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Cover: A NORFORCE Recruit.

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Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir,

I am a PhD student carrying out research into the history of the Borroloola area of the N.T. I am particularly interested in talking to anyone who had anything to do with the area during W.W.II. I recently came across the article in your journal on Stanner's coastwatch unit by Captain Vane (D.F.J. Jan/Feb 1979), which mentions military activities in this area of the Gulf of Carpentaria. The unit in question being the North Australia Observer Unit 2/1 NAOU, A Company (Eastern Northern Territory) HQ (1, 2, 3, 4, Pls.).

For some time now I have been trying to locate servicemen who were based in the area during the war. Would it be possible for you to advertise in your journal my interest in talking to such people. I am prepared to travel anywhere in Australia to meet people. You are welcome to write this request up yourself or to include my attached letter to the editor. Also do you happen to know the current contact address of Captain Armoury Vane. ❏

Yours faithfully

RICHARD BAKER

If any of our readers can help, Mr Baker can be contacted at Geography Dept, University of Adelaide, PO Box 498, Adelaide, SA 5001. — Editor

Dear Sir,

I am a little disturbed by the design of the Badge depicted by Major Keane as the official badge of the Australian Defence Force Academy in your Jan/Feb. 1987 edition (No. 62). It was incorrectly described in your heading as a "crest".

The practice of using a shield in a badge (as opposed to the roundels used by the RAN for HMA Ships' badges and by the RAAF for Squadron badges) is one which the Garter Principal King of Arms (Sir Colin Cole KCVO) might reasonably object. A Shield of Arms by convention can only be taken into use for official purposes by means of a Grant of Arms made by the Kings of Arms by virtue of their delegated powers from the Crown. From the illustration provided I have my doubts that the

ADFA badge has received the final imprimatur of the College of Arms, although I am aware that some discussions did take place with Sir Colin Cole in 1985.

In the symbology outlined by Major Keane no reference has been made to the border given to the shield. This seems to be depicted in gold, a non-heraldic tincture. Perhaps it is meant to represent argent (silver), but in heraldic painting this is usually left white. It is also unusual to have one colour (depicted in the sword blade) superimposed on the same colour (i.e. the pages of the open book). More importantly the seven pointed star (inaccurately described as "the federation star") is also not in an acceptable tincture. The Royal Warrant granting the Commonwealth Coat of Arms in 1912 describes the Commonwealth Crest as "a seven pointed Star" (gold), which incidentally is also used in the Shield of Arms granted to Viscount Slim of Yarralumba. The seven point star is properly called "the Commonwealth Star" as it is so described in the Flags Act 1953.

I have no doubt that approval for the use of the Royal Crown to surmount the ADFA badge has been properly obtained from the Governor-General acting on behalf of Her Majesty. However, I do have some qualms that the badge could be described by some as a "bogus shield of arms" if it has not had the full approval of the College of Arms in its present form. This would, I believe, detract somewhat from its dignity. ❏

M.C.N. D'ARCEY
Major (RL)

How General Bennett Became a Major-General

Dear Sir,

I should like to add a few comments to supplement Brigadier Speed's interesting Review, in D.F.J. No. 62, of Mr Lodge's *The Fall of General Gordon Bennett*.

As an opening shot it could be said that the title of this book is an unhappy choice. Some will consider it to be an inappropriate one; it immediately invites the question "Fall from where to where?"; and it recalls to mind those

uplift books of the Victorian era with such titles as *The Fall of Millie the Mill Girl*.

The word "flawed" in respect of General Bennett's character has been around now for quite a time and it is beginning to "affright my gaze" every time I see it. It is time to "Stand at ease" this moralistic and emotive term. In this connection it is an ugly word and it is much more applicable to chinaware.

General Bennett was indeed ambitious and it is unfortunate that he was also sarcastic in speech and denigrating when speaking in private conversations of others. Commanders of all ranks who indulge in sarcasm at the expense of others and who disparage, unofficially, the military reputations of others, must be awarded a black mark. But ambition is something different. Any army will stagnate if its general officers lack ambition. But ambition can express itself in acceptable and in unacceptable ways. Ambition was not a monopoly of General Bennett during his service in the Australian Army. It was perhaps the blunt, impetuous and immature ways that General Bennett sometimes expressed his ambitions that caused him so much trouble in his relations with others. No general officer can escape from inclusion in the "power game" if it is only for personal security and a desire to "survive". Each player is judged in accordance with the spirit in which he plays the game. Few regrettably played it in Politics like Lord Casey or in the Army like General Sir Iven Mackay. Nobody could doubt their right to a place at King Arthur's Round Table.

In *The Anatomy of Power*, Professor J. K. Galbraith has pointed out that "Power accrues not to the individual who knows", but to the one "who often out of obtuseness, believes that he knows and who can persuade others to that belief". Space forbids the development of this line of thought here. Readers may develop it for themselves by comparing and contrasting the persuasive powers of Bennett and "Red Robbie" both of whom have now passed into history. And in the search for means to improve performance in the future we study history to find lessons for application.

As regards General Bennett's escape from Singapore in 1942, this subject has been converted from a rational one capable of being explained scientifically into a moral and an emotional question. So persons who argue on these moral and emotional planes will differ among themselves for as long as time shall last

because normative judgments are incapable of proof. My own stand on this question was repeated in the October 1981 issue of the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution of Australia*. In a nutshell I said there that a higher commander in captivity in wartime can do nothing to promote the public interests of his country.

The story of how General Bennett became a substantive major-general in August 1930, after he had been commanding the 2nd Division, A.M.F. since April 1926 in the rank, as far as the public were concerned, of brigadier-general, is another episode in his Army career. But it needs to be examined rationally as a case study in Public Administration. I have already taken up enough space here and so I must defer such an undertaking at present.

MAJOR WARREN PERRY (R.L.)

Sir,

Whilst reading an issue — No. 51, March/April 1985, concerning the history of Ground Defence in the RAAF, by Squadron Leader S. D. Kerr, I found myself asking what is the history of the now Pol Dog H mustering. SNCO's amongst others I have spoken with, fail to give me a clear and concise history with relevant dates etc.

My involvement with the Pol Dog H mustering is now one of 5 years, being posted to Darwin after completing No. 48 basic Security Guard course. Whilst at Darwin I was one of 4 LAC's and 1 CPL Security Guard with 2 RAAF Pol members, who were attached to Tindal to look after the 75 Sqn Mirages, sent there over the Christmas break, when 75 Sqn first arrived at Darwin.

I was involved in both Pitch Black Exercises, receiving a commendation from the 1984 P.B. I was attached to Townsville in Feb 86, and finally posted to Butterworth in December 1986, after seeing the Darwin Police Dog Section double in size.

My request to you, is for a similar article about the Pol. Dog H mustering, as that of the Ground Defence. Much I am sure has happened during our time of which we, as a mustering can be proud, and for once have it put on paper for all to see, and for me personally to be enlightened on my mustering.

JONATHAN RICHARDS
LAC RAAF
Butterworth, Malaysia

Main Findings of the Services Officers Careers Study

Lieutenant Colonel N. A. Jans, RAA, PhD

Introduction

"When I look ahead, I try to assess what the next decade holds: how many good postings will I get in that time? Six out of ten would be an acceptable score. But there's no chance of achieving that now, and the Service is going to continue to change for the worse. Top management is not willing or capable of taking the tough decisions that have to be taken".¹

"I am critical about the Service in many ways — in most ways in fact. Call me a maverick if you like — but that's why I'm staying on — to give in and leave, just because you don't agree with what's happening, is appeasement. If we all left, how would we ever change the system?"

TWO men, two viewpoints on career issues. Challenge and disillusionment. How representative are such views? How widely are they held? Where does the balance of opinion lie?

The Services Officers Careers Study was a behavioural science investigation of the Australian professional military career. The aim of the study was to find out what officers feel about their careers, and why they feel as they do.

The study was innovative in a number of ways. It was the first major, systematic evaluation of officers' attitudes; it sampled officers in all three Services; it was based on a theoretical model which recognizes the importance of life stage in attitudes; and it sampled not only officers but their wives as well, in such a way as to identify the mutual interactions of husbands' and wives' attitudes.

Finally, the attitude scales used were developed specifically for this study, and were validated subsequently by analyzing the extent to which they predicted actual "stay-leave" behaviour by officers.

The writer spent over a year as a Defence Fellow at the Canberra College of Advanced Education on this study, which was the culmination of many years of research and reflec-

tion on officers' careers. A report on the study has been published by the Department of Defence, under the title *Careers in Conflict: Service Officers' Careers and Families in Peacetime*. A book with the same title, which is a modified version of the Fellowship report, will be published later in 1987, in the Canberra College of Advanced Education monograph series.

The sample encompassed officers in all three Services, in the rank range lieutenant to colonel (or equivalents), and their wives. Interviews were conducted with 129 officers and 32 wives. 1300 officers answered a mailed questionnaire (69% response) as did 942 wives (91%). The sample was randomly drawn, stratified by rank and professional category. The study was conducted in 1984.

The aim of this article is to outline some of the main findings of the Services Officers Careers Study. (It must be stressed that this article does no more than "scratch the surface" of the findings).

Main Findings

Overview

In planning this study, it was hypothesized that life stage or career stage would be important in influencing how a man feels about his career. That is, an officer would have different attitudes according to where he is in his career. This turned out to be the case. As a man approaches the middle of his life, a number of things in his life change, both in career terms and in personal terms, and he will have to resolve these changes as part of his mid life transition.

Factors in the Officer's Mid-Life Transition

Most officers are, at mid-life, affected by some or all of the following factors:

- a. *The symbolism of reaching mid-life*, with the realization that time is running out to do all the things he wanted to do as a younger man, and that he may have only a few "good years" left.

"A man goes through life taking things pretty much as they come. Suddenly at a particular point in his life he begins to worry about

things he never thought of before. It's a bit disturbing."

- b. *Changes in the role of parent and/or husband*, and evidence on whether he has been successful in these roles.
- c. *Changes in life priorities*, to give less weight to career needs and more to family and/or personal needs.

"When I was first married, I put my career first. Now I'm balancing the books. I dragged my young wife through an undesirable posting. She put up with a fair bit, and now I'm paying something back."

- d. *Evidence as to whether he has achieved, or is likely to achieve, his career ambitions*. These will vary from person to person. Some aim for the top early in their careers and never lose sight of that aim; others are happy to reach lieutenant colonel (or equivalent). Many will have set themselves certain mid-career goals, such as unit command or an important staff appointment, the achievement of which are not only satisfying in themselves, but are also significant indications that the career is "on track" to other career goals, like promotion to high rank. Associated with mid-life career achievement are two sub-issues: first, the possible quandry of "what comes next?" — and this could apply regardless of whether the mid-life goals have been achieved or not; and second, reaching the career stage where most of the rest of his Service career will be spent in the Canberra defence bureaucracy.

"When I missed out on promotion, I felt absolutely shattered. There's no other word for it. I felt I'd been pretty loyal — this was a real kick in the face."

"Why do officers get out at 20 years? Mainly because they have been brought up to believe that driving a destroyer is the ultimate; and having achieved this, coming to a desk job in Canberra is a let-down. They think 'Jesus, is this all there is?' and leave."

- e. Allied to this previous point, *finding that his career lacks the focus it had earlier in his career*, and lacks also the satisfaction and accomplishment he experienced earlier in his career.
- f. And, tying all these together in a sense: *reaching the 20 year point of the career*. It makes him stop and think things out and

it gives the potential to break free without great financial risk.

If the sixth factor gives an officer the opportunity to begin a new career, the others often give him the motive to do so. And when an officer is experiencing more than one of these pressures, the motivation to resign may be particularly strong.

The Effect on Career Attitudes

The effect of these factors and others discussed at length in the study report, at this life stage of reaching 20 years, is synergistic — greater than the simple sum of the parts.

"A few months ago, I'd made up my mind to stay but then overnight I changed my mind. Why? It's very complicated. I guess there were three main factors. First, the family. The kids are at high school and I feel very strongly that they need stability in their lives for that period. Also, we have our own home in Brisbane, which makes living in a succession of crappy married quarters all the more irritating. Second, postings. In my field, I'm starting to become restricted. Once I got to squadron leader, I'd be employed largely in Canberra or HQ Support Command . . . and that doesn't appeal. . . . These are the main reasons. But also, there's the Service in general. Conditions of service are deteriorating: I can't put my finger on it, but every time you turn around, bang! there goes another little thing. Then there are financial restrictions which make it difficult to do your job properly. It's going to get a lot worse, and it disappoints me. Finally, there's the question of timing your retirement. The longer you leave it, the harder it is to get a job outside. I like the Service, though, and if things were different I'd stay."

The study indicates that the majority of officers who are still serving in their late 30s remain dedicated professionals at heart, who would like to accommodate changed family needs with the demands of their careers and to serve in appointments which offer the chance of accomplishment and satisfaction. But the inherent conflicts in the Service put obstacles in the way of such accommodation. Resolving these conflicts in an optimal way is difficult to do, so there will be many who will reluctantly resign at around 20 years or who will serve on with reduced commitment.

Career Commitment

What is the state of career commitment among Service officers? Figure 1 shows the distribution of scores on two of the major variables of the study, broken down by career stage. Career involvement is an officer's psychological involvement with his career; career motivation is the strength of his desire to remain in it.² Both attitudes are particularly low in Middle career — for officers with between 14 and 19 years of service. Officers at this career stage are, of course, particularly prone to the pressures discussed earlier. Only 49% of Middle career stage officers are motivated to continue serving, with 60% of officers in the Early career stage.

Conflicting Issues in Service Careers

We now turn to two very important issues in Services careers, issues which are so complex that the conflicts inherent in them inspired the title of the report. The issues are:

- a. the career at the Department of Defence, and
- b. the Service family.

The Career at the Department of Defence

The study was predicted on the assumption that an officer's career stage or life stage is important in explaining his feelings about his career. One of the major career cycle changes in the peacetime Service career is the way in which what begins as an operations-oriented career eventually becomes a staff-oriented career. The ADF has a proportionately large Department of Defence establishment: even though the overall force may be small, there is still a need for certain policy and management functions to be performed. As a result, over 40% of senior officer appointments are in the three Service Offices (Navy Office, Army Office and Air Force Office) and Defence Central.

Many officers find this second half of their career much less to their liking than the first half, as is now shown.

The Quality of Work Life at Defence

Many officers do not have a favourable perception of the "quality of work life" at Defence (meaning Defence Central and the three Service Offices). Quality of work life was assessed in the study by the officer's scores on a number

of different variables: career prospects (which centre on the anticipation of future job satisfaction as much as they do on promotion prospects); present job satisfaction (in terms of feelings about the appointment being occupied now, rather than in terms of attitudes to the career as a whole); participation in decision making; the chance that you can accomplish things in the present job; perceptions of how effective the Service is; and career involvement and career motivation.

On every one of these variables, Middle career stage officers at Defence (14-19 years service) score lower than their peers stationed elsewhere (see Table 1).

For example, among Middle stage officers who work at Defence, only 29% rate their career prospects as good, compared with 43% among their peers elsewhere. And whereas two-thirds of the Middle stage officers *not* in Defence report high job satisfaction and job involvement, only one-half in Defence have similar feelings. As a consequence of all of these attitudes, only 35% of Middle stage officers at Defence have a strong desire to go on serving (compared with 54% elsewhere) (see Table 1).

Interestingly, the quality of work life of *Late* career stage officers (20 or more years of service) is not affected by their job location. Most Late stage officers report relatively high levels on all the relevant variables, whether they are located in Canberra or not.

Individual Performance at the Department of Defence

However, attitudes tell us only part of the story. We are also interested in performance. When we look at self-reported job effort and performance of Defence staff officers, we find that, regardless of career stage, they have lower scores than their peers elsewhere (see Table 1). And this applies regardless of whether or not they have been to staff college.

To summarize to this point:

- * Middle stage officers have lower quality of work life and lower job performance when they are in Defence than when they are working elsewhere.
- * Late stage officers at Defence have as good a quality of work life than their peers elsewhere, but they report lower levels of job performance.

Figure 1.
Career Involvement and Career Motivation Levels by Career Stage




Figure 2.
Effect of time in job on self-rated Job Performance




Table 1
 QUALITY OF WORK LIFE BY POSTING LOCATION AND CAREER STAGE

Career stage	QWL variable	Officers In Defence				Officers not In Defence				t-differences between means
		N	Mean	% positive	% negative	N	Mean	% positive	% negative	
Middle	Career involvement	103	3.98	39	33	270	4.33	44	20	2.81*
	Career motivation		4.03	35	31		4.32	54	19	2.31*** ^a
	Service effectiveness		3.85	28	35		4.01	36	34	n.s.
	Career prospects		3.81	29	38		4.15	43	25	2.92*
	Job satisfaction		4.26	50	33		4.88	67	13	4.19**
	Chances of achieving results		4.44	56	34		5.07	71	23	3.26**
	Participation in decision making		4.49	55	24		5.30	77	11	4.82**
	Job effort		5.23	78	12		5.82	88	5	4.13**
	Job performance		5.19	81	5		5.51	93	3	3.09*
How well prepared for job		4.69	60	33		5.32	77	13	3.38**	
Late	Career involvement	104	4.37	52	20	180	4.47	54	21	n.s.
	Career motivation		3.60	28	45		3.61	28	46	n.s.
	Service effectiveness		3.99	30	29		4.11	40	26	n.s.
	Career prospects		4.16	47	29		4.14	41	27	n.s.
	Job satisfaction		4.48	58	25		4.71	62	15	n.s.
	Chances of achieving results		4.86	66	28		5.17	72	21	n.s.
	Participation in decision making		5.11	77	15		5.26	74	17	n.s.
	Job effort		5.48	80	12		5.83	89	3	2.38*** ^a
	Job performance		5.22	84	6		5.51	92	2	2.63*** ^a
How well prepared for job		4.55	60	33		5.37	77	14	4.01**	

** p < .001

* p < .01

Note: a. One-tailed. All others two-tailed.

Reasons for Problems in the Department of Defence

There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs.

