

Engineers, Innovative Capacity and Development in the Americas

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Abstract

This paper offers the first evidence on the prevalence of a central actor in modern growth theory—the engineer. Using newly collected sub-national, and international data as well as historical case studies, it then argues that differences in innovative capacity, captured by the density of engineers and patents at the dawn of the Second Industrial Revolution, in fact, are important to explaining present income differences across US counties, states within countries, and between the US and Latin America. This remains the case after controlling for literacy, other higher order human capital, and demand

side elements that might be confounded with engineering or patenting. Instrumenting engineering using the Land Grant Colleges program further limits remaining endogeneity. A 1 SD increase in engineers at the turn of the 20th century accounts for a 16 percent increase in US county income today, and patenting capacity contributes another 10 percent. This can partly explain why countries with similar levels of income in 1900, but ten fold differences in engineering density diverged in their growth trajectories over the next century.

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Engineers, Innovative Capacity and Development in the Americas*

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“You have all the elements, but you cannot make steel”

—Andrew Carnegie¹

1 Introduction

Carnegie’s taunt to the owners of the Birmingham Steel Company in Alabama highlights the complexity of technological transfer to lagging regions. As Wright (1986) documents, shortfalls in management, learning by doing, and the R&D capacity necessary to adapt technologies to local conditions all impeded the establishment of a dynamic steel (as well as textile and lumber) industry in the American South, and hence slowed catch-up to the North. The issue of differential technological transfer remains central to the more general convergence debate.² Most recently Comin et al. (2008); Comin & Ferrer (2013) argue that the diverging measured intensity of use of new technologies (as a share of economic activity) plausibly explains observed TFP differentials and can drive simulations that closely track the magnitudes of the Great Divergence of the last two centuries (e.g. Pritchett, 1997; Galor & Weil, 2000; Galor, 2011).³ That human capital is a critical ingredient in technology adoption also enjoys a substantial supporting literature.⁴

The nature of the relevant human capital has been less clear. Literacy, and accumulated years of schooling or enrollment have received the most attention, although other dimensions figure importantly in the literature as well: Lucas (1993); Young (1993) and Foster & Rosenzweig (1995), among others, stress the importance of accumulated “learning by doing”;

¹Cited in Wright (1986) p.171.

²See also, Parente & Prescott (1994); Eaton & Kortum (1999, 2001); Caselli (2001); Comin & Hobijn (2004); Keller (2004); Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (2005); Comin et al. (2008, 2010a); Comin & Hobijn (2010); Comin et al. (2012).

³Though not clear on the underlying determinants, recently Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue for the importance of a the shift in industrial composition from those with low to high innovative capacity as critical to growth.

⁴See, for example, Nelson & Phelps (1966); Foster & Rosenzweig (1996); Cohen & Levinthal (1989); Benhabib & Spiegel (1994); Basu & Weil (1998); Temple & Voth (1998); Howitt (2000); Acemoglu & Zilibotti (2001); Caselli (2001); Comin & Hobijn (2004); Benhabib & Spiegel (2005); Aghion et al. (2005); Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005); Ciccone & Papaioannou (2009); Goldin & Katz (2009).

Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991), entrepreneurial skills and orientation; in his classic article on endogenous growth; Romer (1990) highlights the research engineer; Mokyr (2005), the minority of “trained engineers, capable mechanics and dexterous craftsmen on whose shoulders the inventors could stand” (pg.16); Rosenberg (2000) and Nelson (2005), the accumulated ability and scientific institutions to manage new ideas for innovation and invention; Cohen & Levinthal (1989); Griffith et al. (2004), the capacity for research and development needed for technological transfer. Yuchtman (2014) shows that in early 20th century China, engineers enjoyed massive wage premia over all other classes of higher education and that modern Western education and engineers in particular were critical to China’s ability to adopt Western technologies.

Several authors including Mokyr (1998), and Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005) stress that higher-order human capital and the institutions that generated and housed it may have had an even more determinant role at the dawn of the Second Industrial Revolution (circa 1870-1914), which saw an increased emphasis on more structured scientific inquiry such as laboratory-based R&D.⁵ This scientifically oriented human capital, and a technologically savvy entrepreneurial class⁶ were necessary to tap into the expanding and increasingly sophisticated global stock of knowledge and convert it into local growth. The technological leap forward also meant an erosion in the efficacy of existing levels of human capital and innovative capacity relative to that needed to continue to adopt (see Howitt (2000); Aghion et al. (2005)). Building on this insight, Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005) argue for multiple equilibria in innovation where countries whose human capital evolved with the frontier at the time of the technological leap forward could innovate or adopt, but those whose frontier adjusted human capital did not keep up slipped to an equilibrium where even the adoption

⁵Rosenberg (2000) and Nelson (2005) stress the incremental and cumulative nature of technological progress and related institutions more generally as a central dynamic of industrialization.

⁶As numerous authors have stressed from Schumpeter (1934) to the present, technological progress without entrepreneurs to take it to market does not lead to growth (see Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Baumol, 1990, 2010; Glaeser, 2007; Glaeser et al., 2009, 2010; Braunerhjelm et al., 2010; Iyigun & Owen, 1998, 1999). Over the longer term this reflects the accumulation of a specific kind of human capital, at the very least, suited to the evaluation and management of risk, but extending to skills for managing people, credit, and technologies which need to be learned.

of technologies was difficult, and stagnation followed.⁷ Iyigun & Owen (1998, 1999) relatedly argue that if the the initial stock of both professional (scientific) and entrepreneurial human capital is too low, the return to accumulating human capital will be low and economies can find themselves in a development trap.

Empirically, documenting the impact of even very basic measures of human capital on growth or relative incomes has proved surprisingly complex since the seminal studies of Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992).⁸ Most recently, and in a similar spirit to the present work, Hanushek et al. (2015) find that differences in human capital account for 20-35 percent of the current variation in per-capita GDP among US states. Further, there have been relatively few efforts to systematically capture what kind of human capital matters, or even to document the stocks of different types of capital. Goldin & Katz (2011); Goldin (1999); Goldin & Katz (1999) have documented the evolution of secondary and tertiary education in the context of US growth. Judson (1998), Wolff & Gittleman (1993), Self & Grabowski (2004), Castelló-Climent & Mukhopadhyay (2013) attempt to document whether tertiary education matters more or less than primary education. Murphy et al. (1991) document that countries with a higher proportion of engineers grow faster relative to those with a higher proportion of law concentrators.

The problem is exacerbated when a longer historical perspective is taken. Campante & Glaeser (2009) argue that the “lion’s share” of the differences in long run income level between the cities of Buenos Aires and Chicago is human capital, but they lament that literacy remains the primary, albeit coarse, measure (see, for example, Mariscal & Sokoloff (2000)). Voigtländer & Squicciarini (2014) show that mid-18th century French cities with

⁷See also Gancia et al. (2008) for related discussion of convergence clubs resulting from education-technology complementarities.

⁸For overviews see Krueger & Lindahl (2001); Sianesi & VanReenen (2003); Stevens & Weale (2004) and Acemoglu & Zilibotti (2001); Pritchett (2001); Easterly (2002); Benhabib & Spiegel (1994). A recent literature has sought to explain the often small measured impact by incorporating measures of the quality of human capital (see, for example Hanushek & Woessmann, 2007; Behrman & Birdsall, 1983; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2012).

more subscriptions to the *Encyclopédie*, capturing higher order human capital, grew faster after the dawn of the industrial revolution. Waldinger (2012) shows that the dismissal of scientists in Nazi Germany led to a permanent decrease in growth.

To date, however, neither the historical prevalence of Romer’s research engineers or Mokyr’s engineers and mechanics, nor Rosenberg’s and Nelson’s systems of innovation have been quantified in a globally comparable form. That is, the profession has no systematic historical evidence on allegedly *the* central actor in modern economic growth.⁹

In this paper we, first, make this very basic contribution. We establish the stylized facts surrounding the relative density of engineers at the end of the 19th century at the national level for the Western Hemisphere and representative benchmark countries of Europe, and the same at the sub-national level for six countries in the Americas. This is done in a systematic way drawing on graduation records, membership in professional societies, and census data. We see these estimates, in the first instance, as a measure of what they are: the stock of higher level scientifically oriented human capital directly linked to productive activity available at the beginning of the Second Industrial Revolution. Second, because our national measures are based on graduates of domestic engineering schools, they also proxy for the universities and institutions that support them, and for which data are more elusive (see Nelson, 2005). Further, we are sympathetic to the use in Murphy et al. (1991) of engineering density as a proxy for “good entrepreneurship,” perhaps more specifically the advancement of the long-run cumulative process of developing entrepreneurial technological depth and accompanying cultural factors discussed by Phelps (2013). In sum, we see it as a broad proxy for innovative capacity. We document an extraordinary variance in engineering density across countries of very similar income levels in 1900—for instance Argentina, Chile, Denmark, Sweden and the Southern US— that correlates to their divergent income positions today.

⁹Collected articles in Fox & Guagnini (1993) have examined the evolution of engineering capacity in several advanced countries although the comparability of the measures across countries is not always clear, and there is no attempt to establish a link to economic performance.

To more confidently establish the importance of innovative capacity as a determinant of income, we then develop a rich data set for the United States at the *county* level. This vastly expands the degrees of freedom and permits controlling for an extensive set of geographical, growth related, human capital variables and instrumenting for possible endogeneity of engineering using the Land Grant Colleges program. Further, we incorporate patenting density as collected by Acemoglu et al. (2013). Patenting appears only weakly explained by county engineering density and hence, we treat it as driven by human capital more dedicated to invention (Griliches (1990); Sokoloff (1988)) while engineering may arguably be capturing more adoptive activities. Both variables show an important and robust effect: a one standard deviation in engineering density in 1900 accounts for a 16% rise in income today, and patenting capacity another 10%. For a broader sample of countries in the hemisphere, we then demonstrate the continued relevance of engineering at the “state” level. Applying the well-estimated US coefficient to the national level data, a 1 standard deviation in engineering density in 1900 accounts for a 36% difference in income today. We then use historical evidence to validate our ranking of innovative capacity and through case studies document the divergent development outcomes arising within industries and even identical goods in countries with the differing innovative capacities we quantify. Finally, we present some suggestive findings on the determinants of innovative capacity.

2 Data

2.1 Measuring engineering/innovative Capacity

Our primary measure of innovative capacity at the national level across all countries is the number of engineers with domestically emitted university degrees per 100,000 male workers. Unlike literacy data, which countries sometimes collect as part of the census, countries do not tabulate such information in a uniform fashion. Hence, we construct these series using three sources of data.

Engineering Graduates: To the degree possible, calculations are done with actual graduates of engineering colleges and universities within the country. Clearly, many engineers even in the US acquired valuable training on the ground, or may have had partial degrees from some type of technical program. However, such skills are difficult to capture with any degree of commonality across geographical units. As a consistent metric across countries, we take the number of degrees awarded.¹⁰ Though most countries also employed foreign engineers, we are interested in indigenous technical capacity and the institutional structure to generate it, so we focus on domestically trained engineers. Some nationals studied abroad, however the historical evidence from Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico suggests the numbers are small and difficult to document. Since the working life of an engineer is roughly 40 years, we begin accumulating the stock in 1860, discounting the stock in each period by .983 as the rate of death/attrition in each year. In some cases, we have a long series of graduation records which make this procedure straightforward. In Bolivia, Denmark, Mexico, New York, Perú, Spain, Sweden, Venezuela, or Mexico, the flow of graduated engineers is available for the 1860-1900 period. We refer to Ahlström (1982)'s estimates for Germany and France, the frontier countries, which are allegedly generated in a virtually identical manner, yet we do not have access to his data and these are not our calculations. In general, the larger and more advanced the country, the greater the number and types of institutions and hence the more difficult guaranteeing comparability and this also influenced our decision to limit our geographical focus.¹¹ In other cases, for instance, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and the US as a whole, the information is less complete and we bring other sources of data to bear to fill in the gaps in the series.

Membership in Engineering Societies: Data on membership in Engineering societies

¹⁰Fox & Guagnini (1993) tabulate for several advanced countries the number of students enrolled. However, we find often that the difference between students enrolled and eventual graduates can differ greatly so enrollment rates are not as reliable.

¹¹In fact, he calculates the stock for France, Germany as well as Sweden for which we do have the raw underlying data and hence can verify that we are doing the calculations in a virtually identical fashion.

or official registries validate broad orders of magnitude of our generated stocks. In some cases, such as Brazil, registry with the government was required to be a practicing engineer. What is considered an engineer, however, is less clear and hence these measures are less definitionally tight. In other countries, such as Colombia or Argentina, membership in Engineering associations was not required so registration likely underestimates.

Census Data: Census data are also available in several countries. Census data have the advantage of being collected over time by several countries and across sub-national units. However, here, also, it is the individual respondent who is deciding whether he is an engineer or not with limited institutional confirmation, or detail on the actual level of education. This is fine for within country analysis but less reliable for cross country comparisons.¹² Sub-national data derive from the Argentine census of 1895, Mexican National Census of 1895, Chilean Census of 1907, Colombian census of 1912, Venezuelan Census of 1926, and US Census of 1900. For the US county level data, we use the census of 1880 to generate measures of literacy, and density of engineers, lawyers and medical doctors.

Annex I discusses how these three sources of data were employed for each country in detail.

Patenting For the US, we also construct a measure of average patenting activity from 1890-1910 drawing on patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) again, at the county level, provided by Acemoglu et al. (2013). This is likely to capture Mokyr's more structured scientific inquiry at the frontier that began to assume a central role in the Second Industrial revolution in addition to its direct interpretation as new ideas. It does not appear driven by engineers or the other human capital variables and hence interpret it as captures a distinct type of human capital (see Sokoloff (1988)). Comparable patent data is not available for the Latin American countries and hence the variable only

¹²As numerous local historians have noted (Serrano (1993) in Chile, Bazant de Saldaña (1993) in Mexico) and in the case for which we have the best information, the US, censuses are often substantially higher than the actual graduates of engineering programs.

enters in the county-level US analysis.

2.2 Sub-national Income per Capita

Income in 2005 PPP US Dollars is drawn from a highly disaggregated spatial data set on population, income and poverty constructed on the basis of national census data by the World Bank (2009) for the World Development Report on *Reshaping Economic Geography*.¹³ Modern county level US income in dollars is mean household income taken from the 2000 US Census.

