RENEE BUHR, MARHARYTA FABRYKANT, STEVEN M. HOFFMAN,
REGINA JASIULEVICIENE, LIUDAS MAZYLIS, SIMA RAKUTIENE,
VICTOR SHADURSKI, ALIAKSANDR TSIKHAMIRAU,
LINAS VENCLAUSKAS

LITHUANIAN AND BELARUSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Steven M. Hoffman and Renee Buhr
Editors

VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY
Kaunas, 2013

A joint project of:

  Vytautus Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania
  Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus
  University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA

The project was realized with active participation of Adrey Selivanov (BSU) and Jovita Tirviene (VMU)

Reviewers:

  Associate professor Egle Butkeviciene, Department of Sociology Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania.
  Associate professor Aliaksandr H. Hurko, Academic secretary of the Research Center for Belarusian Culture, Language and Literature of the National Academy of Sciences, Belarus.

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PRATARMĖ

Ši kolektyvinė monografija yra dvejus metus vykdyto tarptautinio mokslinio projekto „Lietuvos ir Baltarusijos nacionalinės tapatybės ypatumai Europos integracijos kontekste: panašumai ir skirtumai" rezultatas. Projektą vykdė trijų valstybių atstovai – Vytauto Didžiojo universiteto, Baltarusijos valstybinio universiteto ir Šv. Tomo ir Povilo universiteto (JAV, Minesota) mokslininkai. Visi projekto dalyviai yra pristatomi skyriuje „Contributors".

Tyrimas atskleidė, kad pasaulio globalizacijos procesai nepaneigia ir nesumažina nacionalinės tapatybės svarbos, o nacionalinės savivokos lygis yra vienas iš visuomenės politinės ir ekonominės konsolidacijos komponentų. Lyginamoji Lietuvos ir Baltarusijos nacionalinės tapatybės analizė, siejant jos pokyčius su eurointegracinių procesų įtaka, išryškino bendrų tapatybės kriterijų problemą. Kilo klausimas, kaip galima palyginti nacionalinę savivoką, nustatyti etniškumo ir pilietiškumo santykį. Todėl pateikiama informacija neženklina pretenzingo siekio vienareikšmiškai atsakyti į daugelį klausimų, kylančių nacionalinės tapatybės tyrinėtojams. Manome, kad čia pateiktos išvados ir apibendrinimai yra gera prielaida toliau tirti nacionalinės savimonės vaidmenį formuojantis europinei tapatybei bei palyginti lietuvių ir baltarusių nacionalinę tapatybę integracinių procesų kontekste.

Pritariame kolegų baltarusių pratarmėje išsakytai idėjai, kad tokio pobūdžio bendravimas yra būtinas ir reikalingas. Vykdant šį projektą paaiškėjo, kad akademinė bendruomenė gali ir geba diskutuoti, analizuoti ir komunikuoti, nepaisant kultūrinių skirtumų.

Už finansinę paramą šiai monografijai išleisti dėkojame Lietuvos mokslo tarybai.

Regina Jasiulevičienė
VDU Politologijos katedros
profesorė

СЛОВА ДА ЧЫТАЧОЎ

Ад імя беларускай часткі аўтараў прадстаўленага Вашай увазе выдання дазвольце перш за ўсё падзякаваць літоўскім і амеры-канскім калегам за сумесную творчую працу, а спонсараў пра-екта з Беларусі і Літвы – за арганізацыйную і матэрыяльную падтрымку.

Кожная краіна, кожны народ маюць унікальнае месца ў гіс-торыі, унікальную культуру. Адукаваны чалавек ніколі не будзе сцвярджаць, што гісторыя ці культура адной краіны больш ціка-вая і змястоўная ў параўнанні з іншымі. Сапраўды, існуюць больш вядомыя свету і навуковай супольнасці краіны і народы, пра якія шмат напісана і гаворыцца. Беларусь і Літва, хоць і знаходзяцца ў геаграфічным цэнтры Еўропы, тым не менш не з'яўляюцца самымі вядомымі і зразумелымі краінамі для навакольнага свету. Беларускіх і літоўскіх даследчыкаў, прадстаўнікоў палітычнай, эканамічнай і культурнай сфер чакае шматгадовая напружаная творчая праца, накіраваная на тое, каб пры прыгадванні гэтых дзвюх краін у грамадзян іншых дзяржаў узнікаў адметны вобраз, падмацаваны аб'ектыўнымі фактамі і ацэнкамі. Спадзяёмся, што наш калектыўны твор з'яўляецца невялікім, але канкрэтным крокам на гэтым доўгім шляху. Аўтары ставілі задачу не толькі пашырыць новыя веды па беларуска-літоўскай праблематыцы, але і паспрыяць папулярызацыі гісторыі і культуры нашых краін сярод англамоўных чытачоў. Размяшчэнне манаграфіі ў адкры-тым доступе ў Інтэрнэце дазволіць пазнаёміцца з яе зместам неабмежаванай колькасці зацікаўленых асоб. Мы чакаем камен-тарыяў, канструктыўных заўваг, гатовы да працягу распача-тай дыскусіі. Адзінае, што не падлягае перагляду, — гэта нашы наступныя высновы.

1. Нягледзячы на розныя абставіны (прыналежнасць да розных моўных груп, гістарычныя і культурныя асаблівасці, знешнепалітычныя арыентацыі і г. д.) беларускі і літоўскі народы

з'яўляюцца паміж сабой блізкімі і сяброўскімі. Шэраг навукоўцаў піша нават аб генетычнай блізкасці, падабенстве формулы крыві ў прадстаўнікоў дзвюх суседніх нацый. Таму трэба адзначыць, што спробы супрацьпаставіць два народы, сутыкнуць іх нацыянальныя інтарэсы асуджаны на паражэнне.

2. Патэнцыял супрацоўніцтва дзвюх дзяржаў не рэалізаваны належным чынам. Гэта тычыцца многіх значных сфер узаемадзеяння, у тым ліку навукова-адукацыйнай. Нам трэба больш сумесных праектаў, канферэнцый, публікацый і г. д.

3. Суседнія народы вельмі часта сапернічаюць у шматлікіх сферах. Не выключэннем з'яўляюцца Беларусь і Літва. На розных гістарычных этапах лідары ў гэтым тандэме мяняліся. Трэба адзначыць, што спаборніцтва двух суседзяў дапамагала прагрэсу і ўзаемнаму ўзбагачэнню. І ў будучым неабходна зрабіць усё, каб саперніцтва не прыводзіла да канфрантацыі, а было накіравана толькі на супрацоўніцтва!

Віктар Шадурскі,
прафесар Беларускага дзяржаўнага ўніверсітэта,
доктар гістарычных навук

INTRODUCTION

Regina Jasiuleviciene
Steven M. Hoffman
Victor Shadurski

Statement of Sponsorship

This monograph was developed as part of a larger research project entitled *Peculiarities of National Identity of Lithuania and Belarus in the Context of European Integration,* the aim of which was to conduct a comparative analysis of national identity in these two proximate but very different nation-states. The work was carried out by researchers at Belarusian State University (Minsk, Belarus), Vytautas Magnus University (Kaunas, Lithuania) and the University of St. Thomas (St. Paul, Minnesota, USA). The research was conducted in accordance with an agreement between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on matters regarding cooperation in science and technology as determined by the State Committee on Science and Technology of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Lithuania.

National Identity in Lithuania and Belarus

In a rapidly globalizing world national identity remains a critical factor in both national development and international relations. The issue is particularly relevant for Belarus and Lithuania whose people lived for centuries within the boundaries of the same state or empire, i.e., the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth, the Russian Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this monograph, the late years of the tsarist regime saw considerable ferment on the part of nationalist intellectuals as they actively began to promote their visions of Belarusian and Lithuanian identity; this work proved to be a crucial foundation for the national identities that developed in subsequent years. A key difference between the two states, however, was Lithuania's independence early in the 20th century and its experience as an independent state in the period between the two world wars (see Chapters 1 and 2). As will be discussed in Chapter 1 and elsewhere, Lithuania flirted with independence earlier in the century, having experienced an independent national state in the period between the two world wars. While short in its duration, the period nonetheless has been used by Lithuanian nationalists in their construction of a contemporary state laden with its own symbols, traditions, and a coherent national idea. Belarus, on the other hand, was created whole cloth, for a brief moment as the Belarusian People's Republic, then as a union republic within the USSR in the 1920s with few of the formal attributes of statehood. The Belarusian language, nationality and culture both benefited and suffered subsequent to the founding of the BSSR and it was only after the collapse of the USSR that Belarus achieved independence and international recognition of sovereignty.

Since that time, while a number of researchers have emphasized the shared history that links both the states and the people that occupy them, it is clear that significant differences characterize their respective nation-building processes. As will be shown below, many scholars argue that the Lithuanian nation has a more mature or developed collective identity while Belarus is still struggling to identify a national narrative capable of unifying the oftentimes disparate forces that animate any number of contentious domestic and foreign policy issues.

In the chapters that follow, considerable attention is paid to the roles played by a variety of ethnographic elements central to the Lithuanian and Belarusian national narratives. The Lithuanian language, for instance, together with Latvian and now-extinct ancient Russian and Sudovian languages, are part of the so-called Baltic group and Indo-European family of languages. Some evidence

indicates that from the 10th century B.C. the Baltic language group existed separately from other Indo-European languages. This factor, often referred to as "dissimilarity", is said to promote the preservation and development of the language.

The Belarusian language, on the other hand, belongs to the Eastern-Slavonic group of languages. Native Belarusians have always lived close to other nations similar in language and culture, not only those having a larger population but also those occupying a privileged position in the region. The circumstances have created obstacles to the development of the Belarusian standard (literary) language and have made language assimilation and the use of mixed languages (such as *trasianka*) more common.

A second important distinguishing factor is Belarus' historical role as a borderland between two major branches of Christianity, i.e., Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity. As discussed in Chapter 3, this has put Belarus in a position where it has been pulled between the East and the West for significant portions of its history. The dominance of the Orthodox religion and the subordination of the Belarusian Orthodox Church to the Moscow Patriarchate also can be said to promote the preservation of religious and cultural ties to Russia. Conversely, the Catholic Church, more associated with the West, has traditionally dominated religious matters in Lithuania and at least in the period of the Russian Empire and the USSR, contributed to national consolidation.

If language and religion are to a great extent centrifugal forces, the common heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) may well serve as a unifying element. While there are some points of debate around this historic legacy, the fact remains that both Lithuanians and Belarusians take a certain measure of pride in the accomplishments of the GDL. There was, for instance, little difference in the daily lives of the Belarusian and Lithuanian nations within these large empires. Local elites, as a rule, accepted the language of dominant ethnic groups of the time and in both cases, the peasantry was the guardian of national traditions and the source of national language, mellowed, of course, by a wide range of dialects. One aim of this monograph is to provide a more constructive assessment of the ethnic and linguistic identity of the Duchy as well as

the origin of the prominent figures of both the GDL and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Both countries also face a number of similar problems, including intensive emigration and increasing competition in the sphere of culture. Lithuania, for instance, has seen some 500,000 individuals leave the country in search of new economic and social opportunities; similar processes may be observed in Belarus. While there is some evidence that at least some of the émigrés are returning, the tendency to see more opportunity abroad than at home is still a major concern for both countries. The proximity of both states to the European Union, and the membership of Lithuania in the organization, also likely play important roles in this phenomenon.

Migration and the search for opportunities abroad is one aspect of another issue, namely, the unification and standardization of culture observable as part of the larger process of globalization. While some may deem this acceptable, others see it as a threat, particularly to countries with small populations that do not possess great economic potential. It is of particular concern to a country such as Belarus which one could argue is still in the early stages of the nation-building process and which has limited experience with an agreed upon national narrative.

All of these factors have played a role in determining the multi-vector domestic and foreign policies of both Belarus and Lithuania since independence. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, Lithuania has chosen a path of integration with the West, becoming a member of various institutions, including EU and NATO, while Belarus has equivocated, at times seeking integration with eastern-oriented post-Soviet states, indeed with Russia itself, and at other times with various western states (see Chapter 6). The countries have also adopted very different economic strategies, with Belarus retaining what amounts to a Soviet-style centrally planned economy, at least in terms of a number of major sectors, while Lithuania has adopted an aggressively liberal economic strategy.

Organization of the Monograph

This monograph begins with a framework for understanding the construction and use of nationalist narratives. Renee Buhr, Marharyta Fabrykant and Regina Jasiuleviciene survey existing theoretical approaches to the research on nationalism, typologies of national identity, and the analysis of alternative viewpoints. This chapter also provides an overview of the latest research works and various interpretations of national identity of Lithuanians and Belarusians.

Chapter 2 builds on this discussion through an analysis of the transformation of Lithuanian identity. While subject to numerous competing histories and the constant interplay of historical forces beyond their control, Linas Venclauskas argues that in the end Lithuanian culture and identity have managed to survive, moving largely at the margins rather than at the core of its sense of self.

Aliaksandr Tskihamirau reaches a very different conclusion in regards to the formation of the Belarusian national identity (Chapter 3). Whereas Venclauskas finds that the Litnuanian narrative is fairly well established, Tskihamirau concludes that not only is Belarus is a young state, but its sense of self is protean, suffused with a malleability occasioned by its role as a borderland. Subject to competing influences both east and west, the Belarusian collective consciousness reflects a mixture of these forces, and is to a great extent, still in the earliest stages of knowing who it is and what role it should play.

Chapter 4 introduces the second theme of the monograph, namely, the role played by national identity in the context of European integration. Liudas Mažylis begins this discussion by examining the importance of the European dimension during the restoration and consolidation of an independent Lithuania at the end of 20th century. Mažylis pays particular attention to Lithuania's participation in various European and Euro-Atlantic structures, most notably the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He also discusses at length the development of *Sajudis* within the Lithuanian reform movement.

Chapter 5 continues the discussion of Lithuania and the integration process by focusing on issues of foreign policy. Sima Rakutienė

first turns her attention to issues of national identity, which she defines as those features that constitute a country's essential nature and which can be analyzed within several dimensions, including its cultural, political, societal, and historical aspects. The chapter then assesses the relationship between identity and foreign policy, specifically as they influence the integration process. Rakutienė argues that Lithuania's conception of its national foreign policy role is influenced by an identity based on its particular historical and cultural experiences as well as a socialization process influenced by the expectations of 'others', which, in turn, is influenced by a 'logic of appropriateness', a favorite topic amongst international relations scholars who favor constructivist approaches. The chapter concludes by discussing the results of a survey that examined Lithuanians' and Belarusian students' attitudes towards European identity and relationships between the two countries.

Victor Shadurski takes up a similar set of issues in the monograph's penultimate chapter. Whereas Lithuania has always emphasized a 'return to Europe,' albeit sometimes focusing on Baltic and Scandinavian Europe in favor of other parts of continental Europe, Belarus has, according to Shadurski, wavered in its national enterprise. For instance, while consistently asserting the "complete sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus as the superior, independent and full state authority of the republic in its borders, the legitimacy of its laws, and independence of the republic in foreign relations" the nation's leaders have been less certain about the basis upon which to build a national identity. At times they have based their efforts upon a civic form of national identity; at other times, primordial markers, and in particular language, have been at the core of the effort. Despite the fractures evident in Belarusian society, Shadurski is hopeful that Belarusians will negotiate their way towards a stable and enduring collective identity.

Steven M. Hoffman, Marharyta Fabrykant, and Renee Buhr conclude the monograph with a report on the results of a survey of some 400 Lithuanian and Belarusian students. As they point out, in the twenty years since the dissolution of the USSR a new generation has appeared that is now well along in solidifying their political identity. This generation, unlike its predecessors, has been raised in two independent states, their civic education has focusing on

the history of their particular state rather than the conglomerate of Soviet states and the notion of national self-determination has been an integral part of their inheritance. It is from this generation, i.e., highly educated, oftentimes multilingual, and conversant with a variety of new media, that the next generation of leaders will emerge. How these individuals feel about each other and their own sense of collective self will have much to say about the future of both Belarus and Lithuania. Analysis of the survey results indicate that Belarusian and Lithuanian elite youth consider both civic and ethnolinguistic identity markers to be important, though the civic seems to predominate in the Belarusian sample. This finding is made doubly interesting when connected to the impressions that Belarusian and Lithuanian youth have vis-à-vis European identity (see Chapter 5), particularly when combined with survey responses indicating that the vast majority of respondents value those characteristics that they purport to be 'European.'

The authors of this research do not claim to have presented a full and comprehensive accounting of Belarusian and Lithuanian national identity. Rather, the objective was to identify key problems, examine those external and internal factors that are determinant of contemporary trends of national identity development, and lay a foundation for the continued study of these issues. One other modest but important goal has animated the work, namely, a sincere hope that collaborative efforts of the sort presented here will contribute to the much larger and more significant goal of bringing these two deeply historic nations closer together.

Part I: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CONTEMPORARY REALITIES

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO NATIONAL IDENTITY

Renee Buhr
Marharyta Fabrykant
Regina Jasiulevičienė

Introduction

The ambiguous term *identity* essentially refers to the capacity of individuals and social groups to retain their specificities and qualitative characters, despite historic, territorial and political changes and transformations. It was not until the 20th century that this term became widely used in academic language. In the last decades of the 20th century, this concept became one of the most important categories within the social sciences. The phenomenon of identity is the main factor that describes and differentiates contemporary societies (Dziubka 2008, 286-289). This explains the increased attention paid by researchers to the problems of identity formation and meaning.

There are two traditional directions for identity research in social sciences. One of them is the psychodynamic direction initiated by the work of S. Freud. He emphasized and analyzed the inner psychic structure and dynamics of identity. The other course of identity analysis is the sociological one. Within the framework of this tradition the main theoretical approach of analysis is symbolic interactionism (Plummer 1995, 270-272).

There are diverse approaches to identity research within these two traditions. First of all, two kinds of identity are distinguished: a personal identity, when an individual perceives herself as special, different from the others, yet simultaneously associating and

identifying herself with some social group; and a group identity (national, cultural, political, religious), which enables the construction of the sense of belonging to a certain group and emphasizes its uniqueness in relation to other groups. The identity itself is usually analyzed either from the perspective of social constructivism, when it is considered to be the result of social decisions, based on social conventions; or through the lens of essentialism, when it is perceived to be biologically and culturally predetermined.

Summing up, we can distinguish two main theories of identity. The so-called personal identity theory mostly engages with questions of personal identification and behavior determined by social roles and affiliations, whereas the theory of social identity concentrates on the social processes and relations among groups (State and Burke 2000, 224-237). According to the researchers, both theories are intertwined as the personal identity plays a crucial role in perceiving and describing oneself as a member of any particular group, while the social and cultural environment can influence both personal and social identities by empowering or disempowering them. Meanwhile, the coefficient of identity salience can be applied in both theories.

A comparative investigation of historical and contemporary identity, as well as the influence of European integration on identity's transformation, presented here, is based on both of these theories. National identity is the locus where personal and social identities dramatically interconnect.

Nationalism: Typologies

Typologies of nationalism play a prominent role in contemporary nationalism studies for three main reasons. First, there is no single shared definition of nationalism. The discussion continues on such pivotal issues as whether nationalism reflects or constructs social reality, whether it has existed since time immemorial or emerged at the dawn of modernity (and, in the latter case, if and when it is going to disappear from human history), whether it is a political ideology or a general set of meanings and social relations, whether it is

purely cultural or also to some extent biological and, finally, if natio-
nalism is irrational or has some rational background as well. The
definitions based on alternative answers to these and some other
related questions have led to a diversity that it is easier to divide
into types than to merge into a single concept. Second, abundant
theories of nationalism, including some of the most renowned, were
modeled on different empirical cases. The very universality of natio-
nalism has led to its spread through a multitude of diverse countries
and regions. It is difficult to develop a theory that would encom-
pass established and newly independent states, former metropolis
of empires and ex-colonies, not to mention semantic varieties of the
word "nation" in the world's languages. Typologies therefore help
not only to account for the lack of universality, as in the previous
case, but also to bring order into this diversity. Third, national elites
in various countries adopt and follow different theories of nationa-
lism and thus reinforce the need for alternative notions in a sort
of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, the need for typologies of natio-
nalism remains almost unquestioned. However, the components of
alternative typologies, their meanings and attributions to particular
countries are varied and contested.

Scholars have established a number of scholarly categories of
nationalism. These often are presented as dichotomous types: a
nation may be "Western" or "Eastern," or it may be "civic" or "eth-
nolinguistic (some would say primordial)." East European states are
typically included in the "Eastern nationalism" category, so this sec-
tion begins with a discussion of the Eastern and Western distinction.
There is likewise a link typically made between Eastern nationalism
and ethnolinguistic definitions of what makes an individual part of
nation, so the literature on ethnolinguistic and civic nationalism is
also addressed below. In reviewing this literature, we pay particular
attention to what each type of nationalism says about the require-
ments for membership in the national group.

A discussion of Eastern vs. Western types of nationalism must
begin with Hans Kohn's (1955) work. Kohn argues that Western
nationalism emerged in the United Kingdom; this first variety of
nationalism was individualist and liberal in nature. This type of
nationalism spread from the UK to other locations, in particular the
United States. According to Kohn, American nationalism 'was born

of common effort, in a fight for political rights, for individual liberty and tolerance…What held the new nation together was an idea, the idea of liberty under law as expressed in the Constitution' (1955, 19-20). Groupness in so-called Western nations is thus determined according to the individual's acceptance of the values summarized by Kohn, not according to one's ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics.

Western nationalism and civic nationalism are close relatives. Both assume a level of voluntarism in one's choice of nationality, and both assert the importance of adhering to a set of political values that are shared by members of the group. As emphasized by Renan (1882), the will to be part of the group is more important than ethnic or linguistic characteristics of its members. The term "civic nationalism" differs somewhat from Western nationalism in that it often brings with it an assumption that the state plays a key role in shaping the individual's understanding of nationalism. According to Geertz, the state maintains the nation through 'routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police powers and ideological exhortation' (Geertz 1963, 110).

Individualist liberal nationalism of this variety sprung up in Britain and the United States because of the pre-existing structures that allowed it to flourish, according to Greenfield (1992), Hobsbawm (1990), and Hroch (2007a). Hroch argues that structures established in the time between the medieval era and the dawn of modern nationalism made states like the United Kingdom a favorable location for this variety of nationalism. These structural variables include early (feudal-era) assimilation of minorities, integration between core and periphery in domestic economies, and robust state administration capabilities prior to the onset of nationalism. Also, nationalism in these states had an opportunity to establish itself before nationalism became imbued with certain characteristics that we see today, such as the personalization of the nation and the romantic fascination with peasantry as the soul of the nation seen in the 19th century (Hobsbawm 1990; Hroch 2007b). Nations still had the choice of opting for a Western-style national ideal during and after the 19th century, but this was subject to two conditions: 1) that the state had the structures in place described in the British

archetype case, and/or 2) the political elites leading the nationalist awakening chose political over linguistic or ethnic claims (Hroch 2007a).

Eastern nationalism arose under very different circumstances than the Western variety, and brought with it different ideas of who comprised the group. According the Kohn (1955), this type of nationalism spread to other parts of Europe and the world through the French example. The French example had some contradictory elements: on the one hand, a group defined by the individual's commitment to the values of *liberté, égalité, et fraternité* is clearly in the Western tradition. On the other hand, the French example demonstrated the power of nationalism in raising an army and population to fight a total war in support of an autocratic regime. The success of the Napoleonic regime led other nations to emulate this model, however, 'when nationalism spread to Eastern Europe and later to Asia, to lands with traditions different from those in the West and frequently hostile to Western ways, nationalism tended toward the closed society, in which the individual counted for less than the strength and authority of the national whole' (Kohn 1955, 81). In this type of nation, indicators of membership in the group include language, religion, and ethnicity, and the welfare of the whole nation is often considered superior to the welfare of the individual within it. These indicators of membership in the national group are the same as those we find in what other authors call "primordial" or "ethnic" nations: namely, membership is determined by a number of largely involuntary characteristics such as race, language, religion, region, and blood ties (Geertz 1963, 109-113).

Other explanations for the rise of Eastern nationalism follow from this assumption of mimicry of the French model. According to Greenfeld (1992), this type of nationalism, which she refers to as particularistic nationalism, was the result of importation of the notion of nationalism from the United Kingdom and France. Since nationalism was an "import," this led the recipient nations to feel a sense of inferiority and *ressentiment* at its importation; in response, the recipient nations eschewed the liberal individualistic aspects of nationalism in favor of what they could consider a more homegrown variety. This purportedly local variety established linguistic and ethnic bases for group membership.

Other scholars such as Hobsbawm (1990) also begin with the importation of nationalism from the West, but attribute the differences in group attributes to ideologies about nationalism found in the international system at the time that these new nations emerged. By the time modern Eastern European nations were awakening, the model of nationalism on offer was an ethnolinguistic one; this was partly the result of the romanticist search for the soul of the nation in the peasantry and its vernacular. Thus, intellectuals such as Herder and Fichte shaped the way that leaders in new nationalist movements thought about nationalism and group characteristics. Hroch (2007b) argues that the nation had by this time become "personalized," as if the nation consisted of one body, rather than a large number of autonomous individuals. This body, naturally, needed one primary language and culture, and one space within which to live. He argues that this formula was particularly appealing to what he calls "small nations" – those states that lacked their own ruling elite and a strong literary tradition in their local vernacular. Small states, because they lack a ruling elite with political experience and thus, political aims, are more likely to use ethnic and linguistic appeals in the early stages of nation-building (Hroch 2007c).

These categories of nationalism are, of course, ideal types. A pure version of any of these types is hard to find. However, the combinations of purported national characteristics described by the authors above, and the historical forces that purportedly shape Eastern vs. Western nations, hold some resonance for nationalist intellectuals and political elites. As will be demonstrated in the work on nationalist narratives and rhetoric in contemporary Belarus and Lithuania at the end of this chapter, much of the debate about the nature of national identity matches to some extent with the boundaries of these ideal types. One issue that is particularly contested in Belarus, and appears to play a key role in Lithuania, is the importance of language to national identity. This literature is the focus of the following section.

Language as an "Essential" Marker of National Identity

The role that language plays in defining national identity has been examined for millennia. Over time, two general schools of thought have emerged: the "essentialist" school (today the more nuanced version of this line of thinking is the "primordialist" school) and the "constructivist" school. Essentialists view language as a primary and natural basis for national identity; constructivists consider identity to be created or "imagined" by groups, mutable and subject to the influence of intellectuals and power dynamics in a given society. While the academic trend has tended toward a constructivist approach in recent years, a number of scholars have merged these two extreme positions in order to understand the constraints that primordial elements place on those who would "construct" a national identity.

Essentialist approaches have a long history. Scholars such as Joseph (2004) trace this back as far as the philosopher Epicurus, who believed that languages rose naturally from the bodies of the members of an ethnic group, and that this in turn created ethnically distinct feelings in that population, thereby distinguishing them and their life experience (as witnessed through their unique language) from people of another language group. This idea of language as a natural phenomenon found in the most primitive man has been carried through the years, evidenced in the writings of the German Romantics. Of the German Romantics, Herder and Fichte receive the most attention. Herder (1853) considered language to be a product of an innate culture in primitive man, and as such represented a permanent reflection of a nation's "soul" (Judt and Lacorne 2004). Fichte (1808), reflecting on the lack of a political history around which the German people could coalesce, looked to language as the tie that could bind the formerly disparate polities that lived on what is now German territory. Arguing that German was a "root language" untainted by the influence of other dominant languages (such as Latin), Fichte believed that this was the way to forever unite the German people – in short, language was the core of the German nation (Joseph 2004). In linguistics, this notion led

to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which indicates that the structure of a language has an impact on how an individual experiences their environment – because of this, those who speak the same language experience and understand an event in similar ways, while someone who does not speak that language will necessarily experience and understand the same event differently (May 2008).

Even in the heyday of essentialist thought and national emergence of the 19th century, some scholars challenged the idea of language as innate, natural, or a necessary basis of national identity. Renan (1882), a previous proponent of the notion that language arose naturally in primitive man, challenged the German Romantic notion that language must be the basis of national identity. While language may have the potential to unite a people, he did not believe it was the most important element that bound members of a nation. Instead, the will to live together, and the recognition of a common history and destiny trumped the importance of a shared language. From this came the notion that there may be two different types of national identities, discussed by Mienecke (1907): the "cultural nation" and the "political nation." The cultural nation is one bound by language and culture, while the political nation is bound by affective ties and the will to live together (Judt and Lacorne 2004). This distinction finds expression in current scholarly debates regarding "ethnolinguistic/primordial" versus "civic" national identities.

In recent scholarship, Fichte and Renan's legacies are reflected in debates regarding the importance of language to national identity; some argue that language is simply one of many equally valid potential markers of identity and that identities are largely constructed for instrumental reasons,[1] while others argue that language holds some privileged position as an identity marker, albeit one that is not inevitable or simplistically derived from nature.[2] Among those who believe that language does serve as a predominant identity marker, they attribute this not to nature, but to a number of advantages that language has for unifying people. In the field of linguistics, Heller (1987) indicates that a common language allows individuals to engage socially, and in doing so share experiences that promote

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[1] See Kedourie, Smolicz and Secombe, Geertz, Eastman, Edwards.
[2] See Anderson, Heller, Fishman, Gellner, Billig, Bordieu.

camaraderie, while Fishman (1991) argues that a group's language is best suited to describe the artifacts and experiences of that particular society, and that in this way it shapes the experiences of individuals who share a language in similar ways. Meanwhile, Anderson (1991) argues that the emergence of vernacular languages on a wider scale and in print media allowed for a shared identity among people that was not possible in feudal societies, whereas Billig (1995) and Bourdieu (1982) both indicate that national identity is reinforced in everyday "banal" experiences – very often, a part of that experience is language.

As this brief summary of this extensive literature indicates, determining the role of language in national identity is by no means simple. This is further complicated by constructivist critiques that have been leveled against the notion that a nation is naturally derived. Instead, constructivists argue that the identity of a nation is intentionally shaped by some actors for largely instrumental reasons, either by groups or by those with the most power in society. This makes the question of "national languages" even more important, as scholars strive to understand the role that power plays in establishing official languages and the effect this has on "minority" languages and dialects. According to Hobsbawm (1990, 54):

> *National languages are therefore almost always semi-artificial constructs and occasionally, like modern Hebrew, virtually invented. They are the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to be, namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the matrices of the national mind. They are usually attempts to devise a modern idiom out of a multiplicity of actually spoken idioms, which are thereafter downgraded to dialects, the main problem in their construction being usually, which dialect to choose as the base of the standardized and homogenized language.*

As scholars began to examine the "construction" of national identities, the choice of the official language of a nation also came under scrutiny. Hobsbawm was not alone in voicing his concern that power is intimately linked with the process of defining national characteristics and boundaries; one finds similar notions in Foucault's

(1975) assertions that objects of knowledge and power are inherently linked. In this vein, the field of sociolinguistics has taken on the challenge of understanding the dynamics of national language choice, and the subsequent phenomena of language shift and language death.

May (2008) provides an excellent summary of the dynamics involved. The choice of a common national language often follows from the distribution of power in that society; the stronger (often majority) group in society chooses its language as the "universal" language for use within its state borders. This language then becomes associated with the state itself, and given the belief that the "nation-state" stands for modernity, equality, and common citizenship, the dominant language is thenceforth considered "modern" and normatively superior, while the languages left by the wayside become associated with primordialism and backwardness (May 2008). Before a dominant language can reach this point, however, it must go through twin processes of legitimation and institutionalization (Nelde et al. 1996). Legitimation is relatively simple – it is the establishment of the language as official through either a Constitution or piece of legislation. Institutionalization is a more challenging process, which involves the acceptance of the language in a wide range of contexts, both formal and informal. According to Leith and Graddol (1996), institutionalization requires codification and elaboration of the language in order to make it appropriate for a wide range of uses, as well as the distribution of that language throughout civil society, through media and official use. Once the language has become institutionalized it becomes part of normal daily interactions, reinforcing people's acceptance of that language as natural (Billig 1995).

Once the dominant language has been chosen as the "national" one, a number of linguistic conditions may follow. The first is true bilingualism, where two languages (the dominant and the minority) are spoken equally, across a wide range of social domains (McRoberts 2004). True bilingualism or multilingualism is hard to maintain, and often the result is the territorialization of the languages, with different territories evolving toward a *de facto* monolingual society in that given territory, despite official multilingualism at the federal government level (LaPonce 1987; McRoberts 2004). The second is

the phenomenon known as "diglossia," in which two languages exist but function in different social domains, with the dominant language achieving "high valued" (H) status and the minority language having "low valued" (L) status (Ferguson 1959; Fishman 1967). The third potential condition (and sometimes the inevitable result of the challenges of maintaining true bilingualism or diglossia over time) is language shift, wherein the minority languages become marginalized, eventually leading to the emergence of the dominant language as the only one commonly used in society.

Given the role that language is purported to play in Lithuanian nationalism, and the debates regarding the importance of language to Belarusian nationalism, the above discussion provides us with an understanding of the multifarious forces that shape a "national language" and the ways in which elites may establish and make use of that language. In the following discussions of Belarusian and Lithuanian elite discourses, we see the tensions that exist between primordial and constructivist notions of national language.

History as Content and Form of National Identity

Another pertinent issue in nationalism studies, besides national languages, is the relationship between nationality and history. The seemingly trivial statement that nations, like everything in existence, go through time and experience historical transformations led to much theoretical controversy. The resulting debate follows two main courses, the time (or timelessness) of nations in history and the place of history amidst other indicators and attributes of a national identity.

The question of when nations first appeared in history, or whether they have always existed, yielded four distinct answers reflected in theoretical positions of perennialism, modernism, postmodernism and ethnosymbolism (Smith 1995). Perennialists believe that, although specific nations may come in and out of existence, all history is a history of nations. Modernists oppose this position by defining the nation as a phenomenon of modernity that appears with a start of modernization and, according to some authors (Habermas

1998; Hobsbawm 1990) will eventually disappear during the second modernity and give way to some "postnational constellations." Postmodernists, same as modernists, consider nations not essential, but emergent; however, unlike modernism, this theoretical standpoint does not tie emergence of nations to objective historical circumstances, but defines them as arbitrarily constructed by political elites. Finally, ethnosymbolists propose what they consider a balanced approach by creating retrospective continuity between modern nations and premodern protonational formations, or *ethnies* (Smith 2010), possessing a symbolic meaning for modernity. Each of these approaches has different implications for theoretical analysis and empirical studies of particular cases of nationalism.

Perennialism presents an attitude that, at first glance, stays the closest to both nationalist ideology and commonsensical notions of nationality. It shares with nationalism the idea that nations are not only objective and essential, but also able to shape history, rather than being shaped by it. However, this similarity hides a major difference, particularly important for case studies. While perennialists attribute qualities of eternity and naturalness to the world of nations in general, they allow for much variety, including dissolution of old and emergence of new nations. For nationalists, on the contrary, the primary concern is a specific nation and accumulating proofs of its persistence in history since time immemorial. It is virtually impossible to share nationalist feeling towards a nation, the world of nations as such. Still less it is possible to conceptualize the nation as a universal model without following the steps of nineteenth century romantic nationalism celebrating the national mystique. The common sense, on the other hand, shares with perennialism the notion of the contemporary world of nations as being the only possible and natural order of things (Smith 1998).

The difference here lies in the fact that, unlike commonsensical naïve assumptions, the perennialist approach requires empirical support – and does not fail to get it. For instance, in a detailed study on biblical notions of nationality Grosby (Grosby 2002) draws a conclusion that the Ancient Israel of the seventh century BCE displayed all major characteristics of a fully fledged nation, including a nation-state. Still, as Grosby himself has to admit, this startling discovery serves mostly as an exception that does not prove the rule. Attempts

to prove the perennial existence of the world of nations, not only a single nation seemingly ahead of its time, triggered a prolonged theoretical discussion wrought with contradictions in definitions of a nation for different historical periods. Eventually, Connor (Connor 2004), in a famous article "The Timelessness of Nations" written in reply to Smith, characterized this line of argument as a dead end due to incompatible definitions of a nation held by proponents and opponents of perennialism. Instead, Connor suggested the shift of attention from the timelessness of nations itself to its social representations in popular belief about nationality. This suggestion not merely raised the status of empirical studies within the subject area that until 1990s was predominantly theoretical, but also introduced a methodological approach focused not so much on nations as on national identities and regarding a lay bearer of national identity as a "naïve social scientist" whose notions are to be revealed and analysed.

This transition from macro- to micro-level and from phenomena to their perceptions is characteristic of a modernist approach. Contrary to perennialism, modernism challenges both nationalist and commonsensical notions by allocating nations to a specific historical period with a clear beginning and logically anticipated end. Modernists emphasize lack of continuity between premodern *ethnies* and modern nations and view nation-building not as a continuation of ethnogenesis, but as a political (Breuilly 1993; Giddens 1985), sociocultural (Gellner 1983) or ideological (Kedourie 1993) response to new demands of modernization. In its anti-essentialist stance, modernism is close to the so-called standard social science model, but, unlike social constructionists, modernists had to rely on large-scale framework of historical process and accept the classical modernization theory without restraints. For instance, Greenfeld (1992) in her comparative study of five cases of national identity formation explains inter-country differences in content and intensity of nationalism by unequal pace and successfulness of modernization. Postponed or partial modernization is here directly linked to ethnic nationalism suffused with a feeling of *ressentiment* towards more efficient nations. This approach becomes more and more problematic as classical theories of modernization become replaced by more contemporary ones, centered on intercultural qualitative

differences and advocating multiple modernities. Besides, as Moghaddam (Moghaddam 2010) justly points out, aggressive nationalism and *ressentiment* are determined not solely by a country's drawbacks in modernization, but also by a general identity crisis of the second modernity with its flux of boundaries and diffusion of social norms (Bauman 2000) and by contingent factors unrelated to global modernization.

