

39.  
**A SURVEY OF  
RACE RELATIONS  
IN SOUTH AFRICA**

1975

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**SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE  
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## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS THE WHITE POPULATION GROUP

### NATIONAL PARTY

During the year under review, South Africa has inevitably become increasingly concerned and involved with events in the neighbouring countries of Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola. The Prime Minister, Mr. B. J. Vorster, has pledged himself and his government to strive for peace, co-operation, progress, and development in Southern Africa and Africa as a whole. In doing so, he has made new and highly significant contacts with Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and certain other African states, besides overseas countries.

Speaking in the House of Assembly on 7 February<sup>1</sup> Mr. Vorster said, "I think a better understanding of South Africa has developed in the world and in Africa . . . There has been a clear acceptance that we are of Africa". However, as noted later in this *Survey*, the attitudes of a number of the OAU States to South Africa have hardened.

As described in the chapter on South West Africa, Mr. Vorster has made it clear that this territory will be granted complete independence as soon as possible, but that it will be for the people of the territory concerned, and not for the UN nor Swapo, to determine their future form of government.

The emphasis that Mr. Vorster has placed on the importance of détente and of "normalising relationships" was reflected in his amendment to the United Party's no confidence motion in the Assembly on 7 February.<sup>2</sup> He moved 'to omit all the words after "That" and to substitute "this House—

1. is of the opinion that it is incumbent upon every South African to promote sound relations between peoples and races in South Africa and between South Africa and all non-communist peoples and countries; and
  2. furthermore, notes with appreciation what the Government has done and intends doing in this field."
- This amendment was adopted by 116 to 45 votes.

Describing his contacts with leaders of other States, during the course of his speech, Mr. Vorster said he had made it clear that the policy of separate development would continue to regulate developments within South Africa. He admitted that there was historic discrimination on many levels in SA, and continued, "we

<sup>1</sup> Hansard 1 cols. 379-83, 397-8.

<sup>2</sup> Hansard 1 col. 403.

should do something to get away from it, and the only way as I see it — and I really do believe in this — is by means of the policy of separate development”.

Referring to his internal programme of action,<sup>3</sup> the Prime Minister said that this must be seen over three decades. The first of these “was the decade of apartheid, when we had to separate what had been allowed over the years to intermingle . . . And it goes without saying . . . that we often had to take very negative action during that decade to achieve the goal”.

Then, Mr. Vorster continued, the decade arrived in which the emphasis fell on separate development, “and in that process we created governments, gave people status”.

“Now”, he said, “we have entered the third decade of our policy”. He invited to his office the people who were in charge of the various governments “and I discuss matters with them . . . as one man to another . . . as equals . . . I speak to them very frankly and I tell them: Look, I am not prepared . . . to give you a say over my people . . . But I will not have a say over you for all time either. You must lead your own people . . . I am prepared . . . to face the consequences of multi-nationalism squarely”.

Talks which Mr. Vorster and senior Cabinet Ministers and officials had with African homeland leaders and with the then leaders of the Coloured People's Representative Council and the SA Indian Council, and the outcome of these, are described in subsequent chapters. Mr. Vorster made it clear to the Assembly that the talks had been conducted on the basis of and within the framework of the National Party policy. “It is within the framework of that policy that I am seeking the solution for SA and its problems”. He admitted that during the talks requests were made which had to be refused immediately, for example in regard to representation in the central Parliament, and freehold tenure of land for Africans in urban areas. These requests ran counter to National Party policy. But Mr. Vorster stated his view that “in spite of differences which exist . . . there is acceptance on the part of the responsible leaders of the position as I have now sketched it here”.

(However, the attitude of Black political opponents, the Coloured Labour Party for example, indicated that acceptance did not necessarily mean concurrence.)

Some of the actions taken by the Government in the cause of détente have, naturally, been opposed by White right-wing extremists, within and outside the NP. By-elections during the first half of the year in Pretoria West, Middelburg (Transvaal), and Gezina — all highly conservative constituencies — showed a small swing away from the NP to Dr. Albert Hertzog's Herstigte

<sup>3</sup> Cols. 383-6.

Nasionale Party, although the NP retained the seats with comfortable majorities. Mr. Vorster received considerable backing, however, from both the Afrikaans and the English Press in SA, and it appeared that many of SA's White voters preferred his decisive approach to the more ambiguous one followed by the United Party. At a by-election in the country constituency of Caledon, in August, the votes cast for the NP candidate, who adopted a “verlig” line, gave him a substantially increased majority over the UP candidate than that obtained in 1972 or 1970.

During the year under review the Transkei has moved steadily towards independence, and the powers and functions of certain other of the African homeland governments have been extended. The Government has agreed in principle to widen very considerably the powers and functions of the Coloured Persons' Representative Council (CRC), to grant Cabinet status to its executive committee members, and to set up a statutory liaison body representative of the White and Coloured Cabinets to consider matters of common concern. Similar developments are envisaged for the SA Indian Council.

At a meeting with representatives of the then CRC liaison committee in January, Mr. Vorster promised that the White Cabinet would discuss in detail plans for the “systematic and orderly elimination of unnecessary and purely irritating race discriminatory measures”, which were considered to be unnecessary in applying the policy of separate development.

It was subsequently decided that Coloured and Indian people should be represented on various statutory boards and commissions. Certain restrictions on inter-provincial travel by Indians were removed. The Department of Coloured Relations has suggested that all magistrates should form local committees consisting of White, Coloured, and Indian persons from various walks of life to help to overcome race friction.

The Government undertook to narrow the wage gap as soon as possible. Job reservation has been relaxed in the building industry and some other fields, including government service. Training facilities for African workers in the common area of SA<sup>4</sup> are being extended. The creation is envisaged of African industrial committees with powers to bargain with employers.

Africans are to be included on the boards of homeland corporations. Homeland leaders were invited by the Government to submit suggestions for eliminating undue hardships caused by influx control regulations without jeopardising their effectiveness. Bantu Affairs Administration Boards are to be allowed to use 80 per cent, instead of 20 per cent, of profits on the sale of liquor for services for Africans in their administrative areas. In regard to urban Africans, the Government has decided to relax

<sup>4</sup> I.e. outside the African homelands.

certain restrictions, thus reverting to a situation which prevailed before 1968. Africans who qualify to remain in urban areas will still not be allowed to own land there, but will be permitted to buy the right of occupation of such land on a 30-year lease basis. This will enable them to build their own homes and to sell or bequeath these, and to buy, extend or alter municipality-built houses. A condition is that those who buy or build houses in urban areas must be citizens of a homeland. Professional men and traders will be able to possess their own consulting rooms, shops, or offices in urban areas. Restrictions on the business activities of African urban traders are to be removed.

So far as sport is concerned, multi-racial invitation teams were permitted to play against touring foreign rugby and cricket sides. More flexible arrangements have been made in regard to the admission of Blacks to hotels, licensed restaurants, and theatres in White areas.

There is no doubt that world pressures had considerable influence on the NP's course of action. Mr. Vorster's negotiations, in co-operation with Zambia and certain other African States, to facilitate constitutional talks between the Whites and Blacks of Rhodesia were clearly designed to try to avoid armed conflict in Rhodesia which might spread to SA. But, further to this, some commentators expressed the view that Mr. Vorster hoped that these negotiations in connection with Rhodesia, together with efforts in South West Africa to bring together representatives of all racial groups to decide freely upon their own future, would stave off international action against South Africa in regard to its internal racial affairs, thus giving the NP more time in which to seek to achieve a peaceful and generally acceptable accommodation there in terms of its policy of separate development.

#### UNITED PARTY

The racial policy of the UP was described on page 2 of last year's *Survey*. As mentioned, the party believes, *inter alia*, that SA should become a federation of communities identified according to ethnic and geographical considerations.

An account is given in the next sections of this *Survey* of widespread resignations from the UP that took place in 1975, and of the formation of the Progressive Reform Party.

In an article published in the *Sunday Times* on 10 August the prominent "verlig" UP member, Mr. Japie D. du P. Basson, M.P. (later elected Transvaal leader) said he believed that the new party had made a major mistake in selecting for its first target "opposition to the Opposition". Inter-opposition-party warfare, he said, would benefit only the National Party.

Mr. Basson considered that the franchise plan of the new PRP (described later) would prove to be its biggest handicap.

The practical outcome of this plan would in practice mean the control of the proposed federal assembly and of its federal states by Black Africans, he maintained. Leaving aside the merits of this, no political party in SA would be able to bring about such a situation using ordinary democratic party political processes.

Political co-operation between SA's diverse peoples would have to be launched from a basis of cultural and political security for each of these peoples, Mr. Basson stated. From there on, one could hope for the growth of mutual confidence. Only the UP's policies provided for this.

#### FORMATION OF THE REFORM PARTY

In the past three annual issues of this *Survey* descriptions were given of mounting dissension within the United Party and the emergence of the "Young Turks".

Starting in December 1974 there was a wave of resignations from the UP: divisional and branch committee members and leaders of the youth wing, mainly along the Witwatersrand and in the Western Cape and Port Elizabeth. Mr. Dick Enthoven, M.P., was expelled from the Party caucus following his initiation of a public opinion poll which included questions relating to the Party leadership. Mr. Harry Schwarz, M.P., defied Party whips and walked out of the House when a vote was to be taken on the Prime Minister's amendment to the no confidence motion, described earlier. Both of these men, together with two other M.P.'s, Mr. Horace van Rensburg and Mr. David Dalling, were eventually expelled from the U.P., while Senator Brian Bamford resigned from the Party. Senator Eric Winchester did so later.

During February, 10 of the 13 UP members of the Transvaal Provincial Council, led by Mr. Alf Widman, resigned from the Party and formed a new Opposition in the Council, which they called the Reform Party. There were similar resignations by 14 of the 36 Johannesburg UP City Councillors and four Randburg Town Councillors. (Further Johannesburg City Councillors resigned later.)

Most of those who had resigned from the UP became members of the new Reform Party. Mr. Harry Schwarz accepted an invitation to become the leader of this party. For the time being it adopted the aims and principles set out in Mr. Schwarz's 1973 *Act of Dedication*.<sup>1</sup> The main points of this had been incorporated in the UP's programme of principles, but the Reformists maintained that the UP had not taken action on these points.

The membership of the main governing bodies affected was then as follows:

<sup>1</sup> See 1973 *Survey*, page 7.

	NP	UP	PP	RP
House of Assembly ... ..	123	37	7	4
Senate ... ..	43	10	—	2
Transvaal Provincial Council	61	3	2	10
Cape Provincial Council ... ..	37	17	1	—

### CREATION OF THE SA PROGRESSIVE REFORM PARTY

Following lengthy negotiations and consideration of policy, it was announced on 19 May that the leaderships of the Progressive Party and the Reform Party had agreed on a merger, subject to approval by their respective national congresses.

The Progressives had, meanwhile, been rethinking their qualified franchise policy, outlined on page 5 of last year's *Survey*. A commission consisting of Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, M.P. and Senator Brian Bamford had been appointed to re-examine this policy.

It was decided that the leader of the combined party should be Mr. Colin Eglin, M.P. (PP), the national chairman Mr. Ray Swart (PP), and the chairman of the national executive Mr. Harry Schwarz, M.P. (RP).

During July, the merger was accepted by the congresses of both parties concerned. Then, at a joint meeting, a federal executive committee was elected.

### PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF SA PROGRESSIVE REFORM PARTY

#### Principles

The principles and policy of the new party were set out in a joint statement issued during May. Mr. Colin Eglin described these and elaborated on them in a speech to delegates at a joint congress held in July. The principles were as follows:

1. the recognition of the dignity and worth of the individual human being;
2. the elimination of discrimination against any citizen on the grounds of race, religion, language, or sex, and the creation of conditions in which equality of opportunity could be exercised;
3. the protection of the religious, language, and cultural heritages of the various groups forming the SA nation;
4. the equitable sharing of political power by all citizens of the country, with safeguards against domination and oppression of any race by another;
5. the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law and the protection of civil liberties;
6. the improvement of the quality of life and the standard of living of all citizens through the energetic development of a modern economy utilising to the full the country's national resources;

7. the upholding of SA's status as a sovereign African state, the fostering of understanding and co-operation on the continent, and the promotion of the social and economic progress of its people.

### Constitutional and franchise proposals

It was stated that the new party recognised that any political system in which individuals or groups were, on the ground of race alone, denied the franchise in the state of which they were citizens was indefensible and destined to cause conflict.

The party believed that a federal system consisting of self-governing states, linked through a rigid constitution together with a Bill of Rights interpreted by a powerful independent judiciary, was a system which could provide for the equitable sharing of power in SA and the protection of the rights of individuals and groups.

The states, the boundaries of which would be drawn taking into account group and other interests and such homelands as had not chosen independence, would have the maximum feasible legislative and executive powers. The federal government would have only such powers as were essentially national in character. Non-political corporations would provide inter-state services.

The government of each state would consist of a single chamber. The franchise and the system of election for each state legislature would have to take into account any system which might already be functioning there; and no citizen who qualified by virtue of permanent residence in a particular state would be denied the franchise on the ground of race alone. The basis on which the franchise would be granted to citizens of a state would be decided by negotiation: one man one vote, or a qualified franchise, or a combination of systems.

The federal parliament would consist of a House of Assembly and a Senate with equal and co-ordinate powers. The Senate would be elected by political parties in the state legislatures, proportional to the representation these parties enjoyed in the legislatures. The number of Senators allocated to each state would be proportionate to the number of persons in that state registered to vote on a constituency basis for the House of Assembly.

The House of Assembly would be elected directly by the voters in each state through a combination of proportional representation and constituency systems. In this way, an orderly transition could be brought about to a responsible multi-racial government. Within each state one half of the seats in the Assembly allocated to that state would be voted for on the basis of proportional representation of the parties by all citizens who had basic literacy. The other half would be voted for on a constituency basis by voters who had the required level of educational

achievement or who had at any stage been registered as parliamentary voters. The required level of educational achievement would be the level of free compulsory education which it was the party's policy that the State should provide. This level was set, for the time being, at Standard VIII or its vocational training equivalent. Subject to a minimum, the number of seats allocated to each state would be proportionate to the number of voters in that state who were registered to vote on a constituency basis.

Any Senator acting on behalf of a group or state could refer to the Federal Appeal Court any alleged breach of the Bill of Rights which would be written into the constitution.

The constitution could not be amended save by a three-quarters majority of both the House of Assembly and of the Senate, and in any matters which would diminish the powers of any state, with the approval of a three-quarters majority of the legislature of such state.

#### Other points of policy

Among the other points of policy were the following.

1. The party stood for an open society. People would be entitled to associate with whom they liked, and to use whatever public amenities they liked. They would be able to own or occupy property wherever they liked. At the same time, the State should not interfere with the right of admission to private premises. Universities, cultural societies, trade unions, etc. would have the right to decide for themselves whom to admit.
2. Parents who wished to send their children to church or non-government schools would be allowed to do so. The State would have to provide facilities for separate and for shared schools. Academic freedom and university autonomy would be restored to universities.
3. The colour bar in employment would be scrapped; workers would receive equal pay for equal work; the racial basis of influx control measures would be removed, and positive measures taken to provide work for work-seekers. The migrant labour system would be phased out.

Further details of this policy were under consideration at the end of the year. It was decided that it should be submitted to a national convention of all race groups before finalization, to secure the widest possible concurrence.<sup>2</sup>

#### Meeting with Black leaders

On 27 September an important meeting was held in Johannesburg between leading representatives of the Progressive Reform

<sup>2</sup> Compiled from accounts in the *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 May and 28 July; *Sunday Express*, 27 July; *Sunday Times*, 3 August.

Party, the homeland governments of KwaZulu, Gazankulu, Lebowa, and Qwaqwa, the (Coloured) Labour Party, and the SA Indian Council. All signed a joint declaration, which read:<sup>3</sup>

"We, the leaders of organisations and statutory bodies which have been separated from one another by the laws of our country, declare that we will work together for peaceful change in South Africa. Because we share a common ideal for our Fatherland, South Africa, and are in agreement on the fundamental issues relating to the future of our country, we have decided to create the necessary machinery in order to:

- (i) examine and articulate our agreement on these fundamental issues;
- (ii) consult at regular intervals during the next year;
- (iii) keep lines of communication open so that immediate consultation between us will take place if the circumstances render it necessary.

"We realise that plans for the future of our country will have to be the outcome of frank discussion and exchange of views between representatives of the various sections of our wider South African community, and to be successful must have broad national assent.

"We accordingly declare our intention of working towards the holding of a convention as representative as possible of all who are South Africans, for the purpose of obtaining a mandate from the people for the constitutional and other proposals which will emanate from the initiative we have taken today.

"We are agreed that apartheid or, as it is called, separate development, does not offer a solution and that any constitutional system must embody a Bill of Rights safeguarding the rights of both individuals and groups.

"We accept that in one united South Africa, territory and not race must form the basis of government which should not be racially exclusive."

#### DEMOCRATIC PARTY

During April<sup>1</sup> the leader of the Democratic Party, Mr. Theo Gerdener, revealed at a public meeting that verligte leaders of various parties had met to discuss the possibility of merging, but said that his party had decided not to join the Progressive Reform Party because of a fundamental difference in its constitutional plan for SA. The PRP wanted a federal system with a central Parliament representative of the various racial groups. But the Democrats wanted a confederation in which the constituent states would be independent.

<sup>1</sup> *Sunday Times*, 28 September.  
<sup>2</sup> *Star*, 10 April.

However, the national chairman of the DP, Professor S. A. Strauss, held out the possibility of an election pact between verligte politicians.

Later, in July, the DP's national executive revised details of the party's constitutional plan.<sup>2</sup> In terms of this plan there would be one state in which the Whites, Coloured, and Asians would be grouped together, all the rights at present enjoyed by the Whites gradually being extended to the others. The African homelands, consolidated and developed, would constitute further independent states, and African urban states would be established as well.

Matters of common concern would be handled by a Community of States — a loose, voluntary association, headed by a Council of Ministers, in which decisions would be taken on a basis of consensus.

<sup>2</sup> Star, 17 July.

## THE COLOURED POPULATION GROUP

### MEETING IN JANUARY OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND DELEGATES FROM THE COLOURED REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL

It was reported on page 18 of last year's *Survey* that during September 1974 the Prime Minister, the Minister of Coloured Relations, and his Deputy Minister had discussions with a delegation representing all the Coloured parties in the CRC and the independents. Federal Party representatives considered that the discussions had been of some, if limited, practical value and that contact and dialogue should be continued. The Labour Party leader, Mr. Sonny Leon, however, disagreed with this view and said that he was not interested in further "window-dressing talks".

