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STEIN ROKKAN'S CONCEPTUAL MAP OF EUROPE

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Rokkan's Way

Stein Rokkan never settled for small problems or easy generalizations. Throughout his three decades of involvement in comparative international research, indeed, he showed an almost instinctive reluctance to give priority to any single variable, force, or process. Confronted with an argument for a single dominant variable, such as Karl Deutsch's mobilization or Immanuel Wallerstein's capitalism, Rokkan usually treated the argument as incomplete, as a useful beginning for some class of cases, as a proposal to add another problem and another variable to the accumulating agenda. He worked most easily and effectively with the schemes of the great differentiators; Juan Linz, Talcott Parsons and -- more distantly, but profoundly -- Max Weber often supplied him with models and analogies.

Yet over and over again Stein Rokkan felt the attraction of general propositions. When a Barrington Moore, an Albert Hirschman, or a Perry Anderson came along, he could not resist the temptation to try out the new comparative scheme . . . and to incorporate it, if possible, into his own vast framework. Rokkan characteristically incorporated the new scheme by flattening it: by adopting its variables without adopting its priorities, by treating its main arguments as partial hypotheses with a number of likely qualifications and exceptions. He never escaped the creative tension between the urge to generalize and the passion to account for the particularities of every variant. Biographically, temperamentally, and intellectually, Stein Rokkan came to the center from the periphery. He never lost the sense of a world consisting largely of peripheries -- peripheries that are rich, varied, and worthy of explanation in their own terms.

Stein Rokkan's creative tension extended to his treatment of his own creations. He adopted a compulsively dialectical approach to the models he turned out in such profusion: an incessant round of thesis, antithesis,

synthesis, with the latest synthesis becoming almost instantly the object of a new antithesis. In a remarkable statement of intellectual autobiography opening a 1976 meeting of the Association Française de Science Politique, Rokkan declared that he would

try to explain the intellectual genealogy of a series of models I have developed in the course of my comparative research on Western Europe. You will see at once that they are sketches, trials, and drafts. I have published some of these models, but I have never been satisfied with them: as soon as I have published a version of a model I have been struck by new logical or empirical difficulties and have felt compelled to take up the work again, to rethink the structure of the concepts and variables. We are not dealing with a theoretical structure that is nearly complete: on the contrary, more and more I am convinced that it is a long-term task, an unending series of dialectical confrontations between promising explanatory efforts and the hard, pitiless facts of history and of empirical sociology. So far I have contributed little to this interactive process: I've developed some schemes, but have not had the time or the energy to push the analysis on to a complete systematization of all the combinations implicit in those schemes (Rokkan 1976: 1-2).

Two features of Rokkan's confession stand out: the exquisite sensitivity to incompleteness and contradiction; the driving idea that, nonetheless, the aim of comparative analysis is to create categories and explanations for all the many variants of the phenomenon under study.

What was that phenomenon? At one time or another, Rokkan conducted international comparisons concerning the meaning of the word "democracy", the

characteristics of teachers, the determinants of voter participation, the extension of voting rights, the forms of political cleavage, the structures of national states, and a number of other political phenomena. These diverse inquiries do not all connect neatly with one another. Nor would Rokkan have claimed they did. Nevertheless, an enduring problem lay at the center of Rokkan's thirty-year effort: Given the facts that people throughout the world vary enormously in their interests and aspirations, and that the political possibilities before them always correspond imperfectly to their interests and aspirations, what determines the concrete political means and outcomes that different groups of people actually have available to them?

In struggling with that enduring problem, Stein Rokkan never settled for a reductionist explanation: not the reduction of political means and outcomes to the simple expression of the population's interests; not the reduction to variations in political institutions such as voting laws and party systems; not the reduction to a vague but encompassing "political culture". As time went on, he turned increasingly to complex historical explanations. Confronted with a set of variations in contemporary political means and outcomes, he would move back in time, looking for the crucial choices -- rapid or gradual, explicit or implicit -- that set presumably similar peoples on different paths of development. Thus the precocity or lateness of industrialization, the historical dominance of landed or capitalist classes, the region's response to the Protestant Reformation, and many other features of a region's past became possible determinants of its present politics.

