


International Terrorism and Finland

Toby Archer



International Terrorism and Finland

Toby Archer

Toby Archer
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
toby.archer@upi-fia.fi

Research Assistant:
Mikko Väyrynen
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
mikko.vayrynen@upi-fia.fi



Ulkopoliittinen instituutti
Utrikespolitiska institutet
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs 2004
<http://www.upi-fia.fi>

**International Terrorism
and Finland**

FIIA Report 7/2004

The reports can be ordered from
the Finnish Institute of International
Affairs, tel. +358 9 4342 0718
erja.kangas@upi-fiia.fi

The reports are also available at the
website of the Finnish Institute of
International Affairs
<http://www.upi-fiia.fi>

Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen
Cover and layout design:
Vesa Tuukkanen
Layout: Teresa Pohjola

**The Finnish Institute of
International Affairs**

Mannerheimintie 15 A
FIN-00260 Helsinki
Tel. +358 9 4342 070
Fax +358 9 4342 0769
<http://www.upi-fiia.fi>
e-mail: firstname.surname@upi-fiia.fi

ISBN: 951-769-155-6
ISSN: 1458-994X
Printed by Otamedia Oy,
Espoo, Finland

Contents

Acknowledgements	4
Executive Summary.....	7
Terrorism and Finland – definitions	10
Political violence, terrorism, globalization and Finland	14
The almost complete absence of political violence in Finland since WWII.....	15
Signals of ‘new’ political violence within Finland in the post-Cold War era...18	
A historical background to Islamist Terrorism	23
<i>Takfir</i> and <i>Jihad</i> : The theological justification for terrorism.....	23
Wahhabism and the Saudi connection.....	24
The Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb.....	26
The Afgan <i>Jihad</i> and the formation of al-Qaeda.....	30
The “near” and the “far enemy” – the US becomes the target.....	31
East Africa to September 11.....	35
An unending war?.....	36
Understanding the threat of Terrorism for Finland.....	39
Capability.....	40
Motivation.....	42
Investigating the motivations of Islamist terrorists.....	43
Islamist Radicalism in Europe.....	48
Intelligence failures and mistakes.....	59
Islamist Militancy in Finland?.....	60
Indirect threats to Finland.....	68
Threats to overseas Finnish interests.....	68
The threat of attacks elsewhere in Europe and their repercussions for Finland.....	69
Peacekeeping/Peace enforcement.....	73
Economic interests.....	74
Other indirect risks.....	74
International organisations and Counter Terrorism activities.....	77
The United Nations.....	77
The European Union.....	79
NATO/PfP.....	85
Conclusion.....	89
References.....	93
Bibliography.....	100
Do you want to know more?.....	106
Previously published in the series.....	107

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the experts, officials and researchers who took the time to meet us and answer our questions. We met representatives of:

United States Department of State
United States Department of Defense
United States National Security Council
United States Congressional Research Service
United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
United Kingdom Home Office
Swedish Ministry of Defence
Swedish National Criminal Investigation Department
Swedish Defence Research Agency
Swedish Emergency Management Agency – SEMA
European Commission
European Council General Secretariat
European Union Institute of Security Studies
NATO Military Staff
NATO International Secretariat
Commissariat à L'Énergie Atomique (Paris)
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (Paris)
Kings College, Department of Defence Studies (London)
RAND (Cambridge, UK)
CSIS – Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Washington)
RAND (Washington)
Heritage Foundation (Washington)
The Cato Institute (Washington)
AEI – American Enterprise Institute (Washington)
ANSER Institute for Homeland Security (Washington)
National Defense University (Washington)

Additionally, we would like to thank the Finnish Embassy in Washington, and the Finnish Representation to NATO in Brussels, for their assistance in organising interviews.

Executive Summary

This report was commissioned from The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) by the Finnish Ministry of Defence, to investigate the implications of international terrorism for Finland in the light of the devastating September 11 attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda, in 2001.

The report considers conceptual questions, such as ‘what is terrorism?’, but in an effort to be policy relevant, it adopts a functional definition of the phenomenon: that terrorism is the use of violence, or threat of violence, by non-state actors in an effort to influence, persuade, cower or destroy a society or state, in pursuit of some political, ideological or religious aim.

Due to the prominence of al-Qaeda and its associated groups in the current efforts to counter terrorism, the report is centrally concerned with what is commonly described as Islamic terrorism, but which the report argues is better described as Islamist terrorism. The report investigates the origins of this extreme reading of Islamic holy texts, and considers how certain modern historical processes have produced, amplified and spread the phenomenon. Two concepts are central to the Islamist extremists’ worldview: *Jihad* – that the extremists take to mean holy war against disbelievers, and *Takfir* – the act of pronouncing other Muslims to be disbelievers and therefore making them into valid targets of *jihad*. This ideology was turned into a global phenomenon through the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Islamists were oppressed in numerous Muslim states; marginalizing them from the political process and giving them no way to express their ideology. Denied the ability to act in their own states, many travelled to Afghanistan to take part in the *jihad* against the Soviets. Many Arab and Muslim states actively supported the *jihad* financially and politically, both to bolster their own Islamic credentials at home and as a way of allowing

devout young men to act on their beliefs in a manner that did not threaten the security of their own states. When the Soviet Union was defeated, numerous well trained and radicalised fighters, linked by their ideology, dispersed around the world forming the basis of the loosely connected 'network of networks' of terrorists we see today.

The report goes on to consider the two factors necessary for a terrorist attack to take place – capability and motive – and whether these exist in the case of Finland. The report argues that practical difficulties exist that limit the capability of terrorists coming to Finland to launch an attack, but there are also many difficulties for law enforcement (such as the right to free movement within the Schengen area) in stopping a sufficiently motivated terrorist. The report argues that Islamist terrorists see themselves at war with “Jews and Crusaders”, and this basically covers all of the Western World. Although certain countries appear to be priority targets, the report concludes that there is no reason why Finland or Finns might not be targeted if the opportunity presents itself.

The radicalisation of, in particular, young male and socially marginalized Muslims in Europe is also considered. The report argues that the ideology of the Islamist terrorists is universal and no longer context-bound to the states and regions from which it arose. Central to the ideology is the protection of the *Umma*, the worldwide community of believers, and this means radicalised Muslims in Europe see their struggle against, for example, racism or poverty as part of a global struggle by Muslims, linking them to the conflicts in places as political and culturally diverse as Chechnya, Kashmir and the Occupied Territories. Thus the danger is that this perceived international *jihad* will be manifested locally within Europe. Various terrorist plots that have been stopped across Europe by law enforcement and intelligence agencies suggest that this is already happening.

The report also describes and assesses the actions taken by in-

ternational organisations relevant to Finland – the UN, EU and NATO/PfP – in the fight against terrorism, concluding that although much has been discussed and done, it remains of limited utility and is on the whole a political response to the justified feeling after September 11 that ‘we must do something’. The report argues that successful counter-terrorism cooperation remains predominantly in the realms of professional-to-professional links between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

The conclusions are that for Finland there remains a relatively low risk of being attacked by terrorists. This does not mean that there is no risk at all. The report demonstrates that there is no reason to think that Finland would not be targeted by Islamist terrorists if the opportunity was presented to them, and that secondly, the way that this violent global ideology can manifest itself locally means that a country needs only a very small group, or even a lone individual, willing to act on their beliefs to become a victim of terrorism.

Terrorism and Finland – definitions

Terrorism is about creating terror. Stating this may seem too obvious, but the observation is central to ethical considerations when studying terrorism. The study of terrorism should be carried out in order to enable us to understand it as a phenomenon; whilst mindful of the danger that studies contribute, in their own small way, to raising the level of fear of terrorism and hence to increasing terror. The terrorism analyst can, by default, end up doing the terrorists' job for them. If we end up terrorising ourselves, terrorists who should remain as a very marginal social phenomenon will have won.

The dangers of terrorism for Finland are, on a global scale, *very low*. This must be stated clearly at the beginning and kept in mind throughout this study. Before a terrorist acts, two requirements must be fulfilled. Firstly the terrorist must have the ability to carry out an attack, secondly they must have the motivation. For Finland, the risks are relatively low in both respects. There are numerous apparent difficulties for terrorists, particularly for non-Finns attempting to operate within Finland (these will be looked at further in this report), that will limit ability. Secondly, there are many good reasons to doubt whether non-domestically based terrorists would have much motivation to attack Finland or Finnish targets – the reasons for this will also be examined within the report.

Even on the global scale we should endeavour to keep the risk of terrorism in some kind of perspective. There are certain risks that we are willing to take as a part of life in free societies. In 2001, the year of the horrendous terrorist attacks on the United States, in that same country 42,116 people lost their lives in highway accidents.¹ There is something that makes such a huge loss of life

in some ways acceptable, whilst the loss of 3,000 lives at the hands of al-Qaeda in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania remains completely unacceptable.

Terrorism is a politically and morally loaded word. It is used generally to describe the violent actions of those we disagree with and this can change from state to state and even from individual to individual. The failure of the UN after decades of discussion to agree on a definition of terrorism is indicative of this problem², for as one perceptive journalist quite simply put it: “terrorism is violence committed by those we disapprove of.”³ It is in that sense that we must be aware of the sensitivity in using the word as, for example, former Prime Minister Lipponen discovered when he described the actions of the Norwegian environmental group Bellona as “terrorist”.⁴ There is little point in delving too deeply into attempts to define terrorism – as Audrey Kurth Cronin rightly points out “Terrorism is intended to be a matter of perception and thus is seen differently by different observers”⁵, but for the sake of this report we wish to use the term as a *functional* classification rather than a *normative* one. Our definition would be; violence used by non-state actors to influence, persuade, cower or destroy a society or state, in pursuit of some political, ideological or religious aim. This noticeably leaves out what many call “state-terrorism” (although not “state-sponsored-terrorism”), and whilst this is one of the perpetual arguments within terrorism studies, the use of violence by a state against its own people, or those of another state, seems to fall into a different functional category than terrorism. We may well feel that violence perpetrated by a state is just as illegitimate or repugnant as that carried out by a non-state actor, but it is not “terrorism”. In this way, we can use the term as a way of classifying an action without commenting on the validity of the actor’s cause. Hence, a Hamas suicide bombing is a terrorist act, regardless of whether we agree or disagree with Hamas’s cause.

Despite our wish to use the word “terrorism” functionally, to

describe a tactic used by non-state groups, the term still clearly has negative connotations. Terrorism should not be associated with one social group because of the actions of a few within that wider social group. In the post-September 11th world, discussion on terrorism has become dominated by the actions of terrorists who are Muslim, who justify their actions by reference to Islamic holy texts and Islamic learning. Many terms have been used to describe these people, none of which are wholly accurate or adequate. Some decision on terminology is necessary though; for as one perceptive writer, Jason Burke, puts it: “repeatedly writing ‘terrorist violence legitimised by a particular reading of Islam but rooted in a largely political project defined by local contingencies’ is simply impractical.”⁶ These terminology debates can seem arcane in the light of the often terrible acts that they are connected to. But the contextual nature of terrorism makes this discussion vital. The debate that still exists within Finland on whether the violence that took place amongst Finns between 1917 and 1918 should be called “a war of liberation, a revolution, a class war, a revolt, a civil war [or] an internal war”⁷, demonstrates how words carry both political meaning and emotional sentiment, even more than 80 years after the events.

There are approximately 1.5 billion Muslims in the world, and they follow many different forms of Islam. There is no ‘one’ Islam, just as there is no ‘one’ Christianity or Judaism, despite the claims of differing groups in all the world’s great religion to hold the ‘true faith’. For this report we will use the term “Islamist terrorism”, to try to reinforce the clear distinction between *Islam* as a religion and *Islamism* as a political doctrine. The terrorism does not come from the religion of Islam, it comes from how certain groups and individuals use religious justifications and reasoning in pursuit of their political goals.* A definition of Islamism is controversial, it can have an expansive or relatively narrow meaning – but essentially it is the connection of Islam to political ideology. Maha Azzam, as one example, uses the term Islamist to

* Religiously connected extremist violence has taken place in Israel, the United States and India for example, but rarely we hear the terms Jewish terrorism, Christian terrorism or Hindu terrorism used, although they make as much sense as the term ‘Islamic terrorism’.

refer to disparate groups; including those that operate within just one state, internationally, those which are violent, and non-violent – it is a rather vague ideology that connects them.⁸ This is not uncontroversial; the French scholar Olivier Roy, for example, believes that some Islamist groups have evolved away from the state-based and modernist original Islamist project, to a more global and anti-modernist ideology. He includes bin Laden and those who follow him in this group and uses the term “Neo-fundamentalism” to describe them, but in this report we use ‘Islamist’, as many experts do, to cover this group as well. Finally, it is also important to note that many Islamist groups have pursued their goals through democratic channels and have not used violence; therefore “Islamist” is in no way synonymous with “Islamist terrorist”, but some Islamist groups have used violence and our chosen term refers to these groups.

The arguments about suitable terminology are important and continue, but it is beyond the realm of this report to fully investigate them. We therefore will use the term “Islamist terrorism”, and ask readers to keep in mind the caveats above. Fundamentally, our choice of terminology is an attempt to reflect that there is no simple link between terrorism and the religion of Islam.

Finland has been blessed by an almost total absence of political violence in recent times, although Finnish history is a reminder that any society is capable of resorting to the use of political violence in certain situations. However, a sense of proportion is vital; whilst international attention might well be focused on al-Qaeda and their ilk, for Finland in the post-September 11th world, the closest comparable experience of a terrorist attack – the Myyrmanni shopping-mall bomb – turned out to have originated much closer to home.

Political violence, terrorism, globalisation and Finland

This chapter considers political violence and terrorism, or rather the lack of it, in Finland's recent history. The chapter argues that since the end of the Cold War there has been a visibly increasing propensity towards political violence within the country, even if that propensity remains very small on a global scale. Secondly, the chapter argues that this has been caused by the processes that can loosely be termed 'globalization' and, thirdly, that because of these processes it is becoming increasingly difficult to create a useful distinction between international and domestic terrorism. This provides the domestic context for the more specific consideration of Islamist terrorism in the later chapters.

In Europe, since the end of the Second World War, Finland has held the enviable position of being amongst the most peaceful countries in respect of political violence of any sort. It has not seen the nationalist terrorism that has plagued the UK and Spain, or the extreme-left terrorism that caused so much instability in Germany and Italy. It has had no problems with groups (particularly from former colonies) importing their 'wars' from abroad such as Algerians in France and Indonesian separatists in the Netherlands. It has not even had the experience of organised neo-Nazi violence that Sweden saw in the mid-1990s. Finland's social homogeneity and its peripheral position, both politically and geographically, can be thanked for this – but this situation is changing, as is terrorism. In this sense a reconsideration of the threat is sensible.

The almost complete absence of political violence in Finland since WWII

Since the end of the Second World War, Finland has not only escaped the scourge of terrorism, but has seemingly managed to avoid almost all politically motivated violence.* At the height of the student protests of the late 1960s one of the leading Finnish radicals, Nils Torvalds, announced “we may have to execute someone”. His hope for proletarian revolution in Finland never came to pass and in 1968 – almost comically – the activists’ most dramatic action was occupying *Vanha*, the Old Student House, a building already owned by the students of Helsinki University. President Kekkonen used the radicals as a tool against his conservative critics and ingratiated himself with them to the extent that they addressed him in a telegram as Comrade President.⁹ The same period of turbulence in West Germany led to murder and destruction by the Baader-Meinhof group and its various spin-offs, throughout the next two decades. Meanwhile, the Finnish radicals of the era were integrated into society, including some prominent positions. It seems that the Finnish political establishment could absorb their ideas in the way that the West German political establishment could not.

The overlay of the Cold War era and the pressures of living with a superpower neighbour may well account for this, along with the nationally shared heritage of the sacrifices made across society for Finnish independence during WWII. But Finland was also a functioning social democracy, with minimal differences in standards of living compared to many other Western countries, and whose standards of living were rising consistently throughout the period. This general growth in the economy, and its attendant rise in living standards, seemed unstoppable until the huge recession of the early 1990s, which made many people question whether they could expect continued growth. The recession had repercussions for both the economy and society; the cradle-

* One notable exception was the Kemi Strike of 1949, where two strikers were killed, one by a police bullet, and for a very limited time a state of emergency was declared and troops called in. It was more than a straightforward industrial dispute because it involved a struggle between the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) on one hand, and the Government and Trade Union Congress (SAK) on the other. See Upton A. (1973) *The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland* London, Weidenfield and Nicolson (pp. 307–311).

to-grave welfare state seemed less certain, and more visible social divisions have resulted. The recession was, in effect, the result of a poor attempt to globalize the Finnish economy. As the Cold War came to an end, states began to realise that the continued growth of their economies could not be assured without them becoming more economically active internationally. Protectionist measures for national industries and the ability of governments to control their domestic economies were steadily removed. In Finland this included the removal of currency exchange controls, which led to the banking crisis; the collapse of state-assured bilateral trade with the USSR; the EFTA negotiations and following on from this, eventual EU membership.¹⁰

Globalisation was not only having economic effects. Finland had been throughout the Cold War period not just a closed economy, but also to a great extent a closed society. At the end of the Cold War it was incredibly homogenous in comparison to even the other Nordic states, let alone Western European states that had promoted immigration like the UK, France and Germany. The number of foreign-born people living in Finland rose from around 20,000 in 1990 to over 100,000 at the turn of the millennium – a rise of 500 %. Immigration adds a great deal of value to the host society, but it also creates tension. This is, ironically, exacerbated in a welfare state, where the individual can gain much in terms of social security just by being a citizen.¹¹ If arriving immigrants are granted the same rights as citizens, then people ask why they receive these advantages without having contributed to that society. Some will even argue that immigrants are not and cannot be members of that society due to their colour, religion or whatever and, therefore, have no claim on the rights given to citizens. In a more market-orientated economy such as the US there are less problems assimilating immigrants, because they are entitled to less – hence the host society is more inclined to acknowledge what they give (cheap labour in many cases) rather than what they take.

Globalisation has not just meant the flow of capital, goods, services and people across borders where they did not use to flow. It has also meant the globalisation of ideas. This is not a new phenomenon and can perhaps be traced back to the invention of the telegraph; but radio, telephones, television, faxes and ultimately the internet and email have meant an acceleration of the process. It means that for societies with access to these media, we are now exposed to the ideas of others with unprecedented ease. We have only to note that Islamist radicals have in many ways been pioneers in propagating their beliefs via new media, to realise the importance of this process.

In the light of these globalising forces, we must consider how Finland has changed. It is useful to speculate as to whether it would be as easy for the country to absorb those with radical ideas now as it was in 1968, and if not, what would be the results of their marginalisation? Do these processes somehow mean that Finland is now more likely to be prone to political violence than it was during the Cold War? It appears that the answer is yes.

The Cold War for Finland was a period of stability; enforced and not always comfortable stability perhaps, but stability nevertheless. The end of that period has brought opportunities but has also upset the balance: political violence becomes more likely. A historian looking back over the long term, may well dismiss the idea of Finnish society being somehow inherently pacific on the basis of evidence of this 50-year period. Indeed, the first half of the twentieth century saw political violence leading to bloodshed in Finland, on a scale that is hard to imagine now. The stability was connected to the situation that the country found itself in at the time.