The Prime Minister's tentative proposals for the future, made when opening a session of the CRC in November, were outlined on page 20 of the 1974 *Survey*.

On 23 January of the current year the Prime Minister, Minister of Coloured Relations, and Deputy Minister again met a delegation from the CRC which, in the absence through illness of Mr. Tom Swartz, was led by the acting leader of the Federal Party, Mr. J. A. Rabie. Labour Party members declined the invitation to be present.

According to various Press reports<sup>1</sup> the Coloured representatives present submitted a memorandum in which they said, *inter alia*, that they shared the culture and languages of the Whites, and claimed no part of SA as traditionally their own. Consequently they believed that their interests would be best served by direct representation in the central Parliament. But the Prime Minister again rejected this submission, stating that it would lead to political chaos.

Agreement in principle was, however, reached on a number of matters, mainly arising from suggestions made by Mr. Vorster the previous November, as elaborated upon by him and by the CRC members.

It was agreed in principle that the powers and functions of the CRC should be considerably extended. It would control up to thirteen portfolios instead of five, and would be kept informed on other matters through a proposed inter-Cabinet council. The Executive Committee of the CRC would be given Cabinet status, with each Minister responsible for his own department. These Ministers would have power to initiate legislation without the prior

<sup>1</sup> Rand Daily Mail, Daily Dispatch, and Star of 24 January.

## THE INDIAN GROUP

### RECONSTITUTION OF SA INDIAN COUNCIL

In 1968, when the SA Indian Council first became a statutory body, it consisted of 25 members appointed by the Government, and had advisory powers only. As recorded on page 22 of last year's *Survey*, in terms of Proclamation R167 of 1974 the Council would be reconstituted, to consist of 30 members, half of them nominated and half elected by persons who on the election day were elected members of Indian local authorities, local affairs committees, or management or consultative committees. (The Government had stated that it was not yet feasible to compile a general voters' roll.)

Legislative and executive powers would gradually be delegated to this Council in respect of matters previously dealt with by the Minister of Indian Affairs (but not matters dealt with by this Minister in conjunction with other Cabinet Ministers). Such matters included education and community welfare.

The first elections were held during November 1974, and shortly afterwards the Government nominated the remainder of the members, selecting them in such a way as to make the Council as representative as possible.

An elected member, Mr. J. N. Reddy, was appointed by the Government to be chairman of the Council's executive. The four other members of the executive were, in terms of the Proclamation, appointed by the Council itself, as was the chairman of the Council, Mr. A. M. Moolla.

### OPENING OF THE NEW COUNCIL'S FIRST SESSION

The first session of the new Council was opened by the Prime Minister on 27 November 1974.<sup>1</sup> He paid tribute to the practical and realistic approach of those who had previously served as appointed members.

Mr. Vorster said that it would be one of the Council's tasks, in consultation with the Minister and his department, to work out the next steps in constitutional development. The Government envisaged development along the same lines as those decided upon for the Coloured community (described on page 11).

The Council, Mr. Vorster stated, had made repeated representations for the naturalisation of other categories of Indians than stateless Indians who were legally and permanently resident in the Republic (whose applications were granted). This matter was under consideration.

<sup>1</sup> The proceedings were reported in the Press on 28 November 1974 and in the issue of *Flat Lux* for December 1974.

### MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

On 24 January (the day after he had held discussions with representatives of the Coloured Representative Council) the Prime Minister and senior officials met the members of the Indian Council's executive.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Vorster made it clear, as he had to the Coloured delegation, that requests which had been made for representation in the central Parliament could not be considered.

However, he agreed in principle to the enhancement of the status and functions of the Indian Council, suggesting that detailed proposals should be worked out by the executive committee in consultation with the Minister of Indian Affairs and other Cabinet Ministers concerned. Matters for such consideration included:

- (a) a possible increase in the membership to 45 persons; the extension of the franchise; and the number of persons to be elected (the Prime Minister suggested that there should continue to be some nominated members chosen to represent minority groups and special interests);
- (b) the delegation of executive functions to the Council, which would involve the creation of a Secretariat and the establishment of Cabinet posts; and the stage at which legislative powers should be granted;
- (c) the form of liaison to be established with the Government.

The Prime Minister said he envisaged an inter-Cabinet council on which representatives of an Indian Cabinet, as well as of the Coloured and White Cabinets, would meet together.

Mr. Vorster indicated that Indian as well as Coloured persons might be appointed to statutory bodies, boards, and commissions; and that the wage gap would gradually be narrowed.

He recommended that the executive members should discuss with the Ministers concerned various other matters raised by the delegation, such as the admission to the Republic, on individual application, of wives and children of Indian South Africans who had married during visits abroad, the shortage of land and housing, and difficulties experienced by Indian traders in White group areas.

Mr. Reddy told the Press that he considered the discussions to have been frank, honest, and fruitful.

### SESSIONS OF THE INDIAN COUNCIL IN 1975

Sessions of the SA Indian Council were held during February and July.<sup>3</sup> Particular attention was given to the political future of Indians. It was agreed to accept the suggestions outlined above as interim measures pending representation in the central Parliament. The Council also urged, *inter alia*, that Indians be granted direct representation on local authorities.

<sup>2</sup> The discussions were described in the Press on 25 January and in the issue of *Flat Lux* for March.

<sup>3</sup> Press reports on 19 February and 25 July.



It was reported in *The Star* on 29 October that, at a meeting of the Council's executive, the Minister of Indian Affairs stated that the Government had rejected the proposal by the Indians that the Council should become a fully-elected 45-member body. The Government proposed creating a 40-member Council with 30 elected and 10 nominated members.

#### POLITICAL PARTY

It was announced in July<sup>4</sup> that an Indian Labour Party of SA had been launched, led by Mr. Y. S. Chinsamy, a member of the Indian Council.

#### ABOLITION OF ASSISTED EMIGRATION OF INDIANS

The General Law Amendment Act, No. 57 of 1975, repealed the Indians Relief Act of 1914 (which had resulted from the Smuts-Gandhi agreement), and a further Relief Act of 1927. In terms of these measures, Indians in South Africa could be granted a free passage and/or other financial assistance to enable them to resettle in India or Pakistan.

Speaking in the Assembly on 23 May,<sup>5</sup> the Minister of Indian Affairs said that all applications for such assistance had been granted, but very few applications had been made in recent years. The numbers received since 1965 had been:

1965	17
1966	4
1967	2
1970	2 (but one applicant then changed his mind)

In a speech made at a gathering in Port Elizabeth on 15 May the Minister said that the repeal of the laws concerned should not be interpreted as a withdrawal of a concession, but as an indication that SA wanted its Indian community.

#### CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

In terms of General Notice 779 of 29 November 1974, 2 more stateless people from India were granted SA citizenship during the three months ended 30 September 1974.<sup>7</sup>

The Minister said in the Assembly on 12 June<sup>8</sup> that existing restrictions on the immigration of Indians would not be relaxed.

<sup>4</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 July.

<sup>5</sup> Hansard 15 col. 1029.

<sup>6</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 May.

<sup>7</sup> Earlier statistics have been given in previous issues of this *Survey*. "Stateless" Indians persons who settled in the Republic before constitutions for India, Pakistan, the Maldives Republic, etc., came into effect on the achievement of independence by these countries.

<sup>8</sup> Hansard 18 cols. 8160-4.

#### REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON INTER-PROVINCIAL MOVEMENT

In the course of his speech in the Assembly on 12 June, mentioned above, the Minister announced that, with immediate effect, Indians in SA would no longer need permits to travel from one province to another. They could in future, without seeking permission, settle anywhere in the country that they wished except in the Free State or certain areas of Northern Natal (although they might travel through these areas where the restrictions remained). The Minister described the historical background to the restrictions. He indicated in a Press interview<sup>9</sup> that if the authorities responsible for the remaining restricted areas (apparently the Free State and Natal provincial administrations) indicated that they were prepared to accept Indian residents, he would legislate accordingly.

(In terms of the Group Areas Act persons may, of course, settle only in group areas allocated to members of their own racial groups.)

<sup>9</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 June.

## POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF AFRICANS

### MEETING OF HOMELAND LEADERS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

The first meeting of the leaders of homeland governments with the Prime Minister was described on page 22 of last year's *Survey*. As mentioned, discussion of the affairs of urban Africans was postponed.

A second meeting, to discuss these postponed matters, was held on 22 January. According to various Press reports, Mr. Vorster did not agree to any of the major demands made by the homeland leaders. Certain minor concessions were, however, announced.

1. The Government would consider a form of leasehold tenure of land for Africans who qualified to live in towns and cities in the "common area" of SA. (The leaders had demanded full freehold rights.)
2. The laws and regulations restricting African trading rights in these urban areas would be reconsidered.
3. It would be arranged for representatives of the homeland governments to meet officials of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development to discuss the easing of hardships caused by influx control regulations without impairing the efficacy of these regulations. (Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu refused to be a party to these discussions which, he considered, could result only in the "cosmetic treatment" of regulations which were strongly opposed by Africans because they were racially discriminatory.)
4. Consideration would be given to the creation of bodies which would incorporate both urban Bantu councils and the councils which represented the homelands in urban areas. These bodies, if established, would have greater powers and responsibilities than urban Bantu councils possessed.
5. The official recognition of African trade unions had previously been declared contrary to Government policy; but the leaders could discuss this matter with the Minister of Labour.
6. Consideration would be given to allowing the return of political exiles who were not communists and who had committed no crime other than leaving the country without passports, if application were made by homeland leaders who were prepared to vouch for the persons concerned.
7. The Prime Minister would again discuss with the Minister of Justice the position of African political leaders who were under "banning" orders. (The homeland leaders had asked for an amnesty for political prisoners.)
8. Africans would be included on the boards of homeland corporations.

Chief Buthelezi released to the Press a memorandum which he had read out to the Prime Minister. In this he is reported to have said, *inter alia*, that unless the homelands were enlarged and properly consolidated, the only alternative was for Africans to be represented in the central Parliament. Moves to bring about racial détente in the sub-continent had aroused the expectations of South African Africans. Unless there were meaningful changes within the country, the pent-up frustrations of these people would inevitably lead to civil disobedience and the disruption of services. Chief Buthelezi announced that Mr. Vorster had rejected any possibility of Soweto being declared a homeland.

The outcome of the Government's consideration of the matters mentioned is described in subsequent chapters.

### BLACK RENAISSANCE CONVENTION

A convention was arranged at St. Peter's Seminary, Hammanskraal, during December 1974 by the Black Renaissance Committee, which was headed by Mr. Maurice Ngakane. The organising secretary was Father Smangaliso Mkhathshwa. About 300 delegates attended.

Mr. Ngakane is reported to have said that the purpose of the convention was to achieve Black solidarity, to articulate the Black people's aspirations, and to outline a programme of action for the liberation of Blacks.

According to reports, African homeland delegates, who included the then Lebowa Minister of the Interior, Mr. Collins Ramusi, were not generally welcomed. By majority vote, Blacks working with the separate development system were excluded from voting. "Bantustans" were regarded as being tribally divisive.

Delegates from the SA Students' Organisation (Saso) and the Black People's Convention (BPC) are stated to have interrupted proceedings continually and to have boycotted speeches by Dr. Manus Buthelezi, Natal director of the Christian Institute, and Mrs. Fatima Meer, a lecturer at the University of Natal. Father Smangaliso told a Press reporter later that, strategically, the performance of Saso and BPC members had been a disaster. They alienated the more mature delegates, and arrogantly created the false impression that they were the sole custodians of the term Black. Nevertheless, they deserved admiration for the dogged determination that they brought to the convention.

Besides censuring "doctrinaire blacker-than-thou-ism", as being a danger to Black solidarity and resurgence, Father Smangaliso criticised White liberals for diluting the fervour for change of Black freedom-lovers.

The voting delegates adopted a resolution that stated, "We, the Black people of South Africa at the Black Renaissance Con-

vention . . . hereby declare that we condemn and so reject separate development and all its institutions. We reject all forms of racism and discrimination. We dedicate ourselves towards striving for a totally united and democratic South Africa free from all forms of oppression and exploitation".

The convention dedicated itself to a society in which all people could participate fully in the government of the country through the medium of one-man-one-vote. It called for an equitable distribution of wealth, and the release of all political prisoners, detainees, and banned people.

It called "upon all the countries of the world to withdraw all cultural, educational, economic, manpower, and military support to the existing government and all its racist institutions".

#### ALLEGED DISSENT AMONG POLITICAL EXILES

It was reported in the *Sunday Times* of 27 July that African nationalists in the African National Congress of SA-in-exile alleged that White, Coloured, and Indian communists had "hijacked" the leadership of the organisation and were in control of its funds, granted largely by Russia and other Eastern European countries. Internal differences, it was stated, had reduced the efficiency and morale of ANC cadres in camps in Tanzania. Eventually, during October, eight prominent African nationalists were expelled from the ANC.

## THE CHURCHES AND CHRISTIAN MOVEMENTS

### INTERNATIONAL CHURCH ORGANISATIONS

During the year under review the World Council of Churches again allocated considerable amounts from its Special Fund to Combat Racism to Black nationalist liberation movements in Southern Africa. These grants, described in more detail on page 43 of last year's *Survey*, are intended for humanitarian purposes.

The support given by the WCC to the bodies concerned has been strongly criticised by the rival International Council of Christian Churches.<sup>1</sup>

As described on page 45 of the 1974 *Survey*, at an assembly of the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), held in Lusaka during May of that year, it was resolved that the Churches of Southern Africa, in consultation with the AACC, should convene a consultation to discuss the role of the churches in achieving liberation, justice, and reconciliation. It was decided that this consultation should be held in Gaborone, Botswana, during February. Two weeks before it was due to begin, however, the AACC announced that the proceedings would be postponed indefinitely.<sup>2</sup>

### SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (SACC)

The 1975 national conference of the SACC was held at St. Peter's Theological College, Hammanskraal, during July.<sup>3</sup> About 120 delegates were present, representing 23 denominations and 13-million Christians. Some 75 per cent of these delegates were Black. Two churches made up of African adherents were admitted as full members of the Council — the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika<sup>4</sup> and the independent Bantu Methodist Church. Observer status was granted to the Students' Christian Movement, the African section of the Students' Christian Association.

In his annual report the Council's general secretary, the Rev. John Rees, said that the day of the Black man's liberation from humiliation and oppression was upon him. A nationalism had developed that was as racialistic as any other nationalism in the world, and as vicious. There was no longer talk of gradualism, nor acceptance of compromise.

<sup>1</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 July.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 28 February.

<sup>3</sup> Account based on reports in the *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 and 24 July, and *Sunday Times*, 27 July.

<sup>4</sup> A "daughter-church" of the (White) Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk.

**RACE CLASSIFICATION**

The Deputy Minister of the Interior said in the Assembly on 30 April<sup>9</sup> that about 10 per cent of the applications for change of race classification made to the Secretary for the Interior were granted. The rest were refused.

According to the departmental report for 1974,<sup>10</sup> 120 reclassifications were made by the Secretary during that year, as follows:

White to Coloured ... ..	10
Coloured to White ... ..	33
Coloured to Indian ... ..	24
Chinese to White ... ..	2
Chinese to Coloured ... ..	2
Indian to Malay ... ..	8
Indian to Coloured ... ..	26
Malay to Indian ... ..	13
Bantu to Indian ... ..	1
Bantu to Coloured ... ..	1

During that year, 19 appeals were made to Race Classification Boards against decisions by the Secretary, of which 5 were rejected. Of those that succeeded, one person's classification was changed from Coloured to White and those of 13 persons from Bantu to Coloured.

Refusals continue to cause great hardship. It was reported in June for example<sup>11</sup> that a young Coloured woman had married an Indian and lived with him in Lenasia, Johannesburg. Their two children were classified Indian. But her application for reclassification to this group was refused, leaving her in a state of insecurity, for if she became widowed or divorced she would probably be required to leave her home and children.

**IMMORALITY AND MIXED MARRIAGES**

No comprehensive statistics relating to prosecutions and convictions under the Immorality Act were given in Parliament during the year under review.

<sup>9</sup> Hansard 12 col. 5154.

<sup>10</sup> RP 29/1975 paras 9-10.

<sup>11</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 June.

**MEASURES FOR SECURITY AND THE CONTROL OF PERSONS****EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE, POLICE, PRISONS, AND SECURITY**

The official estimates of government expenditure from Revenue Account for the year ending 31 March 1976 on the services indicated were:<sup>1</sup>

	R
Contribution to Security Services	
Special Account ... ..	14 000 000
Defence ... ..	948 122 000
Police ... ..	167 627 000
Prisons ... ..	66 000 000
	1 195 749 000

This represents 23,28 per cent of the estimated total expenditure from Revenue Account. The budget for Defence was R256 097 000 more than during the previous year.

Proposed expenditure from Loan Account was:<sup>2</sup>

	R
Buildings: Defence ... ..	31 090 700
Police ... ..	6 862 250
Prisons ... ..	11 967 900
Purchase of shares in Armaments Development and Production Corporation ... ..	22 539 000
	72 459 850

This total amounts to 11,09 per cent of the estimated total expenditure from Loan Account.

In a White Paper on Defence and Armament Production<sup>3</sup> that was tabled in Parliament by the Minister of Defence, it was claimed that despite the increase in expenditure on defence, the SA figures compared favourably with those of most Western countries. In the Assembly on 22 April<sup>4</sup> the Minister referred

<sup>1</sup> RP 2/1975 Votes 3, 4, 42 and 43.

<sup>2</sup> RP 3/1975 Votes B and O.

<sup>3</sup> WPE 1975 dated 27 March.

<sup>4</sup> Hansard 11 col. 4578.

to the 1973 issue of the US publication *Military Balance*, in which it was stated that the Republic of SA was then spending \$28 per capita of the population on defence, as against \$1 310 in Israel, \$377 in the United States, \$162 in France, \$156 in the Netherlands, \$155 in Britain, and \$134 in Russia.

The White Paper stated that the SA Defence Force was being modernised. The land forces had been subdivided into a counter-insurgency force and a conventional force. In the former, personal contact with the local population and goodwill on their part was of decisive importance.