Another recent trend in modernist studies of nationalism stems from abandoning the notion of the uniform "invisible hand" of modernization and exploring a multitude of individual actions and their reasons. In particular, Laitin (2007) proved that nationalism is not necessarily irrational and not always serving collective goals at the cost of individuals. He constructed several mathematical models revealing how nationalism can be adapted for individual purposes and flexibly allowed into individual histories. Thus, recent methodological innovations in nationalism studies include focus on contingent factors and varieties in modernization patterns for different nations, and also reintroduce the rational actor model for studying national identities at the micro-level.

Perennialism and modernism, as two opposing poles, form the agenda of debate on the historicity of nations. Of the two other approaches, postmodernism represents a move beyond this opposition, and ethnosymbolism, a quest for a balanced standpoint between the two extremes. Ethnosymbolists suggest that primordial *ethnies* are neither similar nor totally different to modern nations, but possess a symbolic significance, primarily because of their relation to ancient past and its cultural heritage. This concept of inheritance, as well as other similar borrowings from biological primordialism, are used by ethnonationalists (Grosby 2002) in a explicitly metaphotical way. For this reason, ethnosymbolism was criticized as substituting biological essentialism for cultural and, instead of opening a third way, proposing a primordialism in disguise. Notwithstanding this critique, ethnosymbolism contributed to nationalism studies of various theoretical orientations by stressing the symbolic, as well as determinist impact of history and opening the question of the need for historical legitimization of contemporary national identities.

Radical postmodernists reject both the timelessness of nations and appearance of nations as determined by a specific historical context. Instead, the postmodernist approach presupposes a shift of attention from nations and national identities to nationalism as an ideology. An ideological critique of nationalism in the Foucauldian tradition, aimed at revealing hidden relations of "capillary power," is mostly influential at the crossroads of nationalism and postcolonial studies. Although postmodernists fail to explain the power of nationalism as compared to other ideologies, their approach turned attention to the instrumental side of national identity construction and its integration in grand narratives of national history.

The latter direction in nationalism studies gained impetus with the so-called narrative turn in social sciences around 1980s. Narratives were reconsidered from one among many types of discourse to the ultimate, universal and, for some authors (Bekusr year), pre-discursive form of accumulating experience and sense-making. Based on insight from White's conceptual history and Danto's analytical philosophy of history, Ankersmit introduced the concept of narrative logic enabling researchers to implicitly provide definition without merging unique objects into classes (Ankersmit 1983). Such an approach appeared particularly attractive against the background of the seemingly endless debate on the universally acceptable definition of nation and, similarly to adoption of Wittgenstein's language games by Calhoun (Calhoun 1997), indirectly led to an idea that "the nation is defined via its history". This non-reductionist definition, however, proved less instrumental in preventing further attempts of defining a nation more explicitly than in inspiring empirical case studies on varieties in content and structure of nationalist and national identity narratives. Thus, the theoretical debate of the place of nations and history is currently giving way to empirical research on the use of historical narrative in defining and legitimizing nations and the role history plays among other attributes of national identity.

Nationalism: Elite Arguments and New Approaches to Belarusian Identity

The notions of nationality prevailing in contemporary Belarus, similarly to other post-Soviet countries, bear a strong impact of the Soviet past. The current public debate on Belarusian national identity, as well as everyday life manifestations of Belarusianness, reflect in their complexity the inner controversies in the Soviet nationalities policy and underlying theory. The four peculiarities of the "national issue" in the Soviet Union that are most frequently mentioned in literature include official internationalism, pragmatic use of nationalist movements, radical implementation of the right of national self-determination and implicit confirmation of ethnic nationalism at collective and individual levels. Each of these features deserves special consideration.

Initially, the Marxist ideology included little theorizing on national issues, placing class consciousness above all other collective identities. National identities were regarded merely as barriers preventing the working class of different nation-states from achieving unity of action that would allegedly lead to a global revolution. However, Lenin's strategy of making a revolution in a single state, and, contrary to Marx's views, not the most highly industrialized one, caused founders of the Soviet Union to turn their attention to nation-states as contrasted with multinational empires. The latter included the Romanov's empire with its late nineteenth century search for legitimacy in Russian nationalism in place of the by then obsolete dynastic principle (Hobsbawm 1990). The image of the Russian empire as the enemy of the revolution pragmatically meant that revolutionaries were at least temporarily ready to support any national liberation movements directed against the imperial government as a common enemy. Later this position was conceptualized as selective support of nationalist movements that were deemed to act in accordance with Socialist goals (according to this doctrine, political actions could be "national in form and Socialist in content") and immediate withdrawal of this support as soon as these movements were considered to establish too much nationalism or a wrong shade of nationalism. Selective support of national liberation movements

was claimed to be in dialectical unity with the official international-ism, which, according to Connor (1984), masked and legitimated frequent changes in Soviet policy on national issues dictated by emergent pragmatic reasons, rather than by following a universal ideology aimed at global revolution.

Connor's view was influenced not only by the Cold war atmo-sphere of the early 1980s, but also by his thematic focus on Soviet foreign policy. Other authors were primarily interested on the inner side of the national issue in the Soviet Union and its underlying theoretical assumptions (Motyl 1992; Gorenburg 2003). Analyzing the first decade of Soviet history, Martin (2001) famously came to a conclusion that the USSR was the first country in the world to implement affirmative action principles with regard to protecting the rights of national minorities. Inner administrative divisions in 1920s reflected a complicated hierarchy of what was considered to be vari-ous progressive stages of natiogenesis from a tribe to a people and then a fully-fledged nation and the corresponding hierarchy of vari-ous degrees of autonomy. This conceptual ladder reflected the gen-eral Marxist view of history as a linear progressive process.

The affirmative action policy in response to the national issue was wrought with two problems. First, in order to grant national minori-ties with objective rights, it was necessary to first define national entities in objective terms. Thus, the view of nations as being tem-porary and doomed to disappear from the Communist society based on universal equality was paradoxically combined with essentialist notion of nations as long as they existed. Another problem lay in the necessity of defining each Soviet citizen's national identity in similar objectivist terms (nationality was stated in the Soviet passport), which was done according to parents' nationality. In consequence, each citizen of the USSR was simultaneously related to his or her nationality by birth and nationality of his place of residence. These two nationalities did not necessarily complement each other, and their significance was by no means clear, but was considered objec-tive, essential and therefore in some way meaningful. As a result, according to Brubaker (1996), the Soviet national policy combined official internationalism with tacit reaffirmation of nationalism exclu-sively in its essentialist ethnic version.

The fall of the Soviet Union left each newly independent state with a necessity, among other tasks, to form new national identities compatible with the changed realities. Initially, ethnic nationalism was the only available concept, attractive both due to its tacit reinforcement and public condemnation in the Soviet era. In addition, ethnic versions of nationalism matched Western expectations from Eastern European states (Hroch 2000) and therefore, at least in the short run, served the purpose of gaining recognition of new states by the world community. These factors, rather than merely a mechanical reaction to suppressed national sentiments, explain the predominantly ethnic nationalism in the Belarusian public discourse.

Another theoretical approach to national identity, currently gaining popularity in a number of Post-Soviet countries including Belarus, is Neo-Eurasianism (Laruelle 1999). This doctrine in its contemporary form was developed by a Soviet dissident Gumilev. Similarly to the Soviet notion of nationality, Neo-Eurasianists limit nationalism to its ethnic version. However, contrary to the Marxist-Leninist vision of history, Gumilev regarded natiogenesis as a primarily biological process ruled by cosmic physical influences. Consequently, he was interested in *ethnies* rather than nations, and most of all in "superethnies" as collective empire-builders with mutually incompatible interests. This biological version of ethnic nationalism was later merged with the ideology of the Western European New right, particularly de Benoist. In Belarus, this theoretical approach was welcomed by a segment of nationalist elites with diverse political origins partly for its overwhelming facility, but primarily because of disappointment with both a softer cultural version of ethnic nationalism and western liberal democracy, neither of which gained the elites popular support in the early 1990s. The current fascination with radical conservatism has led to emerging exotic forms of Belarusian nationalism (such as Neo-Paganism combined with contemporary geopolitical discourse) celebrated by some intellectuals, but hardly representative of the majority of the population. Nevertheless, most research on Belarusian national identity and nationalism remains focused on the views of elites.

Scholars have made an effort to explain the bases of Belarusian nationalism in the post-Soviet era. Initially, two elite rhetorics caught the attention of scholars, the first referred to by Leshchenko

(2004, 339) as "national identity building practices," a position that advocates a more ethnolinguistic or primordial version of Belarusian nationalism. Leshchenko labels the second as "Soviet identity building" which promotes the closeness between the Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian people, and advocates a common future for these states. A third route toward Belarusian identity is alluded to by Leshchenko, however, when she indicates that for instrumental reasons, there is an effort to "reconcile" Belarusian sovereignty and Soviet identity among political elites, especially President Lukashenka. Ioffe (2007, 48) expands on Leshchenko's formula, suggesting the term "Creole" (a nod to a number of Belarusian writers[3]) for the compromise position between Belarusian and Soviet identity. These national ideals and findings about the appeal of these rhetorics to the Belarusian population will be discussed in the following section.

According to Goujon (1999), Leshchenko (2004), and Ioffe (2007), the national identity builders' version of the Belarusian national identity traces its roots to a pre-Soviet European culture. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are the key polities of reference and a number of purported characteristics of these polities have been attributed as the historical legacy of a distinct Belarusian political and ethnolinguistic identity. Elites of this persuasion argue that the Grand Duchy's political system was relatively democratic for its time, and as the inheritor of this tradition, Belarus should embrace democratic practices in their contemporary political system (Marples 2005). They advocate, and for a short time in the early 1990s, established, the white-red-white flag of the Belarusian People's Republic and the *Pahonia* coat of arms of the Grand Duchy as the national symbols of Belarus (Leshchenko 2004). They are particularly suspicious of any symbol that harkens back to the Soviet era and attempted to remove these from the public domain while serving in the parliament from 1991-1995.

These same elites also argue that since the Belarusian people are a distinct *ethnos* they should determine their own path forward, independent of Russian influence. In a similar vein, they argue that

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[3] Ioffe cites a number of Belarusian authors in this context, including Bulgakau 2001, Abushenka 2004, and Babkou 2005.

Russia's cultural dominance over Belarus in the Tsarist and Soviet era has prevented the Belarusian people from developing their own genuine national identity; as such, they advocate minimizing the influence of Russia over Belarus, both in terms of culture and politics (Sahm 1999; Leshchenko 2004; Bekus 2010).

In linguistic terms, the "nationalist" perspective on Belarusian identity calls for promotion of the Belarusian language in both government and everyday use. The Russian language should be removed from state use and discouraged in schools in favor of Belarusian. From this perspective, the 1995 referendum granting state status to both Belarusian and Russian is considered a step backwards (Goujon 1999). Some, such as the Belarusian Popular Front, go so far as to advocate a specific version of Belarusian, *Tarashkevich* Belarusian, which predates the more common Soviet-era 1933 *Narcomauka* version made popular through Soviet education policies (Goujon 1999; Sahm 1999). However, this is a debatable point; the key point of agreement among "nationalists" appears to be the desire to increase the use of Belarusian and disincentivize the use of Russian and *Trasianka*, a hybrid language of Russian and Belarusian.

A number of scholars have indicated that this "national" identity has been unpalatable to Belarusians. Leshchenko, for example, indicates that the more extreme nationalists, who advocate a strict and rapid shift to everyday use of Belarusian and take a strong anti-Russian stance, failed because they did not take into account the recent history of Belarus (2004, 337). Bekus (2010) also discusses the role that the exclusivity of this national formula may have played in making this idea less palatable than the official, more Soviet or Russophile line. The economic development of Belarus happened primarily during the Soviet era, and the Russian language was a part of that development, particularly in the urban areas. Ioffe (2007) seconds this point, indicating that many Belarusians either speak *Trasianka* or had parents who spoke it, thus making it difficult for many to accept the hard nationalist focus on promoting Belarusian and denigrating *Trasianka* and Russian. It is likewise difficult to eschew the memory of the Great Patriotic War, and the ties this provides to Russia, in a country where monuments to the war and memories of extreme hardship and heroism are still very

much a part of the "public square." These points lead logically into the next school of thought on Belarusian identity, referred to by Leshchenko as "Soviet" in nature.

Those who advocate a "Soviet" version of Belarusian identity present an image of a Belarusian nation that is a brother to the Russians and Ukrainians and emphasize the symbols and heroes of the Soviet era and a shared destiny between Belarusians and Russians. Key identifiers include the efforts of the Belarusian partisans in World War II, the resistance of the Belarusian population to Nazi tyranny, and symbols of the Soviet era, including the current flag and the remaining presence of the BSSR emblem in public places (Sahm 1999; Ioffe 2003; Bekus 2010). One needs only step outside the Minsk train station to see just how prominently these symbols are displayed in the everyday life of Belarusians.

The sentiment here, however, appears to harken back to the days when Russia was "first among equals." This set of elites sees the heavy use of the Russian language as normal in Belarusian society and concludes that the loss of Belarusian would not be considered a serious detriment to Belarusians as a people (Goujon 1999). The Belarusian language has also been denigrated by this camp on occasion, dismissed as an underdeveloped language, or worse, simply a dialect of Russian, while Russian is considered a language of culture and civilization.

This school, not surprisingly, recommends a foreign policy position that is closely aligned with Russia, both economically and politically (Eke and Kuzio 2000; Leshchenko 2004). In the early years of the post-Soviet Republic, it was not uncommon for this elite discourse to recommend reunification or incorporation with Russia; most, however, have simply advocated for economic, military and political union, perhaps along the lines of the European Union. This discourse was promoted by the Lukashenka regime in the mid- to late-1990s (Leshchenko 2004).

Leshchenko argues that this version of national identity has gained more support than the "nationalist" one, mainly because it addresses those elements of history that appear salient to the Belarusian population. Thus, the Soviet era is recognized here as an important element of Belarusian identity and it does not require

that people abandon the Soviet parts of their history, whether that history focuses on the economic development of the state or the wartime aspects.

This school also does not require that Belarusians who currently favor use of Russian learn to speak "proper" Belarusian, however defined by elites, a considerable obstacle for those who speak predominantly Russian or *Trasianka*. And since Belarus has the largest percentage of self-described Belarusians who speak Russian as their primary language (Ioffe 2003; Gorenburg 2006), this is a significant challenge to any party who hopes to shape the national identity in a way that is critical of Russian speakers. The 1995 referendum on language, which provided equal status for both Russian and Belarusian languages and which 83.1% of voters voted in favor of, is likely a reflection of this existing language dynamic (Goujon 1999).

While this school of thought successfully appeals to Belarusians' use of Russian and memory of the Soviet era, it has suffered from its foreign policy direction. Advocating closer relations with Russia has been problematic, especially as the popularity of reunification with Russia has dropped, from 24% supporting in 2003 to only 12% in 2005 (Drakokhrust 2006, cited in Ioffe 2007, 42), and the relationship with Russia has become more contentious (Bekus 2010). Gas price conflicts between Belarus and Russia, and Putin's assertion that union would require Belarus's absorption by Russia have soured the public on having too close a relationship with their massive neighbor (Leshchenko 2004, 341). As the desire to remain sovereign has risen, the more "Russophile" aspects of this school of thought have become a liability.

As a result of these factors, a third position has gained ground. Labeled by some as "Creole" (Ioffe 2008), this interpretation of Belarusian national identity acknowledges the accomplishments of Soviet Belarus, including the economic gains made in Belarus during the Soviet era as well as resistance to Nazi occupation. But it also pays homage to Belarusian culture, part of which is language and part of which is a distinct, if difficult to define, sense of "localness" (Pershai 2008), as well as a strong stance on Belarusian self-determination. Thus, while Soviet-Russophiles have toyed with the idea of reunification with Russia, a Creole discourse calls for continued

independence and sovereignty of the Belarusian state and people (Leshchenko 2004; Ioffe 2007). Proponents of this version of national identity appear willing to tolerate the use of Russian language for now, with the hopes of making the use of the Belarusian language more common in the long term.

This position has gained popularity with the population and with the President himself in the past ten years. President Lukashenka has made a point of "standing up to Russia" in gas price disputes, and couches much of his criticism of Russia in terms of defending Belarusian sovereignty (Ioffe 2007). While the reasons why this compromise would be more appealing are apparent from the discussion of the weaknesses of the "national" and "Soviet" projects discussed above, Creole nationalists face a fundamental issue, namely, defining just where the "Soviet" part ends and the "Belarusian" part of Belarus begins. Is it really just the desire to remain sovereign that distinguishes the Soviet model from the Creole? And why are particular parts of each of the national and Soviet narratives appealing while others are not?

Recent research has examined this conflict from a slightly different angle – namely, the proposition that Belarusian nationalism may be more civic than ethnic, and as such the very ethnic and linguistic attributions of either the Belarusian nationalist or Russophile formula fail to resonate with Belarusians. Perhaps the type of national identity that is emerging in Belarus is a civic one, at least for the time being. Bekus's (2010) research points in this direction, citing IISEPS and other research efforts that indicate that Belarusians identify strongly with their state and co-nationals, even if they don't closely identify with ethnolinguistic markers of identity. This resembles the research and analysis on the topic conducted by a number of the coauthors of the present work as well. In a unique survey intended to gauge attachment to civic, ethnic, and linguistic markers of identity, we found that Belarusians have a strong affiliation with their co-nationals (and a very positive viewpoint of Belarusians as trustworthy and tolerant) and indicate that honoring the history of Belarus, its sovereign independence, and "feeling Belarusian" are far more important identity markers than language, ethnicity or religion (Buhr et al. 2009; Buhr et al. 2011). Like Bekus, we argue that the initial beliefs that Belarusians were "denationalized"

(Marples 1999) stemmed from an assumption that nations in post-Soviet states were Eastern; Belarusians' lack of interest in an exclusive ethnolinguistic vision of national identity may have been the cause of the "denationalized" label and the misunderstanding of the role that civic characteristics currently play in binding the Belarusian nation together.

Lithuanian Nationalism: An "Eastern Nation?"

The boundaries of Lithuanian national identity may appear on the surface to be more straightforward. The persistence of the Lithuanian language during the Soviet era, and the low level of Russification of ethnic Lithuanians during this time would appear to indicate that language is a key component of Lithuanian national identity (Gorenburg 2006). Indeed, a number of scholars agree with this, and add in other ethnic characteristics to the parameters that define Lithuanian "groupness." However, this is by no means the only potential version of Lithuanian nationalism on offer; the history of Lithuania provides sufficient "primordial materials" for both an ethnolinguistic and civic version of national identity. The literature on Lithuanian nationalism reflects this mixed set of primordial materials.

The heritage of Lithuania does provide the materials for a more civic and western style of national identity. This version finds its origins in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Samogitia and Rus's multicultural and purportedly democratic nature. If a democratic, centralized state is the wellspring of civic nationalism, then the Grand Duchy demonstrated elements that could lead it in this direction. The Magdeburg Statutes and the Codex of Law can be said to have provided a brief but deeply felt tendency towards an open and democratic society (Zuprudnik 1993). This tradition was resurrected, again very briefly, in the immediate interwar years with the 1922 election of the *Seimas*. Seventy years later, the establishment of a new Constitution and the 1992 elections that restored the independent *Seimas* were taken by civic-minded nationalists as evidence of a people whose traditions are steeped in liberal economic and democratic principles.

However, many authors argue that ethnolinguistic characteristics provide the boundaries for the Lithuanian nation. For example, at the beginning of the 20th Century, Lapatto pointed to the fact that Lithuanians "steadfastly adhered to the language of their fathers, never adopting any Slavic tongue" (1917, 192), a fact which, in part, justified the "claims, desires and aspirations" for an eventually independent Lithuanian state (1917, 188). According to Donskis, national elites pursued a "one nation, one language, one culture, one state" principle during the Interwar years (2002, 13). A number of national elites pursued an ethnolinguistic description of the Lithuanian nation throughout the 20th century, as they searched for an authentic national identity rooted in various myths, symbols, folklore and, language, the latter being particularly important (Lieven 1993, 113). Striking a tone that would be carried on throughout the 20[th]century, Elisse Reclus early on claimed that "[I]f the value of a nation in the whole of humanity were to be measured by the beauty of its language, the Lithuanians should rank first among the inhabitants of Europe" (quoted in Lapatto 1917, 189). Lithuanian intellectuals such as Šalkauskis (1938, 1939) were interested in the peculiarities of Lithuanian nationalism. In their analysis of Lithuanian national character, these writers tend to echo the arguments of those expressed above in emphasizing the 'Eastern' side of Lithuanian nationalism. However, in the end they acknowledge that Lithuanian national identity is a mix of 'Eastern' and 'Western' elements.

It should not be surprising then, that Klumbyte (2003) states that Lithuanian identity in the early post-Soviet years was defined mostly according to "the one who was Catholic, who spoke the Lithuanian language, and was of the common Lithuanian descent and culture" (2003, 287). While the importance of language to "Lithuanian-ness" usually goes uncontested, other ethnolinguistic markers have been dismissed by some scholars. Thus Senn argues that religion was never "a definitive criterion for Lithuanian nationality" (1959, 6), a fact explained by its role as the so-called Athens of the North, that is, a borderland at the crossroads of many cultures and religious traditions. This interpretation of the Lithuanian religious heritage persisted well into the 20th century. Lapatto, for instance, claimed that Lithuanians "constitute a genteel people ...

always free and liberal in religious thought and practice" and was home not only to Catholics, but also to Lutherans, Calvinists, and other Protestant sects (1917, 192). Lapotta likewise discusses the tolerance of Lithuanian leaders toward the Jewish populations that inhabited the territory for centuries.

However, one must note that political elites and historical political conditions of the existence of Lithuanian state had a distinctive impact on the construction of 'Eastern' type nationalism in the early 20th century. Lithuanian identity was encouraged to be, and was perceived to be a linguistic, cultural and religious one. Therefore, one might argue the national identity of Lithuanians in the pre-war period should be regarded largely as ethno-cultural or 'Eastern'. Thus, from the theoretical perspective, one can observe an interesting phenomenon when both instrumentalism and social constructivism can be applied to analyze the same period of Lithuanian nationalism.

After the loss of independence some specific conditions shaped the country and Lithuanian national identity. On the one hand, nationalism that was considered threatening to the Soviet regime was increasingly discouraged and crushed, for the very idea of Bolsheviks' societal reconstruction was to institute a Soviet society where all the national differences would be leveled out. On the other hand, notwithstanding the transformation of national identity during the period of occupation the partial influence of official education on the new generations, and official propaganda and repressions against any manifestations of nationalism, the breakthroughs of national identity can undoubtedly be traced in literature, music and even sports. Despite these vestiges, it is clear that the manifestation of 'Eastern' nationalism was subdued until the very last decade of the 20th century, and as such substantive research on nationalism did not take place.

Only in the period of the activity of 'Sajudis' and the restitution of Lithuanian independence did the issues of Lithuanian identity become very important again. One has to note that during the second national revival of the late 20th century it became clear that 'Eastern' nationalism had been 'frozen' during the Soviet occupation, and such characteristics of ethnic identity as language, culture,

and religious affiliation had been reestablished again and became commonly accepted traits of Lithuanian-ness. Furthermore, this released energy played a central role in the restoration of independence. However, the awakening of national self-consciousness and patriotism, a crucial component in regaining independence, could not be made absolute and was affected by a number of factors. These included sociopolitical conditions, the ethnic composition of the state's inhabitants, the ambitions of the political elite to aim for international recognition and the return of Lithuania to the normal path of European development. With these conditions adhering, a successful policy of civil integration of non-Lithuanians into the independent Lithuanian state was implemented in the early years following independence. Although the researchers of this subject have noted that political institutional decisions by themselves do not guarantee the sustainability of social processes (Kasatkina, Leončikas 2003, 10), the attitude of the Lithuanian political elite towards the question of ethnic minorities can be regarded as a serious turn towards 'Western' or civic nationalism.

The specificities and transformations of Lithuanian national character after the restoration of independence have received a relatively high level of interest from Lithuanian researchers. While the research on national identity in Lithuania is not totally consistent and can not yet be put into a coherent framework of a scientific paradigm, one can argue that their overall disciplinary scope is rather extensive. The contemporary research is being pursued in the framework of philosophy, sociology, psychology, political science, literary studies and arts. The macro-sociological research on national identity is complemented by studies of individual national identities and research on the processes of micro-social national self-identification. Significant attention is being paid to the research on contemporary transformations of national identity, the impacts of globalization, migration and European integration processes, and to the phenomenon of displaced identity. These particular moments have the most impact for the transformations of Lithuanian national identity in the current period. One has to admit that the research on national identity in Lithuania is not longitudinal, and the research methods and strategies vary from historical-genetic, comparative, hermeneutic, anthropological to empirical sociological.

Summing up these explorations, it is not easy to formulate a straightforward answer to the question formulated in the title of this portion of the chapter: *Lithuanian Nationalism: An 'Eastern Nation?'*. This precise question is not being raised in the research directly. However, during the initial period of independence's reestablishment, when the public discourse was primarily concerned with the themes of patriotism and national self-consciousness, the scientific investigations were also more concerned about national mentality, Lithuanian national self-consciousness, and the search for identity. Scholars emphasized that the national awakening and the struggle for independence is an opportunity to recreate and reestablish national self-consciousness, to retain the continuity in the nation's values and traditions (Kuzmickas 1989; Matulionis 1989). Also, in the research of the later period it was argued that Lithuanian identity has been formed in the 'Eastern' way (Kuzmickas 2008, 173-174):

On the basis of cultural awareness the political consciousness had set off and developed, purposively aiming towards the main target of nation – the institution of the State ... It is as if the statehood 'completes' the national identity, defines it legislatively, judicially and politically, hence raising it to the level of rational consciousness. The nation, without having instituted statehood, or having lost it, is inadequate in a historical sense, and its members, by having become the citizens of alien state in their own will or against it, experience the 'discontinuities' in values and find themselves in the ambiguous state of degraded nationhood.

The prevalent insight of the academic research on current Lithuanian identity is the reflection on its change. One can distinguish several main trends. The first is the research on values. Values are seen as a very important component in the formation of national identity, and their transformations are taken as a manifestation of the change in national identity. The research of Astra (1995, 1996) and Liubinienė (1999) is devoted to these issues. Liubinienė underlines that the national (in other words – 'Eastern') identity, which has been prevalent during the period of restitution of independence, began to change prominently. Life in a democratic society,

confrontation with postmodern values, and European integration have weakened the feelings of nationalism and patriotism, first of all among young people. However, the author claims, the periods of potential weakening or strengthening of expressed national identity do not indicate the extinction of national identity, but rather mark its change (Liubinienė 1999, 95-96). The research on Lithuania's academic youth done by Antinienė demonstrated the separation of supporters of either 'traditional' or 'modern' nationalism, prevalent in this group, and revealed the impact of social demographic trends on the nationalist attitude of Lithuania's students (Antinienė 2011, 163-169).

The second important analytical approach to transformations of national identity is the analysis of the influence of European integration on the structure of Lithuanian identity. This academic path is mainly explored by Vinagrodnaitė (2001), Rubavičius (2006), Švarplys (2008) and others. Taking into account the different research strategies and methodologies of these researchers, it is difficult to summarize their conclusions. However, the main aspects of analysis in this strain of research include various methods of national and European identity construction, current and potential confrontations and conflicts between Lithuanian values and the values of the unified European model, and considerations of the relationship between nationalism, statehood and civic European-ness.

The third theme in the research on Lithuanian identity is related to one of the most apparent contemporary social demographic trends – emigration. According to the conclusions of the researchers in this field (Čiubrinskas and Kuznecovienė, 2008; Čiubrinskas 2011), Lithuanian national identity is to be analyzed as displaced, de-territorialized, situational and contextual, while the strategy of such research should employ an anthropological perspective (Čiubrinskas 2011, 7). In the context of globalization and transnationalism it becomes apparent that one should regard national identity's traits as very diverse and multiple; identity itself seems to have fluid boundaries and appears as merely one among many other individual identities in this situation.

On the basis of scientific, theoretical reflection it is impossible to respond to the question whether the Lithuanian national character

is of 'Eastern' or 'Western' type. The modern Lithuanian nation has formed as 'Eastern' and this type of nationalism was encouraged during the interwar period, playing an important role during the restitution of independence at the end of 20th century. However, the processes of several recent decades do not allow treating it as 'Eastern'.

Conclusion

This brief overview of major approaches to nations and nationalism suggest, among other things, that national identity is not an easy subject for empirical research. Controversies in definitions of national identity naturally cause difficulties in determining its empirical indicators and appropriate methods. As a result, the field of nationalism studies still remains more theoretically oriented, although general dissatisfaction with grand theorizing in social sciences was instrumental in starting the empirical period in the history of nationalism studies.

The predominant disciplinary tradition in nationalism studies approximately since the 1980s has been historical sociology. The research following this approach employs social theories drawn from different subject areas of sociology and political science for analyzing historical cases of nationalism, usually based on information drawn from secondary historical sources. This research framework, while being the most obvious and simultaneously the most flexible and sensitive to both universal and particular, has several important drawbacks. They include blurring the difference between theoretical constructs and empirical evidence, forced reliance on secondary sources, some of which may not wholly deserve it, and, most importantly, the macrosocial perspective embracing identity of a nation, but failing to capture individual variations in national identities.

An alternative approach that would enable empirical research of individuals' national identities remains largely an open issue. The most influential solution was proposed by anthropologists. Thus, Hearn (2007) contrasts abundant research on nationalism in historical perspective with scarcity of studies dedicated to national

identities. He proposes to fill this gap by means of field observation and in-depth unstructured interviews. In contrast to historical sociology, this approach allows one to study not the past, but the present, and not the macrolevel, but the microlevel. Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) enrich this approach by placing it within the new paradigm of everyday life sociology (Sztompka, 2008). In reply to their suggestion Smith advocated the historical sociology approach lest the research of everyday manifestations of national identities failed to account for a broader structural context and its history (Smith, 2010).

This danger may be avoided by restricting the use of unstructured observation and interviews to either primary stages of research for gaining the first acquaintance with the material or to late advanced phases for checking additional hypotheses and getting deeper insights into the overall picture. However, the main body of the research on national identity ought to use more structured quantitative methods in combination with detailed analysis of its current context and its past history. In our study we attempt to keep a balance between the two major methodological approaches in nationalism studies by means of mixed methods design combining comparative historical analysis and sociological survey to develop a comprehensive understanding of Belarusian and Lithuanian national identities.

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MODERN LITHUANIAN IDENTITY: TRANSFORMATIONS AND CONTINUITY

Linas Venclauskas

Introduction

In 2009 Lithuania celebrated its millennium. Some 1000 years earlier the name had been mentioned in the German annals of Quedlinburg, when Catholic missionaries headed by Saint Bruno were attacked and killed on the border of old Russia and Lithuania. Lithuanians always had been considered as brave fighters, a notion as firmly embedded in the nation's autosterotype as is the belief in an exceptional history. While many if not every state and nation holds this view, in the case of East Central Europe the issues are complicated by the presence of a variety of different experiences and narratives about the past. As noted by Milan Kundera, "[C]entral Europe as a family of small nations has its own vision of the world, a vision based on a deep distrust of history. History, that goddess of Hegel and Marx, that incarnation of reason that judges us and arbitrates our fate, that is the history of conquerors. The people of Central Europe are not conquerors" (1984, 8).

This feeling started at the end of the 18th century when the Lithuanian Polish Commonwealth was divided among Russia, Prussia and Austria, with Lithuania becoming part of tsarist Russia. Until this moment Lithuania existed in various forms, as a Kingdom, the Grand Duchy, and a Grand Duchy with federal links with the Kingdom of Poland. After the state's partition a new period, from the end of 19th century antil 1940, can be identified, during which the modern Lithuanian identity began to form and a modern independent Lithuanian state (1918-1940) existed. This period of independence,

followed by a period of unjust occupation, regained ground in March 11, 1990, when Lithuania re-declared its independence.[4]

The last millennium has witnessed significant changes in the nature of Lithuanian identity. The formation of identity is, of course, an ongoing process, one is informed not only by the current situation but also by past and future visions and the dominant narratives of self-presentation. One might, for instance, accept Kundera's notion of Lithuania as being shaped by a singular history of injustice applicable to all of Central-Eastern Europe. However, as will be shown below, such an interpretation is inadequate since, in reality there have always existed competing histories, only some of which have complemented each other. Whichever narrative one chooses to adopt, it is always a question of telling a past, of telling a story.

Grand Duchy of Lithuania

Lithuania is sometimes referred to as the last pagan state in Europe. In fact, in the middle of 14th century the country had three choices – remain pagan, isolated and always attacked by neighbors or fully join the Christian world. If the latter path was to be pursued, a further choice was required: whether to tilt west or east, Roman or Byzantine. Both of these paths were possible. Lithuania had quite successfully expanded its territory eastwards through such diverse means as battles, diplomacy, and marriages.[5] On the other hand, the first and last Lithuanian king, Mindaugas, who ruled from 1253 until 1263, was in 1251 baptized in the Roman rites, not the Byzantine. After the execution of the king, Lithuanian society returned to its pagan roots until 1387, when under the influence of Roman Pope Innocent IV, it turned westward and Roman (Kiaupa 2006).

In 1569 the Union of Lublin created the Polish-Lithuanian

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[4] Alfred Senn and other historians claim that the processes of liberation started at least several years before, referring to the period from 1988 to 1990 as the "Lithuanian awakening" (2002).

[5] One of many examples could be the story of Daumantas (1240-1299). He was a Lithuanian nobleman who ruled one area of Lithuania, but due to the struggles for power in the area fled to Pskov, eventually becoming ruler of that area. He later became an Orthodox monk, was baptized as Timofey and is now one of the saints in the Russian Orthodox Church.

Commonwealth, a kind of federal union between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. From that period one state existed, but with both parts exercising considerable autonomy and, most importantly, developing unique and independent identities. In terms of territory, the Commonwealth incorporated the current states of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and the western part of Ukraine. In doing so, it became a multicultural, multiconfessional and multiethnic state. Its medieval social structure was composed of three orders, but unlike most other western countries the nobility in the state comprised up to ten percent of the population. In 1572, three years after the union, Žygimatas Augustas, the last king of Poland and the grand duke of Lithuania, died without children, ushering in a period of elected kings. The first such king and duke was Henri Valois from France, who ruled for just 5 months, later returning to France to become king of that emerging power.[6]

Valois' election began a tradition in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland of selecting monarchs from different countries and different dynasties. Another important tradition also emerged: the head of the Commonwealth was treated as the first among equals, but no more. This meant that, at least theoretically, all nobility had the possibility of participating in the country's rule, including in the election of the monarchs. As a result of these traditions, by the end of the 16th century the Commonwealth had evolved into a kind of elective monarchy where the broader nobility played quite an important role. The nobility's ability to oppose the monarch and the Commonwealth's experiments with self-government were exceptional for their time in the European context.

Of course, this governing regime had an impact on the nobility's behavior and identity. First of all, the nobility had a greater sense of responsibility with consequential decisions being made not only in the king's court but in local communities and gatherings as well. Since there were oftentimes differences of opinion amongst the nobles, a consensus had to be built among them, which unfortunately sometimes involved recourse to arms. The not infrequent

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[6] Valois died in France in 1589 without children thus ending his line. France's preference for strong monarchic traditions brought in a new dynasty, the Bourbons, that differed significantly from the subsequent monarchs in the Commonwealth.

occurrence of such conflict led to a view of the Commonwealth as being anarchic, with no or weak centralized power, and monarchy and nobles pursuing different interests and visions of the state. The federal composition of the state is also an important point to mention. Formally, it was a union of two states – the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but in reality regional differences were also important. Large, complex, and rife with regional differences, there were nonetheless a variety of forces that unified the Commonwealth. First among these was common pride in various ancestors and past glories. Equally important was the pragmatic sense of needing to defend the state and its territory from outside forces. While there were, of course, tensions between Poland and Lithuania concerning questions who was more significant and influential in the Commonwealth, these did not overshadow the priorities shared by the two federal states.

Secondly, daily life and the weak central political authority of the Commonwealth meant that the nobility had to manage itself. As a result of this self-governing tradition, the *Lietuvos Statutas* (Statute of Lithuania) was created. There were three editions of the document, 1529, 1566 and 1588. The process of creating these documents was organized differently than in other polities. Usually, western monarchs passed laws and orders of this sort, but in this case the work started with the Lithuanian nobility, who determined what should be codified during local parliamentary (*Seimas*) sessions. Representatives from the *Seimas* were then sent to the regional parliament and the proposals from smaller communities were discussed. Finally, the nation-wide parliament took final decisions on the documents. Formally speaking, the Statute of Lithuania was the creation of all Lithuanian nobility and arose through a bottom-up, rather than top-down process. This process played a key role in the idea of self-government among Lithuanian nobility.

At this point we should also consider the complexity and variety of the state and its population. While the Grand Duchy was similar to most of Europe at the time, that is, a society dominated by a nobility serviced by serfs with no personal freedoms, there also existed a class of citizens with their own rights and jurisdiction, primarily due to the Magdeburg Statutes. A variety of religious groups also lived in the region, including Catholics, Jews, Orthodox,

Muslims, and Protestants, with some, such as Jews, enjoying their own administrative and judicial systems. A plurality of languages also was apparent, from the now-dominant but then marginal Lithuanian language as well as Polish, Russian, and old Belarusian, which was used as the official written language in the Duchy. Hebrew, Yiddish, and German were also used in various parts of the Duchy.

