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# Ethiopia-Somalia: Continuing Military Imbalance in the Ogaden

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An Intelligence Assessment

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ALA 83-10116  
August 1983

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# Ethiopia-Somalia: Continuing Military Imbalance in the Ogaden

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

This paper was prepared by [Redacted]  
Office of African and Latin American Analysis with  
[Redacted]  
the Office of Central Reference. It was coordinated  
with the Directorate of Operations. [Redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on

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*August 1983*

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**Ethiopia-Somalia:  
Continuing Military  
Imbalance in the Ogaden**

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**Key Judgments**

*Information available  
as of 20 July 1983  
was used in this report.*

The long and bitter military struggle between Ethiopia and Somalia—the major states in the Horn of Africa—flows from Somalia's irredentist claims to Ethiopia's Ogaden region. We believe the region will continue to be the major theater of conflict between the two countries. Somalia bases its claims on the presence of large numbers of ethnic Somalis in the region, and it asserts—with some justification—that Ethiopia has never exercised full control over the Ogaden. Since Somalia set out to wrest control of the region at the time of its independence in 1960, the struggle has been marked by Mogadishu's support of an insurgency in the region, the Ethiopian-Cuban victory in 1978 over a full-scale Somali invasion, Somalia's reintroduction in 1979 of regular troops and their withdrawal from the Ogaden two years later, and the continued presence of Somali reconnaissance elements in the region.

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Over the past three years, Ethiopia has substantially increased its control over the Ogaden. Using reinforced brigades—combined forces of infantry, armor, and artillery—and tactical air superiority, the Ethiopian Army has been able to expel Somali regulars from the Ogaden and reduce the level of Somali-sponsored insurgent activity to small-unit harassment and isolated ambush operations.

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Ethiopian units in the Ogaden are now clearly superior in manpower, training, and equipment to the Somali forces across the frontier. This is a reversal of the situation prior to the 1977-78 war when Somalia—benefiting from a longstanding military supply relationship with Moscow—possessed one of the best-equipped and best-trained armed forces in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia's current advantage has resulted from Somalia's inability to replace its heavy combat losses, both in trained manpower and material, and the sustained effort by the Soviet Union, which reversed course in the late 1970s and became Ethiopia's principal military benefactor, to build up the regime's armed forces. Since 1977 Moscow has provided Ethiopia with approximately \$2.5 billion in arms and services out of \$4 billion in signed contracts in return for air and naval access to Ethiopian facilities in support of Soviet operations in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

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Despite Ethiopia's military dominance, we believe logistical and political constraints make it unlikely Ethiopia will invade Somalia over the next year or two. Ethiopia maintains the capability—demonstrated by its capture of two border towns in the summer of 1982—to launch effective assaults against targets in the immediate border area with little warning, but we believe its capabilities would be severely taxed to carry out broad attacks deep into Somalia. At the same time, considering Ethiopia's dominance in the Ogaden, we believe Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu views an invasion as an unnecessary drain on men and resources that are more urgently needed to suppress the insurgencies in the north. He is also concerned that direct military action could be counterproductive, as were the attacks last year, because it would rally Somali support for beleaguered President Siad and his regime. Mengistu's recent assumption of the chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) may lead him to limit direct Ethiopian involvement in border fighting at least until his term ends next June. Finally, we believe the Soviet Union would almost certainly oppose an invasion primarily out of concern that it would solidify the US commitment to Somalia. [REDACTED]

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Mengistu almost certainly will attempt to keep military pressure on Somalia, however, by continuing Ethiopian support for anti-Siad dissidents that operate out of Ethiopia, noted most recently in the successful assault in mid-July on a Somali battalion near Matabaan. The Ethiopians also will continue their aggressive military policy along the frontier and conduct periodic limited strikes on Somalia's Army and guerrilla camps across the border. We believe Moscow favors these approaches over an Ethiopian invasion because its direct involvement is minimized and the level of fighting can be more easily controlled. [REDACTED]

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The Somali military is beset by extensive problems that limit its capabilities to a defensive role. But even that role is hampered by obsolete equipment, a poorly run logistic system, poor command and control, a disparate inventory of arms, and an almost nonexistent air defense capability. Western material assistance has resulted in some limited improvement, and proposed training programs are designed to enhance personnel performance, but we believe only a substantial rebuilding of the military establishment over a period of years can provide Mogadishu with even a credible defensive capability. Large-scale reequipment programs to improve Somalia's inventory, however, are beyond the scope of planned military aid and Somali funding capabilities. [REDACTED]

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We believe Somalia's military strength relative to Ethiopia's will decline further over the next two years as the flow of military aid to Addis Ababa from Moscow and its allies continues. According to the US Embassy [Redacted]

[Redacted] the weaknesses of the military and Siad's inability to procure more modern arms are generating growing disenchantment among Somali officers, who are the mainstay of his regime. [Redacted]

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The Somali President is aware of this discontent and will look increasingly to the United States to prop up his regime with military assistance. In our opinion, he views the increasing US involvement in Somalia—especially US access to Somali ports and airfields and the construction of military facilities—as leverage to extract further aid commitments. As internal pressure mounts to demonstrate concrete results from his reorientation toward the West, Siad may feel increasingly driven to use access rights as a bargaining chip to strengthen his position through the acquisition of sophisticated weapons from the United States and its allies [Redacted]

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
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Ethiopian and Somali Orders of Battle in the Ogadēn



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### Ethiopia-Somalia: Continuing Military Imbalance in the Ogaden




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#### Introduction

The long history of mutual antagonism between Ethiopia and Somalia is rooted in Somalia's efforts since independence in 1960 to wrest control of the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region from Ethiopia through direct intervention or by supporting ethnic Somali guerrillas operating there. The Somali-sponsored insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s met with little success. Mogadishu renewed its efforts with a full-scale invasion by a Soviet-equipped and trained military in 1977-78. Somalia hoped to take advantage of the turmoil following the power struggle among Haile Selassie's radical successors and to act before the new Ethiopian-Soviet military supply relationship tipped the balance in Addis Ababa's favor. Nonetheless, Somalia suffered a disastrous defeat as Ethiopia, with massive Soviet and Cuban support, drove Somali forces from the Ogaden. Since then, border clashes have continued sporadically, and occasional flareups in military activity have threatened to erupt into broader conflict.



This paper examines the current military balance, or more properly imbalance in favor of Ethiopia, between the forces confronting one another in the Ogaden, the major theater of conflict between the two antagonists. It assesses the capabilities of these forces to conduct conventional and counterinsurgent military operations, evaluates the limitations on their military effectiveness, describes continuing efforts to deal with problem areas, and discusses the impact of foreign aid programs on the current and future military capabilities of the two countries. Finally, the paper evaluates the implications of the military situation for US and Soviet interests in the Horn.