The same creative tension that drove all Rokkan's work informed his investigation of historical choice-points. The list of cruxes fluctuated, and

lengthened. One characteristic translation of the list into a diagram appears in Figure 1. The diagram comes from the manuscript (Economy, Territory, Identity. The Politics of the European Peripheries) on which Stein Rokkan was working at his death. In it hide at least the following variables:

1. relationship of the region to the seven major Völkerwanderungen (migrations of peoples) which left their residues across the European map;
2. extent and centrality of the region's urban networks;
3. subjection of the region to major empires;
4. religious outcome of the Reformation, including the encouragement or discouragement of distinctive written vernaculars;
5. organization of agricultural production.

Each of these items, obviously, contains much more than one simple variable. Still, the list as a whole conveys a strong series of messages: not to rely on timeless, abstract schemes such as the "crises of development" (penetration/integration/participation/identity/legitimacy/distribution) with which he had been working ten years earlier; to insist on the interaction of economic, political, religious, and demographic factors; to ground the major variables in history. The idea, then, is to explain the differences among contemporary political systems -- and, in this case, especially the political systems of peripheral areas such as Norway or Ireland -- as cumulative consequences of their regions' connections to the chief differentiating processes which had earlier transformed Europe as a whole. Only then, Rokkan suggested, might it be useful to abstract and generalize concerning such questions as the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on party systems.

Such a delay of the final score often reveals an author's loss of interest in the game. In Rokkan's case, however, the hope for an ultimate set




FIGURE 1. STEIN ROKKAN'S MODEL OF EUROPEAN SPATIAL DIFFERENTIATION

of generalizations never seems to have disappeared. As he reviewed one of his later summaries of the European experience, for example, Rokkan outlined a world-wide set of variations among the world's geocultural areas. The "master variables" he singled out were:

1. secular/religious differentiation;
2. linguistic unification/distinctiveness;
3. differentiation/independence of city networks;
4. concentration/dispersion of landholdings (Rokkan 1975: 592-595).

Whether he saw the world in the image of Europe, or Europe in the image of the world, is no doubt an idle question. Either way, the correspondence between this list and his diagramming of European history communicates a clear sense that the exploration of Europe yields information concerning the structure of the world at large.

#### Rokkan's "Conceptual Maps of Europe"

Stein Rokkan was a great inventor of conceptual devices. One of his more intriguing inventions took the form of "conceptual maps" summarizing the principles of geopolitical differentiation within Europe at various points in time. North/South differentiation, for example, always represented some version of the influence of Mediterranean events and structures -- most commonly, the heritage left by the Roman Empire. Rokkan built and modified his conceptual maps in the same dialectical style he applied to his other work: picking up clues from other people's efforts at simplification, stating bold hypotheses only to qualify them immediately, constantly altering the categories, dimensions,



and placements within them.

The very creation of the conceptual maps, indeed, occurred as part of the Rokkanian dialectic. In his semi-autobiographical statement of 1976, Rokkan explained that he turned to the cartographic effort out of dissatisfaction with the sorts of models of cleavage structures and of democratization he had presented in his Citizens, Elections, Parties (1970). Especially, he said, the model of democratization; it "was too atomizing: it treated each case in isolation, without taking account of its connections with its surroundings, of the geopolitical position of the area in question. I began to study the links in space among the different cases, and became convinced of the decisive importance of interregional relationships, both in the process of nation-building as in the further structuring of mass mobilization (Rokkan 1976: 9; emphasis in original text). Rokkan's intuition fell right on target. The most disconcerting feature of his earlier models is their implicit analogy with the giant cross-tabulations beloved of survey researchers: large samples of ostensibly independent "cases", each one self-contained, line up neatly in rows and columns representing the abstract dimensions of theoretical importance. The conceptual maps, as we shall see, did not banish this misleading analogy. They did reduce its scope. More so than any of Rokkan's previous models, they pointed toward a genuinely interactive, historical account of European statemaking.