The strategic importance of the Cape sea-route had once again been stressed by the world fuel crisis, it was noted. Some 25 000 ships passed round the Cape annually, more than 12 000 of them calling at SA ports. The SA Navy intended acquiring further submarines from France for maritime defence, and the construction in SA of six fast guided missile-carrying craft would commence shortly.

A description of a wide range of highly sophisticated military equipment being manufactured in SA was given in the issue of the *Sunday Times* of 20 April.

#### SOME NOTES ON DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL

The same newspaper reported on 4 May that SA was by then able to put into the field a complete army corps consisting of an infantry division and an armoured division.

The Minister of Defence announced on 29 April<sup>5</sup> that 678 Coloured men were serving in the Cape Corps, a unit of the Permanent Force, some in the army and others in the navy. The first seven Coloured soldiers received their commissions as officers during May: an amendment was introduced to the first schedule to the Defence Act, the effect being that Whites will have to salute Black commissioned officers who are senior to themselves.<sup>6</sup>

A Coloured crew was in April manning a naval survey vessel, and Coloured sailors were being trained in combat roles on a SA minesweeper. Their ranks ranged from Able Seaman to Chief Petty Officer, the Minister said.<sup>7</sup>

The White Paper on Defence, mentioned above, stated that some 400 Coloured youths had completed their training in the SA Cape Corps Service Battalion (one of the auxiliary services), while another 200 were undergoing training.

The establishment of a SA Indian Corps Training Battalion and a SA Indian Corps was reported on page 56 of last year's *Survey*.

<sup>5</sup> Assembly Hansard 12 col. 852.

<sup>6</sup> Hansard 10 cols. 4100-1.

<sup>7</sup> Hansard 11 cols. 4582-5, and *Star*, 20 May.

According to the White Paper on Defence and the Minister of Defence,<sup>8</sup> the first group of 36 Africans to be enrolled in an African Corps had by April completed their basic training as well as an instructors' course, and were being employed in the training of a second group. The highest rank that Africans would be able to reach was that of Warrant Officer.

#### THE SIMONSTOWN NAVAL BASE

The "Simonstown" Agreement was a loose contract entered into in 1955, in terms of which the SA Government would take over from Britain the Simonstown naval base, maintain and develop it, and, in time of war, allow Britain the use of SA harbours and certain airfields. The two navies would act in co-operation to defend the Cape sea route. Britain would strengthen the SA Navy by selling to it a number of anti-submarine frigates, minesweepers, and seaward defence aircraft. The Agreement would remain in force until the two governments otherwise decided.

The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. James Callaghan, said during November 1974<sup>9</sup> that his government would consult with Commonwealth and African governments over the future use of the base. He is reported to have added that the political disadvantages, which were great, would have to be balanced against the military advantages, which were small. The British Defence Secretary, Mr. Roy Mason, stated during the following month<sup>10</sup> that a termination of the Agreement would be part of a programme for defence cuts. The Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, told the House of Commons<sup>11</sup> that Britain saw no need for the Agreement, but that mutual assent would be required for its termination.

In a speech to the Cape National Party congress<sup>12</sup> SA's Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, stressed that the facilities at Simonstown were intended to serve not only SA, but also every country in the free world that was friendly towards the Republic.

On 16 June, Mr. Botha told the House of Assembly<sup>13</sup> that, following discussions between the British Ambassador and representatives of the SA Government, the Simonstown Agreement had been formally terminated. "Now", he continued, "the two navies will deal with each other on the same basis as either of them would deal with any other navy with which they have no special relationship." A Foreign Office spokesman in London said<sup>14</sup> that there would be no further joint exercises between the two navies.

<sup>8</sup> Assembly, 22 and 29 April. Hansard 11 cols. 4582-5 and Hansard 12 col. 852.

<sup>9</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 November 1974.

<sup>10</sup> *Star*, 4 December 1974.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 20 December 1974.

<sup>12</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 November 1974.

<sup>13</sup> Hansard 19 col. 8489.

<sup>14</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 June.

Meanwhile, SA continued to develop the naval base. It was announced during November 1974<sup>15</sup> that the Simonstown harbour was to be considerably extended. A synchro-lift dock had been constructed for servicing submarines. A sophisticated underground maritime communications centre, called Silvermine, had been built into a hillside near Fishhoek, with sub-headquarters located at Walvis Bay and Durban.<sup>16</sup>

### RESTRICTION ORDERS ON PERSONS

"Restriction" or "banning" orders, dealt with in the paragraphs that follow, refer to orders which may be served on persons in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act if the Minister of Justice is satisfied that the person concerned is in any way encouraging the achievement of any of the objects of communism (widely defined in the Act), or is likely to do so, or engages in activities which may do so. The types of restrictions which may be imposed were described on pages 38 and 42 of the 1963 *Survey*, and in a memorandum RR. 58/1974 published by the Institute of Race Relations. All restricted persons are prohibited from attending gatherings.

In terms of the original Act, it was rendered an offence to record or reproduce by any means, or to print, publish, or disseminate, any speech, utterance, writing, or statement, or extract thereof, made or produced anywhere at any time by certain categories of persons, unless the Minister of Justice gave his consent, or except for the purposes of proceedings in a court of law.

The categories of persons concerned were:

- (a) persons to whom the provisions of this paragraph were especially applied by virtue of a notice issued under the Act;
- (b) listed persons — i.e. those who were office-bearers, officers, or members of certain organisations that had been deemed unlawful;
- (c) persons who at any time had been prohibited from attending gatherings.

Section 13 of the General Law Amendment Act, No. 57 of 1975, altered this last category. It will now apply to persons in respect of whom a prohibition order to attend any gathering is in force.

It would appear that persons who have received banning orders may in future be quoted after their restrictions have expired or have been lifted.

It does not seem to be clear what the position is in respect of a banned person who has died while his banning orders were in force.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 8 and 9 November 1974.  
<sup>16</sup> See 1973 *Survey*, page 54.

Questioned in the Assembly,' the Minister of Justice said that as at the end of 1974 there were 164 banning orders in force, of which 13 had been renewed once and 16 twice (generally, for five-year periods). During the last six months of 1974, the Minister continued, 9 new orders were issued, 2 withdrawn, and 23 were allowed to expire.

The latest official list of banned persons was gazetted on 11 July.<sup>2</sup> It contained the names of 26 White and 121 Black persons.

During the period now under review three previously-issued orders were renewed for periods of five years, and five for periods of two or three years. One of the persons concerned was Mrs. Lilian Ngoyi, former president of the Federation of SA Women, who was first banned in 1962 and subjected to house arrest. Her order was lifted for a time in 1973, but has been reimposed in respect of attendance of gatherings: the house arrest provision was not repeated. Similarly, Messrs. Eli Weinberg and Ivan Scherbrucker have been re-banned from attending gatherings but are no longer subject to house arrest. Both men were originally banned in 1970 after serving five-year prison sentences imposed under the Suppression of Communism Act. Mr. R. I. Arenstein's house arrest order was re-imposed, however, together with other restrictions.

Three further Africans have been banned on their release from Robben Island after serving sentences imposed under the security laws. Two of them were confined to stated areas in the homelands, considerable distances away from their previous urban homes.

Following representations made by the Chief Minister of Lebowa, the Minister of Justice agreed to lift a banning order on Mr. Godfrey Pitje, a Johannesburg attorney. His order had originally been imposed in 1968, and was renewed twice.

Similar representations by homeland leaders failed, however, in the case of Mr. Robert Sobukwe, the former leader of the banned Pan-African Congress, who was confined to Kimberley on his release after serving a prolonged period of detention on Robben Island.<sup>3</sup>

Accounts were given on page 71 of the 1969 *Survey* and pages 57-62 of the issue for 1970 of the detention, trial, and eventual acquittal of 22 Africans on a number of charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. When they were acquitted the Africans were immediately re-detained, 19 of them subsequently being charged under the Terrorism Act. Again they were acquitted. They were then served with banning orders. Two of those concerned were Mrs. Winnie Mandela, wife of the imprisoned former ANC leader, Mr. Nelson Mandela, and Mr. Peter Magubane. By

<sup>2</sup> Hansard 3 col. 158.

<sup>3</sup> GN 1328, contained in *Government Gazette* No. 4782.

<sup>4</sup> See 1969 *Survey*, page 43.

then they had spent between 17 and 19 months in detention. When their banning and house arrest orders expired during September, they were not renewed.

The Civil Rights League of SA has published a booklet entitled *Sounds of Silence: the Rule of Law in Relation to the Banning System under the Suppression of Communism Act*.

#### BANISHMENT OF AFRICANS

The provisions of Section 5 (1) (b) of the Bantu Administration Act in terms of which Africans may be banished from their homes, and the conditions of banishment, were described on page 43 of the 1967 *Survey*. As mentioned in subsequent issues, for some years prior to 1974 the Government did not invoke these powers, but during 1974 Mr. L. L. Mtshizana was banished from Mdantsane, outside East London, to the district of Herschel bordering on Lesotho.

Replying to a question in the Assembly on 14 March,<sup>4</sup> the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development said that a second person banished in 1974 had been Mr. Mkubo Mngomezulu, who had been ordered to go from Ingwavuma to the Port Shepstone area.

#### TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

The following statistics in regard to travel documents were contained in the report of the Department of the Interior for 1974.<sup>5</sup> During that year:

183 253 passports were issued, 151 refused, and 13 withdrawn;

3 577 other types of travel documents were issued and 8 refused;

8 permanent exit permits were granted;

198 persons renounced and 23 were deprived of SA citizenship;

248 094 visas were issued<sup>6</sup> and 1 828 refused;

239 deportation orders were issued;

179 persons who entered SA illegally were removed.

Apparently at the request of the Chief Minister of the Transkei, Mr. Tsepo Letlaka, a lawyer, was permitted to return to SA without penalty. He escaped without travel documents following the Sharpeville shootings in 1960 and became one of the leaders of the Pan-African Congress-in-exile. He is reported<sup>7</sup> to have said that he applied to return because he felt that when the Transkei became independent it would embody the freedom which he cherished. After he came back he was one of a small group of men selected for training in Pretoria for service in the Transkeian diplomatic corps.

<sup>4</sup> Hansard 6 col. 469.

<sup>5</sup> RP 29/1975.

<sup>6</sup> Citizens of certain countries do not require visas.

<sup>7</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 July.

## CONTROL OF PUBLICATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENTS

#### STATISTICS FOR 1974

In its report for 1974,<sup>1</sup> the Department of the Interior gave the figures that follow relating to the control of publications, films, and public entertainments during that year by the Publications Control Board. (This was before the new form of control, dealt with below, came into operation.)

	Rejected	Approved
Publications and objects submitted to the Board:		
by members of the public ... ..	44	143
in terms of the Customs and Excise Act, 1964 ... ..	685	661
by publishers ... ..	114	123
by the Police ... ..	216	100
		<i>Numbers</i>

#### Full-length films examined by the Board:

rejected ... ..	127
approved unconditionally ... ..	207
approved subject to excisions ... ..	383
approved for showing to certain groups of persons only ... ..	349

#### Public entertainments and proposed public entertainments considered by the Board:

rejected ... ..	2
approved conditionally ... ..	3
approved unconditionally ... ..	5

#### Appeals to the courts against decisions of the Board:

Publications and objects: 2 upheld, 1 rejected, and in 5 cases the prohibition was lifted before the appeal was decided.

Films: 11 upheld, 1 partly upheld, 63 rejected.

Public entertainments: 1 upheld.

#### COMING INTO EFFECT OF THE PUBLICATIONS ACT, 1974

The terms of the Publications Act, 1974, were described on pages 73 *et seq* of last year's *Survey*. As stated, the Act provided for new machinery of control consisting of:

- (a) an administrative Directorate of Publications;
- (b) committees appointed by this Directorate from a panel of names compiled by the Minister of the Interior, the function

<sup>1</sup> RP 29/1975 pages 10-11.

## EMPLOYMENT

### THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

In its annual economic report for the year ended 30 June 1975 the SA Reserve Bank stated that the rate of increase in the gross domestic product at current prices declined from 23 per cent in 1973-74 to 14 per cent in 1974-75. The difference in the growth rates at current and constant prices during the past two years indicated a slowdown in the rate of increase in the gross domestic product deflator from about 16½ per cent in 1973-74 to 11 per cent in 1974-75. The rate of increase in the real gross national product declined more than that of the gross domestic product, namely from about 9 per cent in 1973-74 to only about 2 per cent in 1974-75, largely as a result of prices of imports and exports rising at the same rate.

The year under review, i.e. that ended on 30 June 1975, coincided with the downward phase of the business cycle, whereas the preceding year had been a period of high economic growth in the upward phase of the business cycle. A significant change occurred in the growth rates of the operating surplus (mainly profits) and the remuneration of employees. The operating surplus, which increased by 32 per cent in 1973-4, rose by only 7 per cent in 1974-75, whereas the remuneration of employees rose from 17 per cent in 1973-74 to 21½ per cent in 1974-75. The remuneration of employees of the sectors manufacturing, general government, mining and transport, storage and communication, increased markedly.

On the labour front, the Reserve Bank reported that employment in the non-agricultural sectors rose fairly sharply up to the third quarter of 1974, but levelled off during the next two quarters. Employment in the private sector levelled off and declined in certain sectors, but in the public sector it increased throughout the period. For the first three quarters of 1974-75, total employment in the non-agricultural sectors increased by 2,2 per cent compared with 3,6 per cent in 1973-74. Unemployment of Whites, Coloured and Asians which had stood at 7 150 in August 1974 increased to 10 431 in June 1975. This represented about 0,5 per cent of the relevant labour force.

During the nine months that ended on 31 March, the real salaries and wages of Whites were on average 1,3 per cent higher than the corresponding period a year previously. In the case of other races the increase was 11,9 per cent.

The deficit in the balance of payments on current account increased from R212-million in 1973-74 to R1 507-million in 1974-75. This substantially larger deficit was the net result of sharp rises in the value of merchandise imports and net invisible payments to the rest of the world on the one hand, and a lower rate of increase

in the value of the net gold output on the other hand. These factors were partly counteracted by an increase in the value of merchandise exports. It is not unusual for an increase in the deficit on current account to occur in the downward phase of the business cycle, but it was aggravated by unstable world economic conditions.

The bank rate was raised from 8 to 8½ per cent on 11 August 1975. This was followed by an increase in the price rate on overdrafts as quoted by the major commercial banks from 11 to 11½ per cent.

The Rand was devalued against the American dollar by 17,9 per cent with effect from 22 September. The Minister of Finance, Senator Owen Horwood, said in a statement<sup>1</sup> that the action was taken to strengthen SA's balance of payments and that it would also prevent a further slowing down of the economy.

### FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY

#### General

There are no comprehensive figures available which state the exact amounts of foreign investment in SA. In value terms all foreign investments in both the private and public sectors probably exceed R9 000-million of which more than 50 per cent comes from the sterling area<sup>2</sup>.

According to Dr. W. B. Coetzer, chairman of General Mining, when addressing an international seminar in London, the value of new fixed investment in SA over the next ten years could reach R60 000-million. He added that the level of indirect and direct investment by foreigners amounted to almost 22 per cent of all new investment in the private sector.<sup>3</sup>

In an article published in *Commerce*, journal of the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa,<sup>3</sup> Mr. Nigel Bruce said that foreign investment in SA might dry up unless the Government translated "its recent disavowal of racial discrimination rapidly into reality. Increasingly, the flow of foreign investment into this country is going to depend on rapid and material political and economic reforms. Indications are that Pretoria is worried about the fact that new investment is not being attracted — although the concern is centred mainly on the present poor outlook for the capital account of the balance of payments."

The article referred to the business boom in the previous year which did not attract foreign investment of any significance "as similar spurts of economic activity have done in the past. The reasons for this are connected more with events abroad, particularly the high inflation rates boosted by the fuel crises, and the general ganging up against the White-ruled South, than with loss of con-

<sup>1</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 September.

<sup>2</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 July.

<sup>3</sup> *Commerce*, January 1975.



The Minister of Indian Affairs said<sup>5</sup> that the following amounts were paid from public funds to further sport amongst the Indian population of SA in each of the last five years:

<i>Financial Year</i>	<i>Amount R</i>
1969-70	834,33
1970-71	10 400,00
1971-72	890,00
1972-73	2 000,00
1973-74	7 400,00

#### BANTU SPORT AND RECREATION FUND

The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said<sup>1</sup> that R49 750 had been contributed to the Bantu Sport and Recreation Fund since 25 September 1974.<sup>2</sup> This money had been allocated as follows:

Eastern Transvaal Bantu Affairs Administration Board area, R15 000 to develop a soccer and athletics complex at Kanyamazane.

Central Transvaal Bantu Affairs Administration Board area, R4 809 for improvements to tennis courts and club house at Atteridgeville.

Peninsula Bantu Affairs Administration Board area, R2 000 for improvements to cricket facilities at Langa.

Diamond Fields Bantu Affairs Administration Board area, R28 500 for a soccer and athletics stadium.

Vaal Triangle Bantu Affairs Administration Board area, R12 200 for facilities for soccer and athletics.

<sup>5</sup> Assembly 14 February, Hansard 2, col. 113.

<sup>1</sup> Assembly 15 April, Hansard 10, cols. 692-3.

<sup>2</sup> See 1974 Survey, page 396.

## INTERNATIONAL MATTERS

### UN SECURITY COUNCIL, OCTOBER 1974

The major policy statement made in the SA Senate by the Prime Minister, Mr. B. J. Vorster, in October 1974, on the eve of a meeting of the UN Security Council, was summarized on page 120 of last year's *Survey*, as was the speech to the Council by the SA Ambassador, Mr. R. F. "Pik" Botha. As mentioned, Mr. Vorster's statement was welcomed by the Zambian President, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda.

However, the Cameroon, Kenya, and Mauritania (the three African members of the Security Council) moved a resolution calling for SA's "immediate expulsion" from the UN. This resolution came to the vote in the Security Council on 30 October and was passed by ten votes to three, with Austria and Costa Rica abstaining. Besides the three African states, Australia, Byelorussia, China, Iraq, Indonesia, Peru, and the Soviet Union supported the motion.

Thereafter, in the first triple veto in UN history, the motion was vetoed by the United States, United Kingdom, and France. The British Ambassador, Mr. Ivor Richard, is reported<sup>1</sup> to have said that to remove SA from "the pressures of civilized opinion" would be a confession of failure by the world community. In voting against the resolution his country was giving SA a further opportunity of putting its house in order. The French Ambassador, M. Louis de Guiringaud, was sharply critical of the Republic's racial policies but considered expulsion not to be the appropriate solution. Mr. John Scali, the US Ambassador, opposed SA's apartheid policy "categorically and absolutely", but stated that there apparently were "new voices" of conciliation which should be tested. He believed that continued world pressure would spur changes.