Signals of 'new' political violence within Finland in the post-Cold War era

Rightwing violence:

One of the almost immediate reactions to the increase of immigrants in Finland was the skinhead violence of the mid 1990s, most notoriously but not solely limited to Joensuu. Although the perpetrators of the violence were Finnish, their imagery – being a skin – is British in origin, whilst their (in the loosest sense of the word) 'ideology' – neo-Nazism – is German. Although these young men were reacting to a national or even local situation, their manner of doing so was a mixture of their own culture (Finnish nationalism) and ideas taken from elsewhere. This is arguably a clear effect of globalisation on one small and previously isolated community.

First, the economic situation played a role, increasing unemployment with its attendant social pressure; secondly, foreigners arrived not only in the country but also in that region and, being dark-skinned, they were highly visible; thirdly, a small group of young men were influenced by non-native ideas suggesting that the answer to their perceived 'problem' was not political action through any established channels, but rather, criminal violence. To equate skinhead violence in Finland with terrorism would be incorrect, the violence was aimed at terrorising only a very small, specific section of the population – non-white immigrants. As discussed previously, one of the central features of terrorism is its desire to change the political order, or to influence a society in a certain way.

The Finnish skinheads actually wanted the opposite, their violence was aimed at maintaining the pre-existing order – a Finland with no visible minorities. Nevertheless, the experience of Sweden is instructive here. The rightwing violence it faced in the mid-1990s, although beginning from a similar situation, became domestic terrorism as activists targeted and even murdered those

who took an active stance against their agitation, including police officers, journalists, anti-racism campaigners and trade-union activists. Fortunately, Finland never experienced this kind of real terrorism, but this is perhaps more to do with the size of the problem – Finland still has nothing like the number of immigrants that Sweden has – rather than the authorities managing to find some correct policy response.

Leftwing or anti-globalisation violence:

Over the last couple of years we have also seen a rise in minor violent acts associated with various demonstrations vaguely linked to far-left or anarchist causes; perhaps a local manifestation of (what is often and uncritically titled) the anti-globalisation movement that has emerged worldwide. Finland has not experienced the type of mass disorder and rioting that occurred in Gothenburg in connection with the EU summit there – where insufficiently equipped and trained police fired on the rioters with live ammunition, or the violence that accompanied the G8 meetings originally in Seattle and on a more serious level in Genoa where one activist/rioter was shot dead by police. What has been seen in Finland is an increasing militancy at some demonstrations – in Tampere in 1997, and most notably outside the President's Palace during the ball held each Independence Day. These protests seem to have now become an annual event.

The symbolism of the Independence Day ball is compelling. The televised and much-watched opening ceremony serves as a who's who of Finnish society and in recent years this has stood in contrast to the masked protestors outside, calling themselves the "Uninvited Guests", who would portray themselves as the marginalised nobodies – or at least a voice for that group. Finland remains on a global scale a very equal society, so this division by the protestors into the 'haves' and 'have-nots' is to a large degree posturing, and reflected in the lack of sympathy that the protestors have received from society at large. But it does appear that

the demonstrators wish to dispute the view that national unity still exists, by targeting this event which is meant to symbolise that unity.¹² It may be attractive to just write off the phenomenon as an example of youthful exuberance mixed with lack of judgement, but as the protests have gone from rowdy to violent, necessitating a stronger police response each year, we must ask why this is happening now when it did not happen before.

The lack of any real group which organises these protests is also worrying and instructive. Worrying because it means identifying who is involved, who might become involved, and what their motives are, is much more difficult. It seems that the days when radicals would form a party, or join a pre-existing one and create a faction within it, are gone. It is also instructive because it shows the power of new media in creating protest movements. The internet has been central in allowing activists to form very nebulous networks, allowing events such as the Independence Day 'riots' to take place with very little in the way of organisation by identifiable and structured groups. It was only hours before reports and even pictures of violence at the last couple of Independence Day celebrations started appearing on activist websites, both Finnish and foreign.¹³

The events of 2001, when one rioter tried to seize a policeman's gun, show how easy it would be for these kinds of disturbances to progress from an annoyance to a tragedy.¹⁴ As with the skinhead violence, it is not correct to call this terrorism, as it is not clear whether the disparate individuals involved in the violence have any commonly held agenda for change, no matter how unrealistic. As with the anti-globalisation movement more generally, many different – and even conflicting – interest groups come together under its banner. To a certain extent the small numbers involved might be dismissed as individuals who have violent tendencies anyway, and will always find one channel or another for expressing them. There are rumours that some of the perpetrators of violence at the anti-G8 meetings in other countries have a

history of rightwing violence or football hooliganism, thus giving some credence to this suggestion.

Overall it is important not to get the violence at these demonstrations out of proportion. It really only stands out because of the otherwise almost complete lack of political violence in Finland, and is nothing in comparison to, for example, the riots of August 2000 in some cities in northern England, or even the violence that regularly accompanies strikes and labour unrest in France.

Radical animal rights activism:

Finland has experienced an increasing number of criminal attacks on fur farms by ‘animal liberation’ activists. Although illegal, they have not been violent, indeed violence has been experienced by the activists themselves – particularly the case of one young woman who was shot in the back by a farmer. There have been a number of long-running protests outside various farms that have been intimidatory in nature but the threats have not been acted upon. So far Finland has not experienced any of the bomb and arson attacks that have been seen in the US and the UK in relation to animal liberation groups, which in the UK has led the internal intelligence agency, MI5, to create a special unit in response.¹⁵

Conclusion:

If any of the above three loose groupings move towards more systematic and targeted violence to further their aims then they are surely candidates for the term terrorist – but should they be classified as domestic or international terrorists? All are the product in some way of global influences, even if the activists are Finnish. If there was an attack in Finland, organised in Finland by Islamist extremists who had Finnish citizenship, the case would be even more confused. If the perpetrators were immigrants to Finland, would that make it international terrorism rather than

domestic? Globalisation disrupts these neat boundaries.

In the following chapters we look more specifically at Islamist terrorism, now the pre-eminent form of “international terrorism”, but we argue that it is a global ideology, which has limited implications even for Finland. We will consider how it defies the international/domestic dichotomy – a global movement but with actors often acting in only a domestic context.

A historical background to Islamist terrorism

To understand the current threat of modern Islamist terrorism, we need to understand its development. This involves more than just a history of terrorist acts, but also the development of the ideology that informs those who carry out those acts. The following is based on a number of major English-language studies of the phenomenon, and identifies some central ideas, writers and movements that have been cited by Islamist activists, ideologues and captured terrorists as important to their worldview and ideology. Of course, the named historical writers and theorists have had their ideas co-opted by the likes of bin Laden to justify contemporary violent acts – other interpretations of their work is possible – but the relevance of these historical ideas is in how modern-day Islamist militants use them to justify their actions, rather than in the ideas and writings themselves.¹⁶

***Takfir* and *Jihad*: The theological justification for terrorism**

Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya, born in 1263 in what is now Turkey, “planted a seed of revolutionary violence in the heart of Islamic thought”¹⁷. He believed that his contemporary Muslims were tolerating un-Islamic practices and beliefs that the first generations of Muslims, the *Salaf*⁸, had rejected. He was a fundamentalist in the sense that he believed that the Koran and Hadith¹⁹ contained all the answers to life and social order, and this understanding – known as *ijtihad* – came to the individual believer through study, and not from the rulings of the *ulema*, the religious and legal scholars. In the first years of Islam, after the death

* *Kuffar* is the plural of *kafir*, 'an infidel'. They stem from *kufr* 'a disbelief in God'.

° For most Muslims today, the meaning of *jihad* is the struggle within oneself to live a good life. Many feel that the word has been abused by the extremists, and as a result misunderstood by most non-Muslims.

of the prophet Mohammed, there were what Sunni Muslims call the four *Rashidun* or "Rightly Guided" Caliphs.²⁰ The *Rashidun* unified the Muslim world and, as Ibn Taymiyya believed, ruled in a truly Islamic way. But by his lifetime there were a number of dynasties all claiming to be the true Caliphate's successor. As the idea of the separation of Church and State is not present in Islam as it is in Christianity²¹ (Mohammed had been, in effect, King and Pope) Ibn Taymiyya believed that these rulers had failed to lead in an Islamic way and he condemned them as *kuffar* – disbelievers.* The act of pronouncing other Muslims to be *kuffar* is called *takfir*, and is central to the ideology of modern Islamist-terrorist groups. For Ibn Taymiyya, it also meant that those who followed an un-Islamic leader were *kuffar* themselves. Ibn Taymiyya also believed that *jihad*, struggle or holy war[°], was an obligation for all Muslims at the same level as the "five pillars" of Islam²², and that *jihad* was not just against the infidel beyond Islam's borders, but also against the *kuffar* within.²³

Wahhabism and the Saudi connection

The next important figure on the road to modern Islamic terrorism is Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792²⁴). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab founded the austere and puritan reform movement within Islam now known as Wahhabism. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's followers were even more willing than Ibn Taymiyya had been to accuse other Muslims of *kufr* – of disbelief in God. Wahhabis believed that all those who did not share the Wahhabi faith were infidels and this meant that they saw all their battles as *jihad*. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's chief ally in the spread of the Wahhabi sect was Muhammad ibn Saud, and hence when the modern state of Saudi Arabia was formed in 1932 it became a Wahhabi state.²⁵

According to Gilles Kepel, Saudi Arabia demonstrated its political might with the oil embargo in 1973, and through this took

a leadership role in the Islamic world. Through Saudi power, the Wahhabi ideology has had an effect on the Muslim world which, whilst less visible than that of Khomeini's Iran, has been "deeper and more enduring". It took the initiative away from the secular, socialist Arab nationalists for whom Nasser had been the standard bearer, and supported instead the idea of "a virtuous Islamic civilisation", and used its vast wealth globally to support this agenda. Wahhabis spread across the world (including targeting immigrant populations in the West), attempting to purge local Islamic traditions of their 'superstitions', and creating what they hoped would be the one true pure Islam globally. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, despite Iran being a Shia country, seemed set to lead a new, invigorated Islamic world. But Iran was fervently anti-American, and at the end of 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan it was in no position to ally itself with the 'Great Satan' and resist the Soviets. Instead it was Saudi Arabia that took on this role, and through its financial support for the Afghan *jihad*, its ideological influence remains stamped on the most far-reaching result of the Afghan war – modern Islamist terrorism.²⁶

The Afghan *jihad* brought Muslims from around the world together to fight the infidel Soviets, in the same way that idealists from Europe and the Americas flocked to Spain to join the International Brigades and resist fascism in the 1930s. It produced a core of battle-hardened veterans, who adopted the title "Afghanis" with pride, and who through the 1990s spread out across the world taking the militant Islamist ideology of *takfir* and *jihad* against the infidels with them. Amongst those who went was Osama bin Laden, and although he did fight, far more important was his role in funding the *jihad*. The Saudi royal family began by giving privately, but soon it was an official policy and the Saudis were matching the money that the US was channelling to anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan.²⁷

The Saudi support for the Afghan *jihad* in part strengthened

their claim to the leadership role in the Islamic world, but it also helped the Saudi royals to stabilise the country domestically: it helped the people forget that their rulers were dependent on US military support and to ‘export’ the energies of the devout young men like those who had seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979. This was, in effect, a coup by a group of Wahhabi zealots who took the historical name of the *Ikhwan*. They had pronounced *takfir* against the Saudi King, declaring him an unbeliever – *kafir*. Taking back the Mosque was a two-week-long and bloody operation; hundreds died on both sides as well as innocent pilgrims caught up in the fighting. Bin Laden is reported to have been greatly impressed by the *Ikhwan*, he believed that they were “true Muslims”.²⁸ This is an early indicator of what would later become bin Laden’s hatred for the Saudi regime.

There is no neat line from Wahhabism to the events of 9/11, despite the attempts of some to draw one. Bin Laden’s radicalism was first shown in his membership of the Muslim Brotherhood (see below) which is not a Wahhabi-oriented organisation. Maha Azzam notes: “there is no evidence that bin Laden or his followers would describe themselves as Wahhabi, although they may be inspired by the spirit and tradition espoused by Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab”.²⁹

For a more complete explanation of bin Laden in particular, and radical Islamist ideology more generally, we must look to Sayyid Qutb, described by many as ‘the father of modern Islamism’.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb

The central importance of the work of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), and also of the work of the Pakistani Mawlana Mawdudi (1903–1979), for modern Islamists is, Gilles Kepel argues, that: “their writings rejected the values of the nationalists and reactivated Islam as the sole cultural, social, and political standard for be-

haviour among Muslims^{29,30}

In the post-war period much of the Muslim world was gaining independence from the crumbling European empires. The elites of these countries were generally Western educated and held the idea of nationalism as central to their new countries' identities.

“But for Qutb and his followers, the post-independence history of the Muslim states has no inherent value. Qutb stigmatised it with an Arab word from the Koran, *jahiliyya*, which describes the state of ignorance or barbarism in which the Arabs are supposed to have lived before the revelation of Islam and the Prophet Mohammed... According to Qutb; just like the pagan Arabs of the original *jahiliyya* who worshipped stone idols, Qutb's contemporaries worshipped symbolic idols such as the nation, the party, socialism, and the rest³¹.”

Qutb's works became bestsellers around the Muslim world, but it was his position of influence within the Muslim Brotherhood that would lead to his execution.

The Muslim Brotherhood was started by an Egyptian school-teacher called Hasan al-Banna in 1928. Al-Banna had been horrified by the abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey in 1924, because the end of the caliphate removed the realm of the political from the Islamic world. This concept remains central to Islamism today – the Brotherhood believed that Islam was a total system, both spiritual and political. They feared that the nationalists (Egypt gained nominal independence from the UK in 1922) would ‘corrupt’ the country with Western concepts such as the division of church and states. The Brotherhood's slogan became “God is our objective; the Koran is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; Struggle is our way; and death for the sake of God is our highest aspiration.” They recruited members across society, taking control of unions and guilds and infiltrating members into the armed forces allowing them to set up paramilitary groups. They also cleverly used both the mass media of the day, and the provision of social services to poorer communities* as

* The Palestinian terrorist group Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, and maintains its tradition of social provision by being an important provider of social services and education in the Occupied Territories. This accounts for much of their popular support amongst Palestinians who might otherwise not approve of their methods.

ways of gaining popular support. The Brotherhood spread rapidly across the Muslim world.

At first the Egyptian and other states' elites saw them as a positive phenomenon as they were a strong counter-force to overtly secular, socialist and communist groups who were threatening the elites; the Brotherhood put more emphasis on personal morality and did not divide society into classes and this was seen by leaders as a unifying force. Nevertheless, by the late 1940s they were flexing their own political muscles in Egypt and had outlived their use as a counterweight to the secular opposition, so the King repressed them. The Brotherhood also blamed the Egyptian leaders for the failure of the Arabs to resist the formation of Israel. In revenge, they murdered the Prime Minister but the state responded by assassinating the Brotherhood's founder, al-Banna. Supporters and detractors remain divided over this onset of violence, but it shows from early on that at least some within the Brotherhood were willing to use violence to seek the Islamic society they aspired to.³²

In 1952 Nasser led the overthrow of the King. At first there was an understanding between the Muslim Brotherhood and the "Free Officers" whom Nasser led, but his government quickly instituted reforms that angered some Muslims and one Brother attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954. As a result, some of the Brothers were executed and 4,000 Brothers rounded up and imprisoned. One of these was Sayyid Qutb, and his most influential work was written whilst incarcerated. The Brothers were released in 1962, the same year in which Nasser released many communists who had been imprisoned. Again the idea was that the Brothers would serve as an Islamic counterweight to secular opposition but many in the movement had not forgiven Nasser and his regime, and plotting against him began again. In 1966 many Brothers were re-arrested and charged with sedition, Qutb amongst them. He did not dispute the state's charge but responded by arguing that as the state was *jahiliyya* he did not see how his action could be

wrong. His loyalty was to the worldwide community of Muslim believers, the *Umma*, and indeed it was the religious obligation – *jihad* – for the Brothers to attack the *jahil*. This ideology was a threat to all the states of the Middle East, and the Egyptian court found Qutb guilty and, on 29 August 1966, had him hanged. In many ways, Qutb's ideology led to modern Islamist terrorism. He denounced the secular governments as un-Islamic and argued that it was every true Muslim's duty to overthrow them. This gave a religious legitimacy to the use of violence by non-state actors for those who shared Qutb's worldview.³³

One often-noted period of Qutb's life was his study visit to the USA in the late 1940s, before he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and was still employed by the Egyptian Ministry of Education. He found the US to be alienating and a morally corrupt land, and seems both fascinated and disgusted by what he perceived to be the overt sexuality of the country.³⁴ Dilip Hiro notes that on his return to Egypt his anti-American views were so virulent that he was asked by the Ministry to resign, and later he would write in one of his major works: "What should be our verdict on this synthetic [Western] civilisation? What should be done about America and the West, given their overwhelming danger to humanity...? Should we not issue a sentence of death? Is it not the verdict most appropriate to the crime?"³⁵

Not all scholars agree that Qutb was that profoundly anti-western or inclined towards violence. Professor Mamoun Fandy has argued that Qutb's criticism of the West was meant more as a reflection of the negative changes he saw in his own country; Fandy argues that even when it came to language skills, Qutb did not really understand the US – it was more that he thought he saw the germ of a similar society in Egypt.³⁶

After his execution, Qutb became a martyr for Islamists. After his death, his brother, Muhammad Qutb, became central to interpreting his work and spreading the word; and amongst those who studied under him was a young Osama bin Laden.³⁷

The Afghan *Jihad* and the formation of al-Qaeda

The US spent over \$3 billion supporting the Mujahiddin in Afghanistan, an amount matched only by Saudi Arabia.³⁸ In their '*jihad*' against communism no matter where it appeared, the US maintained the ferment within the Islamic world. The funding was channelled through the Pakistani ISI – the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency – to create deniability, and hence large amounts went to Islamist Mujahiddin groups, such as that of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was cooperating with bin Laden as early as the 1980s.³⁹

In 1984 Bin Laden established the Maktab al-Khidmat, or 'Services Bureau', in Peshawar, Northern Pakistan. This served as a recruiting office for overseas volunteers, providing accommodation for new arrivals before moving them out to camps for military training. It was a joint project with the Palestinian Sheik Abdullah Azzam, who became bin Laden's mentor, a leading ideologue for the Afghani *jihad* and a vocal proponent of Ibn Taymiyya's belief that *jihad* is an obligation for Muslims.⁴⁰ His seminal book for the *Jihadi* movement, *Join the Caravan*, is still readily available and gives both a theological justification for *jihad* as well as more practical information, down to telephone numbers in Peshawar to call when you arrive to volunteer.⁴¹

The volunteers fought against Soviet forces most often in Hekmatyar's forces, or in those of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf* – another Islamist commander. They were considered, more often than not, a hindrance rather than a help by indigenous troops. The exception was one battle near the village of Jaji where bin Laden and a band of Arab-Afghanis held off Soviet special forces for a number of days, despite grave losses and overwhelming opposition. The story was quickly spread by the Arab media and was central to building the myth of bin Laden as a 'warrior prince' in the Islamic world.⁴²

After the Soviets left in 1989, Afghanistan collapsed into civil

* It was his namesake, the Abu Sayyaf Islamist terrorist group in the Southern Philippines, that was responsible for the 2001 kidnapping of Finnish citizens Risto Vanhanen and Seppo Fränti.

war between the bewildering number of factions. Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia and Maktab al-Khidmat was transformed into al-Qaeda, although it is not clear when this actually happened. Kepel argues that the new name originated from a computer file dating back to 1988 listing the names and locations of Afghani veterans worldwide, and that “the database” became “the base” – or in Arabic, “al-Qaeda”.⁴³ There appears to have been a purge within the organisation during this period, Abdullah Azzam was assassinated in 1989, possibly over a dispute with bin Laden over where next to focus the *jihad*.

