Progress, Prospects and Lessons from the MDGs

BACKGROUND RESEARCH PAPER

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This paper reflects the views of the author and does not represent the views of the Panel.

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Background Research Paper for the Report of the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda

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Abstract

On September 8, 2000, the United Nations Millennium Summit concluded with the adoption of the Millennium Declaration as a global vision for the future. In the following years, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) evolved in an effort to save the Declaration from slipping into oblivion. They created a momentum that brought the issue of development back on the international agenda, overcame aid fatigue and galvanized the public. With the MDGs' expiration date of 2015 fast approaching, the world community is focussing on the development of a post-2015 agenda.

This paper seeks to contribute to this process by highlighting the main strengths and weaknesses of the MDGs, deriving the lessons that can be learned from almost 15 years experience with the MDGs. Building on these lessons, the paper suggests different ways of how they could inform and enrich the process towards the formulation of a new development agenda.

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Introduction

> *'We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world's people.'*
>
> Millennium Declaration

The United Nations Millennium Summit concluded with the adoption of the Millennium Declaration as a global vision for the future[1]. The Declaration is based on a set of *fundamental rights* – freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility – and structured according the following topics:

- Peace, security and disarmament;

- Development and poverty eradication;

- Protecting our common environment;

- Human rights, democracy and good governance;

- Protecting the vulnerable;

- Meeting the special needs of Africa; and

- Strengthening the United Nations.

In the following years, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) evolved with the initial objective to monitor the implementation of the commitments made in the declaration – though they ultimately captured only a small fraction of them. With the MDGs' expiration date of 2015 fast approaching, the focus of the world community is by now on developing a post 2015 agenda.

Any new development agenda, however it may look like, should ideally build on the legacy of the MDGs, avoid their mistakes and build upon their strengths. This paper contributes to this objective by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the MDGs and developing

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[1] http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm

suggestions of building on the former while avoiding the latter, deriving main lessons learned from almost 15 years' experience with the MDGs. Thus, it is not the objective of this paper to provide a specific outline for a new development agenda, but rather to suggest ways of how the lessons that can be learned from the MDGs could inform and enrich the process towards the formulation of a future agenda. It proceeds as follows.

The following *section two* provides a brief overview of the world's progress towards the MDGs so far, arguing that while it is definitely time to think about a new agenda this should not distract from the fact that the current job is far from being finished. Progress towards the MDGs has to be accelerated, also to provide any new agenda with the best possible starting conditions. Following this word of caution, the paper then turns to the valuable lessons learned from the MDGs from which any discussion of a new agenda could greatly benefit. As a starting point, the *third section* provides a brief description of the process that led to the MDGs, highlighting what they achieved and where they failed. The *fourth section* briefly summarizes the main global challenges likely to shape the future over the next decades and which any new agenda would have to take into account in order to provide a development narrative that is relevant not just today but also in the years to come.

In *section five*, the paper then turns to a description of the process that led to the MDGs. The top-down approach in which the MDGs were developed is considered one of the main weaknesses of the current framework that undermined ownership of and commitment to the goals in developing countries. It argues that any new agenda has to be developed in a truly participatory approach and provides a highly aggregated overview over the main participatory processes conducted so far. It then argues in *section six* that the most likely result of any participatory approach will be a universally applicable agenda. However, there are some dangers connected to a universal approach which this paper highlights as well as possible solutions to avoid them. Afterwards, the paper sketches in *section seven* the problems that

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arose when the MDGs were utilized – against their intention – as national targets. It argues that national targets can be very advantageous – in case they are ambitious and fair. Thus, the paper suggests two ways of how such ambitious and fair targets might be derived.

In *section eight*, the paper turns to one of the main strengths of the MDGs, their focus. Focus is a precondition for the success of any new agenda, yet it is highly endangered through the broad participatory approach and this section suggests some possibilities of how to keep it. Afterwards, the paper turns to address an often criticised weakness of the MDGs, their so-called 'silo structure', in *section nine*. The paper highlights the problems that such a structure might cause and suggests two ways of how a new agenda can avoid them. Even more criticism was voiced with regard to the neglect of inequality in the MDG framework, a critic that is addressed in *section ten*. Finally, *section eleven* discusses the lessons that can be learned from more than a decade of monitoring progress towards the MDGs, highlighting the targets and indicators that have proven to work and those that clearly didn't, deriving guiding principles for the selection of targets and indicators for a new goal framework. *Section twelve* concludes.