- a. *Lack of career focus.* Early in the career most officers have relatively clear goals and a specific focus for their personal development e.g. they aim to become a unit commander. But once past a certain career point, careers often become "unfocussed". There are many officers in Defence who have very little idea of what will be next for them, and how they can prepare themselves professionally for the future. And not only does their career development tend to neglect the knowledge and skills needed for the Defence bureaucracy, but they also spend relatively little time in each job they hold. The data suggest that job rotation rates are very high. Half the sample had been in their current jobs for only 9 months or less. Only 15% of them were in the third year of their current job. This suggests that many officers are spending less than two years in appointments. Many officers at mid-life find it difficult to gain a new career goal and a fresh and vital focus to their careers, beyond the simple aim — and under the circumstances, a somewhat unhealthy one — of advancement in rank.
- b. *A feeling of lack of competence.* Defence staff work is increasingly complex. It requires skills and knowledge which take time to learn and which are not always transferrable from job to job; and it often requires both a will to push things through against the opposition of colleagues, and an ability to cope with ambiguous situations. It's difficult enough to learn these new competencies without continually changing the personnel in a branch. Officers are not used to feeling out their depth and not right on top of things — it's part of their professional upbringing that they strive for high performance — so this is an unsettling experience. Figure 2 shows how officers at different "tenure points", in terms of time in job, rate their job performance. It shows what might be called a "learning curve". The longer an officer is in a job, it would seem, the more confident he becomes about his performance. Given that many officers will not be long enough
- in their jobs to learn much of career development usefulness — note that performance appears to be virtually static for the first six months in a job — this phenomenon suggests that moving officers frequently between jobs inhibits short term effectiveness benefits which the military believes are associated with this practice.
- c. *Accretion of authority upwards.* It often seems almost a natural law in bureaucracies that authority and influence become concentrated at the top of an organization, and Defence is no exception. Figures 3 and 4 show how an officer's influence in his job varies according to rank and location differences. These two figures depict the levels of participation in decision making and the chances of effort leading to accomplishment for two groups of officers: lieutenants, captains and majors (or equivalents), and lieutenant colonels and colonels (or equivalents). For this latter group, it can be seen that the closer the senior officer job is to Canberra, the less influence the incumbent feels he has on events associated with his job. In fact, colonels and lieutenant colonels (or equivalents) in Defence feel they have no more influence on events than do the majors who are their subordinates.
- d. *The perceived stress associated with senior officers' jobs.* Officers at the middle levels of the Defence hierarchy look at their seniors and see a great deal of stress involved, together with much effort and long hours, some of it on apparently trivial issues. These are not features to which many aspire.

Families

A major life milestone for the Service officer is reaching a particular stage of family development at around the completion of 15 or so years service, the stage where the wife wants to return to work or to become more serious about an existing career and where the children of the family are at high school age. It is at this stage of life that officers will often become less tolerant of the requirement to relocate their families for career development purposes.

Whereas 58% of officers with 13 or fewer years of service are willing to put the needs of the Service ahead of their families' convenience, and move even if there are disadvantages to

their family in doing so, only 40% of officers with 14 to 19 years of service feel the same way.

The majority of wives identify with and support their husbands' careers: 33% express strong support, and 38% conditional support for the officers's continued involvement with the military. On the surface, this seems like a satisfactory situation for the Services. But there are danger signals ahead if there is a continuation of present career management and posting practices. The Services are presently caught up in an Australia-wide phenomenon: the career wife. Younger wives of officers are a highly educated group, in comparison with the population of Australian women. Over 40% have tertiary qualifications or are studying for them, and a majority have strong identification with feminist values (i.e. that a woman has a right to a significant social role outside the home and family). Presently, like most Australian women, they work in "traditional" female jobs (if they are among the 55% of officers' wives who do work), jobs which are highly "portable". This is good news for career managers, but how long will this situation last? In the future, wives are likely to be more career conscious, more involved in "unportable" jobs, and perhaps less willing to put the husband's career automatically ahead of their own.

Another factor of influence is the feeling that children's educational stability is important, especially in the secondary school years. When wives were asked to indicate how important this is to their children, 64% said it was simply "vital".

"Having seen my child suffer considerably socially and scholastically because of relocating during his primary school years, I am determined that the secondary and tertiary years, I am determined that the secondary and tertiary years will be settled and have continuity. I sincerely regret that this may be at the expense of my husband's Army career."

Both these issues tend to make the officer reluctant to move for the sake of his career at a particular life stage. He'll move if there are good reasons for doing so, as he sees it — and often these reasons include the good of the Service. But it would be wise for the Services to expect some increase in the unwillingness of officers to move in the future, especially those at mid-life.

Conclusions

An officer's career stage is important in shaping his attitudes to his career. Under present circumstances, it seems almost inevitable that officers in the Middle career stage will tend to lose their career motivation. Among them will be a substantial proportion of men who are, or will be, wanted for the more senior positions of the Service. Some of the factors involved in this loss are beyond the Services' control, but others are not.

There are two main factors in this loss of career motivation.

One: excessive family mobility at a crucial stage of the family life cycle.


Two: loss of career direction after the early career years. Opportunities to do the things which are the focus of early career development becomes increasingly limited in the later career years; and the work an officer is called on to do later in his career is not always adequately addressed in career development. He finds himself addressed in career development. He finds himself working in an organization — i.e. Defence — where he often feels out of his depth, where he may have low confidence in his own ability and that of his seniors, and where he may feel alienated from the other principal group of actors, the public servants. Because of these and other factors, Defence is an organization which is functioning below its potential effectiveness. Some of the recommendations below, if implemented, could improve the effectiveness of the Department and could reduce the present wastage of valuable officer manpower at the mid career point.

Recommendations

Career motivation of those members of the officer corps close to the 20 years service point can hardly be called high. What could the Services do should this be seen as a problem?

First, the Services could re-examine their policies of career development, and increase the degree of staff streaming after the first decade or so of service. And once in a staff stream, many officers could tend to stay there; they'd be given appropriate training and education, including education in public administration; and they'd be left in appointments for longer periods. These staff streams could have paths leading up to one star rank. These practices would have two benefits. First, careers would


Figure 3.
Participation in Decision Making by Job Type and Rank



Note

1. Scale range 0 - 7
2. Differences between:
 - a. ranks - $p < .0001$
 - b. job type - ltcol-col - $p < .0001$
 - lt-maj - n.s.

Figure 4.
Chances of Accomplishment by Job Type and Rank



Note

1. Scale range 0 - 7
2. Differences between:
 - a. ranks - $p < .001$
 - b. job type - ltcol-col - $p < .0001$
 - lt-maj - n.s.

have more focus and meaning after the early career years; and, second, performance at the Department of Defence — individual and collective — would be improved.

(It is recognized how contrary this is to traditional philosophies of career planning. There's a good deal of conflict between what is proposed and what the Services would like to go on doing in career terms. But is there much alternative? It has been shown that after the stage when an officer has — or would have — commanded, careers lack personal purpose or focus; and it has been shown that performance in the Department of Defence is deficient. To continue with present policies is to perpetuate the problem.)

In addition, authority in the Department could be delegated more frequently. This is more likely to occur in a climate of individual and team competence, so the above suggestion on staff streaming and job stability will encourage such delegation.


Finally, geographic stability could be slowed so as to accommodate family development. Career development and family development must be more balanced than they are presently. Once again, this is complementary to the earlier suggestions.

None of these are overnight solutions. There is no panacea, no conflict-free way of improving career development, family development and Service effectiveness in concert. In fact, there are significant practical limitations to the measures recommended. That is the reason for the title chosen for the report: *Careers in Conflict*. The conflicts will not be easily resolved — but they must be addressed.

Postscript

The report "Careers in Conflict" contains a very great deal more than has been outlined above. There are, for example, over 70 tables of data and statistics. Chapters include the following:

- * an introductory review of the literature on military career adjustment;
- * an analysis and discussion of the effects of career stage and life stage on career adjustment;
- * Service differences;
- * military values and career adjustment;
- * the effect of the Department of Defence on the Service career; and
- * two chapters on the Service family and the factors which shape an officers's priorities between career and family.

The report is available in all Service libraries, and four copies are held in the library of the Canberra College of Advanced Education. In addition, a book with the same title will shortly be published by the Canberra College of Advanced Education monograph series. 

NOTES

1. These and other quotes are from interview notes.
2. Scores on both these variables predict whether an officer will stay with or leave his Service. In 1986, the Navy advised the writer which of the officers in their sample were still serving (this advice was given by serial number — anonymity was retained, so far as the writer is concerned). This was added to the data base, and the attitude scores of those still serving were compared with those who had left. The correlations between staying-leaving and both career involvement and career motivation were each .25 (p .001), a level which is probably somewhat understated because many of those 56 officers who had left the Navy were probably doing so because of age limits.



Nick Jans is a lecturer in Administration at the Canberra College of Advanced Education, a position he has held since leaving the Regular Army in early 1986. He graduated from Duntroon in 1964 and held a series of regimental, staff and training appointments during his military career, including service with 12 Field Regiment in SVN in 1968-69. He has a PhD in organizational behaviour from the UNSW, and his teaching focus at the CCAE is organizational psychology. Jans is a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, with the Army Reserve Staff Group, Army Office.

Towards Effective Training of Foreign Students in English as a Technical Language

By: Major Bruce Copeland BA BEdSt RAAEC

Introduction

IN past years, foreign Service students have come to train at the Schools of the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force.

The technical courses require a high degree of skill by foreign students in comprehension and usage of technical English.

Some of the inherent difficulties for such students will be overcome by Australian Training personnel if attention is given to the preparation of texts with regard to English as both a foreign language and a technical language.

There are many problems in the usage of English as a technical language, inherent in the organization of the language.

Aim

The aim of this article is to:

- identify basic difficulties that confront foreign students in comprehending and using technical English;
- suggest strategies that might be employed to lessen such difficulties; and
- outline a number of aspects developed on the Pidgin Familiarization Course at the RAAF School of Languages at Point Cook.

Background

This article has been written in conjunction with five articles prepared for the Defence Force Journal. These are:

- "A Systems Approach to Mastery Learning" DFJ No 44. Jan/Feb 84;
- "In Support of Our Friends, the Foreign Instructor and Student" DFJ No 50. Jan/Feb 85;

"In Support of the Papua New Guinean Student in Australia" DFJ No 54. Sept/Oct 85; and

- "In Support of More Effective Texts for Papua New Guinea Service Students in Australia" DFJ No 58. May/June 86;

These are cited not as references but as supplementary texts for the reader who may wish to pursue this matter further.

In the last few years, a number of Service schools have come to address their role in training foreign students, towards establishing appropriate strategies.

As part of this, the writer has prepared these articles to give support to policy makers, course managers and instructors.

No Training manuals have yet been written on the subject. At least from these articles, the Defence Force has a common talking point.

The writer has confidence that the basic thrust of each article is accurate. In further articles the subject will be examined in greater detail.

Support to Training

In past years, concern has been expressed within the Royal Australian Air Force of the need to improve the expertise of course managers and instructors in the training of foreign students.

A pilot course had been conducted at the RAAF School of Languages to provide Australian training personnel with the language and cultural background appropriate to training student personnel of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF).

In January 1986, the first Pidgin Familiarization Course for Instructors was conducted with student personnel attending from the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force.

Technical Texts

Many foreign students will find difficulty in reading technical texts.

This will depend upon their familiarity with the English language and the technical culture that accompanies the text.

For all students, texts on technical subjects can be difficult to read for the following reasons:

- There is a completely new vocabulary.
- The reader has to contend with words and equations.
- Highly specialized diagrams have to be understood and related to both the written description and the actual item of equipment.
- Technical books are saturated with ideas with one idea presented after the other.¹

The student will find that words used in a technical sense will have different meanings from the same words used in everyday speech. Often, a more precise meaning will be intended.

Confusion can occur between different terms. To explain the differences in meaning, the instructor may have to resort to abstract explanation.

Foreign students may find that their understanding of English may let them down in coming to terms with the differences between 'mass' and 'weight', 'energy' and 'force', 'force' and 'pressure'. The instructor may well find his/her grasp of technical English will be a limiting factor in providing a clear explanation.

Origins of Words

In past decades, in Australia, support was given to Australian students through the teaching of Greek and Latin roots from which many English words are derived.

The development of English technical terms may be traced back to the start of the Industrial Revolution.

At that time, there was the need for a massive increase in words as new inventions were produced and made available to the industrial and commercial world.

Many words were taken from the Greek and Latin. In some ways, we could say that new words were quite unceremoniously and crudely put together.

A selection of Greek Words is set out as follows:

- phos — light;
- metron — a measure;
- micros — small;
- tele — afar;
- baros — weight;
- skopeo — I view;
- grapho — I write;

- therme — heat; and
- phonos — sound.

As well, a selection of Latin roots is set out as follows:

- facio (factus) — I make;
- video (vissus) — I see;
- volvo (volvus) — I roll;
- jacio (jectus) — I throw; and
- jungo (junctus) — I join.²

An invention that 'wrote' in 'light' became a photograph. A device that 'measured' 'small' objects was a micrometer.

A machine that 'wrote' from 'afar' was a telegraph. A machine that 'measured' the 'weight' of the atmosphere became a barometer.

On the Latin front, a machine that enabled us to 'see' from 'afar' was a television. A wheel that 'rolled' 'again' demonstrated a revolution.

An object that was 'thrown' 'out' was ejected. A point where two structures 'join' is called a junction.

Foreign students and many Australian instructors will lack this background in grammar that simplifies understanding of many technical words.

Same Word — Different Part of Speech

Foreign students may not have the grasp of the English language to enable them to be flexible in its usage.

Through usage, the English speakers have come to use words interchangeably as nouns, verbs and adjectives. This could well cause enormous difficulty for a foreign student.

The word 'discharge' may be used as three parts of speech as follows:

- a *discharge* tube,
- *discharge* from the pipe, and
- fluid will *discharge*.

The following words may be used in technical description:

- an *insert*, to *insert*;
- the *timing*, *timing* the device;
- an air *bleed*, *bleed* the brakes;
- a spark *plug*, *plug* the hole; and
- an oil *seal*, *seal* the flow.

For a foreign student for whom English is a second language, the unusual usage of a word may block understanding of a description.

Groups of Words that Confuse

Students will find difficulty if usage of single words is varied within oral or written description.

The problem is increased many times if such usage takes place within a group of words.

In English and German technical description, a component may be described by a series of words. In German, the series of words may be combined to form a single word.

An item of signals equipment is labelled by the term "Hochfrequenzschwingungsgenerator" which means High Frequency Pulse Generator.

In English, the reader may care to ponder the 'loose fitting bearing insert' or the 'crankshaft main bearing journal'.

Other groups of words will include the following:

- outboard pylon attachment housing,
- rear main bearing,
- port inboard wing pylon,
- oil return rear main bearing,
- boundary layer splitter plate,
- starter ring gear,
- wing rear spar attachment,
- pole shoe screw,
- leading edge ranging antenna,
- rocker arm cover,
- variable intensity formation lighting strip, and
- rocker arm shaft gallery.

The reader may care to underline the item word in the groupings above. We may start with 'rear main bearing'.

When the groups of words are removed from the text, the problem is made easier. Usually, the item word is the last word. Yet, with 'rocker arm shaft gallery', there appears to be four words that are the item words — 'rocker', 'arm', 'shaft' and 'gallery'.

A word grouping when concealed in a sentence, will provide difficulties for many foreign students. We may consider the sentence as follows:

'Loose fitting bearing inserts are subject to over-heating due to impeded heat transfer.'

In this sentence we may identify two word groups — 'loose fitting bearing inserts' and 'impeded heat transfer'.

For the foreign student, there is the problem of sorting out the item word. He/she knows that a 'fitting' is an item. As well, a 'bearing' is a component in an engine. Perhaps the student still thinks that 'insert' is only a verb or doing word.

So, the student thinks that the text is referring to a 'loose fitting bearing' that inserts some-



"Look. It's not 'insert fitting bearing loose.' It's 'loose fitting bearing insert.' Can't ya speak English?"

thing. But the student cannot follow why the verb 'inserts' is followed by 'are'. Perhaps it is a typing error.

'We won't yet break it to the foreign student that 'subject' is a verb as well as a noun.

Perhaps we should leave explanation of 'impeded heat transfer' to another day, out of consideration for the morale of this group of foreign students.

Groupings in Other Languages

Foreign students may find difficulty because such groupings may differ from those used in their mother tongues.

We may take the phrase 'a big red car'.

In a number of languages in South-East Asia, this grouping will be expressed thus:

- a big red car,
- a big car that is red, and
- a car big red.

It would not be obvious to Australian Training personnel that the Papua New Guinean, Indonesian, Malaysian and Thai students may all ponder on 'oil return rear main bearing' in completely different ways.

All in Together

The problem of comprehension will be made worse if the foreign students are simply placed on a course of Australian students.

There will be foreign students who will cope because of their education and experience in technical areas.

However, the foreign students will suffer if the Australian instructor does not speak with due concern for the following:

- Australian idiom,
- word grouping,
- examples familiar to the student,
- forms of words,
- speed of presentation, and
- use of diagrams.

Australian Training personnel may provide difficulties for foreign students if there is no recognition that there are differences in language perceptions between the students of the different nations.

Whole — Part Perceptions

Australian students familiar with technical culture and usage of technical English, will find that a conceptual framework will accompany individual technical items.

Within an electrical system, the term 'armature' is seen to be big and structural.

On the other hand, the term 'brush' is seen to be smaller in relation to an armature but larger than a 'diode'.

A 'carburettor' is smaller than a fuel system, while a 'butter-fly valve' is smaller than a carburettor.

To teach technical terms to a foreign student, there is both a language and a conceptual component.

Confusion may occur among some foreign students faced with a word such as 'jet'. The student may be told that a jet engine has a jet inside of it.

This is the stuff that nightmares are made of.

Same Word — Different Meanings

Foreign students may find to their dismay, that familiar words also mean something else.

We may 'furnish' a house. At the same time, a battery will 'furnish' a charge.

We 'maintain' an engine with a spanner and screw driver. Yet, when we 'maintain' an engine at a constant speed, we keep our fingers well clear.

We 'ground' a circuit. Notwithstanding, we make sure that the metal rod is 'ground' to a particular diameter.

Cause — Effect Cue Words

Foreign students need to be aware of the cue words used to describe 'cause-effect'.

In technical texts, there is often no rhyme nor reason to the usage of appropriate 'cause-effect' structures.

A writer, being thoroughly familiar with the English language will use these structures as required.

The following cue words are suggested:

- with the result that . . . ;
- with a resultant . . . ;
- with the effect that . . . ;
- is caused by . . . ;
- with a simultaneous . . . ;
- concurrently with . . . ;
- in succession . . . ;
- if . . . then . . . ; and
- which produces . . .

Lack of familiarity with the range of such cue words may well be a source of frustration for the foreign student.

An Exercise in Humility

On the Pidgin Familiarization Course, students are confronted with a technical description, the words and concepts of which are beyond their experience.

The technical process involved, is imaginary and designed to simulate an aspect of technology of the twenty-first century.

The Australian instructors who attend the course, are as removed from this area of knowledge as many foreign students are removed from the technical areas that they are required to study on course in Australia.


In the simulated lesson, the Australian students are confronted by an instructor who demonstrates the following deficiencies in his lesson:

- Compound terms are used in description.
- Technical terms are not explained.
- No effort is made to show where the process fits into the "whole."
- Abstract technical concepts are described by many abstract technical terms, previously unknown to the students.
- The students are required to read the description for homework, to be tested the following day.

The instructor does not carry through this form of "instruction" to the bitter end. The

point is readily obvious that many foreign students may well find technical descriptions in English, delivered by an unsympathetic instructor, to be quite a disturbing and morale destroying experience.

The technical description is set down as follows:



The Intergalactic Teleporter

"The *intergalactic teleporter* has been developed to facilitate depulsification of interpelated gamma-beta rays.

The device consists of three components. The *interstitial magnogenerator* delivers the *proto-synthetic rear main conflagurator* to the front of the *primary flocculator* with a resultant unambivalent defaculation of the retro-rockets.