### POLICY STATEMENT BY MR. VORSTER

Mr. Vorster made another important statement in a speech in his constituency of Nigel on 5 November.<sup>2</sup> Referring to his earlier speech in the Senate, Mr. Vorster said the time had come for Africa, Southern Africa, and South Africa to choose between peace and the escalation of violence, between co-operation and confrontation, between progress and destruction, between development and stagnation. He had, in the Senate, pledged himself and his government to strive for peace, co-operation, progress, and

<sup>1</sup> *Star*, 31 October 1974.

<sup>2</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 November.

development in Southern Africa and Africa, the Prime Minister declared.

He made this appeal to all political commentators: "Give South Africa six months' chance. I ask no more than this. If South Africa is given that chance, they will be amazed at where the country stands in about six to twelve months' time."

Mr. Vorster thanked the United States, United Kingdom, and France for having vetoed the Security Council motion.

#### UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 1974

During September 1974 the UN General Assembly had rejected the credentials of South Africa. When this body convened on 12 November members of the African bloc called for a ruling by its president, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, on SA's right to participate in the proceedings. Mr. Bouteflika ruled that the General Assembly refused "to have the delegation of South Africa participate in its work" for the remainder of the current Session. When the legality of this ruling was challenged by the United States' Ambassador, Mr. Scali, it was endorsed by the Assembly by 91 votes to 22, with 19 abstentions.<sup>3</sup>

The SA Ambassador was recalled to the Republic for discussions. The Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, instructed his department to withhold payment of SA's annual contribution to the regular budget of the UN for the current year. Later, in the Republic's House of Assembly, he indicated<sup>4</sup> that the amount withheld had been R721 871. SA had, however, paid R375 619 in levies of various kinds, and R5 675 839 for the maintenance of and increases in subscriptions to allied organisations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliates. No payments in respect of the International Monetary Fund had been payable by SA during 1974. During that year, SA's representation at the UN had cost the country R1 028 525.<sup>5</sup>

#### UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, DECEMBER 1974

During December 1974<sup>6</sup> the General Assembly passed a series of resolutions calling for further harsh measures against SA.

The Security Council was asked to resume urgently its debate on race conflict and apartheid with a view to making the arms embargo against SA mandatory under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. This resolution was passed by 109 votes to one (United States), with nine abstentions (United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Malawi).

<sup>3</sup> *Star*, 13 November 1974.

<sup>4</sup> 13 March, Hansard 6 col. 463.

<sup>5</sup> Amounts given to the nearest Rand.

<sup>6</sup> Various newspapers of 17 December.

It was recommended that SA be "totally excluded" from all international organisations and conferences held under the auspices of the UN (95 votes to 13 with 14 abstentions).

South Africa was called upon to grant unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned or restricted for opposition to apartheid, and to repeal all discriminatory laws. A 13-point resolution, *inter alia*:

- (a) called on Britain to abrogate the Simonstown Agreement;
- (b) asked France to cease arms supplies to and military co-operation with SA;
- (c) called for wide-ranging measures aimed at isolating SA culturally, economically, and scientifically;
- (d) called for larger voluntary contributions to the UN fund for aiding "victims of apartheid";
- (e) authorised the Special Committee Against Apartheid<sup>7</sup> to increase its efforts to bring international pressure to bear on the Republic.

#### SOUTH AFRICA'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN

It was stated in the Republic's House of Assembly on 4 February,<sup>8</sup> on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that "the Government will continue SA's membership of the UN for as long as this is consistent with SA's interests. Within this framework and in the light of developments at the last session of the General Assembly, the Government is still reviewing the situation."

Subsequently, on 25 April,<sup>9</sup> the Minister said, "We want to stay in the organisation as long as it is practically possible, and our future relations with the UN will depend on further developments." The existing situation made it impossible for SA to exercise its membership, and also affected the question of contributions towards the organisation's budget. But it would be a completely different situation if SA were to withdraw from the organisation on its own volition.

The SA delegation stayed away from a special meeting of the 29th Session of General Assembly held early in September to discuss the economic troubles of the Third World.

SA's suspension from the General Assembly no longer applied when the 30th Session of this Assembly convened on 16 September, Mr. Gaston Thorn of Luxembourg having taken over from Mr. Bouteflika of Algeria as chairman. Nevertheless, SA did not resume its seat. During the early stages a speech was made by President Idi Amin of Uganda, during which Britain and France walked out, although members of a number of other delegations showed considerable interest. Mr. Vorster is reported to have told a NP meeting at Lichtenburg that "if the spirit which now reigns

<sup>7</sup> Renamed since 1974.

<sup>8</sup> Hansard 1 Question col. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Assembly Hansard 11 cols. 4810-1.

at the UN continues, it is unlikely that SA will resume its seat in the foreseeable future."<sup>10</sup> The SA delegation absented itself from UN meetings for the rest of period under review.

#### RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND CERTAIN OTHER AFRICAN STATES

##### Cabinet committee

It was reported during December 1974<sup>1</sup> that a permanent Cabinet committee, under the personal leadership of Mr. Vorster, had been set up to co-ordinate diplomatic moves by the Departments of Foreign Affairs and of Information, the Bureau for State Security, and other departments involved.

##### Increasing contact

Speaking in the Assembly on 7 February,<sup>2</sup> the Prime Minister said that there was at present more contact with leaders of peoples in Africa and in the outside world than ever before. In pursuing such contacts, the Government was not shying away from its policy of separate development. "On the contrary," Mr. Vorster maintained, "I find my justification in separate development." He admitted that there was historic discrimination on many levels in SA, and continued, "we should do something to get away from it, and the only way as I see it — and I really do believe in this — is by means of the policy of separate development".

Later in the debate Mr. Vorster said, "I think a better understanding of South Africa has developed in the world and in Africa . . . There has been a clear acceptance that we are of Africa . . . We do not interfere, nor do we permit anyone to interfere in our affairs . . . We shall not attack anyone, but we will most certainly remain prepared to repulse any rash attack on us . . . We, just like the other African States, are seeking understanding and peace, but, like them, not at any price . . . We will render assistance to the best of our ability. Like them (the other States), we are also interested in the development, the order and stability of all States."

##### Trade with other African States

In reply to a question in the Assembly on 18 February,<sup>1</sup> the Minister of Finance said that the latest available statistics, in millions of rands, relating to SA's trade with other African States were:

<sup>10</sup> *Sunday Times*, 13 August; *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 September; *Sunday Times*, 5 October.

<sup>1</sup> *Sunday Times*, 1 and 8 December 1974.

<sup>2</sup> Hansard 1 cols. 379-83; 397-8.

<sup>3</sup> Hansard 3 col. 161.

		1973	1974
Imports	...	191,0	241,5
Exports	...	341,7	453,7
		<hr/>	<hr/>
		532,7	695,2

He did not consider it to be in the public interest to publish particulars of trade with individual States, the Minister said.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs had said a few days earlier<sup>2</sup> that the increase between 1973 and 1974 worked out at 30 per cent. This was important if one appreciated that certain of the States concerned had become less friendly than previously in their political relations with SA.

During April, the French newspaper *Figaro* published an article by a correspondent in Johannesburg.<sup>3</sup> It was reported that African States which traded with the Republic were Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Zambia, Zaire, Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, Central African Republic, and Liberia. The SA Minister of Foreign Affairs said emphatically that no official of his department had given information to any Press representative on trade with individual African States.

##### Aid given to other African States

In the Assembly on 11 March,<sup>1</sup> the Minister of Foreign Affairs provided figures indicating the growth of the financial aid that SA had given to other African States, as follows:<sup>2</sup>

		R
1965-6	...	3 238
1966-7	...	11 682
1967-8	...	44 324
1968-9	...	68 842
1969-70	...	696 427
1970-1	...	711 345
1971-2	...	1 039 288
1972-3	...	866 635
1973-4	...	1 244 300
		<hr/>
		4 686 081

In addition, the Minister continued, loans totalling R15 310 253 had been made available over this period. Of this amount, R1 345 000 had already been repaid.

<sup>1</sup> 3 February, Hansard 1 col. 51.

<sup>2</sup> See *The Star*, 9 April.

<sup>3</sup> Hansard 6 col. 436.

<sup>4</sup> Figures rounded off here to the nearest Rand.

### SA's diplomatic representation in Africa

In its Estimates of Expenditure from Revenue Account for the year ended 31 March 1976<sup>1</sup> the Republic made provision for continued diplomatic and/or consular representation in the following African States:

Malawi	— Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Rhodesia	— Accredited Diplomatic Representative
Angola	— Consul-General
Mozambique	— Consul-General in Lourenço Marques and Consul in Beira.

The consulates in Mozambique and Angola were accredited to the Portuguese. They were closed after new transitional governments were formed in these countries.

Only two African States, Malawi and Rhodesia, are officially represented in the Republic, Malawi having an Embassy and Rhodesia an Accredited Diplomatic Representative.

### RELATIONS WITH THE "BLS" STATES

#### Botswana

Botswana has decided to break away from the rand currency area and the monetary union agreement.<sup>2</sup>

Opening a session of parliament in Gaborone in November 1974, the President, Sir Seretse Khama, welcomed the spirit of détente that was developing between SA and certain other African States. The part that Sir Seretse played in negotiations over the future of Rhodesia, in conjunction with Zambia, Tanzania, and SA, is described in the next chapter.

#### Lesotho

Relations between Lesotho and SA deteriorated during the year under review.

A description of unrest among migrant Basotho mineworkers employed in SA was given on page 289 of last year's *Survey*, and in the chapter on employment in the current issue. During 1975 there were again recurring disputes over the general status of mineworkers; and serious faction fights again took place between Basotho workers and Africans of other ethnic groups (Xhosa in a number of cases), after which the Basotho have demanded repatriation.

Chief Jonathan stated<sup>1</sup> that Lesotho intended making a petition to the United Nations for the return to his country of

<sup>1</sup> RP 2/1975 Vote 5, Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Minister of Finance, Assembly 3 March, Hansard 5 cols. 1692-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Star*, 30 December 1974; *Star*, 2 January; *Sunday Times*, 5 January

the "conquered territory". (This is a strip of land some thirty miles wide along the western bank of the Caledon River that was ceded to the Orange Free State in 1869, following a series of wars between Basotho and Afrikaner settlers.)

The conference of Foreign Ministers of the OAU<sup>2</sup> States that took place in Dar-es-Salaam during April is described later in this chapter. There was, apparently, considerable difference of opinion over the attitude to be adopted towards SA, some States rejecting contact and calling for confrontation, while others preferred to continue striving for a negotiated settlement. Lesotho was one of the "hawks". Its Foreign Minister, Mr. J. R. L. Kotsokoane, is reported<sup>3</sup> to have said earlier that SA's détente overtures were aimed at splitting the OAU.

Referring to the conference in the Republic's House of Assembly on 18 April,<sup>4</sup> Mr. Vorster indicated that, in his opinion, the Lesotho Government had been aggrieved because it had not been invited to take part in the negotiations SA had conducted with representatives of Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania over the future of Rhodesia. However, Mr. Vorster said, the three States mentioned, and not SA, had decided on the composition of the negotiating group.

According to the information he had at his disposal, Mr. Vorster continued, there were four States in particular which "carried the case against South Africa to extremes" — Libya, Guinea, Kenya, "and, to my regret, the fourth was Lesotho . . . Lesotho went out of its way to impede South Africa's case . . . I want the people of Lesotho, with whom we have no problems because the utmost goodwill exists between the people of Lesotho and South Africa, to realize on what course their Minister of Foreign Affairs . . . is directing Lesotho." Mr. Vorster maintained that Mr. Kotsokoane and Chief Jonathan were completely out of touch with the feelings of their people.

The leader of Lesotho's official Opposition, Mr. G. P. Ramoreboli of the Congress Party, is reported<sup>5</sup> to have accused Mr. Kotsokoane of "political ignorance". In the event of confrontation in Southern Africa, Lesotho stood to suffer more than would any other country. Mr. Ramoreboli stated that he fully supported the standpoints of the governments that were endeavouring to bring about change peacefully rather than through violence.

Mr. Kotsokoane made another vehement attack on SA at a meeting of the UN General Assembly in September stating, *inter alia*, that Lesotho's territorial claims to the "conquered territories" of the Free State and parts of other provinces of SA were valid and would not be abandoned.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Organization of African Unity.

<sup>3</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 February.

<sup>4</sup> Hansard 10 col. 4379.

<sup>5</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 February.

<sup>6</sup> *Sunday Times*, 30 September.

**Swaziland**

Swaziland, too, decided to leave the rand currency area and issue its own notes and coins.<sup>1</sup>

**MALAWI**

It was reported in November 1974<sup>2</sup> that the Republic was to lend Malawi R19-million to build a railway link with Zambia.

Malawi's decision that from July 1975 it would permit no further recruitment of Malawian mineworkers for SA's gold mines was described on page 286 of last year's *Survey*. The numbers remaining on the mines dropped drastically, partly through the completion of contracts of service, and partly because Malawians, too, demanded repatriation following serious faction fights.

**MR. VORSTER'S VISIT TO THE IVORY COAST, AND REPORTED CONTACT WITH SENEGAL**

It was reported in the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper *Rapport* on 1 December 1974 that some time before his "give me six months" speech at Nigel<sup>1</sup> on 5 November Mr. Vorster, accompanied by Government officials, had visited the Ivory Coast as the guest of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny (who had been the first African leader to advocate dialogue). Next day, other papers carried similar reports. There was Press speculation, later,<sup>2</sup> that Mr. Vorster had also visited Malawi. Numerous earlier reports had brought to light repeated visits by officials of the SA Departments of Foreign Affairs and of Information to a number of African capitals.

It was not until 15 May (after the OAU Foreign Ministers conference) that Mr. Vorster confirmed<sup>3</sup> that he had, in fact, visited the Ivory Coast, on 22 to 24 September 1974, as the guest of President Houphouet-Boigny. He had been accompanied by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brand G. Fourie, the Head of the Bureau for State Security, General H. J. van der Bergh, the Secretary for Information, Dr. Eschel Rhoodie, and the Head of the Security Police, Brigadier (subsequently General) M. Geldenhuys. Security arrangements during the visit had been left entirely to the Ivory Coast authorities.

The SA party had been made most welcome, Mr. Vorster said. They were accommodated in a guesthouse next to the President's residence in the town of Yamoussoukro. Mr. Vorster and the President held private talks, with the aid of interpreters. "We discussed world problems and African affairs and exchanged ideas about each other's country."

<sup>1</sup> Minister of Finance, Assembly 3 March, Hansard 5 cols. 1692-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 November 1974.

<sup>3</sup> See page 283.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 February.

<sup>5</sup> *Rand Daily Mail* report, 15 May.

It had been widely speculated in the Press that President Leopold Senghor of Senegal had been present at the talks; but Mr. Vorster did not refer to this, and President Senghor did not either confirm or deny the speculations. He is reported<sup>4</sup> to have said, however, that he had written two letters to Mr. Vorster. In the first, he asked for "a gesture of goodwill" by freeing political prisoners in SA. In the second, he suggested that a Senegalese fact-finding commission be admitted to SA.

During October the Ivory Coast's Minister of Information, Mr. Laurent Dona-Fologo, accompanied by his (White) French wife, paid a twelve-day visit to SA as the guest of Dr. Connie Mulder, SA's Minister of Information and the Interior. During his stay he met Mr. Vorster and the leaders of several of the homeland governments.<sup>5</sup>

**NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ZAMBIA, LATE 1974**

The importance for both South Africa and Zambia of a peaceful solution of the problems in Rhodesia became increasingly clear during the period under review. In the Assembly on 21 April<sup>1</sup> Mr. Vorster said that, during October 1974, SA had made contact with Zambia in the matter because both countries had a key role to play. Discussions had then been held in Cape Town with envoys representing the presidents of Zambia, Botswana, and Tanzania, who spoke on behalf, too, of Mr. Samora Machel of Mozambique.

The contact so established had led to meetings in Pretoria, Salisbury, and Lusaka between representatives of Rhodesia and of the other countries mentioned. All were in agreement that the Rhodesian question should be solved through consultation between the leaders of White and Black Rhodesians without any interference from outside.

*The Star* of 18 February quoted Mr. Vorster as having said that officials of Zambia and SA had met more than 15 times, in both countries. There were reported<sup>2</sup> to have been several visits to SA by President Kaunda's political adviser, Mr. Mark Chona. Mr. Ian Smith came to the Republic on several occasions for discussions with Mr. Vorster.

In a speech in the Assembly,<sup>3</sup> Mr. Vorster said that he as the responsible person, together with his colleagues, had tried successfully to create an atmosphere in which the parties concerned could discuss their problems.

<sup>4</sup> *Star*, 22 May; *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 May.

<sup>5</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 and 10 October.

<sup>1</sup> Hansard 11 cols. 4499-4502.

<sup>2</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 January.

<sup>3</sup> 7 February, Hansard 1 cols. 400-1.

A result of the discussions and negotiations was a conference held in Lusaka, Zambia, early in December. It was attended by the presidents of Zambia, Botswana, and Tanzania, and by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, president of the African National Council (ANC) in Rhodesia. Following representations made by SA and the other negotiating governments, the Rhodesian Government agreed to release from detention two prominent African leaders of banned political parties to enable them to attend the Lusaka conference and to have other talks with representatives of negotiating governments. The men concerned were Mr. Joshua Nkomo, president-general of Zapu,<sup>4</sup> who had been in detention since about 1962, and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, president of Zanu,<sup>5</sup> who had been in detention or prison since 1964. Proceedings at the conference are described later.

SA's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, kept closely in touch with developments. During February<sup>6</sup> he confirmed reports that he and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brand G. Fourie, had recently been to Lusaka to meet the Foreign Ministers of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana. Leaders of the Rhodesian ANC happened to be passing through Lusaka at the time. The South Africans were introduced to them, and heard their views. Dr. Muller said he had re-emphasised that the Rhodesian problem must be resolved by Rhodesians themselves.