2.3 Controls

As controls in our regressions, we also employ data on:

Literacy: Aggregate literacy rates we take from (Mariscal & Sokoloff, 2000; Núñez, 2005). Sub-national literacy rates for Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, and the US taken from same census data as above. County level from 1880 census.

Secondary Schooling: Similar to Goldin & Katz (2011); Goldin (1999) for the US we construct a proxy for secondary schooling by the share of 14-17 years olds who report that they are attending school (1880 US census).

Higher Level Non-Engineering Human Capital: For the US, this is measured as number of lawyers and medical doctors per 100,000 inhabitants (US Census 1880). We also aggregate across occupational categories the EDSCOR50 measure that indicates the percentage of people in the respondent's occupational category who had completed one or more years of college. Together these allow us to ensure that our engineering measure is not proxying for the availability of higher order human capital in general.

¹³For further detail see Maloney & Valencia (2015)

Railroads: At the national level, we employ the density of railroads measured as kilometers of track per 1000 square kilometers in 1900 (Pachón & Ramírez, 2006; Thorp, 1998). At the sub-national level, we employ the Interstate Commerce Commission’s data on miles of track per 100 square miles converted to the same units above for consistency in 1899 (ICC, 1899). Individual country level data is not available for Latin America.

Manufacturing output per capita: The value of manufactured products and labor in manufacturing in 1870 taken from NHGIS to compute the per capita and per unit of labor labor manufacturing product.¹⁴

Population Density in 1900: These are collected from census data from the individual countries. Argentina (1895), Brazil (1900), Chile (1907), Colombia (1912), Mexico (1895), Peru (1876), Venezuela (1926), and the US (1900).

Pre-colonial Population Density: This measures the estimated number of indigenous people per square kilometer just before colonization. See Maloney & Valencia (2015) for more detail.

Slavery: As a measure of institutions that is available for the United States sample, we used the 1860 Census as well as the data compiled in Nunn (2008).

Geographical Controls: in addition to the set of sub-national geographical variables collected by Bruhn & Gallego (2011) including temperature, altitude, and annual rainfall, we add a measure of agricultural suitability and river density as developed in Maloney & Valencia (2015). Clearly, populations could also be sustained by marine-based economies where farmland and rivers were of less importance. Hence proximity to the coast for

¹⁴<https://www.nhgis.org/documentation/gis-data>

saltwater trade, transport, fishing potential and amenities potentially persists in importance, much as it was subsequently for European settlement, and to capture this we employ a measure of distance to the coast as calculated by Gennaioli et al. (2013). We further include a measure of ruggedness of terrain from Nunn & Puga (2012).

Table 1 presents the summary statistics at the state level and table 2 at the US county level.

3 Historical Innovative Capacity as a Potential Driver of Present Income Differences: National Data

Figure 1 plots our measure of national innovative capacity against GDP per capita, both in 1900.¹⁵ The availability of data means that our effective sample going forward is restricted to the relatively larger countries depicted here. Several facts merit note.

First, there is substantial variance in the stock of engineers that is weakly related to income in 1900. The Northern United States with a density of 160 is the highest in our sample, roughly double the average for the country as a whole, 84, while the US South shows over a third of the engineering density of the North at 60. Lagging as it is, the American South is miles ahead of the Latin American countries who average under 20. What is most striking is that countries that we tend to associate with declining relative position across the previous century, especially Argentina and to a lesser degree Chile and Mexico, show densities below countries of very similar levels of income: Argentina and Chile had roughly the same level of income as the American South, Sweden and Denmark yet had roughly a third of its engineering capacity of the South, and a fifth of the Scandinavian

¹⁵Maddison does not tabulate a separate series for the American South, but Mitchener & McLean (2003) estimates place the US South roughly 50% below the national average and New England 50% above. Imposing these differentials on Maddison's data, places the South roughly 15% higher than Spain and the North roughly triple. Clearly, issues can be taken with even Maddison's Herculean effort, however, the available alternatives do not suggest that the picture would change much. Prados de la Escosura (2000) PPP based estimates with the OECD correlate .89 with those of Maddison, and do not significantly change the level of Spain relative to the US, although they move Portugal up perhaps 40%, now above Mexico but still 20% below Spain.

countries (100). Even if the number of engineers were underestimated by a factor of two, the lag with the US and Scandinavia would still be dramatic. We argue that that natural resource rents, while elevating income, were not being deployed as they were in the US or Scandinavia to the development of innovative capacity that would prepare them for the next phase of industrialization. In Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005)’s framework, we have countries with similar levels of Schumpeterian backwardness, but with radically different levels of absorptive capacity.

Second, the dominance of the US in the Western Hemisphere is clearly not being driven by some idiosyncratic US data issue that would exaggerate its density. The US average is broadly in the same league as Denmark and Sweden, and even the North is below the calculations by Ahlström (1982) for France (200) and Germany (250), the frontier countries of the era. Nor is some sort of idiosyncratic data issue driving the consistently low scores of Latin America. All cluster very near each other and the colonial mother countries.

3.1 Consistency with historical evidence

Our engineering estimates are consistent with historical evidence. France and Germany were acknowledged leaders in the sciences and engineering. The relative positions of the two peripheral areas- Scandinavia vs. the Iberian peninsula correspond closely to Landes (1998)’ characterization of their attitudes towards science and the enlightenment. Both Sweden and Denmark’s institutions of higher technical learning date from the 1700s. Sweden’s high density is consistent with the characterization by Sandberg (1979) of the country as the “Impoverished Sophisticate.” The overproduction of engineers led many to emigrate to the US and 19th century Swedish engineers are credited with inventing the blowtorch, ball bearings, ship propellers, the safety match, the revolver, the machine gun, dynamite, and contributing to the development of bicycles, steam turbines, early calculators, telephony (Ericsson) among others.

The US started relatively early and energetically in the training of engineers. The first institution of engineering education emerged from the revolutionary war at West Point, established in 1802, which trained engineers for both military and civilian purposes. Subsequently the American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy at Norwich, Vermont awarded its first Civil Engineering degrees in 1837, and Rensselaer School in New York, in 1835. By 1862 there were roughly a dozen engineering schools in the East, but also as far west as Michigan and south as Maryland. The Polytechnic College of the State of Pennsylvania, founded in 1853 granted degrees in mechanical engineering in 1854, and mining engineering in 1857.

The passage of the Morrill Land Grant Act in 1862 led to an acceleration in the establishment of engineering programs, roughly sextupling the number in the decade after passage. The Act led to the establishment of the Columbia School of Mines in 1864, Worcester Polytechnic in 1868, Thayer School of Civil Engineering at Dartmouth College in 1867, Cornell University as well as new Universities in Iowa, Nebraska, Ohio, and Indiana. It also gave impetus to the foundation and consolidation of engineering schools in the South. As early as 1838 the University of Tennessee was teaching courses in Civil Engineering, but in 1879 it began awarding doctorate degrees in Civil and Mining Engineering. Texas AM awarded its first degree in Civil Engineering in 1880, Virginia Tech in 1885 in Mining Engineering, and the University of Kentucky, although having an engineering program dating from 1869, graduated their first civil engineer in 1890. Auburn University in Alabama began its engineering program in 1872, and North Carolina State in 1887. In sum, the post-Civil War period saw the expansion of engineering education throughout the country. We further explore the use of the Morrill Land Grant as an instrument in subsequent sections.

It also saw a deepening, with the profession in the U.S. diversified further into sub-branches. For example, the University of Missouri established both Civil and Military Engineering departments in 1868, and the first department of Electrical Engineering in

1886. The establishment of professional societies in Civil Engineering (1852), Mining (1871), Mechanical (1880) and Electrical (1884), testifies the the consolidation of a process of specialization and diversification. By 1890, a modern and world class engineering profession was firmly established in the US.

Canada's degree of sophistication is probably higher than that suggested by the density numbers. Although the first graduates were in the 1870s, substantial engineering courses were in place by the 1850s. Further, the articulation of the different fields of engineering occurred later than in the US but not much.¹⁶ It is also the case that the four principal Canadian Universities emitting graduates- McGill, University of Toronto, *Ecole Polytechnique* in Montreal, and Queen's University in Kingston Ontario- lay within a circle of 350 mile radius with Cornell University at its center, and that includes many of the principal US departments of the time. Hence, Canada was likely part of the greater New England scientific community.

The data for Latin America are consistent with the observation by Safford (1976) in his classic *Ideal of the Practical* that "Latin American societies in general, and the upper classes in particular, have been considered weak in those pursuits that North Americans consider practical, such as the assimilation, creation, and manipulation of technology and business enterprise in general"(p 3). The national scientific establishments and professional training of civil engineers appeared much later and on a smaller scale. As an example, perhaps the richest country in Latin America at the time, Argentina, began graduating engineers only in 1870, and Peru, one of the premier mining centers of the hemisphere, in 1880, roughly on the same time line as Alabama. Further, in countries like Colombia and Mexico, political instability undermined programs begun relatively early leading to very low levels of graduation. In addition, the process of diversification and specialization was not as advanced as was the case, for example, in Missouri. General engineering associations were

¹⁶The development of, for instance, mechanical engineering as a separate course occurred about 20 years after in the US, and Electrical Engineering 10-15 years after.

set up in many countries around the same time that, in the US, associations in individual sub-fields were established.

Graham (1981) argues that Brazil, consistent with our estimates, lagged far behind the American South in every aspect of industrialization, transportation and agricultural technology (p. 634). In agriculture, there was little use of plows, scrapers, cultivators or mechanical seeders until the 20th century, partly because the low level of literacy rendered pointless the agricultural journals found commonly in the American South. A long literature has focused on Argentina’s weakness in innovation effort in comparison to countries such as Australia and Canada seen as similarly endowed. (see, for example Diaz Alejandro, 1985; Duncan & Fogarty, 1986; Campante & Glaeser, 2009). The determined efforts in both these countries to achieve widespread literacy in the prairies had no analogue in Latin America, nor did the extensive expansion in the form of experiment stations, seed testing services, and technical assistance.

3.2 Aggregate correlations

In sum, the historical evidence confirms that lagged as the American South was relative to the North, as Carnegie suggests above, Latin America lagged even more. As a quick check, basic correlations suggest that these differences in engineering densities for 11 countries are indeed correlated with present income. Since we have population density and income variables at the subnational level, we run a simple regression as a panel and bootstrap the clustered SEs at the country level (the results also hold with simple OLS):

$$Y_{2005,ij} = \alpha + \gamma_E Eng_{1900,i} + \gamma_{pop} Pop_{1900,ij} + \gamma_R Rail_{1900,i} + \beta_L Lit_{1900,i} + \epsilon_{ij}(1)$$

where the variables are defined as above for country i and sub-national unit j: the dependent variable is income per capita today; the explanatory variables are Literacy, Engineering

density in 1900, Railroad density in 1900, Population density in 1900, and a set of geographical controls. Table 3 shows that engineering in 1900 appears significantly in explaining today's income per capita despite controlling sequentially and then together for population density and railroad density. Were we to include Denmark and Sweden, whose density we have confidence in, not to mention France and Germany, the results would be even stronger. Columns 4 suggests that with few observations, it is impossible to separate the impact of engineering and literacy although in subsequent exercises we can.

4 Establishing the Importance of Engineering and Patenting Capacity: US County Level Data

We construct engineering and patenting density data for 2380 US counties.¹⁷ Table 4 presents the OLS estimates including the core controls for geography, economic activity and education which reduce the number of observations to 1905. All specifications have robust errors and are clustered at the state level and include both OLS and fixed effect estimators. We estimate:

$$Y_{2000,i} = \alpha + \gamma_E Eng_{1900,i} + \gamma_P Pat_{1900,i} + \mathbf{Geo}_i' \gamma_{\mathbf{Ge}} + \mathbf{Y}_{1900,i}' \gamma_{\mathbf{Gr}} + \mathbf{HC}_{1900,i}' \gamma_{\mathbf{H}} + \mu_{state} + \epsilon_i(2)$$

To be consistent with the other samples, we begin with an OLS specification of engineering density along with a vector of geographical controls. Errors are robust and clustered by state. In column 1, engineering emerges strongly significantly and of expected sign in the OLS specification. Temperature and distance from the coast both enter negatively and significantly. Column 2 replicates the specification but with the smaller sample lim-

¹⁷A small number of counties change their borders in the last century and we drop them.

ited by slavery and education and results in only minor change in significance and magnitude.

Column 3 then includes the set of income related controls that together work to reduce the correlation that may occur simply because denser, richer areas with more infrastructure and in particular manufacturing and railroads, may be correlated both with engineers in 1900 and also with income today through non-innovation related channels. We further include a measure of slavery as an institutional variable that may be correlated with low human capital but also provides other institutional channels to present income. Population density, our measure of lagged economic activity, and railroads enter positively and significantly and will remain so throughout the analysis. Slavery, which enters significantly and negatively with just geographical controls (not shown) loses significance.

The next 3 columns seek to ensure that the engineering measure is not simply a proxy for human capital more generally. Column 4 includes literacy which enters positively and significantly and reduces the engineering coefficient by just over 10%. Column 5 then includes a proxy for secondary education whose importance across the next century Goldin & Katz (2011) and Goldin (1999) have stressed and which enters significantly and positively. Goldin & Katz (1999) also discuss the importance of the expansion in higher education across the earlier 1890-1940 period and in Column 6 we include several variables to ensure that engineers is not picking up higher order human capital more generally: the share of individuals who report attending at least one year of college, the density of lawyers (see Murphy et al., 1991), and density of physicians. The first two enter significantly and positively. Finally, column 7 includes all the human capital variables together. Literacy and lawyers remains significant although now neither secondary education, the college proxy, nor physicians do. Either literacy or college attendance can eliminate secondary education suggesting that, at this point in history, it is broadly proxying for literacy, or perhaps college readiness. The same remains true in column 8 which controls for state fixed effects. Slavery now enters positively and significantly. This may imply that it was picking up a negative

“Southern” effect which fixed effects now eliminate, but also that its negative impact works importantly through that channel.

In all cases, engineering retains its significance at the 1% level although losing perhaps 50% of its magnitude from the initial specification. The relative robustness of engineering vs. secondary education suggests that a small well-educated technological class was, at this time, more important than broad based post-literacy skills. Perhaps counter intuitively, the consolidation of higher education in engineering occurred before the major expansion of secondary education which Goldin & Katz (2011); Goldin (1999) document rose from only 18% in 1910 to 71% in 1940. Across our period, the corresponding average for the country is 7% with a maximum of 26%.