The function of the *primary flocculator* is to devolve the interpelation of the gamma-beta rays and to receive a primary interconnected charge from the base of the retro-rockets.

The retro-rockets are designed to demagnify the gamma-beta component and to receive the proto-synthetic rear main conflagurator as it connects and depulsifies the primary flocculator."

Strategies

In the preparation of texts for foreign students and in the training of instructors and course managers, attention must be paid to the

problems of comprehension by foreign students.

The difficulties will not disappear overnight. Part of the solution will lie in the preparation of foreign students prior to departure from their country. Part of the problem will be addressed at the Defence Co-operation Language School at the Royal Australian Air Force Base at Laverton.

Preparation of Australian instructors will be carried out in the courses of Instructional Technology in the respective Services.

Specific cultural and language support will be given at the RAAF School of Languages. Cultural considerations will be related on the Pidgin Familiarization Course, to course development and to instructional technique.

Courses are being prepared at the RAAF School of Languages to support training of personnel from Indonesia and Malaysia.

Conclusion

If foreign students are to succeed on technical courses within the Australian Defence Force, skill in comprehension and usage of technical English is mandatory.


Care should be taken by Australian Training personnel in presentation of oral or written description.

There are many ways in which confusion may occur for foreign students.

Awareness by Training personnel of the problems that arise and sensitivity to the needs of foreign students, will be the start to reducing many of the difficulties.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- texts for foreign students be examined towards preparation of texts with description that is easily understood; and
- Training personnel be provided with the means to promote less complicated technical description. 

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Major Copeland has contributed several articles to the Defence Force Journal on aspects of Training. He is presently posted to the RAAF School of Languages. Over a six year period, he has conducted 35 courses to prepare government personnel for posting to PNG. Courses involve language, culture, living conditions and aspects of Training appropriate to Papua New Guinea. Australian Service Personnel involved in training PNG students in Australia have also attended the course.



NORFORCE — On Patrol.

Australian Defence Information Services

By Elaine Alexander, *Defence Information Services Branch*

(A paper presented to the International Defense Information Conference, Boston June 1986)

Introduction

THIS article will describe the major components of library-based information services provided to the Australian Defence organisation. While only an overview can be provided, I hope that it can convey something of the nature and "flavour" of our operations.

Before looking at our information provision capabilities I would like to skim over our history and explain our present organisation. Both reflect the problems and opportunities we face and have strongly influenced the way in which our services are provided.

History

In 1974 a single centrally controlled library service was created to serve all Service and civilian elements of the Australian Defence organisation. It was called the Defence Library and Information Service (DLIS). This was one of many outcomes of the decision to amalgamate five Departments (Navy, Army, Air Force, Supply and Defence) into one Department of Defence in 1974. Another outcome was the creation of the Scientific and Technical Information Branch (STIB) to coordinate document exchange arrangements. DLIS and STIB combined in 1977 to form the present Defence Information Services (DIS) organisation. The DIS network is the largest and most diverse single organisation network in Australia.

Prior to the 1974 re-organisation, the three Services and other Defence elements had several different approaches to library organisation. Navy libraries made their own individual arrangements although books were centrally procured. An Army Library network had been created in 1968 and consisted of 30 libraries. Air Force also had a centrally co-ordinated network which had been set up in the 1960s. Research laboratory libraries had operated in-

dependently and, unlike most of the other libraries, were well staffed.

The one network was achieved by a series of amalgamations of the various elements in the new Department of Defence. Many of the libraries were poorly staffed and few had professional librarians. Collections were often out of date and only the larger libraries were providing an effective information service. On the other hand some libraries, especially those in Defence Central and the larger research establishments, were providing very sophisticated and innovative library services.

The structure chosen for the new network aimed at harnessing the expertise available from professional librarians and systems officers for the benefit of all Defence libraries. It was not possible or appropriate to put professional librarians into every library.

Organisation and Functions

The network has a three tiered structure which has remained largely unchanged since 1977 although there is constant fine tuning. (Figure 1)

To place this in a geographic context it may be helpful to visualise the network as covering almost the same geographic area as America. Table 1 provides a few comparisons between the USA and Australia. It is worth noting that despite the geographic area covered we only serve 1/30 the number of US military personnel.

Table 1 — Some comparisons — USA and Australia

	USA	AUSTRALIA
Area (square miles)	3,539,289	2,967,909
Population	226.5m (1980)	15.5m (1983)
Military Forces (regular)	2,151,568	70,731
GNP (1984)	\$US3619.2 bn	\$US157.663 bn
Defence budget (1984)	\$US258.2 bn	\$US4.836 bn
Defence budget as % of GNP	7.1	3.0

Network Libraries

The main body, and third tier, of the DIS network comprises 80 libraries at military and civilian establishments. Their purpose is to meet the information needs of their users. These libraries cater for operational, support and train-




Figure 1 — Structure of Defence Information Services (DIS) Network

ing units, research laboratories and specialist technical or professional groups. Their size varies from one person operation through to libraries with a staff of 30.

There are also collections at 75 isolated units, overseas posts and ships at sea where the need does not justify a full library service.

Defence Information Services Branch

The hub of the network is Defence Information Services Branch (DISB) which is headed by the Assistant Secretary Defence Information Services (ASDIS). The functions of the Branch are to:

- functionally control, and promote the effective operation of, DIS libraries through:
 - (1) developing policies, programmes and procedures for DISB and for DIS libraries, and monitoring their observance.
 - (2) developing budgets for, and exercising discriminatory control over, expenditure on library material and some non-library material for the whole of DIS.
 - (3) collection, development, acquisition, cataloguing, dissemination and the maintenance of centralised stock records of library material.
 - (4) providing catalogues, current awareness services, retrospective searching, etc and publicising the existence of these services.

- (5) negotiating and operating information and document exchange arrangements with overseas defence organisations.
 - (6) sponsoring, funding and facilitating access to DIS, Australian and overseas bibliographic data bases.
 - (7) providing formal and on-the-job training of library staff and education of library users.
 - (8) acquiring, maintaining and operating information management systems in support of DIS.
 - (9) investigating, determining and recommending scales of issue and standards for the resource requirements of DIS libraries, including staffing, accommodation and special facilities, and monitoring their observance.
- provide information services to Defence Central and the Service Offices in Canberra through the Defence Central Library.
 - provide advice and consultancy service on information management matters to the Defence organisation and operate management information systems on behalf of other Defence elements.
 - liaise with the national information services community to improve Defence information services and to provide reciprocal benefits to the nation.

The DIS Branch is located in the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, within the Department of Defence, mainly because that

was the home of one of its ancestors — the Scientific and Technical Information Branch.

Responsibility for libraries is shared between ASDIS and the Commanding Officer of the establishment served by the Library. ASDIS has functional control which covers policy, procedures, services and professional matters relating to the quality and level of service provided. Commanding Officers have administrative control and therefore determine staffing levels, accommodation, equipment and daily operations within the guidelines laid down by ASDIS.

The organisation of DISB provides for a Liaison Officer, at Major level, for each Service. These officers are needed to explain the ways and needs of their Service to DISB and to explain and make known to the Services the facilities that are available through the DIS network. DISB is also assisted by the Defence Information Services Advisory Committee (DISAC), with representatives of each Service, the scientific and technical community and the central office of Defence.

Regional Libraries

Regional Libraries are the middle tier of DIS, and are located in most States. They are necessary because of the need for professional support closer than DISB to the libraries of the network. The major roles of Regional libraries are to:

- provide library and information services to local Defence elements as a Network library.
- as representatives of DISB in their region, generally oversee the activities and performance of libraries in the region and support them by:
 - (1) assessing training needs in the region and conducting training in accordance with DISB standards and curricula.
 - (2) assisting with reference enquiries (including online searches), current awareness services and inter-library loans.
 - (3) the creation and updating of subject profiles.
 - (4) recommending items to be acquired to meet the particular needs of libraries.
- evaluate, recommend and monitor the provision of resources notably staff and accommodation, required for libraries.

- liaise with organisations external to Defence to improve services to libraries in the region and to improve reciprocal services.
- keep DISB informed on the requirements of libraries in the region and participate in relevant DIS discussion.

Size of Network

By Australian standards the network is large with a budget of \$2.3 million (Australian) for materials and services for the 80 libraries in the network. Table 2 provides some general statistics which illustrate the scope of our operations.

Table 2 — Selected statistics on the DIS network (1985)

Budget 85/86	: \$2.3m (Aust)
Staff (including DISB)	: 195
No of books	: 500,000
No of serials (subscriptions)	: 14,700
No of reports	: 500,000
Loans	: 290,000
Inter-library loans	: 39,000
Reference enquiries	: 37,500

Information Services

Given the size and geographic spread of the network what types of services are provided?

Like most networks our activities can generally be divided into those associated with acquisitions and cataloguing and those concerned with reference and current awareness. We have some others that do not readily fit into this simplistic division and I will address each area in turn.

Books — Acquisitions

All acquisitions are centralized with DISB, apart from the libraries at three large research laboratories.

Libraries submit requests for purchase to DISB as a result of a user request or as a selection by library staff. Once checked and approved, the material is ordered through the appropriate contractor for delivery to DISB. Because of the centralized nature of this system and the fact that many libraries do not have professional librarians, there is active selection of material by staff in DISB. This is done using subject profiles which describe all the subject areas of interest to the users served by a particular library. The profiles are based on information gathered during interviews with representative library users and are recorded as

brief subject statements. Each statement is included in an automated KWIC index covering all libraries. This listing currently has 10,500 entries.

Books — Cataloguing

Cataloguing is done centrally using an online in-house system we call DISLIMS (DIS Library and Information Management System). The embryonic DISLIMS was first conceived in the late 1960s as an automated union catalogue on microfiche for Army libraries — the first of its kind in Australia. It has since grown into an online library management system which provides for cataloguing and stock control of books (and other material) obtained by DISB. The database is in standard MARC format but utilizes a refined tag specification we call DEF-MARC. Books are catalogued using AACR II, Dewey 19 and an adaptation of the Library of Congress Subject Headings. A major product from DISLIMS is the Defence Union Catalogue of Monographs (DUCOM) which is distributed to all network libraries in microfiche form.

Serials — Acquisitions

DISB arranges subscriptions for libraries and many non-library addressees throughout Australia. Subscriptions are reviewed once a year with each recipient submitting its requirements. The bulk of the orders are placed in October for a January to December subscription period. The ordering process has been automated since 1969 (another Australian first) and is a subset of DISLIMS. Each library is provided with a listing of titles currently on order (LIBPER) and another which records holdings of titles throughout the network (PERHOLD). Both are provided on microfiche.

Reports — Acquisition

While some reports are purchased centrally for network libraries the majority are obtained locally either as gratis copies or through document exchange channels.

Many DIS libraries have significant holdings of report material but the main collectors are the three large libraries at major defence research laboratories and the Defence Central Library.

Reports — Indexing and Dissemination

Report material is controlled by the Defence Information Services Technical Information

System (DISTIS) which had its origins in the late 1960s and was one of the first automated systems in Australia designed specifically to control scientific and technical report material.

DISTIS is a computerised information management system that administers four databases, three of which are compiled from records received on magnetic tape from NTIS, US Department of Defense, and the UK Ministry of Defence. Records from these databases are announced to Australian Department of Defence personnel via monthly current awareness bulletins. Provision is also made for local indexers to copy catalogue selected records from any one of these databases into our local database, the Defence Reports Database (DRDA).

DRDA contains 160,000 bibliographic records and holdings of participating DIS libraries and represents their combined holdings from 1970 onwards.

Reports indexing is decentralized and is currently carried out by some 16 network libraries. As more libraries acquire report collections and staff resources the number of input stations will increase. DRDA indexing conventions reflect international scientific and technical information description standards, particularly those used by NTIS, DTIC, DRIC, and DSIS.

To date much of the report material produced in the Australian Department of Defence and held in DIS libraries has originated in our research organisations. Efforts are being made to increase holdings of report material produced by the Australian Defence Force.

On-line maintenance of the database and quality control over all data are performed centrally by DISB and particular attention is paid to the requirements governing dissemination and distribution of classified information.

A variety of products are produced from DRDA. These include a microfiche union catalogue (DUCOR), monthly accession lists, stock control listings, SDI's, a monthly current awareness bulletin, and a number of authority files. It also produces the Australian Defence Scientific and Technical Abstracts (ADSTA) which announces Australian Defence reports released through the Document Exchange Centre (DEC) to our overseas exchange partners.

Document Exchange

Document exchange agreements are a vital link in our acquisition system for report ma-

terial. Exchange agreements between Australia and the US, UK, and Canada have been operating since 1975 and cover:

- regular exchange of suitable security classified material with appropriate announcement and release limitations;
- fulfilment of requests for specific documents where releasing authorities are agreeable; and
- exchange of abstracts.

In accord with the conditions of these document exchange agreements, requests for report material from our exchange partners are processed at DISB in the Document Exchange Centre (DEC) before being sent overseas. Incoming report material is also registered here prior to distribution to requestors.

In addition to the reports received through the DIS exchange agreements, significant exchange of military information takes place under formal exchange agreements. Some of the best known of these include:

- The Technical Co-operation Program (TTCP);
- ABCA Armies Standardization Program;
- ABCA Naval Quadripartite Standardization Program; and
- Air Standardization Co-ordinating Committee (ASCC)

The Technical Information Unit (TIU) receives large numbers of NTIS reports via a Selected Research in Microfiche subscription and is another source for reports acquisition in Australia.

Acquisitions/Cataloguing — Summary

All the acquisition and cataloguing systems described above have the net effect of providing access to commercial and military originated information of direct relevance to our personnel. The catalogues and current awareness services generated ensure ready retrieval of material already held within the network.

Online Retrieval Services

For information not held within the network DIS Libraries use 8 commercial database systems in Australia, America and Europe. In addition some libraries can access 6 Defence databases which are administered by DISB and are only available within the Department. Because of the classified nature of some of the databases, online access is limited. Table 3 lists

the services currently used in varying combinations by 16 libraries.

Table 3 — Online systems accessed by DIS Libraries

SYSTEM	No of Libraries
DIALOG	16
ORBIT	13
MEDLARS	1
AUSINET (Australian Information Network)	16
ESA/IRS (European Space Agency Information Retrieval Service)	13
ABN (Australian Bibliographic Network)	6
DIS/IRS (Defence Information Services/Information Retrieval System)	4
SCALE (an Australian full text legal system)	1
Pergamon Infoline	6

Those libraries without direct online access have their searches done by their Regional Library. It is expected that the number of libraries with direct access and the number of systems accessed will continue to grow. In some cases certain libraries may specialize, eg on medical or legal databases, and provide a service to all libraries in the network.

Current Awareness Services

There are 11 centrally produced bulletins which are available to all libraries. They cover journal articles, reports and books. A list and brief description is provided at the end of this paper. Libraries may also produce their own services and many produce accessions lists or journal contents page services.

The current awareness bulletins have proved to be very popular with over 33,000 documents requested in 1985.

One bulletin has been developed into a computer based index to military journals. The Cumulative Abstracts of Defence Readings (CADRE) now covers articles indexed since 1978 and its unclassified version is available on the Australian public access network, AUSINET.

Consultancy Service

The Information Systems Development Directorate within DISB has been tasked with providing a consultancy service on information management matters to non-library areas within the Department. One outcome of this role has been the development of a database structure suitable for recording specifications, standards and drawings. It has been adopted by all three

Services and is known as the Tri-Service Technical Information Control System or TRIS-TICS.

Defence Contractors

Contractors obtain most of their information from outside the DIS network. Their primary source is the Technical Information Unit (TIU) which is part of the Department of Defence. TIU was created in 1971 to provide a specialised information service to government and industry. It now holds over 300,000 specifications, standards and NTIS reports. DIS Libraries are heavy users of TIU services although the two operate independently.

Contractors can apply for access to material held in the library network through the Defence group associated with the project or by using inter-library loans.

Support Services

I would like to briefly mention some support services and mechanisms which are essential to the operation of the network.

Systems Support

With many of our catalogues and services dependent on computers, the staff of the Directorate of Information Systems Development play a vital role in developing, operating and maintaining our systems. Virtually all of our current software has been developed in-house by our own systems staff and consists of over 300 routines written in COBOL or PL/I. Information retrieval on our databases is achieved by using the IBM Stairs package.

All this software is mounted on an IBM 3033 computer some 750 miles from DISB Headquarters in Canberra. Online access between the two locations is maintained using leased telecommunication lines.

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the components of the DISLIMS and DISTIS systems, most of which have already been mentioned earlier in this article.

Microcomputers are increasingly used for word processing, finance, staff training administration and automation of local procedures. In online searching portable models are used to do demonstrations in areas without online access to these systems and to provide an intelligent interface with commercial database vendors.

Staff/User Support

Staff Training. 4 in-house training programmes are offered:

- basic training for new staff without library qualifications. This is done using a workbook for self-paced instruction plus on-the-job training.
- a 5-day course for more experienced personnel which concentrates on more advanced skills.
- a 2-day course for Service or civilian personnel who are responsible for supervising the library.
- 1-day courses on particular aspects of library services or policies/procedures.

User Education. DISB produces a folder and handouts which can be used by libraries for promotion activities. Various aids, such as guides to the catalogue and a video are also available. Further videos are planned.

DIS Manual (DISMAN). This is a 3 volume manual which sets out the common policies and procedures which apply across the network. An associated task is the creation and identification of standard forms for the whole network.

Standards for staffing, accommodation, equipment and library performance are being developed and should be completed in 1987.

Future Directions

Some of the projects which will occupy our time in the immediate future are:

- purchase and implementation of an integrated library management package. A five-year project commencing in 1987 will see the transference of existing databases into the new system, the implementation of new modules (such as acquisitions) and the widening of access to the system throughout the network. This project will impact on all operations and services and absorb a lot of staff time in the implementation cycle.
- closer links with overseas Defence libraries, possibly through staff exchanges, inter library loans and mutual access to unclassified databases. We would also like to exchange information on services, library standards for staff and accommodation and on user and staff education programmes.
- exploring ways of developing greater uniformity in the format of data provided through exchange agreements.

Figure 2.

DISLIMS





Figure 3.

DISTIS



Conclusion

The DIS network has made substantial progress over the past nine years in forming a coherent network of libraries which had previously belonged to many different organisations.

While many problems remain, the network has developed a national information service for acquiring and disseminating information relevant to our Service and civilian personnel.

In the future we hope to consolidate the progress made and are planning to enhance our services through automation and greater co-operation with organisations in Australia and overseas.

CURRENT AWARENESS SERVICES PRODUCED BY DEFENCE INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH (AUSTRALIA)

The following services are produced centrally and made available to all libraries in the DIS network.

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS (CDR)

This is a weekly bulletin listing articles, with abstracts, selected from recent journals received by Defence Central Library. Subjects fall into six broad categories; policy, operations, management and personnel, electronic systems, computing and information systems, research and development.

DEFENCE OVERSEAS ALERTS (DOA)

Lists items received from Defence representatives abroad. The list covers a wide range of subjects of interest to Australian Defence. It is distributed monthly.

