

10:30-12:00

**Panel 1:
Think Tanks, IIR, and the Cold War**

Chair: Dr. K. Y. Chang (NCCU former President, former IIR Director)

Panelists: Hsiao-pong Liu (Tamkang Univ.)

Titus C. Chen (IIR)

Hwei-luan Poong (IIR)

Discussant: Dr. Yu-Shan Wu (Academia Sinica)

Assembling Scholars in the Face of the Enemy: The Prequel to the Institute of International Relations, 1937-1975

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This paper analyzes the history of the Institute of International Relations (IIR), considered a Kuomintang think-tank before its formal establishment in 1975 at Chengchi University in Taipei. The author traces its history as far back as 1937, arguing that it was developed to deal with national crises such as threats posed by the Japanese or the Communists, rather than to address the interests of a specific political party. Moreover, the author examines the IIR's expansion strategies during the Cold War to understand its transformation from an intelligence organization into a major contributor to international academics, emphasizing the importance of individuals in the development of a think-tank.

Keywords: Think-tank, Institute of International Relations, Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-Kuo

Introduction

Although the Institute of International Relations (IIR) currently operates more as an academic institution than a think-tank, many domestic and foreign scholars still consider the IIR to be a highly reputed think-tank for regional security and mainland Chinese affairs. Dr. Cheng Tuanyao, IIR director from 2005 to 2010, briefly explained the history of this think-tank:²

[The] IIR might be Taiwan's first research institute. The purpose of its establishment was very simple: to become a think-tank for the government. . . . The government needed a research institute to provide ideas for mainland China and international affairs. . . . Since the Kuomintang ran the government for so long, as a government think-tank, we were of course working for the Kuomintang.

The majority of political scientists study think-tanks in relation to specific ideologies, functions, or funding sources.³ Under these concepts, the IIR could be considered a think-tank for the

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²Chung-han Wu, *Categorization and Development of Taiwan Think Tank* (Master Thesis, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 2010), 315-320.

³See for example, Diane Stone, "Think Tanks and Policy Analysis," in Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, & Mara S. Sidney (eds.) *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Methods, and Politics* (New York, Marcel Dekker Inc., 2006),

Kuomintang (KMT) government. This paper reviews the history of the IIR through an alternate political science lens: that of the elite. The author traces the IIR's development as far back as 1937 and reviews individual contributions to government think-tanks, arguing that the IIR was intended for use in situations of national crisis rather than to address the interests of a political party. In addition, the characteristics of the elites involved have played a critical role in shaping the IIR's reputation.

I. Predecessor: Wang Peng-sheng and the Institute of International Affairs

The ROC government established its first think-tank for international affairs in 1937 when Japan invaded China. It was originally named the “Highest Committee of Intelligence,” and brought together numerous intelligence units including both Bureaus of Investigation and Statistics (hereafter BIS) from KMT and the National Military Commission. The director of this committee was Wang Peng-sheng, but his position did not function properly because there were too many of KMT's factions within the committee, which was disbanded after Wuhan was lost to the Japanese in 1938. Chiang Kai-shek then established a new unit under the Military Commission called the Institute of International Affairs (IIA) and also directed by Wang Peng-sheng.

Wang Peng-sheng had studied in Japan, spoke very fluent Japanese, had written several books about Japanese history, and had been involved in Sino-Japanese diplomatic affairs since 1918. He did not belong to any powerful cliques in the KMT, nor was he personally linked to Chiang Kai-shek, but his status as a person with strong academic and diplomatic training made him ideal to lead an intelligence unit against Japan.

Many articles have indicated that the IIA generated very precise intelligence, such as accurately predicting the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. This may be true because information of the Japanese bombing was passed to a young diplomat in Shanghai named Jerauld Write, who later became the American Ambassador to Taiwan during the 1960s.⁴ Due to the IIA's valuable intelligence, the British government set up an intelligence office within the IIA.

How could the IIA provide accurate intelligence? Among the 200 people serving in this institution, many were “enemies,” including Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese. Many famous Taiwanese such as Lian Zhengdung, Huang Guoshu, and Cai Peihuo used to work for the IIA and their valuable analyses were based on their familiarity with the Japanese language, culture, and experiences.

The IIA was created in response to Japanese attack, but once the Japanese were losing the war, its existence was challenged. The fact that Wang Peng-sheng was not connected to any powerful KMT faction proved fatal because he failed to convince any government bodies to take over the IIA after the war. Wang Peng-sheng died soon after the war ended of heart disease at the age of 54. When he passed away, a piece of paper was found in his hand that expressed his great frus-

pp. 149-157; R. Kent Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” *Political Science and Politics* (Washington DC: American Political Science Association), Vol. 22, No. 3, 563-578; Donald E. Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?: Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009); James G. McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US: Academics, Advisors and Advocates* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 4.

⁴Shao Yulin, “Zhuinian Wang Pengsheng Xiansheng (Missing Mr. Wang Pengsheng),” *Zhuanji Wenxue* (Biographical Literature), Vol. 8, No. 5 (May 1966), p. 28.

tration: What is the future of the IIA?⁵

Before he passed away, Wang recommended that Shao Yulin, another Japanese expert, take over his position. Shao was unable to solve the problems challenging this think-tank, so his job consisted of paying gratuity to employees and disbanding the IIA.

The IIA did have some experiences in its short life. First, although Wang Peng-sheng was not connected to Chiang Kai-shek and thus found himself shut out by Chiang's official intelligence units, Chiang selected him as the director of the IIA in recognition of his professional training. Second, the IIA used "enemies" to analyze intelligence, providing Chiang Kai-shek and his allies with valuable information. Third, many of the Taiwanese working for the IIA later became leaders in Taiwan, which indicated its use as a forum for training intellectuals. Finally, the appearance and disappearance of the IIA were related to the rise and fall of military requirement.

II. Reborn: Policy Analysis Office of the Information Division, Office of the President

The Information Division of the Presidential Office took charge of intelligence affairs after the BIS intelligence systems collapsed in mainland China. The collapse of the old systems implied that Chiang Kai-shek could establish a new system in Taiwan and establish better control, thus his son Chiang Ching-kuo became the new leader of intelligence.

The creation of the Policy Analysis Office was similar to the emergence of the IIA. On February 17, 1953, when the Korean War was still active, Chiang Kai-shek gave a written order to his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, Chief of the Information Division, to establish an institute that could clarify international politics. The Policy Analysis Office was the result and scholars have confirmed that Chiang Kai-shek's hand-written orders were largely the result of military need, suggesting that the Policy Analysis Office was designed for military rather than KMT use.

Chiang ordered that his son collect experts to analyze the affairs of their enemies and those related to international politics. According to these orders, Chiang Kai-shek, who had only recently arrived in Taiwan, saw Taiwanese matters as "foreign" affairs, but it was Chiang Ching-kuo who interpreted his father's order. Chiang Ching-kuo's Policy Analysis Office targeted the affairs of the Soviets, the Communists, the US (including the UN), Japan, Korea, and Europe (including South East Asia). Taiwanese issues were not included, however, which made the focus international. The first director of the Policy Analysis Office was the IIA's last director, Shao Yuling.

III. From "For One Person" to "For One Nation"

With his father's help, Chiang Ching-kuo spent three years (1950-1953) reorganizing the intelligence units and strengthening his power. Given Chiang Ching-kuo's involvement in its creation, the major difference between the Policy Analysis Office and the IIA was that the former was no longer troubled by serious factional conflicts because there was only a Chiang clique.

The Division of Information of the Presidential Office became the National Security Bureau on March 1, 1955. Thus, the Policy Analysis Office also became part of the Bureau. In 1958, the Policy Analysis Office was publically renamed the Council on International Relations. In

⁵Hsiung Sheng, "A Biography of Wang Peng-sheng (Wang Peng-sheng Zhuan)," *Academia Historica* (Taipei: Academia Historica), Vol. 7 (December 12, 1989), p. 132.

1961 the name was changed again to the Institute of International Relations. However, within the National Security Bureau system, the title “Policy Analysis Office” has remained.

Why did this office go public? In Chiang Kai-shek’s first address to research fellows on September 19, 1953, he only stated that this research unit was to assist him in his personal decision making. However, in the same speech, he told research fellows to publish a distinguished journal on a par with *Foreign Affairs*, despite the fact that the written order of February 1953 did not contain a word regarding such a publication.

It was unusual for a national leader to require that his advisors publish their thoughts, particularly with the added demand that the publication be academically competitive. Chiang’s written order had only addressed his military need. Thus, it was possible that his speech included the opinion of an “other,” capable of accessing both the speech and the Policy Analysis Office, namely Chiang Ching-kuo.

The Policy Analysis Office was a combination of soldiers, officials, scholars, and spies. If its development strategy remained unclear, it might end up like the IIA: intelligence without theory. Because Chiang Kai-shek had charged these researchers to produce a “distinguished journal like *Foreign Affairs*,” the office was no longer solely for Chiang Kai-shek, his son, or the KMT, but for the public.

During the 1950s, Chiang Ching-kuo spoke to members of the Policy Analysis Office every couple of months. He pushed for theoretical research, exchanges with foreign universities, and the employment of young researchers. He disliked what he referred to as useless, anti-communist rubbish and asked researchers to seek for the advantages of Chinese Communist rule on the mainland. His most important mission seemed to be the fulfilling his father’s request for a “distinguished publication,” and he mentioned it in almost every speech.

After the first IIR’s Chinese publication *Wenti yu Yanjiu* went public in 1957, he kept pushing for an English journal, which was delayed for another four years probably because Chiang Ching-kuo was particular about the English. Although it took the IIR years to prepare its publications, Chiang Ching-kuo’s endeavor was rewarded compared with the IIR’s PRC counterpart. The China Institute of International Studies was established under the PRC Foreign Ministry in 1957 and it released its first publication in 1959, but that was soon terminated due to political concerns. By 2006, only 154 issues had been published and the first English publication was in 2005.