Given all of this, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 16th-17th century might be seen as an exemplary state in the European context. There were no major conflicts between different religious or ethnic groups and those that did exist were local conflicts that were contained and managed by local authorities. Indeed, the Grand Duchy actually benefited from debates between Catholics and Protestants within its borders. First of all, the potential religious conflicts or massacres, seen in other states such as the condition of the Huguenots in France, did not appear in the Commonwealth on a large scale. Second, Protestants paid a good deal of attention to education, primarily because of their belief that every individual should be able to worship God and read the Bible without the help of a mediator such as a priest, as was the Catholic tradition. Besides preaching and religious debates with Catholics, the Protestants in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania created a network of schools and book publishers. As a result of these efforts, Martynas Mažvydas published the first Lithuanian book, *Katekizmas* (Cathecismus), in 1547. It was a simple prayer book written in the Lithuanian language that included a Lithuanian alphabet and some practical suggestions for how to read and pronounce Lithuanian. While a good beginning, publishing in the Lithuanian language remained a sporadic affair, with the next two books in the Lithuanian language published only in 1595 and 1599. After that, in a slow incremental process additional books were published and a network of schools teaching in the Lithuanian language developed. Complimenting this was an emphasis on both general and higher education, mainly with an eye towards creating a scholarly basis for ecclesiastical disputes common at the time. Thus, in 1544, Lutherans in Köngsberg (currently Kaliningrad) opened a university, the very same university from which Mažvydas graduated.

The situation in the Grand Duchy during that period was interesting. Many nobles turned to Calvinism, cities' inhabitants turned to

Lutheranism, and even the king and grand duke Žygimatas Augustas kept written correspondence with the prominent protestants at that time, such as Phillipp Melanchthon, successor to Martin Luther and author of the protestant theological system. For the Catholic Church such a situation was quite dangerous, in that it started to lose its primary position in society. In reaction to this situation, Catholics started to strengthen their intellectual positions. In 1569 Jesuits were invited into Lithuania, and in 1579 Vilnius University was opened and became the center not only for reformation versus counterreformation fights, but also became the intellectual center for the whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The university began researching, rethinking and shaping the Duchy's identity, contributing to the creation of a new type of society where not only the nobility but also wealthy town dwellers were able to enroll in university, enrich themselves by acquiring knowledge, and create and discuss common values such as freedom, patriotism, and republican governance.[7]

Thus, in the 16th and 17th centuries Lithuanian society was diverse in all possible meanings of the word, with different ruling traditions, flourishing multiculturalism and a plurality of religions. However, at the same time a sense of community, common values and identity were present.

The 18th century is well-known for Enlightenment ideas and various suggestions on how to improve states and the administration of communities. As is apparent from the preceding paragraphs, the Commonwealth had its own ruling traditions, many of which were at odds with those of its neighbors. The 18th century was also a time of increasing military power, and the Commonwealth's neighbors, tsarist Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary, increased their military power while the Commonwealth paid less attention to this issue. The Commonwealth's large territory became increasingly interesting to its powerful neighbors. While the state's nobility searched for reforms as well, they generally followed the by now well established

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[7] One of the examples here could be poet Mykolas Kazimieras Sarbievijus (1959-1640) from Poland. He studied in Vilnius and Braunsberg, and after his studies became a professor at Vilnius University and a famous 17th century European poet. His poetry spoke of patriotism, the importance of homeland, and Lithuania's history and pagan traditions. Sarbievijus was called the Horatio of Sarmats, and received a prize from Pope Urban VIII.

tradition of restricting the king's power in service to the ideals of republican governance.

The first partition of the Commonwealth, which took place in 1772, was limited to border lands adjacent to neighboring countries. Later divisions took place in 1793 and finally the Commonwealth was totally occupied and statehood lost in 1795. But before the occupation and even in the early years of the tsarist occupation, there were several attempts to reform the state's administration. There were local projects as well as some that might be called international. One of the reform leaders, Count Michal Wielhorski, requested assistance from Jean Jacques Rousseau. The response was a manuscript from Rousseau that had already circulated in the Commonwealth. After the philosopher's death the manuscript was published with the title *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne*. Rousseau suggested a number of reforms, including some dealing with administration, educational, and justice-related systems. Rousseau elaborated on some patently utopian ideas, including the potential benefits of isolation of the Commonwealth from the international community. According to Rousseau, in order to survive, have a good administration and society, the Commonwealth should not participate in Europe's and the world's politics, but instead should live a closed life, producing goods for itself within a much-reduced territory. Rousseau suggested a true confederation composed of at least three districts in the same state, much as it was in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Rousseau 1953).

While very few of Rousseau's suggestions were realized this episode shows us a few things. First of all, the Commonwealth searched for some reforms but pursued a different path from its neighbors, one not based on absolutism and military power, but on republican ideals that would ensure equal rights at least at the level of the nobility. As a matter of fact, some noblemen already were giving freedom to their serfs; a move which was sympathetic to Rousseau's idea that all human beings should be equal and free. Freedom came with one caveat, however: do not liberate the serfs' bodies before you liberate their souls through education (Rousseau 1953). Second, the state and its politics, as well as its social and administrative structures, were known in Europe and attracted attention as an exceptional form of governance. Third, the reforms

of the late 18th century sought to implement the newest ideas about society and the rights and roles of the individual. The so-called 4 Years Parliament (1788-1792) not only proposed reforms, but also issued a new Constitution on May 3rd, 1791 (Kiaupa 2006). It was the third modern Constitution in the world and the second in Europe (after the Constitutions of the United States and France), and in this document one finds some of Rousseau's suggestions. While Catholicism was named the official religion, the freedom to practice different religions was also part of the Constitution. State authorities were made caretakers of peasants, and the will of the nation was claimed to be the source of power (Kiaupa 2006). Unfortunately, under Russia's pressure the parliament of Grodno stopped functioning along with the reforms embedded in the May 3rd Constitution. Soon both Vilnius and Warsaw were occupied by the tsarist army and the state was partitioned for the second time.

In 1794, in a reaction to such actions by Russia, Tadas Kosciuka, general and comrade of George Washington during the United States' War for Independence, spearheaded an uprising intended to put an end to the occupation and to continue the reforms started by 4 Years Parliament. The uprising was not successful and in 1795 the third partition of the Commonwealth took place. As with the previous period, the uprising demonstrated several things. First, while it was organized and mainly supported by the nobility, the burghers and peasants also participated, with the Lithuanian language being used as one means to address and persuade the peasants that revolution was in their interest. As a result, the use of the Lithuanian language in the public domain increased during the uprising after centuries of use in the private sphere.

Second, among the documents of the uprising there are some hints about notions of Lithuanian identity of the time. To the question of 'who is a true Lithuanian' the answer was given: a person who loves freedom and respects the Statute of Lithuania. Interestingly enough, the tsarist occupational regime did not fully suppress the Statute of Lithuania until 1840, giving the Statutes time to become incorporated into the fabric of Lithuania identity, as well as the values they embodied, namely, freedom, tolerance and diversity. Thus, the uprising not only can be seen as a common activity against tsarist occupation but also as one where a diversification of

ideas and identities flourished. The following uprisings in 1830 and 1863 showed this diversification even more clearly.

Tsarist Occupation

Usually the 19th century is called the "spring of nations," but Lithuania met this century by losing its independence, traditions and statehood that had defined it since the 13th century. While there were some flickers of autonomy during the early stages of the occupation, such as the Statutes of Lithuania, this was likely the first time that Lithuania and Poland felt the injustices of history that Kundera (1984) refers to as one of the main features of Central-Eastern European national identity. But despite the occupation and the oppressions which accompanied it, a modern identity started to form in Lithuania during this time as well. For instance, the notion that a 'true' Lithuanian is one who loves freedom was expressed in the November 29, 1830, uprising, the expressed aim of which was to rebuild the Commonwealth, and according to at least some of the leaders, to abolish serfdom. The tsarist reaction was quick and painful with many schools, churches and monasteries being closed down and harsh new policies of censorship implemented.

A second uprising took place in 1863-1864, with grievances over tsarist oppression again being at the core of the revolt. But the differences between the Polish and Lithuanian sides were bigger this time, as the Poles and Lithuanians started to deviate from one another in their visions of the future, particularly concerning the possible reconstruction of the Commonwealth. The tsarist regime also effectively employed a policy of 'divide and rule' that also contributed to their differences. At various times, the regime supported different sides, usually the weaker of the two, the weaker groups in this case being Lithuanians and Belarusians in comparison with Poles. On the other hand, Darius Staliūnas (2007) argues after the 1863 uprising, the tsarist authorities stopped strengthening non-dominant national groups instead building a policy more clearly based upon discrimination against non-Russians. Thus, while the consequence of the first uprising was to force the closure of Vilnius University, a place acknowledged for criticism and liberal thought,

the second uprising resulted in a complete ban in the publication of any Lithuanian language material using Latin orthography. The logic of the tsarist authorities was straightforward: if Vilnius University was seen as a product of Polish culture and if by closing it down authorities thought to weaken first of all the Polish side, so the prohibition against using Latin letters for publishing in Lithuania would weaken Lithuanian culture and strengthen the Russian. In some respects, therefore, the multinational situation inherited from the Commonwealth was seen by the tsarist regime as a useful tool of manipulation. Indeed, growing national movements among different groups, including Lithuanians, Poles, Belarusians, and Jews, created an increasing level of tension and misunderstandings among people who seventy years ago were citizens of the same independent state.

The 19th century was also a time of troubled identities and modernity, when old structures and ways of life were led to new ones. Changes to society and everyday life were of particular interest to scholars of this time. For example, Émile Durkheim drew clear linkages between the challenges of modernity, changes in society, and group/individual reactions to it. In *Le suicide,* for instance, Durkheim shows that an unclear future and changes in the social structure provoked a series of suicides in France, with data indicating the relationship between feelings of alienation, gender, social strata, religion, and so forth (1951). In this sense even those societies with a long tradition of independence and self-administration were affected by rapid changes. At this time, Lithuania had not only to cope with these changes, but also had to build its modern identity and social structures.

The international system of the middle and late 19th century also provided a number of challenges and questions for Lithuanians to solve. First of all, it was difficult to answer the question, 'who is Lithuanian?' while simultaneously thinking about modernization in society and the economy, particularly since Lithuania was being treated as an economically marginal territory by tsarist authorities. More investments were put in Polish and Ukrainian industrial areas while Riga was developed as an industrial town and port; investments in Lithuania were limited to a network of railroads.

Lithuania was also dominated by agricultural populations. According to the 1897 census, Lithuanian society consisted primarily of peasants, 93% of whom were ethnic Lithuanians. The largest cities in Lithuania were Vilnius and Kaunas, with populations of 150,000 and 70,000 inhabitants respectively. This compares with a population of 280,000 in Riga (Balkelis 2009). Less than 2% of ethnic Lithuanians lived in the cities, while the approximately 75,000 Lithuanians with a university education primarily lived in other Russian provinces, such as Saint Petersburg (26,000) and Riga (28,000) (Balkelis 2009).

As a result of these conditions, the intellectual potential for modernization existed both inside and outside of Lithuania, the most important question being how to modernize and under what circumstances. The difficulty was compounded by the fact questions of identity depended on tsarist Russia rather than the local Lithuanian inhabitants, as public discussion on the topic was nearly impossible though there was some potential to examine this on a personal basis. An active process of Russification was also imposed upon Lithuanian society during the occupation (Staliūnas 2007).

While the process of identity formation is highly contested, most agree that creating a national identity not only requires common goals but also requires a mechanism for spreading information about the nation. Questions of education are also important as are the meaning, construction and role of the public sphere. In the Lithuanian case, the role of the public sphere and the open forum for discussions was found in the press. As mentioned above, publications using the Latin alphabet were prohibited following the 1863-1864 uprising; as such everything was published in so called *grazdanka,* or the Russian alphabet with Lithuanian grammar structure and wording, until 1904. Books and other publications that did not fit this rule were printed in neighboring Prussia and then smuggled into Lithuania. So it happened with the first Lithuanian newspapers *Aušra* (The Dawn) (1883-1886), *Varpas* (The Bell) (1889-1906), *Tėvynės sargas* (The Guard of the Fatherland) (1896-1904) and others. All of these early periodicals started with the common purpose of spreading the idea of Lithuania and its identity to the population. At the same time, many of these periodicals had their own world view and ideological background.

But for nation building efforts to be successful, while various circumstances such as political, economical, and international conditions are needed, there must also exist a critical mass of those who believe in the new ideas and projects. Czech historian and political scientist Miroslav Hroch identifies three phases in this process, the first being scholarly interest in the nation's past, heritage, language, and so forth. The second phase consists of patriotic agitation in which new ideas, patterns of identity, ways of development and notions about modernization are spread among the core group of believers. The final phase of identity formation requires a mass movement directed towards the widespread acceptance of these newly shared ideas (Hroch 1985). According to Hroch's model, national movements start as cultural revivalist movements, which gradually transform themselves into political movements, followed by some political demands such as the liberalization of cultural politics, autonomy or independence. Independence is often seen as the highest goal and the most effective tool for the dominant group to preserve and develop its identity, culture, traditions, education, political traditions and system.

Vilnius University served as an intellectual center until its closing. The university's strong tradition in the humanities meant that the university was still producing historical research based on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Kingdom of Poland or the Commonwealth, while literature studies were likewise strong and well-developed. For example, Joachim Lelevel, a well-known historian of 19th century and one of the founders of numismatics, taught at Vilnius University. Likewise, from 1815-1819, the poet Adam Mickiewicz was actively involved in the liberal student movement *Philomats* and *Philarets* at the university, activities for which he was punished by tsarist authorities. While most know Mickiewicz for his Polish-language poetry, his works include many images drawn from medieval Lithuania.[8] In many respects, then, research and images of the past

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[8] Mickiewicz was born in Zaos nearby Novogrudek (Naugardukas) in contemporary Belarus, in a noble family who spoke Polish but according to tradition and family identity considered themselves Lithuanians. After finishing school he went to study in Vilnius, the historical and political capital of Grand Duchy of Lithuania but at the time one of the administrative centers in tsarist Russia. After graduation he was appointed as a teacher to a Kaunas district school, though he experienced difficulties with the tsarist

and the Grand Duchy were still alive among scholars, intellectuals, and the nobility.

In the middle of the 19th century more ethnic Lithuanian students, whether from well-off peasant or noble origin, enrolled at universities. Roughly speaking, this is the time when new ideas started to circulate in the broader society and with a new audience, the most important of these new constituencies being the Lithuanian peasantry. Writers included Simonas Stanevičius, a collector of folk songs, and Dionizas Poška, a linguist of peasant origin, and Simonas Daukantas, a historian usually considered a pioneer of modern Lithuanian historiography (Balkelis 2009). Poška wrote primarily in Polish and Daukantas in Lithuanian but both contributed to the creation of Lithuanian words still in use.

In the same period, Bishop Motiejus Valančius developed his approach to promoting Lithuanian identity. Ignas Končius gives a brief description of old peasant identity.[9] As with many sons of peasants, Valančius found himself in a contradictory situation. On one hand he came from well-off peasant family and so was familiar with rural life, traditions, and the Lithuanian language. On the other hand, he was a clergyman from an inherently conservative institution which also found it necessary to cooperate with tsarist authorities if it was to survive.[10] At the same time, Valančius clearly

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authorities for his Philomat and Philaret activities. He also spent time in St. Petersburg, Odessa, Crimea, and Moscow and was active in the 1848 Constantinople uprisings.

[9] Ignas Končius (1886-1975) was a Lithuanian ethnographer and physicist, who later settled in Boston. In his memoirs, *Žemaičio šnekos* (Talks of a Samogitian) he demonstrates the typical Lithuanian rural mentality and its traditional values. Among other information Končius provides one typical traditional peasant world view. In answer to the question 'who is a human being', he provides the traditional answer: a peasant. Then what about clergymen? They are not human beings, they are superior, they are closer to God. And nobility? Nobility is nobility, they rule, and we have nothing in common. Are Jews human beings? No, they are not. Why? Because they do not work" (1961). The story offers insights into the traditional peasant worldview that only those who perform hard agricultural labor are truly human beings, thus demonstrating the barriers that needed to be crossed during the period of modernization.

[10] For the ceremony, the tsar donated 1000 silver rubles in order for the bishop to be attired according to the requirements of his position; this included a mitre and a ring, decorated with gemstones.

realized the need for modernization in Lithuania. Looking for ways to combine these three elements, he frequently found himself at odds with the tsarist authorities, so much so that his Diocese was moved from Varniai into Kaunas, thus allowing the authorities to keep a more watchful eye on his activities. Nonetheless, Valančius writings and correspondence suggest that he embraced some notions of modernization rather that sticking to conservative, status quo thinking. One of his initiatives was a rather successful temperance movement in the Lithuanian provinces during a time when the state had a strong alcohol monopoly; the movement therefore not only had an effect on social behaviors but also on the state's budget and income. He also organized efforts to publish books and smuggle them into Lithuania, even writing extensively himself.

Valančius's writings included practical suggestions on daily life, homilies, literature for children and adults, and historical works. Two of his important works written for adult daily reading are *Palangos Juzė* (Joseph from Palanga) and *Paaugusių žmonių knygelė* (Booklet for adults). The content of both books is simple and based on daily life, but the conclusions and morals were intended to have an educational impact on the reader. The main character of the first book, a young gentleman named Joseph, is ready to choose his career. Coming from a peasant family, Joseph would be expected to choose agricultural activities in that according to the peasant way of thinking only a person engaged in agricultural activities could be considered a true human being. But this traditional mentality had social impacts: marriages were organized according to their perceived economic benefit, the same plot of land was divided among all brothers in such a way that it left each with very small lots that were economically insignificant and left owners at a subsistence level of production, and so on. So Joseph does the unthinkable and decides to become a tailor. But instead of ruining his life, Valančius shows that Joseph enjoys his life, travels around the vicinities, meets new people, is happy, wealthy and well-respected. The message is clear: it is time to think in a more modern way, to accept challenges and uncertainty, and that these choices could provide for a prosperous and respectful life as well. In doing so, Valančius broke with the more conservative and tsarist notions of a social structure ordained

by God and instead reacted to the real situation of his followers in a modernizing world and society.

Paaugusių žmonių knygelė is a composition of different novels depicting daily peasant life with the objective of giving practical suggestions on daily life and lessons of morality. In the center of these novels are ordinary men confronted by the challenges of modernity and the possibilities of prosperity. Equally important, however, are important and necessary traditional and often hierarchical social structures, including that of the Catholic Church. In one story, for instance, a wealthy Lithuanian farmer with good future prospects marries a Protestant, at which time his life changes and his success turns to economic and marital/familial failure. As was the case with many of his stories, there is an older and wiser priest who attempts to warn the groom of his impending bad fortune saying: "behold, she might raise your children as Lutherans" (Valančius 2001). While Valančius is not overflowing with Middle Ages messianism, saying that the Catholic Church is the only true church and should dominate, he is emphasizing that it is crucial for Catholics to stick to their traditions and avoid interreligious marriages. From this, one could infer that Valančius considers the Catholic faith one feature necessary for a true Lithuanian.

Second, Valančius seems to argue that Lithuanians, usually men, are not brave enough to involve themselves in new economic activities such as the trades. The third feature, which is also found throughout Valančius' literary creations, is a strictly paternal attitude toward the developing Lithuanian communities. While he cares for and loves the peasants and gives them practical suggestions meant to improve their peasant lives, he also shows that Lithuanians need to be looked after by more educated people who can discern what is good and what is bad or how one should act in one or another situation. For example, Valančius simultaneously encourages Lithuanians to get involved in small business, to open shops and small enterprises, while at the same time arguing that Lithuanians should do that primarily on their own and avoid cooperation with others, especially with Jews who, for historical reasons operated small business as well.[11] In another reading, he encourages Lithuanians to pursue

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[11] Some might say that Valančius was anti-Semitic given some phrases and

local activities and to develop their businesses in their vicinities or parishes rather than across wider networks, as these wide Gubernia or larger regional networks might be already be well organized, again by Jews. (Valančius 2001). Again, Valančius appears to be arguing that the Lithuanian community is in its development stage and needs to take small steps to gain experience in these fields. So while it is necessary to take the path of modernization, one must do so responsibly and incrementally.

Other identity groups also appear in the novels, many times portrayed in a negative light. Valančius shows Lithuanians abused or fooled by Gypsies and traveling non-professional doctors, who in Lithuanian folklore are sometimes called 'Hungarians', a term used by Valančius. In some of the stories Valančius says that even Catholic priests tend to use Lithuanian ignorance in order to benefit from their own or neighboring congregations. Summing up the Lithuanian peasant situation, Valančius concludes that "everyone cheats on these miserables" (Valančius 2001).

Valančius' novels and stories were just two of many responses to the modernization that was challenging Lithuania, bringing with it different and new ways of life, moving people from rural to urban environments, creating new values and new notions of self-definition and identity.[12] The Lithuanian press also played an important role in the move towards a more modern Lithuania. As previously mentioned, the Lithuanian press started with *Aušra* in 1883, a newspaper established by Jonas Basanavičius and Jonas Šliūpas, both of whom were medical doctors engaged in the Lithuanian national

expressions in his texts. However, if one looks into the broader context of his oeuvre it is possible to argue for another motivation for his discouraging Lithuanian and Jewish cooperation. Valančius argues that Jews at the time are more educated, better organized, and more accustomed to these activities. In a cooperative situation Lithuanians would be in a disadvantageous position and potentially open to being misused by those who were better educated and more experienced (Valančius 2001).

[12] Georges Simmel and Ferdinand Tonnies provide us with some further information on the challenges of modernity, particularly as these apply to feelings of alienation. Simmel, for example, noted that modernity is a tension between the rapid development of science, technology, and objective knowledge and the erosion of subjective, personal culture. Tonnies used two terms in defining the tensions of modernity: gemeinschaft – an organic, natural community, and Gesellschaft – mechanized, fragmented, diversified society (Donskis 2002).

revival. Both came from peasant families, but at the same time participated in various liberal activities. For example, Basanavičius was the head of the Lithuanian Council that announced the state's independence on February 16, 1918, while Šliūpas actively participated in the creation of a number of political parties and civil society organizations.

Toward the middle of the 20th century prevailing liberal notions were being transformed by more nationalistic ones; as Donskis emphasizes, "linguistic/cultural nationalism and political nationalism thus became intertwined" (2002, 23). Newspapers followed in this style. For example, Römeris[13] called *Aušra* a utopian newspaper because a plurality of the authors believed that a national revival had to be cultural in nature, and that this revival should not enter into the public sphere (2006). Other Lithuanian periodicals, however, served as the cradles for future political parties, at least in terms of their ideological perspectives. Despite these differences, all Lithuanian newspapers underlined the significance of Lithuanian ethnicity, its exceptionality, and the need for modernization of the Lithuanian culture. Quite often the authors in the Lithuanian press reflected Valančius's position, that is, to look at the Lithuanian community as a subject undergoing the process of development and requiring guidance, protection, and orientation toward the best direction. Such an approach did tend to create a somewhat defensive position more orientated to inner, more homogeneous values, than open and heterogeneous ones. On the eve of World War I, then, the process

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[13] Römeris' ancestors came to Grand Duchy of Lithuania from Germany and settled there for several centuries. Römeris was educated at St. Petersburg Royal Law Academy, where only nobility studied. Graduates often became part of the tsarist bureaucratic system, but Römeris continued his studies at Jaglellionien University at Krakow, and later studied at the Free Political Science School in Paris. After his graduation in 1901, he returned to Vilnius and started his professional and social activities. Primarily he believed in the idea of reconstructing a Commonwealth of two nations and supported the Polish side in this project. But Römeris quite quickly realized Lithuanian potential, stopped his engagement with the Polish side, and after the occupation of Vilnius by Poles in 1920 he moved to Kaunas the provisional capital city of Lithuania. Römeris demonstrated the ability to combine several notions of identity, from the Grand Duchy, to the Polish national movement, to the Lithuanian side – to which he made a number of contributions in education and judicial politics.

of modernization and new identity building was on the rise, but as Balkelis notes, it was far from complete (Balkelis 2009).

Independent Lithuania

Central-Eastern Europe after World War I was characterized by cultural fragmentation. According to Kundera (1984, 5):

> *The history of the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Hungarians has been turbulent and fragmented. Their traditions of statehood have been weaker and less continuous than those of the larger European nations. Boxed in by the Germans on one side and the Russians on the other, the nations of Central Europe have used up their strength in the struggle to survive and to preserve their languages. Since they have never been entirely integrated into the consciousness of Europe, they have remained the least known and the most fragile part of the West – hidden, even further, by the curtain of their strange and scarcely accessible languages.*

While left off the list, there is little doubt that Lithuanians both shared the attributes noted by Kundera and took positions that were protective of the nation. Several phases of national development could be seen in the period of independence following the First World War. In the early stages of independence, starting with the elections to the tsarist Duma, Lithuanian politicians were quite cooperative with other national groups, including Jews. On the other hand, there existed potential areas of conflict. For example, there was some mistrust of Russian-speaking populations, particularly given the Russification efforts under the Tsarist regime. There were also some serious debates with Polish politicians, some of whom believed that a large, strong Poland was of greater importance than the fate of an independent Lithuania. At the same time, some Lithuanian politicians had a notion of recreating the Grand Duchy of Lithuania according to an ethnolinguistic national model. From this the question arose as to whether Lithuanians would be able to 'Lithuanize' former territories with large Jewish, Belarusian, and Ukrainian populations. Assuming the answer was no, the idea of a

smaller but more homogeneous country took priority over a larger multinational one. At the same time, national revivals were taking place in Jewish, Belarusian, and Ukrainian communities. Because of the doubts expressed above about Russians and Poles, Belarusians and Jews were seen as possible allies to the Lithuanian cause, with the former perceived to be allies in domestic efforts, particularly in Vilnius, and the latter in the international arena.

There were some successful achievements as a result of this cooperation in the elections to the tsarist parliament, when Lithuanians and Jews made agreements to support one another's candidates or to vote for an agreed candidate. In the case of a win, one of these candidates in the Duma would represent not only Lithuanian or Jewish positions, but would raise more general questions concerning such issues as national culture and religious questions. This cooperation proved to be fruitful.

A more conservative, Catholic church-oriented ideology provided a different perspective. One of the proponents of this approach was a priest, Adomas Dambrauskas-Jakštas.[14] In 1906, in Kaunas, Dambrauskas-Jakštas published a volume of novels called *Trys pa nekesiai ant Nemuno kranto* (Three conversations on Nemunas riverbank) in which he provided three novels that depicted three different types of Lithuanians. The first were those who already understood the necessity of working for the benefit of Lithuania and were doing so; they were speaking and writing in Lithuanian and encouraging others to do so. The second group were those who were 'half awake', that is, while they understood what was happening in Lithuania and were supporting the political process, they were not brave enough to express themselves in Lithuanian and demonstrate their support. The third group, which is depicted in the novel called *Heroes* consisted of the socialists. According to Dambrauskas-Jakštas, during a visit with a friend he met a third man who expressed socialist ideas, which triggered a debate. The author

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[14] Adomas Dambrauskas-Jakštas (1860-1938) was born to a Lithuanian peasant family and became a Catholic priest, active member of the Lithuanian national revival, collaborator in *Aušra*, and founder and editor of several other Lithuanian newspapers and magazines. With his colleagues, he created the program of the Lithuanian Christian-Democrats party. He wrote a variety of novels, poems, literary critique articles, and taught at University.

states that socialists are wrong for several reasons: first, socialists are speaking too generally about unfair labor markets, the misuse of labor, and their critiques of the bourgeoisie. He claims these are empty declarations: one who is speaking about everything, generally, is speaking about nothing. Second, the author asks whether his opponent knows that socialism was created by Jews, so supporting socialism means supporting Jews. Third, a nationally-conscious Lithuanian should not expend his efforts to other questions and problems, but should focus only on Lithuanian issues. According to the author, "don't you see that Lithuanians are on the way to creating their own culture, identity and society, but are still weak in comparison with other national groups such as Poles or Jews. In such a process, every person should be engaged in strengthening the Lithuanian community; it is unpatriotic to engage in solving the problems of other communities when your own community needs help." In short, socialism is a tricky and evil ideology, and a devoted Lithuanian would never share these views.

This era also saw the creation of political parties based upon the dominant ideologies of the period: liberalism, socialism and conservatism. The first such party was the Social-Democrats established in Vilnius, on May 1, 1896.[15] But as seen in Dambrauskas-Jakštas, who represented conservative, Christian-Democratic thinking, these ideas were often perceived as wrong, if not to say, evil. The creation of the Social Democratic party was followed by different parties and unions, including the Lithuanian Christian-Democrats, established in 1905.

On February 16, 1918, Lithuania declared independence, proclaiming itself a democratic country with its seat of governance to be its historical capital city, Vilnius. At the same time, it was indicated that the territory of the state was based on Lithuanian ethnic lands. This created a double-sided situation: on the one hand, legally speaking, all citizens were equal despite their religion or ethnicity; they had rights to vote and to be elected to the *Seimas* (Parliament). On the other hand, the principal of ethnicity created

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[15] At the end of 19th century social democratic and socialist ideas in Lithuania were fairly popular, especially in Vilnius where other socialist parties had existed since 1893 when Pilsudski had created the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, and in 1897 the Jewish social democratic party, the Bund.

some clear differences based on *us* and *them* distinctions and even tensions – *we* were the dominant group (Lithuanians) that means *we* are the real owners and creators of the country, other ethnic groups are just *guests*. Later this notion turned into public discourse openly using terms like guests, visitors, etc., when referring to local Lithuanian national minorities who were in fact citizens of Lithuania. Of course this type of radicalization in public discourse resembled a broader trend in extreme rightist ideologies in Europe at the time. This was, of course, extremely problematic given the multinational character of the first Republic of Lithuania. For instance, according to the 1923 census, the Jewish community of some 153,000 thousand souls, represented 7.6% of the whole population (*Lietuvos žydai* 2012) with other sizable groups including the Poles, Russians and Belarusians.

While it is fair to characterize the start of the independence period as dominated by liberal thinking, liberal parties experienced difficulties in their organization. As a result, the political sphere was dominated by Social-Democrats and various types of conservative parties or unions, with the Christian-Democrats being most organized and enjoying the widest base of support from civil society. National minorities also participated in elections and usually received a few seats in *Seimas*. Tensions between left and right wings naturally existed and some expressed themselves in intensive debates through public forums, posters, caricatures, and texts in newspapers and journals. Elections to the *Seimas* were tightly contested, the tensions being carried over to the debates taking place in the parliamentary body.

After the Constitutive *Seimas,* there were three more parliaments prior to the December 17, 1926, *coup d'etat*. In the first *Seimas* (1922-1923) there were twenty representatives from the Peasants-Populists party, thirty-eight from the Christian-Democrat coalition, ten Social-Democrats, five from the Workers Company, and five representatives of national minorities, including Poles and Jews. In the second Parliament (1923-1926) there were fourteen representatives of the Christian-Democrats and Farmers Union, twelve from the Labor Federation, sixteen from the Peasants-Populists, eight Social-Democrats, and fourteen representatives of national minorities, including seven Jews, four Poles, one Russian and two

Germans. The majority was held by the Christian-Democrats and their allies, the Farmers Union and Labor Federation. Finally, in the third Seimas (1926-1927) which had little influence following the *coup d'etat*, the Peasants-Populists had twenty-two seats, Social-Democrats fifteen, Christian-Democrats fourteen, Farmers Union eleven, Labor Federation five, Lithuanian Nationalists Union three, and the Farmers Party two. National minorities had twelve seats in all, including five Germans, or more correctly Memelanders, who mostly lived in Klaipėda area, a former German territory that was administered by the League of Nations after World War I and was joined with Lithuanian territory in 1923. Three of the five considered themselves Lithuanians, making national statistics misleading as official statistics indicate only nine, rather than twelve national minority representatives. Poles had four seats and three Jewish representatives were seated (*Lietuvos statistikos metra tis* 1927, Table 1). These data confirm the previous statement about the fate of liberal parties in the early *Seimas*, namely, that while both left and right wing ideologies were clearly represented, liberal representatives were absent. Liberals could be found within every political organization, but these party members were quite often attacked by the other party members for being too liberal or supporting another camp. In this respect, liberalism, at least within the context of this time and culture, was more individual in nature and lacked a strict party organization.

Another important ideological feature bears mentioning. One of the tensions between left and right centered on cooperation with national minorities, with the left generally working to establish coalitions with national minorities while the right insisted that Lithuanians themselves should do everything within their power to create their own country and culture. The first two *Seimas* were dominated by right wing parties, while the third one was dominated by the left, with national minorities supporting the government. While martial law and censorship were lifted during this period, the Church, the Christian-Democrats and other conservative parties and organizations started to fear that these reforms might adversely affect their interests.

These feelings contributed to the *coup d'etat* in 1926, when on the night of December 17th young military officers seized power and

suggested Antanas Smetona[16] assume power. He agreed and began his stint as an authoritarian leader. The American Consul in Kaunas at that time, Robert W. Heingartner, commented on the event in his personal diary, saying that "my astonishment was great when I entered the office at 9 o'clock and learned that there had been a military coup d'etat during the night ... most of the cabinet ministers, including the President, were under arrest" (2009, 75). In Senn's introduction and comments on Heingartner's diary, he notes that the consul first sent news about the event to Washington on the 22nd of December, and then noted in his diary that the new president was, "no doubt a happy choice for the presidency" (2009, 79). According to Heingartner's diary, he met Smetona and his wife before the coup and found him an agreeable man, who told him about the glorious Lithuanian past, regaling him about the state from Baltic to the Black sea, the threats of russification and polonization, and the notion that France and Great Britain had sacrificed Lithuania to Poland (2009). At the same time, Smetona after the coup grew closer to the military, reinstituted martial law and censorship, and created a cult of personality.

Lithuania's society was very vibrant at that time and while there was some support for a more authoritarian rule support for liberal and pluralistic ideas and democracy were not entirely discredited or devalued in society. In order to build support for the coup, Smetona and supporters such as Professor Izidorius Tamošaitis, one of the ideological leaders of the Lithuanians Nationalist Union, attempted to make the case for authoritarianism with much of their argument centering on the threat posed to Lithuania from leftists and national minorities. Pointing to the results of elections to the third *Seimas,* they argued that the parliament was too leftist, with some even calling it Bolshevik. They argued that threats to religion, language,

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[16] Antanas Smetona was one of the most important Lithuanian political figures between World War I and World War II. He served as the first President of Lithuania from April 4, 1919, to June 19, 1920. He again served as the last President of the country from December 19, 1926, to June 15, 1940, before its occupation by the Soviet Union. He was also one of the most famous ideologues of Lithuanian nationalism arguing that the important goal of the Lithuanian nation was the re-establishment of an independent Lithuanian state. In 1941, Smetona emigrated to the United States, settling in Cleveland, Ohio in May 1942, where he died on January 9, 1944.

and even the independent state were increasing. While avoiding explicitly anti-democratic rhetoric, though some authors and politicians were in favor for Fascism or Nazism, they attempted to create a portrait of a Lithuanian nation that was too young and uneducated to use its liberty wisely, as the elections showed. In order to preserve the nation from future electoral and cultural surprises, it was better for Lithuanians to temporarily live under the authoritarian regime. According to Eidintas, 1927 was a year of great difficulty for Smetona, who had to legalize the results of coup d'etat, show gratitude to the army, deal with and calm down opposition, show attention to the provinces, and create mechanisms to support his power (2012).

In the 1930s, more and more attention was given to national values, and interpretations of the past were subject to change. The loss of Vilnius and the Vilnius region to the Poles was of particular concern. In the modern Lithuanian narrative created in the 19th century, Vilnius was seen not only as the historical Lithuanian capital, but also as a Lithuanian city, ignoring the fact that it was a multicultural town. The loss of Vilnius was a clear sign that the common history with Poland should be reinterpreted, the most arresting result of this reinterpretation being that the Union of Lublin was now seen as the beginning of Lithuania's decline. The Polish-speaking Lithuanian nobility of the past were treated as aliens or at least as bad Lithuanians, who betrayed or forgot their mother tongue. The agricultural reform in Lithuania in 1920-1922 was explained not only as a move for social equality, but also as an opportunity to weaken big landlords who were, of course, depicted as pro-Polish.

As an important Lithuanian historian at that time, Adolfas Šapoka began the search for the Lithuanians in the history of Lithuania, looking to the period when the Grand Duke Vytautas was given the title *the Great*. Seen through a strongly nationalist lens, Lithuanians were presented as members of a successful, strong nation, and the plurality of achievements in the country were attributed to Lithuanians themselves rather than to co-equal Poles, for instance. Nationalistic values became more popular, the question of national minorities was raised more often, and authorities were encouraged to solve problems attributed to minorities, sometimes being encouraged to use strategies adopted in Italy or Germany, for

example, when a young Lithuanian philosopher Antanas Maceina in 1939 wrote: "The most important feature of the state is its cohesion … The existence of the new state is founded not on the citizen, but on the Lithuanian compatriot … The state, being the reunification of the nation, cannot treat foreigners, or so called ethnic minorities, in the same way as it treats Lithuanian compatriots" (Donskis 2002, 28). But President Smetona managed to keep to a moderate position – to encourage Lithuanian culture, trades, economy, but at the same time avoid overt discrimination toward other national groups. In the first republic of Lithuania, despite all the tensions, the growing nationalism and the sometimes radical ideas, a plurality of cultures and identities continued to exist, thus making Lithuania integral part of Central Europe. As Kundera says (1984, 6):

> *At the beginning of our century, Central Europe was, despite its political weakness, a great cultural center, perhaps the greatest. And, admittedly, while the importance of Vienna, the city of Freud and Mahler, is readily acknowledged today, its importance and originality make little sense unless they are seen against the background of the other countries and cities that together participated in, and contributed creatively to, the culture of Central Europe. If the school of Schönberg founded the twelve-tone system, the Hungarian Béla Bartók, one of the greatest musicians of the twentieth century, knew how to discover the last original possibility in music based on the tonal principle. With the work of Kafka and Hasek, Prague created the great counterpart in the novel to the work of the Viennese Musil and Broch. The cultural dynamism of the non-German-speaking countries was intensified even more after 1918, when Prague offered the world the innovations of structuralism and the Prague Linguistic Circle … And in Poland the great trinity of Witold Gombrowicz, Bruno Schulz, and Stanislas Witkiewicz anticipated the European modernism of the 1950s, notably the so-called theater of the absurd.*

The question was how to integrate all these different identities and cultures. Frankly speaking, at least in Lithuania efforts were not very successful. Thus, especially in the 1930s and 1940s, Lithuanians encouraged other national groups to be patriotic and speak

the Lithuanian language and showed little interest in neighboring ones.

