Category Archives: Bedouins

by | December 22, 2016 · 9:31 PM

More on Israel and Its Neighbors, or How Christians Invented Suicide Bombing

Jason Y: So do you think Israel is more hated by its neighbors and people it oppresses than by the neighbors of Apartheid South Africa and the people it oppressed? Possibly the settler colonies run by Europeans had a mix of NAM’s who either liked them or didn’t. Perhaps Israel is unable to win any friends at all among NAM’s.

It’s because of how they act! South Africa, same thing. Look at how they acted.

First of all, about half of Israeli Jews are affectively NAM’s themselves! 50% of the Jewish population of Israel are Mizrachi Jews. These are the Jews of the Arab World. They are pretty much just Arabs who happen to be Jewish. Their culture is Judeo-Islamic as the Ashkenazi culture is Judeo-Christian. They lived around Muslims so long that they become rather Islamicized culturally.

Most of them have become some of the most fanatical Israelis of them all, but that’s another story, and they’re not all like that. They are caught between two worlds. They really are just Arabs who practice a different religion like Arab Christians. They have  IQ’s to match. Their IQ’s are ~90. Apparently they never went through the brutal selection for intelligence that occurred under Talmudic Ashkenazi Jews from 1000-1800. High Jewish IQ is the result of a direct selection for intelligence. However, now most of them ferociously deny being Arabs to the point where if you call a Mizrachi Jew an Arab, you might get punched.

There are not many non-Jews over there who liked Israel. There are practically no Arabs who like them. No Iranians like them. Even Turks and Greeks hate them, and they are not even in the neighborhood.

The Israelis are bullies. Have you ever noticed what happens when bullies bully lots of victims for long periods of time leaving the victims with no way whatsoever to fight back? The amount of absolutely insane and frequently homicidal rage that builds up in victims that are not allowed to fight back is terrifying. This is what is going on with the Arabs and Israel.

There some Israeli Druze who fight in the Israeli Army. Why the Israeli Druze support Israel, I have no idea because the Syrian, Lebanese and Golan Druze hate them with insane fervor. And Druze are so weird that if you ask me, they’re not even Muslims. That religion is completely outside of Islam for all intents and purposes, and Druze are very secular people.

Many Israeli Bedouins have sided with Israel for some crazy reason even though the Israelis treat them horrifically.

The Maronites in Lebanon have long been Israeli allies for complex reasons. For one, they hate Arabs with a passion, especially Muslim Arabs, and they insist that they are not Arabs, even though they are. They say they are “Phoenicians.” It’s bull.

The Gamalist Maronites are the people who first brought fascism to Lebanon. I mean the real deal. The ancestors of the present day leaders were open Nazi sympathizers. One had Nazi flags in his locker at school. I suppose they hate Arabs and Muslims and Israelis do too, so there’s your alliance. For many years, they served as a proxy army for Israel in Israeli-occupied South Lebanon. Many of them went to Israel after the occupation ended because they were afraid they would be killed as traitors in their own country. Incidentally, this Occupation is what created Hezbollah. That’s right. Hezbollah is Israel’s baby.

Now since then, this group of Maronites still hates Hezbollah, but things have calmed down. In the 1996 Israel-Lebanon War, the Maronites were officially neutral. Mostly they set up checkpoints outside their neighborhoods. They said they were defending them against Hezbollah. After that war had gone on for a while, even the neutral and formerly pro-Israel Gamalist Maronites started getting mad, and they said if they wear did not stop soon, they would take up arms against Israel themselves. They said they would not fight with Hezbollah but instead would fight separately.

A separate group of Maronites, the Aounists, are in an alliance with Hezbollah for some years now. So about half of even the Maronites in Lebanon are allied with Hezbollah!

During that war, the Israeli army went into a Christian village in South Lebanon in the middle of the night. They got about halfway into the village. The Lebanese Army was in the village and knew the Israelis were there but refused to come out and fight. That’s because the Lebanese Army is pretty useless.

The village appeared to be deserted. Every light in town went off when the Israelis came in and the whole place went dead silent. It was rather eerie. The Israelis got halfway inside the village, when out of nowhere the whole village opened fire on them with automatic weapons out of complete darkness. The Israelis rapidly retreated from this village. This village is 100% Greek Orthodox Christians.

There is a party with its own army called SSNP which is pretty much the party and army of the Greek Orthodox Christians in the region. It was SSNP who opened up on the Israelis. The SSNP are some of the most crazed and fanatical Israel-haters of them all, and they’re all Christians! During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, we saw mass suicide bombings for the first time. For some time, almost all of these suicide bombings were the work of SSNP fighters, often women. So you see that the suicide bombing phenomenon was largely started by Christians! If you want to know why the SSNP hate Israel so much, it’s because they are some of the craziest Arab nationalists of them all.

Israeli officers work alongside Turkish, US, British, Saudi, and Qatari officers inside Syria alongside Saudi, Qatari, US, British and Jordanian officers in Jordan to help the Syrian rebels. One of the main groups that those officers are helping in Jordan and Syria is Al Qaeda.

That’s one of the reasons Arabs on the street often hate the Saudi, Qatari, and Jordanian governments – they work with the Israeli military.

The Israelis and the Saudi Royal Family have long had some crazy alliance. I have no idea what it’s all about.

The Israelis and Jordan have some sort of an alliance.

Egyptian and Israeli officers work together in the Sinai at the Gaza border. That’s one reason a lot of people hate Sisi. His army works with the Israeli military.

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Filed under Africa, Arab Nationalism, Arabs, Bedouins, Christianity, Culture, Druze, Egypt, Israel, Israel-Palestine Conflict, Jews, Jordan, Judaism, Lebanon, Middle East, Nationalism, North Africa, Orthodox, Political Science, Politics, Race/Ethnicity, Regional, Religion, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Terrorism, War

by | June 10, 2016 · 11:27 PM

An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance Part 7 – Regional Tendencies

I have decided to publish my most recent work, An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, on my blog. Previously, this piece was used for the research for An Insiders Look at the Iraqi Resistance, a major piece that appeared on the Islamist website Jihadunspun.com (JUS got the copyright, but I did the research). That long-running top-billed piece is now down, but it is still archived on Alexa here. Note that this material is copyrighted, and all reproduction for profit is forbidden under copyright laws.

For information about reprinting or purchasing one-time rights to this work, email me. This article is an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi resistance and is continuously being revised. It is presently 58 pages long in total. It lists all known Iraqi resistance groups who have ever fought in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad to 2004 and includes a brief description and analysis of each group. There are separate sections covering Size, Tendencies, Motivations, Structure, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Fighters, Regional Characteristics, Regions, Cities or Towns Controlled by the Resistance, Major Attacks and List of Groups by Tendency.

The article was intended to be a political science-type analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, and I tried not to take sides one way or the other. I used a tremendous amount of source material, mostly publicly available news reports from the Internet. Obviously, in an area like this you are dealing with a ton of disinformation along with the real deal, so I spent a lot of time trying to sort out the disinfo from the relative truth.

The problem is that one cannot simply discount sources of information such as Israeli and US intelligence, US military reports, reporting from the resistance itself, Islamist websites, etc. Of course these sources are loaded with disinfo and false analysis, but they also tend to have a lot of truth mixed in as well. In writing a piece like this, you pull together all the sources and get rather “Gestalt” view of the situation. When you examine all the sources at once in toto, you can somewhat sort out the disinfo from the more factual material. Admittedly it’s a hit or miss game, but that’s about as good as we can do source-wise in the inherently hazy subject area of an underground guerrilla war.

Interviews with resistance cadre by the mainstream Western media were given particular prominence in this piece.

REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

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Ramadi, Khaldiya and Habbaniyah west to Husaybah on the Syrian border in Al Anbar Province: Much of Iraqi resistance around Ramadi and the part of Anbar Province west of Ramadi (Hadithah, Hit, Husaybah) is coming from Sunni tribes, often nationalist and Islamist; many are either not fighting for Saddam or are openly anti-Saddam. Almost 100% support in the towns of Ramadi, Husaybah, Rawah and Khaldiya. There are some pro-Saddam elements in this region, especially around Ramadi, Khaldiya and Husaybah. Some Ramadi cells cooperate with other cells in Baghdad.

Anti-Saddam nationalists dominate in Ramadi, Khaldiya and Habbaniyah. A number of suspected Islamist guerrilas were arrested in Rawah. Many police in Ramadi support the resistance and most of Husaybah’s police have refused to show up for work since the local police chief was assassinated in 10-03. In 12-03, Ramadi’s police were also refusing to show up for work. Ramadi police sometimes refuse to assist US soldiers who are being attacked by guerrilas. By 1-04, the cities of Husaybah, Ramadi, Khaldiya and Rawah had gone completely over to the resistance. MA is quite prominent in Ramadi – they may have had up to 1,000 fighters in there in 12-03.

