

The Speeches of John Enoch Powell

**POLL 4/1/12
Speeches, January 1977-December
1978, 5 files**

**POLL 4/1/12 File 1, October-December
1978**

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Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP, to the
Greenwich Round Table at the Trafalgar Hotel,
Greenwich
at 8.00pm, Friday 15 December 1978

Round Table, which I enjoy the opportunity to address in various parts of the country several times a year, is non-political. This does not mean of course that it banishes all subjects which concern the collective life of men in their societies. That would limit its pabulum to such subjects as moth-hunting or Morris dancing; and I would wonder whether even those are perfectly devoid of political content. Round Table is non-party political, which means that its hospitality is not to be abused for the promotion of party views and party ends. 2

Tonight I shall be well within those guidelines - if I dare use an expression so ominously contemporary. The question of which I wish to speak has created a fracture which runs - admittedly along a jagged and irregular line - from top to bottom of both the major political parties. It is a fracture which, true to the metaphor, portends earthquakes; and the news I have to bring you is that in this present month that fracture has suddenly begun to yawn and the seismographs to record precursory tremors.

The decision of Her Majesty's Government not to join the system of fixed currency ratios, known as the E.M.S. or European Monetary System, is the beginning of the end for Britain's membership (in anything recognisable as its present form) of the European Economic Community. In the War of British Independence which began in the 1960's, the long retreat is over. Henceforward the advance begins which will not terminate before our independence is fully regained. All creatures, natural and political, have their life cycle: they wax and wane, they grow and they diminish. From the moment when the process of creating a European political unity comprising Britain ceases to go forward, it does not stand still: it moves into reverse. The bid which Germany and France made in 1978 to involve the United Kingdom in a common currency system was the latest of a progressive series of moves towards unification. For the first time, this one failed. The tide has reached its upper limit on the beach. From now onwards it must ebb. 3

Seven years ago - it was in a speech at East Ham - I predicted that Britain would not join the E.E.C. I was not mistaken. We never have. From the Continent since 1973 there has risen a crescendo of complaint against the British that they do not take

seriously, do not seriously mean, the commitment involved in their adherence to the Treaty of Rome - that they are not heart and soul in the Community. It is no answer to this complaint to refer to the fact that within the Community the French, the Germans and the rest still pursue their separate interests, arguably with more success and selfishness than ourselves. Commitment to the implications of the Treaty of Rome, to progressive economic and political unification of Western Europe, is not inconsistent with sectional interest and local selfishness: there were sectional interests and local selfishness within the German Empire, both the medieval and the modern versions of it. The real reason for Europe's chorus of complaint is its pained and still uncomprehending discovery of the fact that Britain never has accepted the Community, never has intended what the Community is all about.

From both sides the misunderstanding was inevitable and predictable - indeed, boringly, I predicted it. On the side of the Continent it is due to the characteristic which distinguishes European man, homo Europaeus, from the rest of our species, namely, the inborn conviction that he understands the British better than they do themselves, and that, without taking the least trouble to find out anything about them. The fact that the British state is by its fundamental nature incompatible with membership of the E.E.C. has never for an instant been taken in by the Community, even though the British Government told it so in the plainest terms at the very moment of advising a Yes vote in the constitutionally inconceivable referendum of 1975.

On the British side also responsibility for the misunderstanding lies in our own innate characteristics, and two in particular: our humbug and our patience. Nobody in the outside world ever allows, or ever has allowed, sufficiently for those great English virtues: our almost infinite capacity for humbugging ourselves and thereby everybody else; and that apparently limitless patience and indifference to insult and injury which overlies an unequalled capacity for endurance and recovery. Like our infantry, who in this as in so much else are the epitome of the nation, we are no better than average in attack, but in defence and defeat there is nobody to touch us.

It has so happened that at this juncture in our island story the man who was first Foreign Secretary and then Prime Minister is a statesman who exhibits these native qualities in the highest degree. His latest and perhaps greatest triumph - that of approving and applauding the European Monetary System while at the same time

refusing to join it and rejecting it in principle - ought not to blind us to his superb generalship during the retreat phase (now concluded) which has occupied the first five years of our War of Independence; and it is a truism of history that Britain's successful wars begin with a long retreat, though not always as long as this one has been.

In peace, as in war, timing is everything. In retrospect it can now be seen that in 1974-75 opinion in Britain was not ripe for the consequences of such a renegotiation of the Treaty of Accession as the Labour Party's manifestoes of 1974 held out. Those consequences would have been the withdrawal - under some procedure or other - of Britain from the Community which it had only joined a year or two before. It was to be another three years before the electoral majority against withdrawal recorded at the referendum of June 1975 was first eroded and then converted into a minority.

Accordingly in 1974-75 the renegotiation was played out as a charade; and, with one hand half concealing a grin, the Government declared it to have been completed and recommended staying in, while expressly recalling that membership would remain dependent on the continuing assent of Parliament, that is to say, it would still be provisional. The next wave of advance by the Community towards economic and political union was also, though more reluctantly, judged too strong to resist and was therefore absorbed by a strategy of phased withdrawal designed to give the maximum time for recovery. Though accepted in principle at the end of 1975, direct election of the European assembly - which, by endowing the parliamentary body of the Community with the attributes of democratic representation, would immensely increase the authority of Community institutions and correspondingly diminish that of national institutions - was allowed to founder in the session of 1976-77; and the Prime Minister, before the next session, issued a declaration of the Government's intention to safeguard the authority of national parliaments and governments, a purpose directly inconsistent with assent to an elected Assembly.

Nevertheless, after the European Council in the winter of 1977, a sharp retreat was executed, in which parliamentary approval for direct European elections was rapidly secured, although by that time a strong element in the Cabinet was opposed to further withdrawal, and the price had to be paid of a head-on conflict between the Government and the rank-and-file and the policy-making body of its own party. The troops were perilously near to mutiny. However at this stage, as it so often does, Providence took a hand.

There had been an important side-show which, at first little regarded, came to attract increasing public attention. This, which resembled a play within a play, was John Silkin's one-man rearguard action on behalf of the British fishing industry to prevent the Community from appropriating, under the form of a Common Fisheries Policy, the fishing grounds and resources of the British Isles. Ships and the sea will always touch a chord with an island nation; and the spectacle of David outfacing the European Goliath (Gundelach, by the way, is a Teutonic form of Goliath) crystallised the rapidly growing mood of public disenchantment which the opinion polls were registering. This was the time at which even the Foreign Secretary went out of his way in the Commons to "note the fact that there is still a considerable body of opinion in this country which does not feel that we have benefited from our membership of the Community. That is a fact which any government must take into account, and take seriously".

The Community chose this of all moments to stage a summer offensive which was intended by December to have converted the Zollverein into a monetary union and thus deprived the United Kingdom of the power of monetary and economic self-determination. This time, however, there was no further retreat. Continental Europe had overplayed its hand at last. Skilfully whipping up feeling by exhibiting in the cruellest light the economic disadvantages of Community membership - and doing so, by a shrewd stroke, in the very citadel of the moneyed interest, the Guildhall of the City of London itself - the Prime Minister at the beginning of December was in a position to deliver the first British non to the European Community. It is true that the bells were not rung at St Pauls or at St Margarets; but the burst of laughter ^{in the Commons} which greeted the Opposition Leader's luckless exordium "This is a sad day for Europe", as if the news of Alamein had been hailed as "a sad day for Germany", told its own story.

There was however something much more interesting which happened that afternoon, and I end by drawing your attention to it, because in effect the strategy for Britain's next campaign - a campaign, this time, of national resurgence - was being marked out. The newspapers and maybe the Foreign ambassadors did not observe a statement which the Prime Minister made in response to an intervention, a statement both evidently rehearsed and freely volunteered. The fact that the intervention was from an Ulster M.P. is neither here nor there. The Prime Minister's words ran as follows:

"The control by Parliament of this country's economic and financial affairs must always be absolute, except to the extent that we ourselves decide formally to surrender a part of it, as we did, for example, when we entered the International Monetary Fund. I would not hesitate to recommend to the House a departure from our national sovereignty for an international monetary system if I thought that it would increase growth, reduce unemployment and make for better trading relations between the countries of the world as a whole or a part of them. But that must be a deliberate and conscious decision by this country and its people."

What makes that statement so significant is the repeated reference to an explicit and positive decision not merely by Parliament but by the country, as the necessary condition for any cession of Parliament's economic sovereignty. It is a statement which sends the mind back over nearly ten years to the declaration made by Edward Heath just before the 1970 Election, that British membership of the Community self-evidently presupposed the "full-hearted consent of Parliament and people". That precondition was jettisoned by the former Prime Minister as soon as the prospect of Britain being let in by the French presented itself. This time the Prime Minister has armed himself with the same principle of "full-hearted consent" as an insurance against being forced into further retreats and a pivot on which to turn the tables against the Community when he proceeds to attack the encroachments it has already made.

"BUT STILL IT MOVES"

Address in St Lawrence Jewry, E.C.2, 1.15 p.m. Wednesday, 13 Dec. 1978.

The title under which I speak to you is my own choice. I have therefore only myself to blame for any of the consequences. The words "but still it moves" are, as you will have recognised, those that Galileo is alleged to have muttered when ~~rising~~ ^{he rose} from his knees after recanting as heresy what he knew to be the physical truth - that the earth moves round the sun. But I have wrested the words out of their context. I am applying them to a paradox or dilemma which, unlike Galileo, I cannot wholly solve.

Galileo's exclamation was a statement that the sun and earth would continue to ignore the Inquisition and that his tongue had denied what his mind still believed. I use the same words as an imperfect expression of a continual puzzlement - that I live in the presence of two truths, two orders of truth, each in its own way self-evident, yet having no contact or satisfactory relationship with the other.

The ~~reference~~ ^{point} of the Christian church, of all that we call or know as Christian, is a written document, or rather an ~~interest~~ ^{unparalleled} collection of twenty-seven originally separate written documents, which got bound together in the second or third century and have stayed so ever since. That statement is equally valid for a protestant and a catholic, that is, whether one accepts or rejects the authority of the fathers, of tradition or ~~of~~ the magisterium of the Church. The New Testament is, literally, fundamental: it would be impossible to imagine ^{any} Christian whose inner belief and outward ~~worship~~ ^{observance} did not essentially rest upon it.

There are those, whom one is sometimes tempted to envy, for whom the New Testament is fundamental in another sense also, who accept as literal and historical truth and as "the infallible word of God" every sentence contained in the New Testament, ^{- at least, after} ~~once~~ one has arbitrarily adopted a particular manuscript reading of the Greek, a particular translation of that reading, and a particular interpretation of that

translation. This is, of course, what is known as "fundamentalism"; and it exists, in conscious or unconscious forms, far beyond the boundaries of the Bible Belt of the United States.

But the documents which comprise the New Testament, including the first four, which we know as the gospels, are written documents like any others in this respect, that the rules and logic of criticism - textual criticism, literary criticism, source criticism, historical criticism - apply to them by the same necessity ^{as} ~~of~~ the rules (which everyone does, without question, apply) of grammar and syntax. One might as well deny that as refuse to accept that the laws of dynamics and the principles of architecture apply to a church as they apply to any other building.

When these disciplines are applied, ~~in various ways~~ ^{that} to the gospels, they yield certain conclusions ~~which~~ ^{that} can be resisted only by defying the uses of reason and evidence upon which we rely, and are obliged to rely, in every other aspect of life - from medical practice to the administration of justice.

One of those conclusions is that the documents are the sole source of ^{any} ~~all~~ knowledge of the events which the gospels appear to ^{narrate} ~~relate~~: There is no external corroboration; the events belong to history only in the sense that the existence at a certain time of the documents themselves is a historical fact. Another conclusion is that the gospels as they ^{stand} ~~are~~ in the New Testament are the end-products of a long and complex process of evolution. The fact of that evolution is not the less certain for it being ^{probably} impossible ever to trace and reconstruct it other than fragmentarily and conjecturally. What we discern is that, even before the earliest of our gospels, immense effort and thought and excitement had gone into interpreting and re-interpreting whatever was the original impulse or series of events, ^{and that in} ~~in~~ the course of that interpretation and re-interpretation elements from elsewhere had been attracted and had attached themselves to

the main stock as if by a sort of magnetism.

This baffling character of the fundamental documents of Christianity is in no wise to be regarded as an accident, still less as a drawback. Both its unfathomable sources and its live, growing, evolving content - even though the evolution was arbitrarily ~~terminated~~ ^{cut off} at a certain date - are essential to Christianity. Without them it would be a different kind of religion altogether; without them it could not itself be a living and growing thing; without them it could not ^{claim to} be valid for all mankind and for all ages. With ~~the~~ the utmost solemnity we might apply St Paul's words and say that without the capability to "be all things to all men", which Christianity derives from its hidden origin, it would not be true. Christ and Christianity come to us from beyond a veil: they are essentially and, in the most literal sense, revealed.