As of 1979, Rokkan was working with the two conceptual maps appearing in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows us his summary of the geography of major

FIGURE 2. ROKKAN'S GEOETHNIC MAP OF EUROPE BEFORE THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES

	<u>ATLANTIC PERIPHERY</u>	<u>COASTAL PLAINS</u>	<u>CENTRAL PLAINS AND ALPINE TERR.</u>	<u>LANDWARDS MARCHLANDS</u>
<u>BEYOND THE REACH OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE</u>	Icelanders Faeroese West Norse Celts: Scotland, Ireland	East Norse Danes	Swedes	Finns Balts Prussians Poles, Lithuanians Moravians, Czechs
<u>TERRITORY OF THE NORTHERN EMPIRE</u>	Celts: Wales Cornwall Brittany	Angles, Saxons Frisians, Jutes; West Franks/ Gallo-Romans Normans	<u>Germanic Tribes:</u> Burgundians Saxons Alemanni Rhaetians	East Franks Thuringians Bavarians Hungarians Bavarian settlers Tirolians
<u>MEDITERRANEAN TERRITORIES</u>	Basques	Occitans Catalans Corsicans Castilians Portuguese	Lombards Italians Sardinians Sicilians	Slovenes Croats Serbs

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European ethnic clusters before the High Middle Ages. For practical purposes, some such distribution served as the baseline for all of Rokkan's historical analyses; he made no effort to explain the Roman Empire's pattern of influence or the processes of division, amalgamation, and migration that spread distinctive cultural groups across the European map. Thus we begin with some Celts (Welsh, Cornish, and Breton) inside the limits of the northern Roman Empire, and others (Scots and Irish) outside its limits. The conceptual map places the raw materials of European statemaking and political differentiation in a crude spatial grid.

The map is selective, and oriented to the future. Practically none of the Arctic-dwellers appear in it. Along the eastern frontier, we look in vain for Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Wallachians, Macedonians, Kors, Vots, Letts, Turks, Greeks. The scheme distinguishes Lombards from Italians, but does not separate Piedmontese, Venetians, or Neapolitans. On the whole, an ethnic group has a much greater chance to show up on the map if at some time after 1300 someone built a state dominated by people of that cultural origin.

Let us be clear and fair. Rokkan never claimed that the scheme provided more than a crude simplification of a complex process spread over centuries. With that understanding, the scheme has its uses. As Rokkan summarized:

These territorial distributions provided the ethnic-linguistic infrastructures for the institutional developments of the High Middle Ages; the first steps towards the consolidation of centralized monarchies, the early leagues of cities, the first consociational structures. In the next round, the distribution of ethnic identities and affinities determined the character and the cost of linguistic

standardization within each of these territorial structures: the development of such central standards was accelerated by the invention of printing and the religious conflicts of the Reformation and put the peripheries under heavy pressures to accept the norms set by the territorial centres (Rokkan 1979: 1-32).

Thus, in Rokkan's view, the prior distribution of ethnic groups determined one of the major variations in the costs of subsequent statemaking, and helped determine which of Europe's territories and groups would become politically peripheral.

Rokkan's second conceptual map (Figure 3 shows its 1979 variant) lays out the distribution of political entities in Europe from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. It therefore stops history after enormous reshaping of the ethnic "raw materials", at a point when national states had already become the dominant organizations within the European continent, but were still struggling mightily to increase their power within their own territories, within Europe, and in the world as a whole. In fact, the names attached to different locations in the map introduce uncertainty about the reference date and about the units Rokkan had in mind: as a state, no "Belgium" existed before 1830, no "Italy" before 1870. By that time, however, any political unit one might reasonably call "Burgundy" had long since crumbled into morsels gobbled up by France, Prussia, and the successors of the Habsburg empires. And so on through the map.

Clearly, the conceptual map has little value as an index to a precise historical moment or a catalog of a specific historical unit. Instead, it calls attention to systematic differences in the political experiences of people dwelling in various regions of Europe, as a function of their relationships to two major "axes" of development. Rokkan calls the East-West

		THE "STATE-ECONOMY" DIMENSIONS: WEST-EAST AXIS						
Terr. Centres City Netw.	WEAK WEAK Seaward Peripheries	STRONG STRONG		WEAK STRONG City-State Europe			STRONG WEAK Landward Empire-Nations	WEAK WEAK Landward Buffers
		DISTANT	CLOSE	Integrated Into Larger System	Consocia- tional Formation	Fragment- ed until 19th Century	CLOSE	DISTANT
Protestant State Church	ICELAND NORWAY SCOTLAND WALÉS		DENMARK				HANCE GER- MANY PRUSSIA	SWEDEN FINLAND
Mixed Territories		ENGLAND			NETHER- LANDS RHINE- LAND SWITZER- LAND			BAL TIC TERRITORIES BOHEMIA
National Catholic	IRELAND BRITTANY		FRANCE	"Lotharinnia" BURGUNDY ARELATUM			BAVARIA	POLAND
Counter- Reforma- tion			SPAIN PORTUGAL	CATALONIA	BELGIUM	ITALY	AUSTRIA	HUNGARY