Major General Charles Swannack, in charge of Anbar Province, said that 90% of the attacks in Anbar Province are Saddam loyalists or “Wahhabis” (apparently US military propaganda for Iraqi Islamists) and 10% are foreign fighters. His estimates would appear to be incorrect, and Swannack is an unreliable witness anyway. Ramadi is now one of the hubs of the foreign fighter network in Iraq. After foreign fighters are smuggled across Iraq’s border, they are often transported first to Ramadi. Ramadi, Khaldiya, Habbaniyah and Husaybah are extraordinarily hostile towns and some of the hottest war zones in Iraq.
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Fallujah Area: Iraqi resistance in Fallujah is tribal and Islamist, often with links to the Muslim Brotherhood. There are both former Baathists and Islamists present in the resistance but all are led by sheikhs. There are a very high percentage of former Iraqi military amongst the guerrilas here. Islamists dominate. 80% support in town. Numerous resistance groups of variable ideology are based in town. The Fallujah resistance cooperates with the resistance in Mosul and Baghdad at the very least. There have definitely been some foreign fighters active here, but the number does not appear to be very large.

Only about 50% the population ever supported Saddam even when he was in power, and Baathists were never popular in town. Consequently, the majority of the resistance in Fallujah is either not fighting for Saddam or openly anti-Saddam. On the other hand, there is indeed a large pro-Saddam contingent here. The local police are almost all sympathetic to the resistance and often refuse to help US troops search for or fight guerrilas. General Swannack, who is in charge of Fallujah, has estimated total guerrila strength, as of 11-03, in Fallujah alone at anywhere from 1,000-20,000, but Swannack is not a very reliable witness.

Swannack’s former figure seemed to include actual combatants while the latter figure seemed to include active collaborators. 20,000 active guerrilas in Fallujah alone is not an unreasonable estimate at all. By 12-03, Fallujah was essentially in the hands of the resistance. The US had withdrawn to fortified bases outside of town and rarely entered the town proper. By that time, Fallujah was considered the most dangerous town in Iraq and most Westerners were steering clear of the area.

After Saddam’s capture, Fallujah was in open rebellion and most local government buildings were destroyed. guerrilas appeared openly on the streets without their masks, carrying their RPG launchers and AK-47’s in plain sight. This sort of brazen openness is rarely seen amongst Iraqi guerrilas and indicates the degree to which the resistance controls the town. It is also a terrible symptom of an entrenched insurgency. The capture of Saddam appeared to split the resistance into pro-Saddam and Islamist factions. Fallujah, along with Ramadi, is one of the hubs of the foreign fighter network in Iraq. After foreign fighters are smuggled across Iraq’s border, they are often transported first to Fallujah.
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Baghdad and surrounding area: Resistance in Baghdad proper is a mixed bag of anti-Saddam nationalists, Sunni Arab tribal Islamists such as MA, Saddam loyalists and foreign fighters. The latter two seem to be responsible for most of the more spectacular attacks. Some of the mortar attacks on CPA headquarters in 11-03 were done by a group of former Baathists who are now anti-Saddam. Some cells in Baghdad communicate with those in Ramadi, Fallujah, Diyala Province and Tikrit. The Sunni Arab neighborhoods of Adhamiyah and Amiriyah are particularly hostile. Adhamiyah has 100% support for the resistance. After Saddam’s capture, wild demonstrations were staged in the Amiriyah and Adhamiyah Districts.

Unmasked armed guerrilas brazenly took part in these violent demos. Whenever guerrilas are able to move about in populated areas, especially cities, in broad daylight, this is typically a symptom of an entrenched insurgency. Police in many Baghdad neighborhoods refuse to investigate or even receive any citizen tips regarding resistance fighters.

These police say fighting the guerrilas is not their job – it is the job of US troops, not them. Yet a substantial number of Baghdad residents do support the Occupation and the puppet US Governing Council and oppose the resistance. Anti-resistance, pro-US, pro-Governing Council forces are probably stronger in Baghdad than anywhere else in Iraq outside the Kurdish Zone.
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Salah-al-Din (Salahuddin) Province south of Balad: The resistance in this area is almost exactly like the resistance in Diyala Province. Pro-Saddam elements are quite prominent around Dujayl although there has been only moderate resistance in town. This area is very mixed Sunni Arab-Shia Arab. The Shia appear to be sitting out the war, although whether they are siding with the US or not is not known.

Many police in Bani Sad support the resistance. The local ICDC in Mashahidah is at least partly infiltrated. Pro-Saddam elements are quite prominent around Tarmiyah, Dujayl and Mashahidah. Around Mashahida, armed guerrilas have even operated guerrila roadblocks on occasion. The entire area from Taji and Rashidiyah up towards Balad is an extremely hot war zone with continuous attacks.
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Diyala Province: Same as Ramadi/Khaldiya above, but with less pro-Saddam influence. The resistance here is made up of Sunni Arab tribes associated with Saddam’s faith campaign, former Iraqi military, ordinary Iraqis angry about the Occupation, some foreign fighters (often more Arab nationalists than Islamists), and some Saddam Fedayeen, Baath Party members, etc. The resistance here is mostly anti-Saddam. MA is very big in this region and they reportedly have an all-female battalion in this province.

There is a certain amount of Shia resistance (but not much) in Baqubah for some odd reason; a Shia preacher was arrested for storing weapons in his mosque. Many police in Baqubah support the resistance. Pro-Saddam elements are prominent in Baqubah. As of 12-03, the Sunni villages east of Baqubah and the town of Jalula were pretty much controlled by guerrilas. Iraqi Islamist guerrilas have been arrested in Jalula and Baqubah. The nationalist resistance is quite strong here. The area around Baqubah is extremely hot with continuous, often deadly, attacks.

Abu Saidah, a town to the northeast, is the scene of continuous attacks, although it is a Shia town. Most attackers in Abu Saidah are Sunnis who come to Abu Saidah from south of town to attack US troops. US troops arrested an incredible 20,000 men in Baqubah city alone in 12-03 on suspicion of being guerrilas, to give an example of how hot this city is. In 2-04, there were reports that the entire city of Baqubah was now resistance-controlled, even the Shia areas.
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Balad Area: Resistance in Balad area is exclusively Sunni and exists only in the ring of villages surrounding Balad and not Balad city itself. The city of Balad is made up of Shia who are cooperating with the US. The resistance in the Balad area is highly variable, some are pro-Saddam, some are Islamists, some are nationalists, and some are seeking revenge for various acts by US troops; many fighters display some variable mixture of any of these 4 elements. A highly religious Sufi (Sunni) Islamist element is active in the resistance here. The resistance here is not uniform ideologically, and it is very loosely structured. Often fighters will go out on a mission and meet other local fighters who they do not even know.

Fear of arrest has kept the resistance for coalescing much in this area. Almost 100% support in these villages. The Iraqi police are completely infiltrated in these villages, and almost 100% of them are active in the resistance when they are off-duty. By 1-04, US forces considered the Iraqi Police in this area to be unreliable. Soldiers had stopped using the local police for guard duty and soldiers no longer went on joint patrols with local police. In 2-04, a local police chief was in jail in Balad for involvement in the resistance. This area has been thoroughly hostile since Spring 2003 and is one of the hottest war zones in Iraq.

In 9-03, US troops under the control of US Colonel Sassaman, began borrowing heavily from Israeli tactics in the Occupied Territories to use a variety of repressive, mostly illegal, measures against the local population. A number of the villages surrounding Balad, such as Abu Hishma, have been ringed in barbed wire, ID cards have been issued to all residents, onerous curfews have been imposed, and all entry or exit to the villages is through a US or ICDC Army checkpoint.

182 leaders in Abu Hishma have been forced to illegal documents stating that they agree to go to prison on charges of aiding the insurgency if there is even one attack in their zone. By 1-04, the situation had deteriorated further under Sassaman.

Troops had introduced the legally and morally dubious Vietnam-era practice of H & I Fire, or Harassment and Interdiction Fire, whereby US forces simply drop bombs or fire artillery rounds at random towards certain areas, populated or not, thought to be sympathetic to guerrilas. This fire is typically not in response to a particular guerrila attack – it is just random fire and can be launched at any time.

Sassaman’s troops routinely raided offices of the local human rights committees and other locals who were engaging in peaceful protest by criticizing the US Occupation. Critics of the US military in the region were routinely raided and hauled off on (usually false or dubious) terrorism charges, that is, when troops bothered to charge them with anything at all.

During the course of these detentions, arrestees were usually beaten, often badly, and torture of varying degrees was common. Sassaman’s troops routinely smashed up many of the homes they raided, regardless ofwhether the inhabitants were cooperative during the search or not. They had borrowed the Israeli practice of unnecessarily smashing through walls to go from house to house. The upshot of all of this is that the Balad area had been turned into a US military dictatorship under Colonel Sassaman. By 1-04, some parts of this region had been decimated by US arrests, with up to ¼ of the local men in prison as suspected guerrilas.
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Samarra Area: Once again, the resistance here is similar to that in Diyala Province and far southern Salah-al-Din Province. The resistance here is mostly secular, and although many say they are fighting for their religion, that phrase often refers to a more secular version of Islam. The secular grouping includes Baathists, nationalists, and those who want revenge for family members harmed by the US. The Baathists in Samarra tend to be more old-line Arab nationalist Baathists, and many are anti-Saddam. The Islamist faction is active here but definitely in the minority.