I used just then the word "true". It is the sharp point of the paradox which I have proposed in the phrase borrowed from Galileo. It is not because external evidence proves them to be so that the Gospel, and the liturgy of the Church which rests upon it, are true, nor because of the internal evidence of the Christian scriptures, which ~~that~~ would, after all, be ^{only an} ~~a mere~~ argument in a circle. The child's hymn which declares "Jesus loves me, that I know, 'cos the Bible tells me so" is not a correct statement of cause and effect. The proof of the truth of the Gospel is that it has to be so: it is a self-evident necessity. But like all other propositions which are self-evident, it cannot be proved ~~to be so~~ but only perceived ~~to be so~~. It is this perception of a self-evident necessity which is called faith.

The stranger who met the two apostles on the road to Emmaus on the resurrection day, and who was Christ, began (in St Luke's great dramatic poem) his discourse to them with the exclamation: "O fools, ought not Christ to have suffered these things and to have entered into his glory?" That is: "Do you not see the necessity, the inevitability, of the incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection? It had to

be so" He said the same ^{thing} when he appeared among the eleven: "Thus it behoved Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead! Luke underlines the point when he makes the apostles at Emma~~s~~ say, after they had recognised Jesus "in breaking of bread": "Did not our heart burn within us while he talked with us by the way?" It had to be so: everything led up to it and pointed to it.

What had to be so? What has to be so? When that question is addressed to a worshipper who recites the Nicene Creed and a few minutes afterward receives the bread and the wine, he is entitled to retort: "If I knew any other satisfactory and sufficient answer, I would not say and do these things". John the Evangelist characteristically found the perfect expression of this retort: "And Nathaniel said unto Philip, Can any good thing come out of Nazareth? Philip saith unto him, Come and see". 'Come and see' is indeed the natural response of the Christian to the enquirer. It is like the scene where Parsifal is brought into the Temple of the Grail and confronted with the suffering of Amfortas. He puts his hand to his heart; but when Gurnemanz asks, 'Do you understand?' he shakes his head. Only later, suddenly, under the pressure of the experience of life does he see what it all meant. At the entrance to the catacomb, at the door of the church, the Christian says to the passer-by: "Come and see".

Still, though the retort is valid, it invites the response: "Nevertheless, however unsatisfactorily, the necessity of which you ^{ask} ~~speak~~ ought to be capable of statement somehow. Like the Sphinx, I demand an answer to ^{my} ~~the~~ riddle and will not let you go, even though it be the riddle which both Gospel and liturgy resolve without explicit answer". To this inquisition I would, as if placed upon the rack, reply somewhat as follows.

I find that in man there exist reason, to which no aspect of his environment refuses to yield, and ~~also~~ altruism, which impels him to self-sacrifice, above all to the sacrifice of his own life. There

may be inklings or intimations of these two things elsewhere in nature; but their combination and ~~self~~-consciousness is uniquely human. Man has also ^{a power of} ~~an~~ introspection which he cannot exercise without the consciousness of freewill and of good and evil. I find it blankly impossible to conceive these characteristics of man as wholly divorced from the rest of reality. In fact, I find them more real than anything physically perceived. For me, they must be permanent and pervasive, albeit explicit only in man. ^{Merely,} ~~Thus,~~ to use religious terminology, I have been obliged to acknowledge ^a God who knows - that is, who creates - good and evil, whose nature includes rationality, love and self-sacrifice, and whose qualities man is able to perceive and share because of his self-consciousness.

I have therefore asserted as self-evident truths the incarnation, the crucifixion, the resurrection and the holy trinity.

Thus the question: "Is it true that ~~if~~ God was born as man in Bethlehem and was crucified in Jerusalem and rose again?" invites the answer: 'Yes, because it had to be so; it was implicit in the nature of the universe; in Luke's Englished word it "ought" to be'. If we ^{are} ask ^{ed} however: "Were these events historical?", the answer is both no and yes. 'No', because this truth does not belong to the world of Herod the Great who died ⁱⁿ 4 B.C. and of the Roman procurator Pontius Pilate who governed Judaea from 26 A.D. to 36 A.D.; the events are not on the same track as what we call history'. But the answer is also yes: 'Yes, because this truth did not exist in the first century B.C. but already existed by the second century A.D.; it "came into the world" ^{which knew it not} between those outer limits of time ^{somehow and somewhere}'.

Christianity is indeed a historical religion, a defiantly, uniquely, essentially historical religion; for its ^{central} ~~essential~~ truth is ~~that~~ something that not only had to happen but did happen, and from the time that it did happen has gone on happening ever since. ~~The~~ Christmas and Easter are historical; but they have no date.

I return in conclusion~~x~~ to the figure of the aged Galileo, with whom I hope I have not taken undue liberties. He was on his knees to recant what he knew to be the truth, as his reason and observation unambiguously proved it to him. Ten days hence, on Christmas Eve, I also shall be on my knees. I shall not have been brought there or forced onto them by the Inquisition; but I shall be there under an even greater compulsion, that of internal necessity, the conviction that I cannot - even that I dare not - do otherwise. I shall have asserted aloud my belief in the incarnation, and I shall have received in palpable form confirmation that it was directed to me individually. All my thinking, all my enquiry, all my inkling of facts yet undiscovered and questions not yet asked will not prevent me from saying, "But still it moves".

Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP to the
Orange Lodge No. 792 Annual Supper, Sir William
Allen Memorial Hall, Moira, Co. Down.
at 7.30 pm, Saturday, 9 December 1978

I am delighted that tonight's occasion affords me the opportunity of paying tribute, within my own constituency, to the signal service that the Orange Order has rendered during these last years to the cause of the Union and thereby to the cause of peace and stability for all who live and work in Northern Ireland. It is particularly opportune to do so at a time when Northern Ireland's

integral place in the Union is being affirmed by Parliament itself more positively than for almost a century. I say that, because the Redistribution of Seats Bill will restore to Northern Ireland that full representation in Parliament which from 1886 onwards one party in the state was committed to deny and which Parliament did destroy in 1912. 2

I am not myself an Orangeman. I would not have thought it either creditable to myself or respectful to you to have sought to don the orange sash as a sort of perfunctory gesture of assimilation, simply because Ulster Unionism had called me to its aid and made me an Ulsterman by adoption. Notwithstanding, I have carried about with me in my pocketbook for the last four years, to be ready to confute any who might allege otherwise, the terms of the command which is enjoined by the Orange Order upon each of its members - "ever to abstain from all uncharitable words, actions or sentiments towards his Roman Catholic brethren" - and the basic declaration of the Order that it "will not admit into its brotherhood persons whom an intolerant spirit leads to persecute, injure or upbraid any man on account of his religious opinions". 3

~~As a result~~ I want to acknowledge publicly the debt which is owed to the Orange Order for the attitude it has held and the stand it has taken in the crisis of the last ten years. From beginning

to end, the voice of the Order has been raised on the side of the law, of justice, of commonsense and of restraint; and neither danger nor criticism nor hysteria have availed to shake it. Its frame of mind is well expressed, and its leadership well illustrated, by a passage I would like to quote from the splendid statement issued recently under the title The Union and The Institution,^{which} re-affirm~~ing~~^{es} and reinforce~~d~~ earlier words of the Grand Orange Lodge of Belfast:

"Anger and frustration are understandable reactions to the humiliation we have borne in recent years. But we must ever be mindful of the desire of our opponents to exploit such feelings to their own advantage. We must bring our people to see that recrimination and self-pity are no answer to the challenge we face".

Shrewdness,² level-headedness, good sense, determination and an instinct for the essential ~~truth~~ are qualities which the Ulsterman regards as typically his. They are qualities of which the Orange Order has set an example, and never more so than eighteen months ago, when its influence was decisively exerted against a wild and dangerous ~~attempt~~^{bid} to coerce Parliament and ~~the Ministers of the Crown~~^{Her Majesty's Government} by physical and unlawful action. The failure of that ~~attempt~~^{bid}, and the manifest refusal of the Ulster people to countenance it, has perhaps been the prime factor - certainly it ~~has~~^{has been} one of the prime factors - in that marked alteration for the better in our affairs over the last year or so,^{an alteration} which only the wilfully blind can fail to discern and which has created the background and conditions for our current and future political advances.

For all this, a great part of the credit must go to the Orange Order, which gave leadership when leadership was needed.

A continuing contribution of the Order ~~is~~^{has been} its single-minded - I am not afraid to say, simple-minded - inculcation of the meaning of the Union. Amid all the confusion of partisan manoeuvres and the babel of voices peddling insincere "new initiatives" and bogus "political solutions", the Order has steadily pointed to that

essential thing which for Ulster comes first, middle and last: the Union. It has reminded those who were sometimes in danger of forgetting that the Union is the parliamentary Union, the unconditional and undivided supremacy of the Crown in Parliament over all parts of the nation. In no other framework and on no lower plane can the rights and liberties of all in Northern Ireland be assured or their opportunity guaranteed to play in the affairs of the nation whatever part their abilities and aptitudes entitle them to. That is the conception which inspired the creators of the original

parliamentary Union in 1800. That is the faith which nerved the Unionists of 1912 and 1921 to make good Ulster's claim to stay within the parliamentary Union. That is the loyalty which the Orange Order now, as it has done for close upon two centuries, cherishes and sustains.

Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP, at the
Annual General Meeting of the Mourne Divisional
Unionist Association at Newcastle, Co. Down
8 pm, Friday, 8th December 1978

There appear from time to time in the newspapers speculations as to the future marriage of the heir apparent to the throne of this Kingdom. I imagine I speak for most people in saying that I dislike and deplore unnecessary and impertinent intrusions into the personal and private aspects of the life of the Sovereign and the Royal Family, though such intrusions are neither novel nor, probably, preventible. There is however one aspect of a hypothetical marriage of His Royal Highness upon which comment, if duly and respectfully expressed, is neither unnecessary nor impertinent. It is not unnecessary, because a future event can be forestalled or influenced only if it is commented upon in advance and therefore, of necessity, speculatively. It is not impertinent because it refers to an aspect of the life of royalty which is public and not private, by virtue of the very fact of relationship to the throne. 2

The law of this country, deriving from the Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Act of Settlement of 1701, prohibits the possession of the crown of this realm by (I quote the Bill of Rights) "all and every person and persons that is, are or shall be reconciled to or shall hold communion with the See or Church of Rome or shall profess the Popish religion or shall marry a Papist". Such a person may not "use or exercise any regal power, authority or jurisdiction within the same", a provision which presumably embraces the exercise of powers under the Regency Act, 1937. I note also in passing, though it is not immediately material, the fact that the words "hold communion with" would appear to present almost insurmountable difficulties if there were ever to be communion between the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church. 3

All provisions of law have their historical context of origin; and the terminology of the Bill of Rights and the Act of Succession is plainly enough that of men living under the immediate impression of the events of 1688 and the impression, less immediate but still profound, of the events of 1553-58. It would be easy to conclude that therefore, because the world of today is infinitely more remote from those events and indescribably different, therefore that provision of law may be treated as obsolete and thus as readily repealable if convenience should require; but it would be foolish so to conclude, and that is the first thing which needs to

be said, in the comparative peace and calm of a question which is, as I trust it will ^{always} remain, academic. Nobody should underestimate the immense emotional forces which, after nearly three hundred years and despite everything that has altered in the interval, still lurk under the antique draftsmanship of those two Acts of Parliament.

The next thing to be said is that this is not a religious question. By that I do not mean that for some it may not be a matter of religion; for everything may be a matter of religion. I mean that it does not necessarily and on any view involve either religious belief or religious toleration. I stress this because it would be easy, and as foolish as easy, to suppose that, since religious tolerance did not exist in 1688 or 1701 but is now long established and since the desirability of reconciliation between the various branches of the Christian Church - called the ecumenical movement or ecumenicalism - is now so fashionable an assumption as to daunt any prospective doubter, therefore only religious bigotry would dispute that the relevant constitutional provisions are obsolete and as such repealable.

The question is political. I will go further and apply to it a specific form of the description "political": the question is national. It is this character which, carrying it effortlessly across the chasm of so many years, lands it at the centre and burning-point of present politics and present conflicts.

What ^{not} makes the issue political is the fact that the Pope is a temporal sovereign and the head of a state as well as of a Church. It is not as the head of a state that for Roman Catholics he possesses authority and the right to their allegiance. The issue would have been the same during the long period when his temporal status was not acknowledged, and would be the same if the Vatican territory disappeared from the map of Italy and of the world. What does make the issue political is the nature - what is today the unique nature - of the British state.

The British state is a prescriptive monarchy, where all authority - that is to say all lawful compulsion exercised by the state over its members - is ultimately vested in, and derived from, the Crown, and that, not by virtue of any compact - it was not a compact which enabled William and Mary to convert into law the compact which we know as the Bill of Rights - but by virtue of immemorial acceptance, by virtue of the monarchy and the nation being the inseparable products of the same historical process: they are, in a phrase, the creatures of one birth. The unwritten nature of the British constitution - the fact that there is no document,

interpretable by a court, from which the functions of sovereignty derive - is not a quaint and anachronistic foible of the British, which they have retained like a street of half-timber houses that has happened not to have been burnt down or pulled down. It is the central, essential, fact about the British state, without which it would be fundamentally different.

This however does not exhaust the unique description of the British state. It is the characteristic of the English, who form the preponderant mass of that state and evolved its political institutions, that at a decisive point in their history they rejected separation between secular and spiritual authority, and insisted that the source of authority in the state and in the church must be one and the same, whence the wearer of the Crown is on earth the supreme governor of the Church of England and the Crown in Parliament is the ultimate source of the law of the Church of England. A similar but not identical outcome was reached in the sister kingdom of Scotland after the Reformation and the rejection of episcopacy but before the parliamentary union.