Accelerating Progress

While it is definitely more than time to think about a new agenda, it is crucial not to lose sight of the fact that the job regarding the MDGs is far from being done. Before evaluating how the world is faring with regard to the MDGs, it has to be kept in mind, that there exists the typical 3-5 year time lag in the generation of global statistics. In other words, we will only know which of the MDGs have actually been achieved sometime between 2017 and 2020 (e.g. Sumner and Lawo, 2010: 10). Until then, all evaluation has to be based on whether the world is 'on track' with regard to the MDGs.

The result is sobering. The following figure provides an overview of the evaluation of the Global Monitoring Report (2012) for a sample of eight of the key measurable targets: i) extreme income poverty as measured by the international $1.25 poverty line (MDG1a); ii) primary completion rates (MDG2a); iii) gender parity in primary and secondary education (MDG3a); iv) infant mortality rates (MDG4a); v) under-five mortality rates (MDG4a); vi) maternal mortality rates (MDG5a); vii) access to improved water sources (MDG7c) and viii) access to improved sanitation (MDG7c). As becomes plainly obvious from the figure, the world is currently on track in only three of them.

Figure 1: Global Progress towards the MDGs

'Corresponding target' indicates the progress that would be needed in order to reach the respective MDG target by 2015; a value of 100% indicates that the respective target has already been reached.
Source: Based on Global Monitoring Report, 2012: 2

In addition to this global evaluation, one often comes across statements that even in the case of those targets that are globally on track, progress on the national level has often not even been sufficient in half of all countries. Figure 6 in the appendix provides a detailed overview of which indicators are achieved, which are on track and which will probably not be achieved.

However, as will be further elaborated in section eight ('fairness'), the interpretation of the MDGs at the national level is strongly distorted, favouring those countries with better initial conditions to start with. Other methods should be employed in order to measure progress towards the goals at the country level and section eight presents two of the most promising ones.

Concerted effort is needed to accelerate progress in the MDGs in order to finish the job and to provide the best possible starting conditions for a new agenda. The *MDG Acceleration Framework* (MAF) endorsed by UNDG provides a systematic way to support national strategic plans to pursue MDG achievement. Drawing on country knowledge and experience and building on lessons learned, the framework helps to identify bottlenecks in MDG achievement and supports the development of country-level partnerships in order to accelerate progress in achieving those MDGs that are lagging behind. The positive experience that countries like Ghana and Uganda made with MAF has been recognized and highlighted as a 'model example' for other countries (Attah-Krah, 2011: 6). These efforts have to be continued and intensified all the while a future agenda is developed.

The Legacy

In discussing a new agenda, it might be worthwhile to reflect the history and purpose of the MDGs. They have their roots in the Millennium Declaration that was approved by 189 member states at the UN General Assembly on September 8, 2000. It is a summary of the major commitments made during the international gatherings of the 1990s that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

As the mentioned commitments preceding the Millennium Declaration didn't create a lasting momentum, one of the main issues following the General Assembly was how the Declaration

could be prevented to slip into oblivion. In a time of rapidly spreading aid fatigue, partly a result of the widely perceived underperformance of aid, a method was applied that was extremely popular in the 1990s, especially in developed countries. The method's name is Results-Based Management (RBM) and it was considered to be a highly effective solution to improve the performance of government agencies. So-called SMART indicators (i.e. Specific, Measurable, Agreed, Realistic, and Time-limited) provided an easily accessible way to monitor and reward staff performance. RBM already found its way in several of the international commitments of the 1990s. Now it was to be applied to the Millennium Declaration with a clear message to the public: the utilization of RBM methods would enhance the performance of aid and produce visible results so that tax payers could see what their money achieved. Tellingly, Hulme denoted the whole process as '*human development meets results-based management*' (Hulme, 2010).