IV. Using the “Enemies”

During World War II, the IIA hired many Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese employees for their understanding of Japan. In post-1949 Taiwan, the best people to analyze communist affairs still seemed to be the communists. Chiang Ching-kuo was familiar with the talent that often sprang from communist training due to his Soviet experiences. Therefore, Shao Yulin, a Japanese/Korean specialist who had served as the director of the Policy Analysis Office for only one year, was soon replaced by Bu Daomin.

Bu Daomin’s communist experience can be traced as far back as Chen Duxiu’s era. He was Chiang Ching-kuo’s classmate in Moscow and a secretary for both Chiang Kai-shek and Mikhail Markovich Borodin. While Bu was not a scholar, he was a professional diplomat in charge of Sino-Russian relations before 1949 and his close connections to Chiang and his expertise in Russian language and general foreign affairs made him a perfect leader for the IIR.

The IIR’s major publications (*Wenti yu Yanjiu*, *Mainland China Studies*) were initiated

during Bu Daomin's era. The Policy Analysis Office went public and became the renowned IIR during his term. In addition, the IIR's headquarters moved from an old building beside Yuansan Zoo and the Keelung River to a modern downtown building that would not suffer the interruptions of animals, rain, and floods.

Under Bu, many IIR staff members were ex-communists, convicted communists, and inside men who had served the Chinese communists. Information collected from spies, armed forces, and communist publications were sent to these "professionals" who could analyze the changes in Chinese politics through details and clues. One of the achievements of these communist specialists was that the IIR published the *Chinese Communist Who's Who* in 1967. At a time when China was isolated from most of the world, this volume provided the bibliographies of officials from local to central governments and was an important contribution to China studies.

The most famous communist researcher for the IIR was Warren Kuo. Arrested by the KMT in the 1930s, he was once a high-ranking CCP official but soon switched his loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek and served by arresting his old comrades. After Japan surrendered, he was sent to Taiwan in 1946 to keep hunting communists. In 1955, he wrote a book regarding the history of Taiwanese communists. He was assigned to the IIR in 1963 and wrote a book called *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party* that was academically unique because it was released at a time when even Communist China had no similar publication to analyze its own history.

V. Assembling Scholars Domestically and Internationally: Wu Chun-tsai

Wu Chun-tsai was the youngest founding member of the Policy Analysis Office, despite having joined as a part-time research fellow. He had studied in the UK and in India, was a professional correspondent, had taught at National Taiwan University and National Normal University, and had published a book of modern Indian history in 1954. Compared with the other fellows, while Wu Chun-tsai did not have significant military, government, or communist experience, he was equipped with distinguished academic and writing capabilities that were reminiscent of Wang Peng-sheng, and might have been why Chiang Ching-kuo and Chiang Kai-shek recruited him.

Wu Chun-tsai replaced Bu Daomin when the latter passed away in 1964. With strong support from the top, the senior IIR researchers who stood against the young director were forced to leave.⁶ Wu Chun-tsai's academic prowess soon resulted in further extensions of the IIR's reputation. His major contributions were as follows.

1. *Issues & Studies*: the IIR's current major English journal *Issues & Studies* was initiated during Wu's era. In a way, this publication realized Chiang's push for a "distinguished journal." It might not be as famous as *Foreign Affairs*, but it has been a critical academic source for China Studies and remains an influential publication in East Asia.
2. *Service*: With Chiang Kai-shek's approval, Wu dedicated himself to providing more hospitality and convenience for foreign scholars to conduct research so that the IIR and Taiwan could win

⁶No Name, "Zhengyao Yangchensuo: Jiekai Guoguan Zhongxin de Shengmi Miansha (Politicians' Academy: IIR)," *Zhongwai Zazhi* (Kaleidoscope Monthly) Vol. 52, No. 4 (October 1992), p. 113. The author "No Name" should be retired IIR Research Fellow Fang Xuechun.

an international reputation. His endeavor was recognized by *The China Quarterly* in 1968:⁷

The prospects for visitors wishing to engage in research on mainland affairs in Taiwan have taken a sharp upward turn since mid-1966. A change which has corresponded with a great improvement in the quality of analyses being published by the Nationalists themselves. To facilitate outside scholarly work, a “foreign guests reading room” has been set up in the offices of the “Institute of International Relations.” Here one can find secondary materials produced by several organizations on Taiwan, indexes of the holdings of a number of official libraries, and a small staff which tries very hard to help the visiting researcher obtain data he is interested in seeing and which provides introductions to other organizations which might have relevant materials. The reading room, the only one in the Institute with air-conditioning, has a high quality Ricoh copying machine, a microfilm reader-printer and desk space for five or six scholars.

3. Exchanges: the IIR regularly exchanges documents and research fellows with more than eight reputed institutions in the US, Japan, and West Germany. The IIR also holds large annual conferences on mainland China affairs with American and Japanese scholars, and more recently, with European scholars.
4. Policy Recommendation: exchanges allowed Chiang Kai-shek to extend his information sources. For example, he seemed to pay specific attention to Robert A. Scalapino, who suggested Taiwanese independence in the Conlon Report of 1959. The presidential office gave Dr. Scalapino permission to visit Taiwan in 1968, and during this trip he visited the IIR and Chiang Ching-kuo’s second-self, General Wang Sheng. He met Chiang Ching-kuo in March 1969 when the latter went to the US. Wu Chun-tsai visited over 200 American scholars in December 1969, but when he reported on his tour to Chiang Kai-shek in February 1970, Chiang only asked about Scalapino’s opinion, which had never changed: Taiwan should be separated from China. I believe that Dr. Scalapino’s opinion helped Chiang Kai-shek accept the “Dual Representation” strategy in the 1971 UN Chinese Representation campaign.⁸
5. Young Scholars: Wu Chun-tsai understood that the IIR would not always be able to rely on research fellows from mainland China because they would soon retire. Therefore, he needed to generate new forces for the IIR’s future development. He usually targeted newly graduated PhDs from the US and Europe. Another employment method was through examinations. University graduates were allowed to take a test and those who passed served as assistant research fellows. Probably due to instruction from the top, Wu Chun-tsai paid specific attention to hiring Taiwanese-born scholars. Among these, the most famous was Lee Teng-hui.
6. Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies: to maintain a sustainable supply of research manpower, the IIR decided to build its own graduate school to produce talent for mainland China studies. The Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University was therefore established, but its role was essentially as a cover-up because it was managed by the IIR and the National Security Bureau.

⁷Gordon A. Bennett, “Hong Kong and Taiwan Sources”, *The China Quarterly* (London: Cambridge University Press), No. 36 (December, 1968), p. 137.

⁸For Chiang’s Dual Representation strategy, please see Philip Hsiaopong Liu, “Dual Representation: Reviewing the Republic of China’s Last Battle in the UN,” *Issues and Studies* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations), Vol. 54 No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 87-118.

VI. Post-1975 Reorganization

Although the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, the IIR had been losing its advantages since the 1970s. First, Nixon's visit to Shanghai implied the inevitability of a full Sino-US exchange, and thus the IIR would no longer enjoy a monopoly on Chinese information. Second, because Taiwan had lost its UN seat and the US was courting Chinese Communists, it was meaningless for Taiwan to plan a counterattack against mainland China. Third, because Taiwan would soon lose official recognition, to keep international exchanges active the IIR had to dilute its relationship with the National Security Bureau.

In 1975, National Chengchi University again provided a cover-up. Theoretically, the IIR was now part of the school, but under the table the IIR became an independent institution under the Ministry of Education. The most important change was that although the National Security Bureau continued to sponsor part of the IIR's funding, the Policy Analysis Office ceased to exist. Many of the IIR staff members with no research connections returned to the bureau and because national security was no longer so tight, the prequel to this institution ended in 1975.

When Taiwan's democratization began in the 1990s, the definition of national security became debatable. In addition to civilian think-tanks, the government had multiple channels through which to form its policy, and the IIR lost its unique position. Losing its status as an exclusive government think-tank required the IIR to become academically competitive and it officially became part of National Chengchi University in 1996. Currently, the IIR is more of an academic institution because the University has high research requirements and low political needs.

Conclusion

In terms of its influence on the government and its history after 1953, the IIR is much less powerful than before. However, considering the history after 1937, the IIR and the IIA were both produced in times when the nation was confronting a formidable enemy. Although the IIA had significant performance and ample intellectuals, it failed to build a permanent development strategy. Thus, as soon as the war was over, the IIA was no longer needed. The institute was disbanded and the only thing left was Wang Peng-sheng's words of regret.

Compared with the destiny of the IIA, although the IIR has been reduced in size, it still has powerful publishing capability and plenty of excellent scholars. Why was the fate of the IIR so different from that of the IIA? First, Chiang Kai-shek centralized his power in Taiwan, which left much less fractional competition in intelligence units. Second, Chiang Ching-kuo dominated the development strategy for the IIR, pushed very hard for distinguished publications, and was free to select the best candidate for that specific mission. Third, based on the purpose of extensive publication, the IIR not only used communist specialists to exploit information from mainland China, but also disseminated their works to international academics through Wu Chun-tsai, who had dedicated himself to recruiting young scholars for the IIR's further growth. Thus, the IIR has a more solid base than that of the IIA.

The assemblance of scholars during the national crisis was a way to fight the enemy through scholarly exchange and publication, rather than for the interests of any political party. The development strategies of the IIR's elites established a think-tank with academic features and capabilities such that even after restructurings, the IIR did not fall prey to the destiny of the IIA, but continued to shine in the academic arena.

