

The impact of UNCITRAL on FDI

Abstract

This paper evaluates the impact on FDI of UNCITRAL's initiatives to facilitate and strengthen the enforcement of cross border contracts. The paper discusses three initiatives; (i) the New York Convention, and UNCITRAL's model laws on (ii) international commercial arbitration, and (iii) conciliation. These initiatives strengthen countries' international commercial arbitration regimes, and thus facilitate contract enforcement. This can be expected to increase relationship specific investments. In line with this expectation the paper finds that UNCITRAL initiatives are associated with higher levels of FDI overall, and are particularly associated with higher levels of FDI in areas where one would expect investments to be relationship specific such as those in the construction sectors, and those with an intellectual property component.

Keywords: UNCITRAL International commercial arbitration; foreign direct investment; legal rights; gravity equation; incomplete contracts; contract enforcement

JEL Classification: F20, F21, F23, K120

1 Introduction

This paper discusses the impact that a number of initiatives by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) have had on foreign direct investment (FDI). It focuses on initiatives that have strengthened domestic and international legal regimes governing international commercial arbitration (arbitration). Arbitration is relied on by many companies to enforce contracts that cross international borders. For this reason, strengthening the enforcement of these contracts can be expected to lower transaction costs and so promote trade, and foreign direct investment. UNCITRAL's initiatives reviewed in this paper are:

- The *Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards* of 1958 (NY Convention). The NY Convention requires signatories to recognize and enforce awards made in international arbitration proceedings unless certain, relatively restrictive, conditions are met. By facilitating the enforcement of arbitration awards the NY Convention underpins the use of international commercial arbitration. Indeed, large scale use of arbitration is largely traced to the establishment of the NY Convention in the late 1950s (Casella, 1996).
- The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 (Model Law on Arbitration). According to UNCITRAL the Model Law on Arbitration is designed to help states to strengthen their arbitration laws. The Model Law on Arbitration covers arbitral process all the way from the agreement to enforcement of the award. It includes the composition and jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, and court interventions in the arbitral process (UNCITRAL, 2016a). By adopting the Model Law on Arbitration countries should improve the reliability and predictability of using arbitration to resolve contractual disputes.
- The Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002), (Model Law on Conciliation) provides uniform rules with respect to the conciliation process with the aim of ensuring greater predictability and certainty in its use. "The Model Law addresses the procedural aspects of conciliation, including appointment of conciliators, commencement and

termination of conciliation, conduct of the conciliation, communication between the conciliator and other parties, confidentiality and admissibility of evidence in other proceedings as well as post-conciliation issues, such as the conciliator acting as arbitrator and enforceability of settlement agreements” (UNCITRAL, 2016b). An important benefit of the Model Law on Conciliation is that it should reduce the expected cost of using arbitration by decreasing the need for arbitration proceedings.

This paper evaluates these initiatives in three parts. Section 2 describes the impact that UNCITRAL's initiatives can be expected to have; section 3 discusses the results of preliminary empirical analysis on the role that UNCITRAL's initiatives have had. 4 concludes with some implications for policy.

2. Expected Economic Impact of UNCITRAL's initiatives

The importance of arbitration arises from the difficulties firms face when they use foreign domestic courts to enforce cross border contracts. Firms can be unfamiliar with foreign laws and legal processes. Furthermore, surveys suggest that firms often have concerns about the impartiality, length of proceedings, expertise and levels of corruption in foreign courts (PwC, 2013). All these factors lead firms to be wary of relying on foreign jurisdictions to enforce contracts.

Many of the concerns that firms have with relying on foreign domestic are mitigated by arbitration. Surveys (PWC, 2013) find that firms are attracted to arbitration due to the expertise and neutrality of the decision maker, confidentiality of the proceedings a lack of familiarity with the courts and laws in foreign countries, and enforceability. When firms use arbitration they are able to decide the process used for selecting the arbitrators, the procedures under which the arbitration will be conducted, and the law under which any disputes will be adjudicated. The majority of contracts reference English or New York State law. These jurisdictions have large bodies of precedent that provide guidance on the likely results of an arbitration proceedings in the wide range of circumstances that can lead to a dispute (Landes and Posner, 1976). Finally, due to the widespread adoption of the NY Convention it is often easier to enforce international commercial arbitral awards than awards made by foreign domestic courts.