NEW RAND PUBLICATIONS

Covers papers and reports published by the Rand Corporation in the USA. Major disciplines are covered in the physical, social and biological sciences particularly their application to problems of policy and planning in US domestic and foreign affairs.

COMPUTER SELECTIONS

Lists selected articles, with abstracts, from recent computing journals received by Defence Central Library.

CURRENT COMPUTER CONTENTS

Is a bulletin of the contents pages of computing journals received by Defence Central Library.

CURRENT MEDICAL CONTENTS

A weekly contents page service covering medical, dental and health related journals received by Defence Central Library.

CURRENT MEDICAL READINGS

An occasional listing of journal articles relating to the health services.

ADDITIONS TO THE CATALOGUE OF REPORTS (ACOR)

A monthly bulletin of scientific and technical reports added to DIS Libraries, arranged by subject.

ADDITIONS TO THE CATALOGUE OF MONOGRAPHS (ACOM)

Is a monthly bulletin of book material added to a particular DIS Library's collections. It is arranged in subject order using the Dewey call number.


LIMITED OVERSEAS REPORTS ANNOUNCEMENTS (LORA)


Another monthly list of reports but these are limited release documents announced by the Defence communities of USA, UK and Canada.

OVERSEAS REPORTS ANNOUNCEMENTS (ORA)

A monthly service covering commercially available reports announced by the US National Technical Information Service. This bulletin is

available in twenty-two subject categories so that users need only receive the categories in which they are particularly interested.

Many libraries also produce their own journal contents page services covering popular titles on particular subject areas (eg computing). 



NORFORCE — A Bush Briefing.

Comparing the 'Singapore Strategy' and 'Fortress Australia' concepts for Australia's Defence in the 1930s

By Captain P. D. Winter, RAA

... we must retain in European waters sufficient Naval Forces to match both the German and Italian fleets and we cannot do this and send a fleet to the Far East.¹

Introduction

THE Singapore strategy was the basis of Australian defence following the 1924 Council of Imperial Defence (CID) meeting until the collapse of Singapore in 1942. The strategy relied on deployment of the Royal Navy (RN) fleet to the Far East (FE) in the event of an emerging threat. The Singapore strategy was viable and the most suitable concept for Australia, but was badly planned and executed. Factors such as the failure to fully prepare defences, underestimating the Japanese and poor fortunes in battle meant the strategy failed the ultimate test.

The fall of Singapore left Australia open for invasion in 1942, which indicates an alternative defence strategy was required. In the 1930s the Fortress Australia concept evolved based on criticisms that the supposed threat of raids was too shallow and that Australia should be more self reliant in defence planning. Australian governments in the 1930s maintained a commitment to the Singapore strategy, and defence planning was centred on overall Imperial Defence arrangements.

Immediately after World War One (WW1) Australia had very few alternatives other than aligning to the plans for defence of the Empire. Australia's own defence capabilities, especially in industry in the 1920s, were limited. The Government actions in the 1930s however have been criticised, as Australia became too reliant on the RN and when the Singapore strategy was being questioned in 1937/38 the scope for implementation of the Fortress Australia scheme was very limited as war was imminent.

The main criticisms focus on whether Australia was too willing to align herself with Empire plans, making Australia a mere political

dependency. Furthermore, were Australian governments in the 1930s aware of the poor state of the Singapore defences, the vulnerability of capital ships to aerial attack and most importantly the overall doubts that the RN had the hardware to meet a two front war? These questions were the basis of the alternative defence posture, the Fortress Australia concept.

The Lyons government in the early 1930s has been criticised for resisting criticisms of the Singapore strategy especially from senior army advisers. In fairness, later Australian doubts in 1937/38 on the strategy were often answered by British assurances at CID meetings that the RN fleet would be dispatched to the FE if required. This raises questions on the reliability of UK advice, aside from the timely questioning by Australian governments.

The Singapore Strategy

What then was Australia's defence posture in the 1930s. The Lyons Government in 1932 set proposals dating from the 1923 CID into firm policy. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) would be further developed to contribute to the naval defence of the Empire, while land forces were to be organized for local defence against raids and for provision of an expeditionary force of one division.² Criticisms of this policy were best typified by the comments of Colonel D. H. Wynter, who claimed there were grave doubts on the reliability of RN defence.

Australia should aim for self reliance . . . with local defences providing for a possibility of major land and air attack.³

Imperial Defence

The limitations on Australia's defence capabilities made Imperial Defence desirable. The climate of the 1930s increased the pressure on Australian governments to accept this strategy. The nation was still recovering from the horror of WW1, and Australians sought stability from the League of Nations and the 1921 Four Power Pact. The fear of Japanese aggression had been reduced by the limitations on military expansion

from the 1922 Washington Treaty and the 1930 London Treaty.⁴ The Depression crisis dominated public thought, and defence expenditure was accordingly reduced.⁵ Any ability to defend Australia against invasion was jeopardised, thus the Singapore strategy became the only practical mode of defence because of the above circumstances, eg the economic crisis forced postponement of an aircraft manufacturing policy by the Scullin Government, again reducing Australia's local defence potential.⁶

Australia's acceptance of the Singapore strategy rested heavily on the successful historical basis of RN protection. In 1879, the Jervis Report had established the precedent of RN protection of ocean routes and Colonial responsibility for local defence from forts, native forces and coastal batteries.⁷ Troops had been dispatched overseas from the colonies since 1885 as an investment in RN seapower as well as loyalty to the Empire.⁸

The Singapore Base

The choice of Singapore as the FE base by the Admiralty followed Lord Jellicoe's 1919 tour. The Admiral of the Fleet had sought permanent Naval forces in the FE to match the Japanese.⁹ Ultimately, the required fleet was neither built nor stationed. The concept of the base was to allow the RN to deny Japanese



(AWM 3870) PM John Curtin. In 1937, as Opposition Leader, he began to advocate defence policies such as the Fortress Australia concept. A 1937 Parliamentary speech was a verbatim repeat of COL Wynter's paper on Continental Defence.



(AWM 20400) LTGEN J. D. Lavarack. As CGS in 1935 he was reprimanded by Defence Minister Parkhill for backing the Fortress Australia concept rather than the Singapore Strategy followed by the Lyons government.

access to the Australian East coast, Indian Ocean and British lines of communication through the Suez Canal.¹⁰ At the 1923 CID meeting, Australia's delegates (and Prime Minister Bruce) supported the selection of the base and the proposal for RN defence. This was sound in the post WWI climate, with the assumption that the RN sea power success was likely to continue and Australia could not defend herself without an unacceptable diversion of economic resources.¹¹

Between the wars, the merit of the Singapore strategy relied on a belief in RN supremacy continuing. Australia's position in 1924 was made clear by Prime Minister (PM) S. M. Bruce.

At no time has Australia been in a position to defend herself. Today, as in the past; we are dependent upon the protection afforded to us by Great Britain.¹²

Most Australians agreed that the nation was defenceless without Empire support, with the likely threat being Japan. Japan's population totalled 70 million, compared to seven million in Australia in 1925, consequently few Australians saw the point in preparing against a full scale invasion.¹³

Australia's allegiance to the Empire in the 1930s remained strong, explaining the ready acceptance by Australian leaders of Imperial plans at CID meetings. This commitment

throughout the decade was typified by PM Menzies in September 1939. Amidst serious doubts in the Singapore strategy, and yet with no immediate threat to Australia, Menzies declared 'Britain is at war, so is Australia.' Empire defence was the first priority for successive Australian governments in the 1930s. Consequently Australia was committed to WWII, and became a military reservoir for the Empire. By 1941 the bulk of the 2nd AIF was deployed to the Middle East; 14 000 RAAF men served with the RAF through the Empire Air Training Scheme, and RAN ships served in various threats under Admiralty planning.¹⁴



(AWM 2920) Colonel (later MAJGEN) D. H. Wynter. In the early 1930s, he criticised the Singapore strategy in public lectures and was quickly reposed to a lesser appointment.

British Misconceptions

Misconceptions in the 1930s by British leaders seriously hindered development of the Singapore strategy. The later dilemma of Australian leaders in analysing the defence plans would be exacerbated by the British mistakes, especially as Australia relied on British intelligence information. Appreciation of Japanese intentions by British officials was poor, despite constant Admiralty warnings. Haggie had criticised leaders for 'a lack of political dynamism, strategic planning and reaction to lessons.'¹⁵ Japan's disregard of treaties, secretive naval expansion, withdrawal from the League of Nations and actions in the 1932 Shanghai crisis were; according to Haggie, examples of aggression largely overlooked.¹⁶

Estimating the Japanese Threat

Doubts in Britain over the ability of Japanese soldiers should have been dismissed after the 1932 Shanghai crisis. The Japanese landed a division in 48 hours, with a mere 66 000 tons of shipping (compared to 215 000 tons for a British Division).¹⁷ The RN attache in Tokyo in 1935 provides a disturbing underestimation of the Japanese which was typical of many British Servicemen who misunderstood Japan's



To convince Australians that Singapore was impregnable the British administration flew Australians to the Colony in 1941 to see and report the situation on the island.

capabilities in armaments and operational procedures.

Japanese have particularly slow brains, teachers have assured me this is fundamentally due to the strain on the child's brain in learning some 6 000 Chinese characters before any real education can start.¹⁸

Churchill's Stance

A second major factor jeopardising the Singapore strategy, and again beyond the scope of Australian leaders, was Churchill's misconception of the Singapore base. He described the garrison as impregnable.

. . . a fortress of 20 000 men with five 15 inch guns requiring an Army of 50 000 five months to subdue it . . .¹⁹

Throughout the 1930s successive Commanders in Chief (C in C) in the FE, (Deyer in 1934, Little 1936 and Dobbie 1937); had requested reinforcements, increased defences and RAF early warning attack squadrons. Churchill in 1940/41 continued the chain of denials to these requests, ignoring advice on the base vulnerability from the UK Chiefs of Staff.²⁰

A military appreciation by Dobbie in 1937 for the defence of Singapore predicted the most likely form of Japanese attack would come overland from the North. Requests for reinforcement of the North, which Kirby claims could have saved Singapore up to 1940, were ignored by Churchill.²¹ Kirby argues that Churchill gave greater priority to the Middle



Lieutenant-General Percival, commander of all military forces in Malaya at the time of the fall of Singapore.

East in 1941 because of a failure to grasp the need to fully defend Malaya. Churchill considered that US intervention was possible in an emergency through Operation RAINBOW to defend Singapore, so the FE preparations remained inadequate.²²

Reliance on the RN

The third important misconception by the British to prejudice viability of the Singapore strategy was the post WWI vulnerability of




Sightseeing troops in 1941. For most Australian soldiers Malaya was a totally alien experience.

capital ships to torpedo bombers. As early as 1921, US Brigadier General Mitchell predicted after experiments that improved aircraft had the potential to destroy battleships.²³ The new requirement for fleet air cover was not recognized by the RN. No RN losses were sustained up to 1941, and in the Narvik Fjord actions of 1940 battleships had been successful despite bombing attacks.²⁴ Ultimately, it may have been fortunate that Z Force constituted only two capital ships to be sent to their doom in December 1941, when the lesson of air cover was cruelly taught to the RN.

The Singapore strategy viability was therefore retarded by these British misconceptions. The Australian governments of the 1930's were not directly answerable for any of these deficiencies in the scheme, and could be considered correct in maintaining support for the Singapore strategy up to 1941. There is however a fundamental flaw in the Singapore strategy which the Australian Government should have observed in the early 1930s, this being the RN ability to meet a two front war.

The Two Front War

After WWI, the RN had been reduced to a one power standard.²⁵ Automatically, from this limitation (due to the Washington Treaty) the pre-WWI ability of the RN to meet more than one threat simultaneously had vanished. This



One of the prizes the Japanese found awaiting them at Singapore: The Royal Navy's massive floating dock, part of the superb dockyard facilities.

placed the whole Singapore strategy in doubt, as described by Hamill.

Singapore was merely an Imperial symbol giving reality to a strategic illusion, that a two hemisphere empire could be defended by a one hemisphere navy.²⁶

Criticism must be levelled at the Lyons Government here for two aspects. Firstly, the strategy was not fully thought out and British policy was too readily accepted. More importantly, the weaknesses identified by senior army officers such as Wynter were ignored at a time when corrective action was required to negate the possibility of the RN fleet being occupied in Europe if a threat emerged in the FE.

Singapore a Close Run Affair

Despite this inadequacy, McIntyre has argued that the fall of Singapore was 'a close run thing' and he claims Malaya Command still had enough resources to defeat the Japanese attack.²⁷ This series of arguments again justifies the stance by the Lyons Government to support the Imperial Defence concept. Three key factors in the defence of Singapore could have altered history and proved the Singapore strategy viable.

Command Mistakes

The GOC Malaya in 1941, Lieutenant General Percival, was a Staff Officer in Singapore in 1936 and had helped prepare Dobbies defence



The colonial splendour of Singapore's General Post Office. The front entrance was bricked up as protection against bombings.



Smoke rises from the bombed city as Singapore experiences another Japanese onslaught.

appreciation.²⁸ Despite this background Central Malaya, under Percival's command, fell far too quickly (in 63 days with a loss of 130 000 prisoners).²⁹ The Matador Plan, designed as a four month delaying defence, was implemented too late as the Japanese had already occupied the first defensive lines at Singora and Patani. Other defences were not sighted on the Peninsula bottlenecks, instead some units were wasted guarding airfields for the outnumbered RAF and these areas were soon abandoned.³⁰

Air Chief Marshall Brooke-Popham. C in C FE, has been criticised for his failure (with

Percival) to implement 'Matador' and to order early air strikes into South Thailand once the Japanese attack convoy was sighted on 6 December 1941. Brooke-Popham and Percival waited until landings were confirmed on 8 December.³¹ RAF squadrons in North Malaya and the East coast were outnumbered 3 : 1, so once the initiative was lost the RAF was inevitably overcome.³²

The Failure of Z Force

Aside from these two command mistakes, the operations of Z Force (HMS *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*) could have been the saviour of the Singapore base. The Force should have included HMS *INDOMITABLE*, a carrier with nine integral Hurricane fighters. *INDOMITABLE* ran aground at Jamaica, leaving Z Force to face subsequent carnage from Japanese torpedo bombers at Kuanton due to the lack of air cover.³³ Z Force, even with only the two battleships, had the capability to destroy any Japanese warship and could have inflicted a slaughter on the merchant ships landing Japanese invasion forces³⁴ if air cover had been provided.

These fortunes of battle could have resulted in the success of the Singapore strategy. When coupled with the misconceptions by British leaders, the faith in the Imperial Defence Plan by the Lyons Government is understandable apart from the shallow reliance on the one power standard of the RN. Nevertheless, the strategy was unsuccessful and Australia was left vulnerable after accepting UK policy. The criti-



Wounded civilians are carried through Singapore streets in the wake of another Japanese bombing attack.



Black smoke billows from fires in oil storage tanks at the Royal Navy's base on the other side of Singapore island.

cisms incorporating the Fortress Australia concept for defence become relevant, but importantly was the concept more than a loose school of thought dissenting with Government policy? The term Fortress Australia was a post WWII term for defence from the shore, indicating the concept was not fully thought out aside from plans by senior Army leaders.

The Fortress Australia Concept

The Fortress Australia concept had no historical background, rather in 1923 the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Chauvel rejected the fleet to Singapore strategy. Chauvel believed the RN could not meet a two front commitment. He advised that Australia should prepare for a full scale invasion, estimating Japan could land a force of 10 000.³⁵ Chauvel prepared plans to raise a reserve and begin mobilization, possibly the first model behind the Fortress Australia concept up to Wynter's involvement.

Wynter's plans in the 1930s attracted Army leaders, airmen and strategists. His controversial lectures compared a de-emphasis of RAN importance on the premise that the decisive instruments in war were land and air forces.³⁶ The developments in air power made the scheme to defend Australia from invasion more plausible, although the RAAF was not considered effective by Government leaders until 1934.³⁷

The Lyons Government failed to accept advice from Army advisers that defences in Singapore in 1935 were behind schedule.³⁸ Army staff were aware of conflict in the UK over

defence in Singapore (in the late 1920s) from either 15 inch guns or RAF fighters. McIntyre described this procrastination as the most damaging debate in the saga of Singapore, as gun trials delayed preparations.³⁹ The British Labour Government of 1929 had also imposed delays on the defence preparations, amidst the Ten Year Rule in Britain giving a prospect of peace in the late 1920s.⁴⁰

Army officers further doubted assessments from UK intelligence of the Japanese buildup in the 1930s. An appreciation of Japan's attack on Singapore, and then possibly Australia, by Major Packer in 1938 was not taken seriously by the Lyons Government despite wide circulation.⁴¹ Failure to heed advice from senior military personnel on Singapore preparations and the Japanese threat caused anxiety in the Army and RAAF, as described by Williams.

Government leaders were hesitant to accept advice from officers if they differed from British views.⁴²

Rifts in the Armed Services

Different opinions over defence postures created a serious rift in the Armed Services in the 1930s. Governments of the National and United Australia Parties favoured the RAN 'Blue Water School' as part of the plan for Empire naval defence. In contrast, the Army advocated greater self reliance to cope with invasion and air developments as an adjunct to land forces.⁴³ The RAN received financial priority from 1926-36, receiving twice the budget allocation of the



Allied soldiers surrender to the Japanese invaders after the fall of Singapore.

Army and seven times more than the RAAF (who were struggling for survival from proposed mergers with the Army and preferences for civil aviation).⁴⁴

Hankey's Tour

The Federal Government continued to support RN seapower as the first line of defence after the visit to Australia in 1934 of CID Secretary Sir Maurice Hankey. The Lyons Government received assurances on the fleet to Singapore plan from Hankey at a critical time when Army criticisms were increasing pressure on Australia's leaders. Yet Hankey himself sought an assurance from PM Baldwin prior to departing London that the RN commitment could be relied on.⁴⁵ Baldwin's reply, an aide-memoire describing the FE as a priority; was hardly an assurance.⁴⁶

Haggie supports speculation that in 1934 the Lyons Government was misled. He maintains the senior UK cabinet members were concerned that if a weakness in the strategy was admitted, the Dominions would revert to self-dependence in defence.⁴⁷ Hankey's visit left no doubts in Australia's leaders that the strategy was sound, as described by Senator Pearce.

He (Hankey) rejected the ideas held in some quarters that the RN fleet could not or would not be sent to the FE in case of trouble . . . the presence of Mr Hankey gave a real Empire touch.⁴⁸

Senior Army officers remained unconvinced after the Hankey tour. Hankey himself had expressed doubts over the 1932 decision to or-

ganise local defences against raids and not an invasion force.⁴⁹ CGS Bruche and designate Lavarack discussed the possibilities of a Japanese invasion. Matters reached a peak in 1935 when comments from CGS Lavarack earned a reprimand from Defence Minister Parkhill, who indicated that Lavarack should confine his attention to the purely technical aspects of the Singapore Plan.⁵⁰

Support for advice from the Army in 1935 came from E. L. Priesse, former director of the Pacific Branch in the PM's Department.