The Cold War origin of Taiwan-U.S. Conference on Contemporary China: A Strange Legacy of Chen-Tsai Wu and John King Fairbank in Trans-Pacific China Studies

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This essay traces the origin of the Cold War predecessor of the Taiwan-U.S. Conference on Contemporary China (TUSCCC), the first and longest-lasting forum of academic diplomacy carried out by the NCCU Institute of International Relations (IIR). Drawing upon IIR archives, the author dissects domestic and international factors that worked together to usher in the Sino-American Conference on Mainland China (SACMC) in 1970 as the last wave of propaganda offensive executed by the KMT government of the Republic of China. The author takes the Cold War origin of the SACC to illustrate the asymmetric yet co-constitutive relationship of power and knowledge in the making and implementation of national security policy. The IIR story of SACMC discloses how power and knowledge constitute each other in order for the state concerned to weather international challenges. While the creation and refinement of scientific knowledge of politics is hardly autonomous to the wielding of political power, political power is unsustainable without the endorsement and assistance of knowledge holders.

Introduction

On December 3, 2012, the NCCU Institute of International Relations (IIR) held the 41st Taiwan-U.S. Conference on Contemporary China (TUSCCC) in Washington, D.C. The IIR organized the one-day symposium in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of China on Taiwan sponsored the event. As an Assistant Research Fellow of IIR, I was honored to present a paper to the conference. Building upon past experiences, the symposium proceeded like clockwork, generating only slight media attention. The routinization and ritualization of the conference, however, veiled its political-historical significance; few participants bothered to inquire into the political origin and institutional evolution of the conference.

In fact, the annual TUSCCC is the first and the longest-lasting policy-oriented forum of China Studies in the world, beginning in December 1970. For more than a decade it was arguably the most prestigious gathering of China Studies during the Cold War. A cursory reading of the histori-

cal development of TUSCCC inescapably triggers this question: why had Taiwan, a geographically minuscule and lower-middle-income country in the early 1970s, invested heavily, and hence wielded such a disproportionate influence in the intellectual field of China Studies during the Cold War?

This essay takes on the TUSCCC as the primary subject of examination. I present what I have found, as of March 2013, regarding the TUSCCC's Cold War precursor, the Sino-American Conference on Mainland China (SACMC). My purpose is to take the historical development of the conference series as a case study of the asymmetric—if not single-dimensional—relationship of power and knowledge in processes leading to the making of national security policy. The IIR story of SACMC illustrates how power and knowledge constitute each other in order for the state concerned to cope with international challenges. Knowledge and the process leading to its creation are rarely autonomous to power relations. Instead, it is more likely than not that political power predetermines the ideological boundary of epistemic community, sets the political agenda of social scientific scholarship, and ultimately renders scholars dependent—in both material and statutory terms—upon the dominant political system. In this sense, political power dominates and constructs science of politics; such an asymmetric relationship is all the more obvious in the scholarship of International Relations.

Asymmetry nonetheless, knowledge and its creators are never to surrender completely their agency. Their political activism and policy impact are most palpable when power holders are exposed to an unprecedented crisis without viable solutions, a crisis whose devastating effects, if neglected, amount to ontological extermination of the polity in concern. While knowledge is parasitic to power, power is unsustainable without knowledge. Political elites and epistemic aristocrats not only condition and constrain, but also empower and construct, each other in the process of national security policymaking. The living history of SACMC during the Cold War faithfully demonstrates the notion that power and knowledge are co-constituted in an asymmetric relationship. The Cold War was a war of opposing ideas, or a war over contrasting ideologies of socio-economic systems. The East-West confrontation was fought not only in military and developmental terrains, but even more so in ideational and ideological realms where foreign policy/national security policy scholars could make direct contributions to the political ideal they hold dear.

The OPR and the IIR: Two Facades, One Identity

Today it is taken for granted that international academic cooperation and exchanges constitute a normal and indispensable part of intellectual life. Truth-seeking scholars hold the conviction that international cooperation and exchanges, just like international competition, are beneficial for enrichment, accumulation, and sharing of knowledge. Such a conviction is particularly well-received in the scholarship of International Relations, a discipline that studies multi-dimensional phenomena and multi-faceted dynamics of international society. International cooperation and exchanges are carried out for the seemingly pure sake of knowledge production and dissemination. Perfection of human knowledge seems to be the ultimate purpose of international academic cooperation and exchanges. This pre-supposed conviction seems to explain that the Institute of International Relations runs an institutionalized Office of Cooperation and Exchanges. This conviction seems to also account for a number of international programs, conferences, forums, and policy dialogues that the IIR hosted or sponsored regularly. The IIR's main function appears to be an academic bridge that facilitates international cooperation, exchanges, and communication.

Appearance can be deceiving, and popular convictions tend to contradict historical reality.

The Institute of International Relations for quite a while had been an intelligence analysis unit that was almost removed from public view, let alone holding high-profile international academic conferences open to the public. The Institute was created in April 1953 by Chiang Kai-Shek to serve him and his KMT regime with intelligence analyses and policy advices on Communist China, the Soviet Union, and international Communist movements. The ultimate political agenda of the Institute was unambiguous: identifying weaknesses and loopholes of the Chinese Communist regime for assisting Chiang Kai-Shek's KMT government in "recovering" the Chinese mainland. The Institute recruited ex-CCP members, career KMT propagandists, political warfare officers, and covert operation agents to advise on the KMT government's offensive strategy against mainland China. Answering only to the top political leadership (namely Chiang Kai-Shek, his son Chiang Ching-Kuo, and their national security chiefs), the Institute from the outset was placed under direct patronage and tight supervision of Chiang Ching-Kuo, who was authorized by his father to integrate and reinforce KMT regime's intelligence agencies and covert operation units.

As a semi-secretive unit, the Institute during its formative years had kept a low profile, and wore two hats simultaneously: internally and in reality, it was the Office of Policy Research (OPR, 政策研究室) of National Security Bureau (NSB), the top spy agency responsible for espionage, domestic security and clandestine acts. Externally and in disguise, it went about with the innocuous title of IIR, concealing its intimate relations with the KMT government's security apparatus. In other words, at the beginning the Institute was not meant to be an organization carrying out academic cooperation projects and international exchanges. Instead, secrecy and namelessness were the norm. Undoubtedly, political power gave birth to, but also severely constrained, the intellectual and organizational development of the Institute. The functional design and work style of the Institute in the early stages rendered its later publicity—the SACMC as a major representative case—all the more puzzling.

The SACMC came about in 1970, when international status and political legitimacy of the Republic of China on Taiwan precipitated to a critical level in the late 1960s. The conference series was a result of historical contingency. One major domestic factor that eventually made possible the SACMC and other IIR-initiated policy dialogues was the functional and organizational enlargement of the Institute itself in the 1960s, yet this institutional growth developed almost entirely as a coping strategy to international challenges that disqualified the ROC's claim of representing the whole China and even threatened its political survival.

By the late 1950s the CCP regime had consolidated its rule over the Chinese mainland, and the provision of US military aid to Taiwan effectively prevented the ROC government from attacking China. In addition, a growing number of prominent China specialists and State Department officials began to consider modifying Washington's China policy. Back in Taipei, OPR chiefs realized that the manpower of their strategists and the quality of their intelligence analyses no longer met the increasing complicated dynamics of the Cold War. The making of a sensible and viable national security strategy required the NSB to bring into the fold situation analyses and policy advices offered by China specialists and IR scholars who were outside of intelligence circles, OPR strategists concluded. Meanwhile, they urged the ROC government to reinforce its international propaganda campaigns.

Chiang Ching-Kuo approved their requests; Chiang's approval set in motion OPR's functional enlargement and institutional transformation. In February 1958 the OPR, using the title of Institute of International Relations, acquired the legal status of a non-governmental civil organization in order to facilitate NSB's engagement with external scholars and experts. In disguise, the

OPR assumed a NGO identity that came under the supervision of Ministry of the Interior, yet in reality it remained to be referred to as—functionally and institutionally—the OPR of National Security Bureau. The IIR was nothing more than a front of OPR that continued to serve the purposes of intelligence analysis and policy advice.

In December 1959 Chiang Ching-Kuo instructed the OPR to extend policy consultation with the outside world by inviting prominent professors to participate directly in NSB's policy research projects, again under the then-obscure title of the IIR. Also, the OPR was told to set up branch offices, again under the title of IIR, in Hong Kong and Tokyo to collect and exchange intelligence of Communist China. Thirdly, OPR was given a new task of publishing an internationally accessible journal that provided exclusive information and analyses concerning latest developments of Communist China.

Then in late 1960 Chiang Ching-Kuo once more instructed the OPR to further broaden the scope of external policy consultation. Consequently the IIR underwent another institutional transformation in 1961: it obtained the legal status of a private educational institution for academic research, under the administrative supervision of Ministry of Education. While it was yet another undertaking that was meant to conceal IIR's true political identity, this arrangement formally qualified the IIR to carry out the intellectual function of international academic exchanges. In June 1963 the IIR moved its office to downtown Taipei and began receiving foreign experts and hosting policy forums. Steadily the IIR earned international recognition as a reputable institution that distributed exclusive and reliable information about latest developments of the CCP regime.

As the IIR was gaining international reputation, however, the ROC government was losing international legitimacy. The 1960s witnessed an ominous trend to Taipei: more countries (particularly newly independent ones) switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC, making it more difficult for Taipei to justify the claim that it legitimately represented the whole China in the United Nations. Worse yet, an increasing number of American China specialists, foreign affairs bureaucrats, and Congressmen began to give a serious thought of revising Washington's China policy. They took notice of Sino-Soviet split over ideological issues, and suggested that the U.S. government may check the Soviet expansionism and weaken its global impact by engaging and working with the Communist China.

