THE NAVAL REVIEW

TO PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT AND SPREADING WITHIN THE SERVICE OF KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT TO THE HIGHER ASPECTS OF THE NAVAL PROFESSION.

Founded in October, 1912, by the following officers, who had formed a Naval Society:

Captain H. W. Richmond R.N.
Commander K. G. B. Dewar R.N.
Commander the Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett R.N.
Lieutenant R. M. Bellairs R.N.
Lieutenant T. Fisher R.N.
Lieutenant H. G. Thursfield R.N.
Captain E. W. Harding R.M.A.
Admiral W. H. Henderson (Honorary Editor)

> It is only by the possession of a trained and developed mind that the fullest capacity can, as a rule, be obtained. There are, of course, exceptional individuals with rare natural gifts which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are indeed rare. We are coming more and more to recognise that the best specialist can be produced only after a long training in general learning. The grasp of principle which makes detail easy can only come when innate capacity has been evoked and moulded by high training.
>
> Lord Haldane

Issued quarterly for private circulation, in accordance with the Regulation printed herein, which should be carefully studied.

Vol. 93 No. 2 MAY 2005

The Naval Review

Registered Charity No. 214610
www.naval-review.org
ISSN 1741-5535

Contents

Britannia Association

All officers of the Naval and Royal Marines services (*serving, retired and reserve*) no matter where they trained, are eligible and encouraged to join the Britannia Association. This charity was formed for a number of purposes amongst which is the provision of a sustainable framework so as to be able to maintain contacts between past and present officers against the background of the introduction of the Data Protection Act. The Prince of Wales provided the initial impetus for the BA's formation and is now its patron. It also makes grants and it has already provided two Cornish pilot gigs for the College, with a third under construction. Members enjoy special access privileges at BRNC, can network with other members through the web site and become entitled to a number of discounts of interest to all ages. There is a range of membership options, from £10 pa (*which is less than cost, in order to provide no financial barriers*) to Founder Life Member at £500. The important thing is to join us now so as to help build a database as nearly complete as possible and then sustain it.

Contact:

Phone: 07000 000 007 **Web:** www.britanniaassociation.org.uk
Fax: 01752 770033 **Email:** joinus@rnc.org.uk

Editorial

I MUST start with an apology. In the last edition the article *Can Nuclear Power Continue to be Justified?* was, as I explained in the editorial, unsigned. It was in fact, by Commander Peter Green. Much less excusable was the fact that two further articles, *The Chilean Civil War 1891* and *Mine-Hunting Dolphins*, were also, but for different reasons, unsigned. They were written by N. C. Hayes and Lieutenant Commander John Craig respectively. My very sincere apologies to all three authors for the omissions of their signatures in that edition.

The year ahead

Once again it seems more than likely that the Defence Programme and Force Structures will be in the headlines – for us at least. Whoever wins the election, there seems little room to doubt that the reductions started last year will be taken a step further if the rumours from the Whitehall Mill are anything to go by. It is hard to believe that there is any further fat to be found in circumstances in which our forces are in daily operational use and many will no doubt be watching anxiously. The government's response, whatever government it may be, to the needs of our services in the activities that they have been, and will be, called upon to do will have a key impact on the way the next five years will be faced. We should all keep our fingers crossed . . . and pass the ammunition!

The May edition

Against this background, the May edition serves up the usual varied menu although, because the contributions, and therefore the difficulty of the choice, have been greater than usual, it is a 'mini-bumper' edition. The welcome return of GoCo, writing on the very subject I have alluded to above, is accompanied by several other challenging articles dealing with themes of force structure and of the size and shape of the Navy. There is a strong and emotive response to the decision to remove the headmaster from the Admiralty Interview Board and revise in a significant way the selection process, described in the February edition. Some will see an excess of political correctness, others a welcome 'spring cleaning' of a tried and trusted process. Another centenary, that of the laying down of the epoch making HMS *Dreadnought*, is marked in Patrick Tailyour's article, whilst Aidan Talbott receives further response to his contribution *The United States Navy – Feet of Clay* (*NR* Nov '04). There are the usual reminiscences, a feature which your editor confesses unashamedly to enjoying. And there is a fine, nostalgic and moving poem from Patrick Hamilton which, I hope he will not mind me saying, will be most appreciated by members if they read it aloud. Finally, there is an authoritative blow-by-blow description of the celebrations planned for Trafalgar 200. All in all, a promising *à la carte* menu.

An interesting comparison?

This edition also carries, in Reviews I, two parallel reviews. One is of our 'half sister' the *British Army Review* and the other of *The Naval Review*. Each is written by the editor of the other, by agreement but without collusion. And both have been published in both journals. They provide, I think, an interesting comparison between two journals of different backgrounds, styles and structures but, in many ways, similar purposes. Some may think (your editor for one does) that the differences tell us something useful about the

character of the two services – how and perhaps why they differ. If that is the case, it may not be fanciful to suggest that they also have something to tell us about both the value and, importantly, the sensible limits of 'jointery'. It is not very fashionable in Whitehall circles to suggest that there are **any** limits to jointery but it sometimes seems that people confuse the need to understand each other with the need, if need there be, to be like each other. I am sure members will have interesting things to say about this subject!

The polar expedition – Polar Quest

Polar Quest is an RN expedition to commemorate naval polar exploration. It launches in March 2006 with a 30-day, 300-mile ski to the Magnetic North Pole, aimed at junior and novice members of the Naval Service with an aspiration to select two Cadets, aged over 18, to join too. On arrival at the Pole, the team will be extracted by air to Beechy Island for a memorial service at the last resting places of CPO Torrington, Seaman Hartnell and Private Braine RM, members of the ill-fated Franklin Expedition of 1845.

In November 2006 a different team of experienced skiers will conduct a 65-day, 1,400-mile return ski to the Geographical South Pole. On arrival, the team will locate the spot at which Captain Robert Scott raised the Union Flag in 1912 and a memorial service to all naval ranks involved in polar exploration will be held. As an educational venture, the expedition aims to promote the spirit of adventure through online learning initiatives. Managed by Exmouth Community College, online tools will bring the expedition into classrooms and provide real-time interaction between the expedition and the school. The College is also mounting an independent student expedition to the High Arctic to meet the team at the North Pole.

The expedition is offering a limited number of opportunities for individuals to join in through the purchase of a polar postcard, signed by team members at each pole and posted from the South Pole. To book your card, price £5, send a cheque or postal order (payable to Polar Quest) to Captain S. Chapple RM, Polar Quest, CTCRM, Lympstone, Exmouth, Devon, EX8 5AR. Please include the address you want the card to go to, and any message. For further details, visit *www.polarquest.co.uk.*

JEREMY BLACKHAM

www.naval-review.org

PIM

DOING this job l get an interesting insight into *Naval Review* members' habits and preferences. One of these is the time of day when members post their messages to the Wardroom Bar. The general trend is that serving members, particularly those in the MoD, post early in the forenoon. Retired members, either during the Dog Watches – usually after 1800 (understandably) – or in some cases in the late First or early Middle Watch. One case of an early Morning Watch contribution was probably an aberration or severe insomnia – l have taken into account differences in time zone!

Perhaps the most revealing statistic is that 14 February 2005 proved to be the busiest day in the Wardroom Bar to date, with more messages posted in the 24 hours than ever before. That many of those messages were on the subject of Lieutenant Commander Dame Ellen MacArthur, RNR, and her epic circumnavigation may have some connection with the date.

We now have 465 members signed up for access to the members' pages of the website, many of whom are regular subscribers and contributors to the Wardroom Bar discussion forum. The subjects under discussion recently have included:

That Old Annual – following the article in *NR* Feb '05 on the wearing of uniform.

Gay News – started by the announcement of the RN's 'all inclusive' recruitment policy.

Ellen MacArthur – much favourable comment on her epic voyage, Damehood and honorary RNR commission.

The AIB – What Future? – inspired by the article in *NR* Feb '05, many lamentations, particularly the departure of the 'Headmaster'.

2012 Olympics – what is the RN doing getting involved in the bid?

Please would members remember that the website has a notice board where details of forthcoming events, particularly in this year of Trafalgar 200, may be publicised.

ROGERWELBY-EVERARD
Assistant Editor (On-Line)

AGM 2005

IT is intended to hold the AGM in The Wardroom, HMS *Nelson*, Queen Street, Portsmouth at 1700 on Wednesday 18 May, 2005 (by kind permission of the President of the Mess, Commander D. H. L. Macdonald, Royal Navy).

The proposed programme is as follows:

1630 onwards: arrive: tea will be available in the Wardroom.

1700 AGM.

On completion (not later than 1800) to the Wardroom Bar (Cash Bar available).

Members who wish to attend MUST inform the Secretary-Treasurer by NOT LATER THAN close of play, Monday, 16 May, giving their name, and car registration details (make, model, Reg. No., and colour). Parking will be available behind the Wardroom building (turn *right* after being checked by the security guard at the gate).

Trafalgar 200

MEMBERS will recall a Trafalgar 200 taster by the Editor in the February edition of *The Naval Review*. Here is a little more detail about the most imaginative, comprehensive and spectacular range of maritime events ever staged in the United Kingdom.

The Trafalgar 200 project was born out of the Royal Navy's desire to commemorate the bicentenary of the battle and the death of Nelson in an appropriate and memorable fashion. Our vision is to reflect the significance of the battle as an historical turning point, and at the same time commemorate the legacy of Nelson's remarkable leadership, and the relevance of his achievements to the nation today.

We are deliberately not being triumphalist, because we want to use the occasion to paint on a wide canvas and achieve several important objectives. We wish to develop and enhance our links with other navies – including the French and Spanish. Given the opportunity to enhance the Royal Navy's public profile, we are seeking to increase public support for the Naval Service, improve awareness of the United Kingdom's maritime sector, and promote interest in the whole seafaring profession during this year of the sea. Once the budget was agreed, and the objectives endorsed by the Navy Board, the show was on the road.

So a range of events has been devised. We begin with an International Fleet Review, because the trigger for the whole programme was the resounding success of the Fleet in 1805, and the sacrifice made by those who served two hundred years ago. However, the Royal Navy can no longer put on an event of this scale on its own, and indeed the Silver Jubilee Review in 1977 included 17 nations. Furthermore our intention is to develop the theme of Trafalgar in a broader context – the victory was ours but the lasting benefits were international. So, for the 2005 Review some 40 nations have accepted the First Sea Lord's invitation to date. At the time of writing they include: old allies (Portugal, USA . . .), allies who were former foes (France, Spain, Germany, Japan . . .), new allies (Russia, the Baltic states, Ukraine . . .), a number of Commonwealth cousins (Australia, Canada, Malaysia . . .), and many more besides. All of us share the brotherhood of the sea and the Review seeks to build on our common heritage. Nelson demonstrated Britain's mastery of the sea conclusively, but today it is the joint responsibility of all seafaring nations to guarantee the peaceful use of the oceans for the public good, and the Royal Navy wishes to communicate this message by bringing the world's navies together in common purpose.

By chance, 2005 is also the next occasion upon which the RN was the lead Service to host a major public event, and the International Festival of the Sea was already in the planning stage. This event has taken place in Portsmouth Naval Base twice before (1998 and 2001) and traditionally has the vision of reconnecting people with the sea. It brings together the historic context of Britain's maritime heritage (all-day re-enactment using hundreds of actors in costume throughout the historic dockyard), the military (warships, exhibitions and displays), the merchant marine (ships, exhibitions and displays) and 'marinised' entertainment including brass bands, field guns, shanty singers and a huge range of food and fun throughout the 300-acre site. Thirty nations are currently expected to attend represented by about 40 warships, 40 tall ships and 200 classic sailing boats double and triple berthed along more than three miles of jetty. Tri-Service operations will be represented by daily displays of military activity, both on the water and ashore, in a

theatrical but realistic and entertaining manner, with the Royal Marines taking centre stage. The Army and Royal Air Force will also be present in some force. The Festival connects the past to the present and points to the future in a way that should appeal to all age groups. We hope to draw around 240,000 visitors, and must therefore reflect the aspirations of a mass audience whilst maintaining our serious message. As befits the occasion, HMS *Victory* will be the focus of the Festival, fully restored to her 1805 condition. Tickets are now on sale via the Festival website (*www.festivalofthesea.co.uk*) but can of course be purchased at the gate on arrival.

The International Fleet Review will be held on 28 June and International Festival of the Sea from 30 June to 3 July; thus the beginning and the end of the summer 'Trafalgar' week are fixed. Conscious of the forthcoming 60th anniversary of the end of WWII, we wish to reflect the particular sacrifice made by maritime veterans without conflicting with the national VE/VJ Day commemorations later in July. A drumhead service is the traditional manner in which this is done and so an International Drumhead Service will be held on 29 June. This will enable the people who come to see the Fleet Review the previous day to pay their respects to the veterans and reflect on the sacrifice made, both at Trafalgar and also in subsequent sea battles. We will also use the opportunity to educate young people about the significance of our maritime history. Indeed, youth is a major theme for the whole of Trafalgar 200 and many thousands of schoolchildren are being specially invited to the first day of the Festival, for example.

The International Fleet Review will include one of the greatest gatherings of tall ships ever seen in Britain. We therefore wish to exploit this in a specific way to reflect the heritage of Trafalgar. On the evening of the Review day, there will be a dynamic demonstration of elements of a 19th-century sea battle in a huge son-et-lumière, using tall ships under way in the Solent. By its very nature this will necessarily owe rather more to Hollywood than to Hibbert, but historical accuracy is perhaps less important than conveying a message to a wide audience in an entertaining and memorable way. Tall ships are huge crowd pullers even when alongside. We aim to capture the flavour of the times to a background commentary and spectacular pyrotechnic display.

These four major events (International Fleet Review, Son et Lumière, International Drumhead Ceremony and International Festival of the Sea) complete a unique six-day maritime occasion, which will bring the culture of the sea to hundreds of thousands of people. Our summer events will place Nelson and what he did in the forefront of people's minds, and, via television and other media, we will reach a worldwide audience of millions. We will be hosting around 20,000 overseas sailors and nearly 1,000 VIPs in the full glare of international television. At a time when the teaching of history in schools is in sad decline, it is our collective responsibility to inform people about the past. Most have heard about Trafalgar but we intend to remind them what it really meant, and emphasise the significance of that great victory to the nation today.

Moving into the autumn, on Trafalgar Day the First Sea Lord will conduct the traditional wreath laying at Nelson's tomb in St Paul's Cathedral, and in the evening there will be a special dinner on board HMS *Victory* to honour the Immortal Memory. At the same time it is hoped to stage several other dinners within the historic dockyard, which will be attended by a wide cross-section of officers, ratings and guests, uniquely sitting down together to share a common experience of dining on Trafalgar Day in the lee of Nelson's flagship. Meanwhile a wreath will be laid off Cape Trafalgar, on behalf of the Royal Navy, by a ship of today's Fleet.

Our next endeavour is to hold a great national church service to commemorate Lord

Nelson's sacrifice and give thanks for the service of all seafarers both then and since. In St Paul's Cathedral on Sunday 23 October, the Royal Navy will:

– commemorate the life of Nelson;

– celebrate the legacy of his leadership and humanity as an example to young people;

– give thanks for the sacrifices made at Trafalgar, and by the men and women of the Naval Service in the many conflicts since then.

This service provides a challenge, as there are only 2,350 seats in the Cathedral. We wish to accommodate representatives from major national maritime organisations with Service connections, nevertheless this is primarily an occasion for the Royal Navy and a significant number of those currently serving will have the opportunity to attend – of all ranks. We will parade all the Colours of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and reserve and cadet forces to represent the many of our people who will not be able to come. We aspire to invite representatives from all the nations who fought for us on board our ships at Trafalgar (over 40 countries, including such unlikely places as China, Russia, Cuba, Finland and Madagascar: a grand total of 1,726 foreigners fought in Nelson's fleet). Trafalgar was a spectacular national victory but also a remarkable international occasion.

Trafalgar Square is the heart of the capital and on 23 October we will be holding a public event in the square with the Battle of Trafalgar as its focus. This will be the culmination of the whole Trafalgar 200 programme, watched over by the Admiral himself on his column. The Sea Cadet Corps will feature prominently, as will the Royal Navy. It will blend ceremonial with lively entertainment and pageantry and capture for the nation the significance of the victory and its lasting place in our history. The Trafalgar Square event will be a rousing celebration of what Nelson achieved for Britain, and the importance of the whole maritime sector to the United Kingdom's prosperity.

Trafalgar 200 combines many different strands of activity and offers several differing approaches to the bicentenary commemorations. Our events range from the intimate and solemn to the vast and vibrant. We seek to reach a very wide audience, national and international, old and young and no single formula can do justice to the occasion. At the end of the year when we look back on what was achieved, we intend that everyone who has been touched by Trafalgar 200, in whatever manner, will have a special memory on which to reflect. For some this memory may be transitory, but worthwhile nonetheless. But for others the legacy of the battle, the influence of Nelson and the importance of the sea will hopefully remain a conscious fixture in their thinking. Our measure of success will not be an instant outpouring of sea fever, but an alteration of course towards a wider awareness of our maritime heritage and of the Royal Navy, and their importance to the life of the nation.

All this is no mean challenge, and members may be curious to know how we are managing this multi-million pound project. At the time of writing the core team numbers around 120, half of which are contractors. A similar number of front-line stakeholders are actively involved too, and about 1,600 short-term staff will augment us during the summer events. We operate out of The Parade in Portsmouth Naval Base, where we fly the Trafalgar 200 flag. Our Director General is Rear Admiral James Rapp, and Commodore Duncan Fergusson is his No 2. Each event has its own Director jointly assisted by a multitude of supporting functions including media, marketing, protocol, programming, transport, security, youth issues, personnel and so forth. The Fleet staff is of course hugely involved, especially in planning the Fleet Review, likewise the Naval Base Commander's staff in the Festival, and we work very closely with Portsmouth City

Council and the local borough councils. We are funded from three sources: public funding from the Ministry of Defence, commercial sponsorship, and revenue (mainly ticket sales and corporate hospitality). We do business with a wide range of local and national authorities, government departments and statutory bodies. The Royal Navy has never attempted a series of public events remotely on this scale before. It will be a lifetime experience for everyone who comes. Make sure you are there.

In the meantime do take a look at our websites at *www.trafalgar200.com* and *www.festivalofthesea.co.uk*.

MALCOLM FARROW
CAPTAIN, RN
Director, International Festival of the Sea
Director, St Paul's Cathedral Service

The Team is Challenging, Demanding, Rewarding and, Yes, it Does Work

IN May's *NR*, Roadrunner painted a picture of junior officer dissatisfaction gloomy enough to make a matelot weep in his tot. Roadrunner's case centres on the contention that modern recruits think 'a service career is not a "way of life" but a period of employment characterised by a search for individual gratification and personal reward'. In Roadrunner's world the colour of the grass in next door's field is a dazzling shade of green, replete with prolific career opportunities that threaten to tempt away our herd of staunchly individualistic graduates. Our own miserable pastures promise nothing but impersonal career management, drudgery and endless separation. Can things really be so bleak? My own career has been diverse, stimulating, often immensely stressful and, dare I admit it, enormous fun, but it has never, ever, not even during the longest, dullest middle watch at the posterior end of the world, been a drudge. So what's going on?

Armed Services Career – read instructions before use

The most puzzling thing about Roadrunner's article is his failure to explain what he expected of a career in the Royal Navy. I joined the Royal Navy to serve; to go to sea; to become a leader in an elite team; to travel to distant exotic lands; to immerse myself in the art and history of naval warfare; to have a good time about it; and, above all, to avoid being stuck in some dire office for the rest of my natural. I assume that, unless the recruiting literature has taken a bizarre turn, these core elements are still the principal motivations for anyone joining. You might add 'additional qualifications' to the list in today's certificate obsessed society, or 'expanding my achievement portfolio', but all these can be accomplished in other working environments. Such attractions are incidental: if you're going to join a fighting navy it would be a good idea if matters maritime and martial pushed your buttons.

'Service' is a key word and a much devalued concept. The majority of people do not have servants anymore, nor is the idea of the subordination of the individual to the needs of either a group or an employer a common feature of modern living. It is an unfortunate aspect of society that lack of courtesy and consideration towards those who provide

service, in whatever form, is on the increase. At the same time, standards of service continue to decline for similar reasons. These days you are more likely to hear talk of the 'Armed Forces' than 'the Services'. That does not alter the fact that we remain public servants at the extreme end of the 'service' scale.

In return for a quite dizzying variety of jobs – each appointment I have had has been distinct and challenging – I have always felt that my employment has required a degree of personal sacrifice: of service. At times the choices have been very stark: sort out my own problems or do the right thing by the Team. The Team has invariably come first. At every stage I have had to weigh the benefits of service against the considerable demands it imposes. This is a permanent aspect of a career in the Armed Services and there is little that 2SL or anyone else can do to change that. We can tinker around the edges with Personnel Functional Standards but the bottom line is that we are required to go to sea for lengthy periods to learn our trade, do our duty and *in extremis* to fight. This may be the sort of statement that sets some youngsters to yawning but we must never lose sight of these central tenets. It matters not a jot whether you join directly from school or from university or from a previous career. In order to function effectively as part of the Armed Services you have to sign up to the team ethos . . . or do you?

The Armed Services – a reflection of society

Roadrunner raises a very serious issue when he quotes Norman Dixon and suggests that 'the further a military leader is from the society he or she serves, the worse they are likely to perform in battle'. I would agree that the Royal Navy must adapt to support changes in society and I believe that it has done this to a great extent, *pace* women at sea, homosexuality, attention to harmony, the need to more fully justify and explain operations to our people *et al*. However, there comes a point at which the demands of society will begin to undermine the Armed Services' ability to fight effectively. What happens when the Armed Services represent such a small fraction of our national effort and consciousness that we can no longer find sufficient people willing to make the sacrifices required of service? In such circumstances our Armed Services might become a minor and toothless ornament, denuded of quantity and quality, populated by those willing to take on only undemanding military trappings, unsure of their *raison d'etre* and unlikely to be utilised by their government. Crucially, would such an eventuality not simply be a manifestation of democracy? Roadrunner is right in part, in a democracy our Armed Services cannot be anything other than a reflection of society and the will of the electorate.

Many of the pressures on junior officers that Roadrunner describes are direct results of the demands of an otherwise ambivalent society, not the Service. Thankless service, that which is neither recognised nor appreciated, is particularly soul-destroying and unlikely to attract able recruits or retain contented servicemen. Roadrunner's introverted generation is a minor symptom of a more general malaise. How can we maintain healthy and effective Armed Services if they have a low public profile and low public interest? This isn't a case of Kipling's 'Tommy': loved in war, loathed in peace. The problem is that Tommy is now largely unknown and unacknowledged unless the drums are beating. I have to confess, in a society that increasingly doesn't understand 'service' and doesn't much care either, I often have to ask myself why I bother. The answer is invariably 'the Team' and the support and mutual reassurance which it provides.

Society, money and the diminishing Fun Factor

Society has an impact in other ways. Roadrunner and his junior brethren find themselves

on increasingly hard-worked ships in a Navy that is operating with a diminishing pool of resources. It has been characteristic of the Royal Navy in recent years that running costs have been inexorably squeezed, due principally to the structure of defence spending. As a result, platform availability has become a critical element of defence planning. I once heard a very senior civil servant from the MoD point out that the public demands to see the Services fully employed on operations; not on exercises, training or even defence diplomacy – the last of which many outside observers might consider to be frivolous military tourism – but nose to the tactical grindstone. With spending constraints and close public scrutiny to the fore, Fleet performance is now measured in minute detail, support costs are trimmed and trimmed again, port visits curtailed and the level of military benefit derived from deployments endlessly dissected. It is not a little galling that the relentless drive towards value for money for the taxpayer is not accompanied by an enormous degree of interest from the taxpayer in what we do, short of actually going to war. We should not be naïve though. This is about hard politics, government spending and votes, not the best interests of the Service.

It is obvious that a substantial chunk of the burden of increased operational tempo and falling resources will rest with personnel. The net result is that many of us perceive the level of feel-good payback to be diminishing. It was interesting to note that Roadrunner did not specifically include this issue in his article, but I can only conclude that part of the modern aversion to seagoing is a perception that deploying often means extended periods at sea and no 'down' time. That may be true of some deployments but in general I find it is an enormous relief to finally get away on a long deployment, when the Team comes into its own. It is the whole business of trying to work-up warships against very tight timescales and with diminishing resources that produces the greatest strain on people and equipment and involves little respite or 'fun'; I sometimes wonder why we stick with it. Once again, it's the Team that gets me through such moments of doubt.

The job market and Service careers

Against this challenging background, how do we still manage to attract people to the Team and retain them? It has always been, and will continue to be, MoD policy to view the recruitment and retention of Service personnel within the wider context of the civil job market. As we shrink the Service and pile on the pressure, unless Roadrunner's gifted graduates stop pitching up at the recruiting office or actually head for the door, the problem is containable. We have to remember that the Service is still interested in getting its hands on the same sort of people with a predisposition to 'service' that it has always nabbed. That pool of prospective employees was once overwhelmingly 'non-graduate', now it is increasingly 'graduate'[1] but it strikes me that we are getting the same calibre of people through the gates of BRNC; just a little later, a little more mature and in some ways a little more demanding.

Having recruited our chunk of the available manpower pool, I do not imagine for a moment that the Navy Board does not weigh carefully the financial benefits of targeting certain groups with Financial Retention Initiatives (FRIs) against the cost of changing conditions of service or employing more personnel to achieve the same results. There are unpalatable choices to be made, and the glut of junior officers that Roadrunner alludes to will not lead the bean-counters to conclude that we are haemorrhaging personnel. Changes to the career structure now allow more fine-tuning of throughput than was possible previously, something that may soon become evident as we enter another phase of contraction. Where Roadrunner does have a point is in the quality of people we may

be able to retain now that there are more career options open to our personnel. This will require close scrutiny.

If life in a pinstripe suit really was that attractive, life in the Andrew such a drudge, and the job market so wonderfully buoyant, then we would be suffering an enormous exodus of personnel. We are not. The truth is that life in that pinstripe suit can be every bit as relentless and demanding as life in a reefer jacket, with few of the added benefits. With many of us now wed to professional spouses who compete in this job market, we can see for ourselves at first hand the fierce competition in the civil sector.

A Service career still has obvious advantages and that's what keeps pulling the punters in. While Roadrunner may consider the Appointers (that's 'Career Managers' now) to be an impersonal bunch, you do at least have someone dedicated to managing your career; luxury indeed. Given a bit longer in the system, Roadrunner might come to appreciate how little scope there is for added attention to individual needs. In the early stages of your career when – like it or loathe it – you are there to learn the basics of your trade, other than base port, surface/submarine preference and the like, there is little more your Career Manager can address. You could see your Career Manager more often but it would really only be a sop. If you really want a mentor at your fingertips, go and talk to your XO, Head of Department or Commanding Officer about your career; it's what they're there for. Later on in your career you find that the amount of individual attention from your Career Manager increases steadily. Do well in your apprenticeship and that journey to individual gratification speeds up appreciably. Rest assured Roadrunner, regardless of whether we employ accelerated advancement or not, you are competing. I've found it to be one of the attractions of my career that this potentially stressful process doesn't have to occupy my every waking moment, unlike some of my civilian counterparts. Relax, get on with the job at hand, do it well and the rewards will come. Place your trust in the Team.

As Roadrunner acknowledges, we are still rewarded quite generously and I would have to go-some to earn enough to guarantee the same level of pension I will eventually enjoy following service; something that rankles with my own better paid but under-pensioned spouse. In particular, I would have to enter a world of cut-throat competition which pays lip-service to team ethos but ultimately involves a hard fought individual scramble for promotion and wealth. It's not called the Rat Race for nothing.

As for the Service's occasional recourse to FRIs and the continued need for Special Pay, I don't find these tools particularly divisive and envy is, after all, a deadly sin. I've never 'dipped out', I've just consistently failed to 'dip in'!

Finally on this issue, 2SL is right to point out that a Service life and a family life are not incompatible but it is probably true to say that it is getting more difficult to find partners ready to sign-up to the 'personal sacrifice' element of service. Plenty of people manage it though and 2SL and his team are doing everything they can to make the two more compatible. Besides, if I were cooped up in an office in the City for 18 hours a day it could hardly have any more impact on my family life. You pay your money and make your choices in this life.

With these factors in mind, what else is it that keeps people coming through the door?

The most challenging career in the world . . . ever

The answer to that question is that joining the Team is still a very attractive career choice. Roadrunner states that the Royal Navy is not providing 'a constantly stimulating career in order to keep the most able of its junior officers'. I find this observation stunning. I

cannot imagine a more diverse and stimulating career. In the last 20 years in the Royal Navy I've acquired two degrees, changed jobs every two years, learnt everything from double-entry book-keeping to how to take a warship into any port in the world, invaded two countries, kept the peace in several other conflicts, helped build diplomatic relations with countless other countries, dealt with smugglers, piracy and fish thieves, sat on some of the best beaches and supped in some of the finest hotels at little or no personal expense, and had the privilege of working with and leading the most fabulous variety of people from every conceivable background, otherwise known as the Team. Roadrunner, it doesn't get any more stimulating than that; or if it does, I'd like to know where the alternative action is.

It is precisely because my career provides job satisfaction streets ahead of anything else on offer that I've put up with divorce, separation, dull administration, poor public recognition and all the other setbacks and sources of irritation. So what if I had to spend a great deal of time on the bridge driving around in boxes on the chart somewhere off the south coast? Quite a lot of my time on the bridge was spent heading towards Rio for Carnival; to Singapore for two weeks' station leave; to the Maldives; to the Caribbean. Sure, I could pay to go on holiday to Rio like anyone else, but without the Team where's the fun in that? I think we have to be a little more 'glass half full' about the business of standing on bridges.

When junior warfare officers are not learning core skills on the bridge, they are managing people and equipment and that brings its own challenges. Keeping sailors professionally motivated, looking after their welfare and ensuring that your Division is well run take a huge amount of time and effort. Besides, sailors are interesting and rewarding. I'd rather deal with improving the prospects of an underachieving but enthusiastic OM than deal with a sullen and underachieving secretary. That is the essence of our teamwork.

Tending your part of ship, supervising your middle management Senior Rates and providing support to the Heads of Department; where is the lack of challenge here? Done properly, particularly when you're up against all sorts of constraints, this is thoroughly taxing stuff.

Roadrunner applauds the fact that there are now four dedicated bridge watchkeepers in some escorts, but they're almost certainly not all fully qualified, and a proliferation of watchkeepers simply reduces each watchkeeper's share of the 'experience' pool, extending the time it takes for them to qualify. It has been my experience that the more firmly you grasp the nettle, the quicker you learn, the more proficient you become, and the faster you move on to the next test.

It will therefore come as no surprise to learn that I cannot understand the increasing reluctance to take up the reins as Navigating Officer. Certainly, it's an enormous responsibility and can be exceptionally demanding, but I thought that's what Roadrunner was asking for. There is nothing more welcome for a Commanding Officer than the knowledge that you have a well trained, confident and experienced Navigator. I got a real buzz out of knowing that I provided a service that was trusted implicitly and allowed my boss to get on with the business of managing the ship free of any worry on my account.

I'm afraid that if you join a branch whose principal function is to lead and fight warships at sea, you can hardly be surprised when that is exactly what you are expected to do. The same consideration applies equally to engineers and logisticians in their chosen specialisations. We could fundamentally reassess our branch structures and introduce a class of officer dedicated to standing on the bridge and nothing else, but how

many takers do you think we would have for that career?

To paraphrase a famous observation on sex, if you think that a career as a junior officer in the Royal Navy lacks stimulation, you're probably doing it wrong.

So does the Team work?

A career in the Royal Navy remains an attractive prospect and the higher management of the Service is alive to the task of keeping it that way. I would not dream of responding to the concerns of my subordinates with nothing but the well worn 'That's life in a blue suit', but to a certain extent it is that very life that has kept me engaged, entertained and challenged as part of the Team over the years. Because there exists no equivalent team outside the Service, and because I have always thought of the benefits and security that the Team brings, when I weigh up the pros and cons of Service life it is always the Team that tips the balance.

I am now privileged to command a warship in the Royal Navy and well placed to spread the good news that the Team Works. It is part of my responsibility to motivate, to inspire and to point out why the tasks our junior officers perform remain vital and relevant in an age when the doubts that Roadrunner expresses are becoming more widespread. Roadrunner clearly cares about the Team and that's what it's all about. It must be remembered that whatever the peripheral issues of the day, it will always require courage and personal sacrifice to serve in the Royal Navy as part of the Team. In return, the Navy gives an enormous amount back, part of which is unrivalled team spirit. These are not values that should be sneered at or can be overtaken by developments in society; they are enduring. The biggest and perhaps the only individual decision you have to make in your career is to weigh up the package on offer against what is on offer elsewhere. I believe the Navy Board was spot on to identify our Unique Selling Point as 'the Team'; ours is second to none. You'll have an unhappy time, though, if you view your career as an exercise in individual gratification and personal reward. The Royal Navy is and will always be a team, and there isn't a team worth the name that values the individual more than the collective when the chips are down. For my part, the day I can no longer look my people in the eye and tell them that they are doing the best job imaginable will be the day I know the Team isn't working. I'm a long way off seeing that day.

HOME POPHAM

References

[1]BRNC intake was 30 per cent graduate when I joined. 'Grad' was then almost a term of abuse at BRNC. Today the intake is 80 per cent graduate and it is the Naval College Entry who bear the brunt of the banter.

Replacing Trident: A New Nuclear Debate?

IT seems we may be heading for a new nuclear debate. What form it will take and how intensive it will be is difficult for the moment to predict. What seems certain is that decisions will need to be made in the next Parliament about the replacement of the *Vanguard* Class of SSBNs. This much was confirmed by the First Sea Lord just a few months ago.[1] This requirement is likely to provide the catalyst for the debate, which is unlikely to be restricted merely to issues related solely to the replacement of the boats themselves. One of the reasons for this is that some elements within the anti-nuclear movement have taken the need to replace *Vanguard* as an indication that the UK is about to reach a decision on a replacement for Trident as a whole.

Evidence is beginning to accumulate that those opposed to the UK retaining its nuclear capability are marshalling their arguments. By way of illustration, during 2004, the *1958 Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes* (the Mutual Defence Agreement, or MDA) came up for renewal. This milestone attracted some measure of parliamentary interest[2] and also prompted what might eventually come to be seen as the first substantive 'shot across the bows' by anti-nuclear campaigning groups.

On 20 July 2004, Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin (both of Matrix Chambers) delivered a joint legal opinion on the legality of the MDA in which they argued that the agreement should be regarded as running counter to the UK's obligations under the *1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT).[3] While this opinion was quickly refuted by Ministers, its significance should not be ignored. For one thing, it raised legal questions that relied on elements of the International Court of Justice's 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons. Although the ICJ failed to declare nuclear weapons illegal, by accepting that it could not:

> '. . . conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of the State would be at stake. . .'[4]

it also said many other things besides that arguably provide anti-nuclear campaigners with useful material to bolster their case.

As an international lawyer I am usually at pains to stress the utility of law within the international system; indeed I often have to defend it against those who regard it as largely a waste of time. Despite that, I must say that when it comes to the issue of nuclear weaponry I am not convinced that the law has real utility (or relevance) in the shaping of strategic posture. If it has utility at all it is merely to provide a convenient framework for some measure of analysis related, but by no means identical, to moral and ethical standards. However, it is a weak argument against the legal advice of those lawyers who favour complete disarmament that their views are irrelevant; to a great many they will not be viewed that way and, in a similar way in which the Government lost some of its reputation for straight dealing through the perceived illegality of operations in and against Iraq, so it might also lose some ground if legal issues are exposed to broader scrutiny.

What debate?

Just before Christmas, the Oxford Research Group (ORG) convened a workshop at

Charney Manor, the Quaker conference centre in Oxfordshire, to examine the potential for public debate on nuclear issues related to the *Vanguard* replacement. In the fine tradition of the ORG, those gathered at its invitation included representatives from all sections likely to be engaged in the debate – both those in favour of the UK retaining nuclear weapons and those opposed. This author was one who benefited from the experience and came away with a clearer idea of the potential for informed public exchange; it was a valuable experience.

So, the early indications of controversy are already in evidence and it is worthwhile to reflect on what some of the issues are likely to be as the Government considers the options raised by the need to consider eventual *Vanguard* Class obsolescence. Much of what follows draws on the content of the discussion at the ORG workshop. However, as this was conducted under the Chatham House Rule the account that follows will avoid any referencing and will certainly not attribute any of the positions to individuals present at the workshop. Indeed, apart from this author's identity, that of other attendees will not be revealed.

Is Trident actually under threat?

One of the key questions that had to be addressed by the ORG workshop was the extent to which we are likely to be faced with a debate over a successor to Trident. It was clearly the case that some were of the view that we would be faced with this, while others were less than convinced that such things as the First Sea Lord's comment of May 2004 necessarily meant that we would be. Clearly, if it were to be the case that Trident's days are numbered already, then we could reflect back usefully on what happened in the early to mid-1980s during the decision-making process that led to Trident – and the D5 version of it – being chosen as the preferred successor to Polaris. However, it is important to remember that the term 'Trident' can mean several things and some clarification is necessary.

The UK's Strategic Deterrent consists of several elements, all of which together make up the whole. As a whole we often refer to the 'Trident System', but the word 'Trident' is more accurately only a description of one element within that whole. There is a British designed and manufactured warhead, delivered by an American designed and manufactured missile (Trident itself), carried in British designed and manufactured nuclear powered submarines (the *Vanguard* Class). Within the submarines, the 'front' and 'back-ends' must be regarded as distinct from the central missile related technology package provided by the US as an integrated part of the missile provision. What are the basic facts relating to each of these elements?

I have no intimate knowledge of warhead design and would not presume to comment about the likely 'shelf life' of the existing warheads, many of the details of which are highly classified in any case. However, one comment that is perhaps pertinent about the existing warheads is that they may well be somewhat more sophisticated in terms of multiple targeting and re-entry arrangements than existing strategic considerations would demand. We should not forget that the warheads were designed to ensure targeting success in a situation involving the Soviet Union. The capacity of the system to thwart any possible future defensive screen was an imperative at the time the decision to deploy Trident was originally made. So, even if the warheads currently deployed require updating or replacement, this is not necessarily going to require the degree of sophistication currently available. That said, it should not be assumed either that the undoubtedly changed strategic environment necessarily points us in the direction of a

downgrading in capability. Much will depend on intelligence and strategic assessments of likely future requirements for deterrence against nuclear powers that might either emerge in the future or which might modernise their existing systems. Current and likely future Russian investment in the maintenance and upgrading of strategic rocket forces will clearly be a factor to take into account, for example.

As for the missile – Trident itself – this is not yet approaching obsolescence and is maintained to ensure its continued operation for some decades to come. In terms of its technological status, I would say that Trident is about as advanced as an ICBM/SLBM needs to be, with ranges adequate for any target, given the submarines' ability to achieve an ocean launch position within striking distance of any target worldwide. The missiles are also well maintained and, while I have no intimate knowledge of the maintenance routines for them, I see no reason why the technology available should not soldier on for several decades to come. Importantly in this context, the US Trident SSBNs are considered to have an operational life of just over 40 years. The missiles are 'owned' by the UK but are not individually identified; they are a part of the overall pool of missiles available to both the US and UK programmes. The entire pool is maintained by the US, with the UK SSBNs drawing on that pool as an integrated part of the joint US/UK missile deployment programme. This means that the maintenance schedule for the UK's missiles is fully integrated with, and identical to, that provided for the US 'owned' missiles.

Unlike the situation in the early/mid-1980s, when the Thatcher Government was concerned to remain in step with the US and replace Polaris with either Trident C4 or D5, we are not, as yet, faced with a situation in which the US is likely to shift capability upwards, as it did in that previous period of transition. In the mid-1980s, if the UK had not gone for D5, we would have been hard placed to maintain the system in parallel with the US programme. To move beyond Polaris was essential; to move now to something beyond Trident D5 is certainly not; the situations are quite different. In the mid-1980s there was genuine concern that Polaris technology was falling behind the curve; today there is no fear of that sort in relation to Trident . . . certainly not one that has any real substance. Given that this is the case – that Trident is neither obsolete nor worn out – there is no need to get rid of it and, therefore, no need to engage in an urgent debate about its successor.