Acceptance of what the Bill of Rights called "reconciliation to the Church of Rome" involves acceptance of a source of spiritual authority external to the realm and, in the literal sense, foreign to the Crown in Parliament: between Roman Catholicism and the royal supremacy there is, as Saint Thomas More concluded, no reconciliation. A Roman Catholic Crown would signify by definition the destruction of the Church of England because it would contradict the essential character of that Church which, over and above any doctrinal positions, distinguishes it from all other churches whatsoever, namely, its derivation of authority from a source both secular and exclusive to the nation. But the revolution would be more profound than even that.

When Thomas Hobbes wrote that "the Papacy is no other than the ghost of the deceased Roman empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof", he was promulgating an enormously important truth. Authority in the Roman church is the exertion of that imperium from which England in the sixteenth century finally and decisively declared its national independence as the alter imperium, the "other empire", of which Henry VIII declared: "this realm of England is an empire". It was an event which neither the toleration of other churches and religions nor the decline (if such there be) in the Christian religion itself can reverse, so long as the nation continues to be a nation - to be itself. The issue of the sovereign independence of this nation hangs today in the balance. Its

nationhood is openly denied, not to say derided, by a large element in the state, and Parliament has consented to decisions which can be interpreted as tantamount to the formal and deliberate renunciation of national status. For the first time since the Tudors another imperium, a superior external authority - judicial, fiscal and legislative - has been admitted. The possibility of concurrent authority, national and supra-national, is now openly asserted in contradiction of four centuries of our history. In this struggle, which until it is resolved one way or another will continue to dominate the political and public life of this country, the destruction of the essential principle of the Church of England would be the capitulation of a key position, both morally and practically. It would signal the beginning of the end of the British monarchy. It would portend the eventual surrender of everything that has made us, and keeps us still, a nation.

11

Extracts from a paper by the Rt.Hon.J.Enoch Powell MP
delivered to the Oldham Branch of the Institute of
Works Managers at the New Civic Centre, Oldham,
at 8 pm, Friday, 1st December 1978

In the middle 1960's I recall making a number of speeches in which I not only hailed with delight the advent of North Sea gas but suggested that it was a boon for which a special thanksgiving might properly be included in the liturgy of the established Church. In more recent years, on the contrary, I have frequently described North Sea oil as a curse and not a blessing and have argued that Britain would in more respects than one have been better off if it had never happened.

This is one of those contradictions which are only apparent and which, when the seeming conflict has been resolved, serve to illustrate an important point. In a nutshell, the solution in this case is that North Sea gas is cheap energy, whereas North Sea oil is dear energy. Put in those, admittedly over-simplified, terms, there is no difficulty in reconciling a warm welcome for the gas with a frosty one for the oil; but an exploration of the contrast will enable us to recognise and to dispose of some of the most dangerous and deep-seated economic fallacies of our time.

North Sea gas provided us, on a small scale, with the same benefit as our coalfields did on a large scale in the nineteenth century. The point about British coal was not that it was British or 'indigenous', but that it was cheap. It powered the industrial revolution as no other source of energy available at the time in this country or elsewhere could have done, because it was plentiful and above all because it was accessible. The transmission costs were low; and this was the only benefit that was due to its occurrence in our own soil or near this island. If coal could have been delivered to the foundries and the factories at a lower price from overseas, the fact that it was foreign and not British would not have mattered. In fact, until well into the twentieth century, we were exporting it at a profit right across the world.

It was the same with North Sea gas. George Brown's Economic Plan of 1965, though obsolescent by the time it was published, still envisaged the imminent euthanasia of gas as a source of industrial as well as domestic energy. North Sea gas turned these gloomy expectations on their head by slashing the cost. It was the cost that did the trick. If gas had been piped at the same price from Siberia instead of from the North Sea, the result would have been

exactly the same. As in the case of coal, the territoriality of the source was significant only because it was related to the low cost and high convenience of transmission or transportation. What matters is real cost at the point of consumption, wherever the point of origin may be.

No such virtue attaches to North Sea oil. The most that can be stated - even so, with some diffidence, in a market dominated by international arrangements - is that the oil can be sold in the United Kingdom at prices not higher than those at which the same products traded on external markets and imported into the United Kingdom are sold. In other words, North Sea oil has produced no revolution in the energy economics of Britain. We are however still living in the aftermath of the events of 1973, when Middle Eastern oil prices, long held at unnaturally low levels, were released and shot up like a jack-in-the-box far above the levels which will prevail after the full consequences of the price rise have been realized, in terms of economies, of stimulation of production, and of incentive to substitution. It is an ominous fact that the organisations which the consuming nations formed have shown interest from the start in keeping prices up rather than down. Without undue pessimism it would be reasonable to suppose that North Sea oil will not become more competitive - to put it mildly - as time goes by.

Significantly, the grounds on which North Sea oil is popularly - and politically - treated as a godsend do not include cheapness. Those grounds are of a different character altogether. The two principal ones are, first, that North Sea oil, being 'British' or 'sterling' oil, eliminates oil imports from what is called our balance of payments, that is, that we do not have to export in order to buy it; and secondly, that North Sea oil increases our national income and thus our taxable capacity. Both these propositions rest on widespread and serious misconceptions.

We have long lived under government policies which were directed to maintaining an artificial exchange value of the pound. In the course of this endeavour governments have cast upon the screen of the public mind the picture of a balance of payments depicted as two columns of figures, representing respectively imports and exports. If they did not add up to the same total, there would be either a surplus or a deficit - actually, on the balance of trade or visible trade, but commonly it was wrongly called the balance of payments. A surplus was regarded as cause for national pride and governmental self-laudation; a deficit was regarded as a short-

coming of the British people, which they must somehow remedy or else suffer the punishment of a fall in the exchange rate of the pound. With this picture burnt into their retina, it was easy to hoodwink people into supposing that if a big item such as oil was taken out of the imports column, this would eliminate a deficit or even (oh, joy) create a surplus. Hence the supposed blessings of indigenous oil; and you can still read of Treasury Ministers giving answers in Hansard which purport to quantify "the expected benefit to the balance of payments from North Sea oil in the current year." There could not be greater nonsense.

The balance of trade and, still more, the balance of payments are not the result of a sort of compilation of individual items, so that one item can be removed here or another inserted there, as a child might do when building piles of coloured bricks. The magnitudes of the various items are not causes of the respective totals but consequences. Payments in and payments out - pounds received and pounds relinquished, in exchange for other currencies - must balance because they cannot do anything else. Therefore, all the items - loans and borrowings, imports and exports - adjust themselves automatically and continuously, under the influence of the exchange rate, to produce overall equality. It simply is impossible to make a surplus with the rest of the world by cutting imports; for if less of a particular item is imported, everything else immediately alters to make allowance for the change.

Even if it were true (which it is not) that a higher exchange rate for a nation's currency is preferable to a lower exchange rate, the rate cannot be forced up just by refraining from importing, because, immediately the rate begins to rise as a result, exports and the other variables fall off so as to match.

The claim that it is a good thing to replace imported oil by home-produced oil at the same price boils down in short to the assertion that less external trade is better than more - an assertion as vacuous as the opposite assertion that more external trade is better than less. The truth is that we want the best pattern of trade, and that is when we are exchanging our products to best advantage whether inside our economy or across the borders. In some circumstances that will mean more external trade, in others less; but no one can say in advance or as a general rule whether our total overseas trade "ought" to be greater or smaller. Whether we are better off for having North Sea oil instead of importing it depends on whether we are thereby getting it cheaper, i.e. in exchange for less of everything else that we produce or could produce. So we come back to

price; is it cheaper oil or not? If not, there is no benefit.

Jorrocks, the Cockney foxhunter, used to have a rule: 'never dine from home if you can eat better at home.' The trouble about North Sea oil is that we are eating no better at home, and may soon be eating worse.

Let us look now at the other allegation, that North Sea oil increases our national income and thus our taxable capacity - in short, our wealth. It is curious that this notion should be so prevalent when the actual calculations made by Government itself are so discouraging. For example, in the Public Expenditure blue book of January this year the Treasury pointed out that "over the 25 years or so up to the beginning of the recent recession the trend rate of growth of gross domestic product was 2 3/4 per cent a year." They then went on to say that "even allowing for the faster growth of labour supply and the contribution made by the rising output of North Sea oil, it would be imprudent to count on a faster rate of growth of productive potential than 3 per cent a year" - that is to say, only one quarter of one per cent, and not all of that, would be accounted for by North Sea oil.

Under the head of revenue, as opposed to productive potential, the same document expected a rise in the yield of taxation between 1977-78 and 1979-80 of just over £4 billion, of which a third, £1.4 billion, would, in the Treasury's words, "be accounted for by the growing volume of tax and royalty receipts arising from North Sea oil". What that meant, however, is that, as the share of North Sea oil in the gross domestic product increases, the revenue increases more than proportionately because the percentage taken in taxes and royalties on oil is higher ^{that taken} than/on the rest of the national income.

The Treasury allowed a glimpse of the reality to appear when they concluded that "there is now, thanks to North Sea oil and to the adjustments achieved in the past year, an opportunity to move to a higher rate of growth than has been achieved for many years. But it is only an opportunity". The word "opportunity" provides the clue to the nature of the real increase, if any, in our national wealth which is attributable to North Sea oil. It is the possibility - or rather the assumption - that the diversion of effort into producing North Sea oil from producing the goods and services that would otherwise have been exchanged for the equivalent imported oil has thrown up a surplus or margin of productive capacity, though it can neither be demonstrated nor quantified. This surplus or margin, however, if it exists, has to be put to actual use if a net addition

to our national wealth is to result. Thus we arrive at a particular case of the general law that increase in economic well-being depends on a continuous shift of effort from less to more efficient and well-chosen applications. For a highly developed industrial economy like ours there is no a priori presumption that the extraction and processing of an indigenous raw material affords a superior application for capital and labour compared with the alternatives. The decision can only be made from case to case and from time to time; and herein lie some of the dangers of North Sea oil for our future.

The crudest and most obvious danger is that, like the tinker in the Shakespeare play, we might fall victims to the intoxicating delusion that we have suddenly and miraculously become rich and can live accordingly. However, the cold accounts could be relied upon to waken us fairly smartly out of that little daydream, though not necessarily before we have made inflationary fools of ourselves. The more durable and accordingly more serious dangers are different.

Now that we have, as a nation, invested so deeply, in pride and capital, in North Sea oil, the temptation will be enormous, if and when North Sea oil becomes actually dearer than oil or energy obtainable elsewhere or otherwise, to lock ourselves into our own domestic oil economy and infringe the fundamental rule of all trade - to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest. The danger that we shall so behave will be intensified by the fallacious ideas long current about the nature of exchange rates and the balance of payments and the almost unlimited opportunities which these afford to governments for fudging prices and hoodwinking the public. The salutary practice of cutting losses earlier rather than later is notoriously unpopular with politicians; and it is surely not naughty to suggest that those who have published the prospectus for El Dorado and nationalised Shangri La before they got there, are unlikely to lead the van in the retreat from lost illusions. The danger, in short, is that like the ancient Pistol, we may find ourselves being forced to drink our oil.

The second danger is in a sense another aspect of the same. It is the danger associated with all indigenous raw materials and resources, namely the natural tendency, easily understandable psychologically, for effort and investment to be unduly attracted and tied to them just because they are indigenous and because of the constellation of fallacies (which we have just been examining) that surrounds the whole subject of natural resources. I would have no difficulty in proposing for debate the proposition "That in the opinion of this House the happiest countries are those which

have no natural resources". Like all such aphorisms, it is not 100 per cent true; but for a highly developed industrial economy like our own, deeply engaged in worldwide trade, it is a proposition with a remarkably high percentage of truth to it. The pattern of optimum application for such an economy is constantly shifting; and no single resource is likely to retain the same position in that pattern for long.

This brings me in conclusion to the good news last. Ever since the North Sea oil bubble rose to the surface of public consciousness, people have worried themselves into nervous breakdowns about what will happen "when the oil gives out", accompanied by consultations of palmists and necromancers to discover how long it will last, as though its termination would herald in a sort of terminal Ice Age. The only thing certain about such predictions is that in the past they have always proved wildly wrong. But that is not the real consolation. The real consolation lies in the main theme of this paper, namely, that economically North Sea oil is at best a doubtful and highly marginal benefit, and is accompanied by several severe risks and drawbacks. If that is so, we can view the prospective gradual exhaustion of this natural resource with philosophical equanimity, knowing ourselves equally secure against the dangers of sudden and violent wealth and of sudden and disastrous impoverishment.

Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP at a
public meeting in the Town Hall, Warrenpoint
Newry, Co. Down
at 8 pm, Friday, 24th November 1978

I have never, in the course of my political life - to the best of my knowledge and understanding - advocated a policy which I did not believe to be in the interest of all my constituents, however deeply divided, by class or other differences, they might be. This was not less true when four years ago I stood for election for South Down as an upholder of the Union; and I am prepared to assert that, without exception, the measures which my fellow Ulster Unionists and I have advocated and in part secured during the life of this parliament have been calculated to benefit all and to disadvantage none. 2

The Union, though this is a fact sometimes forgotten, is the parliamentary union: that is its true name and its true nature. Men live by faith no less than by reason - perhaps more - and I am not ashamed to avow that, for me, political life hinges upon faith in Parliament. I am an uninhibited and unconditional believer in parliamentary government: I believe that, of all human contrivances, the parliamentary system of the United Kingdom affords the best available guarantee to those who live under it of justice and freedom. I do not, on the analogy of the old ~~sage~~ that "the king can do no wrong", say that Parliament can do no wrong. What I do say is that, of all forms of government, Parliament does least wrong and soonest mends what wrong it does. 3

When the Northern Ireland constitution of 1920 was destroyed in 1972 "at a stroke" - indeed by the very inventor of that famous phrase himself - what was left was not the parliamentary Union. What was left in Northern Ireland was a travesty of parliamentary government. There were three gross respects in which our membership of the Union was a maimed and mutilated thing. First, the population

of Northern Ireland was gravely under-represented in Parliament itself without even a shadow of the excuse that Northern Ireland had a local parliament. This manifest inequity not only, by implication denied the full reality of the Union as far as Northern Ireland was concerned. It prevented the people of Northern Ireland from receiving that degree of attention and representation by their respective Members of Parliament to which they were entitled. The principle of one man, one vote, one value was dishonoured.

The second defect was that the law was made for Northern Ireland not by Parliament but by ministerial Order, which no amount of prior consultation or concessions on the length of the affirmative procedures could render tolerable. To legislate for Northern Ireland by Order was in effect to deny to Northern Ireland the very essence of the parliamentary Union, the meaning of which is that for all parts of the Union the law is made by Parliament itself in the same way and on the same principles. The disadvantage came home to the individual citizens in Northern Ireland, whose representatives were unable to bring to bear upon the making of new law the legitimate interests and wishes of their constituents.

Finally, the third defect was the almost total absence of any local democratic representation of the people of Northern Ireland in the administration of those functions and services which most closely affect their lives. Bureaucratic centralisation is the very anti-thesis of parliamentary government. It would be true to say that at no time - going back long before the nineteenth century - had the central government or Parliament attempted in Great Britain to conduct or control the day-to-day life of the localities. In Northern Ireland, for almost every matter which concerned the details of his daily life, the citizen's sole responsible representative was his Member of Parliament, and that Member's sole responsible recourse was to a Minister of Her Majesty's Government.

At the last general election four years ago I said at meetings throughout this constituency that Parliament could not and would not fail to remedy these defects and to give to Northern Ireland all the rights implicit in the parliamentary Union, which Parliament itself recognised. I remember with what surprise and even incredulity my assurance was received. Yet I had no hesitation in giving it, because I knew that in the long run Parliament could not be false to itself and that its inherent sense of fairness and justice would prevail.

Well, my words are in the course of being fulfilled. Last

year the House of Commons, through a conference convened by Mr Speaker, declared with only one dissentient voice that Northern Ireland ought to have representation in Parliament not just on the same scale as the rest of the kingdom taken as a whole but on a substantially higher scale having regard to its relative remoteness and large size. The Bill to implement that decision, presented by Her Majesty's Government, will receive its second reading next week with the support of all parties but one, and should reach the statute book unaltered early in the New Year.

Meanwhile there has been progress towards remedying the two other grievances of Northern Ireland.

To the plea that Northern Ireland should be legislated for by Parliament itself and not by ministerial Order, there has been a clear response on the part of the Government. All but one of the measures presented to Parliament in this session so far bears on its face the fact that it extends to Northern Ireland; and Members in all parts of the House have welcomed the equal opportunity thus given to Northern Ireland Members and through them to their constituents to participate fully in the making of new law. The opportunity confronts our small numbers with a test and a challenge; but it is one that we shall be proud to take up.

I am not of course saying that there will be no more Orders in Council. Where it is a question of applying to Northern Ireland law which has already been enacted in Great Britain, one must admit that, for the time being, there is no practicable alternative to that procedure; and in fact there were two such examples this week. What I do say, however, is that we are seeing the beginning of the end of colonial rule in Northern Ireland by ministerial Order and its replacement by the normal democratic processes of Parliament.

I come to local government; and there I must polish my optic glass and focus on a somewhat longer perspective. Nevertheless, I will take my courage in both hands and say that, sooner than most people expect, we shall see the institution in Northern Ireland of a system of local administration which will give its inhabitants the same rights as their fellow citizens elsewhere in the U.K. enjoy of controlling through elected representatives the provision and the financing of the services which affect them in the places where they live. This is a subject to which I devoted a whole speech earlier this year in Newry Town Hall. I pointed out then that the time was more than ripe for two developments. One would be the creation of a body elected province-wide which would control the major local

government services through subject and area sub-committees, utilising as their instruments the administrative machinery now answerable to the undemocratic appointed Boards. The other would be the extension of the functions of the District Councils, to whom the more local and detailed aspects of such subjects as roads, sewerage and planning could be devolved.

It was evidently along some such lines as these that Mr Mason was thinking when he said in Parliament a week or two ago:

"The Government want to see established as quickly as possible a new system of government in Northern Ireland which will ensure that elected representatives are again responsible for the administration of the great majority of those functions and services which most closely affect the lives of the people who live there."

If this is what the Government now have in mind, there need be no problem about the condition of "attracting and retaining the support and confidence of the majority in both parts of the community". The Government may rest assured that any political party in Northern Ireland which failed to take ^{the} full part which the electors were ready to give to it in working such a system of genuine local government would receive very short shrift indeed from the public and would see itself speedily displaced by others who were ready to do the work.

And now I will tell you ^{why} ~~how~~ I foresee this happening in the not too distant future. I wonder how many people will have noticed the significance of the recent appointment of an additional junior minister in the Northern Ireland Office, bringing the total to six - six ministers (one Secretary of State, two Ministers of State and three Parliamentary Under-Secretaries) for a population of a million and a half. I will tell you what the significance is. The Northern

Ireland Office is creaking and breaking under the strain of attempting to do the work of not only a government department but a regional local authority and twenty six ~~district~~ authorities as well. It is not as if the Ministers were idle; they labour most industriously. But they are learning the lesson the hard way, that there is no substitute for local government. Flesh and blood could not cope with the ludicrous over-centralisation created by the denial of democratic local government to Northern Ireland. By now the Government know very well that they can not carry on like this indefinitely; and that is why the third thing lacking to Northern Ireland as part of the parliamentary Union is in a fair way to be supplied.

One characteristic is common to all these matters about which I have been talking: representation, legislation, and local government. In each case what was necessary has come about, or is

in course of coming about, as the result of a quiet and gradual process of conviction, whereby all concerned reach their own conclusion that the remedy must be provided. For Northern Ireland this is essential. Northern Ireland's place and rights in the parliamentary Union will be secure and lasting in proportion as their recognition is not the result of party conflict, forcibly and perhaps narrowly achieved, but rests upon the unconstrained assent of Government as such and of Parliament as a whole. This after all, is how it ought to be; for Northern Ireland's cause is the cause of the whole United Kingdom.

Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP to the
Liverpool Scotland Exchange Conservative Association
at the Everton Conservative Club, Liverpool
at 7.30 pm, Friday 17th November 1978

As I sat down to consider on what subject I might best address you, I bethought me of looking out the speech which I had delivered on the occasion of your previous invitation, when I spoke in St George's Hall on 27th June 1975, almost three and a half years ago - an interval representing much the greater part of the life of this parliament. It had evidently proved a popular speech; for the spare copies had been exhausted. But I extracted the original from my safe and sat down to read. Several times in the course of doing so, I turned back to check and re-check that I was not mistaken about the date. Over the first few paragraphs I had started to chuckle: everything, down to minor details, fitted November 1978 so perfectly. In fact, at one moment I even toyed with the idea that I might just deliver the same speech to you again, and tell you at the end: only a word or a name here and there would have needed to be altered. But as I read on, the chuckles died away and were succeeded by a cold sensation down the back. It was not funny: it was weird, even frightening, this déjà vu of a parliament and a nation. 2

In 1975 James Callaghan had just humiliated the Queen and, in her person, the nation by advising her to send Amin of Uganda the plea which enabled him to inflict a slap in the face upon her and us; and the Opposition had been silent in Parliament and the country. Only a single voice, and that not Conservative, had been raised in protest. In 1978 James Callaghan humiliated himself and, in his person, the nation by a grovelling apology to Kaunda of Zambia for sanction-breaking, when it presently appeared that Zambia itself was trading with Rhodesia and begging Britain for weapons which we provided gratis. The Opposition was silent at first, but broke its silence later to approve the gift of arms and express sympathy with Zambia's predicament. As for Rhodesia, there was a manuscript postscript to the Opposition Leader's letter of dismissal to a junior party spokesman who had joined over a hundred of his Party colleagues in voting to call off the sanctions farce: "PS I too feel strongly about events in Rhodesia - we all do". The "strong feelings", whatever they were, remained unspoken. 3

In 1975 it had just been discovered that New Commonwealth immigration was running at higher levels than in the early 1970s;

but the Government had explained that the figures which they and the Home Office had been using without question for twenty years were misleading, and so they had started a new series altogether - which still showed nett immigration running at between 40,000 and 50,000 a year. The Opposition, whose spokesman had been partly responsible for uncovering the error, maintained an embarrassed silence. Three years later - whether by accident or design nobody perhaps will ever know - the Leader of the Opposition uncorked an artesian well of public feeling and anxiety by the use on television of a single apt word, "swamped"; but almost instantly the shades closed in. Never was any subsequent utterance permitted to strike again that instantly recognised note of truth. Taunts and ridicule alike did not avail to induce Her Majesty's Opposition to use one single parliamentary day out of the many at their disposal for the purpose of debating the subject which is the haunting preoccupation of millions in the cities and industrial areas of England. Indeed, but for the chance of a Private Member being lucky in the ballot for a motion two years ago, that subject would have remained undebated in the House of Commons from the beginning to the end of a parliament which seems likely to run to almost its maximum duration. Such occasional utterances as are permitted out of doors have been directed to the purpose - not, I would think, likely to be achieved - of garnering what is called "the immigrant vote".

In 1975 there had been what a concerted chorus of Opposition spokesmen described as "the gravest economic crisis since 1931": the Government was engaged in passing legislation, if not to control wages, to arm itself with the bullying power to influence wage settlements, and inflation was soaring at a rate that was soon to carry it up to unprecedented levels. What was to be done? What was the cause and nature of the forces that needed to be withstood? I cannot refrain in this instance from quoting the actual words I used to depict the stance of the Opposition, for they would not need to be altered by a syllable to describe the scene in the House of Commons last week or countrywide in the last three months: "this time", I said, "it is not exactly silence, but a babel of discordant and contradictory voices, the sounds of men arguing about causes before they get down to arguing about remedies, a pandemonium amid which the Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition must needs sit helpless till one faction shall drive the other from the field and unchain the damsel from the rock".

I do not, I assure^{you}, recall all this with the object of deriding the political party in which, until the last five years,

I lived, moved and had my being. That would be a futile exercise, quite apart from being a discourtesy to my hosts. The lesson of all this is how little has altered between the early days of a new parliament and a new Conservative leadership and the expiring months of an old parliament, when that leadership has been in existence for nearly four years. In those four years, packed with events and vicissitudes, the Opposition has found no recognisable or distinctive voice. I think this is the reason why, when its former Leader happened recently to deliver himself of certain opinions, the country as a whole stopped, looked up and listened, as if it were saying to itself: "well, there at least is a voice: we know it and we recognise it, whether or not we happen to like it".

That this should be so is not a matter of domestic grief, an ominous intimation of forthcoming electoral disaster. I do not even believe that what I am describing has necessarily anything to do with the outcome of the next General Election. The lottery of the ballot box is an unpredictable turbulence upon the surface of the nation's life, rarely connected at all directly or specifically with what is happening in the depths. A General Election may very well be won by a party that has lost its voice and not found it again: elections have been won before now in living memory by parties that had nothing to say. The misfortune is not a private one, but a public one. It is the nation itself that is the loser.

Britain without a Tory party is like a man with one arm cut off or a giant blinded in one eye - it cannot act effectively, it cannot see properly to live its life. I do not need to be reminded that in a two-party state, the form to which a parliamentary monarchy necessarily reverts as its normal condition, the great parties are immensely diverse and kaleidoscopic coalitions. I do not need to be told that Conservative and Tory are not synonymous, and that the Conservative Party comprises political elements which are positively anti-Tory: Whig, Liberal, conservative with a small "c", and so on. What I am saying is, that so long as the United Kingdom, or whatever is left over after devolution and separatism have done their worst, remains a nation at all, there has to be a party in the state which embodies the national consciousness, whose thinking expounds the philosophy of nation, and whose tongue speaks the language of nation. Around that central core can congregate the bearers of all manner of other aspirations and insights; but the core itself is indispensable.

What has not happened between 1975 and 1979, what is meant when one says that the Opposition has found no characteristic or authentic voice, is that it has not rediscovered the nation, and therefore cannot expound what its nationhood is about. Wherever there has been silence when the people waited for their leaders to speak, this is what will be found to have been wanting.