To be sure, the idea of approaching and understanding Beijing was not new, yet the deepening of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War made the proposition increasingly attractive. Given the palpable influence and extensive engagement of the CCP regime in the war, some American China Watchers urged Washington to dialogue with Beijing in order to better manage the war in Indo-China and to avoid a future war with China. Furthermore, radicalized social movements that swept the West after the mid-1960s generated among the youth and academics a sense of interest and adulation to the CCP leadership and their contagious revolutionary discourse. In the meantime, the KMT regime's repressive acts and conservative outlook deteriorated its international image among Western audiences.

America's change of mind on the China policy turned a new page in March 1966, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a series of public hearings entitled "US Policy With Respect to Mainland China." Academics and politicians, the most prestigious being John King Fairbank and J. William Fulbright, testified to either openly or implicitly advocate a revision of US China policy toward "containment without isolation" (which was known in Taiwan as the "Fairbank proposal"), indicating their endorsement of engaging the CCP regime directly and recognizing the PRC as a political reality in contemporary international relations.

The Fairbank proposal and its political ascension alarmed Taipei. No longer could the KMT regime monopolize the Chinese representation in the world, had the proposal been accepted by the U.S. government. More disturbing was the prospect that an initial US-CCP engagement may eventually (and perhaps quickly) lead to diplomatic recognition. Furthermore, any revisions of Washington's China policy would almost certainly be heeded and followed by U.S. allies. To KMT strategists in the NSB, the days of the ROC and its KMT government were numbered as soon as Washington moved to openly engage the CCP regime. Frustrated yet recalcitrant, the KMT leadership decided that actions had to be taken to firmly desist and further delegitimize the Fairbank proposal.

Immediately the KMT propaganda machines were unleashed to work out volumes of vicious pamphlets and commentaries that ruthlessly castigated Fairbank and his revisionist idea, demonizing Fairbank as an enemy of the "Free China" who had since the 1930s been engaged in subversive acts against the ROC. This negative propaganda campaign was meant to damage Fairbank's academic integrity, undercut his intellectual authority, and eventually marginalize his political influence. IIR strategists proudly participated in the collective effort of blackmailing. They accused Fairbank and like-minded American scholars—the famed "Fairbank clique," including A. Doak Barnett, Warren I. Cohen, and Jerome A. Cohen—as appeasers of Communist brutality and collaborators of the CCP regime, who on the one hand conspired with Beijing to exterminate the freedom-loving and democratic Republic of China, and on the other hand harbored and financed the Taiwan independence movement.

Ironically, what seemed to be an existential crisis to the ROC and its KMT regime was an unprecedented window of opportunity for the IIR. The Chiangs and their national security advisors understood that simply blackmailing revisionist figures would not suffice. Instead, the ROC had to be more aggressive in mobilizing all the ideational and material resources at its disposal to support pro-KMT voices and to amplify their policy impact. It was against this larger Cold War context that the KMT leadership handpicked the IIR as a major national security instrument, and authorized the IIR to carry out the multi-front international propaganda campaign, an ideological undertaking of which the Sino-American Conference on Mainland China—the predecessor or the TUSCCC—was a key part.

International Propaganda through Scholarly Exchanges

Back in the IIR office in downtown Taipei, throughout 1966 Director Chen-Tsai Wu (吳俊才) observed anxiously the fermentation of the Fairbank proposal and sought countermeasures. On August 31st, Director Wu accompanied Dr. James Chester Cheng (鄭喆希), a renowned professor of China Studies of University of California, to meet Chiang Ching-Kuo. During the conversation Dr. Cheng proposed to hold an international symposium of China Studies in Taiwan. Chiang Ching-Kuo listened attentively, and instructed Director Wu to examine the feasibility of the proposal. Seizing this long sought-for opportunity, Wu drew up a policy memorandum and had it delivered to Chiang Ching-Kuo on September 20th. Wu was in absolute favor of having the IIR organize and host the proposed symposium in Taipei. His memorandum marked the beginning of the preparation for SACMC.

Wu firstly argued that the timing of holding a conference on contemporary China could not be more appropriate. On the one hand, the IIR had during the past few years gained international reputation for its rich collection, publication, and hospitality; on the other the political agitation

and social chaos in mainland China, brought about by the Cultural Revolution, made international scholars and experts all the more desperate for understanding the latest developments in mainland China. He justified the leadership role of the IIR by reminding Chiang Ching-Kuo that neither governmental bodies nor intelligence agencies were unsuitable for hosting an international academic conference, and local scholars, due to the repressive atmosphere, were fearful for organizing such a politically sensitive event.

Wu further laid down four propaganda objectives for the proposed symposium: (1) to encourage international academic exchanges on the research of the CCP and mainland China; (2) to advance pro-KMT discourse by presenting authoritative essays and informative reports; (3) to sway international scholarship of China Studies by providing materials favorable to the KMT; and (4) to facilitate international understanding and affirmation of progress made in the “Free China,” namely, the Republic of China on Taiwan. Indeed this is soft power at work: an academic function that underscored a not-so-hidden agenda of the Cold War confrontation.

Chen-Tsai Wu integrated major intelligence agencies of the KMT government into his ambitious conference project, including Department No. 2 (KMTCCD-2) and No. 6 of KMT Central Committee (KMTCCD-6), the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) of the Ministry of National Defense, the Bureau of Investigation (BOI) of the Ministry of Judicial Administration, the Department of Intelligence Analysis of the General Staff (DIAGS), and the Department No. 4 of the National Security Bureau (NSBD-4). His initial plan was truly global: among twenty distinguished international scholars to be invited, ten were from the United States, three from Europe, and seven from Asia and Africa. Wu specified that invitees should represent three groups: KMT sympathizers, neutrals, and CCP allies. He further suggested that the IIR, in partnership with other intelligence agencies, may sway opinions of international invitees by providing a selective set of valuable materials of the CCP regime and mainland China.

Power and Knowledge: A Difficult Tango for Intellectuals

While Chen-Tsai Wu delivered his conference project proposal in September 1966 as a most urgent document to the NSB and Chiang Ching-Kuo, it took the NSB more than a year to come forward in October 1967 with a mildly positive answer. The tardy response was unusual, and it seems to suggest that the IIR was not the favorite son of the national security leadership of the KMT government. In fact, the IIR was not the only think tank that advised the Chiangs; instead, all the major bureaucratic stakeholders in the KMT national security apparatus ran their own policy research divisions, and they not only collaborated with one another, but also engaged in fierce competition over material resources, policy impact, and political significance. In other words, the IIR had to prove its administrative competency and reliability, and to earn political trust from the top leadership in order to eventually outshine other competitors for organizing an international event that served dual purposes. As the IIR Director, Chen-Tsai Wu was to wait for more than four years to be entrusted and authorized to organize the conference that he proposed.

Notwithstanding the delay, Chen-Tsai Wu did not lose hope. Instead, during the next four years Wu incessantly and patiently kept the NSB leadership and Chiang Ching-Kuo informed about the imperative of launching academic dialogues for withholding adverse international trend. The asymmetric power-knowledge relationship featured prominently in Wu's confidential correspondence with KMT national security chiefs and Chiang Ching-Kuo (then the Vice Secretary-General of National Security Council, and the Minister of National Defense, effectively

controlling the military and internal security apparatus). During a meeting on November 21, 1966, Wu proposed that the IIR may work with the prestigious Academia Sinica to organize the conference, but Chiang Ching-Kuo ruled out the role of the Academia Sinica; rather, he emphasized that the IIR should consult and coordinate with major intelligence stakeholders of the KMT government. Chiang Ching-Kuo further vetoed Wu's idea of inviting foreign scholars who favored engaging the CCP government. Chiang's instructions indicated clearly that from the beginning he took the proposed conference as a matter of intelligence exchange and international propaganda, and not as an academic event for a better understanding of mainland China.

Wu submitted a revised conference project proposal on December 9 to Chiang. He reported that he carried out Chiang's instruction by inviting all the major intelligence units—including MIB, BOI, DAIGS, KMTCCD-2, KMTCCD-6, General Political Warfare Bureau (GPWB), and NSBD-4—to an internal preparatory meeting, and recommended the international conference to be held in September 1967. Chen-Tsai Wu further proposed to assemble a high-level advisory committee, to be composed of prominent academic leaders in Taiwan. However, Chiang Ching-Kuo once again vetoed Wu's scholarly agenda by disapproving the idea of establishing an advisory committee. Instead, Chiang urged Wu to consult and collaborate closely with Hsiang-Chih Yeh (葉翔之)¹ and Chien-Chong Chen (陳建中)²—Chiang Ching-Kuo's right-hand men for national security affairs. Chiang's instruction once again revealed palpably that he defined the proposed conference as a matter of intelligence and information warfare.

On December 31, 1966, Wu submitted the third memorandum about the proposed conference on contemporary China to Chiang and his national security deputies. Wu revealed that he already followed Chiang's instruction to consult with Yeh and Chen, and they suggested July 1967 as the preferred time slot for the proposed conference. Mindful of Chiang's previous disapproval of an advisory committee composed of academics, this time Chen-Tsai Wu recommended Chiang to authorize the IIR to appoint eleven informal patrons—five prestigious scholars, three revered academic-turned technocrats, and three national security chiefs—with an aim to raise the international profile of the proposed conference. Wu further suggested that the IIR should make every effort to secure the attendance of emerging China scholars who served on the State Department Advisory Panel on China (which was just created on December 2, 1966, by the U.S. Department of State), such as Robert A. Scalapino, George E. Taylor, Lucian W. Pye, and Alexander Eckstein. In summary, Chen-Tsai Wu was hopeful that Chiang would eventually approve his conference project.