Bin Laden fled Saudi Arabia for Sudan (where a sympathetic Islamist government was in power) in April 1991; he had become vocally opposed to the Saudi royal family as a result of their acceptance of US forces on the same soil as the two holiest Islamic sites, during the Gulf War between 1990 and 1991.⁴⁴ The continued presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia has been central to bin Laden’s ‘war’ ever since.

The “near” and the “far enemy” – the US becomes the target

The period of time that bin Laden spent in Sudan would be the time that al-Qaeda would come to distinguish itself from the numerous other worldwide Islamist groups that had used terrorism before. Bin Laden was arguably the first Islamist radical to identify ‘the West’, and primarily the United States, as the pre-eminent enemy.* A number of stages are visible in reaching this point. Firstly, Sayyid Qutb focused on the *jahil* regimes of the Middle East – the rulers of these countries who did not follow what he saw as the correct Islamic path. He viewed the West as corrupt and godless, but the primary obligation for Muslims was to rid themselves of their own apostate rulers. The next stage is visible in the ideas of another Egyptian thinker and activist,

* Although since the 1979 revolution, Iran had identified the US as ‘the Great Satan’, and this had repercussions for Iranian-backed Shia groups such as Hizbollah, who bombed the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, killing 259.

Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj, a leader of the Egyptian Al Jihad group that was responsible in 1981 for the assassination of Egypt's President Sadat. He moved the argument on from Qutb, by saying that it was Muslims' obligation (using language echoed in Azzam's work) to first bring down the *jahil* regimes of their leaders – “the near enemy” – as only then, with a united Muslim world, could they face down the powerful “far enemy” of Israel and its backers.⁴⁵

Bin Laden took the next step, and the actions of al-Qaeda show this. Instead of confronting the ‘near enemy’ first, al-Qaeda decided to attack the ‘far enemy’ – the United States and the West more generally. There is a certain strategic logic to this, in that it is US power that maintains many of the non-democratic regimes of the Arab World. After the 1991 Gulf War there were US forces in Saudi Arabia, the ruling family of Kuwait had been reinstated by US military power, and Egypt remained one of the largest recipients of US aid. Western companies were important in the oil industries of many of the Arab countries and helped provide the financial resources that allowed these *jahil* regimes to maintain control. This was also a period throughout the Arab world where regimes were cracking down on Islamist opposition. This led to the flight of many activists, some to the camps of Afghanistan, some to Sudan with its sympathetic government, and some to Europe – particularly London – where many received political asylum. The ‘near-enemy’ was too strong and had no qualms about suppressing the Islamists; these regimes’ supporters – the far-enemy – would have to be defeated first.

Bin Laden continued building al-Qaeda throughout his time in Sudan, establishing contacts with other Islamist terrorist groups such as GIA and even the Shia Hizbollah (who showed al-Qaeda how to bomb large buildings) and assisting the movement of ‘Afghani’ veterans out of Pakistan and Afghanistan and infiltrating them into countries around the world.⁴⁶ Bin Laden remained in Sudan until 1996 when international pressure on

the government there forced him to return to Afghanistan. During this period, bin Laden assisted *jihadis* fighting worldwide, in such places as Chechnya, Eritrea, the Philippines and Bosnia. Al-Qaeda were operating in Somalia at the time, particularly in conjunction with the Somali Islamist group Ittihad al-Islamiyya, and possibly they had trained the Somalis who killed 18 American peacekeepers that led to the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia in 1993.⁴⁷

BEYOND AL-QAEDA

It is important to realise that al-Qaeda is not the only Islamist group willing to attack the West. In 1993 a New York-based group around a radical Islamist cleric from Egypt, Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman – known as the “Blind Sheikh”⁴⁸, bombed the WTC killing six. The operational leader and bomb-maker of that attack was Ramzi Yousef (who like Rahman, is now imprisoned in the US). Numerous circumstantial ties link Yousef to bin Laden and al-Qaeda but “to this day, the FBI and the CIA maintain that the Yousef-bin Laden relationship has not been elucidated”.⁴⁹

After failing to topple the WTC in 1993 and before his arrest in 1995, Ramzi Yousef hid in the Philippines and researched ways of killing large numbers of Americans. He intended to simultaneously bomb 12 US-owned 747 passenger jets over the Pacific. If successful, approximately 4,000 people would have died. Yousef had developed an undetectable explosive and reliable timers that allowed him to do this, he had even tested a very small version of the bomb in 1994, on a Philippines Airline 747 going to Tokyo – which killed one passenger and forced the plane to make an emergency landing. Fortunately, Yousef’s experimentation led to a fire in his apartment in January 1995, and he fled. Nevertheless, law enforcement agencies did not know if any of the bombs had been assembled and it caused a massive security alert at airports all around the Pacific.⁵⁰

The spread of Afghani veterans worldwide makes it very difficult to identify and eliminate the Islamist terrorist threat. In the aftermath of September 11, more and more groups are identifying themselves with al-Qaeda regardless of whether there is any real direct connection to the now-dispersed leadership or not. As a leading terrorism expert told us in an interview, *al-Qaeda is now an ideology, not an army.*

East Africa to September 11

On 22 February 1998, bin Laden released the statement on the formation of the “World Islamic Front for *Jihad* against the Jews and Crusaders”. The announcement was not only from al-Qaeda, it was co-signed by the leaders of a Bangladeshi, a Pakistani and two Egyptian Islamist radical groups. The statement included the exhortation to kill US civilians as well as soldiers, and to target all of the US’s allies.⁵¹ US counter-terrorism agencies were still focused on state-sponsored terrorism emanating from Iran, and only beginning to take an interest in bin Laden.⁵² The bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on 7 August 1998 killed hundreds and dramatically showed the potential of bin Laden’s organisation. These attacks led to the cruise missile strikes on training camps in Afghanistan and on a factory in Sudan the same month. The cruise attacks are considered by many to have been a failure, and had the inadvertent effect of turning bin Laden into a hero for many in the Islamic world.⁵³

Particularly for the US, there were successes in dealing with al-Qaeda as well as failures. In the summer of 1999, Jordanian Security forces scored a major success when, after surveillance of a number of known Afghani veterans, most prominently one named Abu Zubayda, they raided a house and found a huge cache of explosives and weapons. It emerged that the plot had been to bomb a hotel in Amman, Jordan, which was used by Christian pilgrims, and at the same time attack a number of other sites of Christian pilgrimage in Jordan. The attacks were to take place at the turn of the millennium. This led to an international alert, especially in the US where border security was stepped up. On 14 December, a customs officer stopped a car coming into Washington state from Canada. The driver tried to flee but was caught; in the car was a large amount of explosives. The driver, an Algerian called Ahmad Ressay, subsequently told investigators that he was on his way to Los Angeles to bomb its airport during the

millennium celebrations. Ressam had learnt his bomb-making skills in a camp with Zubayda, the leader of the Jordanian plot. He was aided in Canada by an Algerian-militant network that extended into the US, to Boston and New York. US Counter-Terrorism (CT) officials were shocked both by the size and the technical sophistication of the group.⁵⁴ Another part of the millennium plot was to attack a US naval vessel in Aden harbour, Yemen. Al-Qaeda operatives tried on 3 January 2000, but overloaded their small boat with explosives and it sank before reaching the USS Sullivan. Undeterred, they learnt from the mistake, and on 12 October, they reran the operation and very nearly sank the USS Cole. Although the ship did not sink, 17 sailors were killed.⁵⁵

Bin Laden remained protected by the Taliban in Afghanistan, who would not surrender him to the US. Military options were considered but not taken up. Changes were made to the US's CT structure, but problems persisted leading to the revelations after September 11 that information about the plot was there, but not recognised.⁵⁶

An unending war?

September 11 awoke the world to Islamist terrorism, and since then it has clearly become a worldwide phenomenon. Al-Qaeda is an organisation, and bin Laden a figure, of a global age; they should be seen as symbols of globalisation as much as multinational corporations or international financial markets. Islamist ideology, having started out as a domestic response (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) to a changing international situation (the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924), has become a transnational movement, truly global in reach. With immigration, it reaches well beyond the Islamic world into countries that have been traditionally of other religious faiths.

Islam has numerous different variations, beyond the major division of Sunni, Shia and Sufi. Local versions incorporate aspects of pre-Islamic and non-religious culture, producing the regional differences. Islamist ideology denies this history; there is only one way to be Muslim, regardless of whether you are from Java, Jordan, Paraguay or Canada; there is but one *Umma*. Bin Laden's genius has been to play on this; hence a separatist struggle between Russia and the Chechen people becomes a "Crusader attack" on the Muslim nation, in the same way that Serbs killing Bosnians or the US-led liberation of Kuwait is. Bin Laden's speeches are released to Al-Jazeera satellite TV and placed on internet sites, accessible to the *Umma* globally. The injustices remain local, (repression by non-democratic governments in the Arab world; poverty and unemployment in Western European cities; an Australian-led UN force 'taking' part of Indonesia's territory in East Timor; and – most prominently of all – the Palestinian issue) but are now seen in this global worldview.

For those who are willing to use violence in the hope of changing the world, their actions remain on the whole predominantly local. Tunisians bombed the El Ghriba synagogue in Djerba in April 2002, killing 14 Germans; Pakistani militants murdered 11 French engineers in Karachi in May 2002; Indonesians were responsible for the deaths of Australians, an Ecuadorian, French, Germans, a Dutchman, Britons, Singaporeans, South Koreans, Swedes, Americans, a Swiss citizen and Indonesians⁵⁷ in Bali in October 2002; and Saudis bombed the housing complexes in Riyadh, while Moroccans bombed Casablanca in May 2003. Nevertheless, all these horrendous acts have been linked, sometimes rather tenuously, to the global al-Qaeda conspiracy.⁵⁸ Al-Qaeda is not a static entity, it continues to evolve. Although the US war in Afghanistan has limited its central core's ability to operate and some of its leaders have been killed or arrested⁵⁹, we have seen an increasing number of *jihadi* local groups – particularly in Europe, but also worldwide – being co-opted by al-Qaeda,

making the organisation more diffuse and difficult to deal with.

Gilles Kepel argues that Islamist violence is becoming increasingly marginalised, as Islamist intellectuals recognise its futility and turn towards liberal democracy as the path to a better world. But in the aftermath of September 11, Islamist terrorism seems to be becoming more widespread and less marginal. There is a perception that is clearly widely held in the Islamic world that the United States has decided that Islam as a whole is responsible for the attacks upon it, and this might explain this phenomenon.

US activities since September 11 have made bin Laden's message of the danger of the "far enemy" to the *Umma* – the global Islamic community – seem more, and not less, credible – particularly for Muslims around the world with little education, no political representation, and little hope of an improvement in their circumstances.⁶⁰ The US has engaged in battles that it knew, due to its currently unsurpassable military might, it could win, but it has done little to win in the war of ideas. Bin Laden and his followers have not had their arguments challenged in any systematic way. Whilst huge sections of the Muslim world remain poverty-stricken, unemployed, uneducated and denied basic human and political rights by their rulers, and whilst the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains a festering wound – bin Laden's revolutionary, yet simplistic, rhetoric will continue to appeal.

Understanding the threat of terrorism for Finland

For a terrorist attack to take place both the capability and a motive are needed. One of these factors alone is not sufficient. Anti-terrorism measures tend to focus on the former; this can be as diverse as increased protection to aeroplane cockpit doors to lessen the chance of hijacking, to international agreements on banking standards, making it harder for terrorists to transfer money to fund their operations. In response to September 11, organisations, governments and international bodies have taken numerous steps to lessen terrorists' capabilities. These have been on as grand a scale as the invasion of Afghanistan and the reorganisation of the United States government to form the Department of Homeland Security, down to the precautionary measure of asking people not to put nail scissors in their carry-on luggage for air travel.

Focus on the other side of the equation – the terrorist's motive for acting – is more difficult because it involves first of all trying to understand the motivations of people willing to kill and, secondly, to dispel such motivation seems in many cases close to impossible, as it may be based on intractable international difficulties, or perceived historical injustices. The difficulties of various peace processes around the world are illustrative of this. In terms of what is often described as 'new terrorism' – predominantly religiously motivated groups such as al-Qaeda – the difficulties in dealing with the motivation become horribly apparent. Scholars argue over whether there is a real political agenda motivating their actions – their goals are so all-encompassing, on such a cosmic scale, that to western eyes it appears utopian or even irrational, and to a certain extent creating terror (or defeating their enemies) becomes the goal, leaving no room for

compromise.

In respect of both the capability and motivation needed for launching a terrorist attack, there seems to be little need for real alarm in Finland. We believe that in comparison to other countries it would be difficult to organise an attack in Finland, and there are very few reasons why anyone might want to. Nevertheless, there remains some risk, and these risks will increase if some current policies are continued. This is discussed in greater detail in the chapter “Islamist Militancy in Finland?”.

Capability

The capability of any type of terrorist to launch an attack in Finland is limited. As Finland is a wealthy and well-functioning modern democracy, it has numerous advantages in its favour. The police force is respected by the community (although not necessarily amongst all immigrant communities), well resourced, well equipped and able to implement methods of operation that compare well with any others internationally. Despite its long and often remote borders, both land and maritime, the state has strong and well-functioning border and immigration controls. The Russian border has always been the source of some concern and the increase in illegal drug-use shows that no country is completely impervious to unwanted external influences, but overall, border security is as good as can be expected in a free society. One US official we spoke to noted that Finland does have some problems with being a route for people trafficking, and clearly if illegal workers can reach the country so could individuals with more hostile intent, although overall we were told by Finnish diplomats that from the higher reaches of the US administration they had been very happy with Finnish cooperation on CT activities.

The above discussion considers more the danger of groups or individuals coming to Finland to commit terrorism, but a big-

ger problem to consider and protect against would be threats from people already in the country, be they immigrants or indigenous. Much focus in the media has been on potentially catastrophic terrorism such as that witnessed on 9/11, but far more easily available methods of causing injury and death are available. For example, in Finland there is greater access to firearms than in other EU countries such as the UK. Terrorist groups in other countries have demonstrated that explosives can be stolen from quarries and the like (ETA has done this in France), and this has happened in countries where people are more likely to consider the storage of such material from a 'security' perspective. Finally, the Myyrmanni Shopping Centre explosion clearly indicated that even someone with no formal military or explosive training can create a bomb that has devastating effects. It appears that in the Myyrmanni case, the bomber did not even intend to die in the explosion and it was only his own mistake that led the bomb to detonate prematurely, killing him along with his victims. A willingness to die for one's cause greatly increases the ease of launching an attack.

This all suggests that whilst doing everything that a state can to limit a terrorist's or potential terrorist's capabilities for carrying out an attack, in a free society there can be no expectation of total security. All new security measures have their cost, be it in financial terms or in terms of freedom for all citizens. As one Swedish Ministry of Defence official pointed out, modern societies are full of potential vulnerabilities and even if we could make society 100 % secure, would it be worth the cost? He argued that we have to decide what risks are unacceptable and act to minimise those, whilst accepting that less severe risks remain elsewhere. He suggested as an example for Finland or Sweden, that as societies we cannot accept the cost that would result from an attack on a nuclear power station – therefore the security of such facilities should be as high as it possibly can be; whilst on the other hand, as vital services such as hospitals and banks have

their own emergency power supply, it is not worth the cost of guarding against the unlikely event of an attack on the electricity distribution system – this is an acceptable risk. He also suggested that in times of particular risk, reinforcing the security of certain key facilities (such as nuclear installations) is a role that the Defence forces can play if the legal structures allow⁶¹; but ultimately he judged the risk of an attack to be so low in countries such as Finland and Sweden that there will be only a few very special cases where the cost of an attack is extremely high.

Motivation

Above, we have suggested that no matter how hard a state tries to deny the capability of a terrorist to act, if a would-be terrorist is sufficiently motivated, he or she will find a way. But how can “sufficiently motivated” be defined? What factors create this motivation and what motivation exists for a terrorist to attack Finland? Here, again, Finland is shielded by its peripheral position both politically and geographically. Its position on the edge of Europe is far away from the symbolic power of the capitals of the European ‘great powers’ (Paris, Berlin, London), the centre of the new European institutions (Brussels), and even further away from the Mediterranean where Europe meets the poverty, social conflict and the non-democratic political systems of the Maghreb and the Middle East. It also has no imperial past like those of many other European states. Simply put; *for anyone without a particular reason to focus on Finland*, it is doubtful that any foreign group would target it as, for example, being symbolic of ‘the West’. There are many other targets in Europe and North America that have more symbolism. Additionally, Finland’s Cold War policy of neutrality and its post-EU-membership non-alignment has kept it out of international conflicts. Like the other Nordic states, it likes to see itself as a supporter of the United

Nations (through peacekeeping, for example) and international law, and as a giver of generous development aid.⁶² But Finland has not involved itself directly in differing international conflicts in the role of a negotiator in the way that Norway has (Middle East Peace Process, Sri Lanka). Therefore Finns tend to believe that internationally, Finland is viewed as inoffensive: it provides no reasons for anyone to wish it harm and therefore the country faces no risks.

We believe that whilst there is much merit in this argument, it is based on an insufficient understanding of the worldview of those who are willing to use violence in the name of Islamist ideology. Secondly, we argue that it misses the point that with increasing diversity of Finnish society, people who hold this kind of militant ideology will not come into contact with the actions of the Finnish state only in the sense of Finland acting abroad, but also domestically – as residents and citizens of Finland. If Finland focuses only on how its international actions do or don't provide motivation for a terrorist attack, the country may miss how its domestic actions may do likewise.

We must therefore turn to a more detailed investigation of the motivations for Islamist terrorism, which we divide into two separate categories: functional and cosmic.

Investigating the motivations of Islamist terrorists

Functional considerations:

These are the more 'normal' strategic or tactical decisions that terrorists take in pursuit of their goals. Many terrorist groups have launched attacks outside of the country they are 'at war with,' but aimed at symbols or interests of that country. For example, the IRA mounted attacks on the European mainland, but aimed at symbols of British power, such as a series of attacks on

members of the British Forces in Germany (attacks also took place in Holland and Belgium) during 1989–90 in which non-British civilians were also killed. In Finland, SUPO (the Security Police) is obviously considering this risk: immediately after September 11, security was stepped up at the Israeli and American embassies in Helsinki⁶³, and SUPO states that its work includes preventing acts aimed at “international targets situated in Finland”.⁶⁴ There is the related fear that as security becomes increasingly tight at US embassies in particularly high-risk regions (such as areas where local police capability is limited as in parts of Africa, or where there is clear evidence of terrorists operating with anti-American intentions such as in South East Asia), terrorist activity might be ‘displaced’ to areas where an attack is not expected. As argued above, there are many limitations on a terrorist’s capability to operate in Finland, which means it is still unlikely that terrorism would be displaced here, but nevertheless this should remain a consideration.