Schools also played a role in shaping the ideas about history and memories that went into identity formation. While it is unnecessary to discuss the entire educational system of interwar Lithuania at this juncture, it is useful to focus on one particular element. There were no doubts about the necessity of primary education and high school education for the normal functioning of society. State-run and private primary and secondary schools existed, some run by national minorities, using their languages for teaching.

There were, however, some debates about the university system and the kind of university the new society needed. Because of a lack of money, authorities decided there was insufficient funding to found a university; they determined that a more affordable solution would be to provide scholarships for talented students to study abroad. There were also a number of debates that took place about the nature of a university: should it be oriented to narrow specializations suitable for training concrete professions? Or should it be based on a broader educational approach predicated on certain values. The so-called High Courses were opened in 1920, and Lithuania University was opened February 16, 1922, primarily by the initiative by several colleagues who chose the second type of university.

Another important idea was that the university should be national and contribute to the prosperity of the new state and its society while also being a gateway to the world, a place of education, research and critical study. While there were some official requirements regarding the admission of national minorities university officials did not follow through on these. On the contrary, the university became the place of knowledge and scholarly debates, and a number of statesmen taught at the University, including Juozas Tumas-Vaižgantas, Izidorius Tamošaitis, Petras Klimas, Augustinas Voldemaras and Antanas Smetona. The newly established University recruited internationally regarded teaching staff, Alfred Senn a linguist, Vasilij Sezeman, a philosopher, or Lev Karsavin, historian and historiographer who, while working at Vytautas Magnus University, wrote what is still considered one of the best books on medieval

culture. In short, the university succeeded in its two goals: to create an educated future generation and to integrate differences in religious and national outlooks.[17]

Occupations

The first Soviet occupation not only stopped all these processes, but also tried to change the type of identity being developed in the interwar years: in the place of national identity was advanced the idea of a class-based identity. In the interwar period, Lithuania was a nationalizing country that restricted top positions in public administration and state institutions (except cities and municipalities), including the army and police, to national minorities. During the first Soviet occupation, this situation changed with many ethnic Lithuanians feeling betrayed by national minorities, as if the latter were Soviet collaborators. This situation contributed to the creation of an even more nationally-based identity. For example, in Lithuanian memories, the first exiles to Siberia were Lithuanian, though documents show that Lithuanian citizens of other nationalities were sent there as well. Because of the first Soviet occupation and its effects on Lithuanian society, the German occupation was seen as holding out the possibility of restoring Lithuania's independence. Moscow planned to use the Baltic states to show to the world community that these three states were willingly entering the USSR. According to Senn (2007, 252), "[T]he entire process followed the plan first laid out by the Politburo in October 1939. Without the

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[17] Perhaps the best illustration of this viewpoint was offered by Stasys Šalkauskis, a philosophy professor and last Rector of the university before the Soviet occupation. Šalkauskis argued that social education should be geared toward fostering social activities and political culture, including the proper relationships between individuals, their relationships with institutions, and the responsibilities of institutions. National education was to be based on three levels – national, patriotic and nationwide. The first level was necessary to gain knowledge of one's language, history, customs and traditions. Patriotic education was necessary to integrate these different national educations, from the perspective of common values and potential for future cooperation. The last step in education was international education from which one would learn that educated individuals with common goals, values and strong cultures could complement and enrich each other (Šalkauskis 2002).

Politburo's guidance the three Baltic republics would not have marched lockstep into the Soviet Union."

Individuals in Lithuanian society could be placed into at least four groups at the beginning of the Soviet occupation: 1) those who favored the occupation, such as the Lithuanian Communist party, and some public figures and intellectuals who related the occupation more with socialist ideas and less with oppressive occupation; 2) those who were against the occupation; 3) those who were fed up with Smetona's regime and were waiting for any changes; and 4) those who remained indifferent and took a "we'll see" approach. The first group favored continued occupation, while the second tried to resist. The third and fourth groups realized over time that the Soviet occupation would not only affect the former development of the state, identity and culture but that it could even pose a physical threat. Lithuanians were used to life in a relatively calm society with a dominant Lithuanian language, Lithuanians in top government positions, and an active Catholic church; yet within a year almost all of this was lost. The Lithuanian language was pushed aside by Russian or both languages were used, top administrative positions will filled with representatives of other nationalities, the Catholic church faced oppression by the regime, as did Lutheran churches and synagogues, though Lithuanians took less notice of the latter instances of oppression.

The feelings of betrayal encouraged the most nationalist of Lithuanian organizations to take their chances to restore justice. A clandestine organization called the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF) was established, headed by Kazys Škirpa, the head of Consular department in the Lithuanian Embassy to Nazi Germany and admirer of that order. The first statement in the LAF's rules indicated that a member of the organization could be any ethnic Lithuanian regardless of his political orientation. Two things should be highlighted here: first, the strong nationalist statement that only Lithuanians were welcome in the organization and second, that political or party orientation was unimportant. Taken together, these elements meant that a future Lithuania was projected as a nationalist and autocratic country and that national minorities were problematic as were political parties. The idea that Lithuanian nationalists could use a military conflict between Nazi Germany and USSR was fulfilled as members

of the LAF started an uprising and fought against the Soviets, at the same time saluting the "war genius Adolf Hitler and the new Europe" (*Naujoji Lietuva* 1941, 1).

While the pro-Nazi Provisional Government was created in order to restore independence, or at least this is how it was announced on the radio, the Nazis themselves had different plans. On the one hand, the Nazis saw Lithuania, and more broadly the former Commonwealth's territory and Ukraine, as a storage and supply area and did not care too much about the local inhabitant's aspirations; all that was required was to keep them calm and feeling threatened. Second, Hitler fought two wars all the time, one with his adversaries on the battlefield and a second with a perceived worldwide Jewish conspiracy. The Jewish population in this region was large, so the Holocaust started immediately after the Nazis invaded one territory after another (Snyder 2010). As opposed to the Soviets, the Nazis based their ideology on race, and as previously mentioned some elements of Lithuanian society also preferred to think in ethnic terms and emphasize differences between various national groups. Having in mind the feelings of betrayal at the hands of national minorities from the time of the first Soviet occupation and some popular stereotypes that Socialism and Bolshevism were created by Jews, the Nazis did not have too much difficulty separating and stigmatizing the Lithuanian Jewish community and encouraging some Lithuanians to willingly participate in mass killings. Indeed, one of the most popular stereotypes of the time was that Jews and Bolshevism were one and the same, a perception captured by the term 'judeobolshevism'.

The result of the Nazi occupation was horrific, with more than ninety percent of local Lithuanian Jews being killed in their homeland by Nazis and their collaborators. As a result, the world and Lithuania almost lost the unique Litvak culture, and after the war Lithuania was a less multicultural and vibrant society then before. At the time, however, many in Lithuanian society did not feel that it could be losing something precious. From 1918-1940, different cultures and identities existed side by side but had little interest in each other. During the Nazi occupation, the most active individuals in society were Nazi sympathizers or those who supported strong nationalist views and believed in opposition between different national groups.

For example, the LAF program in 1941 mentioned (Donskis 2002, 27):

The preservation of the Lithuanian nation's racial purity, the encouragement of Lithuanian women in the accomplishment of their paramount mission – to provide the nation with as many healthy newborns as possible, the promotion of Lithuanian ethnic domination in the country's largest cities, the strict and uncompromising battle against trends within Lithuanian culture that are irrespectfully loyal to and respectful of Lithuanian-ness, or do not hold the nation and national cohesion to the first priority in all matters.

Such plans, one based on a 'pure' nation and a culture and identity based on ethnic values all with a corresponding state, did not prevail. As early as two months after the beginning of the Nazi occupation it became clear that the restoration of Lithuania did not fit into Nazi plans. Indeed, as noted by Juozas Brazaitis, who replaced K. Škirpa as Prime Minister and later served as minister of education, Lithuanians at the time felt 'all alone' (*Vienų vieni*) fearing a second Soviet occupation perhaps more than the Nazis. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the second Soviet occupation, there still were hopes to regain the state's independence with the help of the West. But it was also an illusion. So in some respects, Lithuanian identity was frozen in its phase of development around 1940, a sentiment captured by Kundera when he argued that (1984, 11):

Central Europe, therefore, should fight not only against its big oppressive neighbor but also against the subtle, relentless pressure of time, which is leaving the era of culture in its wake. That's why in Central European revolts there is something conservative, nearly anachronistic: they are desperately trying to restore the past, the past of culture, the past of the modern era. It is only in that period, only in a world that maintains a cultural dimension, that Central Europe can still defend its identity, still be seen for what it is.

So language kept its significance, lithuanized Lithuanian history preserved its significance, and religion (Catholicism first of all)

became a form of resistance. Outside of the Lithuanian homeland, those in exile, which included the more than 60,000 Lithuanians who had left the country after World War II, continued their cultural and social life in one of two directions. The first direction took a conservative approach, where they felt that they brought Lithuania with themselves and that it was their duty and mission to preserve Lithuanian-ness. As such, this approach called for maintaining inter-war period organizations, political and social structures, views and ideology. Their attitudes towards Soviet Lithuania were troubled, as some felt that maintaining contact, even with friends or relatives, would grant legitimacy to the Soviet occupation. For these individuals, the only way to live was in a closed Lithuanian sphere outside Lithuania, cherish Lithuanian-ness and plan to bring it back when Lithuania again became independent.

The second direction came mainly from the *Santara-Šviesa* (Concord-Light) organization, which suggested another way of being Lithuanian in the world. With this approach, one was advised to be open to the world, pay attention not only what is happening with one's national community but with others as well, and in general try to contribute to the creation of a better world based on variety, mutual understanding and recognition of contribution. This more open, liberal discourse was grounded and developed in Lithuanian culture as well, asserting that there was not a 'Lithuanian' versus 'non-Lithuanian' problem. Rather, there are universal human problems, which parties and ideologies should respectfully debate. Donskis indicates that Vytautas Kavolis, a prominent scholar of sociology and comparative civilizations in the USA and one of the leaders of the *Santara-Šviesa* organization, suggested this new type of identity. Instead of closing oneself up in the confines of your own culture and thinking that occupied Lithuania is lost for the moment, Kavolis urged émigrés to search out contacts with the country and encourage people in various activities that may someday reconcile liberalism and nationalism in Lithuanian culture (Donskis 2002).

The development of identity in occupied Lithuania had perhaps even greater difficulties than those in the diaspora, both because the Soviets tried to create a homogeneous society based on Bolshevik ideology and culture, and because the main features of Lithuanian identity has already been named and did not change much

from 1940 through the period of occupation. On the other hand, when viewed in comparison to its Baltic neighbors, Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania fared relatively well, despite the losses to nationalism of the post-World War II period. As Hiden and Salmon note (1994, 132):

> *According to the 1970 census, ethnic Estonians constituted 60% compared to over 88% in 1934. In Latvia, ethnic Latvians amounted to 57% in comparison with a prewar figure of over 75%. By 1989, the proportion of Latvians had fallen to 50.7% - a bare majority. In Lithuania the proportion of ethnic Lithuanians still stood at 80% of the total population – only 4% less than the figure for 1923. They had even managed to increase their share of the population of Vilnius 43% by 1970.*

Conclusion

In the end, it is clear that Lithuanian culture and identity managed to survive despite Soviet efforts to do it great harm. Indeed, Vilnius itself serves to make the point that despite the tumult of the previous century, Lithuanian identity has moved only at the margins: this City of Strangers (Briedis 2009) is, as it was in the interwar years, the capital of the state and the center of the Lithuanian national projected.

However, at the end of the 20th century, after the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of Soviet Union, new forms of identity that are both more open and more complex have come to the fore in Central Europe. And thus we return to Kundera's description of the post-Cold War époque of unfair and unjust history. The people of Central Europe, says Kundera (1984, 8):

> *[C]annot be separated from European history; they cannot exist outside it; but they represent the wrong side of this history; they are its victims and outsiders. It's this disabused view of history that is the source of their culture, of their wisdom, of the "non-serious spirit" that mocks grandeur and glory. 'Never forget that only in opposing History as such can we resist the history of our*

> *own day.' I would love to engrave this sentence by Witold Gombrowicz above the entry gate to Central Europe.*

Were this to be done, it would not mean that everything has ended; on the contrary, it would mean that everything has just begun.

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A WORK IN PROGRESS: THE FORMATION OF BELARUSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

Aliaksandr Tsikhamirau

Introduction

This chapter examines the formation of the Belarusian identity in the context of the Belarusian *ethnos* and the factors that shaped this identity from ancient times until Belarusian independence. The chapter argues that the location of Belarusian lands, at the border between the Western and Eastern Christian world, likely impeded the formation of this identity and had an effect on the elements that characterize Belarusian identity, throughout its history.

The processes that led to the formation of Belarusian national identity were complicated and multidimensional. It is almost impossible to identify accurately the self-identification of the population that lived within the modern borders of Belarus in the earliest days of human settlement as an authentic local folklore, narrative sources, legal acts and the rest of it are unknown to us today. Nevertheless, a number of scholars argue that the early development of the Belarusian *ethnos* proceeded from a Baltic basis (Kastsiuk 2000; Taras 2010; Stankevich 2010). Existing toponyms for these inhabitants, primarily referenced by the names of nearby rivers, including among other the Biesiedz, Volma, Gaina, Drazhnia, Losha, Naroch, and Usha rivers, tell us about the influence of the Balts in the area. In the 6th century the Slavs were introduced into the ethnogenesis of the Belarusians while in the period between the 7th and 9th centuries, as a result of synthesis of the Baltic

and Slavic cultures, new ethnic communities were formed, including the Krivichs, the Dregovichs and the Radzimichs, the latter being direct predecessors to contemporary Belarusians. The first polities, such as the Polotsk and Turov-Pinsk lands-principalities, emerged between the 10th and 12th centuries, these populations being united not according to tribal criteria but on the basis of joint settlement on a given territory.

Kievan Rus'

In the 9th and 10th centuries, the pre-Belarusian population was involved in the process of creating a large empire with its center in Kiev, namely, Kievan Rus'. The Krivichs-Polochans took the most active part in this process. The accession of pre-Belarusian areas to Kievan Rus' led to the combination of a local or territorial self-identification with a more general imperial one, i.e., as part of the population deemed 'Russian'. The ethnonym *Rus'* (*rusy, rusiny, rusichi*) was also used to indicate Belarusian lands (Kraliuk 2011). An important component of the imperial ideology was the adoption and spread of Eastern Orthodox Christianity on the territories of Kievan Rus'. The conversion of Belarusian lands to Christianity began with the establishment of an Eparchy (or Episcopate) by the Great Kievan Prince Vladimir in Polotsk in 992. In 1005, a Christian Episcopate was also created in Turov.

By the beginning of the 12th century, a mixture of demonstrative, public Christian worship and continued secret worship of pagan deities was typical for the Belarusian lands. The religious dualism of the Belarusian ancestors was reflected in a legendary epic work, *The Tale of Igor's Campaign*, where it is said that while Polotsk Prince Vseslav Briacheslavovovich was crossing the Khorse's road disguised as a wolf, he heard the ringing of the bells from the Saint Sofia Cathedral in Polotsk (*Slovo o polku Igoreve* 1990). His removal of the Cathedral's bells in Novgorod during his military campaign of 1066, however, also testifies about Vseslav's hesitation in faith. At the same time, during his rule the cult of the Saints Boris and Gleb, whose assassination was attributed to Sviatopolk of

Turov, was deeply rooted and strong links with Kiev Pechersk Lawra were maintained.

In the 12th century, Orthodoxy became dominant in the Belarusian lands, though elements of paganism remained up to the 20th century. Conversion to Christianity contributed to consolidation of the elements of Slavic culture and language in the pre-Belarusian society, since the South-Bulgarian or Solun dialect was taken as a basis for Church Slavonic, the language in which religious sermons were read. At the same time the Orthodox Church functioned as a significant instrument for the consolidation of Russian lands, substituting local cults with a common imperial ideology based on the idea of inviolability of the canonic territory of the Russian Orthodox Church with Kiev at its center.

By the beginning of the 13th century the majority of the population of the Belarusian territories considered Orthodoxy as their natural faith. In particular, the Roman Pope Honorius III in his message to judges in Livonia from February 8, 1222, noted the fact that some Rutheni, settled in Livonia, preserved adherence to the "Greek schism masquerading under the guise of ancient customs" (Matuzova 2002, 206). Who actually adhered to the "Greek schism" is not noted in the message; however, it can be assumed that they were natives of the Polotsk principality.[18]

In the 12th century, the larger territories and principalities on the territory of Belarus began to divide themselves into smaller fiefdoms, a movement which increased the significance of separate towns such as Minsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Logoysk, Grodno, Pinsk, and Brest. Likewise, local toponyms, including the Polochans, the Pinchuks, the Turovichi, the Beresteitsy, the Orshantsy, and the Slutchans, came into existence and were used by the local population together with the ethnonyms noted above.

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[18] An equally important component of identity in these early times was the social status of a person. One's place in the social hierarchy, whether he was free or a slave, a representative of the aristocracy or an ordinary man, etc., played a key role.

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania

An important stage in the development of Belarusian identity and ultimately statehood was the accession of the Belarusian lands into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 13th and 14th centuries. The lands of the Upper Ponemanne, or the Black Rus', constituted the core of the Duchy, and very soon the term 'Litva' spread among them. A Belarusian town, Navahrudak, became the first center of the new state. Under the rule of the great Lithuanian princes, the territories of western Belarus became independent from the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, allowing them to better preserve their independence from Western European Knights Crusaders and the Golden Horde khans. In the 14th century, the rule of the great princes of Lithuania spread over the entire territory that now comprises Belarus's modern borders. Unlike western Belarus, the principalities of eastern, central and southern Belarus preserved political autonomy and their previous Russian identification. At the end of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th centuries, the term 'Lithuania', or sometimes Litva, was used to describe Troksk and Vilnius lands, Black Rus', Podlachia and Brest lands, Polesia, Pinsk, Minsk lands, districts on Berezina, Middle Dniepr and Sozh, and the western part of Polotsk lands with Braslaw. The term 'Rus' was used to describe Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Kievan lands, principalities of Chernigov-Northern lands, Volyn and Podolia (Bokhan 2008). The absence of a strict hierarchical power system in the Grand Duchy led to the use of many ethnonyms with respect to the population of the Belarusian lands, the Russians, the Ruthenians, the Litvins, the Litvins-Russians, being among the more common. In the middle of the 13th century, Western European chroniclers started using the term *White Rus'* in reference to this population, but this usage was fragmentary and did not have an actual geographic or ethnic connection. However, it does appear that the term 'Whiter Rus' was used with respect to the lands that were out of the canonical power of the Roman Pope (Chamiarytski and Zhlutka 1995).

In the early years of the existence of the Grand Duchy, Slavic or Russian elements dominated the region's culture. For instance, a diplomat of the Teutonic Order, upon visiting the Duchy in 1397, noted that the Litvins were mostly obtaining their primary education

in the Russian schools, under the auspices of the Orthodox Church (Kyburg 2012). In the 14th century, the great Lithuanian princes considered the Orthodox Church an important tool to consolidate their influence on the Russian lands and endeavored to create a separate Orthodox Metropolis with the center in Kiev, directly dependent on Constantinople patriarch.

An important factor in the consolidation of the Belarusian *ethnos* was the ancient Belarusian language, sometimes referred to as 'Russian mova'. The language served as the basis of the Church Slavonic language and local dialects that dominated the northern part of Poprypiat and the southern part of the Podvinsk-Dniepr region and until the end of the 17th century functioned as the state language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In the 14th and 15th centuries it incorporated European elements, including German, to include names of crafts, instruments, and weights and measures.

At the same time the presence of a significant "Russian" component in the GDL was not an obstacle to its rulers' efforts to widen links with the countries of Western and Central Europe. At first, their actions in a western direction were aimed at preserving the sovereignty of the GDL. However, from the second half of the 14th century onward, the western vector of the foreign policy of the Grand Duchy obtained more ambitious goal, namely, the integration of the state into the European system of international relations. The expansion of ties with the countries of Western and Central Europe was accompanied by the introduction of the Western branch of Christianity, Catholicism, into Belarus. In 1251, the Great Prince Mindaug converted to the Catholic faith and established the Catholic Episcopate on his territory with the help of the Dominican Order, which located the bishop's residence in Lubcha near Navahrudak. Early efforts at spreading Catholicism in the Duchy proceeded with difficulties, however, as the local population resisted (Zhlutka 2012). It did not help matters that Mindaug himself was not particularly stable in his choices having converted once more in 1260, this time from Catholicism to Paganism. But these failures did not halt the efforts of the Catholic missionaries. In the 14th century, for instance, Franciscan monks were active in the area.

In the second half of the 14th century, the Grand Duchy of

Lithuania established closer ties with Poland on the basis of the dynastic Union of Krewo (1385-1386). The Union contributed to the expansion of Catholicism in Belarus, reflecting a deliberate choice of the political elite of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to accept a more western European orientation (Kravtsevich, Smolenchuk and Tokts 2011). In 1387-1388 the Polish king and the Great Lithuanian Prince Jogaila created the Catholic Episcopate in Vilnius, the capital of the GDL and by 1500, about ninety Catholic parishes were founded on the Belarusian territory, a point emphasized in the Charter of 1387 which emphasized that only Catholics had rights and privileges in terms of propriety, private freedoms and state obligations (Teplova 1997). Jogaila reinforced this movement with a second Charter in 1413 which restricted service in state office to persons of the Catholic faith (Teplova 1997).

However, one should not overstate the case regarding the persecution of Orthodoxy in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania after the conclusion of the Union of Krewo. After consolidating his position on the throne in 1392, Vitaut's instructions were to not force the 'Rusins' to change their faith (Teplova 1997). In 1415-1419 he offered to unite the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, though in practice this proposal wasn't implemented.

In the second half of the 15th century and at the beginning of the 16th century rulers of the GDL expressed indifference in questions of confession, though they privately worshipped as Catholics and encouraged the activities of Catholic Orders, primarily the Ordo Sancti Benedici, in their territories. Their position with regard to other religions determined not only their ideological views, but also their politics. Thus, the Great Lithuanian Prince Kazimir IV, who ruled from 1440-1492, admitted that during his reign the number of schismatics, i.e., Orthodox observers, in the GDL had not diminished but had increased (Teplova 1997). In 1447, he equalized social rights of the "Russian" gentry, princes and pans of the GDL through judicial means, according them similar rights to those of the Lithuanian gentry and aristocracy of Catholic confession. In 1460, he authorized the establishment of the Kievan Orthodox Metropolis.

During the reign of the Great Prince Zhigimont II (1506-1548) Orthodox adherents also achieved high official positions, heading

embassies, state treasuries, voivodeships, and elements of the armed forces. Orthodox churches and monasteries were actively constructed in the GDL during this period. An Austrian diplomat who was present in the GDL in 1517, Siegmund von Herberstein, noted that in Vilnius there were "more Russian temples than churches of Roman confession" (2003, 268). Likewise, in 1563 the son and successor of Zhigimont II, Zhigimont III August, allowed the Orthodox to take high offices in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and equalized them with the Catholics in terms of rights and privileges, a decision confirmed in 1568.

The expansion of political, economic and cultural ties with the countries of Western and Central Europe contributed to Europeanization in both the political and military spheres of the GDL. A number of political changes and events can be attributed to this process, including the spread of humanism and individualism, codification of legal norms of the GDL, the Wallach homestead reforms of 1557, the establishment of class-representative bodies including the Sejm, new elements of local self-government propogated through the Magdeburg law, printing, and the opening of a university in Vilnius. The European influence spread primarily among the privileged classes of the GDL, but by the 16th century it reached the merchants and craftsmen populating Belarusian towns.

To a certain extent, increased freedom of movement abroad for GDL citizens also contributed to the westernization of Belarus. The first monarch to give such a right to his subjects was Kazimir IV who, in the Charter of 1447, allowed "princes, pans, gentry and boyars" to leave the country freely "in order to search out a better destiny and study knighthood for any land except of enemy lands" (Kuznetsov and Mazets 2000, 53). Kazimir IV's successors, Great Princes Aleksandr and Zhigimont II, extended this right to the tradesmen of Vitebsk (May 2, 1447) and Polotsk (February 21, 1547).

In the first half of the 16th century, natives of the GDL studied in the universities of Krakow, Vittenberg, Prague, Konigsberg, Leipzig, Basel, Zurich, Geneva, Padua, Strasburg and other European cities. Francisck Skorina, Astaphiy Volovich, Andrey Volan, Nikolay Gusovky received their education in the European universities. Skorina, for instance, spent a significant part of his life in Prague, where

in 1517-1519 he published twenty three Bibles in Russian, having added numerous phrases in the publications that were later incorporated into the Belarusian language. A significant contribution in the spread of information about Belarus was made by Gusovsky, who upon the request of Pope Lev X, authored *The Song about the Aurochs*, a work that was published in Krakov in 1523.

The expansion of European values and modes on the Belarusian lands destroyed previous ways of living and was accompanied by the exacerbation of social, interreligious and interethnic contradictions. An intensification of these contradictions eventually led to the decline of the GDL, despite the efforts on the part of Lithuanian-Russian gentry to preserve it. Also important, of course, were the military campaigns with the Muscovy State during the late 15th and throughout the 16th centuries that resulted in the loss of the numerous Russian territories (Kravtsevich, Smolenchuk and Tokts 2011). During the years of the Livonian War in 1558-1582, a serious blow was struck to the GDL economy and its position in the international arena. In 1562-1578, the lands of Dvina Ukraine, Upper and Middle Dnieper Ukraine came under the control of Muscovy.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita)

One positive feature of the wars with Muscovy was a strengthening of ties between the GDL and Poland, a relationship formalized by the Union of Lublin in 1569. Article 2 of the Union Charter said "[T]he Principality of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are one and complete body and not a separate but a common republic (Rzeczpospolita), which united and merged in one people from two states and peoples" (Kuznetsov and Mazets 2000, 61).

Nevertheless, the Union of Lublin did not lead to the elimination of the sovereignty of the GDL. It preserved its state offices, military forces, state coat of arms, the 'Pahonia, and a state seal. Up until the end of the 18th century, a special financial tribunal which controlled monetary proceeds in the GDL Treasury also functioned in the GDL (Jukho 1992). Customs check points remained on the

border between the GDL and Poland until 1775 (Jukho 1992). The Rzeczpospolita was, in essence, a "state of two peoples".

At first, the GDL representatives sought to demonstrate their independence to the Poles. In 1573 the Lithuanian senators raised the question of the return of Ukrainian lands back to the GDL, as these lands had been included as part of Poland in the Union of Lublin in 1569. During the same year, the Sejm meeting in Vilnius, despite objections by the Lublin Orders, ordered that tax revenues from Podlachia and Volyn be deposited in the GDL Treasury (Bokhan 2008). Two weeks before the next Sejm of Rzeczpospolita, senators and gentry ambassadors from the GDL began to hold smaller sejms, initially in Volkovysk and later in Slonim, where common positions on issues facing the Duchy were elaborated. In the 1570s, a practice of gathering a general assembly to consider the issues of defense policy, financing and taxes was established. The so-called 'Vilnius Convocations' eventually served as substitute for the GDL Sejm.

The adoption of the next Statute of the GDL in 1588 became a significant obstacle on the way to unification of the political systems of Poland and Lithuania. Statute creators excluded any mention of the Union of Lublin of 1569, later amended it with provisions that stipulated the sovereignty of the GDL. The statutes claimed that the head of state, the Great Prince of Lithuania, should have protected rights and privileges on behalf of the GDL and share power with the Rada and the General Assembly. Other provisions stipulated that only natives of the GDL would be allowed to hold offices and purchase lands in the GDL, that the GDL preserved the its right to decide whether or not to participate in wars waged by the Poles, and that the Great Prince was obliged to return all lands lost since the beginning of the 16th century to the GDL. The fact that the Statute was created in the old Belarusian language was of a great importance, the writers of the Statutes claiming that the Polish language was unable to reflect fully the GDL's sophisticated terms and conditions (Jukho 1991).

Between the 16th and 17th centuries, the European Reformation and military clashes between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Rzeczpospolita with the Grand Duchy of Moscow greatly influenced the formation of the Belarusian identity. In contrast to the countries

of Western Europe, representatives of the feudal gentry, along with the tradesmen in the major cities, became the main champions of Protestantism of the Lutheran variety in the GDL. In 1539, Abraham Kuleva established the Lutheran School in Vilnius but due to pressure from Catholic priests he left the GDL in 1542. Ian Vikler, his successor, was also unsuccessful in his activities. The circle of his successors was limited to the boundaries of the German community in Vilnius (Martos 2012).

Attempts to spread Calvinist ideas in Belarusian territories met with greater success. In 1553 the GDL Chancellor and Vilnius voivode Mikolaj Radziwill the Black established the first Calvinist Cathedral with typography in Brest; an additional 132 cathedrals followed in territories in his possession. His family town of Nesvizh became the main center of Calvinism in the GDL. Besides the Radziwills, the Kishkis, the Volovichis, the Dorogostayskiye, the Khodkevichi, the Solomeretskiye, the Tyshkevichi, the Zbrozhayskiye and other representatives of famous and influential clans worshiped as Calvinists. Calvinism also spread among the tradesmen in big cities, though the peasantry in general remained indifferent to a new teaching and accepted it only under the pressure of their masters (Bokhan 2008). On December 14, 1557 the Calvinist community for the first time gathered in Vilnius. By the beginning of the 17th century the community had spread across the Belarusian landscape, dominating parts of Vilnius, lands to the south including Minsk, Orsha, Polotsk, Mstislavl, Vitebsk, and Brest-Podlachia (Bokhan 2008).

Arianism was another branch of Protestantism in the GDL. In the second half of the 16th century, the Arian Communities functioned in places such as Navahrudak, Kletsk, Iwye, Nesvizh, Lubcha, Jury and other (Bokhan 2008). The GDL's rulers were forced to accept these new realities such that in 1563 Zhigimont-August afforded rights to Protestants equal to those of other Christian branches in the GDL.

The religious policies established by the great princes of Lithuania at the end of the 14th through the first half of the 16th century prevented the GDL from participating in the bloody religious wars that spread throughout Western Europe after 1522. At the same time, religious pluralism did not necessarily remove interconfessional contradictions, and likely impeded the formation of a common

ideology that may have consolidated the population of the GDL and the Belarusian lands.

In the second half of the 16th century, ideas of the European Counterreformation began to spread across Belarusian lands. As in other European countries, the Jesuit order was the prime mover behind these ideas and in 1569 the order's representatives settled in Vilnius. While Jesuits worked primarily with the privileged classes, they also attempted to portray themselves as protectors of the public interest, standing in opposition to the excessive oppression of the peasantry (Bokhan, Golubeu and Jemelianchyk 2004). In 1569, a Jesuit two-form school opened in Vilnius followed within a year by a five-form Collegium. In 1579, the Roman Pope Gregory II granted the status of Academy to Vilnius Collegium, on par with Krakow University. The first rector of Vilnius Academy was Piotr Skarga. The main task of the Academy was the preparation of teachers for schools and collegiums. In 1586, more than 700 students were studying at the Academy, a number that increased to more than 1,200 by 1632 (Teplova 1997). In the 17th century, Jesuit schools and collegiums were operating in Polotsk, Nesvizh, Orsha, Brest, Grodno, Vitebsk, Navahrudak, Minsk, Bobruisk, and Mogilev (Bokhan and Golubeu and Jemelianchyk 2004). The popularity of the Jesuit institutions was no doubt enhanced by the fact that not only Catholics but also representatives of other Christian confessions could study there.

In 1577, the Jesuit Piotr Skarga published *On the Unity of the Church of God under one Pastor.* Skarga portrayed Orthodoxy as the Greek schism, threatening the integrity and internal peace in Rzeczpospolita. Following the purchase and destruction of the first edition copies by Orthodox adherents the book was reissued in 1590 (Bokhan, Golubeu and Jemelianchyk 2004). Skarga was an avid supporter of Europeanization within the GDL, arguing that western European countries were at a higher stage of development, a fact reflected in the Greek Patriarch's dependence on Turkish sultans (Teplova 1997). In doing so, Skarga failed to attach any significance to Slavic cultures and called for the use of Latin and Greek languages to spread Christian ideas (Kutuzova 1998).

The policy of the Rzeczpospolita monarchs, who preserved their

adherence to Catholic religion, contributed greatly to the success of the Catholic Counterreformation. Protestant adherents were the first to feel its effects. In Vilnius in 1581, Protestant books that had been issued in Nesvizh, Brest and Zaslawye were burnt under the authority of Episcope Ian Radziwill. At the end of the 1590s and the first decennial of the 17th century, Protestant cathedrals were increasingly subject to damage. In 1611, for instance, a mob of fanatics destroyed the Calvinist Cathedral in Vilnius with its library and archives. The influence of Jesuit ideas combined with actions taken under the auspices of Rzeczpospolita authorities led the sons of Nikolay Radziwill the Black to return to the Catholic faith. Also, the Catholic faith became that of Lew Sapieha, Ivan Khodkiewicz, Ivan Czartoryski, Samuil Sanguszko, and Yanush Zaslawsky, all of whom held important offices in the state system of the GDL. Only the Radziwills in Birzai maintained their commitment to Calvinism (Bokhan, Golubeu and Jemelianchyk 2004).

The Orthodox adherents were also struck. In 1579, Stephen Bathory transferred most of the Orthodox churches in Polotsk to Jesuits, though he didn't seek the total elimination of Orthodoxy. Nor did he prevent the presence of orthodox eparchies on the territory of the GDL. The Prince Konstantin Ostrogski was also a defender of the Orthodox faith in Rzeczpospolita, establishing in 1576 the Slav-Greek-Latin Academy at his family estate in Ostrog. The Academy was a scientific community with Orthodox leanings and published many liturgical books and other works aimed at protecting the Orthodox faith.

During the reign of Zhigimont Vaza, whose worldview was formed to a great extent under the influence of Jesuits, actions meant to unify the Catholic and Orthodox churches intensified. Orthodox eparchies of the Rzeczpospolita elaborated on the conditions of this union, findings with which Rome concurred in 1595. An agreement was reached that called for the preservation of Orthodox sermons, with recognition of the superiority of the Roman Pope. Some influential Catholic figures, including the Chancellor of the GDL Lew Sapieha and Vilnius voivode Mikolaj Radziwill the Orphan, spoke in support of the Union. In particular, Sapieha supported the Unionist Monastery in Cherey, provided financial support to the Monastery of the Saint Trinity in Vilnius, and contributed to the printing of Unionist

books in Vilnius typography of the Mamonichi (Bokhan, Golubeu and Jemelianchyk 2004). On October 16, 1596, the Assembly of the Orthodox hierarchs of the Rzeczpospolita adopted the Union. In 1599, the Brest Assembly Rules began being implemented, accompanied by the forced transfer of the property of the Orthodox Church to the Uniates. The main disseminator of Uniatism on the Belarusian lands was the Basilian Order, created in 1617.

The introduction of the Church Union did not result in *rapprochement* between the Catholics and Orthodox. A variety of elements, including the lower clergy and the Orthodox gentry, resisted. Polemic works criticizing the Union were also widespread. To a great extent, anti-Uniate moods were typical for the eastern regions of Belarus and Minsk, though they developed also in other places such as Slutsk, Pinsk, and Vilnius. The Unionists also did not receive wide support from the side of the Catholics, who spoke about Greek-Catholicism as a servile or peasant faith (Bokhan, Golubeu and Jemelianchyk 2004).

Guided by the ideas of the Counterreformation, at the beginning of the 17th century the Rzeczpospolita administration unsuccessfully attempted to extend its rule over territories controlled by Moscow. The lone positive result for the GDL was the return of Smolensk and Starodub lands in 1618, though these were subsequently lost to Moscow in the first half of the 16th century.

Discord amongst the various confessions and sects in the Rzeczpospolita created favorable conditions for the intervention of foreign states in its affairs. In addition to the tsars of Moscow, who traditionally posed themselves as defenders of Orthodoxy, the Swedish Kings expressed a desire to act as patron to the Protestants in the 17th century. External and internal pressure forced Rzeczpospolita authorities to implement changes to their policies vis-à-vis religion. Thus, in 1620 Zhigimont Vaza unofficially recognized the recovery of the Orthodox Hierarchy in the Polish-Lithuanian state (Bokhan, Golubeu and Jemelianchyk 2004). After the death of Zhigimont Vaza in 1632, a new monarch of Rzeczpospolita, Vladislav IV, authorized creation of a commission that worked out the *Articles of the Solace of the Greek Religion*. In 1633, the Rzeczpospolita Sejm confirmed the articles and returned rights and religious freedom to the

Orthodox Church, and officially accepted its hierarchy, a move that allowed the Orthodox to build cathedrals, hospitals and schools and create typographies. Vladislav IV attempted to distribute cathedrals and possessions among the Orthodox and the Unionists proportionally to the quantity of believers but this attempt finished with failure due to resistance from Rome. In 1635, the Sejm confirmed the king's privileges and consolidated the equality of the Russian, or Orthodox, churches. Decisions taken by the Sejm consolidated the right of the Orthodox Metropolis to practice jurisdiction over four eparchies, one of which, Mstsislaw-Mogilev, was situated in Belarus. In their turn, five eparchies ended up under the Unionists' jurisdiction (Bokhan, Golubeu and Jemelianchyk 2004). Three of them, i.e., Pinsk, Smolensk and Polotsk, were located in Belarus.