Table 5 next explores the interaction of the engineering term with patents. Annex Table A1 suggests that engineering density is significantly correlated with patenting, but it explains perhaps 5% of the variance across counties and is not robust to instrumenting. Further, even with a complete specification including all measures of formal human capital, we explain 50% of the variance. This suggests that, as in Sokoloff (1988) there may be an particular entrepreneurial or inventive human capital not captured by our engineering term. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 repeat the last two full specifications but replace engineering density with patenting density as the innovation capacity measure. Patenting enters significantly at 1% again with and without fixed effects. The human capital variables enter similarly to before. Columns 3 and 4 combine engineering and patenting in the full specification and both remain significant at at least the 5% level with and without fixed effects. Both measures decline 15-20% in magnitude suggesting that one channel through which engineering density operates is through patenting (as suggested by table A1) and that some of patenting’s effect is as a proxy for engineering density perhaps working through non-patenting channels. However, that each continues to enter very significantly and independently suggests that they are capturing different types of human capital: perhaps more technological adoption in en-

gineering and inventive activity in patenting. We fully accept the argument of Moser (2013) that much innovation including patentable invention is done outside the patent system and hence such distinctions cannot be drawn too sharply. However, our results suggest that there is a particular type of human capital captured by patents not captured by our other measures.

4.1 Instrumenting engineering

Though we have attempted to control for other channels through which our engineering measure may be correlated with present income beside the capacity to manage and generate new technologies, we attempt to control for residual upward bias by instrumenting engineers. There may be additional bias in the opposite direction since the large share of counties reporting zero engineers is more likely to reflect measurement error, rather than that there was absolutely no capacity of any kind to adopt technologies.¹⁸

In the spirit of Moretti (2004), we also attempt to instrument engineering density using the log distance to the nearest Morrill Land Grant colleges and universities. As discussed earlier, the Morrill program was introduced in 1868 precisely to remedy the perceived shortfalls in regional technical assistance in agricultural and mechanical innovation. It was to an important degree supply driven. Its motivation was driven by both democratic ideals of educating the working man, and by observation that the US had none of the agricultural and technical schools found in Europe (Nevins et al., 1962; Nienkamp, 2010). Early years saw struggles over definition of what form that education should take, and precarious finance suggesting little initial impulse from the private sector. Further, prior to the Civil War, the South had actively opposed the bill, fearing greater interference in matters such as universal primary education and only the withdrawal of the Confederate States from the US Congress

¹⁸50% of the countries report zeros. The vast majority are found in small counties which, in 1900, may not have had the scale to generate an engineer. The maximum county size is 1,240,403 with the 99th percentile at 140,000. 88.9% of zeros are found in counties below 20,000 of of counties with 5,000 inhabitants, 75% are zeros. The zeros also pose an issue in comparability of the OLS and IV estimates since IVs offer a local estimate over the support where there is variance in both the instrument and the variable to be instrumented. In the present case, this may also push up the IV estimates.

allowed the bill to be passed. However, during Reconstruction, recognizing its technological lag, the South started private institutes such as Georgia Tech, and actively embraced the Morrill Program. Hence, while public functionaries may have broadly felt that the structure of their economies would reward such investment (although the long absence of agricultural institutes suggest this is far from obvious), there is little evidence of organized industry lobbying, for example, that would suggest causality from industry demand for engineers to the establishment of these universities.

Though the promoters of the Morrill program did not envisage it as fomenting engineering per se, the program would eventually finance the first engineering departments in the West, Midwest and Especially the South and was more fundamentally a central driver in developing the higher order scientific and Engineering capacity of the country. Nienkamp (2010) in *Land-Grant Colleges and American Engineers* argues that, especially the Mid-Western schools “provided the foundation, both in training and number, for twentieth-century American professional engineering” and were critical in defining their identity and ushering in the modern scientific, laboratory-based approach to technical education. Nevins et al. (1962) argues that the Morrill Program “promoted the emergence of the most effective engineering schools on the globe.” Goldin & Katz (1999) notes that while the majority of new universities of the time were privately started and Morrill cannot explain the expansion of higher education, as of 1908 they also note 60% of the nation’s engineering students were found in public universities and the “geographical dispersion of engineering students came mainly from those enrolled in public schools” the rise of which they attribute to the Morrill program (Goldin, 1999). Hence, the instrument is conceptually closely linked to engineering density, while its amorphous early motivation and supply driven nature can explain, for instance, the lack of a significant positive correlation with manufacturing activity, at the county level.

The first stage of a basic 2SLS reveals a strong positive correlation between engineering

density and the Morrill proxy with very high Cragg-Donald F-tests (1% level) and acceptable F-tests suggesting a strong instrument. Column 5 presents the second stage results for the complete specification with fixed effects and engineers enter again at the 1% level with a value an order of magnitude higher than the OLS estimates. We do not present all previous specifications simply because, as with the OLS specifications, both engineering and patenting retain their significance and broad magnitudes throughout.

Column 6 presents the results of a Buchinsky quantile regression model with selection into being a zero on the instrument stage. This specification is also desirable because it relaxes the assumption of joint normality implicit in the standard Heckman model. The first stage again suggests a strong instrument at the 1% level. The coefficient on engineering falls to half the 2SLS, 3.51, and maintains its strong significance. As before, the first stage is strongly significant.

In the spirit of the next section that works at the “state” level, we replicate the exercise for the 1900 5% subsample (again, which does not permit us to work at the county level), with the number of covariates reflecting the reduced degrees. This higher level of aggregation allows for more mobility of labor among unit of analysis, although, clearly, this is not preventing the emergence of very significant coefficients. Second, it allows another 20 years of impact of the Morrill program and the full consolidation of the engineering infrastructure. Third it allows introducing a measure of mining activity which is available at the state, but not country level. Finally, the aggregation also offers an alternative approach to the zeros. The OLS and instrument estimates are 1.2 and 2.1 respectively and significant, even with 48 observations (Annex Tables A2 and A3).

Taken together, the US data suggests that innovative capacity, spanned by engineering and patenting density, has a strong and independent effect on future income levels. More specifically, running specification 6 in standard deviations suggests that a one standard

deviation rise in engineering density leads to a 16% increase in income. Though not instrumented, patenting capacity leads to another 9.7%. Hence higher level human capital plausibly accounts for large differences in state level income per capita. This does not imply the unimportance of lower level capital. A 1 SD increase in literacy accounts for 51%. A comparable increase in secondary schooling leads to only a 4.5% increase although, again, the high school movement began substantially later and the variance in 1880 is very small. As a final back-of-the-envelope exercise, taking the coefficient from the well saturated US regressions and applying it to the international data in Figure 1, a one standard deviation rise in engineers in 1900 leads to an difference of 36% in 2000 income. Clearly, we cannot take this result too literally, but again, it suggests that differing endowments of higher level scientific capital potentially contribute importantly to income differences.

5 International sub-national engineering data

To see whether innovative capacity retains its predictive power beyond the US, we collect engineering data at the sub-national (state) level for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and the US for which census data are available. To give a feel for the disparities, Figure 2 maps this data for the US and Mexico by decile of engineering density and strikingly confirms that the border divided worlds apart. In fact, the data likely understate the true difference since our calculated stocks in Figure 1 suggest substantial overstatement in the Mexican census data. Perhaps predictably, the advanced New England states and the heavily mining dependent and generally less populated Western states show the highest density while the emerging industrial centers of the Midwest are close behind. The South is concentrated in the lower ranks with South Carolina, Georgia, Arkansas and Alabama in the bottom deciles- the lowest density in the US. What is striking, however, is that the country that was the principal mining center of the Spanish empire is almost entirely concentrated in the first and second quintiles with Sonora and the two Baja Californias appearing in the third and fourth deciles. Taking out Mexico City and the border states, Mexico is almost

uniformly below even the American South in density of engineers. As we discuss next, despite four centuries of mining, it had not acquired a corpus of trained professionals in the field compared to relative newcomer, the American West. The other countries show similar patterns.

Table 6 employs the sub-national data and comes to similar conclusions to those previous. We estimate:

$$Y_{2005,ij} = \alpha + \gamma_E Eng_{1900,ij} + \gamma_{pop} Pop_{1900,ij} + \gamma_L Lit_{1900,ij} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{ij} (3)$$

Engineering density is persistently significant and broadly of the magnitude of the OLS estimates from the US. The finding of continued significance even after controlling for a measure of population density (column 2) is consistent with Comin et al. (2010a). In column 3, Literacy again enters positively and significantly and reduces the coefficient on engineering by 40%, again, broadly consistent with the US results. Though we cannot control for a more complete set of human capital measures, the county level exercises above suggest that, in fact, engineering is capturing innovation related human capital and not human capital accumulation more generally. We also run the regressions with a complete set of geographical controls but these absorb substantial degrees of freedom and do not enter significantly so we omit them.

In sum, the various estimations suggest that our county level US findings resonate internationally: both literacy and higher order human capital related to engineering and science and technology are important determinants of long run income.

5.1 Mechanisms of influence today

Table 7 offers some suggestive mechanisms through which these engineering densities in 1900 could continue to affect output today. We collect five indicators at the country level that

broadly capture modern day innovation-related inputs and outputs and calculate the simple correlation. The first is the dynamism of the system of research and development measured as total R&D expenditures as a share of GDP. The second asks about firm capacity for innovation ranging from pure licensing to pioneering their own new products and processes.¹⁹ These two, arguably, correspond most closely to Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005)’s R&D model. The third draws from a globally consistent measure of management quality from Bloom & Van Reenen (2010) and in particular, the sum of the scores on the two questions dealing with how firms identify new production processes to adopt. On the output side, we have Comin & Hobijn (2010); Comin & Ferrer (2013); Comin et al. (2008)’s measure of technological adoption at the extensive margin, averaging their industrial and sectoral scores,²⁰ and finally patent applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) per million population as tabulated by the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum et al., 2012). Together, these give an impression of measure of national absorptive and inventive capacity in the present. In virtually every case, the correlation between our engineering numbers in 1900 and these indicators today is above .9.

6 Support from History: Case Studies

This section offers historical evidence that confirms that innovative capacity was a critical barrier to taking advantage of the advances of the Industrial Revolution. The interaction of lost learning by doing, weak higher level human capital, and underdeveloped technical institutions emerges in explanations of the lag of the US South as well as Latin America. However, it also offers support for more complex view of how innovative capacity affects steady state growth. Numerous models exist for modeling the micro economics of adoption. Comin et al. (2010b); Comin & Hobijn (2010); Comin et al. (2010a) for instance are closely aligned with the opening stylized facts (theirs) about divergence at the intensive margin.

¹⁹“In your country, how do companies obtain technology? [1 = exclusively from licensing or imitating foreign companies; 7 = by conducting formal research and pioneering their own new products and processes].

²⁰Their data on the arguably more relevant intensive margin is not yet available

Human capital shortfalls are embedded in a scalar that reflects barriers to adoption for the agent that adapts the technology to the idiosyncrasies of the country or for individual producers that find a profitable use for the technology. The models of Howitt (2000); Aghion et al. (2005); Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005) add a feature central to this paper—that as the technological frontier shifts out, the skill level required to maintain the same level of absorptive capacity increases as well. Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005) further add that 1. the efficacy of education is a function of the level of technological advance and 2. the introduction of a new method of technological change, loosely termed “modern R&D” such as culminated in the late 19th century with the modern R&D laboratory (the rise of institution such as government research agencies, scientific academies, universities with close ties to industry etc.) gives rise to the possibility of an important and discrete shift in the productivity of innovation technology. This gives rise to three equilibria: countries with with a threshold level of skill could undertake this “modern R&D” and innovate; countries with less may still adopt and grow but with a persistent income gap relative to the innovators; countries with insufficient absorptive capacity cannot even adopt and stagnate (see also Howitt (2000) for a model of complete stagnation). Further, advances in the frontier not accompanied by a rise in local human capital can cause a country to lose its absorptive capacity and slide to a worse equilibrium.

Our data do not permit testing explicitly for convergence clubs and we must be satisfied with a correlation with present income. However, the historical case studies do suggest the importance of these dynamics and these ideas help organize what happened around 1900 in the US South and Latin America vs. the US North. The initial conditions in terms of skills broadly defined allowed the latter to fully adopt modern R&D technologies, while in the former, they did not. In the South they were unable in some cases to undertake the necessary R&D to adapt some new technologies to local conditions, for instance, in steel. In Latin America, the erosion of their frontier adjusted human capital was so severe when faced with new technologies in metallurgy and chemistry that they were forced to abandon

critical industries, in our case mining, altogether and could not, in many cases, mount a manufacturing effort.

6.1 The American South

An extensive literature deals with Southern development and we present only a brief summary to draw the parallel with other cases. Wright (1986) casts much of his work explaining the US South's persistent lag exactly in terms of an innovative capacity framework. "The fundamental reason for [protracted lack of uptake of technologies] is that early industrialization is a matter of learning in the broadest sense of that term: in management, in technology, in marketing and certainly-though this is often underestimated- in learning on the part on the part of the labor force"(pp. 124-125). The South came relatively late to industrialization and lacked the indigenous technical capacity necessary for rapid catch up.²¹ The emblematic failure was of the Birmingham Steel industry, which Carnegie referred to. The problems were manifold-high labor costs, product quality and marketing- all of which reflect the low level of collective, accumulated learning by doing. But also central was that the low iron, high phosphorous nature of Alabama red hematite required substantial adaptations of technology to the Southern context which the local innovative capacity was not able to engineer. Nor was it able to develop Southern versions of new inventions in the paper and textile industries. By way of contrast, Japan also initially imported technology and processes, but over time it generated distinctive technologies and, by the 1920s, was making its own textile machinery. In lumbering and iron making, as well, Southern producers of the 1920s were not only not innovative, they were using methods phased out decades earlier elsewhere. Arguably, the big push by the federal government, ranging from the Land Grant colleges to selective location of advanced industries, and migration of higher order human capital, raised innovative capacity toward the frontier and permitted catch up.

²¹Wright (1986) argues that "Having missed the formative phases of the 'American System', the South was lacking a machine-tools and capital-goods sector almost entirely and therefore was bypassed by the kind of adaptive, dynamic, path-breaking series of technological breakthroughs that made 'the American system' distinctive." (p. 124-125).