It is also worth considering what the likely reactions of Islamist terrorist groups would be if the anti-terrorist activities of states that feel they are threatened (such as the US or UK) were successful. It seems that if they are denied the ability to strike at their primary targets, they will find secondary targets. In this case the security of Finnish interests abroad – notably embassies and consulates – should be considered. The Casablanca bombings, thought by many to be the work of al-Qaeda or an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, in May 2003 demonstrate this danger. Amongst the places attacked were what could be described as the ‘soft targets’ such as a Spanish restaurant. The Belgian consulate was also heavily damaged and police officers guarding it killed, but the Belgian Foreign Minister has stated that the Belgian Government believed they had not been the target of that attack. Later media reports suggest that the target had been a Jewish-owned restaurant near the consulate, but the situation is not clear, as other reports suggest that the Belgians had been warned of a

threat to them days before the attack.⁶⁵ Many other attacks on European targets around the world also demonstrate the vulnerabilities of European 'soft' targets: 14 Germans killed in the bombing of a Tunisian synagogue in April 2002, the May 2002 murder of 11 French naval engineers in Karachi, and the suicide boat bombing in October 2002 of a French oil tanker off Yemen. Additionally, numerous plots have been claimed to have been foiled by European intelligence services, and only the efforts of crew and passengers (plus the incompetence of the bomber) on the American Airline flight from Paris to Miami saved them from being killed by Richard Reid's 'Shoe-bomb'.⁶⁶

This kind of displacement threat has implications for all Western countries including Finland, particularly if the consulates and embassies of any Western country are being targeted. This very vague interpretation of who is considered 'the enemy' by al-Qaeda and other Islamist radicals brings us to the next type of motivation.

Cosmic considerations:

The term 'cosmic' is used in the sense of all-encompassing. Although this is a struggle carried out by men, the terrorist sees the struggle as one far beyond mankind. Audrey Kurth Cronin writes: "Religious terrorists often feel engaged in a Manichaeian struggle of good against evil, implying an open-ended set of human targets: Anyone who is not a member of their religion or religious sect may be "evil" and thus fair game. Although indiscriminate attacks are not unique to religious terrorists, the exclusivity of their faith may lead them to dehumanise their victims even more than most terrorist groups do, because they consider non-members to be infidels or apostates..."⁶⁷.

Almost all religions produce extremists who are willing to use violence to promote their cosmic view (until September 11, the second most costly single terrorist attack in terms of lives lost was the 1985 bombing of an Air India Boeing 747, off the coast of

Ireland, which was carried out by Sikh extremists), but none of these other groups have developed the global reach that Islamist groups currently have.

Bin Laden effectively announced the beginning of his war with America on 22 February 1998 with the announcement of the formation of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders”. Bin Laden’s anger was still clearly focused on US troops in Saudi Arabia, but it also talks of “those Christian legions spread like pests”; the “major destruction to the Iraqi people at the hand of the Christian alliance”; and states that “to kill and fight Americans and their allies, whether civilians or military, is an obligation for every Muslim who is able to do so in any country...”.⁶⁸

The use of the Crusader imagery is a central theme in bin Laden’s public announcements. It is a cultural concept, not a geographical one, basically meaning the Christian ‘West’, including Russia. It does not just apply to the US forces that were based in Saudi Arabia, and the Coalition forces that are now on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan but extends worldwide. Bin Laden has said: “The crusader Australian forces were on Indonesian shores, and in fact they landed to separate East Timor, which is part of the Islamic world.”⁶⁹

The Australian humanitarian intervention in East Timor was carried out within the UN framework. Indeed in the same broadcast bin Laden condemns the UN: blaming it for the establishment of Israel; for “cooperating” in the “massacre” and “rape” of Muslims in UN ‘safe havens’; for sitting idly by as Muslims die in Chechnya and Kashmir; and for the blasphemy of elevating the idea of “international legitimacy” above the will and law of God. Therefore Kofi Annan is “a criminal” and “Today, and without any evidence, the United Nations passes resolutions supporting unjust and tyrannical America”, so that, ultimately: “Under no circumstances should any Muslim or sane person resort to the United Nations. The United Nations is nothing but a tool of

crime”.⁷⁰

We have come to expect terrorists to operate within the political logic of the current international system, to desire political power in its recognisable current form, even if their demands seem most unlikely – basically to share ‘our’ worldview. But Islamist terrorists share no joint cosmic assumptions with those whom they attack. The concepts of nationhood, of neutrality, of negotiated settlement, of non-combatants, of the UN and international legitimacy do not exist within their cosmic view and its religious justifications. A number of our interviewees mentioned what is rapidly becoming the new cliché of terrorism studies, but which does in some way encapsulate this: “some terrorists just want to bomb their way to the decision-making table, others think they can bomb their way to the head of that table – but the ‘new’ terrorists just want to blow the whole table up.”

This explanation of ‘new terrorism’ is complicated by the number of local or regional conflicts that have become connected to the more universal radical Islamist agenda. Chechnya, Palestine, Kashmir and now Iraq: all have their very real and individual political dynamics, but have now become part of the wider cosmic struggle that Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda identify with. What was a political and military struggle with nation-states such as India, Russia or Israel, becomes a cosmic struggle with the infidel forces of the ‘Crusaders and Jews’. It is in places that are away from the direct consequences of these struggles that this cosmic view is gaining ground – particularly in Europe.

Islamist radicalism in Europe

Immigration since the years after the Second World War has brought Islam into Europe to an extent not known in its modern history outside of the Balkans. Different communities have brought very different Islamic traditions with them from their home regions: South Asian in the UK, Turkish in Germany, North African in France to name just the most obvious – but the religion practised by the immigrants, and in particular by the children of immigrants, has started to move towards a more unified version – what the prominent French scholar of Islam, Olivier Roy, calls “EuroIslam”.⁷¹ Commenting on Roy’s latest work, *L’Islam Mondialisé*, Clifford Geertz notes that Roy sees: “a sharp distinction between ‘Islam as religion’ and ‘the concrete practices of Muslims,’ considered as an assemblage of social, not cultural facts. The first may be left, along with the Koran, ‘to the theologians’; the second is ‘a worldwide phenomenon, which supports and accompanies globalization.”⁷²

Hence we can see the radicalisation of some Muslims within Europe not as a religious process, but rather as a social one. Islam becomes an identity for immigrants living in a country where they are not really accepted, whilst they are losing the family and social contacts they previously had with their country of birth. For children of immigrants who were either born in Europe, or arrived at a very early age, this sense of alienation seems even more severe: despite, for example, being born in England and carrying a British passport they know that many within that society do not accept them as being English. Yet, at the same time, they know they are not really of the country of their parents’ birth. Some diaspora communities are strong enough to withstand these pressures for some time, maintaining an identity foundation for their members, but eventually the influence of that host culture (through education, media, an individual’s work-

ing life etc.) begins to compete.

The experience of different immigrant groups and individuals varies greatly. Some will 'privatise' their immigrant culture to a lesser or greater degree, and in many ways be assimilated into the host culture, often successfully (Indians in the UK are an example of this and it seems to matter little whether they are Hindu, Sikh or Muslim; or whether they emigrated directly from the subcontinent, or were amongst the "Ugandan Indians" expelled by Idi Amin in 1972). Other groups fail to integrate successfully, but their resistance to the host culture comes in ways that are not, or only tangentially, connected to their ethnic backgrounds (the appropriation of US-originated hip-hop culture is a clear example; whether it be Francophone Rap or UK-South Asian Raggamuffin hip-hop, the prevalence of images of urban violence and gangs in US hip-hop is echoed). The riots that have hit both French and British cities in connection with issues of high unemployment, racial tension and prejudice suffered by ethnic minority communities is testament to this failure to integrate.

An alternative identity for those who cannot, or will not integrate into the European host culture is that of "a supranational community, the Muslim *Umma*".⁷³ The *Umma* is the Islamic Community of the Faithful, but Roy argues that for EuroIslam it is a constructed community – "partly imaginary, but once imagined it becomes real in effect – a development much advanced by the advent of the internet and its associated subculture. Oddly enough, this type of radicalisation goes hand in hand with Westernization in France and in other European countries. Most radicalised Muslim youth in Europe are Western educated, often in technical or scientific fields."⁷⁴ In many respects, there is nothing odd about this; this new vitality in the concept of the *Umma* has been enabled by technical advances; globalisation is after all 'global' – it affects all cultures, not just Western ones.

Nevertheless, education does not always lead to success and social acceptance, and this is particularly the case for immigrant

communities in Europe that still face prejudice and racism. But education does allow people who are attracted to the radical, globalised Islamist ideology rapid access to others who share these ideas. This may be through a remote medium that propagates this worldview, increasingly now via the internet (for example downloadable video clips of speeches and sermons), but also literature, videos⁷⁵ and recordings of radical Imams' sermons from worldwide sources. Secondly, young educated Muslims can access this milieu via international travel. For example, Zaccaria Moussaoui – the only person that the US has charged in connection with September 11 – a Frenchman of Moroccan descent, became an active Islamist radical, including going to fight in Chechnya and Afghanistan, only when he arrived in London and started moving in militant circles there, particularly those associated with the Finsbury Park Mosque.⁷⁶

This is where the observation of the educational backgrounds of those who have gone on to become terrorists is telling: for these men (and they are virtually all men), the centre of their identity is being a Muslim and activism is the way to show this. Their education has been instrumental in their arriving at this worldview but, it seems, has not provided them with the ability to question it. Here we lean towards speculation, but there is such clear evidence that the majority of Islamist terrorists have a background in the natural sciences or engineering (and increasingly computing), that it suggests that the critical questioning central to social science and humanities does not support the fundamentalist *jihadi* mindset. This lends support to writers who argue that the type, or lack of education in the Islamic world is linked to the “root causes” of terrorism.

What sparks this move towards radicalism in Muslims within Europe is a lot less apparent. It is helpful to split the militant Islamists into three groups: immigrants who bring to Europe direct experiences from their home countries; those Muslims that have been born and brought up in Europe; and lastly, European

converts to Islam.

1) *Immigrants to Europe:*

Their radicalisation may well be complete before they even reach Europe – caused by the situation and their own experiences in their home country. If not, then the alienation of being a foreigner could spark the process. One former CIA officer to whom we spoke, noted that it is this group that terrifies European security services as they do not understand why some immigrants ‘flip’ (as he put it) and become very militant, whilst most others integrate to greater or lesser extents into Western societies – but either way, go on to live peaceful lives. An illegal Algerian immigrant wrote a powerful essay on the mind of the terrorist in the Observer newspaper considering this: “Even when we feel forced to leave [home] to make a living in the West, we are tortured by loneliness and longing for our homeland. We live in the ugliest parts of the cities working for pitiful wages, sending what little profit we make home to our families. The initial thrill of Western decadence quickly wears off. Hot sex is often followed by cold rejection. Poverty protects us from the thrall of consumerism. Our minds drift back to the golden memories of youth, the love and sharing among families and neighbours.”

He continues: “In exile, two things sustain us. One – the feeling of brotherhood with other Algerians, and two – the practice of our religion. Without them, we writhe in agony like a fish without water. To keep them, we would sacrifice anything.”⁷⁷

Discussion of the backgrounds of many of those involved in the September 11 attacks seem somewhat similar to this: Ruthven notes that their alienation from ‘the West’ tended to focus on the decadent and superficial – it seems they spent much of their time in the US in bars, fast food restaurants and even brothels and here they, perhaps correctly, saw a spiritual emptiness in Western civilisation. But, he argues, they clearly did not attend churches, concerts of any kind, art galleries or sporting events

where they might have seen the 'spirit' they presumed the West to be lacking.⁷⁸ Anyone who has had experience of living in a foreign country will know that first impressions often focus on the different, the bizarre, and what is perceived by the viewer as unpleasant. It takes longer, and may well require more than just superficial interaction with the locals, to be able to start to see the strengths of that society. Clearly, if the individual sets himself apart from the society (and if that society is resistant to integration by foreigners) those first impressions will remain dominant. This will be true not just for immigrants who turn to their religion for comfort, but also for all those who keep to their expatriot groups.

2) *European-born Muslim radicals:*

This second group is, in many ways, harder to understand than the first. Some young Muslims who go on to use violence in search of their goals come from poor and marginalised backgrounds; sometimes with criminal histories – prison being one channel for recruitment.⁷⁹ Many of these men, despite being born into Muslim families only become overtly religious after taking up the *jihadi* cause – what some have called 'born-again' Muslims. Jonathan Stevenson, a terrorism expert at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, writes that the 15 million Muslims in Europe "are only half-accepted socially and are politically underrepresented. The marginal status makes them susceptible to radicalisation".⁸⁰ This argument clearly has some validity but is only part of the story; there are other marginalised ethnic groups in European states (the Afro-Caribbean community in the UK, or Sub-Saharan Africans in France are two obvious examples) that have not become radicalised like some sections of the Muslim community. Secondly, as noted previously in the discussion on educational backgrounds, many who are attracted to Islamic radicalism are not particularly poor or marginalised. In the UK, much recruitment has taken place on uni-

versity campuses and the radical British-based cleric Omar Bhakri Mohammed boasted to Danish Television that in the UK, the Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (see below) “controlled” the Islamic Societies of over 55 universities and colleges, until they were banned from most campuses as a result of a campaign by the Organisation of Jewish Students that focused on their anti-Semitism.⁸¹ Olivier Roy argues that this mix of backgrounds is to be expected as we have seen the same in non-Islamic violent groups in the past: “Their groups are often mixes of educated middle-class leaders and working-class dropouts, a pattern common to most of the Western European radicals of the 1970s and 1980s (Germany’s Rote Armee Fraktion, Italy’s Brigada Rossa, France’s Action Directe).”⁸²

Fuad Nahdi, the editor of a British magazine for Muslims, has warned of the widening appeal of radicalism to British Muslims – citing Afghanistan, the new Anti-terrorism Act, the war in Iraq and the current *Intifada* in the West Bank and Gaza as all being central to this. He also notes that the pressure on Islamic communities since September 11 has pushed the radicals underground and out of sight of the wider Muslim community: “Nobody has a clue [now] about what kind of theology these young Muslims are developing. But informed more by rage than the message of peace within traditional Islam, the results are likely to be dangerous.”⁸³ He also notes that before September 11 it was normal for young Muslims “lured by romanticism and goaded on by real issues” to go and “do jihad” – normally in Pakistan/Afghanistan or Chechnya. This has become much more difficult under the current security situation and he fears that those who want to ‘fight’ will do it in their own countries rather than on distant battlefields. Nahdi wrote again a month later, following the news that two young well-educated British men (Ashif Muhammed Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif) had died committing suicide-bomb attacks in Tel Aviv – the attacks also claimed three innocent victims. Nahdi writes: “I am not surprised by news of Britain’s first suicide bomb-

ers; what, however, I find astonishing is that it took place in Tel Aviv, not Manchester.”⁸⁴ Other leading Muslims in the UK also point to Palestine as being central to the growing anger, as opposed to Kashmir and Chechnya where bloody conflicts are also underway, but seem not to have developed the same symbolism for Muslims in the West.⁸⁵

Overall we have a situation where radical Islamist ideology is becoming more accessible to European-born Muslims (via both new technologies and education), whilst at the same time the impetus for some young Muslims to be attracted to that ideology is increasing (through technology bringing them closer to what is happening to Muslims worldwide – giving the idea of the *Umma* more meaning). This is reinforced by young Muslims finding ‘being Muslim’ a comfortable identity in comparison to only half-acceptance as British, French, Italian etc. and the feeling that they are clearly not Pakistani, Algerian, Moroccan etc. as their parents are.

3) *European converts to Islam:*

Olivier Roy notes that there are over 100,000 converts to Islam in France alone. Some convert for practical reasons – for love and to allow them to marry a Muslim partner, others because they find the Islamic religion more spiritually appealing than the religion in which they were raised. But there are also a small but significant number who are attracted to radical Islamist ideology and go on to become terrorists. Roy notes that they fit the same mould as many other Islamist activists, some are educated leaders (like a Frenchman, Christophe Caze, killed in a shootout with French police in Roubaix in 1996 – who was a doctor) whilst others are less educated and often ‘dropouts’ who have not fitted well into society (Richard Reid, the ‘shoe bomber’, being the most obvious case). Roy believes that two decades ago these would have been the same people attracted to violent leftist groups; Islam is merely ‘a cause’ that demands their activism.⁸⁶ A

clear parallel would be violent anti-globalisation activists who follow the cause for reasons that have little to do with a perceived unfairness in the global trading system. One Swedish government researcher we spoke to also noted a few, somewhat strange, connections between some Islamist radicals and neo-Nazis. If nothing else, both groups are rabidly anti-Semitic; in Germany, a Hizb ut-Tahrir representative made an anti-American speech at a meeting of the ultra-right National Democratic Party.⁸⁷ The type of person who is attracted to the neo-Nazi worldview might find the violent fringes of the Islamist movement in Europe not wholly unfamiliar terrain.

H I Z B U T - T A H R I R (H U T)

Hizb ut-Tahrir – “The Party of Liberation” – is a radical Islamist movement dedicated to bringing about a global caliphate ruled by Sharia – Islamic law. The International Crisis Group (ICG) describes the movement’s statements as: “often strongly anti-Western, anti-Semitic and anti-Shia.”⁸⁸ Michael Whine of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, adds anti-Hindu, anti-Sikh, anti-feminist and homophobic to this list.⁸⁹ HUT was founded by Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabahani in East Jerusalem in 1953, and is opposed to all the current Middle Eastern regimes believing them to be un-Islamic. It claims to be pacifist, but according to Whine, HUT organised coup attempts in Syria and Jordan in 1968, and has made similar attempts in other Arab countries since then.⁹⁰ As a result HUT has been outlawed across the Middle East and has been forced underground. It is more of a movement than an organisation, with different groups worldwide using the HUT name, but seeming to have only vague connections to each other. In the 1980s HUT became established in London, seemingly by Omar Bakri Mohammed and a fellow Syrian, Farid Kasim – both of whom were vocal members of a large Islamist community of exiles that was forming in London during that period, and the British-based group seems to have become central in widening HUT’s influence particularly in Europe and the US. HUT also spread rapidly through the Central Asian republics in the late 1990s, to the extent that it is now seen as a major security threat by the totalitarian leaders of those states – despite HUT’s professed non-violent agenda.⁹¹ The Russian security services have arrested HUT members in Moscow and have claimed that HUT is linked to the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) which is, in turn, linked to al-Qaeda⁹², although the ICG report harbours some doubts about this.