These activities resulted in relative calm settling over society. However, at the end of the 1640s the Rzeczpospolita became involved in a serious internal conflict related to the anti-government protests of the Ukrainian Cossacks. In 1654, this conflict grew into military clashes between Rzeczpospolita and the Moscow State. In 1654 and1655 Russian forces occupied almost the whole territory of the GDL. In a diplomatic maneuver, the GDL hetman, Radziwill, attempted to form a Union between the GDL and Sweden in a meeting in a village, Kedainiai. The main condition of the Union was the preservation of political autonomy of the Principality. This saved the Rzeczpospolita from final and inglorious decline. Despite the fact that the majority of gentry and tycoons of the GDL did not support the Union of Kedainiai and preferred to preserve the Union with Poland, the fact of its conclusion provoked military clashes between Sweden and Moscow State, which facilitated the international position of Rzeczpospolita. According to the Truce of Andrusovo concluded in 1667, and confirmed by the "Eternal Peace" in 1686, it preserved the biggest part of the Belarusian lands in its structure.

It is worth noting that in the 17th century many Orthodox citizens of Belarus began identifying themselves as "Russians" such as those within the Moscow state. These people were often referred to as the 'Great Russians' while at least in the second half of the 17th century, the ethnonym "White Rus'" was routinely used for naming the lands of Eastern Belarus (Averianov 2012). In general, however, in the 17th and 18th centuries the impact of the Orthodox

Church decreased in Belarus. Ruling elites of the GDL gave preference to Catholicism, and "ordinary" people were inclined to practice Uniatism.

At the same time, Polish influence on Belarusian lands increased, spread again through the elitist classes of the GDL. In the 17th century, the Polish language, accompanied by the translation of writings from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet, officially a new practice legitimized in 1696, became the basis for official documents of the Rzeczpospolita. According to Belarusian researchers, cultural polonization was fostered by the practice of large landowners and other gentry borrowing Polish forms of public life (Kravtsevich, Smolenchuk and Tokts 2011).

In addition to the interconfessional contradictions in the GDL, inter-class ones were clearly expressed, as was the case in many other countries at that time. To a great extent, the policies of the great princes of Lithuania contributed to the consolidation of class inequality. Thus, in Jagailo's Charter of 1387, the rights of the Catholic gentry to dispose and possess their lands freely, to marry their daughters and sisters-in-law, and to be exempted from their obligations in favor of great princes were consolidated. In the 15th century such privileges also covered the Orthodox gentry.[19] In the 18th century, efforts were made in the Rzeczpospolita to overcome these interreligious, interclass and interethnic contradictions and to form a general civilian and national ideology along the lines of the modern notion of a 'civic nation'. These efforts ended in failure and predetermined an ignominious set of partitions undertaken by the combined empires of Russia, Prussia and Austria. As a result, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania finally ceased to exist, and the Belarusian lands became part of the Russian empire, as annexation into the empire led to the transformation of the ethnonym 'White Rus' to the term 'Byelorussia' (Averianov 2012). After inclusion in the Russian Empire, the Belarusian lands were deprived of any political

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[19] In some cases, the separation from other classes brought about peculiar traits in the minds of the elite classes of the GDL. For instance, in the 17th century the notion of 'Sarmatism,' based on the exceptionalism of the privileged class, gained popularity. However, this particular ideology can not accurately be considered as a manifestation of Europeanization, as its adherents were inclined to oppose the "old" gentry's traditions to the "spoiled mores" of Europe (Bokhan, Golubeu and Jemelianchyk 2004).

independence and were considered by the Russian rulers to be exclusively imperial provinces.

The Tsarist Era

There were sporadic efforts to revive the GDL as an independent state, including those related to the Napoleonic wars. In April 1811, in the context of tense relations between Russia and France, the Russian emperor Alexander I instructed the senator M. Oginski to embark on a project of reconstruction of an autonomous Grand Duchy of Lithuania within the Russian Empire. In May 1811, Oginski prepared proposals and presented them in the form of an aide-memoire. The proposals called for the creation of a province comprised of the Grodno, Vilnius, Minsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Kiev, Podolsk and Volyn territories, the Bialystok region and the Ternopol district; the centre of the new Grand Duchy of Lithuania was to be in Vilnius (Taras 2012). The province would have been under the control of an emperor's vicar, but the special Lithuanian Chancellery, headed by the Secretary of State in St. Petersburg and Administrative Rada and headed by a vicar in Vilnius, would have become auxiliary management structures. The project provided for the possibility to grant to the GDL Statute of 1588 the status of the main civil law of the province, to appoint GDL natives to state offices in the GDL, to allocate funds for development of public education of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and to create a GDL military force as one of the units of the Russian army (Taras 2012). Not surprisingly, the proposal provoked a protest on the part of Russian politicians who viewed Oginski's activities as the first step towards the division of Russia and return of the Belarusian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian lands to the rule of Poland. Facing strong pressure from conservative politicians, Aleksandr I did not dare to recreate the GDL.

More decisive in this question was the French Emperor Napoleon I, whose forces seized the territory of Belarus in 1812. On July 1 of that year, Napoleon signed the Decree on Education of the GDL, limiting it to the borders of Minsk, Vilnius and Grodno provinces and Bialystok district (Taras 2012). A new administrative entity in Vilnius, the Commission of Provisional Government of the Grand Duchy

of Lithuania, was also created. The Commission was instructed to decide on issues of food and trade, police, finance, military courts, internal affairs, education and religion. The gentry of Belarus and Lithuania created a National Guard of the GDL in all provinces and county centers. The reconstituted GDL was, of course, a political fiction, as it could not determine its policies independently and was required to receive the approval a special French commissioner for any action. Nonetheless, a significant part of its Lithuanian gentry sought to rebuild a tight union with Poland, an effort at least psychologically supported by the fact that the 'official language' of the Commission of the Provisional Government of the GDL was Polish (Taras 2012).

Not all the natives of the Belarusian lands welcomed the arrival of the French army. While the gentry and some of the wealthier citizens supported Napoleon I, peasants were either indifferent or openly hostile towards new authorities. Hostility was more common in the Eastern districts of Belarus, where the Orthodox population was dominant; however, the Catholics and Unionists were inclined to support the French emperor (Khoteev 2012). Hostility increased with Napoleon I's political and military failures and the withdrawal of the remains of his grand army from the Russian Empire at the end of 1812. In some cases peasants were against not only the French, but also their own 'pans' (Taras 2012; Khoteev 2012). The victory of Russia and other European states over Napoleonic France in 1812-1815 put an end to the idea of a revival of the Rzeczpospolita and the GDL, though it did not lead to a radical change in the political and economic composition on the Belarusian lands. In December 1812, Alexander I presented persons who had supported the French with amnesty, a move that allowed the Polish landlords on the Belarusian lands to preserve their rights and privileges.

After the Napoleonic Wars, the Belarusian lands were the object of an ideological and political struggle between the Russians and the Poles. Despite the fact that the area was clearly under the administration of Russia, Polish cultural influence, which spread with the support of the system of education and sermons of the Catholic Church, was prevalent by the beginning of the 1830s. The main driving force of the anti-Russian resistance was the gentry class. In general, the local gentry supported the return of Polish statehood,

though the historical development and economic situation of Belarus encouraged the local gentry to preserve the traditions of the political, social and economic structure of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This sentiment was reflected by Limanowski, who noted at the end of the 1850s (Bardah 2002):

> *For us, Litvins, that is Polish young people from the historical Lithuania, the talk was about uniting of Lithuanian movements with the movements of Congressional Poland above all (Kingdom of Poland, which became part of the Russian empire in 1815 – here)… We really wished Poland's return to its old borders, but according to our beliefs we were federalist republicans, and not only wished to ensure the rights for all nationalities, which were its part, but being adherents of the people, supported the feeling of national independence, arousing among the Lithuanian-Belarusian population.*

In general, the Litvinism apparent on the Belarusian lands in the 19th century presented itself like a peculiar form of regionalism in line with Polish culture and Polish influence in Belarus. To a great extent, the ideology of Litvin gentry was reflected in the works of Mickiewicz, who created works of literature in Polish, but at the same time honored the homeland of Lithuania, that is the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

After the revolt of 1830-1831, which started in the Kingdom of Poland but very soon covered all the territory of Belarus, the Russian government began a more aggressive policy of incorporating Belarusian lands into the Russian state. The failure of a second revolt in 1863-1864 further encouraged the Russian government in their policy of 'strengthening of the Russian roots', the end result being the elimination of institutions of higher education in Belarus[20] and the translation of official business correspondence from Polish into Russian. This was followed in 1840 by the termination of the 1588 Statutes, a continuing preference for Orthodox adherents and a forced transition of the Uniatists to Orthodoxy, and the handover of the local primary schools to the Orthodox Church. In 1864, Russian

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[20] Vilnius University was closed in 1832 followed by the Gorki Agricultural Institute in 1864.

authorities banned local literature in Roman letters, efforts were made to recruit administrative staff for Belarus from internal Russian provinces, and the terms 'Byelorussia' and 'Litva' were expunged in favor of 'western region' or "northwest region'. By the second half of the 19th century, therefore, Belarusian Russophiles had worked out the concept of 'western Russianness', an identity which regarded Belarusians as a sub-ethnos, a separate branch of the one Russian people together with the Great Russians and Small Russians, and one defined in large part by its adherence to Orthodoxy.

Despite all of this, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, a new ideology began to take shape in Belarus, one based on the principles of ethnic nationalism. The founders of nationalist ideas were trying to attract the masses, which in Belarus meant the rural peasantry, and to instill in them the idea of a cultural Belarusian identity and the need for self-organization on national, that is to say ethnic, grounds. A social component aimed at improving the life of nationals was present in their proposed ideology, though the resolution of social problems was said to be linked to the change of the political status of Belarus that would result from a national struggle for liberation. Numerous writers cultivated the image of Belarus-as-victim, humiliated and colonized by the Russian and the Polish. According to this narrative, the "land of ancestors" was populated with oppressed and suffering Belarusians who had forgotten their great past.

The development of this ethnic nationalist ideology was accompanied by selection of the ethnonym 'Belarus', sometime seen as 'Belaya Rus' or 'Byelorussia' in the English, as a name with which the Belarusian nation described itself. At the same time, efforts were made to define the ethnic territory of the Belarusians. Belarusian intellectuals agreed that this included Vilnius, Vitebsk, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev and Smolensk provinces along with parts of Suwalki, Kownia, the Duchy of Courland, Pskov, Tver, Kaluga, Oryol, Kursk, and Chernihiv provinces (Karskiy 1917). Belarusian nationalist ideologues regarded the everyday language used by the local population as the main criterion of the Belarusian identity. While gaining ground, Belarusian ethnic nationalism nonetheless remained a marginal phenomenon at the onset of the First World War, due in equal measure to the opposition of the Russian administration and Polish

organizations and an absence of mass public demand for a nationalist ideology.

From Occupation to the Belarusian People's Republic

World War I destroyed the previous system of intergovernmental relations and allowed the idea of a Belarusian state to come into being, a process that was accelerated by the German occupation of western Belarus in 1915-1917. Expecting to weaken the Russian and Polish impact on the conquered lands, German occupiers contributed to the formation of numerous Belarusian cultural and educational institutions and the expansion of usage of the Belarusian language.

From the end of 1915 until the beginning of 1917, Vilnius served as an ideal political and spiritual center of Belarus, hosting the first schools with a Belarusian language curriculum, training courses for Belarusian-speaking teachers, the Belarusian Club, the Belarusian Publication Society, the Belarusian Theatre, and a Belarusian museum. In 1916 the Belarusian-language newspaper *Homon*, issued two times a week and published in Latin writing, commenced publication. The same year the Belarusian People's Committee, obliged to coordinate activities of all Belarusian organizations that evolved on the territories occupied by the Germans, was established.

Some Belarusians, particularly those in Vilnius, attempted to revive Belarusian statehood in the form of a Union between Belarus and Lithuania. In December 1915, the Provisional Rada of the Confederation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was established in Vilnius. A message drafted in 1915 indicated an intent to create a Lithuanian-Belarusian state on the territories occupied by the Germans (Kancher 1921). The document was published in Lithuanian, Polish, Belarusian and Jewish languages. In February 1916, the details of the project were laid out. The project developers presupposed that Vilnius and Kownia provinces and also the Belarusian and Lithuanian parts of Suwalki, Grodno, Minsk provinces and Courland would become part of the Confederation with Vilnius as the capital

(Vialiki 2008). In May 1916, the Confederation Rada of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was transformed into the Permanent Lithuanian-Belarusian Commission.

In the fall of 1916, Lutskevich and Lutskevich developed a new plan for a larger union of Eastern European peoples composed of Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, giving it the grand title of the 'Between-Seas Union'. In their opinion, the creation of such a Union could have pulled the young countries out from under the guardianship of Russia and Poland and contributed to a more effective revival of a long-suffering war time economy (Vialiki 2008).

The overthrow of the Russian monarchy in the spring of 1917 allowed Belarusians to intensify their actions on the Russian side of the front as well. Minsk became the center of Belarusian national, political and state rebirth on the territory preserved under Russian control. In comparison to the Vilnius Belarusians, who stressed the possibilities and necessities of Belarus's existence as an independent state and political entity, the Minsk group preferred to preserve Belarus as a part of the Russian Democratic Federative Republic. A corresponding arrangement was announced at the Congress of the representatives of the Belarusian organizations, which took place in Minsk on April 7-9, 1917 (new style). Delegates at the meeting believed that the Belarusians should satisfy themselves with the provision of political and cultural autonomy under Russia, since without Russian support they would not have been able to achieve the unification of all ethnic lands and to oppose Polish influence (Kancher 1921).

The main result of the work of the Minsk Congress was the creation of the Belarusian National Committee (BNC). The BNC's position found a voice in the newspaper *Free Belarus*, which commenced publication in Minsk in the Belarusian language. The BNC members called on the Russian Provisional Government to solve the problems of national and cultural development of the Belarusians as soon as possible by contributing to the unification of ethnically Belarusian lands, establishing Belarusian schools, and so on.

The dismantling of the Provisional Government by radical Russian revolutionaries in November 1917 seriously impeded the formation of a Belarusian nation-state. In December 1917, the Soviet

structures developed in Belarus after the upheaval in Petrograd forcibly stopped the work of the All-Belarusian Congress in Minsk, whose delegates had attempted to form the democratic Belarusian Council as a political alternative to the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dispersal of the All-Belarusian Congress, the advancement of German military forces up to West Dvina, Dnieper and Sozh in February-March 1918, and the Russian withdrawal from the war in compliance with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk strengthened the position of the supporters of Belarusian independence in Minsk. In March 1918, the separation of Belarus from Russia was announced and efforts to develop the democratic Belarusian People's Republic (BPR) began.

The BPR's leaders were spiritually close to Europe, taking the systems of Western Europe, and in particular France, as the model for the governmental, social and cultural structures that the Belarusian state should follow. At the same time, they did not reject socialist ideas, considering Belarus a state that was to be developed for the benefit of the working people. Nonetheless, the supporters of the BPR emphasized the importance of solidifying the role played by the Belarusian language as well as other aspects of Belarusian culture. According to Lesik, one of the prominent ideologues of the Belarusian national movement, "the people need to be taught, it should be shown that until our native Belarusian language has become dominant in its lands, until this time it will be poor, dark and hungry" (Liosik 1994, 275). In April 1918, the BPR's Government announced that it would grant Belarusian the status of the official state language of the Republic (Kavalenia 2011).

Significant attention was also paid to the development of the Belarusian educational system. In April 1918, Belarusian studies courses were established in Minsk, and in July 1918 teacher training courses opened in Bobruisk. The Svisloch Teacher Seminary, created in 1916, and the Minsk Teacher Institute, which started working in September 1918, were both engaged in the preparation of Belarusian teachers. Until the end of 1918, about 350 Belarusian primary schools and 2 Belarusian gymnasiums in Vilnius and Budslaw functioned on the territory of Belarus (Kavalenia 2011). The possibility of opening the University and Agrarian Institute in

Minsk was considered, but the BPR's figures did not manage to put it into practice.

The German occupation, commencing in the summer of 1918, allowed for the continuation of some of these efforts. Changes in German policies also allowed the BPR's leaders to implement a variety of other actions, including the dissemination of registration certificates among the Belarusian population, the issuance of BPR passports, the provision of assistance to refugees and persons serving in the Russian army, and the establishment of Belarusian councils in cities and rural areas. Attempts were made to expand trade relations with Ukraine and Lithuania, to introduce a Belarusian national currency, and to create full military forces. These attempts were not very successful and ultimately, due to the ambiguous attitude of the German occupation authorities as well as weak public demand for the creation of a Belarusian nation-state, the Republic was largely stillborn.

The change in the political situation in Europe in the fall of 1918 brought about by the defeat of Germany and its allies in the First World War complicated the position of the Belarusian nationalists. Withdrawal of the German troops from the territory of Belarus at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 was accompanied by strengthening of Russian and Polish influence, backed by military and political means. In 1919-1920 Belarusian lands became the location of military and political clashes between Poland and Soviet Russia, each of which preferred to integrate Belarus into their polities according to their own national interest. This did not, however, exclude the possibility of flirting with the Belarusian nationalists when it served their purposes.

Soviet Russia used the Belarusian national idea in the pursuit of its own interests more successfully than did Poland. Based on the approval of Soviet authorities the development of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (the BSSR) was initiated in December 1918. It ended in January 1919, with the formation of the BSSR government in Smolensk and its transfer to Minsk. Unlike the BPR, the BSSR was based on social or class-based ideas found within an ideology of proletarian internationalism, with any ethnic component playing a secondary part. A "militant" atheism also dominated the BSSR.

In February 1919, the Soviet Russian authorities changed their approach to Belarusian statehood and redrew the borders of the BSSR in order to unite the remaining part of Belarus with the Soviet Lithuania. While Soviet authorities considered the total elimination of Belarusian statehood in 1919, they decided not to take such a serious risk. Instead, a second proclamation granting the independence of the BSSR was issued on July 31, 1920, accompanied by a decision to grant a more significant role to the ethnic component in the BSSR's political construction.

The Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Interwar Period

In March 1921, the territory of Belarus was divided according to the Treaty of Riga. Except for western Belarus and the Vilnius region, the territory of the BSSR was incorporated into Poland in 1922. At the same time, however, the BSSR had its status as an independent state legally confirmed. In November 1922, Soviet Belarus officially gained recognition from Germany. Two years later, fifteen counties of Vitebsk, Gomel and Smolensk provinces were accepted into Soviet Belarus, and in 1926 Rechytsa and Gomel counties were added. As a result of these enlargements the territory of the BSSR increased from 52.3 thousand to 126.3 thousand square kilometers (Kavalenia 2011).

The policy of Belarusization, launched in December 1920, contributed to the strengthening of the BSSR's position. The policy emphasized the necessity of expanding the availability of books and newspapers in the Belarusian language and strengthening the Belarusian struggle against Russian and Polish chauvinism (Glagouskaja 2001). In a message to all cultural workers of Belarus the Central Executive Committee of the BSSR Councils Session stated (February 5, 1921) that "the Belarusian working people now can build its culture in its own language ... Hundreds and thousands of cultural workers related to their lands, knowing their nature, economy, history, language, and at the same time capable of the building of communism, are needed. But there is the most acute need for those

workers capable of working in the Belarusian language" (Glagous-kaja 2001, 97). At this Session the necessity to "proceed from the steady perspective of balanced and gradual transition of schools, where the Belarusian children study, to their native Belarusian language of studies" was adopted by the special Rule (Korshuk et al. 2001).

The Soviet Russian administration had a favorable attitude towards the national experiment in Soviet Belarus at this time. Stalin, for instance, assured the various parties that communists were not going to introduce forced Belarusization (1947, 48-49):

> *There is the Belarusian nation, which has its own language, different from Russian, and as a consequence it is possible to revive the Belarusian culture only on the basis of its native language ... Some forty years ago Riga was a German city, but since the cities grow at the expense of villages, and the village is a keeper of nationality, now Riga is a purely Latvian city. Some fifty years ago all cities of Hungary had the German character, now they are magyarized. The same thing will happen to Byelorussia, in which cities the non-Belarusian population is still dominant.*

The support of Moscow encouraged further actions in the sphere of Belarusization. For instance, the Belarusian language was chosen as the official language for relations between the state, professional public institutions and organizations (Korshuk et al. 2001) with all state documents to be translated into Belarusian within three years. Various proclamations also addressed the necessity of extending the study of the Belarusian language within the educational institutions of the BSSR (Korshuk et al. 2001).

The direction toward Belarusization was actively supported by the Communist party of Belarus. In decisions of plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus in 1924-1925, attention was repeatedly paid to the necessity of adopting measures necessary to achieve this goal. For example, in the decisions taken at the January plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus in 1925 it was emphasized that "the issue of development of the language, literature, schools, all the culture in the Belarusian language is recognized as the first and main task"

(Korshuk et al. 2001). In the 1920s, the practice of 'indigeniza-tion' was implemented, and preference was given to local natives in appointments to official positions. Later, in 1927, all of the work in the BSSR's government was translated into the Belarusian langu-age including the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the BSSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the BSSR, the People's Commissariat on Education of the BSSR, Kalinin dis-trict, and the secretariats of all districts executive committees. The People's Commissars on Internal Affairs and Social Security were expected to reach a goal of 60 percent Belarusization, and compa-rable numbers were expected in the other bodies (Platonau 2002).

The capital of Soviet Belarus, Minsk city, began acquiring the traits of the leading Belarusian cultural center. The Belarusian State University and the Institute of the Belarusian Culture, remade into the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR in 1929, were established. Research on local history work was encouraged in the republic and literary works honoring Belarus's "national and democratic" tradi-tions were published once again.

All of these events, including a November 1926 conference desi-gned to develop standards for the Belarusian language, contributed to the extension of the sphere of use of the Belarusian language and the enrichment of the Belarusian professional culture; howe-ver, Belarusization in the BSSR blended with communist ideology and practice and was implemented inconsistently. Soviet authorities became increasingly reluctant to strengthen the influence of Belaru-sian nationalists and began calling for the use of the Belarusian lan-guage only as a means of realizing class interests and implementing the ideals of World Revolution (Korshuk et al. 2001). Any deviations from the 'general line' were strictly censured and stopped.

To a great extent the difficulties were related to the peculiari-ties of the republic's position. Despite the fact that Soviet Russian and the Soviet Belarusian authorities in the 1920s endeavored to eradicate Russian national self-identification in the Soviet Social-ist Republics, the active use of the Russian language remained in the Soviet republics. And the BSSR, in which authorities used the Russian language in cooperation with other Soviet republics and Moscow, was not exceptional in this regard. Active use of the

Russian language increased after the creation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1922, which at the time of its founding included Soviet Belarus.[21]

At the end of the 1920s, authorities in the USSR shifted from national concessions in favor of the Soviet republics to the strengthening of centralized governance and became closed off from the outside world. The result of this policy, combined with Stalinist repressions more generally, was a new policy of 'Russification' with serious adverse consequences for Belarusian peasants in particular, who functioned as the main keepers of traditional culture during collectivization in the 1930s. The national-oriented intelligentsia also suffered painful blows, with Communist authorities blaming the BSSR authorities and the Communist Party of Belarus for indulging the Belarusian national intelligentsia and promoting bourgeois and "kulak" ideas. The main threat for the BSSR was, according to the new mindset, "Belarusian offensive chauvinism and national democracy" (Korshuk et al. 2001, 22).

In the 1930s large-scale campaigns were repeatedly held in the republic to expose 'national democrats', 'counter-revolutionary elements' and 'foreign spies'. The terror extended to persons not only suspected of deficient loyalty in respect of the Soviet authorities, but also those figures who had stood at the origins of the creation of Soviet Belarus. Throughout this period, propaganda centering around the 'unbreakable unity' of the Belarusian and Russian peoples increased. New trends also affected the spheres of education and science. Thus, in 1933, an effort was undertaken to reform Belarusian spelling conventions with the intention of purging the Belarusian language of "national democratic elements" and polonisms (Lych 2010, 262).

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[21] Other nation-building efforts were occurring elsewhere during the interwar period, based on the efforts of Belarusian emigres, including some in Lithuania and the Czech Republic. Any of these efforts were, however, of little interest to the Belarusian population since in many cases the emigres ideological tenets lacked clarity and a compelling argument. Some of the figures, for example, Vaclau Lastouski, proposed that they reject the use of the term 'Belarus', substituting it with the term 'Kryvija' (Lastouski 1997). A significant share of emigres also considered Poland as the main enemy of the Belarusians and perceived separate elements of the communist ideology and practice as benevolent.

Russification also weakened the Belarusian impact in western Belarus, which from 1921-1939 was a part of Poland. Polish authorities stoutly resisted the possibility of granting territorial and political autonomy to the Belarusians. Initially, they allowed for the possibility simply to satisfy ethnic and cultural demands of the Belarusian population, but soon pulled back from these guidelines and began to introduce a forced Polonization policy for the Belarusian population. A variety of tactics were used including imposing limits on Belarusian education, language, political parties, publishing, and religious activities. At the same time, Polish authorities encouraged the emigration of the Belarusian working population abroad and resettlement of the Poles on Belarusian lands. Polish propaganda routinely depicted the Belarusians as a wild people incapable of independent development while any demonstration of Belarusian national self-identification was explained as an action provoked by the USSR (Chiari 2005).

The Belarusian population, in particular the intelligentsia, was trying to oppose this policy of Polonization. Vilnius remained the main spiritual center of western Belarus, where the majority of the Belarusian organizations and parties functioned, and where Belarusian books and magazines were issued. It was in Vilnius that attempts to create original theories of the development of the Belarusian nation were made. In particular, Kanchevsky paid attention to the difficulties Belarusian intellectuals faced in their cultural and political choices because of their tense position between the European West and the Russian-Asian East in his articles published in 1921-1922. According to Kanchevsky, it was the tension between the messianic cultures of the West and East, together with a reluctance to accept one of them, which shaped the particular Belarusian national worldview (Abdziralovich 1993). As an alternative, he proposed the concept of "the third way", basing Belarusian statehood on pure national forms of cultural life and rejecting both wild capitalism and tyrannical socialism. He considered "free brotherhoods" and "people's cooperation" of peasants and craftsmen as optimal forms of organization for the social and political life of Belarus (Kirchanov 2011, 24).

However, the opportunities for opposition were limited. Some of the representatives of the Belarusian national movement in Poland

sympathized with the USSR and communist ideology. For example, Tarashkyevich, one of the most prominent figures of the Belarusian national liberation movement in Poland, switched to pro-Soviet and pro-communist positions. In the late 1920s, Polish authorities actually undermined the basis of the Belarusian system of education on the "Kresy", which accelerated the process of assimilation of the Belarusian population. By the late 1930s, most Belarusian public organizations as well as scientific, cultural and educational institutions were eliminated in western Belarus.

World War II and the BSSR

The Second World War once again drastically changed the international position of Belarus. On September 17, 1939, the USSR authorities sanctioned the Soviet Army deployment of troops into the Polish state based on a political agreement reached in August 1939 with Nazi Germany. By the beginning of 1939 the Red Army occupied the whole territory of Western Belarus.

The Red Army's arrival was viewed differently by different segments of society in Western Belarus. If the Poles in general perceived it hostilely and were engaged in active resistance, the Belarusians openly welcomed the elimination of Polish state structures and expressed the hope that with the support of the USSR they could fully realize their right to self-determination.

At a meeting held in Bialystok on October 29, 1939, the delegates of the People's Assembly of Western Belarus (elected on October 22, 1939), proclaimed themselves the highest authority in the land while continuing its support for the USSR, maintaining that "[O]nly the Soviet power will provide us with political, economic and cultural prosperity, and ensure the freedom of national development of all peoples in Western Byelorussia" (Mikhniuk 2003, 186). The same day, the People's Assembly of Western Belarus turned to the Supreme Councils of the USSR and BSSR with the request to accept Western Belarus in the USSR and BSSR in order to end the separation of the Belarusian people (Mikhniuk 2003). A corresponding request was approved by the Supreme Council of the USSR on

November 2, 1939 and by the Supreme Council of the BSSR on November 14, 1939.

Another enlargement of the BSSR was accompanied by the annexation of the Vilnius district to Lithuania and of Western Polesia to Soviet Belarus. In 1940, the BSSR transferred the Svencionys district and "parts of the territories with predominant Lithuanian population of Vidzav, Gadutishki, Ostrovets, Voronovo and Radun districts to the Lithuanian SSR" (Marchenko, Meliankov and Strumskis 1982, 11). The attached territories fell under the policy of Sovietization with all of the ensuing consequences, including collectivization of agriculture.

In 1941 to 1944 Belarus fell under German occupation. During the first stage of the occupation, the Germans considered Belarus only as an object of colonization, although their policy was aimed at de-communization, de-Russification of the conquered territories, and consistent with policies elsewhere, extermination of the Jewish population (Chiari 2005). The change in tactics allowed Belarusians to form the bases of a national system of education and create a number of public organizations including professional unions, the Union of the Belarusian Youth, and so on. In December 1943, the Belarusian Central Rada, members of which considered themselves the provisional government of independent Belarus, was created in Minsk.[22]

At the same time, the influence of the USSR and Poland remained in Belarus, even during the German occupation. It was demonstrated in the form of armed resistance. A typical feature of the Soviet underground and partisan movement was the presence of 'Russophile' slogans. As for the Polish armed underground, it sought for restoration of an independent Poland according to the borders it inhabited before the beginning of the Second World War (Chiari 2005).

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[22] A curious trait of Belarusian self-identification in the years of the German occupation was the division between 'westerners' and 'easterners'. The former, largely citizens of Western Belarus, were more active and used the Belarusian language in communication. The easterners were citizens of the BSSR and demonstrated more passivity in their organization of public life; they also preferred to communicate in the Russian language, a source of irritation to many westerners (Turonek 2008).

Following the German defeat in 1943-1944 the Soviet system was reconstructed in Belarus and in 1945 the world community recognized the inclusion of Western Belarus in the USSR and BSSR. The Polish authorities, satisfied with the transfer of 17 districts of the Bialystok region, refused claims from Belarus to consider a revision of the borders (Lych 2011). An important milestone in the history of the BSSR occurred in 1945 when it became a founding member of the United Nations, although later its foreign policy activities were extremely formal and in general were reduced to fulfilling the USSR's interests.

After the end of World War II, the consolidation of the Soviet system and communist ideology in the BSSR was accompanied by the closure of the Republic's borders and strengthening of its Russification. A renewed emphasis was placed on the inviolability of the common historical destinies of the Belarusian and Russian peoples and on the necessity of struggle against Western influence and bourgeois, largely ethnic, nationalism. The Soviet ideologues obscured the fact of Belarusian statehood in the pre-Soviet period and negatively assessed the effects of membership in the GDL and Rzeczpospolita on Belarusian lands. The sole exception were their views on Kievan Rus' as they tied this polity to the concept of the 'ancient Russian nation' popular in the USSR. Belarusians who appeared in the West in the post-war years and who were political and ideological opponents to the USSR were characterized as "former Hitler acolytes having joined the service of American and Western German imperialism" (Kirchanov 2011, 50).

Urbanization, the construction of large industrial enterprises, and an increase in the education of the Belarusian population had a significant impact on the ideological and political processes taking place in Soviet Belarus. From the second half of the 1960s until the beginning of the 1980s, the BSSR turned into an industrial republic with a predominantly urban population. In 1985, sixty-two percent of the BSSR population lived in cities (Lych 2011). The development of the industrial capacity of the Republic strengthened its ties with other republics of the USSR. Within the USSR, Belarus functioned as an 'assembly shop', getting raw materials and sending finished goods to other Soviet republics. To a great extent, Minsk and the eastern regions of the BSSR, where the majority of industrial

enterprises were located, were dependent on the other republics. The main economic partners of the BSSR within this framework were the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

A peculiarity of the urbanization process of the BSSR during this period was the fact that the growth of the urban population was driven primarily by the influx of ethnic Belarusians into cities (Lych 2011). However, the increase in the number of Belarusians in cities was not accompanied by the growth of Belarusian cultural influence (see Shardurski, this volume). Indeed, the influence of the Belarusian language steadily narrowed, first due to the Russification of the system of education and secondly because the party-state and economic apparatus of the republic functioned in the Russian language.[23]

Belarusian nationalists who proposed alternative directions of ideological and political development were forced to either go underground or emigrate. They were unable to stay underground for long, and by the beginning of the 1950s were forced to stop their activity. From the 1960s until the beginning of the 1980s, the anticommunist movement in the BSSR existed only in the form of dissidents such as Hilevich and Karatkievich.[24]

A series of crises that affected the USSR at the end of the 1970s-1980s contributed to the disappointment of the Belarusian society in communist ideals, though the crises of communist ideology was not so obvious in the BSSR as it was in other Soviet republics. None-theless, the policy of *perestroika* and the Chernobyl catastrophe became catalysts for protests in Belarus. In 1988, the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) was created in the BSSR, following the exam-ple of the neighboring Baltic countries and Ukraine. Its supporters

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[23] Eviction of persons who considered themselves Polish from the territory of the BBSR to Poland also contributed to Russification. In 1944-1946 and 1955-1959, up to 600,000 people left Soviet Belarus (Vialiki 2009).

[24] In the 1950s-1980s Belarusian emigres were active in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Australia. They generally adhered to the idea of ethnic nationalism, criticized communist ideology, objected to the Russification of Belarus and militant atheism, and sought to preserve Belarusian cultural heritage in the receiving countries. For many emigres, arguments regarding the superiority of Western culture and aspirations and the need to bring Belarus closer with Western countries was quite natural.

presented anticommunist positions and considered the BPR's figures to be their ideological predecessors. The BPF searched for a way to detach Belarus from the USSR and to create an independent Belarusian state based on ethnic lines and borders (Pazniak 1992). An important component of the Front's ideology was a demand for Belarus to reach the status of a neutral, nuclear-free country. The BPF's activists did not seek out integration with the European Union, but gave preference to the creation of a Baltic-Black Sea Union composed of the Baltic Republics, Belarus and Ukraine (Pazniak 1992).

Elements of the BPF's ideology were reflected in the Declaration on State Sovereignty, adopted on July 27, 1990 by the Supreme Council of the BSSR. This document became a compromise between the Belarusian communists, speaking from the point of view of the Russophile position, and Belarusian nationalists who considered Russia as the major barrier to Belarusian independence. It matched the BPF's aspirations to gain the status of a nuclear-free, neutral state with the Russophiles' demand to preserve Belarus within the USSR (Rakashevitsh 2003).

At the beginning of 1991, the crisis in the Soviet Union reached its highest peak. A number of member-states declared their independence, and in some other republics a 'war of laws' ensued, wherein the republics gave preference to their own legislation and refused to implement decisions taken by the Soviet bodies. Trying to restrain separatist tendencies in the republics, USSR President Gorbachev proposed to hold a referendum on the preservation of the USSR. The majority of the citizens of the USSR participating in the referendum answered "yes" to the question "Do you want to preserve the Soviet Union as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics where human rights and freedoms will be respected fully?" In the BSSR over six million people participated in the referendum; almost seventy percent voted in favor of preserving the USSR (Osipov and Baburin 2001).

After the referendum, the USSR authorities agreed to transform the previous USSR into a federation of union republics. The BSSR authorities expressed their readiness to take part in the transformation of the USSR, but after an unsuccessful attempt to depose Gorbachev in August 1991, the Supreme Council of the BSSR granted

the status of constitutional law to the Declaration on State Sover-
eignty of the BSSR. The deputies also adopted the Decree on Politi-
cal and Economic Independence of the Republic.

On September 19, 1991, the Supreme Council approved a new
name, the Republic of Belarus, and the white-red-white banner
and *Pahonia* coat of arms used by nationalists as the state symbols
(Kravchenko 2009). In December 1991, the deputies supported a
proposal made by the Russian and Ukrainian authorities to eliminate
the Soviet Union and create the Commonwealth of Independent
States. The creation of the CIS consolidated the status of indepen-
dent Belarus and provided it with recognition from the international
community. For the first time in many hundreds of years, the Belar-
usian state obtained the status of a completely sovereign entity,
capable of forming its internal and external policy independently.

Conclusion

There is little doubting that the location of Belarusian lands at the
crossroads of different civilizations, and in particular, the western
and eastern Christian worlds, impeded the development of clear cri-
teria for Belarusian identity. Instead, the efforts by various powers
both east and west to spread their values across the Belarusian
lands has led to a unique mixture of influences and a nation that
continues to borrow cultural elements from both directions. Despite
this constantly shifting set of forces, at this early moment in the
history of an independent Republic of Belarus it is possible to iden-
tify a number of factors around which a nascent Belarusian national
identity is emerging, including the bond to a specific territory, a still
powerful connection to the 'soil', and an enduring sense of 'local-
ness'. Also important is a religious background based in Christianity,
inclusion in particular social strata, and shared value orientations
(see Chapter 7 of this volume).

All of these factors, as well as the apparent consolidation of a
Belarusian *ethnos,* has served to create a high level of conservatism
in Belarusians. Whether this conservatism can withstand an incre-
asingly globalized world, not to mention the continuing struggle of

trying to steer a consistent tack east or west, is the fundamental challenge facing the Belarusian people.

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Part II: **NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

LITHUANIA'S EUROPEAN IDENTITY DURING THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD

Liudas Mazylis

Introduction

This chapter discusses the importance of the European dimension during restoration and consolidation of an independent Lithuania at the end of 20th century and, in particular, the role of played by *Sajudis* during this period. In doing so, it examines the integration of Lithuania into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Sajudis, the Lithuanian Reform Movement

When retrospectively analyzing the discourses of Lithuanian elites during the post-Soviet period as well as different stages in the development of the Lithuanian independence movement *Sajudis* it is possible to recognize the persistence of European values in the movement. In order to do so, however, a series of methodological problems must be addressed. First, there is the problem of just what is meant by 'European identity' and 'European values'. Does this mean democratic values, Western values, or something else altogether (Mažylis 2010)? What should we look for and what should we expect to find within the discourse of an emerging elite that has been subject to decades of occupation? What will be the impact long-term 'Sovietization', particularly during the very beginning of a conscious process of liberation from Soviet empire? Shall

we look for emergent signs of democracy as an indication of the acceptance of European values? Or we should analyze the development of ties with European institutional structures, through which European values might be consolidated?