The benefits of arbitration will be greatest for relationship specific investments. These are defined as investments that have far less value outside of the initial relationship. A concrete example is an investment in a coal mine that will be located next to its only customer, a power station. A firm would typically only invest in the coal mine if it had entered into a contract with the power plant outlining the amount and price of coal that the power plant will purchase. If the mine is then built, but the power station breaches the contract by stopping payments the value of the investment in the coal mine would be greatly reduced. For this reason, a mining company would be wary of making an investment in the coal mine unless they were confident that they could enforce the contract with the power plant. As this example suggests relationship specific investments often arise in infrastructure. Other examples include large construction projects where a failure to pay for the project would lead to losses for the construction firm, the provision of finance where a failure by a borrower (say) to pay back the loan leads to losses, imports where the importer cannot be sure of the quality of the product being purchased, and projects that have an intellectual property component where the client can use the intellectual property but refuse to pay for it.

Difficulties enforcing contracts can be expected to lead to less relation specific investments. Consistent with this, Nunn (2007) finds that a country's ability to enforce written contracts is an important determinant of its comparative advantage. This result is based on the insight that improved contract enforcement leads to higher relationship-specific investments which leads to the expansion of sectors in which these investments are particularly important Nunn (2007). Another example is (Berkowitz et al, 1996) who finds that adopting the NY Convention is associated with greater export of goods whose quality is difficult to evaluate at point of delivery.

While there are often benefits from using arbitration rather than the domestic courts, arbitration comes at a cost. It is estimated that in many countries the cost of an arbitration case is ten times, or more, expensive than the cost of a comparable case in a domestic court (Myburgh & Panigua, 2016). One contributor to these higher costs is that unlike in a domestic court whose services are typically provided at low or no cost, the parties to an arbitration need to pay for the arbitrators as well as various administrative expenses. This can be a substantial proportion of the damages sought, especially for smaller claims. The Paris based International Chamber of Commerce reports that its costs make up a substantial proportion of small claims. It estimates that litigants will be charged 35% of a 100,000 Euro claim or 35,000 Euro, 13% of a million Euro claim or 130,000 Euro, and 4% of a 10 million Euro claim or 400,000 Euro. Due to the high cost of arbitration commentators suggest that parties use the domestic courts for disputes over smaller amounts (Casella, 1996).¹

An important way to lower the cost of using arbitration is to promote the use of mediation and conciliation. Increasing the use of mediation and conciliation can reduce the number of disputes that enter into arbitration proceedings. Due to the high costs of arbitration proceedings this can significantly reduce the cost and time of disputes (Love, 2011). For example, a study found that in Argentina a mediation costs one sixth of an arbitration (Jorquiera and Alvarez, 2005). This suggests that even a small increase in disputes resolved through mediation and conciliation can substantially reduce the expected cost of using arbitration to resolve disputes arising from a contract.


2.1. A simple model of the impact of UNCITRAL's initiatives

To understand the effect of the improvements in arbitration that UNCITRAL brings it is useful to consider a simple model based on Meltiz (2003). This model is illustrated in Figure 1. The model assumes that there is a range of prospective investment projects with different levels of productivity $P(\theta)$. Each MNE receives a signal on how productive its investment it will be, and then it decides whether to invest, and how much to invest if it does. The profitability of investing at different levels of productivity is shown by the upward sloping "profitability line". The point at which this line crosses the x-axis is the productivity threshold above which there is a positive return and so firms invest. All projects to the right of that threshold are undertaken. The distance from the right hand side of the graph to this crossing point determines how many projects will be undertaken. The amount invested in each project is determined by how profitable it is. More is invested in projects that are more profitable (i.e. further above the x-axis). Total investment is a

¹ This discussion is focused on arbitration around investments. For disputes over the delivery of goods the cost of arbitration can be relatively low at a few thousand dollars

function of the area below the profitability line but above the x-axis (as shown by the shaded area in Figure 1). The greater this area the greater the total volume of FDI.

Figure 1: Description of the model




The model described by Figure 1 allows us to review firms' decisions to use different forms of dispute resolution, and also the impact that this has on the volume of investments, and the number of investments made. When firms to use a particular form of dispute resolution, such as the domestic courts, this has implications for their profitability and fixed costs (Myburgh and Panigua, 2016). By comparing the profitability under three different scenarios we can investigate what our priors suggest should be the impact of UNCITRAL's initiatives on investment. In particular we review three scenarios:

1. **Scenario 1: Domestic courts.** Here firms can only use foreign domestic courts to enforce contracts. The profitability ($\pi(D)$) of the resulting investments at different levels of productivity ($P(\theta)$) is shown by the dotted line. The result is relatively poor contract enforcement and so few investment projects as the profitability line cross the x-axis far to the right, and relatively low levels of investment as poor contract enforcement depresses profitability (the profitability line is not far above the x-axis).
2. **Scenario 2: Arbitration with poor legal protections.** Under this scenario the profitability of using arbitration is shown by the dotted line with longer dashes ($\pi(A)$). This line falls below ($\pi(D)$) across projects with different levels of productivity. This assumes that relying on arbitration is less profitable than using the domestic courts because the benefits of using arbitration do not outweigh the higher costs. This is consistent with the view that absent the protections provided by the NY Convention, the Model Law on Arbitration and similar domestic laws, arbitration would be seldom used. This is in line with the historical

experience that there was little use of arbitration prior to the NY Convention (Casella, 1996).

