul, 1981.
- \_\_\_\_ and İlhan Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi ve Nizam-ı Cedid'e Dair Eseri*, Ankara, TTK, 2001.
- Beyhan, Mehmed Ali (ed.), *Cabi Ömer Efendi, Cabir Tarihi (Tarih-i Sultan Selim-i Salis ve Mahmud-ı Sani)*, 2 vols., Ankara, TTK, 2003.
- Bizbirlik, A., "XVIII. Yüzyılda Bir Osmanlı Valisinin Ölümü Ardından Gelişen Olaylar Üzerine", *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi XV* (2000): 171-81.
- Black, Jeremy, *A Military Revolution?: Military Change and European Society 1550-1800*, Hampshire, 1991.
- Bonney, Richard (ed.), *Economic Systems and State Finance*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1995.
- \_\_\_\_ "The Struggle for Great Power Status" in Bonney ed. *Economic Systems and State Finance*.
- Bostan, İdris (ed.), *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, İstanbul, Kitap Yayınevi, 2006.
- \_\_\_\_ "İzn-i Sefine Defterleri ve Karadeniz'de Rusya ile Ticaret Yapan Devlet-i Aliyye Tüccarları, 1780-1846" in Bostan (ed.), *Beylikten İmparatorluğa*, 325-347.
- \_\_\_\_ "Rusya'nın Karadeniz'de Ticarete Başlaması ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 1700-1787", in İ. Bostan (ed.), *Beylikten İmparatorluğa*, pp. 285-325.
- \_\_\_\_ *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersane-i Amire*, Ankara, TTK, 2003.
- Broers, Michael, *Napoleonic Imperialism and the Savoyard Monarchy 1773-1821. State Building in Piedmont* (Lewiston, 1997).
- Brummett, Palmira, "Reviews", *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 24/1 (2000):

42-44.

- Burçak, Berrak, “Modernization, Science and Engineering in the Early Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 44/1 (2008): 69-83.
- Charrière, Ernest, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant, ou, Correspondances, mémoires et actes diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de France à Constantinople et des ambassadeurs, envoyés ou résidents à divers titres à Venise, Raguse, Rome, Malte et Jérusalem, en Turquie, Perse, Géorgie, Crimée, Syrie, Egypte, etc., et dans les états de Tunis, d'Alger et de Maroc*, Paris, Impr. Nationale, 4 vols, 1848-60.
- Cezar, Yavuz, “Economy and Taxation: The role of sarrafs in Ottoman finance and economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” in C. Imber, K. Kiyotaki and R. Murphey (eds.), *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West*, v. I, I.B. Tauris, 2005, pp. 61-76.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “18. Yüzyılda Eyüp’te Para ve Kredi Konuları Üzerine Gözlemler” in T. Artan (ed.), *18. Yüzyıl Kadı Sicilleri Işığında Eyüp’te Sosyal Yaşam*, İstanbul, TTV, 1998.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Mali Bürokrasi Tarihine Giriş. XVIII. Yüzyılda Bab-ı Defteri”, *Toplum ve Ekonomi* 4 (1993): 129-160.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, İstanbul, Alan, 1986.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Bir Ayanın Muhallefatı Havza ve Köprü Kazaları Ayanı Kör İsmail-oğlu Hüseyin (Müsadere olayı ve terekenin incelenmesi)”, *Bellekten* XVI/161 (1977): 41-78.
- Cole, Juan, *Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East*, Palgrave/McMillan, 2008.
- Comstock, John A., *History of the Greek Revolution...*, New York, 1828.
- Crummey, Robert O., *The Old Believers and the World of Antichrist: The Vyg Community and the Russian State 1694-1855*, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.
- Cunningham, Allan B., *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution: Collected Essays*, v. 1. (London: F. Cass, 1993) [ed. by Edward Ingram].
- Çağman, Ergin, “III. Selim’e sunulan bir ıslahat raporu: Mehmet Şerif Efendi Layihası”, *Divan: İlmî Araştırmalar* 7 (1999): 217-33.
- Çakır, Baki, “Geleneksel Dönem (Tanzimat Öncesi) Osmanlı Bütçe Gelirleri” in M. Genç and E. Özvar (eds.) *Osmanlı Maliyesi, Kurumlar ve Bütçeler*.
- Çınar, A. O., *Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behic’in Sevanihü’l-Levayih’i ve Değerlendirilmesi*, Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1992.
- Çiçek, Kemal, “Diplomat, Banker ve Tüccar: 18. Yüzyıl Başlarında Larnaka’da Para Ticareti ve Yabancı Sermaye”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 20 (2001): 269-81.
- Çizakça, Murat, “The Kapudan Pasha and the Shipowners” in E. Zachariadou (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha, his Office and his Domain*, pp. 203-212.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships. The Islamic World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives*, Leiden, Brill, 1996.
- Dale, Stephen F., *Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600-1750*, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Davenport, Richard A., *The Life of Ali Pacha, of Janina, Vizier of Epirus, Surnamed Aslan, or the Lion*, London, 1822.