The principal expenditure therefore, should not be the RAN, for our defence against the attack that would matter — raids and invasion, not blockade of overseas trade — our reliance should be on our land forces and aircraft.⁵¹

ALP Support

The Fortress Australia concept received political backing in 1936 from the ALP. Up to that point, the concept was a series of criticisms against RN reliance based on Chauvel's plans in 1923. A paper on the Continental Defence Plan by Colonel Wynter was taken up in Parliament by Opposition Leader Curtin. Although a pacifist, Curtin began rethinking the traditional ALP defence posture and began advocating self-sufficiency.⁵² His 1937 election speech included reference to a 50 squadron RAAF, as 'Australia's defence strength lies in aviation.'⁵³

With ALP support, the Army criticisms had by 1936 become an alternative policy. But the policy by then was not viable as the nation was

locked into Imperial Defence and facing war. At best, the Lyons Government could merely seek RN assurances and support appeasement (as done at the 1937 CID).⁵⁴

Doubts in 1937

The final aspect for review concerns the 1937 CID. This conference confirmed Australia's commitment to the Singapore strategy. Defence Minister Parkhill had begun earnest questioning on the fleet to Singapore plan at a May 1937 CID meeting in London. Parkhill was impressed by the commitment to 1940 from First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Samuel Hoare.⁵⁵ At a subsequent CID meeting in June, Parkhill again pressed the question as to whether the Singapore Fortress would resist an attack prior to the arrival of the fleet.

At this meeting, Parkhill mentions 'doubts in Australia.'⁵⁶ British Defence Minister Peter Inskip retorted 'he thought the necessary assurance had emerged from the meeting.'⁵⁷ Further, Sir Cyril Deverell reinforced the assurance by stating 'all our plans are based on the Fortress holding out.'⁵⁸ Parkhill felt assured. This was reaffirmed at the 1939 Wellington CID, where Australia's CNS Calvin strongly supported RN sea power.⁵⁹


The British leaders were not candid with the Lyons Government. Assurances continued through 1937-9 that Singapore would hold for 70 days, yet no commitment to a full time fleet was ever undertaken.⁶⁰ An example of the British being non-committal comes from a March 1939 British Strategic Appreciation Committee.

It is undesirable to make any further communications to the Dominions as to the limitation in the size of the fleet we should be able to send to the FE.⁶¹

Australia's High Commissioner in London, former PM Bruce, describes the mounting doubts in 1938.

There are a number of gaps in the information that we have with regard to naval forces in Singapore and the FE.⁶²

He later warned PM Lyons in 1939 few capital ships could be expected in an emergency, preceding a similar cablegram from PM Chamberlain as hostilities against Germany and then Italy began to overshadow the FE.⁶³ Lord Caldecote's cablegram arrived in 1940, and this marked a turning point with confirmation that the RN fleet concept could not be guaranteed.



Victorious Japanese troops march into the city of Singapore.


Australian defence would soon be entrusted to the US.⁶⁴

Conclusion

The defence plans for Australia were threadbare with Caldecote's cablegram. In review, the actions of Federal governments from 1923 in supporting the Singapore strategy can be faulted in only two aspects, with the concept being viable but poorly planned and executed. Australian governments did not appreciate the risk of the RN reduction after WWI to a one power standard, and then did not react to advice from senior Army staff on aspects such as Japanese intentions and Singapore defences.

It must be remembered that despite this, the scheme for Imperial Defence was viable and the luck of battle fortunes (especially with Z Force) favoured Japan. Other misconceptions by British leaders; such as the poor assessment of the Japanese, misunderstanding of the Singapore base capabilities by Churchill and the non-recognition of battleship vulnerability to aerial bombing; were all factors jeopardizing the strategy which were beyond the control and knowledge of Australia's leaders.

Australia had relied on the RN in the past, and in the post WWI climate the defenceless Australia continued that arrangement. Proponents of the Fortress Australia plan, mainly Army officers, proposed other defence modes but no real alternative defence policy eventuated

until ALP backing for the scheme was evident in 1936. By that time, the Lyons Government was locked in to the Singapore strategy and could only seek assurances from the British. The Singapore strategy even then seemed viable, as assurances were given by Hankey in 1934 and in crucial 1937 CID meetings that the RN would meet the commitment. The British, seeking to gain time, encouraged the Dominions to work towards Imperial Defence and to maintain faith in the Singapore strategy. The fall of France and the Italian menace in 1940 meant the British hopes were dashed and the FE became a lower priority. 

NOTES

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NORFORCE — Getting the Message Across.

United Nations Forces in Northeast Asia United Nations Command and United Nations Command (Rear) Their Missions, Command Structures and Roles in Regional Security.

By Capt Liane I. Degville (AALC) ARES

Scope

THIS article deals with the command structure, legal basis, and roles of United Nations Command and Headquarters, United Nations Command (Rear). Australia is an active and committed participant in these command organisations and Australian Forces' Personnel from Regular and, more recently, Reserve forces play an integral role in the achievement by these commands of their defined missions.

Relevance

The roles of UNC and UNC(R) in the maintenance and promotion of military security and stability are crucial for the continued stability of regional and world peace.

Historical Analyses

On 25 June 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of Korea. The United Nations Security Council denounced the aggression and it was only due to the absence of the representatives of the Soviet Union (with its power of veto) from the Security Council meeting on 27 June 1950, that a resolution calling for assistance from member nations of the United Nations was able to be passed.

Under the command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the UN Command, almost three quarters of a million men served in the UN Forces. In addition to 250,000 US and 400,000 ROK forces, the following nations participated by committing military, naval and air contingents:

Australia
Belgium
Canada
Colombia
Denmark

Ethiopia
France
Greece
India
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
South Africa
Sweden
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom

Together with the United States, these 20 nations represented almost half of the 52 nations which at that time were members of the United Nations.

After 25 months of armed conflict, the Armistice Agreement was signed on 27 July 1953. It is important to note when considering the current and future status of UNC that that agreement is not a peace treaty (hostilities continue in fact as well as in theory as a peace treaty has still yet to be signed) and that it was signed by representatives of the armed forces involved (other than the Government of the Republic of Korea) in their capacity as force commanders, and not by or on behalf of the governments involved. A permanent political settlement and cessation of actual hostilities has now, 34 years later, yet to be achieved.

Establishment of UNC(R)

Following cessation of hostilities, the UNC mission changed from that of defeating aggression to enforcing the terms of the Armistice Agreement (AA).

The UNC Headquarters, which had been located in Tokyo was moved to Seoul on 1 July 1957 to carry out this mission more effectively¹.

UNC(R) was established in Tokyo to conduct certain administrative, support and liaison functions of a diplomatic type, in Japan.

Japan As a Host-Nation : UN-Japan SOFA

In the meantime, Japan had ceased to be an occupied nation and had been restored to the status of an independent nation with its own sovereign rights. In 1954, the Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan (UN-Japan SOFA) was promulgated.

This agreement entered into between Japan, the United States and certain of the nations listed above who participated in the Korean conflict, (other than the Republic of Korea itself) provides basing rights for UN Forces in Japan similar to those rights granted to US Forces under the parallel US-Japan SOFA².

Command Structures and Roles — UNC and UNC(R)

UNC

CINCUNC

The headquarters of UNC is located at Yong-san Army Garrison Seoul, Korea. The Commander in Chief of UNC(CINCUNC) serves simultaneously as Commander United States Forces Korea (USFK), Commanding General Eighth United States Army (EUSA), and Commander in Chief Combined Forces Command (CFC). The position is filled currently by a four-star General, U.S. Army.

Legal Authority

The legal authority for the UNC remains the Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950 which requested that the United States provide the personnel for command of UN Forces. The remaining commands acquired their legal authority for operating in Japan from bilateral defence agreements entered into between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

Primary Mission

The primary mission of the UNC is to carry out the terms of the Armistice Agreement. This includes conducting the affairs of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), and the various components thereof.

The practical effect of its mission is of great benefit to Japan and Korea by the promotion of long-term national and regional security. Japan and Korea are involved by reason of cir-

cumstance of history but benefit by the security gained. It is important to remember, however, that whilst in the case of Korea this is achieved by "collective security", in the case of Japan that nation's current constitution, which denies collective security, is respected and in relation to Japan security is achieved on a bilateral basis.

Military Armistice Commission

The MAC was established pursuant to the AA to supervise the implementation of the agreement and to settle, through negotiation, any violations of it. It is the *only* available mechanism and channel of communication between the two opposing sides across the DMZ. Since the AA was signed and at the time of writing this article, 433 meetings have been conducted.

It is noteworthy that such a sole channel of communication is a military body, comprised of military commanders and not of politicians, but that its daily role is more political than military.

Structure: The MAC is a joint international military organisation without a chairman and consists of 10 members, five senior officers appointed by CINCUNC and the other five senior officers appointed jointly by the commanders of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV).

Of the five members appointed by CINCUNC, one is from the US, two from ROK, one from the UK and one designated on a rotational basis from among the other current sending-state nations of Australia, Canada, France, Philippines and Thailand. New Zealand is not included among the rotating nations as New Zealand is in a unique position, having allowed its accreditation in Korea to lapse but whilst still maintaining its accreditation in Japan. That this is so is unfortunate. The UNC is often unfairly charged with being over-represented by U.S. personnel. That the U.S. assumed the mantle of leadership is a coincidence of history. The true international character of the UNC can only be promoted by maintained and re-committed accreditation and participation.

MAC components and their functions: The MAC conducts face to face negotiations at the Joint Security Area (JSA) in the DMZ. There are 3 components of the MAC, each having its own distinct mission and purpose:

- MAC Plenary Sessions,
- Joint Secretariat, and
- Joint Duty Office.

MAC Plenary sessions: can be called at any time and have a four-fold mission:

- to negotiate serious violations against the AA,
- to supervise implementation of the AA,
- to discuss any and all pertinent topics to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and
- to act as a mediator between CINCUNC and the North Korean Supreme Commander of the KPA.

Joint Secretariat (JS): provides administration and staff assistance to the MAC. A Secretariat is maintained by each side. A Secretary's meeting can be called by the Secretariat of either side and at any time.

Over the years, the matters discussed at these meetings have been broadened by practice to include discussions of less serious violations of the AA which would otherwise have been matters of concern to the Plenary Session, thus freeing the PS from the burden of excessive minutiae and thereby allowing it to concentrate upon matters of more serious and immediate concern. Such matters now handled by the Secretariat, for example, may be the presence of automatic weapons in the DMZ or the failure by military personnel to wear armbands.

Joint Duty Office (JDO): maintains 24 hour contact between the two opposing sides by telephone communications, Joint Duty Officers meet daily at noon (except Sundays and Holidays) to exchange written correspondence and notify alleged infractions of the AA.

In addition to these elements of the MAC, language personnel from each side meet weekly to discuss points of translation and Security Officers meet from time to time to discuss alleged infractions and misbehaviour concerning security guards of either side.

Promotion of tension by KPA/CPV: Not surprisingly, the KPA/CPV has used the quasi-political role of the MAC to disseminate propaganda and to maintain constant pressure and strain upon the peaceful implementation of the AA.

Most recently, the KPA/CPV has used the annual Team Spirit military exercises conducted in Korea between US and ROK forces as excuses

to disrupt the conduct of MAC meetings and business.

On 28 January 1986, the 433rd MAC meeting was held. At that meeting the Senior Member (US), Rear Admiral C.F. Horne III responded to KPA/CPV complaints concerning Team Spirit '86 and their intention to suspend dialogue during the exercise period: after referring to prior notification given to the North Korean command by UNC advising of the exercises and extending an invitation to them to observe the exercises, RADM Horne stated:

"It is clear to anyone that your side conducts dialogue when it chooses to, exercises or not; and when it doesn't want to conduct dialogue, it doesn't, using as a pretext our exercises as convenient to you." "If you really felt threatened by Team Spirit you would redouble your efforts in the south-north dialogue, because it is talking together that really reduces tension and defuses potentially warlike situations." "So all your arguments are false."

Joint Observer Teams (JOT): The MAC, or the Senior Member of either side, is authorised by the AA to dispatch JOT's to investigate reported violations of the AA that occur within the DMZ. However, the KPA/CPV has frustrated this mission by refusing since April 1967 to participate in such joint investigations. Despite this refusal, the UNC's multi-national Special Investigative Team (SIT) conducts unilateral investigations of more serious allegations and incidents. The SIT was established particularly for this purpose after the 1967 refusal by KPA/CPV to participate in JOT's.

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)³

The NNSC is another Armistice Affairs agency composed of senior officers from Sweden and Switzerland (UNC choice) and Czechoslovakia and Poland (North Korean Choice).

The NNSC was created in 1953 to investigate armistice violations that occur outside the DMZ, and to inspect the arrival and departure of military personnel, equipment and weapons at five designated ports of entry on each side. However, since 1956, this agency has been unable to function as envisaged due to North Korean obstructive tactics. Nevertheless, it continues to perform an active role with its international presence within the DMZ.

Continuing Tensions:

It is clear that tensions between the two opposing sides continue to run high. That this is so is understandable when recent violent incidents are considered. The refusals by the North Korean side to participate in JOT's and the role of the SIT's are particularly important in light of this violent background.

Incident

1976 Axe Murders

On 18 August 1976, an unarmed working party comprised of US and ROK personnel advanced, as they were empowered to do so, into the narrow zone between UNC and North Korean emplacements in the DMZ. The objective of the working party was to remove an overhanging limb from a tree in that intermediate zone which had been obstructing line of sight across the zone.

Shortly after entering the zone, the party was approached by a considerably larger party from the north Korean side. This party was armed with axes, a weapon often carried by North Korean personnel in an area delimited to non-automatic weapons.

During a skirmish and before assistance could reach the UNC party, two US military personnel were axed to death by members of the North Korean party.

Soviet Defection: Penetration across Military Demarcation Line (MDL):

About 1130 hours on 23 November 1984, a tour sponsored by the North Korean side arrived at the MAC conference building. Minutes after their arrival, a member of the touring party, Vasilii Yakovlevich Matuzok, a Soviet citizen, broke away from that party and sprinted the entire length of the MAC conference building, crossing the MDL to the UNC security guards on the south side of the building.

Matuzok, calling in English for help, was assisted with physical cover by one of the UNC security guards who ran with Matuzok towards the UNC checkpoint. Chasing Matuzok, a number of North Korean guards, armed with type 68 automatic assault rifles⁴, and estimated at about 10 in number, ran across the MDL into the UNC portion of the Joint Security Area (JSA) firing at Matuzok and the UNC guard. During this time, additional North Korean personnel were observed moving south of the road which leads to a UNC checkpoint.

In the ensuing exchange of fire between UNC and North Korean guards, one UNC guard was killed and another wounded. North Korean casualties were estimated at five.

At approximately 1156 hours, the KPA/CPV Joint Duty officer telephoned the UNC Joint Duty Officer and requested a cease-fire which was approved by the UNC.

These incidents are related in order to illustrate that tensions on the DMZ between the two sides remain high and to stress the importance of the presence of UNC in that area and the crucial role that it plays in maintaining peace and security despite the lapse of 33 years since the cessation of continual armed conflict.

United Nations Command (REAR)

UNC(R) is that component of UNC which is situated in Tokyo and which provides to that forward command certain support.

Whilst the UNC is present in Korea pursuant to the terms of and in order to enforce and maintain the terms of the Armistice Agreement, the presence of and the primary mission of UNC(R) is based upon the UN-Japan SOFA.

Primary Missions

Two primary missions of UNC(R) in Japan are to:

- ensure the maintenance in force of the Agreement regarding the status of United Nations forces in Japan (UN-Japan SOFA), and to
- accomplish, in conjunction with military, civilian, and governmental agencies in Japan, necessary actions concerning matters of interest to UNC.

Pursuant to the UN-Japan SOFA, UN bases in Japan are maintained so that in the event of the resumption of hostilities in Korea there will be UN bases to support, logistically, UN Forces in Korea.

Secondary missions include representing the CINCUNC in Japan and acting as a catalyst for Japan-ROK communications, which will be discussed later.

UN-Japan SOFA: Historical and Legal Background

On 8 September 1951, at San Francisco, the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan was signed.

Pursuant to that treaty, Japan, as well as resuming its status as a sovereign nation, de-

clared its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and in particular the obligation "to give the United Nations every assistance in any action (the United Nations) takes in accordance with the Charter"⁵.

On that same day in San Francisco Yoshida Shigeru⁶, then Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan and Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State of the United States of America, signed and exchanged certain notes. Pursuant to these notes, it was agreed that "if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the Member or Members of the forces engaged in such United Nations action. "It is an interesting legal point to note that the 'Support' referred to in the Acheson-Yoshida Agreement is to be *permitted* and *facilitated* by Japan but not to be *provided* by Japan. Such support is to be provided by the member or members of the forces engaged in such UN action. On the other hand, the UN Charter the terms of which Japan accepted refer to Japan giving "every assistance". This distinction, though of legal merit and interest is perhaps superfluous to the ambit of this article.

The permission of such support is provided for in detail by the agreement referred to above as the UN-Japan SOFA (the Agreement).

UN Forces in Japan

The support given by the Government of Japan is given to "the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force".

However, such support is limited to those members of the United Nations who are "parties to the Agreement". In addition to the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America acting as the Unified Command, a party may include "each Government which signs or signs 'subject to acceptance' and accepts, or accedes to, this Agreement, as the Government of a State sending forces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations Resolution."⁷

A qualification of participation in this agreement is, then that that member have partici-

pated in the Korean armed conflict by sending forces to it. Of the original 21 member nations referred to at the commencement of this article who participated in the Korean conflict, and other than the USA acting as Unified Command, ten qualified sending-states have signed or acceded to and become parties to the Agreement: Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia, Philippines, France, Italy, Thailand and Turkey.

Of these, France, Italy, South Africa and Turkey have, since qualifying as parties and after initial participation in the activities of UNC(R), ceased to continue active participation, but whilst still remaining parties to the Agreement and so remaining qualified to participate should they wish to re-commit themselves.

In fact, in recent months, France has re-committed itself to full participation in UNC(R) obligations and activities, and some other countries of the original 21 whilst not yet parties to the Agreement have registered their interest in acceding to the Agreement and in committing themselves to participating.

Obligations of Participation

Liaison Officers

The initial obligations of sending-states participating in the activities of UNC(R) pursuant to the Agreement is to assign to that command a liaison officer. These Liaison Officers⁸, with the exception of New Zealand, coincidentally have the dual responsibility of being the military attache in Japan for their respective countries.

In the case of New Zealand, no military attaches are assigned to either Japan or Korea. Instead, it's minister-counsellor in the Tokyo embassy serves as Chief, UNC Liaison Group for New Zealand to both UNC and UNC(R).

As depicted in the command chart, liaison officers in Korea are members of the UNCMAC Advisory Group and participate in the activities of UNCMAC itself. Liaison officers in Japan participate in the activities and obligations of UNC(R).

The Joint Board⁹

Chiefs of each participating Liaison Group participate by way of their membership on the UN-Japan Joint Board. The Joint Board was established by the UN-Japan SOFA for the Administration of that agreement.