3. **Scenario 3: Arbitration with strong legal protections including those provided by UNCITRAL.** UNCITRAL's initiatives have two effects. The first is to make arbitration a more effective form of contract enforcement. As a result, the line that shows the profitability line from investing using arbitration ($\pi(A(\text{UNCITRAL}))$) is steeper than the profitability line when domestic courts are used ($\pi(D)$). It is steeper because investments are more profitable at every level of productivity. A steeper line can be expected to increase the size of investments, and volume of investments. The second effect is to lower the expected cost of using arbitration through the Model Law on Conciliation. This increases the number of projects for which it is profitable to use arbitration which in turn can be expected to increase the number of investment projects.

Figure 2: Firms profitability from arbitration and domestic courts



2.1. Implications of the analysis

Overall the analysis in this section predicts that UNCITRAL's initiatives should promote FDI in sectors where investments are relationship specific, and that in particular:

1. The NY Convention, the Model Law on Arbitration and to a lesser extent the Model Law on Conciliation should increase the volume of investment
2. The Model Law on Conciliation and to a lesser extent the Model Law on Arbitration and the NY Convention should increase the number of investment projects,

The next section reviews the results of a number of preliminary empirical exercises that evaluate these predictions.

3. Empirical analysis of UNCITRAL's initiatives

This section conducts a preliminary analysis of the impact of UNCITRAL's initiatives on different sectors and types of activity. Although the results of this analysis are inherently tentative, we do find some indications that UNCITRAL's initiatives are associated with an increase in FDI. The research discusses previous research on the NY Convention by Myburgh and Paniagua (2016), it then extends this analysis to discuss the impact of UNCITRAL's initiatives on different types of investments, and investments in different sectors.

Myburgh and Paniagua (2016) find that the NY Convention is associated with large increases in FDI. The paper finds that there is a far larger increase in the volume of investments, than in the number of investment projects. This result is consistent with the discussion in Section 2 which found that the high cost of arbitration should limit its usefulness to smaller projects, and so the NY Convention would largely affect the volume of investment rather than the number of investment projects. We extend this result in the Appendix and find that as expected adoption of the Conciliation Model Law is associated with an increase in the number of projects.

As discussed in Section 2 one would expect UNCITRAL's initiatives to be more important for investment activities that are more likely to relationship specific. To test this hypothesis we analyze the association between UNCITRAL's initiatives, and aggregate FDI on a cross-section of 87 countries across a number of investment activities. After controlling for GDP the regression explains around 70% of variation in aggregate FDI. As shown in Figure 3 the results suggest that the NY Convention and UNCITRAL's Model Law on Arbitration are associated with higher volumes of FDI in a number of activities. Notably this includes construction, business services, design and ICT. The activities where UNCITRAL's initiatives are positively associated with higher volumes of FDI are arguably the activities that are more likely to be relationship specific than those activities such as customer care where UNCITRAL's initiatives are not positively associated with higher volumes of FDI. These results are consistent with the proposition that UNCITRAL's initiatives have promoted FDI (for more detail on some of the limitations of the analysis see footnote 2 and the Appendix).²

Figure 3: Association between FDI and UNCITRAL's initiatives, a (+) shows a significant statistical relationship

Activity type	Activity	Adopted NY Convention	Adopted UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration	Adopted UNCITRAL Model Law on Conciliation
	Business services	+	+	+

²As discussed in more detail in the Appendix there are limitations to an analysis of this kind. In particular, factors other than UNCITRAL's initiatives are likely to be promoting FDI and so one cannot definitively conclude from this analysis alone that UNCITRAL's initiatives have caused the increase in FDI. The limitations in data mean that one cannot conclude that UNCITRAL's initiatives are not having an impact in the sectors because there is no positive statistical relationship shown. For example, it may be that the Model Law on Conciliation does promote FDI in more sectors. However, too few countries have adopted it, and we have relatively little data by activity. This suggests that even though a positive relationship may exist our analysis may not have found a statistically significant relationship.