- David, Geza - P. Fodor (eds.), *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, Leiden, Brill, 2000.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Suleyman the Magnificent*, Budapest, Lorant Eotvos University, 1994.
- Davison, Roderic, "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered", *Slavic Review* 35 (1976): 463-83.
- Demirci, Süleyman, *The Functioning of Ottoman Avariz Taxation: An Aspect of the Relationship Between Centre and Periphery. A case study of the province of Karaman 1621-1700*, İstanbul, Isis Press, 2000.
- Dilçin, C., "Şeyh Galib'in Mevlevi-hanelerin Tamirine İlişkin Şiirleri", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları XIV* (1994): 29-76.
- Dimitropoulos, D., "Aspects of the Working of the Fiscal Machinery in the Areas Ruled by Ali Paşa" in Anastasopoulos and Kolovos (eds.) *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans*, pp. 62-72.
- Dixon, Simon, *Catherine the Great. Profiles in Power*, Longman, 2001.
- Djuvara, Trandafir G., *Türkiye'nin Paylaşılması Hakkında Yüz Proje (1281-1913)*, [Turkish tran.: Pulat Tacar, Ankara, 1999].
- Dodwell, E., *A Classical and Topographical Tour...*, 2 vols., London, 1819.
- Doğan, F., *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Zeytinyağı (1800-1920)*, Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2007.
- Doğru, Halime, "Öldürülen Hacı-oğlu Pazarı Ayanı Sarıklıoğlu ile Adamlarının Muhallefatı ve Tasfiyesi", *Uluslararası Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri Sempozyumu*, Eskişehir Üniversitesi, 2005, pp. 157-169.
- Duffy, Christopher, *Russia's Military Way to the West. Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power 1700-1800*, London, 1981.
- Dümen, E., *Denizde Yıllar Boyu Anadolu Türkleri 1081-1922 (Onsekizinci Yüzyıl)* İstanbul: Dz.K.K Basımevi, 1993.
- Eldem, Edhem, "Dış Borç, Osmanlı Bankası ve Düyun-ı Umumiye", in Genç and Özvar (eds.) *Osmanlı Maliyesi, Kurumlar ve Bütçeler*, pp. 95-113.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Capitulations and the Western Trade", in S. Faroqhi (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, pp. 283-335.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *French Trade in the Eighteenth Century*, Leiden, Brill, 1999.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "XVIII. Yüzyılda İstanbul'da Poliçe Tedavülü ve Kambiyo Kurları Hakkında", *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, Ankara, TTK, 1993, pp. 1671-1684.
- Emerson, J., *The History of Modern Greece...*, 2 vols., London, 1830 [v. 1], 1845 [v. 2].
- Engin, Vahdettin, "Mahmud Raif Efendi Tarafından Kaleme Alınmış İngiltere Seyahati Gözlemleri" in *Prof. Dr. İsmail Aka'ya Armağan*, İzmir 1999, pp. 135-162.
- Erdem, Hakan, "Recruitment for the 'Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad' in the Arab Provinces, 1826-1828" in I Gershoni, H. Erdem, U. Woköck (eds.), *Histories of the Modern Middle East: New Directions*, Boulder, 2002, pp. 189-206.
- Ergenç, Özer, "Osmanlı Klasik Dönemindeki 'Eşraf ve A'yan' Üzerine Bazı Bilgiler", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3 (1982): 105-118.
- Ertaş, Mehmet Yaşar, *Sultanın Ordusu (Mora Fethi Örneği 1714-1716)*, Yeditepe, 2007.



- Esmer, Tolga, *A Culture of Rebellion: Networks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790-1808*, Chicago University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009.
- Eton, William, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire*, New York, Arno Press, 1973 [1798].
- Faroqhi, Suraiya (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, v. 3: *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- \_\_\_\_ “Zeytin Diyarında Güç ve Servet: Edremit Ayanından Müridzade Hacı Mehmed Ağa'nın Siyasi ve Ekonomik Faaliyetleri” in Ç. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds.) *Osmanlı'da Toprak Mülkiyeti ve Ticari Tarım*, İstanbul, TTV, 1998, pp. 82-101 [*Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, SUNY, 1998].
- \_\_\_\_ “Exporting Grain from the Anatolian South-west” in Anastasopoulos (ed.), *Provincial Elites*, pp. 293-317.
- Fidan, Murat, “Osmanlı-Rus Ticari Rekabetinin İki Devlet Arasında Yapılan Antlaşmalara Yansıması”, *Tarih Dergisi* 44 (2006): 65-122.
- \_\_\_\_ *XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Rusya Ticari Münasebetleri*, Samsun Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2002.
- Finkel, Caroline, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* London, John Murray, 2005.
- \_\_\_\_ *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman military campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606*, Wien: VWGO, 1988.
- \_\_\_\_ “The Provisioning of the Ottoman Army during the Campaigns of 1593-1606” in A. Tietze (ed.), *Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen/Relations Habsbourg-Ottomanes*, Vienna, 1985, pp. 107-24.
- Fischer-Galati-Kiraly (eds.), *Essays on War and Society in East Central Europe, 1740-1920*, New York, Boulder, 1987.
- Fleming, Kate, *The Muslim Bonaparte. Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece*, Princeton, 1999.
- Forest, Alan, “The Revolution and Europe” in F. Furret and M. Ozoof (eds.), *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, pp. 115-24.
- Furret, Francois and M. Ozoof (eds.), *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution* Harvard University Press, 1989[A. Goldhammer trans.].
- Gardiner, R. (ed.), *The Line of Battle. The Sailing Warship 1650-1840*, Conway, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_ “The Frigate” in Gardiner (ed.), *The Line of Battle*, pp. 927-45.
- Gawrych, George W., “Mevlevism and the Nizam-ı Cedid”, *IJTS* iv/1 (1987): 91-114.
- Gell, W., *Narrative of a Journey in the Morea...*, London, 1823.
- Gencer, A. İ., *Bahriye'de Yapılan Islahat Hareketleri ve Bahriye Nezareti'nin Kuruluşu (1789-1867)*, Ankara, 2001.
- Genç, Mehmet and E. Özvar (eds.), *Osmanlı Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Bütçeler*, 2 vols., İstanbul, Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006.
- Genç, M. (ed.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, İstanbul, Ötüken, 2003.
- \_\_\_\_ “18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş”, in Genç (ed.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda*, pp. 211-26.