6.2 Multiple equilibria in mining: Latin America vs. the US

The potentially catastrophic impact of a dearth of innovative capacity is nowhere more in evidence than in the industry in which Latin America for centuries had a true comparative advantage, yet by the turn of the 20th century had completely stagnated: mining. Close observation by numerous historians offers a particularly compelling window on how a similar inability to adapt new technologies in the face of declining ore quality nearly destroyed the Chilean mining industry as well. As Figure 3 illustrates, Chile saw its world market share of copper fall from 40% to under 4 percent by 1911, and even as early as 1884 the *Sociedad de Minería* (Mining Association) wondered openly whether Chile's copper mines would survive at all (Collier & Sater, 1996). Chilean historians date this technological slippage to the beginning of the nineteenth century, when “the work of mining was not very systematic” and the “receipt of industrial innovations [from abroad] was slow and without visible influence” (Villalobos et al., 1990, p. 95-96).²² One of Chile's most venerated historians, Francisco Encina noted that “from the point of view of capital and of technical and administrative aptitude, the copper industry is as demanding as the most complicated manufacturing industry” (Encina, 1972, p. 62). However, his studies revealed “an extraordinary economic ineptitude in the national population consequence of an education completely inadequate to meet the demands of contemporary life.” (p. 17). Another prominent historian, Pinto Santa Cruz (1959) argued that Chileans failed to take advantage of opportunities for learning by doing and to evolve the innovative capacity required to confront the technological revolution in mining and hence became dependent on foreign firms.²³

²²Charles Lambert, a representative of a British mining company in La Serena who was trained in the *École Polytechnique in Paris*, noted in 1819 the primitive mining practice, scarce knowledge of minerals, and inefficient smelting, all of which represented poor technique relative to that employed in Europe. See also Maloney (2002).

²³“The technological demands of the period, in contrast to what is occurring today in some areas of mining or industry, were relatively modest and thus not too costly. What could and had to be done in the national mining companies and in agriculture was perfectly compatible with the resources accumulated in the long

Figure 3 captures this importing of technical ability, first in the 1870s and 80s as Britain expanded in the nitrate and coal industry, and then after 1905 when major foreign copper companies took over the copper industry. The census data shows the density of foreign entrepreneurs increased from almost zero in 1870 to 80 in 1920, the last census which permitted disaggregating by nationality/profession, or roughly 4 times Chile's domestic density in 1900. Local capacity was increasing as well, however, the share of foreign engineers in the country total increased sharply from 1% of total engineers in the country to around 40% across this period. These movements emerged concomitant with Chilean production reaching new highs and market share of an expanding global supply staging and important recovery. As in Mexico, below, and consistent with Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005)'s education externality, both the quantity and the quality of the engineering graduates produced by local universities were thought inferior to the talent imported from Europe and the US (Serrano, 1993; Bazant de Saldaña, 1993). Increasing frustrated by the creeping influence of foreigners across the major industries, it is perhaps not surprising that Chileans developed a self-perception that they were perhaps "unfit for the modern era" (Monteón, 1982, p. 62 and 35).²⁴ By 1918, American interests controlled 87% of Chilean copper output (O'Brien, 1989).

Similar stories of an inability to exploit new technologies leading to decline in the mining industry can be found throughout the region. The engineering data in Figure 1 supports the historical evidence that in Mexico local entrepreneurs lost share in the industry they had dominated for centuries precisely due to lacking the capacity to master emerging

periods of bonanza. If the process had been initiated and maintained adequately, without doubt it would have created the means to confront more challenging tasks, such as those posed by copper mining when it was necessary to exploit less rich veins. However, faced with the technological revolution, the local mining companies did not have either sufficient accumulated resources or organizational and administrative capacity—both of which were indispensable. In these circumstances, there was no other option but the introduction of foreign capital and expertise." Pinto Santa Cruz (1959)(p 71)

²⁴Prominent intellectual Tancredo Pinochet Le-Brun(1909), granting that Chileans were inferior to Europeans, still wondered, "Don't we have minds in this country that can go to Europe to learn what professors, whom we have imported and continue importing, have studied? Are we truly incapable of steering our own ship?" *La Conquista de Chile en el Siglo XX*, Santiago, La Ilustracion, page 81 cited in Monteón (1982)).

technologies (Ruiz Larraguivel, 2004; Brading, 1971; Marichal, 1997). Even in Zacatecas, San Luis de Potosí, and Guanajuato, long centers of mining, engineering density was at low levels compared to the newcomers in the US West. Around 1900, abandoned, underexploited and newly discovered mines fell to foreign hands that could bring new global technologies to bear. As an example, the Guggenheim interests opened smelters in Monterrey (1892) and Aguascalientes (1894) purchased the largest Mexican Smelting and Refining company in 1906, introduced modern methods of extracting and refining silver ores and in addition, started the production of lead and zinc mining (Bernstein, 1964; O’Brien, 1989). By the early 20th century, the Americans absolutely dominated the industry.²⁵ In Upper Peru (now Bolivia), the decline of silver production in some of the most famous mines, like those at Potosí, arose from the “failure to apply new mining techniques, heavy mortality among Indian laborers and the exhausting of previous rich veins” (Scobie, 1964, p.59). In Ecuador, Hurtado (2007) argues that the discovery of new mineral deposits was hindered by a resistance to scientific methods.²⁶

The US eventual dominance of the Chilean copper and Mexican mining industries strikingly illustrates the road that could have been taken with the same homogenous product. Not only does Wright (1999) argue that US in the 19th century “parlayed its [natural] resource-based industrial prosperity into a well-educated labor force, an increasingly sophisticated science-based technology, and world leadership in scientific research itself” (Wright, 1987, p. 665), but he uses precisely the US copper industry as an example of national learning and of innovation as a network phenomenon. Wright stresses that in

²⁵See Maloney (2015) for data on nationality of owners.

²⁶More generally, Di Tella (1985) argues that Argentina proved unable to move beyond a state of exploiting the pure rents of a frontier or extraction of mineral riches, and beyond the “collusive rents” offered by state-sanctioned or otherwise imposed monopolies to tap the “unlimited source of growth” found in exploiting the quasi-rents of innovation, as the US, Canada and Australia were able to do. They remained in an adoption or, perhaps, stagnation equilibrium. The same phenomenon is seen in agriculture where the absence of innovative infrastructure was recognized by contemporary Argentines as key to explaining the lagging performance of the wheat industry compared to that in Canada and Australia. Fogarty et al. (1985) attributes to weak innovative capacity the outcome of a quasi-experiment whereby the Spanish Merino sheep were introduced into New South Wales, Australia, and Argentina’s River Plate region in the same year and had the same access to European capital, but by 1885 showed yields of only half the wool per sheep in Argentina.

the post civil war period, the US became the foremost location for education in mining engineering and metallurgy. It was the revolution in metallurgy (e.g. the Bessemer process and the introduction of electrolysis on a commercial scale for the refining of copper) overwhelmingly an American achievement, that propelled the copper industry during the last decades of the 19th century. The transference of these technologies by US firms to their mines and smelters in Chile and Mexico revolutionized the antiquated industries in both countries, dramatically increased production, and left them dominant in both.²⁷

The US reaped high growth dividends from inventing new technologies in mining, and its engineering and scientific capital became the best in the world. At the same time, and with exactly the same goods, Latin America's declining human capital relative to the expanding technological frontier left it unable even to adapt new technologies, and the domestic industries stagnated. The success of the Chilean State Copper Company, established in 1976, testifies that this need not be permanent and at least an adoption equilibrium was reachable by nationals with the accumulation of the necessary human and knowledge capital.

6.3 Retrogression in industry in Brazil: Minas Gerais

In iron manufacturing, Baer (1969); Rogers (1962); Birchall (1999) argue that despite a tradition of iron smelting dating from the mid-sixteenth century, the techniques used at the end of the nineteenth century were primitive. While particularly the northern US colonies engaged in a sustained process of learning by doing and innovation in both iron and steel (Swank, 1965) from the early 18th century on, from 1830 to 1880 Brazil actually experienced a "retrogression in technique" (Rogers, 1962, p. 183). Unable to innovate, Brazilian firms

²⁷The Guggenheim's El Teniente mine was the first in the world to apply the flotation process in concentrating low-grade ores. Mechanizing digging made Chuquibambilla in the north the largest open pit mine and, again, a new concentration process was introduced using sulfuric acid and electrolytic precipitation to treat the mine's ore. From 1912-1926, copper production in Chile quintupled as a result, reversing a 25 year period of stagnation (O'Brien, 1989).

instead lobbied for protection from cheaper iron imports.²⁸ The critical innovation for the development of the native steel industry was the foundation in 1879 of the *Escola de Minas* (Mining School) at Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais, which, as the *Escuela de Minas de Antioquia* was a major diffuser of new practices and led to the establishment of the first new blast furnace since the failures at the beginning of the century. On the other hand, the textile industry for which we have entrepreneurship data above was less fortunate. As (Birchal, 1999, p. 183) notes “the existing informal and spontaneous technological innovative system was not developed enough to take the process of technological assimilation farther in the direction of a profound modification of existing foreign technologies, or to create a more complex indigenous technological alternative” again, much as Wright argues for the American South.

This raises the larger question of, given the sheer disparity of our innovative capacity numbers, if it was so hard for the American South to start competitive industries with its innovative capacity captured by 60 engineers per 100,000 individuals, how did Latin America’s industry expand so quickly at the turn of the 20th century with an average of 10? Much also may lie in the Potemkin nature of much of Latin American industrialization that, as in the American South, was dependent on imported capital goods and innovated little. Across the region, blocks in the input-output table were rapidly filled in but, as Haber (2005, 2006) notes, these industries were not modern in the sense of being at the technological frontier or being able to export to other countries. Much as Wright notes in the American South, Latin America relied heavily on foreign technology imports, and was sluggish in developing an indigenous local machine and capital goods industry, a result attributed to low innovative capacity.²⁹ The fact that Latin America evolved the highest levels of tariffs in

²⁸Of the thirty ironworks in the headwater region of the Rio Doce in 1879, only seven used Italian forging methods, while the rest used the old African *cadinho* (crucible) technique. Graduates of the *Escola de Engenharia do Exército* (Military Engineering School) established in 1930 led the steel industry as it developed through the 1960s.

²⁹“Since... capital goods industries now required well-developed scientific and engineering capabilities, Mexico had little choice but to import its capital equipment. The blast furnaces and rolling mills came from the United States, the high-speed cigarette machinery from France, the paper-making machinery from

the world prior to World War I –on average five times the rates in Europe– is arguably the result of the need to protect an industry erected on weak foundations of entrepreneurship, accumulated learning by doing, and higher level human scientific capital.³⁰ This supports Haber’s theory that the standard view of protectionism stimulating industrialization is potentially backwards. An emerging, but technologically backward and uncompetitive industry demanded protection. In turn, lack of exposure to foreign competition blunted the need to upgrade quality and technical capacity.

7 Drivers of innovative capacity

7.1 The US

Though a detailed examination of the factors determining innovative capacity at the turn of the century are beyond the scope of the paper, we briefly explore select potential drivers. Table 8 presents, first, the results for the US county patents for both engineers and patents. As a predetermined measure of agglomeration or economic activity, we introduce population density prior to colonization. We further introduce slavery as well as a southern dummy (at the state level), plus geographical controls. Because of the zeros in engineers, we present both OLS (Column 1) as well as quantile estimates with selection to report a zero (Column 2). Column 3 reports OLS for patents and Column 4 the corresponding quantile regressions.

Somewhat strikingly, pre-colonial population enters strongly significantly and positively in all specifications with both engineers and patents. This offers a channel through which agglomerations and arguably economic activity persist over time (see Maloney & Valencia (2015)). Slavery enters negatively and very significantly in all specifications confirming that reduced investment in higher level human capital is a channel through which slavery had

Switzerland, the textile looms, spindles, and other equipment from England, Belgium, the United States, or Germany.” Haber (1997), p. 18

³⁰Coatsworth and Williamson and Clemson and Williamson, cited in Haber (2005).

a depressing impact on future incomes. South continues to enter significantly in all except the engineers selection model suggesting an impact beyond the set of factors associated with slavery. The geographical controls tell a mixed story. For engineers, only ruggedness enters positively while for patenting it enters negatively, perhaps reflecting the importance of engineers to mining, but not necessarily the likelihood that mining would generate patents. Temperature enters positively and significantly, and rainfall negatively in almost all specifications. For patents, altitude enters positively and significantly, and coastal distance negatively.

7.2 The role of colonial heritage?

The degrees of freedom available in the international data are insufficient to generate comparable results with any degree of confidence. However, the remarkable similarity between the engineering density in Spain and Portugal and their colonial dependencies is consonant with the inheritance of values and institutions related to educational and entrepreneurial capital formation from the Peninsular powers to their colonies, and in striking parallels in development outcomes among them. Spain and Portugal, confronted with the Industrial Revolution in England, failed to develop a scientific vocation nor the complementary innovation promoting institutions essential to industrialization. In fact, strikingly Spain's own development path shows the exact same issues of inability to manage new technologies and external dominance characterizing Latin America (Tortella Casares, 2000) suggesting a high degree of commonality in underlying factors. For example, the evolution of the Spanish mining industry precisely foreshadows the subsequent experience in Chile and elsewhere discussed earlier. Though Spanish mines were rich, and mercury had been worked for a thousand years, the lack of technical capacity and capital, and the slow growth of domestic metallurgical know how led Spanish entrepreneurs to work close to the surface and then sell out to foreigners once easy veins had been exhausted. In 1873, a UK and German led conglomerate purchased the mines on the Rio Tinto river in Andalucia, introduced new technologies, and from 1877-1891, became the world's largest producer of copper, contributing the to fall in Chile's global share in Figure 3. As (Tortella Casares,

2000, pp. 96, 213-215)) summarizes: “extraction and processing constitute a classic example of the failure of Spanish entrepreneurs to confront the problems of developing an industrial sector with complex technology, intensive use of capital, [and] a fast-expanding horizon.”

The colonies, legally cut off from direct commerce and interaction with Northern Europe- even trade with Cadiz was through peninsular intermediaries- were unlikely to absorb an alternate set of institutions and values from the industrializing center or evolve indigenous analogues, as the US did. Mass education was not prioritized on either side of the Atlantic: in both mother countries literacy lagged even the black (often freed slave) population in the American South, and is of similar magnitude to that of the Latin American colonies.³¹ The Peninsular tradition of higher education was largely religiously based, focused on law, philosophy, and theology, proved resistant to attempts to introduce enlightenment-informed technical curricula,³² and was exported to the colonies. As Safford continues (p. 3) “The Latin American upper classes have been noted for their devotion to the study of law, the humanities, and the arts and their lack of interest in the natural sciences and technology. In the hands of the upper classes, Latin America’s educational systems, at least in times past, have been dedicated to forming and maintaining the political elite and have been only mildly effective in furthering such economically practical aims as the broad diffusion of literacy and technical capacities.”³³ In sum, in the patterns of human capital accumulation and

³¹Tortella (1994) notes that in 1900 Spain had a literacy rate of 44%. This is slightly below that of Argentina (48 %) and blacks in the American South (49%) (Collins & Margo, 2006)), and not dramatically ahead of Peru (38%), Chile (37%), Colombia (32 %), or Mexico (22%). Portugal’s low level of literacy, 22%, is essentially identical to that of its colony Brazil (20%).