No one can make Britain a power in Europe, whether inside the European Economic Community or out of it, who is unable to tell the people and the world whether Britain is a nation with a sovereign parliament or not. Every debate, every decision, every alignment hangs upon that. Without two sides to that argument, Britain and the British Parliament in the 1970s have been like one who tries to clap with one hand: there is no sound coming out of it, opposition is reduced to a dumb show. Parliament itself, the nation itself, is being fought about today; but its defenders are an army of anonymity, troops without badges, mercenaries in a cause that no one has expounded to them. 11

The superficial and the cynical find no mystery in the fiasco of Mrs Thatcher's precipitate abandonment of her discovery of the vast population changes which impend in London and elsewhere and of the fears which that prospect inspires in so many of her fellow citizens. But those who seek a sufficient explanation in the orchestrated outcry of the media, the predictable reaction of the liberal Establishment, and the anxiety about votes to be won or lost have not looked deep enough. The danger of the coming years - a danger comparable with that of the greatest armed aggressions - can be confronted only by those who have, like a rock beneath their feet, an articulated, proclaimed and understood philosophy of nationhood. Without that, all discussion of what is denominated by the four-letter word 'race', all discussion of the future of the population of this country, either becomes a series of evasions and concealments of reality or else degenerates into racialism in the true pejorative sense of the term. It has been an emergency with which a Conservative Party that had ceased to be the party of the nation did not possess the intellectual and dialectical equipment to cope. 12

Remote though it may seem at first sight, the Rhodesian debacle of the Opposition is ultimately traceable to the same cause. The original failure in 1965 to repudiate the assertion of continuing U.K. sovereignty and parliamentary responsibility in a Southern Rhodesia which had declared itself independent, led, after all the humiliations of the intervening years, to the parliamentary collapse of 8th November 1978 where the Conservative Party was

found to have no coherent doctrine as to the national status of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis either Rhodesia or the United Nations. Of all the branches of government, foreign affairs most of all presupposes a thoroughly understood doctrine of national interest and national identity. The renunciation of any such doctrine to pay the price of entry into the European Community could not be confined in its effects to one continent alone. It was bound to disable the Conservative Party in interpreting the circumstances in Africa, the Middle East, or the Far East, and in advancing tenable and defensible policies for Britain. Without its own philosophy, the party would be at the mercy of ^{the ~~hand~~ of ~~others~~} those of its opponents, abroad and at home.

Economics are politics in disguise. The embarrassing inability of the Opposition to resolve, or even openly to recognise and debate, ¹⁴ its internal differences over economic policy is not due to the Leader and her colleagues having studied different textbooks or sat at the feet of different professors of economics. Matters of exchange rates, balance of payments, monetary systems, trading practices, are not resolved by economic theories: they are expressions of political will and cannot be handled consistently or intelligibly to the public or (still less) inspiringly, unless the individual decisions and policies can be consciously related to a political philosophy and view of the world. To decide what to do or not to do about sterling, you must first know whether Britain is a nation and what a nation is; you must know of what sort of political purpose these economic phenomena are to be the manifestations and instruments.

The internal politics of inflation and of industrial relations have indeed been the playground of the grossest logical and intellectual failures of the Opposition. Yet even there the root fault lies in political, not economic analysis. The catastrophes of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 and the Counter-Inflation Act 1973, from the consequences of which the Conservative Party has as yet not even begun to disentangle itself in opposition, could only have occurred because Government and Party had ceased to entertain any conception of society and of the nation that could be described as Tory. The organic had been replaced by the inorganic, the institutional by the artificial, the romantic by the prosaic. * *

As I said three and a half years ago, and it is more true now than then, "the British people in bewilderment and mounting anxiety and confusion look to their representatives and above all to Her Majesty's Opposition, whence in emergency the challenge to

analysis and action ought traditionally to come, to lead them, to enlighten them, and to inspire them". One day that will happen, but only when the Conservative Party has learnt once more to speak to them as a nation, in the language of nation, about what it means to be a nation. Nothing else will do.

Trans
Extract from speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell MP
to the Export Managers Club at The Cockney, Charing
Cross Road, W.C1.
at 7 pm, Wednesday 25th October 1978

Among the fields of study for anthropologists and sociologists in the future few will be more productive than the story of incomes policy in British politics in the last thirty years.

The problem which that story presents is easily stated; but its solution is probably beyond the reach of contemporary resources. Here is a society which for thirty years, irrespective of its prevailing political colour at the time, has tied itself into knots and tortured itself to distraction by attempts to do something as manifestly impossible as the proverbial operations of filling a sieve or making a rope out of sand. That something is to prevent a fall in the value of money by fixing wages. 2

The first time or two, in the far-off days of Stafford Cripps or the less far-off but already distant days of Selwyn Lloyd, it was possible to assume that public and politicians had just not noticed that they were on to an absurdity; but that evasion is no longer seriously available. In 1964 - I mention it simply to provide a dating - I was declaring from a seat on the Opposition front bench that "incomes policy is nonsense, silly nonsense, and what is more and worse, dangerous nonsense". Since then the nonsensicality has not merely been proved logically out of academic and political mouths alike; it has been demonstrated exhaustively and repeatedly in practice and (as the engineers say) "to destruction" by experiment. 2

Yet the nonsense bestrides the political scene still, as triumphant and invulnerable as ever, while the year 1978 draws to its close. In fact, the latest phase is not only surcharged with humour and personal pathos; it presents the social scientist's old problem of accounting for this phenomenon of apparently in-

intractably irrational behaviour in a new and fascinating guise. Here are two highly intelligent human beings, Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher. They have both not merely seen the play several times before; but they themselves have had parts - the one a principal, the other a walking-on part - in the more recent performances. What have they learnt, and what have they to say?

Mrs Thatcher says that the government, as the government, ought to have nothing to do with the fixing of remuneration: that should be left, where there is collective bargaining, to "free collective bargaining". So far so good, so far so very good: this might mean that she has perceived and accepts the fact that a fall in the value of money cannot be caused by a general rise in wages, but that a general rise in wages is a result, an inevitable result, of the fall in the value of money, which consequently can not be affected by attempting to constrain or influence wages. Alas, there is a possible alternative explanation of her pronouncement in favour of free collective bargaining. This is that she is convinced that governments can not successfully or safely intervene in the fixing of remuneration and that therefore they had better leave it alone, whether or not it is the cause, or a cause, of the fall in the value of money.

The suspicion that this latter explanation may be the true one is prompted by Mrs Thatcher's insertion of a tell-tale word in front of "free collective bargaining". She said "responsible free collective bargaining". Now, if wages don't cause inflation anyhow, it doesn't matter whether the "free collective bargaining" is "responsible" or irresponsible: if it's irresponsible, it can only do harm to those who are irresponsible and no one else, and that sort of irresponsibility is not usually long persisted in. The use by Mrs Thatcher of the word "responsible" invites the question: "And what ought the government to do if they form the view - incidentally, how do they form the view? - that the free collective

bergaining is 'irresponsible'?" Whoever wrote that word into her script must have stood back and chuckled at his success in papering over not a crack but a chasm. But she ought not to have left it in.

Then there's Edward Heath, who is angry - as only he knows how to be angry - at the very idea of anybody asserting that an effect can have only one cause - for instance, that an increase in the supply of money can by itself cause a fall in the value of money. He says, No, this is mere dogma. According to him (and not only to him, for I seem to remember hearing a lot of other people talk the same way in the past) it is dogmatic to say that an effect has one cause, but undogmatic to say that it has three causes. If he had to deal with a typhoid epidemic, and it was proved that it was being caused by the water, he would say: "Nonsense, we must fight the epidemic on all fronts - pure air, rich food, services in the churches, magical ceremonies, the lot. Confound these waterists and their dogmatism".

There is only one condition upon which it would be justifiable to talk and act in this way, namely, if the cause or causes had been demonstrated by rational argument, evidence and experiment. It would then be appropriate to dismiss not merely as dogmatic but as irrational those who insisted that there were in fact fewer, or more, or different causes.

What is astonishing to an observer about the entire scene is the rooted determination of the political leaders on the opposing sides of the dispute not to dirty their hands with clear and rational argument. Not one of those, from the Prime Minister downwards, who assert that an increase in wages causes inflation has made the slightest attempt to show how it does so or even how it can do so. On the other side there have admittedly not been lacking minor figures - camp-followers or private soldiers in the political host - who have been ready to come forward with public argument and

proof that increased wages do not and can not cause inflation. But their proofs have not been used, nor their arguments adopted, by their leaders. Why not? Therein lies the puzzle - to find the motive and to explain the mechanism of this tacit agreement to sustain the unsustainable and to repeat courses of action of which the unsoundness and futility have been abundantly shown in practice.

Mr. Speech
Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP to the
Cardiff Business Club, at the Royal Hotel, Cardiff,
at 7.30 pm, Monday 23 October 1978

INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Many economic fallacies can be, and ought to be, treated by working politicians with tolerance. If the general acceptance of such fallacies is harmless, time and the philosophers can be left to dispose of them in due course. Unfortunately, many economic fallacies are not harmless; and when they are intertwined with subjects of deep public concern and emotion, they can be dangerous indeed. In

Wales above all unemployment has for long been such a subject. The capital of Wales is therefore a most proper place for the exposure and if possible demolition of two economic fallacies about unemployment which receive wide currency and authoritative repetition and which are capable of creating much damage. 2

To prove at the outset that these fallacies deserve to be taken seriously, I will present them in the own words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in a speech he made in his constituency a fortnight ago. Here is the first: "Inflation can be kept under control without increasing unemployment only if there is the right combination of fiscal and monetary policy with moderate pay increases.

If pay rises much too fast, the government would be forced to adopt much tougher policies on tax, spending and interest rates than would otherwise be necessary". 3

What the Chancellor of the Exchequer is saying here is that, if the rate of inflation were to fall wholly or partly because lower money wages are demanded and paid than would otherwise be demanded and paid, unemployment will not increase. I was careful to say "lower than would otherwise be paid"; for unless higher wages would in fact have actually been paid but for voluntary and deliberate restraint, the whole statement becomes meaningless. If the increases could not and would not have been paid anyhow, *Chancellor* the would be simply

talking about nothing. I do not exercise 'restraint' if I avoid touching with my head a chandelier ten feet above the floor, nor is the avoidance of a collision between those two objects evidence of 'moderation' on my part. So if the Chancellor's contention is to be taken seriously, it must mean that when inflation is reduced by a fall in the velocity of money - because people refrain from using money which already exists - unemployment does not increase, but when inflation is reduced because the supply of money is increased less than previously or not at all - due to less new money being put into circulation - then unemployment will rise. *Explain*

Chancellor's
 This assertion, which is widely made and widely believed, is a fallacy and a dangerous fallacy. ~~How does~~ ^{does not} its falsity depend on accepting the view (which I myself happen to hold) that inflation ^{at least in part} as we know it is uniquely due to the supply of money having been increased by government action. I will undertake to refute the Chancellor's fallacy on grounds equally applicable to a Friedmanite ^{equally applicable for a monetarist} and an anti-Friedmanite analysis; for my object is to show that ~~it~~ ^{is} the fact that inflation ^{is} decreased, and not the reason why it is decreased, ^{my} which causes unemployment to rise. *what*

It will be convenient however to start with the ~~other~~ ^{second} fallacy ^{of this} which was asserted by the Chancellor in his speech at Leeds. He *there*

said: "Confetti money is the father and mother of unemployment: it simply prices people out of jobs". ~~point~~ This statement - that an increase in the supply of money reduces employment - is the exact opposite of the truth. The truth is that a fall in the value of money (~~or~~ ^{ie}, inflation), however it is caused (and if the Chancellor attributes it to an increase in the money supply, I am the last person to complain) causes a rise in the demand for labour, whereas a rise in the value of money (~~or~~ ^{ie} deflation) causes a fall in the demand for labour. It is not difficult to explain why this is so. *Paradox*

If, as the value of money fell or rose, all money figures whatsoever - prices ^{capital} values, wages, the lot - were automatically,

to match

instantaneously and unobtrusively adjusted ~~accordingly~~ - if the fairies came in every night and did the job for us quietly, smoothly and secretly - neither inflation nor deflation would make the faintest bit of difference to anything. ^{or plain} But that is not what happens in real life. In real life different figures ^{some wages etc} are adjusted at different intervals of time so that the 'sticky' ones continually lag behind. The result is that ^{during inflation or deflation} some things are always becoming ^{In that sense} relatively dearer ~~on that account~~, and others relatively cheaper; and of course, when something becomes relatively dearer, the demand for it falls, and vice versa. Now, wages and earnings are among the 'stickier' items: they do not move upwards by any means automatically or instantaneously, and as for moving downwards, there is a deuce of a commotion before that happens. Consequently in times of deflation labour gets relatively dearer and so the demand for it falls. (I surely don't have to labour that point in South Wales above all.) On the other hand, in times of inflation labour gets relatively cheaper and the demand for it rises. So if "confetti money", ^{which is how} as the Prime Minister and the Chancellor use the expression, means inflation, Mr Healey was dead wrong: it is deflation, not inflation, that "prices people out of their jobs". Having got that straight, we can now turn back to Mr Healey's first fallacy.