Wu was to be disappointed for a good reason. Chiang was not opposed to the general idea of organizing an international conference on contemporary China, but dragged his feet. On January 13, 1967, Chen-Tsai Wu scribbled down his conversation with Chiang Ching-Kuo the previous day, during which time Chiang intimated, "I have to think it [the proposed conference] over; it must proceed well if it is to be done, and it is inappropriate for us [the KMT government] to take the lead." Chiang concluded that the conference project required "further consideration and discussion." The entire conference project was therefore shelved for more than three years, and was not revitalized until early 1970.

¹Director-General of KMTCCD-2, which was the KMT's top spy agency in charge of espionage operations in mainland China.

²Director-General of KMTCCD-6, which was in charge of political warfare and intelligence analysis on mainland China.

Detour and Delay for the Good?

In appearance, Chiang Ching-Kuo's procrastination and the resultant postponement of the conference were disappointing. After all, there was not to be a more appropriate timing for Taipei to initiate such a propaganda counterstrike, when China scholars in the West were desperate for any authoritative information about agitation and chaos that the Cultural Revolution had engulfed mainland China. And indeed Chiang's hesitancy seemed to indicate his deep-seated reservations about the competency of the IIR, which had never been assigned to organize a major international operation like the one proposed by Wu. However, the frustration was actually a tolerable side effect of a momentous decision that greatly elevated IIR's political status and ushered in its golden decade (1970-1979).

Intimidated by the Fairbank proposal (the "international appeasement" as it was coined by KMT propagandists) and its political ascension in the US, Chiang Kai-Shek in Spring 1966 instructed the ROC Presidential Office and the Standing Committee of KMT Central Committee to jointly assemble a Comprehensive Study Group for External Propaganda and Foreign Policy (PSG), which was tasked to propose ways and means for withholding the advance of "international appeasement." In Fall 1966 the PSG dispatched Hsiang-Chih Yeh and Chien-Chong Chen to the US to survey the general public opinion on China-related issues. Their secret report—which was submitted in December 1966 to Chiang Kai-Shek—urged the KMT government to ratchet up international information warfare.

In particular, Yeh and Chen proposed to draw upon the IIR's international reputation: the IIR as a front may be authorized to share classified information about the CCP regime and mainland China only with foreign scholars and experts who found favor with the KMT. The rationale was self-explanatory: the preferential treatment would presumably greatly elevate pro-KMT academics' intellectual authority and political influence, and through them redirect the course of international opinion back to KMT's advantage. Following this logic, Yeh and Chen proposed to increase the IIR's manpower and budget, modernize its facilities and equipment, enrich its deposit of classified materials, and expand its international outreach programs.

On January 6, 1967, the PSG approved policy proposals drafted by Yeh and Chen, and recommended the KMT government to develop the IIR into an authoritative center for the research of mainland China, and to make the Institute the sole officially-authorized access point of international academic exchanges for China scholars. The PSG further recognized the diplomatic importance and policy relevance of the proposed international conference on contemporary China. It was against this larger policy background that Chiang Ching-Kuo, just six days after the PSG meeting, instructed Chen-Tsai Wu to put off the preparatory work for the international conference project. Instead, Chiang reminded Wu to shift his attention to the new, more challenging task, i.e., the institutional enlargement and functional expansion of the IIR, without which the proposed international conference could not be held successfully as Chiang demanded.

On January 25, the Standing Committee of the KMT Central Committee formally approved the PSG policy recommendations regarding the IIR. The decision consequentially uplifted the political status of the IIR in the KMT national security machinery, and effectively transformed the Institute from a covert advisory unit that answered only to the Chiangs, to a high-profile academic body known for its conservative agenda, rich collection of classified materials, and international outreach and hospitality. The Institute of International Relations thenceforth stood out from among other competing think tanks in the KMT national security apparatus, moving upward the

institutional ladder to be the most influential research institution that advised the ROC government on China policy and foreign policy.

The blessing and affirmation of the top KMT leadership immediately brought more material and policy resources for Chen-Tsai Wu to establish in Spring 1967 the Office of Cooperation and Exchanges (OCE) and the Division for Material Collection and Distribution (DMCD), which soon became IIR's two largest supportive units, each commanding 25-30 full-time professional staffs providing customized services for in-house research fellows and visiting scholars from abroad. In the meantime, Chen-Tsai Wu was immersed in scouting a new site for the enlarged Institute. Moreover, in 1968 Chiang Kai-Shek obliged Wu with a demanding job, tasking him to found and administer a graduate program to train new blood of China specialists for the replacement of ageing national security strategists.

Tortuous Path to the SACMC, 1967-1970

Nevertheless, Wu was not to forget about his proposal of hosting an international conference on contemporary China. Insofar as he was engaged in institutional building and functional expansion, he did not move his eyes off the conference project. Instead, Wu kept seeking windows of opportunity that allowed him to bring the conference project back to the IIR agenda.

In late June 1967 the China Council on Sino-American Cooperation in the Humanities and Social Sciences, which was housed in Academia Sinica, held a bilateral Conference on Economic Development of Taiwan in Taipei. Walter Galenson, a professor of economics of Cornell University, visited the Institute of International Relations on June 30 after the conference. Galenson made suggestion to Chen-Tsai Wu of organizing a Sino-American bilateral conference on mainland China problems (like the one he just attended in Academia Sinica), and promised to advocate for the conference in American academic communities. Galenson further proposed a preparatory meeting, to be held in Hawaii around the time of Christmas 1967.

Chen-Tsai Wu immediately informed Chiang Ching-Kuo about the Galenson proposal. In a top-secret official letter dated July 1, Wu indicated that the proposal was not only reflective of the general viewpoint of American academics but also compatible with the KMT's current propaganda strategy of swaying American scholars, hence worth a serious consideration. Wu took the Galenson-proposed Sino-American bilateral conference as a functional substitution for the previous project of international conference, only on a smaller and more manageable scale.

Chiang Ching-Kuo responded mildly positively, but instructed Wu to hold the preparatory meeting in Taipei. Chen-Tsai Wu then wrote to Galenson on July 10, informing him of the change of venue of the preparatory meeting. However, Galenson's correspondence of September 28 dashed Wu's hope of setting in motion the bilateral conference project. Galenson indicated that he was already short of fund, and had to apply for travel grants from the American Council of Learned Society—if he ever made the decision to come to Taipei for the preparatory meeting.

Wu was not to hear from Galenson again, and the idea of a Sino-American bilateral conference on mainland China was once more put to the back burner. Working under a power holder who was only moderately interested in international scholarly exchanges, Chen-Tsai Wu's effort came to a halt in October 1967. He could only push so far, and had to reckon with it. After all, the state of ROC's international representation in 1967 was critical but not fatal, as the Cultural Revolution had consumed Beijing's energy and slowed down the CCP government's diplomatic offensives against the ROC.

However, Wu kept to himself the idea of a Sino-American conference; this time it took him nearly two years to bring up the idea again. Impressively, IIR archives portray a Chen-Tsai Wu who had developed no sense of frustration but pressed on with goals that he held as beneficial to the fate of ROC.

In June 1969 the Joint Committee on Sino-American Cooperation in the Humanities and Social Sciences convened the third plenary meeting in Taipei. American scholars who attended the event once again requested their ROC counterparts to organize and host a Sino-American bilateral conference on mainland China issues. The Joint Committee, of which Che-Tsai Wu was a key member, decided that the Academia Sinica and the Institute of International Relations to work together for the preparation of the proposed bilateral conference; a week later Wu reported the decision to Chiang Ching-Kuo and his national security chiefs.

Around this time the global configuration of the Cold War had evolved: the Sino-Soviet rift intensified and surfaced; the U.S. was making every effort to get out of the quagmire in Vietnam; Beijing resumed her comprehensive diplomatic offensives against the ROC in the United Nations; and the idea of working with Beijing to check the Soviet expansion gained currency in Washington. For the ROC government, these ominous developments suggested a looming crisis of her international legitimacy and political survival.

In October 1969 Wu, upon an invitation of Department of State, toured the United States for two months. He was shocked with what he eye-witnessed in America. In secret reports cabled back to Taipei, Wu unreservedly expressed his apprehension over the menacing phenomena by which he was overwhelmed. Compared to his upbeat remarks three years ago, Wu in late 1969 sounded more anxious and desperate. Wu was worried sick about the popularization and mainstreaming among China scholars of the call for engaging the Communist China. Wu realized that the war in Vietnam had worn down a deeply divisive American society, and the anti-war mentality had lent tremendous credence to the proposition of utilizing Beijing's influence over North Vietnam to contain the war in Indo-China. Doing that, however, required Washington to develop efficient lines of communication with Beijing, and to offer Beijing valuable concessions as bargaining chips. Engaging China was not only perceptibly advantageous to Nixon's agenda of pulling American forces out of Southeast Asian fields, but also beneficial to American's global Cold War strategy. Toward the end of the 1960s the whole American society was tilting from a conservative political outlook to a liberal trend of political argumentation. As far as foreign policy elites were concerned, a realist line of argument that emphasized geo-strategic calculations began to reign over the rusted justification of isolating mainland China based upon the ideological cause.

As a result, Wu observed dishearteningly that a majority of American China scholars—especially the younger, emerging generation in their 30s and 40s who grew up with experiences of Civil Rights Movement, social liberalization and anti-war campaigns—already changed side. They favored the policy of engagement, promoted the establishment of official diplomatic relationship with Beijing, advocated for the granting of UN membership to the Communist China, and called for the loosening of restrictive measures against mainland China (such as trade embargo and travel ban). Each of these policy propositions—which was gaining currency in Washington—was tantamount to the abandonment of America's political support for the ROC and the abolition of Washington's ideological alliance with the KMT. From his conversation with scholars and officials, Wu gathered that they no longer gave a serious thought about helping the KMT leadership to reclaim the Chinese mainland. American academic and foreign relations elites already accepted the PRC as a normal part of the contemporary world, and did not seek to subvert the socialist rule.