Samarra was not treated well by Saddam’s regime, so there are only a few regime supporters amongst the resistance in this area – most of the resistance is either not fighting for Saddam or is actively anti-Saddam. Former Iraqi military, including high-ranking officers, are active in the resistance here. There is 90% support amongst the population. Many Iraqi police here support the resistance, and the police force appears to be at least partly infiltrated. The local ICDC troops cover their faces with bandannas to hide their identities because the town is so pro-resistance. By 11-03, the US had withdrawn from most of its bases in town and only entered Samarra in large armored contingents.

Shia make up a minority in this town, known for its Shia religious shrines. These Shia appear to support the resistance, at least passively, but the full extent of their actual involvement, if any, is not known. Capt. Matthew Cunningham of the 4th Infantry Division estimated in 12-03 that there were 1,500 guerrilas in and around Samarra. By 12-03, Samarra was essentially guerrilla-controlled. Most of the fighters in Samarra were from Muhammad’s Army, which, considering the secular, anti-Saddam and Arab nationalist nature of Samarra, is further evidence against MA being either an Islamist or Saddam loyalist formation.
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Tikrit and surrounding area: Resistance in Tikrit is pro-Saddam, although a few Tikritis are anti-Saddam. There is almost 100% support in town. This strongly pro-Saddam element extends from Tikrit up to Baijii, over to Hawija and down to around Balad. The police force has been at least partly infiltrated with guerrila spies and active guerrilas since 8-03. An on-duty Iraqi police officer who was holed up with guerrilas in a Tikrit home participated in an attack on US troops on 2-8-04 and was killed in the attack.

Iraqi police were suspected of direct involvement after a foiled roadside bomb attack in Tikrit on 2-2-04 in which an on-duty Tikrit fireman was also arrested. The resistance in most of the towns surrounding Tikrit is pretty much the same as in Tikrit. Tikrit has had an absolutely hostile feel about it since 5-03 and is still one of the most hostile cities in Iraq. Despite many media reports after Saddam’s capture about how Tikrit was improving, Tikrit has remained an utterly hostile town.

This fact was illuminated by the stark, brutally frank note a US officer left in 2-04 for troops coming to replace him: “What they have to understand is that most of the people here in Tikrit want us dead, they hate us and everything we stand for and will take any opportunity to cause us harm.”

Strangely, a fair number of the local police force do not appear to sympathize much with the resistance and often actively assist US soldiers. The Tikrit area has been a very active war zone for many months now. Some Tikrit cells communicate with other cells in Baghdad. Awja, Saddam’s hometown outside Tikrit, was surrounded with barbed wire for many months, and all residents were required to have ID cards and go through a checkpoint to enter or leave town.
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Baiji Area: This area has been known to be a stronghold of support for Saddam, and the resistance originally was former regime supporters and foreign fighters. However, by November, there were more and more former Iraqi military joining the fight, and many were not fighting for Saddam. There is 100% support in town. The police will sometimes not even come when the US calls them for assistance, and the townspeople ran the police out of town in a riot recently. Baiji would appear to be pretty much guerrilla-controlled since 10-03.

In 1-04, guerrilas were actually setting up roadblocks in Baiji at night. This is a disastrous sign for the US, since guerrila roadblocks in an insurgency are typically a symptom of a highly entrenched insurgency that is often quite difficult to dislodge. Other signs of an entrenched insurgency are guerrilla uniforms, guerrilla shadow municipal governments, and the presence of armed guerrilas moving about openly in broad daylight in towns and cities.
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Hawija Area: Although this town has a reputation for being a Saddam loyalist stronghold, the resistance here is split between pro-Saddam and anti-Saddam factions. The resistance here is Sunni Arab, often former Iraqi military, Arab nationalist, anti-Kurd, anti-Kuwaiti, and anti-Zionist, with Islamist tendencies. Sunni Arab tribes play a big role in the resistance here. Revenge for acts done to local residents by US forces plays a big role.

The resistance here seems partly motivated by fears of usurpation by resurgent Kurds under US tutelage. Some Saddam loyalists are indeed active in this region. In 10-03, US troops pulled their base out of town due to continuous attacks. By 11-03, Hawija was controlled by guerrilas. Walls were covered with pro-resistance graffiti and the names of guerrila fighters. The mood on the street was fiercely pro-resistance. This town is almost another Fallujah – this area is a very hot war zone. US troops have detained 1,000 men in Hawija as suspected guerrilas.
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Mosul: The resistance in Mosul is similar to Fallujah in that Islamists, often with Muslim Brotherhood links, dominate, although it differs in some ways. The Mosul resistance differs from that in Fallujah in that Mosul has a greater proportion of pro-Saddam elements. Also, support for the resistance is much less than 100% of Mosul, though they do have a lot of support there, especially in Sunni Arab West Mosul, where the support level is very high. The Kurds and Assyrian Christians in Mosul appear to mostly be siding with the US. The only exception is the tiny number of Kurds associated with the dregs of Ansar al Islam (AI) who have been arrested here.

There is a significant pro-Saddam element in Mosul and a very significant component of former Iraqi military, especially officers. The Baath Party was also very big here – 60% of people in town were members. Back in 4-03, when Baghdad fell, the local resistance was made up of Baathists and Islamists, both under the control of the local religious leadership. Lately the structure and leadership of the Mosul resistance is more uncertain.

In 9-03, meetings were held between the Islamist resistance of Fallujah and Mosul and Palestinian Hamas leaders in Jordan to learn new tactics – possibly suicide bombings.

The resistance in Mosul may be quite large. Local Iraqis claim there may be up to ~20,000 or more guerrilas in Mosul alone. US officers in Mosul were claiming in 2-04 that AAI provides transportation, targets and explosives expertise to both foreign fighters and Iraqi guerrilas in Mosul. The same officers claimed that Al Qaeda was one of the main groups responsible for running foreign fighters across the borders into Iraq.
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Ninewa Province north, south and west of Mosul to the Syrian border: Resistance in this area is more active than one may think, but it is pretty hard to characterize. Right around Mosul, it may look like the Mosul resistance, but we are not sure. Over towards the Syrian border, there are a lot of Bedouin Arab tribes who appear to be active in the resistance, but their role is hard to characterize. There is considerable Kurd-Sunni Arab conflict in certain parts of Ninewa, especially in towns like Sinjar by the Syrian border.

Most of the fighters would appear to be local Sunni Arabs. Some of the guerrilas in this area are just local Sunni Arab farmers upset at the US for various slights. The Kurdish areas in Ninewa have seen little resistance, but a handful of the remainders of AAI have been captured in the area. The resistance in Tal Afar is interesting in that this is a town dominated by Shia Turkmen yet has seen considerable resistance. The makeup of the resistance in Tal Afar is presently unknown.
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Kirkuk Area and Tammim Province: Resistance in the Kirkuk area and Tammim Province in general is quite active yet very hard to characterize at the moment, except that it is probably dominated by Sunni Arabs. It may resemble the resistance in the Baiji/Hawija area, but we are not yet sure. Resistance is confined to the Sunni Arab parts of Tammim; the Kurdish area remains very calm.

Hawija is dealt with in a separate entry. The area of Tammim along the highway from Tikrit to Kirkuk, though it has seen few attacks, is utterly hostile. The police force in Kirkuk is partly infiltrated. The Kurds in Kirkuk itself are generally pro-US, with the exception of 25 Kurdish Islamists who were arrested in Kirkuk in 12-03 and charged with being connected with the dregs of AAI.

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Upper South: Resistance south of Baghdad down to around Karbala and Hilla (a mixed Kurd/Sunni Arab/Shia Arab region, becoming more Shia towards Karbala) is difficult to characterize, except that it is reportedly made up of the same actors as elsewhere. Locals claim that Sunni Arab Islamists are playing a large role in attacks around Hilla and Hawsa. There have been a considerable number of attacks in this zone for months now. Pro-Saddam elements do not appear to be very active in this area.

Latifiyah is dealt with in a separate entry. Although there is not yet any direct evidence that the Shia in this zone have joined the resistance in any significant numbers, there is suggestive evidence for their involvement. The police force in Karbala is now at least somewhat infiltrated. By 1-04, the area in a radius around Mahumiyah and especially Iskandariyah had once again become very hot, with daily attacks, sometimes deadly. Mahmudiyah is a mixed Kurd/Sunni Arab/Shia Arab town that has been very hostile, off and on, since 8-03.

Iskandariyah is a majority-Shia mixed Sunni-Shia town where Sunni and Shia live side by side with few apparent problems. Support for the resistance in Iskandariyah is very high, maybe 80%, equally split amongst both groups. Both Sunni and Shia take great pride in the resistance attacks; the implication of this pride is that the Iskandariyah resistance is largely local and that the local Shia are also involved. By early 2004, Iskandariyah was controlled by the resistance.