A detailed policy statement by President Kaunda was published in the *Sunday Tribune* of 3 November 1974. Speaking about Rhodesia, he is reported to have said, "A military victory for the Smith regime is impossible, but a Black victory is inevitable... Mr. Smith must now opt for a political solution. If he should do so, he will find Africa ready to help work out an honourable formula which guarantees the interests of all in Rhodesia and also guarantees genuine peace founded on love and understanding... We offer our good offices to any one who wishes to use them to achieve peace based on justice and genuine freedom in Southern Africa. Our interest is to end war and bloodshed and establish peace and prosperity in their place... We... reaffirm our pledge to call upon the liberation movements to desist from armed struggle if Mr. Smith accepts negotiations with the legitimate and authentic leaders of the African people... We are ready to support any efforts designed to facilitate the convening of a constitutional conference geared to work out a settlement acceptable to the majority of the people of Rhodesia."

President Kaunda stated that "South Africa's withdrawal from Rhodesia is necessary and urgent and would open the way to a solution of the Rhodesian problem... If the South African

<sup>4</sup> Zimbabwe African People's Union.

<sup>5</sup> Zimbabwe African National Union, a more radical body which broke away from Zapu in 1963.

<sup>6</sup> *South African Digest*, 21 February.

Government is ready to follow the way of peace to achieve for this continent and its people the best that is possible, then all I can say is that Africa, in accordance with the principles laid down in the Manifesto on Southern Africa,<sup>7</sup> stands ready to help create conditions for peaceful change."

Mr. Vorster stated several times<sup>8</sup> that the SA Police units that were assisting the Rhodesian Security force would be withdrawn as soon as violence stopped.

#### MR. VORSTER'S VISIT TO LIBERIA

Liberia was one of the countries that led the case against SA in the International Court of Justice in the 1960's, described in earlier issues of this *Survey*. Nevertheless its President William Tolbert is reported<sup>1</sup> to have said, in a speech at the United Nations late in 1974, that his government was pleased by SA's "apparent positive reaction to the need for peaceful co-existence in Southern Africa".

Mr. Vorster is reported<sup>2</sup> to have told President Tolbert that what happened in Southern Africa would affect the rest of Africa. Accordingly, he had sought peace and had made contacts with various African countries, in order to "normalize" relations. According to numerous Press reports,<sup>3</sup> one of these countries was Liberia. As a result, President Tolbert invited Mr. Vorster and senior SA officials to visit his country. Prior to the visit, he invited first Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu, and then Mr. Sam Nujoma, the exiled Swapo<sup>4</sup> leader, to come to Monrovia and give him their views.

A full report, purporting to comprise the substance of discussions that took place between Mr. Vorster and President Tolbert, and stated to have been obtained from "a reliable source" within Liberia, was published in *The Times* of London and quoted in various SA newspapers.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Vorster was stated to have been accompanied by Dr. Hilgard Muller, Mr. Brand G. Fourie, and General H. J. van den Bergh, while President Tolbert had senior Cabinet Ministers with him.

In the Assembly on 17 February,<sup>6</sup> Mr. Vorster confirmed that he and Dr. Muller, accompanied by senior officials, did visit Liberia, on 11 and 12 February.

"Our reception was a particularly hospitable one," Mr. Vorster said. "We had long and fruitful discussion on all matters which one could expect African leaders would discuss with one another, especially in these days... I understand that a long

<sup>1</sup> The "Lusaka Manifesto". See 1969 *Survey*, page 78.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. report in *The Star*, 18 February.

<sup>3</sup> *Sunday Express*, 3 November 1974.

<sup>4</sup> *Star*, 18 February.

<sup>5</sup> e.g. *Star*, 19 February.

<sup>6</sup> South West Africa People's Organization.

<sup>7</sup> e.g. *The Star*, 18 February.

<sup>8</sup> *Hansard* 3 col. 845.

version of this talk appeared in a report in *The Times*. Of course we, on our part, were not responsible for that version. I have not yet had an opportunity of studying it, and, therefore, I cannot accept responsibility for anything which appeared in that report . . . I repeat that it was a fruitful visit, that we were received very well indeed, and that as far as I am concerned, I sincerely believe that it was more than worthwhile for SA that we paid this visit."

#### CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF CERTAIN OTHER AFRICAN STATES

##### Central African Republic

According to various Press reports,<sup>1</sup> after Mr. Vorster's visit to the Ivory Coast, President Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic spent two days in discussions with President Houphouët-Boigny.

An "official mission" of five persons from the CAR, including two Cabinet Ministers, visited SA during February. They are stated<sup>2</sup> to have seen various parts of the Republic, including the Transkei, and to have met Mr. Vorster, Dr. Muller, officials of the Industrial Development Corporation, and others, to discuss, *inter alia*, economic aid for various projects. One such project is stated<sup>3</sup> to be the erection of an hotel complex in the CAR capital, Bangui.

A second delegation of three, led by a Cabinet Minister, came to SA during March.<sup>4</sup>

Reports state<sup>5</sup> that during March a Franco-African summit conference was held at Bangui, attended by President D'Estaing of France. Détente with SA was the main subject of private talks, and Presidents D'Estaing and Bokassa made it clear that they backed any moves towards peace in Southern Africa.

##### Nigeria

During January a group of Nigerian businessmen visited SA, possibly on the invitation of certain companies in the Republic. As was pointed out in the Press, consent for their visit must have been given by their then President, General Yakubu Gowon.<sup>1</sup>

A few weeks later the editor of Nigeria's *Sunday Times*, Mr. Gbolabo Ogunsanwo, came to SA and had discussions with Mr. Vorster: apparently very frank ones. He afterwards described Mr. Vorster as "a very tough man".<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> c.s. *Star*, 19 February.

<sup>2</sup> *Star*, 13 February; *Rand Daily Mail*, 15 February; *South African Digest*, 21 February.

<sup>3</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 March.

<sup>4</sup> Newspapers of 14 and 15 March.

<sup>5</sup> c.s. *Daily Dispatch*, 1 April.

<sup>1</sup> *Star*, 28 and 30 January and 20 February.

<sup>2</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 March.

#### MEETING IN JANUARY OF THE OAU'S LIBERATION COMMITTEE

The eighteen member-countries of the OAU's Liberation Committee met in Dar-es-Salaam during January. According to various Press reports<sup>1</sup> it was agreed that the liberation of those areas "still under colonial and racist domination" could be achieved either by peaceful means or by armed struggle. The Committee would prefer to achieve its objective by peaceful means if that were possible. But armed struggle would be intensified if White minority regimes remained intransigent.

Recent initiatives in Lusaka to achieve a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian dispute were welcomed, but the Committee promised both political and military support to the ANC if talks broke down.

The SA Government was urged to relinquish its control of Namibia (South West Africa). If SA failed to implement UN resolutions on this matter, the OAU would have no alternative but to intensify Swapo's military campaign.

It was agreed that the OAU should intensify its efforts at all levels to ostracise the White-minority government in SA and to do away with the "inhuman system of apartheid".

The Committee decided to increase its financial aid and material assistance to the exiled African nationalist movements, but urged them to form a united front. The bulk of the funds set aside by the OAU for this purpose would be channelled to Rhodesia's ANC and to Swapo.

#### CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF OAU STATES, APRIL

An extraordinary conference of the Foreign Ministers of OAU States was held in Dar-es-Salaam during April, and opened by President Julius Nyerere. It was a follow-up to an earlier meeting which had been held at Addis Ababa in February, and at which there were differences of opinion over the issue of détente between the OAU States and SA.<sup>2</sup>

As mentioned later, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole of Zanu had been re-arrested in Salisbury on 4 March. A Special Court, set up to decide on the "necessity or expediency" of continuing his detention, ruled on 2 April that his detention was fully warranted. Nevertheless, two days later Mr. Ian Smith announced that Mr. Sithole would be released to attend the Dar-es-Salaam conference. It was reported<sup>3</sup> that President Kaunda had sent a message to Mr. Vorster stating it was vital that the strongest possible team of Rhodesian African nationalists, which must include Mr. Sithole, should attend the OAU meeting to support the case for détente to be put by the Foreign Ministers of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana, and Mr. Samora Machel of Frelimo. Dr. Hilgard

<sup>1</sup> c.s. *Rand Daily Mail* and *Star* of 14 January.

<sup>2</sup> *Star*, 18 and 19 February.

<sup>3</sup> *Sunday Times*, 6 April.

Muller and Mr. Brand Fourie flew from SA to Salisbury for urgent talks with Mr. Smith.<sup>4</sup> In his announcement,<sup>5</sup> Mr. Smith said that Mr. Sithole had been released to attend the conference as a result of a request from Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the ANC, supported by the four northern presidents and the SA Government. It was "not a decision to which the Rhodesian Government readily agreed. However, we were assured that to do so would sufficiently assist the cause of détente".

Mr. Sithole was, thus, able to accompany Bishop Muzorewa, Mr. Nkomo of Zapu, and Dr. Elliot Gabellah, deputy president of the ANC, when they left Salisbury for Dar-es-Salaam on 5 April.

Speaking in the SA House of Assembly on 18 April,<sup>6</sup> Mr. Vorster said that the chief objectives of the Foreign Ministers' conference had been two-fold: firstly, to determine attitudes towards South Africa, and secondly, to "salvage and reaffirm the unity of the OAU".

As mentioned earlier, some States, notably Libya, Guinea, Kenya, and Lesotho, rejected contact with SA and called for confrontation. Others supported the case for détente — for a negotiated settlement if possible rather than an aggressive Black war of liberation — which was advocated by Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, and, apparently, by the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, Liberia, and others. Mr. Machel is reported to have said that Frelimo would support whatever form of struggle was decided upon by the ANC, whether it was an armed struggle or a political or diplomatic one.

A compromise "declaration" was issued at the conclusion of the meetings, about which there were conflicting and confusing reports. It appears, however,<sup>7</sup> that Mr. Vorster's implied promise in November 1974 that considerable changes could be expected within six months was deemed to have been mere words that had not been followed by action. Détente and dialogue with the SA regime were rejected "unequivocally and finally". But consultation and contact would be permitted under certain circumstances. Zambia, in co-operation with the Rhodesian ANC and working closely with Tanzania and Botswana, should continue negotiations with Mr. Vorster over Rhodesia and the liberation of Namibia, but Zambia should, where practicable, keep the OAU informed of all stages of the negotiations.

According to the speech by Mr. Vorster quoted above, certain member-states feared that separate development would succeed in the Republic, the African homelands becoming independent states. The meeting, thus, decided to have nothing to do with

<sup>4</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 April.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 5 April.

<sup>6</sup> Hansard 10 cols. 4370-88.

<sup>7</sup> *Star*, 9 April.

<sup>8</sup> c.g. *Star* report, 11 April.

the homeland leaders. The only man recognised by the OAU as the leader of all the Black peoples in SA was Mr. Nelson Mandela, Mr. Vorster said.

Mr. Vorster continued, "In the process of the meeting . . . a whole series of old and, so far as I am concerned, futile resolutions were adopted . . . which have been adopted over the years in the OAU and at the UN and which were now simply being re-confirmed."

One resolution called for the appointment of a committee to ensure the observance of economic sanctions against SA, and to identify corporations dealing with both SA and Black Africa. It demanded an effective oil embargo, including the refusal of port facilities to SA tankers. It called also for the banning from African ports and airports of all naval vessels and aircraft leaving or entering SA, and for the barring of SA tourists from African States. (There was, however, apparently no specific stricture on trade by African States with SA.)

According to reports, there had been differences of opinion over the question of the employment in SA of migrant workers from other States. The resolution decided upon merely urged States bordering on SA to encourage their workers to return home.

African nationalist movements were urged to unite and become more effective; and OAU States were asked to increase their aid to these movements.

The resolutions passed were to be ratified at the next OAU summit conference, tentatively planned for Kampala in July.

At the end of the meetings, Mr. Sithole remained in Dar-es-Salaam, fearing re-detention if he returned to Rhodesia.

Commenting on the meetings, Sir De Villiers Graaff said in the SA Assembly on 17 April,<sup>8</sup> "I believe the effect has been to polarize the situation for Southern Africa into two distinct aspects: the peaceful 'liberation' of Rhodesia and South West Africa on the one hand, and the continued pressure on South Africa on the other." He commented that détente abroad . . . depends upon détente at home . . . For continued détente to be achieved it is necessary that those supporting dialogue with South Africa, in the belief that Government policy will lead to peaceful change towards a more just society in South Africa, should see progress made." Similar statements were made by representatives of the Progressive and Reform Parties.

#### COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE, MAY

A Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference, representing 33 leaders of governments, was held in Kingston, Jamaica, early in May. In an unprecedented move, the Jamaican Government invited Bishop Muzorewa, Mr. Nkomo, and Mr. Sithole from

<sup>8</sup> Hansard 10 cols. 4301-9.



Rhodesia (generally called Zimbabwe at the conference). Chief Clemens Kapuuu from South West Africa arrived (uninvited) to press for the equal recognition of the National Convention with Swapo as a bona fide Namibian political organisation.

According to numerous Press reports during May, African States urged that, in the event of talks between Blacks and Whites in Rhodesia failing or becoming obviously time-wasting, the Blacks would be justified morally and politically in taking up arms against the Smith regime. If they decided to do so, the Commonwealth countries should help to finance the training of guerrilla fighters. (Frelimo had offered to make a training camp it established in South Tanzania available for this purpose, if necessary.) However, Britain refused to commit itself to backing armed violence or contributing to the costs of training fighters.

African States are said to have pressed, too, for efforts to have the UN ban on arms for SA made mandatory under the Charter. This was not supported by Britain either.

It had been widely suggested that, if the Rhodesian talks failed, the incoming Frelimo government in Mozambique should apply sanctions against Rhodesia, denying railway and harbour facilities. But this would involve Mozambique in considerable loss of revenue, and in unemployment among dockworkers. The Commonwealth States, including Britain, thus decided that a compensatory fund be established, preferably under the aegis of the UN.

The Conference recognized the ANC as the principal voice of the majority of the people of Rhodesia. SA was warned to cease defying the world sanctions campaign against Rhodesia. The Commonwealth States reaffirmed their "total and unequivocal condemnation of apartheid and all forms of racism".

Discussions on the question of South West Africa are mentioned in a later chapter.

#### CONFERENCE OF THE ILO, JUNE

The International Labour Organization (ILO) held its annual conference in Geneva during June.<sup>1</sup> One of the documents for consideration was the eleventh annual report on apartheid in SA; compiled by the Director-General, M. Francis Blanchard of France. He listed steps that SA should take in order to regain international acceptability among organisations concerned with labour matters. These were:

- (a) the repeal of the "pass laws" and the progressive elimination of the migratory labour system;
- (b) the granting of full trade union rights to Africans;

<sup>1</sup> The report that follows was compiled from various Press reports between 4 and 30 June.

- (c) the removal of restrictions on the occupational advancement of Africans and their access to vocational training and apprenticeship;
- (d) the elimination of wage disparities based on race or sex.

Mr. Arthur Grobbelaar, general secretary of the Trade Union Council of SA, was present as an observer. He is reported<sup>2</sup> to have told the Press that propaganda against SA was being continued during the proceedings, but that according to his observations and discussions "the hard line has been discernably softened". There was no question but that Mr. Vorster had made an impression by his détente moves. "But the Africans' expectations have been raised and the whole thing could fall flat or even turn extremely sour if these expectations are not realised to some extent at least".

The Palestine Liberation Movement had applied to be seated at the conference as an observer. The third world bloc outvoted the Western nations in a resolution to the effect that liberation movements recognized by the OAU or the League of Arab States could, if invited by the ILO, be granted observer status. Western countries had urged, in vain, that some qualification should be attached which would demand that the liberation movements should at least adhere to UN or ILO principles. The Palestine Liberation Movement was duly seated.

The exiled S.A. Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu), too, had applied for observer status. This application failed to gain OAU support. Sactu then changed its tactics. A request was made for the admission of three representatives of the South African ANC-in-exile, and this request was granted. At a plenary session Mr. John Gaetsewe, general secretary of Sactu, spoke in the name of the ANC. A hearing was given, too, to Mr. Solomon Mifima, the labour secretary of the South West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo).

Following the majority decision to admit the Palestine Liberation Movement, the American and Israeli labour movements withdrew from the conference in protest, maintaining that this body had nothing to do with international labour affairs. The United States government and employer delegations withdrew temporarily in a gesture of support.

According to an observer,<sup>3</sup> increasing difficulties were arising in the ILO stemming from differing views on the role of this body. Most of the Western States saw it as being a practical organisation devoted to improving workers' standards of living, safety, technical education, and the like. But the third world countries, which had a voting majority, had different priorities.

<sup>2</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 June.  
<sup>3</sup> *Star*, 27 June.

Many lacked economies sufficiently developed to need a sophisticated labour structure. They saw the ILO as being primarily an important forum of world opinion in which they could air broad grievances.

The United States set up a body to re-examine its relationship with the ILO. Its House of Representatives decided to hold up the US contribution of some R15-million a year to the ILO budget.

#### CONFERENCE OF THE OAU IN JULY

A conference of Foreign Ministers of OAU States, followed by a summit OAU conference, was held in Kampala during July. President Idi Amin of Uganda succeeded President Nyerere as chairman of the OAU for the following year. Tanzania and Zambia, which had opposed the venue and the selection of President Amin as chairman, boycotted the proceedings.

According to various Press reports, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the UN, addressed the summit conference. He described it as a great disappointment that at its meeting held during the previous month the Security Council had been unable to reach agreement on measures to be taken to end the "problem of Namibia", and he condemned SA's racial policies. (Proceedings at the Security Council meeting are described in the chapter on South West Africa.)

President Amin is reported to have spearheaded a bid to harden attitudes to SA, and to have threatened that SA would "see fire" before the end of the year unless it granted immediate majority rule to its Black population.

During the proceedings, news was received that President General Gowon of Nigeria, who was attending the conference, had been deposed in a military coup. He left Kampala, as did the heads of state of Egypt, Cameroun, Gabon, the Congo, and Niger.

The conference adopted without change the resolutions of the OAU's Liberation Committee passed at this committee's meeting in January (see page 295), and those of the conference of Foreign Ministers of OAU states held at Dar-es-Salaam during April (see pages 295-7). The summit leaders called for SA's expulsion from the UN and for a mandatory arms embargo by the UN, and rejected détente with Pretoria.

The OAU secretary-general reported to the Foreign Ministers that 21 of the 46 countries belonging to this organization were heavily behind in paying their dues, the largest debtors being Libya, Morocco, the Central African Republic, the Sudan, Zaire, and Zambia.

#### UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER

During October there was a four-day debate in the UN General Assembly on a motion which, among other things, called on the UN to proclaim a "special responsibility towards the oppressed peoples of South Africa" and towards people imprisoned because of their struggle against apartheid.

When the resolution was put to the vote, however, 43 of the countries which had attacked SA in the debate, including four of the sponsors of the resolution, failed to be present. The resolution was passed by 90 votes in favour and none against, with nine Western countries abstaining.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Star*, 25 October.

## MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA

### MOZAMBIQUE

#### New government

The establishment of a transitional government in Mozambique, with Mr. Joaquim Chissano as Prime Minister, was described on page 112 of last year's *Survey*.

The leader of Frelimo, Mr. Samora Machel, remained in Tanzania until the end of May, and while there co-operated with Zambia, South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania in efforts to facilitate a Rhodesian constitutional conference. As mentioned earlier, Mr. Machel is reported to have said at the OAU Foreign Ministers' conference in April that Frelimo would support whatever form of struggle that was decided upon by the Rhodesian ANC, whether it was an armed struggle or a political or diplomatic one. Frelimo offered to place the training camp it established in South Tanzania at the disposal of insurgent forces if armed warfare eventuated.

Mozambique became an independent country as from 25 June, with Mr. Machel as president and head of state. Mr. Chissano was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Council of Ministers included three White and one Asian Mozambicans.

The country became a one-party, Marxist-orientated, socialist state.

#### Refugees from Mozambique

It was mentioned in last year's *Survey* that, following rioting in Mozambique as the war there came to an end, large numbers of refugees, mainly Whites, poured into SA. The SA Government announced that residence and work permits would be granted to those who were likely to make useful contributions to SA's well-being, but not to unskilled persons. The SA Minister of the Interior said on 19 February<sup>1</sup> that some 19 000 of the 25 000 who fled to SA had been allowed to take up employment. Most of the rest had left voluntarily for other countries.

About 226 remained, reported to be unskilled persons and/or families who could not readily be classified in terms of population registration in SA. They were accommodated for some months in a refugee camp at Cullinan, near Pretoria, and provided with food, blankets, etc., but eventually arrangements were made with the Portuguese Government for them to be sent away. They were

<sup>1</sup> *Star* of that date.

given a choice of destination. Apparently some returned to Mozambique, while others left for Portugal, Angola, Madoira, or Brazil.

According to a Press report,<sup>2</sup> over the past 2½ years almost half of the 200 000 Whites had left Mozambique, some 20 000 of them having settled in South Africa.

#### Policy of new government

The new government in Mozambique set up factory, village, and district committees with educative functions and also serving as channels of communication with the party hierarchy.

In speeches made at mass gatherings, Mr. Machel is reported<sup>3</sup> to have said that the State would exercise full control over all land. Undeveloped land that was used for speculation would be nationalised and made available to the people.

Mr. Machel announced a State take-over of all private educational institutions including mission schools. He made a strong attack on the Christian churches. The Council of Ministers stated<sup>4</sup> that the people's education would be developed on the lines of "national and revolutionary culture".

All hospitals, clinics, and funeral parlours were nationalised, and lawyers' offices and private doctors' surgeries were ordered to close. Strict control was imposed on the movement of foreigners: the Council of Ministers stated that priority would be given to internal tourism for the masses and to visitors from approved African and socialist countries. All citizens, without distinction, became liable to be called up to serve in the National Defence and Reconstruction Service.

#### Relations with South Africa

Mr. Machel decided that Mozambique would not establish diplomatic relations with either South Africa or Rhodesia. The SA Consulate-General in Lourenço Marques and the consulate in Beira, which had been accredited with the former Portuguese government, were closed; but SA officials remained in the capital to issue visas and handle trade relationships.

SA was not invited to the independence celebrations. Among the honoured guests, however, were the exiled Mr. Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress and Mr. Sam Nujoma of Swapo.

SA gave various forms of assistance. It was reported<sup>5</sup> to be selling, on Mozambique's behalf, the gold which in the past had been sent to Lourenço Marques to cover the deferred payments of Mozambicans employed on the SA mines.

<sup>2</sup> *Sunday Times*, 22 June.  
<sup>3</sup> *Star*, 19 June; *Rand Daily Mail*, 25 July.  
<sup>4</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 June.  
<sup>5</sup> *Star*, 28 June.

SA's Minister of Transport said in the Assembly on 5 March<sup>6</sup> that the tonnage of minerals exported through Lourenço Marques had of late shown a considerable drop. The General Manager of the SA Railways had, in consequence, visited Lourenço Marques. It became apparent that the conditions could to a large extent be attributed to the failure of the section of the railway line within Mozambique to cope with all the traffic offered, and to a shortage there of locomotives and other rolling stock. In response to requests for assistance, SA had promised to make some diesel locomotives available to the Mozambique Railways. A team of SA experts had been sent to test the track, and help was being given with the modernization of signals, repair of trucks, provision of spares, and acquisition of rolling stock.

A spokesman for the SA Railways said on 25 April<sup>7</sup> that, as a result, traffic to SA had already increased by 10,2 per cent, and from SA by 31,5 per cent.

#### ANGOLA

A description was given, on pages 113 *et seq* of last year's *Survey*, of guerrilla fighting in Angola, negotiations for a cease-fire between the Portuguese and the guerrillas, the formation of a provisional government, rivalry between the three liberation movements, and clashes that took place between them in November 1974. The three groups were:

- (a) the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) led by Dr. Agostinho Neto, said to be Marxist-orientated;
- (b) FNLA (the Front for the Liberation of Angola) led by Mr. Holden Roberto, brother-in-law of President Mobutu Sese-Seka of Zaïre;
- (c) UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi.

A faction of the MPLA, under Mr. Daniel Chipenda, was expelled and was reported<sup>1</sup> subsequently to have joined forces with FNLA.

It was announced in January and early February<sup>2</sup> that leaders of the three movements had signed a joint political agreement. They would form a transitional government to hold office from 1 February until independence was granted, planned for 11 November. It would be headed by a Prime Ministerial Council (instead of a single Prime Minister) consisting of a nominee of each of the movements, the chairmanship rotating amongst them. Certain government departments would also be divided between the three bodies. Portugal would retain various powers for the time being, and there would be a Portuguese High Commissioner,

<sup>6</sup> Hansard 5 col. 1864.

<sup>7</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 April.

<sup>1</sup> *Star*, 22 February.

<sup>2</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 January and 1 February; *Sunday Times*, 2 February.

This arrangement did not work in practice. The government was split by dissension. From March onwards there were frequent reports of very serious fighting between the MPLA and FNLA troops, starting in the capital, Luanda, and spreading to towns and villages throughout the country. It was widely reported<sup>3</sup> that the Soviet Union and Cuba were sending arms to the MPLA (Cuba sending troops as well), while Red China and the United States were supplying weapons to FNLA through Zaïre. The casualty figures are unknown, but are estimated to have run into thousands, including civilians who were caught in cross-firing. Very many Africans were left homeless. It was reported in June that the fighting had brought anarchy to the northern part of the country. Refugees, White and Black, poured into Luanda, Nova Lisboa, and other towns. The lighter-skinned people who could afford to do so competed for passages out of the country by sea or air.

It was announced on 16 May that Portugal had imposed virtual military rule, under Portuguese troops, and that this action had been taken with the support of the Presidents of Zambia, Zaïre, and Tanzania, who were deeply concerned over the power struggle.<sup>4</sup>

During June, the leaders of the three rival movements met in Nakuru (Kenya) under the auspices of President Kenyatta, and signed a pledge to "renounce the use of force as a way to solve problems"; but, some two weeks later, violent fighting again started between the MPLA and FNLA. The Portuguese troops were unable to keep order. The situation degenerated into civil war.

UNITA's army chief complained<sup>5</sup> that, since April, there had been periodical attacks on its encampments, presumably by MPLA troops. By early August UNITA, too, had been drawn into the civil war. FNLA and UNITA abandoned Luanda, pulling out of the three-power provisional government, the MPLA taking over all ministries. The Acting Portuguese High Commissioner announced that Portugal was re-assuming responsibility for the administration of Angola.<sup>6</sup>

Portuguese troops evacuated the northern part of the country and, together with thousands of light-skinned civilians (referred to as "Whites" in the paragraphs that follow, for the sake of brevity) set off in convoys for Luanda or Nova Lisboa.

Portugal used its TAP airline to fly White civilians out of Angola. Airlines of other countries helped. No fares were charged, but the evacuees had to leave most of their possessions behind, were limited to about R100 in foreign exchange, and faced an uncertain future as there was massive unemployment and political

<sup>3</sup> e.g. *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 August, 26 September, and 8 November, and numerous other reports.

<sup>4</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 and 19 May.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 6 August.

<sup>6</sup> Various reports of 8-15 August.

instability in Portugal.<sup>7</sup> For a start, about 500 people were flown a week, but it was planned to step this figure up to several thousand a week. These plans proved impossible to carry out in full, however. The Luanda airport was dangerous to use because of firing from the ground, and a shortage of fuel developed. The runway at Nova Lisboa was too short for passenger jets.<sup>8</sup>

Many of the White refugees decided to escape by road to South West Africa. By June, the first of them had arrived at the border posts of Runtu and Oshikango. A SA official said that those without the necessary documents would be treated as people in transit.<sup>9</sup> Transit camps were opened for them at Grootfontein, Oshakati, and Tsumeb. As the flood of refugees grew, people who had arrived at these transit camps were flown from there to the camp at Cullinan which had earlier been used to accommodate refugees from Mozambique, or to new camps opened nearby at Magaliesoord and at Lyndhurst near Johannesburg. By 14 August it was reported that some 5 000 refugees were being accommodated in SWA and SA. The numbers who had crossed the borders had probably doubled by mid-September, to at least 10 000.<sup>10</sup> (Some reports gave a considerably higher estimate.)

But it became increasingly difficult for people to escape. Petrol supplies became exhausted in towns on the way south, and cars were stranded along the way. Patrols of the guerrilla movements set up roadblocks and looted convoys of cars and lorries. It was reported<sup>11</sup> that Swapo groups were operating together with the Portuguese African fighters.

The SA Police helped to rescue one convoy whose members had, in desperation, tried to escape by driving south along the waterless soft sand of the Skeleton Coast. Other groups of people set off in small craft to try to reach Walvis Bay by sea: some were wrecked and drowned.

The SA Government announced that only those refugees who could satisfy SA's minimum immigration requirements would be allowed to remain in the country. Those who were eligible were moved to the Lyndhurst camp, where prospective employers interviewed them.

The Government chartered a cruise liner to ferry nearly 3 000 "unqualified" refugees from Walvis Bay to Lisbon. It hoped, later, to recoup the costs from Portugal. (Portugal paid a first instalment during October.<sup>12</sup>)

It was announced in the Press on 19 September and 21 November that about 1 300 Angolan refugees had been accepted for permanent residence in SA, while between 9 500 and 10 500 had

<sup>7</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 June.

<sup>8</sup> *Star*, 11 and 14 August.

<sup>9</sup> *Star*, 5 June.

<sup>10</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, of that date and of 10 September.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 14 August.

<sup>12</sup> SABC news broadcast, 21 October.

been repatriated by SA to their countries of origin, mainly Portugal, or had left of their own accord.

At the time of writing it is impossible to estimate how many of the Whites, said to have numbered some 420 000 in 1974,<sup>1</sup> remained in Angola by choice or enforcedly, or intended returning once peace was restored.

It was reported in October<sup>2</sup> that at least 230 000 had been flown out, while many thousands more had crossed overland into SWA, or had flown or sailed to other countries, such as Brazil.

On the evening of 10 November the last of the Portuguese officials and army personnel left Angola. In a brief ceremony, the Portuguese High Commissioner handed over independence to "the people of Angola". There was no government to which power could be transferred, since the country was still in the throes of a savage and widespread civil war.

President Machel of Mozambique publicly expressed his support for the MPLA. Mercenaries from a number of countries joined in the fighting. During November, China announced that it was stopping arms supplies to FNLA.

It was reported late in November that Russia and Cuba had stepped up their support for the MPLA. The US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, is reported to have protested through diplomatic channels to Moscow against Soviet military intervention.

South Africa's involvement in the Angolan situation is described in the chapter on South West Africa: as mentioned, it reinforced troops guarding the border between the two territories, and the Cunene hydro-electric scheme. Some bands of SWAPO attackers were, apparently, pursued by SA troops as they retreated back into Angola. The SA Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, is stated to have appealed to the United States and to NATO to move openly against the Russian intervention.

Nigeria announced that, because of the SA involvement, it would grant recognition to the MPLA.

<sup>1</sup> *Star*, 4 August.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 21 October.

## RHODESIA

### POPULATION

An estimate of the Rhodesian population, made in 1972, was as follows:

Africans: . . . . .	5 400 000	(77% Shona, 17% Ndebele)
Whites: . . . . .	262 700	
Coloured and Asians:	27 300	

### LUSAKA TALKS IN DECEMBER 1974

The negotiations that took place late in 1974 between representatives of SA, Zambia, Botswana, and Tanzania in regard to the future of Rhodesia are described on page 291.

As a result of these negotiations, a conference was held in Lusaka, Zambia, early in December 1974. The account that follows is based on numerous Press and other reports: no authoritative statement was issued.

The talks were, apparently, held between the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana, and six representatives each of Zanu, Zapu, and the ANC. Some 13 of these representatives had been released from detention by the Rhodesian Government to enable them to be present. SA's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brand Fourie, confirmed in a Press interview that he had been present, but declined to comment further. Representatives of the Rhodesian Government were, apparently, in Lusaka.

It was widely reported that the Rhodesian Africans were, initially, disposed to suspend their principle of "Nibmar" (no independence before majority African rule) in exchange for an offer by Mr. Ian Smith of firm progression towards eventual majority rule. Mr. Smith laid down two preconditions: there must be a cessation of guerrilla activities; and any constitutional conference called would have to accept in advance that no lowering of standards would be agreed to. (By this he apparently meant that a qualified franchise would be retained.)

It seems, however, that after lengthy discussions, the Rhodesian Africans, at the insistence of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole of Zanu, adopted the point of view that they would not put an end to guerrilla fighting nor participate in a constitutional conference unless immediate majority rule was agreed to in advance.

The Rhodesian Government issued a statement<sup>1</sup> to the effect that the African nationalists' demands were unacceptable.

<sup>1</sup> c.s. *Sunday Times*, 8 December 1974.

On his return to Rhodesia the ANC secretary-general, Dr. Gordon Chavunduka, is reported<sup>2</sup> to have said that the "immediate majority rule" demand had been the maximum one. "That is not to say that it is not negotiable."

Mr. Vorster is reported<sup>3</sup> to have stated that the negotiations in Cape Town, Pretoria, Salisbury, and Lusaka had initially made very good progress. Promising new points of principle had been accepted which held out the prospect of a complete and speedy solution. But at the end of the proceedings a new demand was made which "was in total conflict with the spirit, intent, and result of the agreement up to this point. Rhodesia cannot, therefore, be blamed for the failure of the negotiations. Unless the other parties return to the basis and method of approach agreed upon before the deadlock . . . it must be assumed that agreement cannot be reached.

"Without interfering in anyone's domestic affairs, South Africa did everything to bring the parties together and to promote understanding for each other's problems . . . South Africa will continue its efforts, if at all possible, to bring the parties together again around the conference table. The alternative is too ghastly to contemplate".

Later, President Kaunda made a statement which showed similar concern. He is reported<sup>4</sup> to have said, "Either we resolve problems peacefully by meaningful negotiations conducted in an atmosphere of mutual respect and on the basis of equality, or we accept armed conflict as the only alternative, with all its consequences." If the road to peaceful change were closed in Southern Africa, Zambia and the rest of Africa would have no choice but to support the armed struggle waged by liberation movements to eliminate injustice, racial discrimination, and oppression, the President said.

### PROPOSED COMMON FRONT OF RHODESIAN AFRICAN NATIONALISTS

It was announced on 9 December 1974<sup>5</sup> that an agreement had been reached in Lusaka between the presidents of the four Rhodesian African nationalist movements, Mr. Joshua Nkomo of Zanu, the Rev. Mr. Sithole of Zanu, Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the ANC, and Mr. James Chikerema of Frolizi (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe). The four organisations would come together under the banner of the ANC (the only one of these bodies that was not banned in Rhodesia), under the interim presidency of Bishop Muzorewa, with the other three leaders included in an enlarged executive. A meeting would be called later to adopt a revised constitution for the ANC. The aim would

<sup>2</sup> *Rand Daily Mail and Star* of 11 December 1974.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 9 December 1974.

<sup>4</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 March.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 9 December 1974.

be to prepare for any constitutional conference which might be called for the transfer of power to the majority. The statement concluded, "The leaders recognize the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe".

#### REPORTED AGREEMENT REACHED IN LUSAKA

In a broadcast made on 11 December 1974,<sup>6</sup> Mr. Ian Smith announced that agreement on certain points had been reached in Lusaka with the African nationalists. He had received assurances that there would be a ceasefire agreement, guerrilla activity in Rhodesia ceasing immediately. The proposed constitutional conference would take place without any preconditions.

Accordingly, Mr. Smith continued, Rhodesia had agreed to release detained African nationalists. They would be allowed to engage in normal activity under the law applicable to all Rhodesians. This action was being taken on the firm understanding that everyone concerned would conduct himself peacefully and within the law. Mr. Smith warned his countrymen that because of the isolation of some of the bands of insurgents it might take some time for the undertaking that acts of terrorism would cease to become fully effective.

The decisions reached would, he believed, create the right atmosphere for the holding of a constitutional conference, Mr. Smith said. He assured White Rhodesians that it was the Government's firm intention to maintain law and order, and that it would not deviate from the standards of civilization embodied in the constitution.

These moves might turn out to be the first step towards a settlement, the Prime Minister stated, but "the major task still lies ahead with many complex problems." He called upon all Rhodesians to establish a climate of mutual respect in which constitutional matters could be discussed calmly and objectively in the hope that a settlement would be reached which would be in the best interests of all Rhodesians.

Returning from Lusaka as free men, the Rhodesian African leaders said, in a joint Press statement, that while "the independence we seek is independence on the basis of majority rule", there would be no preconditions. The reconstructed ANC was ready "to enter into immediate and meaningful negotiations with the leaders of the Rhodesian Front and with the British Government . . . on steps to be taken to achieve independence on the basis of majority rule." Rhodesian guerrillas would be instructed to suspend fighting "as soon as a date for constitutional negotiations has been fixed".