#### Ground Forces <sup>1</sup>

**Ethiopia: Achieving the Upper Hand**  
*An Increasingly Effective Force.* The Ethiopian Army over the last three years has established greater



#### Ethiopia-Somalia: Order of Battle <sup>a</sup>

	Somalia	Ethiopia
<b>Army</b>		
Personnel	38,000 <sup>b</sup>	180,500 <sup>b</sup>
Divisions	11	22
Tanks	291	640-740 <sup>c</sup>
Artillery/rocket launchers	485	726-826 <sup>c</sup>
Mortars	455	1,100-1,300
Air defense guns	300	655-705 <sup>c</sup>
Armored vehicles	490	616-716 <sup>c</sup>
Attack helicopters	none	16
SAM battalions	10	8
<b>Air Force</b>		
Personnel	2,500	3,500-4,000
Jet fighters	47	117
Reconnaissance	none	12
Helicopters	none	30 <sup>d</sup>
Transports	17 <sup>e</sup>	24

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<sup>a</sup> See appendix C for detailed breakdown.

<sup>b</sup> Total includes personnel from Air Defense Command subordinate to Army headquarters.

<sup>c</sup> Figures exclude some 200 tanks, about 135 field artillery pieces, nearly 200 armored vehicles, and some 40 air defense guns purchased by the Ethiopians from the Soviet Union but assigned to Cuban forces.

<sup>d</sup> Figure includes air rescue and transport helicopters.

<sup>e</sup> Few of the transports are operations.




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control over the Ogaden region than it had exercised for well over a decade.<sup>2</sup> The turning point in its campaign came during the summer of 1980, when it defeated Somali regular forces in heavy fighting around the strategic town of Werder in the eastern Ogaden. Since then, it has taken advantage of the disarray among the Western Somali Liberation Front

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<sup>2</sup> The historical antecedents of the Ogaden dispute are discussed in appendix A.



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(WSLF) forces—the guerrilla movement Somalia has used to pursue its irredentist designs on the region—and the inability of the Somali Army to operate regular combat units in the Ogaden to establish a presence along key points of the frontier, where it has occupied locations it was forced to abandon years ago.<sup>3</sup> [redacted]

Ethiopia has stationed over 60,000 men in the Ogaden to counter WSLF activity and the Somali Army. These troops are organized into seven divisions and two task force units garrisoned near the larger towns in the region. The Ethiopian force is highly mechanized, with each division possessing its own armor, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and artillery units. The Ethiopian inventory of major weapons consists of approximately 155 to 180 tanks, almost all of which are Soviet T-54/55s; 60 to 70 APCs; and approximately 105 pieces of artillery. [redacted]

Ethiopian employment of reinforced brigades—2,500 to 3,000 troops supported by artillery and armor—for their major military operations has facilitated the effective concentration of firepower and the rapid exploitation of breakthroughs, such as in the attacks last summer against the border towns of Balenbale and Goldogob currently occupied by Ethiopia. This force structure is advantageous for Addis Ababa in that it simplifies logistic support, enhances rapid deployment, and minimizes command-and-control problems. Addis Ababa has successfully employed its reinforced brigade tactics in launching punitive cross-border attacks against Somali Army and guerrilla camps and to support anti-Siad dissident raids. [redacted]

Another key to Ethiopia's success in the Ogaden fighting has been its ability to integrate the operations of ground and air forces effectively against tactical Somali targets. The Army's decided advantage in mobility, aided by the flat terrain of the Ogaden, has enabled it to move quickly and with little or no warning against Somali forces. [redacted]

[redacted]

<sup>3</sup> See appendix B for a survey of the role of both Ethiopian and Somali-supported dissident groups in the conflict. [redacted]

Ethiopia's capabilities in the Ogaden are undergirded by its military supply relationship with the Soviet Union since 1977 and the presence of Cuban troops for the same period of time. The relationship guarantees weapons and spare parts under a series of contracts that provide for a total of \$4 billion in arms; deliveries of military assistance to date have amounted to about \$2.5 billion. In addition, a portion of the approximately 1,700 Soviet advisers and technicians in Ethiopia are involved in maintenance and planning functions with government forces in the Ogaden. The use of Cuban troops in the northern Ogaden as a security force also allows Ethiopia to commit its forces for operations in other areas of the region. [redacted]

In return for its assistance, Moscow has gained military advantages in support of its Red Sea and Indian Ocean operations. Soviet naval ships have access to a small naval facility on Dahlak Island and occasionally visit the Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab. In addition, Soviet IL-38 antisubmarine and naval reconnaissance aircraft operate in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean from the airfield at Asmara. [redacted]

**Problem Areas.** Ethiopian troops in the Ogaden continue to be plagued by a weak logistic system. Improvements have been made in recent years, but a combination of distance, environment, inefficiency, and a poor road network have created serious problems for government forces. [redacted]

Ethiopian units suffer from chronic shortages of food, lubricants, and fuel. [redacted] deliveries of rations and fuel—usually by convoys originating at the major supply depots at Dire Dawa and Jijiga—frequently are late and at times insufficient. The convoys must travel a great distance—it is almost 700 kilometers from Jijiga, the major supply center, to Ferfer on the Somali border—over a road network that consists of gravel or dirt tracks. Addis Ababa has occasionally used air deliveries to forward bases to supplement truck convoys when the need is urgent or if the roads are impassable, but such measures are costly and have not significantly reduced supply problems. [redacted]

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
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***The Role and Capabilities of the Cuban Forces***

*We estimate that 9,000 to 11,000 Cuban military personnel are in Ethiopia. Some 6,000 to 8,000 of these troops are organized into four combat brigades, three in the northern Ogaden and one outside Addis Ababa; the remainder man Ethiopia's air defense sites and serve as advisers or logistic personnel. With the exception of a mechanized brigade located near Addis Ababa that we believe serves as a palace guard, the Cuban forces are deployed in the Ogaden as a strategic reserve force to counter any future Somali invasion* [redacted]

*The Cuban units form a well-equipped ground force, designed and trained to fight a conventional war. The Ethiopian military has provided them with approximately 200 tanks, some 135 artillery pieces, and nearly 200 armored vehicles.* [redacted]



*In view of the clear superiority of Ethiopian forces, there is no compelling military reason for the continuing Cuban troop presence in Ethiopia. Mengistu, however, appears to believe that they are necessary as*

