Rural migrant workers in urban China: living a marginalised life

Employment and working conditions

The occupational composition of migrants and non-migrants is rather different. Little overlap is found between migrant workers and local residents in industrial and occupational distributions. Unlike urban residents, who are primarily employed in manufacturing and other industries, rural migrants are concentrated in service and construction industries (Knight, Song & Jia, 1999). Moreover, most migrant workers take up physically demanding jobs as manual labourers, textile and garment factory workers, toy factory workers and service workers. Indeed, they mainly occupy jobs that local residents disdain (Roberts, 2000).

Since the majority of migrant workers are uneducated and do not have special skills, job mobility among migrant workers is very low. Those who are occupationally mobile can compete only for less technical or non-technical jobs (Yu & Hu, 1998). Coupled with a lack of knowledge of their legal rights, migrant workers have been subjected to a great deal of exploitation. To begin with, quite a large number of migrant workers complained of delays in wage payment, which is a tactic used by the factories as a way of preventing the migrant workers from leaving freely (Liu, 2004). In a study conducted by Ma (2000), it was reported that some factories require new workers to bring capital with them. For example, all manufacturing companies require their new employees to deposit as much as 600 yuan with the firm. Another practice is to pay workers only 1/5 to 1/3 of their monthly salaries and to hold the remainder until the end of the year. Thus, it is not surprising to find that conflicts relating to overdue salaries between employers and migrant workers occur fairly frequently in China. Indeed, drastic measures such as strikes and holding managers or employers in custody have been taken by disgruntled migrant workers (Ma, 2000). The phenomenon of overdue payment is particularly problematic in the building and service (e.g. restaurants and food-related businesses) industries (Yan & Liu, 2004).

The working conditions of rural migrants are also rather disconcerting. Migrant workers are perceived as cheap labour and are paid a very low wage, averaging 300–600 yuan. Tan (2000) found that migrant workers were forced to work 10–12 hours a day, seven days a week, with no guarantee of one day of rest per week (see Table 3). More than half of the factories in Tan's survey failed to pay the government-required social security premium for their migrant workers. A number of small factories even refused to reimburse workers for their medical expenses. Also, over 80 per cent of the factories did not provide maternity leave for female workers. Yet, in some foreign-invested enterprises, the owners were not willing to do anything to protect the health of migrant workers, putting these people in hazardous environments with dust, toxic substances, noise and poor ventilation (Tan, 2000).

In a previous study on rural–urban migrants in Shenzhen (Wong & Lee, 2003), we discovered that the five most stressful work-related issues of the respondents were: a lack of consideration and understanding from the management (m = 3.43, where m = mean score), inadequate rest due to overtime work (m = 3.36), no chance to take up an additional part-time job (m = 3.29), no opportunity to move to a higher paid job (m = 3.26), and unfair treatment by the management (m = 3.24) (Table 4). This information appears to convey similar findings to other studies on the lives of migrant workers in urban China. Essentially, management has considerable power over their migrant employees and can pose unreasonable demands on them. Moreover, migrant workers are powerless and have little government protection. Invariably, this is related to the status of migrant workers in urban cities in China.

Social security and medical benefits

In China, social welfare benefits are closely tied in with one's residence status within the Hukou system. Therefore, migrant workers are largely excluded from social security and medical benefits in the urban cities because they are not official residents of those cities. In a 2003 study on rural migrants in Shanghai, Feng, Zuo and Ruan (2002) found that of the 4,714 migrants surveyed, only 14 per cent had health insurance and 10 per cent had pension plans, whereas 79 per cent and 91 per cent of local employees had health insurance and pension plans, respectively. Although it is compulsory for employers in urban cities in China to contribute to unemployment funds set up by the government, these funds apply only to local residents. Migrant workers who work in the same units are not entitled to unemployment benefits. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the respondents in our study mentioned the lack of social security protection as a source of stress (Table 4).

Education of migrant children

According to Xinhua News Agency (2004), China's migrant children drop out of school at a rate of 9.3 per cent, and those who do go to school are mostly over-aged. Migrant children in China who have never been to school represent 6.85 per cent of the total migrant children population. The greatest difficulty migrant parents face is that educational expenses are too high. This stops them from sending children to the public schools. Indeed, the opportunity for education is also closely tied in with the Hukou system. Children who are registered residents in the cities are entitled to 9 years of schooling. In one study, Fleisher and Yang (2003) found that migrant families have to pay an annual fee ranging from 3,000 to 30,000 yuan per child to have their children enter public schools. Although the private schools charge quite low fees, these schools are usually rather small, lack qualified teachers, and do not have standard teaching materials or adequate sanitation facilities. In 2003, the General Office of the State Council issued a document that aimed to provide access to education for migrant children and prohibit the public schools from charging extra fees. However, this policy has proven, so far, to be ineffective. Although the central government stipulated the policy, the local governments do not carry it out properly. Take Baoshan district in Shanghai as an example; for migrant children to be admitted to the schools, their parents must fulfil four conditions. First, they must obtain four certificates: temporary resident certificate, identification certificate issued by the police station at the place of origin, employment certificate issued by the labour bureaus of destination and certificate of student status from the place of their origin. It should be borne in mind that these certificates cost a migrant worker as much as 200–300 yuan, and deter some migrant parents from putting their children in public schools (Zhao, YH, 2000). Second, the migrant workers must have a fixed abode. Third, they must have been living in Baoshan district continuously for more than 1 year. Lastly, they must have worked in the area for more than 6 months. In a study conducted by several universities in Shanghai (Cheng & Zhang, 2004), it was found that no more than 20–30 per cent of the migrant families could fulfil all of the above-mentioned conditions, and only 15 per cent of those who fulfilled the conditions had actually entered their children in the public schools.