At a World-Bank-convened meeting in Washington DC, 19-21 March 2001, entitled '*From Consensus to Action: a Seminar on the International Development Goals*', agreement could be achieved to drop OECD's International Development Goals (IDSs) and instead establish a so-called Inter-agency and Expert Group on the Millennium Development Goal Indicators (IAEG), consisting of experts from the DAC, World Bank, IMF and UNDP (Manning, 2009; Hulme, 2009; Hulme, 2010). It was the task of the IAEG to extract key targets that would lay the foundation for the MDGs. It turned out to be an ongoing process with targets and indicators evolving over time, distilled from the resolutions of 23 international conferences and summits held between 1990 and 2005[2].

A specific challenge with which the work of the IAEG was confronted was the fact that the Millennium Declaration did not specify a baseline for the global targets. This failure has been a consequence of the fact that at the Millennium Summit the B-group and the G-77 were

unable to reach agreement with regard to the level of aspiration of the global targets. In an attempt to nevertheless '*create the semblance of consensus*' (Vandemoortele, 2011b: 5), member states deliberately omitted the specification of the baseline and, in consequence, the time in which the MDGs were to be achieved.

The IAEG finally decided to utilise 1990 as the baseline for the MDGs as most of the targets of the international conferences and summits from which the MDGs have been distilled utilise this baseline. With the decision about the baseline, the IAEG ultimately set the level of ambition for the MDGs. The majority of the targets of the original conferences and summits were derived from simple linear forward projections of the global progress of the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, fully in line with RBM's idea of realistic targets, the MDGs represented a political statement of what should be feasible at the global level.[3] Vandemoortele (2008: 221):

> 'Were progress for child survival, for instance, to continue as in the 1970s and 1980s, the global under-five mortality rate (U5MR) in 2015 would be two-thirds lower than in 1990. Were the global net enrolment ratio (NER) to continue its increase of the 1970s and 1980s, universal primary education could be achieved by 2015.'

Yet, by the time when the MDGs were developed more than ten years had passed since the baseline year and it was already clear that the progress that had been achieved between 1990 and 2000 was below the average achievements of the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, by the time the MDGs were introduced, the world was already off track for achievement in 2015. In the same way as the MDGs were an attempt to overcome aid fatigue by applying methods of RBM, the attempt to stick to targets for which the world was actually already off track could be interpreted as a '*rallying cry to tackle this problem*' (Manning, 2009: 55).

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[2] See table 1 in the appendix for an overview of the different conferences and summits from which the MDGs were drawn.
[3] According to Vandemoortele, a prominent exception was the target for maternal mortality that wasn't based on a global trend, but rather randomly chosen, more like a 'noble intention' (Vandemoortele, 2011a: 14).

Based on the work of the IAEG, General-Secretary Kofi Annan presented his first follow-up report to the outcome of the Millennium Summit on 6 September 2001 (Annan, 2001a). Annexed to the report was a '*Road Map*' that contained the initial MDG framework, which at that time comprised 8 Goals, 18 Targets and 48 Indicators. The Road Map – and consequently the MDGs – was welcomed as 'a useful guide' but not formally endorsed by the UN. In fact, the MDGs were only informally approved at the UN Conference on International Financing for Development held from 18-22 March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico – but not formally endorsed by the General Assembly until 2005 (Manning, 2009: 11; Hulme, 2010: 19; Manning, 2010: 7; Sumner and Lawo, 2010: 4; Langford, Sumner and Yamin, 2013: 2).

The MDGs succeeded in their task to draw public attention. For many the success of the MDGs had not been anticipated and once it became obvious, an intense process of negotiations and lobbying began in order to broaden the MDGs. In 2002, three indicators were added to the initial MDG framework. At the UN General Assembly Summit from 14-16 September 2005, member states endorsed the MDGs and agreed to include four new targets. The MDG framework was revised accordingly in 2007, i.e. the four new targets were included as were 16 new indicators, eight indicators were removed. The new (and current) framework, comprising 8 goals, 21 targets and 60 indicators, is effective since 2008.[4]

The MDGs achieved their purpose to rescue the Millennium Declaration from oblivion. In fact, they created a *momentum* that brought the issue of development back on the international agenda, mobilized public attention and overcame aid fatigue. Statistical capacity building and an increase in ODA are at least partially attributable to the MDGs. As for the former, the data requirements for monitoring progress towards the MDGs promoted the adoption of the

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[4] Refer to table 8 in the appendix for an overview of the initial and the two extended versions of the MDGs, based on the respective Secretary-General Reports of 2001, 2002 and 2007 (shaded areas indicate those targets and indicators that have been added or removed in 2002 and 2007, respectively).