- \_\_\_\_ “Esham: İç Borçlanma” in Genç (ed.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ’nda*, pp. 186-96.
- \_\_\_\_ “Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi”, in Genç (ed.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ’nda*, pp. 99-153.
- Gershoni, I, H. Erdem, U. Woköck (eds.), *Histories of the Modern Middle East: New Directions*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
- Goriainow, S., *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, Paris, 1910. [Turkish trans.: Macar İskender and Ali Reşad, *Devlet-i Osmaniye-Rusya Siyaseti*, İstanbul, 1331. Its reprint: Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu and Ishak Keskin (eds.), *Rus Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi*, İstanbul, Ötüken, 2006].
- Gosu, A., “The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition and the Sublime Porte” in K. Karpat and R. Zens ed. *Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, personalities and political change*, University of Wisconsin, 2003, pp. 199-237 [IJTS, I:2/9 (2003), special issue].
- Gökbilgin, M. Tayyib, “Nizam-ı Cedid”, *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, v. 6, pp. 309-318.
- Göyünç, Nejat, “Yurtluk-Ocaklık Deyimleri Hakkında”, in *Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu ’na Armağan*, İstanbul, 1991, pp. 269-77.
- Güçer, L., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler* İstanbul, 1963.
- Gülsoy, Ersin, *Girit’in Fethi ve Osmanlı İdaresinin Kurulması (1645-1670)*, İstanbul, Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2004.
- Güran, Tevfik, *19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Tarımı*, İstanbul, TTV, 1998.
- \_\_\_\_ “The State Role in the Grain Supply of Istanbul 1793-1839”, *IJTS* III/1 (1985): 27-41.
- Hathaway, J., “Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History” in A. Singer (ed.), *Mediterranean Historical Review* 19/1 (2004): 29-53.
- \_\_\_\_ (ed.) *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 8/1-2 (2002) [special issue].
- \_\_\_\_ *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt. The Rise of the Qazdağlıs* Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- \_\_\_\_ “The Household: An Alternative Framework for the Military Society of Eighteenth Century Ottoman Egypt” in K. Fleet (ed.), *Oriente Moderno* 18/1 (1999): 57-66.
- Haythornthwaite, Philip J., *Weapons & Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars*, London, 1996.
- Herbette, M., *Fransa ’da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi “Moralı Esseyit Ali Efendi (1797-1802)* [Turkish trans.: E. Üyepazarıcı, İstanbul, 1997].
- Herold, J. Christopher., *Bonaparte in Egypt*, Barnsley, Pen&Sword, 2005 [1963] [foreword by Christopher Summerville].
- Heyd, Uriel, “The Ottoman ‘Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II” in Heyd (ed.), *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization*, Scripta Hierosolymitana, v. IX, Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, 1961, pp. 63-96.
- Heywood, Colin (ed.), *Writing Ottoman History: Documents and Interpretations* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.
- \_\_\_\_ “The Ottoman Menzilhane and Ulak System in Rumeli in the Eighteenth Century”, in Heywood(ed.), *Writing Ottoman History*, X.