However, the submarines are a quite different matter. The *Vanguard* Class will reach the end of their lives just as the previous Polaris-carrying *Resolution* Class did. They have an operational life of around 25 to 30 years, they came into service from 1994-99 (taking over from the *Resolution* Class that entered service between 1967 and 1969) so we must expect them to be getting to the end of their operational lives by about the early to mid-2020s. Given that the full project for Trident and *Vanguard* to replace Polaris and *Resolution* took about 14 years before the first *Vanguard* became operational, a similar timeframe would require a project start date of sometime around 2006-08. But the key project here is for a replacement SSBN . . . not the replacement of the entire system. This means that the project to replace *Vanguard* will almost certainly be much shorter than the 14 years required to deploy the *Vanguard*s operationally as a replacement for the *Resolution*s. In summary, Trident is capable of lasting through the lives of two successive SSBN platforms.

Clearly we have no need to consider for the present the need to replace Trident. This is not something that all on the anti-nuclear side of the debate fully appreciate. Indeed, many of those who were present for the ORG workshop were gearing up to a full-scale debate about a full Trident successor. Something worthwhile achieved at the workshop, therefore, was the clarification of this reality.

That is not to say that the anti-nuclear campaigners' guns are well and truly spiked! Very obviously the need to replace the *Vanguard*s provides an opportunity to revisit many of the issues that go to make up the nuclear debate in the round. A full-scale nuclear debate would arguably be conducted at two levels. One would concentrate on whether the UK ought to be in the nuclear weapons business at all, while the other level would be about the nature of the successor system. The fact that the second order debate (about successor options) is probably regarded as irrelevant, at least from an MoD perspective, will not deter the anti-nuclear campaigners from using the issue of *Vanguard* replacement to re-invigorate the wider debate about Britain's nuclear future. But this is not necessarily a bad thing.

Perhaps also the time is right to ask some searching questions once again. Of course, caution will ultimately be a defining feature of the decision arrived at; anything other than that would be irresponsible from this writer's point of view. Nevertheless, perhaps one option is worth investigating. Although a reduction in capability would never satisfy the ardent anti-nuclear campaigner – only complete nuclear disarmament would achieve that – the nature and number of nuclear devices we place on our Trident missiles perhaps ought to be reviewed. A reduction would not only allow HMG to continue to present a responsible strategic nuclear option to the British public, it would also reinforce the UK's official line consistent with the NPT that ultimately disarmament is something to which we wish to move towards. We can, of course, fudge that one – the NPT contains no time line and this is one of the standard rationales for seemingly not doing anything in that regard. But should we fudge it, and will we always be allowed to get away with that approach? Given the undoubted damage the saga of Iraq has done to the Prime Minister's reputation for honesty (not entirely justified perhaps), smug assumptions about the general public's willing acceptance of Government statements on such issues as the strategic deterrent may not be entirely wise. It is certainly worth going over the ground once again; there are plenty of others who will be anxious for us to do so.

STEVEN HAINES

References

[1]In May 2004, Admiral Sir Alan West stated, during a conference at RUSI, that a decision on replacing the SSBNs is expected in the next two to three years. See A. Chuter, 'UK Debates Trident Sub Replacement' in *Defence News*, 31 May 2004.

[2]Parliamentary Questions related to the renewal of the MDA were tabled, for example, by both Alan Simpson MP and David Chaytor MP.

[3]This opinion was commissioned by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy and Peacerights, see the full legal opinion available on *www.basicint.org/nuclear/MDAlegal.htm.*

[4]ICJ Advisory Opinion (1997) *35 International Legal Materials* 809 and 1343, Paragraph 105 (2) E.

Their Name Liveth

ADMIRALTY, Admiralty, Admiralty calling,
Calling the names which were called in the past.
A handful will answer where once there were hundreds
Who now find their echo alone in the heart.

Acheron, Arrow, Ardent, Acasta,
Ajax, Achilles, Albion, Aid,
Albemarle, Agincourt, Amethyst, Asia,
Anson, Aurora, Amphion, Ambuscade.

Barham, Bacchante, Boreas, Beagle,
Benbow, Bellona, Barfleur and *Broke,*
Bulwark, Britannia, Birkenhead, Bristol,
Basilisk, Berwick, Blanche, Bolingbroke.

Breasting the oceans in order majestic,
Line upon line to the reddening sun,
Hull-down on horizons through mist so caressing,
We proudly salute you whose battles are won.

Caesar, Centurion, Cossack, Calliope,
Conqueror, Cornwall, Cressy, Carlisle,
Canada, Codrington, Cambrian, Coventry,
Colossus, Canopus, Coquette, Crocodile.

Diadem, Doris, Devonshire, Duncan,
Donegal, Dragon, Danae and *Drake,*
Deptford and *Dryad, Dreadnought, Dominion,*
Dido, Dunedin, Defiance, Defence.

Ceaselessly wakeful and constantly watching,
Even when riding at anchor you lay,
Guarding the hills which so gently enfolded you,
Sinuous, seaman-like, silent and grey.

Eagle, Euryalus, Edinburgh, Erin,
Enterprise, Edgar, Emerald, Exe,
Elephant, Egmont, Egret, Endymion,
Echo, Electra, Encounter, Express.

Fearless, Formidable, Frobisher, Fury,
Fortune and *Forester, Foudroyant, Fame,*
Furious, Foxhound, Faulknor, Fairy,
Fervent and *Falmouth, Firedrake* and *Flame.*

In peace you were lovely – trim, sleek or majestic,
Decks scrubbed white like corn in the sunshine, and brass
Which twinkled and shone in a clear-cut perfection,
Your hulls grey enamel which mirrored like glass.

Grebe, Galatea, Ganges and *Gurkha,*
Gallant, Goliath, Gentian and *Gnat,*
Glowworm, and *Glorious, Grafton, Gibraltar,*
Glasgow, Godetia, Greyhound and *Grant.*

Havelock, Hero, Hasty, Hyperion,
Hannibal, Hermes, Highflyer, Hood,
Hotspur and *Halcyon, Havock, Hibernia,*
Hindustan, Hereward, Hercules, Hawke.

Have we lost you? I wonder, for though we can't see you,
We know in our hearts that you're part of us yet.
How can we have lost you, who manned you, who kept you;
How can we have lost you who will not forget?

Intrepid, Inflexible, Isis, Implacable,
Iron Duke, Invincible, Innistrashull,
Imogen, Ilex, Indus, Impregnable,
Inglefield, Icarus, Iris and *Isle.*

Javelin, Jaguar, Juno and *Jervis,*
Juliet, Jason, Jamaica and *Jed,*
Jersey and *Jackal, Jupiter, Janus,*
Jasmine and *Jonquil, Jewel* and *Jade.*

Masthead lamps blinking across the dark waters,
Signal lamps answering out in the stream,
'To the Fleet, from the Flagship: prepare to weigh anchor;
Alter course in succession with Stroma abeam.'

Keith, Keppel, Kenya, Kelvin and *Kimberley,*

Kempenfelt, Kipling, Kelly, Khartoum,
Kandahar, Kingston, Kent, Kestrel,
Kingfisher,
Kennet, King Edward, Kilmarnock,
Kilmorne.

Laforey, Lightning, Lookout and *Legion,*
Loyal and *Lively, Latona* and *Lance,*
Lurcher and *London, Leopard,*
Leviathan,
Lion, Lark, Lapwing, Lord Nelson and
Larne.

'It is on the Navy,' they said, 'that our safety,
Our wealth and our welfare do chiefly depend.'
It was to our ships that we turned to so lately,
And looked for safekeeping, our shores to defend.

Mohawk and *Monmouth, Medea,*
Magnificent,
Marlborough and Monmouth, Majestic
and *Mars,*
Malaya, Mashona, Meteor, Myrmidon,
Melampus, Melpomene, Minotaur,
Marne.

Naiad and *Neptune, New Zealand,*
Nigeria,
Niobe, Norfolk, Newark and *Nile,*
Nemesis, Nelson, Nimrod, Nerissa,
Nymph, Niger, Nottingham, Nene,
Nonpareil.

But twice in your lifetimes your hour matched your glory,
August the fourth and September the third
Came with relentlessness, war overtook you,
You slipped and went off without breathing a word.

Ocean, Osiris, Oberon, Onslaught,
Orion, Ophelia, Oracle, Owl,
Opportune, Orwell, Obedient and *Onslow,*
Orlando, Otranto, Obdurate, Orme.

Powerful, Pathfinder, Pegasus, Panther,
Penelope, Pickle, Pelorus, Patrol,
Parthian, Pincher, Penzance and
Protector,
Phaeton and Phoenix, Perth, Philomel.

At Jutland, off Malta, round Crete and the Falklands,
The Dogger Bank, Zeebruge, Sirte, the Plate.
To Murmansk, to Gallipoli, Dunkirk and Calais,
The Western Approaches, the cold Denmark Strait.

Quiberon, Queenborough, Quality,
Quentin,
Queen Elizabeth, Querulous, Quintet and
Quorn,
Quail and *Queen Mary, Quester* and
Quantock,
Ever awake at the first flush of dawn.

Rodney and *Russell, Revenge* and
Reliance,
Royalist, Ramillies, Raven, Racoon,
Royal Oak, Resolution, Raider,
Relentless,
Repulse, Royal Sovereign, Racer,
Renown.

Three watches, all weathers, alone or in convoy;
'Down deadlights, on strongbacks'; in calm or in gales:
Alert and unsleeping, the ocean unending,
Shipping it green so it flattens the rails.

Sirius, Skipjack, Suffolk and *Skirmisher,*
Swiftsure and Spitfire, Spiteful and
Scourge,
Saracen, Savage, Saumarez, Shearwater,
Sylvia, Scorpion, Seagull, Superb.

Troubridge and *Termagant, Tumult* and
Teazer,
Tyrian, Tuscan, Terpsichore, Tyne,
Theseus, and *Thunderer, Terrible, Tiger,*
Triton, Trafalgar, Tenacious and *Thyme.*

Some didn't return. They went down and took with them
A lot of the men who had served them so well.
Now they're lying together, ships and their companies,
They've made their last passage, a passage through Hell.

Una and *Useful, Ullswater, Unicorn,*
Undaunted, Unswerving, Unbending and *Usk,*
Ursula, Unity, Undine and *Ulysses,*
We see you take station in gathering dusk.

Victory, Vanguard, Vengeance and *Valiant,*
Vanquisher, Venturous, Vortigern, Vain,
Vehement, Vesper, Vanity, Vigilant,
Vampire, Vindictive, Vance and *Verdun.*

Those that came back when the ceasefire had sounded,
Bearing the scars won at Jutland and Crete,
Broke out new ensigns, and with pride unbounded,
Sent out the signal, 'Rejoining the Fleet.'

Warrior, Warspite, Whirlwind and Warwick,
Westminster, Wishart, Wakeful and *Wren,*
Waveney, Woodlark, Wizard and *Wrangler,*
Wessex and *Wager, Wasp, Wolverine.*

Excalibur, Excellent, Exmouth and *Exeter,*
Yarmouth, York, Yarrow, Yelverton, – yes,
Zulu and *Zealous, Zephyr, Zealandia,*
Zenith, Zambesi, Zodiac, Zest.

Raise your glasses, new Navy, to all those before you,
Remember with gratitude those who are gone.
Look forward, new Navy, with pride in your future:
'Up Spirits!' We're with you. Your names will live on!

PATRICK HAMILTON

This fine poem was written by Patrick Hamilton, who served throughout WW2 in, among others, Dido *at 2nd battle of Sirte, then in the destroyer* Lively, *which was sunk under him, and finally the corvette,* Vetch. *He left the Navy after the war and became a successful painter.*

Inshore Patrol – Is the Royal Navy Ready to Fight and Win?

A paper submitted to Kingston University in partial fulfilment of the degree MSc Technology (Maritime Operations)

THE Royal Navy has deployed Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) in home waters and abroad for many years, tasked in the main to constabulary roles under various Military Aid to the Civil Power arrangements. Latter-day tasking has included security patrols off Northern Ireland, the Falkland Islands and Hong Kong, drug interdiction operations conducted at the request of HM Customs and Excise and the ongoing Fishery Protection mission in support of the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Adapted minesweepers have often delivered an adequate capability but purpose-built ships have met the more specialised remits since the mid-70s. The exceptionally well-appointed *River* class OPV has recently entered Royal Navy service to ensure the effective enforcement of national fishing legislation for many years to come. Whilst the role of the bespoke OPV has varied with the needs of the time, the generic requirement for an offshore patrol capability is clearly enduring. In parallel, a somewhat less clearly defined need has also been recognised to fulfil tasking more suited to an *inshore* maritime patrol, where agility, speed and shallow draft are prerequisite. Royal Naval tasking for Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPV) has largely arisen from meeting security responsibilities within British sovereign waters abroad. The long-standing deployment of two dedicated

RN patrol craft to Gibraltar and the more recent re-establishment of a similar formation in Akrotiri, Cyprus, are clear examples. Providing utility across a range of local tasks, both the mission and the nature of the assigned assets in these inshore arenas has evolved with the ebb and flow of the perceived threat over the years. But, since 2001, the upsurge in terrorist activity has dramatically refocused the direction of their work and, in Gibraltar particularly, they now find themselves stretched as never before.

Workable tactics, techniques and procedures in the inshore counter-terrorism role, including high-visibility Force Protection activities, have seen iterative refinement at both Gibraltar and Akrotiri. As a result, these inshore patrol missions have delivered enhanced security in the Sovereign Base Areas at minimal cost. To date, they can be considered wholly effective. Nonetheless, the vessels selected and deployed for these burgeoning tasks were not the products of detailed capability definition, nor mission-specific development, but were simply the closest fit of the very limited available options at the critical time. Whilst it is unrealistic to assume that such craft could ever be ideally suited to their important new role, the traditional adaptability of naval personnel to make best use of resources to hand has, as ever, done the Service proud. In tandem, some staunch support from the relevant Integrated Project Team has also contributed enormously. But how much more effective might these little ships have been with the benefit of specific and mission-related research, design and development? And does their current tasking define the limit of the Navy's future requirement in this area? Furthermore, if they were really tested, what confidence can there be that their capability would be sufficient to defeat the most dangerous threat that they are in place to defend against? To frame tactical level answers, it is important to set the issue in context and to take cognisance of strategic military thinking, as the new threat environment shapes our armed forces and influences the doctrine of maritime operations.

Facing an asymmetric adversary

As the war on terror continues, it almost goes without saying that the opposition could seize any chance for retaliatory action but is most likely to try in circumstances where local effect can be greatly magnified, perhaps to create strategic consequences. Coalition military forces in Middle-Eastern hotspots and elsewhere already face the probability of surprise asymmetric attack and the risk is increasing. In asymmetric warfare, the initiative often lies with the attacker even if the defence is on extreme alert. The recent suicide attack against the much-publicised deployment of the Black Watch Battle Group to Fallujah presents a prime example of the nature of the challenge. The threat warning and readiness could not have been higher yet the attack struck home. The incident highlights the extreme difficulty of countering a well-targeted suicide bomber, particularly where defensive Rules of Engagement mandate positive identification of the threat before lethal force can be used. Of course, the consequences of precipitous or erroneous defensive fire can be profound. Thus, the defender is committed to restraint until he is sure of the threat, whilst doing everything that he can to preserve distance between it and the most likely target. In practice, especially when the traffic density is high, the assured differentiation of hostile from neutral frequently requires face-to-face interaction. Maintaining the requisite safe distance from the vital area whilst this is achieved is often very difficult. The Black Watch incident highlighted the stark reality of defending against incognito suicide bombers. The bomber exploited the opportunity to advance steadily whilst his identity was in doubt and got close enough to detonate amongst his targets. In so doing, he not only caused tragic local effect but also delivered

a strategic blow against British public support and coalition integrity. From the terrorists' perspective, what has been seen to work on the land can be made to work on the water. In the maritime environment, the targets are large, expensive, strategically tempting and vulnerable. The defensive challenge is just as complex as on the land except that it is even harder for the defender to identify and address a threat whilst keeping it at arm's length from the vital area. Furthermore, the effect of a simple attack can be dramatic indeed.

The inshore maritime threat

The accelerating incidence of asymmetric attacks against maritime targets in the Gulf region reflects a growing risk in any of the world's inshore waters and choke points, but especially where 'high-profile' shipping routinely or predictably manoeuvres amongst busy background traffic. The neutralisation of the USS *Cole* in October 2000 during a routine gash-ditching procedure and a similar result from an attack against the VLCC *MV Limburg* as she loaded oil near Aden two years later, have generated a spate of follow-on attempts. Open source intelligence reveals Iranian terror groups practising tactics with armed jet skis and the development of armed stealth boats and suicide craft by the Tamil Sea Tigers. Both are probably being made available to other groups. It is reported that unsuccessful suicide bombs have been targeted recently against a warship and also facilities at the Al Basra and Khor Al Amaya oil terminals off Iraq. With regional terrorist groups around the world taking notes, previously safe inshore passages, anchorages and ports have become high-risk zones. Naval consolidation tankers, military sealift shipping and warships compelled to make in-theatre port calls for any reason are particularly vulnerable.

Countering the inshore threat

To offset the inshore threat, a spectrum of layered defensive measures around likely high-value targets in Middle-Eastern waters has been adopted. Swift and appropriately armed IPVs have been employed to deter, to identify and to initiate defensive responses. Local control of the water-space in the vital area surrounding defended shipping has been imposed, extending the boundary of 'safe water' away from the defended unit and maintaining a protected zone within it. But in the Gulf theatre it has been purpose-specific assets from the US Navy Reserves that have delivered primary Force Protection, utilising bespoke Inshore Boat Units (IBU). Each IBU includes three 8-metre, steel-hulled jet boats, armed with two 50-calibre guns. The *Cole* attack has of course provided immense impetus to raising the effectiveness of unit and area defence against the asymmetric attacker, but the necessary assets, tactics and procedures were already readily to hand. Perhaps the painful lessons of USN inshore and riverine operations 35 years ago in the Mekong Delta and South China Sea have endured, where 16-metre 'Swift Boats' were found to have extreme utility against an asymmetric threat. But there can be no doubt that the Americans have been quick to field a range of robust, agile and appropriately armed craft that have seized the Force Protection mission in today's complex inshore arena. The USN is not alone in such preparations for inshore tasking. Indeed, most of the Gulf navies, including the newly formed Iraqi coastal Defence Force, now operate with an armed IPV capability. Indeed, rudimentary scrutiny of any contemporary defence industry magazine illustrates the current explosion of interest in the inshore patrol mission across the world. The market choice for 'off the shelf' IPV is extensive, ranging from armed personal watercraft through militarised speedboats and upwards, well into the OPV area.

Towards a future Navy

As with all other major and many lesser navies, the Royal Navy is adjusting quickly to the new threat environment and the Strategic Defence Review (New Chapter) has defined a clear direction for the Service to advance. The aspiration for the RN, as the Maritime Component of the UK's Joint Military Force, is crystal clear in recently published Doctrine and throughout the family of Future Navy concept papers. Here, the importance of UK Maritime Security sits alongside Flexible Global Reach, Theatre Entry and Maritime Force Projection. The declared end state of the Future Navy process is 'to deliver a balanced and rapidly deployable Joint expeditionary warfighting capability, to counter conventional *and asymmetric* threats in areas of strategic interest to the UK'. In the light of this, and of the discussion above, it follows that the future Joint Operating Area will inevitably include an inshore zone within which effective layered defence against asymmetric actors will be needed. Surely this will require organic, sustainable and effective assets? So, the case to develop and field a fit-for-purpose, readily deployable, inshore patrol component of the Versatile Maritime Force is robust. The concept chimes equally with the emerging doctrine of Effects Based Operations and with the stark lessons from current operations and coalition experiences in the Gulf. To determine the precise capability of the future Inshore Patrol Vessel (IPV(F)) that would meet this requirement, it is necessary to clarify the probable task.

Future Inshore Patrol

The IPV(F) mission might be defined as 'to deploy globally with the Versatile Maritime Force in order to provide a stand-off Force Protection capability in inshore waters'. In order to deploy into theatre, the IPV(F) would need to be of a size and design that would allow global passage and theatre entry as an integral part of the VMF. This might be within amphibious shipping or, equally, embarked in sealift charter vessels. The American IBUs were airlifted into the operating area. By whatever means, the IPV(F) would need to be capable of routine shipment worldwide. Craft of perhaps 12 to 18 metres length overall might be envisaged, with three or four vessels assigned for a deployment as a single Task Element. When in theatre, the IPV(F) would conduct scouting and interdiction operations in advance of an inshore or port ingress by high-value shipping each and every time this was envisaged. The task would then involve the establishment and maintenance of secure inshore sea areas within which additional layers of defence might be integrated, perhaps utilising booms and nets and supported by coverage of ship-mounted weapons. Within the 'safe' zone, protected naval units would be able to manoeuvre and berth with impunity from water-borne asymmetric attack. The IPV(F) would be responsible for confirming the status of benign traffic prior to entry within the defended zone. Using secure, network enabled data-link, it would be able to contribute to the inshore Recognised Maritime Picture and receive coherent and co-ordinated Command and Control. It would need lengthy endurance and good reliability, and at least two or perhaps three hulls would be required to sustain a continual watch by one. The IPV(F) would need a day and night surveillance capability and be effective in inclement weather, to match the spectrum of environmental conditions prevalent in envisaged future theatres. Hull stability, crew protection and weapon arcs are issues that would need proper consideration. Manpower would require frequent roulement and so light crew levels would be advantageous, perhaps only four or five. There would be a need to challenge and communicate with suspect craft and to hold such vessels at a safe range whilst checks could be conducted. The duty IPV would need to be

ready to respond to aggression and be armed such that accurate firepower could be delivered from a position beyond the effective range of hand-held small arms. Weapon mounting and calibre would need to be appropriate to the task and allow for seamless Command and Control, particularly with regard to returning effective, well-aimed fire at speed and whilst under helm.

As soon as a threat became apparent, the IPV would need to adopt a fully combat-ready posture within the ROE, concurrently issuing unambiguous warning to the threat whilst simultaneously alerting the other defensive layers. The patrol vessel would undoubtedly use speed and manoeuvre to reduce the likelihood of taking damage whilst attempting to maintain distance between the defended high-value unit and the aggressor. In the worst case it might need to survive peripheral exposure to premature suicide bomb detonation, automatic gunfire or rocket-propelled grenade attack. The IPV would need to be light for agility yet robust to significant battle damage if it is to sustain an effective defence during and immediately after an initial attack. Finally, and importantly, the personnel manning the IPV(F) force would need to be trained and tested comprehensively to meet exacting standards of ROE application, posture, manoeuvre, multi-cultural awareness and diplomatic communication skills, in addition to their regular departmental naval proficiencies. All these considerations define the generic user requirement, if the Versatile Maritime Force is to be adequately prepared to meet the envisaged inshore asymmetric threat. So, how do they compare with the Royal Navy's currently fielded IPV capability?

Current Gibraltar IPV

The two Gibraltar Squadron IPV, HM Ships *Scimitar* and *Sabre* are 16-metre craft capable of speeds of around 30 knots in seas up to a light chop. They are of glass-reinforced plastic construction and were originally procured as support craft for the British Army in the inshore waters of Northern Ireland. They have an enclosed bridge and an open after deck on which two 7.62mm General-Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG) are mounted, one on each quarter. Kevlar screening provides a modicum of protection for the gunners. Engagement of a manoeuvring target in the ahead-sector, whilst at speed and under helm, presents the most awkward scenario for weapon arcs but can be achieved with teamwork and close Command and Control. Surveillance aids include commercial radar and an externally mounted night-vision device. An electronic navigational display is used for situational awareness but the broadcast of own status and contact information is not fully integrated with their headquarters. The work required to fit these craft adequately for their role has been extensive, but they have been adapted well to meet the challenges they have encountered to date. Their primary shortcomings are in their ability to absorb and recover from battle damage and in their primary armament. Bringing the target within the IPV's maximum effective engagement range also brings the IPV within likely range of the belligerent's own weapons. With probable ROE considerations requiring positive threat identification, the risk is high that the attacker would engage first, and if he did and scored hits below the waterline, platform survivability is not assured. Nonetheless, the Gibraltar Squadron are, in the main, well equipped, manned and trained to provide an effective, albeit limited, combat capability in the outer layer of Gibraltar's inshore defences.

Current Cyprus IPV

The two Cyprus Squadron IPV, HM Ships *Dasher* and *Pursuer* are very different craft.

Deployed at very short notice in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the two 20-metre, 49-ton *Archer* Class P2000s were withdrawn from their designed training role with the University Royal Naval Units (URNU). There are 16 of these vessels in commission with the Royal Navy; two of which were recently replaced by *Sabre* and *Scimitar* in Gibraltar. Specifically fitted for the delivery of navigation and sea-sense training, essentially for young civilian men and women, the P2000s' internal layout is optimised for that mission. Accommodation and training space are maximised for a capacity of 12 students over and above the five ship's staff, whilst habitability, although retaining a degree of 'character-building' austerity, is impressive. The ships are each propelled by two huge Rolls-Royce CV12 engines that once saw service in the army's Chieftain tanks. Although cost-effective at the time of their build, the CV12s' power-to-weight ratio is woefully insufficient to do the planing hulls justice and they produce a maximum speed of only around 17 knots, fine though that is for navigation training. The design of the whole craft is aligned to comply with the full panoply of legislation that underwrites the complete safety of MoD-sponsored civilian passengers as far as is physically possible in a small seagoing vessel. *Dasher* and *Pursuer* were modified for their constabulary role with the addition of a pedestal-mounted GPMG on the open foredeck, stowage for hand-held rifles, some Kevlar armour and a sunscreen over the flying bridge. Providing excellent all-round visibility from an elevated position, the ships do have some advantages over their Gibraltar-based cousins but they too are vulnerable to any form of battle-damage and have operational shortcomings against the generic Force Protection requirements.

Other inshore craft

The variety of rigid inflatable boats and small raiding craft in current Royal Naval and Royal Marine service could be, and frequently is, deployed in support of Fleet Force Protection with armed personnel embarked. In this role, they do provide a pragmatic extension of early warning and deterrence, but their surveillance capabilities are restricted to a very local area and their reach with embarked weaponry is very short. Furthermore, their viability in any sea-state, or at night, is reduced dramatically. Importantly, it is likely that craft deployed for Force Protection will be organic tenders to ships in theatre and their crews will have had little opportunity to develop the integrated Command and Control skills that will be key to effectiveness in this role. These craft certainly have an important and growing part to play, but perhaps this should be as a supporting element within a much more robust layered defence architecture. The urgent requirement to deploy IPV capability to Cyprus as the war against Saddam Hussein loomed large, might well set a precedent for similarly urgent re-tasking of the 14 *Archer* Class P2000s assigned for URNU sea training, since no alternative assets are apparent. As has been exposed, these craft are far from suited to the envisaged operating tempo and environment for effective Force Protection and the ships' companies are wholly inexperienced in this type of work. At least once a year, particularly during Joint Maritime Courses or Staff College Sea Days, URNU P2000s are invited to participate in composite exercises, but invariably they are assigned roles as Fast Inshore Attack Craft aggressors. No provision has yet been made to develop co-ordinated manoeuvres, tactics and expertise for integral IPV Force Protection under tight ROE and against the realities of the inshore asymmetric threat.

Summary and conclusion

During the long Vietnam war, the USN grew to learn the value of an integral force of well-

armed, fast and durable inshore workboats that could extend the influence of offshore Task Units. The Americans re-learned this lesson during the first Gulf war and, even before the USS *Cole* was attacked, invested in a number of very capable formations of deployable Inshore Boat Units. In many ways, the *Cole* incident was a defining moment and the IBUs have seen exponential growth since; several IBUs currently provide the stalwart of inshore Force Protection in the Gulf region. Meanwhile, the US Coastguard has responded to the need to beef up constabulary patrolling in US ports and anchorages and is expanding considerably in appropriate capability. Although the Royal Navy's Versatile Maritime Force faces a similar threat, the need for bespoke resources, training and organisation to push the interdiction boundary away from the vital area does not appear to have been so clearly gripped, relying on ship-borne weaponry and armed organic helicopters or small craft. This compromise lacks sustainability in depth and ignores the realities of the suicide bomb threat that the Black Watch and the USN have learned.

There exists a clear and continual need to conduct scrutiny and direct communication with numerous contacts at a safe range and to be able to hold them there for as long as uncertainty of identity exists. It is difficult to see a substitute for a dedicated force of fast, armed and enduring inshore patrol craft, supported by a range of other defences, such as booms and nets. The P2000 is an excellent asset for its designed sea-training role and although it may look and behave like a warship, it is very poorly suited to the inshore Force Protection challenge. *Scimitar* and *Sabre* offer a little more clout but their job in Gibraltar is full time. It is clear that as the Royal Navy focuses on amphibious and capital shipping, the asymmetric risk to these tempting targets has risen to the point that sooner or later the test will come. Worryingly, the Navy's routine defences in foreign inshore waters or choke points, apart from Gibraltar, appear to be seriously flawed. I conclude that, against the exacting threat posed by apparently innocuous suicide craft or by fast inshore attack vehicles, the Service is not yet fully ready to fight and win. This position surely requires urgent corrective action if the VMF is to retain military potency, particularly at times of strategic vulnerability, when public awareness of maritime operations is heightened. It is for consideration that the US Navy's IBU organisation presents a very credible and cost-effective model on which to base an RN solution to address a fragility that carries a potentially strategic risk.

IAN CARTER
COMMANDER, RN

Romans 12:19

THE boat's newest affiliation was with a small, landlocked market town in the middle of East Anglia. Its distance from the sea meant little as there are few ports in our health and safety conscious nation that are willing to accept visits from any sort of nuclear submarine, let alone a shiny new ballistic missile boat. Indeed, we were concerned at one time that we were to be without any civic affiliation at all. The submarine had been deemed unsuitable and rejected as 'non-PC' by the Aldermen of numerous towns and cities before we were eventually adopted. Even in rural Suffolk, hardly a hotbed of anti-establishment thought or a fertile CND recruiting ground, the road to affiliation was a rocky one. It was only the local Royal Naval Association's vociferous support from the galleries and gratuitous waving of white ensigns during the crucial council meeting that secured the relationship between submarine and borough. It is a brave local councillor indeed who can stand up to the combined might of a hoard of determined ex-matelots in blazers and RNA ties.

The resolve of the RNA to secure the affiliation was a good indicator of the warmth of the welcome we were to receive on our first official visit. The desire to make a substantial initial impact, and more probably the prospect of a good run ashore, ensured that the party selected to make the long trip down from Faslane was very much selected from the figurative (and in many cases, actual) First XV. The Captain, First Lieutenant, Pusser, Doctor, Navigator and Warrant Officer Coxswain were numbered in our merry band and were ably supported by a motley assortment of the ship's company, selected on the basis of availability, rather than presentability, sporting ability or social ability. Like all submariners, they were at their best in adversity and rose magnificently to the occasion.

Unfortunately, the parsimonious subsistence regulations and dearth of funds in the travel budget reduced us to staying in fairly austere conditions, some 15 miles from the centre of town, as guests of our light blue brethren. The Officers' Mess was like many one finds in the Air Force, with both building and occupants totally lacking in character. The accommodation allocated to the ship's company was another matter entirely. It was a well camouflaged and nuclear-hardened bunker, a Cold War throwback which went under the highly impressive name of the Alternative War Operations Centre. With an elaborate communications fit and racks of bunks reminiscent of an empty bomb shop, it was a real home from home for tired and emotional submariners.

As it was our inaugural visit, the range of presentations, receptions, luncheons, dinners and speaking engagements that we were invited to attend would have overwhelmed an entire SM Squadron, let alone a select few from a single boat. With all sorts of generous invitations received from the local populace, we were forced to refuse politely many tempting offers and some interesting proposals were filed away for our next visit. Unsurprisingly, one of the visits that successfully made the shortlist was a guided tour of the local brewery. We were given a fascinating insight into the brewer's craft and were shown all manner of extremely shiny pipework, to the delight of the back-afties, and eventually ended up in the bar, to the delight of everyone else. The ales available for tasting were impressively varied and ranged from 'strong' through 'dangerously strong' to some which you could light bonfires with. The girls behind the bar were delighted to be presented with a boat's crest and awarded their honorary dolphins in gratitude for an interesting and informative tour. This entirely altruistic act may have contributed

indirectly to the Herculean amount of free beer offered and gratefully consumed. When we finally left, weighed down with brewery gizzits and crates of Suffolk's finest ale, we were feeling little, if any, pain.

Perhaps it was naïve to schedule a representative football match immediately after the brewery. It was possibly even more naïve to invite the mayor and advertise it on local radio, and downright foolish to have forgotten the boat's brand new football kit. It was therefore a very strangely dressed team, most of them aficionados of the oval rather than the round ball game, who took to the field later than planned to face the extremely young, fit and talented team from the local soccer school of excellence. Enthusiasm was unable to triumph over skill and the final score resembled Ladbroke's odds on Elvis, Marilyn Monroe and Glen Miller being discovered alive and well on the same day. Having narrowly made it to the final whistle intact, we cleaned back into our finery and headed for our next engagement at the British Legion, where we were hosted in fine style. In common with the members of all RNAs and Retired Servicemen's Clubs anywhere in the world, everyone was convinced that all sailors, regardless of generation, rate, rank or age have an inexhaustible capacity for rum. With some outstanding and fairly humbling wartime dits ringing in our ears, and now somewhat the worse for wear, although still smartly turned out in full number one uniform, we made our way to the nearest public house. The run ashore that followed was the stuff of legend as, still ably led by our Captain, we cut a swathe through the alehouses of the town, spreading bonhomie, ship's crests and zap stickers wherever we went. This continued well into the night and culminated in the command team and much of the ship's company of a quarter of the UK's nuclear deterrent 'shaking a wicked hoof' in the local nightclub until the early hours.

Returning on board the RAF base just as the sunrise of truth was breaking, the last surviving stragglers of the previous night's run ashore made their way gingerly into the mess, only to receive glares of utter, unbridled vitriol from the assorted slug-balancers who were already enjoying their breakfast. We looked each other over, and although our uniforms were not quite up to Admiral's Rounds standards, our slightly dishevelled appearance did not merit the 'daggers' we were getting. After we had endured breakfast in disapproving silence, one of our number elected to 'investigate this case himself' and discovered the awful truth.

It seems the bulk of the ship's company had preceded us back, arriving well after midnight and in high spirits. They successfully negotiated the blast doors at the entrance to the Alternative War Operations Centre and were about to turn in when something in the corner of the bunker caught their eye: an impressive and well equipped communications console, intended to be used in the event of a dire emergency, but strangely reminiscent of a submarine ship control console. Meanwhile, throughout the camp, the brave boys of the Royal Air Force were sleeping peacefully, recharging their batteries for a busy Thursday forenoon's work before going on weekend leave. Their peaceful slumber was rudely shattered by main broadcast. 'Stand by to surface, drain down and open one, two, three, four and five LP master blows, line up vent state yellow, prepare the blowers for running.'

Temptation had proved too much, and oblivious to the fact that their pipes could be heard all over the camp, they had launched into some impromptu ship control team training. Heartened by the success of the initial drill, the boys really got into the swing of things. They dived, surfaced routinely on both LP and HP blows and in emergency; they went deep for fishing vessels, had collisions forward, midships and aft; the reactor was

scrammed and flashed up again; Otto fuel leaked, hydraulics burst and electrical supplies failed; planes were jammed and operated in air emergency and they were brought to Action Stations (missile and torpedo) numerous times.

Unbeknown to them, a sizable crowd of irate crabs had now gathered outside their temporary accommodation. Walls several feet thick and doors built to withstand the best the Soviets could throw at them prevented those outside from venting their wrath on those inside. The zenith of the attempts to alert our intrepid sailors to their wider than intended audience fortunately coincided with the onset of fatigue and the pipe was made 'fall out from harbour stations, harbour cotter one, two port, three, four, five port and six main vents, sea cotter two and five starboard main vents, there is no access to the casing' and they retired to their racks, weary, happy and still utterly unaware of the commotion they had caused.

Next morning, they were accosted by a sleep-deprived and indignant Flight Sergeant, who berated them at some length. One of the more optimistic fore-ends Leading Hands, still dressed in number one uniform with dolphins to the fore, and being beyond any doubt the only submariners for hundreds of miles in any direction, came up with the excuse that 'it wasn't us'. Eventually news of the debacle reached the more senior members of the visiting party, and cogniscent of the fact that our boys were as guilty as a puppy sitting next to a pile of poo, we made our way with heavy hearts to the guardroom to find a conscientious and alert young Flight Lieutenant had transcribed all pipes verbatim. He seemed most aggravated and waved this painstakingly produced document, which ran to several pages, under our noses. The First Lieutenant stepped forward and with a deadpan expression carefully examined the offending document. Slowly shaking his head, he informed the hapless young duty officer that submarine operating procedures were classified to a stratospheric level that he was obviously not cleared for and, having duly confiscated the evidence, we beat a hasty retreat to the wilds of Scotland.

Fortunately, our Captain saw the funny side and took some solace in the fact that all the Emergency Operating Procedures were correctly carried out. Ruffled RAF feathers were smoothed by a placatory letter, but on every subsequent affiliated town visit, all accommodation at RAF *Nonsuch* was strangely full.

FRONT ROW

Ship Self-Defence in its Context

An edited version of a Conference Keynote address in November 2004

I HAVE been asked to give the keynote address for this Ship Self-Defence Conference at what is, for the UK defence and maritime establishment certainly, a very difficult time in operational and, especially, in force planning and budgeting terms, where we have not yet seen the end of the reductions. It will, therefore, be difficult for smaller navies too I am sure, and maybe even for the USN. I thought it would be best not to try to deal in technical detail with the kind of threats ships may face and precisely how they might be countered, but to talk rather more generally, and throw out a few ideas as a background to the later discussions. I want to suggest that the problem of ship defence today is rather more complicated than merely finding technical counters to the latest gadgetry any adversary might throw at us. My approach is therefore to describe some of the overall environment, and to identify some of the issues which I think have a bearing on the general question facing this conference, and hope that you can resolve at least some of them during your discussions. If this is too ambitious, I may at least have suggested more facets of the question! The key issues, I shall claim, are really about the choices and decisions facing a medium-sized nation in a very difficult, changing and expensive world, since that determines to a degree the threat. I hope to touch on some issues which may not receive a lot of regular attention. As always my remarks are principally based on, and informed by, the UK experience. Questions then, not answers.

The environment

The world today is certainly a complex place, strategically, politically, economically, ideologically and militarily. The threat of worldwide terrorism which we now face has clearly superseded the cataclysmic threat of immediate destruction which characterised the Cold War; it has not, however, removed the threat of regional wars – rather the reverse as we have seen. The somewhat 'theological' and pure approach and straightforward strategic calculus which we applied to the world of mutual nuclear deterrence, and which was accepted by the two key players, has given way to a world in which a new and complex calculus is needed, and in which there is little agreement about it among the many players – make no mistake, this is a serious intellectual challenge with few initial 'givens'. Indeed, it is clear that one consequence of the end of the Cold War, foreseeable but not always foreseen, is that it has replaced the notion that war was so cataclysmic that it was to be avoided at almost all costs, with a return to the Machievellian or Clauswitzian option of the use of force as a deliberate instrument of policy. We have seen plenty of that in the last decade – some would even say that we have seen too much of it at the expense of other instruments. The range of wars in which we or, we sometimes forget, others might engage as a policy option is very large, is unpredictable and is not very amenable to control. It stretches from very small, even benign, peacekeeping operations all the way through to possible confrontation and major conflict with newly arising superpowers, including those potentially armed with nuclear weapons or Weapons of Mass Destruction. Indeed, we might argue that since the world has returned to an historically more normal pattern, the likelihood of war over the historically more usual issues – economics, access to resources, food, border delineations, ideologies etc – is much increased; I believe the evidence tends to support this. The globalisation of much of the world's commercial and technical activity may have great economic benefits. But

with this change comes a huge potential change to the problem of maritime force protection and ship defence, for the threat now ranges from full-scale attack from sophisticated precision weapons, down through lower intensity but challenging attacks perhaps in the littoral or choke points, to a more or less continuous global threat from individuals or non-state actors in almost any port in the world, **including, importantly, in the once safe haven of our home ports** – a big change indeed.