³²In Portugal, the flagship university at Coimbra briefly established a more technical curriculum in 1759 under the Marquis of Pombal in the context of radical political, education and ecclesiastical reform to modernize the state and energize the economy. However, in 1777 there was a reaction against the reforms and the emphasis on natural science was abandoned and civil law regained its ancient prestige. The Spanish enlightenment in the same period saw the establishment of groups of autonomous sociedades económicas (economic societies) that sought to diffuse technology from abroad and establish libraries throughout the country, as well as some Royal Societies emphasizing applied science. But Spain began training engineers seriously only in the 1850s, and by 1867 the country had only one functioning School of Industrial Engineers, located in Barcelona (Riera i Tuébol, 1993).

³³Spanish America saw universities established from the moment of conquest, yet they were largely committed to the training of ministers to convert Indians, and lawyers to staff the empire (Benjamin, 1965). As (Will, 1957, p.17) documents for Chile, although it applies with greater generality “With the exception of the inadequate facilities provided by a few religious organizations, there did not exist before the middle of

of development trajectories, the similarities are so close as to suggest a dominant role for inherited attitudes and institutions.

8 Conclusion

Much of the growth literature stresses differences in the capacity to generate, import, and apply new technologies as central to explaining relative growth performance. In particular, Aghion et al. (2005) document that different frontier adjusted endowments of human capital broadly construed dictate very distinct growth trajectories and Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005) argue that at the time of a radical shift in technological progress, such differences lead to convergence clubs of high growth and stagnant economies. To date, however, there has been little data generated on the higher level human capital and institutions required to make this possible, especially in a historical context, and none to attempt to verify its impact on income differentials.

This paper first generates national level engineering data for the Americas in 1900 that suggests that differences in innovative capacity plausibly can explain the disparate development trajectories of countries which, at the time, had very similar levels of income. This measure, compiled using graduates of local engineering universities, professional associations and censuses, is arguably the first to offer international comparability for this key period around the Second Industrial Revolution. We see it as a measure of higher level scientifically oriented human capital per se and supporting institutions, as well as arguably a more general measure of technological sophistication of the entrepreneurial class.

To more conclusively establish the link, we employ county level data from the US and

the eighteenth century an institution capable of furnishing the youth of the colony with the barest essentials of a secular education.” The majority of the relatively few university educated members of the Brazilian elite at independence trained at Coimbra in the reinstated legal theological tradition (Carvalho, 1982). In Ecuador, (Hurtado, 2007, p. 115) argues that education quality even among the elite was poor and unfocused on practical elements. Again, he cites the American ambassador to Quito in the 1850s who found “convents instead of presses, barracks in place of schools.” See comparable accounts in Will (1957) for Chile; Safford (1976) for Colombia; and Lopez Soria (2012) for Peru.

establish the robust explanatory power of engineering density and patenting, controlling for a variety of economic and geographic variables; measures of secondary and tertiary education that may be correlated, as well as attempting to control directly for endogeneity. Finally, we show the persistence of the impact of engineering density in a multi-country panel working at the “state” level.

We then provide historical evidence that broadly confirms the ranking of countries emerging from our engineering data and which suggests that precisely an inability to manage the new technologies emerging from the Second Industrial Revolution slowed growth in the Southern US, and led to a loss of competitiveness in a sector long an area of comparative advantage in Latin America— mining. The fact that the US was able to leverage this sector into a well-educated workforce, and world leadership in scientific research while Latin America lost the industry confirms the importance of innovative capacity, and the persistent effect of early human capital investments. It also lends support to the idea of multiple equilibria arising from differences in innovative capacity.

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9 Annex I: Construction of Engineering Data

9.1 Argentina

The principal source is *Historia de la Ingeniería Argentina* (Centro Argentino de Ingenieros, 1981). At the end of the 19th century, there were three universities that granted the title of civil engineer which was their omnibus term for engineers- Buenos Aires, Cordoba and La Plata as well as a school of mining engineers in San Juan. The CAI documents that from 1870, the year when the first engineers graduated in the country, until 1900, 250 engineers received their diplomas. We do not know the distribution of these degrees across years so we impute uniform graduation rates after which the attrition adjustment leaves 196 or a density of 12.³⁴

9.2 Bolivia

In Bolivia, the first engineering school, the Escuela Nacional de Ingenieria in Oruro, began in 1917 and hence Bolivia has 0 locally trained engineers by 1900. As late as 1937, 84% of engineers in the Patiño Tin mines (accounting for 10 of world production) were foreign(Contreras, 1993).

9.3 Brazil

Telles (1994) *Historia da Engenharia no Brasil, Seculos XVI a XIX* is the principal source. In 1858 the Royal Academy of Artillery, Fortification and Drawing, established in Rio de Janeiro in 1792, dedicated itself to civil engineering for the first time, studying steam engines and railroads, and in 1874 it became independent of the Military and became the Polytechnical School of Rio (today the School of Engineering of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro). This was the dominant institution for training engineers. Brazil's second engineering school was founded around Mining in Ouro Preto. However, the low motivation for technical teaching of the time the school's isolation, among other social factors, made it difficult to recruit students and it graduated few. From 1894 to 1896 four new schools were started in São Paulo, Pernambuco, Porto Alegre and Salvador. Telles (1994) suggestion that these schools would eventually end the Polytechnical School of Rio's monopoly confirms the dominance of the latter in the production of engineers up to that point. We do not, however, have a long time series on graduates from any program. Telles reports the average annual number of domestic engineering graduates in Brazil as a whole for the period after 1890 at 45 per year, half of them produced in Rio by 1900. To estimate graduation rates for the 1860-1890 period, we rely on evidence from reported stocks. Telles tabulates the number of engineers in Rio as reported in *Almanaque Laemmert*, a periodical dealing with governance, commerce and industry in Rio, for 1854, 1870, 1883 and from the official *Almanak dos Engenheiros* an official publication of the government for the whole country in 1906. In Rio in 1854, there were 6 engineers and in São Paulo, the other principle locus of engineering talent, in 1857, there were 5. We therefore set 11 as our initial stock for the country in 1860. In 1870, the *Almanaque Laemmert* notes that Rio had grown to 28 engineers and by 1883, 126 (page 593). Given the rough earlier parity of Rio and São Paulo in 1854-57, we double the Rio numbers figures to get national figures for these periods. While the Almanak may

³⁴A later data point is offered by Almada & Zalduendo (1962), which, when adjusted to be compatible with our data, yields a density of 41.25 in 1925. Given the rapid increase in output of engineers in the beginning decades of the 20th century in most countries, this supports our 1900 estimate.

be overstating the stock by including non degreed engineers, the implicit graduation rate leading up to 1883 is roughly 15 per year which is substantially below Telles' documented graduation rate of 45 beginning in 1890. On the other hand, the consolidation of the Ouro Preto School of Mines and the new schools established after 1890 doubled whatever Rio's capacity was and that was likely substantially more in 1890 than prior. Hence, a three-fold increase over the last two decades seems plausible. We interpolate an average value between the known values of 1883-1890. Together, these lead to a total stock in 1900 of 786. If we extrapolate at the same graduation rate, the terminal stock in 1906 is 968 or slightly above the value reported by the official Almanak (941) suggesting that we may, again, be overstating the stock somewhat. Density 12.

9.4 Canada

McInnis (2004) is perhaps the most complete of a thin literature. Substantial engineering curricula had been introduced at King's College (UNB), at McGill College, and the University of Toronto in the 1850s although demand for engineering education gained traction only in the 1870s. McGill offered a full diploma course by 1863 although the first five students graduated only in 1874. Four year courses were implemented in Civil Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Practical Chemistry and Mining by 1878, Electrical engineering in 1891, Chemical Engineering and Metallurgical Engineering in 1908. The University of Toronto School of Practical Science opened in 1878 and offered the degree of civil engineer in 1885. In 1874, Laval University established an Ecole Polytechnique which emitted its first graduates in 1877. Other smaller programs also emerged at the same time. Also of importance, The Royal Military College in Kingston Ontario, established in 1876, with West Point as a model, explicitly had the dual object of providing scientific training to military officers as well as producing civilian engineers.³⁵ If we take the discounted sum of the licensed graduates plus half the military graduates ³⁶ by 1900 we reach a total density of about 41. This is relatively low by US standards especially given the number of institutions offering engineering courses, as well as the articulation of the different fields of engineering at a relatively early phase. The development of, for instance, mechanical engineering as a separate course about 20 years after in the US, Electrical Engineering 10-15 years after, but still far ahead of any of the Latin Universities in the sample. Electrical engineering appears more or less at the same time as in the US. It is worth noting, however, that the four principle Canadian Universities emitting graduates lay within a circle of 350 mile radius with Cornell at its center and including many of the principle US universities of the time. Density: 41

9.5 Chile

As Serrano (1993) notes in *Universidad y Nación: Chile en el Siglo IX*, training at the *Universidad de Chile* (University of Chile), the principal source of engineers in the 19th century, began in the mid-1850s. Prior to this, there were effectively no schools in Chile and those engineers trained abroad were very few. From 1846-50 there had been 2 fellowships to

³⁵<http://www.warmuseum.ca/education/online-educational-resources/dispatches/the-royal-military-college-of-canada-1876-to-the-present>

³⁶our thanks to Marvin McInnis for discussions on this

study abroad with uneven results. Serrano notes (p. 216) that between 1856 and 1879, 100 geographical engineers (surveyors/geographers), 61 mining engineers and 4 civil engineers plus 11 general assayers graduated. This gives us a graduation rate for the first 20 years of our exercise. To anchor the subsequent 20 years, Villalobos et al. (1990) collaborating with Serrano in *Historia de la Ingeniería en Chile*, offers that “in the 19th century there were 130 Chilean engineers and toward 1938, the country had a list of 270 professionals graduating from the University of Chile. They created, in 1930, the Institute of Mining Engineers of Chile ” (p. 198). The context may be taken to suggest that we are talking exclusively about mining engineers, although in personal communication, Serrano confirms that it is total graduated engineers. This is consistent with the fact that the implicit graduation rates from the pre -1879 period, 2.3 mining engineers per year, respectively accumulates to only half of the 130 number cited by Villalobos at end century. Clearly, this gap could be made up by a rapid expansion in number of graduates from 1879 on, but as Serrano notes, in 1867 the government expressed concern that the numbers of graduates in physical studies and mathematics was actually decreasing (page 212) so this would have represented a reversal in trend. Geographical engineers translate broadly as surveyors/geographers which are not generally treated as engineers per se and hence, to the degree that they are included in the 130 number, this overstates installed capacity. Density: 17.

9.6 Colombia

As Safford (1976) notes in his *The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia's Struggle to Form and Technical Elite*, the process of establishing a technical class was undermined by recurrent civil wars which often whipsawed the ideological foundations of the schools when they were not closing them, and perennial shortages of funding. The *Universidad Nacional* (National University), founded in 1867, was the dominant source of degreed engineers. It was built on the Colegio Militar (Military College) which operated over two brief periods, 1848-1854, and then in 1861. In the early 1880s, the Congress also authorized the creation of mining schools in Antioquia, Rionegro, Popayan and Ibague but most were aborted by the civil war of 1885. Safford (1976). The exception was the *Escuela Nacional de Minería* (National Mining School in Antioquia set up in 1887 to 1895, that would eventually close due to a lack of financing, among other factors, and become part of the *Escuela de Ingeniería de la Universidad de Antioquia* (Engineering School of the University of Antioquia). Poveda Ramos (1993) in *Historia Social de la Ciencias en Colombia: Ingeniería e Historia de las Técnicas* summarizes “By the end of the century, there were only three schools of engineering in Colombia: the *Universidad Nacional*, the *Escuela Nacional de Minería*, and the *Universidad Republicana* (Republican University) in Bogota. The number of students was small, so much so that the National University, the largest of all, the number of students fluctuated from one year to another between 25 and 50.”(p.55). The *Universidad Republicana* (now the *Universidad Libre* Free University) was begun in 1890 but it nearly collapsed financially by 1910 and its contribution to our accumulated stock is likely to be small. Facultad de Ingeniería (2011) tabulates that from 1868-1870 enrollments in the National University averaged 35 per year, yet graduates in the 1871-1875 period average about 4 per year. Though the authors note that their tabulations may not be complete, the virtual absence of graduates from 1876 to 1888 is plausible as from 1876 to 1884 the school was again taken over by the military and oriented away from industry related training. In 1880, despite 56 enrolled, higher mathematics and engineering classes contained only 4 students. (p. 195). In the National School of Mines,

from 1887 to 1890 average enrollment was 25 students. Safford notes 63 alumnae of the 1888-1894 period, which is confirmed by Santa-Maria Alvarez (1994) as the number of "egresados" (exiters) of the program. However the same text notes that only five of these had graduated with thesis across the period (in 1893 and 1894) and none again until 1906 (Annex 5 page 103). Poveda Ramos (1993) confirms the lower numbers noting that the first 3 degrees of Mining Engineer were granted in 1893. The two schools together yield an accumulated stock of 75 Engineers by 1900. This is broadly consistent with Safford's finding of "more than 200 Colombian engineers and surveyors" in 1887 derived from the *Anales de Ingeniería* (Annals of Engineering), the organ of the Colombian Engineering Association Safford (1976) page 219) which, again does not discriminate by whether or not the inscribed had completed a degree, nor separate out surveyors. However, we also know that both the University of Cauca as well as the Republican University in Bogota were generating some unknown quantity of graduates. We round to 100 as number that would incorporate these and missing graduates from Antioquia and the National University. Density: 5.