*a deterrent force as long as Somalia refuses to recognize the present border and continues to support the WSLF insurgency. While recognizing that Ethiopia has gained the upper hand in the Ogaden, we believe the leadership in Addis Ababa probably fears that a revitalized Somali military—rebuilt with US and other Western assistance—will eventually make another attempt to seize the disputed region. Ethiopia almost certainly, in our opinion, views the Cuban forces as a symbol of Moscow's and Havana's commitment to the present regime and a reflection of the close personal ties between Mengistu and Castro.*

[redacted]

*According to the US Embassy, there is some evidence that Havana has either organized from forces in country or deployed a quick reaction force to Ethiopia for use elsewhere in Africa. We have not been able to confirm these reports, but they are plausible. Cuban troops stationed in Ethiopia have been involved in at least two out-of-country deployments: in June 1978 about 1,000 Cubans were flown to South Yemen in the aftermath of a coup; and in March of the following year approximately 1,500 Cuban troops went to South Yemen after the outbreak of hostilities with North Yemen. In both cases, the Cubans eventually returned to Ethiopia. On other occasions, individuals or small groups, primarily technicians, have been sent to Mozambique or Angola to deal with specific technical problems.* [redacted]

*Water for troops and vehicles has been a particularly difficult supply problem in the dry Ogaden. The Ethiopians have tried to better utilize existing wells or drill new wells in the remote areas.* [redacted]

[redacted] *units are often faced with mechanical difficulties such as broken water pumps. Ethiopian efforts to establish a coordinated supply system have been hampered by the tendency of individual units to hoard scarce water tankers and other vehicles.* [redacted]

*Units at forward locations suffer most from maintenance problems, which are compounded by distance and a shortage of trained personnel. This problem exists more at the brigade and battalion level than with the division, however, where Soviet technicians are usually permanently assigned. Addis Ababa has had some success in addressing maintenance deficiencies by using mobile assistance teams—usually combined units made up of Soviet and Ethiopian personnel—and establishing maintenance centers where*

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
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### The Horn of Africa



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equipment can be returned for repairs. The teams periodically travel to the various units in the Ogaden to fix equipment and perform other maintenance tasks. These measures temporarily boost the operational rate for major equipment, but the problems recur frequently as a result of continuous use in the arid, rough terrain of the Ogaden. [redacted]

Low morale has some impact on Ethiopian military capabilities, but we believe it is not a serious factor. Reports of desertions from southern units do not appear to be excessive—by Ethiopian standards—and this factor does not significantly erode unit effectiveness relative to opposing Somali forces. According to the US Embassy, most morale problems in the Ogaden are caused by ethnic Somalis and other Muslim troops who are often inducted into the Army against their will and by highland Ethiopians who have trouble adjusting to the harsh Ogaden climate and the long separation from their homes and families. [redacted]

The Ethiopian leadership believes the recently proclaimed National Service Law—which obligates all Ethiopians between the ages of 16 and 30 to register for preinduction military training—will alleviate some of the morale problems in the military and create a pool of skilled technicians and officers. According to the US Embassy, Chairman Mengistu intends to deal with the morale problem by using the large manpower pool made available by the draft to establish a rotation plan for personnel in the military and to set up a strong reserve program. This would allow for a steady rotation of troops serving in frontline units or remote locations. The Ethiopian leadership also believes that tapping the better educated elements in Ethiopian society for military service will give it the skilled personnel needed to maintain the sophisticated equipment in the inventory. [redacted]

There is resistance to the draft—reflected by an increase in the number of youth attempting to leave the country for Sudan and the West—and we believe the program will have only limited success in meeting its goals. According to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, many of the younger Ethiopians are strongly motivated to remain at relatively high-paying civilian jobs and would prefer to emigrate rather than experience the harsh life of the armed forces. Public resistance and a present shortage of training facilities

in the country, according to the US Embassy, will limit the number of potential inductees the Ethiopians will be able to bring into the military. [redacted]

#### **Somalia: A Force on the Defensive**

*An Eroded Position.* The Somali military has never recovered from the serious losses it suffered in the Ogaden conflict; the Army lost over half its armor and mechanized equipment in the heavy fighting of 1977-78. Moreover, the Air Force was eliminated as an effective force early in the war and has been unable to challenge Ethiopian air supremacy since then. [redacted]

The Somali Army currently numbers approximately 38,000 troops formed into 11 infantry divisions. These units are concentrated primarily in the northern and central sectors of the country to defend the corridors that Addis Ababa might use in the event of a full-scale invasion. A typical Somali division and its subordinate units are approximately 50-percent understrength and generally deficient in armor and artillery support. The Somali weapons inventory is largely obsolescent and generally inferior to Ethiopian armament in both quantity and quality. It consists of a complex mix of Western and Soviet arms that strains Somalia's limited maintenance capabilities. [redacted]

Despite the material imbalance, the Somali military does retain some capability against limited Ethiopian incursions. The capability is marginal, however, unless the Somalis have sufficient advanced warning to establish defensive positions—a questionable prospect, given Ethiopia's ability to mount up to brigade-size attacks with little or no warning. Somali defensive capabilities and morale were improved somewhat last year when it acquired 24 M-113 armored personnel carriers equipped with TOW<sup>4</sup> antitank missiles from the United States, 100 US-made M-47 tanks and 72 105-mm artillery pieces from Italy, and 45 Soviet-made T-54 tanks from Egypt. [redacted]

<sup>4</sup> Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided. [redacted]

**Major Deficiencies.** The acquisition of these weapons, however, did not redress several continuing major deficiencies of the Somali armed forces cited [redacted]

[redacted] in a recent report:

- A hodgepodge inventory of weapons, many of them obsolete, nonoperational, or inferior to those possessed by Ethiopia.
- A poorly run logistic system that is lacking in coordination and accountability.
- An almost nonexistent air defense capability.
- Poor command and control within and between the services.
- A lack of sufficient funds for the purchase of arms and spare parts, resulting in chronic shortages of even maintenance items.

