

5

Date : 06/25/98

Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSC
RECORD NUMBER : 145-10001-10190
RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 190

Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 54214 Date:
~~18-10-2817~~

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MEMORANDUM
DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : PROCUREMENT OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT

SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/23/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
CH

DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Procurement of Soviet Aircraft

1. At the 22 March 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) there was a discussion of the question raised by the Attorney General on the possibility of U. S. manufacture or acquisition of Soviet aircraft.

2. With respect to manufacture in the United States of copies having the external configuration of Soviet aircraft, the following table sets forth estimates received by the U. S. Air Force in response to queries on the covert domestic production of such planes:

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Configuration</u>	<u>Time to Produce</u>	<u>Cost*</u>
I. MIG 17	To withstand distant observation and photography	One in 6-8 mos. 12 within 1 year	\$3.5 million for six aircraft
II. MIG 17	To withstand close examination of exterior; nontechnical people view certain parts	One in 9-10 mos. six within 6 mos. 12 shortly thereafter	\$13-15 million \$22 million
III. MIG 17	Exact replica, subject to technical scrutiny	Not possible	
IV. MIG 19	Same as I above	Approximately same as I above	\$7 million for six
V. MIG 19	II above	II above	\$26-44 million
VI. MIG 19	III above	Not possible	
VII. IL 14	All cases extremely difficult and time-consuming; recommend obtaining from third parties.		

*(U. S. Government to supply engines)

190

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

3. CIA has carefully reviewed the means available of acquiring Soviet aircraft:

a. By defection of Soviet or neutral country pilots:

b. By purchase of aircraft from the non-Bloc countries which have received planes from the USSR.

As regards "a" there have been only four defections of personnel in Soviet fighter aircraft, all MIG 15's since 1953. Acquisition of Soviet aircraft through defection has been inhibited by limited access to pilots and the established policy of various countries to grant asylum to pilots but to return aircraft. Defection operations in non-Bloc areas could create political problems. The fact that the United States was actively engaged in attempts to defect pilots of supposedly friendly countries might be revealed.

As far as "b" is concerned, CIA has investigated the possible purchase through all of its channels. The consensus is that it would be most difficult to persuade countries to sell Soviet aircraft.

4. In the case of aircraft acquired by defection or purchase, the revelation of U. S. interest would preclude the subsequent covert use of these planes. To conceal the existence of manufactured aircraft for possible covert use would require the establishment of a maximum security area. Otherwise, it would be most difficult to conceal the existence of such aircraft from the prying eyes of the American press and public.

5. There is a possibility that such aircraft could be used in a deception operation designed to confuse enemy planes in the air, to launch a surprise attack against enemy installations or in a provocation operation in which Soviet aircraft would appear to attack U. S. or friendly installations in order to provide an excuse for U. S. intervention. If the planes were to be used in such covert operations, it would seem preferable to manufacture them in the United States.

16
21

16

16

16