9.7 Denmark

The Polyteknisk Laereanstalt was founded in 1829 as the first university level technical school in Copenhagen and was one of the first of its kind in Europe and was heavily influenced by the French Ecole Polytechnique. Harnow (1997) in his study of the impact of engineers in Denmark only focuses on this school, arguing that from 1850 to 1920 it was by far the most important Danish technical institution. He tabulates the number of graduates across the period 1832-69 and then for roughly 10 year periods after. Taking the yearly graduation rate as the average of each period and then applying the usual discounting yields a density of 92.

9.8 Ecuador

The *Escuela Politécnica Nacional* (National Polytechnical School) was founded in 1869 by the President Gabriel García Moreno with the aim of establishing a center for research and training of engineers and scientists at a high level. German Jesuits were brought for the purpose but the school was closed in 1876 for political reasons and was only reopened in 1935. This trajectory is not so different from that of Colombia's School of Mines, although that country had two other universities for more or less three times the population. We can't know the number of graduates of the program, over these seven years, but the density would have to be less than that of Colombia, including that until 1935 there was effectively no local training capacity which is part of what we're trying to capture here. [http : //www.epn.edu.ec/index.php?option = com_contentview = articleid = 1129Itemid = 378](http://www.epn.edu.ec/index.php?option=com_contentview=articleid=1129Itemid=378). We assign a value of 2.

9.9 Mexico

The earliest technical training in Mexico was the *Colegio de Minería* formerly the *Real Seminario de Minería* (College of Mining, Royal Seminary of Mining) in Mexico city which opened in 1792 and was perhaps the most secular and highest quality technical institution in the hemisphere at the time. Bazant de Saldaña (1993) in her *Historia de la Educación Durante el Porfiriato* has best documented the subsequent evolution. Wars of independence, foreign invasion, and perilous fiscal situations led to a steady decline and by the time it was transformed into the *Escuela Nacional de Minería* (National School of Mines) in 1867 under Benito Juárez, the number of students was so low that the government considered closing it and sending the 8-10 students abroad. Porfirio Díaz would subsequently put great

emphasis on engineering as part of his modernization campaign. Despite this, by 1902, still only 18 engineers were graduating per year. Flows from the National School of Mines from 1876-1901 total 327. From 1876 to 1880 (41); 1881-1890 (106); 1891-1901 (180). Most other universities in other areas contributed very few. Allowing for another 16 years prior at the 1877 rate, which likely overstates the case, gives a total stock in 1900 of 336 or a surprisingly low density of 5. Other figures broadly corroborate. The census reports 884 engineers for Mexico city or roughly half the total that it reports for the entire country. Applying that ratio to the stock above gives 159. By comparison, Bazant cites the *Massey Blue Book*, an English language director of Mexico (City) as giving a total of 91 engineers and the *Directorio de Vecinos de la Ciudad de Mexico* as 183, both including some unspecified number of foreigners. The *Association de Ingenieros* (Engineering Association) in 1910 counted 255 members which, again, is not clear on the level of education of its members and may also include both the acceleration in graduation at the turn of the century in many countries. In all, the magnitudes do not suggest that our stocks are importantly underestimated. Density of 5.

9.10 Peru

Although there were institutions teaching technical skills in various parts of the country, modern engineering began in Peru in 1852 two French and one Polish engineer to design and undertake public works of engineering. The need to import talent for these tasks, as was the case elsewhere in Latin America, testifies to the dearth of locally generated qualified human capital. The first school of engineers was discussed in the early 1850s, but only became reality when the Peruvian state in 1876 invited Polish engineer, Edward John Habich, to advise on irrigation, railways and other projects as well as the founding of a school of mines. Lopez Soria (2012) in *Historia de la Universidad Nacional de Ingenieria, los Años Fundamentales, 1876-1909* notes that the resulting School of Civil Construction and Mining Engineers (now the National Engineering University-Universidad Nacional de Ingenieria) opened in 1876 and graduated its first class of 4 in 1880. The school was heavily damaged when used by the invading Chilean forces in 1880 and took several years to rebuild, only graduating one more student by 1882. Lopez Soria (2012) tabulates annual list of graduates going forward, disaggregated by specialty and allowing us to take out surveyors and include only industrial, mining and civil engineers, giving a total net of attrition of 100. This broadly confirms the statement by the *Sociedad de Ingenieros Del Perú* (Peruvian Engineering Society) (established 1898) of "more than 80" engineers in the country. This gives us a density of 5.

9.11 Portugal

Formal training of non military engineering in Portugal did not begin until the turn of the 20th century with the Instituto de Lisboa (Institute of Lisbon) which started training industrial engineers in 1903 (Heitor et al), and the *Instituto Superior Técnico* (Higher Technical Institute) founded in 1917 Diogo (2007)). Hence, we are unable to generate a stock of graduates as in many of the other cases. Diogo argues, however, that military engineers were responsible for most civil engineering projects and hence military engineers should be counted in this case. The *Associação dos Engenheiros Cíveis Portuguezes - AECP* (Portuguese Association of Civil Engineers) also did register the majority of those who considered themselves non-military engineers. Though registration in the AECP was not mandatory to be a practicing engineer, it was mandatory in the organization that followed,

the *Ordem dos Engenheiros (OE)* (Order of Engineers). In 1870 the AECP reports 150 inscribed; in 1926, 733. We take the average growth rate between the two points and impute the value for 1900. After 1900, we are able to compare the rates between the AECP and the mandatory OE: in 1930, there were 845 members (AECP) and in 1936, 1127 members (OE). Imputing the same growth rate between 1930 and 1936 as previous suggests that the AECP is understating the stock of practicing engineers by roughly 20%. We apply this to the stock value generated using the AECP data for 1900 to yield 579 or a density of 22. This is likely to be an overstatement since we do not know what fraction of these had any higher educational training.

9.12 Spain

We offer two estimates of the stock of Spanish engineers derived from Riera i Tuebols (1993) from 1867 *Industrialization and Technical Education in Spain, 1850-1914* and López et al. (2005) *Estadísticas Históricas de España: Siglos XIX-XX* from 1857. The estimates differ in scope. Riera i Tuebols reports graduates of *escuelas de ingeniería* engineering schools as such, starting with Spain's first, founded in Barcelona in 1867, to train industrial engineers (see also Riera, 2008). He also offers data from mining and civil engineer graduates primarily from institutions in Madrid. Though Riera's tabulations are the most accurate count of certifiably degreed engineers from university programs available, the resulting stock, 892, may be a lower bound. López et al. (2005) casts a broader net, including information from all technical schools (including *Escuelas Nacionales, Escuelas Superiores, Escuelas Especiales, Escuelas Centrales, Escuelas Profesionales* and *Escuelas Elementales*). Although this compendium is more comprehensive geographically, the estimates include graduates from other technical disciplines potentially miscategorized as engineers as well as including graduates of indeterminate level of training. We treat the resulting estimate of 3,089 as an upper bound. The Riera number is roughly half of the number of engineers and architects combined reported in the 1900 census. The Lopez is about 50% higher, which makes it the only case among our countries where the accumulated estimate is above that reported in the census. Since, as noted, self-reported census definitions are looser than documented degrees conferred, we find this improbable. Density either 12 or 42 respectively and we plot the average of the two. In our regressions, the Spanish influence is accounted for by a dummy so our results are unaffected by these estimates.

9.13 Sweden

The reference here is Ahlström (1993) who tabulates graduates of the two principal engineering programs. The Kungl Tekniska Högskolan (KTH) or Royal Technical University in Stockholm has roots in the Laboratorium Mechanicum founded in 1697, which later became the Mechanical school (1798). The Chalmers Institution in Gothenburg, founded in 1829, provided technical education equal to that of the KTH. Ahlström argues that in the mid 19th century, "...anyone in Sweden who sought an internationally reputable technical education could find it in these institutions." Density is 99.

9.14 United States

9.14.1 National data

We draw on several sources for the US engineering numbers. First, Mann (1918), in his *Study of Engineering Education* done for the Joint Committee on Engineering Education,

tabulated graduates from US schools until 1915. As of 1900 this gives a total of 14,679, which gives a density per 100,000 workers of 50. However, as Adkins (1975) in *The Great American Degree Machine: An Economic Analysis of the Human Resource Output of Higher Education* notes, before 1940, the Office of Education made no effort to maintain comparability across years or completeness of coverage of educational institutions. It is not clear how they identified the universe of relevant institutions and, if an institution did not respond to their survey two years in a row, it was dropped from the interview rolls. Hence, Mann’s estimates underestimate the true stock by a potentially significant amount. To bring to bear other sources of information, we use more reliable graduation data in select states or periods to calibrate the Census numbers, and then impute engineering stocks for the country in 1900. First, Adkins’ tabulations for the US in 1930 yield a stock that is .53 of the census declaration of occupations in engineering at that time. Second, Edelstein (2009) in *The Production of Engineers in New York Colleges and Universities, 1800-1950* offers a full and comprehensive stock accounting for the state of New York for our time period 1900. His tabulations yield a density of 179 which is .67 of the US census number corresponding to New York that year. It is likely that New York’s number may have a higher density of fully degreed engineers self-reporting in the census than the country as a whole so this number may be somewhat high. Similarly, Adkins’ estimates for the whole country in 1930 may reflect that, in the ensuing 30 years, a higher share of self-declared engineers actually had degrees. Mann’s numbers yield a ratio of .39 which we expect to be too low for the reasons outlined above. Hence, we take an intermediate value of .5 as the national ratio of actual graduates to Census declared engineers in 1900 and the data for the South and the North are projections based on this ratio. This yields a density of 84 for the entire country, 160 for the North, and 60 for the South.

9.14.2 County level data

Innovative capacity: As elsewhere we calculate density by engineers per 100.000 male workers. We use OCC1950 variable of IPUMS USA for 1880 census and we aggregate all categories for set up engineers: Engineering, chemical engineers, civil engineers, electrical engineers, industrial engineers, mechanical engineers, metallurgical and metallurgists engineers, mining engineers, and other engineers. We use as proxy of male workers the 40% of population because there are inconsistencies in labor force variable. Patenting is the collected number of patents between 1890 and 1910 like proportion to 1880 population. Number of patents was collected from Akcigit et al. (2013) and include all patents granted by the USPTO.

Sub-national Income in 2005 US Dollars is the household mean income drawn from 2000 USA Census.

Geographical Controls: we include temperature, altitude and rainfall taken from Worldclim. We use distance to river (distance between the county centroid to the near medium or big size river) derived from HydroSHEDS (USGS 2011). We employ a measure of distance to the coast calculated like distance between centroid and the near coast similar to Gennaioli et al. (2013). We further include a measured of ruggedness of terrain from Nunn Puga (2012).

Growth variables: Population Density in 1880 as a measure of agglomeration is taken from the 1880 census data. As a measure of lagged economic activity, we calculate two

measures using manufacturing output, taken from the 1870 NHGIS. Per capita yields a measure of structural transformation, per manufacturing output a measure of productivity. The extreme values and high variance of manufacturing employment suggests some lack of confidence in the 1880 labor allocation data so we report only the first measure. However, the results do not change appreciably using the other. We use slavery as a measure of institutions taken from the 1860 Census as well as Nunn (2008). For railroads, we employ two variables from the Nebraska-Lincoln University railroads data. An identifier variable if the county has railroad or a railroad density variable.

Human capital: Aggregate literacy rates we take from 1880 Census. As with engineers, we measured lawyers and physicians density per 100.000 habitants. We use the OCC1950 variable of IPUMS USA for 1880 census. Lawyers and Physicians categories are used from OCC1950.

Instrument: we compute the distance between the county centroid to the near the 57 1862 Land Grant Colleges.

9.15 Venezuela

Mendez (2013) in *Historia de la Tecnología en Venezuela* notes that the *Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV)* (Central University of Venezuela), as it would eventually be known, become the primary source of engineering graduates from 1867 on: 8 from 1867 to 1879 ; 80 from 1880 to 1889; 102 from 1890 to 1899. Other universities that graduated engineers were la *Universidad del Zulia* (University of Zulia) (1 in 1892) and the *Universidad de Valencia* (University of Valencia) (4 between 1892 y 1904); *Colegio Federal de Maracaibo* (Federal College of Maracaibo) 1886 (5) who submitted their these to the UCV for approval. To fill in the 1860-1866 period, we take the average of graduates from *Academia de Matemáticas de Caracas* (Academy of Mathematics of Caracas) from 1831 to 1872 (97 graduates) perhaps half of which were employed in civil or industrial work. Applying our usual discounting gives about 185 engineers. The engineering association gives 196 although this may include foreigners and members of undetermined educational attainment. Density: 11.

10 Annex II: The US at the State Level

We now look more closely at the US sub-sample alone since the 1900 census offers several other correlates that allow us to test the robustness of the engineering results (Table 4). The cost of these additional covariates is the reduced number of observations (51). The geographic variables for this sample are not significant as a block and we drop them to preserve degrees of freedom.³⁷ The magnitudes of the remaining coefficients are not sensitive to this omission. In columns 1-3, Engineering enters significantly freestanding, with population density, and literacy included sequentially and entering significantly and positively as before.

We test the robustness of this result in two ways. First, the US sample allows progressively adding a richer group of controls. Following Murphy et al. (1991) for the present day, in column 4 we include the density of lawyers. This does not alter the magnitude of the engineering variable suggesting that we are not picking up simply higher order human capital. In column 5 we add state-level measures of railroad density and mining activity which, again, capture infrastructure or industrial activity that engineering may be proxying for. The former enters significantly and positively although mining does not and engineering continues to remain significant and of similar magnitude.

It is also possible that engineering is proxying for the institutional differences across states, and in particular, the legacy of slavery. We employ slavery data from Nunn (2008) which reduces our sample to 38 observations. Consistent with Nunn (2008), slavery alone (not shown) enters negatively and significantly. However adding engineering eliminates its importance, while engineering density itself remains strongly significant (Column 6). This suggests that weak engineering capacity is one possible channel through which the institution of slavery depressed Southern incomes.³⁸

Including all variables (column 7) renders many insignificant although engineering prevails. Though we are pushing the data hard given the limited degrees of freedom, engineering retains its significance after controlling for agglomeration effects, other higher order human capital, sectors using engineers that may have an independent effect, and institutions.

Second, though we have controlled for the two activities most related to engineering, in the spirit of Moretti (2004), we also attempt to instrument engineering density using the number of Morrill Land Grant colleges and universities found in each state. As discussed earlier, the Morrill program was introduced in 1868 precisely to remedy the perceived shortfalls in regional technical assistance in agricultural and mechanical innovation. In practice, this program financed the first engineering departments in the emerging West and Midwest and especially in the South. It was to an important degree supply driven. Prior to the Civil War, the South had actively opposed the bill, fearing greater interference in

³⁷Given the small number of observations, we also bootstrap the standard errors. The results remain unchanged.