US efforts to improve Somali training and maintenance capabilities have had some results, but we believe the benefits of these programs depend heavily on continued US and allied involvement. The Somali Army's weapons acquisitions over the past few years have placed additional burdens on its maintenance, training, and logistic systems. [redacted] spare parts are in short supply for much of the recently acquired equipment, and we believe the Somalis lack the capability to maintain the bulk of it independently for any length of time. [redacted]

The initial euphoria that resulted from the deliveries of Western arms last year is beginning to subside. [redacted] some Somali officers have complained about the poor state of the reconditioned Egyptian-supplied armor. [redacted] the Somalis are unhappy with the Italian-provided M-47 tanks, which are outgunned by Ethiopian armor and use gasoline rather than the diesel fuel utilized by most of Mogadishu's armor—a factor that further complicates supply requirements. In addition, [redacted] less than 50 percent of the M-47s remain operational and even these would be of dubious value in combat. [redacted] artillery from Italy is near the end of its usefulness, and its range has been reduced considerably by excessive wear in the gun barrels. Even the M-113s and TOW systems only marginally improve the country's antiarmor capabilities because of their limited numbers. [redacted]

Although the Army has shown a knack for cannibalizing equipment to keep remaining weapons operating, it has to date shown little capability to conduct such basic activities as preventive maintenance, let alone major repairs. There are repair facilities scattered throughout the country, but the quality of their work is uneven. [redacted] some frontline commanders are unwilling to send equipment to repair shops in rear areas because they fear it will not be returned. [redacted]

The Army also suffers from severe command control problems. The scarcity of radios hinders communications and coordination between military units. In addition, unit effectiveness is degraded by personal and tribal rivalries between various commanders. Such rivalries are, in fact, encouraged by President Siad and his close supporter Defense Minister Samantar to keep real or potential opponents divided, thereby reducing their threat to the regime. [redacted]

The recently implemented Somali reorganization in the Balenbale-Galcaio area, while designed to improve the Army's performance, actually will degrade it, in our opinion. [redacted] this area—the Central Sector—has been split into two corps and the Defense Minister in Mogadishu has assumed control of the Somali reserve force in the rear. This move only further complicates coordination—the corps commanders are rivals—by dividing the military assets available to respond to Ethiopian provocations and could also delay the deployment of the reserve troops in an emergency. [redacted]

The tribal unrest besetting Somalia also appears to be taking its toll on military effectiveness. According to attache and Embassy reporting, over the past year several hundred officers and enlisted men belonging to the dominant tribe in the north, the Issaq, fled the country because of their unhappiness with Siad's favoritism toward his fellow Marehan and their allies and with his harsh rule in the north. The Issaq are disgruntled over Siad's heavyhanded suppression of dissent, the arrest of northern opposition leaders, and

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his refusal to address their economic and political grievances. [redacted] Embassy reporting also indicates that tribal tensions led some northern units to mutiny. [redacted]

[redacted] the Army's ability to defend the frontier has also been adversely affected by its involvement in tribal feuds and disputes over water and grazing rights. This situation has been exacerbated by the Ethiopians, who have actively encouraged some of the fighting and provided arms to several tribal groups. [redacted]

[redacted] some of this tribal feuding has led to isolated interunit clashes within the Somali Army. [redacted]

### Counterinsurgency Capabilities

#### Ethiopia: Tightening Control

Addis Ababa has used a variety of tactics in its increasingly successful campaign in the northern and central Ogaden to counter the guerrilla activity of the WSLF. Ethiopian forces conduct periodic sweep campaigns to disrupt guerrilla concentrations and infiltration routes. They have also attempted to garrison small towns, checkpoints, and waterholes near the border area. We believe, however, that these operations have been hampered by a lack of accurate intelligence on the movement of small insurgent units and by the logistic strain of supporting large numbers of troops along the frontier. [redacted]

The Ethiopians have also attempted to exploit fighting between WSLF units and northern Somali tribes to isolate the guerrillas from their sources of intelligence and support. These conflicts are generated by traditional issues such as water rights and smuggling. The Ethiopians, who occasionally provide political and limited military support for the non-Ogadeni clans, have enjoyed some success in their efforts. [redacted]

In the central portion of the border, where most of the traditional infiltration routes for both the guerrillas and Somali Army units are found, the Ethiopians have established a security zone of approximately 20 small bases. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] We believe the Ethiopians use these facilities to monitor the movement of the Somali Army and of nomadic tribes in an effort to screen out the insurgents. Larger Ethiopian units are located several kilometers to the rear of these camps to respond to detected threats. [redacted]

#### Somalia: Unprepared for a Growing Challenge

Active support of insurgent movements by Ethiopia and Libya, under their 1981 pact, has created a new security problem for Mogadishu. Initially, the Somali Government relied on the WSLF and paramilitary forces to contain the insurgent threat and supplemented their efforts by stationing small units of regular forces in the Ogaden. These forces attempted to keep the dissidents and the Ethiopian Army away from the frontier by attacking their staging bases and training camps in the Ogaden. [redacted]

This policy, which was only marginally effective, began to collapse in 1980 in the face of more aggressive Ethiopian military operations and the dissipation of WSLF capabilities. By the end of 1981, Ethiopia had driven out of the Ogaden almost all Somali regular units, except for reconnaissance teams and small infantry units. Moreover, Somalia's operations deep into the Ogaden were restricted by the signing of the military access agreement with the United States in 1980 and subsequent US Congressional constraints on the deployment of Somali regulars in the Ogaden. As a result, Mogadishu has been forced to limit the operations of its forces to the immediate area of the frontier. The Ethiopians have exploited this to consolidate fully their positions along the border. This, in turn, has allowed the anti-Siad dissidents to conduct more frequent hit-and-run raids and occasional large-scale attacks on political and military targets in Somalia. One such assault occurred in mid-July, when anti-Siad dissidents—supported by Ethiopian armor and artillery—attacked a Somali battalion holding positions near the border west of Matabaan. [redacted]

[redacted] Siad's bowing to US pressure by refusing to allow regular units to operate in the Ogaden has generated resentment [redacted]

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among segments of the officer corps. Mogadishu's immediate postwar policy of maintaining regular forces in the Ogaden to keep the Ethiopians away from the frontier is viewed as essential by segments of the military.

[Redacted]

The Somali Army is ill prepared to meet the insurgent threat. Poor communications and the lack of mobility—caused by the high number of inoperative vehicles and the lack of helicopters—severely weaken its ability to respond to guerrilla operations.

[Redacted]

Mogadishu is now attempting, with Western assistance, to train and equip a brigade-size unit specifically for counterinsurgent activity—a process that will take a long time. In any case, it is highly unlikely that a brigade-size unit will be able to defend effectively Somalia's long and open frontier, especially with dissident forces operating in both the northern and central portions of the country. Mogadishu lacks the helicopters to deploy these units rapidly by air, and their ground mobility will probably be limited by the same problems besetting the regular Army. Even if these problems are overcome, the Somali counterinsurgency units will be competing with the regular Army for scarce resources and risk being absorbed into the conventional forces during a crisis.