Yusufiyah is an extremely hot zone, with continuous attacks against US targets in this heavily Shia town. The implication here, not yet proven, is that in Yusufiyah, the Shia are heavily involved in the resistance. The US military estimates an incredible 4-5,000 guerrilas are active around Yusufiyah alone.
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Latifiyah: The mixed Sunni/Shia Arab farming town of Latifiyah in the Upper South is particularly hostile – seven Spanish intelligence officers were shot dead in an attack by Ansar Al Sunna here in 11-03, and the local police drove by the scene of the attack and would not even stop to help. Afterwards, crowds came out, and some cheered while others danced on the bodies. The resistance here is generally not fighting for Saddam and is driven by the privations locals have suffered under the US occupation. There is also a pocket of Sunni Islamists, which is possibly how Ansar Al Sunna was able to pull off this attack. Still, there do appear to be some pro-Saddam elements in the town. In 1-04, two Iraqis working for CNN were shot dead in an attack on their SUV convoy near Latifiyah.

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The South, from the Karbala-Hilla Area south to the border: The resistance in the main Shia South south of the Karbala-Hilla Area, is very poorly known. The only resistance fighter arrested here with a known agenda was a Saddam loyalist former intelligence officer who had been involved in anti-Shia purges in 91.

Clearly, if men like him are leading the resistance in the South, they cannot expect much sympathy from the local Shia. This man’s cell had been involved in attacks in Nasariyah. There are reports that Iranian-backed groups or even Iranian fighters themselves, infiltrated the area in Spring 2003 and have been stockpiling weapons ever since. However, Shia Islamists, Iranian or not, have been involved in only a few attacks in this region.

Mostly, these Shia seem to be stockpiling weapons and biding their time. The major car bombing of the Italian forces at Nasariyah was done by an unknown cell from Fallujah, possibly Saddam loyalists and/or foreign fighters. The situation in Basra is dealt with in a separate entry. A few of the attacks in the Shia Marsh Arab region are matters of simple revenge for affronts to tribal and cultural dignity, especially for intrusive searches involving dogs. Certainly there are near-daily attacks in this area, and the resistance is more active than usually reported. However, the number of attacks here is far, far lower than in most the Sunni Arab-dominated regions above.

Thus far, there is no evidence that the Shia in this region have taken up arms in any significant numbers. In 9-03, about 15% of the Shia in Karbala supported the idea of taking up arms, but most of them seemed to be waiting for the go-ahead from their religious leaders, which may never be forthcoming.

Karbala has seen many attacks, including one massive simultaneous car bombing, but in general the attackers are unknown. Local leaders claim they are the work of Sunni Islamists. The massive simultaneous car bombing on 12-27-03 in Karbala was conducted by three cells, probably all Sunni Iraqis, two cells from Baghdad and one from Ramadi. At least one cell was made up of Sunni Saddam loyalists from Adhamiyah in Baghdad.
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Basra: Resistance down around Basra is significant but poorly known. Local Shia leaders allege that it is made up Sunni Baathists, and at least one high-ranking Saddam loyalist former intelligence officer has been arrested. He was involved in purges of Shia after the 1991 Shia Uprising. A few foreign fighters are present – a Syrian woman was suspected in a plot to bomb the harbor in 11/03. Basra was quite hostile as of 12-03 and had the feel of a war zone. There was shooting every day. Almost none of the Shia locals appear to be happy about the Occupation, though many say it is better than Saddam. There is no evidence that Shia have joined the resistance here in any significant numbers.

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by | June 10, 2016 · 10:23 PM

An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance Part 4 – Foreign Assistance

I have decided to publish my most recent work, An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, on my blog. Previously, this piece was used for the research for “An Insiders Look at the Iraqi Resistance” a major piece that appeared on the Islamist website Jihadunspun.com (JUS got the copyright but I did the research). That long-running top-billed piece is now down, but it is still archived on Alexa here . Note that this material is copyrighted and all reproduction for profit is forbidden under copyright laws.

For information about reprinting or purchasing one-time rights to this work, email me. This article is an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi resistance and is continuously being revised. It is presently 58 pages long in total. It lists all known Iraqi resistance groups who have ever fought in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad until 2005 and includes a brief description and analysis of each group. There are separate sections covering Size, Tendencies, Motivations, Structure, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Fighters, Regional Characteristics, Regions, Cities or Towns Controlled by the Resistance, Major Attacks and List of Groups by Tendency.

The article was intended to be a political science-type analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, and I tried not to take sides one way or the other. I used a tremendous amount of source material, mostly publicly available news reports from the Internet. Obviously, in an area like this you are dealing with a ton of disinformation along with the real deal, so I spent a lot of time trying to sort out the disinfo from the relative truth.

The problem is that one cannot simply discount sources of information such as Israeli and US intelligence, US military reports, reporting from the resistance itself, Islamist websites, etc. Of course these sources are loaded with disinfo and false analysis, but they also tend to have a lot of truth mixed in as well. In writing a piece like this, you pull together all the sources and get sort of a “Gestalt” view of the situation. When you examine all the sources at once in toto, you can kind of sort out the disinfo from the more factual material. Admittedly it’s a hit or miss game, but that’s about as good as we can do source-wise in the inherently hazy subject area of an underground guerrilla war.

Interviews with resistance cadre by the mainstream Western media were given particular prominence in this piece.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Syria: Although US propaganda has made much of the Syrian connection to the Iraqi insurgency, there does appear to be some truth there. Various Iraqi guerrilla groups have claimed that they get assistance, in one way or another, from Syria. MA claims they get money from Syria. Whether he meant the Syrian state or non-state actors in Syria is not known. The Martyr Khattab Brigade of foreign fighters claims to have a training camp in Syria. A cell in Baghdad claimed that Syrian intelligence operates in Iraq, but was unclear on their exact role.

Another group in Baghdad said they got weapons from Syria. They did not specify whether the weapons came from the state or non-state actors. Apparently, fighters and weapons are still able to cross various borders, including the Syrian border, into Iraq to help the insurgency. For a long time, the Syrians were not only doing little to stop the cross-border traffic in fighters and money into Iraq, most of which was being run by local Bedouin tribesmen, but they were possibly even helping these Bedouins run the traffic. More recently, the official support from the Syrian regime seems to have been dramatically reduced or even ended, but the Syrian hands-off attitude is little changed.

The official Syrian security presence at the border has been beefed up and makes some cursory efforts at stopping traffic, but reports indicate that they are easily bribed into looking the other way. The Syrian state does not seem to be actively involved in the cross-traffic anymore, but they do not appear to be doing much to stop it either. There seems to be a “look the other way” attitude in place instead. Fighters, weapons and money come from Syria, but it the available evidence suggests non-Syrian state actors (possibly the local Bedouin tribes or the insurgent groups themselves), not Syrian state actors, who are running the weapons and men across.

In 1-04, reports indicated that much of Syria’s northeast border area with Iraq had become something of an open-air arms market. The arms traffic was going across the Ninewa Province border with few difficulties. In addition to guerrilas, pro-Coalition Kurdish forces in northern Iraq such as the PUK were amongst the customers. As of 2-04, guerrilas in Baghdad continued to report significant quantities of weaponry being smuggled over the Syrian border and into Baghdad.

There have been numerous reports of Syrian fighters fighting in Iraq long after the fall of Baghdad. They seem to be especially notable around the Fallujah-Amiriyah-Ramadi region and over by the Qaim-Husaybah border region. guerrilas in the Qaim area reported in late 2003 that there were a significant number of Syrians fighting in the insurgency there. In December 2003, a Syrian woman was arrested in Basra with bomb parts as part of a conspiracy to bomb the port there.

Most recently, in 5-04, an AP reporter encountered a force of hardline Syrian jihadis in the Jolan District of Fallujah after the US withdrawal. They were extremely hardline Sunni Islamists reminiscent of the most hardline Syrian Muslim Brotherhood elements. In late 2003, guerrilas reported that Syrian students in Baghdad seemed to have suspiciously large amounts of cash on them, and that a number of these students, along with other foreign students similarly awash with suspicious cash, were supporting the insurgency financially. No one seemed to know where the Syrian students’ cash came from, or that of the other foreign students, for that matter.

So far, ~200 Syrians have been arrested so far on charges of insurgency in Iraq. Clearly, Syrians and other foreign fighters are fighting in Iraq. I estimate the size of this group as no more than 3-5% of the total insurgency. Clearly, men and weapons come over the Jordanian, Syrian, Kuwaiti, Saudi and Iranian borders into Iraq. At the moment, there is little to implicate the Syrian state in this traffic other than that they do not seem to be doing a lot to stop the traffic. One may indeed argue, why should they? A strong case could be made that this is a US problem. Policing the Iraq-Syria border for unwanted traffic is the responsibility of the US.

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by | November 7, 2015 · 2:09 AM

Salafi Jihadism: Part 1

Original here. This essay is very well-done, the best I have ever read on the subject.

This is the first of a two-part post on Salafi jihadism. Part 1 is intended to provide a definition of jihad, a look at the history of Salafism/Wahhabism, their similarities and differences and how they spread in the end of the 20th century.

Also before anyone thinks I’m targeting Salafis for an agenda, I intend to cover jihadism in each segment of Islam. I simply chose to begin with Salafi jihadism due to its greater relevance and attention in the world today.