The UN is represented on the Board by:

Senior Representative: Chief of Staff, US Forces Japan, (Major General or Rear Admiral),

Deputy Representative and Secretary: Commander, UNC(R),

Political Advisor: Military-Political Counselor from the US Embassy, Tokyo, Sending States: Chief of each Liaison Group/member nation.

Japan is represented upon this Board by:

Senior Representative: Director-General, North American Affairs Bureau, Gaimusho,¹⁰

Deputy Representatives: Members representing each of the Gaimusho, Ministries of Justice, Finance, Agriculture and Forestry, the Defence Facilities Agency and the Japan Defence Agency.

Secretariat: a member representing the Gaimusho.

UN Forces' Obligations

By the Agreement, the forces¹¹ of UN member nations participating in the activities of UNC(R) have agreed to certain obligations, including:

- to respect the law of Japan and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the Agreement, and in particular, from any political activity in Japan;¹²
- to be subject to the laws and regulations of Japan in respect of customs¹³, and in relation to offences committed within the territory of Japan and punishable by the law of Japan to those laws relating to criminal offences.¹⁴

Japanese Obligations

Obligations of the Government of Japan include:

- to allow members of the UN Forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents to enter into and depart from Japan subject to notification from UNC of the number of such persons entering and departing, the date of entry and departure, the object of entry, and the expected duration of stay;¹⁵
- to seek such legislation and take such other action as it deems necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within the territory of Japan of installations, equipment, property, records and official infor-

mation of the United Nations forces, and for the punishment of offenders under the applicable laws of Japan.¹⁶

UN Forces' Benefits

Under the Agreement, UN Forces acquire certain rights, amongst them:

- Vessels and aircraft operated by, for or under the control of the UN forces for the purpose of the Agreement are accorded access to such ports or airfields as may be agreed upon by the Joint Board, free from toll or landing charges.¹⁷

Cargo and personnel carried on such craft may also be accorded other exemptions under the Agreement. In the exercise of this benefit, UN Forces are required only to notify Japan of such movements; there is no requirement first to get the approval of the Government of Japan. In practice, however, this right is not abused nor taken advantage of; the relevant Japanese Ministry is kept well informed of all such movements and its comments are sought and well appreciated.

Entry into Japanese airspace of aircraft of UN Force Members, landings of such aircraft of portcalls by ships of such nations are thereby facilitated and are without the requirement of otherwise lengthy procedures and reportings were such visits and calls to be made on a bilateral basis between Japan and the country of origin.

- The UNC Forces may use such facilities in Japan, inclusive of existing furnishings, equipment and fixtures necessary for the operation of such facilities as may be agreed upon by the Joint Board.¹⁸

The facilities available for use by UN Forces are any of those facilities and areas the use of which is provided to the USA under the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America¹⁹ and which are approved and designated by the Joint Board for use by UNC Forces. There are 7 facilities in Japan which have been accredited by the Joint Board for use by UN Forces:

Yokota Air Base (USAF)
Camp Zama (USA)
Yokosuka Naval Base (USN),
Sasebo Naval Base (USN),
White Beach, Okinawa (USN),

Kadena Air Base, Okinawa (USAF), Marine Corps Air Station, Futenma, Okinawa (USMC).

Each of these bases fly the UN Flag in addition to the flags of the US and Japan.

- Income and property taxation exemption granted to UN Forces their members, civilian components and their dependents.²⁰

Benefits to Liaison Groups

In addition to the benefits outlined above, personnel attached to each member nation's Liaison Group receive additional benefits from their association with US Forces.

The US Forces supply to military personnel of participating sending-states attached to the UNC and stationed in Korea and Japan, their civilian components and their dependents, certain administrative and logistical support to enable them to each participate on an equal footing. This is conducive to an atmosphere of cooperation and participation which itself allows for appropriate responses and reactions should any crisis arise.

Benefits for Regional Security

By such international participation in UNC and UNC(R), and by the hospitality granted those forces in Japan by the Japanese Government which, it should be stressed, does not amount to "participation", security in Korea is promoted and achieved. That security is but part of the promotion and maintenance of the security of the overall Asian Pacific region. Security in this region is critical not only because this geographic area plays an important strategic and geographic role in the access by the Soviet Union to the Pacific, but for the reason also that countries in this region, developing rapidly in industrial strength but trailing in defence strength, promise to be the future leaders in and powers of the international economic, industrial and political community. To enable them to so develop and at the same time to withstand the communist forces which are active, strong and insidious in this region, it is strategic for those Western Nations who are now able to, to assist in the promotion and maintenance of this regional security. Japan's undertaking, by the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty between the US and Japan (Art. vi), to contribute "to maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" is evidence of Japan's recognition of that threat.

UNC and UNC(R) promote and maintain regional security by ensuring the integrity of three important lanes of communication: sea, air and people. Sea and air lanes of communication are secured by the presence of sea and air craft of UN forces in this region. People-lanes-of-communication are secured by the achievement of the missions of UNC(R) through the activities of the Commander UNC(R) and referred to later in this article.

Basic Command Structure

UNC(R) is a subordinate command to HQ UNC which is located in the ROK. Its sister organisation in the ROK is the United Nations Military Armistice Commission Secretariat. Both organisations report directly to the Deputy CINCUNC, and are the sole organisations dedicated exclusively to the UNC mission.

Accomplishment of Mission

The UNC(R) accomplishes its mission by working closely with the Japanese Gaimusho not only through the activities of and participation in the Joint Board, but also by daily administrative and social activities of a diplomatic kind.

HQ UNC(R) maintains a particularly close relationship with the Japan Defence Agency and individual members of each of the Ground, Air and Maritime Self-Defence Forces.

The performance by Liaison Officers of their duties is assisted by keeping them informed of and involved in UNC activities. As part of this assistance, an annual trip to the ROK for Liaison Officers is conducted and individual trips to the ROK as well as to other UNC bases are frequently sponsored.

The Commander UNC(R)

The main role of the Commander is representative: he is the representative in Japan of CINCUNC (Korea) in all matters pertaining to the UNC. Through him, contact is maintained between CINCUNC and the Government of Japan. He achieves his mission largely by the conduct of his dual roles as Deputy Representative and Secretary of the Joint Board.

This role is more than merely providing amenities for such contact; rather he must facilitate effective interface and cooperation between the international UN Forces (most of whom operate as well-meshed, well-integrated forces) and Japanese agencies which operate in

styles and structures different to that of the west (which difference itself has long baffled experts in the fields of management and trade).

It is an understatement to define such a Commander as a military diplomat.

UNC(R): A Catalyst for Japan-ROK Communications

It is a sign of the confidence held by the Government of Japan in the role and conduct of UNC(R) in the exercise of its missions and relationships forms that it has recently allowed UNC(R) to operate as a means of communication between it and the Government of the Republic of Korea.

It is an acknowledged US aim to facilitate and improve communications between the ROK and Japan so that regional harmony may be enhanced.

Relations between the two countries are strained to the point of continual animosity. The reasons for this are historic, relating back to the time when Korea was a colony of Japan. As well as having had a general condescending attitude towards Korea, an attitude which remains to a measurable extent today, Japan has been charged with harshness and cruelty in the former administration of its colony.

Despite the lapse of almost half a century since the end of WWII, we cannot complacently assume that time heals all wounds. However, the fact that two countries with such delicate relations are earnestly endeavouring to make their alliance succeed is a timely reminder that both countries take seriously the common and geographically imminent communist threat.

Non-US Force Representatives

When the Government of Japan agreed to the establishment of and hosting of UNC(R), it suggested that a non-US force or force representative be assigned to the command. The reason for this stipulation was to ensure that UNC(R), staffed as it is by US Force personnel, maintains its appearance as a component of United Nations Forces, rather than appear as a parochial US organisation.

From 1957 to 1976 this requirement was met by a Thai Air Detachment which was assigned to UNC(R). This detachment was recalled in 1976 and until 1978 was replaced on an interim basis by the United Kingdom which sent officers on TDY from Hong Kong.

Since late 1977 a force representative has been supplied by the Republic of the Philippines, from either the Philippine Army or Constabulary. The Philippine Force Representatives have been and continue to be sent for a period of one year during which they are provided with a programme of observation and orientation training for which UNC(R) pays all travel and per diem expenses.

Service as UNC(R) Force Representative has shown to be excellent training in preparation for duty as military attache/Chief of Liaison Group for these countries.


The Banyan Tree

The chosen symbol of UNC(R) is the Banyan tree, a tree found in many areas of the Pacific. The Banyan tree is characterised by its unique trunk which is not a single trunk but is comprised of a number of root-extensions, bound together. The Banyan tree is able to withstand the heaviest Pacific storms where other one-trunk trees cannot due to the strength it gains from the number of its bound trunk components.

Like the Banyan tree, so will Pacific region security be maintained: by the combined strength of all the members of the UN Forces rather than by the dominance in the area of just one.

Australian Participation

Australia has, since the Korean conflict, continued to participate in the security activities of UNC (Korea) and UNC(R) (Japan). Its participatory role is well regarded by other participating nations and in view of the growing importance of security in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, Australia might wish to increase its participation in the functioning of UNC(R) by making more service personnel available to that command, if only on an "on-call" basis.

Such increased participation would be warmly received and appreciated by all current participating nations. 

Notes

1. HQ UNC Command Historical Summary 1 January 1984 31 December 1984.
2. Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (signed at Washington on 19 January 1960).

3. Ibid. n.1.
4. The presence of automatic weapons alone in this zone constitutes a grave violation of the AA.
5. Treaty of Peace — clause reiterated in Article V (a) (iii) of US SOFA.
6. In this article, Japanese names are cited in the Japanese manner, surnames preceding christian names.
7. Treaty of Peace — clause reiterated in Article I (b) of UN SOFA.
8. The dual-hatted Liaison Officers hold the title of "Chief, UNC Liaison Group" for their respective countries. On 1 July 1957, when UNC moved to Korea and UNC(R) was established, those nations which desired to maintain their participation split their liaison groups, in most cases retaining the senior officer in Japan and assigning the junior officer to Korea.
9. The Joint Board is a body distinct and separate from the "Joint Committee" which is a body established to administer the US-Japan SOFA but whose membership comprises many of the same members as the Joint Board.
10. "Gaimusho": Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
11. The "forces" include the members of such forces, the civilian components of such forces and their dependents: UN SOFA Articles I (d), (e), (f), and (g).

the following footnotes (12-20) all refer to the UN SOFA;

12. Article II.
13. Article XIII.
14. Article XVI 1 (b).
15. Article III.
16. Article XVII.
17. Article IV.
18. Article V (1)
19. Ibid n.2. It is important not to confuse the US-Japan SOFA with the UN-Japan SOFA.
20. Article XII.

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2. HQ UNC Command Historical Summary, 1 January 1984 31 December 1984.
3. Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan 1954.
4. Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding the status of United States Armed Forces in Japan 1960.



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The Actions of the Australian Flying Corps, First AIF, on the Western Front 1916-1918

By Officer Cadet David Steel, RAAF College

PER ARDUA AD ASTRA

'Approval has been granted for the formation of a flying corps in Australia'

Military Order 570

22 October 1912

'... the Air Service ... The heavens are their battlefield; they are the cavalry of the clouds. High above the squalor and the mud, so high in the firmament that they are not visible from earth, they fight out the eternal issues of right and wrong.'

Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George
British Prime Minister

Vote of thanks to the flying
service — House of Commons
29 October 1917

'... making history and establishing a tradition that will never fade as long as Australia has an Air Force'

Lieutenant-Colonel L. A. Strange
Recollections of an Airman
London, 1935

Synopsis

THE war of 1914-1918 saw the emergence of air power as an element of military power. It also laid the foundations for the future of military aviation in this country. The Australian spirit, I suggest, was the main factor behind the decision to establish squadrons of the Australian Flying Corps within the first Australian Imperial Force, rather than merely allow the RFC to recruit for pilots and ground crew in Australia.

The Australian flyers in the Great War contributed greatly to the development of air combat. There were fifty-five aces from a country with a population of only five million contributing only four squadrons to the war. These men pioneered much in the area of reconnaissance, bombing, radio, artillery co-ordination, training methods and supply dropping.

These men were the fathers of the Royal Australian Air Force and this country owes them much.

Introduction

The war of 1914-1918 is remarkable for a number of things. It is remarkable in that the romance and adventure which had always been associated with going off to war was finally destroyed and ground into the mire of the Somme along with countless thousands of young men. It is remarkable for the breaking of the three most important agreements of the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. Namely the use of poison gas, attacks by submarines on merchant shipping, and aerial bombardment by airships and airplanes, of open towns!¹

The Great War is also remarkable for the obstinacy shown by both sides in the insane stalemate of trench warfare on the Somme with tactics akin to hitting oneself over the head with a hammer repeatedly. This is the saddest aspect of this war.

Certainly the most unexpected aspect of the Great War is the role air power played in the battles that were fought. The advent of aerial warfare saw the most amazing advances in equipment, tactics and training in the four years of the war.

Wing Commander Robert Stanford-Tuck, DSO, DFC, RAF (Retd.) commented on the relationship between warfare and technology in his foreword to Christopher Chant's book *World War Two Aircraft*, he said:

'It is perhaps a sad reflection on society that during war years man's inventive genius often reaches a peak of achievement which seems to tail off or slow down, as he advances into a peaceful era.'²

This observation is certainly true of aviation in both world wars and in smaller conflicts since.

In the Great War the capabilities of aircraft advanced at such a pace that the pilot was left behind. At the outbreak of WW1 aircraft were unarmed, carried no bombs, could climb to ten thousand feet given a few hours and could reach

speeds of about seventy miles-per-hour. By the end of the war aircraft such as the SE-5a could climb to twenty thousand feet at 140 miles-per-hour and carried two forward-firing machine guns and a hundred pounds of bombs.

At this height pilots need special oxygen apparatus and thermal suits to fly the open-cockpit aircraft used in the Great War. Such technology was still being developed and most pilots made do, often landing suffering from lack of oxygen and near frostbite.

I have been fortunate in obtaining literature in my research for this article. Whereas much of the literature surrounding the Great War, concentrates on the senseless slaughter of trench warfare, I have managed to get access to some personal accounts of life in numbers 2, 3 and 4 Squadrons of the AFC, thanks to the very helpful staff of the RAAF Museum at RAAF Base Point Cook. The widely published literature about the AFC in this war is generally confined to a few chapters in RAAF histories.

This reflects the way the war was seen by many people. Literally hundreds of thousands of men were in the AIF and of them only a few hundred were associated with the AFC. It was in these fragile formative years and from these few men, that the AFC evolved into the efficient and successful corps that it was by 1918.

Accounts of the efforts of individuals illustrate what I feel is the uniquely Australian way of tackling problems. Corporal Jack Stubbs was a member of the Australian half flight sent to Mesopotamia in 1915. Corporal Stubbs showed remarkable resourcefulness in modifying aircraft for particular tasks in this ultimately futile campaign. Bombs were unavailable or damaged in transit and the aircraft were designed for reconnaissance but Corporal Stubbs managed to modify bomb racks to take artillery shells. He managed to modify the fuselages of aircraft to allow bombs to be dropped, fitted as many as four machine guns, all forward firing, to aircraft and pioneered the dropping of supplies from the air with parachutes. This is the same sort of resourcefulness shown by the ANZAC troops at Gallipoli in their invention of the periscope and the grenade, but is not as well known.

The Australian character was just as evident in the flying corps as in the land forces and though their worlds were vastly different, the men were still the same, they were Australians.

In this article I will look briefly at the formation of the AFC. This will then frame the actions of the AFC on the Western Front during the war and provide a basis for the examination of the lessons learnt and the consequences for Australia and the RAAF.

Formation of the AFC

The settlement of Australia in the nineteenth century was almost 100 percent British. The overall population was very dedicated to the Empire and loyal to the crown. Ron Cooper in his article *Why the Australian Flying Corps*³ suggests that the Australian people were isolated from any shortcomings of the British Government during this time and that a sense of 'national homesickness' existed. The vast size of Australia and its isolation from Europe forced Australians to become self-reliant. They had to produce everything they needed within the country because it was a five month voyage by ship to Europe.

Cooper describes Australians as:

'... a sturdy, self-reliant race, capable of the most rigid self-discipline, but contemptuous of discipline for disciplines sake.'⁴

Whilst Australians were distinguishing themselves in South Africa in the Boer War, the six Australian states were federated and in 1901 the Commonwealth of Australia was formed and national pride rose high.

Cooper then relates the Breaker Morant affair in some detail and draws attention to the displeasure of the Australian Government over the incident. He says:

'The Australian Government was thus left in serious doubt as to the *bona fides* of the case and moved to ensure that the control of the Australian forces would never again be surrendered to absolute British control.'⁵

Cooper concludes his article in saying that the decision of the Australian Government to form the Australian Flying Corps was partly due to a proud young nation's desire to establish a complete defence force and partly due to the desire to retain control of Australian forces when they were fighting for the Empire.⁶

An organization known as the Aerial League of Australia was formed in April 1909. The League's aim was to get the Government to establish military aviation in Australia⁷ by 1911. Companies shipped planes from England and flew demonstrations before large crowds in Australian cities, in an attempt to influence the

Government to buy some aircraft. In early 1911 the Military Board deferred plans for an aviation corps, but on 30 December 1911 following the visit of the Minister for Defence, Senator Pearce, to the Imperial Conference in London, financial support was granted for a flying school.

On 22 October 1912 approval was granted for the formation of a flying corps. The site of Duntroon in Canberra was proposed for the new flying school but this was rejected as the close hills made it dangerous for student pilots. The site of Point Cook on the shores of Port Phillip Bay in Victoria was chosen for the school, and the formation of the Central Flying School and Aviation Corps was publicly announced on 7 March 1913. The title 'Australian Flying Corps' appears to have never been officially promulgated but was simply adopted from references in proposal papers and was no doubt influenced by the title 'Royal Flying Corps' of the English aviation forces.⁸

Training of pilots began at Point Cook on 17 August 1914, thirteen days after war broke out with Germany. This first course of four students graduated in November 1914 and within a few months Australian airmen were flying in combat in Mesopotamia (now called Iraq). A 'half-flight' of four pilots and fifty men were sent to Mesopotamia on 20 April 1915.

The Australian Flying Corps (AFC) was part of the first Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and was sent overseas to fight for the Empire. Australia was the only dominion of the British Empire to raise its own flying corps and such was her resolve in this area that by 1918 the AFC comprised four operational squadrons. Number One Squadron operating in Palestine and numbers Two, Three and Four Squadrons operating in France; together with four training squadrons based in England and the Central Flying School at Point Cook, Victoria in Australia.

Cooper has a valid point I believe. The actions on both Gallipoli and the Western Front support his argument. The Australian Government was right to be concerned about the control of its troops. Australians were under the command of Australian officers it is true, however, they always managed to be placed in the middle of the front, facing the toughest opposition and often took crippling losses.

The Australians were proud and daring fighters. Proud of their fighting reputation, their national identity and their disregard for authority. They still are.