³⁸Taking the parameter value on engineering from the most complete specification (column 7), the difference in engineering density between the North and the South could account for a log difference of .12 or roughly 13 percent which is, in fact, larger than the difference that currently exists between the two regions.

matters such as universal primary education. The withdrawal of the Confederate States from the US Congress allowed the bill to be passed. However, during Reconstruction, recognizing its technological lag, the South started privately some universities such as Georgia Tech, and actively embraced the Morrill Program.


The first stage reveals a strong and negative correlation between engineering density and the Morrill uptake, suggesting the role of the program as a remedial supply side effort.³⁹ As discussed earlier, Morrill financed programs in Texas, Virginia, Kentucky, and North Carolina began awarding degrees in the 1880s and 1890s which means that their accumulated engineering stock would still be low in 1900. Table 5 presents the second stage results. Though we have few degrees of freedom, engineering enters significantly in all specifications despite sequential addition of agglomeration, literacy and lawyers as controls. The coefficient is significantly higher in all specifications suggesting that the instrument is, in fact, helping to overcome an important downward bias.

In sum, the various estimations offer support to the idea that higher order human capital and institutions related to engineering and science and technology at the turn of the 20th century plausibly are important to explaining present prosperity.

³⁹With 51 observations, this exercise is somewhat heroic and diagnostics should be taken as suggestive. Both the first stage Cragg-Donald F test and Anderson-Rubin test of joint significance of regressors are marginally acceptable suggesting that attempting to instrument is informative. Using the second wave 1890 Morrill grants yields stronger diagnostics although there is less clarity on the selection criteria and hence we prefer using the 1868 wave. Both yield similar second stage results.


11 Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Income 1900 and Engineering Density 1900




Note: Plot of GDP per capita in 1900 from Maddison. Engineering Density is accumulated graduates of engineering programs per 100,000 male workers around 1900 as described in the Annex.

Figure 2: Sub-national Engineering Density, US and Mexico, in 1900



Note: Engineering Density at the subnational level for North America. Derived from census reported engineers per 100,000 male workers around 1900.

Figure 3: Copper Production in Chile and Foreign Engineers



Note: The figure shows the decline in Chilean production and share of the world market for Copper approaching 1900 and then the sharp recovery with the entrants of foreign mining companies and engineers in 1905. Engineering density per 100,000 male workers calculated from National Censuses available until 1920 when Chile ceased to divide by profession-origin.

Table 1: Summary Statistics (State Level, Americas)

Variable	mean	p50	sd	min	max
Ln Income	9.03	8.92	0.91	7.13	11.18
Engineers	25.34	11.00	31.49	5.00	84.00
Engineers (sub)	88.30	44.81	108.69	0.00	472.59
Population Density (1900)	42.78	4.54	248.42	0.00	3319.27
Population Density (1500)	8.88	2.00	26.13	0.00	392.34
Literacy	41.93	34.00	24.41	11.30	86.70
Literacy (sub)	53.86	46.57	30.97	7.64	98.31
Railroads	3.15	1.80	2.71	0.30	9.30
Railroads (sub)	65.12	48.54	57.46	5.16	309.20
South	0.15	0.00	0.36	0.00	1.00
Slavery	20.67	3.28	25.16	0.00	72.66
Lawyers	218.92	139.22	210.93	1.64	1156.44
Mine Output (\$)	.466	.123	1.06	.000075	6.49
Spain	0.81	1.00	0.39	0.00	1.00
Land Suitability	0.56	0.58	0.28	0.00	1.00
River Density	3.28	3.29	1.23	0.00	6.92
Average Temperature	19.97	20.40	5.83	2.38	29.00
Rainfall	1.28	1.10	0.95	0.00	8.13
Altitude	0.66	0.19	0.92	0.00	4.33
Dist. from Coast	0.87	0.91	0.12	0.45	1.00
Ruggedness	126.89	99.33	103.53	0.00	474.34

Notes: Log Income per capita in 2000 (PPP 2005 US dollars). Engineering density measured by engineers per 100.000 male workers. Engineering density measured by engineers per 100.000 male workers, sub-national. Engineering density measured by engineers per 100.000 male workers, sub-national, scaled by national estimates of engineering stock. Population density is number of individuals per 100 square kilometers in 1900. Pre-colonial population density measures the number of natives per square kilometer in 1492. Literacy share of the population that is literate in 1900. Literacy share of the population that is literate in 1900, sub-national. Railroad density measured as miles of track per 1000 square kilometers. Railroad density measured as miles of track per 1000 square kilometers, sub-national. Colonial Good and Bad Institutions as generated by Bruhn and Gallego (2011); none is excluded category. South is a dummy variable for whether the US state is a Southern state according to the US census. Slavery is measured as a fraction of the population and is taken from Bergad (2008) and Nunn (2008). Lawyer density measured by lawyers per 100.000 individuals. Mining is total mining output in 1860 in hundred thousand dollars. Spain is a dummy for whether the country was a Spanish colony: Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. Agriculture Suitability is an index of probability of cultivation given cultivable land, climate and soil composition, from Ramankutty, Foley and McSweeney (2002). Rivers captures the density of rivers as a share of land area derived from HydroSHEDS (USGS 2011). ; Temperature is a yearly average in degrees celsius; Altitude measures the elevation of the capital city of the state in kilometers; and Rainfall captures total yearly rainfall in meters, all are from Bruhn and Gallego (2011). Distance from the Coast from (Gennaioli et al., 2013); Ruggedness of Terrain from Nunn & Puga (2012) .

Table 2: **Summary Statistics (County Level, US)**

Variable	mean	p50	sd	min	max
Ln Income	10.043	10.032	0.219	9.165	11.360
Engineers	0.022	0.000	0.038	0.000	0.299
Patents	0.453	0.274	0.602	0.000	6.041
Ln LGC distance	0.176	0.281	0.683	-5.450	1.765
Rainfall	0.077	0.076	0.042	0.009	0.393
Altitude	0.025	0.023	0.019	0.000	0.175
Ruggedness	0.005	0.003	0.006	0.000	0.043
Distance to river	0.017	0.014	0.014	0.000	0.141
Average Temperature	-0.002	-0.006	0.061	-0.160	0.188
Dist. from Coast	0.027	0.023	0.020	0.000	0.102
Population Density	0.003	0.001	0.049	0.000	2.055
Manufacturing GDP	0.042	0.018	0.066	0.000	0.576
Slavery	0.153	0.019	0.215	0.000	0.925
Railroads	0.584	1.000	0.493	0.000	1.000
Literacy	0.759	0.829	0.203	0.151	1.000
School Assistance 12-17	0.051	0.055	0.018	0.000	0.090
Educational Score	0.073	0.073	0.019	0.035	0.168
Lawyers	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.005
Physicians	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.004

Notes: Log Income per capita in 2000. Engineering density measured by engineers per 100,000 male workers. Patents density measured by patents per 100 habitants. Dist. to LGC is distance to Land Grant College measured by distance between the near LGC and the county centroid. Population density is number of individuals per 100 square kilometers in 1880. Literacy share of the population that is literate in 1880. Secondary is share of 14-17 years olds who report that they are attending school. Tertiary is- percentage of workers who report completing one or more years of college. Railroad is a identifier variable if the county has railroad. Slavery to county level is taken from Nunn (2008). Lawyer density measured by lawyers per 100.000 individuals. Physicians density measured by physicians per 100.000 individuals. Mining is total mining output in 1860 in hundred thousand dollars. Rivers captures the distance between the near river and the county. Rivers taken from HydroSHEDS (USGS 2011). ; Temperature is a yearly average in degrees celsius; Altitude measures the elevation of the capital city of the state in kilometers; and Rainfall captures total yearly rainfall in meters. Dist. to Coast is distance between the coast and the county centroid; Ruggedness of Terrain from Nunn & Puga (2012). Manuf. Output is the manufacturing output per capita in 1880 taken from NHGIS.

Table 3: Summary Regressions: Innovation Capacity (1900) vs Income per capita (2000)
(National Level, Americas)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Engineering	28.4** (14.26)	25.5** (12.87)	27.0* (14.35)	15.7 (27.09)	25.0* (14.71)
Pop Density		0.03* (0.01)			0.03** (0.01)
Railroads			0.07 (0.06)		0.06 (0.07)
Literacy				0.02 (0.02)	
Constant	8.7*** (0.17)	8.8*** (0.22)	8.5*** (0.17)	8.3*** (0.42)	8.6*** (0.32)
N	273	225	273	273	225
N Countries	11	9	11	11	9
R ²	0.77	0.76	0.81	0.81	0.79

Notes: Dependent Variable is log subnational income per capita (2000). Engineering density measured by engineers per 100,000 male workers (coef scaled by 1000). Population density is number of individuals per 100 square kilometers in 1900. Railroad density measured as miles of track per 1000 square kilometers. Literacy share of the population that is literate in 1900. Robust and clustered SE in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Engineering Capacity as a Determinant of Income (County Level, US)

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) OLS	(7) OLS	(8) OLS
Engineers	0.224*** (0.03)	0.289*** (0.04)	0.188*** (0.03)	0.147*** (0.03)	0.184*** (0.03)	0.118*** (0.03)	0.112*** (0.03)	0.0938*** (0.03)
Rainfall	0.0263 (0.06)	0.0328 (0.07)	0.0304 (0.07)	0.0557 (0.07)	0.0290 (0.07)	0.0739 (0.06)	0.0828 (0.07)	0.131 (0.08)
Altitude	-0.00325 (0.03)	-0.0195 (0.08)	0.0335 (0.07)	0.00472 (0.08)	0.0418 (0.07)	0.0168 (0.07)	-0.0108 (0.07)	-0.0716 (0.06)
Ruggedness	-0.0817 (0.08)	-0.0813 (0.1)	-0.104 (0.09)	-0.0295 (0.09)	-0.115 (0.09)	-0.0780 (0.08)	-0.0342 (0.08)	-0.0193 (0.08)
River Dist.	0.0236 (0.03)	0.0148 (0.03)	0.0220 (0.03)	0.0187 (0.03)	0.0187 (0.03)	0.0352 (0.03)	0.0296 (0.03)	0.0293 (0.03)
Temperature	-0.281*** (0.05)	-0.310*** (0.05)	-0.124** (0.06)	-0.0113 (0.05)	-0.0781 (0.06)	-0.131* (0.07)	-0.0361 (0.07)	-0.0784 (0.2)
Coast Dist.	-0.171*** (0.05)	-0.236*** (0.05)	-0.168*** (0.05)	-0.128** (0.05)	-0.174*** (0.05)	-0.176*** (0.05)	-0.129*** (0.05)	-0.0725 (0.09)
Pop. Density			0.0930*** (0.007)	0.0952*** (0.007)	0.0934*** (0.007)	0.0831*** (0.009)	0.0896*** (0.008)	0.0993*** (0.008)
Manuf. Output			0.193*** (0.04)	0.173*** (0.03)	0.212*** (0.04)	0.169*** (0.04)	0.161*** (0.03)	0.122*** (0.04)
Slavery			-0.102 (0.07)	0.179 (0.1)	-0.0419 (0.08)	-0.0216 (0.08)	0.161 (0.1)	0.178** (0.07)
Railroad			0.161*** (0.04)	0.112*** (0.03)	0.144*** (0.03)	0.124*** (0.03)	0.106*** (0.03)	0.0957*** (0.02)
Literacy				0.463*** (0.1)			0.395*** (0.1)	0.502*** (0.07)
Secondary					0.120** (0.05)		0.00482 (0.05)	0.0374 (0.05)
Tertiary						0.142** (0.05)	0.0471 (0.04)	0.0588 (0.04)
Lawyers						0.131*** (0.04)	0.112*** (0.04)	0.119*** (0.03)
Physicians						-0.000377 (0.05)	-0.0463 (0.04)	0.0179 (0.03)
N	2380	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905
R ²	0.188	0.238	0.313	0.362	0.319	0.345	0.371	0.476
FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Dependent Variable is log subnational income per capita (2000). Engineering density measured by engineers per 100,000 male workers (coef. scaled by 1000). Patents density measured by patents per 100 inhabitants. Rainfall captures total yearly rainfall in meters; Altitude measures the elevation of the capital city of the state in kilometers; Ruggedness of Terrain from Nunn & Puga (2012); Rivers captures the distance between the near river and the county. Rivers taken from HydroSHEDS (USGS 2011). Temperature is a yearly average in degrees celsius; Dist. to Coast is distance between the coast and the county centroid. Population density is number of individuals per 100 square kilometers in 1880. Manuf. Output is the manufacturing output per capita in 1880 taken from NHGIS. Slavery to county level is taken from Nunn (2008). Railroad is a identifier variable if the county has railroad. Literacy is share of the population that is literate in 1880. Secondary is share of 14-17 years olds who report that they are attending school. Tertiary is percentage of workers who report completing one or more years of college. Lawyer and Physician density measured per 100 individuals. Engineers instrumented using log distance to nearest Land Grant College measured by distance between the near LGC and the county centroid, estimated by 2SLS and Buchinsky quantile 2SLS. Robust and clustered SE in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Engineering and Patenting Capacity as Determinants of Income: Patents & IV (County Level, US)