Definition of Jihad: The Arabic word Jihad is derived from the verb Jahada – meaning to strive or struggle. In Islamic terminology it means to make an effort, to endeavor and to strive for a noble cause. The word is generally used to describe any type of striving in the cause of Allah (God). According to Islamic teachings there are three main types of Jihad as explained below:

i) Jihad-e-Akbar, i.e jihad of the highest order. This is the jihad (struggle) for self-reformation. The struggle is against our own temptations such as greed, lust and other worldly temptations. This type of jihad is obligatory on every Muslim throughout his life.

ii) Jihad-e-Kabir, i.e major jihad. This is the jihad of propagation of the truth, the message of Qur’an. The Qur’an also instructs us to spread this message with wisdom, tolerance and respect to others and their beliefs and prohibits the use of any coercion or force. According to the Qur’an anyone who devotes his time, effort, wealth or knowledge to the cause of righteousness is practicing Jihad-e-Kabir. This is also obligatory on all Muslims.

iii) Jihad-e-Asghar, i.e jihad of the lower order. This is the jihad of a defensive battle. The Qur’an has clearly restricted this type of jihad to certain conditions while forbidding transgression of any sort. The conflict must of a defensive nature for the Muslim community, Muslims must have been prevented from freely practicing their religion and beliefs, and they must have been driven from their homes.

Another requirement for the declaration of this type of jihad is the existence of an Islamic State and a Muslim leader to declare it; without this condition, Muslims are allowed to defend themselves in case of being attacked or persecuted but not to declare and prosecute an official jihad. Once a jihad has been declared, the Muslim army is bound by a set of regulations to observe while on campaign, some of which are listed here.[1][2]

It is critical to understand that the aim of jihad is not the conversion of non-Muslim populations. Most scholars agree upon the concept of jihad being a defensive measure; some modern Islamic revivalists such as Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam argued for the use of jihad as an offensive measure but for the expansion of Muslim territory and Islamic ideals rather than the religious conversion of the local peoples, forced or otherwise, to Islam. As a result, jihad is similar to the Christian concept of a crusade but differs in this critical matter among others. However, jihad is a hotly debated topic in jurisprudence, and a look at the opinions of various scholars can be found here.[3]

History of Salafism/Wahhabism: Salafism is a conservative, orthodox movement within Sunni Islam that seeks to return the practice of Islam to its fundamentals. As such, it emphasizes emulation of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the Salaf as Saliheen (Pious Predecessors) which comprise the first three generations of Muslims (Companions, Successors and Successors of the Successors), and it rejects any rituals or beliefs not practiced by them; as a result, they are against any innovations, or bidah.

In legal jurisprudence, Salafis are divided among those that remain faithful to the four Sunni maddhabs (schools of law) and those that reject them in favour of ijtihad (independent legal judgement).

In terms of politics, Salafis are generally divided into three categories.

The largest category consists of the quietists, those who believe in remaining indifferent to politics and repression in favour of being closer to God.

The next largest category is the activists, that comprises those who participate in politics to advocate for Islamist agendas and religious legislation.

The smallest category by far is the jihadists, which are the most well known category worldwide but are a tiny minority.

The central tenets of Salafism have existed since the earlier days of Islam, with scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah referring to and emphasizing adherence to the model of the Salaf. However, Salafism did not spread widely until the 18th century when Muhammad Abdul Wahhab started preaching in the Najd area of Arabia. Abdul Wahhab believed that the practices of the society around him, including venerating the tombs of the Companions, or making invocations to holy men, were similar to the practices during the pre-Islamic Jahiliya (Age of Ignorance).

Thus, he wished to return to a more puritan and conservative form of Islam free of any supposed innovations or bidah and similar to how he believed Islam was practiced in its earliest days. He also believed that those who professed themselves to be Muslim but participated in bidah were beyond the pale of Islam. He began preaching in the town of Unayna, but his actions and ideals were unpopular with the nobility of the era, with Abdul Wahhab being expelled from his town due to pressure applied by a powerful chief, Sulaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Ghurayr.

However, he managed to find refuge with the ruler of the town of Diriyah, Muhammad ibn Saud. In 1744, they formed a pact whereby ibn Saud would protect and propagate the doctrines espoused by Abdul Wahhab by military action, while the latter would religiously legitimize the former’s military conquests and allow the imposition of Islamic taxation, which would net the Al Sauds more income than at the current rates.

Hence began a period of conquest over multiple generations that expanded the Al Sauds’ holdings to much of Arabia, created the First Saudi State and the propagation of Abdul Wahhab’s teachings, pejoratively termed Wahhabism by its critics, outside of Najd. This is also where Abdul Wahhab broke with traditional Salafist thinking; unlike traditional Salafists, Abdul Wahhab was willing to use force and coercion to spread his teachings and was willing to participate in politics and political agreements to achieve that goal.

Scholars are disputed over the degree of brutality sanctioned by Abdul Wahhab, but it is clear that in successive generations, the Wahhabis have become more and more radical, ultimately adopting ibn Taymiyyah’s ideas of takfir (excommunication); this allowed them to brand Muslims living in violation of Islamic law to be non-Muslims and thus justified their fighting against other Muslims. They also adopted a ‘convert or die’ approach to their enemies.

This increasing ruthlessness was the cause of the Al Saud’s downfall. In 1802, the Wahhabis attacked Karbala, slaughtering much of the population and desecrating the shrine of Imam Hussain, and launched a similar assault on Taif in 1803, slaughtering the male population and enslaving women and children.

Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire, which controlled Arabia at the time, had enough and dispatched an army in 1818 that destroyed the First Saudi State, killing the Al Saud ruler, razing Diriyah and doing their best to stamp out both the House of Saud and the Wahhabi movement. However, the remoteness of the Najd prevented either from happening, and a Second Saudi State resulted in that region; consequently, by the end of the 19th century, most of the townspeople in the area were Wahhabis.

Many of the new members were former Bedouins who abandoned nomadic life for settlements on the insistence of Wahhabi religious scholars who declared that a nomadic lifestyle was incompatible with Islam. The newly settled Bedouins served well as soldiers for the Wahhabi religious leaders.

Although alive, Wahhabism remained mostly confined to the Najd till the end of the First World War. During the war, the reigning head of the Al Saud family, Abdulaziz ibn Saud, aided the Allies by revolting against the Ottomans. Although his campaign to rule Arabia had begun in 1901, he was unable to assert his authority over Hijaz until 1923, when the British removed their support for the Sharifs of Makkah.

In 1927, Abdulaziz signed a treaty with the British, who recognized his independence from the former Ottoman territories in exchange for letting go of Transjordan, Iraq, Kuwait and other British protectorates. However, Abdulaziz faced an internal rebellion among his troops. During his campaigns, he made use of the Ikhwan, a militia of radical Wahhabi Bedouin warriors. When he signed the treaty with the British, the Ikhwan refused to obey and raided Transjordan.

Unwilling to risk British ire, Abdulaziz fought the Ikhwan and defeated them in 1929 with British support. The survivors of the Ikhwan were then organized in various militias which would later form the core of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Although defeated, the Ikhwan left their mark on Arabian society by uprooting the old cultural norms and supplanting them with radical Wahhabi ideology as part of their campaign on behalf of the Al Sauds.

In addition, Wahhabi ideology spread to the cities of Makkah and Madinah and gained control of the religious apparatus in the land. Although the Wahhabi religious establishment was given much latitude with respect to religious observance and teaching, in many cases Abdulaziz overruled the ulema, allowing the driving of automobiles and the attendance of Shia pilgrims at the annual Hajj. In addition, most of Abdulaziz’s consolidation of power and dealings with Western powers kept him at odds with the ulema.

Although Salafism/Wahhabism inspired offshoots such as the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deoband movements in South Asia, the reach of these two ideologies was quite low during most of the 20th century. Even within Saudi Arabia, the implementation of Islamic law was relatively relaxed compared to today.

This changed in 1979, when two things happened. First the Iranian Revolution occurred, toppling the Shah there and sending shockwaves through the monarchies in the region. Second, the Grand Mosque in Makkah was taken over by Islamic extremists who called for the stricter implementation of Islamic doctrines and the fall of the Al Saud family.

In the aftermath of these events, the Saudi government became stricter in religious matters. Due to the huge increase in oil income since the 1973 oil crisis, the government had lavished funding on religious literature, scholarships and hundreds of new Islamic schools, universities and mosques. In order to counter any threat of an Iranian-style revolution by the Shia population of the country and to satisfy disgruntled conservative clerics, this funding was further increased.

The beginning of the Afghan War provided an opportunity to export troublesome clerics to Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries. This achieved two aims; first, it allowed the Sauds to embed a Wahhabi religious establishment of their choice, and secondly, the export of Wahhabi ideology served as a bulwark against the revolutionary doctrines that Iran was beginning to propagate in the Middle East. Since the Afghan War attracted volunteers from all over the Muslim world, almost all of whom spent time in the Saudi-sponsored religious schools, the spread of Salafism was assured.[4]

Due to the financial support that Salafism/Wahhabism enjoys from the Gulf, it has received attention and commands influence disproportionate to its size. There are roughly 50 million Salafists in the world, a tiny fraction of the total Muslim population.[5] Yet, Salafi scholars such as Zakir Naik from India are some of the most recognizable in the Muslim world, having instant name recognition even amongst many non-Salafis.