Supply & Demand

But at this stage someone might interject: "that is all very well when we are talking about straight inflation or straight deflation, about a fall or a rise in the value of money; but Mr Healey, you will observe, referred to 'keeping inflation under control', ^{that} which might mean keeping inflation at a steady rate, neither increasing nor decreasing, so that the value of money would fall at a steady rate year in year out". That, if I may say so, is a very intelligent question, and I will answer it at several levels. ^{I should not have asked it}

First, when politicians talk about "controlling inflation", they usually really mean reducing ^{it} or even ending it but are afraid to say so openly for fear of not succeeding or else (or also) because

Explain.

they do in fact know ^{that this} ~~the~~ painful concomitants of reducing or ending inflation ^{are painful} and would rather not advertise their true intention.

However, if inflation did remain steady at (say) 10 per cent per annum year after year ^{and} if everybody was convinced that that was how it would continue, it is quite true that the adjustment of money figures would tend to be ^{automatic} and to that extent the 'leads and lags' which cause ^{the} shifts of supply and demand would become milder.

The same of course would apply to continuous deflation at a steady rate. But these are hypothetical situations which need not concern us; for they cannot happen in the real world. Everybody knows that

neither inflation nor deflation can go on ad infinitum at (say) 10% per annum compound, and therefore people will never assume it - though they can, and in practice often do, assume stability in the value of money, because that is something which could continue ad infinitum.

There is held it that we are talking a head, was talking about since inflation.

What actually happens when inflation continues but at a declining rate is that the fall outstrips expectations, which are usually extrapolation from the latest previous past period. Thus, although inflation at a falling rate is still inflation and not deflation, it does produce the same effect as actual deflation: money wages, instead of lagging behind as they did when inflation

was soaring upwards, tend to get ahead of the actual fall in the ^{rate} ~~value~~ of money. ^{of depreciation}

As a result unemployment emerges, indistinguishable from deflationary unemployment and sometimes (not surprisingly) so described. ^{describes popular language} This is what has been the experience of the last three years, so far as unemployment has been due to financial causes at all and not to structural ones.

Thus the emergence of unemployment in a period of falling inflation is the effect of the falling inflation itself. Whatever happened to cause a given percentage fall in the rate of inflation - whether it was brought about by a reduced rate of increase in the money supply or by a fall in velocity due to wage increases that

could have been paid but were altruistically declined, or by both causes operating together - the consequential rise in unemployment will be the same. It is therefore a fallacy to assert, as did the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that falling inflation, when due to falling velocity, does not cause unemployment, whereas falling inflation, when due to reduced increase in money supply does. Falling inflation always and necessarily causes unemployment.

If the Chancellor were saying to the unions that the inflation rate is going to fall to 5%^{over the next 12 months} and that therefore, if money earnings generally rise by more than 5%, unemployment will increase, he would be making a rational statement; but it would be one of which the

unions could make no practical use. In the first place they would need to rely implicitly upon his prediction, and for that the precedents are not exactly encouraging. In the second place, even if they were convinced of the truth of the prediction, they would still have to depend on the estimate, industry by industry and even plant by plant, of what would be the future movement of demand for labour at a given real price in that industry or plant over the period ahead. But that is what in any case, to the best of their ability, those engaged in negotiations are attempting to do.

The whole endeavour of the government - an endeavour not repudiated by Her Majesty's Opposition - to sell wages policy by threatening inflation and to sell control of inflation by threatening unemployment is hocus pocus and economic illiteracy. The danger of the hocus pocus is that it invokes the deep fear and hatred of unemployment in order to obtain support for policies which cannot produce the promised result. When politicians peddle economic fallacies to the people for their political ends, the last state of that nation is commonly worse than the first.

*History of failure to explain
failure to argue: this discourse.*

NEWS RELEASE

Ulster Unionist Party

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Ulster Unionist Party Conference, Fermanagh
Unionist H.Q., Enniskillen.

SATURDAY, 21st OCTOBER, 1978

Speech by Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, M.P., in
debate No. 3 on "Constitution".

This is an excellent motion and a wise one, which I hope this Conference will affirm.

The present parliament will be of historic importance in the story of Ulster. If they could be here today, the great men of Ulster's past would be rejoicing with us - Carson and Craigavon, and an earlier statesman too, the creator of the Union, whom we tend undeservedly to forget, Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh. The decision of the House of Commons, which before many weeks are out should have passed into statute, that Ulster shall again be fully represented in Parliament, has affirmed the Union and banished the spectre of separation in a way that no mere declarations and pledges could have done.

Our work however is not finished. Though equally represented with the rest of the Kingdom, we shall still not yet be equally governed. The re-affirmation of the Union will not be complete until the laws of this part of the Kingdom are made by Parliament and not by Order-in-Council and until the local administration of those laws is in the hands of Ulster people elected by their fellow citizens. The twin aspects of "direct rule" - a bureaucratic administration and legislation by ministerial order - are inseparably linked: they must be replaced by the same genuine democracy as our fellow-subjects throughout the rest of the Kingdom enjoy.

The resolution refers to "a devolved legislature functioning on parliamentary principles". When such a system can be devised which is consistent with the maintenance of the Union, Ulster has a right to it before any other province. But that is a problem which Parliament has not yet solved. The Conservative Opposition and we Ulster Unionists fought side by side against the Scotland and Wales Bills, because we knew they would open the way to the break-up of the Union. Why, the House of Commons actually threw out a clause which pretended that the Bills would leave the Union unimpaired.

Ulster must be wary of falling into a trap prepared by its enemies. Who was it that opposed full representation of Ulster in Parliament? The SDLP and the Irish Republic. Who is it that opposes

local government in Ulster? The SDLP and the Irish Republic. Who is it that demands a devolved government and parliament instead? The SDLP and the Irish Republic. Why? You know why. Because they see in that the instrument for breaking up the Union, a gate that will lead back to the uncertainty and confusion on which terrorism feeds.

We shall be wise not to give our enemies what they want. For Unionists the rule is simple: "seek ye first the Kingdom and its unity, and all these other things shall be added unto you". We in Parliament will not pause until we have done away with everything that marks out Ulster from the rest of the Kingdom as inferior or separate. We will have the Union, the whole Union, and nothing but the Union. That is the strategy which this resolution lays down. It gives our marching orders, and we are ready to obey them.

Ulster Unionist Party Conference
Fermanagh Unionist H.Q., Enniskillen
Saturday, 21st October 1978

Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP
in debate on constitution

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Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP, at a
public meeting in the Royal Victoria Hall, Southborough
Kent
at 8 pm, Thursday, 12th October 1978

The Foreign Secretary may not be a man after everybody's heart (who is?), but no one who has observed him since he reached that office can be in any doubt that Dr Owen is a man who looks far ahead. As one who has a career of some thirty years in human probability ahead of him, he takes the long view, and is determined not to be so deeply committed to current policies, trends and assumptions that he would be prevented in years to come from espousing any cause which then seemed likely to carry him to the top. That is why his words deserve much closer study by watchers of the skies than they often appear to receive. For example three months ago in the House of Commons he was referred by a questioner on his own side to an editorial in the Daily Express "which was very much in line with the views of the Labour Party Conference that either fundamental changes should be made in the Common Agricultural Policy or we get out of the Common Market". (The Daily Express, as you know, which has reason to observe public opinion and circulation with deep interest, has recently been working hard to retrieve the colossal blunder made by its former owners when in October 1971 it deserted the cause of Britain and the views of its preponderant readership in order to raise the banner inscribed "with Heath to Brussels".)

The Foreign Secretary was not satisfied to respond with one of the bromides which all ministers have at their disposal for parrying the Parthian supplementary question. Instead he replied: "I note the fact that there is still a considerable body of opinion in this country which does not feel that we have benefited from our membership of the Community. That is a fact which any government must take into account, and take seriously". Considering that the

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latest studies of public opinion show a majority of five to three against British membership, including a majority amongst Conservative voters, you might not feel that the Foreign Secretary was offering more than an understatement of the truth, which in itself hardly requires imperatively that he should be offered the next vacancy in the Order of the Garter. But Foreign Secretaries do not have to say these things at all, especially even when they are even more unwelcome to the European states than to the mandarins in Downing Street. The Foreign Secretary, however, has gone much further. In July of last year he made a ^{significant} statement in the House of Commons,

though you were not allowed to become aware of it by the Press and other media, which are as determined to conceal the truth about the European Community as they are about the subject they call "race".

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Here it is. He was asked by a Member on his own side if it was not "now legitimate for the Labour Party to go into the next General Election with a specific promise in its manifesto that a future Labour Government will negotiate our withdrawal." He replied: "It is open to argument whether that would be a recipe for electoral success. In my view it would be a recipe for electoral disaster. I believe that the British people do not like a Government or a party to change course only two years after having put the issue to them in a referendum". He continued: "It may well be that the British people and this Parliament, as they have every right constitutionally to do, may wish to reassess the question of British membership. That is open to them at any time, but I believe that to do so after such a short period would be little short of disastrous".

Every phrase in that carefully measured statement deserves to be pondered. This at least is certain: the Foreign Secretary scrupulously dissociates himself from those, like the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary, who assert that "we are in Europe to stay". On the contrary, Parliament and people can "reassess the question of

membership at any time". He is, with respect, quite right there and, in line with the Government's own official assurance at the time of the referendum, that, in the event of a Yes vote, "our continuing membership will depend on the continuing assent of Parliament". He went out of his way, moreover, to record that it is not merely "open" to Parliament and people to "reassess British membership" but that "it may well be that they will wish to". His sole qualification is that it was too soon to do so only two years after the referendum. What jangling cacophonous discord those words would have been in the ears of Dr Owen's continental colleagues if they had been privileged to know of them. 8

Dr Owen may not live in the real Africa. He certainly lives in the real UK, where a majority and a growing majority of the electors are against British membership; and whoever's nose has to be put out of joint, he does not intend to be stranded on a sandbank with the tide coming in. Even the argument for a decent interval after the referendum is disposable: how long is decent depends ^{on} how strongly people feel. No wonder it was reported from Paris this summer that members of the French Cabinet had made "comments ranging from irritation to dismay" at the British Foreign Secretary's coupling assent to the proposed new European currency system with a wholesale revision of the common agricultural policy on the ground that Britain "had concluded in 1972 an agreement on agriculture unfavourable to its interests". Dr Owen knows on what side his bread tomorrow will be buttered. Nor will the selection for debate at his Party's conference of a composite motion on the EEC, which was carried by three to one on a recorded vote without opposition from the platform, have been lost upon him. Its wording, now that it has been decisively adopted by the Labour Party conference, is worth putting on record. It calls for the following action: 9

"To amend the 1972 European Communities Act so as to restore to the House of Commons the power to decide whether any EEC regulation, directive or decision should be applicable to the UK;

reform fundamentally the Common Agricultural Policy to permit food imports from the world market, abolish food mountains and allow member states to adopt a deficiency payments system:

rewrite the Treaty of Rome so as to curtail the powers of the Commission and give express recognition to the rights of member states to pursue their own economic, industrial and regional policies;

reject any moves towards economic and monetary union and any other encroachment on the rights to self government of member states, including any extension of the EEC assembly's powers;

ensure that the benefits of Britain's indigenous fuels are retained for the British people; and

transform the EEC into an enlarged, reformed and more flexible institution in which independent states could meet and discuss issues of mutual concern."

I do not think that there could be a more measured, clear or accurate expression of the predominant will - the increasingly predominant will - of the British people as to the future relations of the United Kingdom with the EEC. In brief, we are determined to maintain - or, in so far as it has already been forfeited, to regain - our parliamentary democracy and our political independence, while co-operating with our continental neighbours as closely as is consistent with that overriding condition. We, we the majority of the British people, ought to be immensely encouraged that in the teeth of the political Establishment on both sides of the party divide and no more than three years after that monstrous misrepresentation and constitutional outrage, the referendum, our cause has advanced to a point which it would have seen absurdly optimistic to predict either in 1972, when the European Act had been crammed through the Commons by paper-thin majorities, or in 1975 when the Labour Government had torn up the pledges of renegotiation on which alone it had succeeded in getting elected to office. In a word, we are winning. The question now is how our counter-attack is to be

carried to final victory.

Let us examine our strategic position, its strengths and its weaknesses, and see what ought to be our lines of advance.

There is, as I have already said, the indispensable asset of British opinion: the British people do, with increasing eagerness, wish, in the Foreign Secretary's words, "to reassess the question of British membership". In the way of that wish there stand two twin obstacles, powerful to all appearance though in reality illusory. One is the belief that we do not have the right to recall our political independence; the other is the fear that we are not

physically able to do so. They are the two cries, so sedulously orchestrated by those who wish to see Britain a province in a European state, that "we are in and we cannot get out" and that "we cannot go it alone". To the demolition of these two delusions we ought to consecrate our energies. The arguments are all on our side. We have it on the highest possible authority, that of the Foreign Secretary, that it is "open" to Britain "at any time" to terminate or modify its membership of the Community. No breach of faith or of honour is involved, since our constitutional position has always been clearly and frankly stated to our partners. Nor need we fear the slur of reaction or the risk of running counter

to the healthy British instinct for "not putting back the clock". The reasoned ^{ula} form of reassessment adopted by the Labour Party, which I have just read to you, represents anything but "putting back the clock": it is eminently constructive and moderate and contains hardly an item with which any ordinary, fair-minded person would disagree.