This has coincided with a political and popular feeling in most countries of the West that the proportion of national GDPs to be spent on defence should be greatly reduced – in UK for example it has roughly halved in the last 15 years or so. Fortunately, the increase in trade and GDP caused by globalisation, itself a product of the end of the Cold War, means that this reduction, though certainly damaging to defence force structures, may not be quite as bad in real terms as it at first sounds; bad enough though. But there is another aspect of globalisation which has mixed consequences too. That is the exponential growth in technology, particularly in the field of information technology, and particularly in the commercial sector, and its increased availability, with the military advantages that brings as well as the enormous costs and increased vulnerability to which I will return. It is in this area that a real difficulty for medium powers resides. To put it quite bluntly, no country other than the USA can afford to address fully all the issues that I have just sketched out. So, for the rest of us, it means only one thing – difficult choices between important things, all of which seem desirable or even necessary. That of course is what the UK's July 2004 Defence White Paper told us, though there was also a suggestion that making an heroic assumption about the impact of Network Enabled Capability somehow meant that the choices were merely about how things would be done, rather than about what and how many things were able to be done.

For the UK, one thing is certainly clear. We, the UK, can no longer operate against a large, sophisticated force alone and by ourselves, although for the moment we can certainly field well equipped and operationally experienced forces of highly professional skill at whatever level we decide to participate. We have chosen to operate alongside the United States except where, as for example in Sierra Leone, the opposition is of generally low capability, or in straightforwardly peacekeeping or security operations (such as, for example, disaster relief or public order restoration). At the same time, the UK has both a relationship with Europe with which it is struggling, and an inescapable obligation to provide security at home for the citizens of the United Kingdom against a global threat about which we only know a limited amount, not least because it is diverse, often from individuals rather than states, and much of it has probably still to emerge. And in some cases it seems clear that armed force as an instrument of policy is a necessary response. In a word, the UK faces a multiplicity of challenges which common sense tells us require different response capabilities, but all of which we cannot, or will not, afford. This leaves us with a number of hard choices and some difficult questions. I do not want to claim that I know the irrefutable answer to these questions, but I do lay claim to be able to frame some of the questions whose answers will help to decide how, and against what sort of threats, we must prepare to defend our ships.

The key issue, I suggest, is how UK integrates its force structures with those of its allies and particularly with those of the United States. Clearly the UK cannot do everything, but if we wish to operate in 'the front line' with the United States and gain such political and operational influence and leverage as this might give us, we certainly need to operate at the same level of technical capability as the USN in whatever we do provide, particularly in the key enabling field of C4ISTAR, where complete

interoperability is necessary. The same is true, but to a lesser extent, with other allies. Does the country then provide the highest level capabilities (for example aircraft carriers) or does it seek to provide complementary capabilities that the USN or other allies may be unable or unwilling to provide? And, in making this choice, does it plan against the most likely threat of the foreseeable future or the most dangerous (which may be both different and quite unlikely)? Typically, the services have said that, if they provide against the most dangerous threat they will automatically have dealt with the lesser and more likely. I am not at all sure that this is any longer true and I believe that we now have some evidence that it is not. And, if we are faced with this choice, are we sufficiently sure that our intelligence and analysis is good enough? Are we anyway heading for an increasing degree of role specialisation between nations despite the distaste and unease which most British servicemen feel for this subject? And, given that military force is merely one instrument of national power, security and prosperity and the Grand Strategy which sustains them, to what extent should British force structure plans be constructed to take greatest overall benefit from its national industrial base and its sustenance – or perhaps in the era of the European Defence Agency, the European industrial base – itself seemingly due for further rationalisation? This is another theme which attracts little sympathy from many military men, but there may be little point in defending a society which has insufficient wealth, skill and employment to provide a satisfying and prosperous life for the bulk of its citizens. None of the answers to these sorts of questions are easy, but I am sure that I don't need to point out that the level of threat and some of the steps we might consider in force protection and self-defence may depend on these answers.

The world of networks

Of course, the growing dependence of Western nations on Network Enabled Capability that I have already mentioned brings further factors into the equation. For a start, it introduces a new vulnerability, a vulnerability shared with the civil and business community who also undertake Network Enabled functions. Any electronic activity or C4ISTAR architecture can, in principle, be attacked electronically and we have already seen some dramatic examples of computer network attack. This is a vulnerability to which we need to give a good deal more attention in an era when much complex technology has its origins in the civil sector and may therefore be quite widely available. And it is a vulnerability which can be just as dangerous in its potential military impact as a vulnerability to more conventional kinetic or direct energy weapons. But are our peoples ready to regard an electronic attack on, say, financial or power distribution systems, or even on systems which support military units as an act of war and respond accordingly? And it may anyway be an attack by a wildcat, non-state group. How can we defend against this sort of thing?

There is another issue that springs from NEC-based force structures and that is its potential impact on manpower numbers. One of the drivers of the Network Enabled approach is that it should allow much more effect to be delivered from much less hardware and fewer platforms. And one of the consequences of this is that there are likely to be far fewer people manning the platforms we do have. In high intensity warfare this is doubtless a benefit. But in lower level activity, in broader security operations, or simply in day-to-day business, I wonder if it is such a benefit. If the UK has learned one thing from its long experience in Northern Ireland, in the Balkans, in the Gulf and in other places around the globe, it is that self-defence and force protection can be a very

manpower intensive activity as well as an enduring one. In the home base it certainly is. This is probably even more the case in an era of non-state actors and terrorism, where the threat is a 360 degree threat and always present, and where the attacker frequently has the initiative. To a considerable extent, the more the UK aligns with the United States in its operations, as it seems likely always to do, correctly in my view, the more this will be true. We all face, it appears, a growth in the demands placed upon our people in individual units simultaneously with a demand, and the opportunity, for achieving our principal effects with many fewer people. As a matter of interest, just reflect that the armed services in UK are manned by around a third of one per cent of the population, protecting the other 99.7 per cent. Perhaps this is an example of the different capabilities demanded by high intensity warfare and lower level peacekeeping, peace enforcement and security tasks. Perhaps it shows that we need to engage the remainder of the community much more. At the least it shows us that we need to think quite carefully about the choices we make.

And on the subject of people, there are also, I believe, more difficult and sensitive issues about personal freedoms, to which we may be giving insufficient attention. The rapid expansion of information technology brings us substantial benefits, or at any rate conveniences, in our everyday lives. It also brings, not only to the authorities, but also increasingly to the ordinary citizen, the ability to know a great deal about each of us, and what we are doing and where, in virtually real time. Obviously, to those wishing to watch and counter the activities of criminals or potential terrorists, this is an enormous assistance and temptation. Nevertheless, despite the workings of the Data Protection Act, in a society where, even in UK, over half a million people work for the government and have access to personal data, there are clear risks to personal freedom. I would go further and suggest that we in the West are now, increasingly, learning to live with restrictions and surveillance which, a few years ago, we might even have regarded as part of the unacceptable face of totalitarian societies or as real 1984 stuff. One must not over-exaggerate this, but neither must we be careless of freedom whose price, we know, is eternal vigilance. So here is another choice or balance to be made; that between reasonable freedom for the innocent citizen, and particularly for the serviceman, and protection from the sort of threats I have been talking about. Difficult though it is, the choice should not be made simply ‘on the nod’. As Umberto Eco said in *The Name of The Rose*, ‘True wisdom consists not in knowing what we can do, but rather in knowing what we can, but perhaps ought not, to do’. Once again this balance is easier to talk about than to achieve.

I have suggested that the problem of force protection and ship defence is a multi-dimensional problem, and a difficult one at that. I have suggested that there is a number of hard choices to be made and, as ever in life, there is no guarantee that any particular choice is the right one. That, of course, is why we entrust such decisions to experienced people with a sense of morality, integrity and humanity and not simply to computers. You may feel that this takes us some way away from the subject I have been invited to talk about, but I don’t really think it does. I want to suggest that the problem of force defence is far more complex and is set in far too complex an environment to be solved simply by identifying the military threats and finding the technical counters to them, although of course that has to be done too.

A reminder

I want to finish on a slightly controversial note. I have talked a great deal about the need to strike a series of balances and face difficult choices. Of course any country has a duty

to do everything it can to ensure that its forces are able to undertake those operations to which their nation commits them. But in war, as in few other human activities, the race is to the swift and the daring. Especially as we approach the bicentenary of Trafalgar, we should remember that war is not simply about self-defence; rather it is about taking dangerous risks in pursuit of great goals – calculated risks certainly – but dangerous risks. However, risks can never be guaranteed to fall the right way – some will go wrong. War is inherently dangerous and uncertain. That is not, however, a reason for not taking dangerous risks and we need to understand that, in those circumstances, there will be casualties. We have become rather attracted by the idea of a war without casualties – on our side at least. There have been plenty on the other side, including, it appears, many thousands of civilians. Understanding this issue of military risk may help us both to reflect carefully before we use force as a policy tool, but also help us not to shy away from necessary use of force because we fear the casualties we may endure. Great nations have always understood this. We must do all we can to preserve our fighting capabilities safely, and of course our fighting capability includes, most importantly, our people. But we must not develop a mindset which puts so high a premium on protection and self-defence that it inhibits us from risking what must be risked in wartime when the national stakes are very high. That would be a poor memorial to our past heroes, and we must keep things in the right balance. The fighting capability of our ships, the initiative and boldness of our commanders and people, and their ability and willingness to take calculated but necessary risks must never be undermined, notwithstanding all that we may attempt to provide, to assist them to do their tasks in the greatest possible safety.

ST EMILION

Is the Maritime Case Sustainable?

A KEY strength of the 'Maritime Case' is that the RN is able to achieve early entry into theatre, in the absence of Host Nation Support (HNS) if required. This is by virtue both of the deployment of globally deployed units and the ability of RN units, including 3 Commando Brigade, to be largely self-sustaining. The Ministry of Defence also requires Maritime Task Groups to be able to sustain themselves for a reasonable period in a hostile environment before a supply 'coupling bridge' is established from the United Kingdom with little, or no, reliance on HNS, and to be able to land amphibious forces within the littoral. Recent exercises have severely tested this 'sustainability' picture. There is evidence of a steady increase in the number of items demanded on the home base, and materiel items being shipped abroad reached an all-time high during the Aurora deployment of early 2004. Recent operations and exercises have enjoyed robust HNS and coupling bridge support and encouraged an expectation of easy access to, and from, Task Groups to move personnel. A culture is developing wherein it has become ever easier to ferry personnel to, from and around Task Groups (TG) through the use, and misuse, of air assets. The type of questions on which the naval case could 'fall foul' include:

– With modern manning and equipment support regimes, are we becoming too dependent on outside support?

– Why put a Joint Strike Fighter on a carrier rather than ashore if it requires a similar in-theatre footprint ashore to support it?

– If the TG is not self-sustaining for a reasonable period, what unique ability does the Maritime Component bring to the Joint Force Commander in the littoral?

One of the prime causes of increased materiel traffic is reduced onboard inventories as a result of changes in support policy, exemplified by Contractor Logistic Support. It is a principle of modern, commercial logistics that 'inventory is sin'. Commerce can take the view that it does not require to hold a spare of a part that is statistically unlikely to fail. In the unlikely event that it should fail, it has ready access to industry to procure a replacement. It can often take the risk that the part will not be available in time, offsetting any financial penalties incurred (and customers potentially lost) when it is not available against the money saved by reduced spares held. If Defence, and particularly the Navy, gets it wrong, the penalty incurred can result in loss of Operational Capability, constraints on freedom of manoeuvre and, ultimately, military failure. Rightly, the Armed Forces have embraced a philosophy of lean support, but the interpretation appears to be that lean equals 'reduced' rather than 'optimised' support. The net result is that new systems and platforms are entering service which are very limited in their ability to conduct sustained operations without an umbilical cord to the UK or HNS.

The current lack of sustainment stock for Merlin is a very real concern and will test support for the helicopter during the MARSTRIKE 2005 deployment to the Middle East. The RN needs to be especially careful to ensure that proper consideration is given to appropriate sustainment of the Type 45 *Daring* Class, *Astute* submarines and the Joint Strike Fighter. The concept for logistic support of the latter is predicated on a system of rapid provisioning of stock and removal of unserviceable items into the Supply Chain. In turn, this relies on the US Navy's permanent 'Carrier Onboard Delivery' (COD) service when a friendly airhead is within range and the US's impressive plans for Joint Sea Basing allowing global freedom of operation without recourse to HNS. It does not easily relate to the RN's traditionally autonomous supply construct, lack of COD or indeed its currently mandated MoD requirement, as outlined in the first paragraph.

It has been acknowledged for some years that the material stock, known as the 're-issue load' provided from Afloat Support Shipping has been turning over very slowly with a low proportion of Task Group demands actually being provided by this service organically. We continue to carry millions of pounds worth of spares afloat either in warships or their auxiliaries. Unfortunately, they are often the wrong ones, with the decisive, battle-winning spares often held by the Integrated Project Team (IPT), contractor or manufacturer in the UK, largely for reasons of cost and at the expense of TG sustainability. This has further contributed to a situation where we rely on spares coming from outside the Task Group, and it may be fairly said that the RN has allowed the acquisition and support community to reduce Task Group sustainment stock, thus undermining one of the unique attributes of the Maritime Component. One of the key reasons for this is that the re-issue load was predicated on long periods of force sustainability for a limited range of items. In today's expeditionary environment the answer may be less 'depth' and more 'breadth' and work is now under way to scope what the optimum load for such valuable assets might be and how regularly this can be manipulated to reflect Task Group composition. Advances in logistical modelling carried out by LARO (the DLO's Logistic Analysis and Research Organisation at Wyton) may hold the key to more flexible storing for both front-line units and support shipping, for the two should be conceptually indivisible. Additionally, the Reduced Support Period has resulted in additional pressure to husband scarce assets within the UK, from where these can be flown worldwide, rather than the items being placed (and

inevitably 'tied') into ships, further mitigating against the idea of organic Task Group sustainability.

While a lack of spare parts can be a show-stopper, an inability to conduct personnel movements is more manageable. A 'closed drafting period' may be imposed and/or pain taken by retaining compassionate/medical cases on board. However, we have recently seen an increase in personnel movements on exercises and operations, which in turn increases the demand on the supply chain and reliance on support from outside the TG. Three reasons may account for this. Firstly, the importation of a less 'platform constrained' culture by the RAF, now that they work for periods with Harrier GR7/9s off the CVS. Secondly, manpower shortages which have caused the filling of many 'gaps' at short notice, and after the imposition of the TOPMAST manning strategy an environment has developed in which personnel are less tied to individual platforms and more to their flotilla 'squads'. TOPMAST Squad roulemont inevitably means greater personnel movements. As, arguably, a more modern, compassionate employer, the Maritime Component Commander will be reluctant, even during operations, to stop personnel movements, be they for drafting, TOPMAST roulemont or 'compassionate' reasons. Lastly, the rise in the dependency on contractors may mean that the TG is reliant on embarking a civilian to rectify a defect, with all the Geneva Convention implications that this can bring. While these, in themselves, do not account for the full number of personnel movements recently seen to, from and within Task Groups, it may fairly be argued that we conduct these often non-essential movements simply because we can. We have benefited from operating recently with the luxury of friendly ports and airports, and our helicopters, particularly ASW Sea Kings, have not been overstretched on combat operations. However, this trend may well reverse itself after 2006 when the number of support helicopters is reduced and, in any event, we should plan, and be able, to operate for reasonable periods without recourse to outside support.

While much work is being done in this area, not least the Chief of Defence Logistics' *Joint Supply Chain Blueprint*, we are in danger of losing one of UK Defence's prime capabilities. If a key plank of the naval case really is to be able to operate for a significant period in a hostile environment with little or no support from the UK or from host nations, then some careful re-thinking needs to be done in relation to personnel movements, Contractor Logistic Support and sustainment stocks afloat. The importance of these matters is well understood in many parts of the Fleet HQ and beyond, but their relevance needs to be more widely aired and, where appropriate, proper funding should be put in place.

I have been deliberately selective in my examples. Even if JSF, when operating from a CVF, requires a significant logistics footprint ashore, it may be that a host nation is happy to provide access to a port or airport for this purpose but not a base from which to conduct combat operations. Clearly, CVF brings many other advantages but surely it is incumbent on us to maximise the benefit of Carrier Strike? With a little extra thought, direction and possibly reallocation of resources, we can genuinely meet Defence requirements and maximise Flexible Global Reach. Flexible global reach cannot be achieved if our reach is constrained by a reliance on HNS. While it is arguable that the old Fleet operating philosophy of all units being 'Ready in Current Location' is no longer viable, it is important that we are genuinely able to sustain ourselves against the requirements that are placed upon us by the Ministry of Defence.

JACK SPRATT

It’s the Wrong Navy, Gromit!

WHAT ho, readers. I do hope you’ll forgive the long lay-off, but I’ve spent the last season out to grass following a rather unfortunate family fracas. You will recall, I’m sure, my loony, aged relatives Marmaduke and Maisie, about whom I have from time to time penned the odd word. Old Marmers is increasingly sealion, as he rather touchingly describes his condition, and so I had taken to rallying around and visiting the old booby as often as possible, taking with me snippets of news and gossip from his beloved old Service. Sadly, there has been precious little good news to pass on and I fear that the litany of gloom may not have helped, because one day the old loon cracked, leapt from his bathchair and with a heart-rending howl hurled himself through the (unfortunately closed) French doors and disappeared into the garden, last seen heading SSW at a fairly purposeful 9 knots – quick for Marmers – in the general direction of the lake.

Alerted by the sound of crashing doors, breaking glass and a howling Admiral, Maisie appeared at the study door grasping her old elephant gun, a memento of her happy days in Trincomalee controlling the local wildlife while Marmers was at sea. The old girl had a decidedly steely look in her eye and I have to say that I was quivering like a bowl of wardroom custard.

‘What the hell’s going on?’, she bellowed in a voice that made every item of wildlife within a half mile break cover, including a rather startled looking Marmaduke, who emerged from wherever he had gone to ground and set off once again towards the lake, though now at a spritely 14 knots. Anyway, I tried to explain to the aunt what had happened, hoping that she would be mollified, but I fear my explanation had the opposite effect. Reaching into the recesses of her tweed suit, she extracted a bloody great shell and bunged it into the breach of her main armament.

‘Time to do the decent thing. Should have done it months ago. Time to put the old boy down.’

And with that she slammed shut the breach and strode purposefully into the garden.

‘And it’s all yours and the damn Navy’s fault.’

Gulp.

I sprang into action.

Maisie comes from old country stock and as a result can be pretty pragmatic when it comes to the unnecessary prolongation of life. It seemed to me that the decent course of action would be to proceed with utmost despatch into the garden, locate Marmers and get him out of harm’s way. After some pretty frantic to-ing and fro-ing I spied the old boy, ambling about distractedly in a clump of rhododendrons. Perhaps I should mention at this point that Maisie, while an excellent shot in her younger days, had become increasingly erratic in later years, much to the discomfiture of the neighbours, tradesmen, innocent wildlife and even the occasional low flying aircraft (actually, in the last case I think she’s just pretending not to have seen the offending crate. . .).

As I advanced on Marmers in the clump I heard a distinct ‘Tally ho!’ which was followed in turn by a searing pain in my starboard buttock, the roar of Maisie’s elephant gun, and then, mercifully, unconsciousness.

And that, dear readers, is why I’ve been hors de combat for so long. The road to recovery for an aged geezer is slow and even with several very pleasant sojourns at RAF Headley Court, which appears to be run as a rest home for jaded crabs (those light blue

buggers still really know how to abuse the system), I'm only just back on the fighting, or to be more strictly accurate, pen-pushing, strength. There I was, happily minding my own business and shuffling about that marvellous invention, the Appointers' margin – a study here, an attachment there, some first rate loafing everywhere, all in aid of my gentle convalescence – when the dreaded phone call came. I know that this will make me sound frightfully old-fashioned, but when the thing rang I was deep in gardening mode. The poor old booby on the other end was completely non-plussed that anyone on gardening leave would actually garden. I can only suppose that, as a Pompey native, gardening to him meant no more than scraping away the canine ordure from his front doorstep.

Anyway, the long and the short of the wretched call was that I was told to stow my rake and proceed with all despatch to Town, where a desk awaited me. Ever the optimist, though he threatened me with the full three-year sentence, I know that with the recent return to the Main Building, much of the working week will be spent thrashing through an interminable balloon debate, trying to work out who should be ditched in order to meet the 'efficiency' target du jour. Classic situating the appreciation in my book and for once I'm all in favour – as long as I can be heaved over the side sharpish and sent back to the real world of ships and sailors.

When I was first posted to the Misery of D in the dim and distant past, I remember being told that what set the MoD apart from every other Department of State was that it was unique in being staffed by both civil servants and practitioners, a mix that made the MoD especially effective. Naively, I fell for the obvious calumny and went about my business believing that I had joined a particular elite. Now I can see that I was having my leg pulled. While the great ship of state sails merrily on, consuming billions of British taxpayers' money (and billions loaned by kind foreign investors), we at the MoD appear to be alone in failing, year after year, to get the sums right and secure enough loot to keep the circus performing. What's worse, we seem to be insufferable swanks, boasting to all and sundry how we're the first at this and the best at that, and invariably the first to introduce the latest batty scheme to roll off the stocks, whether or not we need it. Take the wretched RAB nonsense that requires us to buy kit and then mysteriously pay for the damn stuff all over again, and then value the thing in such a way that makes replacement all but impossible. Furthermore, some of the high priced help (I use the term in the very loosest sense) decides to spend what every one of us who has ever audited the POs' mess fund knows is not real money, but an accounting convention designed to indicate the notional value of an enterprise. And then, bugger me but the nobs try to sweep the whole thing under the carpet in the most mealy-mouthed fashion. I think we all know what would have happened to Subby Goco if he'd tried the same shabby trick with the mess funds, don't we readers?

In the face of this financial fiasco, the dear old Andrew is soldiering on with an impressive wish-list, even though the sizes and numbers of ships and submarines on the order book are shrinking before our eyes and are likely to shrink more well before they are delivered, if they ever are. Sadly, readers, there are only two areas of growth in the MoD today: the Central TLB and the number of civil servants. The first is out of control and the second shows no sign of slowing, which means that every year a greater proportion of the Budget will not be available for bullets, boats and bayonets.

I hate to sound too much like Cassandra, but you have to admit that things aren't looking overly rosy, are they? I think that there are two reasons for the Navy's current predicament. The first, to which I'll return, is that we have fallen in love with big ships, when our past suggests that we have been most successful in small ones. The second is

that we have chosen to bind ourselves to nuclear propulsion. I suppose that I really ought to nail my colours to the mast and declare my wholehearted belief in nuclear power. Even the briefest survey of the UK power industry should be enough to convince the vast majority of us that fossil fuel has had its day. Our reserves of both oil and gas in the North Sea are waning and we are now a net importer of fuels. The market has driven out the spare capacity that existed in the National Grid and we are now reliant on imported power, principally from French nuclear reactors, to make up unforeseen shortfalls. Though the Middle East will decline in importance as an oil exporter in the coming years as the Caucasus fields come on line, we will still find ourselves sourcing our oil from the most unstable parts of the planet, such is God's sense of humour.

In the face of this somewhat bleak outlook, the current Government is acting with characteristic pusillanimity towards the civil nuclear programme, having painted itself into an emotional corner over the whole nuclear issue. Instead, they seem to be opting for the pretty toy windmill option that will provide some power when the wind blows (statistically 80 per cent of the time). Then, the RN will become the sole user of nuclear power in the UK and we will therefore take on the ownership costs of the entire nuclear infrastructure – to run about a dozen reactors.

We are already being slowly bankrupted by nuclear ownership and the time has come to properly re-open the nuclear debate – which is actually two separate, though partially linked, debates: one about propulsion and one about weapons and deterrence. The two debates must be allowed to happen separately, because if there continues to be a requirement for an independent nuclear deterrent (to deter whom – our loony chum Osama?), we may have to think up another way of powering the vessel – if the weapon is to be seaborne.

It may be, though, that the starting point in the debate is economic, rather than military. For my money, the RN will only be able to afford to continue with nuclear power as a minority partner, which means that the Government will have to commit to both renewal and enlargement of the civil sector to break our dependence on fossil fuel and fund future research into Fusion, which some still see as the philosophers' stone of the modern world.

As for the big ship thing, it seems to me that this fetish can only end in tears. For a start, big ships mean fewer ships and planning for fewer means having fewer to cut – and cuts happen as night follows day. We should learn from our khaki and light blue chums. They can absorb damage because they have many small units. It is relatively easy to cut a percentage of an armoured formation or squadron. One cannot cut 15 per cent of a ship. For us, it tends to be all or nothing. Better then to have a great many smaller platforms. If, for example, we were to go for an ambitious order of 48 2,000-tonne corvettes, even if we only got 36, we'll still have a significant class. There are many benefits from going for small and many. A country that seems wedded to the idea of global policing needs bobbies on the beat – not some lardy inspector sitting in the office filling in forms. We spout about Networks and warfare, but without eyes, ears, radars and sonars on the beat there won't be any information to network. No surprise that there is currently a scramble going on to fill the Humint void in the army – a void deliberately created by our infatuation with (expensive) Techint. Interesting parallel? Maybe.

I have another observation to make about big ships. I think they bring out the worst in the Navy and hark back to the ghastly Victorian era. Which ships are more fun – big ones or little ones? Nuff said. The true heart of the Service is in little ships: FPBs, corvettes, diesel submarines and aircraft (but most decidedly not carriers – which merely transport

the fun and glamour (ie the wafus) from one place to another). It is in those little ships that one found initiative, bravery and punch. I think that the same is true of the Army, which excels at irregular warfare. Perhaps it is in the national psyche and our pirate blood that we are happiest freebooting in small units, leaving the dullards to man the big ships?

As for the carriers, are we *really* going to put manned aircraft into enemy airspace in 20 years? Emphatically, no. The carrier has had its day and we should move on. It is, incidentally, the wretched carrier business that caused poor Marmers to run amok. Pretty much everything he predicted has come to pass – the current industrial spat; the cost overrun; the slippage; the ineffectiveness of the solution; the huge programme risk in JSF; the flawed notion of manned combat aircraft in the 2020s. For an old duffer he is remarkably modern in his thinking and yearns for the Navy to embrace the UAV and Cruise. Our khaki chums will want, quite rightly, to call the shots and what they will need is firepower on tap, for which read TACTOM and all its descendants. If we want to remain in the power projection game, we should invest even more in the amphibious business – after all, the naval service owns Britain's finest soldiers – the Royal Marines. The USN is busy re-ordering into Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups supported by surface and sub-surface strike assets. We can't afford the first but we already have the bones of a pretty reasonable second, though we're desperately short of support helicopters, so perhaps that's where we should put our money. A sensible investment might result in a rounded, highly effective Navy, capable of operating ashore at Divisional strength supported from seaward by firepower, lift, plentiful escorts and conventional submarines. Affordable? Yes. Achievable? Only if we can unburden ourselves, finally, of our old war, Cold War, mindset.

I'm ready to do my bit, dear readers, but at the moment I'm damned if I can see how. My time seems more than amply filled already and the Directorate seems to be snowers: defining our core change objectives; populating our various management plans; agreeing annual personal objectives (and delegating the tricky ones); interminably recycling information; preparing and conducting briefs; endless attendances at the first refuge of the decision-averse – the meeting. Sadly, friends, there is no time for real work. The only possible way of changing the way we (fail to) do business is by sacking every other worker in the Department – it would be the Ministry's greatest contribution to Defence.

GoCo

Effects-Based Programming – What's it all About?

THERE has been a lot of talk and writing about Effects and how they can be applied to military planning and operations. It would be fair to say that the subject has a long way to go before it is fully understood, but the developing concept is mature enough to be put into practice in certain areas. In terms of the Defence Planning Assumptions, the 11 Strategic Planning Effects[1] are 'the desired outcomes that UK defence must deliver, or contribute to delivering, in order to realise the policy goals set out in the Defence Aim'.[2] In short, the theory is that UK defence should be targeting its forces to achieve desired planned effects, rather than simply applying the same forces in the same way to each event. For instance, in an operation, a missile that hits the secret police headquarters but avoids the water treatment plant sends a message of deterrence to a key arm of the adversary's forces but a message of reassurance to the civilian population. In peacetime, a Military Training Team can bring the effects of stabilisation, transformation and prevention to the local population and military, and a warship visit can bring a message of reassurance to the local British community, but one of deterrence to the local warlord.

But what does it all mean for the Royal Navy, and why should we embrace it? In short, not only is it the future, but it also makes complete sense to do so in terms of the employment of our ever more scarce Fleet assets. It has been developed as a concept for some years and is now growing in maturity and acceptance; Chiefs of Staff signed off the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre Paper 'UK Military Operations – An Analytical Concept' in January this year, and Defence Strategic Guidance 05, when published later this year, will put greater flesh on the bones developed in earlier strategic guidance.

The beginnings for Fleet

The further reduction in resources was the key driver to the process for Fleet. After Short Term Plan (STP) 03 and the Medium Term Workstrands in 04, our Destroyer and Frigate (DD/FF) numbers were going to fall from 31 to 25, our submarine numbers from l l to 8, and our small ships from 22 to l6. STP 05 will reduce our support ship numbers from 18 to 17. It was clear that some activity was going to have to stop; our global strategic influence would, by circumstance, have to be reduced because we simply would not have the hulls. A key target for reduction would have to be the Current Military Tasks (CMT). Up to the beginning of this year, we had always kept two DD/FF at high readiness in home waters for towed array and Fleet Ready Escort duties and five DD/FF on deployed CMTs. These were the Atlantic Patrol Tasks (North) and (South), the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Operations TELIC (Northern Arabian Gulf) and CALASH (Global Counter-Terrorism Ops in the Arabian Sea). These permanent DD/FF contributions brought immeasurable strategic influence and benefit to the UK. In the South Atlantic we brought reassurance to the Falkland Islanders, and a gentle message of deterrence to an Argentinian government whose attitude towards the Islands could have hardened at any time. In the Caribbean, as well as the very visible stabilisation and reassurance brought about by disaster relief, we were able to assist in transformation of local defence forces, while helping to disrupt the narcotics trade. Participation in the NRF bought us influence with the US and at the NATO table, while our presence in the Gulf was a clear message of solidarity with the US and other coalition nations. But we had to realise that

permanent presence could not be sustained in all these areas; these five tasks would have to reduce to something nearer to three.

Why three?

It's all to do with the 'roulement factor'. Because we train ships and their companies for their tasks, then deploy them, then bring them back and maintain and rest them, it takes well over three hulls to generate that one, permanently deployed ship. If you then take into account the number we have to have in readiness for the medium scale warfighting operation as required by the Defence Planning Assumptions, there is very little flexibility. We were able to do five tasks with 31 DD/FF, but a drop to 25 would mean that two tasks would have to go. But which ones, and why? There had to be some form of prioritisation.

The prioritisation process

Up to now, this article has majored on the surface flotilla, but we have a broad range of assets and capabilities that can be deployed globally to achieve, or contribute to the achievement of, strategic effects. Warships, submarines, Royal Marines, aircraft and auxiliaries can be deployed singly, or in combination, or in task groups, or with Flag Officers and staff, to achieve any of the strategic effects that the Ministry of Defence or the Government requires and, as resources allow, in whatever region. The key point is that it must be done with the prior knowledge of the effect required, and backed up by a co-ordinated Information Ops (IO) campaign. But how do we establish what those key areas are and the effects required?

Throughout the past eight months, Fleet's programming staff have been working with the MoD's Maritime Commitments Strategic Steering Group[3] to tie down exactly what the regional and sub-regional priorities are, and what effects are required, and when. The Defence Planning Assumptions talk in terms of 'Core Regions' – those areas of the world in which we are most likely to conduct operations. Clearly the major focus for naval activity was to be in these areas, but with the ability for global reach, other areas, such as the South Atlantic and the Far East, were not to be ruled out. Through a process of analysis and consultation, regions and sub-regions were prioritised, with guidance on which effects were required within those areas.

The practice

How does it work in practice? Broadly, Fleet's programming staff have three methods by which effect can be achieved: Permanent Presence, Planned Surge and Reactive Surge.

Permanent Presence speaks for itself and is a continuation of the Current Military Tasks. It is a single DD/FF which, simply by being there, can bring insight, prevention, reassurance, stabilisation and deterrence. To a lesser extent it can bring coercion and disruption and contribute to the effects of defeat and destroy. A clear example is the Navy's permanent contribution of a DD/FF to Op TELIC in the Northern Gulf. It brings all the above effects in good measure and, equally importantly, the continued solidarity with coalition nations and the consequent negotiating ability.

Planned Surge is the programming of a unit, tailored group or task group to bring effect to areas where an event is likely to occur that will require greater presence. The following hypothetical example illustrates what could be done, and what effect could be brought if, should the decision be made, there was to be no further permanent presence in the South Atlantic. The autumn amphibious exercise has, for the past few years, taken

place in the Eastern Mediterranean. Why? Because it is linked to the autumn NATO exercise, and that is where it has always been held. There is no strategic requirement for it to be there – it is there because it always has been. An alternative might be to hold the exercise off West Africa; there are some excellent training grounds on the West African coast and hinterland, and enough friendly countries that could accommodate Marines, ships and aircraft. But, think of the effect that such an exercise would also bring. West Africa is not known for its stability and peaceful ways; years of corruption and civil war have left many of its countries' populations with injuries and disease, while their dictators continue to squander their natural resources. The presence of a single ship (as with HMS *Norfolk* off Sierra Leone in 1999) or a group of ships, and particularly one that is putting Marines ashore, would send very strong messages of reassurance to the regional civilian population and one of deterrence to the current or next dictator. That dictator might note the ability of Royal Marines to deploy far from home, and in large numbers, and also remember their part in previous West African crises. Indirectly, and with a correctly managed Information Campaign, a similar message would be received in other parts of the South Atlantic. A key point is to get the message right; years of good diplomatic work could be undone if the message came across as provocative rather than firmly persuasive. Another example of planned surge could be the timely programming of a submarine to surface very publicly off whichever Area of Interest required it, with the effect being adjusted by making the patrol either overt or covert. The key point in all of this is that such activity has a similar, if not greater, effect than that of a single unit. The effect of the deployment of a Carrier Task Group, for instance, to an area of concern might last the entire length of that particular Government's term in office.

Reactive Surge is achieved through the short-notice reprogramming of a unit or units to achieve effect in a specific area in response to an unexpected action that could threaten regional or UK security. A coup that threatened the legitimate government of one of our overseas territories in, say, the Caribbean, could be diffused by the short-notice deployment of the high readiness amphibious Task Group. For disaster relief, the swift redeployment of HMS *Chatham*, RFA *Diligence* and HMS *Scott* in January to provide assistance to the areas hit by the tsunami made a considerable impact both in the region and at home.

Other methods of achieving effects, without using Fleet assets, is the programming by Fleet or Naval Staff, of staff talks or Flag Visits. While not having the same impact as a DD/FF, submarine or task group, they would demonstrate a level of interest in that particular country that would progress relations. In the end, in peacetime, naval activity abroad is all about conflict prevention – the ability to target areas that may cause conflict in years to come, and contribute to their stability.

The Force Generation Review

None of this would be possible without the ability to generate our assets properly. Under the Navy Board endorsed Force Generation Review, Fleet programmers concentrate on delivering the Joint Rapid Reaction Force as the core output, with the generation of Task Units rather than individual elements as a means of delivering the greatest impact. Using the tri-annual Joint Maritime Courses (JMC), Task Units consisting of three or four DD/FF complete these courses together before joining the Reaction Force at very high readiness. This rolling process generates approximately 10 DD/FF to the Reaction Force per year. Under effects-based programming, the Reaction Force assets' 24-month programme would read as follows:

First 12 months. Each three or four unit Task Unit is available for deployments of up to four months. This could either be as part of a Maritime Strike or Littoral Manoeuvre Task Group (the two constituents of the Core Maritime Roles), as a three or four ship group, as individual elements, or as a combination of all four. The first of these groups formed in last summer's JMC and the first major group roll-out is happening as I write – the Carrier Group deployment to the Arabian Sea to participate in Exercise MAGIC CARPET off Oman.

Second 12 months. The Task Unit breaks into individual elements, conducts Theatre specific training and then deploys for one of the Current Military Tasks. It then returns and restarts the generation process along with other force elements.

The 'Force Generation Review – Next Step' capitalises on DD/FF force generation work and proposes a two-year cycle for Maritime Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre capabilities. The Maritime Strike capability depends on the generation of the Carrier with its own air group and the Littoral Manoeuvre capability depends on the co-ordination of 3 Commando Brigade, amphibious shipping and air assets. This cycle will culminate in a medium scale exercise combining Maritime Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre every two years. Its first manifestation will be in the autumn '05 deployment, part of which is intended to be off Africa. The aspiration is to provide the right amount of regional cover, in the right priority order, over a period of four years. Key to ensuring that this cycle is coherent is the monitoring of activity, and Fleet staff are developing, in consultation with Naval Staff, a method of measuring coverage within regions. This will allow for adjustment as the cycle progresses.

Summary

Due to resource constraints, the current pressure of operations and the change in the approach to Defence activity, Fleet needed to find a more effective way to employ maritime forces to support wider Government objectives. This can be done through effects-based programming – the achievement of joint effect by the employment of its broad range of assets, using either individual elements, a group of assets, or as part of a larger Task Group. This new approach will enable Fleet to achieve effect wherever it is required, and have the flexibility to surge to other regions at short notice. It is what Fleet assets do best – supporting Government objectives by contributing to both operations and conflict prevention.

MARTIN EWENCE
COMMANDER, RN

References

[1]The 11 strategic planning effects are: Insight; Prevent; Reassure; Stabilise; Transform; Deter; Coerce; Disrupt; Defeat; Destroy; Resilience.

[2]The Defence Aim: 'To deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism; and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and stability'.

[3]The MCSSG consists of one- and half-star representatives from across the policy and commitments areas of the MoD, plus the Foreign Office and Defence Sales. It was established in 2002 and meets twice per year to provide guidance to Fleet on tasking priorities.

The United States Navy – Feet of Clay: An American Response

AS a retired US Navy officer, I approached Lieutenant Commander Talbott's article (*NR* Nov '04) with a good deal of scepticism. Since moving to the UK several years ago, I have become used to, but never comfortable with, the British practice of comparing themselves to America – whether it be food, fashion, or military prowess. In the latter area, a common thread seems to be that, while the Yanks are bigger, better equipped, or have better technology, they are deep down just a bunch of trigger-happy, unsophisticated colonial bumpkins who cannot compare with their British counterparts. And I found exactly that self-satisfied view in the first paragraph, where I read, 'the RN is an incomparably better navy than the USN'. I would take issue with that. My purpose in responding is not to criticise the Royal Navy – I have too much respect for their professionalism. My own experience is that British forces are indeed wonderfully trained and ably led, though there are aspects of military performance here that I find widely inconsistent with that comfortable self-image. But I do hope to address Lieutenant Commander Talbott's article from an American viewpoint, since I found myself supporting some of his points while strongly disagreeing with others.

As a former deck officer, I had my doubts whether an administrative and logistics officer could get a truly accurate picture of the USN from two years working at a shore-based supply centre, even if augmented by a couple of field trips to a carrier. Not surprisingly, I found several areas where the author was well off the mark. But as I read through the article, I have to admit that Commander Talbott has identified a number of USN problem areas. In many cases, these simply reflect the fact that the comparative wealth of the USN in both manpower and funding has allowed it to avoid the hard choices the Royal Navy has had to make over the past several decades. I suspect that is now changing.