The Salafi movement is described as the fastest growing Islamic movement in the world, according to a report by the BND, the German domestic intelligence service.[6] This is especially true for regions such as Europe and North America, which have no native Islamic traditions of their own and thus are more susceptible to supplanting than historically Muslim areas.

Although Salafis have historically been peaceful and apolitical, believing in using persuasion rather than force, modern Salafism is often considered indistinguishable from Wahhabism and in many cases, conflict has arisen when Salafis have tried to propagate their doctrines. For instance in Pakistan, there is much animosity between followers of the Deoband movement, inspired by Salafism, and the Barelvi movement, inspired by the Sufi traditions of the subcontinent.

Moreover, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, more and more Salafists are becoming part of the activist category, joining politics to propagate their beliefs. One example of such a movement is the Nour Party in Egypt, which gained a quarter of the seats in the 2011-12 elections.

In normal circumstances, one might consider the engagement of conservative Islamists in democratic politics to be a positive sign; however, the failure of the Arab Spring to bring meaningful change to the lives of people in most of the affected countries has disillusioned many democratic Salafis, many of whom have shifted to the jihadist category of Salafism, thinking military action to be the last feasible route.[7]

Sources:

1 http://islamicfaq.org/jihad/

2 http://www.islamhelpline.net/node/441

3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jihad#Current_usage

4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabism

5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi_movement#cite_note-123

6 http://www.aina.org/news/20120416150547.htm

7 http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21656189-islams-most-conservative-adherents-are-finding-politics-hard-it-beats

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by | September 8, 2015 · 8:36 PM

Most Caucasian Populations Have Significant Non-Caucasian Elements

I received this comment today. I deleted the comment and banned the poster because he insulted me, but his comments are interesting nonetheless. His position is that most Caucasian populations are significantly admixed with non-Caucasian, and I am afraid he is right. There are probably few if any pure Whites or pure Caucasians.

The guy appears to be some sort of a Hindu nationalist type and he seems to be making a big deal out of the fact that Indians are mostly White, especially high caste ones of which he seems to be a part. He is quite offended by the idea that Indians are part-Australoid, but that is how they show up on some charts.

He says the Australoid component is more similiar to SE Asians such as Thai people. However, this Asian component also looks something like the Asian part of the Ancient Northeast Asian group. The Asian part of the ANE’s has been called different things, but to me they look Ainuid. So the Asian part of Indians looks like Ainuids/Thais. I think he may really be onto something here. It is a good hypothesis.

He is just wrong about some things below. ANE did not originate in Amerindians (How did that happen? Did it move back from the Americas to Asia?); instead, Amerindians are obviously partly derived from ANE from Northeast Asia itself. The Karitiana of Brazil have the highest ANE ever found. They may be the remains of some of the earliest settlers to the Americans.

The Chukchi are probably also heavily ANE somehow because these very Asian-looking Eskimo like people actually plot Caucasian on some charts! So in Far Northeastern Asia, early Caucasoids and early Asians have been mixing it up for some time. He also notes that Berbers have a lot of Black blood. This is correct. In fact, on some charts, Berbers plot outside of Caucasian altogether and end up slightly into the the Black or African quadrant.

He also says that Ashkenazi Jews have a lot of Asian and Black in them. Asian maybe (ancient Asian). Black, no way. I have seen charts showing that Ashkenazi Jews and other people of the Caucasus have the least amount of Black of any White group on Earth. How hilarious for Stormfronters that Jews are the most pure of all the Whites. Australoids are absolutely not archaic Whites or archaic Caucasians.

This is an interesting blog. What I’d like to point out, however, is that there is quite a bit of misinformation regarding the genetic makeup/ancestry of races and ethnic groups/castes found in India on this blog. I noticed you implied in some of your posts here that Indians are hybrid population between two groups, one most similar to present-day non-White Caucasoids, and one most similar to Australian Aboriginals.

Let me explain what the genetic/latest research has actually shown, as far as India’s demographics and the genetic composition of its castes is concerned. What follows is a detailed explanation of South Asian genetics and therefore, I must warn you, it is a long wall of text but completely accurate and supported by the latest research, despite containing a lot of jargon that may give you a headache. Bear with me here.

Indians are composed of two composite groups: ANI or the Ancestral North Indians, a group which itself is a composite of two or more different Caucasoid populations, that are on average, closest to present-day Georgians in genetic makeup, and ASI, or the Ancestral South Indians, a group which is also a composite of two or more different populations, at least half of which is Caucasoid in nature, with the other half varying in composition from one ethnic group to another.

In other words, while ANI is completely Caucasoid in nature, ASI is 50-60% Caucasoid in nature depending on the caste in question, and the remainder of ASI ancestry is either composed of Mongoloid, proto-Mongoloid, proto-Caucasoid or in exceptionally rare, isolated cases like the Paniya tribe of South India, of proto-Australoid-like ancestry which still isn’t the same as having Australoid ancestry. Keep in mind that Australoids themselves are at least 80% Mongoloid in genetic makeup and are considered to be archaic Whites themselves.

They are also the furthest group genetically on Earth, from the Negroids/Congoids/Bantuids of Sub-Saharan Africa. So, apart from a minority of untouchables of South India and parts of East India who are not even a part of the caste system to begin with, no other group in South Asia has any proto-Australoid-like admixture to speak of. And Indians are predominantly Caucasoid and group with other Caucasoids according to every genetic test/anthropometric study since the dawn of time. More information here.

It is crucial to remember that Indians have nothing to do with Australoids – those people are completely different apart from a very few isolated tribes in India that have real proto-Australoid-like admixture due to their status and extreme isolation. And this admixture has nothing to do with ASI admixture – ASI is just like the paleolithic ANE influence in Europeans, and half of it is Caucasian (at least half, if not more, it varies for different people in India) and it is a composite just like ANI is with different components for different people/castes in India.

The Reich et al paper even pointed out that the Onge were at best a poor proxy to get something without ANI admixture and little ASI admixture, and even then, it was a worse proxy than the Han Chinese. In other words, East Asians were a better proxy than the Onge themselves.

The reason they picked the Onge as a (poor) proxy was because they were the only group they could find in that region without ANI admixture and because they are such an old population that has been isolated and separated from mainland populations for a very long period of time. They also have very few individuals left, so owing to the problems of genetic drift, they assume ownership of a component, and the admixture program tries to force the Onge component in an admixture model of South Asians.

In more recent papers, this has been clarified further and it has been stated that they were simply making a poor guess when using the Onge as a proxy in the model.

Furthermore, to illustrate just how poor of a guess it was, they pointed out that ASI is massively separated from the Onge. In fact, ASI is just as far from the Onge as the Utah Whites (a group of random Euro-descent samples from Utah in the States) are from the Onge, indicating that ASI is as related to Onge as Utah Whites are.

Papuans and Onge have no relation to India at all – the Onge are in SE Asia. Han are a much better proxy. In addition, Indians lack Denisovan admixture and other crucial haplogroups found commonly in the Onge as well.

It must also be said that if Indians are erroneously assumed to have proto-Australoid-like ancestry, so are Europeans.

You might be under the false assumption that Europeans are somehow a “pure” Caucasoid population, when in fact that couldn’t be further from the truth. The latest genetic research conclusively shown that Europeans are all admixed to different degrees between at least four main populations of people: West European Hunter-Gatherer (WHG), Early European Farmer (EEF), Scandinavian Hunter-Gatherer (SHG), and Ancient North Eurasian (ANE).

It has also conclusively shown that all populations of Europeans and other “White” Caucasoids have significant to huge amounts of non-Caucasoid ancestry due to the fact that the ANE/Ancient North Eurasian component is at least 45% East Asian/Mongoloid in ancestry. The ANE component is based on the genome of the infamous Mal’ta boy or MA-1.

In Europe today, it peaks among Estonians at just over 18%, and intriguingly, reaches a similar level among Scots. Finns, Russians and Mordovians also carry very high ANE in addition to very high amounts of much more recent Siberian admixture. What’s even more interesting is that this ANE influence is the very influence found among South Asians, albeit in a slightly different variety known as ASI.

What the aforementioned information means is the following: Indians are not a hybrid population between Caucasoids and Australoids. In reality, the vast majority of Indians are an admixed population between Caucasoids and Mongoloids – except in this case, the Mongoloids are most similar in phenotype and genotype to SE Asians like the Thai.

According to the latest research, the average Indian is at least 75% Caucasian and 25% Asian – these figures have been substantiated by multiple reports including the National Geographic Project’s Geno 2.0 DNA ancestry test samples, the 23andme test samples, and even the Reich et. al paper published in the highly-cited/high impact factor scientific journal Nature.

It has been conclusively proven that South Asians/Indians range from 5-10% Asian to 35% Asian or in other words from 65% Caucasian to 95% Caucasian. The most Caucasian people in the region are from the northwest of the Indian subcontinent, and the least Caucasian people are from the east and south. Only one person broke the magic 35% barrier, and he was a Bangladeshi (38%).