Instead, it was the existential survival of the ROC and its KMT government that was at stake.

While wary of the alarming situation in America, Chen-Tsai Wu was even more critical of ROC diplomatic agents' passivity, timidity and incompetency. In secret reports he pointed out several times that the period of 1969-170 was extremely critical for the ROC-US relationship, which was arguably the most important foreign relations to the KMT government. Wu further indicated that ROC's UN membership and all the accompanying privileges would be in grave danger in the coming year of 1970. The loss of UN seat would almost inevitably implicate political, military, and economic development of the ROC, Wu predicted. Yet Taipei's diplomatic agents were not only incapable of withholding the adverse tide, but even busy with in-fighting, self-aggrandizing, and self-profiteering, Wu observed. Ineptitude of ROC foreign affairs system prompted Chen-Tsai Wu to conclude that alternative ways and means had to be devised for the retention of the ROC's international legitimacy.

Agony and desperation, however, triggered Wu's activism. Realizing the imminent diplomatic crisis, Chen-Tsai Wu took initiative while he was still traveling from city to city in America. He revived the long-ignored bilateral conference project by exercising discretionary power to sign cooperation and exchange agreements with the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, St. John's University Institute of Asian Studies, and University of South Carolina Institute of International Studies, three American research institutes known for their political conservatism and sympathetic attitude to the KMT government. We could not be sure whether Wu's 1969 initiative was approved by Chiang Ching-Kuo, but it did not seem to bother Wu anymore.

Unlike his previous submissive and cautionary tone, Chen-Tsai Wu in his final report strongly advised the ROC government to carry out ten measures as soon as possible, the last being holding an annual Sino-American Conference on Mainland China (SACMC), to be organized and hosted by the IIR, with logistic assistance provided by the Academia Sinica and the NCCU Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies. Wu recommended to forget out senior "CCP appeasers," i.e., John K. Fairbank and like-minded China specialists, and instead invited "Neo-leftists," i.e., American scholars who held sympathetic attitude to socialism and the CCP, but remained either neutral or agnostic about the controversy of the ROC's international representation.

Wu's report and policy recommendations finally found favor before Chiang Ching-Kuo and KMT national security chiefs, who kept abreast with the ROC's uncertain political future and her dashed international legitimacy, but could not work out coping strategies that were innovative and viable. It was against this larger political background of uncertainty and anxiety that Wu's conference proposal, after four years and many frustrating twists, was finally adopted and executed as Taipei's last propaganda offensive in her international relations.

The SACMC and the Golden Decade of IIR

The year of 1970 was memorable not only to Chen-Tsai Wu but also to the IIR. In May the Institute relocated to the new, modern, and spacious headquarter compound in Mucha at the southern tip of Taipei. From December 13 to 19 the IIR, in partnership with the abovementioned three American research institutes, convened successfully the first Sino-American Conference on Mainland China at the classic Shijian Palace in downtown Taipei. 296 scholars and experts attended the conference, during which time 38 papers were delivered, covering a variety of subjects including CCP history, propaganda strategy, domestic political struggle, economic policy, ideological campaigns, foreign relations, and PLA development.

28 American scholars and librarians participated in the conference, including Robert A. Scalapino of University of California, Berkeley, Clarence M. Wilbur and Michel C. Oksenberg of Columbia University. The conference was enriched by exhibitions of classified CCP materials collected and made available by various ROC intelligence agencies, such as KMTCCD-6. Conference attendees endorsed a proposal of institutionalizing the conference. The Hoover Institution agreed to host the next Sino-American Conference on Mainland China in December 1971. Chen-Tsai Wu's passionate agenda—to save the ROC, the true and genuine representation of China, by scholarship—was fulfilled. His perseverance paid off.

A month after the gathering, Yu-Ching Chen (陳裕清), then Director-General of Department No.4 of KMT Central Committee (KMTCCD-4, in charge of propaganda affairs), submitted a case report in January 1971 to the Standing Committee of KMT Central Committee, recommending the laudation of Chen-Tsai Wu and his IIR deputies for their outstanding service for organizing and hosting the conference. Chen claimed that American participants who were suspicious of political agenda of the conference were impressed with the genuinely academic nature of the conference. Likewise, American scholars, according to Chen, were convinced that the ROC government was able to provide original CCP documents and materials, and ROC scholars based in the IIR were competent in offering informative and objective analyses on mainland China. Chen further recommended the KMT leadership to authorize the IIR to host more international conferences on mainland China problems.

In Summer 1971, the ruling KMT underwent a bureaucratic reorganization. A Culture and Communications Committee (文化傳播工作會, KMTCCC) was created to replace the KMTCCD-4. Whoever headed this Committee would reign over educational policy, propaganda campaigns, and cultural policy of the ROC. Chen-Tsai Wu was nominated for the new post for his proven capabilities and political allegiance. With Chiang Ching-Kuo's endorsement, Wu was promoted to be the first Director-General of KMTCCC. He left the IIR for the new post in August 1971. With Wu's blessing from on high, the IIR in following years secured more material and political support, and the Sino-American Conference on Mainland China in the following decade went ahead to be the flagship program of the IIR, and the most prestigious academic gathering of China Studies in North America. Wu's legacy stays until now.

Navigating through the Sea of Westphalia Diplomacy: Role of Think Tank in Taipei-Seoul Forum

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Introduction

Taipei-Seoul relation has been stagnated for more than a decade before the direct flight of two countries was restored in 2004. The two “brotherly” nations shared common history from pre-WWI state-building, Japanese occupation as well as post-WWII anti-communism to political democratization and economic liberalization. Yet, the post-cold war power restructure in East Asia drove the two apart. After the diplomatic break-up, two leading Think Tanks—IIR and SFIA from Taipei and Seoul respectively—did manage to sustain a channel to maintain an unofficial diplomatic dialogue for Taipei. Nonetheless, the “Track 1.5” exchange demonstrated itself a bumpy sail on turbulent sea of Westphalia diplomacy. It took a thick layer of social networking to nurture a fragile public diplomacy where Taipei-Seoul Forum (TSF) was based over passing decades. The invisible ceiling of Westphalia Diplomacy never fade away.

The main purpose for this paper is to examine the opportunity and constrains of public diplomacy in nurturing foreign relations with Taipei-Seoul Forum as a case in point. Much of the literatures study the impact or influence of think tanks on policy decision-making in domestic or global issues. This paper will look at the issue from a geopolitical perspective where state and non-state actors works together to reach out for diplomatic breakthrough. The research will also focus on the unique transnational alumni social networking through TSF which had buffered fragile bilateral relations in its most difficult time. Lastly, the paper tries to demonstrate the boundary of think tank diplomacy under norms of Westphalia diplomacy.

Historic Background

Relations between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and South Korea has gone through three stages of transition, namely, pre-cold war stage, cold war stage and post-cold war stage. On April 13, 1919, with the formation of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea and its subsequent recognition by the Republic of China, the leaders of two young nationalist governments had developed a friendship of common destiny in the first stage of bilateral relations. With the establishment of the provisional government, Korea was able to make concentrated efforts toward

achieving independence from Japan. The unique affiliation between the two regimes was strong and steady throughout the WWII era. By the end of WWII in 1943, the Republic of China joined with United States and USSR for the Cairo Conference, which resulted in the Cairo Declaration in which Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek strongly supported an independent Korea, free from the Japanese Colonial Rule.¹

After Korean War, Seoul needs to manage its relations with Pyongyang when Taipei facing military threat from Beijing. The two anti-communist companions has fostered decades of brotherhood in the bipolar system. However, following the fall of Berlin Wall, communist states of Eastern Bloc were cooped into Western capitalist economy by opening up to market economy including joining global chains of production. Among others, China turns out to be the beneficiary of the fastest growing economy in the capitalist world. Neighboring an emerging China means a new challenge for Taipei and Seoul.

Apparently, in the third stage, realpolitik took hold in ROK's strategic calculation. A long-time friendship and Cold war allies between ROC and ROK proved to be friable after China set its agenda to open up and make herself powerhouse of the global economy. In 1989, South Korea explore diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. It was against this historical and geopolitical background that Taipei-Seoul/Seoul-Taipei Forum (TSF/STF) was first initiated by Seoul Forum for International Affairs (SFIA). Actually, TSF was first proposed by Professor Kim Dalchoong, the program chair of Seoul Forum for International Affairs (SFIA) to its counterpart in Taipei- Tamkang University to launch the first TSF/STF in Seoul in 1989, followed by the Asia and World Institute as the co-sponsor in Taipei for 1990. It was not until 1992 when the Institute of International Relations (IIR) of National Chengchi University, under the directorship of Professor Bih-Jaw Lin, and Professor Chi Su undertook the co-sponsorship of the 3rd conference on the eve of diplomatic break off.

Around the same time, Seoul-Beijing relations had reached the breaking point of normalization when two sides held out olive branch. Moscow's warming relations with Seoul along with Tokyo's attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang have made it easier for Beijing to improve relations with Seoul.² On 17 September 1991, the PRC withdrew their objection against South Korean membership in the United Nations. In return, President Roh Tae Woo shifted diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC, and confiscated the property of the ROC embassy, transferring it to the PRC on 23 August, 1992. Seoul government's belated recognition of Beijing did not bring around understanding from Taipei. The very action by the ROK government was regarded ill-mannered by Taiwanese people. In return, Taipei terminated direct commercial flight connection with Seoul. For twelve years, only charter flights were operated between the two cities. The lack of scheduled flights caused tourist numbers from the Republic of China to drop from 420,000 in 1992 to 200,000 in 1993, recovering only partially to

¹The Korean independence movement received sympathetic support from Sun Yat-sen as early as 1919-1920. In 1933, Chiang Kai-shek granted a personal interview with the leader of the Korean Independence Party, Kim Ku, and promised KMT support for his independence movement. However, Sun Yat-sen had advocated the recovery of Korea as well as Taiwan for the sake of effective national line of defense. Notwithstanding this kind of thinking, during the war CKS has set his mind on fighting for Korean independence and the KMT's official policy was to support that movement. So *Wai-chor, Nation, Territory and Frontier: Chiang Kai-shek's Realism in Action, in Power and Identity in the Chinese world order.* eds. by Billy K. L. So, John Fitzgerald Huang Jianli, James K. Chin, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 2003. p. 76.