But let's look at some of the specifics noted by the author. The 'monstrous' areas of overmanning observed are not really the result of no apparent planning. Manpower documents in the USN are extremely detailed and continuously reviewed. Certainly, as a warship commanding officer (CO), I never felt entirely comfortable that I had enough men for the job since normal manning was only 90 per cent of allowance. Nevertheless, I agree that the USN needs to be much more proactive in outsourcing and privatisation. That is happening, just as the USN is designing reduced manning into its new classes of ships. For example, manpower goals for the 14,000 ton DDX are around 125 officers and crew, including helo detachment, so we are moving in the right direction. However, I also agree that the USN shore establishment needs a much harder look at cutting the fat from its manning. As a seagoing officer, I always suspected that the sailors I desperately needed were all lounging around in some do-nothing shore job, especially at the supply centres. I'm happy to see that I was right all along.

The statement that commanding officers have an incentive to keep bloated manning in order to preserve more 'must promote' slots on their promotion reports reflects a lack of understanding of the USN fitness report and promotion system. By the early 1990s, 'grade creep' had resulted in nearly every officer being ranked at the top of his peer group (much like the current complaints on UK GCSE and O levels). There were ways around this that forced commanders to break out their top performers, but clearly the

system needed to be fixed. A decade ago, we brought in a new requirement that only 25 per cent of officers per unit could be ranked in the top 'must promote' group, and those had to be ranked on a ladder (1 of 4, 2 of 4, etc). Consequently, artificially inflating officer manning levels does not give a CO greater leeway to puff up his 'must promote' recommendations.

I also find myself in substantial disagreement about the quality of people in the USN. As in any large organisation, one gets a spread of individual capabilities – some absolutely outstanding, most very able, and a few who consistently bring up the rear. As a group, I would say that US sailors are well above our society as a whole – just as their RN counterparts are in the UK. Yes, many of them join to get technical training, steady pay and good benefits – just as they do in the Royal Navy. But they also join out of a sense of patriotism, service to others and a desire for adventure. I see nothing wrong in either set of motives. What counts is how people perform. The allegation that many men join the USN because they are given the option of the Navy or jail by a judge is rubbish – an old wives' tale that one still hears from time to time. In fact, I recently saw a reference to it on an Internet piece written by a USN officer. He too was wrong. It was hardly ever true in the past, and it is even less so today. Enlistment and retention statistics allow a great deal more selectivity in weeding out those with civilian police records or performance problems.

Is the USN officer corps a 'curiously anodyne group'? I suppose that may be true. Certainly, the USN has become exceedingly intolerant of mistakes – both private and professional, and the reputed 'zero defect mentality' of the Service is a subject of internal comment and debate. Today, being caught in a single instance of DUI or marital infidelity is usually a career-ending event. In the good old days, drinking and chasing women were not just tolerated, they were expected (at least according to the nostalgic old-timers). Tailhook and a public expectation that our warriors should also be choirboys mean that too much individuality can get one into trouble. But the pendulum can also swing too far in the other direction. I note that the RN is amazingly forgiving of commanding officers who damage their ships. If a USN CO runs aground on a charted rock or collides with another vessel, he is usually gone within 24 hours.

Lieutenant Commander Talbott has a point when he writes that the USN has far too many officer specialties and sub-specialties. But that should not be unexpected in an organisation with nearly 15 times more personnel than the RN. The broad scope of its activities coupled with the USN's size allows, indeed requires, a greater degree of specialisation.

The author is correct that the USN is less well-versed in NATO procedures than the RN and other European navies. While there is a core of USN officers and sailors who have had NATO tours and are extremely proficient in NATO procedures, their number is relatively small. But think about it. Half the USN is in the Pacific, where they use US developed tactics. For the Atlantic Fleet, only a small percentage of the Fleet participates in STANAVFORLANT or STANAVFORMED each year. So, on any given ship, there are very few crew members who have ever sailed with NATO – quite different from a Royal Navy frigate. Moreover, NATO tactics evolve slowly, whereas the USN is constantly experimenting and introducing new tactics and procedures throughout the Fleet. Consequently, US sailors spend more time on the newest innovations. Should the USN be better versed in all aspects of NATO tactics? Sure. But it is less critical for them and less central to their success than it is for the RN.

Lieutenant Commander Talbott found the USN to be 'hideously political'. I hate to be

the bearer of bad tidings, but 'politics' is inherent in any large organisation, and I daresay it exists within the Royal Navy. I have certainly seen it in my own dealings with MoD and I suspect most senior RN officers have too. The simple fact is that people tend to like or respect some colleagues and subordinates more than others. Moreover, organisations sometimes have conflicting or competing interests. Both those factors lead to officers being identified with one group or another, even when they have not made the choice themselves. The author notes the problem of 'politics' as reflected in the USN's warfare communities – aviation, surface and submarine. I have to agree with him there. His example of the various Type Commanders in San Diego was right on the mark. This is an area where the RN provides an excellent example of building a single service culture, and you are to be applauded on that account.

Are there problems with the USN promotion system? Perhaps. Race and gender are certainly noted when an officer's record is briefed to a promotion board. On the other hand, I have sat on several promotion boards and have never seen an unqualified officer promoted regardless of race or sex. The system itself is extremely objective and fair, and it is meticulously enforced. Because of the sheer number of personnel being looked at by any selection board (normally around 13-15 members sit on a board), very few of them know a given individual. Every board member knows how the fitness report system works, which jobs are the most challenging, what key phrases and accomplishments to look for in an evaluation, and how to detect an inflated report. Having a senior officer weigh in on your side is very helpful in getting the best assignments. It is much less decisive in promotion, where actual performance in the job is what counts.

What about the full-length photographs in each officer's record – updated annually? They were introduced specifically to judge weight control, not race. The photos are augmented by an annual physical fitness test and a medical department recording of an individual's body fat measurement. By and large, those measures have been effective.

The author suggests that USN commanding officers undertake superfluous and uncoordinated initiatives to generate attention to help them stand out for promotion. Yet in the preceding paragraph, he accuses USN officers of a lack of creativity. I don't think he can have it both ways. I would suggest that most COs want to improve things on their ships and in the Fleet as a whole. The challenge is coordinating such efforts. In an organisation as large as the USN, that is a major problem. I would agree with Lieutenant Commander Talbott's description of the symptom, but not his diagnoses of the cause.

I could go on, but I would like to finish with just two points. First, the author is absolutely spot on in observing that British familiarity with the United States brought about by America's global media influence does not mean that Britons really know or understand us. The same thing goes for America's understanding of Britain. One of the real surprises when I moved to the United Kingdom was how very different the Americans and British are, despite our shared goals and values. Second, Lieutenant Commander Talbott is to be congratulated on a very thorough and wide-ranging analysis of the USN. While I disagree with some of his observations, particularly those which appear to be based on second-hand reports, I also have to admit that he put his finger on a number of very real problems. Despite the flaws, his article has helped build some of the understanding both navies need for truly effective cooperation.

JAMES R. STARK
REAR ADMIRAL, US NAVY (RETD)

Tales from My Father

ROWING ashore for the last time after 35 years could not have been easy, but that inevitable lot fell to my father, Captain Geoffrey Bennett, in 1958. It was made a bit easier by his already having an additional career as a writer; his novels and radio plays under the pen name Sea Lion had done well, though he always made it clear to me there was no large fortune, nor even a small one, in this often under-rewarded activity even though he fully embraced Dr Johnson's dictum that anyone who wrote for anything except money is a blockhead. Woe betide any publisher or editor who tried any nonsense over payments.

His last significant posting had been the fascinating assignment as naval attaché in Moscow shortly after Stalin's death, but on his return home it was clear that the navy, or rather the Government, was having one of its periodic fits of what we now call 'downsizing', or what many would regard as putting the nation's defences in jeopardy, so he looked around and was offered a job in the household of the Lord Mayor of London. This coincided with some very generous 'golden bowler' offers so he took the opportunity.[1]

Having been Flags to a number of Admirals, this sort of social and ceremonial organisation came easily, even if riding at the head of the Lord Mayor's procession on a horse was a challenge.

One of his Lord Mayors was a handsome man, if a bit thin on top. He was also a shade vain but during his time in office he had a quartet of teenage daughters not prepared to let father take himself too seriously. One week he appeared a number of times on BBC television. My father overheard a daughter say to him:

'You know, Daddy, you should be on commercial television. Then you could bow your head to the camera and say "I always use Mansion House polish".'

From this time on he was periodically to come home with tales from the office, though it was soon to be a different office. Life in the Mansion House had a heavy social side and as my mother was in poor health he managed to change after a couple of years to the City of Westminster where he became Mayor's Secretary for the next 14 years. This was before the Herbert reorganisation of London's local government when Westminster was still just quite a small enclave in the heart of the capital.

Soon after arriving he had to organise a 'topping-out' ceremony to mark the completion of some new building. He sent round instructions which included, 'The city flag and the union flag will be hoisted side-by-side'. It wasn't long before he had another office on the phone:

'I didn't know the union had a flag.'

A bit of education was necessary.

Then he was in charge of a gala charity film show and decided to send out the leaflet soliciting takers for the expensive tickets to all those living in and around Belgravia's posh Eaton Square. He got his secretary to prepare a list from Kelly's. When she showed it to him he noticed 'Duke of Wellington PH'.

'Check that decoration will you?' he asked. She came back:

'Er, Captain Bennett, it's Duke of Wellington, Public House'.

In 1965 the present City of Westminster, a much larger area with greater responsibilities, was created. This meant a move from a comfortable if modest Victorian office at the bottom of Charing Cross Road to a 20-storey sixties angular soulless

glass-walled office tower in Victoria. Just before the move a memo came round saying that as there was limited lift capacity in the new building they wanted to stagger starting and ending working times and would my father please indicate what time he wanted to start and finish work. He could not resist replying: 'Start 1100, finish 1115' .

It was about this time that he changed his literary bent from fiction to history and as he was retired he could use his own name. His several books were well received and he was very proud to be invited to become a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. One was *Nelson the Commander*, and not long after this appeared the film of Terence Rattigan's *Bequest to the Nation* about Lady Hamilton came out. In this film Nelson's soulmate is depicted (by a badly miscast Glenda Jackson) as a blousy lush, in direct contrast to the sweet simpering Vivien Leigh from the wartime film. This led to a furious correspondence in *The Times* about which was fairest. My father weighed in heavily twice, supporting Rattigan. At this time he was also corresponding with Buckingham Palace on some city matter, probably a state visit. One letter came back with a handwritten PS.

'The Duke thinks you are being beastly to Lady Hamilton; the Queen reserves judgement.'

One of his annual tasks was organising the 'switching on the lights' ceremony for the Trafalgar Square Christmas tree sent from Norway as a thank you for our efforts in World War II. This was on a fair scale and usually made television. After one, he came home a bit unhappy. It had been almost messed up because at the last minute a large Norwegian children's choir touring Britain had appeared with no advance warning and insisted on being involved. This had led to some rapid last minute reorganisation of careful plans. Next day he spoke to his contact at the Norwegian embassy and suggested that it might have been helpful if he had had some forewarning. An obviously irate but apologetic diplomat explained he had only been contacted by the choir in the morning and had then forcefully told them it was far too late and they should not try to get involved in any way. He had been ignored by some self-important do-gooder.

Another Christmas he had to sort out a silly problem arising from bureaucratic stupidity. It had been made clear that the tree was a total gift, with Norway accepting responsibility for the cost of putting it up and the decorations. This included lighting. But one year afterwards the Embassy got in touch with my father and suggested that the bill they had received from the electricity board seemed rather high. My father's enquiries showed that some Twitmarsh[2] had decreed that the charge should be at the highest commercial rate possible, not the usual domestic rate.

Like most historians my father often had very sceptical views of the work of others in his field. (Is there any area of human endeavour with more reciprocal bitchiness?) Another Christmas I saw him almost dancing with joy. W.H. Smith's seasonal catalogue had listed a work by one he thoroughly despised under 'Fiction'.

Around this time he turned his historical attentions to that most controversial naval event, Jutland. He came home one evening during his researches looking very pleased and waving a small grey book.

'It has survived', he said.

It was a copy of the Harper brothers study of the battle prepared in the Admiralty in 1919. This was supposed to be lost, because when Jellicoe read it he was so unhappy he ordered the destruction not only of all copies but also the printer's plates. He had tried to do to it what Muslims would like to do to *The Satanic Verses*. However, one copy had somehow survived and he had been lent it, by whom he did not tell me. To be fair he

conceded that it did not contain anything radically new as the Harpers had later written extensively on the battle.

Soon after this appeared he had to escort his Lord Mayor to the memorial service for Noel Coward in St Martin-in-the-Fields. He was seated when Lord Mountbatten appeared. He spotted my father – as fellow communicators they knew each other quite well – and came and sat down next to him.

'Ah! I've just read your Jutland.' And he began a not too *sotto voce* conversation on the subject. Then he noticed Lord Snowdon sitting just in front and tapped him on the shoulder.

'Here you. This is the Navy's church you know; there's a white ensign up there.' He pointed. 'You should have been in the Navy, it would have done you good.'

RODNEY M. BENNETT

References

[1]The story circulating at this time was that the Admiralty drew up proposals for the pay-offs, making them generous in what they felt was the safe assumption that the Treasury would slash them. For once (this must be unique in history), the Treasury dozed and allowed them through as first proposed.

[2]For those who do not know it a term coined by Sir Patrick Moore in his *Bureaucrats, How to Annoy Them* (written under the name R. T. Fishall) for an obtuse official. Named after one T. Whitmarsh with whom he had had some tiresome dealings.

Derry Delights

I HAD heard her urgent footsteps as she ran up the gangway. It was spring 1947 and the submarine depot ship HMS *Stalker*, the 100-metre long Tank Landing Ship (LST) was at Berth 11 on the river Foyle along the Strand at Londonderry. It was teatime on a sunny afternoon and, with the cabin door open, I was writing home to my Ma. Aged 22, it was less than a year since I had been commissioned Temporary Acting Sub-Lieutenant RNVR and, with my Captain and fellow officers on a 'run ashore', found myself in charge of 100 sailors, a depot ship and four running reserve *S* Class submarines.

'Where's your Captain? I want to see your Captain,' shrieked a very agitated female Ulster voice. The Quartermaster at the head of the gangway started to lead her to my cabin 10 paces away, but she pushed past and exploded through the door. Probably 18 and with hair down to her waist she exuded alcohol, and when I said I was temporarily in charge she burst out, 'I want to make a complaint – one of your sailors has just raped me in the train coming back from Buncrana!'

I simultaneously grabbed my wallet from the desk, slipped on my jacket with its solitary wavy gold ring on the sleeve, and in nanoseconds thought through the very comprehensive programme of training I had received since joining the Navy just before the end of the war. Nowhere had there been anything about sailors raping girls in railway trains.

Gently easing her out of the cabin onto the upper-deck where I would have a clear 60 metres escape run, I pretended to listen as she gave vivid details of what had happened. Then out of nowhere my mental search engine produced 'Aid to the Civil Power'. Turning to the girl I said, 'As this alleged offence occurred ashore and not on the ship, it is a case for the local police and I will gladly phone them for you and get them to come down.' 'Oh, no Sir, don't do that – I don't want to bother them.' 'But I insist – Quartermaster ring the Londonderry police.' And she was off down the gangway like a shot.

I then sent for the Coxwain, and asked if he knew who the rating was and if he was back on board. 'Yes, Sir. He's back on board and although he's had quite a bit to drink he'd like to see you.' So I then learned from the sailor that he had been sitting quietly in the compartment 'minding my own business', when the girl had suddenly pulled a cut-throat razor out of her handbag and threatened to slash his face if he didn't hand over his money. Fortunately, he had been able to overpower her, and shortly afterwards the train had got back to Derry. He totally denied the allegation she had made. I said he was not to go ashore again and ordered the Coxwain to keep an eye on him.

It was at least an hour before the Inspector and Sergeant came on board. Over a glass of beer in the Wardroom they told me why they had been delayed. That afternoon in the NAAFI Canteen, a short distance away further down the Strand, were some 200 sailors from the Derry flotillas of destroyers and frigates, enjoying their Sunday afternoon 'Char and Wad'. On learning about the rape allegation they poured out and pursued the girl up the Strand to the city centre. 'We met her as we were coming down, Sir. She was being chased across the churchyard, so we took her into custody and have locked her up for her own protection.' She was obviously well known to the Fleet but what the bone of contention was that gave rise to the chasing throng I never did learn.

At about 7 o'clock the Captain returned and wondered why the police were on board. They told him that the girl was well known to them and that it was most unlikely that she

would be pressing charges. Invited to stay for supper, the police finally left at midnight. By this time we had been told (in the strictest confidence) the days on which certain by-roads were not patrolled, should we ever wish to do a bit of smuggling across the border. With both clothes and food still heavily rationed, this was valuable intelligence!

Four days later on Thursday morning I was standing on the upper deck with an armed guard, waiting for a car to take us to Ebrington Barracks to draw cash for the Ship's Company pay. To my amazement the girl from Sunday came up the gangway again, this time hand-in-hand with a young man in a suit. 'Oh,' she said, 'I'm glad you're here, we've been out this morning and have just got married. I told my husband all about you and wanted to bring him along to meet you.' I shook his hand, congratulated him, wished them both well – and was highly relieved to see the car arrive.

As they say in Yorkshire: There's nowt so queer as fowk!

DAVID COAST
LIEUTENANT, RN

Footnote

These memories from the immediate post WW2 years were prompted by the arrival in 2003 at Pounds shipbreakers, Portsmouth of HMS *Stalker*, the 60-year-old last surviving Mk3 steam driven LST. At 330ft long they were the largest ever, and many, including *Stalker (LST 3515)*, were built in Canada. The shorter Mk2s were used for D-Day, the Mk3s coming into service in late '44 and '45.

The ship recently featured in two episodes of *Waking The Dead*. Attempts are being made to rescue and preserve her and to this end a Registered Charity has recently been established; details on *www.maritimesteamrestorationtrust.co.uk* and from Malcolm Tattersall, 39 Fairfield, Hebden Bridge, West Yorks, HX7 6JB.

Birth of a Naval Engineering Museum

FROM a junk yard to a historical museum! This is how one can aptly summarise the whole story of the dedicated efforts put in by a select band of officers, sailors and civilians of the Technical Training Establishment INS *Shivaji*.

The old Steam Demonstration Room (SDR), which had been used for training officers and men of yesteryear, had become a near junk yard. The screeches and grunts of the once racing machinery had reverted to a tired silence; but that was not to be for long. On 2 November 1988, the author (the then Commanding Officer) visualised this ageing but still steaming machinery as the sentinels of the marine engineering world to unfold to budding marine engineers the history of the past and the growth of marine engineering through the ages. Commander V. M. Sarwat, duly assisted by Lieutenant Commander (SD (ME)) M. M. Rehman and a few dedicated and experienced staff of sailors and civilians, taxed their brains and brawn to transform their CO's vision to reality. Eventually the junk yard was transformed to a pride of place in INS *Shivaji*.

Germination of the idea

Soon after taking over command of INS *Shivaji*, in August 1988, a piquant situation arose – that of demolishing the entire old steam training complex, then known as the SDR, which was commissioned in 1949. The machinery therein was declared redundant and listed for disposal. This was due to the commissioning of the new Leander steam training wing, which had been commissioned in 1976. Technically the demolition was justified under the accounting and audit rules, yet the author, an old marine engineer who like so many others having been trained by this very same old SDR some 34 years back, could not accept this event taking place. This complex, in fact, had trained thousands of MEs, ERAs, MECHs and officers and came to be regarded as the 'Mecca' of the Indian Navy marine engineers. It was therefore felt that a great injustice would be done to the past generation of marine engineers, as well as the future, if this valuable steam training complex could not be retained and preserved. It was strongly felt that its retention in the form of a museum could achieve the following:

(a) Serve as a vital link between the marine engineers of the past and of the future.

(b) Serve as a living monument to the state of art in marine engineering then prevalent. This, in turn, would help to trace the historical development of marine engineering with respect to design, material, and manufacture at any point of time.

(c) Serve as a tribute to the vision of the policymakers of the Royal Navy, who installed ship-borne machinery ashore for live and realistic training and at a height of 2,200ft above MSL.

(d) Finally, serve as a token of gratitude on behalf of many of our past engineers who have passed out through the portals of the SDR and personally that of the author.

The Plan and its implementation

Considering all the above factors, a case was drawn up to convert the old SDR into a naval engineering museum. It did not take long to convince the higher authorities, and a quick go-ahead was given. Accordingly, a plan was drawn up for its implementation and the commissioning of the museum. The project team was constituted with Commander

Sarwate in charge, assisted by Lieutenant Commander Rehman and a few members (both military and civilian) of the factory staff. The team was charged with converting an abandoned building, with machinery lying therein ready for disposal, into an almost live steam complex with everything shipshape (brasswork shining, pipes painted/distempered etc.) in the shortest possible time and with the available resources. The project team was thoroughly motivated with this challenging task because they too felt the need to retain and preserve these vintage machines. The team worked like a well-oiled machine and with incredible speed. It was amazing to witness the sudden transformation that took place in the old junk yard. The net result was the creation and birth of a naval engineering museum – the first of its kind in India, perhaps the only one east of Suez.

The project team went to such efforts that even the main turbine propulsion unit could be easily turned by the hand turning gear as before – everything being opened up, eased, greased and lubricated. The project was a runaway success. The old SDR was finally commissioned by Vice Admiral A. K. R. P. Sawhney on 23 January 1990. This indeed was a big landmark in the history of INS *Shivaji*.

Important vintage machinery

Some of the vintage machines are listed at Table 1, along with their salient features:

Serial No	*Name of equipment*	*Source from where removed*	*Year of manufacture*
1	Admiralty 3 drum main boilers with auxiliaries (Port)	HMIS *Baluchistan*	1935
2	Admiralty 3 drum main boilers with auxiliaries (Stbd)	HMIS *Punjab*	1935
3	Triple expansion reciprocating main engine with auxiliaries	HMS *Bethrust*	1938
4	HP and LP main turbines along with gearing and output shaft	HMS *Protector*	1938
5	Steam steering gear	HMS *Bethrust*	1938
6	Steam turbo generator	HMS *Protector*	1940
7	Steam dynamo	HMS *Bethrust*	1941
8	Distilling plant (Caird & Rayner)	HMS *Bethrust*	1942
9	Spare HP turbine rotor	HMS *Protector*	1938

Table 1

Besides the above, there are about 80 other items in the museum, such as:

- Fan engines
- Drain coolers
- Main circulating pumps
- Air pumps.

The salient features of some of the items are:

Main boilers

The main boilers, with the associated ancillaries, were originally fitted on board HMIS *Baluchistan* and *Punjab* Class frigates of the Royal Indian Navy:

Type:	Admiralty 3 drum tube boilers with open front
Make:	MIS Yarrow D, Glasgow
Year received:	1946
Working Pressure:	280 psi
Type of Steam:	Saturated
Air Registers:	Open front, 1943 type Registers

Main reciprocating engine

This main engine, along with its auxiliaries, was originally fitted on board HMS *Bethrustan* frigate of the Royal Indian Navy:

Type:	Triple expansion reciprocating HP, IP and LP engines
Make:	MIS Sergeant & Co Pvt Ltd, Queensland
Year received:	1946
Working Pressure:	250 psi
Horse Power:	2500 HP
No. of Cylinders:	3
Reversing Arrangement:	Stephenson link motion
Condenser:	Regenerative, single flow
Circulating Pump:	Reciprocating Centrifugal

HP and LP main turbines

This turbine installation with complete accessories was fitted on board HMS *Protector*:

Type:	Reaction type
Make:	MIS Yarrow & Co, Glasgow
Year received:	1946
Working Pressure:	280 psi (saturated)
Horse Power:	2500 HP
Condenser:	Regenerative, two flow type
FL Pump:	Reciprocating
Extraction Pump:	Reciprocating

Reciprocating steam-driven hydraulic steering gear

Fitted on board HMS *Bethrust*:

Type:	Reciprocating steam engine driven-hydraulic
Make:	MIS Yarrow & Co, Glasgow
Year received:	1946
Steam Pressure:	50 psi
No. of Cylinders:	Two
Hydraulic Rams:	Two

Distilling plant complete with accessories:

Originally fitted in HMS *Bethrust*:

Type:	Single Cell

Make:	MIS MS Caird and Rayner Ltd, London
Year received:	1946
Working Pressure:	60 psi (LP saturated)
Type of Pumps:	Combined Reciprocating type
Element:	Copper Coil.

Conclusion

It is felt that the list of vintage machinery could have been increased and value enhanced if some of the equipments of old ships like INS *Mysore*, or the *Hunt* Class destroyers could have been retrieved.

The museum would have never seen the light of day had it not been for the deep sense of gratitude that the author had for his *alma mater*. This SDR building too could have met with a similar fate as other old buildings that were to be demolished in the wake of the new project expansion programme.

Finally, it is said that old attachments, rather like old sentiments, die hard and when they do die it is a painful separation. Luckily, as far as the SDR is concerned we have been spared this, so that the marine engineers can now proudly say:

'Not only for the present, but for a lifetime.'

COMMODORE M. K. BANGER
INDIAN NAVY (RETD)

Duck Wars in the South Atlantic

AS one disadvantaged by myopia and an inability to comprehend advanced mathematics and physics, I was destined to spend 30 years as a member of the Supply and Secretariat Branch. Although preferable to pandering to the egotistical whims of certain senior officers in the Secretariat role, Supply matters in their purest form can be exceedingly dull; even under the new 'sexed-up' mantle of Logistics, little will have changed. That said, it does have its lighter moments. . .

In 1982, I was Pusser of a *Leander* class frigate nearing completion of refit and destined for service in the South Atlantic. By the time we were ready to deploy, the Falkland Islands had been liberated and the war was effectively over, but a good deal of uncertainty remained as to the level of support we could expect to receive once in theatre. Our task group comprised two Type 42 destroyers, another *Leander* and a RFA tanker. One of the other pussers had recently returned from a stint with the main task force and, consequently, had adopted the image of self-acclaimed 'war hero'. He was thereby able to steal the show at the pre-deployment meeting and we deferred to his suggestion to store some morale-boosting 'goodies' in the tanker. From memory these included: extra fresh vegetables, breakfast cereals, crisps, prawns and frozen duck – each ship's share of the latter being about 1,500 lbs. To this day, I can only think that an extra '0' had been added to the order in error!

My ship was stored for war with extra dry provisions stowed in just about any compartment that had space to spare. This not only ensured that the ship's company wouldn't starve but also served to make the stokers' pot-mess some of the finest and most varied in the Fleet! Imagine our chagrin when, two days into the deployment, the RFA decided that its fridges could no longer cope and wished to transfer all the extra 'goodies' to the four warships in company. Despite lack of stowage space, this was duly completed by VERTREP, but we subsequently discovered a large quantity was missing – especially crisps and prawns. This perhaps explains why the RFA were so keen to terminate the arrangement early but, sadly, the light-fingered members of the tanker's crew were less fond of duck. The missing prawns became the subject of an exchange of signals entitled 'the green prawn yawn', but that is another story.

Now, Pusser's frozen duck is not a tender beast and even the Wardroom rebelled after a spell of wrestling with duck à l'orange, duck with cherries, duck surprise, etc, etc. The ship's company were less impressed. The PO Caterer then had a brainwave – 'We'll call it chicken, sir!' – and a quantity was disguised as such in various dishes before his ruse was rumbled. The next brainwave came from the Flight Commander who managed to exchange some frozen duck for fresh milk, cream and eggs ashore in West Falkland. I'm sure the Falkland Islanders found duck a pleasant change from the ubiquitous Upland Goose that normally graced their tables and we enjoyed their produce in return. Despite these efforts and some 4-5 months later, we still had about 1,000 lbs of duck left onboard.

Prior to arrival of the relief task group, each ship was 'buddied up' with another in the next group and invited to prepare a list of operational stores needed in theatre but still in short supply back in UK. The final signal made to our 'buddy' was a lengthy one and, somewhere between Chaff dispenser and GPMG mounts, we inserted 1,000 lbs of frozen duck. Clearly equally bored by the detail of stores signals, my oppo in our 'buddy' ship agreed to take the lot. Recovering from the initial surprise of receiving black bin-liners full of frozen duck amongst materiels of war deposited on her flight deck, our 'buddy'

experienced similar difficulty persuading an equally sceptical ship's company to eat the stuff – and we experienced difficulty getting the S549 (stores receipt form) signed. I understand some 800 lbs or so was eventually returned to the victualling yard in Devonport and, for all l know, it is still doing the rounds of the Fleet!

A. MALLARD

Change for Change's Sake – A Process Ruined

THE article by Commander Betteridge (*NR* Feb '05), *The Admiralty Interview Board – The Future?*, discussed how the study was being conducted into the future of the AIB, the removal of the head teachers, and details of other changes being made. I support his article wholeheartedly. My article concentrates on what has replaced the extremely good system that has stood the test of time in an evolutionary way for over 100 years.

My credentials for writing this article are that I served in the AIB for a total of four years between 1997 and 2003, during which time I boarded in the region of 1,500 candidates. Since I have left the service I have periodically been asked to assist in boarding and did 29 Boards between May '03 and Dec '04 . I undertook the three-day training package for the new AIB process and have done six Boards in January and February. I have little confidence in the new process, and will be taking no further part.

I have been unable to establish the rationale behind the change. What was previously in place examined the 'whole' person, was cost-effective, impeccably fair, thorough, auditable, and without doubt provided the Royal Navy and Royal Marines with the best of the candidates with whom the AIB was presented by DNR. All Board members had total confidence in the process, which was substantiated by DERA, latterly Qinetiq, during routine scrutinies.

The new process, based on 'competencies' and a 'behaviour-based interview' claims to be objective rather than subjective. The process comprises a detailed framework of competencies for each event undertaken by the candidates. Board members *have to* consider a mark in every competency dependent upon 'evidence-based' positive or negative behaviours by the candidate. This means that Board members are considering marks for *each* candidate in 16 boxes for the gym exercise (previously 4), 12 boxes for the discussion exercise (previously four), nine for the essay (previously one), and 23 for the interview (previously four). The result of this is, for example, that Board members are expected to consider marks in 48 boxes during the discussion exercise which lasts 45 minutes. In reality, there is no more objectivity in the new process than there ever was, and despite the aspiration and great efforts to remove all subjectivity, this is not possible; more importantly, it is a seriously flawed aspiration in a system that is designed to assess people and their potential. In the autumn of 2000, I was tasked to write a detailed paper whilst serving in DNM on *An Understanding of Competencies and their application in the Naval Service*. Within this paper was discussed the officer recruitment and selection process in which it stated of the AIB, that 'the current system of assessment follows best practice'. Below are three quotes from within the paper.

From: *Defining Managerial Skills and Competences* – Hirsh and Stebler:

'The central purpose of competences is to make various forms of assessment less subjective. However there are two basic problems with trying to use competence frameworks as a totally mechanistic approach to assessment.

First, we are assuming that the assessors can rate competences as distinct from rating overall performance of the individual in a set of tasks or activities. However, research indicates that assessors even in the most structured assessment environment – the assessment centre – appear to assess performance at a task rather than performance of a particular attribute. So, assessors briefed to look for several attributes in each exercise or task in an assessment centre actually score the candidates on their overall performance at that particular exercise or task.

Second, the breaking down of activities into skills or personal attributes also leads to problems in adding them up again to reach an overall rating – do you want two measures of judgment for every one of communication? There is at present no simple way of defining such a recipe for management with weights for different attributes.'

A quote from Mr Peter Riley of the Institute of Employment Studies: 'Competencies can give an illusion of objectivity.'

A quote from *People Management 6 July 2000 – History Repeating* – Karen Moloney:

'As far as we know, God didn't carry out behavioural event interviews with Moses and other leaders of the ancient Israelites. He knew what he wanted, and so articulated the first competency framework in the form that some people may argue needs updating, but one that is still clear and inspiring today'.

The AIB has been assessing four attributes of candidates (competencies in all but name) for a very long time, and these were Effective Intellect, Leadership Potential, Character and Personality and Motivation. The Royal Navy knew what it wanted in the assessment of officers, the system was still clear and inspiring, and above all it worked well.

The new process assesses Effective Intellect, Leadership Potential, Courage and Values, Powers of Communication, and Motivation, but the process is now so prescriptive and inflexible as to lose sight of what is trying to be achieved.

We often say, and quite rightly, that we are inviting young people to join a family when joining the armed services. Who in their right mind would ask someone to join a family as an officer without knowing where his/her home is, what schools and university were attended, what grades were achieved at GCSE and A level, what degree studied and qualifications achieved, and what his/her hobbies and interests are? These are all details which Board members knew previously but are now excluded. This is information that paints a picture of someone – it is not information on which a pass or fail is based. Furthermore, one has to ask oneself, who would want to join a family without it appearing to take an interest in you?

Candidates have to write an essay as before, but, whereas in the past, very appropriately, the head teacher marked the essay, now all Board members do so. There are eight boxes, headed spelling, vocabulary, sentences, punctuation etc, allocated .5 of a mark, and one box (maturity) allocated one mark. Board members have to allocate either the full mark or zero in each box. Because all things come in shades, the only sensible way of marking the essay is to read it and give it an overall mark. *But this is not an objective process.* Why have a process that is not sensible or practised in reality by the Board members?

Previously, candidates sat a general awareness/current affairs test. This has now been removed, along with the Board President asking any questions on general awareness and current affairs; instead the Board President concentrates on leadership only, a subject previously very adequately explored by the Commander/Lieut. Col R.M. on the Board. The head teacher previously asked questions on academic matters relevant to the candidate and also sought to probe any interests in reading, culture and other pastimes that the candidate might have. The head teacher's and Board President's interviews enabled the Board to get a grasp of the breadth and substance of the candidate.

With the new process, the Personnel Selection Officer (PSO) has taken the place of the head teacher on the main board interview and asks questions on what is called 'courage and values'. This is a term I still do not understand in relation to the assessment of 17 to 25-year-olds, but perhaps more importantly it is a term I feel convinced the candidates

themselves do not understand. A typical first question a candidate is now asked is, 'When did you last meet someone from a different culture?', followed by, 'And how did you feel about it?' Such a question is a non-question to most 17 to 25-year-olds whose response is that it is not an issue to them. Asking such a question in these terms is indicative that culture is an issue in the Royal Navy. Another question is, 'Give me an example of a time when you have had a setback and persevered', followed by, 'And how did you feel about that?' Some may reply, failing an exam at school, others may say climbing a mountain. The mark that the Board members apportion to the answer is meant to be objective, but how can it be anything other than subjective since the answer is based on different people's experiences; to suggest otherwise lacks realism. A further question is, 'Can you describe a risky situation that you have been in?' followed by, 'And how did you feel about that?' How many l8 to 20-year-olds have been in what might be described as a significant risky situation? Such questions, asked in this stilted manner, reveal little and frequently receive trite and shallow answers. For in-service candidates these questions are most inappropriate, and the time could be better spent finding out what makes the person 'tick'. Many of the questions now asked in the interview relate to those that the candidate has already answered in detail on a form which he/she received at home. This enables the candidates to have well prepared and manufactured answers, whereas previously a more comprehensive form was completed at the AIB. Asking questions relating directly to the form now seriously reduces the relevance of the interview and enables candidates to prepare and practise their answers. I can say that I gleaned virtually nothing of substance about any of the candidates from any of the PSO's interviews that I witnessed during the six Boards that I have done. I endorse the comments made in the previous article about the abolition of the old PSO's interview and the loss of the summary exercise.

The consequences

What has resulted in this new process is no assessment of a candidates 'character and personality', an aspect that received one quarter of the overall marks in the past and was based on a candidate's style and presence, drive and energy, interests (cultural, sporting and other), general awareness and his/her compatibility with officers, ratings and other ranks. This bears no relation to the new Courage and Values element of the new process.

The Boards that I have done under the new regime have failed a number of candidates who would hitherto have passed, and has passed candidates who would have failed. The process allows for no overview or discussion of a candidate's performance, and indeed there is no final consideration prior to the pass/fail decision being made – it is merely the addition of numbers in boxes. One is allowed to change a mark previously given at this stage in the light of other events, but this too seems quite wrong since the mark given earlier in, for example, the gym exercise should not be being changed at this stage. It is now well understood by Board members that if a candidate performs poorly during either the gym or discussion, due to the weighting given to marks, he/she is very likely to fail the Board. This was most certainly not necessarily the case before.

The new marking and assessment process is shallow and fundamentally flawed. The premise that you can select our future Royal Naval/Royal Marines officers on a wholly objective, competence-based system is totally inappropriate. By definition, an objective process is unable to recognise candidates with *potential* who may be young, but who have not necessarily performed very well in all tasks. (The assessment of potential is largely, if not completely, a subjective judgment.) With a purely objective process, such

as it is now meant to be, Board members could reasonably be reduced to Lieutenants, since subjective judgments are deemed to be inappropriate, yet, for example, the Boards are meant to be objectively assessing leadership '*potential*'!

The previous AIB process required officers of suitable rank and experience with sound judgment and an ability to probe into the 'whole person' so that we could select the very best rounded men and women of depth and substance to lead our people. It enabled Board members to select candidates with 'potential', and this it succeeded in doing extremely well. This is the process that has been abandoned and one that the head teachers complemented so well with their experience and wisdom.

One of the great strengths of the old process was that it had stood the test of time. However, over the past two years nearly every time I went to board something else had changed. More often than not this was to do with the gym tasks, which had been developed over many years. All of them have now been changed: the gym rules made over-complicated resulting in frequent and disruptive interruptions by the senior rates, the removal of some excellent evolutions, which had stood the test of time, and, extraordinarily, the incorporation of what can only be considered dangerous tasks. All this has been done with the intent to make tasks more equable. A worthy aspiration, but with only limited knowledge one would know this is not possible, and as before there will always be tasks that are less easy than others. The result is the loss of some fine gym tasks – change for change's sake.

The verdict

To study periodically what one is doing and to make improvements is wholly sensible. However, it lacks professionalism and common sense to conduct a study with a disturbing level of secrecy and then make a radical change to the process:

– without there being a sound reason for change;

– without consultation with those people who best understand the current system (not through lack of trying by long-standing members of the AIB);

– without accepting any advice offered by nearly all of the Board Presidents during 2003-04, many of whom had far greater experience than those making the decisions;

– without trialling the new system;

– without retaining, where possible, those staff who knew the old process, so as to ensure a smooth and professional analysis of the new process.

Implementing the change has meant the dismissal of around 60 head teachers, many of whom had been very long-standing members of the AIB. Despite advice offered from a number of quarters on appropriate ways to say farewell to the head teachers, the stonewall effect persisted; the *manner* in which these highly supportive pillars of society were discarded has been none other than embarrassing, discourteous and a sorry episode for the Royal Navy. The result has alienated around 60 fine advocates of the Service, living all round the United Kingdom.

The AIB used to be a process in which all Board members had total confidence. I fear this is not now the case. It is now a process that has been 'dumbed down' and can now best be described as a politically correct system, lacking in any depth and substance. It fails to get to the heart of a person and candidates are now seen as a series of numbers in boxes within a mechanistic process, allowing for no flexibility.

This *is* Change for Change's Sake and a process ruined.

LIEUT. COL. STEPHEN BUSH, OBE RM

Dreadnought and her People

The 'Abyssinian hoax'

ON 18 February 1910, Admiral Sir William May, Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet in his flagship, *Dreadnought*, received a telegram, ostensibly from Sir Charles Hardinge, the permanent secretary of the Foreign Office, stating that the Emperor of Abyssinia and three princes with their suite would visit the ship that afternoon at 1700 and apologising for the short notice.

The captain of *Dreadnought* was Herbert Richmond and the gunnery lieutenant was Kenneth Dewar. The Flag Lieutenant, the Hon. Peter Willoughby, was sent hot-foot to Weymouth Station to greet the royal entourage. *Dreadnought* was at Portland. Inside the station a red carpet had been laid down and there was a barrier in position to keep sightseers at a proper distance. Meanwhile, on board, a large marine guard and band had been paraded and some of the officers, detailed to receive the Royal party, were in frock coats with swords.