In Europe, it remains a radically militant group but has not been linked directly to acts of violence, only to calls to violence. This has led to HUT being outlawed in Germany, for its call for violence against US and Jewish targets – it was said that it was “extremely conspiratorial” in the way it carried out activities, and a German Government researcher said “You can’t say that HUT are terrorists, but they are most definitely a group that shares the same spirit.”⁹³ The Danish HUT group has been particularly active, organising a rally in Copenhagen during the Afghanistan War that gathered over 1,000 protestors. This seemed to shock many in Denmark – that such a radical group could attract so many – and led to both media and judicial attention. The head of the Danish group, Fadi Abdullatif, was given a suspended prison sentence in 2002 for distributing racist and anti-Semitic literature, and there are ongoing investigations into whether the organisation can be banned. The group had been successful in recruiting in poor, high crime areas of cities like Nørrebro, Århus and Odense – areas with large immigrant populations – and was credited at first with causing a fall in crime rates in those areas.⁹⁴ When interviewed by Danish Television, Abdullatif claimed to have no connections to the London-based HUT group. When the journalists subsequently interviewed Bakri Mohammed in London, he said that Abdullatif had studied under him in the UK, and that “Brother Fadi” was “politically ambitious”, “the dynamo of HUT in Den-

mark⁹⁵, and that soon the Danish group would be competing with the UK to be the leading HUT group in Europe.⁹⁵ Olivier Roy also notes that HUT is also active in Sweden and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in the US.⁹⁶

Whilst not a terrorist group, Hizb ut-Tahrir is a very radical Islamist movement, and although it claims to be non-violent, European activists under the HUT banner have called for violence against those they disagree with. The Danish television documentary also contained two allegations of direct threats made by people associated with HUT (both to other Muslim immigrants; a journalist and feminist activist). It is resolutely anti-integrationist and plays on the alienation felt by some Muslims living in Europe. Its presence in Finland would be negative in three respects: 1) it would indicate the failure to integrate sections of the different Muslim communities; 2) its activities may further radicalise those attracted to its ideology; and 3) it is a trans-European organisation facilitating rapid contacts to the centres of militant Islamist activity in Europe such as London.

AL - MUHAJIROUN (AM)

Al Muhajiroun – “The Emigrants” – are a British spin-off of Hizb ut-Tahrir. The group was founded in 1996 by Omar Bakri Mohammed, when he split from HUT claiming it wasn’t radical enough. Bakri Mohammed is an interesting character, a Syrian who studied in Cairo, then lived in Saudi Arabia before being expelled and seeking asylum in the UK in 1986. He thrives on media attention and has become very prominent in the UK after September 11, speaking in favour of bin Laden and global *jihad* , although he has been more careful in his pronouncements than before – due to the strength of the new British Prevention of Terrorism Act. Nevertheless in August 2002 AM still organised a well-attended rally in that symbol of Britain’s imperial past: Trafalgar Square. AM claims to fund-raise and recruit for groups such as Hamas, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, although some doubt this. HUT has become more covert in recent years in the UK, and AM seems to be functioning as its public face. Some argue that the membership of both organisations is basically the same. What seems quite certain is that AM did recruit young British (and possibly other European) Muslims to train and fight in Afghanistan and also in Kashmir. At least three British Muslims killed in allied bombing raids in Afghanistan were connected to AM; others are known to have died in Kashmir fighting Indian forces, and their families have blamed AM for recruiting them. Finally, the two British Tel Aviv suicide bombers of April 2003 are said to have had links to AM.⁹⁷

In 2002 Bakri Mohammed claimed that AM was setting up an office in Copenhagen, leading to much debate in Denmark. It is not clear whether this was really the case, or a true-to-form example of Bakri Mohammed finding a new set of journalists to amuse himself with. Regardless, there is clear connection between AM and Danish HUT through the relationship of Bakri Mohammed and Abdullatif. Again, al-Muhajiroun is not a terrorist organisation, but like HUT: “it does serve as an important radicalising agent in the process of turning young British Muslims against Britain and into militant Islamists, and serves as a portal through which some have been encouraged to pass on their way to becoming terrorists.”⁹⁸

Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Muhajiroun, and other groups like them should be a matter of concern to all European countries.

Intelligence failures and mistakes

Clearly, since September 11, the focus of attention has shifted markedly to Islamist groups in Europe and worldwide. Certain profiles have been constructed officially, and by the media, of the type of person that might conceivably be a terrorist. More often than not, young, male and Muslim seems to be enough.* A year after September 11, 1,600 had been arrested worldwide but no one had been convicted and only two face charges in relation to the attacks. The case of Lofti Raissi is a prime example: An Algerian pilot, and British resident, he was arrested in the UK on an FBI tip – supposedly a video showed him to be the trainer of the 9/11 pilots. It turned out the man in the video was his (also innocent) cousin. British judges threw out the extradition request and released Raissi, but only after he had spent nearly a year in prison.⁹⁹ A similar case was the arrest of a Turkish-German and his American girlfriend; the story, widely reported, was that German police and US intelligence had foiled an al-Qaeda-affiliated plot to bomb a US base in Germany on the anniversary of 9/11. Much less reported was the release of the two, months later, when a judge found the charges to have no basis.¹⁰⁰ Fears that NATO could be a target for al-Qaeda were sparked when a number of Pakistanis were arrested in Naples by Italian police, supposedly with bomb-making equipment and maps indicating the NATO AF South headquarters. The claims were subsequently retracted and the men released as innocent.¹⁰¹ All such incidents show the necessity for reliable intelligence and a solid understanding of the groups concerned. They also provide ammunition for Islamist militants and provocateurs who wish to argue that the “West” is fundamentally against all Muslims.

* In the US, a new acronym has been coined by certain Middle-Eastern minorities in connection with difficulties they now face during legitimate air travel: “TWA” or “Travelling whilst Arab”.

Islamist militancy in Finland?

Finland has, by European standards, a small and relatively new Muslim community.¹⁰² The majority are immigrants who have arrived in the last two decades, particularly the Somali community who arrived as refugees from the Somali civil war at the start of the 1990s. As with all immigrants to Finland, the majority reside in the Helsinki area. Finland, in stark contrast to Denmark, Norway and Sweden, operated a very tight immigration policy throughout the Cold War period, and hence still has one of the lowest foreign-born populations of any EU country. Therefore as a nation, Finland is only starting to face the issues of integration and multiculturalism that the other Scandinavian countries have been dealing with for a number of decades, and that countries such as France, the UK and Germany have been facing for almost half a century. Even now, numbers of all immigrants – including Muslims – remain small, meaning that the related challenges are not on the scale of those that, for example, Sweden or Denmark face.

To learn more about the Muslim community in Finland we spoke with Imam Chehab of the Islamic Society of Finland and Helsinki Mosque, the oldest (of the non-Tatar) and the largest of the Finnish Mosques. The Mosque's congregation is predominantly made up of immigrants and their families, with a small number of native-Finnish converts. The majority of those with an immigrant background come from Arab and Middle-Eastern countries, but there are many other worshippers who originated from across the Islamic world. There are other mosques in the Helsinki area, including the Pasila Mosque which is predominantly Somali, and other smaller mosques serving the Pakistani, Turkish and other African communities.

On the issue of militant-Islamist activity in Finland, the Imam told us that it remains very marginal. None of the Finnish

mosques preach hatred of other religions or social groups, and there are no organised militant groups openly present in Finland like Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark. In particular, he noted that he knows of nobody brought up in Finland who holds militant views. Nevertheless, we were told that there are individuals who do have some connections to, or support, various militant groups based outside of Finland. This might tally with the media report of SUPO's statement that there are a couple of dozen individuals in Finland with some sort of link to terrorist or militant groups.¹⁰³

Therefore it can be said that in Finland, *currently*, there is very little to worry about in terms of Islamist-inspired violence, or indeed, even non-violent militant actions. Nevertheless, we wish to argue that Finland should not dismiss Islamist violence as a danger only for other countries – something that cannot happen here. The important question is whether the current situation will change in the future.

There are numerous reasons to believe that it could. There are basic demographic trends; immigration continues and now that Finland is part of the EU with free movement of labour it is much harder for it to be limited. Secondly, it is clear that Finland, like many other European countries with ageing populations and large pension payments to meet, will actually need immigrants to come and work. Thirdly, some already established immigrant communities tend to have larger families than native Finnish families meaning that, as an example, the Somali community in Finland will increase in size. Overall, we can expect that there will be more Muslims in Finland in the future than there are now, and it is a simple statistical fact that the larger a population, the more likely there is to be a tiny minority that hold extreme views.

Secondly, there are already certain problems in integrating minorities – if this situation deteriorates we will see the increase in radicalisation that seems to have been related to alienation elsewhere in Europe. Of course, radicalisation of some young

* One Al-Muhajiroun leader was given a 6-month prison sentence in 1999 for petrol-bombing a Territorial Army base in west London, and we were told by one researcher with links to British intelligence that there is a very real fear that an attack in the UK is only a matter of time – the anti-car-bomb measures taken around the parliament buildings being indicative of this.

^o It is interesting to note that in France in recent years there have been numerous reports of vandalism of synagogues and desecration of Jewish graveyards, perpetrated not by neo-Nazis and skinheads, but rather by young Muslim extremists.

Muslims is only one of the numerous possible social problems that result from the alienation of certain sections of a society, and perhaps not even the most serious (the type of social problems such as crime and poverty evident in the suburbs of many French cities or some inner-city areas of the UK point graphically to this), but for the purposes of this study it is the most pertinent. Increased militancy does increase the chance of politically-motivated violence, although not necessarily greatly: Europe has suffered very few terrorist attacks that can be directly attributed to Islamist terrorists, and those attacks that have taken place have generally been context-specific, like the GIA bombings in France in the mid-90s. Despite the fears in Britain stemming from the clear evidence of militancy and an inclination towards violence amongst young radical-Islamists, there have still been no serious attacks.* This is in contrast to Northern Irish terrorism which, despite the peace process, continues.

Nevertheless, Islamist militancy even if non-violent is not a healthy sign for a society. In many ways it is like neo-Nazi activity, in that certain groups are left to live in fear^o, even if that is just of harassment or low-level violence rather than out-and-out terrorism. Militancy breeds division within ethnic-minority communities, and between those communities and the wider host society. The huge popular vote gained by Tony Halme of the True Finns party in the last general election, who has been openly critical of immigration into Finland, is indicative that sections of the wider Finnish community will have a low tolerance of perceived wrong-doings by ethnic minorities. This success should be compared with the success of populist right-wing parties in other European states like the Pim Fortuyn list in the Netherlands, and the Danish People's Party where immigration has been on a vastly differing scale. It should be of concern that whilst social problems related to immigration remain on such a small scale in Finland, a candidate who clearly focused on those issues in a negative way could obtain such a large vote. If there was visible

militancy amongst the Muslim community within Finland, it is easy to imagine that people already inclined to mistrust immigrants would try and associate the militants with *all* Muslims, as we have seen elsewhere in Europe. This clearly creates a vicious circle of mistrust by the host society leading to further alienation amongst those who suffer from prejudice; causing yet more militancy leading to yet more mistrust.

Finland has a unique opportunity to learn from the mistakes made by other European countries on these issues. Unfortunately, it appears that at the moment there is an unwillingness to do so. The writer, as a foreigner who has lived in Finland for a number of years, feels firstly there is an unwillingness to admit that there is a problem of racism and xenophobia within Finnish society, as this threatens the nation's self-image of being an advanced Nordic society, seeing itself as a model for other societies. Imam Chehab noted that there are extensive contacts between the Muslim community and the State, both at national and local levels; including numerous ministries and the Presidency. Yet, he typified the concrete results of these relationships as very low, particularly so in terms of financial aid for projects that community leaders feel would be important. Central to these is the desire for an Islamic School and secondly, a care-home specifically for Muslim children being taken into local authority care, which would be able to help both Muslim children and their families and accepts that the problems and issues they confront will be different due to the immigrant experience and their culture. Imam Chehab noted that people who are marginalised will become a negative influence on society, whether that be in terms of turning to a militant version of their religion or in turning to criminality of some sort.

The Imam believes that the problems now visible amongst some young Muslims in Sweden will be exactly the same problems that Finland will face in ten years' time. The authorities need to look for more flexible approaches to these issues, learning from the

experiences of other countries, rather than continuing current policies which, he argues, are simply 'papering over the cracks'.

Questions of identity are notoriously complex, with huge variations possible between individuals due to their own experiences, but overall Imam Chehab felt that very few Muslim immigrants in Finland feel that they are Finnish, regardless of what is written on the front of their passport. He contrasted this with Sweden where he felt there is now a large and successfully integrated Muslim population. He noted that there are a number of Islamic schools and similar state-funded institutions, and to a large degree this has an important effect: when you feel the government supports you, it becomes your government, your state. When it does not, you feel little sense of ownership. He noted that the Islamic school in Helsinki being privately run and funded, currently accepts only the minimum legally required involvement of the state. Yet he said that if it was state-supported then it would of course be run completely in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. He also noted that plentiful funding from foreign countries is available for Islamic schools, but they have not taken it as they do not want their loyalty to be owed to another country that may well have its own agenda.

We spoke at some length with the Imam about the worldviews of the Muslim community in Finland. He believed that the views could be divided into three groups. Firstly there are the Finnish converts who, despite having become Muslim by faith, remain 'Finnish' in all other ways, including knowing their rights as citizens. The second group are immigrants who have escaped bad situations in their countries of birth and as a result feel a sense of gratitude to the country that has given them refuge. The third group, which he believes to be the majority amongst Muslim immigrants across Europe, feel that it was the activities and policies of 'the West' that led to them having to leave their homeland – be that for economic reasons or non-economic reasons such as war. As a result, they feel that they owe no gratitude to the coun-

tries where they now live. This sentiment will only be amplified if they face prejudice or a lack of opportunities once resident in Europe. Importantly, 'the West' is seen as a bloc – in many ways a mirror image of how the West tends to view “the Muslim World” in an undifferentiated way. Therefore Finland's history as a young nation with a past of being a colony itself, makes no difference to it being seen as part of 'the West'.

Two anecdotal stories Imam Chehab recounted to us suggest that if an individual already has a certain mindset – in this case that of Finland as part of the 'oppressive West' – then they will retrospectively find the 'evidence' to support this. The first case concerned a TV documentary shown some years ago about the birth of Israel. One of the elderly Zionists who was interviewed noted that there had been a small number of Finns who had fought with them. Rather than dismissing these as probable mercenaries, adventurers or crackpots, the Imam remembered this was discussed by some as evidence that Finland was supportive of Israel and not sympathetic to the Palestinians. Another similar anecdote was about a member of the congregation who showed the Imam an article he had discovered in an obscure history journal noting that during the 11th century Crusades, there was a Finnish regiment amongst the Christian armies which was reputed to be particularly blood-thirsty. This again was taken as indicative of Finnish attitudes to Islam a millennium later! Although individually these stories might seem almost comical, they do suggest a particular attitude amongst a few individuals who see Finland as no different from any other Western country. At the very least they show a lack of understanding of Finnish history and society, again suggesting a failure of integration. Of course it will be only a few individuals who would justify their feelings against Finland in these obscure historical terms, but a failure of integration leading to marginalisation, unemployment, poverty and lack of educational opportunities will provide much more contemporary grounds for some to wish ill on the country.

Overall, currently there is no reason to fear the activities of militant Islamists in Finland. Nevertheless we do know that there are some people in the country who have connections to radical groups and we have also seen that modern European-based Islamist militancy is transnational. Not only does the internet allow rapid access to the ideas of other militants worldwide, but the Schengen area and low-cost airline flights to London or Paris mean that anyone with a wish to become involved in a militant group can do so with only a little extra effort. Finland is a free society, and therefore these things cannot be limited. What can be limited is the alienation and marginalisation from wider Finnish society that could push young Muslims to search for answers from those who preach hate.

Counter-terrorism is *not* a reason to promote integration and good race relations. A multicultural society is good in itself, as well as a necessity in this globalising world. Further, a society that is at peace with itself and where everyone – whatever their race, religion, or country of birth – feels they have equal rights, opportunities, and levels of respect, is a society where those with a message of hate, be they Islamist militants or neo-Nazi skin-heads, will find it hard to gain a hold. A society at peace with itself could, at some future point, avoid having an individual decide that he can further his aims with a bomb or a gun; but that would merely be one of the many benefits that stem from having an open, equal and just society. At the moment it is not clear whether the authorities both nationally and locally are prepared to deal with these difficult issues – there is a choice to be made between learning from the mistakes made in other countries or making the same mistakes once again. Clearly the former is preferable, whilst the latter looks all too possible at present.

Finnish society has a long history of emigration and very little experience of immigration. The unique and often uncomfortable position Finland dealt with during the Cold War has left a legacy of homogeneity and insularity. Finnish society needs lead-

ership as it comes increasingly into contact with cultures very different from its own in this age of globalisation. If it does not get this leadership in a positive way from its current political establishment, new populist figures are likely to appear, offering a different type of leadership – which in the longer term will have only negative consequences for all.

The type of questions raised here go far beyond the scope of this study. The issues need to be understood across the whole of government and society – as employment, education and social services are all involved. The issues are both difficult and sensitive, but warrant serious further discussion and study.

Indirect threats to Finland

Threats to overseas Finnish interests

Finnish interests overseas, be they state or private, are unlikely direct targets of terrorists but of course security must remain a serious concern. Al-Qaeda have a clear history of targeting embassies, most successfully in their attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, but plans to bomb the embassies of the US and its allies elsewhere, such as in Singapore, have been foiled by intelligence services. For the same reasons discussed in the chapter “Understanding the threat of terrorism for Finland”, a Finnish embassy would be an unlikely primary target of an Islamist terrorist group, but there are two real fears – firstly that an attack on a nearby embassy could affect a Finnish one – this is even more relevant when embassies of different nations share one building. Secondly, that as the security of prime targets, (usually US, Israeli and UK embassies) increase, terrorists might look for easier targets, in which case any European or Western embassy might do. This was clearly thought to be the case in the Casablanca bombings of May 2003 when it appeared at first that the Belgian consulate had been targeted, but there is some confusion as to whether it really was the objective of the bombers.

Finnish private firms overseas again seem unlikely to be targeted, beyond the normal concerns that might face any Western company operating outside their homeland. Finland’s largest company, Nokia, was targeted as part of a boycott campaign against companies deemed to be supportive of Israel through their dealings with that state, but it appears that Islamist groups have only attacked private commercial interests when those interests have been identified with the actions of their governments. The clearest example of this was the bombing of the (British-based) HSBC bank headquarters in Istanbul on the same day in

November 2003 that the British Consulate in the same city was bombed. Other possible examples are what was believed to be the suicide boat-bombing of a French oil tanker, the Limburg, off the coast of Yemen in October 2002, and a never-carried-out plan to bomb the Bank of America in Singapore as part of a simultaneous attack on a number of targets in that city.¹⁰⁴

Finally, Finnish tourists and travellers overseas face exactly the same risks that all other tourists do. The Bali bombing claimed the lives of citizens of numerous Western countries in addition to locals and is indicative of this. A high-quality travel-warning system is obviously vital, and if Finland, as a small country, does not have representation everywhere that can provide the relevant information, this would seem to be an obvious arena for Nordic or European cooperation.

The threat of attacks elsewhere in Europe and their repercussions for Finland

There is a clear risk of a major terrorist attack in Europe, and this would have major repercussions for Finland. Finland, as a member of the European Union, has a moral obligation to help its European partners if they were the victims of an attack, and this may well become a legal obligation in the future in connection with the solidarity clause being suggested by the European Convention (see the chapter: “International organisations and counter-terrorism activities”).