If you’d like a layman’s interpretation of the data in the aforementioned sources, check out this article by Razib Khan, one of the pioneers in the field of population genetics, particularly as it pertains to the archaeogenetics of South Asia as a whole – he writes articles for Discover Magazine, which is a well respected source. He is also a PhD student at UC Davis. Here is a post describing the general findings of genetic research into South Asian populations

In addition to the Reich et. al paper and other landmark papers in this field, the Harappa Ancestry Project, which is helmed by a genetic expert and is working in combination with Reich’s data is also another landmark study into the archaeogenetics of South Asia. It has conclusively proven and further substantiated the results I aforementioned.

According to the samples collected by the project, there is a sharp correlation between caste/location and Caucasian ancestry in India, with the upper castes in all parts of India being significantly more Caucasian than the lower castes, and the North-West Indian/South Asian upper castes being the most Caucasian of all – up to 95%.

All of the Northwest Indian/Pakistani/Nepali/Afghani upper castes are between 5-18% admixed with East Eurasians/Mongoloids; in other words all of them are between 82-95% Caucasian. These castes would include the Rajputs, Jatts, Khatris, Gujjars, Sindhis, Brahmins, Bhumihars, Balochis, Brahuis, and certain upper caste Punjabis, and Pathans. Note that this is only applicable to the upper castes aforementioned that are in the North and North-West of India as well as Pakistan and Nepal.

As for the rest of India (and Bangladesh/Sri Lanka), as I mentioned earlier, the average South Asian is 75% Caucasian and 25% Asian, so a good amount of South Asians are more Caucasian than 75%, and a good amount are less Caucasian.

For instance, the average Tamil (from South India, and well represented in the diaspora in the USA as the “typical Indian” stereotype) is 33-34% non-Caucasian, and the average Bengali/Bangaladeshi is closer to 55-60% Caucasian. The dalits of Tamil Nadu or the lowest caste Tamils (also well represented in the States), are at least 40% non-Caucasian. The lowest castes of India, the Chamars, who are found all over India (also in the States) are also in the 50-60% Caucasian range. Upper caste Indians in the rest of India (apart from the Northwest) tend to be 70-80% Caucasian.

If you’d like to see the data for yourself, here is the link to the spreadsheet.

For reference, the “South Indian” component is 50-60% Caucasian, and the ANE/NE Asian component is 45% non-Caucasian. The SE Asian, Siberian, Papuan, American and Beringian components are all Mongoloid, and the E. African, San, Pygmy and W. African components are all Negroid. Keep in mind that the data here is accurate only for South Asians, other regions are too under-sampled in the project.

Now you might be wondering, if South Asians, particularly the upper castes in the North and Northwest, are between 5-18% admixed, are they alone in this predicament? As I alluded to earlier, they are anything but alone.

Let’s start with Middle Easterners and Northern Africans. Egyptians, Moroccans, Libyans, and other North Africans are on average 15% Black/Negroid admixed. In fact, according to the latest research, the average North African is 15-16% black, and individual countries like Egypt and Tunisia are 18-21% Black on average, so some would be more than 21% black, some less.

The highest admixture is found among Moroccans and Berbers, who can be up to 30% Black/Negroid admixed on average. As far as the Middle East goes, Yemeni people have been shown to be 18-19% black on average, and the Bedouin tribes have been shown to be 16-18% Black on average as well. Qataris are 12-16% Black, and Saudi Arabians range from 14-18% black as well, on average. Jews, particularly the Ashkenazim, have also been shown to be 16.5% admixed with Mongoloid and Black/Negroid on average.

So on average, MENA people are 75-85% Caucasoid and 15-25% Black/Negroid admixed, therefore its safe to say that MENA people are Caucasoid-Negroid hybrids, with some groups being more and others less Negroid. All these figures have been collected by National Geographic and many other researchers.

As far as West Asians/Central Asians are concerned, they show significant amounts of Mongoloid admixture on average.Tajiks have 15% Mongoloid admixture on average, while Turkmen have 16% Mongoloid admixture on average.

However, some groups of Turkmen average 27% Mongoloid, and some are 35-56% Mongoloid. Southern Turkmen on average are only 1/8 to 1/3 Mongoloid or better said 13-31% Mongoloid. However in some parts of Turkmenistan like the northern and eastern parts, the Mongoloid DNA reaches 33-55%. Other parts of Turkmenistan are 33-55% Mongoloid.

Even many Turkish people are 10-20% Mongoloid and 15% Mongoloid on average. Iranians are also Mongoloid admixed – up to 10% on average, with the Azeris of Iran being even more admixed. Tatars are 16% Mongoloid admixed on average.

So, its safe to say that most West Asian groups are a hybrid of Mongoloids and Caucasoids, being on average 80-85% Caucasian and 15-20% Mongoloid, with some groups being much less Caucasian and much more Mongoloid.

Now, lets look at the European data. All non-Sardinian Europeans have been shown to have significant amounts of ANE ancestry due to the Malt’a boy mentioned earlier, and this ANE ancestry is related to/is the same as ASI ancestry in South Asians, relating Europeans to Amerindians and East Asians.

The ANE component is composed of 45% Mongoloid and Australoid-like ancestry (similar to the distant relation that some South Asians have to proto-Australoids), and the Malt’a boy also has a proto-Australoid ASE component on the order of 10%.

This ANE component peaks in the Karitiana Indians of South America

More info about ANE’s relationship to ASI is available at this link which itself references this landmark paper:

It is also pertinent to point out the fact that ANE ancestry in all Europeans with the exception of Sardinians (who have very minor ANE ancestry) is mostly (45-55%) non-Caucasoid in nature, and does not include separate additional East Asian ancestry that is due to much more recent admixture with Mongoloids from the Golden Horde and other admixture events.

ANE or NE Asian is best thought of as very ancient Asian admixture, while the recent admixture is added separately. A recent landmark paper definitively showed a clear signal of admixture in Northern Europe, represented by the ANE/NE Asian component. Here is the link to the paper and here is a link to the layman’s explanation of it.

What this paper definitively shows (as do successive papers recently released after it) is that Europeans, especially Northern Europeans, have huge amounts of NE Asian, also known as ANE, admixture. This is because they are descended in part from an Amerindian population.

What is the actual amount? Well, remember that ANE or NE Asian is made up of two components – one is Caucasian and related to Levantine ancestry and the other is related to NE Asia/Siberians and the American Indians, peaking in the Karitiana Indians of South America.

Therefore, according to the research data in the latest papers, Northern Europeans are 5-18% admixed with Mongoloids, or in other words, Northern Europeans are 5-18% Non-Caucasoid, and the authors pointed out that this is actually a conservative estimate, one that is lower than what the actual value is likely to be – which is purported to be even higher than the 5-18% range, easily crossing over into the 10-20%+ non-Caucasoid range.

Keeping in mind that in the Near East among Lezgins, Chechens and Ossetians, ANE is in the 23-27%+ range. This means that other Eastern Europeans not residing in Northern Europe are also heavily admixed with non-Caucasian ANE ancestry as well. The ANE ancestry is 45% East Asian/Amerindian in composition and 10% SE Asian in ancestry, so 55% non-Caucasian and ANE ancestry ranges from 8-21%+ in almost all Europeans except Sardinians.

A table with ANE scores from a recent paper. Remember how I mentioned earlier that this ANE non-Caucasoid ancestry did not include additional, more recent, non-Caucasoid East Asian ancestry?

Well, lets take a look at that data as well. Russians and Finns are 80-88% Caucasian depending on the person (not including non-Caucasoid ANE admixture which would make them even less Caucasoid) because of much more recent East Asian admixture with the areas with the higher non-Caucasian mixture in the 12-20% range around Leningrad.

Finnish people, according to the latest genetic study, are at least 13-17% East Asian, and Russians, according to the latest genetic study, are 12-18% East Asian. More info here.

Lithuanians and Swedes are at least 10%-20% admixed with recent East/Mongoloid mixture. If we add this recent Mongoloid admixture to the more ancient ANE ancestry in Europeans, we get the following numbers: Russians, Finns and Swedes are 17-30% Mongoloid/Non-Caucasoid and 70-83% Caucasoid. Because of this, Finns have been found to be distinct from other Europeans and don’t cluster as close to them. Russians in the North are much the same way.

Therefore we can sum up the above with the following three sentences:

  • Proto West Eurasians + ANE/ASI-like = Europeans and Latin Americans
  • Proto West Eurasians + ASI/ANE-like = South Asians and Central and West Asians
  • Proto West Eurasians + African = Middle Easterners and Northern Africans

And since everyone in these regions can be as much as 30% non-Caucasoid due to either Mongoloid or Negroid ancestry, (but closer to 20-25% non-Caucasoid), Indians are definitely not alone in being admixed Caucasoids on this planet. They are actually part of the norm, being on average, 75% Caucasian and 25% Asian,

The data clearly shows that Indians are as admixed as other Caucasian groups throughout the world, and in some causes, purer, particularly in the case of the upper caste North and North-West Indians, who are at most 18% admixed or less and thus 82-95% Caucasian.