FIGURE 3. ROKKAN'S CONCEPTUAL MAP OF EUROPE, 16th-18th CENTURIES  
(States recognized as sovereign, 1648-1789, shown in italics.)

line his "state-economy" axis. On the West, states which extracted surplus from a highly monetized economy, long stimulated by its involvement in seaborne trade. In the center, the band of tightly-linked trading cities extending from northern Italy up to Flanders, surrounded by areas of intensive agriculture: city-state Europe. On the East, states which ultimately extracted their surplus from coerced agricultural labor. This axis, declares Rokkan,

reflects the fundamental asymmetry of the geopolitical structure of Europe: the dominant city network of the politically fragmented trade belt from the Mediterranean to the North, the strength of the cities in the territories consolidated to the seaward side of this belt, the weakness of the cities in the territories brought together under the strong military centres on the landward Marchland (Rokkan 1979: 42).

The statemaking implications of the "state-economy" axis are evident.

The North-South dimension, in contrast, receives the name of "state-culture" axis. There, according to Rokkan, we see the long-run impact of the Roman Empire, as transmuted into the relative influence of the Roman Catholic Church and its Orthodox sister in different bands of Europe. To the North, we find a band in which national Protestant churches early marked off religious and linguistic areas within which the barriers to the state's cultural penetration were relatively low. As we approach the South, we encounter increasing degrees of religious "supraterritoriality", with correspondingly higher barriers to cultural integration. In the Mediterranean band, according to the map's implicit argument, the strong

presence of an international religious structure presented statemakers with a serious rival, and ethnic particularists with a strong base for resistance to national integration.

Despite the vagueness in its references to historical times, places, peoples, and political units, Rokkan's conceptual map identifies some principles of variation within Europe which other treatments of European political development regularly miss. To be sure, some predecessor made each of the major arguments which Rokkan translated into an "axis", "dimension" or "band" of his diagram; he worked, as we have seen, largely by transmogrifying and assimilating other people's monocausal structures. But the notion of an encompassing, two-dimensional process of differentiation in Europe's human geography which limited the possibilities for statemaking in different corners of the continent -- that notion, so far as I know, was Rokkan's own invention.

The conceptual maps have some of the characteristic weaknesses of all Rokkan's major models. In a perceptive exegesis of Rokkan's political geography, Bertrand Badie remarks:

All in all, the variables Rokkan constructs in the course of his analysis are so numerous and defined so independently of one another that the conceptual map which results provides no more than an orderly juxtaposition of individual cases, each one representing an irreducible form of state- and nation-building. As compared with the methods of [Perry] Anderson and [Immanuel] Wallerstein, this method has the advantage of offering a more detailed and complex summary of the differences among European societies. On the other hand, it abandons any effort at an integrated, hierarchical explanation of political

development, and thus moves away from sociological analysis, and the universal phenomena that analysis seeks to illuminate. Beyond the debate on the autonomy of politics, we begin to witness the confrontation between two different approaches, two different ways to use history in a developmental perspective. Anderson and Wallerstein turn to an historical method in order to show how differentiation occurs as a result of the operation of a factor they have previously defined as fundamental to national development; in contrast, Rokkan uses history to make an empirical review, by means of "retrospective diachronic analysis", of all the factors which might somehow have influenced the various observable forms of change; but he cannot gauge their weights or their interrelations (Badie 1980: 115-116).

That judgment is, in my view, a bit too harsh. Like a seasoned tabulator of survey responses, Rokkan implicitly invoked two interpretive principles: a rule of variance-reduction and a rule of parsimony. He preferred variables which reduced the unexplained variance. For a given amount of variance-reduction, he preferred a smaller number of variables. Conscientiously followed, the two principles sometimes lead an investigator to spurious and/or superficial explanations. But they also urge the investigator to eliminate distinctions which do not actually make a difference, to give priority to distinctions which make a difference in a wide range of cases, and to undertake motivated choices among variables which overlap extensively. If we were to indict Rokkan's application of the principles of variance-reduction and parsimony, it would surely be for excessive zeal: for seeking to eradicate all the unexplained variation, and for incessantly substituting new variables for old in the search for the Great Underlying Variable.