On boarding, the Emperor and the princes inspected the guard of honour, who were red and blue Royal Marines, and Sir William May mentioned the distinction to the interpreter who replied, 'I am afraid it will be rather hard to put that into Abyssinian, Sir, but I will try'. The interpreter who was Adrian Stephen, Virginia Woolf's brother, had had a classical education and spoke to the three princes in a mixture of Homer and Virgil with a smidgen of Swahili which seemed to suffice! In fact the Emperor, by name Anthony Buxton, replied parrot fashion in the same manner. Mercifully, the one man in the Fleet who could speak Abyssinian was on leave.

The interpreter, Adrian Stephen, was 6ft 5in tall and known to Captain Richmond and Captain Gough-Calthorpe, the Chief of Staff. But by dint of a beard and altering the register of his voice neither of them recognised him.

Captain Richmond gave them a tour of the ship and in the Wardroom they were offered food and drink, of which Horace de Vere Cole as Mr Cholmondeley of the Foreign Office imbibed generously. The visitors refused because of the effect this might have on their make-up! The ubiquitous interpreter averred that the religious beliefs of Abyssinia made it impossible for the Royal Family to touch food unless it was prepared in quite special ways. There was a nasty moment when the moustache of one of the princes began to peel off, but the interpreter managed to dab hastily at his upper lip.

Before leaving, they refused a gun salute, and in the picket boat returning they heard from the Midshipman that the bandmaster had been unable to get a copy of the Abyssinian national anthem but had played, as the next best thing, the anthem of Zanzibar. When they reached shore, Horace de Vere Cole, who had organised the hoax, tried to pin a decoration on the Midshipman's chest, but he refused to accept it without permission from his superiors. They kept up the pretence in the train back to London, insisting that the waiters in the buffet wore white gloves.

When the hoax became widely known, through the *Daily Mirror*, the words *'Bunga Bunga'* (words used by the entourage to express appreciation) became public catchwords and were introduced as tags into music hall songs and so forth. Unfortunately, Admiral Sir William May was not best pleased as he could not go on shore without having them shouted after him in the streets. Captain Richmond treated the matter in the best of good humour, as did Kenneth Dewar. Here is the dramatis personae who can now be identified as *Dreadnought*'s people: Emperor of Abyssinia – Anthony Buxton; Princes – Virginia Stephen (later Woolf), Guy Ridley and Duncan Grant; Interpreter – Adrian Stephen;

Organiser – Horace de Vere Cole, who also played Herbert Cholmondeley of the Foreign Office.

Kenneth Dewar, who was the gunnery lieutenant, had the advice of W. W. Fisher. He was the Flag Commander on Sir William May's staff, and was on board during the hoax. He was responsible for gunnery matters in the Fleet. Owing to the immense increase in gunnery activity in 1910 it had become impossible for the gunnery lieutenant of the flagship to deal with all the paperwork, returns and firing programmes and a commander, experienced in gunnery matters, was now appointed to the staff of Commanders-in-Chief with the title of Flag Commander.

This was an important period in Fisher's career because of his association with Sir William May in the study and solution of tactical problems. Fisher's original mind was of great assistance to Sir William May, whilst he was carrying out an exhaustive series of deployments, under all conditions of weather, to enable all ships to bring their broadsides to bear on the enemy. Sir William May was very grateful to Fisher and wrote, 'A most able and capable officer in every way, Commander Fisher's knowledge of Naval Tactics and gunnery is quite exceptional'. Fisher became an Admiral and died in 1937 aged 62. When C-in-C Mediterranean his nickname was *The Great Agrippa* after the Roman Emperor of that name. Ironically as C-in-C Mediterranean, in 1935, he had to deal with the Abyssinian crisis.

The Genesis of *Dreadnought*

While in the Mediterranean as C-in-C in 1902, Sir John Fisher had been collecting ideas for building a new class of warship. When he became C-in-C Portsmouth in 1903, he continued to study the question and gathered around him some of the first of *Dreadnought*'s people, namely W. H. Gard, the Chief Constructor of the Dockyard, Alexander Gracie of the Fairfield Ship Building Company, and a particular naval officer by the name of Reginald Bacon who was a gifted torpedo officer. In January 1903, Fisher had appointed Bacon to the newly created post of Inspecting Captain of Submarine Boats, with a free hand to experiment, develop and organise the Submarine Service. In June 1906, Bacon was appointed the first commanding officer of *Dreadnought* and was responsible for her acceptance trials. He had, as experimental gunnery officer, the very clever gunnery officer F. C. Dreyer, who later became Jellicoe's Flag Captain. One of the troubles he discovered with *Dreadnought* was that there was a fault in the rudder because it was overbalanced. This meant that the steering engine was not powerful enough to right the helm and bring the rudder amidships. He saw that it would be bad for prestige to announce this and kept it hidden until the end of the acceptance trials when the matter could be dealt with. He left *Dreadnought* in the early autumn of 1906 and became Director of Naval Ordnance. He left the Navy in 1909 and became Managing Director of the Coventry Ordnance Works and returned in 1915 to become Flag Officer Dover. He became an Admiral on the retired list.

The later commissions

The second captain of *Dreadnought* was another torpedo officer, Charles Madden, who was Jellicoe's brother-in-law. He was later Chief of the Staff to Jellicoe from 1914 to 1916. He was another member of the Committee which Fisher gathered round him to study the question of building a new class of warship. Apart from those referred to, there were also Rear Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, Engineer Rear Admiral Sir John Durston Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet, Rear Admiral Alfred Winsloe, Captain Henry Jackson, Captain John Jellicoe, Sir Philip Watts, Director of Naval Construction, Lord

Kelvin, Professor Biles, Sir John Thorneycroft and Mr R. E. Froude of the experimental tank at Haslar. Charles Madden became an Admiral of the Fleet and First Sea Lord. His brother-in-law, Admiral Jellicoe, in his Battle of Jutland Despatch wrote, 'I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant work of my Chief-of-the-Staff, Vice Admiral Sir Charles Madden KCB, CVO. Throughout a period of twenty-one (*sic*) months of war his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his long experience in fleets, his special gift for organisation, and his capacity for unlimited work have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet action and during and after the action, he was always at hand to assist, and his judgment was never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.'

Wilmot Nicholson was appointed Commanding Officer in 1912. He later survived the sinking of the cruiser *Hogue* in 1914 and commanded a destroyer flotilla in the light cruiser *Aurora*, with Commodore Tyrwhitt in the Harwich Force. He was an old friend of the Commodore and became an Admiral in 1925.

Dreadnought at war

The need for a Naval War Staff had been clear for many years and it was introduced in 1912. However, prior to this, five years earlier, the Gunnery Lieutenant Roger Backhouse was appointed to *Dreadnought*, succeeding Dreyer. Later in 1914 Bertram Ramsay was also appointed to *Dreadnought* having completed the second course ever held for Naval Staff Officers. Twenty years later Ramsay found himself Chief of Staff to Backhouse, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet. It was a disastrous appointment. Backhouse was a workaholic and a one-man band, hopeless at delegating. Ramsay chafed at being sidelined and in December 1935 he asked to resign, describing himself as a 'mere cipher'. He was placed on the retired list in October 1938 and promoted Vice Admiral on the retired list on 12 January 1939. Nevertheless, Admiral Backhouse nominated Ramsay as Flag Officer Dover, 24 years after Bacon, from which sprang Ramsay's enduring commands in connection with the Dunkirk operation and D-Day. It must be said that not everyone had the view of Backhouse that Ramsay had. Cunningham had a different view: 'Backhouse had great personal charm, outstanding ability and was a prodigious worker . . . he really had little use for a Staff and preferred to do everything, even to the smallest details, himself . . . a fine man with whom to work.' Ramsay was re-instated on the Active List as Admiral and was killed in an air crash in January 1945.

On St Patrick's Day in March 1915, *Dreadnought* sank U29 off Cromarty Firth. Let Midshipman P. E. Maitland describe the incident.

> 'At about 12.30 the Officer of the Watch, Lieut. Cdr Basil Piercy sighted a periscope on the port bow about 1,200 yards away. We altered course towards her and closed watertight doors. She zigzagged ahead from one bow to another (*sic*). At about 600 yards, the periscope could be seen through the gun sights and one twelve pounder was fired which missed by about 50 yards . . . finally as she was crossing from port to starboard, we hit her just abaft the periscope, there were no survivors.'

This boat was Commanded by Otto von Weddingen who had been responsible for sinking *Cressy*, *Hogue* and *Aboukir*. Basil Piercy was born for physical training duties, immortalised by Bartimeus as India Rubber Men.

Engineering matters

As the first big ship to be driven by Parsons Turbines, it is fitting if we now turn our

attention to the two Engineer Commanders who served in her from 1905 until 1911, Onyon and Gaudin. The introduction of turbines was regarded with a good deal of apprehension in certain quarters. There were four shafts. The wing shafts had one high pressure ahead and one high pressure astern turbine. The amidships' ones were fitted with three turbines each – one low pressure ahead, one low pressure astern and one for going astern. Each turbine had 39,600 blades. Compared to the monstrous racket of earlier reciprocal engines, the engine rooms of *Dreadnought*, were as quiet, *and as dry*, as a cathedral. Her shaft horsepower was 23,000 and designed speed 21 knots. William Onyon was appointed, on building, in July 1905, three months before her keel was laid on 2 October 1905. He subsequently received a commendation from their Lordships who expressed their appreciation of his services in connection with the construction and management of the machinery of the *Dreadnought* and he was specially promoted to Engineer Captain on 29 June 1911. He retired at his own request in 1913 on taking up an appointment with Messrs William Beardmore & Co Ltd at their naval construction works at Dalmuir, Scotland. Edouard Gaudin succeeded Onyon in December 1908, and he was a French interpreter, not surprisingly as he was a Breton. He served in her until March 1911 and was promoted to Engineer Captain in May 1911. He became an Engineer Rear Admiral in 1914 and then Assistant Engineer-in-Chief of the Navy.

A happy ship

Dreadnought was a happy ship and, for most officers, a springboard to promotion, but 'on the whole she was a very uncomfortable ship'. Who said that? None other than the naval author, Lionel Dawson, who joined the ship in 1913 when Wilmot Nicholson was in command. The mess decks were small and cramped, and, being aft, most inconvenient for the internal economy of the ship. She was the first battleship in which the greater part of the officers' quarters were forward. It was by no means an unqualified advantage. Cabins were small and distributed all over the ship. Lionel Dawson again: 'My first cabin was in one of the mess decks aft, and a horrible place it was to live in. From it one had to walk half the length of the ship to the officers' bathroom. My second cabin was forward, all mixed up with the chain cables and a diesel generator which made it very uncomfortable when it was running'. Here is another quote which indicates a happy ship just prior to World War I. 'I remember once the Commander (Edward Inman) complaining to his Mate-of-the-upper-Deck that he could get no work done in the ship that afternoon as the Chief Boatswain's Mate is following the Captain about to measure him for his kit for the damned fancy dress dance ashore this evening, while all the carpenters are making dummy swords and pistols for the pirates who are to go with him! This was at Berehaven and the dance was at Bantry in County Cork. They entered the ballroom en masse to the tune of the pirates' song from Peter Pan:

Avast! Belay! Yo, ho! We say
From Bantry Bay we've come
And if we *Dreadnought* all is well –
We're out to have some fun.'

When war began, *Dreadnought* sailed for Scapa Flow as flagship of Vice Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, of the Fourth Battle Squadron in the Grand Fleet. She left the Grand Fleet before the battle of Jutland and became the flagship of a force of battleships based upon Sheerness and was decommissioned in 1920.

Dreadnought was not just the name of a ship, it became the universal name of a type of battleship, and her people were pioneers of that class of ships which became known as The Grand Fleet and fought at Jutland and, finally, in the Second World War.

PATRICK TAILYOUR

And Finally, That Reminds Me About . . . An Important Bicentennial

THE slew of new publications about Trafalgar, Nelson and the glory days of our sailing heritage, which appeared in the Book Reviews section of the last edition of *NR*, has reminded me that 2005 marks an exceptionally important bicentennial in the history of seafaring. Yes, it is exactly 200 years since Captain Francis Beaufort devised, with extraordinary insight and clarity of thought, his eponymous scale of wind strength. Of course, it took the Admiralty another 33 years formally to adopt it, but since then it has been remarkably enduring: despite all our modem advances, this basic numerical scale together with its associated list of sea-state criteria continues to provide us with a simple, practical way to describe wind strength.

It was realised early on that when the sea state was unhelpful, there were other useful criteria that could be used to determine the wind strength number. The earliest method was based upon the amount of sail a frigate could safely carry when sailing full and by; this technique gradually waned in utility until, probably by the 1920s, it had fallen into disuse. When I joined the Navy in the last third of the 20th century the 'coastal criteria' column in the front of the ship's log informed us that if we happened to see a fishing smack double reefing its gaff mainsail, we could be sure we were encountering a Force 6. Since I never actually saw a gaff-rigged fishing smack, I always imagined that they must all have obeyed the criterion for a Force 8 gale, 'fishing smacks return to harbour', an order that has apparently never been rescinded. Perhaps this is confirmation that, despite the best efforts of both the Admiralty and the admirable Admiral Beaufort, we have yet to devise lasting criteria for every occasion. This was certainly apparent when I was the navigator of a *Ton* class minehunter in the early Seventies.

Our group was operating in the Suez Canal where the routine was boring and arduous: we were at hunting stations for 12 hours a day with two days stand-off during a 10-day cycle. After some weeks, the ships and the ships' companies were looking a little ragged around the edges. Our First Lieutenant, with estimable imagination, decided that he would address both problems at one stroke by arranging some useful recreation for the ship's company. Thus, what started out as a fine desert morning, found relays of sailors on paint stages happily painting both the ship's side and themselves a rather fetching shade of grey. This event, together with a change in the weather, gave me pause for thought and I set about constructing a table of 'desert criteria' for future editions of the ship's log. I have, even now, failed to fill in *all* the blanks but I can give several criteria that future desert navigators might find useful. Force 7 would state, 'Minehunting operations become untenable' and Force 8 would be, 'Visibility reduces to zero in sandstorm'. At the other end of the scale, Forces 0 to 2 involve the Egyptian army in various stages of prostration. The criterion which I can fill in with the greatest confidence is, however, Force 5, which should read, 'Ships' sides of freshly painted minehunters turn yellow and become "non-slip"'.

DITTO

Correspondence

SHOWCASING THE RN

Sir,–Rob Hoole (*NR* Letters Nov '04) asks where the ignominious sinking of the TV series *Making Waves* leaves us in the RN, but goes a good way toward providing the answer – 'A Good Deal Better Off'. He spells out what some people thought before it was even broadcast, and a good many realised subsequently – despite the effort put into it by the RN the series had 'rubbish' written all over it from the start, and was only ever going to be an embarrassment to the service.

Whether a TV drama centred upon contemporary naval life could ever be 'a valuable opportunity to showcase the Royal Navy' is a moot point. 'Showcase', to my mind, implies an institution wanting to be seen at its best – or certainly in a good light – yet the definition offered of 'drama' is of *dynamic* interchange and action between *fictional* personae in (structured) *fictional* situations. When ' dynamic' means conflict and/or sex, and 'fictional' means the setting is sufficiently far-removed from most viewers' experience that the scriptwriters will make up whatever implausible nonsense they think they can get away with, then one is well on the way to *Making Waves* – but could things have been different? Only, I suspect, if the programme-makers had been a good deal more sympathetic to the RN, and/or the RN had been able to wield a good deal more clout – and even then there is the problem that everyday life in today's RN isn't really that *dramatic*. Certainly not when one has taken out all the aspects we might like publicised but the politicians wouldn't; and all those the TV types might think 'sexy' (literally or figuratively) but which the RN wouldn't want emphasised. Which is actually true of most occupations, stand fast the Emergency Services – hence the enduring popularity of police and hospital dramas.

In the current situation I think the RN would be wasting its time and resources supporting another TV contemporary naval drama series, even if anyone were prepared to take the risk in the near future, on the grounds that our desire to 'showcase' and the programme-makers' wish to 'dramatise' are unlikely to be compatible. One-off dramas perhaps, provided *we* think the script is good enough; but my own preference insofar as TV/cinema 'showcasing' is concerned would be to offer opportunities for the making of short, inexpensive, unsensational documentaries about the life and work of the RN – maybe even just the two to four minutes of the average medium/long TV news report. Maybe even – Shock! Horror! – be prepared to commission/make/sell our own.

My real purpose in writing this letter, however, is to point to an alternative (one of many) to TV/cinema when it comes to 'showcasing' the RN – exploitation of RN museums and 'heritage'.

As an MSc project I am currently comparing single-service policies and practices concerning museums, taking as examples the Communications and Radar Museum at HMS *Collingood* and Army museums of similar size (the Military Intelligence Museum, at Chicksands) and theme (the Royal Signals Museum, at Blandford). I had expected to find differences between the RN and Army, but was surprised how pronounced they are.

In the UK there are, in addition to the National Army Museum, some 120 museums of regiments and corps of the British Army, of which about half are MoD(A)-funded in their operations (generally speaking those of current 'Regular' formations), while of the remainder a significant proportion (often those of TA/Reserve units) receive no 'operations' funding but are sited on MoD estate. Even those which receive no MoD(A) support are likely to receive some form of assistance from the appropriate Regimental/Corps Association, the National Army Museum and/or the Army Museums Ogilby Trust. These museums are spread throughout the land, as one would expect, and MoD(A) considers them to be of significant importance in projecting a positive image of the Army to visitors, be they British or foreign,

researchers, retired military, school parties, special interest groups, families out for the afternoon and/or sheltering from the rain etc etc.

By contrast MoD(N) supports just four 'naval' museums (including the Royal Marines Museum, which in many respects is more soldierly than naval). Three of them are within five miles of Portsmouth city centre, and none really succeeds (in my view) in conveying to visitors the purpose and achievements of the majority element of the RN (i.e. the surface fleet) in the 20th century and currently. But they are at least *supported*. Readers may remember a letter in the October 2002 *NR* to the effect that the *Collingwood* Museum and Archive was to be put in a lay-apart store – in fact it remains open, but without 'official' funding, and with its long-term future by no means clear. And this is a collection of great potential importance, capable of being developed to illustrate how, in the 50 years after 1899, the development of Wireless Communications, Tactical Plotting and Radar (together with associated developments, e.g. Communications Intelligence) facilitated a genuine transformation in the nature of maritime warfare. Considering that for all but the last few of those 50 years the RN was the world leader in such developments, I can't help thinking that we should be making more of that collection – certainly my study shows that the British Army gives more support to collections which in many ways are of less importance.

What is to be made of this letter? We may or may not be better off without *Making Waves*, but I don't regret its passing for one moment. More importantly, that debacle might prompt serious thought as to whether we ever go for such tawdry bait again when a possible alternative is to exercise more control over the image of the RN presented to the viewing public. And last, but not least, we should consider whether the RN is *fighting* 'sea blindness' or *causing* it. We should look at how the other two Services promote their public image – policy and practice concerning museums and 'heritage' being just one example of how the RN is disadvantaging itself – and take active measures to 'showcase' the real Navy.

MARK BRADY
LIEUT. CDR, RN

THE ADMIRALTY INTERVIEW BOARD

Sir,–Commander Betteridge's article in the February *NR* about radical changes at the AIB has set me, and I suspect several other Flag Officers and Commodores who have been privileged to manage the Officer selection process over many years, to wonder how, with the demise of the Headteachers, it is intended to replace the vital links with educational establishments which their presence ensured.

I can understand, with the radical changes which have taken place in the BRNC training syllabus, that an in-depth study into the selection process was timely and sensible. And with 85 per cent of new entrants now being graduates, I can appreciate that the assessment of candidates' academic ability by a Headteacher Board member is no longer as important as it was of yore. But their presence was of value (certainly greater than the £70K pa to be saved by their dismissal) in other ways.

It is hoped that the system of inviting visitors to witness the selection process will continue and that visitors will remain as impressed by the new as Betteridge suggests they have been by the old. The links between DDNR(O), the Schools Liaison Officers, BRNC, RNEC Manadon and the AIB ensured that a steady stream of Heads of Schools, Heads of Sixth Form Colleges and University Academics were invited to visit the AIB and the Training Colleges. The process of 'selecting' Heads to become members of the AIB panel usually started with an invitation to witness the selection procedure. Before their first 'Boarding Week', opportunities for them to study the training at first hand by visiting BRNC and/or RNEC were always offered and usually taken up. Exposure to the 'Ways of the modern Navy' was gained progressively during the Heads' boarding weeks by opportunities for discussion with Commanding Officers of ships, also invited to witness the process or to dine in the

Wardroom or at Dean House where, after dinner, film shows were sometimes offered. Taken back to their educational establishments was a steadily growing knowledge of the Royal Navy, an understanding of the qualities needed to succeed as a Naval Officer and a respect for the Service as a challenging career. Of course this knowledge and enthusiasm was cascaded down to their Schools' Careers Officers, many of whom also witnessed our procedures. I believe the temptation to advise the most talented of their pupils that they were too good for the Royal Navy was rarely exercised by AIB Panel Heads: conversely, I know that many a reluctant but subsequently successful candidate was persuaded that he was certainly good enough to apply. How, I wonder, will this most valuable link in the PR chain be replaced?

P. N. MARSDEN
REAR ADMIRAL

Sir,–AIBs have gone all technical, but are their selections any better than they used to be? To get into the Navy in 1936 as a 'Special Entry', ie after leaving school and not through Dartmouth, one had to pass written exams in seven subjects, of which English, General Knowledge, a Modern Language and Maths, Physics, Chemistry were compulsory; marks were deducted for bad handwriting. The dreaded interview followed, worth, with one's Record, 400 of the 1,750 marks available. Six or seven middle-aged gentlemen in plain clothes sat one side of a long table whilst you sat all alone opposite them not knowing who they were but believing them all to be Admirals. Questions and discussion followed. I was nearly tripped following some discussion about Russia by being asked: 'What do you know about Red Admirals?' 'They are butterflies, Sir,' got me off the hook, but next came a simple question from the other end of the table: 'Where do you live?' 'North Wiltshire, Sir.' 'I see you went to Rugby School – couldn't your parents have found somewhere comparable nearer home?' 'I don't think so, Sir.' 'I am the Headmaster of Marlborough.'

Long live headmasters!

The current experts may say that our interview was far from being 'competency based' but I believe that, more importantly, it was 'leadership potential' based and that this should always be the main aim of any officer selection board.

T. S. SAMPSON
CDR, RN

CHANGES TO THE ADMIRALTY INTERVIEW BOARD

Sir,–As Commander Betteridge observes (*NR* Feb '05) the Admiralty Interview Board (AIB) has been selecting officers for the Royal Navy since it was constituted by Admiral Sir John Fisher over 100 years ago. If, however, it is to retain its credibility as an assessment centre, it must ensure that it is able to evolve to keep pace with changes in society and employment law as well as advancements in selection techniques.

Having observed the AIB process shortly after taking over his appointment, 2SL saw little change from the assessment that he had undergone before joining the Navy. He therefore directed Director Naval Recruiting (DNR) to conduct a study with three clear aims:

> To create a more standardised, objective and equitable process to ensure that all candidates are subject to the same assessment.
>
> To create a process that is in line with best practice in selection.
>
> To select officers that are capable of conducting their duties as mid-seniority Lieuts RN/Capts RM in the Fleet.

As Captain AIB I led the study; I am an ex-officer with a wide variety of appointments behind me, including a seagoing career in a number of ships and submarines.

The Armed Forces are, quite rightly, committed to ensure '. . .that the Services' recruiting organisations are at the forefront of modern recruiting practices and to facilitate the exchange of best practice between the Services'. With that aim, a Tri-service report into officer selection procedures at the AIB, the RCB (Army Regular Commissions Board) and the OASC (RAF Officers and Aircrew Selection Centre) was commissioned from

outside assessors by SP Pol (Service Personnel Policy) in 200l. This highlighted a number of areas where the AIB fell short of best practice in selection and made recommendations for changes to the process. These had not been implemented when I began my study in 2003. Once the study had been set in train, I made a point of observing a number of assessment centres in action and was able to see the recommended techniques successfully at work. Additionally, DNR provided funding to support the AIB work with professional and independent occupational psychologists who further advised on selection best practice and, in particular, how to implement the changes I proposed to meet the requirements of the Employment Rights Act (1996). Accepting professional and independent advice in updating the well established format of the AIB ensured that 2SL's first and second aims were achieved.

The key recommendation of the study was to introduce an assessment process based on competencies derived from the personal attributes of the Officers Joint Appraisal Report. The OJAR is used to report on the performance of all officers, regardless of their specialisation or appointment. By using selection criteria based upon the generic attributes officers require to conduct their duties successfully in the Fleet, the AIB would contribute to achieving 2SL's second aim and meet his third aim above. The remainder of the changes I recommended followed from this decision once it had been made.

During the course of the study, I conducted focus groups with my staff at the AIB to discuss options and, as the structure of the new process began to take shape, they were given the opportunity to test the various assessment tools and to contribute to their development and refinement. Those willing to embrace change and help make the new system a success became fully involved in preparations for the changeover. Their contributions have been instrumental in ensuring a smooth transition for the revised AIB.

To meet the demands of the new process, Board members are given an enhanced training package in competency-based assessment and equal opportunities delivered by independent occupational psychologists. Once trained, they are required to board regularly to maintain their currency; they are also 'health checked' by the trainers when they have been in post for a few weeks to ensure they continue to meet the standards they have been taught. This constant requirement to refresh board members' skills contributed to the decision to restructure the Board without head teachers, but a wide cross-section of civilian guests continues to be invited to observe the AIB to maintain its openness to public scrutiny. Furthermore, full and independent audits and validations by external occupational psychologists have been programmed in at six months and one year thereafter to ensure that the new system is valid and remains so.

As a member of my staff at the time, Commander Betteridge discussed the approach I was taking with me regularly during the course of the study; furthermore, he saw the comprehensive report that I forwarded to DNR with the reasons for the changes that I recommended. While he does not find them convincing, DNR, FOTR (Flag Officer Training and Recruiting) and 2SL did, and I have been very pleased with the way the new boarding process is bedding in since it commenced in January 2005.

The Royal Navy has always been willing to embrace change; the AIB must not allow Admiral Fisher's great vision of 100 years ago to anchor its procedures irrevocably to the past.

I. K. GODDARD OBE
CAPTAIN, RN
CAPTAIN ADMIRALTY
INTERVIEW BOARD

Sir,–Commander Betteridge (*NR*, Feb '05) gives a wide-ranging appraisal of the Admiralty Interview Board process and discusses changes commencing Jan '05 resulting from the Second Sea Lord initiated study. He is, of course, entitled to his opinions, but he should not assume that he speaks for 'most officers who have served in the AIB'. I am also a veteran of the AIB process experiencing some 2,400

candidates/700 boards, not only under the old, but also the modified 2005 system. I would like to reassure him and *NR* readers, who hold the naval selection system dear to their heart, that the AIB is improved and is delivering the candidates most likely to succeed at BRNC Dartmouth and CTCRM Lympstone.

I do believe in the old adage, 'If it isn't broken, don't fix it', and have always been proud and privileged to work at the AIB. I did initially have reservations about changes, as change involves risk. However, one must guard against complacency, and as progressive as Admiral Fisher's initial vision in 1903 was, and with developments since, there were still aspects that needed a spring clean.

We can argue about the degree of change to the AIB, but we can agree a baseline. Officer candidates are subjected to four main testing components: written tests (including psychometrics, essay and service knowledge test), gym (leadership) test, discussion (now termed planning) exercise and interview. These assessment opportunities remain unchanged in the AIB changes, but Commander Betteridge did not mention the addition of a new component, the fitness assessment based upon the multi stage fitness or bleep test. I was part of the team in the Directorate of Naval Physical Training and Sport that introduced the Royal Naval Fitness Test in 1999. Fitness testing has since been embraced by all those currently serving. It was natural to extend this to a fitness assessment to those seeking to become Royal Naval Officers and serves as a very good indicator of service motivation. It also has the potential to save training wastage later on.

The composition of the board now comprises a Captain, Commander and Lieutenant. I was initially saddened to see this change removing the head teachers. They are all rightfully top of their professions, and were stimulating and charming company. Board members receive a comprehensive three-day training package and are subsequently monitored to evaluate performance, as interviewing is not a matter of thinking up any old question that pops into your head. There are various ways of asking a question as well as legal requirements to be met and many potential causes for complaint from the candidates that necessitate this rigorous training. We must also ensure a standardised question package presenting a level playing field of opportunity for all candidates. It became increasingly obvious that it was impractical to incorporate the cadre of 70 head teachers into such a training regime, made even more complicated by their unpredictable availability due to their demanding professions. So the era of head teacher paid employment has come to an end, but hopefully not their attendance to witness boards and comment on the process.

The marking system has changed and is now an aggregation of all components of the assessment. All board members' marks contribute equally to the total and have to be justified on evidence observed. This is a more objective, auditable process with less redress for complaint and legal challenge than in the system it replaces.

The experience of the last two months' boarding has been very positive for both board members and visitors, such that already the AIB is being hailed as a system for other recruiting organisations to seek out. But readers do not just have to take my word for it, the AIB has always welcomed visitors to observe and monitor its fairness in the selection of future officers of the Royal Navy.

COMMANDER A. J. KENNAUGH

CAN NAVAL NUCLEAR POWER CONTINUE TO BE JUSTIFIED?

Sir,–In the excellent article in the February 2005 issue of *NR*, Commander Green draws attention to the decline of nuclear engineering expertise in both the naval and civil fields. Particularly in the civil field, successive governments have been reluctant, for environmentally inflamed political – post Chernobyl – reasons, to grasp the nuclear option.

There is much justified concern, and political posturing, about global warming. It is extraordinary that the one proven method of power generation that offers carbon-free capacity to meet future power needs, ashore and afloat, should be ignored.

As the author points out, the 'Green' lobby have done an excellent job. In a recent conversation with my son, 37, he was almost hysterical about not wishing to expose his and successive generations to the risk of radiation accidents and showed great faith in the ability of 'renewables' (wind, tide etc.) to meet future needs.

There have been reports in the media recently that the UK government is considering reviving a civil nuclear power programme. Don't hold your breath, Sir. The short-term political risks in taking such a course far outweigh the long-term benefits. Our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will curse us for not continuing the excellent start made in nuclear power generation in the latter half of the 20th century.

Finally, one small error in the article. I recall it was in June 1968 (not 1969 as stated at the foot of page 4) that HMS *Resolution* sailed on her first patrol. I remember the day well, three days after my 26th birthday. Having slipped from the jetty at Coulport and fallen out from harbour stations we were sailing down the Clyde. The Captain, Mike Henry, beside me on the bridge, surveyed the glorious Scottish summer scene, hills bathed in sunshine, sailing boats flitting over the water and commented, 'This is a funny way to earn a living', before going below.

ROGER WELBY-EVERARD

OPPORTUNITIES TO COMMAND – THE GOLDEN YEARS?

Sir,–Reading the correspondence in *NR* Nov '04, I noticed in Aesop's letter 'the chance of a DD/FF Commanding Officer having previously commanded as a Lieut/Lieut. Cdr are slim'. This may well be so and most regrettable it is. However, it set me thinking about the years when I was in a position to hope for a command; a small ship though it might be. In 1947, Lieut. Cdrs were driving Battle Class Destroyers and Frigates worldwide. The period 1950 to about 1975 gave a lot of opportunities for young officers to get commands. The CMS/IMS/SDB building programme was in full swing, there were the last of the MTBs, *Blackwood* Class Frigates, the odd *Algerine* and *Isles* Class Trawlers, and even a few MMS hanging on. In 1957 there were 14 CMS in the Mediterranean alone for Lieuts/Lieut. Cdrs, and many more around the world. Many of these ships gave a large measure of independence to their COs. With command came the full range of privilege and responsibility, even to the entitlement to 'the pipe'.

Any Lieutenant of average ability could look forward to one command and probably two before he reached the 'top of the zone' for promotion to Commander. Pilots, Observers, CD Officers and other specialists all got their share. A Commander taking over a DD/FF would have almost certainly had a command of some sort, and probably his First Lieutenant would have had one also.

I became a Lieutenant on 1 January 1950, and in 1953, having had a period as No 1 of the first CMS to complete, I was appointed to command an IMS for a full two years from build. I was then No 1 of the last somewhat battered *Hunt* class Destroyer running trials from Portland (Lieut. Cdr CD in command). Then I got a Mediterranean CMS for a full two years, the last six months being in the Far East.

Although I did not get a 'brass hat', as soon as I celebrated the 'Feast of the Passover' it was back to the boats as Senior Officer of a Commonwealth Navy Patrol Boat Squadron.

By the time I came in from sea at the age of 41, I had six years command time, and had spent 17 of the previous 20 years in seagoing ships. So those in my generation could feel fulfilled even without a 'brass hat'. We joined to command HM Ships and had had our fair share. Those who read the journal of the *Ton* Class Association, *TONTALK*, (a commercial here) can learn of the wide-ranging and sometimes hair-raising activities of CMS/IMS COs.

I must have been a glutton for punishment, as on leaving the RN at 50 I joined the Merchant Navy and had a further three years as Master of Coasters and commercial survey vessels. Most of this was away from UK waters and I served under the Blue and Red ensigns, and the Panama and Cypriot flags.

We cannot hope for such halcyon days in the 2000s , but officers of my generation were able to feel that we had been there and done

that: and fortunately there were few T-shirts and no baseball caps to be got. Happy days and I don't regret any of it.

A. J. D. COXON
LIEUT. CDR, RN

BRITANNIA ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE: One Hundred Years ADMIRAL FISHER AND THE SELBORNE SCHEME: A Revolution in Naval Education

Sir,–As an erstwhile 13-entry cadet I read with interest Dr Jane Harrold's two articles about the Royal Naval College Dartmouth and the education of naval officers (*NR*, Feb '04).

Although the Labour Government decided in 1948 to abolish entry at age 13, there seems some misapprehension (though not perhaps on Dr Harrold's part) that this decision was implemented in the same year, and when I visited the College some years ago the guide was telling visitors that the last 13-entry joined in 1948. For the record, *The List* shows that the last of these entries joined Dartmouth at the start of the summer term 1949; so the last 13-entry left at the end of the spring term 1953.

Dr Harrold says (p.28, para 4) that 'Dartmouth was a public school . . . its pupils were not yet in the Navy. . .' but this begs the question: when did those who entered at 13 join the Navy if not on admission to Dartmouth? Moreover, the idea that the 13-entries were not in the Royal Navy is inconsistent with the Admiralty's decision in 1914 to send the cadets at Dartmouth to sea.

A midshipman serving in HMS *Cornwall* recorded in his journal on 12 October 1914 the names of those he knew who were lost in HMS *Cressy* with the words: 'It is damned rotten luck on all of them. Poor little beggars! I expect they only got in the way the whole time.'

They may not always have been an asset, but they were in the Navy.

ROGER BUNBURY

THE SELBORNE SCHEME

Sir,–While writing my book *The Archer-Shees Against the Admiralty – the story behind The Winslow Boy* about three decades ago, I made significant enquiries into the origins of the Selborne scheme and even met some veterans of the early days, so may I be allowed a few comments on Dr Harrold's informative articles (*NR* Feb '05). My enquiries centred on Osborne rather than Dartmouth but the roots of both are the same.

Apparently, it was originally intended that the boys would not enter the navy until age 16, but the Public Schools made strong representation that this would mean losing good boys halfway through their time so it was lowered to 14.

The dislike of the insistence that engineering should be a key part of the syllabus and that some cadets would have to become engineers was widespread. It was said that some parents would actively encourage their offspring not to try too hard in this subject. Apparently, even among the cadets themselves it was regarded as creditable to become bottom of the engineering class.

Certainly the Admiralty was sensitive about this. When George Archer-Shee's father completed the application form for his son, under the question as to which branches he could be considered for, he initially wrote 'Engineer or Executives preferred, Royal Marines if necessary'. But this was not acceptable and he had to amend it to 'Any of the three branches without reserve or qualification' (ADM 116/1085a in the National Archives).

Osborne and the Selborne scheme were the subject of significant public criticism up to the First World War. Even by the standards of the day they were seen by many as too harsh a regime for such young boys. A former cadet, T. G. Bedwell, who arrived at Osborne in 1910, told me a common punishment was 'facing paint': standing for an hour close to a plain wall looking straight ahead. He was enduring this one day when someone important was being shown round. When he saw what was happening he asked for an explanation. As he went away Bedwell heard him mutter 'disgraceful', and the practice was abolished soon afterwards.

Bedwell was in the same term as the future King George VI. Even after he ascended to the throne, the King would regularly attend term

reunions with an opportunity to let his hair down for an evening. So, when a recent BBC TV programme claimed he had been 'bullied' at Osborne my eyebrows raised. However, Bedwell did tell me he believed it was forcing the left-handed Prince to write with his right hand that led to the disastrous stutter that caused him so much anguish later.

Many of the problems were caused by the limited use made of the highly professional civilian schoolmasters. The first headmaster, Charles Godfrey, was an outstanding educator and trained his staff thoroughly. Several from the early days went on to become public school headmasters and even the music teacher rose to Principal of the Royal Academy of Music. How similar the situation was at Dartmouth I did not enquire, but it can not have been all that much different.

What the masters resented was that they were given no responsibility for their charges outside the classroom. They believed they should play their part in the whole development of their characters, as they would at any public school. It was left entirely to quite young naval officers who were not always well-equipped for the task.

This contributed to the Archer-Shee disaster which caused so much embarrassment. G. B. Smith, the English master at the time, told me that there were a number of other incidents which never got any publicity but 'they were frequent enough to put at risk the whole brilliant education experiment which the Selborne scheme involved'. The situation changed when most of the naval men vanished with World War I and the civilians were given broader responsibilities.

It is not quite fair to say that Osborne was closed just because of downsizing after the war. It had never been seen as anything more than temporary until Dartmouth became large enough. The premises had only become available because King Edward wanted to get rid of his parents' favourite home, which he loathed. The prefabricated accommodation in the grounds used for the college was rudimentary, and there had been significant health problems among the cadets. The Osborne Magazine of the era reported almost every term a death among these apparently healthy young boys.

Nonetheless, the scheme produced the generation of officers, my father included, who served the nation well – in particular during World War II.

RODNEY M. BENNETT

THE DIVISIONAL SYSTEM

Sir,–Under the heading *Command – Are we taking it seriously* in the February 2005 *Naval Review* Aesop draws attention to two examples which suggest that all is not well in the Divisional System.

Recently a Commanding Officer was administratively dismissed his ship, apparently because two junior people had complained (of bullying by him) to a 'hotline'.

If anything can be calculated to undermine the trust, responsibility and loyalty which should operate between all levels in the Navy, and also to sideline the proven procedures for making complaints and requests, this politically correct backdoor conduit is it. It is surprising that in a military service such a potentially disruptive device was ever allowed. Did its existence contribute to the Divisional people in the ship losing the trust of their juniors and the juniors their trust in their seniors?

Has this hotline been imposed upon all three Services ? It is suggested that the press release I read in a newspaper was 'from the MoD' – implying 'the Centre' – and not from the Navy's own mouthpiece, the Director of Defence Publicity (Navy). Perhaps it *was* 'the MoD' – whose 'Divisional' performance over the late Dr David Kelly also left a lot to be desired.

GEORGE CHAPMAN

A GOOD BOLLOCKING

Sir,–DittO's article 'And that reminds me about . . . a good bollocking' (*NR* Nov '04) would, I had felt sure, trigger a plethora of post from *NR* members revealing tales of past bollockings, famous or personal, received or delivered over the years. But not a murmur in the *NR* of Feb '05.

Can it be that all members are as pristine as the blown spume? Surely not!

Fortunately I have never received a 'full Roy Newman' (perhaps because we are in the same Term and have been good friends for 50 years), but I can well imagine that the punch would carry some weight. But I did, in my naval career, especially in its formative years, receive my fair share.