²Ahn, Byung-joon (1990) "South Korean-Soviet relations: contemporary issues and prospects," *Asian Survey* 31:9, pp. 816-825.

360,000 by 2003. The feeling of betrayal prevails ever since in Taiwanese society.

Alone with the diplomatic closure, sub-state level exchanges were also disrupted including the long-standing academic forum between IIR and Korean Sogon University.³ The newly established Taipei-Seoul Forum was also on the edge of closing off due to controversial role of conservative SFIA. However, after diplomatic break-off, Taipei needed to sustain a dialogue channel with the conservative government of ROK. The assurance of continuous support to the TSF/STF was delivered by Dr. Frederick Chien, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of ROC government, who had known Kim as a graduate student back to in 1965 when Kim was registered student in NCCU. To some extent, personal relations between Kim and Chien also nurtured for TSF/STF to carry on. In a nutshell, the potential networking capacity of SFIA plus transnational personal networking tracing back to almost three decades which had served as a foundation for the viability of TSF/STF in the following decades.⁴

The adjustment of conference agenda to focus on normalization was adopted after 1992. Until 1992, the TSF/STF dialogue was focused on assessment of the emerging regional trends and issues in the post-cold war era, changing domestic politics, as well as cross-strait relations and South Korea's northern policy. After the diplomatic break off, the program agendas had been focusing on how to rebuild and normalize bilateral relations.⁵ The most dubbed accomplishment of TSF from Korean perspective was the resumption of direct air link in 2004⁶ as a result of continuous dialogue among academic, industrial and public sector over the years as well as policy report afterwards. Likewise, the final agreement by Seoul government on direct flight between Kimpu and Taipei international Airport in 2012 was also regarded as a timely breakthrough for Taipei after the enduring effort of advocacy among Panelists from Taipei.

In celebration of the direct flight, in 2005, SFIA sent a delegation of distinguished member of Seoul Forum for International Affairs (SFIA), including Han Sung-Joo, formal Foreign Minister as the head of delegation and Kim Kyung-Won, the former Secretary General to the President at the Blue House and other well-established opinion leading in Korea. An official visit to Secretary General of the Republic of China was regarded the highest level of track 1.5 diplomacy ever since the break off. Thereafter, FTA has been a subject of Taipei's main concern While ECFA turns out to be Seoul's vital interest. Not much progress in respect of normalization of diplomatic until the second term of President Ma Yin Jeou, did the Korean government agree to endorse the campaign pledge of direct flight between Kimpu and Taipei International Airport in 2012 just in time for the 20th anniversary of TSF when special honor was granted to Professor Kim Dalchoong by MOFA.

³ Since 1980, Minister of Foreign Affairs of ROC and Minister of Unification of ROK government jointly initiate track 1.5 diplomacy with IIR and Korea Institute for National Unification (think tank of Korean Ministry of Unification) as the coordinating institutes for note exchange on issues of common interest. However, from 1986 on Sogon University took over on Korean side symbolizing a downgrade of the public diplomacy into asymmetric one with purely academic track from Korean side.

⁴ A personal story shared by Dr. Kim Dalchoong.

⁵ Opening remark of Kim Dalchoong delivered at the 20th Taipei-Seoul Forum, October 12, 2011.

⁶ On September 1, 2004, representatives of South Korea's unofficial mission in Taipei and the Republic of China's unofficial mission in Seoul signed an aviation agreement allowing aircraft of each side to enter the airspace of the other. This permitted the resumption of direct scheduled flights and also allowed flights from South Korea to Southeast Asia to fly over the island of Taiwan instead of detouring over mainland China or the Philippines. Analysts estimated this would save South Korean airline companies ₩33 billion (US\$29 million at 2004 exchange rates) in fuel costs and other fees.

Think Tank as Diplomatic Actor

IIR was established in 1953 as a leading think tank to provide intelligent and research information on international affairs with special focus on Soviet Union and Communist China. Ever since its inception, IIR was regarding government think tank. Directors of IIR were nominated by the highest authority of the government before integration with National Chengchi University. The ex-directors of IIR used to rotate with cabinet members including Minister of Education, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director General of Government Information Office, and Deputy Secretary of National Security Council, etc. It is also true that some research fellows were recruited to serve in government office, namely, Diplomat to the United States, Minister of Mainland Affairs, senior security advisor of National Security Council, etc. (see table 2) The unique organizational background entitled IIR diplomatic actor for TSF/STF. Since 2006, IIR delegation to STF was upgraded to invite former Minister of MOFA as the head of delegation attempting to reinforce the impact of public diplomacy.

On the other hand, members of SFIA consist of high-level government officials, distinguished scholars (potential candidate for government officials), parliament members, diplomats, etc. Dr. Lee Hong-koo, chairman of the board for SFIA served as the Premier of ROK in 1994-1995 and also chairman of New Korea Party. Selective membership of SFIA revealed itself a talent pool for conservative government. Both IIR and SFIA are closely networking with governments which made them playing an unofficial role for public diplomacy.

The earliest use of the phrase “public diplomacy” to surface is actually in *The Times* in January 1856 in a piece criticizing the posturing of President Franklin Pierce.⁷ The modern meaning of the term “public diplomacy” was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a distinguished retired Foreign Service officer, when he established an Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy. In the brochure for the new center provided a description of the concept: “Public diplomacy . . . deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; . . .”⁸ Alan K. Hendrickson, Professor of Diplomatic History, defined Public diplomacy as “the conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of nongovernmental entities (political parties, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, educational institutions, religious organizations, ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments.”⁹

Two graduate students, Kim Dalchoong and Yu-ming Shaw, on behalf of two leading think tanks met in Taipei in 1994 to refresh their old memory of classmates in 1966 at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Kim was the program chair of SFIA while Shaw was director of IIR. Both agree to collaborate as the counterparts on perennial think tank diplomacy for years to come.

It is common understanding that TSF/STF is by no means an academic forum in essence.

⁷ ‘The American president with a laudable desire,’ *Times* (London), 15 January 1856, p. 6.

⁸ <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy/Definitions>

⁹ <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy/Definitions>

Table 1. Official Background of Seoul delegation attending Taipei-Seoul Forum (1993-2011)*

Personal background Korean Panelist	Government official	National Assembly Member	Foreign Service	Years of Participation in Taipei-Seoul Forum
1. Ahn Byung-joon		V		1993, 2005, 2009, 2011
2. Ahn Choong-Yong	(Former)** President, KIEP***			
3. Bark Taeho	(Later) MOFAT		V	2007, 2009, 2011
4. Chung Chong Wook	(Former) National Security Advisor		V	2011
5. Chung, Eui-yong		V		2009
6. Choi Kang (coordinator of TSF/STF)			V	2009
7. Hahm Chaibong (coordinator of TSF/STF)				1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2011
8. Han, Chul-Soo			V	1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2011
9. Han Sung-Joo	(Former) MOFA		V	1997, 2005
10. Hyun Hong-choo	(Former) MOL	V	V	1995, 2009
11. Hyun, Oh-Seok	(Former) MOFE		V	2003, 2005
12. Jung Ku-hyun	Advisory to government			1993, 2011
13. Kim Dalchoong (founder of TSF/STF)				1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011
14. Kim Jin-Hyun	(Former) MOST			1993
15. Kim Kihwan	(Former) MOTI		V	1995, 1997
16. Kim Kyung-Won	(Former) Chief of Staff to President		V	1993, 2005
17. Kim Myung Ja	(Former) MOE			2009
18. Kim, Woosang			V	2000, 2011
19. Lee Dong-Bok		V		2007
20. Sun, Joun-yung	(Former) MOFAT		V	2007
21. Paik Jin-Hyun	(Later) Judge of the ITLOS		V	2000
22. Yoo Se-Hee	(Former) ACMOFA			1995, 2005
23. Yoo Jang-Hee	(Former) FPAC	V		2009

* Diagramed by Author

**Later/Former means the timing of public service when participated in TSF/STF

MOFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOST = Ministry of Science and Technology

MOTI = Ministry of Trade and Industry

MOFE = Ministry of Finance and Economy

ITLOS = International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

MOL = Ministry of Legislation

MOE = Ministry of Environment

MOFAT = Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

NSCS = National Security Council Secretariat

ACMOFA = Advisory Committee to MOFA

FPAC = Foreign Policy Advisory Council

KIEP = Korean Institute for Economic Planning

Given the historical background, track II or track I.5 diplomacy was the hidden agenda. The term 'track II diplomacy' was coined by a former American diplomat, Joseph Montville, referring to negotiations by non-state actors and the issues normally fell into the official diplomatic sphere.