As will be shown below, the first of these trajectories can be identified as an important element in the initial stages of the *Sajudis* movement, that is, a belief in principles of democracy, the importance of public openness, the power of democratic parliamentarian representation, a belief in the possibility of prosperity through individual initiative, and the reconstructing non-governmental sector. On the other hand, trust in Western international institutional structures as guarantors of both 'soft' and 'hard' security occurred at a relatively later date in the movement's development.

Research work on the construction of a European element within Lithuanian identity discourses is based on one of two approaches. The first is a 'civic construction' which in the case of the Lithuanian SSR as well as other Soviet republics is yet to be created, defined historically, and delineated in terms of territory. This approach is contrasted with a 'real, mobilized class' based on what has been referred to as primordial factors, including ethnicity and language. As I have argued in a previous paper (Mažylis 2012) a Lithuania disconnected from the East but ethnically pluralistic was under construction at the time of the Soviet occupation.

Whichever of these approaches is used, one must be very cautious when attempting a purely 'historical' reconstruction of the meaning of 'Europe', if for no other reason than since independence the content and meaning of the notions themselves have been subject to rapid change (Berenis 2008). Reconstructing 'Europe' retrospectively and constructing it in a contemporary perspective will yield different meanings of the term. In this respect, it is not just about finding some sort of stable equilibrium since equilibrium conditions themselves have been changing. As Hay has pointed out, constructivist institutionalism does allow us to break up assumptions of stable equilibrium and conducting our analysis under disequilibrium conditions (2008). Thus, in the discourse of 1988, 'Europe' would have had and no doubt did have various shades of the meanings. Moreover, drawing consistent

features of a perceived Europe is difficult sociologically given the importance of the contextual background of identity for both Lithuanians and Europeans generally. In Kuznecoviene's words, "people do not oblige themselves very strictly for appropriate sample of values" (Kuznecovienė 2007, 9). In the case of *Sajudis,* the notion of 'Europe' was almost fully absent in its documentary records, at least during initial stage of its activities. There was a number of publications, however, arguing rather naïvely that the centre of Europe lies on Lithuanian soils.

Whatever the actual status of Lithuania at the time of independence, analyses of later discourses, that of 1996, 1998, and 2000, finds that there was a rhetorical path for allowing a return to Europe, using a variety of metaphors, including 'moving towards' and even 'dragging [Lithuania] into' Europe, the latter clearly identifying Europe with the European Union as an entity with specific political, and economic values and standards not typical for Lithuania's society. According to Rubavicius, such a rhetoric in the first years after restoring independence represented an important component the self-understanding of Lithuanians, somewhere between nationality and adapting to globalization and new economic conditions (Rubavičius 2008).

Following the new instrumentalist logic, one can look within developments regarding the formal institutional signs of 'Europeanization' rather than value-based or normative viewpoints that might be construed as positions of societial consensus. Doing so would allow one "to review structural factors assessing their stability, or, possibly, fluctuations or paradigmatic institutional changes" (Thelen, 1999, 383). Equally important is the behavior of the actors embedded within these institutions as well as the symbols, myths, and archetypal thinking that underlie the actions and analytical reconstruction of events on the ground. Based upon all of these factors, a number of critical junctures of value-normative self-understanding of Lithuanian society can be easily recognized.

From Perestroika to the Varnishing Soviet System

Within the initial stage in *Sajudis*' development, a period of time that ran from perestroika to the end of the Soviet system, there can be distinguished three sub-stages. The first of these sub-stages ran from 1985 until May-June, 1988, which predated the formal institutionalization of the *Sajudis* movement. It is characterized by relatively few reflections on perestroika initiatives coming out of the Kremlin with the notion of a *varnishing system* coming to Lithuania mainly through the Moscow press. During this initial stage, distancing oneself from this paradigm seemed very dangerous for local actors in that the danger of potential massive repressions was quite real. Thus, artists, environmentalists, historians, and ethnography experts were content to try to express their ideas in abstract rather than concrete forms. As a result, it is not surprising that during this sub-stage there is little specific reference to European values. The turning point in this approach is well known, namely, a visit to Lithuania by two representatives of Estonian National Front in May, 1998. Their visit led to a push for formal institutionalization of the independence movement, with the *Sajudis Movement for Perestroika* being established soon afterwards.

A number of important works have described the process leading to the establishment of *Sajudis*. According to Kavaliauskaitė and Ramonaitė (2011), for instance, the process was based on a variety of pre-existing social networks. Citing Alfred Erich Senn, who was physically present during very formation of *Sajudis*, Lieven claims that while ten of the names of this group "had been decided in advance, the rest appear to have emerged spontaneously" from the groups of humanitarians, technicians, and youth (1994, 225). Following the initial formation of the organization and throughout the early summer of 1988, fear of large scale oppression was still quite high, a feeling that was dissipated only after a visit by high ranking Kremlin officials. After the visit, according to Laurinavičius and Sirutavičius, "Lithuania changed" (2008, 122).

Subsequent to *Sajudis*' creation, a discourse of liberation was clearly in evidence, characterized by what might be called a set of

value or normatively driven equilibriums. The most important discourse was an agreement on the part of Lithuanian elites that 'half true is impossible'. Historical facts such as the existence and the content of Molotov-Ribbentropp protocols suddenly became openly known for the majority of the nation as did the loss of independence in 1940s; indeed, the latter became an important basis for talking about how independence was to be restored. This discourse involved not only the fact that such things were hidden from the nation in the first place but also *what* was hidden.

Out of this discourse another emerged, namely, a so-called 'Aesopian language' that used the term sovereignty instead of independence, "the latter meaning something less than the full right to self-determinations that could somehow be accommodated within the Soviet system" (Lieven, 1994, 229). Part of this discourse involved an effort by some within the *Sajudis* movement to incorporate Lithuania into a renewed Union undertaken by the free will of the Lithuanian people. Viewed by many as alarming and provocative, the debate illustrated the contentious nature of the debate taking place within *Sajudis* regarding the best path to achieve the goal of Lithuanian independence (Laurinavičius and Sirutavičius 2008). As a result, conflict arose during the founding congress of *Sajudis* concerning the use of Aesopian language, tactics, the speed of the processes of re-establishing independence, and the idea that Moscow was preparing a trap for Lithuania in a form of renewed Union treaty.

One other important issue arose at that time, namely, how the concept of Europe was to be situated among a variety of other important discourse topics, including spirituality, the renewal of the education system, environmental protection, and ethnic relations. Within the context of these other notions, Europe was only occasionally and episodically mentioned. At the same time, the concept of the West was spontaneously identified in *Sajudis'* founding documents while Russia and the satellites of the USSR were explicitly not identified with Europe.[25]

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[25] There was also one very clear linkage drawn between European and Asian culture, that of poet Sigitas Geda, who compared "what was going towards us through Russia from the dark, cruel, two-faced if not ten-faced Asia." Geda contrasted this value space where an "independent man was

Soon after *Sajudis'* founding congress at the end of 1988, a formal institutional contradiction arose within Lithuanian elites. While *Sajudis* was approaching independence though the obtuse notion of sovereignty, the Lithuanian Communist Party was drifting from careful reforms towards the idea of re-establishing independence but at a slower pace. By the end of 1988, Lithuanian society therefore faced a challenge. The first ever democratic elections were planned by Gorbachev in the USSR, with candidates being selected to be part of the People Deputies' Congress. *Sajudis* decided to participate in the elections using the slogan "Why do we ask for freedom? Do the free people behave like this?" The decision to participate is evidence of a shift in the value equilibrium and movement away from the gradual displacement of the Soviet system towards undivided and total freedom. As a result, the formal institutionalization of the processes appeared to be just that, a formality, though, in fact, the changes took much were far from guaranteed.

One important expression of such a formal institutionalization was the electoral victory of *Sajudis* candidates in the elections of 1989. This success was followed by a radical change in the wording in the formal documents of *Sajudis*, that is, the use of the word 'independence' instead of the more oblique term 'sovereignty'. This change was codified in a symbolically important place, the Kaunas Musical Theatre, on the equally symbolic date of February 16. Two and half years later, or roughly 1000 days, independence followed.

The *Sajudis* period, therefore, can be reconstructed as follows: fear of repressions of the system, a short period of collaboration within the Soviet system, and open conflict with Soviet system, culminating in against the system. European norms and values based on democratic, peaceful political activities were in evidence since the very beginning of the movement, although the notion of 'Europe' was rather episodic within the social discourses existent at the time. Also at this time, the feeling of 'being captured', and the use of various symbols of annexation and being an occupied

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respected and valued, that's only in Europe". No other speakers took up this idea however (Geda 1990).

territory arose. Rhetorical verses such as 'we were occupied but somehow did not realize it'; 'in 1940 there was at least partly legitimate decision of Lithuania to join Soviet Union' and 'we were sold we did not know it' were well understood and popularized. Such phrases reinforced the notion of being 'torn out from the European body' particularly amongst the older generation and were major elements in the emergence of a European identity.

By 1989 *Sajudis* had become a political power on the Lithuanian scene. The People Deputies Congress in Moscow became a vehicle for spreading messages of freedom while millions of people in all three Baltic republics formed themselves into a region-wide chain. The so-called Baltic Way offered compelling evidence of the total involvement of people in the quest for independence. The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, led by the Secretary of Communist Party, Algirdas Brazauskas, was pushed by *Sajudis* into making the necessary legal arrangements for eventual independence, including the legalization of alternative political parties. At the same time, the Lithuanian Communist Party was internalized, by splitting away from the Communist Party of Soviet Union, thus disassociating communism from any necessary identity as being pro-Russian. The culmination of the events was a resounding victory for *Sajudis* in the 1990 electoral campaign to the Supreme Council of Lithuania, a victory that marked a clear preference for the immediate restoration of independence as opposed to the step-by-step tactics advocated by the Communists.

The Next Stage: Recognizing an Independent Lithuanian State

After the adoption of the Acts of Independence on March 11, 1990, the situation changed radically. First, Lithuania's independence was not immediately recognized many members of the international community, an outcome that was not expected by a number of *Sajudis* leaders. As a result, the feeling of being located in an open and insecure international space became dominant, symbolized best by the notion that Lithuania was 'alone of alones'. The aggressive

intentions of the Soviets became evident almost immediately, with an economic blockade being announced in the summer of 1990 and again in January, 1991. Geopolitically, this led Lithuania's new leadership westward for support, arguing that the new state was in a 'plain field' and largely indefensible. Looking for security in the embrace of both the United States and NATO became the dominant practical and driving component of self-understanding rather than a more abstract European trajectory.

Coincident with the notion of being in an insecure space was a feeling that with independence the nation had 'come home', the words of a popular song by Kestutis Genys, – *I am coming home to Lithuania, country of my love* – being representative of this theme. Both of these themes were reinforced by concrete activities of the Soviets and then after dissolution, Russia. Another reinforcing narrative was the idea that Russia was the 'other', a perception borne out by both contemporary action and a larger historical narrative that located Russia outside of what it meant historically to be a Lithuanian.[26]

During the first months of the activities of the Supreme Council, decisions concerning international relations were limited mainly to defining relations with USSR and cooperation between the three Baltic states. Expert groups were formed by the Presidium of Supreme Council. While the European dimension was not directly addressed, there are clear indications of Lithuania's self-understanding as being European, including that contained in a March 11, 1990 appeal to the world. This was followed by a number of appeals to a variety of European institutions, including the Council of Europe, leaders of France and Germany, to the Danish and Norwegian nations, and so on. In all cases, the appeal was for restoring the independence of the Baltic States and eliminating the vestiges

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[26] Unfortunately, much of the today's research lacks this dual understanding of the various interpreting discourses. In reconstructing painful experiences, researchers typically concentrate on the Second World War while the more recent conflicts with Moscow are forgotten, including the bloody conflicts that occurred in January, 1991, an incident which reinforced memories of the previous historical conflicts. Such fresh recollections are important for a better and more complete understanding of contemporary Lithuania but also for dictating present geopolitical choices and future trajectories (see Berg and Ehin 2009, 10).

of the Second World War (Landsbergis 1997). For instance, a letter dated May 10, 1990, and addressed to the President of the Commission of European Community, Jacques Delors, asked that members of the *Europos Taryba* condemn the activities of the USSR against Lithuania and provide Lithuania with immediate humanitarian aid. The letter also raised the first mention of the possibility of free trade with European Community (Landsbergis 1997). The request pre-dated by three years the 1993 Copenhagen Summit where the idea of a free trade area is typically taken as the first time such a possibility was mentioned. Similar possibilities were raised in another letter from Landsbergis to Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterand in May, 1990 (Landsbergis 1997). The letter addressed the possibility of Lithuania restoring itself as democratic state and coming together with the whole of Europe so as to improve the human condition.

Later that year, a joint letter authored by Vytautas Landsbergis, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, and Arnold Ruutel was sent to Enrique Baron Crespo asking that an official inter-parliamentary group representing Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the European Parliament be formed. While such a request might appear rather naïve, the leaders saw their request as an important means of consolidating independence and strengthening the new democratic order (Landsbergis 1997). Following this initial request, a second letter was sent to the President of Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Anders Bjork, asking him to provide Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia with the status of special guest delegation. According to Landsbergis, granting the request would allow those countries to gradually integrate ourselves into the family of European nations (1997). Landsbergis continued his appeals for "European integrity" during his visits to European nations, arguing that "[I]f justice towards the Lithuanian nation and state is violated, [justice] is violated in Europe ... Danger lies in the unconcern of the Western world. We are fighting not only for ourselves, but also for you, people of Western world" said Landsbergis, a phrase specifically designed to appeal to western notions of the indivisibility of democracy and freedom (1997, 164).

While the main thrust of Lithuanian diplomatic thought was oriented towards negotiations with the USSR, according to Landsbergis

"we had and we ever will have a Western attitude towards politics" (1997, 164). As Lieven concludes, "a keynote of Baltic national feeling since its rebirth in the 1980s has been the desire to return to Europe. Baltics feel also ... that the rest of Europe has a duty to help them to do. Western involvement [in a case of Russian aggression] will be matter of Western choice" (1994, 376). Lieven also argued that while the west was already committed emotionally and politically to the Baltic independence, emotional commitment needed to be backed by real support (Lieven 1994). In Lieven's view, on-going debate about the frontiers of Europe and where they lie was largely without merit. Instead, the Baltic States should be seen as bulwarks, if not the fence, against essentially non-European, Asiatic Russia (Lieven 1994).

In addition to the events that occurred in the autumn of 1991, two other important strands of diplomatic action were taking place, the first being negotiations with Boris Yeltsin, the leader of the new, and apparently, more democratic Russia. As Landsbergis points out, "after the January events, two states supported us, one very big and one very small: Russia and Iceland" (Landsbergis, 1992). The second strand involved discussions on re-establishing diplomatic relations with Scandinavian countries. Lietuvos Aidas points out that both of these strands rotated Lithuanian westward towards the Nordic states specifically and the European Community more generally. Such movement was seen as imperative that would afford the country protection against a "permanent danger" (quoted in Landsbergis 1992, 318).

A Strategic Pause

With the collapse of the Moscow putsch came the end of open aggression and threats from Moscow. Suddenly Vilnius witnessed a bloom of flags on the cars of foreign representatives on its streets. Also evident was a geo-political self-understanding that Lithuania was clearly not with the Kremlin, be it democratized or not and that there was no alternative but to seek union with nearby neighbors as a means achieving some degree of security, be it hard or soft. Given the unlikely prospects for the former, democratic instruments

were felt to provide the necessary measure of security. The further Europeanization of Lithuania were therefore seen as a natural continuation of the fight over independence and the idea of 'no more USSR' came to be understood as an aspiration, and in some cases, a return to the West.

Such a venture was not without its risks. As Lieven points, "escaping from Russia's sphere ... is more difficult ... than was the extraction from the Soviet Union [because it goes] against powerful strands of history and economics" (1994, 376). Properly coordinated aid, with the deliberate aim of not simply helping the transition to a market economy, but of minimizing unemployment and reducing food prices during that transition, was desperately needed during the transition period. Yet the process of becoming members of "international financial and banking structures took an extended period of time, due, in large part due to difficulties with potential western benefactors" (Landsbergis 1994). In 1992, however, Lithuania was granted special guest status in the Council of Europe, after which it became a member of both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, all of which opened up access to significant lines of credit. A fuller membership in Council of Europe was realized in the Spring of 1993, Russian military troops exited the country in the summer of 1993 without any new concessions, and an application to NATO was made in January of 1994.

In the midst of these developments, a new institutional context arose in October 1992 when a new Lithuanian Constitution was adopted by referendum. The Communists, led by Algirdas Brazauskas, came back into power through democratic elections, a result known as the 'communist nomenclature revenge'. For the first time in Europe, a communist party was legitimized through democratic elections and with it a new value equilibrium occurred, one that recognized that the democratic choice of citizens might well result in the legitimization of former Soviet structures as representatives of the political left wing in the Lithuanian political spectrum. Such an outcome required a re-negotiation of the European institutional perspective of Lithuania.

Integration into the European Union

Official Lithuania's relationship with the European Community is generally thought to have been initiated on August 27, 1991, when the Baltic states were recognized by the Community. However, a day before the ministers of foreign relations of the Baltic States had signed a common document with Denmark in Copenhagen signifying the full-scale resumption of that diplomatic relations between Denmark and the Baltic States. Thus, while many western countries avoided direct relations, the Nordic countries, with Denmark in the lead, responded quickly arguing that support was necessary for the preservation of democracy, human rights, international law, and sustainable development. Denmark went so far as encouraging Lithuania to be active in creating its so-called European Neighborhood policy. Using Euro-centered language, the Danes presented Lithuania as being eager to shift the European center eastwards, much as Denmark had done in the course of its own development. Russia's efforts to counter this movement by proposing security guarantees for the Baltic countries were soundly rejected. Even the 'middle way' proposed during the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 was ultimately rejected since the path to EU membership was well underway with the signing of free trade agreements. According to Maniokas (2003), an essential factor behind this momentum was the interest on the part of the European Union itself to enlarge eastwards. As early as 1993 it was clear that the interests of those favoring Lithuania's European identity coincided with Europe's own emergent sense of an enlarged identity.

The last decade has involved an effort on the part of Lithuania's elites to consolidate its European status through the formation of European institutions, harmonization of legal acts, market liberalization, and reforms to its administrative systems. Lithuanians accepted the necessity and even the desirability such reforms, seeing them as providing systems more advanced than their own. "Brussels' bureaucrats could, in other words, offer Lithuanians more effective systems of governance" (Povilaitis, Mažylis and Unikaitė 2003, 89).[27]

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[27] An understanding of Europe by the general public, however, remained

When Lithuania was finally invited to start negotiations in 1999, euro-optimism had become the dominant rhetoric. There were no serious arguments for euroscepticism as a useful political strategy and no serious eurosceptic parties or politicians appeared. On the contrary, for political actors, integration to the EU became a convenient way to speculate on and manipulate voter opinion (Mažylis and Unikaitė 2003). The EU accession referendum in 2003 was therefore simply a ratification of a consensus reached over many years. Indeed, on the first day of EU membership, on May 1st, 2004, nothing happened, nothing else than a result that marked a return to the West, accomplished without shooting and shouting, just singing a sweet-voiced song of youth rock group called *Pikaso* about being "in a middle of Europe – and you are living there".

Conclusion

The formation of pro-Western, pro-European features within modern Lithuanian can be explained by a number of important factors can be identified:

- experiences of the Lithuanian independent state of the first half of the 20th century;

- an understanding on the part of Lithuania elites they there were confronting a rapidly 'varnishing' Soviet system in the summer of 1988;

- the rejection of 'half-truths' that accompanied a new recognition of the Molotov-Ribbentrop protocols as well as the very fact of occupation and annexation of Lithuania in 1940s;

- the creation of 'unlimited truth' and 'unlimited freedom' as values shared by Lithuanian elites;

- confidence in democratic institutes expressed by the use of

rather abstract until 1997, since by then the decision not to invite Lithuania to EU membership negotiations had become important topic on mass media. Why, it was asked, were the Estonians invited to negotiations and not the Lithuanians? Despite this issue, it was understood that integration into the EU was a dynamic process.

slogans such as openness, democracy, sovereignty already in use as early as in 1988;

- rejecting 'non-Europe' as insecure space not by only historic memories but stimulated by repeated hostility from USSR and subsequent 'near neighbourhood' claims from Russia;

- an intuitive belief in Western space if not physically then at least morally;

- formal institutionalized consolidation towards European structures with gradual identification of them; and

- a high confidence level in the process of European integration and the belief that it represented a 'coming back' to Europe not as a marginal or peripheral state but as one in the very center of Europe.

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Chapter 5   IDENTITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF LITHUANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST EU-PERIOD

Sima Rakutiene

Introduction

In 2003 more than half of Lithuania's citizens said *yes* in a referendum regarding the country's admission into the EU; one year later the country became a fully-fledged member of the organization.[28] Unfortunately, the euphoria and optimism of 2004, based on the achievement of Lithuania's foreign policy goals and the consequent expectations for a better future were soon replaced by general sense of anxiety about the country's future. Several factors were behind this shift in attitudes, including a significant increase in emigration, the isolation of its energy system, and a generally tepid response to Lithuania's effort to raise the level of anti-Russian sentiments amongst the members of the European Union.

During the second half of 2013 Lithuania will assume the presidency of the EU Council, a date that will mark the first decade of Lithuania's membership in the European Union. There are three main priorities in Lithuania's forthcoming EU Council agenda: a revision of the organization's energy policy, a renewed emphasis on the Union's Eastern Partnership program, and the EU's strategy for the Baltic Sea region. All of these priorities reflect both Lithuania's foreign policy dynamics as well as its sense of national identity (Priorities of Lithuania's Presidency in the EU Council 2013).

[28] 63.37% of Lithuania's citizen eligible to vote came to the referendum and 91.07% said "yes", see: http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/2003/referendumas/rezultatai/rez_l_16.htm. Accessed 08/12/2012.

National identity, or those features that define a country's essential nature, can be analyzed within several dimensions, including its cultural, political, societal, and historical aspects. This chapter assesses the relationship between identity and foreign policy and how these two dimensions impact each other. The argument is based on a theoretical framework that includes research on a common European collective identity and the integration process. The chapter also discusses a variety of related issues, including how European integration and European common identity have influenced Lithuania's foreign policy. The chapter argues that Lithuania's conception of its national foreign policy role is influenced by an identity based on its particular historical and cultural experiences as well as a socialization process influenced by the expectations of 'others', which, in turn, is influenced by logic of appropriateness.[29] The chapter also examines Lithuania's foreign policy trends, role and conception during the period of Lithuania's membership in the EU. The chapter concludes by discussing the results of a survey that examined Lithuanian and Belarusian student attitudes towards European identity and relationships between the two countries.

The methodology used in this chapter is mostly of a qualitative nature. In February of 2012, group interviews were conducted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, with the number of respondents varying between two and five. The interviews (in a form of focus group) lasted approximately four hours and included personnel from the Eastern Neighbourhood Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In April 2012 an interview was conducted with Dalia Grybauskaitė, an advisor to the current president of Lithuania and in October 2011 an interview was conducted with the staff of the Embassy of Lithuania in Brussels. Various strategies, programs, documents, and scientific literature were also included in the analysis. The third part of the chapter is based on results of a survey

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[29] According to this argument, a state's identity brings with it a shared understanding of the type of foreign policy behavior that is 'appropriate' for a state with that identity. According to constructivist international relations theory, socialization of states that are new to the identity group by states already in the identity group can shape the behavior of a new state, even in the absence of material incentives.

of some 400 Lithuanian and Belarus students enrolled at Vytautas Magnus University and Belarusian State University.

Integrating National Identity and Foreign Policy

Within the current international relations literature, national identity has become an important analytical tool for explaining problematic or cooperative relationships between states. Social constructivists have re-introduced the concept of identity into international relations discourse by using meta-theoretical reflections and cultural and normative dimension (Ashizawa 2008, 572). The formation and the change of identity or, to put it another way, the construction and de-construction of identity, is used to explain national, regional and international security problems and also foreign policy directions. This approach has also been used by Lithuanian researchers (Jakniunaitė 2007; Miniotaitė 2006; Statkus and Paulauskas 2006), for example by Dovile) in attempting to explain Russia's sense of identity and its impact on her attitudes towards neighbouring countries.

The concept of identity has become important, in part, because it unites history, raising questions of how the past influences the current status of the country and how both of these will likely affect its future. At the same time, identity is used not just in reference to an individual country's foreign policy but also to explain the collective posture of a group of sovereign states such as the European Union. Given the concept's broad reach, it is perhaps not surprising that there are few rules governing its use. One of the ways to analyze identity is to explain the 'narrative' of the country, that is, to provide a story about how the state was created and which elements in a given society were important in this state-building process. For instance, Hansen and Waever (2003) explained how an overarching identity common to all of the Nordic states influenced their integration into EU processes. In essence, they argued that Euroscepticism is a common feature for all of the Nordic countries and that concepts of 'state', 'nation', 'society' and 'people' are the key analytical concepts of this identity constellation.

Identity as a concept becomes even more complex when there

is a need to define the collective identity of the European Union. European identity has several sources and meanings, but it is usually understood as being an integral part of the EU, possessing democratic institutions and processes, being a promoter and implementer of the rule of law, and evincing strong support for human rights. Supranational institutions, such as NATO and the Schengen zone, also have become a common feature of a collective European identity. As Helene Sjursen points out (2006, 90):

Supranationalism is defined as the establishment of a mutually binding legal arrangement – connected to sanctions – between the actors. Such mutually binding institutions would be necessary in order to ensure collective action, which is to take away the motives for actors not to comply with common rules. They sanction non-compliance; hence make it less costly to act in a morally adequate way. Without mutually binding legal norms, there is always a risk of defection and a concern that some actors contribute more than they receive (whereas others are free-riders). In order to avoid such risks common rules are necessary.

In essence, says Sjursen, European integration created a bidirectional Europeanization processes. On the one hand, member states and candidates, even before seeking membership in the EU, must be considered Europeanized as understood by the *acquis communautaire*. On the other hand, after gaining membership a state gains the chance to influence the EU's common policy and to even more strongly take on the attributes of a collective identity.

According to Hooghe and Gary (2001, 51) the founding fathers of the European Community believed that these processes- Europeanization and nationalism- may coexist. Today many would argue that however successful coexistence might or might not be, the EU has, in fact, gained a common identity and a high degree of 'constitutionalization' that operates within a set of common norms and rules (Hix 2006). As a result, the EU is increasingly able to mandate a wide array of policies, including EU enlargement policy, the ENP, the Eastern partnership, and so on (see Figure 1).

The European Union is usually described as a normative, ethical, or civilian power. Barbe and Johansson-Nogues (2008), for instance,

Figure 5.1. Terms/concepts used to describe the nature and identity of the European Union

Source: Created by author (Sima Rakutiene), published in Ракутене Сима, Внешняя политика Литовской Ресрувлили в контексте европейской идентичности, Журнал международного права и международных отношений 2011/2 (57), (Минск „Развитие"): 74-76.

analyzed the notion of EU being a 'modest force for good' within the ENP while Sjursen (2006) described the EU as an unconventional actor that seeks to shape the international rules and norms as well as to position itself within the current normative international order. Both of these analysts reflect what is probably the most popular notion of the European Union in recent decades, that is, its role as a 'normative power', a concept introduced by Ian Manners at the beginning of this century (2006). In essence, Manners formed a pyramid of European norms, the most essential being 'peace', which itself is based on political, civil, and economic freedom, and democracy, which is based on the rule of law and good governance (Manners 2006). According to Manners, these norms can be understood as a normative constitution,

one that serves as a principle foundation for the EU's common foreign policy and as well as its collective identity. Manners also emphasized that the EU can be differentiated from other international actors by its willingness to intervene in areas outside its territory with other than purely military instruments (2006).

According to Lisbeth Aggestam, who created an analytical framework based upon what she referred to as *role analysis*, collective identity is important because a chosen or preferred "role reflects a …conception of identity" (2006, 26). Aggestam bases this claim on Holsti's notion that "a role conception… is a product of a nation's socialization process and is influenced by its history, culture and societal characteristics" (Holsti 1987, 38). The present question is the manner in which the prevailing conception of European identity is used by Lithuanians, that is, why and how does the country incorporate, integrate, and interpret European identity and in which circumstances and social contexts? In terms of foreign policy, the question arises as to whether and to what extent the common European identity has become part of Lithuania's national foreign policy.

Lithuania's Foreign Policy Construction Within European Integration

 At the present time, there are a host of influences bearing upon the conduct of Lithuania's foreign policy. For instance, according to the constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the Office of the President is the main institution responsible for the country's foreign policy formation and implementation. Yet, while changes in the person holding the office may cause major changes in the country's foreign policy, thus highlighting the potential 'personalization' of foreign policy, Lithuania's historical and political experiences remain the primary source for the country's foreign policy decisions.

Also of importance is what Schimmelfennig refers to as 'appropriateness', a manner of behavior that is based both upon a country's particular historical and political experiences and international rules and norms, the primary international actor in this case being the EU (2003). According to Schimmelfennig, such logic compels state

actors to follow a norm-guided decision process. "To the extent that state actors are convinced of the appropriateness of international rules, they comply even in the presence of net costs to themselves" (2003, 6). Since 2004, Lithuania has taken an active role in post-Soviet space based upon such logic. It has adopted European values of the sort explained by Manners and has sought to become a leading force in the creation of a more democratic community in the region.

Table 5.1. Lithuania's foreign policy directions and discourse dynamics

Period	1991-2004[30]	2004-2009	2009-current[31]
Foreign policy conception	Membership in the EU and NATO	Democratization of European Eastern neighbours	Balance between the East and the West
	Good neighbourhood	Regional leader role	Interests based policy
	Focus towards Western European community	Focus towards Central-Eastern Europe	Focus towards Baltic sea region and Nordic states

Source: Created by author (Sima Rakutiene), published in Ракутене Сима, Внешняя политика Литовской Ресрувлили в контексте европейской идентичности, Журнал международного права и международных отношений 2011/2 (57), (Минск „Развитие"): 74-76.

At the same time, according to Nyunr (2006), the best way for small states to achieve success in foreign policy is through regional integration, multilateralism and the building of good relationships with its immediate neighbours. Lithuania's foreign policy is based on all of these principles, as highlighted by its early successes in achieving membership in the EU and NATO. Following these early

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[30] Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas. 1996. *Deklaracija dėl Lietuvos Respublikos užsienio politikos tikslų,* 1996 m. lapkričio 28 d. http://www.viv.lt/elements/vd10.pdf (accessed on 20/01/2013).

[31] Lithuania's support for the Eastern European countries was also described as country's development policy in the Government's quidelines: Lietuvos Respublikos vystomojo bendradarbiavimo 2011–2012 metų politikos nuostatos. Patvirtinta Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės 2011 m. sausio 12 d. nutarimu Nr. 10. http://www.lrv.lt/Posed_medz/2011/111228/09.pdf (accessed on 20/01/2013). LR Vyriausybė. 2011 metų Vystomojo bendradarbiavimo ir paramos demokratijai programos įgyvendinimo gairės.

successes, however, Lithuanian foreign policy analysts were consumed with debates about the country's vacuum in foreign policy and uncertainty about the appropriate direction for the nation's foreign policy, i.e., to the east or to the north (see Table 5.1).

The debate over orientation was the core object in the discourse between 2003-2004 and in 2009 with the election of President Dalia Grybauskaite. Those promoting a northern approach argued for the creation of a more Nordic identity and a greater degree of cooperation within the wider Baltic Sea region, one that would include Scandinavian and other Nordic countries. This direction was also associated with a more pragmatic version of foreign policy.

Others, however, emphasized Lithuania's historical identity and close historical and cultural ties with Poland and other Central-Eastern European countries. In the latter narrative, Lithuania's history was an important source for the preferred role set and the 2004 declaration that Lithuania was to serve as a bridge between the west and the post-Soviet countries. As noted by Paulauskas, "living at a crossroads of regions and civilizations opens up most probably the first opportunity in history to bridge the East and the West and make Lithuania a centre of gravity in a geographically and culturally diverse region" (2004, 11). Adamkus reiterated the point when he declared that "we will seek to expand the Baltic region's engagement with the neighbours in the North, the South and the East and contribute actively to the development of new formats of regional co-operation, which would bridge the Nordic countries and the Central and Eastern European nations" (2004, 19). While such statements sought to clarify Lithuania's geopolitical position and its new identity as a free and democratic state they also underscored the role that identity was to play in its foreign policy.

Agreed to by all of the main parliamentary parties, Lithuania began the processes of positioning itself in European processes.[32] Expectations were high that the strategy would create a positive identity and lead to new activities in the region. Analysts such as Paulauskas argued that "without an active foreign policy, Lithuania,

[32] LR Seimo rezoliucija Dėl Lietuvos Respublikos užsienio politikos krypčių Lietuvai tapus visaverte NATO nare ir Europos Sąjungos nare, 2004 m. gegužės 1 d., Vilnius.

which is just a tiny spot on the world map, might remain unnoticed even while deciding issues of vital importance to its future (2004, 11)." Questions remained, however, as to whether Lithuania possessed the capacity for implementing this new foreign policy agenda (Rakutiene 2009). The first question concerned Lithuania's experience with the processes required to transform post-soviet states into European countries. Critics were also skeptical that Lithuania could or would be able to share that experience with other Eastern European and South Caucasus countries (Rakutiene 2009). Membership in supranational organizations, including the EU and NATO, was seen as a key element in this strategy as was a systematic effort to create good relationship with its neighbours.

Lithuania's foreign policy objectives were clearly spelled out in 2004, the development of democracy and the reproduction of the European and transatlantic values being the most important of these objectives. Lithuania's main political parties and various governmental programs were designed to support the democratization and Europeanization processes in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the three South Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.[33] During the same period, the European Union created the so-called 'Wider Europe' initiative, also known as the ENP. The initiative was designed to spread the influence of European and international values such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights and to create closer political and economical relations with the neighbouring countries in the East and in the South. Lithuania's foreign policy was highly influenced by this initiative; at the same time, Lithuania took a lead role in implementing ENP on behalf of the EU.

In accordance with the ENP, Lithuania actively promoted the transitional processes and integration of Eastern European and south Caucasus countries into the EU and NATO.[34] Between 2004-2009, Lithuania also dealt with forthrightly with and strongly promoted Ukraine's and Georgia's potential membership in the EU and

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[33] Lietuvos politinių partijų susitarimas dėl pagrindinių valstybės užsienio politikos tikslų ir uždavinių 2004–2008 metais. http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_r=5042&p_k=1 (accessed on 20/01/2013).

[34] Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės programa. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo nutarimas Nr. XI-52 „Dėl Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės programos" įsigaliojo 2008 12 09 (Valstybės žinios, Nr. 146-5870).

NATO, with Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus, together with the Polish president, becoming the main actors in the field. All of these actions were, of course, influenced by history, political experiences and expectations by 'others'. As Ramunas Vilpisauskas has pointed out (2009, 95):

> *During the first five years of EU membership, Lithuania modeled its role in neighbourhood policy on the basis of historical references and attempts to reduce energy vulnerabilities, rather than existing economic interdependences. This implied particular emphasis on the partnership with Poland and attention to Southern-Eastern neighbours such as Ukraine and Moldova reaching to the Caucasus, namely, Georgia.*

A variety of historical reasons were raised in promoting this foreign policy agenda. Commonality between Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine within Rzeczpospolita (Lithuania-Poland's Union), as well as a common political heritage of belonging to the Russian empire and later the Soviet Union were emphasized (Kruglashov 2008) as was an even deeper history rooted in the Grand Duchy. These historical and political experiences, especially the memory of Soviet policies and the knowledge of Russia's 'inappropriate activeness', strengthened Lithuania's domestic support for the states such as Georgia. According to the officials of Lithuania's Ministry for Foreign affairs "we have a commitment to our Eastern partners and there is common understanding based on our common history and political experience. There is solidarity with these countries and the solidarity even was raised by the war between Georgia and Russian in 2008" (interview data, 10/02/2012, Vilnius).

According to some analysts, the latter illustrated Russia's inappropriate behaviour in relations with its neighbors, behavior which became an important source of Lithuania's and Europe's foreign policy. Thus, in 2008 Lithuania's Minister for Foreign Affairs Petras Vaitiekunas was the first foreign official to support Georgia during the armed conflict. Later he was joined by his Polish, Latvian and Estonian counterparts (Officials of Lithuania's Ministry for Foreign affairs, interview data, 10/02/2012, Vilnius). Officials of Lithuania's Ministry for Foreign Affairs noted that Ukraine and Georgia attracted

Lithuania's attention after the color revolutions in these countries, i.e., the Rose revolution in 2003 and Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004. Lithuania's president Valdas Adamkus played an active role in the latter, being invited to take play the role of mediator by Ukrainian president Leonidas Kucma[35] together with Polish President Kwasniewski (Nekrasas 2004). This date marked Lithuania's active and successful support for the democratization in the post-Soviet space.

Both Lithuania's and Poland's actions between 2004-2008/2009 were based on various modes of international institutionalism including an inter-parliamentary assembly involving Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania. Later in 2009, Poland, together with Sweden, suggested what was to become the Eastern Partnership, which ultimately became an EU multilateral initiative that sought a greater degree of economic and political integration among Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Despite not being included in the early stages of the initiative, Lithuania remains one of its most active EU's members.[36] Indeed, promotion of the Partnership is one of the priorities of Lithuania's forthcoming EU's Council presidency. Also during 2004-2009, Lithuania served as an important link between Georgia and both the EU and NATO. During that time, Lithuania's President Valdas Adamkus attempted to veto several agreements between the EU and Russia, arguing that Russia failed to fulfill her international commitments towards Georgia and that it should not be rewarded for such behavior.