Two, acquired as a Midshipman, within days of each other in Hong Kong in the mid-'50s, spring to mind. The first being delivered by the Commander who had ordered me to appear at Colours in plain clothes wearing the same suit that he had seen me wearing to go ashore the previous evening. His words? 'I don't want Teddy Boys in my ship'. And my new HK suit later went, as new, to the Hungarian refugees!

The second relates to words of cautionary advice given me by a Lieutenant on learning that I had been sent for because, after knocking on the Captain's cabin door, I had inadvertently pushed aside the curtain without listening for the Order 'Wait!' and had thereby witnessed him imbibing one of his immediate post-breakfast Gins & Tonic. (We were all told that he had had a hard war: no Counsellors then!) And the advice? 'Just imagine he is stark bollock naked!'. Whatever form the subsequent bollocking took passed through my 18-year-old brain without explosion because my imagination was working overtime. And, in my later career, I passed on this advice to other young officers when faced with a particularly choleric Senior Officer.

For me, the most humbling and memorable bollockings were always of the 'you've let me down' type.

But has the finesse and discretion of such traditional naval bollockings now been lost? It would certainly seem so if, by the whim of some new-fangled, politically-correct Sneak-Line, a Captain can be relieved of his Command simply by administrative, and highly publicised and media-titillated *fiat*, without benefit of a trial by court martial, by invaliding for ill-health, or by routine succession.

Of course most of us must have had our share of 'difficult' Captains but we learned how best to thrive under their command. And besides, some of our juniors probably thought that we were 'difficult' too.

Ronald Hopwood's *The Laws of the Navy* have been forgotten.

TEARLESS

NAVAL BIOGRAPHICAL DATABASE

Sir,–A subscriber has drawn my attention to Cdr Wilson's biographical undertaking (*NR* Feb '03) and I wish him *bon chance*. I think most of us would welcome the publication of such biographies.

On a slightly different tack, some of you may be unaware that a rather broader and more detailed project – the Naval Biographical Database – is already under way. Using a fully relational database, the aim is to provide an outstanding research tool, to academics and genealogists alike, by re-creating the key events in the careers of all those who have served in or been associated with the Royal Navy since 1660. More information about the project, and details such as design, input categories and coverage, may be seen at *www.navylist.org*. I am making steady progress but, with an estimated 50 million entries to go, you will perhaps understand why I have made no similar approach to living officers. Indeed, I am currently exploring, in conjunction with the Royal Naval Museum and the National Maritime Museum, how the project can be carried forward in the long term, since it will obviously not be completed in my lifetime.

With such an ambitious project, there will be inevitable gaps in the information which it is possible to recover, and probably the most difficult period, outside wartime, will be from the 1950s onwards. Anything you can do to help bridge this gap will be of immense value to those who take this project forward in the future. In the meantime, I am still trying to convince the Royal Navy of the advantages of downloading current appointments and drafts into the system, but without any tangible success.

I am supporting every date in the database, over 100,000 so far, with the source of that piece of information. I would therefore ask that, where possible, you seek out precise dates from such sources as flimsies or service

certificates; and, in this context it is just as important to record the date of leaving a post as that of appointment or joining. Being a completely private initiative, most of my time is spent driving this project forward and I just do not have the capability to either respond to large numbers of individual queries or to store such data awaiting input. However, please spread the word and, for those who would be willing to assist this project, I would ask that you consider depositing information with the Library of the Royal Naval Museum – preferably marked for use of this project in order to avoid possible access or copyright problems in the future.

CHRISTOPHER DONNITHORNE

Book Reviews – I

UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS
July-December 2004
Hudson Papers Volume 2
(Oxford University Hudson Trust)

Thoughts on the present discontents

Particularly in the later issues of *Proceedings* in the period under review, there has been an introspective cast to the material that is, if not new, much more prominent than in the confident, power-oriented, warfighting-based, technology-dependent emphasis of the quite recent past. This review article will concentrate on this trend, detectable indeed over the previous six months and discussed in the November 2004 issue of *The Naval Review*, but more marked lately. In doing so it may swing the pendulum too far, that being the way of pendulums, and one must not forget that the mainstream of the US forces continues to be the way of the warriors of the most powerful nation on earth, doing their job of exerting that power in the interest of the United States. It is so laid down in the 30 September 2001 *Quadrennial Defence Review Report*: 'US forces must maintain the capability to impose the will of the United States and its coalition partners on any adversaries, including states and non-state entities. Such a decisive defeat could include changing the régime of an adversary state or occupation of foreign territory until US strategic objectives are met.'

It can be no coincidence that that quotation comes in one of the most thoughtful articles under review, 'Let's Get Serious about Stability' by Colonel Mark Cancian, USMCR (Retired) in December 2004. Cancian accepts that régime change can be a sensible objective; he does not address the matter of legitimacy, to which this review will return. But he does argue that if the objective of an operation is régime change, then 'a stability operation will be central to the success of the mission'; and 'getting better at this mission is a necessary part of preparing for future wars'. After all, he contends, the US did not do too well in Vietnam and Somalia, and is not doing too well in Iraq '(thus far)' and Afghanistan '(perhaps)'. He then analyses where US theory and practice at present fall short – too much emphasis on warfighting; transformation defined in purely technological terms; belief that stability is not the armed forces' job; belief that it can be grafted on after the formal war is finished; belief that a defeated population will be docile; belief that victorious armed forces will be capable of doing it in their stride. He advocates consideration of post-conflict stability at all stages of planning; a force mix with a much higher proportion of police follow-up; expanding the menu of non-lethal capabilities; investigating Carabinieri-type forces, at present lacking in the US organisation; and making more use of civilian reconstruction organisations under State Department control.

Cancian's article has many constructive ideas but perhaps it does not take one factor sufficiently into account: people don't always like foreigners, particularly when they are heavily armed and demonstrably determined to 'impose their will'. That is more directly addressed in two articles in the November issue of *Proceedings*, traditionally one that concentrates on the US Marine Corps. The cover of this issue is dramatic: a US Marine in combat gear, boot raised, making a forcible entry through a dark hole into who knows what. At first, one is bound to say, it looked as if he was kicking ass. But no, there was no one else present, and it was far more a symbol of venture into the unknown.

And that is the underlying theme of these two articles. The first, 'Corporal Jones and the Moment of Truth' by Hospital Corpsman Third Class Lorenzo Puertas, US Naval Reserve, paints a picture that will be familiar to most who have served in Iraq, or Somalia, or Northern Ireland: a stone-throwing incident that could turn into an ambush, or a riot, or an atrocity by one side or the other, with the senior protagonist on the occupation side a junior NCO. Puertas argues that 'Without cultural training, [Jones's] reaction will be a product of his personal experiences and

beliefs. He might have cultural misunderstandings that lead to serious errors in judgment. He might fail in his mission – and he might find himself despised in one poor neighbourhood, or by a billion horrified TV viewers.'

The article then, with several cogent quotes from the media and from senior officers both serving and retired, develops the case for cultural training 'from squad leaders to expeditionary force commanders'. It accepts that in many cases the possessors of a foreign culture must be regarded as 'the enemy' but quotes Sun Tzu on 'knowing the enemy and yourself'. Puertas goes on to advocate, among other measures of cultural awareness, much more emphasis on language training, 'building bonds of trust and understanding between Marines and the local population'.

A somewhat different slant on the same theme is found in 'Beyond Hearts and Minds Culture Matters' by Barak A. Salmoni, an assistant professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School. This is based more firmly in USMC doctrine and concentrates on the Stability and Support Operations (SASO) approach and USMC senior officers' concept of the 'three-block war' – simultaneous engagement in civil affairs, policing and high-intensity combat. The core of the SASO approach was the slogan 'First, do no harm'. Training, according to Salmoni, included many of the language and cultural elements advocated by Puertas (though neither of the articles refers to the other). The slogan, the training and the machinery came under many severe tests in 2004, not least in the Fallujah enclave. Civil Affairs Platoons, a key element of the strategy, found themselves often isolated and unsupported by indigenous security units. Salmoni identifies some cases of spectacular success but, reading between the lines, these are relatively few. The general picture is of a severe uphill struggle with many miles yet to go.

A third article, 'Urban Warfare Transforms the Corps' by Major Kelly P. Houlgate USMC, returns us to warfighting and orthodoxy. It makes the point that the majority of conflicts in which the Corps was involved over the past two decades involved urban warfare, and over a third were 'exclusively urban'. It puts forward many suggestions for improving equipment, training and procedures that would improve proficiency in this difficult military art. One thing I found striking in this standard-length article: it did not at any point mention that civilians might be involved.

What's the sea got to do with all this?

It is interesting, and may be significant, that most of the articles seeking – however obliquely – to answer that question, in this batch of *USNIP*, are by people not in the US Navy. There may be many explanations for that; it is simply stated here as a fact.

In 'A Farewell to the Gulf' (October 2004) Commodore P. D. Jones, RAN, describes the run-up to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM particularly in the context of the Maritime Interception Force (MW) from October 2002 to April 2003. This multinational force was initially tasked with the enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq – it is unfortunate that the article does not even summarise its terms of reference – but shifted, of course, to a war role as March 2003 approached. The emphasis changed from anti-smuggling patrols to the elimination of mine and sabotage threats, which loomed large, and the eventual securing of the waterway up to Umm Qasr so that supplies could arrive by sea. In all, 27 ships from four navies – five if the US Coast Guard is included – participated. Commodore Jones 'was very proud of the MIF' which he commanded, clearly, with distinction.

The US Coast Guard comes next in *Proceedings'* discussion of the sea dimension. Two major articles in the August 2004 issue, both by Captains USCG, appear to take opposite views. Captain (Retired) Bruce Stubbs, a deep student and prolific writer on Coast Guard affairs, argues that 'Multimission Costs Too Much'. The 'new paradigm' of Active Deterrence demands high-complexity national and international operations in close co-operation with other forces and agencies – all activities to which the present Coast Guard force structure and organisation are unaccustomed. Stubbs argues that the resources just aren't there, and that the

homeland security task – much expanded anyway since 9/11 – must take priority. Captain Steve Vanderplas, on the other hand, accepts that the Coast Guard was given much enhanced tasks after 9/11 and was scarcely ready for them; but it must also 'assume maritime sovereignty roles far greater than its already formidable task of preventing terrorists from using or disrupting the US maritime transportation system'. It needs 'to find the multiplication key on its calculator and present a theoretical budget based on actual mission requirements'.

Closely related is the topic addressed by Captain Michele Cosentino, Italian Navy, in 'Defeating Terrorism from the Sea' (December 2004). He starts with a bang: 'In the past 20 years, more than 100 hostile actions have been carried out against maritime shipping.' But he soon makes clear that the majority of these were piracy or sea robbery, not terrorist actions *per se*, and does tacitly set piracy aside in favour of the rarer true terrorism, 'a tool to influence the behaviour of a nation'. A box illustrates the extent of this: *Achille Lauro, Cole, Limburg* and the Tamil Sea Tigers are the limits of achievement – though of course we do not know how many operations have been aborted. Cosentino argues, nevertheless, that the impact of the actions that have occurred is out of proportion to their frequency and that countermeasures are necessary against the most likely threats: small surface vessels, mines and air vehicles. The proposed countermeasures follow a pattern that is probably familiar to planners but is well worth reiterating for general readers. Intelligence (including friendly intelligence) and surveillance, Awkward-type training and defence, and international co-operation all feature, as does the ability to 'strike terrorists in their safe havens'.

It would be wrong to imply that US Navy contributors have been silent on all the topics that arise from the current and future situations. Indeed the pages of *Proceedings* contain the usual mix of articles from all branches of the service. 'Branch' may be the right word: many of the pieces strike the outsider as special pleading for one aspect or other of this complex and often mutually competitive organisation. Rather than enter into these internal frays, your reviewer would like to single out three that seem to have more general application.

The first two concern the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). It may not have been apparent to *NR* members – it was certainly not to me – just how far this project has got. It is substantially further on than concept: two designs, by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, are on the table and their characteristics are shown in 'LCS Parts from the Past to Meet Today's Needs' by Vice Admiral Timothy LaFleur (July 2004). It is not easy to summarise even the salient features, but they include a 3,000-ton hull or 'seaframe', not far short of 400-foot length, very fast sprint capability, modular design to accommodate interchangeable ASUW, ASW and MCM packages, and reliance on unmanned vehicles in all warfare modes so that only a limited number of trained specialists are needed to accompany each package and back up the core crew of 35-45. If this is thought through in terms of infrastructure, organisation and training, it means a truly revolutionary method of operating; one has to say that if anyone can do it, the Americans can.

A particular role for the LCS is addressed in 'LCS Will Transform Mine Warfare' by Rear Admiral Paul Ryan, US Navy (Retired) (December 2004). This emphasises the contribution to be made by unmanned systems in the future packages, useful of course for self-protection as well as economy of manpower, and makes sensible proposals for transition from the current mix of systems to the new, which, Admiral Ryan argues, will 'provide a more cost-effective minehunting and minesweeping capability'. That claim is more credible for its modest wording. The timescale is not far short of 10 years.

Finally, a major article by Rear Admiral James Stavridis and Captain Frank Pandolfe, US Navy, ('From Sword to Shield', August 2004) claims a transition of naval forces in the past year 'from conventional combat operations to a complex global politico-military role in support of deterrence counterterrorism, economic growth, and political stability'. Well, well. It is really quite

hard to believe that a nation, and a naval establishment, of the educational attainment and scope of the United States hadn't hoisted in that this was the normal condition of the exercise of sea power, with formal sea-fighting the exception. Probably one's colleagues at the Institute and the Naval War College would agree; did they not argue some years ago that 'Mahan is Not Enough'? But yes, it probably is true (and this column has frequently implied) that the US Navy as a whole has concentrated overmuch on the warfighting function; one's guess is that their doctrine publications give nothing like the same emphasis to benign and constabulary roles as does our own BR 1806.

Thus Stavridis and Pandolfe's article ought to be welcome, and its headings look eminently sound, if not unfamiliar to jaded old Europeans. *Patience and dwell*, offset at need by *Speed and Precision; Timely intelligence; Managing Uncertainty* in one's own sphere and *Creating Uncertainty* in the opponent (I particularly liked these – shades of Colonel Harding RM in the 1913 *Naval Review*); *Pre-empting the enemy* (more on this story later); *Enhancing Economic Security and Stability . . . Expanding International Military Education and Training; Establishing Naval Liaison Elements; Leveraging* (oh dear – but we do use 'average' as a verb, so . . .) *Public Diplomacy; Maximising boarding capabilities; Establishing sea-based disaster relief planning cells; Investing in unmanned surveillance assets; Strengthening Joint and Coalition interoperability.* It is an impressive list, and contrasts with Cancian's statement (December 2004) that all but two of the Defence Department's 79 major system proposals are 'designed for defeating state militaries armed with conventional weapons'.

One wonders how much the wake of the December 2004 tsunami has done to accelerate this movement in US Navy thinking and practice. Though downplayed by the more anti-US sections of the British media, it is clear that the presence and activities in the early days of a US carrier off Sumatra were absolutely critical in the provision of timely and massive relief to that most stricken area. Again, perhaps an Old European can offer a little advice: do not necessarily expect profuse gratitude, either from people on the ground still in shock, or from governments that may feel themselves demeaned by accepting bounty from the rich foreigner. It's a nasty old world out there, sometimes, for those that long to be loved.

The Hudson Papers

The generous foundation of the Oxford University Hudson Trust enables several selected naval officers to study, as Hudson Fellows of St Anthony's College, aspects of security in the modern world. They are aided, as is made clear in the Foreword by the Director of Defence Studies (Royal Navy), by some of the most eminent of the senior members of the university. The publication of their work is greatly to be welcomed.

Three papers comprise this second volume. The first is by Commander Nick Roberts and is entitled 'Countering Global Reach Terrorism: Limitations of the Use of Military Force'. That is an up to date topic sure enough, and the inevitable time delay between completion and publication has done little to diminish the paper's argument or impact – which is in itself a tribute to the soundness of the research and the logic of the conclusions. Inevitably the headings are founded in international law and state practice: Forcible action and coercive diplomacy; the legitimate use of force and the campaign against terrorism; the phenomenon of non-state and near-state actors; the self-defence aspect and all its ramifications; the use of evidence in justification of action; questions of prevention and pre-emption; the limits of coercive diplomacy, including the linked concepts of deterrence and compellence; and 'positive inducements' (the author's quotation marks). All is cast in the framework of international law, particularly as encapsulated in the UN Charter. The author's conclusions are that if the centrality of the Charter is to be upheld, it must be matched by appropriate 'firm and positive action', particularly by the Security Council.

'Genocide, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law' is the title of a paper by Steven Haines, long known to most of us as a

contributor to and committee member of *The Naval Review*. This was his final flourish as a serving naval officer; he is now Head of the Department of Social and Political Science at Royal Holloway, London. As might be expected from someone of his background not only in international law but in the development of naval and defence doctrine, this is a deeply-informed and perceptive paper. Haines takes as his exemplars the Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo crises of the 1990s, and examines in particular whether there is, outwith the operation of the UN Security Council or, by default, the General Assembly, any right or even obligation on the part of states to take action to put down genocide or extreme humanitarian wrong. The paper develops what might be called principles of international justice, which states might use as guidance, and increasing reference is made throughout the paper to the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which reported in December 2001. Haines himself served on this body and clearly believes its recommendations are sensible and valid. His paper is of very high quality and your reviewer's only criticism is that it nowhere appears to provide a definition of genocide – a word freely used throughout. Such definitions do exist, in treaty language or literature: too many, perhaps, for comfort. The paper may take the view that 'you know it when you see it'. But is that really so? There are already indications from the media that the term is all too readily used as a catch-all for any perceived corporate injustice or violence. Definition, and evidence, are critical for such an emotive word – the establishment of which, as Haines points out, generates third-party obligation – and more extensive discussion in the paper might have been helpful.

Finally, a topic of a quite different nature is addressed in Commodore N. D. Latham's 'Defence Industry in a Global Context: Policy Implications for the United Kingdom'. Accepting that defence industries are not only very large and diverse, but constantly and sometimes rapidly changing in their organisation and operations, the author adopts a case-study approach, examining the South African, Russian and United States' defence industries before turning to those of the United Kingdom. No doubt this was done because of the diversity of these three structures; at that stage of reading, one was inclined to wonder whether they were so far apart that correspondences between them were too tenuous, and whether study of at least one European state would have been valuable. Nevertheless, the paper has many important points to make, not least the influence on government of the very different military-industrial complexes in Russia and the USA. When the British case was reached, the reason for the non-consideration of other European industries became apparent; for so many links now exist between British and European armaments industries that it is actually quite hard to study any one of them in isolation. It is still the case that there are identifiably British industrial stakes, and a British national interest in them, but the author's general conclusion is that an 'open market' is beneficial and to be encouraged.

The Connection

Reviews of *USNIP* and *The Hudson Papers* have been combined in this article for what seems to be a good reason. The former are necessarily concerned mainly with the practices and policies of the mighty power across the Atlantic. So, for page after page, are the latter: the legitimacy of US intervention in Iraq, and in Bosnia, and the influence of the US arms industry, pervade all three papers. Like it or not, we are in this hegemonic situation, and to help deal with it 'for good' – which is what we are told our forces are for, and maybe we can all drink to that – we need to study it, to listen to those who know more about it than we do, to make judgments when (and only when) they are within our competence, and to employ our resources from a basis of knowledge and understanding. Not easy: these documents will help.

RICHARD HILL

THE BRITISH ARMY REVIEW

There are some critical differences as well as similarities between the *British Army Review* and *The Naval Review*. *BAR* is published three

times a year, but in a very different format from *The Naval Review*. It is a well-produced, high quality 'glossy', printed in a very clear typeface on high quality paper, with a number of well-produced illustrations (some in colour) in each issue; an expensively produced journal compared with its naval cousin. It is also rather larger both in size and page numbers so, even allowing for its much larger circulation, it is certainly more expensive to distribute too. This is possible because, and it is an important point of difference, it is an official Army publication, 'prepared under the direction of the Director General of Development and Doctrine' and 'the information it contains is for official use only'. Moreover, most of the material published in it is subject to Crown Copyright, reproducible only by permission of the editor who is a retired Army colonel provided with office accommodation and support (and pay! although he is a one-man band and has other, albeit lesser tasks) at the Upavon headquarters of the Adjutant General. Finally, and in some respects the most significant difference from *The Naval Review*, authors are expected to obtain clearance from their Commanding Officers to publish articles, the editor accepting responsibility for obtaining MoD clearance where that is necessary or appropriate. *Naval Review* members will need no reminding that no such strictures apply to them, the Admiralty Board having decided nearly 100 years ago that, provided that circulation of the journal was confined to members of a relatively narrowly defined status, no approval to publish was necessary and, moreover, that the use of pseudonyms to protect authors, especially more junior officers, was acceptable. Only the editor's discretion stands between the *NR* (and its contributors) and the void! I could not discern a single pseudonym in *BAR* and I cannot help wondering if this sometimes discourages potential authors.

I make this point because it seems to me that these two different cultures have a marked effect on the nature of the material published in the two journals. On the face of it, the format of the *BAR* is similar. After an editorial, there is a series of articles on professional subjects, ranging in the Autumn 2004 issue from discussion of current doctrinal, operational and organisational issues to historic analysis and personal reminiscence; I could not, however, detect any irreverently humorous articles of the sort the *NR* usually carries. There is a correspondence section which has a serious professional tone, a 'review article' (Reviews I in *NR* terms), and a series of book reviews covering some fascinating professional subjects (but none maritime as far as I could see, though the sinking of the *Bismark* gets an earlier mention) and, an idea here for the *NR* perhaps, a review of a Gordon Ramsay book (with lessons on both leadership and cookery) and of Lynne Truss's much hyped Staff College Manual *Eats, Shoots and Leaves*. So far, so similar then. But wait a moment. Amongst the article signature blocks are Warrant Officer A and even Corporal B. This is indeed a difference, to your reviewer a most welcome one, and one which the *NR* might certainly wish to consider emulating. It seems self-evident that the closer you can get to 'the soldier in the trench' (or sailor in the gun mounting) the more helpful, trenchant and relevant some of the lessons are likely to be, and this is obviously important in a journal with the Army-wide circulation of *BAR*.

But despite all these similarities (and, in some cases, improvements) there is a distinct difference in tone between these two publications, probably, in your reviewer's estimation, because of the sharp difference in the standing of the two towards their parent Services. There is certainly a highly professional tone to the *BAR* and a rather more formal written style; there is nothing wrong with that of course and your reviewer, struggling as he sometimes does with the grammar and syntax of the contributions he receives for the *NR*, felt a slight pang of jealousy of his opposite number! But, somehow, one felt that there was a slightly greater degree of institutional rectitude in the *BAR* than in the *NR*. Or, to put it another way, there is a slightly greater tendency to irreverence and perhaps to challenge of the ordained order of things in the *NR* which I missed in the *BAR*. I have long felt that the

most important things for senior people in any walk of life to hear are the things that they are least likely to want to hear, and I had a feeling that the *BAR* was a little less likely to achieve this desideratum than the *NR*. Perhaps this tells us something about important cultural differences between the two Services – and that usually tells us something about the differences in the way in which they need to operate and fight in their particular environments, as well as about their history. I am not sure that I can sum it up any better than I did in my opening paragraph – one is an official publication; the other is not.

Where does that leave us? Two somewhat different approaches – but which is better? I am not sure that that is a meaningful question. The two are indeed different, and I hope it is apparent from the two reviews presented here that both have features which appeal to their reviewers, and other features about which they have some reservations; hardly a surprise! Probably both Services gain much benefit from what they have and both would benefit from having as well what the other has. It is beyond a peradventure that both Services would gain, in this era of highly joint operations, from expanding their readership to the other Services' journals and I am sure both editors would welcome this. Certainly it would do a good deal to enhance mutual understanding and respect.

JEREMY BLACKHAM

THE NAVAL REVIEW

As is so often the case the Royal Navy makes sensible arrangements. This is probably something to do with having fewer tribes to placate and amuse. True, the seaman officer believes that he is a lean-jawed member of the master-race and submariners view the rest of the Royal Navy in only a slightly more favourable light than they do the enemy, but they are a more cohesive organisation than the Army. They have a shared language – gizzets, heads, dits, CSB, runs ashore – unlike the Army which has a separate argot for each tribe, enough, indeed, to dedicate a complete university department to ensure their survival. Perhaps, if we registered Sapperese as a language in peril, we might attract good people to ensure their continuance in numbers – in much the same way that these people care for stone curlews or fairy shrimps or Welsh. There is, after all, a synergy here: sapper tanks make tracks and ruts that fill with water and in which fairy shrimps thrive. The same people could lobby for more sapper tanks thus achieving longevity for sappers and fairy shrimps. The only objection is likely to come from gunners, who seem unaware of the lack of synergy between stone curlews and HE.

One such sensible arrangement is *The Naval Review*, which is a sort of sister mag to *The British Army Review*. There are differences. *NR* is privately funded – the annual sub is £24 pa for its four issues. It is open to commissioned officers (UK and Commonwealth) of all Services and some maritime related civil servants. *BAR* is distributed to all units rather than to individuals and is publicly funded – but is an all rank publication. So straightaway, *NR* can live up to its aim:

> *To promote the advancement and spreading within the Service of knowledge relevant to the higher aspects of the Naval Profession.*

It is independent of the Admiralty Board but operates under a charter from them which permits serving officers to contribute to the *NR* without any clearance. And the *NR* has a set of rules to protect its publication which include not allowing it to be seen by other than its members, and certainly not by the press. Only after 10 years can the publication be freely quoted. These precautions are to help ensure that the *NR* can be useful as a medium for free discussion. And if you have never previously heard of it, let alone known of its contents, then it has clearly succeeded in this aspect.

The *NR* is slightly old-fashioned in appearance – an A5 soft-backed publication in navy blue – what else indeed? There are few pictures, which probably explains the paucity of contributions from lieutenants. It is also slightly old-fashioned in tone. I suspect that is part of its appeal. It has an illustrious history and before the First War it was a mighty influence on government. Indeed, it was set up in October 1912 by Captain Herbert

Richmond, one of the 'Fishpond' that surrounded the great Admiral Fisher – the man who said that the army was a projectile to be fired by the Royal Navy, and he didn't see the Royal Navy as a service provider nor would he be amused by the administrative fashions and fads that seem to blight our lives and Service. This tone is one which the retired find soothing – there are stories from the past of glorious exploits and infamy, there is plenty of whimsy and then – just to wake up the old and bold – the mag takes on a serious air and discusses matters ranging from analyses of the Falklands air campaign to Patchwork Enabled Capability via a digression on NATO in Afghanistan and taking in along the way a perceptive analysis of the current navy in the form of a review of the annual RN publication, *Broadsword*. Anonymity is cheerfully provided, although some of the sobriquets, *One Armed Monocular*, might not fool all.

I do not know if it has always been so, but I sense that *NR* tackles the issues of the day more questioningly than *BAR*. In recent years *BAR* contributors seem to have become more reluctant to engage in controversy, and this is most certainly not due to editorial policy – quite the opposite. Whether this is because the modern soldier is so busy (which probably is a part-explanation) or whether it is due to the career compression suffered by the near all-graduate officer intake or some other explanation, I cannot say. Perhaps *NR*, too, has noted this decline – but the pages show good evidence that its readers/subscribers support its aim.

The correspondence column is strong – as in any periodical, a vigorous letters page is vital. This is not a magazine to express poorly researched argument. If HMS *Camperdown* had 534 portholes, you had better be right because there will be some ex-First Lieutenant of HMS *Camperdown* who still has the logbook for 1895 which shows clearly the controversy over the 535th porthole, the one where the future First Sea Lord nipped in after a disastrous run ashore.

The substantial book review section has its own editor, in fact there are several officials overseeing and producing the *NR*. They are all honorary positions, which is a strength as long as there are sufficient good men to come forward. Indeed the editor is a retired 3* flag officer, who has a full-time job and other interests in addition to his editing tasks. The books tend to be mainly maritime in nature, not surprisingly, but there might have been a bit more coverage of other Services. (*BAR* usually reviews about seven times more books on air power than *Air Power Review*.) The standard of reviews is high and not for the first time it seems to me that the book review editors of the nationals would do well to poach some of the reviewers of *NR* and *BAR* for the more specialist books on war – much of their current stuff is woeful and by people who you would have thought would do better.

NR is an important journal because it provides an outlet for informed discussion on matters of professional interest to maritime warriors. This is especially important as a counter to the increasing politicisation of our domain. The organisation, structures, equipment and operation of the Armed Services are proper matters for debate by its own people. Yet there is an unwillingness, influenced perhaps by an over-sensitiveness to political controversy, to engage in this debate. To be quite blunt, because the Iraq War is still a controversial matter there seems to be a refusal to conduct the usual lessons-learned exercise. And this refusal stems from a belief that any criticism could be construed as political comment and is therefore improper. Wrong. It is our duty to examine our performance and recommend change. That is why we have publications like *NR* and *BAR*. When Field Marshal Lord Slim instituted *BAR* he did so expecting *all officers and NCOs to read it and a lot to contribute to it from their own experience so that others could learn*. If the findings from the observations and comments make for uncomfortable reading, then so be it – nobody ever told us to expect soldiering to be comfortable. Would we rather that our sailors and soldiers (and airmen – although the RAF doesn't have a *BAR/NR* equivalent) continue with flaws in equipment or procedures just because we didn't want to upset someone? Nothing noble or brave about that.

In our very different ways *NR* and *BAR* continue to provide the outlet. I doubt that the

Army could set up a *NR*-type solution now; it has, though, set up the modern equivalent – *www.arrse.co.uk*. I haven't the space to review that site here, but it fulfils some of the *NR/BAR* charter. It is easy, yet wrong, to ignore or dismiss *arrse.co.uk* as scurrilous rubbish – it ought not to be so easy to similarly treat *NR/BAR*. Which is why we are a bit more ponderous and stuffy, but we would be failing in our aim if we shirked the difficult issues.

JOHN WILSON
EDITOR, THE BRITISH ARMY REVIEW

THE MARINE ENGINEER'S REVIEW

The contractual arrangements for the overall management of design, building and commissioning of the two CVFs is causing major and unresolved upset between the government and the three companies involved. The warship building programme also attracts much attention in the technical press.

Ships

RN

CVF

MoD has insisted that it wished to appoint Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), a major defence contractor, a subsidiary of Halliburton Oil and owners of DML-Devonport Dockyard, as physical integrator of the CVF project to oversee the work of BAeSystems and Thales, respectively the Build and Design contractors. An added feature in the row, which has been reported in the press for several months, was KBR's mothballed oil production rig-building facility at Nigg (Invergordon) which they could have pressed to use for the assembly of the CVF hulls rather than Babcock's Rosyth Dockyard. This could have led to large job cuts or complete closure of Rosyth. However, very recent news (13 February) stated that the Nigg facility is now for sale.

Reports suggest that BAeSystems could withdraw from the CVF project altogether – the Chairman of BAeSystems had commented that 'It's a Train Wreck'. However recent press reports (6 February) state that a compromise has been reached between BAeSystems and MoD so that KBR's role may have been reduced to one of programme management adviser pending further discussion, with the ships to be definitely assembled at Rosyth. This is clearly an on-going and highly political debate, not yet resolved, in which delays and cost over-runs in the *Astute* class SSN and Nimrod maritime attack and reconnaissance aircraft projects are very relevant. The first of the latter at last made its inaugural flight in August 2004.

A report in *NR* Oct '02 suggested that podded drives were being considered for the CVF. Your reviewer wonders if the recent demise of the world cruise of the P&O liner *Aurora* will affect such a decision. The latter's problems are thought to be due to the failure of such a unit though reports in the technical press have been very limited to date.

A retired Engineer Officer who had been involved in the design of CVA 01 in the mid-60s wrote to the MER noting that the BAeSystems staff in the CVF team were totally unaware of the CVA 01 debacle. The writer commented 'read your history'.

The weight problem with the JSF STOVL version seems to have been solved by weight reduction in the airframe. Budget increases for the UK versions are associated with conversion to enable the aircraft to carry British weapons.

Type 45

VT Shipbuilding at Portsmouth has completed structural work on the first block of the first Type 45 destroyer for transfer to BAeSystems yards on the Clyde by barge. Fitting out is now in hand.

HMS Illustrious

The refit was completed at Rosyth in November 2004. It comprised a large programme of work including rebuilding a main propulsion gearbox, a strengthened ski jump to accommodate GR7 and GR9 Harriers and an improved communications mast.

HMS Ark Royal

The new design enclosed mast is being manufactured by Babcocks Design and Technology at Rosyth for installation during the current refit. The design by Qinetiq is

based on the outline in *NR* Nov ’03. The enclosed design will reduce and simplify the maintenance of the antennae within it.

HMS Nottingham
The ship was handed over on time, following repairs of the grounding damage described in *NR* May ’03. Work included hull repairs, replacement of damaged equipment and major recabling.

RV Triton
Further to the report in *NR* Nov ’04, the ship has been sold to the company Guardline for hydrographic survey work on behalf of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. There is no further interest in using her for hull research.

RCN
There are still no clear published reports on the fire in HMCS *Chicoutimi* (formerly HMS *Upholder*) in October 2004 except to note that the fire started in the Captain’s cabin and an adjacent electrical panel. The three other submarines already delivered have been taken out of service pending a final report and resolution of the legal issues.

RAN
HMAS *Tobruk*, the LSL/Heavy Lift Ship, built in Australia to the RFA *Sir Bedivere* design, and one of the Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA), presumably HMAS *Kanimbla* or *Manoora*, will be replaced by a new design Amphibious Ship. French and Spanish shipbuilding groups are involved. The French group are providing information on an existing design, a similar design capable of carrying more troops and an extended version. It is intended to build the ships in Australia with in-service delivery between 2010 and 2014.

HMAS Westralia
Tenders have been sought for conversion of the commercial double hulled tanker *Delos* to replace the above by 2006. Work will include fitting RAS equipment, a flight deck, adequate habitability and accommodation, damage control and Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs). See also Master Ned’s letter from Australia XXVII (*NR* Nov ’04) on these and other aspects of the RAN programme.

Indian Navy
An Italian shipyard is designing a new aircraft carrier or Air Defence Ship. It will be very large, displacement 38,000 tons, propelled by four GE LM 2500 gas turbines.There are no other details. It is inferred that she will be built by Cochin Shipyard in India with assistance from Italy. It is not known what effect this will have on the planned acquisition of the Russian heavy aircraft carrier/cruiser *Admiral Gorshkov* for conversion to a STOBAR (short take-off, arrested recovery) carrier, which has been out of service for more than 10 years (*NR* Apr ’01).

The Coastguard has ordered three 3,300 ton cutters from an Indian shipyard, the first for delivery in 2006. They will be 308ft long diesel propelled and carry a helicopter. A photograph of a model shows a turreted gun mounting. Their duties will include EEZ control, including all forms of law enforcement, search and rescue and pollution control.

USN
X Craft
There is more information on this high speed technology demonstrator (*NR* Nov ’03) – which included the basic dimensions. Following launch in February 2004 she is now approaching completion for delivery in April 2005. After preliminary evaluation and crew certification she will be based at San Diego as part of preparation for delivery of the four prototype Littoral Combat Ships (LCS).

The X Craft is intended to evaluate hull and machinery performance and will carry prototype ‘plug in and fight’ mission packages carried in up to 12 20ft containers loaded over a stern ramp. These include battle force protection, MCM, AS warfare, amphibious assault or humanitarian support as required. She can operate manned or unmanned surface or sub-surface vehicles up to the size of a 36ft RIB and two H-60 helicopters or UAVs, though there will be no hangar facilities for the helicopters.

She will have minimum manning with a

base complement of 26 USN or USCG (interesting!) with three watchkeepers and one on roving patrol to handle engineering systems. There will be associated high levels of automation and monitoring.

Propulsion will be in Combined Diesel or Gas Turbine (CODOG) format with two diesel generators for cruising and ship's power and two GE LM 2500 gas turbines to provide sprint speeds, all through water jets.

This vessel is clearly the precursor of a range of new types of surface ships. See also the DD(X) destroyer under 'design' below.

Wasp Class LHD

The GE LM 2500+ gas turbines to be fitted in lieu of steam machinery in the eighth and last of the class has now been granted USN certification. There are indications that there may be a follow-on class of these large amphibious assault ships.

Sea Coaster

The Austal USA shipyard in Alabama has launched the Sea Coaster demonstrator for the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to examine the feasibility of high speed hull forms. This is a surface effect catamaran in which air is blown into cavities in each hull to reduce resistance and thus permit speeds of up to 56 knots. She is 102ft long, 33ft beam and 10.6ft draught, diesel driven.

Denmark

The first of two Flexible Support Ships (FSS), HDMS *Absalon*, was handed over in autumn 2004 to become operational in 2006, with the second ship in 2007. They are 450ft long, 64ft beam, speed 26 knots, endurance 28 days or 9,000 miles. A wide range of capabilities and equipment are fitted including mines, high speed rapid insertion craft for Special Forces, two helicopters and the ability to operate Chinooks and main battle tanks, the latter via a RoRo landing ramp. The fixed weapon is a Mk 45 127mm/54 gun and a variety of container mounted AA and ASW missiles, or a hospital, can be carried.

Three Patrol Ships (PS) will also be built to a similar hull design but capable of high level military operations.

These five vessels in conjunction with the SF-300 multi-role patrol craft are intended to replace many existing ships including three corvettes, four minelayers and 10 FACs, all as part of a major upgrading of the Royal Danish Navy.

France

The French Navy and the Directorate of Military Intelligence have ordered from a Dutch shipyard a new signals intelligence ship (Sigint), *Dupuy de Lôme*, to enter service in 2005. She will be used for strategic intelligence gathering including communications and radar monitoring. She is diesel driven, capable of 16 knots in Sea State 3 and up to 10 knots in Sea State 6 with helicopter deck and underway replenishment facilities.

The French/Italian programme for multipurpose frigates (Frégates Multi-Missions or FREMM) will have diesel electric cruising machinery and a gas turbine, Rolls Royce MT30 or GE LM2500+, driving through conventional gearing, shafts and propellers. This avoids the need for large motors, converters and switchboards. The first will enter service in 2008 and there will be land attack and AS versions.

Italy

A new carrier, ITS *Cavour*, ordered in November 2000, was launched in 2004 for delivery in 2007. The ship is 800ft long, 128ft beam and 28.5ft draught, displacement 27,100 tons, propulsion by GE gas turbines to give a speed of 28 knots and a range of 7,000 miles at 16 knots. She will carry EH 101, NH 90 and SH 3D helicopters, AV 8B Harriers and later the JSF. The hangar will accommodate vehicles for a variety of missions.

The dimensions and most details are similar to those of ITS *Andrea Doria* in *NR* Oct 2000 so that the ships appear to be of the same basic design, though the latter is described as a Nuova Unita Maggioni Amphibie (NUMA), a combined LPD/RoRo/Aircraft Carrier. The latter was built as a back-up to the carrier ITS *Guiseppe Garibaldi*, itself a much older and smaller vessel commissioned in 1985. Your reviewer is confused but hopes that the intention will be clarified in due course.

Romania
The second ex-RN Type 22 frigate *Regina Maria*, formerly HMS *London*, to be transferred to the Romanian Navy will be delivered in spring 2005. The first of the two ships, now *Regele Ferdinand*, was named and commissioned at Portsmouth in September 2004 – *NR* Nov '04.

Egypt
Five ex-German Tiger class Type 148 Fast Attack Craft were transferred in 2004, with support to be supplied by the French shipbuilder CMN.

Second-hand warships
The latter two items are only a part of a world-wide programme of selling off warships surplus to the original owner's requirements. A detailed report in *Jane's Defence Weekly* in June 2004 suggested that up to 98 modern second-hand warships were becoming available, some of which have been covered in previous reviews. *Jane's* commented that many of these projects will require the new owners to modernise the ships to their own requirements, provide considerable refitting, and supply spares etc. Many second-hand ships have been laid up for years, eg the USN DD968 *Spruance* class destroyers started to be laid up in 1998 and have been inactive for over seven years. To quote *Jane's*, 'Buyer beware'. In UK, MoD has a contract with BAeSystems for handling disposal, refitting and re-equipping of surplus RN ships.