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 12 December.

Mr. Vorster reaffirmed that as soon as it had been clearly confirmed that terrorism in Rhodesia had ended, South Africa would withdraw its police from Rhodesia because the necessity for their presence there would have fallen away.

The agreement which Mr. Smith had mentioned was apparently not fully recorded in writing, and differences about its origin and terms arose.

It was announced in the Press on 14 and 15 December 1974 that aircraft of the Rhodesian Air Force had been dropping leaflets over the north-eastern areas where guerrillas were operating, and sky-shouts were being made, telling African fighters that the war was over and that they should either lay down their arms and report to the nearest soldier, policeman, or official, or should leave the country immediately.

During the hearings of a special tribunal at the end of March, following the re-detention of Mr. Sithole, mentioned later, counsel for Mr. Sithole argued that the ceasefire agreement meant that both warring parties should remain in the *status quo*, each holding and retaining his arms, and neither party surrendering. The Government had breached this agreement (which was not in writing), he maintained.

According to Press reports<sup>7</sup> there were other disputes, during January, over exactly what had been agreed to in Lusaka. The ANC claimed it had been agreed that there would be amnesty for African nationalists in exile. Political trials would stop, and death sentences on political prisoners would be revoked. The Rhodesian Government replied that no death sentences had been imposed on political prisoners: only on terrorists convicted of crimes against the State. African leaders claimed that a general amnesty for political detainees had been promised. In fact, only about one-third of them had thus far been released, they said, nearly 300 people remaining in detention. The Africans declared they understood that the state of emergency was to be lifted and free political meetings allowed: the Government replied that there would be no question of this until détente became an absolute reality.

At the hearing of the special tribunal, counsel for the Rhodesian Government handed in a certificate from Mr. Ian Smith which is reported to have stated that the major terms of the agreement had been decided during a meeting between himself and Mr. Vorster during October 1974. Mr. Vorster had had the support of the Governments of Zambia and Tanzania in these arrangements.

Following a further meeting with Mr. Vorster in April, Mr. Smith is reported<sup>8</sup> to have proposed that representatives of his

<sup>7</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 and 14 January.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 29 April.

Government and the ANC, together with representatives from South Africa and the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and Frelimo, should try to define exactly what had been laid down in the Lusaka Agreement.

#### CONSERVATIVE GROUPS OF WHITES IN RHODESIA

The elections that took place in Rhodesia in 1974 were described on page 97 of last year's *Survey*. The two main political parties were the Rhodesian Front, led by Mr. Smith, and the Rhodesian Party, to the left, led by Mr. Tim Gibbs. Mr. Smith's party won all of the 50 White seats. The ANC as such had decided not to contest any election held under the existing constitution, but seven of the eight elected African seats went to "unofficial" ANC candidates or supporters, the eighth being won by a member of the Centre Party.

Besides these groups, there are two right-wing (White) parties, the United Conservative Party, led by Mr. William Harper, and the Rhodesia National Party. During November they merged to form the Rhodesia National Movement. According to Press reports,<sup>9</sup> towards the end of 1974 a branch of Saskon (the Southern Africa Solidarity Congress) was established in Salisbury: this is stated to be an ultra-right-wing organisation formed by the HNP in SA. Yet another group is the Candour League of Rhodesia.

A further organisation, established early in 1975, is said to be GRA (die Genootskap van Rhodesiese Afrikaners), a front organisation of the SA Broederbond.

#### VISIT TO SOUTHERN AFRICA BY MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN

Early in 1975 the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. James Callaghan, paid a visit to Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, and South Africa. It was reported that, as Mr. Smith made no overtures to see him, he did not go to Rhodesia. The Press pointed out<sup>10</sup> that Britain obviously wished to consider what steps, if any, it could usefully take in relation to Rhodesia. It would have to participate in discussions if the stage were reached of asking the British Parliament to lift sanctions and accede to Rhodesian independence.

During his very brief visit to SA, Mr. Callaghan and the British Ambassador had discussions with Mr. Vorster and senior SA Government representatives. Afterwards, Mr. Callaghan told the Press<sup>11</sup> that both he and Mr. Vorster had expressed their views on various issues very frankly. They did not concentrate on issues that undoubtedly divided them and would continue to do so. "I was able to indicate to the Prime Minister the views of the

<sup>9</sup> e.g. *Sunday Times*, 13 April.

<sup>10</sup> e.g. *Star*, 12 December 1974.

<sup>11</sup> *Sunday Times*, 5 January.

African leaders that I have met on the way round and to give him my reaction to their views and the reaction of the British Government to the developing situation in Southern Africa . . . There is no doubt that South Africa has been playing a very substantial role in the developments that have taken place in Rhodesia and with the African countries. I think that role has been recognized by other African states, even though there are substantial differences in these matters".

It was reported<sup>12</sup> that Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere had support moves to ensure the future of Rhodesia's White minority assured Mr. Callaghan that key Black States were prepared to once majority rule had been arranged.

#### CONTINUED WARFARE

During the period thus far reviewed there were frequent reports of acts of violence in the north-east border areas of Rhodesia: considerable numbers of African villagers who refused to assist insurgents were beaten up, killed, or kidnapped; people were killed or injured in further landmine explosions; there were more (but fewer) attacks on White farmhouses; casualties occurred among both insurgents and members of the security forces in occasional pitched battles.

Such activities continued, although possibly on a slightly diminished scale, after the Lusaka agreement in December 1974. Four SA policemen were killed in a guerrilla ambush on 24 December, and two killed and four wounded in a landmine explosion on 2 January. Another SA policeman was killed and five wounded in a skirmish on 12 January. A SA civilian working in a tsetse fly control unit was wounded in an ambush early in March. Rhodesia did not release full casualty figures, but both Black and White members of security forces and civilians were killed or injured, and a number of further guerrillas killed or captured.

Mr. Callaghan is reported to have said on 4 January<sup>13</sup> that Presidents Kaunda and Khama had both told him that they not only regretted the continued guerrilla activity, but also, while recognizing the difficulties of the situation, that they disavowed violence. Mr. Callaghan added that the cause of settlement would best be served if all concerned lived up to their undertakings, and this included the cessation of acts of violence.

In his New Year message Mr. Vorster said that the road to peace "is not a one-way traffic lane on which landmines can be planted with impunity and on which travellers must run the gauntlet of snipers' bullets. Making allowance for the fact that it takes time to bring word to everyone in the bush it must, however,

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 12 January.

<sup>13</sup> *Star*, 4 January; *Sunday Times*, 5 January.



be stated with emphasis that those who gave their word will do well to honour their commitments. The fury that stems from broken pledges knows no limit, and the wrath of a man of peace who finds that he has been betrayed wilfully is an all-consuming fire".

Rhodesia's Minister of Justice, Law and Order, Senator D. Lardner Burke, stated<sup>14</sup> a few days later that guerrillas had intensified their activities in parts of the country in spite of orders from their leaders to halt hostilities. More insurgents had crossed the border since the ceasefire was announced. Pamphlets had been circulated in the operational zone exhorting rebels to go on fighting.

Because of this, Senator Lardner Burke continued, no further detainees would be released for the time being. A halt to the releases would be called until the Rhodesian Government was satisfied that a genuine attempt was being made to stop terrorism.

A former Frolizi leader in exile in Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. James Chikerema, maintained that the Lusaka agreement had provided for the ceasefire to become effective only when a date had been announced for a constitutional conference.<sup>15</sup>

The Press speculated<sup>16</sup> that ceasefire violations were attributable to a break-away group of militant Zanu men, who were disobeying instructions from the Zanu leader in Zambia, Mr. Herbert Chitepo, to remain in their base camps. It was reported<sup>17</sup> that recruiting for the guerrilla forces had been stepped up in Rhodesia.

#### SENTENCES ON GUERRILLAS

According to Press reports, between November 1974 and the following March at least six captured guerrillas who had earlier received death sentences were executed; eight more were sentenced to death, and at least three received sentences ranging from five years to life.

It was reported on 23 April<sup>18</sup> that the Rhodesian Ministry of Justice had decided to make no further public announcements of the execution of convicted men.

#### PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS IN SALISBURY

Late in January, Mr. Smith and Government officials met a delegation from the ANC for preliminary discussions about the venue, chairmanship, and size of delegations for the proposed constitutional conference. Further talks were held during the following month, but no agreement was reached.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Star*, 11 January; *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 January.

<sup>15</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 January.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 1 February.

<sup>17</sup> *Sunday Times*, 9 March.

<sup>18</sup> *Rand Daily Mail* of that date.

<sup>19</sup> *Sunday Express*, 2 February; *Star*, 14 February.

#### USE OF THE SA POLICE

It was reported in February that the S.A. Police were being withdrawn by roster from forward positions on the Zambesi River to base camps. The SA Minister of Justice confirmed<sup>20</sup> that the policemen had been ordered back to these camps to ensure that there would be no incident involving South Africans while a prospect existed of a meeting between the Rhodesian Government and the ANC.

Mr. Vorster said in the Assembly on 21 April,<sup>21</sup> "We have not wanted to and never want to become involved in the maintenance of internal order in any state. With us it concerned the infiltration of terrorists into Rhodesia from other areas who also had South Africa as their objective."

#### DETENTION OF MR. SITHOLE

Mr. Sithole was detained in Salisbury on 4 March. The Rhodesian Government was reported to have stated it had reliable information that he had been carefully planning the assassination of certain of his opponents, and he had been placed under detention to protect their lives and to maintain law and order.

Because of the fear of victimization of witnesses it would not be possible to try Mr. Sithole in the High Court under the normal procedure of this court, it was stated. Instead, he would appear before a special three-man court presided over by the Acting Chief Justice, Mr. Justice MacDonald. This court would not try him, but would give a judgment on whether or not a case had been made out for his detention. As much of the details of the charges against him as could be made known without imperilling security would be made known. Mr. Sithole would be permitted legal representation and allowed to give evidence and to call witnesses in his defence.

The ANC then suspended further talks with the Government until Mr. Sithole had been released or tried in open court.

The Emergency Powers (Special Court) Regulations were gazetted on 13 March. The court would decide on the "necessity or expediency" of continuing Mr. Sithole's detention, whether on the grounds on which the detention order was issued or on any other grounds. It was stated that the Minister of Law and Order would be authorised to appeal to the President against the decision of the court if he considered that this decision would endanger public safety and order. A few days later, however, the Government announced that it would consider itself bound to follow the Court's recommendations.

Mr. Israel Maisels, Q.C., from SA headed the legal team that defended Mr. Sithole. The Rhodesian Government provided these legal representatives with a document setting out the grounds for

<sup>20</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 10 March.

<sup>21</sup> *Hansard* 11 cols. 4502-3.

his detention, alleging, *inter alia*, that he had plotted the assassination of certain influential politicians, had continued to pursue the military aims of Zapu, had resisted attempts to make the ceasefire operative, and had made every effort to discredit détente moves.

When the hearing began, the defence asked for further particulars regarding the alleged assassination plot. The court ruled that these could not be given because the lives of witnesses might be endangered if their identity were disclosed. Counsel for the Minister of Law and Order said that he did not intend calling secret evidence unless this became absolutely necessary. Mr. Justice MacDonald is reported to have stated it was unlikely that the court would, in fact, have to consider the charge relating to the alleged assassination plot. It would first consider the allegations that, as leader of Zanu and of its liberation army, Mr. Sithole had been responsible for the deaths of victims of terrorists since the ceasefire.

The defence had asked for the exact terms of the ceasefire agreement. In a letter to Mr. Sithole's attorneys the Rhodesian Solicitor-General said the agreement was the one reached between the Government and other interested parties, and announced by Mr. Smith on 11 December 1974. It was not alleged that Mr. Sithole had personally negotiated the agreement, nor was it possible to prove that Mr. Sithole or Zanu had agreed to the ceasefire as it was understood by the Rhodesian Government. It was only possible to prove that the Government had bona fide believed as a result of assurances received that there would be a cessation of hostilities shortly after 12 December. The ceasefire agreement was not in writing. Its precise terms were irrelevant. But the State was alleging that Mr. Sithole had deliberately taken steps to ensure that the ceasefire — whatever it was — would not be observed by his followers.<sup>22</sup>

As described on page 311, the defence then contended that the Government itself had breached the ceasefire agreement by calling on guerrillas to surrender or to leave the country immediately. A ceasefire meant what it said — that both warring parties should remain in the *status quo*, each holding and retaining his arms and neither party surrendering.

The State then produced a certificate signed by Mr. Ian Smith giving particulars of the agreement decided upon during the meeting between himself and Mr. Vorster in October 1974. Mr. Vorster had had the support of the Governments of Zambia and Tanzania in regard to the terms of this agreement. It was stated, *inter alia*, that as a *quid pro quo* for the release of detainees, terrorism would cease immediately.

Mr. Sithole announced that he no longer intended defending himself. The leader of his defence team said that Mr. Sithole had

<sup>22</sup> From Press reports.

been anxious to demonstrate his innocence in regard to any assassination plot, but this opportunity was being denied him. The production of Mr. Smith's certificate prevented Mr. Sithole from arguing his case on the cease-fire aspect of the case.

The defence team withdrew, but the hearing continued. Evidence was given relating to guerrilla activities since 11 December.

On 2 April the court ruled that Mr. Sithole's detention was fully warranted, in that he had encouraged terrorism and resisted the so-called cease-fire.

Next day, following representations received from Zambia, SA's Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of his department, Dr. Hilgard Muller and Mr. Brand Fourie, flew to Salisbury for talks with Mr. Smith. On the following day, in a radio and television statement, Mr. Smith announced that Mr. Sithole was to be released to attend the Dar-es-Salaam conference of Foreign Ministers of OAU States. This matter is described on page 295. As mentioned, Mr. Sithole remained outside Rhodesia after the conference, fearing re-detention if he returned home.

Meanwhile, two top Zanu officials including the deputy-leader, Mr. Robert Mogabe, had left Rhodesia secretly for Dar-es-Salaam, under the impression that, following the court's ruling, Zanu would not be represented at the conference.

#### DISSENT AMONG MEMBERS OF AFRICAN NATIONALIST GROUPS

It was mentioned earlier that certain ceasefire violations were attributed by the Press to a break-away group of militant Zanu men, who were disobeying instructions from the Zanu leader in Zambia, Mr. Herbert Chitepo. There were numerous reports of dissention between rival Zanu groups in Zambia, the division being largely along tribal lines.

On 18 March Mr. Chitepo was killed when a landmine exploded as he was leaving his home in Lusaka by car. His bodyguard and a child standing nearby were killed too, and a second bodyguard seriously injured. Zambian troops are reported to have arrested some fifty members of the Zanu group that opposed Mr. Chitepo, releasing most of them after questioning. President Kaunda instituted a commission of enquiry into Mr. Chitepo's death.

The Zambian Government withdrew recognition of Zanu, Zapu, and Frolizi, instructing them to close their offices in that country. Only the ANC would be allowed to operate in Zambia. The OAU had, earlier, decided to recognize only the ANC. Tanzania decided to follow suit.

It was reported early in May that there had been serious clashes between the rival Zanu groups in Zambia, resulting in a number of deaths. Fourteen bodies were found.

Within Rhodesia, there appeared to be mounting ill feeling between Zapu and Zanu.

#### PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

President Kaunda visited the United States during April. According to Press reports,<sup>23</sup> at a dinner party at the White House he criticized the United State's Southern Africa policy and attacked American "indifference" to the liberation of people there.

In the course of subsequent speeches and at a Press conference President Kaunda is reported to have said that Black Africa would not compromise on the principle of majority rule. Unless this was accepted, there was bound to be an explosion of violence in Southern Africa. Oppressed people had the right to answer force with force.

The President urged the United States and the West generally to exert whatever political, diplomatic, trade, and other form of pressure possible to help oust the "colonial regimes" in Rhodesia and South West Africa, and "vile" apartheid in South Africa. "We recognize that the three million White settlers in South Africa are African," he said, "but they are not super-Africans".

In the SA House of Assembly on 21 April<sup>24</sup> Mr. Vorster said that he did not wish to do anything that could jeopardise peace in the sub-continent. But he believed President Kaunda should guard against "overstraining the bowstring", as this would not promote the cause of peace.

#### VIOLENCE IN SALISBURY

On 1 June the ANC held a meeting in an African township of Salisbury to discuss its attitude to constitutional talks. Emotions became heated: it was reported<sup>1</sup> that a group of supporters of the banned Zapu forced their way in and attacked two former Zanu leaders — Mr. Enos Nkala was thrown out of a window, and Dr. Edson Sithole was forced out of the door.

Violence erupted outside the building. The police were suddenly stoned when they attempted to restore order: reports stated that some of them drew their pistols and fired, mainly warning shots into the air, but some shots were fired direct at the crowd. Eleven Africans were shot dead and about 23 wounded. Some 68 were arrested, to face charges of public violence.<sup>2</sup>

#### FURTHER DISCUSSION OF PLANS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

A third round of talks between Mr. Smith with certain members of his Cabinet and an ANC delegation took place on 22 May.

<sup>23</sup> *Rand Daily Mail* and *Star* of 21 April.

<sup>24</sup> Hansard 11 col. 4502.

<sup>1</sup> *Star*, 2 June.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, and *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 June.

Mr. Smith said afterwards<sup>1</sup> that each side had re-stated its position, but little progress had been made. He had told the African leaders that "when we next meet we agree to hold a conference, or we say it is off and give reasons".

At its meeting on 1 June the ANC agreed to meet Mr. Smith for a further attempt to organise a conference, subject to certain conditions. But there was not unanimity: Mr. Enos Nkala, formerly a Zanu leader, dissociated himself from the decision.<sup>2</sup>

The ANC secretary-general, Dr. Gordon Chavunduka, said on 3 June, however, that his Council and the Government had agreed to hold preliminary talks without any preconditions. The Government had dropped its demand for a ceasefire first, and the ANC had agreed not to insist on the release of detainees.

In a statement made in Geneva,<sup>3</sup> Mr. Sithole is reported to have said that the ANC would insist that the conference be held outside Rhodesia, preferably in Britain or any country that was neutral. But he had no reason for optimism that a peaceful solution would be reached through a constitutional conference. Such a meeting would prove only that discussions could not succeed, and that armed struggle was the only answer. Bishop Muzorewa (who had left Rhodesia) is stated<sup>4</sup> to have said in Lusaka that the ANC had vetoed any further talks with Mr. Smith in Salisbury, and would meet him only at a conference held outside Rhodesia. It was essential that Mr. Sithole should be present, and the latter might be re-detained if he returned to Rhodesia.