Lithuania's active support for the democratization and Europeanisation of its eastern European neighbours also facilitated its relations with the United States, a country long seen as Lithuania's most important strategic and security partner and one that shared a common interest in a more stable Black Sea region (Daniliauskas

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[35] The declaration for cooperation was signed between the Presidents of Lithuanian and Ukraine in 1996. Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidento ir Ukrainos Prezidento susitikimo bendra deklaracija (Algirdas Brazauskas ir Leonidas Kučma). Vilnius, 1996 m. rugsėjo 23 d.

[36] Despite various activities in post-Soviet space for promoting democratisation and Europeanisation together with Poland, Lithuania was excluded from hosting and launching the Eastern Partnership in the early stage. LR užsienio reikalų ministerija, 2006 metų užsienio politikos veiklos ataskaita. http://www.urm.lt/index.php?2999896586 (accessed on 08/02/2012).

2005). According to an advisor to President Grybauskaite "stable political systems are important not just for us but for our global partners as well" (personal interview, 19/04/2012).

Lithuania's socialization with 'others' participating in Europe's institutional structures was less successful. The efforts on behalf of Georgia, for instance, came to naught, in part because of Lithuania's inability to build the coalitions necessary to sustain her position. Lithuania also exaggerated the dangers of further relations with Russia. As Bailes has noted "apart from the different degrees of integration …the most obvious difference between Nordics and Baltics has been the greater readiness of the latter to stir up change and actively weaken Russian influence in other post-Soviet states like Georgia and Ukraine" (2006, 34). According to Tromer, Lithuania's rather strident position was based on a hope that the "EU, with all its instruments and 'power', would be helpful in dealing with Russia, as Russia, in the Baltic experience, prefers to deal with major powers" (2006, 94). Instead, the EU's core countries, including Germany and France, were eager to pursue cooperative rather than conflict-based relations with Russia.

These experiences, that is, the relative success of Adamkus's leadership in post-Soviet space, the unsuccessful effort to influence the EU's internal structures, and a series of domestic difficulties with Russia, i.e., the 2006 closure of the Druzba pipeline and the loss of oil, all influenced the reconsideration of Lithuania's foreign policy. Thus, in 2009 the newly elected president Dalia Grybauskaite called for a more pragmatic sort of foreign policy, one that would seek a greater foreign policy balance between the East and the West, the strengthening of relations with the Nordic states, and a re-orientation towards the Baltic Sea region.

The reset was not without its critics. For instance, President Grybauskaite met not only with Russia's president but also twice with Belarusian president Lukashenka.[37] Despite these efforts,[38]

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[37] D. Grybauskaitė. Išvykstamųjų vizitų ataskaita, atvykstamųjų vizitų ataskaita (2009, 2010, 2011 m.). http://www.president.lt/lt/prezidento_veikla/vizitai.html (accessed on 20/01/2013).

[38] Analysis of the incoming and outgoing visits and annual speaches of the President of Lithuania (Dalia Grybauskaite). Lietuvos Respublikos prezidentės Dalios Grybauskaitės metinis pranešimas, 2010 06 08. http://www.president.

however, relations with both Russia and Belarus remained frosty. The President was also strongly criticized and even condemned for her support of Lukasenka's political regime. Such criticisms took place with a larger foreign policy debate around the basis of that policy, i.e., whether to develop an agenda based on certain values and norms or on more pragmatic and largely economic consideration.

Whoever occupies the Presidential office, Lithuania's membership in NATO and the EU remains a critical precondition for its Eastern policy (Lopata, Statkus, 2006), that is, its effort to drive the Eastern European and South Caucasus countries closer to the European Union. The European integration process and its membership in the European Union is also central to its overall foreign policy agenda. Indeed, without membership in the EU and NATO Lithuania's foreign policy could not be as active and courageous as it was. On the other hand, some of these efforts, particularly those in relation to Russia, have caused the conflict between certain normative dimensions and the more pragmatic policies. At the end of the day, it is fair to say that European integration is one part of larger identity and foreign policy formation processes that continue to unfold.

European Normative Dimension and Foreign Policy: Students' Positions

As noted above, the EU's international actions are associated with a common European identity which in turn is based on international and European values implemented in the EU's political and legal system (Hix and Bjorn 2011). Given the purpose of this monograph, i.e., an analysis and comparison of Lithuanian and Belarusian identity formation within the European integration process, an analysis of the attitudes of each state's citizens is appropriate. One important category to consider are those who will soon be assuming

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lt/lt/prezidento_veikla/kalbos/lietuvos_respublikos_prezidentes_dalios_
grybauskaites_metinis_pranesimas.html (accessed on 20/01/2013).
Lietuvos Respublikos prezidentés Dalios Grybauskaités metinis pra-
nešimas, 2011 06 07. http://www.president.lt/lt/prezidento_veikla/
kalbos/lietuvos_respublikos_prezidentes_dalios_grybauskaites_metinis_
pranesimas_8496.html.

leadership positions in various sectors of society. Assuming a normal relationship between education and social status, it is reasonable to assume that many of these individuals will come from the various institutions of higher education in both Lithuania and Belarus. Based upon these assumptions, a survey was undertaken of students at Lithuania's Vytautas Magnus University and Belarusian State University. The survey (see Appendix) was conducted in late 2011 and consisted of a mix of forced choice and open-ended questions. The latter results are reported in this chapter; the results of the former are the subject of Chapter 7 of this monograph.

As noted above, a common European identity serves as an important element in the EU's foreign policy. At the same time, a commonly shared set of values and norms have become an essential element of the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership program, the latter including Belarus. Again as noted above, while Lithuania is a full partner in these initiatives, there are elements of Lithuania's foreign policy agenda that may result in some degree of conflict with Belarus. The first question taken up in the survey therefore concerned the relationship between the two countries and what might make the relations between Lithuania and Belarus better; the second question concerned perceptions of values common to the European experience.

As shown in Figure 5.2, most of the Belarusian respondents stated that a free visa regime creation would be a key in making better bilateral relations. A position or expectation in relations with the European Union is a common feature for all the EU's eastern neighbors, including Russia, as they seek to create a visa free regime with EU countries.

Lithuanian respondents also defined free visa regime as important factor for making relations better, but unlike their Belarusian counterparts, many believed bilateral relations will improve if Belarus would establish the democratic form of government and/or change the political leadership (see Figure 5.3). This compares with only 5 percent of Belarus respondents who declared that strengthening of the democracy in their country will have the positive effects between their countries, and the approximately 4 percent who believe that Belarus' inclusion into European integration processes

will create positive relations. On the other hand, students of both countries saw the importance of creating historical, cultural, academic and commercial events in improving relations.

Figure 5.2

Figure 5.3

The second question in the survey concerned the extent to which student shared common perceptions about European values. In both cases, students recognized democracy as the most common of all European values (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). On the other hand, human rights and freedoms as well as political rights were often recognized as European values by Belarusian students while only a few Lithuanian students recognized the *rule of law* as a common European value. These results might be explained by an understanding of democracy as a political regime and a form of government that involves human rights, rule of law and other democratic institutes rather than being simply associated with free and fair elections. Also, it is evident that Belarusian students more often recognized those European values which are not part of their country's political practice.

Recognized European values by Lithuanian students

Legend:
- Democracy
- Unity/commonality
- Tollerance
- Human rights and freedoms
- Equality
- Liberalism
- Culture
- Freedom
- High living standards
- EU common idealogy

Figure 5.4

A variety of other values were also identified as common to the European ethic. Approximately 15 percent of Lithuanian students pointed to the idea of 'unity' while Belarusian students identified

European values recognized by Belarusian students

Figure 5.5

solidarity as an important European value. Belarusian students wrote that a market economy is a European value, while Lithuanians described the EU as creating a common ideology based upon a common economic structure. High livings standards and high incomes were recognized as European values by both sets of students. Some six percent of Lithuanian respondents recognized liberalism and national culture as European values, while four percent of Belarusian respondents said that national culture is a primary European value. The recognition of values such as tolerance, freedom, and equality are in accordance with Manners' pyramid of European norms and mostly associated with citizens' social, political, individual freedoms. It is worth noting that students in both countries recognized a fairly similar set of values despite the fact that for eight years Lithuanians have been living as a member of the European Union during which time Belarusian students have lived outside EU and under an authoritarian regime.

Conclusion

This paper has analyzed the ties between identity and foreign policy. Identity is an important source for country's foreign policy and role-set. After Lithuania gained membership in the EU and NATO in 2004, the state created a new foreign policy conception based on identity, historical and political experiences and the logic of appropriateness. The implementation of the country's foreign policy and the socialization with 'others' within EU internal structures and the Eastern neighborhood, or post-Soviet space, resulted in Lithuania being one of the most anti-Russian of all of the EU's members. This role-set caused changes in the Lithuanian foreign policy discourse resulting in a search for the state's identity that is still in flux in the in the 21st century.

Finally, according to research based on students' answers it is concluded that both the EU and European identity involves norms, values and features which were recognized by both the Lithuanian, or EU, and Belarusian citizens. The perceptions held by both sets of students mostly reflects the official foreign policy positions demonstrated by the respective states.

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BELARUSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY, STATE BUILDING AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Victor Shadurski

Introduction

The dissolution of the USSR created significant opportunities for nation-building amongst the many indigenous ethnic groups that populated the Soviet republics and autonomous jurisdictions. Former soviet republics, previously in possession of the formal attributes of statehood, now found themselves with the right to determine their priorities in foreign and internal policy as well as to actively support and develop their ethnic and cultural endowments. This chapter provides an account of this process in Belarus while also seeking to answer an important and puzzling question, namely, why does the collective consciousness of the Belarusian nation remain significantly underdeveloped at least in comparison to other post-Soviet states?

Nation-Building in a Time of Uncertainty

The process of nation-building had both common and specific traits in different parts of the post-Soviet space. In Belarus, as well as in other republics, an active movement to consolidate ethnically homogenous nation was unfolding even before independence. For instance, nationalist supporters had formed various political organizations, including the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) which

functioned not only to promote the cause of a Belarusian national identity but also as a force in opposition to the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). These efforts found voice in 1990 with the adoption of the "Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic" by the Supreme Council of the BSSR. The Declaration proclaimed "complete sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus as the superior, independent and full state authority of the republic in its borders, the legitimacy of its laws, and independence of the republic in foreign relations" (O gosudarsvennom suverenitete 1990).[39]

Coincident with the declaration of sovereignty was a discussion in political circles and Belarusian society in general regarding the role that the Belarusian language should play in building Belarusian statehood. National democratic forces, which were in the clear minority, defended the priority of the Belarusian language particularly given the rapid breakdown of the Soviet party system. In January 1990 these forces seemed to triumph with the passage of a Law "On Languages in the Byelorussian SSR." In accordance with Article 2, "Official Language, Other Languages in the Byelorussian SSR" the Belarusian language was proclaimed an official language. At the same time, however, the right to the free use of the Russian language as a language of inter-national relations of the USSR peoples was guaranteed (Ab movakh 2012).

The desire to deepen the use of the Belarusian language in everyday discourse again traced its roots to pre-independence efforts. While the pace of integration was very slow language enthusiasts had achieved some measure of success prior to 1991. For instance, the Belarusian language began extending its presence in educational programs and the routine activities of governmental and public institutions. Courses on the Belarusian language were actively established in the republic and Belarusian-language groups were created in kindergartens, schools and universities. In 1978, for instance,

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[39] For many the passage of the Act has become the most significant milestone of contemporary history of Belarus. Indeed, prior to a November 1996 referendum, July 27 had been celebrated in the country as the main public holiday. It is worth noting that since the adoption of the Declaration the task "to transform Belarus into a neutral state" was preserved in all official political and legal documents concerning foreign policy of the country.

there were 905 kindergartens with Belarusian language studies, which constituted 18.3 percent from the total number of pre-school institutions. This had grown to 3277 (68.6 percent) by 1993 and by the middle of the decade 80 percent of first-formers started their studies in Belarusian (Shadurski 1996).

Not surprisingly, the successful penetration of the Belarusian language, as well as the adoption of various other policies, including the adoption of the new state symbols such as the white-red-white flag and the *Pahonia* coat of arms, provoked discontent from pro-soviet and pro-Russian audiences, both of which formed a signifi-cant part of the Belarusian society. Many of these opponents were natives of Russia or of other USSR territories now living in Belarus, having moved earlier to the Belarusian cities in search of better work and living conditions. Others were military pensioners and other veterans of various Soviet government institutions. For them Belarus was an integral part of either, or both, the USSR and Russia. From their vantage point, the Belarusian language was a mere dia-lect of the Russian language.

The second, and the most numerous group of opponents, were the so-called *citizens in the first generation*, or natives of rural areas who had obtained city residence permits for the purpose of working on one of the numerous industrial enterprises that had been establis-hed in the cities during Soviet times. Having received permission to enter a Russian-speaking city, these people had, for many decades, attempted to rid themselves of so-called *trasianka*, a pidgin dialect representing a mixture of the Belarusian and Russian languages. The redirection of language was part of a larger effort designed to overcome the lower-class status of *kolkhoznik,* or *native from the countryside*. The proposed transition to exclusively Belarusian stan-dard language contradicted these efforts and demanded a level of energy and commitment they saw as neither necessary nor useful.

Standing between these opposing views was a third group who believed that the equal coexistence of both the Belarusian and Russian languages was a realistic possibility. While not necessa-rily opponents of a Belarusian language policy, they nonetheless considered it necessary to accept the reality that the majority of the population were, in fact, Russian speakers. These moderates

therefore favored granting Russian the status of an official language. Their position was helped by the fact that the language problem, as well as the issue of Belarus's independence in general, was seen by many citizens of the new state as being strongly associated with the economic difficulties that surfaced just after independence in the early 1990s. A return to previous soviet practices, including those in the sphere of language and culture, was considered by many as a way to overcome the many negative consequences of the transitional period.

Both Belarusian and foreign researchers were attentive to the contradictions of language policies in the first years of the country's independence. David R. Marples, for instance, argued that the desire to put the Belarusian language ahead of the process of democratization was premature. The fact that Belarusian educational institutions initiated language instruction without necessary methodological materials only contributed to the general unpopularity of the effort. As a result, at least according to Marples, as well as Zianon Pazniak, the leader of the Belarusian People Front, the effort to increase the use of the Belarusian language was widely perceived as a threat to the Russian-speaking population and became a central question on the eve of the adoption of the first Constitution of independent Belarus and the first presidential elections (Marples 1999a, 1994).[40]

Such was the contentious state of language and its use that the then newly-elected President Alexander Lukashenko proposed a referendum to resolve the issue. Together with three other

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[40] V. Snapkovski has indirectly addressed this issue in his analysis of the different uses of basic concepts and terms used in the Declaration on State Sovereignty (July 1990) and Constitution of the Republic of Belarus (March 1994). According to Snapkovski, the term "Belarusian people", which was understood in the Declaration as a complex of all citizens of Belarus of different nationalities united around an indigenous Belarusian ethnos, was substituted in Constitution with the dry and inexpressive legal term "people of the Republic of Belarus (Belarus)". The latter concept lacks ethnic content and national color, a serious deficiency in a Constitution aiming to create a unified state. In Snapkovski's view, the concept "people of the Republic of Belarus (Belarus)" sounds offensive to ethnic Belarusians, who now constitutes more than 80 per cent of the population of the country. Such an etymological invention conceals, obscures, blurs over ethnic, national, Belarusian core of the population of the Belarusian country (Snapkouski 2012).

questions, the referendum offered the following question "Do you agree with assigning the Russian language the status equal to that of the Belarusian language?" 83.3 percent of the voters supported the question (Refendum 1995, 2012).

The referendum of 1995 opened a second stage in the formation of the Belarusian national identity, namely a period in which the Belarusian state attempted the creation of a civic rather than an ethnic model of the nation. During this period, the ethnic component of the state began to play a secondary role, much as it had during the Soviet period. According to many experts, for instance, the Belarusian language began to lose ground during this period. For instance, in the 2011/2012 school year instruction was conducted in the Belarusian language for come 45,000 children, a mere 12 percent of all children attending kindergartens. During the same year, only about 18 percent of all secondary students studied all of their subjects in the Belarusian language. At the same time, according to official statistics, in 2010, of the 11,040 titles of books and brochures in circulation only about 9 percent of the titles were in the Belarusian language (Byelorusskiy yazyk 2012).

Coinciding with the general retreat of the Belarusian language, the beginning of the new century also marked a turning point on the part of state officials in regards to the relationship with Russia.[41] Suspending any pretense of unification, officials were firm in their claim to an independent way of development, clearly announcing that though the interests of Belarus and Russia sometimes coincided they were not identical. One immediate cause of this declaration was a reaction to statements on prospects of the Belarusian-Russian integration made by Russian president Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader, having decided to take the initiative in building a unified state, was clearly determined to be the prime architect of both its forms and the pace of its development. In the summer of 2002, for instance, Putin emotionally called for a separation of "flies from cutlets". He offered the Belarusian side several variants of unification: one on the principles underlying the European Union; a

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[41] This is not to argue that state officials completely rejected the use of Belarusian language in the state-building efforts. In 2002, for instance, it was decided to publish official documents in both languages. Also in 2002, Lukashenko's Independence Day speech was delivered in Belarusian.

second where Belarus would become part of Russia; and a third featuring further improvement of the existing Union Agreement. The first two of these variants were clearly preferred by Moscow (Putin i Lukashenko 2012). Belarusian president Lukashenko essentially rejected all three of the proposals, arguing that Russian authorities would do well "not to destroy an existing scheme" (Intervyu Presidenta Respubliki 2002, 2012).

The gas conflicts of February 2004 marked a new level of tension in Belarusian-Russian relations. In response to unsanctioned Belarusian acquisition of gas from a transit pipeline, the Russian company Gazprom cut off the supply of natural gas to Belarus, after which the Belarusian ambassador in Russia was recalled for consultations. According to the state press centre, Belarus considered cutting off the Russian gas in winter "a step, which has not been taken since the Great Patriotic War". According to a presidential statement, the relations between Russia and Belarus were "for a long time poisoned with gas" (Lukashenko 2002).

Despite all of this, and the regular reoccurrence of such events, there was no permanent break in relations. What did occur was a consolidation of the Belarusian power and Belarusian society on the basis of affirmation of the country's independence. Indeed, during the conflicts even political opponents began supporting the Belarusian authorities, considering them a real guarantee of the Belarusian sovereignty. Thus, a state-sponsored information campaign convinced a significant part of the Belarusian society that the Belarusian nation must pursue a developmental path independent of Russia. The notion that "Belarus is not Russia" marked the beginning of the new, third stage of nation-building, which is still in evidence today.[42]

Coincident with the desire to author a more independent Belarus was a turn towards the west and the European Union. Before the 2010 economic crisis, for instance, Belarus ranked first in the in the number of Schengen visas issued, when some 428,000 visas type C, e.g., short-term visas, which allow the holder to stay in the EU no more than 90 days during a half of a year, were issued to

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[42] One result of the conflict was a gradual reduction of the Russian's TV channels in the Belarusian information field.

Belarusians. By comparison, Indian citizens received only 406,000 Schengen visas and Turks, with seven times the population of Belarus, received only 522,000 type C visas (Belarus 2012).

Choosing a Path

Given the variety of options available to them, the question remains as to why Belarusian authorities have chosen the current path towards the consolidation of national identity. Why did Belarus, unlike neighboring countries, forgo the model of ethnocentric state, where the state itself would be proclaimed the property of one ethnic group, in favor of a multi-pronged strategy of nation- building? And is there a place for drastic changes in this process in favor of an ethnic factor?

A partial answer to these questions can be seen in several peculiarities of the Belarusian nation development in the 1990s-2000s, a major component of which is the failure of the language project discussed above, a fact which has resulted in what might be termed a society-wide guilt complex in regards to the purported use of the language. This phenomenon was clearly expressed in both the 1999 and 2009 national censuses. In both cases, while the majority of the Belarusians stated their routine use of the Russian language in official and daily activities, they also declared their commitment to the Belarusian language (Statistsicheskiye publikatsii 2012). As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the Belarusian language was named as their native tongue by more than a half of the population with some 60 percent of ethnic Belarusians making the same judgement. According to official statistics, about 30 percent of the population used the Belarusian language at home, though this is likely an overstatement of its actual use.

Table 1. Distribution of the separate nationalities population according to their native language (people)

	Total	Of the total number of persons of a given nationality indicated as their native language				
		Language of their nationality	Belaru-sian	Russian	Polish	Ukrai-nian
Total population	9 503 807	5 688 429	217 015	3 191 963	1 057	4 636
Belarusians	7 957 252	4 841 319	x	2 943 817	941	3 786
Russians	785 084	756 111	21 956	x	25	406
Poles	294 549	15 854	171 287	99 819	x	183
Ukrainians	158 723	46 403	12 497	97 139	22	x
Jews	12 926	245	1 175	11 126	3	27

Table 2. Distribution of the separate nationalities population according to the language they usually speak at home

	Total	Of the total number of persons of a given nationality indicated as the language they speak at home				
		Language of their nationality	Belaru-sian	Russian	Polish	Ukrai-nian
Total population	9 503 807	2 853 013	153 271	5 915 433	379	701
Belarusians	7 957 252	2 073 853	X	5 551 527	336	600
Russians	785 084	757 531	16 653	x	9	35
Poles	294 549	3 837	120 378	149 904	x	24
Ukrainians	158 723	5 578	9 701	140 249	9	X
Jews	12 926	37	254	12 401	1	1

The use of both Belarusian and Russian by native speakers also did not lead to consolidation of the Belarusian language positions in society. Thus, a significant part of the Belarusian-speaking citizens and publications use *Tara kievica* (or Belarusian Classical Ortho-graphy), which was widely used in the Belarusian territories before the language reforms initiated in 1933 by the BSSR government at which time a new grammar with the unofficial name of *narkomovka* was promulgated. Dictionaries were published in this now official

language, the majority of newspapers and books were issued using *narkomovka*, and educational process in schools and universities was conducted in the official Belarusian. "Tara kievica" supporters, however, criticized the grammer for its Russification emphasis, that is, the use of Russian words and idioms at the expense of authentic Belarusian words and pronunciation. In practice, the use of both Belarusian grammars led to a mixture of different variants of pronunciation and spelling.

There is no doubt that at the present time, the survivability of the Belarusian language remains open to question. For instance, UNESCO lists Belarusian as one of the world's vulnerable languages (2010). Among other things, such a classification means that the majority of children speak the language but its use is limited in many spheres, including at home (Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger 2012).

Despite such concerns, there are a number of on-the'ground indications regarding the viability of the Belarusian language. For instance, Belarusian is the language of choice for products being marketed by Samsung, the South Korean electronics giant. In September 2012, the company presented a new project entitled "The Taste of Belarusian Photos." A number of posters were slated for wide distribution with themes that included the Taste of the Belarusian Language (Flora), the Beauty of the Belarusian Language (People), and the Wealth of the Belarusian Language (Fauna) (Samsung v Belarusi 2012).

At the same time, the Belarusian language has been used by the Catholic Church as the language of liturgical services since at least 1992. The continuing interest by the church in the development of the Belarusian language in theology and liturgy was evidenced by the Archbishop of Minsk, Mogilev Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, during the 2012 meeting of pontifical Council of Justice and Peace when he presented Pope Benedict XVI a book translated into the Belarusian languages of all four Gospels and the Liturgy of Times. "The Pope, having looked through new publications, expressed his satisfaction with development of theological and liturgical Belarusian language" (Papa Rimskiy 2012). The result has been significant increase in devotees, an experience that has been replicated, though to a lesser degree, by the Belarusian Orthodox Church.

A second unique aspect of the Belarusian identity formation concerns the most significant component of the national state consciousness, namely, a common system of basic values, historical and cultural symbols and myths. In this regard, the Belarusians are highly fractured. According to the German researcher Astrid Zam, "when in conditions of perestroika mobilization of the Belarusian consciousness became possible, different political forces, excluding a short period in 1991 and 1992, initiated ... a continuous 'spiritual civil war', where reference to historical events presented an important instrument of political polarization" (Zam 1995, 146).

For many Belarusians, the Soviet period and in particular the Great Patriotic War, occupies a central place in their historical consciousness. If, for the majority of citizens of the Baltic states and other peoples of the Eastern European region the Soviet period is regarded as one of occupation, for the majority of Belarusian citizens the history of the BSSR was perceived as a period of the most active development and formation of the nation. Indeed, victory in the Great Patriotic War is one of the main symbols of the nation's collective identity. As such, the war is actively presented in literature and arts, tourism, and the day of liberation of the Belarusian capital from the Nazis – July 3, 1944 – is celebrated as the main national holiday of the country.

In contrast, previous efforts to create a national narrative around earlier historical epochs such as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polotsk principality, or Rzeczpospolita have failed to generate an ethnical consciousness. Thus, at a recent round table meeting devoted to the topic of religious factors and Belarusian national security, the Deputy Director of the Informational-Analytical Center, Professor L. Krishtapovich, argued that the seeking to locate the roots of Belarusian identity in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania "lie apart from the real process of our spiritual consolidation and development" (Pryedstavitsyel IATs 2012).

The fragmented nature of the nation's historical consciousness continues to manifest itself in various ways. For instance, some researchers have noted a particular correlation between historical preferences of the Belarusians and their foreign policy views (Buhr et al. 2011). Thus, a high regard for the Grand Duchy evinces, at

least to some extent, a pro-European feeling and a subsequent desire for Belarusian integration into the EU. Supporters of active integration with Russia, on the other hand, exhibit little enthusiasm for the history of the GDL and Rzeczpospolita, instead paying attention to historical unity of Eastern Slavonic peoples in the framework of Kievan Rus', the Russian Empire, and the USSR.

Given the conditions of fragmentation regarding the historical consciousness of the Belarusian society, it is not surprising that reference to practically any event of the past provokes heated debate. This situation was in evidence during the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the crossing the river Berezina by Napoleonic troops (November 2012). Even a title as neutral as the *War of 1812 and Belarus* provoked harsh criticism from the side of the Russian officials and a number of the Belarusian historians and politicians. Thus, according to A. Surikov, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Belarus, who spoke at the plenary meeting of the conference and later returned to this topic at his press conference (December 19, 2012), it is necessary to use a particular language to describe the event, namely, that "this war was proclaimed by the God's anointed, Emperor Alexander I, and Belarus was a part of Russia those days. Now part of the Belarusian intelligentsia, based on the current position, claim that for Belarus this war is not a patriotic one. I am very disappointed with this fact" (Surikov 2012).

Further controversy ensued in reaction to the words of Kasper Vanchikgo, the head of the Political Department of the Polish Embassy in Minsk, when he argued that the Polish troops of Napoleonic army "were bringing freedom to the Belarusian people". The asertion was roundly criticized by B. Batura, the Head of executive power of Minsk region: "He (Kasper Vanchik) noted that Napoleonic army was bringing liberation to our people. Liberation at this price – I think these words are not worthy of diplomat. We want to believe that from now on the Belarusian land will become not a disastrous crossing but a reliable bridge between nations moving towards each other with peace" (Na Brilyovskom pole 2012). Such highly contested views of critical historical events not only demonstrate the lack of consensus in the Belarusian society in general and scientific community, in particular, but also emphasize the role of external factors

in the process of perception and interpretation by the Belarusians of their historical past.

A third peculiar attribute pertinent to the development of the Belarusian national identity since independence is the presence of several so-called national projects, that is, a complex of basic ideas about the past, present and future of the country and the nation, as well as groups of interests lying behind them. Bugrova (2004) has noted at least three such projects just in the first years of independence, one of the most prominent being that attempted by the Belarusian Popular Front. The program was intended to consolidate the independence of the Belarusian state while dissociating the nation from any sense of Russian heritage, all of which was to be built upon the foundations of a national ethnic revival. A second project was proposed by liberal democratic forces represented by the head of the Belarusian parliament, S. Shushkevich. The project was directed at establishing an independent legal state with parliamentary form of government and various democratic institutions. Yet a third project was formed by representatives of a party and economic elite headed by the leader of government V. Kebich. Bugrova argues that this project mostly gravitated towards soviet traditionalism while containing some elements of pragmatism. It provided for the use of economic benefits from the Russian resources while admitting to the partial privatization of state property. According to Bugrova, this project enjoyed the greatest degree of popularity amongst the population at large, in part because the Soviet period was not so discredited in Belarus as in other former Soviet territories (Bugrova 2004).[43]

The difficulty of sustaining the first of these narratives has been pointed out by numerous commentators. I. Bobkov, who has devoted considerable time and effort to an analysis of the evolution of the Belarusian idea, claims that the reality of Belarus as a so-called 'borderland" has resulted in a kind of dissociation or the lack of cultural integrity necessary for development of the "Belarusian national narrative". As a result, Bobkov questions whether or not any sort of national project can actually be realized (Babkou 2003).

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[43] Bugrova excluded from her analysis those forces and groups who rejected the idea of an independent Belarus or who considered the creation of Belarus as a mistake on the part of Soviet authorities. Such groups were and continue to be present.

V. Akudovich also points to the fragmentation of the Belarusian cultural space. Describing the cultural and linguistic integrity of the Belarusians as a form of archipelago, Akudovich stresses the virtual impossibility of a coherent national identity for Belarus, at least as far as it might depend upon the traditional language model (2004). In his later works, Akudovich states that while Belarusian intellectuals have been trying to solve the problems that arise from a lack of ethnic and cultural integrity, the Belarusian nation has been formed in practice on a variety of other grounds, including a common state, common laws, and a way of living, all of which allows citizens to imagine Belarus as an organic whole (Akudovich 2006).

An opposite point of view was reflected in the works of V. Bulgakov, who asserts a cultural and linguistic version of the national identity and possibility of its realization in modern Belarus. V. Bulgakov refers to Bogushevich's activity as a "fundamental moment of the Belarusian national discourse" (Bulghakau 2003), where the latter established three bases for formation of the Belarusian identity: heritage/continuity of the Grand Duchy, Catholicism, and the Belarusian language. At the same time Bulgakov recognizes the inconsistency between the current state of affairs and a model of the nation built upon such grounds.

The problems of Belarusian national identity has also drawn the attention of foreign researchers. Natalia Leshchenko, a British researcher of Belarusian origin, has worked actively with the problems of national identification in the 2000s. Like Bugrova, Leshchenko sees Belarusian national identity as highly contested, including what she identifies as *national* and *soviet* identities. Again like Bugrova, Leshchenko sees the Belarusian Popular Front as a mouthpiece of the national version and the current president as the prime sponsor of the soviet model. Each of these narratives is based on specific language policies and a distinct interpretation of Belarusian history. The soviet version considers the Belarusians as a branch of the Russian nation, with the BSSR being seen as a culmination of the Belarusian historical development. The national version of identity, on the other hand, locates the Belarusians as a fully European nation and argues that Russia and to a lesser extent Poland, are the sources of the Belarusians' sufferings. Leshchenko buttresses her arguments through references to each narrative's accounts of the basic

myths about the Belarusians' origin, significant historical moments, attitudes towards perceived enemies, various moral traits, differing perception of the future, and economic and social orientations (Leshchenko 2004).

Gregor Ioffe continues this approach, arguing that until recently there were two national projects in the Belarusian society, namely, what he calls a pro-European nativist orientation and a Moscovite liberal approach. More recently, however, a third genre has joined the mix, so-called "Creole nationalism" (see also Mikola Riabchuk 2000). According to Ioffe, the emergence of this third way reflects the fact that Belarusians, unlike most Europeans, are in the early stages of nation-building. How this turns out will be determined by the economic progress of the country, acknowledgment of the values of independence, and recognition of uncompleted process of nation-building. For Ioffe, President Lukashenko is the most visible symbol this third approach, arguing that he enjoys real support amongst large segments of the Belarusian population, a position strongly criticized by the Marples (2007).

The result of this conceptual ambiguity is the contemporary presence of at least three different groups, each with a particular set of basic ideas about the past, present and future of the country, its historical symbols and also specific geopolitical preferences and each in a relative state of flux. The first are what might be termed "Euro optimists", a movement that has existed in the Belarusian society during the whole of independence and which is aiming for the accelerated inclusion into the process of European integration. In their view, entanglements with the east will, as was the case with both the Russian Empire and the USSR, largely impede national development. Primarily an urban phenomenon, important historical and cultural references for this group include the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the development of the Belarusian language, the use of the *Pahonia* and the white-red-white flag. 'Euro Belarusians' count on the support of the EU and the USA in conducting democratic reforms in politics and economy, with many representatives of this strategy considering economic sanctions against the Belarusian state appropriate. Supporters of this approach include the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly) and the Conservative Christian Party. In 2002 the *European Movement* was established in

Belarus, the explicit aim of these groups being to introduce "common European values among the Belarusians" and to prepare "society for the future accession of Belarus into the European Union" (Puti evropeisatsii Belarusi 2011). The work was continued in the fall of 2009, when the European Congress took place in Minsk, the strategic goal of which was to plan for "the European future of Belarus." According to its organizers, "no one awaits Belarus in Europe, but actually it is us who don't want to wait. We are ready to act right now in order to bring Belarus maximally closer to the EU" (Puti evropeisatsii Belarusi 2011).

A second major approach to the nationalist question seeks a greater unity between Belarus and Russia. These 'pro-Russian Belarusians', 'Belorosy', or 'Soviet Belarusians' emphasize the unity of Eastern Slavonic peoples. For this group integration with Russia, up to and including the inclusion of Belarus into the Russian Federation, is a core part of the policy agenda. In taking this position, many adherents deny the uniqueness of both the Belarusian nation and the Belarusian language. From their perspective Belarus should play the role of outpost in opposition to Western influence. During the whole period of independence there have been attempts to create pro-Russian parties and public associations in Belarus. The most active of these groups were Slavic Assembly *Belaya Rus* and Popular Movement of Belarus, the activities of which ceased in the second half of the 1990s. However, another phase of pro-Russian elements was observed in the second half of the 2000s. The Belarusian Republican Public Association, for instance, argued for tighter links between Belarus and Russia based upon not only the presumed economic value of such a partnership but also on the cultural affinities of Orthodoxy and the idea that Belarusians to the cultural realities of the "Russian world" (Zelenkovski 2011; Shtefanovich 2012).

A recent manifestation of this ideal was seen in July 2011 when representatives of Belarus joined the activities of the All-Russia People's Front in having approved the Declaration of International Russia. On October of that same year at the working conference of International Russia, Y. Baranchik, the Head of the organizational committee *For the Union of Belarus and Russia* on behalf of the Belarusian delegation proposed the creation of a Eurasian People's Front modeled on the declarations of International Russia (Rukovoditsel

Table 3. **"If you had to choose between unification with Russia and joining the European Union, what would you select?", %** *(Geopoliticheskiye kacheli)*

Date	11'04	12'05	06'06	12'07	12'08	12'09	12'10	03'11	06'11	12'11	03'12	06'12	09'12
Unification with Russia	49,3	51,6	56,5	47,5	46,0	42,3	38,1	31,5	35,3	41,4	47,0	43,6	36,2
Joining the EU	33,7	24,8	29,3	33,3	30,1	42,1	38,0	50,5	44,5	39,1	37,3	39,8	44,1

proyekta "Imperiya" 2011). In March 2012 an organizational committee was established in order to create the Belarusian Republican Public Association *Eurasian Civil Union* and in October 2012 members of the organizational committee supported the Charter of Reunification of the Divided Nation, which was adopted in Moscow on September 21, 2012.

Assisting in the development of these initiatives, and popularity of the above-name organizations, is an increase in economic migration from Belarus to Russia. Going forward, such migration, if it is accompanied with a rise living standards in Russia might well increase calls for faster and tighter rapprochement with Russia.

Each of these narratives have been strongly represented in the survey work conducted by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), a Belarusian research center registered in Lithuania, which has asked the same question for many years, namely, "If you had to choose between unification with Russia and joining the European Union, what would you select?" As can be seen in Table 3, the September 2012 survey registered a noticeable change in geopolitical preferences of the population, with a significantly smaller percentage of respondents favoring unification with Russia than was previously the case. At the same time, the percentage of those in favor of joining the European Union was steadily rising.

Absent from these surveys was a third alternative, namely, a version of nationalism that Ioffe labeled *Creoles*, a group that has grown with each year of independence. Such people, while not necessarily envisioning Belarus as part of the EU, also want to avoid absorption of the country by Russia, belongs to this group. According to this formulation, Belarus should try and position itself between these two centers of power. Proponents of this position early on recognized that Soviet Union, and by extension Moscow's, influence was in serious jeopardy and that while Belarus and Russia share many common features, they were nonetheless different countries with different tasks. This group was also supported by many Euro optimists, who understood that Belarus was not likely to quickly gain membership in the EU. The idea of Belarus as a so-called geo-political swing state, one that could serve as bridge between East and West, holds strong appeal to this group (Chantington 2003).

To a great extent, this has been the position taken by Belarusian authorities for much of the independence period. Thus, the National Security Concept of Belarus (November 2010) states that "the Republic of Belarus is a complete, independent, sovereign European state, which doesn't belong to any of the great powers, conducts peaceful foreign policy and is seeking to create conditions for acquiring the neutral status" (Kontseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti 2011). Also, while Belarusian authorities are actively involved in the process of post-Soviet integration (i.e., the Customs Union of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, the Common Economic Space projecting the Eurasian Union), they also argue that that east-leaning integration should not exacerbate the split between Belarus and the European Union, particularly since the latter is a significant trading partner. President Lukashenko (October 2011), also has argued that the integration of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan should not be seen as an effort directed against the interest of other European countries, instead stressing the idea that the Eurasian Union should be seen as simply another aspect of a larger process of European integration which would help its participants to establish relations with leading global economic structures. Understood in this fashion, the Eurasian Union could assist in the creation of a common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok (Lukashenko 2011; Poslaniye Prezidenta byelorusskomy narodu 2012).

The importance of this third way was recognized in the September 2012 survey conducted by IISEPS when, for the first time, respondents were given the opportunity to select among a variety of alternatives. As can be seen in Table 4, a plurality of respondents favored an independent approach, one that would recognize the distinctive character of the Belarusian people and nation (Geopoliticheskiye kacheli 2012).