At a minimum, Rokkan's procedure has the merit of clarifying what we have to explain. A significant part of the literature purporting to deal with "political development", after all, consists of sketches of explanations for things that never happened: standard sequences of political institutionalization, the achievement of national integration, and so on. A good deal of the same literature, furthermore, misconstrues the European experience: imagining it, for example, to consist of a series of approximations, more or less successful, to British parliamentary democracy. In these intellectual circumstances, we must welcome an empirically-grounded specification of what the analysts of European political development actually have to explain. The geographical distribution identified by Rokkan calls for explanation: why the central band of commercial cities and their hinterlands long and successfully resisted integration into large national states, why culturally homogeneous and autonomous states concentrated disproportionately along the northwestern frontier, and on down the inventory. In addition, Rokkan's axes themselves pose significant explanatory problems: if the initial sway of the Catholic Church over everyday social relations does not explain the marked North/South differences in the creation of national churches strongly controlled by their respective states, what does? Is it not true, as Rokkan suggests, that their immediate access to commercial cities made it easier for the statemakers of Europe's western regions to bypass their great landlords and raise essential revenues from trade? Stein Rokkan's conceptual maps make such questions clearer and more pressing.

At that point, however, Bertrand Badie's complaint begins to gain force. The number of "variables" that visibly affected the direction taken by one European state or another is very large. Even with the wide variety

of political units Rokkan takes into consideration, no strictly empirical sorting of the multiple European experiences can come close to identifying the crucial variables, eliminating the incidental variables, or specifying the relations among the variables. By itself, Rokkan's search procedure leads to an endless alternation of thesis and antithesis, without synthesis.

More important, the conceptual maps ultimately fail to accomplish the objective for which they originally seemed well suited: the examination of spatially-ordered links among political histories. Despite some intriguing hints of interdependence, the scheme as a whole presents the various national experiences as individual "cases" displaying the results of being subjected to different combinations of "variables". But Sweden, to take an obvious instance, is not simply a "case" located somewhere in the northern reaches of a giant cross-tabulation. The Sweden which appears on Rokkan's conceptual map is a shrunken remainder of the expansive power which at one time or another dominated Norway, Finland, Estonia, Livonia, and other important parts of the North. Can we reconstruct the political development of Sweden -- or, for that matter, of Norway, Finland, Estonia and Livonia -- without taking that interaction directly into account? As a Norwegian, Stein Rokkan was acutely aware of Sweden's long hegemony in the North. Yet his scheme tends to reduce the known facts of international power to effects of similar positions within an abstract grid.

#### What's Lacking? What Should We Do About It?

Faced with that critique, I suppose Stein Rokkan would have smiled, run his fingers through his bushy hair, and replied, "Yes, that's right. How do you think we should get those international connections in?" He was the first to discount the current version of his model, to bemoan the connections

it missed, to look for ways of altering it to deal more adequately with historical realities. With such a man, one did not hesitate to criticize. But, the criticism stated and discussed, one always felt a certain desire to help. Rokkan's influence endures: the work left unfinished in 1979 invites us to take up the task and continue the search for better formulations.

On the questions addressed by his conceptual maps, where did Stein Rokkan leave the task? Let us recognize the value of those maps. First, they help us see that there was a spatial order to the development of national states in Europe -- and order which such classifications as center/semi-periphery/periphery simply do not capture. Second, they make a case for the independent importance of variations in religious organization (or of other factors strongly correlated with religious organization) as an influence on the builders of states in different parts of Europe. Third, they cast new light on an old paradox: the fact that capitalism and national states grew up together, and presumably depended on each other in some way, yet capitalists and centers of capital accumulation often offered concerted resistance to the extension of state power. Rokkan's emphasis on the network of trading cities brings out the probabilities that a) where those networks were dense, local capitalists had an interest in resisting incorporation into strong states, and the means of defending that interest, b) access to the taxable trade organized by those cities, and to the capital accumulated within them, gave crucial advantages to statemakers whose territories lay athwart, or adjacent to, the dense trading networks, c) only late, gradually, and incompletely did the masters of European states nationalize the capital on which they drew, both in the sense of insuring that capital accumulated within a state's effective territory was at the disposition of that state and no others, and in the sense of relying mainly on local capital for the credit and financial administration required to meet the state's operating expenses, and d) the statemakers of eastern Europe,

unlike their counterparts to the west, had compelling reasons for relying heavily on their regions' landlords, and for clamping both the peasantry and the urban classes under tight controls.