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) IV-Buchinsky
Engineers			0.0959*** (0.03)	0.0817*** (0.02)	0.111*** (0.03)	0.161*** (0.04)
Patents	0.125*** (0.04)	0.114*** (0.04)	0.105** (0.04)	0.101*** (0.04)	0.120*** (0.04)	0.0974** (0.04)
Rainfall	0.0860 (0.08)	0.142 (0.08)	0.0815 (0.07)	0.145* (0.08)	0.145* (0.08)	0.147* (0.08)
Altitude	-0.0370 (0.07)	-0.0964 (0.06)	-0.0359 (0.08)	-0.0932 (0.06)	-0.105* (0.05)	-0.0873 (0.06)
Ruggedness	-0.00177 (0.08)	0.00274 (0.07)	-0.0115 (0.08)	-0.000973 (0.07)	-0.00529 (0.07)	-0.000402 (0.07)
River Dist.	0.0306 (0.03)	0.0268 (0.03)	0.0276 (0.02)	0.0256 (0.03)	0.0310 (0.03)	0.0292 (0.03)
Temperature	-0.0248 (0.07)	-0.0681 (0.2)	-0.0385 (0.06)	-0.0731 (0.2)	-0.0507 (0.2)	-0.0750 (0.2)
Coast Dist.	-0.119** (0.05)	-0.0537 (0.09)	-0.118** (0.05)	-0.0493 (0.09)	-0.0411 (0.09)	-0.0740 (0.08)
Pop. Density	0.0889*** (0.007)	0.0983*** (0.008)	0.0891*** (0.008)	0.0985*** (0.008)	0.0946*** (0.008)	0.102*** (0.008)
Manuf. Output	0.135*** (0.04)	0.0886** (0.04)	0.119*** (0.04)	0.0770* (0.04)	0.0829* (0.04)	0.0503 (0.04)
Slavery	0.175 (0.1)	0.189** (0.07)	0.174 (0.1)	0.193*** (0.07)	0.175*** (0.07)	0.166** (0.07)
Railroad	0.117*** (0.03)	0.106*** (0.02)	0.114*** (0.03)	0.103*** (0.02)	0.189*** (0.04)	0.155*** (0.04)
Literacy	0.408*** (0.1)	0.512*** (0.07)	0.401*** (0.1)	0.516*** (0.07)	0.509*** (0.07)	0.506*** (0.07)
Secondary	0.0147 (0.05)	0.0448 (0.05)	0.0148 (0.05)	0.0470 (0.05)	0.0285 (0.05)	0.0445 (0.05)
Tertiary	0.0397 (0.04)	0.0533 (0.04)	0.0290 (0.04)	0.0446 (0.04)	0.0502 (0.04)	0.0297 (0.04)
Lawyers	0.113*** (0.04)	0.117*** (0.04)	0.0916** (0.04)	0.0986*** (0.03)	0.112*** (0.04)	0.102*** (0.03)
Physicians	-0.0496 (0.04)	0.0152 (0.03)	-0.0441 (0.04)	0.0161 (0.03)	0.0127 (0.03)	0.0155 (0.03)
N	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905
R ²	0.370	0.476	0.376	0.480		
FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
F statistical (robust)					14.023	25.45
F statistical (robust and cluster)					7.755	
F Cragg-Donald					20.34	

Notes: Dependent Variable is log subnational income per capita (2000). Engineering density measured by engineers per 100,000 male workers (coef. scaled by 1000). Patents density measured by patents per 100 inhabitants. Rainfall captures total yearly rainfall in meters; Altitude measures the elevation of the capital city of the state in kilometers; Ruggedness of Terrain from Nunn & Puga (2012); Rivers captures the distance between the near river and the county. Rivers taken from HydroSHEDS (USGS 2011). Temperature is a yearly average in degrees celsius; Dist. to Coast is distance between the coast and the county centroid. Population density is number of individuals per 100 square kilometers in 1880. Manuf. Output is the manufacturing output per capita in 1880 taken from NHGIS. Slavery to county level is taken from Nunn (2008). Railroad is a identifier variable if the county has railroad. Literacy share of the population that is literate in 1880. Secondary is share of 14-17 years olds who report that they are attending school. Tertiary is percentage of workers who report completing one or more years of college. Lawyer and Physician density measured per 100 individuals. Engineers instrumented using log distance to nearest Land Grant College measured by distance between the near LGC and the county centroid, estimated by 2SLS and Buchinsky quantile 2SLS. Robust and clustered SE in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. In Column 5, F statistical of instrument's relevance is 14.023 with robust standard errors and 7.755 with robust and clustered to state level standard errors. Cragg-Donald F statistical is 20.34. Using quantile regression in Column 6 F statistical of instrument's relevance is 25.45 with robust standard errors.

Table 6: Innovative Capacity as a Determinant of Income (Fixed Effect, Subnational)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Engineering	1.0*** (0.33)	1.1*** (0.28)	0.6*** (0.17)
Pop Density		0.03** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Literacy			0.01*** (0.00)
Constant	9.5*** (0.41)	9.4*** (0.38)	8.9*** (0.36)
N	170	166	166
N Countries	6	6	6
R ²	0.11	0.18	0.37

Notes: Dependent Variable is log subnational income per capita (2000). Full sample is Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, US and Venezuela. Engineering density measured by engineers per 100,000 male workers (coef. scaled by 1000). Population density is log number of individuals per 100 square kilometers in 1900. Literacy is share of the population that is literate in 1900. Bootstrapped clustered SE in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Mechanisms through which Engineering in 1900 Drives Income in 2000.

	All	New World
Inputs		
R&D/GDP	0.94	0.96
Firm Innovative Capacity	0.94	0.94
Modern Management	0.93	0.93
Outputs		
Patents	0.95	0.98
Technological Adoption	0.84	0.94

Notes: Table reports the correlation between engineering density in 1900 and three inputs and two outputs in the 2000. Inputs: 1. R&D expenditures as a share of GDP. 2. Firm capacity for innovation ranging from pure licensing to pioneering their own new products and processes. “In your country, how do companies obtain technology? [1 = exclusively from licensing or imitating foreign companies; 7 = by conducting formal research and pioneering their own new products and processes]. 3. A globally consistent measure of management quality from Bloom & Van Reenen (2010) and in particular, the sum of the scores on the two the questions dealing with how firms identify new production processes to adopt. On the output side, we have 1. Comin & Hobijn (2010); Comin & Ferrer (2013); Comin et al. (2008)’s measure of technological adoption at the extensive margin, averaging their industrial and sectoral scores and 2. patent applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) per million population as tabulated by the World Economic Forum (2008-9)(World Economic Forum et al., 2012).

Table 8: Determinants of Innovative Capacity (County Level, US)

	Engineers		Patents	
	OLS	Buchinsky	OLS	Quantile
Pop. Density	0.02*** (0.004)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.3*** (0.06)	0.2*** (0.02)
South	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.2*** (0.05)	-0.2*** (0.02)
Slavery	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.7*** (0.07)	-0.3*** (0.05)
River dist.	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.04)	-1.7 (1.3)	-0.7 (0.5)
Temperature	0.09*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.01)	0.4 (0.6)	0.4** (0.2)
Rainfall	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-1.2* (0.7)	-1.3*** (0.3)
Altitude	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.05)	3.8* (2.1)	2.4*** (0.6)
Coast Dist.	-0.06 (0.06)	0.02 (0.03)	-4.5*** (0.9)	-0.7* (0.4)
Ruggedness	0.5* (0.3)	0.2 (0.1)	-16.0*** (5.3)	-9.1*** (1.9)
N	1912	1912	1907	1907
R ²	0.140		0.231	

Notes: Dependent Variable is innovative capacity measured by engineers per 100,000 male workers and patents per 100,000 inhabitants. Pre-colonial population density measures the number of natives per square kilometer in 1492. South a dummy capturing southern US states; slavery as tabulated from the 1860 Census as compiled in Nunn (2008). Rainfall captures total yearly rainfall in meters; Altitude measures the elevation of the capital city of the state in kilometers; Ruggedness of Terrain from Nunn & Puga (2012); Rivers captures the distance between the near river and the county. Rivers taken from HydroSHEDS (USGS 2011). Temperature is a yearly average in degrees celsius; Dist. to Coast is distance between the coast and the county centroid. Population density is number of individuals per 100 square kilometers in 1880. Geographical controls include river density, average temperature, rainfall, altitude, distance from a coast, and ruggedness of terrain. Robust SE in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A1: Engineering Density as a Determinant of Patents & IV (County Level, US)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV-Buchinsky
Engineers	0.308*** (0.04)	0.295*** (0.04)	0.188*** (0.03)	0.188*** (0.03)	0.187*** (0.03)	0.124*** (0.03)	0.120*** (0.03)	-0.0316 (0.03)	0.133*** (0.04)
Rainfall		-0.167 (0.2)	-0.192 (0.2)	-0.193 (0.2)	-0.192 (0.2)	-0.134 (0.1)	-0.141 (0.1)	-0.149 (0.1)	-0.142 (0.1)
Altitude		0.211* (0.1)	0.215** (0.09)	0.215** (0.09)	0.212** (0.09)	0.217** (0.08)	0.213** (0.08)	0.215*** (0.07)	0.217*** (0.07)
Ruggedness		-0.184 (0.1)	-0.187* (0.1)	-0.189* (0.1)	-0.183* (0.1)	-0.175* (0.09)	-0.181** (0.08)	-0.177** (0.08)	-0.180** (0.08)
River Dist.		-0.0221 (0.05)	0.0283 (0.04)	0.0286 (0.04)	0.0297 (0.04)	0.0323 (0.03)	0.0362 (0.03)	0.0374 (0.03)	0.0401 (0.03)
Temperature		-0.0269 (0.2)	-0.00366 (0.1)	-0.00887 (0.1)	-0.0203 (0.1)	0.0183 (0.1)	-0.0519 (0.1)	-0.0503 (0.1)	-0.0505 (0.1)
Coast Dist.		-0.253** (0.10)	-0.202** (0.08)	-0.202** (0.08)	-0.195** (0.08)	-0.227*** (0.08)	-0.229*** (0.08)	-0.244*** (0.08)	-0.254*** (0.07)
Pop. Density			0.0182** (0.008)	0.0182** (0.008)	0.0183** (0.008)	0.0103 (0.007)	0.00874 (0.007)	0.00971 (0.008)	0.0117* (0.007)
Manuf. Output			0.507*** (0.06)	0.508*** (0.06)	0.495*** (0.06)	0.459*** (0.06)	0.442*** (0.06)	0.469*** (0.06)	0.431*** (0.06)
Slavery			-0.0802*** (0.03)	-0.0854*** (0.02)	-0.0985*** (0.03)	-0.0692** (0.03)	-0.144*** (0.03)	-0.149*** (0.03)	-0.169*** (0.03)
Railroad			-0.0483 (0.03)	-0.0473 (0.03)	-0.0440 (0.03)	-0.0833*** (0.03)	-0.0734** (0.03)	-0.0660** (0.03)	-0.0938*** (0.03)
Literacy				-0.0128 (0.04)			-0.144** (0.06)	-0.152** (0.06)	-0.155** (0.06)
Secondary					-0.0672* (0.04)		-0.0950** (0.04)	-0.0954*** (0.03)	-0.0991*** (0.04)
Tertiary						0.104** (0.04)	0.141*** (0.04)	0.157*** (0.04)	0.135*** (0.04)
Lawyers						0.203*** (0.06)	0.203*** (0.05)	0.236*** (0.06)	0.219*** (0.06)
Physicians						-0.00798 (0.03)	0.0181 (0.04)	0.0178 (0.04)	0.0171 (0.03)
N	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905
R ²	0.316	0.340	0.471	0.471	0.472	0.505	0.511		
FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Dependent Variable is patents per 100,00 inhabitants (1900). Engineering density measured by engineers per 100,000 male workers (coef. scaled by 1000). Patents density measured by patents per 100 inhabitants. Rainfall captures total yearly rainfall in meters; Altitude measures the elevation of the capital city of the state in kilometers; Ruggedness of Terrain from Nunn & Puga (2012); Rivers captures the distance between the near river and the county. Rivers taken from HydroSHEDS (USGS 2011). Temperature is a yearly average in degrees celsius; Dist. to Coast is distance between the coast and the county centroid. Population density is number of individuals per 100 square kilometers in 1880. Manuf. Output is the manufacturing output per capita in 1880 taken from NHGIS. Slavery to county level is taken from Nunn (2008). Railroad is a identifier variable if the county has railroad. Literacy share of the population that is literate in 1880. Secondary is share of 14-17 years olds who report that they are attending school. Tertiary is percentage of workers who report completing one or more years of college. Lawyer and Physician density measured per 100 individuals. Engineers instrumented using log distance to nearest Land Grant College measured by distance between the near LGC and the county centroid, estimated by 2SLS and Buchinsky quantile 2SLS. Robust and clustered SE in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. In Column 5, F statistical of instrument's relevance is 14.023 with robust standard errors and 7.755 with robust and clustered to state level standard errors. Cragg-Donald F statistical is 20.34. Using quantile regression in Column 6 F statistical of instrument's relevance is 25.45 with robust standard errors.

Table A2: Innovative Capacity as a Determinant of Income (US)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Engineering	0.5*** (0.15)	0.8*** (0.15)	0.4*** (0.14)	0.4** (0.18)	0.6*** (0.11)	1.2*** (0.40)	1.2*** (0.33)
Pop Density		0.04*** (0.01)					-0.008 (0.03)
Literacy			0.003* (0.00)				0.01 (0.01)
Lawyers				0.2 (0.21)			-0.2 (0.23)
Railroads					0.002*** (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)
Mining					-14.7 (10.58)		-23.1*** (7.12)
Slavery						-0.0002 (0.00)	0.006 (0.00)
South						-0.004 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.07)
Constant	10.6*** (0.02)	10.4*** (0.06)	10.4*** (0.15)	10.6*** (0.07)	10.5*** (0.03)	10.6*** (0.06)	9.3*** (0.91)
N	51	51	51	51	44	38	34
R ²	0.14	0.40	0.17	0.17	0.47	0.41	0.60

Notes: Dependent Variable is log subnational income per capita (2000). Engineering density measured by engineers per 100,000 male workers (coef. scaled X 1000). Population density is log number of individuals per square kilometer in 1900. Literacy share of the population that is literate in 1900. Lawyer density measured by lawyers per 100,000 individuals (coef. scaled X 1000). Institutional Controls: Slavery and South "Railroad density measured as miles of track per 1000 square kilometers. Mining is total mining output in 1880 in US 100,000 dollars. Robust SE in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Innovative Capacity as a Determinant of Income (US, instrumented)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Engineering	0.9* (0.50)	1.6*** (0.51)	0.8** (0.36)	0.9** (0.40)	2.1** (1.06)
Pop Density		0.07*** (0.02)			0.08** (0.03)
Literacy			0.002 (0.00)		-0.002 (0.00)
Lawyers				-0.02 (0.25)	-0.3 (0.34)
Constant	10.6*** (0.08)	10.3*** (0.11)	10.4*** (0.16)	10.6*** (0.08)	10.5*** (0.25)
N	51	51	51	51	51
R ²	0.02	0.06	0.09	0.02	.

Notes: Dependent Variable is log subnational income per capita (2000). Engineering density measured by engineers per male workers (coef. scaled X 1000). Population density is log number of individuals per square kilometer in 1900. Literacy share of the population that is literate in 1900. Lawyer density measured by lawyers per 100.000 individuals (coef. scaled X 1000). Robust SE in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. R^2 in specification 5 is close to 1 but not calculated.