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by | February 17, 2015 · 11:42 PM

The West Hates Assad Because He Is Against Israel

BBC:

Bashar talked about reform. He seemed to be a break with the past. Western leaders tried to befriend him. Tony Blair considered giving him an honorary knighthood. But stubbornly, President Assad wouldn’t give up his opposition to Israel and his support for its enemies.

Wow amazing. Straight from the horse’s mouth. They came right out and admitted that the reason the West or at the least the UK hates Assad so much is because he opposes Israel and supports its enemies.

Though frankly this last part is nonsense. Assad used to let some of the Palestinian groups have be headquartered in Damascus, but those were just political above-ground offices that did nothing but issue press releases and make posters. I assure that the true core armed wing of the DFLP, PFLP, PFLP-GC and Hamas are not headquartered in Damascus! The true hard core armed wings of these groups are simply right there in Palestine. The leaders are in Palestine too, generally hiding out underground. The real political leadership of Hamas has recently been in the UAE and Qatar and their top leaders like Mashaal have always moved between Qatar, UAE, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen and Iran. So really it is the US allies in the Arab World who are truly harboring the hard core of Hamas. However, most of the US allies in the Arab world have renounced overt support for the Palestinian armed wings. Even Syria doesn’t give them much of anything. Hamas at least is armed by Hezbollah and Iran. I have no idea where the rest of the groups get their guns. They certainly do not get them from any Arab state openly. No Arab state dares to arm the Palestinians openly, however the weaponry they get from Hezbollah does come from the Syrian military. A lot of the missiles Hamas was firing in the last war were Syrian-made but acquired via Hezbollah. Hamas is now manufacturing their own missiles in factories in Gaza, so the notion of who is arming them will soon become moot. Iran and Hezbollah arm Hamas via the Sinai in general. The weapons come from Iran or Hezbollah to either Sudan or the Sinai. If they go to Sudan, they are moved to the Sinai. Once in Sinai, Bedouin smugglers who will do anything for a buck and have a long tradition of living outside the law smuggle the weapons up to El Arish next to Gaza. They are then moved into Gaza via tunnels or possible via small ships from Sinai to Gaza. Iranian and Hezbollah personnel disembark in the Sinai and then are moved by the Bedouins to the El Arish area where they are moved into Gaza via tunnels. Much of the vast underground Gaza tunnel structure was designed by Iran and Hezbollah.

Really the only Muslims who are helping the Palestinians with arms and armed infrastructure are the Shia Iranians and Hezbollah. No Sunni government other than Sudan is doing jack for the Palestinians.

Israel, the US and the rest of the West have decided that Iran, Hezbollah and Syria form an Axis of Resistance Block that are hardline anti-Israel entities. They are all linked and they need to be taken down. If you take down one, the others are weakened. For instance, if Assad can be taken out and a US client like the Free Syrian Army takes hold, they will cut off relations with Iran and Hezbollah and align themselves with the West and probably remove Syria from the Axis of Resistance. This is why so many Syrians oppose the FSA – they are nothing but pro-US puppets who want to sell out to Israel and the US and turn Syria into another US client Arab state.

The West figures if they can take out Syria, the other two will be harmed. Hezbollah is supplied by Iran and Syria. Iran moves weapons to Syria, which moves them to Hezbollah. If you take out the middle of the chain, Iran would have to supply Hezbollah directly and there are no good and easy ways to do that. They could go through Turkey, but Turkey dislikes Iran. They could go be sea, but Israel controls the Eastern Mediterranean. I suppose they could directly fly the weapons in, but Lebanon might not want to let Iranian planes land in its territory to supply Hezbollah. Israel and the US would start seriously threatening Lebanon .

So if you take out Syria, Hezbollah is more or less screwed. They would lose out their main supplier and their link to Iran. Iran would be weakened too by the loss of Syria. Now Iran would be alone and isolated among the hostile Sunni states of the region. And the link between Iran and Hezbollah could be severed, possibly fatally.

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Filed under Africa, Arabs, Bedouins, Britain, Europe, Geopolitics, Iran, Islam, Israel, Middle East, Morocco, North Africa, Palestine, Politics, Radical Islam, Regional, Religion, Shiism, Sudan, Sunnism, Syria, Tunisia, USA, Yemen

by | November 21, 2009 · 11:11 PM

We Don’t Respect You

The post will deal with the extent to which Whites respect one race or another.

First of all, an anecdote to start it off. I received a link from Stormfront linking to one of my articles about genetics and race. There was a chart there (see below), that, if interpreted in one particular way, could show that Amerindians are the closest large race to Caucasians, or Whites (this assuming that Whites are closely related to all other Caucasians, which they are). The competition was Africans, Amerindians, Siberians, NE Asians, SE Asians, Oceanians and Australoids. Of these groups, Amerinds appear to be the closest to Caucasians.

The question of the closest race to Whites or Caucasians is an interesting one. First of all we need to leave out some groups that are on the border between races.

Berbers and Bedouins are two groups of Whites that are quite close to Blacks. Bedouins and North Africans in general lump Caucasian though.

Ethiopians, Somalis, etc. are, I believe more and more, an intermediate large race in between Caucasians and Blacks. Nevertheless, on most charts they lump African so we will deal with them as Africans here.

Hispanics are a recent mixed race people that is left off most charts.

There is an axis extending from Turkey to Chukotka that I call the Asian-Caucasian Axis. On some charts, many of these groups are pretty much on the border between Asians and Caucasians and some are damned hard to put in one category or another. This includes Turks, Jews, Armenians, Iranians, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pakistanis, South Indians, Nepalese, Kazakhs, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Altai, Shor and associated North Turkic Siberians, Buryats, Mongolians, North Chinese, Koreans and the Chukchi. It also includes all associated groups.

The Chukchi are fascinating as they are an obviously Asiatic people that actually lump Caucasian on some charts.

We will leave all of these separate groups out of the analysis since on major charts, they are just lumped into Caucasians or North Asians.

However, on these same major charts, it does look like Amerindians are the closest major race to Whites.

Here is the chart in question. As you can see, the cluster of NE Asian - Siberian/Eskimo - Amerindian is the closest major race to Whites (Caucasians). According to my reading, which may be in error, the Amerindians seem to be closer to us than the others. There are other charts that also show Amerindians as very close to Caucasians.

The commenter on Stormfront noted this and commented on it, saying that he had often felt that they were the closest race to Whites. He said that when you look at them, it’s like looking in the mirror at what we used to be thousands of years ago and we could become again. In addition, he noted that he respected them as a race.

This got me to thinking. In the US anyway, Whites respect Amerindians as a race. They didn’t used to, but even in the old days, there was massive intermarriage. There is something about an Indian woman and a White man that is hard to stop. The Latin American Whites have been trying to stop White men from breeding with mestizas and Indias for centuries, and it’s a futile cause. And I respect Indians as a race too. Sure, they’ve got their problems, but they are mostly just their own problems – drugs, alcohol, self-destruction.

Even in Latin America, Indians are not so much despised, really, or not as much as Blacks. At any rate, they are not regarded as very troublesome. They are seen as potentially verbally violent, and sometimes physically, but this is not a real problem. As one White Latin American said, “Give an Indian a handful of tortillas and a six pack and he’s good for the night and won’t give you any trouble.”

This got me to thinking about whether or not we Whites respect other races. As I said, we respect the Indian. We also respect Hispanics. Since most here have a very large amount of White in them anyway, this just makes them even easier to respect. One thing you notice very quickly is that Whites don’t really hate Hispanics all that much. It’s hard to get even redneck Whites interested in hating Hispanics. We have too much common with them, and they have too much White in them. They are similar to us genetically and culturally.

Whites marry Hispanics very readily, and the usual format is White man – Hispanic woman. Hispanic women are seen as more submissive (= feminine) than White women, so it’s a natural match. A similar principle is working with White men and Indian women and White men and Asian women. A possible reason for these similarities is that Indians originate in Asian and are still quite Asian-like.

Anyway, finally getting around to the title of the post, it then occurred to me: Whites do not respect Blacks! We flat out do not respect you. Period. Exclamation point. In what way do we not respect you?

In the deepest way possible. Whites do not respect Blacks at their very difficult to change essence. We don’t respect you as a race.

As a White man who has lived his whole life in White culture, this is painfully and obviously true for the majority of Whites.

Now, the White racists will say that Blacks do not deserve to be respected for a variety of reasons, particularly behavioral ones. Let us just leave that question aside for a moment. Regardless of whether Blacks deserve it or not, we just flat out don’t respect them at their very racial essence, and that’s the only point to consider right now.

Why do I bring this up? Because really, this is at the root of a lot of the problems between Whites and Blacks in the US. We don’t respect you. And in many ways, a whole lot of other stuff just flows right out from that. Now, if Whites respected Blacks as a race, I’m convinced that race relations would be a lot different in this society.

Just a mental snack for you to chew on tonight…

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Filed under Amerindians, Anthropology, Arabs, Asians, Bedouins, Berbers, Blacks, Chuckchi, Criminology, Ethiopians, Europeans, Genetics, Hispanics, Mestizos, Mixed Race, North Africans, Physical, Race Realism, Race Relations, Race/Ethnicity, Racism, Siberians, Sociology, White Racism, Whites