Table 2. Official background of Taipei delegation attending Seoul-Taipei Forum (1993-2013)*

Seoul-Taipei Forum (1993-2010) Personal background	Taipei Panelist	Government officials	National Assembly	Foreign Service	Years of Participation in Seoul-Taipei Forum
	1. Chang, Parris H.C.		V		2004
	2. Chao, Chien-Min	MOMA			2010
	3. Chen, Chien-Jen	(Former)** MOFA	V	V	2010
	4. Chien, Eugene Y. H.	Fomer MOFA/MOE/ MOC		V	1999, 2006
	5. Chien, Fredrick Fu	(Former) MOFA/Control Yuan		V	2008, 2013
	6. Chou, Hsi-Wei	county magistrate			2010
	7. Chu, Eric Li-Luan		V		1999
	8. Ho, Szu-Yin	(Later)** NSC			2002
	9. Hong, Chi-chang	(Later) NSC			1999
	10. Lin Chiu-Shan		V		1999, 2002
	11. Lin, Bih-Jaw	(Later) NSC			1994, 2004
	12. Lin, Cheng-Yi	(Former) NSC			2004
	13. Lin, Chen-wei	(Later) NSC			2004
	14. Lin, Wen-Cheng	(Former) NSC			2004
	15. Lin, Yu-Fang		V		1996
	16. Shaw, Yu-Ming	(Later) MOGIO			1996
	17. Schive, Chi	CEPD			1999
	18. Tseng, Chery H. J.	CEPD			2006, 2008
	19. Tung, Chen-yuan	(Later) MOMA			2004
	20. Tsai, Ing-Wen	(Later) MOMA			1999
	21. Wong, Ming-Hsien	NSC			2006
	22. Wu, An-chia	(Later) MOMA			1996
	23. Wu, Joseph Jau-Shieh	(Later) MOMA		V	1999
	24. Yang, Philip	NSC/ (Later) MOGIO			2008

* Diagramed by Author

** Later/Former means the timing of public service when participated in TSF/STF

MOFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOMA = Ministry of Mainland Affairs

MOC = Ministry of Communications

MOGIO = Ministry of Government Information Office

MOE = Ministry of Environment

NSC = National Security Council

CEPD = Council for Economic Planning and Development

Sometimes, the term remains somewhat ambiguous because in several cases track II also includes members from the official process when acting in their private or personal capacities. In fact, this inclusion of track I actors with track II process was coined track I.5 which is the mix of state and non-state actors.¹⁰ In the case of TSF/STF, one has to agree that track 1.5 applies to the program arrangement and delegations. (see table 1 & 2)

¹⁰Shankari Sundararaman, Research Institutes as Diplomatic Actors. In Global Governance and Diplomacy.

The list of delegation with official background in Table 1 exemplified the networking capacity of Seoul delegation over the years. The same goes with Table 2 from Taipei side. Both IIR and SFIA kept on practicing their role of public diplomacy by sending track I level of delegation in their private capacity. Over the years, in addition to routine meeting for changing notes on regional issues and bilateral relations, the informal breakfast meetings with cabinet member or official visits to ruling party headquarters were arranged by organizers. Through those meetings with a wide range of government or nongovernmental entities for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments, and thus, IIR and SFIA were practicing track I.5 diplomacy through the platform of TSF/STF.

Transnational Social Capital Building for Public Diplomacy

The first systematic contemporary analysis of social capital was produced by Pierre Bourdieu, who defined the concept as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.” Social capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that may be mobilized through that network.¹¹ In the case of public diplomacy, social capital encompasses local network and transnational network and the effort to activate those networks for policy adjustment. To what extent can the aforementioned network of TSF/STF be mobilized for policy adjustment would be essential for think tank diplomacy.

According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal, there are three major types of social capital, namely, structural, relational and cognitive.¹² **Structural social capital** is based on the network of people an individual knows and upon whom she can draw for information or assistance. Important aspects of structural social capital are the number of ties a person has, with whom and how strong the tie is.¹³ **Relational social capital** ‘. . . describes the kind of personal relationships people have developed with each other through a history of interactions’¹⁴ and often encompasses the resulting trust and associability that grows through time.¹⁵ Finally, **cognitive social capital** ‘. . . refers to those resources providing shared representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning among parties’, which has also been described as the shared goals as well as shared norms and values that build up through relationships over time.¹⁶

Judging from the perennial meeting for two decades and consistent participation of key member in delegations, TSF/STF has basically sustained its structural social capital and developed

¹¹P. Bourdieu 1985. The forms of capital. in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. J.G. Richardson, p. 248. New York: Greenwood; Bourdieu P. 1980. Le capital social: notes provisoires. *Actes Rech. Sci. Soc.* 31: 2-3, cited from Alejandro Portes. 1998. Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. *Annual Reviews Sociology.* 24: 1-24.

¹²J. Nahapiet, and Ghoshal, S. (1998). ‘Social capital, intellectual capital and the organizational advantage.’ *Academy of Management Review*, 23: 2, 242-266.

¹³Burt, R.S. (1992). *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹⁴J. Nahapiet and S. Ghoshal, (1998). ‘Social capital, intellectual capital and the organizational advantage.’ *Academy of Management Review*, 23: 2, 244.

¹⁵C. Leana and H. Van Buren (1999). ‘Organizational social capital and employment practices.’ *Academy of Management Review*, 24: 3, 538-555.

¹⁶Inkpen, A. and Tsang, E. (2005). ‘Social capital, networks, and knowledge transfer.’ *Academy of Management Review*, 30: 1, 1146-1165.

Table 3. Cross networking of classmate/alumni community*

University of alumni networking	National Chengchi University	Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy	Yale University
List of alumni			
Kim, Dalchoong	classmate	classmate	
Shaw, Yu-ming	alumni	classmate	
Shao, Vincent	classmate		
Frederick Chien			alumni
Lee, Hong-koo			alumni

*Diagramed by Author

some relational social capital over the years. In addition to institutional networking, TSF/STF has strong personal ties among organizers. Thanks to international elite education provided by the United States, both Dr. Dalchoong Kim and Dr. Yu-ming Shaw, Director of IIR went to Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for graduate study in 1966. Kim and Shaw were classmates at school and colleagues as bar tenders at a tavern in Harvard square after school. None of them would realize that years later, this personal network built in Boston may be conducive to bridge over trouble relations between Taipei and Seoul. Not to mention the cross networking of alumni/class community in NCCU, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Yale University as well as those days in Taipei when Kim and Chien got acquainted at NCCU. (see Table 3) It was decades later, when two nations are economically competitive, politically and socially divided; personal relations becomes an essential base for reconstruction of trust and reciprocity.

Somehow, Cognitive social capital between Taipei and Seoul is still premature at this moment. Other than common value on democracy and liberal economy, Taipei and Seoul are two competitive entities trying to survive in a turbulent international political economy. Seoul needs to deal with Pyongyang when Taipei needs to deal with Beijing. In this game of changing partner, Taipei and Seoul had conflict of interest in Westphalia norm of diplomacy. As Seoul holding to its current political position, normal visit of high-level government officials is still a red line for Taipei after perennial dialogue. In sum, TSF/STF was able to mobilize social capital for think tanks for public diplomacy to the extent that formal statehood identity is excluded.

Tug of War between Knowledge and Power

Comparing the structure of two delegations, we found that most of Korean panelists with government official background (GOB) attended the TSF more than once and most of Taipei panelists with GOB attended the STF only once. (see Table 1 & 2) The difference has to do with the variation in function of IIR and SFIA. Unlike its counterpart acting solely as think tank, IIR has two roles to play when in organizing international conferences. On one hand, it has to sustain policy network to full fill the role of diplomatic actor; on the other, the institute has different criteria for evaluation of its performance. In reality, networking with academic community matters more than policy community. In result, inclusive structure of Taipei delegation mean less intensive policy network for the function of diplomatic actor. Instead, the selective membership of SFIA brings about exclusive structure of the Seoul delegation. The asymmetric structure of delegation between Taipei and Seoul also hinders the intensity of transnational network.

Nonetheless, the core concept of social capital is that social networks matter, both for those in the networks as well as sometimes for bystanders as well. As IIR sharing more and more teaching load for its academic capacity, the social network of TSF/STF also reaches out to benefit student community. A Ph.D. student of NCCU benefits from social network of IIR in TSF/STF to conduct field study in Seoul for his dissertation on Korea.¹⁷ The bonus effect of transnational social network may not be a core value of social capital building. Yet, to branch out social network to academic community could also create some peripheral value which may foster the legitimacy of IIR in its capacity as a research institute in campus.

Conclusion: Westphalia Diplomacy v.s. Public Diplomacy

Historically, governments contracted think tanks emerged largely in response to growing international and domestic pressures. IIR was created by the leader of R.O.C. government to serve as a core advisor for policy on mainland and international affairs. SFIA was created as a source of knowledge and personnel for conservative government. The strong networks of the two think tanks and their governments made them legitimate candidates for public diplomacy after diplomatic break off.

Thanks to strong personal strong commitments, TSF/STF has survived in a sea of “Westphalia” diplomacy in the past two decades. TSF/STF were initiated by SFIA in Seoul in 1989 and carried on for more than 20 years with an entrenched expectation to fabricate a policy-driven social network that somehow compliments the vacuum formal diplomacy between Seoul and Taipei. However, the organizational reform for academic-driven by-partisanship of IIR drove TSF/STF to the cross-road between knowledge and power. Whether IIR can live up to a balanced role of intellectual and policy capacity is and will continue to challenge the colleagues of the institute.

Looking ahead, the challenge for TSF/STF would be institutional adjustment for inclusive participation of younger generation both in social and intellectual networks to revamp the Westphalia wall of state-centered diplomacy. With comprehensive transnational networking among younger generations, Taipei and Seoul may enlarge the existing structural social capital with new agenda to enhance relational social capital of trust and reciprocity. The future task for our young scholars will be to look beyond “Westphalia” diplomacy and to work on cognitive social capital building by setting new agenda for policy recommendations in identifying common goods as well as common threats for future collaboration.

As for IIR, constrains of public diplomacy may not be removed for the moment. Yet, opportunity in nurturing bilateral relations is always there for younger generation to fill perhaps in a new framework of Taipei-Seoul Forum based on the solid foundation built by their mentors for the years to come.

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¹⁷Nahapiet and Ghoshal, p. 244.

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