Since September 11, European interests and citizens have been targeted elsewhere in the world (Bali, Casablanca, Djerba, Karachi, Riyadh and others) but so far there has not been an attack by Islamist terrorists on European soil. There are fears of terrorists using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), perhaps a bio-terror attack, and such an attack could directly affect Finland through the spreading of disease even if the original attack was

far away. It is reassuring that a Swedish scientific expert we spoke to said that currently this type of attack, much hyped by the media, would be incredibly difficult for a terrorist group to execute. The Aum Shinrikyo sect that attacked the Tokyo subway with sarin nerve gas in 1995 led to the deaths of 12 people. This was a horrific attack, but could have been worse by an order of magnitude if the group had been more successful in weaponising the sarin. This was not because they lacked the skill; the sect had recruited a large number of exceedingly skilled scientists from some of the finest universities in Japan and had spent millions of dollars on research. It is just fortunate that such weapons are technically very difficult to manufacture. Advanced bio-weapons remain currently beyond the capabilities of non-state actors, according to specialists in the field.

A more likely scenario would be a more ‘classical’ terrorist attack on one, or a series of European targets. Planned attacks of this nature have so far been prevented by law enforcement, but they indicate that there are Islamist terrorist groups in Europe trying to strike European targets. From media reports alone it is hard to be able to discern how serious these plots are – which ones might have resulted in major losses of life, and which were less likely to have ever succeeded. Clearly it is in the interest of law enforcement agencies to declare all operations successful in stopping a major terrorist plot, and the media also thrives on this – hence mistakes have been made as noted in the chapter: “Islamist radicalism in Europe” and media coverage of charges being dropped tends to be much less prominent. Nevertheless, the following plots have all been cited¹⁰⁵ as serious ones:

- December 1994 – Algerian terrorists hijack a flight to Paris killing some on board, their original intention was either to crash the plane into central Paris, or explode it over the city. The plane is successfully stormed by French special forces whilst on the ground in Marseilles.

- June 1998 – A plot to attack the World Cup in France is

averted, with nearly 100 arrests.¹⁰⁶

- December 2000 – A plot by Islamists based predominantly in Frankfurt to bomb Strasbourg, and in particular a Christmas Market, was thwarted.

- January 2001 – attempted attack on the American Embassy in Rome.

- June 2001 – aborted attack on American Embassy in Paris.

- December 2001 – attempt by Richard Reid to bomb a Paris-Miami flight.

- May 2002 – attempt to bomb Bologna Cathedral.

Even though small in comparison to September 11, plots such as these, had they been carried out, would have had major implications for European security, and could well bring into question some of the freedoms that Europeans have grown used to such as the Schengen area. If an attack was shown to be the work of Islamist militants, we could also expect an increase in racial tension across the continent.

An attack on the scale of September 11 within Europe would be devastating, not only in terms of the loss of life and direct cost in property damage, but also in that it could be expected to bring about considerable difficulties in Europe's already fragile economy, much as September 11 did in the United States. This would of course have direct repercussions for the Finnish economy.

S W E D E N

Sweden has experienced numerous terrorist attacks and incidents on its territory in the last three decades. These have been connected to Croatian ultra-nationalists, the West Germany Red Army Faction and various Arab groups. Importantly, these attacks were not aimed at Swedish targets, rather at targets in Sweden⁷, and it seems that this history has had no effect on the Swedish public who, according to opinion polls, think that the threat of terrorism against Sweden is very remote. More recently the arrest, and subsequent release (that provoked anger from US law enforcement agencies), of Kerim Chatty who boarded a flight to London with a loaded gun has done nothing to change this attitude.

Sweden's liberal asylum and refugee policy has led to Stockholm becoming a base for many terrorist groups operating worldwide. Recently, the Indonesian government and parliament have heavily criticised Sweden for 'sheltering' leaders of GAM – the Free Aceh Movement – which Jakarta sees as a terrorist organisation.¹⁰⁷ In the early 1990s Al-Ansar, the bulletin of GIA, was published in Stockholm giving a voice to the Islamist side of the brutal civil war underway in Algeria at the time¹⁰⁸, and it appears that Eritrean Islamic Jihad has a presence in Sweden. We were told that there is clearly a small number of active militant-Islamists in the country but the Swedish Security Police, SÄPO, knows the activists and talks with them in a 'pre-emptive' manner. Thus, the activities of this small group seems to be closely monitored and not an immediate threat.

After 9/11, the Swedish Government was very supportive of the United States in the "War on Terrorism", but some argue that this was hypocritical as Sweden has long accepted the presence of known terrorists in the country as long as they did not cause trouble for Sweden. This attitude is comparable to what some writers have called the French "Sanctuary Policy" prior to the early 1980s¹⁰⁹, which France abandoned after it started to become the victim of terrorist attacks itself. We were told in France that in the 1990s, Sweden had refused to extradite a GIA terrorist suspect to France; in this case, one of our Swedish interviewees suggested that the given legal reason was a smoke-screen – in actual fact the authorities had been afraid of upsetting GIA sympathisers within Sweden. It will be interesting to see how the EU framework decision, which requires EU member states to criminalise membership of a terrorist group, will affect Swedish Policy.

⁷ In 1972 an SAS airliner was hijacked by Croatian nationalists, but this was a 'secondary' attack – they were trying to gain the freedom of their associates who were imprisoned in Sweden after the murder of the Yugoslav ambassador to Stockholm.

Peacekeeping/Peace enforcement

With its involvement in SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo and, most recently, ISAF in Afghanistan, Finland is involving itself in new and potentially dangerous forms of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. Two French experts on Islamist terrorism we interviewed asked us whether Finland had troops in Kabul with ISAF. On hearing that this is indeed the case, they said simply “then Finland is a target”. The four German ISAF troops killed in Kabul in June¹¹⁰ were targeted simply because *jihadi* factions operating in Afghanistan see all outside forces as ‘infidels’ and ‘crusaders’. As noted earlier, the UN gives no legitimacy in their eyes. They will not differentiate between members of the coalition who are actually fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants, and the ISAF troops who are providing security and reconstruction support in Kabul. For the Islamist militant groups there is no neutrality. These, of course, are force protection issues that the military professionals are best positioned to deal with. There has been some discussion as to whether there is a possibility of terrorism being ‘exported’ back to states providing peacekeeping/enforcement forces, but this does not seem to have happened in any significant way so far. In a study¹¹¹ on this potential problem in the case of Kosovo, only one case of a terrorist action elsewhere, but with connections to Kosovo, was identified – the murder of the British military attaché in Athens by members of the radical-leftist November 17 group. The group stated that he was targeted because of his role in gaining Greek government support for the Kosovo campaign. This is, in many ways, reassuring: the terrorists only targeted Britain which was central to the actual fighting, not any of the countries that provided the troops for KFOR after the fighting had ended.

In Norway, there was much concern when a taped message purporting to be from bin Laden’s closest advisor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, threatened not just the usual suspects of the UK, US

and Australia, but also Norway. Amongst the theories as to why al-Zawahiri singled out Norway was Norwegian involvement in the Afghanistan operations. It is not at all clear that this was the real reason, and fortunately there have been no attacks to date against Norway or Norwegian interests.

Economic interests

Finland is part of the global economy and, hence, a hostage to events affecting the international economy as all other integrated trading nations are. Many experts argue that another major attack in the US would be enough to push the currently fragile US economy back into recession with worldwide repercussions, including the Finnish economy. A major attack in Europe could have similar results. In many ways, these risks are beyond the control of Finland, but if nothing else they provide another reason for playing whatever role the country is able to, in the fight against terrorism internationally.

Other indirect risks

* An example of this in Finland's locale would be the murder of the prominent Russian liberal politician, Galina Starovoytova, in St Petersburg in 1998. More recently we have seen the assassination of the Serbian prime minister, Zoran Djindjic. Both murders have been attributed to organised crime groups.

There have been attempts to link organised crime (OC) and terrorism, but these links remain unconvincing. There is no doubt that the insecurity that allows terrorism to exist also allows OC to thrive; within Europe the prime example is the Balkans and in particular Bosnia where both OC and *jihadi* groups have established strong presences in the aftermath of the war. Also, in states where OC becomes very strong, they may carry out acts that 'look like' terrorism. These might be an attempt to influence the Government or stop other parts of the state or civil society from impeding their activities*, but ultimately their aim is to maintain a position where they can make money. It is the profit motive

(not ideological, political or religious reasons) that drives them, and in that sense they are not terrorists by our definition. This is not to minimise the threat that OC can constitute. Clearly for Finland, Russian organised crime is a very serious concern, but despite its violence, it is not terrorism and therefore not within the remit of this report.

There are fears of Russian organised crime being involved in the trafficking of radio-active materials out of Russia, which terrorists might try to use in the construction of a radiological 'dirty-bomb', or even a nuclear device, and this clearly has implications for Finland. Andresen, writing in 2000, claims that there are no recorded examples of this happening¹¹², although Helsingin Sanomat reported in 2002 that SUPO suspected that materials used in the production of WMDs had been smuggled through Finland.¹¹³ We were also told by the Swedish WMD expert of a case in 1994 when a ton of beryllium (used in nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons) being transported from Estonia to the US disappeared between Stockholm harbour and Arlanda airport. With access only to open-source information it is hard to assess how serious a risk this is, but the issue has implications for the Police, Border Guards, Intelligence Services and quite possibly the Defence Forces as well – as the organisation with the best resources for dealing with WMDs. As well as domestic measures that could be taken against this risk, the G8 Global Partnership is a multi-year project attempting to secure all Russian WMD technology and material at source. The US Government has so far been the major funding source, but now it is hoped that the EU and other countries will assist. If Finland does deem WMD transit to be a serious risk to its national security, the Global Partnership would be an important international arena in which to participate.

Finally, it is well known that terrorist groups worldwide use criminal activities to fund themselves. As an example, there is evidence of smaller groups using credit card fraud to fund their

activities. French terrorism experts told us that in France, Islamist terrorist groups had used, through intimidation, small grocery shops run by members of their diaspora community as both a source of income and a way of laundering money made in other criminal enterprises. Overall though, this criminal activity may be important as a way of detecting terrorist groups or sympathisers but it is not what is generally taken to be organised crime.

International organisations and counter-terrorism activities

This chapter looks at the involvement of the most important international organisations for Finland in the ‘War on Terror’. These are: the United Nations, as the basic guarantor of international norms and law; the European Union, which is now central to how Finland reacts to the current global environment both in terms of internal and external measures; and NATO, the premier European security organisation, which Finland cooperates closely with through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) membership. These three are all huge and complex bureaucracies, and we did not have either the time or the expertise to do extensive independent evaluations of their counter-terrorism (CT) efforts – all of which are worthy of further study. What follows is only a brief outline of these institutions’ CT activities and some pertinent comments and opinions expressed by experts and officials that we interviewed.

The United Nations

The UN has managed to produce 12 different conventions relating to terrorism over the last 40 years, but they all focus on specific issues like hijacking or hostage-taking, rather than against terrorism *per se*. This is because, despite three decades of trying, the UN has not been able to formulate an acceptable definition of terrorism for all its members. The difficulty has been caused by attempts to distinguish national liberation movements from terrorist groups, in particular by Arab nations supporting Palestinian resistance to Israel, and by Pakistan in supporting Kashmiri separatists attempting to break away from India.¹¹⁴

It was in this context that the UN took action after the September 11 attacks. Resolution 1373, adopted on 28 September 2001 set the basic international legal framework for countering terrorism.¹¹⁵ Again it manages to avoid the issue of defining terrorism too closely, although Secretary General Kofi Annan has said that whilst he understands the importance of “legal precision”, what is more important is “moral clarity”.¹¹⁶

Under 1373, all signatory states were obliged to report on the implementation of the resolution within 90 days to the newly-formed Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the Security Council. The reports differed greatly in size and quantity between different member states. The purpose of the CTC is not to introduce some form of sanctions against states that do implement the resolution, but rather to aid in the dissemination of best practice. Finland submitted its first report to the CTC on 21 December 2001, Document S/2001/1251, outlining the Finnish compliance with resolution 1373. The CTC responded to this by asking for further clarifications, which were provided by the Finnish Government on 11 July 2002 – S/2002/879, and further on 25 February 2003 – S/2003/279.¹¹⁷

The former Italian Ambassador in charge of international anti-terrorism coordination argues that although it is too early to say whether the CTC process will be a success, overall 1373 was vital in quickly providing a legal framework for CT activities by other national and international organisations to be based upon.¹¹⁸ The opinion of analysts and experts we spoke to was mixed; one American analyst argued that the UN’s response had been weak, basing this on the fact that they still couldn’t create a workable definition of terrorism. Another noted that the UN will never work well as a “clearing house” for CT information or intelligence exchange, because it has, as an institution, a “cultural aversion to intelligence”. Alternatively, one British researcher pointed out the reporting system under 1373 has had one of the highest compliance rates of any similar UN initiative, and it is

not only poorer, developing countries which have found weaknesses in the CT ability – a US expert told us that Argentina realised it needed assistance on the issue of stopping terrorist financing, after it looked at the 1373 criteria. In this sense, 1373 was seen as very useful in that all countries had to consider their own legislation and internal security structures in the light of terrorism.

The UN framework has also paved the way for other international cooperation to take place – for example the EU is now helping other countries to fulfil their 1373 commitments (See below).

Fortunately, the structures were all put in place whilst the spirit of cooperation that followed 11 September still existed. It is not certain whether the international tension over the war in Iraq will affect the UN's CT operations, but it is to be hoped that it will not, as they clearly have given direction and assistance to many states' attempts to stop terrorism.

The European Union¹¹⁹

As noted above, the UN Resolution 1373 was the basic legal building block for the EU's response to September 11. The EU reacted rapidly to the attacks, to show solidarity with the American people and the US administration and to ensure that Europe was as secure against attacks as it could be. Without doubt, September 11 provided a huge stimulus to European cooperation, and problems between member states were put aside to rapidly produce unanimously-supported initiatives and programmes. One European Commission official we spoke to said that this original enthusiasm is now beginning to ebb away, leading to a period of "stagnation or stabilisation", depending on one's outlook. A senior official in the European Council Secretariat told us that there is a somewhat contradictory atmosphere, in that the threat of

Islamist terrorism has been officially acknowledged within the Union, but the lack of an attack within Europe is leading many to feel that there is no serious threat to the EU. Considering the plots by Islamist terrorists to attack Europe that seem to have been thwarted by European law enforcement and intelligence agencies, this does seem rather bizarre – Europe’s success in stopping an attack taking place is leading to complacency over whether an attack could take place.

The EU’s actions can be divided into external and internal actions, and this is reflected in the two central working groups: COTER under Pillar II (External Affairs), focusing on external CT issues and the “Terrorism Working Group” within Pillar III (Justice and Home Affairs – JHA) that deals with police and intelligence matters.

Internal issues:

A number of the independent experts we interviewed noted that the European-wide arrest warrant (this actually was a result of the Tampere summit of 1999 but was adopted with the political drive after 9/11) and the Joint Definition of Terrorism have been very significant advances for the EU. Indeed with the joint definition of terrorism, the EU has become the first international body to be able to define the phenomenon. One expert told us that he believes that the definition is exceedingly wide, and it leads you to consider if other agendas were at work in its drafting, but the EU’s line is that extreme care was taken not to include political actions that might lead to the breaking of laws, but are not what is generally accepted as terrorism – e.g. direct actions, political protest marches etc.

With regard to intelligence-sharing and cooperation between both the police and security services of the member states, it is apparent that the EU had only limited “added-value” to offer. This is not in itself a negative thing, as the EU sits atop a web of pre-existing bilateral intelligence links between the members

states and also with other non-EU European states. Historically the EU (or EEC as it was then) actually played a role in facilitating these links through the TREVI process beginning in 1975. These links are particularly strong between the countries that have experienced terrorism over the years; one London-based terrorism expert noted that France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain and to a slightly lesser degree the Netherlands, all have excellent bilateral CT links, despite any differences in approach to CT as can be seen between Britain and France.*

One terrorism expert we talked with noted that this is often forgotten in the US, although a number of US CT experts and government officials did state that the US could learn a lot from some of the experiences of various European countries. Our interviewee in the Council Secretariat typified counter-terrorism as being very much an “old boy’s network”, but that there is nothing wrong with this. The professionals in the field know each other and hence the framework is there, and not something the EU has to create. The EU has a useful role to play, for example, in disseminating best practice in these fields but some of the actions it has undertaken are perceived as being less productive. One example that we were given was the bi-yearly threat assessments made by the Presidency in response to questionnaires given to the member states. The assessments were said to have mainly focused on indigenous terrorism to date, and contain little that “can’t be read in the newspapers”. A working group was set up to deal with Islamic terrorism specifically, but as one interviewee told us, this now seems to have “gone to sleep”. One problem which was identified was the lack of leadership from the Commission, part of the reason for this, it was suggested, being a lack of expertise on terrorism within the Commission. Our Council interviewee stated that there is only one person within the Commission with truly wide expertise in the field. Another major problem is that many people within the EU institutions, including the Commissioners, have been keeping a low profile on many

* France has criticised the UK repeatedly for allowing Islamist militants to recruit and operate openly in the UK. The British philosophy seems to have been that the intelligence gathered from just monitoring such people is more productive than the French approach of arresting anyone suspected of recruiting. The British position has hardened since 9/11, and some experts argue the original policy was more a result of the focus of resource on Northern Irish terrorism and an underestimation of the Islamist threat.

issues until it is clear how the Iraq situation will turn out.¹²⁰

EUROPOL has had its stature increased post-September 11; immediately after the attacks experts were seconded to it from all the member states and an ad-hoc anti-terrorist unit was established, which has subsequently been integrated into Europol's permanent structures. Relations with US law enforcement have also been reinforced with agreements on the sharing of data, and also an exchange of liaison officers between Europol and the FBI. A US State Department Official from the CT Office told us that there is no way to share CT intelligence with the EU as a whole, so hopefully this newly-established Europol-FBI link may go some way to resolving this problem. Europol's analytical capability in particular is very strong and it will be in a position to see trends not visible to individual states. The Council Secretariat official that we interviewed said that Europol, like the intelligence agencies, is something of a pre-existing network where many of the professionals in the field know each other from connections that predate Europol. This gives a strong basis to begin with and, given the right political support, it can rapidly become a very useful actor in the CT field. This image was reinforced independently by a Swedish police officer we spoke with, who believed that the bilateral political links that are facilitated through Europol are important even if the operational 'added-value' is, so far, of limited significance.

EUROJUST is a relatively new organisation within the third pillar of the EU. Perhaps because of the organisation's limited history, none of our interviewees specifically mentioned it. Nevertheless, this organisation of 15 prosecutors in charge of coordination and cooperation on serious crimes that are trans-European, including terrorism, has already had an important impact on countering terrorism. It was instrumental in coordinating the investigations that led to stopping the planned attacks against the US Embassy in Paris, the Christmas Market in Strasbourg and against the Kleine Brogel US airbase in Belgium.

The other important internal role that the EU has been involved in is Civil Protection, particularly in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack. These initiatives include the ongoing organisation of the following: providing experts for coordinating emergency responses, a stock-taking exercise of relevant expertise and resources of member states, an emergency communications systems to be available Union-wide, the establishment of a monitoring centre, and relevant training and exercise provision.