More generally, Rokkan's conceptual maps embody an important hypothesis.

We might outline it this way:

1. in a broad sense, statemakers and would-be statemakers in all parts of Europe were aiming at similar ends, but
2. both the means to accomplish those ends and the strategic problems posed by threats and opportunities in adjacent areas varied systematically by location within the continent, and
3. the different approaches to statemaking taken as a consequence of those variations in means and strategic problems produced significantly different political structures, region by region.

The hypothesis is important precisely because it is not self-evident. To the extent that we consider the structure of a state to result directly from the interests of its dominant classes, for example, we will doubt that statemakers in different parts of Europe were, indeed, pursuing similar ends, and will be more inclined to attribute systematic geopolitical variation to the geography of dominant classes and their interests. Rokkan's scheme recognizes the significance of that geography of interests, but treats it as a set of constraints on aspiring statemakers.

In this light, the greatest flaw in the argument represented by the conceptual maps is one I have not mentioned at all. The argument does not say why the people who built different kinds of states undertook the effort in the first place. Were they simply attempting to build up their personal power by whatever means were available? Did they have a vision, however dim and faulty, of the sort of structure they were struggling to create? Did states take shape as unintended by-products of efforts directed to other ends? I am not sure whether Stein Rokkan ever addressed these questions directly, or what reply he would have given them in 1979. For my own part, I think the answer is: some of each. The people who extended the power of national states were surely attempting, on the whole, to advance the interests of their own families, of their own factions, of the classes to which they belonged. The vision they had

occasionally showed the influence of a doctrine or an historical memory, but most often represented the condition of a rival: the point was to create an organization sufficiently effective to check, or even vanquish, that rival. Yet the state structures that actually took shape grew largely as unintended by-products of other activities.

Which activities? The question helps us to become more specific about the elements missing from Rokkan's scheme. The interactions of warmaking, taxation, and capital accumulation profoundly shaped European statemaking. Europeans did not undertake those three great activities with the intention of creating centralized, differentiated, autonomous, far-reaching political organizations -- national states. Nor did they ordinarily foresee that organizations of that sort would emerge as a consequence of the pursuit of warmaking, taxation, and capital accumulation. To put it very, very crudely: the people who controlled European states (and organizations on their way to becoming states) made war in order to hold off, or to master, their competitors, and thus to enjoy the fruits of power within a secure, or even expanding, territory. To make more effective war, they attempted to locate more capital. In the short run, they might acquire that capital by conquest, by selling off their assets, by coercing or dispossessing accumulators of capital. In the long run, the quest involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit, and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the people and activities within their own territories. As the process went on, they developed a durable interest in promoting the accumulation of capital, sometimes in the guise of direct return to their own enterprises,

sometimes in order to assure the availability of capital to borrow and tax, sometimes to forward the interests of the capitalists on whom they relied for financing. All these activities required organization: the creation of standing armies, the establishment of services to supply those armies, the institution of tax-collecting bureaucracies, the shaping of banks, markets, and mints. Statemakers did not seek to create the organization; they sought to sustain the activity. But the organization they created to sustain the activity hardened into the apparatus of a national state: durable, centralized, differentiated, autonomous, powerful.

My account is willfully crude and incomplete. It may well be wrong. I certainly have provided no evidence here for its correctness. To the extent that it is plausible, nevertheless, this line of argument indicates what kind of effort would most effectively continue Stein Rokkan's three-decade inquiry: his underlying search for the origins of the political means and outcomes available to different groups of Europeans. A further tracing of the geographic variations identified by Rokkan's conceptual maps will not yield large intellectual returns; the maps have served their purpose. In general, the next round of work must examine the interactions among contenders for power and their consequences for the creation of new political structures. In particular, the interactions involved in warmaking, taxation, and the accumulation of capital deserve the closest attention.

Stein Rokkan never settled for small problems or easy generalizations. Neither should we, his heirs and debtors.

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