There are two reasons for the stringent responses made by some local governments regarding the admission of migrant children to public schools. First, in Article 8 of the Education Law of the People's Republic of China, it is stated that compulsory education is the responsibility of the local government in urban cities. Migrant children without residency status are not supposed to receive these educational benefits. Such responsibility rests with their local government of origin. This puts migrant children in a very awkward situation because neither of the local governments is willing to fulfil the responsibility (Ju & Ji, 2004). Second, the central government gives no incentive or disincentive to the local governments to implement this policy (Ju & Ji, 2004). Thus, due to limited resources, local governments have no enthusiasm for carrying out the education policies for migrant children stipulated by central government.

Housing

Migrant workers are confronted with housing problems in the cities. Since the Hukou system links registration status with social welfare and employment, migrant workers are not entitled to subsidised rental and cannot purchase housing at subsidised prices (Wang & Murie, 2000). In urban China, there are limited numbers of commercial apartments on the market and those available are extremely expensive. For example, a one-bedroom apartment costs at least 1,000 yuan a month in Beijing (Zhao, YH, 2000); the great majority of migrant workers cannot afford to pay for such housing. As a result, many migrant workers are forced to live in the dormitories provided by their employers. This type of accommodation rarely has indoor sanitary facilities (Chai & Chai, 1997; Shen & Huang, 2003).

The lack of opportunity to improve one's housing conditions may be further hampered by the policies set by the various local governments. For example, in Beijing, there is a regulation stipulating that any institution or person leasing housing to non-Beijing residents must obtain a house-leasing certificate from the district or county government, and renew it annually. However, to be eligible for renting, the house or apartment must be privately owned and must be certified by the police bureau as meeting safety standards. The owner must sign an affidavit with the family-planning agency and the police bureau, agreeing to be responsible for the prevention of crime in the house or apartment. In addition, the owner must pay a fee equivalent to 2 per cent of the annual rent. Undoubtedly, this regulation has raised rental costs and deters owners from considering renting their houses or apartments to migrant workers.

Discrimination by urban residents

Although migrant workers play an indispensable role in economic growth in China, they are frequently portrayed negatively in the media. They are perceived as a threat to social stability and are often linked to the increase in crime rates in the cities. They are also perceived as competing with unemployed urban residents who have been laid off from the state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, the general public holds the view that migrant workers are stupid and ignorant, and should be blamed for their misfortunes (Davin, 2000). Thus, it is not uncommon for migrant workers to experience unpleasant social encounters such as verbal disrespect, deliberate avoidance or being looked down upon by the urban residents (Guo, 2004). Indeed, the hostility displayed by local residents has hurt migrant workers’ selfhood and self-respect (Guo, 2004), and has widened the social gap between migrant workers and local residents.

The Hukou system (the household registration system)

A meaningful analysis of rural–urban migration in China cannot be made without making reference to the Hukou system, which affects the migration experiences of many migrant workers in the cities (Chan, Liu & Yang, 1999). The Hukou system was established in the 1950s. It registers every person at a specific place (usually their place of birth), and requires all changes in residence to be registered with and approved by both the government of the place of origin and that of the destination. This policy became even more restrictive when the Chinese government introduced the food stamp system, and provided low-priced rationing of foods to each individual residing in his or her place of residence. There were two main consequences resulting from implementing these policies. First, it became almost impossible for an individual to move from one place of residence to another. Second, the division between rural farmers and urban city dwellers became wider, with rural farmers lagging behind in economic and social resources (Zhao, YH, 2000).

Indeed, entitlement to public and social services depends entirely on the type of Hukou the individual has. As an urban resident, a person is entitled to employment, health care, housing, pension and food subsidies. None of these privileges, however, are available to people with a rural registration (Cai, 2003). With the introduction of a socialist market economy and the establishment of the responsibility system in rural China, it has become very difficult to restrict people from migrating to the cities. Unfortunately, the Hukou system has done little to accommodate to the changing situation. Indeed, as the previous analysis indicates, the Hukou system has been largely responsible for creating a marginalised group of migrant families who are not allowed to enjoy the same employment, housing, health and welfare benefits as the urban residents in China.