External relations:

With the EU's external relations, CT now plays a central role. We spoke with a senior official in the Commission's External Affairs Directorate and that interview is the basis of the following. Firstly, he believed that the importance of the EU's presence at the G8 is often underestimated. The G8 has a specific working group on terrorism, the Roma group, where the EU's External Affairs Directorate is represented. But there is also a second, the Lyon Group, that focuses on Organised Crime, which a Commission representative from JHA attends. The Commission has found that the two groups actually complement each other very well, and a lot of the CT measures are actually implemented within the Union under Pillar III/JHA. As well as direct cooperative CT measures being carried out through the G8, it has also become central to cooperative threat reduction programmes with Russia. The G8's Global Partnership aims at securing all of Russia's weapons of mass destruction and also at stopping the proliferation of knowledge through the 'brain-drain' of scientists and technicians. This clearly has great importance in countering the most serious type of terrorism imaginable.

The EU now includes CT clauses in all its agreements with third countries. These are based on UN 1373, and aimed at helping these developing countries in attaining the UN-set standard. There has already been a pilot project with Pakistan, the Philip-

pines and Indonesia; member states lend experts (for the pilot project it was a police officer, a magistrate and a judge) who visit the countries concerned, study their current CT structure then write a report detailing how they believe it can be improved. EU help can then be given for any problems that cannot be dealt with by the third countries alone, but this is not done in isolation. Rather it becomes part of the multi-year partnership programme that the EU has with that state. This is a more holistic approach than assistance given state to state; for example, in instituting CT measures, human rights considerations will not be sidelined. So far the pilot project has been well received and successful.

Conclusion:

The EU reacted with uncharacteristic speed and assertiveness after September 11. There has clearly been a reduction in the political momentum since then, but it does appear that CT has become a constant consideration within the Union's external and internal actions. The current European Convention process is one very important determinant of the future. A number of our interviewees, including EU officials and Swedish and British Government officials, pointed to the importance of the *solidarity clause*¹²¹ which has been proposed. In the event of a major terrorist attack within the Union at the moment, it would be unthinkable that the other member states would not assist their partner in some manner, but the extent of this could become greater, or more systematised with a solidarity clause in a European constitution. There is obviously concern amongst the non-aligned members that this should not become the equivalent of NATO's Article V. This was stressed by Swedish government officials, and it is expected that Finland would have similar concerns.

European CT cooperation, both at bilateral levels and through the EU institutions, appears to be extensive and relatively successful. It appears that the EU has not suffered an Islamist terror-

ist attack in the last couple of years, not because there are no Islamist groups that would attack European states, but rather that, so far, European law enforcement agencies have managed to foil the plots that have existed. There is, of course, the danger that this success is leading people to believe that there is no threat; it was worrying that a number of our interviewees who follow European CT issues all stated that it would take an attack in Europe to bring home the seriousness of the threat that Europe faces.

NATO/PfP¹²²

One leading French CT expert told us that CT is, and will remain, 80 to 90 percent an issue handled by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Only a small section is military, and hence arguably NATO's role is marginal. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, this did not appear to be the case. NATO took the historic step of invoking Article V on common defence, in effect saying the attack on the US constituted an attack on all the allies. This did have some practical implications; NATO AWACS planes were deployed to the US to free US assets for missions in Afghanistan. Similar steps were taken with naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet many argue that the political importance of the Article V declaration was completely ignored by the US.¹²³ One US expert and former administration official we interviewed said that even a limited, mainly symbolic role for NATO in Afghanistan would have strengthened the Alliance, but instead the US policy has actually weakened it.

Nevertheless, NATO does have a mandate for involvement in CT matters. At the Washington Summit in April 1999 a new Strategic Concept was agreed on, and the first half of Article 24 includes a reference to terrorism. Chris Bennett, editor of the NATO Review, argues that NATO, by deciding that a terrorist attack on

one ally by a non-state actor can trigger Article V collective defence has, in effect, mandated itself a long-term role in combating terrorism.¹²⁴

The – at the time – Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, has laid out the three roles that he sees for the military, and hence NATO, in combating terrorism: Firstly, defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability to attack. Secondly, offensive measures to prevent and deter. Thirdly, consequence management: measures to limit the consequences of terrorist attacks.¹²⁵

Amongst the offensive measures being developed, the headline proposal is for the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). The PCC aims to make European forces more deployable, sustainable and able to apply force in other areas of the world. In the light of the Afghanistan conflict this has clear CT potential. Heavy-lift air transport, precision-guided munitions and air-to-air refueling capability are all aimed at by the PCC. The NRF is designed to be a rapidly deployable, easily sustainable and hard-hitting joint NATO force – one that can be used worldwide. It is destined to begin initial operations by October 2004 and be fully ready by 2006. The British Foreign Office officials we spoke to said that balancing the needs of the NRF and the EU's Rapid Reaction Force will be central – but if this can be successfully managed then the two forces could complement each other well, with the NRF being more offensive but on a much smaller scale than the RRF. From experts outside of governments, there was a great deal more scepticism. One told us that whilst the NRF could help maintain US interest in NATO it will be of little help in CT in the foreseeable future – after Afghanistan, al-Qaeda does not have a “bricks-and-mortar” presence, hence there is even less of a military CT role than was the case two years ago.

The defensive and the consequence management actions underway in NATO intersect on many points. There has been focus on CBRN attacks and how to detect and deal with them. Within

NATO, the WMD Centre is active but its impact is limited by firstly, the relatively small budget of the civilian staff of NATO (as one EU Commission official put it, the EU's budget for external affairs alone is twenty times greater) and secondly, by the difficulty of having to work with Alliance members' interior ministries as well as the more traditional defence ministries. One NATO initiative tried to catalogue members' capabilities for dealing with CBRN, but found it considerably more difficult than expected. UK Foreign Office officials said that the central problem was whether national assets could be pledged to the Alliance; nevertheless, the lessons learnt have been valuable for the ongoing EU exercise that is looking at similar issues. Some more visible actions have been taken, such as NATO naval forces escorting member-state commercial shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar since the threat of terrorist attacks on such ships was discovered. Recently, the capture of a Ukrainian ship by Greek commandos that was bound for Sudan and full of explosives was said to be the result of NATO intelligence.

Within the PfP framework, there has been some movement, particularly the formation of the PAP-T (Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism), but overall we were left with the impression that action through the PfP and EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) remains very limited as a result of the greatly differing nature of NATO's partner countries: ranging from advanced democracies such as Sweden and Finland through to authoritarian and poor regimes such as some of the Central Asian republics. Finland has organised a seminar on border security for its fellow partners, but we were warned not to overestimate the outcomes of such events – the biggest achievement is often just getting all the participants into the same room on the correct day. Overall we were told that there is a problem with how Finland can cooperate with NATO on terrorism issues, as the Alliance remains very tight and there is no single working group or committee which could serve as the central point for this kind

of cooperation. Secondly, the Ministry of the Interior is focusing its cooperative efforts on Europol and EU institutions, meaning that there is little interest or resources for focusing on NATO's cooperative endeavours.

Conclusion

The Myyrmanni shopping-mall bomb of October 2002 clearly showed how easy it would be for Finland to be attacked by terrorists. Despite the lack of any understandable political motivation in that case, the bombing exposed the vulnerability of this society to one individual with a reasonable standard of education, easy access to huge amounts of information through the internet, and the very limited financial resources necessary to buy the bomb-making material. No global conspiracy was needed; no visits to terrorist training camps, no complicated international financial movements, no smuggling of operatives or equipment across borders. In the modern world it is easy to become a terrorist if one wishes.

Nevertheless, this report holds that Finland remains an unlikely target. Although, as we have argued above, there is no neutrality in the cosmic view of a committed Islamist terrorist, it is clear that Finland's peripheral status both politically and geographically weighs very heavily in its favour when it comes to *not* being targeted by international terrorists. There are so many other targets elsewhere, more easily reached and attacked, that it would seem most unlikely that anyone without a specific reason to focus on Finland would make the effort to attack this country. The cost is too high and the symbolism too low.

Therefore, there are two possible ways that Finland could still be targeted. Firstly, Finnish interests abroad could be the victim of a terrorist attack. The three most obvious targets are embassies, peacekeeping troops, and tourists – al-Qaeda has shown itself willing to target all three. There is a particular danger that as states which have been the main target for Islamist terrorists, most notably the United States, keep increasing the security of their overseas missions and of any troops deployed abroad, then

attacks will be displaced onto other 'Western' targets. The attacks on German peacekeepers in Kabul; on tourists from all over the world in Bali; on a Spanish, and possibly Belgian, target in Casablanca; and on Western civilians living in Riyadh; all demonstrate that the hatred of Islamist terrorists extends beyond just the United States and its closest allies.

The second way in which Finland could be targeted would be by an Islamist militant already living here. As explained in the report, this currently seems a most unlikely eventuality. There appears to be little radical militant activity within the Muslim community in Finland and hopefully this situation will continue, but it is not certain.

Evidence from other European countries suggests that particularly amongst some younger Muslims there is an attraction to a more globalised version of their faith; which, stripped of the local traditions and practices specific to different regions of the Muslim world, is more conducive to the Islamist worldview. Additionally, Muslims from different ethnic minorities across Europe still face prejudice, racism and a lack of equal opportunities. This creates an atmosphere where the combative rhetoric of the Islamists is even more attractive, as it purports to provide a solution to these real problems. At the same time, the globalised world provides more immediate knowledge of the situation of Muslims worldwide: the very real political and military struggles underway in Muslim communities in as diverse places as Palestine, Kashmir and Chechnya come to be regarded as part of one assault on the 'Muslim nation' – reinforcing the Islamist worldview. And the same technology that allows access to this news from around the world also facilitates the coming together of like-minded individuals no matter where they live in a geographical sense. There is no need for Islamist preachers teaching hate in Finland, when you can download their sermons from an internet site.

One Swedish official we interviewed stated that, with regard

to Islamist terrorism, he believes that the biggest risk to Sweden is not an organised international conspiracy, but a “lone lunatic”, just as we have seen “lone lunatics” influenced by extreme rightwing or leftwing ideologies committing violent acts. But to call this potential terrorist a ‘lunatic’ is to avoid taking responsibility, as if our actions have no bearing on his actions. The more successfully immigrants are integrated into the society, the less likely it is that such attacks would ever take place.

Our appraisal of the response of international organisations to September 11 is mixed. The huge political pressure to ‘do something’ in the aftermath of the attacks is apparent in the actions of the UN, EU and NATO, and without a doubt some of the actions have been useful and effective. Nevertheless, it is clear that there was only a limited understanding of the phenomenon being dealt with, and this restricted what could be done. For militaries worldwide, September 11 proved that terrorism now has the potential to be one of the greatest threats to a nation’s security, yet it also proved that their ability to prevent it was minimal at best. The problems of using military power to protect against terrorist attacks are reflected in the difficulties that NATO is facing in finding a role in the fight against terrorism.

As we stated in the introduction, it is important to keep a sense of perspective on these issues. If there is another major attack in the US on the scale of September 11, it would certainly be disastrous for the world economy and in the long term this might have more far-reaching consequences for Finland than a limited attack within the country – no matter how tragic that would be. The Myyrmanni bomb was a tragedy and a horrific experience for all involved, but it did *not* threaten the stability of the country in anyway; in fact, for most people life went on as before. As the UK has shown with the IRA; Spain with ETA; and many other European countries that have experienced terrorism: democracies are not fragile, they can withstand harsh blows and bounce back. They can fight terrorism, and even if they can’t stop it, they

can marginalise it, making sure it does not stop the normal democratic business of the country. Ultimately, this is our best defence.

References

¹ US Department of Transport, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2002) *National Transportation Statistics 2002* <http://www.bts.gov/publications/nts/index.html>

² See for example: "Terrorism's Slippery Definition Eludes UN Diplomats" *CS Monitor* 4 February 2002.

³ Whitaker, Brian "The definition of terrorism" *The Guardian* 7 May 2001

⁴ *HS International Edition* 21 March 2001

⁵ Kurth Cronin, A (2002) "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism" *International Security* Vol. 27, No. 3 Winter 2002/03 (p. 32)

⁶ Burke, Jason (2003) *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror* London, I. B. Tauris (p. 24)

⁷ Jussila, Hentilä, Nevakivi (1999) *From Grand Duchy to a Modern State* London, Hurst and Company (p. 113)

⁸ Azzam, Maha (February 2003) *Al-Qaeda: the misunderstood Wahhabi connection and the ideology of violence* London, RIIA Middle East Programme (Briefing Paper No. 1)

⁹ See Kiiskinen, Jyrki (1997) "When the revolution comes" *Books From Finland* No. 4 1997 The article is a review of Tapani Suominen *Ehkä teloitamme jonkun: Opiskelijaradikalismi ja vallankumousfiktio 1960- ja 1970-lukujen Suomessa, Norjassa ja Länsi-Saksassa*

¹⁰ Kiander, J (2001) *Laman opetukset. Suomen 1990-luvun kriisin syyt ja seuraukset* Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus, Helsinki.

¹¹ See for example the comments of Swedish Parliamentarian Mauricio Rojas, in "A survey of the Nordic Region" p. 12 *The Economist* 14 June 2003

¹² See <http://www.vaikuttava.net/article.php?sid=3045>, <http://www.vaikuttava.net/article.php?sid=1495> The latter article includes the interesting observation "We want to act non-violently, but if the police destroy the possibilities for organised activity and use violent methods as in Gothenburg or Genoa, no one can really guarantee the non-violence of all the demonstrators."

¹³ <http://personal.inet.fi/musiikki/hya/manty/kkkvj2001.html> or <http://www.indymedia.no/print.php?id=3933>

¹⁴ See *HS International Edition* 7 December 2001

¹⁵ From SUPO's Annual Report 2002 English Summary it is clear that the Finnish Security Police also follow "non-parliamentary movements for animal rights".

¹⁶ Clifford Geertz, the eminent American anthropologist, has written an excellent two-part article ("Which Way to Mecca?" Part I, 3 June; Part II 3 July 2003) in *The New York Review of Books*, looking at the large number of books published on Islam and Islamists since September 11. He notes that very few are written without an agenda and of course are of varying quality. Nevertheless he does note that Gilles Kepel's major study "Jihad: The trail of political Islam" is amongst the most comprehensive and scholarly, and Professor Kepel's analysis was central to this writer's understanding

of the phenomenon.

¹⁷ Benjamin, D. Simon, S. (2002) *The Age of Sacred Terror* New York, Random House (p. 50)

¹⁸ The *Salaf* were the inspiration for 'Salafism', a reform movement within Islam at the end of the 19th Century, which means "the path of pious ancestors", but is used today by some fundamentalist Muslims, such as Wahhabis, to describe themselves in contrast to those they perceive to be bad Muslims who do not follow the religion correctly. (See Kepel 2002:219–220)

¹⁹The collection of actions and words of the Prophet, synonymous with the term 'Sunna'.

²⁰ See entry "Caliphate", Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, Copyright (c) 2003 on: <http://www.encyclopedia.com> Confusingly, the minority Shia tradition of Islam, does not recognise the four *Rashidun* Caliphs; their belief is that Ali, the fourth Caliph in the Sunni tradition, was the original true Caliph. This triggered the central split in Islam. The term 'Shia' originates from 'party of Ali'. See also Hiro (2002) Chp. 1

²¹ "And he said unto them, render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar's, and unto God the things which be God's." (Luke 20:25 King James Bible)

²² These are prayer, pilgrimage, alms, fasting and the declaration of faith.

²³ Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (pp. 45–48), Ruthven, M (2002) *A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America* London, Granta (p. 135)

²⁴ Different sources do not agree on the date of Wahhab's death, citing dates between 1787 and 1792.

²⁵ Hiro, D (2002) *War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response* London, Routledge (pp. 39–41); Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (pp. 52–54); Ruthven (2002) op. cit. (pp. 136–137); Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2003

²⁶ Kepel, Gilles (2002) *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* London, I.B. Tauris (pp. 61–62)

²⁷ Bergen, P (2002) *Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* London, Phoenix (p. 54); Hiro (2002) op. cit. (p. 143)

²⁸ *ibid.* (pp. 140–142)

²⁹ Azzam (2003) op. cit. (p. 2)

³⁰ Kepel (2002) op. cit. (p. 25)

³¹ *ibid.*

³² *ibid.* (pp. 27–30); Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (pp. 57–59); Hiro (2002) op. cit. (p. 63)

³³ Kepel (2002) op. cit. (p. 27); Hiro (2002) op. cit. (pp. 65–68)

³⁴ Ruthven (2002) op. cit. (pp. 76–83)

³⁵ quoted in Hiro (2002) op. cit. (p. 66)

³⁶ Siegel (2003) "Sayyid Qutb's America" *NPR*; Ruthven (2002) op. cit. (77–78)

³⁷ *ibid.*; Bergen (2002) op. cit. (p. 50)

³⁸ Hiro (2002) op. cit. (p. 206)

³⁹ *ibid.* (chp. 6); Bergen (2002) op. cit. (chp. 3)

- ⁴⁰ Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (pp. 99–100)
- ⁴¹ Azzam, Abdullah *Join the Caravan: Al-Jihaad Fesibillah – The forgotten Obligation* available at http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_caravan_1_foreword.htm. It is not clear who translated the text or when but the translator discusses the ‘martyrdom’ of Azzam and the end of the Soviet Union, dating it at 1992 or later.
- ⁴² Hiro (2002) op. cit. (p. 221)
- ⁴³ Kepel (2002) op. cit. (p. 315)
- ⁴⁴ Bergen (2002) op. cit. (pp. 81–82)
- ⁴⁵ Hiro (2002) op. cit. (pp. 78–79); Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (p. 78)
- ⁴⁶ Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (p. 112)
- ⁴⁷ *ibid.*; Bergen (2002) op. cit. (chp. 4)
- ⁴⁸ Famed for having provided the *fatwa* that legitimated the assassination of Sadat in 1981.
- ⁴⁹ Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (p. 239)
- ⁵⁰ *ibid.* (pp. 20–24)
- ⁵¹ For the full text of the declaration see <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>
- ⁵² Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (pp. 256–257)
- ⁵³ Bergen (2002) op. cit. (p. 128)
- ⁵⁴ Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (p. 33, 311–313) Bergen (2002) op. cit. (p. 143)
- ⁵⁵ *ibid.* (chp. 9)
- ⁵⁶ Benjamin (2002) op. cit. (p. 347)
- ⁵⁷ <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/10/14/bali.tourists/>
- ⁵⁸ Delpech, T 2002 *International Terrorism and Europe* Chaillot Papers No.56; Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies (p. 15); Rogers, Paul (2003) “Al-Qaida: evolution, not comeback” *Open Democracy.net* 22 June 2003 (www.opendemocracy.net)
- ⁵⁹ Two different US terrorism experts both told us that the media in the US, and worldwide, missed the huge significance of the capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, called “al-Qaeda’s director of global operations” (*Newsweek* 23 June 2003, p. 28), in March 2003 in disrupting centrally planned al-Qaeda operations.
- ⁶⁰ See the UN Development Programme/Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development *Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations* New York, UNDP.
- ⁶¹ International examples would be the deployment of light armour to Heathrow airport in the UK in February 2003 or National Guardsmen being used in the US at airports and other potential targets like major bridges.
- ⁶² Currently Finland allocates 0.35 % of GDP to development aid, as compared to 0.7% or more from its Nordic neighbours (www.stat.fi).
- ⁶³ The simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, clearly showed al-Qaeda sees attacking embassies as a way of hitting the

United States from unexpected directions.