[Redacted]

**Air Forces**

**Ethiopia: A Position of Strength**

**Overall Superiority.** Aircraft located at the major airbase at Dire Dawa and at the forward airfield at Gode support government troops in the Ogaden. Dire Dawa is the home base for Ethiopia's 12 MIG-15/17s—used primarily for training—and approximately 20 MIG-21s. These aircraft support Ethiopian operations in the northern Ogaden and occasionally launch punitive attacks on WSLF and Somali

Army bases in northern and central Somalia. In the past, they have flown reconnaissance and strike missions as far east as the Somali port of Berbera.

[Redacted]

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Gode is not used as a permanent base because it lacks suitable fuel storage and other support facilities. Jet fuel, for example, must be flown in or transported by truck—a costly venture. MIG-23s and MIG-21s, however, are deployed there for varying periods of time to support Ethiopian operations along the border. Indeed, the deployment of aircraft to Gode has served as a key indicator of pending Ethiopian military operations or as a reflection of Addis Ababa's concern over Somali military activity along the frontier.

[Redacted]

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The Ethiopian Air Force conducts close air support, air defense, and reconnaissance missions. Its pilots are proficient—by Third World standards—and have performed well in ground attack missions against Somali and WSLF units. The Air Force, for example, played a key role in turning back the major Somali Army attack on the town of Werder in 1980, inflicting heavy casualties on personnel and military vehicles.

[Redacted]

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Ethiopian pilots and aircraft are vastly superior to their Somali counterparts. In two months of aerial engagements during the 1977-78 war, the Ethiopians destroyed approximately half of the Somali Air Force while suffering light losses. Although the Ethiopians had no experience in aerial combat prior to the war, their success was largely attributable to training, tactics, and maintenance capabilities acquired from the United States during the pro-Western regime of Haile Selassie. Since the Ogaden war, the Ethiopian Air Force has operated with impunity over the region and along the border.

[Redacted]

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**Continuing Concerns.** Despite its successes, the Air Force suffers from several problems that lower its overall capabilities, especially during sustained operations. The need to provide pilots to support extensive air operations in insurgency-plagued northern Ethiopia as well as the Ogaden has resulted in a shortage of

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trained pilots, especially for the MIG-21s. Although a large number of personnel are being trained in the Soviet Union, we estimate that the instruction takes from two to three years. Moreover, according to US Embassy reporting, the Ethiopians are not pleased with the quality of Soviet training, especially in tactics, and require all pilots to take additional training from Ethiopian instructors upon returning from the Soviet Union. This further delays pilot certification. [redacted]

The Air Force also suffers from a low operational rate for its aircraft. We estimate that an average of 50 to 75 percent of the country's fighters, transports, and helicopters are available for use under normal circumstances, but the Ethiopians probably would be unable to maintain these levels under sustained operations. The difficulties stem from an inefficient logistic system, Soviet delays in providing spare parts, and the inability of Soviet or Ethiopian maintenance personnel to make on-the-spot repairs. Despite these problems, the Air Force is able to support Ethiopian troops effectively in the Ogaden, especially when military activity in other parts of the country is low. [redacted]

**Somalia: Trying To Rebuild**

[redacted] the Somali Air Force is unable to perform its primary missions of defending the country against Ethiopian air attacks and providing close air support for the Army. Its three main limitations are numerical inferiority, the obsolescence of the aircraft, and the acute shortage of trained pilots and maintenance personnel. [redacted]

Mogadishu, with Egyptian assistance, has managed to keep a few of its old MIG-17 and early model MIG-21 aircraft flying, but the Chinese-produced F-6 (MIG-19) aircraft are the backbone of the Air Force. None of Somalia's aircraft, however, are a match for the modern MIG-21s and MIG-23s in the Ethiopian inventory. This disparity is especially evident in air-to-air combat capabilities. The Somalis, for example, had to rely on aircraft cannon for aerial engagements until the Chinese supplied new heat-seeking missiles for the MIG-21s; any Soviet-provided missiles still carried in the inventory probably have exceeded their operational life. [redacted]

The Somali Air Force's technological problems are further compounded by a severe shortage of qualified pilots. [redacted] both the Egyptians and the Chinese have been unsuccessful in their training efforts because of generally poor aptitude and motivation among Somali trainees and limitations on flying time caused by both fuel shortages and maintenance problems. The Chinese on several occasions have voiced their frustration with the inability of the Somalis to grasp more than the basics of flying or maintenance. The Somali Air Force commander grounded all the F-6s after the temporary departure of the Chinese technicians last year, because, [redacted] he did not trust his maintenance people to work on the aircraft. [redacted]

During the fighting around Goldogob in July 1982, the Air Force did fly a few reconnaissance and ground support missions against the Ethiopians. But Addis Ababa retaliated by bombing the Somali airbase at Galcaio, thereby causing the withdrawal of the aircraft and effectively knocking the Air Force out of the conflict. Mogadishu did not commit its small force to aerial combat in the Goldogob fighting because it realized the inferiority of its pilots and aircraft would result in unacceptable losses. [redacted]

**Air Defense Forces**

**Ethiopia: A Capability in Search of a Threat**  
Ethiopia's air defense forces rely heavily on Cuban and Soviet advisers to defend the major military facilities in the country. Surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites—consisting of SA-2s and SA-3s—are located around the key port of Assab and the military installations at Debre Zeit, Dire Dawa, and Jijiga. Because of the Cuban and Soviet role, we believe most of Ethiopia's air defense equipment, the radar net, and the systems' support network are well managed and in good operational condition. The integration of Ethiopian personnel into the system upon completion of their training, however, could lead to a degradation of the SAM capability over time. [redacted]

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The Ethiopian Army possesses most, if not all, of the country's anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) weapons. These guns, some of which are radar controlled, are manned by Ethiopian troops, but the relationship of the AAA system to the air defense command is not clear. The AAA units appear to be under the operational control of the Ethiopian divisions and are assigned to the brigades for duty. Because of the absence of a credible air threat from Somalia, however, some of the smaller caliber AAA are used primarily in an antipersonnel role. [redacted]

**Somalia: Underequipped and Overmatched**

We assess Somali air defense forces as completely ineffective against the Ethiopian threat. Weaknesses within both SAM and AAA elements are so extensive that we believe a major overhaul is needed before the forces can provide even a limited defense of a small number of point targets. The system suffers from a shortage of spare parts for its Soviet equipment, poor maintenance, insufficient live-fire training, and poor communications. The Egyptians have reported only limited success after several years of trying to improve the capabilities of the SAM and radar networks. [redacted]

The SAM systems are not capable of providing a realistic air defense. [redacted]