- \_\_\_\_ “Some Turkish Archival Sources for the History of the Menzilhane Network in Rumeli during the Eighteenth Century” in Heywood (ed.) *Writing Ottoman History*, IX.
- \_\_\_\_ “The Via Egnatia in the Ottoman Period: The Menzilhanes of the Sol Kol in the Late 17<sup>th</sup>/Early 18<sup>th</sup> Century”, in Heywood (ed.) *Writing Ottoman History*, XI.
- Hickok, Michael, R. *Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth Century Bosnia* Leiden, Brill, 1997.
- Hobhouse, J. C., *A Journey Through Albania and other Provinces...*, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1817.
- Holland, H., *Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly, Macedonia, &c. during the years 1812 and 1813*, London, 1815.
- Horne, Alistair, *The Age of Napoleon*, New York, Modern Library, 2004.
- Hurewitz, J. C., “The Background of Russia’s Claims to the Turkish Straits: A Reassessment”, *Bellesten* XXVIII/111 (1964): 459-503.
- \_\_\_\_ “Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Reevaluation of the Origins of the Problem”, *World Politics* 14 (1962): 605-32.
- \_\_\_\_ “The Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy: the Conversion from Unilateralism to Reciprocity in the Nineteenth Century”, *Bellesten* 25 (1961): 455-66.
- \_\_\_\_ *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Princeton, 1956.
- İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin (ed.), *History of the Ottoman State, Society, and Civilisation*, 2 vols. İstanbul, İrcica, 2001.
- İlgürel, M. (ed.), Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, *Mehasinü’l-Asar ve Hakaikü’l-Ahbar*, Ankara, TTK, 1994.
- İnalçık, H., “The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlords and Tenants” in J.-L. Bacque-Grammont and P. Dumont (eds.), *Contributions a l’histoire economique et sociale de l’Empire ottoman*, Paris, Leuven, 1983.
- \_\_\_\_ “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700”, *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 283-337.
- \_\_\_\_ “Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration” in Naff and Owen (eds.), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, London, 1977, pp. 27-52.
- İnbaşı, M., *Ukrayna’da Osmanlılar, Kamaniçe Seferi ve Organizasyonu (1672)*, İstanbul, Yeditepe, 2004.
- İşbilir, Ö. (ed.), *Nizam-ı Cedid’e Dair bir Risale: Zebire-i Kuşmani fi Tarif-i Nizam-ı İlhami*, Ankara, TTK, 2006.
- \_\_\_\_ *XVII. Yüzyıl Başlarında Şark Seferlerinin İaşe, İkmal ve lojistik Meseleleri*, Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D, 1997.
- İyigünler, U., *Mustafa Rasih Efendi’nin Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaretnamesi*, Kırıkkale Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1998.
- Jervis, Henry and White Jervis, *History of Island of Corfu and the Republic of the Ionian Islands*, London, 1852.
- Jorga, N., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* 6 vols., [Turkish trans.: Nilüfer Epçeli, İstanbul, Yeditepe, 2005].
- Kadı, İsmail Hakkı, *Natives and Interlopers: Competition Between Ottoman and Dutch*

- Merchants in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century*, University of Leiden, unpublished Ph.D dissertation 2008.
- Karal, Enver Z., “Nizam-ı Cedide dair Layihalar”, *Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi*, I/6 (1942): 414-425; II/8 (1942): 104-111; II/11 (1943): 342-351; II/12 (1943): 424-432.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Selim III'ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları-Nizam-ı cedid 1789-1807*, Ankara, TTK, 1988 [1942].
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Selim III. Ün Hattı Hümayunları*, Ankara, TTK, 1942.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Selim III Devrinde Osmanlı Bahriyesi Hakkında Vesikalar”, *Tarih Vesikaları* 1/3 (1941): 203-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1797-1802)*, İstanbul, Milli Mecmua Basımevi, 1938.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Yunan Adalarının Fransızlar tarafından işgali ve Osmanlı-Rus münasebatı 1797-1798”, *Tarih Semineri Dergisi* I:2 (1937).
- Karpat, Kemal, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Katib Çelebi, *Kitab-ı Cihannüma li-Katib Çelebi*, Konstantiniye, H. 1145 [1732].
- Kaya, Süleyman, *XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Toplumunda Kredi*, Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2003.
- Kiraly, Fischer and Galati (eds.), *Essays on War and Society in East Central Europe, 1740-1920*, New York: Boulder, 1987.
- Keep, J., *Soldiers of the Tsar. Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874*, Oxford, 1985.
- Khoury, D., “The Ottoman centre versus provincial power-holders” in Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, v. 3, pp. 135-56.
- Kiel, M. and Alexander, “Mora”, *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, v. 30, pp. 280-85.
- Kiraly-Bak (ed.), *From Hunyadi to Rakoczi War and Society in Late Medieval an Early Modern Hungary*, New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982.
- Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası (TOEM)* 37, 42, H.1328.
- Koçu, Reşad Ekrem, *Osmanlı Padişahları*, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2004.
- Kolodziejczyk, Dariusz, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomacy Relations (15<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Century). An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents*, Leiden, Brill, 2000.
- Kolovos, Elias [et al.], *The Ottoman Empire, The Balkans, the Greek Lands: towards a Social and Economic History. In Honor of John C. Alexander*, İstanbul, The Isis Press, 2007.
- Körner, M., “Expenditure” in R. Bonney (ed.), *Economic Systems and State Finance*.
- Kunt, M., *The Sultan's Servants: the Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government 1550-1650*, Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 393-420.
- Kuran, E., *Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri, 1793-1821*, Ankara, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1968.
- Kurat, A. Nimet, *Prut Seferi ve Barışı (1123) 1711*, Ankara, TTK, 1951.
- Kürelî, İbrahim, “Esseyit Ali Efendi'nin Paris Risalesi”, *İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi* 5 (1997): 172-197.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Abdurrahim Muhib Efendi'nin Fransa Sefaretnamesi (Küçük Sefaretname)*, İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1992.