Customer	Sales & Marketing	+		
	Customer care			
	Tech support			
	Shared services			
Complex	Headquarters			
	Design	+		
	ICT	+	+	
	RD			
	Education			
High Fixed costs	Maintenance			
	Extraction			
	Manufacturing			
	Logistics		+	
	Construction	+	+	

4 Concluding Remarks

This paper has found that UNCITRAL's initiatives to strengthen the domestic and international legal regimes for arbitration have promoted foreign direct investment (FDI). The paper suggests that UNCITRAL's initiatives have promoted relationship specific investments. Countries that adopt the NY Convention and UNCITRAL's Model Law on Arbitration and Conciliation tend to experience higher levels of investments in sectors such as construction and activities such as ICT.

Appendix I

We conduct a series of statistical exercises to evaluate the importance of UNCITRAL's initiatives for FDI. These exercises aim to show where UNCITRAL's initiatives are associated with more FDI and the nature of this association. They also provide a tentative indication of the impact that these initiatives may be having on FDI. Our analysis has a number of limitations which suggest that results should only be considered tentative. An important limitation is that we have not been able to model the factors that lead countries to adopt the model laws, or the NY Conventions. This is a particular limitation in the case of the Arbitration model law. It appears that jurisdictions such as England or Hong Kong with established arbitration regimes have not adopted the Arbitration model law. This phenomenon suggests that adoption of the model law will not be monotonically associated with a stronger arbitration regime. This will tend to attenuate any relationship between adoption of the model law and FDI and so could lead to fewer statistically significant results. Consistent with this we find fewer statistically significant results for the adoption of the Arbitration

Model Law than we expected. A number of important variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Variables dictionary

Variable	Description	Source
LFDI	Log of aggregate incoming greenfield FDI in 2012	FDI Markets
LGDP	Log of GDP	World Bank data
NYC	Is the country a member of the NY Convention?	New York Convention
UNCITRAL	Had the country adopted the Arbitration Model law by 2010?	UNCITRAL
CONCIL	Had the country adopted the Conciliation Model law by 2010?	UNCITRAL

We conduct a sector analysis to examine in depth effects that might be hidden on an aggregate level. Rather than focusing on sectors, we study the individual's investment project activity. Firms' activity reveal more information than aggregate sectoral data. For example, a highly complex chemical project might be masked in the agricultural sector. We have identified three groups of activities on which we expect a different impact of arbitration: high fixed costs, complex and customer activities.

The estimations related to activities with high fixed costs are reported in Table 2. These activities are maintenance, extraction, manufacturing, logistics and construction. Contrarily as expected, arbitration has no significant association with most activities with high fixed costs. Arbitration, both UNCITRAL and NYC, has a positive and significant association with FDI only in construction.

Table 2: High Fixed Cost Activities

	(1) Maintenanc e	(2) Extractio n	(3) Recyclin g	(4) Manufacturin g	(5) Logistic s	(6) Constructio n
LGDP	0.865*** (0.08)	0.514*** (0.18)	0.908*** (0.10)	0.901*** (0.09)	1.078*** (0.10)	1.082*** (0.12)
NYC	0.122 (0.64)	0.403 (1.39)	-0.424 (0.75)	0.610 (0.69)	1.093 (0.77)	2.482*** (0.92)
UNCITRAL	0.144 (0.34)	0.263 (0.74)	0.104 (0.40)	0.020 (0.37)	0.734* (0.41)	1.101** (0.50)
CONCIL	-0.032	-0.128	-0.125	-0.326	0.104	-0.094

	(0.56)	(1.21)	(0.65)	(0.60)	(0.67)	(0.81)
Observations	87	87	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.601	0.110	0.531	0.589	0.654	0.620

Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Complex activities (Headquarters, Design, ICT, RD and Education) are reported in Table 3. The picture is different from high fixed cost activities. Arbitration has a positive association in most of them (except for HQ, which might not involve complex activities). NY Convention is positive and significant for Design and ICT and UNCITRAL membership as well for ICT.

Table 3: Complex Activities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Headquarters	Design	ICT	RD	Education
LGDP	1.136*** (0.10)	1.201*** (0.09)	0.707*** (0.12)	1.161*** (0.10)	0.857*** (0.08)
NYC	0.136 (0.77)	1.230* (0.70)	2.557*** (0.95)	0.916 (0.77)	-0.574 (0.58)
UNCITRAL	0.261 (0.41)	0.369 (0.38)	1.133** (0.51)	-0.180 (0.41)	0.260 (0.31)
CONCIL	-0.133 (0.67)	-0.291 (0.61)	0.408 (0.83)	0.343 (0.67)	-0.066 (0.50)
Observations	87	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.642	0.724	0.472	0.656	0.633

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Business Services, Sales and Marketing, Customer care, Tech support and Shared Services are the customer related activities. The estimation results are reported in Table 4. Again, although we observe certain heterogeneity, most of customer related activities are found to have a positive impact from arbitration. Particularly Business Services is positively associated with both NY Convention, and adoption of the arbitration and conciliation model laws.