In a dispatch dated 20 September 1915, the Secretary of State for the Colonies invited the dominion forces to send officers and other ranks to the Royal Flying Corps to be trained and suggested that whole squadrons might be the best sized unit. After some discussion of size, the Australian Government agreed with this request. The idea of keeping the unit wholly Australian appealed to them.⁹ Major-General Sir Sefton Brancker said in his memoirs that the British Government attempted in 1915 to enlist men from the dominions directly in to the RFC.¹⁰ Australia 'rebelled at once' says Brancker. Thus the strong sense of nationalism and unity which was being fed by reports of Australia's heroic sons at Gallipoli was clearly evident in the formation of the AFC. Squadrons were to be entirely manned and funded¹¹ by Australia, and were to be part of the AIF. The same sentiments are evident here as in the Army composition of the AIF. Australia would do her bit for the Empire and she would do so on land and in the air.

In July 1916 the Secretary of the War Office in London wrote to AIF Headquarters, requesting two hundred candidates for pilot training in the RFC. Though it was against Australia's policy to allow these types of transfers,¹² it appears that dedication to the Empire was the stronger emotion. Men had been discouraged from applying for commissions in the British services because of the desire to demonstrate the ability and independence of the Australian forces, but it seems to be a different matter when Britain requested the transfers.

The letter from the Secretary of the War Office said in part . . .

'In view of the exceptionally good work which has been done in the Royal Flying Corps, by Australian born flyers, and the fact that the Australian temperament is specially suited to the flying services . . .'¹³

This, I feel is the passage that convinced the Australian Government to relax its policy. The British were praising the Australian ability and achievements and then appealing to have some Australians to fill vital places in the expansion of the RFC.

One Squadron AFC

In January 1916 Number 1 Squadron AFC was formed at Point Cook. In the correspondence prior to its formation, both the British and Australian Governments desired that it be wholly Australian,¹⁴ as indeed it was. On arrival in Suez the members of Number 1 Squadron found that they were to be under the command of the Fifth Wing, Royal Flying Corps, and referred to as Number 67 (Australian) Squadron, Royal Flying Corps. The Australians were a little indignant at this and it took a good deal of time and correspondence before they were referred to as Number 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps.¹⁵

The aerial forces in Palestine involved a number of RFC squadrons and No. 1 Squadron AFC, and were called the Palestine brigade of the Royal Flying Corps. In mid-1917 this brigade was divided into two wings, the 5th Wing and the 40th Wing. 1 Squadron AFC was in the 40th Wing and their missions involved strategic reconnaissance, bombing and photographic map making, essentially in an Army cooperation role.

In June 1918 Major (later Air Marshall Sir) Richard Williams who was the commanding officer of No. 1 Squadron AFC was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and given command of 40th Wing. Thus an Australian born officer of the Australian Flying Corps was given a command outside the AIF, he now commanded a formation larger than the AFC could produce.

There was a total of seven squadrons flying in the Palestine Brigade RFC in 1918. Each month No. 1 Squadron AFC consistently topped the lists of hours flown, bombs dropped, aerial combats and photographs taken.¹⁶

After the war when the Australian Government considered the idea of a separate air force, the experience of Sir Richard Williams and other AFC officers was to prove valuable. They learnt about aerial warfare in Europe and the Middle East as well as the more important concepts in the use of air power and the command of men and their advocacy was vital in the forming of the Australian Air Force as a separate service on 31 March 1921.

I have included this brief account of the actions of No. 1 Squadron AFC because they were important in several ways. Firstly, the squadron was the first squadron of the AFC to be formed and sent overseas as part of the AIF. Secondly, because of the significance of

their insistence on being called Australians and recognized as part of the Australian Flying Corps. Thirdly and most importantly, because of the actions of Sir Richard Williams. In later years this man was called the 'Father of the RAAF'. He devoted most of his life to developing the RAAF, fighting hard for it in its junior years and his experience in World War One prepared him for this and convinced him of the need for an independent flying service.

The Western Front Squadrons

Numbers 2, 3 and 4 Squadrons AFC were involved in action on the Western Front in the last two years of the Great War. These three squadrons were all raised in Australia and trained mostly in Britain. They were numbered 68, 69 and 71 (Australian) Squadrons respectively, of the RFC, in a similar fashion to the re-numbering of No. 1 Squadron in Palestine. I shall refer to them by their AFC designations.

Numbers 2 and 4 Squadrons were fighter squadrons. They flew fighter and scout patrols and were equipped with SE-5a's in the case of 2 Squadron and Sopwith Camel F-1's and Sopwith Snipe 7F-1's in the case of Number 4 Squadron. Number 3 Squadron was an army support squadron, flying operations such as artillery direction, photo reconnaissance and bombing and flew slower, more stable aircraft like the Royal Aircraft Factory RE-8 and Bristol fighter F.2B.17.

I have been particularly fortunate to discover a personally typed and hand-corrected manuscript entitled

'The Story of my Life; — part 3 1917-1918 (After I left Egypt and transferred to the AFC)

The author of this story is ex-Air Mechanic Hubert D. Billings who was a member of the 1st Signal Troop, Australian Engineers, he then transferred to the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade and then to No. 2 Squadron AFC. He served from April to December 1915 on Gallipoli, from January to October 1916 in the Sinai Desert and in England and France in 1917 and 1918 following his transfer to No. 2 Squadron.¹⁸

Bert Billings served with 2 Squadron as a radio instructor and he relates many amazing facets of the training and operations of the squadron. One of the areas pioneered in this war by Billings and others was air-to-ground communication. One of the roles of aircraft

was the direction of artillery from the air. Artillery was a major part of trench warfare and therefore being able to accurately hit the enemy's artillery became very important. Aircraft would circle over the battle and send directions by radio to the artillery batteries.

This may sound easy but it was not. Communication was only one way, pilots could send but not receive and they could only send in morse because open voice transmission had yet to be developed. They had to look at the ground and estimate the fall of shot whilst looking out for attacking aircraft and enemy ground fire, all this whilst flying an aircraft and operating a cumbersome wireless set.

Billings relates a novel way of teaching this complex operation to trainee pilots.

'To teach the basic operation of the type of wireless in 'planes, we installed a seat high up in an instruction room to represent a pilot up in the air on a flight to observe artillery fire . . . in this mock up of a 'planes cockpit we had an actual aerial . . . a two pin plug . . . also a buzzer and key to represent the wireless transmitter. In conjunction with the above we had a large contour map about twelve feet square (on the floor) showing hills, roads, buildings etc. . . . flashes were made by a small globe on the end of a long pointer, and would indicate where the shot fell.'¹⁹

This simulation exercise is brilliant in its simplicity! I think it is a tribute to the inventiveness and creativity of these pioneers because, though the 'simulator' could not simulate the problems of ground fire or cross wind or enemy planes, it would have trained the pilots well in the use of the unfamiliar equipment so that when in the air they could concentrate more fully on their flying and observing, because the task of sending signals would be almost automatic. Today's modern simulators bear a remarkable similarity to this novel invention.

Billings and his fellow instructors took this simulation one step further.

' . . . we would locate small bags of black powder at regular distances and directions from the target (perhaps a haystack) and these were connected to our control point. . . . These were exploded as desired . . .'²⁰

Hence this further simulation gave pilots experience in flying, observing and signalling all at once and was as good as the real thing except

for the absence of the enemy. The ingenuity of these people did not stop at this however, they also developed devices for signalling to aircraft from the ground, before electric signal lamps came into use, and devised a camera-obscura arrangement for bombing training.

This camera-obscura was a lens in the ceiling of a dark room with a scale map on a table underneath the lens. As an aircraft flew around above, its reflection would be cast on the map by the lens. The pilot would send a morse signal to indicate when he considered he should have released his bomb and the ground technicians would determine its point of impact.²¹

Two Squadron moved to France on 21 September 1917²² and shortly afterwards became the first Australian squadron to fly in air combat in France. Their first major operation was in support of the tank assault against Cambrai on 20 November. This assault was preceded by ten days of 'softening up' the German opposition. The pilots from 2 Squadron would fly low over the German lines, machine gunning and bombing targets of opportunity. In this operation the 2 Squadron pilots were flying the slow, stable DH-5's, they were slower than the German Fokkers but still the Australians were able to shoot down a number of Germans.²³ In December the squadron was equipped with the faster and more manoeuvrable SE-5a.

Billings describes an incident in 1917 when a pilot in an SE-5a put on a low-level display of aerobatics for an American band which was visiting the squadron to give a recital.

'He dived at us and skimmed over the band at 300 m.p.h. only 20 or 30 feet above . . . (it) had a diving speed of 300 m.p.h. which was very fast for those days.'²⁴

The SE-5a certainly was a fast aircraft, it had a 200 horsepower engine and could fly at 140 miles-per-hour in level flight. The SE-5a was the aircraft flown by sixteen aces in No. 2 Squadron²⁵ but I think 300 m.p.h. in a dive may be a bit optimistic.

The Australians got on very well with the French it seems. Billings in his manuscript describes the life:

' . . . at such places as Bailleul, we were located on the outskirts of a city where civilian life continued on a more or less normal way, women living with their children (only very old men left at home) they took in our washing and did mending too.'²⁶

He describes the street cafes, called *estaminets* and how they used to eat suppers of fried eggs and chips.

'We became good friends with a family in the city, and often spent an evening with the family. We aired our small amount of French and they did the same with their English . . . we all had a lot of laughs.'²⁷

This passage contrasts with other parts of Billing's manuscript where he describes actually being shelled.

In the notes for Wing Commander Wrigley's book, *The Battle Below*,²⁸ there are many poems and thoughts on aspects of the war in France. In contrast with the tale Billings relates, Wrigley wrote a short piece entitled 'A picture from the Western Front'.

'Everywhere you go here there is nothing but ruin,

Every village is shot all to pieces, every field torn by big shell; and we have gone through forests where you would have difficulty in finding one tree untouched by shell or bullet.

Just toss in dead men, dead horses and all sorts of abandoned battle-equipment and you have an idea of the way things look here.

I'm a little hazy on what hell is like but compared with war it must be a place where you sit with your feet on the mantel, smoking your pipe and blowing foam off a cold one!²⁹

These two pictures and countless others, serve to illustrate the uncertainty of war, periods of hell and periods of leave when the men would try to forget for a few hours.

' . . . I'd give anything for the sight of a real town again'³⁰ says Wrigley in the same piece.

1918

In March 1918 Germany began its final assault, shelling viciously for days and launching every aircraft in to the air. The allied trenches were bombarded by over 6000 German guns firing high explosive and poison gas shells.³¹

By this time the concept of the flying circus was established. A circus was a group of two or three squadrons of fighter aircraft which flew together and used the tactics of hunting in packs. The Germans developed the idea and their circuses were called *jagdstaffel* or *jagdgeschwader* meaning fighter wing. The name circus actually derives from two things, firstly the fact that many German circus pilots would paint their

aircraft bright distinctive colours like red, yellow and green.³² Secondly, circuses were mobile. They would pack up their base, put much of it on a train and move on to the next town or wherever the ground forces needed extra air power.

It is commonly thought that the German circuses were composed of the elite, that all the pilots were experienced and successful³³ but this may be a legacy of the popular view at the time. It is true that the *jagdstaffeln* (plural) had heroic, well-known and successful leaders, such as Baron Von Richthofen, Hermann Goring and Oswald Boelcke, these men were great pilots, tacticians and leaders, however it is apparent that many of their circus pilots were not elite champions as is commonly thought.

'Popular Flying' in September 1934 published an account of (then) General Goring's eighth victory in the skies of France in the Great War. It was taken from a collection of German Airmen's experiences.³⁴ In this account Goring relates the battle of his circus of 8 June 1917, when he scored his eighth victory. He also describes the other pilots of his circus and his role as their leader.

'Ten machines of my youthful Staffel were flying behind me in squadron order. . . . it was up to me to keep a sharper lookout than ever in case the enemy should fasten on to one of them from behind and finish him off before I could come to his aid, because they were all so inexperienced as scouting pilots. But I was very keen and anxious to train my promising material in to a Staffel of tough and dashing fighters.'³⁵

I think the main advantages of flying circuses in the last two years of the war were, strength of numbers, powerful leadership, mobility and the skills acquired by the junior pilots through flying with their national heroes.

The allies operated in circuses also and April 1918 saw No. 2 Squadron AFC operating in a circus with Numbers 43 and 80 Squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps. This was the period after the strong German push of March had been halted and there were few German aircraft in the air at this time. The 'push' as it was called, pushed the allies back to just past the village of Villers-Bretonneaux. This advance was checked here and from this point the allies counter-attacked to push the Germans back to the line between St. Quentin and Cambrai.

The Australian Advance

In late March 1918 Marshall Foch was appointed as Supreme Allied Commander on the Western Front. Following this the division of responsibilities between the Australians and the French was clarified. The Australian Corps was assigned to the section of the front from just south of Villers-Brettoneaux to a point midway between Bouzincourt and Aveluy in the north.³⁶ The line at this time was unsettled following the rapid German advance in March and the aircraft of the RAF³⁷ and AFC were to play a major role in harassing the Germans to prevent them consolidating their positions.

Number 2 Squadron AFC was operating in a circus at this time as I have mentioned, and it was flying in support of British forces from an airfield at Bellevue. No. 3 Squadron was moved in to Poulainville near Amiens to fly missions in support of the Australian forces in their advance. There were three main mission types involved in this advance. The most important missions were artillery coordination missions. The pilots and observers of 3 Squadron directed the Australian artillery fire against the Germans to;

‘. . . prevent them establishing themselves in strongly defended positions.’³⁸

The second mission type was straight out dog-fighting for survival as the German Air Force attempted to stem the mounting allied air superiority. These combat missions would often come about when an aircraft on artillery reconnaissance was attacked by the Germans. To counter this to some extent the concept of ‘top cover’ was developed. In July 1918 No. 4 Squadron was doing artillery reconnaissance work and low level bombing and strafing, and No. 2 Squadron was flying top cover³⁹ to ensure against surprise attack. Both these squadrons were now based at Reclinghem.⁴⁰

The third mission type was the strafing and bombing of German troops, supply lines and other targets. This role was often combined with the artillery spotting role. After directing the artillery the planes would drop down to about two thousand feet and strafe the trenches on their way back to the airfield.

Lieutenant Tom Prince was an observer with No. 3 Squadron in France at this time. He was interviewed in 1970 by the Australian Society of World War 1 Aero Historians and the interview printed in their yearly journal. Mr Prince

describes his first flight over the trenches on an artillery direction and bombing mission.

‘We levelled out at five thousand feet. The cruising speed of the RE-8 was rated at ninety miles-an-hour so it did not take us very long to travel the fifteen miles to the line. . . . Len Chase (Lieutenant L. P. Chase) then began registering one of our batteries on to a target behind Hamel . . . When it was time for our final task we side-slipped to two thousand feet and Chase dropped the bombs on Hamel, while I fired a drum from my Lewis gun along one of the German trenches. Then we headed for home . . . we had time for a wash and change before lunch.’⁴¹

Number 3 Squadron also provided much of the photographic coverage of the Australian Corps area. These photographs were extremely valuable as trained analysts could interpret a great deal of information about such things as enemy ammunition stockpiles, trench activity, railhead activity and whether a battery was out of action or not.

The main assault on the German positions began in August and by mid-October the allied forces had pushed the front back about forty miles to St. Quentin and Cambrai. As the allies pushed forward the squadrons had to move regularly to keep within contact with the front. Three Squadron moved from Bertangles to Villers-Bocage to Proyart and then to Bouvincourt, sometimes spending as little as five days in one place.⁴²

Cooperation between the Squadron and ground forces was one of the keys to the success of this campaign. Wrigley describes how 3 Squadron assisted in reducing a salient (bulge in the front line which spreads forces thinner) opposite Ville-sur Ancre in May 1918. The entire area was photographed to provide the 6th Australian Infantry Brigade with the most recent information for their attack. Aircraft bombed rear points to hinder supply and directed artillery fire against the enemies batteries.⁴³

When the actual attack was made an aircraft patrolled overhead — at 4 am on 19 May. This was very hazardous in these days before effective radio and with no more navigation aids than a simple compass. On a signal from the aircraft, a blare from a Klaxon horn, certain troops would let off flares, thus their position was noted and mapped and the aircraft flew

back over headquarters and dropped the map.⁴⁴ When it became light similar flights were made to plot the positions of the Germans in retreat. This kept the commanders up to date with the troop movements.

These innovative tactics of cooperation led to an allied advance of over forty miles in a few short months and ultimately to the success of the allied offensive.

Conclusion

Accounts of heroism abound when tales are told of the Great War. Sadness, stupidity, courage and mateship are the most prominent elements of the land war. Men were living on the edge of their nerves, under fire continuously and in conditions fit for no human being.

The flying service was another world. There was a glamour associated with the daring life of an airman. The attractions of the Flying Corps over the infantry were seen to be many. The men had tents and cooked food, away from the front, there were far fewer casualties and long periods of no contact with the enemy. Then there were also long periods of time spent orbiting in a slow stable vulnerable aircraft, directing artillery fire, all the time being vulnerable to attack from both patrolling enemy fighters and to ground fire. There were moments of sheer terror, throwing a flimsy machine around the sky with (often) a superior German-built machine spewing bullets at you from its twin machine guns.


Apart from these obvious differences, I think the main difference between aerial combat and land warfare was that in the air it was an individual war. There were no radios to tell the pilot what to do, or to warn him of danger. He had to rely on his own skills to locate the enemy and he had to decide if, how, when and where he would attack. There were no Generals in charge, no Lieutenants blowing whistles to signal the attack, and his opponent was likewise an individual who had to make his own decisions. The words of the Secretary of the War Office in his letter to AIF Headquarters come to mind . . .

‘. . . the fact that the Australian temperament is specially suited to the flying services.’⁴⁵

Obviously it was a combination of all the factors I have mentioned that appealed to the Australian Character.

Pride in oneself and not letting your mates down were the striking features of the operation

of the Australian squadrons. Liddell Hart was an adjutant of an Australian Squadron (No. 2) in 1917 and he says of the men in the squadron: ‘. . . they had the fundamental discipline of doing their job well and never neglecting any detail of their work on the aircraft.’⁴⁶

The Australians had pride in themselves and in their work and in their country. 

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My thanks to the Curator of the RAAF Museum at RAAF Base Point Cook, Flight Sergeant D. W. Gardner, OAM, JP and his staff, for their help, advice and access to many rare documents, photographs and letters, which contributed greatly to the writing of this article.