Table 4

Answer	%
Its own, particular route	42.1
Common route of the European civilization	25.2
Comeback to the Soviet route	20.3
Undecided / No answer	12.4

Conclusion

There are many distinct factors that characterize modern Belarusian society, including an inability to offer compelling solutions for its most complicated national and state tasks, a bias towards a reliance upon isolated social networks to solve problems, a long and bloody history of wars and conflicts that have persuaded Belarusians that they have a limited ability to change unfavorable conditions and a concomitant notion that survival is best achieved by acceding to power. That these conditions prevail more than twenty years after independence means that the Belarusian nation demonstrates a fairly weak collective consciousness, with the state weakly consolidated and divided amongst competing notions of the best way to achieve economic and political stability. Given these facts, rather than a clear path forward, it is plausible to speculate on *both* an optimistic outcome that would see a consolidation of the national consciousness as well as a pessimistic result, complete with the disappearance of the national language and the loss of cultural originality. We would like to hope that despite the impact of negative factors and what some might argue to be certain natural tendencies, Belarusians will negotiate their way towards the optimistic variant.

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Part III: YOUTH AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

YOUTH AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN BELARUS AND LITHUANIA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Steven M. Hoffman
Marharyta Fabrykant
Renee Buhr

Introduction

Chapter 1 of this monograph provided an overview of the many competing notions behind the formation and maintenance of national identity. As was discussed, many of the most well-developed themes are often presented as dichotomous types, that is, a nation may be 'Western' or 'Eastern,' 'civic' or 'ethnolinguistic/ primordial' and so on. Whichever of these typologies finds favor with a particular author, however, the question ultimately resolves to a single question: who is and who is not part of the 'national club'? Brubaker, for instance, concludes that national identity is best seen as a type of "groupness", a term that carries with it a sense of commonality of the members of the group, along with shared feelings of belonging and fundamental agreement about critical public narratives (2004, 47). In much the same manner, Greenfeld argues that "nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a 'people'" an oftentimes ill-defined population that is "seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity" (1992, 7). The extent to which the citizens of Lithuania and Belarus feel that they are part of a national group, whether because of ethnic heritage, language, religion or a nebulous sort of 'civic pride', has occupied a central place throughout much of this monograph. The preceding chapters have provided the reader with the historical

background necessary to understand the potential interplay of ethnolinguistic and civic factors in the history and nation-building efforts of historical and contemporary Belarusians and Lithuanians.

Likewise, the previous chapters give us an indication of the new 'wrinkle' in national identity-building particular to EU member states and those who aspire to accession. The notion of a supranational European identity, widely discussed but seldom formalized by the European Union, save for a mostly symbolic effort to provide 'EU citizenship' to citizens of member states, adds a further dimension to the choice of national identity markers available to East European states (McCormick 2008). That is, while certain individuals, particularly those with a high level of education and geographic mobility, might embrace this pan-European identity, most residents of Europe privilege their national heritage over any sort of pan-European collective identity (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Garry and Tilley 2009). However, the influence of European identity norms may be more apparent in new member states and those seeking to gain access, as new states hoping to be seen as 'appropriate' societies for entry to the EU may feel more pressure to adopt elements of a European identity (see Chapter 5). In short, there are many cross-cutting influences that could be shaping the national identities of individuals in East European states in the post-Soviet era.

This chapter examines the nature of national identity found in Belarusian and Lithuanian youth through a micro-level analysis of survey data – a departure from the primarily macro-level analyses in a number of the preceding chapters. With the use of this survey instrument, we hope to determine the level of saliency of given identity markers, both ethnolinguistic and civic, apparent in the individuals surveyed.

Youth and Identity

In the twenty years since the dissolution of the USSR a new generation has appeared that is now well along in solidifying their political identity. This generation, unlike its predecessors, has been raised in an independent state, their civic education has focused

on the history of their particular state rather than the conglome-rate of Soviet states, and the notion of national self-determination has always been a part of their inheritance. It is in this generation that we may glimpse the beginnings of truly post-Soviet national identities and the repercussions that such identities might have for domestic politics and international relations well into the future.

In order to better understand the nature of this potentially dis-tinctive sort of national identity, a survey of 400 university-aged respondents was undertaken in September 2011 in Lithuania and Belarus. In the case of Belarus, the respondents were students in the Faculty of International Relations; Lithuanian respondents were drawn from a variety of faculties. The instrument was based upon the work of Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2009) and was designed to assess the boundaries of national identity, the depth of attachment to the notion of "being" Belarusian or Lithuanian within a broader value framework, and the fidelity of the survey respondents to both the state and their fellow nationals. The instrument consisted of 27 questions resulting in some 71 variables that pertain to these ques-tions of affinity and obligation (see Appendix 1). Multiple response, forced answer questions based on Likert scales were used, though a number of open-ended questions relevant about the European Union were also included. Thematic elements included identity and patriotism, government assistance and spending, personal obliga-tions, interpersonal trust, pride in national accomplishments and history, and typicality or, in other words, the range of possible national identifiers discussed at length throughout this monograph. In some cases, the distribution of replies between the two samples was compared using regression analysis, a method which allows an estimation of the significance of the national factor separately for each dependent variable.

The first question taken up in the survey concerned *affinity* or the extent to which the two populations felt themselves to be tied to their respective nationals. The question was addressed in two ways, the first being the connection with regards to other nation-als and second, as a means of self-identification. Although in both cases there is a stronger agreement demonstrated by the Lithuanian respondents, it is statistically significant only for the second ques-tion (B=-0.182, $\rho<0.001$, R^2=3.3) an indication that that Lithuanian

youth are more concerned with their national identity than Belarusians, which is quite in accordance with the historical evidence. However, the small percent of variance explained by the national factor suggests the existence of larger variance within rather than between the two samples (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2).[44]

Table 7.1: I feel strong ties with Belarusian/Lithuanian people

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N	%	N	%
Strongly Agree	67	33	80	41
Somewhat Agree	92	46	82	42
Somewhat Disagree	36	18	28	14
Strongly Disagree	5	3	5	3%

Table 7.2: Being a Belarusian/Lithuanian is important to the way I think of myself as a person

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N	%	N	%
Strongly Agree	66	33	96	49
Somewhat Agree	81	40	74	38
Somewhat Disagree	41	20	18	9
Strongly Disagree	12	6	8	4%

This question of affinity was also taken up in another series

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[44] Another form of identity that was explored in the survey concerned subnational identities, that is, identification with other racial/ethnic groups, others of the same gender, work groups, religious groups, region, and city and/or village. The last of these is particularly interesting given the notion of "localness" that prevails within much of the literature on Belarusian nationalism; religious bonds are also important given, again, the presumed role of Catholicism as a nationalist glue in Lithuania. On the three of these identity type, namely, ethnic/racial (B=0.135, ρ<0.001, R^2=1.8), professional (B=0.172, ρ<0.001, R^2=3.0), and religious (B=0.165, ρ<0.001, R^2=2.7), there exist statistically significant differences. Belarusians express stronger feelings of identity in all these cases. These results suggest that the root of Belarusian personalizing nationalism is the strong need for feelings of belonging, which increases demand for some type of identity and affiliation. In the case of Lithuania, some 60% of the respondents expressed little or no solidarity with others from same religious group.

of questions concerning 'typicality', an issue seldom studied in the nationalist literature. As can be seen in Tables 7.3-7.6, both Belarusian and Lithuanian students demonstrate some antipathy towards their national fellows, being split almost evenly between those who share a sense of affinity and those who do not. While the fact that the issue of who is a 'typical' Belarusian/Lithuanian is rarely debated in both countries in precisely these terms of "me versus the rest" the ambiguous sense of affinity amongst students is an interesting and potentially significant finding.

Table 7.3: When I think of Belarusian/Lithuanian people, I think of people like me

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Strongly Agree	31	16%	25	13%
Somewhat Agree	87	44	73	37
Somewhat Disagree	63	32	70	36
Strongly Disagree	18	9	25	13

Table 7.4: I would feel good if I were described as a typical Belarusian/Lithuanian

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Strongly Agree	28	14%	30	15%
Somewhat Agree	62	31	50	26
Somewhat Disagree	69	35	64	33
Strongly Disagree	40	20%	48	25%

Table 7.5: In many respects I am different from most Belarusian/ Lithuanian

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Strongly Agree	30	15%	33	17%
Somewhat Agree	69	35	65	33
Somewhat Disagree	81	41	70	36
Strongly Disagree	18	9%	24	12%

Table 7.6: On important issues I find often agree with the Belarusian/Lithuanian people

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	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N	*N*		
Strongly Agree	16	8%	15	8%
Somewhat Agree	65	33	76	38
Somewhat Disagree	95	48	76	38
Strongly Disagree	22	11%	24	12%

The ambiguity surrounding affinity might well be explained by the various attitudes that these students have towards their fellow nationals (Tables 7.7-7.10). In this case, there are statistically significant differences between the respondents. Lithuanians, compared to Belarusians, see their fellow nationals as better informed about politics than do Belarusians (B=-0.186, ρ<0.001, R^2=3.5) while Belarusians, compared to Lithuanians, estimate their fellow nationals higher on the unambiguously positive qualities of unselfishness (B=0.311, ρ<0.001, R^2=9.7), tolerance (B=0.657, ρ<0.001, R^2=43.2), and trustworthiness (B=0.503, ρ<0.001, R^2=25.3).

Table 7.7: Belarusian/Lithuanian people are very informed about politics

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Strongly Agree	9	5%	16	8%
Somewhat Agree	35	18	48	25
Somewhat Disagree	95	48	104	53
Strongly Disagree	61	31%	28	4%

Table 7.8: Belarusian/Lithuanian people are unselfish

	Belarus		*Lithuania*	
	N		*N*	
Strongly Agree	48	24%	6	3%
Somewhat Agree	93	47	43	22
Somewhat Disagree	51	26	88	45
Strongly Disagree	7	4%	59	30%

Table 7.9: Belarusian/Lithuanian people are tolerant

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Strongly Agree	123	62%	9	5%
Somewhat Agree	58	29	53	27
Somewhat Disagree	14	7	96	49
Strongly Disagree	5	3%	38	19%

Table 7.10: Belarusian/Lithuanian people are trustworthy

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Strongly Agree	113	57%	23	12%
Somewhat Agree	73	37	98	50
Somewhat Disagree	13	7	69	35
Strongly Disagree	1	>1%	6	3%

The issue of trust is further highlighted in Tables 7.11 and 7.12. The interesting and somehow controversial result here is the lack of statistically significant differences for trust in general (Table 7.11) while, in the case of its practical application (Table 7.12), Lithuanians tend to be considerably more skeptical (B=-0.401, ρ<0.001, R^2=16.1). This attitude towards people in general is compatible with the differences in attitudes towards fellow nationals noted above.

Table 7.11: Would most people take advantage or be fair?

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Take Advantage	86	43%	129	66%
Be Fair	34	17	59	30
Don't Know	79	40%	1	>1

Table 7.12: Can most people be trusted?

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Can Be Trusted	53	26%	53	27%
Can't Be Too Careful	128	64	136	69
Don't Know	19	10%	0	0%

The generally more positive attitude that Belarusians possess towards their national fellows is also reflected in their trust of people at the polls. As shown in Table 7.13, Belarusian respondents express slightly higher confidence in their fellow nationals' wisdom of the vote (B=0.122, ρ<0.05, R^2=1.5).

Table 7.13: Confidence in the wisdom of the vote

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Great deal	17	9%	4	2%
Some	54	27	34	17
Little	79	40	115	60
None	48	24%	40	20%

In sum, it is apparent that Belarusians have a significantly more positive autostereotype, i.e., attitudes towards their identity group, than do Lithuanian youths. Of particular importance is the unusually high percent of variance explained by the national factor alone regarding the autostereotypical trait of tolerance. This self-description is arguably the most widespread for the Belarusians both in private speech and public discourse and is often used for legitimization of what is perceived as lack of assertiveness in defending Belarusians' national rights. This is an interesting example of the way positive autostereotypes may be connected with relatively low levels of expressed nationalism, although the socio-cognitive existing theories of in-group favoritism would predict exactly the opposite relation.

The affinity with fellow nationals is also related to the issue of state obligations and which groups in society should or should not receive assistance from the state. Of the various nominated categories, i.e., farmers, students, small business owners and pensioners, statistically significant differences were discovered for both pensioners and farmers (Tables 7.14 and 7.15). Belarusians express more support for helping pensioners (B=0.140, ρ<0.01, R^2 =2.0), which may be explained by the unavailability of private non-state old age insurance. Lithuanians, on the other hand, agreed with offering more support to farmers (B=-0.322, ρ<0.001, R^2=10.4),

which may be related to the farmers' situation after Lithuania joined the EU. On the other hand, for Belarusian students of an elite faculty, farmers represent the backward part of society and evoke associations with the ineffective Soviet collective farms, leaving potentially little chance for social solidarity in this regard. Both sets of respondents overwhelming agreed that students should receive assistance (95%) while somewhat smaller but nonetheless healthy majorities (75%) agreed that small business owners should receive assistance.

Table 7.14: Should/should not get assistance FARMERS

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Should get	123	62%	175	89%
Should NOT get	77	39	21	11

Table 7.15: Should/should not get assistance PENSIONERS

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Should get	191	95%	172	88%
Should NOT get	9	5	24	12

Just as affinity and a feeling of typicality might affect views on state-provided assistance, so too might they affect attitudes towards the provision of public goods and the state's role in affecting the conditions of life. While statistically significant differences were discovered in four of the five cases (the only exception being improving conditions for minorities),[45] Belarusians routinely expressed more support for state intervention in assuring individual welfare (Tables 7.16 and 7.17). The Belarusians' positive autostereotype may account for this difference in that a more positive view of one's fellow nationals may generate more positive attitudes

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[45] The statistical results for each category were: public education (B=0.173, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=3.0$), living wage (B=0.606, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=36.9$), solving problem of urban areas (B=0.162, $\rho<0.01$, $R^2=2.6$), and ensuring a basic standard of living for all (B=0.545, $\rho<0.01$, $R^2=29.7$).

towards assisting someone in securing a higher or at least a minimal living standard.

Table 7.16: There is a state obligation for LIVING WAGE

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Yes	179	89%	59	30%
No	21	11	137	70

Table 7.17: There is a state obligation for ENSURING A BASIC STANDARD OF LIVING FOR ALL

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Yes	179	90%	71	36%
No	19	10	125	6

Given these results it is perhaps not surprising that Lithuanians feel that the government spends too much on a variety of public goods, including education (B=-0.420, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=17.7$), welfare (B=-0.342, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=11.7$), solving the problems in urban areas (B=-0.549, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=30.1$), and ensuring a basic standard of living for all (B=-0.523, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=57.3$). The first case is especially surprising, considering that both samples consist exclusively of students, who would be expected to support higher levels of spending on education. The fact that Lithuanians view government spending as excessive may be explained both by the relatively negative autostereotype discussed above or by a stronger level of support for free market economy.

Attitudes towards the obligations of the state, particularly in the case of Belarus, stand in relatively sharp contrast to the obligations that respondents feel of themselves towards others in society. In both cases, students believe that, unless there is a crisis, they have only moderate obligations towards the community and society in general. The only statistically significant difference is that Lithuanians regard local volunteering as more important than do Belarusians (B=-0.186, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=3.5$), which may be explained by learning and accepting the relevant European practices (Table 7.18).

Table 7.18: Volunteering in local community

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Strongly Agree	46	23%	79	40%
Somewhat Agree	103	52	85	43
Somewhat Disagree	45	23	27	14
Strongly Disagree	5	3%	3	2%

The question of how much and on what the state spends its money is, of course, strongly related to issues of national self-identification and who is and who is not part of the nation. Two categories of national identifiers were specified, the first being traditional or so-called primordialist factors, including place of birth, place of residence, language, parentage, and religion. A second category of identifiers were civic in nature and included citizenship, respect for laws and institutions, valuing freedom and equality, believing in the independence of Belarus from the influence of other states. Finally, the notion of simply "feeling" Belarusian or Lithuanian was also included.

Statistically significant differences were found for both primordialist and civic indicators (Tables 7.19-7.23), the greatest differences were found with regard to language, that is, being able to speak the national language (B=-0.330, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=10.9$), citizenship (B=-0.342, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=11.7$), respect for the country's political institutions and laws (B=-0.265, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=7.0$), and believing in the independence of one's nation from other states (B=-0.263, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=6.9$). On the other hand, *feeling* part of one's nation was also considered very important by very healthy majorities in both places (77% in Belarus and 69% in Lithuania) while religion was largely disregarded as a significant national marker. This is particularly striking in the case of Lithuania with its supposed premium on Catholicism as a national religion.

In general, for both Belarusian and Lithuanian students there are some important benchmarks for the attainment of national status, that is, of being a 'real' member of the national body. However, the fact that Lithuanians, compared to Belarusians, put a higher premium on a number of both ethnic *and* civic indicators suggests a

more exclusive form of Lithuanian national identity relative to the Belarusian case.

Table 7.19: To be able to speak Belarusian/Lithuanian

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Very Important	89	45%	147	75%
Somewhat Important	50	25	36	18
Not Very Important	43	22	8	4
Not At All Important	17	9%	5	3%

Table 7.20: Having Belarusian/Lithuanian citizenship

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Very Important	56	29%	115	59%
Somewhat Important	71	36	67	34
Not Very Important	57	29	11	6
Not At All Important	15	8%	3	2%

Table 7.21: Having respect for country's political institutions/laws

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Very Important	89	45%	129	66%
Somewhat Important	60	30	53	27
Not Very Important	34	17	11	6
Not At All Important	16	8%	3	2%

Table 7.22: Believing in the independence of Belarus/Lithuania from the influence of other states

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Very Important	105	53%	157	80%
Somewhat Important	71	36	30	15
Not Very Important	14	7	5	3
Not At All Important	9	5%	3	2%

Table 7.23: Valuing Freedom and Equality

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Very Important	145	73%	153	78%
Somewhat Important	39	20	34	17
Not Very Important	13	7	5	3
Not At All Important	2	1	3	2

As pointed out elsewhere in this monograph, post-Soviet nation builders each face their own unique set of problems. In the case of Lithuania, it is retrieving suitable material from a long history of lost glories; in Belarus it is the necessity of establishing the fact of a historical Belarus in the first place. The survey results offer encouragement to both (Tables 7.24-7.25). In both cases, for instance, there was broad if not terribly deep sense of positive esteem of one's own country. While both groups felt a general pride in being a Belarusian or Lithuanian, the latter nonetheless saw their country as superior to most others (Table 24) (B=-0.155, $\rho < 0.01$, $R^2 = 2.4$) and that it offered a superior place to live (Table 25) (B=-0.416, $\rho < 0.001$, $R^2 = 17.3$).[46]

Table 7.24: B/L is a better country than most other countries

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Strongly Agree	19	10%	30	15%
Somewhat Agree	51	26	61	31
Somewhat Disagree	82	41	69	35
Strongly Disagree	47	24%	30	15%

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[46] The fact that Belarusians have a higher opinion of their fellow nationals while Lithuanians are more attached to their country and nation in general suggest a new typology contrasting personalized and depersonalized nationalism.

Table 7.25: I cannot think of another country in which I would rather live

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		*N*	
Strongly Agree	6	3%	44	22%
Somewhat Agree	23	12	59	30
Somewhat Disagree	69	35	46	23
Strongly Disagree	101	51%	44	22%

National pride is, of course, influenced by a mix of both myth-making and the realities of day-to-day life, the former often revolving around history and its interpretation. Somewhat surprisingly, Belarusians are more proud of their history (Tables 7.26-7.30), including not only its Soviet period, which would be understandably less popular in Lithuania (B=0.473, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=22.4$), but also for its pre-Soviet Belarusian People's Republic (B=0.248, $\rho<0.001$, $R^2=6.2$) and the post-Soviet Republic of Belarus (B=0.179, $\rho<0.01$, $R^2=3.2$).

Table 7.26: Pride in history of Belarus/Lithuania

	Belarus		Lithuania
	N		*N*
Very Proud	94	47%	missing variable
Somewhat Proud	74	37	
Not Very Proud	23	12	
Not Proud At All	7	4%	

Table 7.27: Pride in accomplishments of Grand Duchy

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		*N*	
Very Proud	123	62%	102	52%
Somewhat Proud	62	31	75	38
Not Very Proud	11	6	13	7
Not Proud At All	2	1%	2	1%

Table 7.28: Pride in founding of BSR/LPR

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Very Proud	72	36%	39	20%
Somewhat Proud	90	45	78	40
Not Very Proud	29	15	53	27
Not Proud At All	7	4%	23	12%

Table 7.29: Pride in accomplishments of BSSR/LSSR

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Very Proud	30	15%	7	4%
Somewhat Proud	84	42	28	14
Not Very Proud	67	34	66	34
Not Proud At All	17	9%	92	47%

Table 7.30: Pride in accomplishments of post-Soviet Belarus/ Lithuania

	Belarus		Lithuania	
	N		N	
Very Proud	23	12%	14	7%
Somewhat Proud	78	39	57	29
Not Very Proud	75	38	79	40
Not Proud At All	21	11%	44	22%

Conclusion

For those studying nationalist trends in post-Soviet Europe, Belarus and Lithuania offer a host of intriguing differences. Belarusian youth, for instance, possess a much more positive autostereotype relative to Lithuanians of the same age, seeing their fellow nationals as more trustworthy and tolerant. Young Lithuanians, on the other hand, tend to identify themselves more strongly with the nation as a general concept despite professing rather skeptical views on their fellow nationals, a skepticism which extends to such factors as a

lack of support for the welfare state model and the obligations of the state towards its citizens generally.

This question of obligation felt by Lithuanians and Belarusians to their co-nationals is ripe for future examination. A number of factors could be at play in the relatively low level of commitment Lithuanians feel to government provision of public goods such as education, a living wage, and a basic standard of living. Is it tied to the relatively negative views that Lithuanians hold of their fellow nationals? Or are the neoliberal economic policies and ideologies forwarded by the European Union in the East European accession states the cause of this apparent disdain for a social safety net? Perhaps the economic recession that hit a number of East European states during the time of the survey simply induced a level of pragmatism in the Lithuanian students, as the public discourse indicated that there simply 'wasn't enough money to go around' These questions will be the focus of a future research project by some of the contributors to this volume.

Equally significant are the divergent views regarding the bases of nationalist sentiment, that is the primordialist versus civic factors so prominent in the nationalist literature. The varying attitudes with respect to language, respect for the country's political institutions and laws, and believing in the independence of one's nation from other states indicate that geographical proximity does not guarantee a similar nationalist experience. At the same time, the fact that Lithuanians, at least compared to Belarusians, put a higher premium on a number of both ethnic *and* civic indicators suggests a more exclusive form of Lithuanian national identity relative to the Belarusian case. The findings also indicate that Lithuanian national identity is more multifaceted than the label of 'Eastern nation' would imply. While language proves to be an important marker of Lithuanian identity, more civic indicators such as respect for one's country and its sovereign independence also appear to be key elements, a finding that provides further support for Brubaker's (1996) assertion that national identities are indeed a hybrid of these ideal types. It is also worth noting that the values seen as significant by early nationalist leaders do not necessarily become imprinted upon succeeding generations, a point strongly evidenced by the relative insignificance of religion as a national marker for Lithuania's youth

despite its prominence in the nation-building efforts of the 20th century (Buhr et al. 2012).

In sum, for both Belarusian and Lithuanian students there are a number of important benchmarks for the attainment of national status, that is, of being a 'real' member of the national body. How and to what extent these various attitudes enable a deeper sense of national pride and loyalty should be of great interest not only to academics but to political leadership as well.

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APPENDIX

Survey A:

Who Counts as a Belarusian: The Boundaries of National Identity

Survey B:

Who Counts as a Lithuanian: The Boundaries of National Identity

Survey A

**Who Counts as a Belarusian:
The Boundaries of National Identity**

1) Demographic factors

Year born
Gender
Level of Education
Religion
Country of Birth

2) Belarusian Identity

Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree* with each of the following statements:

– I am a person who feels strong ties to the Belarusian people
– being a Belarusian is important to the way I think of myself as a person

3) The Belarusian People

Please tell if *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with each of the following statements:

- – Belarusian people are very informed about politics
- – Belarusian people are unselfish
- – Belarusian people are tolerant
- – Belarusian people are trustworthy

4) Government Assistance and Spending

Many people in Belarus can potentially receive some government assistance, like student loans, food stamps, welfare, farm subsidies, business subsidies, and so on. There is a limit, though, on how much money the government can give out. Please tell me if you think the group *should* or *should not* get government assistance.

- – farmers
- – students
- – small businesses
- – pensioners

The following is a list of possible obligations that the state might owe to people living in Belarus. Please tell me if you think *there is* or *is not* a state obligation for each:

- – publicly-provided education
- – a living wage or income
- – improving the conditions of minorities
- – solving the problems of urban areas
- – ensuring a basic standard of living for all

The following are some of the issues currently facing Belarus. Please tell me if you think the country is *spending too much money on it, too little money*, or *about the right amount* on each issue:

- – improving the nation's education system
- – welfare payments

- improving the conditions of minorities
- solving the problems in urban areas
- ensuring a basic standard of living for all

5) Belarusian Identity

Some people say each of the following factors is important in making someone truly Belarusian. Others say they are not important. Please tell me if you think each of the following factors are *very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at all important* in making someone truly Belarusian.

- to have been born in Belarus
- to have Belarusian citizenship
- to have lived in Belarus for most of one's life
- to be able to speak Belarusian
- to have parents that are Belarusian
- to be a Christian

Other people think a different set of factors are important in making someone truly Belarusian. Please tell me if you think each of the following factors are *very important, somewhat important, not very important,* or *not at all important* in making someone truly Belarusian.

- to respect the country's political institutions and laws
- to feel belarusian
- to value freedom and equality
- to believe in the independence of Belarus from the influence of other states

6) Personal Obligations

For each of the following, please tell if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* that this is something you *personally* owe or do not owe to fellow Belarusians.

- helping when there is a crisis or disaster in the nation

- volunteering in your local community
- giving money to charities
- paying taxes

7) Individualism

Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree* with the following statement: any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding in Belarus.

8) Egalitarianism

Some say that is people were treated more equally in Belarus, there would be many fewer social problems. Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with this idea.

Some say that one of the big problems facing Belarus is that not everyone is given an equal chance to succeed. Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with this idea.

9)Interest in Politics

Please tell if you are *very, somewhat, slightly, or not interested at all* in politics and national affairs.

10) Interpersonal Trust

Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or do you think they would try to be fair?

- try to take advantage of you if they got a chance
- try to be fair
- don't know

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or would you say that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

- people can be trusted

– can't be too careful in dealing with people

– don't know

11) Patriotism

Please tell me if *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with each of the following statements:

– I feel proud to be a Belarusian

– generally Belarus is a better country than most other countries

– I cannot think of another country in which I would rather live

12) Pride in Belarusian Accomplishments

Please tell if you are *very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud* or *not proud at all* in regards to each of the following:

– the way democracy works in Belarus.

– Belarus' political influence in the world.

– Belarus' economic achievements.

– The history of Belarus.

Thinking of the history of Belarus, for each of the following please tell me whether you are *very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud,* or *not proud at all* of:

– the accomplishments of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus, and Samogitia

– the founding of the Belarusian People's Republic

– the accomplishments of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic

– the accomplishments of the post-Soviet Republic of Belarus

13) Reactions to Criticisms

Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree* with each of the following statements:

- when someone from another country criticizes Belarus, it doesn't bother me at all
- there are some things about Belarus today that make me feel ashamed of the country
- Belarusians should support the government of Belarus even if it is wrong
- Belarusians who disagree with what the country stands for shouldn't be guaranteed their basic rights

14) Group Identification

Please tell me if you *very strongly, strongly, weakly,* or *do not at all* identify with the following groups:
- people in your racial or ethnic group
- people who are the same sex as you
- people who do the same work as you
- people who share your religious beliefs
- people from your region of the country
- people from your city/village

15) Typicality

Please tell if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with each of the following statements:
- when I think of the Belarusian people, I think of people who are a lot like me
- I would feel good if I were described as a typical Belarusian
- in many respects, I am different from most Belarusians
- on the important issues, I find I often agree with the Belarusian people

16) Wisdom of the Vote

Please tell me whether you have a *great deal, some, little,* or *no* trust and confidence do you have in the wisdom of the Belarusian people when it comes to making choices on Election Day?

17) Cross National Relations

OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

- Name the most important historical figures in Lithuania. *maximum of five*
- Name the most important historical events in Lithuania. *maximum of five*
- Which events in the history of Belarus had the greatest impact on the evolution of Europe? *maximum of five*
- Which events in the history of Europe had the greatest impact on the evolution of Belarus? *maximum of five*
- What do you understand by the term "European values"?
- In your opinion, what can be done to improve Lithuanian-Belarusian relations?

Who Counts as a Lithuanian:
The Boundaries of National Identity

1) Demographic factors

Year born
Gender
Level of Education
Religion
Country of Birth

2) Lithuanian Identity

Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, some-what disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with each of the following statements:

– I am a person who feels strong ties to the Lithuanian people
– being a Lithuanian is important to the way I think of myself as a person

3) The Lithuanian People

Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with each of the following statements.

– Lithuanian people are very informed about politics
– Lithuanian people are unselfish
– Lithuanian people are tolerant
– Lithuanian people are trustworthy

4) Government Assistance and Spending

Many people in Lithuania can potentially receive some govern-ment assistance, like student loans, food stamps, welfare, farm

subsidies, business subsidies, and so on. There is a limit, though, on how much money the government can give out. Please tell me if you think the following groups *should* or *should not* get assistance from the government.

- farmers
- students
- small businesses
- pensioners

The following is a list of obligations that the state might owe to people living in Lithuania. Please tell me if you think *there is* or *is NOT* a state obligation in regards to each:

- publicly-provided education
- a living wage or income
- improving the conditions of minorities
- solving the problems of urban areas
- ensuring a basic standard of living for all

The following are some of the issues currently facing Lithuania. Please tell me if you think the country is spending *too much money*, *too little money*, or *about the right amount* on each issue:

- improving the nation's education system
- welfare payments
- improving the conditions of minorities
- solving the problems in urban areas
- ensuring a basic standard of living for all

5) Lithuanian Identity

Some people say each of the following factors is important in making someone truly Lithuanian. Others say they are not important. Please tell me whether you think each of the following factors are *very important, somewhat important, not very important,* or *not important at all* in making someone truly Lithuanian.

- to have been born in Lithuania

- to have Lithuanian citizenship
- to have lived in the Lithuania for most of one's life
- to be able to speak Lithuanian
- to have parents that are Lithuanian
- to be a Catholic

Other people think a different set of factors that make some-one truly Lithuanian. Please tell me whether you think each of the following factors are *very important, somewhat important, not very important,* or *not at all important* in making someone truly Lithuanian.

- to respect the country's political institutions and laws
- to feel Lithuanian
- to value freedom and equality
- to believe in the independence of Lithuania from the influence of other states

6) Personal Obligations

For each of the following, please tell if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* this is something you *personally* owe or do not owe to fellow Lithuanians:

- helping when there is a crisis or disaster in the nation
- volunteering in your local community
- giving money to charities
- paying taxes

7) Individualism

Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with the following statement: any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding in Lithuania.

8) Egalitarianism

Some people say that if people were treated more equally in

Lithuania, there would be many fewer social problems. Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with this idea.

Some people say that one of the big problems in Lithuania is that not give everyone an equal chance to succeed. Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with this idea.

9) Interest in Politics

Please tell if you are *very, somewhat, slightly, or not interested at all* in politics and national affairs.

10) Interpersonal Trust

Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or do you think they would try to be fair?
- try to take advantage of you if they got a chance
- try to be fair

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or would you say that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
- people can be trusted
- can't be too careful in dealing with people

11) Patriotism

Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with each of the following statements.
- I feel proud to be a Lithuanian
- generally Lithuania is a better country than most other countries
- I cannot think of another country in which I would rather live

12) Pride in Lithuanian Accomplishments

Please tell me whether you are *very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud* or *not proud at all* in regard to each of the following:

- the way democracy works in Lithuania
- Lithuania's political influence in the world
- Lithuania's economic achievements
- the history of Lithuania

Thinking of the history of Lithuania, please tell me whether you are *very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud,* or *not proud at all* of:

- the accomplishments of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
- the accomplishments of the Lithuanian Council during the interwar period
- the accomplishments of the LithuanianSoviet Socialist Republic
- the accomplishments of the post-Soviet Republic of Lithuania

13) Reactions to Criticisms

Please tell me if you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with each of following statements:

- when someone from another country criticizes Lithuania, it doesn't bother me at all
- there are some things about Lithuania today that make me feel ashamed of the country
- lithuanians should support the government of Lithuania even if it is in the wrong
- lithuanians who disagree with what the country stands for should not be guaranteed their basic rights

14) Group Identification

Please tell me if you *very strongly, strongly, weakly,* or do *not at all* identify with each of the following groups:

- people in your racial or ethnic group

- people who are the same sex as you
- people who do the same work as you
- people who share your religious beliefs
- people from your region of the country
- people from your city/village

15) Typicality

Please tell me whether you *strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat*, *disagree,* or *strongly disagree* with each of the following statements:

- when I think of the Lithuanian people, I think of people who are a lot like me
- I would feel good if I were described as a typical Lithuanian
- In many respects, I am different from most Lithuanians
- on the important issues, I find I often agree with the Lithuanian people

16) Wisdom of the Vote

Please tell me whether you have a *great deal*, *some*, *a little* or *no* trust and confidence do in the wisdom of the Lithuanian people when it comes to making choices on Election Day?

Cross National Relations

OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

- Name the most important historical figures in Belarus. *maximum of five*
- Name the most important historical events in Belarus. *maximum of five*
- Which events in the history of Lithuania had the greatest impact on the evolution of Europe? *maximum of five*

- Which events in the history of Europe had the greatest impact on the evolution of Lithuania? *maximum of five*
- What do you understand by the term "European values"?
- In your opinion, what can be done to improve Lithuanian-Belarusian relations?

CONTRIBUTORS

Renee L. Buhr is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. Her research interests include nationalism and the impact of EU integration on national identity and nationalist political party performance. She has published papers on these topics in *Nationalities Papers* and *Government and Opposition*.

Marharyta Fabrykant is a lecturer at the Chair of Psychology of the Belarusian State University in Minsk, Belarus, and an associate researcher at the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research of the Higher School of Economics in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Her research interests include nationalism, narrative analysis, and modernization versus neo-traditionalism.

Steven M. Hoffman is Professor and Chair of the department of Political Science at the University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota (USA). His published work includes books, journal articles and research studies on national identity in the newly independent states of East Central Europe, community-based energy systems, and environmental policy. His latest work includes *The Global Challenge of Encouraging Sustainable Living: Opportunities, Barriers, Policy and Practice* (with Shane Fudge et al., Edward Elgar Ltd, forthcoming). Dr. Hoffman has taught numerous courses at the University of St. Thomas as well as study abroad and off-campus courses in East Central Europe, New Zealand, and in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness of northern Minnesota.

Regina Jasiuleviciene is Professor of the Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. She has published a number of articles on human rights issues and the peculiarities of human rights process in Lithuania. She is teaching courses in a variety of fields including human rights, political theories and methodology, international relations theory

and methodology, theories of European integration, and theory and methods in politics.

Liudas Mazylis is Professor of the Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy at the Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. His publications include books, journal articles and research projects on European integration, Europeanization, and political systems of Lithuania and neighboring countries. His latest book is *Nearby the Non-Europe: Challenges of EU Neighborhood Policy Towards Eastern Neighbors* (2010). Prof. dr. Liudas Mazylis has prepared and is teaching courses on political systems and decision making in the European Union, political systems of the Baltic states, and the EU neighborhood policy.

Sima Rakutiene is lecturer and Doctor of Political Science in the Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. She is also coordinator of political science students' qualification practice, secretary of the Faculty Council and a member of International Politics and Development Studies programme committee. Her publications include journal articles and research projects on European integration, the EU's neighbourhood and other foreign policies, Lithuanian and Finnish foreign policies and neighbourhood experiences, European Union institutions, and methodological guidelines for the preparation of student papers and bachelor theses.

Victor Shadurski is the Dean and Professor of the Faculty of International Relations of the Belarusian State University, an author of more than 200 scientific publications including 3 monographs issued in Belarus and abroad. This research interests the history and foreign policy of Belarus, Belarus in multilateral and bilateral cooperation, and regional processes in modern Europe and the Baltic region. Dean Shadurski is a Chief of the Editorial Board of the Journal of International Law and International Relations (Minsk), a member of editorial boards of 5 other foreign scientific journals.

Aliaksandr Tsikhamirau is an Associate Professor of the Faculty of International Relations of the BSU, an author of several works devoted to the problems of the foreign policy of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, European integration and Belarusian emigration. Professor Tsikhamirau is also giving courses for students and masters on

the foreign policy issues of the countries of Europe and Northern America, Central and Eastern Europe, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine.

Linas Venclauskas is a lecturer at Vytautas Magnus University (Kaunas, Lithuania) and Vice-Dean of Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy. He has published a number of articles on Lithuanian-Jewish relationships and modern Lithuanian anti-Semitism. Dr. Venclauskas is teaching courses at Vytautas Magnus University for BA and MA students, including problems of modern Lithuanian culture, intercultural communication, civil society and national minorities in the Baltic Sea region.

Renee Buhr, Marharyta Fabrykant, Steven M. Hoffman,
Regina Jasiuleviciene, Liudas Mazylis,Sima Rakutiene,
Victor Shadurski, Aliaksandr Tsikhamirau, Linas Venclauskas

LITHUANIAN AND BELARUSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Collective monograph / Kolektyvinė monografija

Editors / Redaktoriai: Steven M. Hoffman, Renee Buhr
Designer / Viršelio ir maketo autorė Rasa Švobaitė

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