⁶⁴ The Finnish Security Police (SUPO) *Annual Report 2002: English Summary* <http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/supo/home.nsf/pages/446DF80B096E4FB5C2256BE900418357>

⁶⁵ See for example “Carnage in Casablanca” <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/18/attack/main554414.shtml> and “Bomb Carnage Shocks Morocco” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3037157.stm>

⁶⁶ See Graff-Paris, J “Is Europe Next?” *Time* 10 November 2002 (European edition)

⁶⁷ Kurth Cronin 2003:41

⁶⁸ For the full text of the declaration see <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>

⁶⁹ BBC Monitoring “Bin Laden rails against Crusaders and UN”. Translated from the original Arabic speech of Bin Laden broadcast by Al-Jazeera TV, 3 November 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1636782.stm

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ Roy, Olivier (2003) “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” *The National Interest* Spring 2003.

⁷² Geertz, Clifford (2003) “Which Way to Mecca? Part II” *The New York Review of Books* 3 July 2003 (p. 37 footnote 3) discussing Olivier Roy’s *L’Islam Mondialisé* (Le Seuil 2002) will be published in English during 2003.

⁷³ Roy (2003) *op. cit.* (p. 64)

⁷⁴ *ibid.* It is not just in Europe where the connection between a ‘Western’ scientific or technical education has been noted. Malise Ruthven notes that the few high-quality studies done on the background of Islamic fundamentalists completely support this assertion. Even the large-scale study of Palestinian suicide bombers, done by Nasra Hassan, notes that none of them were uneducated. See Rutven, M (2002) *A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America* London, Granta (p. 111–115) (He considers studies that have been done in Tunisia, Egypt and Pakistan), and Hassan, Hasra (2003) “An Arsenal of Believers” *The New Yorker* 31 March 2003

⁷⁵ For example, one can go to the “Shop” section of the Jihadunspun.com website and easily order videos entitled “Russian Hell” Parts I, II, and III that show the ‘glorious’ exploits of Mujaheddin killing Russians in Chechnya. An interesting aside related to the Jihadunspun website is the claim by the writers of Azzad.com, an unashamedly violence-promoting Jihadi website, that Jihadunspun is actually a tool of a Western security agency, and they give lengthy arguments to support this. If this is the case, one should perhaps be reticent about trying to buy any of these videos!

⁷⁶ “‘Westernized kid’ grows into 9/11 Suspect” *USA Today* 25 June 2002

⁷⁷ ‘Rachid’ (2003) “Inside the mind of a terrorist” *The Observer* 9 March 2003 (www.observer.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4621334,00.html)

⁷⁸ Ruthven (2002) *op. cit.* (pp. 19–21)

⁷⁹ See for example the work done by the TERRA group of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence on the Algerian GIA recruitment of French Muslims in the mid-1990s. Lia, B. Kjøk, Å. (2001) *Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000* Oslo, FFI/Rapport-2001/

03789 (pp. 29–31), also Kepel (2002) op. cit. p. 310

⁸⁰ Stevenson, J (2003) “How Europe and America Defend Themselves” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 82, No. 3 March/April 2003 (p. 82)

⁸¹ Danish Television documentary on Hizb ut-Tahrir (broadcast on FST in Finland May 2003)

⁸² Roy (2003) op. cit. (p. 70)

⁸³ Nahdi, Faud “Young, British and ready to fight” *The Guardian* 1 April 2003

⁸⁴ Nahdi, Faud “Tel Aviv first, then Manchester?” *The Guardian* 2 May 2003

⁸⁵ See the comments of Inayat Bagawala, Press secretary to the Muslim Council of Great Britain “West Asia terror – made in Britain” *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) 24 May 2003

⁸⁶ Roy (2003) op. cit. (p. 70)

⁸⁷ “Net Around German Islamic Fundamentalists Gets Tighter” 17 January 2003 *Deutsche Welle World* www.dw-world.de

⁸⁸ ICG *The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign* 30 January 2002 Central Asia Briefing Osh/Brussels

⁸⁹ Whine, M (2003) *Al-Muhajiroun: The portal for Britain's suicide terrorists* www.ict.org.il/articles/articleid=484

⁹⁰ *ibid.*

⁹¹ ICG (2002) op. cit.

⁹² “Islamists arrested in Russia” *The Guardian* 11 June 2003

⁹³ “Net Around German Islamic Fundamentalists Gets Tighter” 17 January 2003 *Deutsche Welle World* www.dw-world.de

⁹⁴ Reports from the *Copenhagen Post* and the news section of the website of the Danish Embassy in Washington.

⁹⁵ Danish Television documentary on Hizb ut-Tahrir

⁹⁶ Roy (2003) op. cit. (p. 67) and “World: Analyst Speaks about ‘Globalisation’ of Islam” 28 May 2003 *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (www.rferl.org)

⁹⁷ See Whine (2003) op. cit.; Roy (2003) op. cit.; Martin Jones, D (2003) “Out of Bali: Cybercaliphate Rising” *The National Interest* Spring 2003.

⁹⁸ Whine (2003) op. cit.

⁹⁹ “After the biggest manhunt in history, no one has been convicted and only two face charges” 6 September 2002 *The Times*

¹⁰⁰ “Couple acquitted on terrorism charges” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 9 May 2003 (<http://www.faz.com/>)

¹⁰¹ BBC “Arrests ‘ruined’ Pakistanis’ lives” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2947255.stm

¹⁰² The exception is the small Muslim Finnish Tatar community who came to Finland whilst it was still part of the Russian Empire.

¹⁰³ *Helsingin Sanomat* 21 May 2002 (of course, many of these may be to non-Islamist

groups)

¹⁰⁴ Gunaratna, Rohan (2003) "Al-Qaeda's operational ties with allied groups" *Jane's Intelligence Review* February 2003

¹⁰⁵ Delpech, Thésèse (2002) *International Terrorism and Europe* Chaillot Papers No.56; Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies (pp. 54–55)

¹⁰⁶ This particular case remains controversial – despite such a large number of arrests being made in numerous cities across Europe, no explosives were recovered and only a small number of firearms (see Lia, B. Kjøk, Å 2001:42).

¹⁰⁷ "It won't be Swede success for Jakarta" 11 June 2003 *The Straits Times* (<http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg>)

¹⁰⁸ Kepel (2002) op. cit. (p. 303)

¹⁰⁹ Shapiro, J and Suzan, B (2003) "The French Experience of Counter-terrorism" *Survival* Vol. 45, Spring 2003 (p. 69)

¹¹⁰ See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2980902.stm

¹¹¹ Hansen, Annika (2000) "Muscular Peacekeeping and Terrorism – the Example of Kosovo" in Lia and Andresen (2000) *Terrorism Political Violence and Organised Crime – Security policy Challenges of Non-State Actors* Oslo FFI Rapport-2000/06444 (p. 10–11)

¹¹² Andresen (2000) "The Threat from Russian Organised Crime" in Lia and Andresen (2000) op. cit. (p. 21)

¹¹³ *Helsingin Sanomat* 7 November 2002

¹¹⁴ See Jordan M "Terrorism's slippery definition eludes UN diplomats" *The Christian Science Monitor* (4 February 2002) <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0204/p07s02-wogi.html>

¹¹⁵ For the full text of the resolution see <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/>

¹¹⁶ See Jordan (2002) op. cit.

¹¹⁷ Finland's reports to the CTC, and those of all the other member of the UN, are available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/1373reportsEng.htm>

¹¹⁸ Armellini, Antonio (2003) "International Terrorism: Global Challenges and Italian Responses" *The International Spectator* 1/2003 Vol. XXXVIII p. 106

¹¹⁹ For extensive and expert commentary on the EU's CT actions see Dubois, D (2002) "The Attack of 11 September: EU–US Cooperation Against Terrorism in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs" *European Foreign Affairs Review* No. 7 2002; Gregory, F (2003) "The EU's role in the war on terror" *Jane's Intelligence Review* January 2003 pp. 14–17; Duke, S (2003) "CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link" *European Foreign Affairs Review* No. 7 2002; Den Boer, M Monar, J (2002) "Keynote Article: 11 September and the Challenges of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor" *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol. 40, 2002.

¹²⁰ This interview was conducted on 27/03/03, just days after the fighting in Iraq had begun.

¹²¹ See “Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence” Brussels 16 Dec. 2002, Convention Secretariat CONV 461/02

¹²² For more in-depth reviews of NATO’s actions since 9/11 and its potential role in CT issues see recent editions of *NATO Review* and Johnson, R & Zenko, M (2002) “All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should be on the Front Lines in the War on Terror” *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* Winter 2002–03

¹²³ Indeed Bob Woodward’s account of the US administration in the immediate period after 9/11 suggests that the invocation of Article V seemed barely to register at the most senior levels, and even when the war had turned the US’s way there was still a reluctance to allow NATO any role. See Woodward, Bob (2002) *Bush at War* New York, Simon and Schuster. p. 176, 306.

¹²⁴ Bennett, C. (2003) “Combating Terrorism” *NATO Review* Spring 2003 <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art2.html>

¹²⁵ Robertson, G “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism” Speech Moscow 9 December 2002. *International Affairs* Vol.49, no.2/2003 (p. 36)

Bibliography

Armellini, Antonio (2003) "International Terrorism: Global Challenges and Italian Responses" *The International Spectator* 1/ 2003 Vol. XXXVIII

Azzam, Abdullah *Join the Caravan: Al-Jihaad Fesibillah – The forgotten Obligation* available at <http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam>

Azzam, Maha (February 2003) *Al-Qaeda: the misunderstood Wahhabi connection and the ideology of violence* London, RIIA Middle East Programme (Briefing Paper No.1)

Benjamin, D. Simon, S. (2002) *The Age of Sacred Terror* New York, Random House

Bennett, C. (2003) "Combating Terrorism" *NATO Review* Spring 2003 <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art2.html>

Bergen, Peter (2002) *Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* London, Phoenix

The Bible, King James version

Burke, Jason (2003) *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror* London, I. B. Tauris

Delpech, Thésèse (2002) *International Terrorism and Europe* Chaillot Papers No.56; Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies

Den Boer, M Monar, J (2002) "Keynote Article: 11 September

and the Challenges of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor” *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol. 40, 2002

Dubois, D (2002) “The Attack of 11 September: EU-US Cooperation Against Terrorism in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs” *European Foreign Affairs Review* No. 7 2002

Duke, S (2003) “CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link” *European Foreign Affairs Review* No. 7 2002

Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence Brussels 16 Dec. 2002, Convention Secretariat CONV 461/02

Graff-Paris, J “Is Europe Next?” *Time* 10 November 2002 (European edition)

Geertz, Clifford (2003) “Which Way to Mecca? Part II” *The New York Review of Books* 3 July 2003

Gregory, F (2003) “The EU’s role in the war on terror” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* January 2003 pp. 14-17

Gunaratna, Rohan (2003) “Al-Qaeda’s operational ties with allied groups” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* February 2003

Hansen, Annika (2000) “Muscular Peacekeeping and Terrorism – the Example of Kosovo” in Lia and Andresen (2000) *Terrorism, Political Violence and Organised Crime – Security policy Challenges of Non-State Actors* Oslo FFI Rapport-2000/06444

Hassan, Hasra (2003) “An Arsenal of Believers” *The New Yorker* 31 March 2003

Hiro, Dilip (2002) *War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response* London, Routledge

ICG *The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign* 30 January 2002 Central Asia Briefing Osh/Brussels

Johnson, R & Zenko, M (2002) "All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should be on the Front Lines in the War on Terror" *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* Winter 2002-03

Jussila, Hentilä, Nevakivi (1999) *From Grand Duchy to a Modern State* London, Hurst and Company

Kepel, Gilles (2002) *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* London, I.B. Tauris

Kiander, Jaakko (2001) *Laman opetukset. Suomen 1990-luvun kriisin syyt ja seuraukset* Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus, Helsinki

Kiiskinen, Jyrki (1997) "When the revolution comes" *Books From Finland* No.4 1997

Kurth Cronin, A (2002) "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism" *International Security* Vol. 27, No. 3 Winter 2002/03

Lia, B. Kjøk, Å. (2001) *Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000* Oslo, FFI/Rapport-2001/03789

Martin Jones, D (2003) "Out of Bali: Cybercaliphate Rising" *The*

National Interest Spring 2003.

Nahdi, Faud “Young, British and ready to fight” *The Guardian* 1 April 2003

Nahdi, Faud “Tel Aviv first, then Manchester?” *The Guardian* 2 May 2003

Robertson, G “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism” (Speech Moscow 9 December 2002). *International Affairs* Vol.49, no.2/2003 Moscow

Rogers, Paul (2003) “Al-Qaida: evolution, not comeback” *Open Democracy.net* 22 June 2003 (www.opendemocracy.net)

Roy, Olivier (2003) “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” *The National Interest* Spring 2003.

Ruthven, M (2001) “This man may become our nemesis” *The Guardian* 10 October 2001

Ruthven, M (2002) *A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America* London, Granta

Siegel, Robert (6.5.2003) *Sayyid Qutb's America* Radio report broadcast on “All Things Considered”, National Public Radio (Washington). See also <http://discover.npr.org/features/feature.jhtml?wfid=1253796>

Stevenson, J (2003) “How Europe and America Defend Themselves” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 82, No. 3 March/April 2003

SUPO – The Finnish Security Police *Annual Report 2002: English Summary* www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/supo/home.nsf/pages/446DF80

B096E4FB5C2256BE900418357

UN Development Programme/Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development *Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations* New York, UNDP

Upton A. (1973) *The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland* London, Weidenfield and Nicolson

Whine, M (2003) *Al-Muhajiroun: The portal for Britain's suicide terrorists* www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=484

Woodward, Bob (2002) *Bush at War* New York, Simon and Schuster

Other Sources:

Columbia Encyclopaedia, Sixth Edition, Copyright (c) 2003 on: <http://www.encyclopedia.com>

Danish Television, documentary: "Hizb ut-Tahrir" (broadcast on FST in Finland May 2003)

FAS – Federation of Atomic Scientists <http://www.fas.org>

www.indymedia.no

www.Jihadunspun.com

National Public Radio (Washington)

NATO Review (<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/>)

<http://www.un.org/>

US Department of Transport, Bureau of Transportation Statistics

<http://www.vaikuttava.net/>

Newspapers and New Agencies:

Al-Jazeera TV (Qatar) translation via BBC Monitoring
CNN

Copenhagen Post (Copenhagen)

BBC News (London)

CBS News (www.CBSNews.com)

CS Monitor (www.CSMonitor.com)

Deutsche Welle World

The Economist (London)

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt)

DO YOU WANT TO KNOW MORE?

A huge number of books have been produced since the September 11 attacks of 2001, making it difficult when first approaching the subject to distinguish between the good and the bad. Before September 11 only a small number of journalists had studied al-Qaeda and bin Laden closely, and these writers deserve attention. Peter Bergen's *Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (2002, Phoenix) and Jane Corbin's *The Base: Al-Qaeda and the Changing Face of Global Terror* (2003, Pocket Books), were both originally written before 9-11 but have been extensively updated since, and provide readable introductions to al-Qaeda. Another journalist, Jason Burke, in *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror* (2003, I. B. Tauris) provides a slightly more academic look at the rise of al-Qaeda, but interestingly puts more emphasis on the South Asian aspects of the phenomenon as opposed to a more common Middle East focus.

Professor Gilles Kepel's *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (2002, I.B. Tauris) is perhaps the most comprehensive single-volume study of Islamism, in both its violent and non-violent forms. Kepel looks at the impact of Political Islam on societies as diverse as Malaysia and Turkey, placing much emphasis on understanding the appeal and impact of Islamism from a sociological perspective.

The internet has vast amounts of information: some useful, much useless, and a lot biased in one way or another. The US Council on Foreign Relations maintains a good website called "Terrorism Answers" (www.terrorismanswers.com), that has much solid background information on terrorism worldwide and does not shy away from uncomfortable questions that the US must now confront. The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Israel also has a website with a huge amount of information mainly, but not solely, looking at groups that threaten Israeli security. The website includes databases on attacks and terrorist groups (<http://www.ict.org.il/>).

There are many different English language Islamist and jihadi websites that can be visited to gain a perspective on these views (see for example www.1924.org a British site linked to the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation). It is also possible to read on the internet some of the classic texts of Islamist militants such as Abdullah Azzam's *Join the Caravan* (http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_caravan_1_foreword.htm).

Previously published in the series:

Christer Pursiainen & Sinikukka Saari: *Et tu Brute! Suomen Nato-optio ja Venäjä*. UPI-raportti 1/2002.

Christer Pursiainen & Sinikukka Saari: *Et tu Brute! Finland's NATO Option and Russia*. FIIA Report 1/2002.

Hiski Haukkala: *Kohti ulottuvuuksien unionia. Itälaajentumisen vaikutukset pohjoiselle ulottuvuudelle*. UPI-raportti 2/2002.

Hiski Haukkala: *Towards a Union of Dimensions. The effects of eastern enlargement on the Northern Dimension*. FIIA Report 2/2002.

Hanna Ojanen: *EU:n puolustuspolitiikka ja suhteet Natoon: terveellutta kilpailua*. UPI-raportti 3/2003.

Arkady Moshes: *Ukraine in tomorrow's Europe*. FIIA Report 4/2003.

Arkady Moshes (ed.): *Rethinking the Respective Strategies of Russia and the European Union*. Special FIIA - Carnegie Moscow Center Report 2003.

Soile Kauranen & Henri Vogt: *Piilopoliittisuudesta poliittisuuteen. Afrikan, Karibian ja Tyynenmeren valtioiden ja Euroopan unionin yhteistyön kehitys*. UPI-raportti 5/2003.

Hanna Ojanen (ed.): *Neutrality and non-alignment in Europe today*. FIIA Report 6/2003.

International Terrorism and Finland

Toby Archer

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 by al-Qaeda terrorists demonstrated to the entire world how devastating modern terrorism has become – most clearly the large number of lives lost, but also in terms of economic disruption and in the damage to our sense of security and hopes for the future. As a result 'Terrorism' has become a term heard daily around the world, but it remains a vague and little understood concept. This FIIA report, commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Defence, seeks to understand terrorism and looks at the implications of the phenomenon for Finland.

The report investigates what "International Terrorism" means in a globalised world. It argues that although the ideologies that inspire those who are willing to use violence for their cause may be international, the manifestation of that violence is often local. The report is centrally concerned with what is commonly, if badly, described as "Islamic terrorism" and addresses issues such as: the difficulty in finding suitable terminology for this phenomenon; the origins of this extremist ideology; how this ideology is affecting Europe; and what are the implications for Finland?

There has been a general presumption that Finland is not at risk from terrorism, but very little evidence to back this presumption up. This FIIA report seeks to remedy that situation. The news is predominantly good: Finland does not face a high risk of terrorist attacks. But certain ideas – such as that Finnish non-alignment and support for the UN system offer protection from al-Qaeda-type terrorism – are shown to be just myths. Integration, with Europe in particular, and the globalising world in general, brings these issues closer to Finland than they ever have been before.

ISBN 951-769-155-6

ISSN 1458-994X



Ulkopoliittinen instituutti
Utrikespolitiska institutet
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
<http://www.upi-fia.fi>