Table 4 Customer Activities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
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	Business Services	Sales Marketing	Customer Care	Tech Support	Shared Services
LGDP	0.688*** (0.06)	0.787*** (0.06)	0.835*** (0.08)	0.732*** (0.10)	0.660*** (0.11)
NYC	0.932** (0.42)	1.407*** (0.44)	-0.069 (0.63)	-0.369 (0.76)	0.500 (0.84)
UNCITRAL	0.616*** (0.23)	0.305 (0.23)	0.439 (0.34)	0.335 (0.41)	0.326 (0.45)
CONCIL	0.748** (0.37)	-0.170 (0.38)	0.541 (0.55)	0.310 (0.66)	0.167 (0.73)
Observations	87	87	87	87	87
R^2	0.729	0.764	0.604	0.434	0.360

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In the next set of tables we present the results of estimating our variable of interest on large group of countries over a decade. We used the dataset from Myburgh and Paniagua (2016) that contains data from 190 countries during 2003-2012. We borrow the same empirical techniques proposed by the authors, adding to their regressions variables measuring whether countries adopted the model laws on conciliation and arbitration. With this type of analysis we hedge the empirical limitation of the cross-section sectoral analysis. In this panel setting, we can therefore infer a certain degree of causality from statistically significant results.

The results reported in Tables 5 include the analysis of the intensive margin (volume of investment) in columns 1 and 2 and the extensive margin (number of projects) in columns 3 and 4. The regression include a large of controls for economic activity (GDPs), transaction costs (distance, border, landlocked), cultural links (common language, colonial links, same country in the past, and religious affinities) economic and institutional (Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free Trade Agreements) and arbitral systems (New York Convention). Along with these observable factors, the regressions include a large set of controls for unobservable factors (fixed effects). For robustness, we both included country fixed effects in the odd columns and country-pair fixed effects in the even columns. These dummies control for any omitted variable at the country or country-pair level.

Focusing on our variable interest we can observe that the effect of conciliation is positive and significant for the extensive margin, with a coefficient of 0.605 (and robust to both specification in columns 3 and 4). This means that host countries which adopt Conciliation Model laws receive on average more foreign investment projects than those countries that have not adopted the model, with similar characteristics, that have not adopted conciliation. However, the volume of these projects is not affected by conciliation. These results suggest that conciliation has a positive effect

in creating new investment partnerships rather than intensifying existing ones.

Table 5 PPML Estimation (volumes and projects)

	(1) FDI (volumes)	(2) FDI(volumes)	(3) FDI (projects)	(4) FDI (projects)
LGDPs	-0.121 (0.22)	-0.018 (0.23)	-0.130 (0.18)	-0.115 (0.19)
Distance	-0.342*** (0.06)		-0.369*** (0.04)	
Common Border	0.024 (0.13)		-0.131* (0.08)	
Common Language	0.488*** (0.11)		0.510*** (0.06)	
Colony	0.514*** (0.11)		0.626*** (0.08)	
Same Country	0.388 (0.24)		0.571*** (0.15)	
Religious affinity	0.840*** (0.23)		0.416*** (0.13)	
Landlocked	-0.107 (0.09)		-0.049 (0.06)	
Free Trade Agreement	0.242** (0.11)	0.321*** (0.11)	0.248*** (0.07)	0.069 (0.07)
Bilateral Investment Treaty	-0.097 (0.07)	-0.464** (0.21)	-0.007 (0.05)	0.020 (0.12)
NYC	0.622*** (0.24)	0.652*** (0.22)	0.544*** (0.09)	0.548*** (0.09)
Arbitration	0.082	0.063	-0.098	-0.099

model source	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)
CONCIL source	-0.165 (0.12)	-0.177 (0.12)	-0.071 (0.11)	-0.077 (0.10)
Arbitration model destination	-0.059 (0.13)	-0.031 (0.13)	0.022 (0.06)	0.027 (0.06)
CONCIL destination	0.398 (0.26)	0.399 (0.26)	0.605** (0.28)	0.607** (0.28)
Observations	39181	39263	39181	39263
R^2	0.451		0.810	
<i>Country fixed effects</i>	Yes		Yes	
<i>Country-pair fixed effects</i>		Yes		Yes
<i>Year fixed effects</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country pair

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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