- Kütükoğlu, Mübahat, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri* İstanbul, Enderun, 1983.
- \_\_\_\_\_ *Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri, 1580-1850*, 2 vols., Ankara, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1974-76.
- \_\_\_\_\_ *“Tanzimat Devri Osmanlı-İngiliz Gümrük Tarifeleri”*, *TED* 4-5 (1973/75): 335-93.
- Lavery, B., *Nelson and the Nile: The Naval War against Bonaparte 1798* Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1998.
- \_\_\_\_\_ *“Ships Fittings”* in Gardiner (ed.) *The Line of Battle*, pp. 137-145.
- Lewis, B., *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, London, Norton, 1982.
- \_\_\_\_\_ *“The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey,”* *Journal of World History* 1/1 (1953): 105-125.
- Mahan, A. T., *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*, Boston, 1890.
- Manfroni, Camillo, *Storia della Marina Italiana*, Roma, Forzani E C. Tipografi Del Senato, 3 vols., 1917.
- Martin, M. (ed.), *The Despatches, minutes and correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley during his Administration in India*, 5 vols., London, 1837.
- Masters, Bruce, “Semi-autonomous forces in Arab Provinces” in Faroqhi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, v. 3, pp. 186-208.
- McGowan, “The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812” in H. İnalcık and Quataert (eds.), *An Economic Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 639-758.
- \_\_\_\_\_ *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe. Taxation, trade and the struggle for land, 1600-1800*, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- McGrew, Roderick E., *Paul I of Russia, 1754-1801*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992.
- McKnight, J. L., *Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic. The Genesis of Russia’s First Balkan Satellite*, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1965.
- McCranie, K., “The Operations and Effectiveness of the Ottoman Navy during Napoleon’s Invasion of Egypt, 1798-1801” in A. Shmuelevitz (ed.), *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801*, İstanbul, The Isis Press, 2002.
- Mitchell, D., *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power*, New York, McMillan, 1974.
- Moalla, A., *The regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814: army and government of a North African Ottoman eyelet at the end of the eighteenth century* London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.
- Mordvinov, R.N. (ed.), *Admiral Ushakov*, 2 vols., Moscow, Voenizdat, 1952-56.
- Murphey, R., *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700*, University of California Press, 1999.
- \_\_\_\_\_ *“Provisioning Istanbul: The State and Subsistence in the Early Modern Middle East”* *Food and Foodways* 2 (1988): 217-263.
- Naff, Thomas, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns and Trends” in Naff and R. Owen (eds.), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, Ill.: Carbondale, 1977, pp. 88-107.
- \_\_\_\_\_ *“Reform and Conduct in Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-1807”*, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 83:3 (1963): 295-315.

- Nagata, Y., “Ayan in Anatolia and the Balkans during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: A Case Study of the Karaosmanoğlu Family” in Anastasopoulos (ed.) *Provincial Elites*, pp. 269-90.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Some Documents on the Big Farms (Çiflik) of the Notables in Western Anatolia*, Tokyo, 1976.
- Neumann, C., *Araç Tarih Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet'in Siyasi Anlamı*, İstanbul, TTV, 1999.
- Nicolas, N. H., *The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson with Notes By Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, G.C.M.G*, London: Chatham Publishing, 1988 (reprint of Henry Colburn's edition in 1844-1847), v. 4 (September 1799-December 1801).
- Noradounghian, Gabriel, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman: traité...*, 4 vols., Paris, 1897-1903.
- Orkun, Hüseyin Namık, *Türk Hukuk Tarihi-Araştırmalar ve Düşünceler-Belgeler* Ankara, 1935, pp. 402-447.
- Ozoof, M., “Equality”, in F. Furret and M. Ozoof (eds.), *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, pp. 671-83.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Fraternity”, in F. Furret and M. Ozoof (eds.), *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, pp. 694-703.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Liberty” in F. Furret and M. Ozoof (eds.), *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, pp. 716-25.
- Öğreten, A. (ed.), *Mustafa Kesbi, İbretnüma-yı Devlet (Tahlil ve Tenkitli Metin)*, Ankara, TTK, 2002.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Nizam-ı Cedid'e Da'ir Islahat Layihaları*, İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1989.
- Özcan, Ahmed, *Kethüda Said Efendi Tarihi ve Değerlendirmesi*, Kırıkkale Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1999.
- Özdemir, Şenay, “Osmanlı Donanmasının Bir ‘Seyir Defteri’ ve XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Denizciliğine İlişkin Bazı Gözlemler”, *TAD* 24/37 (2005): 113-163.
- Öztunç, H. Baha, *Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti*, Gazi Osman Paşa Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2007.
- Özvar, E., “Osmanlı Devletinin Bütçe Harcamaları (1509-1788)” in Genç and Özvar (eds.) *Osmanlı Maliyesi, Kurumlar ve Bütçeler*.
- Padfield, P., *Nelson's War*, Kent, Wordsworth Editions, 2000.
- Pamuk, Ş., “Osmanlı Devletinin İç Borçlanma Kurumlarının Evrimi, 1600-1850” in Pamuk (ed.), *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Kurumları*, Türkiye İş Bankası, 2007, pp. 133-47.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “The Great Ottoman Debasement, 1808-1844: A Political Economy Framework”, in Gershoni, Erdem and Woköck (eds.), *Histories of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 21-36.
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Paranın Tarihi*, İstanbul, TTV, 1999.
- Panaite, Viorel, “Wallachia and Moldavia From The Ottoman Juridical And Political Viewpoint, 1774-1829” in Anastasopoulos and Kolovos (eds), *Ottoman Rule*