Marakech Action Plan for Statistics (MAPS) in 2004 as well as *National Strategies for the Development of Statistics* in numerous countries.

As for the latter, since the midst of the 1980s, ODA as percentage of GNI had declined continuously. None of the international conferences and summits of the 1990s was able to induce a reversal or even a halt of this development. On the contrary, the global recession starting in 1992 led to an even steeper ODA reduction: the following years witnessed not only the decrease of relative ODA, this time even absolute ODA decreased. The reversal of the trend began in 2001, i.e. briefly after the introduction of the MDGs. ODA as the percentage of GNI increased from 0.23% in 1999 to 0.32% in 2010 (OECD/DAC data sets).

The following figure provides an overview of the development of absolute (in million USD) and relative ODA (as percentage of GNI) from 1960 to 2010/2011. It also indicates the years in which the 23 international conferences and summits took place from which the MDGs have been derived. Despite the fact of a missing counterfactual that in fact prevents any reliable evaluation of the impact of the MDGs, they seem to have at least contributed to the halt and reversal of aid-fatigue.

Figure 2: Development of ODA

1) World Summit for Children, 2) World Conference on Education for All, 3) International Conference on Nutrition, 4) UN Conference on Environment and Development, 5) World Conference on Human Rights, 6) Global Conference on Small Island Developing States, 7) International Conference on Population and Development, 8) World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, 9) 4th World Conference on Women, 10) World Summit on Social Development, 11) 2nd Conference on Human Settlements, 12) World Food Summit, 13) World Conference of Ministers Responsible for Youth

Source: Based on OECD/DAC data sets

This *momentum* that brought the issue of development back on the international agenda, mobilized public attention and overcame aid fatigue is arguably the main legacy of the MDGs. Any new agenda should take due care to maintain and build upon this legacy.

However, it was not the only purpose the MDGs were to fulfill, as Vandemoortele, one of the '*fathers*' of the MDGs explains (Vandemoortele, 2011a: 13): '*Originally they had a dual purpose. Besides rescuing the Millennium Declaration from oblivion, the MDGs were meant to broaden the development narrative beyond the narrow growth paradigm.*'

After almost two decades of nearly stagnating human development and rapidly spreading aid fatigue, in a time when structural economic transformation took center stage, the objective of the MDGs was to bring the focus back on social development. In his follow-up report to the

World Summit for Children (29-30 September 1990, New York) Kofi Annan summarized the desolate condition of investment in social development (Annan, 2001b: 5-6):

> '[…] with few exceptions, developing countries devoted only about 12 per cent to 14 per cent of their national budgets to basic social services throughout the 1990s, while donors allocated only 10 per cent to 11 per cent of their aid budgets, which were already at a record low. These amounts fell far short of the minimum needed to meet the most pressing needs of children in primary health care, nutrition, basic education, safe water an adequate sanitation.'

The MDGs were to provide an impulse for the creation of a broader interpretation of human development beyond economic growth. However, instead of invoking a turn from the narrow economic growth paradigm towards a broader human development paradigm they were interpreted far too literal as social service provision. Taking stock, Vandemoortele (2011a: 13) declares rather bluntly: '*While the rescue [of the Millennium Declaration] has been quite successful, the search for a broader interpretation of development has failed.*'

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the MDGs have been criticized for discouraging investment in productive sectors and promoting '*welfare and aid dependence over growth and self-reliance*' (Manning, 2010: 8). It will be the ambitious task of any post-2015 agenda to succeed where the MDGs failed, i.e. to provide a convincing development narrative that draws upon the lessons learned from the MDGs and is responsive to the changes in the global environment that is in some instances quite different from the time the MDGs were developed. The following section provides a very brief overview of some of the most important global trends that are likely to shape the future over the decades to come.