Ship and equipment design. Conferences
Apart from new ships already under construction and described above there is a number of new designs under design or consideration.

USN DD(X)
The X-craft and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are described above and the plans for the heavily armed stealth destroyer are developing. It is seen to be a 14,000-ton vessel with a pronounced stealth hull form carrying two 155mm (six-inch) guns, 80 vertical missile launcher silos with Independant Full Electric Propulsion (IFEP), prime mover unknown. There are no other details.

Fuel cell ships
A German company has produced a design concept for a 263ft corvette with full electric propulsion using a gas turbine for high speeds and fuel cells for general power supplies and cruising, thus avoiding the need for diesel generators. A variety of pods, waterjets and special propellers is being considered with motors etc from the electric ship programmes.

Fuel cell modules are being built in Germany, initially for installation in standard containers. There is collaboration with the USN where similar trials are planned for USN DDGs (*NR* May '04).

Support ships
Two recent papers ('An Economical Navy' by John Grimwood – *NR* Feb '05 and 'A View of Afloat Support' by St Emilion – *NR* Nov '04) both hold views on the requirements for afloat support vessels – size, speed, capacity and simplicity of design. *NR* Nov '04 also commented on p.412 under 'Miscellaneous' on the increasing number of proposals for fast transports, and this continues. Rolls Royce have produced proposals for a range of military vessels, two transports and two combat vessels, all derived from a standard monohull. To varying degrees they reflect St Emilion's ideas. The French company Alsthom has produced a design for a fast transport 722ft long, speed > 30 knots.

There is much interest in EEZ Control vessels for various navies and coastguards. Apart from the three vessels being built for the Indian Coastguard (above), Norway and France are having similar ships designed or built. They are all tug-type hulls, some armed, with capabilities for EEZ patrolling, fishery protection, firefighting, pollution control and acting as salvage tugs for removing grounded ships from environmentally delicate situations.

Shipbuilders are also producing designs for OPVs and FACs – VT has a 315ft OPV with helicopter or small boat capabilities for use in EEZ and a 226ft stretched version of the Super Vita FACs derived from the design produced for the Hellenic Navy. It is not known whether there are customers for any of these.

The M Hull
This is another type of hull form, intended to reduce hull drag by using bow-wave energy to increase lift, being investigated in the US. A contract has been placed for building an 80ft version. It is hoped that the design will also reduce hull motion by 'self-stabilisation'.

Torpedo retriever
Qinetiq is to buy an underwater remotely operated vehicle (ROV) for retrieving lost torpedoes, for use at the MoD range at Kyle of Lochalsh. It will be called *Quantum* and will carry a grab as well as facilities for retrieving torpedoes buried in the seabed.

Equipment
Electric warship
The annual papers on this topic seem to have concluded, probably because construction of ships and hardware is now in hand. However, there are warnings in the technical press that the use of high voltage power systems (up to 11kV) will require very high standards of training and expertise despite some experience going back to the wartime T2 tankers, pre-war cruise ships and earlier USN vessels.

Rolls Royce is working with three universities, Manchester, Sheffield and Strathclyde to establish a new University Technology Centre (UTC) to develop electric ship technologies dealing respectively with extreme environments, machinery and drives, and power systems.

Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS)
USN authorities are pressing ahead with this system and a contract has been placed with General Atomics for the Development and Demonstration phases. If successful the system will be installed in the new construction CVN 21 (and CVF?) and back fitted in existing carriers to replace steam catapults.

The system is lighter, less complicated, has greater power to suit aircraft of increasing sizes, can handle UAVs, is cheaper to maintain with reduced manpower requirements, has a greater launch rate and is completely independant of the ship's propulsion system (*NR* Nov '04).

Torpedo loading winch
A prototype winch has been designed which is easily transportable and can be landed on a submarine casing, thus reducing reliance on dockside cranes. It consists of separate motor and diesel power units. Six units have been ordered. More details are being sought.

Composite propellers
The USN Naval Surface War Centre (NSWC) is investigating the merits of propellers made of composite materials with pitch-adapting blades, originally designed in Germany for very large yachts, in the hope of reducing noise, cavitation and vibration, and providing greater ship acceleration. Individual blades can be exchanged without docking and the materials, carbon and polyethylene fibres, have greater impact resistance than metals. The NSWC is investigating the use of such propellers in SSBN and SSGN.

Submarine Rescue System
British and German companies are designing a new type of submarine escape system capable of operating at any depth. Simulated escapes have been tested down to 1,800ft and in a Qinetiq simulator. Production versions are expected in 2005 for back fitting and new construction.

Fire detection
Qinetiq has developed a device known as Re-entry Evaluation Detector (RED) to enable firefighters to check quickly if sealed compartments can be entered to avoid risks of fires re-igniting. The equipment, one man portable, comprises a gas sensing probe and a thermocouple with possibly a camera. The processing unit uses algorithms combining readings from the sensors to give Red, Amber or Green indications to the users. The outputs can be recorded as evidence for investigations. The Fire Service and industry are taking great interest in the device.

Navigational Satellite System
This European system, known as Galileo, is due to start operation in 2008 when the first four satellites go into orbit. The contracts will be managed by a German company but much

of the control will be based in Portsmouth (*NR* Oct '02). The European Defence Agency, which will allow EU forces to operate separately from the US or NATO, has granted a 20 per cent share of Galileo to China and there are press reports that this could render British and US forces, both using GPS, unable to operate together due to US refusal to allow defence assets to be shared with China.

Survival
Qinetiq has developed a Vulnerability Reduction Strategy which includes a set of ship design tools called 'Survive'. This is a system for analysing the effect of attacks on ships, particularly in littoral waters. Further work includes studies of the effects of explosion fragments, damage to magazines and assessing a ship's residual strength post-hit. The strategy is being applied to Type 45 and CVF.

Conference
The IMarEST will host the next World Maritime Technology Conference in London from 6 to 10 March 2006, with worldwide attendance. There will be 10 main 'streams' of which Naval Engineering, Underwater Vehicles, EEZ Management and possibly Operational Oceanography will be of the greatest interest to *NR* readers.The Chairman of the Technical Committee will be Professor (late Commander) Chris Hodge.

Shipbuilding and repair. Naval support
Shipbuilding and repair
Apart from the debate about the CVF build (above) there has been much discussion about a new approach to British shipbuilding – for which the naval programme is the only real hope. One solution is diversification, taken up by BAeSystems, VT and the dockyards in various forms, including the building of super yachts at Devonport and the revived Appledore, and much more commercial refitting work at Portsmouth and elsewhere. FSL Portsmouth includes the docking of Warrior, refits of the Antarctic Survey vessels and of fast ferries.

Another solution is to provide shipyards with a continuing and relatively even programme of new construction entirely dependent on the MoD ordering programme. 'Smart acquisition' is seen not to be working, with programmes still suffering cost and time overruns. An important factor is the amount of total project budget spend before contracts are signed, to reduce the risk to final cost.

The possibility of merging facilities owned by BAeSystems, VT, Babcocks and other non-shipbuilding contractors appears to have been discounted while accepting a degree of collaboration. A new British Shipbuilders is definitely not wanted! See also St Emilion's article (*NR* Nov '04).

Docking cycles
Qinetiq is investigating a new underwater survey and repair strategy for different classes of ship to reduce dependance on docking to a minimum – an interval of 12 years is being considered – and thus to reduce downtime and the need for facilities. This is related to similar USN work (*NR* Nov '04).

Repairs to structures
Carbon fibre/epoxy patches are now being used to repair cracks, corrosion and other holes in glass fibre, aluminium or steel structures. Qinetiq and VT have shown that such repairs can last for many years and reduced downtime and thus cost are a great advantage. Welding (hotwork) is avoided and there is no need to set up fire protection, empty magazines, fuel tanks etc. Curing temperatures are limited to 55 to 60°C. Access to the repair is only required on the side to which the patch is fitted.

Support
Ammunition jetty at Devonport
An ammunitioning jetty for SSN support was to be built at Devonport on the Cornish bank of the Tamar, away from the dockyard and the populated area. The plan has now been scrapped at a cost of £25m and SSN will continue to be rearmed in the Naval Base.

Other maritime affairs
ECDIS
There are still considerable delays in the take-up of ECDIS by shipowners due to cost

and lack of coverage. Many ECDIS equipped ships still have to carry and update paper charts. However, ferries on fixed routes, some fast ferries and prestige ships such as *Queen Mary 2* are being granted 'letters of equivalency'.

Security

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) International Ships and Port Facilities Regulations (ISPS) came into force on 1 July 2004. This has already led to ships either being turned away from ports or being detained.

Physical port security is now attracting much attention following 9/11. Electronic equipment now in use includes sonars, ROVs and command and control. Military installations, LNG and cruise ship terminals and Iraqi ports demand particular attention. The US Coastguard has received a considerable boost (*NR* Aug '03) and is now operated by the Department of Homeland Security.

And some last thoughts

A Captain's Bridge Chair has been designed to enable the Captain or OOW in commercial vessels to operate, by himself, all aspects of the propulsion system, in conjunction with an integrated bridge system. Lieut. Cdr Coxon's article – 'OOW, you have control' (*NR* May '03) – seems relevant but makes life on the bridge lonely. Complement reductions?

A Russian army landing craft has been converted into a floating church on the River Volga. Another opening for the MoD Disposals Services Agency?

R. B. BERRY
COMMANDER RN

Book Reviews – II

THE ROYAL NAVY SINCE 1815: A NEW SHORT HISTORY

by ERIC J. GROVE

(Palgrave Macmillan – £16.99 pb)

ISBN 0 3337 2126 80

How timely. Just as one puts down Nicholas Rodger's second volume, the pressing need to fill the last 200 years of the Royal Navy's history is answered. While we wait for Professor Rodger to complete his magnificent project, and wait we must, this new book will hold the field as the best study of the subject. It will also offer some strong, well developed themes for those who follow. Eric Grove will need no introduction to readers of this journal: his career has kept him in close contact with the service for three decades. Despite this his enthusiasm for the Royal Navy shines through as strong as ever. Much important new work on this period has appeared in the last two decades, of which Eric himself has produced a goodly proportion. His expertise informs both the later chapters and his handling of work by other experts. But this is no mere text book: it contains original and carefully developed arguments that transcend the details and ensure a thought provoking read. The key themes that underpin the narrative are policy and procurement, technology, operations and personnel as filtered through the political and economic demands of the state. Examining these issues as integral parts of the policy process across a long period ensures the underlying continuities of naval policy are clear: deterrence, sea control, power projection, policing functions and alliance building keep recurring. Consequently apparent highlights like administrative reform, technical change and the odd disaster become less significant. Controversial episodes like the l981 Nott review are revisited, and a persuasive case made for the relative unimportance of the Falklands to post-1982 naval development.

It is also bang up to date. History does not stop, and Eric's ability to analyse the underlying issues before the archives were opened made his *Vanguard to Trident* a remarkable demonstration of how to integrate archive based and contemporary history. This book allows him to bring the story up to date, although all too briefly. A new edition of *Vanguard* is surely necessary? It remains the definitive history of the post-war navy. Eric ends on a high note, but not without a warning. The current inter-operable, interventionist environment is tailor made for a naval expansion. The need to build in flexibility and to ensure that the other services are on board is emphasised by the experience of post-war marginalisation and decline.

One must hope that those who have such things in their control will ensure that this handy text is placed alongside BR1806 in the intellectual equipment of all new officers. It is brief, sticks to the point, combines fast paced narrative with rewarding analysis, and should persuade the doubters that the past is a powerful tool in the naval armoury. Those who might dispute the point are referred to the concise, illuminating handling of the l960s carrier controversy. For too long the Royal Navy has been careless of its past: a past more glorious, and more informative than that of any other Navy, Army or Air Force. Perhaps in the 21st century it might be persuaded to own that past. It is curious that while every other navy across the globe commemorates its great admirals by naming major warships in their honour Britain has managed without a *Nelson* at sea since l947. Would living up to the past be too great a burden for the modern service?

Nothing the Navy will be called on to do in the 21st century will be without precedent. As Captain Sherard Osborn observed: 'the probabilities are, that the day for fleet actions on the high seas has gone by: and that fleets will in future be used at strategical points upon their own or their enemies coasts' (p.52). Osborn's point is as true today as it was when he wrote it: in the mid l860s. But, as ever, much has changed in the interval. While this country depends on overseas trade and investments for wealth, safety and strength it will require a first class Navy.

A rare treat; compulsory and compelling.

ANDREW LAMBERT
King's College, London

DOWN TO THE SEA IN SHIPS
by CHRIS WEST
(West Publications, Halifax Nova Scotia;
$30 Canadian plus postage from
Mr C. West FRINA, 1041 Wellington Street
Unit 403, Halifax NS B3H 4P5, Canada)

The author is a member of *The Naval Review*, and if a member is the author of a privately-published book, where is he most entitled to a review?

But any member who cares to follow up this review may find there is more to it than that. This 180-page paperback describes a varied and enterprising life, all indeed in the service of ships and the sea. Born a doctor's son in 1923, Chris West was a Special Entry Cadet in 1941 and served in the widest variety of ships, from HMS *Queen Elizabeth* to an ex-Norwegian whalecatcher and, eventually, 'S' class submarines. After the war he became a naval architect and worked worldwide, his greatest successes being in the tropical Far East where his guidance and initiatives produced important results.

What this modestly-told tale most brings home is the contribution that resourceful individuals can still make in what sometimes appears an increasingly conformist, corporatist world. 'Inspiration' may be too strong a word; 'example' is certainly appropriate, in big letters.

RICHARD HILL

LIFE AT FULL THROTTLE
by Admiral SIR JOHN TREACHER
(Pen & Sword – £19.99)
ISBN 1 8441 5134 4

I never served with Admiral Treacher, but he certainly had the reputation as a 'doer', with not much time for wafflers or yes-men. Much of his early career in the Navy was in the Fleet Air Arm; he flew on operations in the Korean War, for instance. His promotion was rapid, and he became Commander-in-Chief Fleet at the age of 51, as a full admiral. To the great surprise of many in the Service, he decided to retire after his time as C-in-C, to pursue a business career. He was quite determined to find a hot seat and a hands-on position. His first job was with National Car Parks, where he was invited to study the organisation and propose changes. He threw himself into the various tasks with much enthusiasm, and clearly gained a lot of experience, as well as forming many useful contacts.

His second position, after some difficulties in finding the 'right' post, raised not a few eyebrows. He became the Chairman and Chief Executive of the casino operations of the Playboy Corporation. He took up his duties in June 1981 (he was then 57) and worked with them for some years. But earlier he had accepted a non-executive seat on the board of Westland Helicopters, and it was with Westland that he devoted most of his time and energy after parting company with Playboy. Westland went through very difficult times, and his account of the events where he was intimately involved is arguably the best part of the book. Even today, in his early 80s, he has many business and charitable interests in the UK, the US and continental Europe.

This book is his memoirs written, as it were, 'straight from the shoulder'. While he pays handsome tribute to various people who helped him, I doubt if any words he wrote were changed substantially. How can I judge it as a book? I found much of the early part of it disappointing; it is a factual report on his various appointments, mentioning the many people he worked with and for, but with only few comments, opinions or insights. To a certain extent it is inevitable that. if you are going to give a summary of a service life, much of what you write, and the names of people you mention, will mean little to the general reader. Maybe this part would have been more attractive to read if he had allowed himself to be more controversial!

It was clearly a major decision when, as C-in-C Fleet, he wrote to the First Sea Lord stating that he did not wish to be considered for any further appointments, although he must have known that his chances of further advancement were good. He is quite open here, writing: 'At the age of 52 I had served nearly 35 years in the Navy, many of them devoted to the Fleet Air Arm . . . I believed I had fifteen to twenty working years ahead of me, with a young family to support. If a change of direction was to take place it had to be now.'

He devoted as much energy to his business interests as he had to the Navy, and was

quickly able to be on a par with experienced businessmen, and to make his presence felt. The great difficulties encountered in Westland, and the tortuous negotiations conducted worldwide, frequently by him, form – as I suggest above – the most interesting part of the book. This chapter has the intriguing title 'Rotating the World', but did Westland win the long drawn-out battle? I'm not sure if there really was a winner; it is gripping reading, however, and various politicians come out of it badly.

But (and it is a big 'but') the memoirs of one man cannot possibly embrace all the aspects of a very complicated international situation, primarily the relations between Westland, the government of the day and many overseas groups. His comments and opinions are well worthwhile, but are not the whole story.

After leaving Westlands, he finishes with just three pages of 'Reflections'. He has trenchant opinions on, for example, the European Union and identity cards; get the book and read them for yourself!

H. L. FOXWORTHY
COMMANDER, RN

STRIKE FROM THE SEA
The Royal Navy and US Navy at War in the Middle East
1949-2003

by IAIN BALLANTYNE
(Pen & Sword – £19.99)
ISBN 1 8441 5059 3

Iain Ballantyne's history of the RN and USN's participation in the Gulf wars since 1949 is an intelligent departure from the norm. Deftly written, and in a style that is more personal than detached, it demonstrates not only an assured knowledge of the subject but also the author's liking and respect for the maritime community. In it he explains, in simple terms, the reasons behind the deployment of the British and American Navies East of Suez in the post-Second World War period – how they respond to various disputes down the decades, from the Abadan crisis of 1951, the Suez debacle 1956, the Tanker War of the 1980s, confronting Libya, DESERT STORM in 1991 and the post-September 11 War on Terrorism. Finally, he analyses the Iraq War of 2003 that deposed Saddam Hussein.

The most recent conflicts have a clear connection with the British colonial past and the United States' policies in the Middle East. In the earliest incident, Iain Ballantyne describes how the Royal Navy's presence provided calm during the Abadan crisis of 1951 when the Iranian Prime Minister, Dr Mohammed Mossadegh, nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Notwithstanding the age of some of the vessels involved – more akin to the imperial policing roles of the Victorian era – their activity provided hope to the British and foreign oil workers during a period of tension that lasted for four years and included an attempted coup in 1953. It was the Abadan crisis that would have given heart to the Egyptian leader Abdel Nasser who, following his coup of 1952, seized control of the Suez Canal in 1956. Under pressure from the UN and the US, the British and French backed down from military intervention, but only after a remarkable moment in British history – the first mass helicopter assault from the sea in the face of enemy fire. The first incident involving Kuwait occurred in 1961, when, following his bloody coup against the pro-British government in Iraq, the dictator Abdel Qasim attempted to annex Kuwait. The Naval force that mustered included aircraft carriers, frigates, minesweepers and Royal Marines, and was key to providing and sustaining the force that persuaded the Iraqis to back down. The subsequent incidents we are more familiar with, but the historical background puts them clearly into context.

Not only providing interest from the historical perspective, the book charts how capability has developed in response to geographical demands, as well as those from the enemy. We learn, for instance, that it was the *Tribal* Class frigates, ready from the early 60s, that were purpose built for service East of Suez having, amongst other innovations, air conditioning. But it is the importance of the aircraft carrier in these operations that comes across most emphatically. As the book's introduction states, 'it is clear that naval forces, and aircraft carriers in particular, have been decisive throughout the decades, especially as the Gulf region is often politically and culturally hostile to the

presence of large numbers of Western Troops on the ground'. This sentiment is particularly timely, as the battles for and against the new carrier continue to rage within the MoD.

A further strength of the book, in addition to its easily digestible style, is in the range of its personal accounts and photographs. As a defence journalist and now editor of 'Warships IFR', the author has had frequent and privileged access to many of the ships and personnel involved in the crises since 1990. Each provides further insight to the situation of the time and is easily associated with the account.

This is a book for those both comfortable and unfamiliar with the subject – the historian, the capability watcher, the casual military observer – but, most importantly, it provides a timely reminder of the continued indispensable utility of maritime power, and particularly aircraft carriers in expeditionary warfare. Those in the battle for resources can take some comfort.

MARTIN EWENCE
COMMANDER, RN

THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT TWENTY YEARS ON: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

edited by STEPHEN BADSEY, ROB HAVERS and MARK GROVE

(Frank Cass – price not quoted)
ISBN 0 4153 5029 8

The genesis of this book was a conference at RMA Sandhurst in June 2002. Britannia RNC Dartmouth was closely involved in the preparation and running of the conference and one of the editors is on the Dartmouth staff.

People who have been at such conferences (as your reviewer was in this instance), and then read the conference book, are inclined to wonder whether the two are related in any but the most superficial way. The subject matter is broadly the same, and the names of the more striking protagonists are familiar, but did X really say Y in front of the audience? Even after a time lapse of two and a half years, can one's memory be that defective? The answer is, I guess, threefold. First, speakers are usually asked to present a shortened version of their papers, and the detail is left out, to be reproduced when the book is published. Second, quite a lot gets added to texts afterwards – maybe in light of subsequent reasoning or information, maybe as a result of discussion in the margins of the conference itself. Third, yes of course, memory can be deficient or selective.

Much, therefore, probably has been added in the course of production of this book. And – here comes memory again – a lot has been left out. In particular, there has been no attempt to chronicle the discussion period that followed each paper or set of papers. For many, that is the most interesting part of any conference; the speaker's competence in meeting challenges (however courteously addressed) to his or her facts and reasoning. In this particular conference those discussions were both lively and germane. I'll bet that the abiding recollection, for many of the participants, was the part played by one journalist who dominated large slabs of the business; yet there are no references in the text to anything he said, and the index contains only three passing references to a book written by him. There were, also, workshops on specialised aspects of the conflict, and no record from them could be detected – though it may be that some of the papers in the book were prepared for workshops at which your reviewer was not present.

Does it matter? Yes it does; if conferences are to have full value, all participation ought to be acknowledged, and it can be done, given skilful rapporteurs.

What is left is, nevertheless, a book that stands in its own right as a valuable 300-page volume. We have telling insights into the political process, both at the start of and in the management of the war: most striking is the part that personalities played. That too is apparent in the military aspects. The absolutely critical contribution to resolve played by Sir Henry Leach at the start, and by Sir Terence Lewin later, as well as the huge professionalism of all three services, are well displayed. There is a great deal about command organisation that has lessons for joint operations in the 21st century, and about logistics in the new expeditionary environment. One note that seemed a bit false was the frequent reference to the pre-Falklands RN as a 'Cold War anti-submarine

force for the North East Atlantic'. Do they really think the naval staff were that naïve? Another matter of some contention is the strategic effect of the Vulcan attack on the Port Stanley runway at the start of the war; indeed two contributors seem to differ diametrically on that. But on one aspect no doubt all can agree: it was a political thunderclap.

As is made clear, it took another 10 years, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to restore a proper appreciation of strategic balance and the worth of sea power in it, but the Falklands – as many contributions to this book generously acknowledge – did much to start thinking back towards the eternal verities. In spite of the criticisms above, the book has many telling things to say.

RICHARD HILL

RN FRIGATES IN FOCUS

by LIEUT. CDR BEN WARLOW RN
(Maritime Books – £14.95)
ISBN 1 9044 5903 X

This little book is one of a series that presents a photographic record of Royal Naval warships. Unpretentious, simply presented with a brief factual commentary, it paints a story that spans just over half a century of the development of frigates. It illustrates very well the earlier classes that grew out of the destroyers and escorts of the Second World War and has some particularly splendid photographs of the earlier ships. The author's brief introduction gives a concise history of their development, and thereafter it is over to the photographs themselves to speak to the reader. The notes are descriptive, but they vary in information: interesting in parts but frustrating in others. For example, the growth in size of tonnage and the reduction in numbers of crew display the remarkable development of this class, yet these statistics are largely lacking. However, the evolution from tiny escorts to near light cruisers at the end of the century is visually most apparent in this book, together with the increasing sophistication of weaponry and sensors.

The joy of this series lies in poring over the photographs and studying the details they reveal. Fifty-plus years of history is wrapped up in them, and the shrinkage of the fleet from hundreds of escorts to just a couple of dozen by the end of the last century is noticeable. Highly capable but few in number, where will this form of warship be in 10 years' time?

R. J. LIPPIETT
REAR ADMIRAL

BRITAIN, NATO AND THE LESSONS OF THE BALKAN CONFLICTS 1991-1999

edited by STEPHEN BADSEY and PAUL LATAWSKI
(Frank Cass – £20.99)
ISBN 0 7146 8192 X

The contemporary focus of military attention is on events in Iraq. But for most of the 1990s it was closer to home, in the Balkans.

A book that examines our experiences in the Balkans and seeks to draw lessons from them is therefore welcome. It ought to be timely as well, but unfortunately it is not. This book, published in 2004, contains the proceedings of a conference held at Sandhurst five years ago. Much of its content, including an Introduction by Geoff Hoon, has not been updated. Notwithstanding the delays and frustrations that authors and editors often experience in getting books published promptly, this is far too long a delay. A work published in 2004 should reflect the greater time available for considered judgment about the period in question, and not just the first impressions available in early 2000.

This is also an unbalanced volume. Kosovo receives much more attention than the earlier involvement in Bosnia, and those who served in the Adriatic during the '90s will be disappointed to find no mention whatever of maritime operations, other than a passing reference to *Splendid*'s Tomahawk strikes. Turning a conference into a book requires very careful editorial attention and whilst there is plenty of good material here, overall it does not add up to a satisfactory work in its own right.

Two early chapters examine the historical background and debunk several myths concerning the effectiveness of the partisans in the Second World War, and the implications for intervention of the Yugoslav terrain. This reviewer found this section much the most interesting. A fairly comprehensive review of the Kosovo air campaign is also

good, contributed by airman turned academic, airpower enthusiast Tony Mason.

Media operations also get plenty of attention, including a piece by Jamie Shea who readers will recall was NATO's chief spokesman at the time. The issue of differing national ROEs is discussed, noting that British forces were not allowed to use lethal force to protect property, but US, French and Italian forces were. An interesting doctrinal point is made by Major General Dannatt who commanded 3 Division in Kosovo, when he talks about 'Manoeuvre Peacekeeping' and appeals for a single cohesive military doctrine applicable to all missions.

Charles Dick of RMA Sandhurst makes an important point when he notes that economic prosperity is not a panacea for ethnic and religious conflict: 'It is impossible to force communities to live together in harmony when they do not want to.' This is a very important lesson and one that flies in the face of the universal presumption in favour of maintaining existing international borders.

This is a worthwhile contribution to the history of the Kosovo campaign, less so the other Balkan conflicts. Preserving authoritative conference material is important, but it does not always make for a book worth having for its own sake. Look for it in a library if you want to know more.

J. R. STOCKER
LIEUT. CDR, RNR

BRITAIN, AMERICA AND ANTI-COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA 1945-53: THE INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

by ANDREW DEFTY
(Routledge – £65)
ISBN 0 7146 5443 4

This is an admirable book on an important subject, and all the better for being commendably brief. It is based on the official papers now available in the National Archive on the foundation of the Information Research Department (the IRD) in 1948 and its policy direction up to 1953. As such it provides part (though only part) of the information dimension of the Cold War, and of the lessons we can now draw from it.

Previous writers have tended to give the IRD a bad press, as a tool of the CIA and American Cold War warriors, and an example of covert news management in the post-1945 'garrison state'. Dr Defty neatly disposes of most of the associated myths. The IRD was not an uncontrolled Cold War irregular; it was created by the Labour Cabinet as a considered response to the USSR's worldwide propaganda campaign against the West, and operated as a Foreign Office department under close political and official control. It was not engaged in Black Propaganda. It sought to influence opinion-formers overseas, and sometimes at home, with well-researched and accurate material about communist activities, and issued this output without attribution in order to have greater impact than if it had been identified with government's special pleading. It cooperated closely with the comparable American efforts, but on equal terms and usually with differing emphasis.

Defty also brings out the issues of politico-strategic Cold War policy that this role presented. Soft power like any other power has to be used with an aim, but was Britain to use the IRD to seek détente with the Soviet Union, or its collapse? Was it to limit itself to combating Soviet influence in the West and the Third World, or should it aim to hearten resistance to the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe, or go further and loosen the regime's hold within the USSR itself? The book clearly describes the shifts in the IRD's direction as the Cold War became institutionised by 1953. We may feel with hindsight that Britain could have been more consistent in its information policy, and perhaps lacked conviction in it: the IRD grew quickly after its foundation but was already being cut back by 1953, and was eventually disbanded in 1977. Nevertheless, the main impression from this account is of an admirable government initiative, and a sensible pragmatism in directing it in the complexities and dangers of the Cold War. I doubt if we would do any better today.

Yet the parallels are close. We live, again, under threat. If there is a war with terrorism, it is partly a battle of ideas, but we hear very little about it. What is the current British information effort within it? Is its aim defensive, to contain terrorism and support for

it and wait for them to burn out, or to advance the competing ideology of liberal democracy? Does Britain have a distinctive input, or is its message submerged in America's?

This book is the best sort of history that encourages us to learn from it and ask questions about the present. I hope Dr Defty will soon flesh it out with further parts of the IRD story.

MICHAEL HERMAN

RED STAR UNDER THE BALTIC
by VICTOR KORZH
Translated by Clare Burstall and Vladimir Kisselnikov
(Pen and Sword Maritime – £19.99)
ISBN 1 8441 5138 7

For those of us unfamiliar with the part played by Russian submarines in the Baltic during the Great Patriotic War (WWII), this book draws back a veil.

A concise foreword by Rear Admiral Kozlev sets the scene. The subsequent narrative is principally concerned with the adventures and misadventures of three Russian submarines and their three separate patrols. The author, Victor Korzh, an engineer officer, participated in all three patrols.

'Red Star' is no 'Das Boot'; it is a more prosaic telling of the stupendous challenges confronted by the Soviet Baltic submarines. From the relative safety of the River Neva, within besieged Leningrad, the submarines sailed either by night, or in the long summer hours of daylight, under the protection of smoke screens. To reach the open Baltic, beyond the Gulf of Finland, they had to run the gauntlet of bombardment by the German artillery along the southern shore, German-laid minefields, aerial attacks, and anti-submarine nets. The Germans' priority was to keep Russia's Baltic submarines bottled up in the Gulf of Finland. They failed, but inflicted a terrible toll.

Even before their sailings from Leningrad the submariners' problems in preparing their boats for sea were daunting. During the winter of 1942, Leningrad was short of almost all commodities necessary for survival. The temperature was often –25º or less. In these conditions, the submarine sailors, cold and hungry, had to cross the city to collect or scavenge spare parts from iced-up railway sidings, from derelict factories, and from the shells of bombed-out power stations. To shift the equipment to the submarine's berth, the sailors loaded it onto railway wagons and pushed the wagons to the dockside.

'Red star' was written in 1966 – the Brezhnev era: understandably, the book has a 'censored' feel about it. 'Stalin's rules' still applied, so the late Victor Korzh (he died in 1993; the book was translated in 2004) would have to have been most careful in what he wrote.

Not only were the Russian submarines being hunted by Germany's anti-submarine forces, but also by the Finns. Between 1942 and 1944 Finnish submarines sank three Russian submarines. All too often the Red submarines' surfaced night-attacks on German convoys, and subsequent emergency dives, led to heavy depth-charge counter-attacks. Where these attacks were not fatal, they caused severe damage, ranging from battery flooding (with the resultant escape of choking chlorine gas), through destruction of the gyro compass, the breakdown of the boats' sonar, to the jamming of the after-hydroplanes.

Victor Korzh relates the names of every one of the many officers and ratings mentioned in his narrative. So much so, that we are given the name of the sailor who is 'asked' to change a light bulb. Revealing is his apparent acceptance of the statutory Commissar, who is always there at the commanding officer's elbow, or attending impromptu 'Soviets' in the sailors' messes.

Pity that the only chart or map is an unhelpful one of Leningrad. If you want to know where Suursaari Island is – the Russian forward operating base – you'll have to reach for your atlas.

The author gives us detailed information about the defects that occur whilst at sea and the crew's heroic work in repairing them. He also gives a frank account of the boats' successes and failures in attacking the enemy. What the telling lacks is a sufficient description of the context in which the Russian Baltic submarines were fighting.

It is rare to be given the chance to read a first-hand (translated) account by a Russian of

their war at sea; 'Red Star under the Baltic' is certainly worth reading.

SELBANEV

FORGOTTEN VOICES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWO IN THE WORDS OF THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO WERE THERE

MAX ARTHUR in association with the Imperial War Museum

(Ebury Press – £19.99)

ISBN 0 0918 9734 3

This book is a sequel to *Forgotten Voices of the Great War* and is based on taped interviews held in the Imperial War Museum's Sound Archive. With thousands of taped interviews to use, Max Arthur has set himself the challenging task of drawing a picture of what the Second World War was like for those with first hand experience of it. It must have been a monumental task, to select the extracts to be used, check them for historical accuracy, and, in so doing, Max Arthur is aware of the problems. In his Preface he states that

> 'What I have sought to do is to capture the experiences and atmosphere of the Second World War: the waiting, the preparation, the action and the consequences of those actions. Some of these accounts are raw and horrific, others more matter of fact or reflective. They all have their place in the tapestry of war.'

Each year between 1939 and 1945 is preceded by a short history, with further explanations of campaigns included when the author felt it necessary. Naval events do not predominate: this is a book that aims to cover all theatres, and all aspects of the war.

Inevitably, there are almost inconsequential points that capture the imagination. In the first chapter, *1939*, all of the stories about evacuation were fascinating to me and held my attention. And throughout the book, within the first hand accounts of battles and campaigns which I had already read about elsewhere, there were others: Wing Commander Lucian Ercolani's account on page 251 of hunting a leopard at the behest of some villagers, for example. Had he ever dreamed that his war service would include that? Or, on page 302, Lieutenant-Colonel Otway's account of trying to convince two German soldiers that he and his men were actually British soldiers, not SS men dressed in British uniforms, on exercises.

This is a book full of human insight and experience not found in some of the weightier histories. For example, two that I was really interested in followed on from each other. Both describe an incident that occurred in the Battle of Arnhem and illustrate the danger, and the attraction, of reading primary accounts of historical events.

On page 355, Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost of the 2nd Parachute Battalion is describing the increasingly difficult situation he and his men were finding themselves in at Arnhem, short of water and ammunition and under fire from a German 150mm gun:

> '. . . During the day the Germans sent back to us, under a white flag of truce, one of our sappers, Stan Halliwell, who had been captured. He told me the Germans had sent him on trust to ask if I would meet the German commander under the bridge to discuss surrender terms. I said to him, "That's complete nonsense, there's no question of that." He then said, "Well, sir, what shall I do – do I have to go back and tell them that, or can I stay and fight?" I told him to stay and fight and that they'd get the message anyway!'

Corporal Stan Halliwell, of the 1st Parachute Squadron, Royal Engineers, remembers things slightly differently. After surrendering to the Germans, he recalls that they sent him back to Colonel Frost with a message.

> 'I agreed to go but at every corner I came to, some bugger fired at me. Eventually I found Colonel Frost and delivered the message. He said, "Well, if you go back, tell them to go to hell." So I thought, "I'm not going back to tell them that," so I stayed.'

Does the difference in accounts matter? And does it detract from the narrative? I think not in this instance.

I could detail many other accounts, including the savage defence of Kohima and Imphal, or the impressions of British medical

students entering Belsen, but it becomes difficult choosing what actually to mention. Suffice to say that this is a book that I think any student of the Second World War will enjoy.

In his Introduction, Sir Martin Gilbert points out that whilst the 'voices' are predominantly British, there are others, including a German schoolgirl and a Japanese officer, as well as numerous British and Commonwealth servicemen and women. I think that this was one of the weaknesses of the book; I felt that they were so infrequent that they sat oddly in the volume as a whole. There should have been more, or none, in my opinion. This still didn't stop me feeling slightly in awe of these men and women, and what they had experienced and endured.

Would I recommend this book to readers of *The Naval Review*? Definitely.

ANDREW FIELD

HITLER'S GREY WOLVES

by LAWRENCE PATERSON

(Greenhill Books – £19.99)
ISBN 1 8536 7615 2

Some time ago, I reviewed another book by this author entitled *First U-Boat Flotilla* and applauded the amount of research that Paterson had undertaken in interviewing surviving protagonists from the Flotilla in order to write a lengthy and very readable book about a mass of unembellished facts. I complained of the lack of sufficient maps to support the text and wondered why, if the Kriegsmarine's well known subdivision of ocean areas into easily referenced squares was used so much by the author, a chart of those squares was not provided. All the same criticisms and observations apply to this latest book. To the professional submariner, it early becomes clear that the terminologies used by the author to describe submarine activities mark him out as not being one – while that does not matter; the use throughout the book of the name 'Malaysia' in the context of a story unfolding some 18 years before that name was 'coined' along with reference to 'Jahore', will upset Far East Bores.

This is a well written book, well illustrated – not least with previously unpublished photographs from the personal collection of the CO of U861 – with factual appendices, list of source material and comprehensive chapter notes. The U-boat operations east of the Cape are factually documented in many earlier books. With the war in the Atlantic going badly for the Germans thanks to the convoy system, the allies' reading of German signal traffic, the continually improving allied airborne radars and the closing of the mid-atlantic Air Gap, the early success of German surface raiders in the Indian Ocean and the prospect of easy interruption of oil supplies from the Gulf being sailed independently through poorly patrolled seas, offered Dönitz a chance to redress the balance and cause the draw down of assets from other theatres. Paterson describes all this in great detail, documenting the operations of most of the boats that operated off South Africa, in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and ultimately from Penang and, occasionally, from Surabaya. He includes the contribution made by Italian submarines operating from their base in Bordeaux – interesting in itself as these boats belonged to a partner who changed allegiance part way through – and also, briefly, the transport operations of the large Japanese submarines carrying raw materials and personnel to France for the German war effort. Throughout, the tenacity, endurance and courage of the U-boat crews, not to mention the frugality of their lives and the frequent need to improvise as plans collapsed, are remarkable. In some cases, up to 150 days at sea in 1,200-ton un-airconditioned boats in tropical waters: in all cases, sailing from European ports against an enemy who has 'broken' the sailing signal, at least intercepted the mid-ocean fuelling rendezvous signals and, more likely, sunk the U-boat tanker on station before the thirsty customer arrived: sailing to an uncertain situation in the Indian Ocean with but rare opportunities to replenish, and any such fraught with danger from better-than-expected antisubmarine patrols, in order, finally, to arrive at a new operating base under the overall control of an ally who turned out to be something less than the helpful ally such a situation demanded, called for unusual fortitude – and most of them had it. Add to all that the fact that some early success in this theatre soon gave way to an unsustainable

equation of huge effort for pitifully small reward and one might understand why no one has previously thought such an unimportant campaign worth recording in this detail. Read this book and you will become an expert on the subject.

A reviewer is necessarily critical and I have minimised my criticisms above. There are many more statements made by the author with which I might have argued. Nevertheless, or possibly because of that, I do recommend this book for its comprehensiveness, readability, its account of operating in these very different conditions, the detailed character portraits of the major players and the implied tribute it pays to brave men who gave so much for almost nothing and, mostly, got scant thanks for it.

CHARLES NIXON-ECKERSALL,
CAPTAIN, RN

THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH 'U' CLASS SUBMARINE
by DEREK WALTERS
(Pen & Sword Maritime 2004 – hardback £19.94)
ISBN 1 8441 5131 X

Factors affecting British submarine design 'between the wars' (1919-1939) ranged from the government's wish 'to abolish the submarine', expressed at the disarmament conferences, through the enthusiasm of gunnery officers for submersibles armed with 12-inch guns (as monitors) or 6-inch guns (as cruisers), to the need for submarines to hold the Japanese battlefleet in check until the 'one-power standard' British battlefleet could get to the Far East. Underlying these ditherings was the fact that, as Roskill put it: 'the development of the submarine and the aircraft had, although comparatively few naval men realised it in 1921, totally changed the concept of seapower; and the capital ships over which the naval advisers wrangled so protractedly at Washington were already obsolescent'.