[redacted] most of the liquid fuel SA-2s are probably not operational, despite Egyptian efforts, due to neglect. The capabilities of the solid fuel SA-3 are marginal at best because of a shortage of spare parts, improper maintenance, and ineffective radars. The SA-2s and SA-3s, moreover, which are deployed for point defense of major military facilities around Mogadishu, Berbera, and Hargeisa, are located too far from the border to pose any threat to Ethiopian air activity in the Ogaden region. [redacted]

The Somali AAA system also has little capability against the Ethiopian air threat. It consists primarily of small caliber artillery which is optically aimed; none of these units have radar fire-control systems. Although the air defense crews are well disciplined and trained in procedures, their equipment is poorly maintained and suffers from prolonged exposure to the elements. [redacted]

**Outlook**

Given the pace and composition of current and projected Soviet arms deliveries to Addis Ababa, we believe Ethiopia's military superiority over Somalia will continue to increase both quantitatively and qualitatively over the next two years. Even if the necessary amounts of new equipment were provided to create an effective Somali defense force, it would, in our opinion, take Mogadishu several years to train combat troops and maintenance personnel to integrate the new systems into its inventory. [redacted]

Most equipment currently in the Somali inventory is obsolete or nearing the end of its useful life. Moreover, Mogadishu itself lacks the technical capability and logistic means to support the diverse equipment it already deploys; at the same time, meeting the cost of hiring others—such as the Egyptians or other foreign contract personnel—to perform these functions is heavily dependent on outside assistance. Mogadishu's usual source for such funding, Saudi Arabia, is increasingly reluctant to commit the necessary money, according to the US Embassy in Jidda. The Saudi leadership has come to view Somalia as a "bottomless pit," is suspicious of Siad for his socialist leanings and past Soviet connections, is displeased with what they see as his limited adherence to Islam, and is concerned over the extent of corruption in the country. [redacted]

Addis Ababa, on the other hand, appears to be assured of a continuing flow of spare parts from the Soviet Union for weapons already in its inventory as well as more advanced weapons systems and equipment. [redacted]

Addis Ababa's combat air capabilities will be further enhanced later this year when it receives an interceptor variant of the MIG-23. In addition, we expect that Soviet and Cuban technicians will continue to fill existing maintenance and logistic gaps while the Ethiopians continue efforts to improve their own capabilities. [redacted]

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We believe the Ethiopians will attempt to use their dominant military position in the Ogaden to end Somali support for the WSLF insurgency, mainly by continuing their effort to seal the frontier to infiltration. According to US Embassy reporting, Addis Ababa is determined to establish clearly, and to enforce, its claims to towns, entry points, and water-holes on its side of the disputed border.<sup>5</sup> To supplement this effort, we expect the Ethiopians to continue limited-scale attacks against locations that are used as infiltration points, as well as launch retaliatory air and ground strikes against Somali Army and guerrilla positions across the border. We believe sporadic raids of up to brigade size will be used to keep military pressure on Mogadishu and to disrupt concentrations of Somali forces. Such operations—which are of short duration—are relatively easy for the Ethiopians to support logistically and can be launched with little warning. In addition, we believe the Ethiopians will continue to encourage and support Somali dissident attacks deep in Somalia in an effort to erode Somali morale and, ultimately, to generate a coup against Siad. [redacted]

We do not believe Ethiopia will initiate a major invasion of Somalia during the next year or two because the success of its present military policy in the Ogaden has substantially reduced the Somali threat. In addition, Mengistu, in our opinion, believes such an action would be an unnecessary drain on men and resources that are, considering the present Ethiopian ascendancy in the Ogaden, more urgently needed to suppress the Eritrean and Tigrean rebellions. An invasion also would undermine Addis Ababa's highly successful diplomatic campaign to portray Somalia as the aggressor, as well as tarnish the image of Mengistu in his new role as OAU chairman. Moscow, in our opinion, would almost certainly oppose an invasion primarily out of concern that it would prompt Washington to move forcefully to solidify the US presence in Somalia. Moscow would also be concerned over the implications in international forums of overt aggression by a Soviet-supported regime, and might

<sup>5</sup> The central portion of the Ethiopian-Somali border has never been demarcated. In 1950 the United Nations accepted the Provisional Administrative Line proposed by Great Britain pending a formal agreement on the boundary by Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. Different maps of the region, however, place the poorly defined provisional line in varying positions, leaving claims to many towns open to dispute. [redacted]

be reluctant to support an Ethiopian policy which would further increase arms requirements or draw Soviet advisers into a more active role. [redacted]

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We believe the Mengistu regime, however, will continue its efforts—primarily using Somali dissidents—to oust Siad and to foment tribal conflict within Somalia. Mengistu deeply distrusts Siad—the feeling is reciprocated by the Somali leader—and Mengistu probably believes a post-Siad regime would be too preoccupied with establishing its legitimacy to pursue irredentism, at least over the short term. Ethiopian support of Somali dissident movements clearly demonstrates their belief that tribal unrest both weakens the Somali regime and diverts the attention of the Army to internal security problems. The Soviets—who would like to see Siad ousted and US influence in the region eliminated—have been kept by the Ethiopians from playing a direct role with the dissidents. Moscow, however, probably supports this activity because it furthers Soviet goals in the region and has little risk for Moscow. [redacted]

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**Implications for the United States**

We believe, based upon past developments, that the continued decline in Somalia's military strength relative to Ethiopian capabilities will result in increasing appeals from Mogadishu for assistance from the United States and its allies. Siad will be subjected to growing pressure from his military to obtain more and better military equipment to reverse this trend. Heightened tensions along the border—for example, an Ethiopian attack against Abdiwaq, a vulnerable Somali-held military and administrative center located 2 kilometers on the Ethiopian side of the administration line—could increase internal pressures on Siad to demonstrate positive results from his turn to the West. [redacted]

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In our view, Siad probably will face increasing disaffection from his military leaders if he is unable to fulfill their longstanding expectations that substantial Western military assistance would result from his pro-Western policies. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

Moscow, for its part, distrusts Siad and would be cautious in responding to any overtures made by him. We believe, however, that the Soviets would be tempted to try to strengthen their position in the Horn—and eliminate the US presence—by exploiting anti-Siad sentiment in the Somali military. Washington's perceived identification with the Siad regime probably has made Siad's opponents more amenable to Soviet support and influence and we believe there probably are some elements in the military with lingering pro-Soviet sentiments. Even if an anti-US regime gained power in Mogadishu, however, the Soviet Union would move cautiously in trying to re-establish its position in Somalia so as not to jeopardize its ties with Ethiopia. Moscow clearly views Ethiopia as a major African power, the most important country in the Horn, and in a good position from which Moscow can extend its influence and oppose Western interests in Africa and the northwest Indian Ocean area. [Redacted]