Britain has nothing, then, to fear on the score of her honour; but has she the strength? Not the strength "to go it alone" - that extraordinarily silly phrase, which bears no relationship to regaining our right to trade freely and on our own terms wherever in the world we think best - but have we the strength to

exercise political independence or are we already bound hand and foot to Brussels? The facts themselves, facts notorious to everyone, contain the answer to that question. The rest of the Community has a huge visible trade surplus with the UK: it is to their interest much more than ours to maintain and encourage their commerce with Britain. The last thing in the world they would want to do is to hamper our European trade. In fact their ambition is to make Britain a captive market for their agricultural surpluses at the highest possible price, while Britain outside the trammels of the CAP would have the choice of the cheapest and most plentiful markets

in the world. Where else need one look? To energy? Britain has an increasingly predominant proportion of the energy resources of Western Europe. To fisheries? The lion's share of West European stocks of fish are in the internationally recognised sovereign waters of Britain. To currency and exchange rates? It is in their own interests, not Britain's, that the other states want to create a rigid European currency system and an iron cage of fixed parities. If the phrase were not too harsh - it is realistic enough - I would say that in every direction Britain has the whip hand over the Community. 17

How, then, if these illusory inhibitions upon a ripening

British public opinion are cleared away, can that opinion now be made effective. We have here an invaluable asset in the imminence of a parliamentary general election. 18

We do not even now know whether elections to a directly elected European Assembly will take place next year. What is certain is that it is Parliament and not the European Assembly which "constitutionally" (to use the Foreign Secretary's word) can alone give effect to any "reassessment of Britain's membership". The true debate and the real contest belongs here in Britain and will be fought out and decided here.

Britain's political dependence or independence is above all about Parliament, and a general election is the fulcrum of the leverage which opinion exerts upon government. The situation of the two contending parties is not the same. In the cabinet, in the government and in the present parliament the Labour Party is divided. At the top it has fallen victim to its recurrent disease of Macdonaldism or wanting to dine out with duchesses; but its heart and its rank-and-file are solidly with majority opinion in the country. Labour in government again would be held on a tight rein; Labour in opposition would shed its Macdonaldism overnight and come out all but 100 per cent for the policy of its conference.

What about the Conservative Party? To outward appearance it presents a smooth, glossy surface of Europeanism, with a tolerated fringe of patriots too few to be worth disciplining. The reality is otherwise. On this subject, as on so many others, the bulk of that Party detest the European scrape that Edward Heath got them into and wish to God they knew how to get out of it. But there is this in their favour: the Conservative Party may not care about Britain, but it cares about votes. They watch the opinion polls and feel the public pulse like nobody's business. The Conservative Party is much more malleable by the electorate than upon the surface appears; and of its ability to switch through 180 degrees without too anxious repining over consistency or pledges, the political history of the decade leaves no room to doubt. Electors who make it clear beyond peradventure that any support from them is conditional upon the candidate, if not as yet the party, promising compliance with the wish of the British people to reassess membership of the Community are exerting pressure upon a door which, though heavy and brassbound, has hinges and can turn upon them.

Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell, MP to the
Hounslow Round Table, The Camellia, Syon Park,
Brentford, Mddx.
at 7.30 pm, Tuesday, 10 October 1978

We are all of us agog to hear the next instalment of the real-life James-Bond drama of the Bulgarian defectors. While we are waiting, an even more extravagantly improbable mystery and detective story claims our attention. This one, when published paperback in due course with a lurid and arresting cover, might be entitled "The Mystery of the Prime Minister and the Five Per Cent".

There is a school of thought, though I personally have not hitherto belonged to it, which is widely diffused, particularly amongst members of the intelligentsia and the property-owning classes, not to say amongst those members of the community who habitually vote Conservative. According to this doctrine, the economic troubles of Britain and especially the propensity of the trade unions to intensify them by striking at the drop of a hat and demanding exorbitant and inflationary wage increases, are largely, if not wholly, the work of a Communist conspiracy. In fact, many adherents of this school go about in daily dread of something which is called "the Communist take-over".

We received startling evidence in the behaviour of the Prime Minister at the Blackpool conference last week - evidence which dovetails neatly into the behaviour of previous occupants of his office, and notably Edward Heath at the beginning of 1974 - to suggest that the masterminds behind this Communist conspiracy (supposing such a conspiracy to exist at all) have achieved a technological break-through which makes the Bulgarian poison-ball-and-umbrella-ferrule contraption look hopelessly primitive and unsubtle. They must have evidently have discovered a method - whether by gas, injection or minute trace elements in food, I know not - of introducing into the systems of leading ministers, and

pre-eminently of prime ministers, a mind-bending, hallucinatory drug. This drug compels them, in contravention of facts which they understand perfectly well, to create situations in which the trade unions will be bound to beat the government hands down and in which the maximum damage to the economy and humiliation to lawfully constituted authority will be inflicted for no purpose whatsoever.

It may of course be that there is some other explanation for these phenomena; but though I shall suggest, before I conclude, the outlines of an alternative theory, I cannot claim to offer anything approaching a full and satisfactory analysis. In the absence of such an analysis, the hypothesis of a Communist psychopharmacological implant of some kind must remain - to credulous minds - distinctly attractive. Anyhow, all I can do is to set out the phenomena and leave you to draw the best conclusions you can.

The Prime Minister knows the following facts. First, increased money wages are not a cause of inflation, but a consequence of inflation. If inflation next year is to be five per cent, the increase in money wages generally cannot be far one side or^{the} other of that figure. If on the other hand inflation next year turns out to be ten per cent, a ten per cent increase in money wages generally cannot be long delayed. Secondly, the cause of inflation, as we have experienced and are still experiencing inflation, is the increase in money supply which has already taken place anything between a year and three years previously. This increase in the supply of money is the cause of inflation in the full sense of the word 'cause': it is not only a necessary condition, without which inflation could not occur; it is the efficient, working, active cause - the causa causans, as the schoolmen used to call it. The third fact which the Prime Minister knows is that every fall in the rate of inflation causes a temporary rise in unemployment. It does so by the same mechanism as that by which deflation properly

so called causes unemployment. Conversely, increased unemployment can no more cause a fall in the rate of inflation than it can cause deflation - it is a consequence and not the cause.

Finally, the Prime Minister knows that money supply is increased only by the conscious action of governments in meeting part of public expenditure by creating debt in the hands of the banks, and that governments do this either to avoid taxation or because they are unable to borrow from the public or for both reasons.

If you ask me how I know that the Prime Minister knows these things, I reply that he has told us so. His whole attack, continually repeated, upon his Conservative predecessors for having caused the rising inflation of 1974-76 by increasing the money supply in 1972-74 makes no sense except upon the basis of those facts. What is more, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other Treasury ministers have explicitly named and explained their policies in the light of them.

Knowing these facts, then, the Prime Minister must also know two more things in consequence. He must know that the rate of inflation during the next 12 months, whatever it is going to be, is already determined and beyond the reach of alteration; and he must know that as in previous years the general rise in money earnings will be approximately in line with it.

The problem can now be posed. Why, knowing all this, did the Prime Minister deliberately and in the most frontal manner court defeat at the hands of the trade unions by demanding that they should accept in advance a limitation of the increase in money earnings during the next twelve months to five per cent? There was no beneficial result to be had, even if his demands were accepted and could be enforced, only the unnecessary creation of a series of unedifying and damaging disputes within industry and within the trade unions themselves. In any event the government, as the

government, and the country were bound to be the losers.

This behaviour of the Prime Minister in 1978 is much more baffling than that of his predecessor in 1974. There is no evidence that Edward Heath ever knew or understood or accepted the facts which I have set out. Moreover he was operating a control of incomes by statute, and was thus trapped in machinery of his own construction, whereas James Callaghan - partly perhaps because he had that awful example before his eyes - had skilfully reduced control of incomes to a system of non-statutory bullying and ear-stroking and had at his disposal inexhaustible resources of vagueness, prevarication and circumlocution. Yet the fact remains that, with all these advantages, the Prime Minister apparently set out to create as nearly as possible a replica of the impasse in which Edward Heath's administration perished. Why?

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The puzzle is further complicated by the Prime Minister's own reference, in his speech accepting defeat on the five per cent proposition, to the fact that the government held in its hands the means of avoiding inflation or an increase in the rate of inflation. Here is the passage: "If Monday's decisions result in a weakening of the impulse" - note that word - "that pay policy has had in helping" - note that word too - "to keep inflation in single figures and if, as a result, inflation starts to move up, then the government will take offsetting action to keep inflation down through monetary and fiscal measures". Despite the effort to represent increase of money supply and increase of earnings as alternative causes of inflation, the wording cannot conceal that the passage is spoken by a man who knows that government causes, and can refrain from causing, inflation. He quite correctly went on to explain that money earnings must keep broadly in line with the rate of inflation thus caused or permitted: "it would have an impact", in his words, "on the wages companies could pay".

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One final twist is given to the enigma by the behaviour of Her Majesty's Opposition; and this it is which lends colour to the suspicion that there must be something wrong with the air or the water. The Opposition, of course, know perfectly well all the facts that the Prime Minister knows. If anything, they know them rather better; and their spokesmen in one debate after another have made it clear that they know them. The Conservative Party is not less resolved never again to behave as it did in 1972-74 than Charles II after the Restoration was resolved "never to go on his travels again". Among the Opposition the name of Barber is about as popular as that of Bradshaw after 1660. Moreover the Opposition have declared themselves - and what sound more siren could be uttered to tempt ^{the} trade union vote? - to be in favour of "free collective bargaining". So what can they be waiting for? Surely one great gale of ridicule should sweep from end to end of that Party, unmasking the Prime Minister's fatal and illogical obstinacy and telling him what to do about wage claims, the trade unions and the T.W.C. in the immortal words of the steward to the sea-sick lady in Punch: "You don't have to do anything, Madam; it does itself". Instead of all which ^{there arises} a confused murmur or babel of voices, from which one gathers not that the Prime Minister must be off his head but that just possibly he may be being that little trifle too rigid.

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So reluctantly I come to attempt some explanation other than James Bond to account for so extraordinary a scene. One possibility is that all these politicians who in days gone by have proclaimed and acted upon the belief that earnings increases caused inflation are now ashamed to deny what they once asserted and prefer, like the elderly Scots bachelor, to "whore it to the end". The trouble with this explanation is that they have already sufficiently and publicly recanted, and that avoidance of head-on conflict with the unions and general industrial disruption is well

worth purchasing at the price of one or two red faces. Another explanation, which I admit made a strong appeal to me in the past, is that, by blaming the trade unions, the employers and the public generally for causing inflation through wage and price increases, the politicians neatly escape detection and punishment for being themselves the true and only culprits. This theory would fit fairly well to explain Conservative behaviour; but why should the Labour Party in election year, with at least a reduced rate of inflation prevailing, be so keen, after praising the trade unions for their past moderation, to put them undeservedly into the dog-house?

Maybe, however, there is an element in truth in these two hypotheses, and in a third, namely, that the advisers of all governments, being themselves bureaucrats, are always happy to propound and support theories which imply the need for more control and intervention and are much averse from any policies which would make control and intervention superfluous, if not harmful. Still, some force more instinctive and more compelling seems to be called for to explain the self-destructive irrationality of successive governments.

I venture a suggestion, a tentative suggestion - no more.

I believe it may be fear or, to use an apter synonym, funk. Like the heathen convert to Christianity who still harbours a residual fear of the old gods, or like those who have been reluctantly persuaded of a scientific truth but are fearful to trust to its implications, the politicians have a sheer irrational dread that the world will fall down unless they keep propping it up. It was the same in post-war Germany when Erhardt, explaining that they did not need physical and price controls but that the economy would right itself if these were abolished, encountered screams of agony and terror. It was the same in 1971, when bankers and merchants the world over were convinced that international trade would stop in a week if

exchange rates were not kept fixed by governments. How do we know that an iron ship will float? Better stay with timber. How do we know the parachute will open? Better stay on board the burning plane. Yes, of course we know that money supply creates inflation and nothing else can do so. Of course we know that increased wages are the effects and not ^{the} cause of inflation. We know this; but we do not believe it. So leave us alone to repeat our old mistakes, though no doubt the same old consequences will follow.

All that may seem very foolish; but it is very human, and it happens.