It was not until the end of the 1920s that officers who had commanded submarines in World War I could reach flag rank and it was Rear-Admiral Noel F. Laurence KCB DSO who, as RA(S), stated the requirement for a 'Small, Simple Submarine for Anti-submarine Training'. This was the genesis of the 'U' class. Designed originally to be unarmed 'clockwork mice' , as the war-clouds gathered it was deemed prudent to incorporate an armament of four internal and two external torpedo tubes and a 3-inch gun. The first three of the class, *Undine*, *Unity* and *Ursula*, were completed in 1938. On 3 September 1939 12 more 'U' class boats were ordered, but with welded hulls and minus the two external torpedo-tubes, owing to the difficulty in so small a boat of retaining trim while discharging a salvo of six torpedoes. With repeat orders throughout World War II, a total of 49 'U' class and 23 of the slightly larger 'V' class were completed, of which 15 were transferred to Britain's Allies. It is to a lively description of the operations of these boats, both British and Allied, that Derek Walters's book is devoted, with illustrations (but sadly no charts) to match.

It has been said that 'chronology is the soul of history' and in that sense this book has no soul. For example in Chapter II, 'British submarines in Home Waters', the first 'U' class success, when *Ursula* sank a German torpedo-boat in December 1939, is followed a few pages later by the unique achievement of *Venturer* in February 1945 which, while fully submerged, torpedoed *U864*, also fully submerged. Again, Chapter VI begins with the loan of HMS *Urchin* (renamed *Sokol*) to the Poles in January 1941; a few pages on comes the sinking of *U974* by the Norwegian *Ula* (ex-*P66*) in April 1944, then the arrival at Algiers late in 1943 of the Free French *Curie* (ex-*P67*). More important, however, than exciting episodes – except to those taking part – is the amount of damage inflicted upon the enemy. Although the 'scores' of individual boats have now been reliably established (cf Hezlet, *British and Allied Submarines in World War II*) Walters does not make use of this data. Remarkably, for COs who sank 20,000grt or more, the figures were 'U' class (six COs) 248,947grt; for 'T' class (seven COs) 221,272grt; and for 'S' class (two COs) 57,029grt. As to warships torpedoed (not all of them were sunk) the 'U' class hit one battleship, eight cruisers, seven destroyers or escorts and nine U-boats; the 'T' class hit six cruisers, two destroyers or escorts and 11

U-boats; and the 'S' class hit one pocket-battleship, two cruisers, four destroyers or escorts and seven U-boats. The 'Small, Simple Submarine for Anti-submarine Training' did not do so badly.

By contrast a new 'U' class, lead ship *Upholder*, built in the 1980s, combined the most advanced hull design, sonics and torpedo armament with diesel-electric propulsion. Now under Canadian ownership and renamed, it is ironic that their primary peacetime role is to act as 'clockwork mice' for the anti-submarine training of NATO's nuclear-powered submarines; no doubt if war came these boats would, like the Royal Navy's WWII 'U' class, discomfit the enemy more than somewhat.

IAN MCGEOCH

ANOTHER PLACE, ANOTHER TIME

by WERNER HIRSCHMANN
(with Donald Graves)
(Chatham Publishing – £20)
ISBN 1 8969 4138 9

From age 10 in 1933, it was the author's ambition to be a German Naval Officer and, specifically, an Engineer Officer. The war both directed his career down unchosen paths and severely curtailed it. Largely apolitical, Hirschmann like most of his contemporaries, supported Hitler and, therefore, the National Socialist Party, as the saviour of his demoralised country. He makes no bones about this and maintained his allegiance until the end.

Thankfully for your reviewer, this is not 'another book about U-boats'. This is a unique book, bullied from Hirschmann some 55 years after the times described, about a German submariner and it is a delight to read. It includes a veritable feast of previously unseen photographs and many of these are gathered into a 30-page pictorial tour of both the exterior and interior of a Type IXC/40 long range U-boat – the most informative and welcome descriptive essay.

Not a book about the wider war or the U-boat-Waffe, a book about the author. In their turn, the training of young officer recruits, aspiring engineers, then submarine engineers are all described as undergone and remembered by the author. At all stages his own enthusiasms and confidence, along with occasional misgivings, are clearly recorded. He recalls war service in La Spezia (sunshine, chianti and ice cream) followed by time in a training flotilla in the Baltic, then appointment to U190 and an operational posting at last, the strains, risks and relaxations associated with running out of Lorient – the last justified by the first two – his return to Germany with the boat after the evacuation of the French Atlantic ports, more parties and burgeoning romance in battered Berlin, the last patrol of U190 up to her surrender to Canadian forces in May 1945 off Newfoundland. He recounts his 29 months as a POW in Canada and his eventual return to Germany and marriage to the girl who waited.

It is all very personal, never sickly and, as the author admits, at such a remove, it is mostly the 'good' bits that get remembered. Nevertheless, his honest accounting of life in a submarine – even in wartime, largely boring! – and his unembellished descriptions of people with whom he served, both those liked and the others, ring a very true peal throughout this book. No axes are ground and his 50 years living in Canada have not dulled his interests in matters naval. I am quite confident that all who have served in submarines at any time will really enjoy this book and probably so, too, will anyone with an interest in what it is that makes people want to follow their career choice through both good times and bad. Thoroughly recommended.

CHARLES NIXON-ECKERSALL
CAPTAIN, RN

THE IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM BOOK OF 1914
The men who went to war

by MALCOLM BROWN
(Sidgwick & Jackson – £20)
ISBN 0 2830 7323 3

This is not the first book about the opening months of the 1914-18 War, and with their Centenary only 10 years hence won't be the last. But the author, having written a number of IWM books concerning that conflict, expects this to be *his* last – the culmination of 15 years' work, substantially in the museum's Department of Documents.

He finishes at 'the beginning' because 1914

was the supremely dramatic year of the Great War, perhaps of the whole 20th century. Such a war had been anticipated for years, yet almost everyone was unprepared when 'an obscure act of political terrorism' caused uneasy post-Napoleonic Europe – then the world's political and economic centre – to explode in a conflict of great thrusts and counter-thrusts during which several hundreds of thousands of soldiers died, and at least as many civilians fled their homes. Most people expected it would be concluded as swiftly as the Franco-Prussian War had been – but this time France was supported by Russia and Britain, forcing Germany to fight on two European fronts *and* believe she must have a large navy. Germany over-reached, and could not repeat the swift and decisive victories of 1870. By Christmas 1914 the main protagonists had fought to a standstill but none would concede the prospect was of a protracted, bloody (and muddy) slugging-match.

Britain's available land forces – the small but highly professional British (Army) Expeditionary Force and the scratch Royal Naval Division – were flung into the melée in Belgium and Northern France, and shattered there, but not before the BEF (joined in October 1914 by the Indian Corps – a portent of subsequent British domestic and imperial developments) had been instrumental in stemming the German onslaught. And though he summarises events at home and worldwide it is with the BEF, and to a lesser extent the RN Division, that the author is largely concerned. He argues persuasively that British intervention in the European land war was decisive – largely on account of the quality of the BEF – in denying the Germans a quick victory. For better or worse therefore, and largely unwittingly, *British* actions in 1914 determined the nature and duration of the Great War.

Is there really anything new here? Malcolm Brown thinks so, and skilfully incorporates many personal accounts only recently available to scholars into a broadly-sketched story. He provides an excellent concise history of Britain's land war in 1914, illuminated with the thoughts and experiences of a variety of participants. The dust jacket might cause one to dismiss this as another unremarkable book about the British Army on the Western Front but inside is an admirable work – scholarly yet readable, insightful and informative, which neatly summarises a very complex story. My only substantial criticism is that the author, having in his own words 'long wished' to write about the doomed expedition to Antwerp, should have said more about the maritime-strategic reasoning behind it. This was *not* a sideshow, or Churchillian 'dabbling' in the land war, but part of a broader naval effort to deny the Germans control of the Belgian coast (and especially the Brugge-Zeebrugge-Ostend 'triangle'). As with the Norwegian campaign of 1940 one may criticise pre-war leaders for not making adequate preparation, but in the circumstances the Admiralty had little choice but to intervene.

But this book is less about Strategy and Operations than individuals' parts in them. In that respect I believe it should be a model for authors writing subsequent popular histories of any aspect of the British experience during and after 1914. It is also well-presented and reasonably priced – worthy of an admirable museum which adheres to its original purpose of explaining that experience, and worthwhile reading for all wishing to understand the British march to war in 1914.

MARK BRADY
LIEUT. CDR, RN

THE HABIT OF VICTORY
The Story of the Royal Navy 1545-1945
by CAPTAIN PETER HORE
(Sidgwick & Jackson and the National Maritime Museum, London – £25)
ISBN 0 2830 7312 8
Discounted offer available: £22.50 (inc. UK post & packing): tel: 01256 302692 and quote GLR code 841

What a marvellous title for a book about the Royal Navy in this year that celebrates Trafalgar. Yes, the story is of the Royal Navy triumphant (mostly, though there are warts visible), but it is not triumphalist, for that would be hubris, inviting retribution from nemesis: and the navy has enough to do contending with uncomprehending politicians without worrying about the gods.

The subtitle is a tad misleading, for it is not the story, but a story, or a version of the story. For the story, one goes to such writers as James, Clowes, Lewis and Rodger. Peter Hore's book owes more to *Deeds that Won the Empire* and Callender's *Sea Kings of Britain*, and would be the ideal book for the favourite nephew/niece who has expressed an interest in joining the Service. It would provide them with a vital sense of what they would have to live up to, if they were to contribute to making the Royal Navy fit to fight and win.

But the book is certainly not merely for sea-struck teenagers (I hope such beings still exist). It should remind those serving of the background which should colour their daily actions and their forward thinking.

In telling this story, the author has very largely drawn on the resources of the library of the National Maritime Museum, and the narrative develops as a series of loosely connected episodes, told in the words of those who carried out the actions. These make excellent history, being primary sources, uninterpreted by an author whose mindset may not readily comprehend the circumstances of the sea. (Your reviewer is emphatically not having a dig at the current generation of 'proper' naval historians – but there have been, over the years, a number of naval histories in which the appreciation was situated, rather than the other way round.) And the author's naval background is apparent – no academic would (could) write that 'the sailors' pay was adrift'; nor that, on a cutting out expedition in the Gironde, the supposed guide, an unofficial pirate, 'went off on a jolly of his own'.

Two episodes in the coverage of the 19th century stood out. One was the section covering the activities of Home Popham in support of Wellington in the Peninsula, and of Fremantle in the Adriatic. Littoral warfare is nothing new, and the same theme continues elsewhere: the Syrian campaign of 1840, and the Russian War of 1854-6. It was naval pressure in the Baltic rather than Balaclava heroics which caused the Tsar to seek peace. The other section was that covering the career of Josiah ('Blood is thicker than water') Tatnall, whose family were loyalists in the rebellion, and who was educated in England, but who served in the USN, rising to be a Commodore, before serving the Confederate Navy in the Civil War. As Commodore of the US squadron in the Far East he helped, and was helped by, the British during the Second Chinese War, 1859-60. It is nice to know that, when he fell on hard times in old age, RN officers raised a subscription for him.

Also in the 19th century are two adjacent sections which contrast strongly with one another, deliberately: they cover the careers of Admiral Hastings Markham (Tryon's nemesis) – brave but bone-headed – and Sir Walter Cowan – 'bloody, bold and resolute' if ever anyone was.

The 20th century is also well covered, particularly WW2, where quotations from Professor Blackett (operational research) and Captain (Commodore RNR) Boucher provide a nice counterpoint on the convoy war.

As to nit-picks – well, the author says there are at least two typos, which your reviewer missed, so you're not likely to be worried, but there's one egregious mis-statement of fact (clue; it's in the 20th century). (I won't reveal it, but the author knows I know.)

Taken all round, this is an excellent swing through naval history. If you're young, and starting to build a library of naval history, you might do much worse than make this a starting point. It ought to be in every ship's library. (If a cash-strapped MoD can't afford it, then individual messes ought to consider buying it for themselves.) It ought to be required reading at BRNC, and/or the Initial Staff Course (Maritime); and it ought to be on the reading list for every non-naval student on the Advanced Command and Staff Course at JSCSC.

ALASTAIR WILSON
COMMANDER, RN

WELLINGTON'S NAVY
Sea Power and the Peninsular War
1807-1814
by CHRISTOPHER D. HALL
(Chatham Publishing – £25)
ISBN 1 8617 6230 5

It is a truism, so often forgotten, that the British Army, whose primary role has been to fight wars overseas, has only been able successfully so to do because it has been transported, succoured, guarded and supported by the Royal Navy. And when

disaster threatens, the Navy has had to be able to effect rapid contingencies to evacuate that Army as at Gallipoli and Dunkirk, and at Corunna in 1809 and again in 1812, when General Murray disgracefully abandoned Tarragona. Those last two examples come from the Peninsular War, a campaign where that critical relationship was so evident along a great stretch of coastline, covering three seas, which had to be constantly patrolled and treated as a semi-permeable membrane through which only benign elements were privileged to pass.

Not that the support was always recognised at the time. Shortly before receiving *Wellington's Navy* to review, I finished reading General Napier's account of the Peninsular War. He ends a passage about Murray's failure to hold on to Tarragona with the words:

> 'Wellington's urgent remonstrances could not procure a sufficient naval force on the coast of Biscay!'

while it is not until the very end of the campaign, during the crossing of the Adour, that Napier gives full credit to the ships and seamen in support. Yet, within the theatre of war, the allies enjoyed the ability to move soldiers and equipment rapidly by water, a benefit denied the French. Nor did they act solely in that capacity, putting their hand at whatever was required; building bridges; ferrying supplies, bribes and bullion; fighting alongside soldiers, hauling and manning siege guns; delivering amphibious landings; everything, and more, that a ship on work up today might be expected to carry out. Crucially, by delivering victuals, they enabled Wellington to feed his forces without seizing local supplies thus guaranteeing the active support of the populace who could contrast his forces with those of the plundering French. Importantly, for troop morale, the navy could evacuate the wounded and support field hospitals.

This book addresses an existing imbalance and misunderstanding and gives credit to the fleet that kept Wellington's forces in being. Wellington, himself, did, years later, acknowledge that contribution, writing:

> 'If anyone wishes to know the history of this war, I will tell them that it is our maritime superiority that gives me the power of maintaining my arm while the enemy are unable to do so.'

But at the time he was often dissatisfied, as this key summary of the importance of the Royal Navy to him indicates:

> 'I cannot express how much we shall be distressed if the navigation of the coast should not be secure from Corunna, at least, to Cadiz. We have money, provisions, clothing, military stores and equipments on all parts of the coast almost every day in the year, and the loss of one vessel only may create a delay and inconvenience which may be of the utmost consequence.'

Occasionally, he was down right grumpy:

> 'Your Lordship, will have seen that the blockade of the coast is merely nominal.'

A view that brought forth this wonderful reply from the First Lord:

> 'I will take your opinion in preference to any other person's as to the most effectual mode of beating a French army, but I have no confidence in your seamanship or nautical skill. Neither will I defer to the opinion on such matters of the gentlemen under your command who are employed in the siege of San Sebastian, and which happen to be at variance with those of every naval officer in Her Majesty's service.'

For those who would wish to read about an unheralded but vital naval role in the defeat of Napoleon this is an excellent book. It deals clearly with the complexities of the relationship between sea and land command and is thoroughly recommended. I would add that reading it along with a parallel text on the land campaign adds to the enjoyment, balance and understanding.

DAVID CHILDS
COMMANDER, RN

NELSON'S *VICTORY*
101 Questions & Answers about HMS *Victory*, Nelson's Flagship at Trafalgar 1805
by PETER GOODWIN
(Conway Maritime Press – £9.99 (or £5.99 at discount stores!))
ISBN 0 8517 7988 3

The Nelson decade has already spawned some

huge doorstops, but, to prove that small is beautiful, by contrast here is this little work. Concise it may be, but you will be surprised at just how much information about the ship and her era is packed into its 100 pages.

The author is the Keeper and Curator of HMS *Victory* and must be exceptional in achieving his MPhil in maritime history via *Ganges, Sultan,* Polaris submarines and the long nuclear course! Given his engineering background it is no surprise that his own drawings are meticulous, and these are backed-up by a nice selection from E. W. Cooke's *Shipping & Craft* (1829), and from the Colonel Field (RMLI) collection, along with numerous photographs from the archives. The illustrations of the obsolete ironclad *Neptune* with her ram-bow firmly driven into *Victory*'s port side after breaking her tow, and the resultant damage, are probably the least known amongst them. It is all too clear how close we came to losing her then and for some time thereafter. Also illustrated is that other Trafalgar veteran, HMS *Implacable*, which fought against us as the *Duguay Trouin*, and in 1949 was with great difficulty destroyed by us in a shameful act of maritime vandalism.

NR members all doubtless have a good foundation knowledge, but if their children, friends, or relatives, get hold of this little gem before they do, then they are still likely to find themselves seriously embarrassed. Do you know what charge was needed to fire a 24lb shot, or how many rounds *Victory* fired at Trafalgar? Be prepared, and buff up before taking anyone for a visit, or simply indulge yourself.

The old ship has changed much in recent years, with many previously closed-off areas now accessible to the public. The most significant recent development has been the impressive re-construction of the magazine area, revealing a comparatively greater attention to explosive safety at Trafalgar than was evident at Jutland just over a century later.

Victory is central to our naval heritage, and we should never underestimate how much other navies envy her, and all that she represents. So we should do all that we can to support her, and know all that we can about her – if we do not, how can we complain that others are 'sea blind'?

FRANK SCOTT

FEEDING NELSON'S NAVY
The True Story of Food at Sea in the Georgian Era
by JANET MACDONALD
(Chatham Publishing, – £19.99)
ISBN 1 8617 6233 X

There is more to *Feeding Nelson's Navy* than meets the eye. First impressions are admittedly not exciting. Were it not for Nelson the title would be dully mechanistic. The chapter titles have an ominous feeling of remorseless process: 'Basic Rations'; 'Administration On Board Ship'; 'How it got there – the Work of the Victualling Board'; 'How the Men Ate' 'How the Officers Ate'; 'What Other Navies Ate'; and 'Diet in Health and Sickness'. The reader's menu already looks as unappetising as the Georgian sailor's staple diet of hard-baked biscuit, salt meat and dried pease.

The reader very quickly has the measure of the book's careful, accurate prose, the thoroughness of an author whose high priestly vow is that it all must be described. Now and then there is a display of rather non-instinctive humour, but occasionally a bright flash of irony as she contrasts the 'real' navy with that of fiction and film. The plain factual account of the French naval ship commends itself. She had two cannons on board but only one cannon ball, and that could not be fired because it was used to crush the mustard seed for cooking. The French always had their priorities right with food. Nelson apparently did not. The author is careful not to debunk our great hero, especially if she wants to sell a few of her books on the back of Trafalgar 200, but she does describe some of his more 'senior' moments. One such description lapses into grannyish disapproval when she says that Nelson got into a 'terrible tizzy' about there being no molasses on board. The Victor of the Nile in a tizzy? Should you start the book at the end, as we *NR* readers are trained to do of course, you will find 23 pages of appendices. You can skip these quite easily, unless you are particularly interested in the calorific value or vitamin content of naval foodstuffs. You might, however, dip into the 14 pages of traditional recipes, there to find the curious lobscouse.

The book's genesis is in a MA dissertation. Chapter 6 purports to ask 'academic' questions: 'how did the other side do it' and 'did the difference in the way we did it and the way they did it have an effect on the outcome?' Though the questions were not elegantly phrased, they potentially set the conditions for stimulating comparisons and contrasts, and conclusions that showed the link between one nation's logistics and the success of its fleet. How disappointing to be told that there was not really much difference and what there was had little or no effect on the outcome. Although the author has doubtless been faithful to her research findings, this sort of non-thesis does not really sell books.

The book's great strength lies in its focus on the overriding aim of sustaining the fleet at sea in a time of conflict. It addresses the fundamental challenge of how to supply 1,000 ships and feed 140,000 men. In this it is practical, hard-edged and to the point. The role of the Victualling Board is summarised crunchily as providing 'the fuel that enabled the fighting machine to perform well in the face of the enemy'. Everything from the high level organisation and planning of the Victualling Board to the meal time arrangements on board one of the ships is painstakingly set out. References to stock rotation, musters, ships' endurance, menus, store ships, accounts, ship's agents and chandlers, and of course the catering scandals lend great credibility to the book. We are in familiar territory, for the fundamental principles then were little different from those today. This recognition draws the naval reader in and one is bound to say respectfully that the author has mastered her subject. She understands the processes she describes and handles naval terminology with assurance. In fact, the author will expand the reader's vocabulary and deepen his cultural understanding of the Georgian navy.

The book has been nicely published. The time to sell it would be right after someone has done the tour of HMS *Victory*. Its anecdotes, illustrations and research detail could be usefully raided for the odd mess dinner speech.

R. P. HOLLINS
COMMANDER, RN

THE CAPTAIN COOK ENCYCLOPAEDIA

edited by JOHN ROBSON
(Chatham – £30)
ISBN 1 8617 6225 9

This is a companion volume to Chatham's *Nelson Encyclopaedia* which appeared to mixed reviews, including a cool reception in these pages (*NR* 91(2), May 2003, pp 186-7). Whilst it might be a reasonable proposition to entrust a volume on Nelson to the encyclopaedic mind of Colin White, the basic flaw of the Chatham formula becomes very plain when applied to the vast global span of Cook studies. To his credit, John Robson has recognised this and drafted in a large team of additional contributors, including Andrew David and Glyndwr Williams.

However, this presents an editing challenge which has not been grasped. Some splendid essays such as that on the astronomical results of the voyages come at a cost of very uneven coverage elsewhere. Whilst 'Wapping' gets three pages, 'Seamanship' merits about 20 very indifferent lines, rather less than 'Wallpaper and stained glass, Cook in'. Overall, the nautical entries are disappointing. But, arguably, those whose interests are primarily in this field will look elsewhere for illumination. As might be expected, there is extensive coverage of anthropological and ethnographical subjects and *NR* readers may feel that it is excessive to devote more pages to 'Cook as god and Cook's death' than almost any other entry. Throughout, there is much repetition which could have been removed.

There are other disappointments. The index, essential apparatus in an encyclopaedia, is poor. For example, the only discussion of the nature of the instructions which Cook received is buried in the entry on indigenous peoples. Whilst the numerous illustrations are well-chosen and generally well-reproduced, the maps are much less satisfying. Your reviewer has never understood the enthusiasm for the sparse chartlets in Mr Robson's *Captain Cook's World*, and the strange voyage maps which he has commissioned for this work are quite inadequate, even for the general reader.

Having said all this, there is much to praise.

A judicious introduction provides an excellent review of the contemporary status of studies of Cook and the European encounter with the Pacific and explains the approach to selection of the entries. This is followed by a summary of the story line which will be ideal in a home or school library where this might be the only work on this subject. There are useful appendices including a record of pertinent logs and journals in the various archives, and lists of all the members of Cook's crews (*sic*). The bibliography is particularly comprehensive. In recognition that the book cannot possibly do justice to a story which just runs and runs as each century goes by, Mr Robson has opened up a website called *www.captaincookencyclopaedia.com*. Readers are invited to use it to report errors and new information.

The biographies of the participants in the voyages form a major element, and are comprehensive and sound. So is the coverage of the Pacific explorers of other nations, with the exception of the Russians. The importance of the collections and observations made by seamen and scientists is also reflected. The geographical spread of the place entries is satisfactory; Cook's toponymy is discussed, and it is probably unreasonable to expect to find details of the derivation of such wonderful names as the Glass House Mountains which the voyages bequeathed to our maps and charts. Literary threads are well-covered, from the famous link with Coleridge through William Wales, right up to modern fiction. The entry on 'lives' of Cook is very conservative, and coverage of 'popular biographies', which, it appears, include Alan Villiers' *Captain Cook, the Seaman's Seaman*, is confined to the bibliography. However, many of us would probably agree with Mr Robson's judgment that 'More has been written in the last 35 years than in the previous 200. It would probably have been better had many of these books never been published.' The encyclopaedia escapes this stigma. It achieves its aim of gathering in one place as much verified information about Cook as possible for future researchers. In doing so it provides some fresh slants on the story, including an excellent entry on music onboard and ashore, and a most interesting reappraisal of Cook's attitude to religion.

M. K. BARRITT
CAPTAIN, RN

THE AGE OF THE GALLEY
Consultant editor Professor JOHN MORRISON
ISBN 0 8517 7955 7
THE LINE OF BATTLE
Consultant editor BRIAN LAVERY
ISBN 0 8517 7954 9
(both Conway – £16.99 paperback)

Conway's 'History of the Ship' series was an ambitious project that ran throughout the 1990s under the series editorship of Robert Gardiner, with Dr Basil Greenhill as series consultant. Each of the volumes is now being reissued in paperback form, which will make them more approachable and affordable.

As the series title implies, they are strongly biased towards the material side of naval history, but inevitably include manning, operations, tactics and strategy. The large-size pages and spacious format – over 200 pages per book – mean that they can go into considerable detail and can be furnished with copious illustrations.

Each book is the product of several experts, and all is drawn together by consultants of wide knowledge and editorial skill. These, the first two of the series to be received for review, make it clear that the complete work would be a prized addition to any maritime library.

RICHARD HILL

JOHN PAUL JONES
A Restless Spirit
by PETER VANSITTART
(Robson Books – £17.99)
ISBN 1 8610 5621 4

I have to confess that I found this a rather irritating book. On too many occasions the author departs from his narrative to pad out the book with historical comparisons, anecdotes and allusions quite foreign to his general argument. 'The soldiers were too frequently in arrears of pay. Wellington himself, years later in the Peninsula, had to rely for urgent funds not on the Treasury but on Nathan Rothschild' and 'Decades later,

British quartermasters in the Crimea were displeased by receiving large quantities of military boots, for the left foot only' – these examples from a page dealing with the condition of troops in America during the War of Independence. 'British arrogance was not dissolved by defeats at Saratoga and Yorktown . . . The Duke of Windsor, wartime governor of the Bahamas . . . (believed that) successful colonial administration depended upon coloured peoples being forbidden to use the front door of Government House'.

But, to be fair, the descriptions of the management of the early American navy (chaotic), the pre-revolutionary French court (corrupt, chaotic), the administration of the Russian court under Catherine the Great (autocratic, reforming, incompetent at the fringes) are interesting. John Paul Jones, Scottish pirate or American hero, operated in all these *mileux*, his unique selling point being a frenzied energy, a desire for 'glory' and, against many odds, an ability to get some things done, producing a blizzard of exhortatory correspondence wherever he went.

He remains, however, a minor and rather suspect figure in an era rich in great naval personalities. His early career as a young Scottish captain of a British merchant ship was tarnished by being sued for assault by his Scots carpenter, Mungo Maxwell, and subsequently a murder in Tobago under circumstances which would probably have got him off on self-defence grounds in an English court, but not in Tobago. He fled to Virginia and changed his name from Paul to Jones.

When the American revolution began in 1775, he enlisted in the Continental Navy and took command of the sloop *Providence* in 1776 and, in this ship and subsequently the *Ranger*, became a successful commerce raider against British merchant traffic. He also, rather unsuccessfully, tried to burn down his home town, Whitehaven, also landing on St Mary's Isle in the Solway and looting Lord Selkirk's silver – being praised for 'punctilious behaviour' by Lady Selkirk who was in residence. This caused a terrific coastwise flap, the British being unused to invasions.

As captain of the unhandy ex-French East Indiaman *Bonhomme Richard*, 40 guns, he fought a creditable frigate action against the *Serapis*, off Flamborough Head, causing her to strike, although the amount of support he received by raking fire from his unbalanced ally Landais in the *Alliance* frigate, 36, remains debatable.

This success against the Royal Navy enhanced his reputation enormously, giving him leverage in his negotiations about prize money, the repair of ships and the reforms he felt were needed during a prolonged period ashore in France. Eventually frustrated, he was appointed rear admiral in the Russian navy in 1788 and fought against the Ottoman Turks in the Black Sea – actions in which, in general, Jones' fine tactical instincts were negated by poor communications and factionalism. He returned to Paris in 1790 and died in 1792 before taking up appointment as US consul at Algiers.

This book paints a perceptive portrait of this hero who is responsible for the phrases 'in harm's way' and 'I have only just begun to fight'. The Russian and French episodes give interesting insights. There's a bit too much poesy for my taste. Probably only of interest to the enthusiast.

G. F. LIARDET

BOOKS RECEIVED

The following books have been received and are gratefully acknowledged. Space and subject do not allow a full review; it is hoped that the following brief notices, which are made without any value judgment or recommendation, will be helpful in bringing the books to the attention of members with specialised interests.

Churchill and the Admirals, by Stephen Roskill (Pen & Sword, 351 pp., £8.99 paperback, ISBN 1 8441 5104 2): paperback reprint of classic study covering both World Wars and Churchill's time as First Lord and Prime Minister.

One of Our Submarines, by Edward Young (Pen & Sword, 320 pp., £7.99 paperback, ISBN 1 8441 5106 9): paperback reprint of 1952 book about the author's experiences in 'U' and 'S'-class submarines in the Second

World War.

The Battle of Trafalgar, by Geoffrey Bennett (Pen & Sword, 256 pp., £7.99 paperback, ISBN 1 8441 5107 7): paperback reprint of book first published in 1977. Includes full coverage of the preliminary moves and much useful basic information.

Silent Hunters, ed. Theodore P. Savas (Pen & Sword, 215 pp., £19.99, ISBN 1 8441 5062 3): Yet another book about Second World War U-boat commanders. This one covers six, the essays being by different authors, some of whom served in U-boats themselves.

Farwell's Rules of the Nautical Road, by Craig H. Allen (US Naval Institute Press, 719 pp., $45 US, ISBN 1 5911 4008 0): Eighth edition of comprehensive American primer, with numerous case studies.

Destroyer Leader: HMS Faulknor 1935-1946, by Peter C. Smith (Pen & Sword, 302 pp., £25, ISBN 1 8441 5121 2): Third and expanded edition of book first published in 1967 about 'the hardest-worked destroyer in the Fleet'. Many illustrations and diagrams.

We Joined the Navy, by John Winton (Maritime Books, 254 pp., £14.95 hardback, ISBN 1 9044 5906 4): reprint of Winton's classic, humorous novella about entry and training in the l950s. The other four in the canon are republished in similar format.

British Warships and Auxiliaries 2005-2006 (Maritime Books, 96 pp., £6.95 paperback, ISBN l 9044 5911 0): latest edition of well-known economical guide to ships and aircraft of the fleet. 'Auxiliaries' include all the Marine Services, which themselves amount to 46 vessels.

Stopping Napoleon, by Tom Pocock (John Murray, 262 pp., £8.99 paperback, ISBN 0 7195 6604 5): paperback version of book reviewed in *NR*, Nov. '04 at p.437.

Nelson: The Immortal Memory, by David and Stephen Howarth (Conway, 390 pp., £9.99 paperback, ISBN 0 8517 7993 X): paperback reprint of biography first published in 1988.

Don't Rock the Boat, by Captain Ian Bradley RNZN (Ian Bradley, 584 pp., $34.95 NZ from 45 Ngarahana Ave., Albany, Auckland, New Zealand, ISBN 0 4730 9298 0): autobiography of an officer whose non-promotion and subsequent resignation in 1980 were the subject of several high-level inquiries, which he reports in detail and with much personal comment.

The Encyclopedia of U-Boats, by Eberhard Möller and Werner Brack (Greenhill Books, 240 pp., £19.99, ISBN 1 8536 7823 3): with comprehensive illustrations and tabulated data, this includes details of U-boats preserved in various naval museums, in Germany and elsewhere.

With Naval Wings, by John Wellham (Spellmount, 200 pp., £18.99, ISBN l 8622 7227 1): wartime autobiography of a naval pilot who flew throughout the Second World War, in the attack on Taranto among many operations. The book was first published in 1995 and reviewed in *NR* at p.278 that year.

Commando Men, by Bryan Samain (Pen & Sword, 190 pp., £6.99 paperback, ISBN 1 8441 5209 X): account of 45 Royal Marine Commando from D-Day in 1944 to the end of the Second World War, first published in 1988.

Steel Boat, Iron Hearts, by Hans Goebeler with John Vanzo (Chatham, £18.99, ISBN 1 8617 6 258 5): crewman's account of life and demise of U-505.

The Sailor's Word-Book, by Admiral W. H. Smyth (Conway, 744 pp., £9.99 paperback, ISBN 0 8517 7972 7): reprint of digest of nautical terms first published in 1867, said to have been used by many recent authors of the age of sail, both in fiction and non-fiction.

CORRECTION

In the February 2005 issue, at p.94, the review of Ben Warlow's *Battle Honours of the Royal Navy* was wrongly ascribed to Rear Admiral R. J. Lippiett. It was in fact by Commander A. J. W. Wilson. Apologies all round.

RICHARD HILL
BOOK REVIEW EDITOR

New Members

The following have enrolled as members or rejoined since 1 September, 2004:

ANNETT, I. G. … … … … … … … … COMMANDER
BLACKLEY, J. D. … … … … … … … … (NAVAL HISTORIAN – USA)
CADDY, P. … … … … … … … … … HON. MIDSHIPMAN, RNR
CLEAVES, R. … … … … … … … … PETTY OFFICER (COMMS)
DOUGLAS, P. G. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
DUDLEY, S. M. T. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
DUNLOP BROWN, E. R. … … … … … … … … (rejoined)
FEASEY, I. D. … … … … … … … … LIEUTENANT
FLEGG, M. J. … … … … … … … … LIEUTENANT
FLINT, G. F. … … … … … … … … HON. MIDSHIPMAN, RNR
GEARING, R. M. … … … … … … … … SUB-LIEUTENANT
GLEN, N. C. … … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
HUNT, S. C. … … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
MARTIN, R. G. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
MAYNARD, A. T. W. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. COLONEL, RM
MOODY, P. P. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
MORRISON, R. W. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
MUGRIDGE, D. R. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
PEYMAN, T. A. … … … … … … … … LIEUTENANT
RAMSEY, R. T. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
RICE, P. L. … … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
SCOTT, H. F. M. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR, RNR (rejoined)
STULTING, P. C. B. … … … … … … … … LIEUTENANT (JG), USNR
VOGEL, L. D. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
WHEELER, C. H. G. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
WHITLEY, I. D. B. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
WOOD, C. A. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
WORTHINGTON, J. M. F. … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
WRIGHT, G. J. T. … … … … … … … … SUB-LIEUTENANT
WYNESS, C. J. … … … … … … … … LIEUTENANT

Prize membership for a period of two years has been awarded to:

BLACKBURN, J. … … … … … … … SUB-LIEUTENANT, RNR
HALL, E. C. M. … … … … … … … … SECOND LIEUTENANT, RM
HARDINGE, C. H. … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR, RNR
KEARSLEY, I. … … … … … … … … THIRD OFFICER, RFA
KEITH, B. C. … … … … … … … … LIEUTENANT
MURPHY, N. … … … … … … … … … LIEUT. CDR
PHILLIPS, S. … … … … … … … … … SUB-LIEUTENANT, RNR
STEVENS, D. G. … … … … … … … … LIEUTENANT
WILLIAMS, P. A. … … … … … … … … LIEUTENANT
YATES, S. E. … … … … … … … … LIEUTENANT

(These prize winners include a number whose prize membership, for one year only, is for achieving an Open University Accreditation with Distinction on the Initial Staff Course (M).)

Obituary

We regret to report the death of the following members since 1 September 2004:

Date joined	*Member*
1962	Lieut. Cdr J. G. Bird
1946	Captain R. De L. Brooke, dso , dsc
1951	Lieut. Cdr A. R. Fisher
1960	Commander P. G. Fortescue
1988	Rear Admiral G. P. D. Hall, cb, dsc
1950	Captain G. C. Lloyd, cbe
1958	Commander D. W. Mills, cbe, dsc
1982	Lieutenant R. E. H. Orr
1950	Lieut. Cdr J. G. St L. Sharples
1987	Lieut. Cdr D. T. Smith
1936	Commander E. T. Stanley, dso, dsc
1982	Commodore D. S. H. Whiter, obe

THE NAVAL REVIEW
Registered Charity No. 214610

TRUSTEES:
Admiral of the Fleet Sir JULIAN OSWALD, GCB
Captain P. G. HORE, RN
Rear Admiral R. B. LEES
Rear Admiral R. J. LIPPIETT
Rear Admiral R. A. G. CLARE

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2004

	2004	*2003*
	£	*£*
INCOME		
Subscription Income	47,261	*47,767*
Income Tax recovered from Deeds of Covenant	8,016	*8,631*
Interest on Investments	7,297	*7,686*
Interest on Nat West Deposits	731	*528*
Donations Received	46	*35*
Advertising Income	761	*0*
Profit on realisation of Investment	1,953	*0*
	£66,065	*£64,646*
EXPENDITURE		
Editorial and Secretary/Treasurer Honoraria	26,769	*26,073*
Employers National Insurance	943	*1,114*
Printing and Production	22,900	*24,764*
Literary Services	2,742	*2,558*
Guinness Prize	150	*0*
Stationery and Duplicating	2,889	*3,671*
Accountancy Fee	206	*206*
Bank Charges	509	*368*
Direct Debit Charges	1,768	*945*
Meeting Expenses	299	*0*
Postage and Telephone	7,089	*6,310*
Equipment Repairs	266	*0*
Sundry Expenses	0	*72*
Depreciation of Computer Equipment	0	*843*
Investment Manager's Charges	470	*0*
Website Costs	321	*3,379*
	£67,321	*£68,301*
TOTAL EXCESS OF EXPENDITURE OVER INCOME	(£1,256)	*(£3,655)*

NB: Figures are rounded to nearest whole numbers, which may appear to produce arithmetical errors.

THE NAVAL REVIEW BALANCE SHEET AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2004

			2004		*2003*
		£	£	£	£
FIXED ASSETS					
Investments at Cost	Note 1		90,577		*123,577*
Tangible Assets	Note 2		0		*0*
CURRENT ASSETS					
Sundry Debtors		506		*150*	
Balances at Bank		40,878		*8,329*	
Cash in Hand		0		*32*	
		£41,384		*£8,511*	
CURRENT LIABILITIES					
Accounts Payable and Subscriptions in Advance	(Note 3)	2,275		*1,146*	
		£2,275		*£1,146*	
NET CURRENT ASSETS			£39,109		*£7,365*
			£129,686		*£130,942*
ACCUMULATED FUNDS					
Accumulated Fund			130,942		*134,597*
Surplus for the Year			(1,256)		*(3,655)*
			£129,686		*£130,942*

J. J. R. OSWALD, Chairman A. J. W. WILSON, Secretary-Treasurer

THE NAVAL REVIEW ACCOUNTANT'S REPORT TO THE TRUSTEES

We have prepared the attached Financial Statements, without carrying out an audit from the records and information submitted to us.

We confirm that the accounts are in agreement with the books and records.

A. C. WILDER & CO
Chartered Accountants
3, Station Approach
Worcester Park
Surrey
KT4 7NB

18 February 2005

NOTES TO THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2004

	2004	*2003*
	£	*£*
1. INVESTMENTS		
2,421 units – M & G Charifund Income Units	10,572	*10,572*
£34,593 6¾% Treasury Stock 2004 – Sold November 2004		*33,000*
16,374.65 units – Charities Aid Foundation Income Fund	10,000	*10,000*
12,886.6 units – Charities Aid Foundation Balanced Growth Fund	10,000	*10,000*
£9,650 Monks Investment Trust 6⅜% Debenture 2023	10,005	*10,005*
88,270.93 units Cazenove High Income Fund Income Shares	50,000	*50,000*
	£90,577	*£123,577*
MARKET VALUE as at 31 December 2004	£118,766	*£144,705*

Realised gains have been recognised in Income and Expenditure for the year.
No adjustment has been made for the increase in the value of the Investments.

	£	*£*
2. FIXED ASSETS		
Cost of new Computer	2,529	
Less: Depreciation	2,529	
Net Book Value	(£0)	

The cost of the Computer Equipment is being written off over three years on a straight line basis to nil value.

3. ACCOUNTS PAYABLE AND SUBSCRIPTIONS		
Subscriptions in advance	£2,041	*941*
PAYE and NIC		*0*
Accruals	234	*205*
	£2,275	*£1,146*