- and the Balkans, pp. 21-44.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Ottoman Law of War and Peace: the Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2000.
- Panzac, D., "International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18<sup>th</sup> Century", *IJMES* 24/2 (1992): 186-206.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Commerce et navigation dans l'Empire Ottoman au XVIIIe siècle*, İstanbul, The Isis Press, 1996.
- Papastamatiou, Demetrios, "Tax-farming (*İltizam*) and Collective Fiscal Responsibility (*Maktu*) in the Ottoman Southern Peloponnese in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century", Kolovos et al., *The Ottoman Empire, The Balkans, the Greek Lands*, pp. 289-307.
- Pappas, N. C., *Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*, Thessaloniki, 1991.
- Parker, G., "Dynastic War" in G. Parker (ed.) *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: the Triumph of the West*, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 148-66.
- Parveva, Stefka, "Agrarian Land and Harvest in South-West Peloponnese in the Early 18<sup>th</sup> Century", *Etudes Balkaniques* 1 (2003): 83-123.
- Pekin, E., "Music At the Ottoman Court" in *Sultan Bestekarlar. Turkish Classical Music Composed by Ottoman Sultans*, İstanbul, Kalan Müzik.
- Plomer, William, *The Diamond of Jannina: Ali Pasha, 1741-1822*, New York, Taplinger, 1970.
- Pivka, O. von, *Navies of the Napoleonic Era*, New York, Hippocrene Books, 1980.
- Poqueville, *Travels Through the Morea, Albania, ...*, London, 1806 [Trans. from French].
- Quataert, D., "Clothing Laws, state and society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829", *IJMES* 29/3 (1997): 403-425.
- Raeff, Marc, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800*, Yale University Press, 1983.
- Ragsdale, H., "Russian Foreign Policy, 1725-1815" in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, D. Lieven (ed.), v. II: "Imperial Russia, 1689-1917", Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 504-29.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project", *SEER*, 66/1 (1988): 91-117.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Tsar Paul and the Question of Madness*, New York, Greenwood Press, 1988.
- \_\_\_\_\_. (ed.), *Paul I: A Reassessment of His Life and Reign*, University of Pittsburgh, 1979.
- Rodger, A. B., *The War of the Second Coalition, 1798 to 1801*, Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Rossi, L., "Napoleon's Own Rendering of his Expedition to Egypt and Holy Land" in A. Shmuelevitz (ed.), *Napoleon and the French in Egypt*.
- Sakaoğlu, Necdet, *Bu Mülkün Sultanları. 36 Osmanlı Padişahı*, İstanbul, Oğlak, 2004.
- Salgar, F., "Müzisyen Sultan III. Selim" in *Vefatının 200. Yılında Bir Reformcu Şair ve Müzisyen: Sultan III. Selim Han* (exhibition catalogue), İstanbul, 2009, pp. 65-73.
- Salzmann, A., *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire. Rival Paths to the Modern State* Leiden, Brill, 2004.

- \_\_\_\_ “An Ancien Regime Revisited: Privatization and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire”, *Politics and Society* 21 (1993): 393-423.
- Sarikaya, A., *Ömer Fa'ik Efendi, Nizamü'l-Atik*, İstanbul Üniversitesi, unpublished graduation thesis, 1979.
- Saner-Gönen, Yasemin, *The Integration of the Ottoman Empire Into The European State System During The Reign of Sultan Selim III*, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 1991.
- Saul, N., *Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807*, The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Savaş, A. İ. (ed.) *Ebu Sehl Nu'man Efendi. Tedbirat-ı Pesendide (Beğenilmiş Tedbirler)*, Ankara, TTK, 1999.
- Sezer, H., “Tepedelenli Ali Paşa İsyanı”, Ankara Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1995.
- Shaw, S. J., “The Transition from Traditionalistic to Modern Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Reigns of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839)” in H. C. Güzel et. al., *The Turks* v. 4, Ankara, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002, pp. 130-149.
- \_\_\_\_ *Between Old and New: the Ottoman Empire Under Selim III, 1789-1807*, Harvard University Press, 1971.
- \_\_\_\_ “Selim III and the Ottoman Navy”, *Turcica* 1 (1969): 212-241.
- Shirokorad, A. B., *Russko-Turetskie Voyny 1676-1918 gg* [Turkish trans.: Ahsen Batur, *Rusların Gözünden 240 Yıl Kıran Kıran Osmanlı-Rus Savaşları. Kırım, Balkanlar, 93 Harbi ve Sarıkamış*, İstanbul, 2009, trans.].
- Shmuelevitz, A. (ed.), *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801* İstanbul, The Isis Press, 2002.
- Shuval, T., “Cezayiri Garp: Bringing Algeria Back into Ottoman History”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 22 (2000): 85-114.
- \_\_\_\_ “Households in Ottoman Algeria” *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 24/1 (2000): 41-64.
- Soucek, S., “The Strait of Chios and the Kaptanpaşa's Navy” in Zachariadou ed. *The Kapudan Pasha*, pp. 141-65.
- Soysal, İ., *Fransız ihtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri (1789-1802)*, Ankara, TTK, 1964.
- Stathis, P., “From Klepths and Armatoloi to Revolutionaries” in Anastasopoulos and Kolovos (eds), *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850*, pp. 167-80.
- Strauss, J., “Ottoman Rule Experienced and Remembered: Remarks on some local Greek chronicles on the Tourkokratia” in Adanır and Faroqhi (eds.) *The Ottomans and the Balkans*, pp. 193-221.
- Sunar, M. Mert, *Cauldron of Dissent: A Study of the Janissari Corps, 1807-1826*, SUNY Binghamton, unpublished MA thesis, 2006.
- Süslü, Azmi, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunu Paylaşma Projeleri, 1807-1812”, *Belleten*, 46/187 (1983): 745-805.
- \_\_\_\_ “Rapports Diplomatiques Ottomano-Français” *Belleten* 47: 185 (1983): 237-79.