Extract from speech by The Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell MP
to the Paddington Young Conservatives at the Coburg
Hotel, Bayswater Road
8 pm, Thursday, 5th October, 1978

I had the misfortune to catch sight on television of the sickening scenes at the Prime Minister's meeting in Nigeria with the president of Zambia ten days ago. The humiliation of Britain by the Queen's chief minister, who rushed to Africa to explain, to apologize, to grovel and to ask for absolution from the ruler of a Central African territory, recalled - as one bout of nausea recalls a previous one - the behaviour of the same gentleman three years ago, when only Foreign Secretary. It was the episode, now apparently forgotten amongst so much else of the same kind, when, on his advice, which she could not constitutionally reject, the Queen invited and duly received a slap across the face from the ruler of Uganda, who then proceeded to insult her further by demanding, receiving and treating with public contumely the personal mission of her Foreign Secretary. 2

This time I waited, as I had waited then, for the thunder to follow the flash, for the roar of anger and repudiation that would arise from a proud nation whose politicians in office had besmirched it. Not a word, not a sound; in this generation of perpetual protest, not a placard, not a shout! Apparently we have supped so full of humiliation that it has become our normal diet, on which we look to be fed unresistingly by whatever party is in power. The silence of Her Majesty's Opposition attained a height of eloquence denied to their speeches. They said nothing; they had evidently no criticism to offer; they found nothing out of the ordinary, nothing which called for comment, in the spectacle of the British Prime Minister fawning on Kaunda in Kano. It only happened to be Callaghan and Owen, but seemingly it might just as well have been Thatcher and Davies. 3

It is all the same now. Britain has lost her voice. There is nobody who speaks for her interest or her honour - if indeed she has an interest or an honour at all, since those are properties of nations and we are authoritatively informed that the day of the nation is over and that we ought to lay aside the obsolete pretence of being one. So far lost upon us is the ancient truth, which has painfully to be rediscovered whenever it is forgotten, that for a people there is no safety without honour and no prosperity without pride.

If, so it was said, we do not promptly and personally lick the feet of the African states, they will interfere with our trade; they will no longer humour us in our delusion that we have sovereign responsibility in Rhodesia; they will introduce into their countries hordes of Russians with snow on their boots; and finally, who knows but they may not actually vote against us in that Parliament of Bedlam, the United Nations, and what would become of us then?

We must be blind indeed if we do not see what moral was drawn by those abroad and at home from the spectacle of Callaghan in Kano. It was simple and plain enough: Britain is afraid, and Britain can therefore be injured and insulted with impunity. I said advisedly "abroad and at home"; for what do we suppose was the effect of watching such a scene as that in Nigeria upon those Asians and Africans who will grow to be a third or more of the population of London and other English cities? "If Britain is afraid of them", they thought to themselves, "Britain will also be afraid of us".

In any case it is an economic fallacy, which we should have outgrown, to suppose that Britain's economy would be noticeably affected by any punitive measures which African states could take against our trade. The futility of the economic sanctions of the world against Rhodesia ought to enable us to despise Zambian sanctions against the United Kingdom. But the economic point is

the real point not. Even if there were adverse economic consequences, no self-respecting nation would "eat its meal in fear"; and the nation which stoops to do so is speedily taught that safety is not to be purchased with subservience.

To maintain Britain's honour is not the same thing as to indulge in bluff or bluster or to overcall our hand. It is not only not the same: it is the opposite. Our persistence in pretending after U.D.I. in 1965 that Britain had power and therefore responsibility and therefore sovereignty in Rhodesia was to court humiliations of which the Bingham Report and the peripatetic rebuffs to Dr Owen are only the mildest foretaste of what is to come. But unprotestingly both political parties and all audible sections of opinion, whether approving or condemning sanctions or - like the Conservative Party - doing both at the same time, concurred in painting Britain into a corner where all and sundry would snarl and snap at her like a bear chained to a stake. And that is only the freshest example of how, all round the world, when an honest and manly assertion of non-involvement beyond the limits of our real power would have secured respect and immunity, Britain has made a spectacle of herself by insisting on being concerned in what was none of her business.

The reverse of the same picture is our failure to rule our own roost. In industry we shall permit the French to buy Chrysler GB and we shall accept unconscionable terms from France and Germany for being allowed to crawl back into the European Airbus project. In finance we are about to subject our currency and our economic life to the constraints of a European system far more damaging than those of the I.M.F. and the international bankers' agreements. On the seas around our shores we allow ourselves to be told that we have no right to protect the livelihood of our own fishermen. So we go on, presenting to the world the likeness of King Lear in the storm, forcible-feeble, despised and of suspect sanity. Yet

neither by those in power nor by those out of power is the nation's revulsion at its predicament expressed or its latent sense of honour and self-respect reasserted. Of that, whatever else the political parties do or do not do, they have proved themselves incapable.

It cannot last like this. Unless we actually have ceased to be a nation at all and have become a mere geographically delineated mass of humanity, the nation has to find a voice; and if it cannot find one, it will make one. For the Conservative Party above all the position is critical. It cannot comfort itself with the reflection that, whoever else fails to pick up the challenge, it cannot be the Labour Party which does so. There is no incompatibility between socialism and nationalism: the combination of "national" and "socialist" is not without precedent, and the precedent is instructive. On the other hand, in the long run a British conservative party which is not nationalist cannot survive at all; for in terms of British history and politics, the Tory Party is about the nation and ultimately about nothing else. Through all aberrations, adulterations and diversions the role of expressing and interpreting the British nation to itself and the outside world, in its institutions, its personality, its continuity and its homogeneity, belongs uniquely to the Conservative Party. It cannot renounce that role and still remain.

Why then, if that is so, is the Conservative Party today unable to "speak for Britain"? Why have nation and nationhood so fallen out of its grammar and vocabulary that Conservative lips seem incapable of pronouncing them? I think I know. Indeed, I am sure that I know; for the thing is really self-explanatory. The Conservative Party has given not just passive assent but active support, assistance, encouragement and advocacy to the renunciation by Britain of the status of a nation. That renunciation has not been theoretic or philosophical: it has taken the form of repudiating specifically the very institutions by which Britain has always

recognised and known itself as a nation. To do all this and at the same time to remain the voice of the nation, sensitive to its fears and resentments and jealous of its honour, is a simple impossibility: the two functions are by definition mutually incompatible.

Boredom or impatience or bad conscience may growl something about "King Charles' head"; but boring or not, painful or not, there is no way in which the little matter of a sovereign parliament can be evaded. In institutional terms, the British nation and its sovereign parliament are synonymous: the Crown and Parliament of the United Kingdom contain within themselves all the essential attributes of nationhood in British form. That belonging to the European Economic Community involves of necessity the repudiation of British parliamentary sovereignty is a proposition which even the most captious no longer attempt to deny. Indeed, it would be impossible to do so, in the presence of overriding legislation and taxation by an external authority, of supreme jurisdiction by an external court, and of the direct election of an external parliamentary body. This had to be the price; this was the "eternal jewel" that had to be given to pay the entry. It was the Conservative Party which overcame its scruples and reluctance and made "the great renunciation"; it is the Conservative Party which to this day is the apologist and encomiast of what was done and of all the necessary and logical consequences of what was done.

It is not my fault - I state no more than is irrefutable - that the Conservative Party must choose - whether deliberately or by default, but choose it must - between being the party of the European Community or the party of the British nation. It cannot be both. If its choice is not to "speak for Britain", then assuredly somehow sometime that role will be taken up by another. That may well be what will happen; but it does not need to be so.

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Speech by the Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell MP to the
Newbury Round Table, Elcote Park Hotel, Kintbury,
Berks.

at 7.30 pm, Tuesday, 3 October 1978

My purpose this evening is to draw your attention to an elephant pit which is being prepared for Britain. The fact that it is being dug and covered with grass and sticks in full view of the elephant unfortunately affords that animal no safeguard. I have long ceased to believe that the Biblical proverb, "In vain is the net spread in the sight of the bird" was meant to apply to Britain.

On the contrary, the more openly the net is spread and the more candidly the intentions of the fowlers are published, the more probable it is that the British will walk straight into it and get themselves caught.

At the last European Council in July, with Britain alone entering a reservation, the nine governments of the E.E.C. decided that at its next meeting it would proceed to set up a new European monetary system. We already have an acronymic name for it, "Ems", as if it was a real thing here and now. The officials and finance ministers of the nine countries were ordered to hatch out a detailed plan for their masters' approval in December. The essence of the system is that the exchange parities of the respective currencies will be fixed and a European institution will be set up to keep them fixed. I should also mention that there is to be a new European currency unit at the centre of the system. Again, the child's birth has been anticipated by deciding how it is to be christened. Its acronym is ECU which bears a remarkable resemblance to the French word - and historical coin - écu: indeed, you would only need to add écu d'or for the identity to be complete.

Considering that the adoption in 1925 of a fixed gold parity for the pound sterling entailed upon Britain an untold total of miseries and hardship, and considering that the adoption in 1945 of

the Bretton Woods system of fixed parities maintained by international intervention - an American version of the selfsame principle now being adopted for Europe - entailed upon Britain twenty-five years of humiliation and moral and economic damage, anyone who did not know the 'form' would imagine that every alarm bell would long ago have been ringing wildly. Not a bit of it! The British public and (until it went into recess) the British Parliament took hardly the faintest notice of the whole business. After all, there were the summer holidays; and after that there was to be the pleasurable, if meaningless, excitement of a general election; and in any case, had not our 'father figure' 'honest Jim' - who incidentally reversed himself on E.E.C. membership itself in one month flat after walking into the Foreign Office - assured us that Britain's position was reserved? 'Plenty of days still to Christmas; so let's think about something else!'

Meanwhile Britain's acquiescence is already being openly treated as a fait accompli. Here is The Banker for September: "Politically the United Kingdom and Italy have little choice but to go along for the ride - if they want to be included in talks on further initiatives in future. This is largely accepted in Whitehall." The Daily Telegraph's editorial informs its docile Conservative readership that "the first essential is a genuine commitment by the British Government to take part and to welcome the disciplines that this will impose upon us. Of course it will involve a substantial extra surrender of national sovereignty". Those words "of course", "substantial" and "extra" deserve ample pondering. The E.E.C. Commissioner for Monetary Affairs assured the world weeks ago that "all the governments of the Nine were determined to arrive at concrete decisions on the new European monetary system by the end of the year!" When our Chancellor of the Exchequer found himself isolated at Brussels among the finance ministers of the E.E.C., it was not

because he expressed any opposition to the principle of the E.M.S. It was only a disagreement about the way in which the compulsory fixed parity was to be expressed. Unless Britain wakes up to what is really going on, and speedily summons the courage to pronounce the indispensable monosyllable No, it will already be all over by December, and France and Germany - the Franco-German accord - will have won by far the greatest battle so far in the war of conquest which they are waging against the United Kingdom.

Simpletons who live in a barley-sugar world of benevolence are at liberty to imagine that our friends the French and our good kind German allies have thought up yet another scheme, out of the charitable impulses of their hearts, for affording assistance to us British in reducing inflation and expanding our trade and production. Those who know the real Europe, that seething cauldron of resentments, ambitions and hostilities, understand very well what is afoot! Step by step the once proud offshore island is to be subjugated^{and turned} into a subordinate province. The only dispute will be between France and Germany as to who is to have the larger share of the spoils and tribute. That dispute however still lies some distance ahead: for the present they can help each other to impose their common purpose.

No, I am not talking about such chicken-feed as the Common Agricultural Policy. It goes without saying that the^{C.A.P.} regime, of common prices imposed by political authority in an autarkic economy closed to the outside world, the system which has been the main prize so far gained by France out of the E.E.C. and which France intends to widen and deepen, depends upon a common currency or (what is effectively the same thing) a system of currencies interchangeable at fixed equivalences. That is all true, and that would be motive enough for the continental nations to gang up against Britain to create such a system. But that is the least of

the mischief. A common currency means common government: the one is meaningless and impossible without the other. Accept common money and you have accepted common government.

Do I have to spell it out with matchsticks? ^{well, hang on.} [National currencies do not automatically remain in fixed alignment. If one threatens to diverge, what happens? 'Oh', say the rules of the game, 'the others will lend it their money with which to bid up the price of its own currency'. And when (as they must) they get tired of lending to it, what then? They order it to alter its ways and dictate to it how to do so. Who then is going to do the dictating?

Where will be that common government which a common currency implies?

You guessed it. "Paris-Bonn accord on European currency" run the headlines. France and Germany, who hatched and willed this business, will see to it that they rule the roost: a Franco-German hegemony to begin with, and afterwards we shall see whether it will be a French hegemony, as France intends, or a German hegemony, as the Germans never cease to purpose.

All this has nothing to do with common markets or freedom of trade or all the alleged ideals of the E.E.C. Quite the reverse. This is not about freedom: it is about compulsion. Mr John Nott, the only Opposition spokesman on economic matters who deserves to be taken seriously, wrote a remarkable letter recently, which made

this point. "If," said he, "our rulers wish to create a European currency zone, all that is necessary is to free all movement of money, capital or current, and let people decide for themselves what currency to buy and what to sell." So what, he asked, is the purpose of adopting a system of compulsion (and therefore of controls) instead? He gave the right answer: "To conceal the ultimate consequence for the British people of what is proposed." That "ultimate consequence" is the economic and thereby the political subjugation of the British people. So I suppose that Mr Nott, as a supporter of the E.E.C., will be voting for it in due course when Her Majesty's Opposition has wobbled off into line with the Daily

Telegraph. One point however he got wrong; and I mention it because it reinforces the moral. He supposed that, given freedom of exchange and absence of control, "eventually the strongest currency would predominate". Not so: when there is freedom of exchange and where therefore prices - in this case exchange rates - move to keep supply and demand in equilibrium, there is no meaning in "strong" currencies or "weak" currencies, and the very notion of "predominance" cannot exist. "Predominance" is exactly the consequence and the intention of a European currency system of fixed parities - the predominance of those who framed and intend to impose the system with that very end in view.

How long will the British people be content to be led from one defeat to another by those who are either blind to what they are doing or who openly or secretly desire the supersession of Britain's political independence?