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We believe the assistance issue, coupled with dissatisfaction over Siad's restraints on military operations in the Ogaden, will become key factors in the months ahead. The Somali Army is trained as an offensive force and, [Redacted] we believe midlevel and junior officers are chafing under its current defensive posture. In our opinion, the Somali military's tradition of assertiveness—and its perception of itself as the vanguard of Somali reunification—will eventually cause it to react against efforts to relegate it to a permanent defensive role, regardless of the military realities of the situation. According to Embassy reporting, this and other military-related factors—such as a perceived inadequacy of new arms deliveries from the West—could lead to a reduction of Western influence or even a coup attempt by elements within the military who blame Siad and the West for the country's military weaknesses [Redacted]

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We believe that Siad is aware of these problems, as well as the fact that his present policies are only buying him a limited amount of time. In our opinion, Siad has a primarily pragmatic interest in Western support and would not balk at threatening to return to the Soviet fold—as he has in the past—in an effort to pressure the West. At present he views the continued, deepened US involvement in Somalia—especially the establishment of US central command facilities—as a key factor in his efforts to retain power and rebuild his military. We believe Siad is convinced that the strategic value of Somali military facilities, once the United States has invested economic and political resources into developing them, will provide him greater leverage. As internal pressure mounts to demonstrate concrete results from his reorientation toward the West, Siad may feel increasingly driven to threaten US access rights unless additional and more sophisticated arms are provided by Washington. [Redacted]

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### Appendix A

#### Roots of the Ogaden Dispute

The Ogaden conflict, more than other African border disputes, revolves in large part around competing definitions of nationhood. Somalia, as the only African state with any claim to ethnic homogeneity, defines the issue in terms of ethnic unity. Multiethnic Ethiopia, on the other hand, sees nationhood as the possession of territory and, beset by its own separatist insurgencies, views ethnicity as a divisive issue in the process of nation building. [redacted]

Somalia's attempts to cloak its cause in the Organization of African Unity's endorsement of the concept of national liberation struggles have been unsuccessful. The Ethiopian position has been reinforced by the OAU's longstanding endorsement of the principle of respect for boundaries existing at the time of independence.<sup>6</sup> In recent years, however, Somalia has won the support of a number of fellow Arab League members, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia, by emphasizing Pan-Arabism or the Soviet-Cuban presence in Ethiopia. [redacted]

The recovery of Somali-inhabited areas from neighboring countries is one of the few unifying issues in Somali society and one that has the support of almost all groups. The Somali people have a strong emotional attachment to the goal of Somali reunification, although they disagree at times on methods to achieve this goal. Any Somali government would have difficulty surviving if it publicly renounced the "cause" because it would be viewed as having abandoned the Somali peoples living in the Ogaden, northeastern Kenya, and Djibouti. [redacted]

<sup>6</sup> The founders of the OAU recognized the potential threat to African peace posed by the arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries. The OAU position rejects adjustment of frontiers by military means, but does allow for negotiated changes in boundaries. [redacted]

Ethiopia, on the other hand, believes that political concessions to Mogadishu would only increase the aggressiveness of its Somali neighbor. The Amharic and Tigrean peoples, who form the core of Ethiopian society, are intensely suspicious of the Somalis. [redacted]

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Addis Ababa views the Ogaden as a vital buffer zone between Ethiopia's Coptic Christian-dominated core area and hostile Muslim lowlanders in Somalia. In fact, the Ethiopian leadership is determined to increase its control over all the ethnic populations within its borders. It fears that concessions in the Ogaden would stimulate pressures on the central government from other restive minorities for similar treatment, threatening the foundations of the Ethiopian state. [redacted]

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## Appendix B

### Dissident Groups

#### Somali-Sponsored Insurgents in the Ogaden

To pursue its irredentist goals in Ethiopia's Ogaden region, the Somali Government has created, controlled, and supported various insurgent groups since becoming independent in 1960. Its latest vehicle is the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), formed in late 1975 by Somali President Siad. [redacted]

From its inception, the movement—like its predecessors—has received virtually all of its leaders, training, arms, supplies, and funds from the Somali Government. [redacted] the guerrilla force is treated as part of the Somali Army; for example, its troops are used for reconnaissance, border defense, and at times to augment regular Army units. [redacted]

We estimate that the WSLF numbers less than 5,000 armed men. In our opinion, its military capabilities—which have always been limited—were reduced further by the withdrawal of Somali Army units and advisers from the Ogaden in 1981. Mogadishu's troops and advisers formed the backbone of the insurgency and provided all of its heavy firepower. Since 1981 the WSLF has been faced with several leadership crises, tribal squabbling, and a reduction in support by Mogadishu. The movement, as a result, has little cohesion and, in our view, is capable of conducting only harassment attacks on Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden. [redacted]

The US Embassy and Western journalists report that the WSLF field commanders have come to resent Mogadishu's domination of the insurgency and its subjection to the whims of Somali national policy. We believe both sides have a fundamental difference of opinion as to their respective roles: the military wing of the WSLF now views itself as an independent entity fighting for Ogadeni rights; the Somali Government, on the other hand, continues to consider the guerrillas a vehicle to further Mogadishu's goal of "national reunification." [redacted]

In our opinion, a guerrilla movement in the Ogaden cannot be successful without heavy involvement by Mogadishu. Siad's concern over propping up his regime and rebuilding his own military has caused him to diminish greatly support for the WSLF. Because of this, and the Ethiopian Army's increased capabilities in the Ogaden, we view the threat to Ethiopia posed by the WSLF to be minimal. [redacted]

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#### Ethiopian-Assisted Anti-Siad Dissident Groups

Ethiopia and Libya provide training, arms, and financial support to two Somali guerrilla groups seeking the overthrow of President Siad: the 3,000-man Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF); and the Somali National Movement (SNM), which commands only a few hundred armed adherents. Despite large amounts of aid from Addis Ababa and Tripoli, neither group currently poses a serious threat to the Siad government. [redacted]

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The SDSF was formed in 1981 by the merger of the Somali Salvation Front, dominated by the Majertain clan, and two very small Marxist exile groups. This unification was brokered by Ethiopia and Libya which, since their 1981 pact, are collaborating in efforts to overthrow Siad. The merger was designed to broaden the tribal base of the Salvation Front and to give it a political character that would appeal to Marxist ideologues in the Somali Government and ruling party. [redacted]