- Şahiner, A., *The Sarrafs of Istanbul: Financiers of the Empire*, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi unpublished MA thesis, 1995.
- Şakul, K., “Ottoman Attempts to Control the Adriatic Frontier in the Napoleonic Wars” in Andrew Peacock (ed.), *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World*, Oxford University Press (Proceedings of the British Academy) [to be published in December 2009].
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Diplomatik Bir Mesele Olarak İaşe: Rus Donanmasının Osmanlılar Tarafından İaşesi (1799-1806)”, in Feridun M. Emecen (ed.), *Eskiçağ’dan Modern Çağ’a Ordular –Oluşum, Teşkilat ve İşlev-*, İstanbul, Kitabevi, 2008: 387-410.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Nizam-ı Cedid Düşüncesinde Batılılaşma ve İslami Modernleşme”, *Divan İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi* 2/15 (2005): 117-150.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi Üzerine Bir Literatür Değerlendirmesi”, *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, 1/ 2 (2003): 529-571.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Gökten çadır düştü”, *Toplumsal Tarih* 117 (September 2003): 30-34.
- Şaşmazer, Lynne Marie, *Provisioning Istanbul: Bread Production, Power, and Political Ideology in the Ottoman Empire, 1780-1807*, Princeton University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2000.
- Şen, Adil (ed.), *İbrahim Müteferrika ve Usulü’l-Hikem fi Nizami’l-Ümem*, Ankara, Türk Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1995.
- Tabakoğlu, Ahmet, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi*, İstanbul, Dergah, 1985.
- Tayfur, F., *Osmanlı Belgeleri Işığında 1821 Rum İsyanı ve Buna Karşı Oluşan Tepkiler* Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2003.
- Testa, Baron I. de, *Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane...*, 11 vols., Paris, 1864-1911.
- Tilly, Charles, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, Cambridge, Mass.: B. Blackwell, 1990.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “War Making and State Making As Organized Crime”, in P. Evans, D. Reueschemeyer, T. Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Tucker, C. J., *The Foreign Policy of Tsar Paul I*, Syracuse University, unpublished dissertation, 1965.
- Tukin, Cemal, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, İstanbul, Pan, 1999 [second edition by Bülent Aksoy; *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu devrinde Boğazlar meselesi*, İstanbul, 1947].
- Turan, Şerafettin, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile İki Sicilya Krallığı arasındaki ticaretle ilgili Gümrük tarife defteri”, *Belgeler* IV/7-8 (1967): 79-167.
- Turğut, V., *208 Numaralı Mühimme Defterinin Transkripsiyon ve Tahlili 1798-1800 (H 1213-1215)*, Sakarya Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2006.
- Uçman, A., *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*, İstanbul, Tercüman, 1976.
- Unat, F. R., “XVIII. Asır Osmanlı Tarihi Vesikalarından: Şehdi Osman Efendi Sefaretnamesi”, *Türk Tarih Vesikaları* I/1 (1941): 66-80, I/2 (1941): 156-59, I/3 (1941): 232-40, I/4 (1941): 303-20; I/5 (1942): 390-400.
- \_\_\_\_\_, “Kapıcıbaşı Nişli Mehmed Ağa’nın Moskova Sefaretnamesi”, *Türk Tarih Vesikaları* II/10 (1942): 284-299; II/11 (1943): 352-371; II/12 (1943):

462-473.