#### RENEWED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY

In an interview published in Dar-es-Salaam, Bishop Muzorewa is stated<sup>5</sup> to have said that unless Rhodesia called a constitutional conference on his terms within three months, it would have to face renewed guerrilla warfare. The Press reported<sup>6</sup> that the militants in the ANC claimed to have 3 600 guerrillas either trained or in training in camps in Mozambique and Tanzania. They were being joined by others who were crossing the border secretly.

According to a number of Press reports,<sup>7</sup> senior African school pupils from schools near Rhodesia's borders with other countries had been absconding to join the nationalist forces. Their numbers could only be guessed, since some might have returned from boarding schools to their homes, but the total might have been in the vicinity of 600. The Rhodesian Government imposed

<sup>1</sup> *Star*, 26 May.

<sup>2</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 June.

<sup>3</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 June.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 29 July.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 21 July.

<sup>6</sup> *Sunday Times*, 13 July; *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 July.

<sup>7</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 17, 23 and 25 July and 7 August; *Sunday Express*, 27 July; *Star*, 2 August.

a curfew along certain stretches of its borders to try to prevent young people from leaving the country.

An official spokesman is stated<sup>8</sup> to have said on 20 July that, since the so-called ceasefire in December 1974, 87 guerrillas and 15 Rhodesian servicemen had been killed.

Mr. Smith promised increased support for White farmers in the north-eastern districts. The security forces were strengthened, for example by the more frequent call-up of civilians. A women's service was created.<sup>9</sup>

#### REACTIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES

It was reported in July<sup>10</sup> that both Tanzania and Mozambique had insisted that the ANC should resolve internal dissension and create an effective leadership structure.

The British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. David Ennals, visited Southern Africa late in June for discussions with heads of the States which had been involved in plans for a constitutional conference, including South Africa. Twice again, in June and August, Mr. Ian Smith visited SA for talks with Mr. Vorster.

At the conclusion of Mr. Smith's visit on 9 August, a joint statement was issued<sup>11</sup> reading, "The Rhodesian and South African Ministers had a very fruitful discussion on the whole Southern African situation and have agreed to proposals which, if implemented by all parties concerned, can lead to a settlement of the issues involved. Further announcements will be made in the near future."

In a Press interview,<sup>12</sup> President Kaunda of Zambia gave sincere praise to the role that Mr. Vorster had played. He gave warning that the patience of the ANC and of countries such as his own was running out. "However," he continued, "I would hate to say that we have laid down a time limit after which peaceful negotiations cannot continue. This is not a matter to be treated lightly because the lives of people are at stake." He agreed with Mr. Vorster that a failure to reach a settlement was a matter too horrible to contemplate. If warfare started it was inevitable that Zambia and other countries would be drawn into it. The President made an impassioned plea for South Africa to stay out of the fighting, if this occurred.

It had been reported a week earlier<sup>13</sup> that Mr. Vorster had warned Mr. Smith that SA would not allow herself to become embroiled in any intensified guerrilla war.

<sup>8</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 July.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 23 July and 5 August.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 21 July.

<sup>11</sup> *Sunday Times*, 10 August.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 3 August.

#### WITHDRAWAL OF THE SA POLICE FROM RHODESIA

It was announced from Salisbury on 2 August that the remaining SA policemen, on standby in Rhodesia, would be back in the Republic by the end of the month. The Acting Commissioner of Police confirmed this announcement,<sup>14</sup> adding that his Minister had said that the policemen had been sent to stop SA terrorists from crossing the Zambesi River on their way to SA. No such infiltrations had, however, taken place for some time.

President Kaunda welcomed the withdrawal of the SA police which, he stated, lessened the areas of difference between SA and Zambia.<sup>15</sup>

#### "PRETORIA AGREEMENT"

The text of the agreement signed in Pretoria on 9 August by the South African and Rhodesian Prime Ministers and their colleagues and by a representative of the four African Presidents was released to the Press by the Rhodesian Diplomatic Mission in SA on 27 August.<sup>16</sup> It read as follows.

- "A. The Rhodesian Government through its Ministerial representatives, and the ANC through their appointed representatives, will meet not later than August 25 on the Victoria Falls bridge in coaches to be supplied by the South African Government for a formal conference without any preconditions.
- "B. The object of the formal meeting is to give the parties the opportunity to publicly express their genuine desire to negotiate an acceptable settlement.
- "C. After this the conference will adjourn to enable the parties to discuss proposals for a settlement in committee or committees within Rhodesia.
- "D. Thereafter the parties will meet again in formal conference anywhere decided upon to ratify the committee proposals which have been agreed upon.
- "E. The South African Government and the governments of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, respectively, hereby express their willingness to ensure that this agreement is implemented by the two parties involved."

Mr. Smith told the Rhodesian House of Assembly later<sup>17</sup> that he had telephoned and telexed the Zambian Government to say it had been agreed in Pretoria that whilst negotiations were

<sup>14</sup> *Star*, 2 August.

<sup>15</sup> *Sunday Times*, 10 August.

<sup>16</sup> e.g. *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 August.

<sup>17</sup> *Rhodesian Herald*, 27 August.

in progress, ANC leaders in Rhodesia would be completely free to consult with their colleagues outside.

#### PRELIMINARIES TO THE VICTORIA FALLS MEETING

The SA Railways decided to send the SA State President's dining car, which contained a long table, for the conference, and, for private discussions by the two sets of delegates, saloon cars used by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Transport. These were driven to the centre of the Victoria Falls bridge, the border between Rhodesia and Zambia.

Mr. Smith said in a broadcast<sup>18</sup> that he expected the meeting to be a short, purely formal one. But Bishop Muzorewa replied<sup>19</sup> that the Africans wanted serious discussions. He was concerned about the holding of the committee stage discussions within Rhodesia, for there was no guarantee that Mr. Sithole, Mr. James Chikerema, and certain other ANC leaders would be allowed to attend without risk of being arrested.

Mr. Smith met two senior representatives of the Council of Chiefs and assured them that his Government would consult with this Council and obtain its agreement before completing any future constitution.<sup>19</sup>

#### THE CONFERENCE AT THE VICTORIA FALLS, 25 AUGUST

At the conference, Rhodesia was represented by Mr. Smith, three of his Cabinet Ministers, and the Secretary to the Cabinet. Bishop Muzorewa headed a thirteen-man ANC team.

Mr. Vorster, accompanied by Dr. Hildgard Muller, and President Kaunda flew to the Victoria Falls to attend the opening of the proceedings and to hold private discussions (commencing on Zambian soil and continuing later in Rhodesia). Mr. Mark Chona of Zambia and Mr. Brand Fourie of SA attended the conference as observers.

After opening speeches by Mr. Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Mr. Vorster, and President Kaunda, the proceedings began. According to a full report in the *Rand Daily Mail*,<sup>20</sup> each side tabled a document. Mr. Smith's gave effect to the Pretoria Agreement and sought to have committee talks started in Salisbury within a week.

The ANC stated that it genuinely wanted to negotiate a settlement. It went on to say, "We publicly state that the only genuine settlement . . . is the one that shall be based on the transfer of power from the minority to the majority people of the country—that is to say, majority rule now." This clause was rejected by Mr. Smith, and, during an adjournment, the ANC instead

<sup>18</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 15 August.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 18 August.

<sup>20</sup> 30 August.

expressed its commitment to a settlement acceptable "to all the people of our country". The ANC also gave up its original demand that substantive committee-stage talks had to be held outside Rhodesia. Agreement was reached on all points except one—a demand by the ANC that leaders outside the country should be allowed to return for the talks and be granted immunity from the enforcement in any way of an existing sentence or order, and from arrest, prosecution, detention, or restriction. Mr. Smith found this draft clause to be unacceptable. The conference ended late at night without agreement on this point.

In a statement made to the House of Assembly next day<sup>21</sup> Mr. Smith said that it was now incumbent on his government to bring in other Rhodesians to help in achieving a settlement, for example the Council of Chiefs and representatives of other African organisations.

All sixteen African Members of Parliament (including the eight chosen by tribal electoral colleges) subscribed to a statement giving the ANC their full support and rejecting any suggestion that they should help to negotiate a settlement. The ANC, they said, was the only organisation representing the true voice of the African people.<sup>22</sup>

#### SPLIT IN THE ANC

On 1 September a statement<sup>23</sup> was issued from Lusaka in the name of Bishop Muzorewa (who was on a visit overseas) announcing the formation of a Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC) as the external wing of the ANC. Its chairman was the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and its secretary Mr. James Chikerema (former members, respectively, of Zanu and Frolizi).

Four prominent former Zapu members in Lusaka told the Press that this move was an act of "conspiracy" against the national executive of the ANC in Rhodesia.

On the two following days Mr. Sithole made it clear that he still held that a peaceful settlement was impossible. He told the Press,<sup>24</sup> "As far as I am concerned we shall go home whether Smith grants us immunity or not. We shall shoot our way into Zimbabwe." In a radio interview he said<sup>25</sup> that Rhodesia's constitutional problem could be solved only through full-scale guerrilla war.

Mr. Joshua Nkomo (former Zapu leader) denounced Mr. Sithole's appointment as chairman of the ZLC as being null and void. Such an appointment should have been made by the executive of the ANC or by the Council itself, he declared. He accused

<sup>21</sup> *Rhodesian Herald*, 27 August.

<sup>22</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 August.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 2 September.

<sup>24</sup> *Star*, 2 September.

<sup>25</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 September.

elements of the ANC outside Rhodesia of deliberately delaying the convening of the full congress of the Council that had been envisaged when the organisation was formed in December 1974, to be held with the object of adopting a constitution and electing office-bearers.<sup>26</sup>

On 7 September the national chairman of the ANC, Mr. Samuel Munodawafa, called a meeting in Salisbury of the Council's national executive committee, which could patently not be attended by about eight exiled members nor some eleven who were still in detention. The meeting was boycotted by the Acting President in Rhodesia, Dr. Elliott Gabellah, and by the secretary-general, Dr. Gordon Chavunduka. Nevertheless, a quorum of 37 of the 69 members was present. Plans for a national congress were discussed.<sup>27</sup>

Bishop Muzorewa, now back in Lusaka, decided to expel from the ANC Mr. Joshua Nkomo, Mr. Munodawafa, and the national organising secretary, Mr. Killion Bhebe. The Zambian authorities forbade him to issue this Press statement from their territory; thus the order of expulsion was announced from Salisbury by Dr. Chavunduka. It was reported<sup>28</sup> that, wishing to demonstrate its neutrality, Zambia asked the Lusaka-based section of the ANC to leave premises that they had been occupying in the grounds of the presidential estate, and that they moved to a building on the outskirts of Lusaka.

The 37 executive committee members of the ANC who were in Rhodesia called a national congress, held in Salisbury on 27 September. About 5 500 people were reported to have attended, a large proportion of them Matabele who came from the Bulawayo area by train. (Mr. Nkomo is a member of this tribe.) The congress was boycotted by supporters of Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Sithole. Mr. Nkomo was elected president of the ANC, and a new executive was elected. Mr. Munodawafa remained national chairman. He said, "We want majority rule now. We shall not accept any constitutional settlement that leaves effective power still in the hands of the White minority." Mr. Nkomo, too, emphasized that the new executive stood for immediate majority rule.<sup>29</sup>

Mr. Chikerema stated in Zambia<sup>30</sup> that the Lusaka-based faction of the ANC refused to hand over the ZLC to Mr. Nkomo's faction. Mr. Sithole said<sup>31</sup> that when the Zimbabwe masses were at the helm of power, it would not be possible for them to share power with the exploiters they were fighting to eliminate.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 10 and 5 September.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 8 September, and *Star*, 27 September.

<sup>28</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 September.

<sup>29</sup> *Star*, 27 and 29 September; *Sunday Times*, 28 September; *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 September.

<sup>30</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 October.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 11 October.

On 26 October the supporters of Bishop Muzorewa called a public meeting in a Salisbury township. It was reported in various newspapers that more than 35 000 people gathered in the township to show their support for the Bishop's faction of the ANC. The meeting had to be cancelled because the municipal authorities had imposed a limit of 6 000 (as had been done earlier in the case of Mr. Nkomo's congress).

A spokesman for the Nkomo faction commented that these people had been *supporters* of the Bishop's faction, not *delegates*. Those who attended the Nkomo meeting had been properly accredited delegates, he claimed.

#### ATTITUDES OF HEADS OF OTHER STATES

The heads of State of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique, and Congo-Brazzaville met in Lusaka in mid-September. President Mbutu of Zaïre was unable to be present. It was reported<sup>32</sup> that the object was to discuss the affairs of Angola and Rhodesia. No public statement was issued.

SA's Foreign Minister, Dr. Hildgard Muller, is stated, during a visit to West Germany, to have told newsmen that countries north of Rhodesia were co-operating with SA in "cutting off terrorism" against Rhodesia. The Rhodesian issue was, in consequence, being isolated, making it unlikely that violence would erupt on a large scale.<sup>33</sup>

A few days later, a forthright statement was made by the Zambian Foreign Minister in an address to the UN General Assembly. He is reported<sup>34</sup> to have said that Zambia was committed to the total liberation of Africa. In the context of Southern Africa this meant an end to White minority domination and the realisation of majority rule. The means to this inevitable end would either be peaceful, or would be an armed struggle by the liberation movements. It was up to the racist minority régimes to choose between these alternatives.

#### TELEVISION STATEMENT BY MR. IAN SMITH

In a television interview conducted in Rhodesia by a British company, which was broadcast in Britain and Rhodesia on 12 October, Mr. Smith replied to questions about the initiative that had been taken by South Africa and "the four northern presidents" in trying to facilitate a settlement. He is stated<sup>35</sup> to have said, "It is my belief that if we had not embarked on this particular détente exercise we would by now have achieved a settlement in Rhodesia. Last October (October 1974) we received indications that Bishop

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 13 September.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 17 September.

<sup>34</sup> *Star*, 23 September.

<sup>35</sup> *Sunday Times*, 12 and 19 October; and daily papers between these dates.

Muzorewa was ready to resume discussions, and that there were prospects of reaching a conclusion. Furthermore, we were achieving success in the anti-terrorist campaign which had considerable bearing on settlement prospects." The approach from Bishop Muzorewa had indicated that "there were only a few points that were outstanding. If we could have solved these we would have had a settlement by now . . . I go so far as to say that I believe that if this new initiative had not been taken by Mr. Vorster and the four northern presidents we would have had a settlement by now."

Mr. Vorster told the Press<sup>36</sup> that, from experience, he hesitated to comment on such a delicate matter relying solely on Press reports. But if reports on the television interview were correct, then they did not correspond with the facts or with Mr. Smith's own repeated statements. After the news media had provided a recording of the interview Mr. Vorster said that if the statement by Mr. Smith was correct, then it was absolute news to him. On no occasion during their numerous talks over the past year had Mr. Smith mentioned the new approach by Bishop Muzorewa.

Mr. Smith is reported<sup>37</sup> to have told the Press that no criticism of Mr. Vorster had been actual or implied. He had simply been stating facts. Although he had used the words recorded in the TV interview, he had not meant what the Press read into them.

The SA Press was unanimously indignant. On the evening of a Cabinet meeting the Minister of Indian Affairs, addressing a public meeting, said,<sup>38</sup> "We were all deeply shocked . . . The onus to negotiate rests on the shoulders of Mr. Smith."

Questioned in Lusaka,<sup>39</sup> Bishop Muzorewa made it clear that he had held discussions with Mr. Smith in his capacity as president of the ANC. The whole world knew of this, he said. After he had failed to obtain a reasonable offer from Mr. Smith he had reported the whole exercise to his national executive, which rejected Mr. Smith's token offer. Mr. Vorster had had nothing to do with this rejection of the offer.

On 20 October Mr. Smith flew to Pretoria and he and Mr. Vorster, both accompanied by Cabinet Ministers, had discussions lasting some four hours. Thereafter, an official joint statement was handed to the Press.<sup>40</sup> It said, "The two Prime Ministers, supported by their different Ministers present, had candid discussions. Mr. Ian Smith re-emphasised that his remarks in the television interview were not intended in any way to criticise the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, for his laudable efforts to

<sup>36</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 October.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 14 October.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 15 October.

<sup>39</sup> *Star*, 15 October.

<sup>40</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 October.

achieve peace in Southern Africa. In fact, he had been a willing party to Mr. Vorster's efforts.

"Mr. Smith, therefore, has apologised to Mr. Vorster for any embarrassment caused by his remarks during the relevant television interview and assured him there was no inference that Mr. Vorster had in any way attempted to interfere in Rhodesia's internal affairs. The Rhodesian delegation once again expressed their high appreciation of Mr. Vorster's efforts to promote a more favourable climate for a peaceful settlement.

"Both Prime Ministers have agreed that genuine attempts should be made to pursue policies leading to peace in Southern Africa. The Rhodesian Prime Minister informed Mr. Vorster that he is making every effort to inaugurate talks aimed at solving Rhodesia's constitutional problems."

#### GUERRILLA FIGHTERS IN MOZAMBIQUE

It was mentioned earlier that at the end of March the ZANU deputy leader, Mr. Robert Mogabe, fled from Rhodesia to Dar-es-Salaam. According to a Press report<sup>41</sup> he became leader of Rhodesian African guerrilla fighters, said to number between 4 000 and 6 000, who were waiting in Mozambique in case the Zimbabwe Liberation Council, led by Mr. Sithole, decided upon large-scale warfare against Rhodesia.

#### TALKS BETWEEN MR. NKOMO AND HEADS OF STATES

During October and November, Mr. Smith and certain of his Cabinet Ministers had talks on three occasions with Mr. Nkomo, who was accompanied by senior members of the newly-elected ANC executive. Mr. Nkomo was reported to have visited Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania for discussions with heads of States. He made it clear to the Press that he continued to stand by the principle of "majority rule now".

It was announced on 1 December that Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo had that day jointly signed a declaration of intent to plan a constitutional conference. It was stated in this document that any representative of the ANC, nominated by the ANC to attend any meetings held inside Rhodesia in connection with this conference, would, while there, be allowed free movement, free speech, and immunity from preventive detention and restriction.

<sup>41</sup> *Sunday Times*, 9 November.