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The SDSF, however, has had little success gaining support outside of the Majertains. Most Somalis view the movement as a Majertain vehicle for regaining the power lost when Siad seized control in 1969; others have been alienated by either its close ties with the Ethiopians or its Marxist rhetoric. [redacted]

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Libyan and Ethiopian assistance to the SDSF resulted in a gradual improvement in its military capabilities during 1982. It was able to take advantage of the Somali Army's lack of mobility and overall weakness to launch increasingly bold attacks along the frontier and within Somalia. Although the Ethiopians provided air and ground support to the dissidents for larger operations, most SDSF forays were conducted without operational assistance. Their attacks, however, continued to be limited to Majertain-inhabited areas of central Somalia [redacted]

The dissident's momentum was reversed in July 1982 when they were defeated in an effort to capture the Somali town of Galcaio. The SDSF believed the capture of the district capital would spark a Somali Army rebellion against Siad. [redacted] he dissidents—reinforced with Ethiopian regulars—suffered several hundred casualties and were forced to withdraw to the Somali border town of Goldogob, which they and the Ethiopian Army still occupy. [redacted]

This defeat caused some SDSF officials to question the political and military leadership of Col. Abdullahi Yusuf, the front's Ethiopian-installed chairman, who was one of the leaders of the 1978 coup attempt against Siad. The internecine squabbling, in turn, has adversely affected the morale of the SDSF forces; with guerrillas already chafing under the tight controls the Ethiopian Army imposed on their operations and access to equipment in late 1982, desertions increased significantly when Siad announced an amnesty in February of this year. [redacted]

The other anti-Siad group, the SNM, draws its support primarily from the Issaq, a major northern Somali tribal family. The SNM was formed in London in 1981 and last year moved its operations to Ethiopia in an effort to acquire assistance from Ethiopia and Libya. [redacted]

The leaders of the SNM have resisted strong pressure from Ethiopia and Libya to merge with the SDSF. Addis Ababa and Tripoli apparently believe a merger would revitalize the Majertain group and allow it to expand its operations within Somalia. The conservative Muslim leadership of the SNM, however, rejects the Majertain group as a Marxist organization with

goals incompatible with their own, and also fears that a close identification with the Ethiopians would alienate the SNM from its supporters in northern Somalia.

The Issaq rebellion is motivated by the tribe's belief that it is the object of political and economic discrimination by the central government, which is dominated by Siad's Marehan subclan. [redacted]

[redacted] the SNM enjoys considerable sympathy in northern Somalia, where violent demonstrations broke out on several occasions last year to protest Mogadishu's policies. The harsh reprisals ordered by the Somali Army commander in the north, and the purge of Issaq officers from the Army because their loyalty was suspect, led to a brief increase in the size of the SNM ranks. [redacted]

The movement, however, has not been able to exploit this unrest. It lacks an effective military arm, with only a few hundred dedicated combatants. Many armed Issaq groups that join the SNM do so on a temporary basis, [redacted] Because of this, its operations have been limited to small-scale raids against Somali border outposts or vehicle traffic. As with the SDSF, the Somali amnesty program has hurt the SNM. According to our estimates, several hundred Issaq dissidents have turned themselves in since February. The group remains a nuisance to the government, but it does not pose a serious threat to Mogadishu's control of northern Somalia, according to Embassy reporting. [redacted]

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## Appendix C

Breakdown of Ethiopian and Somali  
Orders of Battle

## Ethiopia

	Inventory	Source	Remarks
<b>Ground Forces</b>			
<b>Tanks</b>	640-740		
M-47	50	Yugoslavia	
T-34	30	South Yemen	
T-54-55	560-660	USSR	
<b>Armored vehicles</b>	616-716		
BRDM-2	130	USSR	
BRDM-2/AT-3	24	USSR	Cuban forces only
BTR-60	350-400	USSR	
BTR-152	50-100	USSR and South Yemen	
BMP-1	62	USSR	Cuban forces only
<b>Artillery/rocket launchers</b>	726-826	USSR, US	
<b>Antitank weapons</b>	2,400 <sup>a</sup>		
AT-3 Sagger	300	USSR	
Recoilless rifles/rockets	700 <sup>a</sup>	USSR	
Others	1,400	USSR	
<b>Personnel</b>	180,500		
<b>Air Force<sup>b c</sup></b>			
<b>Fighters</b>	117 (74)		
MIG-15/17	12 (8)		
MIG-21	62 (42)		
MIG-23	25 (20)		
F-5	18 (4)		
<b>Transports</b>	24 (17)		
DHC-5	2 (2)		
AN-12	9 (6)		
C-47	13 (9)		
<b>Personnel</b>	3,500-4,000		

<sup>a</sup> Minimum estimate.

<sup>b</sup> A breakdown of Ethiopian pilots is not known. We estimate, however, that Ethiopia has 150 to 200 MIG-qualified pilots, some of whom are dual qualified.

<sup>c</sup> Numbers in parentheses are aircraft estimated to be operational.



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**Somalia**

	Inventory	Source	Remarks
<b>Ground Forces</b>			
Tanks	291		
T-34	35	USSR, Egypt	5 operational
T-54/55	110	USSR, Egypt	
M-41	11	US	Captured from Ethiopia
M-47	100	Italy	
Centurion	35	Kuwait	
Armored vehicles	491		
Fiat 6614/16	310	Italy	210 operational
M-113/ TOW	24	US	
M-113	11	US	Captured from Ethiopia
BTR-60/152	105	USSR	80 operational
Saladin	30	UAE	
Ferret	11	UAE	
Artillery/rocket launchers	485	USSR, Egypt, Romania, Italy	
Antitank weapons	695 <sup>a</sup>		
106-mm recoilless rifles	200	Pakistan	
Milan launchers	95	France	
Strim launcher	Unknown	France	
Others	400		
Personnel	38,000		
<b>Air Force<sup>b</sup></b>			
Fighters	47 (32)		25 pilots
Hawker Hunters	9 (0)		0 pilots
F-6 (Chinese MIG-19)	26 (23)		10 pilots
MIG-15/17	6 (4)		6 pilots
MIG-21	6 (5)		9 pilots
Transports	17 (6)		
BN-2A Islander	4 (4)		
G-222	2 (0)		
C-47	7 (2)		
P-166	4 (0)		
Personnel	2,500		

<sup>a</sup> Minimum estimate.

<sup>b</sup> Numbers in parentheses are aircraft estimated to be operational. These figures are based upon attache reporting and reflect the high level of Chinese and Egyptian technical involvement with the Air Force. The shortage of pilots for the F-6 and the lack of dual-qualified pilots reduce the number of aircraft that could fly at a given time.



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