- Ursinus, M., “The *tersane* and the *tanzimat*, or how to finance a salaried fleet” in Zachariadou (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha*, pp. 291-301.
- Uzunçarşılı, İ. H., “Ondokuzuncu Yüzyıl Başlarına Kadar Türk-İngiliz Münasebatına Dair Vesikalar”, *Bellekten* XIII/51 (1949): 573-650.
- \_\_\_\_\_ *Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, Ankara, 1943.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “İngiltere’nin Akdeniz Hakimiyeti Hakkında Vesikalar”, *Tarih Vesikaları* I/2 (1941-42).
- Uzunçarşılı Oğlu, “Amedi Galib Efendi’nin Murahhaslığı ve Paris’ten Gönderdiği Şifreli Mektuplar” *Bellekten* I/2 (1937).
- \_\_\_\_\_ “Arşiv Vesikalarına Göre Yedi Ada Cümhuriyeti”, *Bellekten* I/3-4 (1937): 627-47.
- Veinstein, G., “On the Çiftlik Debate” in Ç. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds.), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, New York, Albany, 1991, pp. 35-53.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “Some Views on Provisioning in the Hungarian Campaigns of Süleyman the Magnificent” in Hans Georg Majer (ed.), *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte in memoriam Vanko Boskov*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986, pp. 177-85.
- Vlachopoulou, A., “Like the Mafia? The Ottoman Military Presence in the Morea in the Eighteenth Century” in Anastasopoulos and Kolovos (eds.) *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans*, pp. 123-36.
- Vlachos, G., M. *EITANHΣOΣ ΠOAI TEIA: O Kanonismós tής Navtilias (1803/1805)* [*The Merchant Marine Regulation 1803/1805 of the Ionian Republic*], Athens, 2005.
- White, D. Fedotoff, “The Russian Navy in Trieste. During the Wars of the Revolution and the Empire”, *American Slavic and the East European Review* 6:3/4 (1947): 25-41.
- Wilkinson, William, *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia* London, 1820.
- Winfield, Rif, *The 50-Gun Ship*, London, Chatham Publishing, 1997.
- Wittmann, W., *Travels in Turkey, Asia-Minor, Syria, and Across the Desert into Egypt During the Years 1799, 1800, and 1801 in Company with the Turkish Army, and the British Military Mission*, Gregg International Publishers Limited, England, 1972 [1803].
- Wright, D. G., *Napoleon and Europe*, Longman, 1996.
- Xenos, Stefanos, *East and West: A Diplomatic History of the Annexation of the Ionian Islands to the Kingdom of Greece...between 1799 and 1864*, London, 1865.
- Yalçınkaya, Mehmed A., Yalçınkaya, “Türk Diplomasisinin Modernleşmesinde Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi’nin Rolü” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* XX (2001): 109-133.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “İsmail Ferruh Efendi’nin Londra Büyükelçiliği ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1797-1800) in K. Çiçek (ed.), *Pax Ottomana. Studies in Memoriam Prof. Dr. Nejat Göyünç* Ankara, Yeni Türkiye, 2001, pp. 381-407.
- \_\_\_\_\_ “Mahmud Raif Efendi as the Chief Secretary of Yusuf Agah Efendi, The First

- Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Ambassador to London (1793-1797)", *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma Merkezi V* (1994): 385-434.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Embassy in Europe: The Embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London (1793-1797)*, University of Birmingham, unpublished dissertation, 1993.
- Yaşar, F., "Viticulture and wine production in Ottoman Monemvasia in the sixteenth century" in I. Anagnostakis (ed.) *Monemvasian Wine-Monovas(i)a-Malvasia*, Athens, 2008, pp. 279-295.
- Yaycıoğlu, A., *The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis, and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)*, Harvard University, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2008.
- Yerasimos, Marianna, *500 yıllık Osmanlı Mutfağı*, İstanbul, Boyut, 2007.
- Yeşil, F., *Nizam-ı Cedid'den Yeniçeriliğin Kaldırılışına Osmanlı Kara Ordusunda Değişim, 1793-1826*, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2009.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman Eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi's Observations", *Bulletin of School of the Oriental and Asiatic Studies*, 70, 2 (2007): 283-304.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *III. Selim Döneminde Bir Osmanlı Bürokrati: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi*, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, unpublished MA thesis, 2002.
- Yıldız, Aysel, *Vaka-yı Selimiye or the Selimiye Incident: A Study of the May 1807 Rebellion* Sabancı Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2008.
- Yıldız, Gültekin, *Osmanlı Kara Ordusunda Yeniden Yapılanma ve Sosyo-Politik Etkileri (1826-1839)*, Marmara Üniversitesi, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2008.
- Yıldız, Hakan, *Haydi Osmanlı Sefere: Prut Seferi'nde Organizasyon ve Lojistik*, İstanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006.
- Yılmaz, Kaşif, *III. Selim (İlhami). Hayatı, Edebi Kişiliği ve Divanın Tenkitli Metni* Edirne, Trakya Üniversitesi, 2001.
- Zachariadou, Elizabeth (ed.), *The Kapudan Pasha: his office and his domain*, Rethymnon, 2000.
- Zarinebaf, Fariba, J. Bennet and J. L. Davis, *A Historical and Economic Geography of Ottoman Greece. The Southwestern Morea in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century*, Athens, 2004.
- Zens, R. W., *The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin in the Age of Ottoman Social Change, 1791-1815*, University of Wisconsin, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 2004.
- Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy*, I.B. Tauris, 2008.