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The Impact of German Submarine Warfare on President Wilson's Decision to Declare War on Germany, 1917

By Bryan Wharton, ARES

IT is one of the great ironies of the United States entry into the Great War, which was precipitated by the successful employment of the relatively new weapon, the submarine, that America played a considerable role in initially furnishing the German Empire with the seed that would grow into this war machine. In true *laissez-faire* manner in the 1880s a New Jersey designer Simon Lake took his submarine plans to central Europe after failing to interest his government in them. He arrived in Germany at a time when Admiral Von Tirpitz, with the Kaiser's backing, was beginning Germany's naval challenge to the Royal Navy. Tirpitz was quick to see the potential in what Lake lay before him. "The Krupp armaments company dealt with Lake, and finally managed to take over all his patents and push him out of his own business. From these events the German U-Boat program was developed, for Admiral Tirpitz was first to see the submarine as an offensive weapon."¹

This episode passed with few in the United States or England realizing its future significance. Circumstances moved along and from August 1914 the old world of Europe was rocked by a war that many, particularly in the new world did not understand, and even more wanted no part of. However, this was to be total war, waged as such by both sides, and the impact of the German undersea fleet was to be the major contributing factor in bringing American opinion around to the Allied cause leading up to the declaration of war by President Wilson before Congress on April 2nd 1917, just three years later.

From the beginning of the conflict the United States Government was firmly in the hands of the progressives, led by President Wilson and assisted in foreign policy by his Secretary of State, Bryan. "Progressives might have been expected to be more inclined to neutrality since many of them had long recognized that Imperial

Germany despite her democratic deficiencies possessed virtues which England notably lacked."² In 1914 Wilson proclaimed neutrality and called upon Americans to "remain impartial in both thought and action."³ For all the good intentions the policy was never correctly adhered to, with trade becoming its big stumbling block. The Royal Navy controlled the Atlantic and this established a trade in munitions between the United States and the Allies from which Germany was excluded. This trade in fact pulled America from a depression year in 1914 to boom years in 1915 and 1916. The huge allied purchases quickly put a strain on their financial reserves and with the support of key advisors Wilson approved the raising of loans by the Allies on the American market. Germany could effectively overcome this neutral industrial and financial policy by using her submarines in an unrestricted campaign destroying the ships sustaining her enemies.

With her strength in surface warships, the British from the first days of the war controlled trade between neutral countries and the Central Powers. As the war made grim progress these controls were tightened. President Wilson's response to British trade violations was limited to mild protest notes, received politely, then quickly forgotten. The importance of trade was such that an American embargo of Britain would not have been popular, especially with farmers and industrialists. "Hence the United States accepted the British blockade of the Central Powers, but was not so ready to accept a German counterblockade."⁴

The following quote sums up general opinion of the English at the time. "People in the United States enjoyed disliking her, but it was the dislike of first cousins. Americans thought they and the English were members of the same cultural scheme."⁵ Wilson was a noted Anglophile as was his key advisor, the colourful Colonel House, whose pro-allied sentiment regularly surfaced with such statements as:— "We have given the Allies sympathy and we have given


them, too, the more substantial help that we could not offer Germany even if we were so disposed."⁶ Secretary of State Bryan stood out as a beacon of neutrality and even-handedness but was to resign in response to the harsh diplomatic notes presented to Germany in the wake of the *Lusitania* sinking. What was happening was a gradual move toward intervention by men in the highest government posts. Backed by large sections of the American Press, "they all but allowed Great Britain to run wild in the violation of international law . . . while they insisted on holding Germany to strict accountability."⁷ British reports of alleged German atrocities in Belgium received wide circulation and following the *Lusitania* sinking, "even sober newspapers burst forth with denunciations of mass murder and of savages drunk on blood."⁸

"American interest in the war . . . for a long time was the defense of our neutral rights according to the established rules of maritime warfare, as they had been known in the past. We did not understand that new modalities of warfare and new weapons — above all the total blockade and the submarine — had rendered obsolete some of the more important of these rules."⁹ Amidst total war conditions Americans were expecting gentlemanly behaviour from the warring parties in insuring the safe passage of her nationals and exports. The submarine was only effective when submerged, on the surface it was vulnerable to shellfire or ramming. This made it dangerous for the U-Boat commander to adhere to outdated laws demanding search and safe disembarkation for neutral crews and passengers. From February 4th, 1915 Germany declared she would sink enemy vessels entering British waters. Events moved rapidly, until May 7th when, without warning, the Cunard liner *Lusitania* was torpedoed and sank quickly, taking to a watery grave 128 Americans. The incident galvanized United States society into a rage against what Theodore Roosevelt called, "an act of piracy."¹⁰ President Wilson did get a pledge from Germany to in future not attack unarmed passenger liners. This proved ineffectual when the unarmed French passenger ship, the *Sussex*, was sent to the bottom on March 24th, 1916 causing injury to American passengers. "Outraged, Wilson . . . presented an ultimatum to Berlin, declaring that unless the Germans ended their barbarous methods of making war on passenger and freight carrying vessels, the United States would . . . sever re-

lations. This of course was a threat of war-an irrevocable threat."¹¹ "German ambassador (to the U.S.) Bernstorff judged correctly that neither Wilson nor public opinion would permit America to enter the war on any issue other than the submarine, and that it was vital to secure a postponement to the intensive campaign."¹² The German Government agreed and on May 4th promised that rules of visit and search would be followed.

The winter of 1916-17 saw a stalemate on the brutal killing ground that was the western front. Russia had been knocked out of the war, French soldiers were becoming mutinous, following the slaughter at Verdun, and Britain had reached a point of spiritual and financial exhaustion. Germany, suffering the starvation of what was called "the turnip winter", due to the blockade, was little better off. Meeting at Pless on January 9th 1917 Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg yielded to his military commanders Hindenburg and Ludendorff who wished "one final roll of the iron dice" to break this deadlock. This meant resumption of unlimited submarine warfare," the German admiralty guaranteed . . . to reduce the British to absolute starvation within five months."¹³ "The risks were great . . . but Hindenburg and Ludendorff argued that merciless U-Boat warfare would bring England to her knees, well before distant and unprepared America could field an effective force in France. If success beckons, Bethmann Hollweg conceded, we must follow."¹⁴ With the sinking of four American ships between February and March and the release of the Zimmerman telegram President Wilson could not back down from his stated position. With his cabinet's unanimous backing for a war declaration Wilson left for the Capitol.

America from the beginning of the war expoused neutrality and it is worth noting that when she entered the war it was over an issue of neutrality. Despite the push for preparedness and pro-allied support from many quarters, be they power brokers, the media, financiers or industrialists, "it was never sufficient to constitute, for the national consciousness as a whole, adequate justification for entering the war."¹⁵ It was to be the new technology of the submarine used in total war, thereby contravening established maritime law that was to swing the body of American public opinion to support intervention. Was it a case of international law not keeping pace with 20th century technology?

Possibly, and the lesson in history is one worth contemplating by the advisors of today's President as he embarks on Star Wars technology. 

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THE CHALLENGE



UNCLE SAM: "You'll have to start it William!"

America's Entry into World War I. p.1.

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Book Review


ANGEL VISITS: FROM BIPLANE TO JET, by Frank Griffiths. Thomas Harmsworth publishing 1986. Hardback \$

Reviewed by Brigadier F.W.Speed.

A quaint title to a set of RAF reminiscences, it is based on the words of a Thomas Campbell 'what though my winged hours of bliss have been, like angel visits ...'.

The set runs from September 1939 when the author was one of a team flying Blenheims from England to Singapore, on duty in Malaya and in wartime in the UK, some of the latter in a special duty flight engaged in testing the upcoming devices 'radar' and 'automatic landing of aircraft', adventures in Europe, and through to post-war air transport operations.

It comes as a slight shock to find grammatical errors such as singular verbs following plural subjects and *vice versa*, 'Lay' instead of 'lie', 'affect' instead of 'effect', and 'principle' where 'principal' is intended; but it becomes quite entertaining to notice these mistakes in otherwise well-written, dramatic stories. Also, there is much wisdom of a practical kind.

The book is interesting reading, and instructive, for both airmen and others alike, though doubtless for different reasons. 

DEMON TO VAMPIRE

Reviewed by Air Commodore P. G. Heffernan, OBE, AFC, RAAF (RTD)


I REGARD this book as an example which any other author proposing to write the history of an RAAF Unit should follow. Official histories can generally be regarded as a somewhat vague statement of the Unit's activities and I know from personal experience, that if the events recorded did not suit higher command, they should be deleted.

However, in this book, the author, the Squadron Medical Officer, has used the official history as a starting point. By diligent research and personal contact with past and present

members, he has obtained histories that would never have found their way past officialdom.

The problems of forming a new Squadron in peacetime are not easy. However when the Squadron went to war in obsolete aircraft under a higher command that vacillated in its orders from day-to-day, it becomes almost impossible to give the praise and honour due to the pilots and ground crew which was rightly due to them. The paucity of awards and decorations give some indication of the lack of contact between the fighting personnel and the staff. It is a credit to Squadron Leader Brook's personal contact with the survivors of the Malayan campaign that he has drawn such a vivid picture of what the Squadron suffered. The book is well illustrated with photographs and the maps are clear and easily understandable.

The portions of the book which deal with the years following World War II, speak volumes for the enthusiasm of the young men and women who are prepared to give up their leisure time to make the Squadron what it is today.

Squadron Leader Brook is to be congratulated on the excellence of his work and I highly recommend this book as essential reading matter to all members of the RAAF who wish to study the lessons that can be learnt from the experience of those who went before. 

ALERTING AMERICA: THE PAPERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER. Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, 1984. 373 plus xxii pages, paperback, with tables, graphs and diagrams. Price \$28 hardback, \$16 paperback.

Reviewed by Don Jender, Department of Defence

WHEN Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, two of the central tenets of his national security policy were belief in the need to build up US defence capability, and in the aggressive role of the Soviet Union in the world. These perceptions were widely held by conservative elements of US society (and still are). In the years leading up to Re-

agan's election victory, one of the groups which did most to give legitimacy to this outlook was the Committee on the Present Danger. It is difficult to underestimate the impact of the Committee and its documents on the national security debate in the US in the late 1970s. Members were influential in government, academic and business life, and Committee papers gave intellectual rigour to the opposition to the generally pro-detente, pro-arms control attitude of the Carter Administration. Readers will find at the start of the book a list of Committee members who were appointed to positions in the Reagan Administration. It is impressive evidence of the influence of the Committee's views on the Administration. This book reproduces in unedited forms most of the papers produced by the Committee up to late 1984; they were issued originally as pamphlets.

Four major themes are evident in the papers in this book, and these can be summarised as follows:

- the danger posed by the expansionist aims of the Soviet Union;
- the inadequacies of the strategic arms limitation agreements (SALT I and SALT II);
- the relative military and strategic capabilities of the United States and Soviet Union; and
- programs needed to rectify US military deficiencies.

The papers dealing with the first subject present in an articulate fashion the conservative case against the Soviet Union, as expounded by specialists in Soviet matters such as Richard Pipes. The case in essence is that the Soviet leadership inherited traditional Russian expansionist aims, is motivated by aggressive Marxist-Leninist ideology, and is prepared to commit enormous resources to the defence sector, to the detriment of other areas. The papers in this book are a readable, reasonably concise statement of a particular point of view (still dominant in the Reagan Administration), but readers should be aware that there is a significant alternative view which gives less prominence to the evil intentions of the Soviet leadership.

The subject of SALT I and SALT II is rather arcane and specialised, but was of considerable interest to the Committee in the late 1970s. The SALT II agreement was then being negotiated, and conservative forces held that it would be detrimental to US security. The SALT II agreement was eventually signed by Presidents Carter


and Brezhnev, but never ratified by the US Senate, for various reasons, including opposition to its contents from groups such as the Committee. The papers in the book dealing with objections to the SALT agreements are relevant mainly to those interested in that field, but they are a good guide to the conservative case against those agreements.

The question of the relative military capabilities of the United States and Soviet Union was investigated in enormous detail by the Committee in the late 1970s, and many of the papers in the book in this subject were developed by Paul Nitze, an expert of great experience in this area. He is particularly strong in analysis of strategic systems (eg intercontinental ballistic missile data and calculations). The calculations in the papers are very detailed, and some background in strategic analysis is needed to fully understand them. Nevertheless, a good idea of the arguments used can be obtained by readers without this specialised background.

The defence buildup undertaken by the Reagan Administration has been extensive, but still falls short of what the Committee thought necessary to redress what it saw as an imbalance which was becoming more marked with time. Papers in the book set out the Committee's program of defence buildup, and there is an interesting comparison of how well the Reagan Administration had done in implementing the measures the Committee thought necessary to correct the imbalance.

Eighty pages of the book are devoted to analysis of the results of surveys commissioned by the Committee on issues such as SALT II and US/Soviet military strength. This was done largely because other surveys were regarded by the Committee as misleading showing the US public as favourable to arms control and the SALT agreements. This material is not of general interest, except as a demonstration that the phrasing of questions has a critical influence on the results obtained in surveys.

This book is essential reading for those interested in the background to the US defence buildup and the Reagan Administration's attitudes to strategic arms limitation agreements and the Soviet Union. The detailed calculations of strategic nuclear capabilities are valuable reference sources, but are particularly relevant only to specialists in the field. The papers issued by the Committee have always been outstandingly well written, given the complexity of the subject


matters. All who have an interest in US/Soviet relations and military and strategic capabilities should at least examine the book, and many will find it repays close study. 

MODERN SOVIET COMBAT TANKS, by Steve Zaloga, Osprey Publishing Company, 1984, 40 pp \$10.95.

Reviewed by Richard Pelvin IADMIN-A

FOR some years now Osprey have published their Vanguard series of monographs covering various aspects of the history of armoured forces. This volume, the 37th in the series, covers the development of Soviet combat tanks since 1945. It concentrates on the T-54/T-62 and T-64/T-72 families although other vehicles are mentioned including Chinese copies.

A development history of each type is provided, as are details of construction and assessments of design strengths and weaknesses. In addition to the Red Army, Soviet tanks have seen service in no less than 47 countries and the author provides a concise summary of this service. A short description of the Soviet turret numbering system is also included.

As with all Osprey publications the highlight of the book is its illustrations. There is a plentiful supply of good monochrome photographs and 16 colour plates produced by the author. All illustrations are supported by informative captions. 

THE BRIDGE WITH THREE MEN, by Anthony Hewitt, published by Jonathan Cape, price \$25.95.

Reviewed by John Buckley, OBE

THE author, then a captain in the Middlesex Regiment was captured when the Japanese Forces took Hong Kong (on Christmas Day 1941). Together with a New Zealand Air Force pilot and a monocled English doctor, he escaped from Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland.

Their object was to reach Chungking, the wartime capital of Nationalist China. In the process they had to journey through Japanese,


Nationalist and Communist Chinese Army areas, all fighting for control. Not the least problem was the local bandits. The three officers displayed outstanding courage and sense of adventure which puts this story into the class of great wartime escapes. Many times they faced capture or death.

The most help they received in the epic "Long March" was from a band of Communist guerrillas, who took them to their camp in the mountains. In return for medical aid and military training the escapees were well looked after. Later they were escorted by night on dangerous cross country marches to the Chinese Nationalist lines.

For a time their journey continued by slow river boat on which conditions were most primitive. Finally they were taken on a derelict, producer gas fired truck to KuKong where they were welcomed by the British Military Mission.

From KuKong they went their separate ways, the New Zealander to the Middle East and a distinguished service for the remainder of the war. The doctor was soon in battle again commanding a Field Ambulance in Burma and being promoted to full Colonel. He is now in private practice in Hong Kong. Hewitt served in India and Germany, Canberra and Singapore before returning to live at Buderim in Queensland.

Each received the Military Cross for their escape and subsequent adventures in China.

It is a most adventurous story, full of interest and excitement, told in a modest manner. I thoroughly enjoyed the book. 

NO MEAN DESTINY THE STORY OF THE WAR WIDOW'S GUILD, by Mavis Thorpe Clark, published by Hyland House

Reviewed by John Buckley, OBE

THIS is the story of a group of talented, able and very determined women — all war widows — who from small beginnings rose to be a powerful group prepared to fight for their rights against unsympathetic Governments.

It is also the story — almost a biography of their first leader, Jessie Vasey, widow of Major General George Vasey.

Jessie had outstanding leadership qualities which were put to very good use throughout

her 21 years service to the war widows. She was not overawed by Cabinet Ministers or top public servants.

Mrs Vasey was determined that the World War II war widows would get a much better deal than the first World War widows. It was a long and determined fight to gain well deserved benefits from successive governments.

In spite of Prime Minister John Curtin's war-time promise that veterans and their dependants would be looked after in peacetime, post-war governments have failed in many respects to honour those promises. I was present when John Curtin made such a pledge to servicemen at the Boomerang Club in Australia House, London during his visit in May 1944. Curtin was a compassionate and sensitive man and it was no idle promise on his part. Others have failed to honour his promises.

The author has covered many of the trials and tribulations of the war widows in fighting for their rights. There are now over 65,000 war widows in Australia and this number is increasing.

The present Government has recently cut-back on some of the benefits held by the war widows and no doubt the Guild will have to maintain a strong posture to avoid any further cuts. This applies equally to all ex-service persons and their dependants.

I know of two adult intellectually handicapped dependants of war widows who recently have had serious problems in getting care and accommodation. It was like a game of "musical chairs" no organisation wanted them. No doubt, there are many more with such problems. I hope the War Widows organisation is looking at this matter. It is time Governments honoured John Curtin's promises.

If Jessie Vasey was still alive she would be in there still fighting for her beloved widows and their dependants. It was clear that she always got a sympathetic ear from Sir Frederick Chilton and Sir Richard Kingsland. Likewise her successors and the present organisation from Mr Derek Volker. Three dedicated and compassionate leaders of the Repatriation Department. Nevertheless they had to administer Government policies.

One tribute to Jessie Vasey gives a fitting description of her contribution. It reads:

"Look back down the years and rejoice that there was a woman of the calibre of Mrs

Vasey CBE, to guide the destiny of the War Widows Guild throughout Australia for 21 years. Her wonderful courage and enthusiasm carried the Guild from success to success. She was a humanitarian in the strict sense of the term and her fight for the war widows was against the strongest odds — male prejudice. She was a woman in a man's world."

Needless to say Mrs Vasey was assisted and has been succeeded by equally talented and determined leaders. The organisation continues to progress.

Mavis Thorpe Clark has written a splendid story about the War Widow's Guild. It is living proof that 'heaven helps those who help themselves'.

CIVILIANS AT WAR: JOURNALS 1938-1946 by George Beardmore. Oxford University Press 1986. (First published by John Murray Ltd, 1984). Paperback \$18.95.

Reviewed by Brigadier F. W. Speed.

AT first sight, a journal of a thirty-year old civilian in England in the second world war, appears to hold little attraction more than forty years on. Yet a special feature is that the author, an insurance clerk-salesman, with an asthmatic condition, was also a part-time writer. He had an instinct to note down what he saw and heard, and to record the many uncertainties that confronted him and his family.

This slightly-edited collation of notes made from day-to-day therefore contains material of value in the present time of international turbulence. Regrettably there is, in parts, a disjointed character that makes the story difficult to follow, but in the main it is worth the effort.

The West and much of the East are now ill-prepared for civil defence. The muddles that distressed civilians in England in 1938-46 may re-emerge in different form in countries such as Australia should conditions deteriorate to a state approaching war. Those who assert that hostilities can be averted by unilateral disarmament might be induced to think again if they were to take in these observations by a then young just-married man with pacifist leanings. At least, they might provide a shock.