The decentralisation processes in economic development and social welfare

There is a tendency for the central government in China to decentralise control over economic development and social welfare. Economic and social welfare decentralisation came about when, in the late 1970s and 1980s, local government officials called for more autonomy and control over local affairs (Iredale et al., 2001). The fiscal contract system introduced at the end of the 1980s further increased the revenue share retained by localities, and thereby allowed them to implement their own priorities and policies (Iredale et al., 2001). While there are obvious advantages to decentralising the power to local government, problems occur when local governments have different understandings of the laws and ‘notices’ stipulated by central government. To make matters worse, it is difficult for the central government to enforce these laws and notices. Local governments may respond to these policies with little enthusiasm, particularly when such policies appear to jeopardise local interests. After all, the policies lay down only principles, and there is no punishment if local governments do not strictly observe them. Even if central government has detailed regulations in place, the resources needed for enforcement are seriously inadequate. Some notices have no budgetary or personnel support and, in some cases, do not have a government department legally responsible for implementing them.

Taking overdue wages as an example, the central government has issued ‘notices’, such as The Circular of the General Office of the State Council on effectively settling the issue of overdue payment in the construction industry, 2003, Issue 94. General Office of the State Council November 22, 2003, demanding that local governments ensure that private enterprises follow the notices. Unfortunately, local governments do not want to enforce this because ‘there is a common fear among township and village governments that enforcing the Chinese law too strictly will destroy the investment environment and scare away foreign investors’ (Tan, 2000: 302).

Another example is that, although the central government has urged the local governments to provide education for children of migrant workers (e.g. Notices from State Council: The Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Transmitting and Issuing the Proposals of the Ministry of Education and Other Departments for the Provision of Regular Education Assistance (Issue 31), General Office of the State Council December 30, 2003 Issue No. 36, Serial No. 1107), few local governments have taken action to enforce the ‘notices’. Those who have responded to the policies have devised various strategies to protect the interests of local residents and have set stringent requirements for migrant workers to receive the services. For example, as cited above, to limit the number of children who can study in the public schools in the Baoshan district of Shanghai, the local government has set very stringent criteria for migrant children to be admitted to the schools.

There are at least three reasons why local governments do not enthusiastically uphold the notices set by central government. First, both local governments and local people understand that their interests are directly related to foreign investors. It is important to uphold rather than upset those relationships (Tan, 2000). Second, migrant workers are perceived by local authorities as the ‘three withouts’: without legal documents to live in the city, without legal work permits and without legal sources of income. In relation to rural–urban migrants, the primary tasks of the local governments are to collect fees, issue permits, supervise migrants through public security organs, and detain and deport them back to the countryside if they commit any crime (Davin, 2000). Third, there are little incentives or disincentives for local governments to either carry out or not carry out the policies.

The obscure role of the trade unions in foreign-invested enterprises in China

Since the 1980s, the National People's Congress and the central government have instituted a series of laws and regulations to regulate labour relations in foreign-invested enterprises in China. Essentially, all foreign-invested enterprises must abide by Chinese laws. In 1990, the Chinese government adopted the International Labour Organisation Convention No. 144 on tripartite negotiation, and promised to take a neutral stand and allow the labourers and the enterprises to negotiate and resolve their conflicts and interests (Tan, 2000). Moreover, the government also tightened up its regulations and set up labour arbitration and inspection bodies to conduct regular inspections of the factories. Despite all of these efforts, the rights and interests of migrant workers are still not being upheld (Tan, 2000).

An analysis of the practice of the trade unions can give us some idea as to why it is difficult to uphold the rights and interests of migrant workers in China. In China, workers have the right to set up or join trade unions irrespective of their employment, gender, nationality, race, religious belief or education. However, a large number of migrant workers work in small groups and are scattered in various private enterprises (e.g. those in service industries). These people may not belong to any union or are unaware of the existence of unions. Furthermore, in foreign-invested enterprises, the foreign investors may refuse to allow the establishment of a trade union within the enterprise. Once a trade union is set up, the trade union representative usually becomes the Chinese manager in the enterprise (Tan, 2000). This puts the representative in a rather ambiguous position. He or she not only has the responsibility to safeguard the interests of the labourers and the enterprises, he or she must also uphold the interests of the local government. As mentioned above, since local governments are more interested in pursuing economic growth, the trade union/Chinese manager in the enterprise is more inclined to maintain a good relationship with the foreign investor and sacrifice the rights and interests of the migrant workers (Tan, 2000). Thus, the tripartite relationships among local governments, foreign investors and the migrant workers, as stipulated in the International Labour Organisation, cannot be effectively exercised. As Zhu (1995) puts it, in the Chinese world of industrial relations, unions have become largely a part of the bureaucratic control system, unable to distinguish themselves from management.