A broader Picture

A narrative that lays the path for future development cooperation should ensure that it is not only relevant today but also in the years to come. Therefore, it seems to be worthwhile to take a moment to reflect the main challenges the world is likely to face in the years to come. Especially two conditions are very different from the time the MDGs were introduced. First, new emerging powers are rapidly changing the global power architecture that has been in place since World War II. In view of the changed global power architecture it seems to be rather unlikely that a top-down approach like the one applied to develop the MDGs would even be feasibly today. Second, the introduction of the MDGs was fueled by the Monterrey Consensus (2002) on mobilizing resources for development. The current debates about a new development agenda, however, coincide with a time of economic and financial crisis and resulting budget austerities. Thus, the initial conditions for a new development agenda are quite different from the ones faced by the MDGs. But what about the global challenges?

As the world is about to breach planetary boundaries, it faces an increasing list of challenges, many of which were already felt at the time the MDGs were developed (though probably not to this extent): high population growth, urbanization, migration, water and food scarcity, financial volatility, the 'end of oil', conflicts, communicable diseases and spreading inequality. The world is needed to join forces to respond to these challenges and avoid the high costs of business-as-usual.

Projections on population growth suggest that while the population of developed regions is likely to change only minimally, the population of developing regions will enlarge considerably. However, the level of the increase will depend crucially on women's access to family planning. The most recent population forecasts from UNDESA for 2100 range from a world population of 6.2 (low fertility scenario) to 15.8 billion (high fertility scenario) (UNDESA, 2011: 2). It depends on the decisions taken today how strong the future pressure

on labor markets, social systems, the environment and global resources such as food, water and energy will be.

The strong trend towards urbanization is likely to continue. In 1950, 29% of the world's population lived in cities, in 2011, numbers increased to 3.6 billion. UNDESA (2012: 1) estimates that this number will increase to 6.3 billion in 2050, implying that about 67% of the world's population will live in cities. In other words, estimates suggest that virtually all population growth will be concentrated in urban areas of developing countries (UNDESA, 2012: 3). Urbanization can be a virtue or a curse, depending on the investments that are made today. It is easier to create jobs and provide services like education, health systems, drinking water, sanitation etc. to urban than rural areas. At the same time, a failure to provide adequate services has much severe implications in cities than it has in rural areas. In addition, many cities are located near coasts and rivers, implying that they are especially prone to hydro-meteorological threats. Consequently, careful urban planning and investments are needed in order to ensure that megacities turn into hubs of economic growth instead of mega-slums of spreading poverty and disease.

Economic growth, population growth and urbanization increase the pressure on global resources, like, for instance, food production. According to a recent study, '*[n]ew and expanding cities could displace up to 30 million hectares of the highest-quality agricultural land by 2030 – roughly 2 percent of land currently under cultivation.*' (Mc Kinsey, 2011: 6). This loss would be in addition to the expected loss of up to 20% of agricultural productivity in developing countries between 2008 and 2050 due to climate change (Edame et al., 2011: 205). Thus, investments and innovations in agricultural productivity are urgently required to meet the increasing demands of the future.

In addition, economic growth, population growth and urbanization pose a progressive threat on the environment. According to a recent World Bank report (2012) conducted by the

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, current primary energy use produces about 32 billion tCO_2, over 80% stems from fossil fuels. Based on UNDESA's medium population forecast of 8.6 billion people in 2035 and an average economic growth rate of 3.5% per year between 2010 and 2035, global primary energy demand is expected to rise by over one-third until 2035 (IEA, 2012: 49). The report warns that '*[w]ithout further commitments and action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the world is likely to warm by more than 3°C above the preindustrial climate.*' (World Bank, 2012: xiii). In case current mitigation commitments are not fully implemented, the world could warm by 4°C in the 2060s. Consequences are likely to be '*unprecedented heat waves, severe drought, and major floods in many regions, with serious impacts on human systems, ecosystems, and associated services.*' (World Bank, 2012: xiii-xiv).

Since 1992, 4.4 billion people have already been subject to disasters (UNISDR, 2012) and global warming of up to 4°C is likely to let these numbers appear small. 19 of the 20 countries that are most at risk as a consequence of extreme weather conditions in 2015 are countries with large numbers of poor people[5] (Melamed, 2012: 19). The response to the environmental threat cannot be less economic growth that is urgently needed to create jobs and provide the resources for a growing population. Rather, it needs to go hand in hand with innovations such as, for instance, decoupling[6]-innovations in the areas of de-carbonization of primary energy or energy efficiency.

These are only a few examples but they already convey the key message: business-as-usual comes at costs the world cannot afford. With public support being high as never before, a new post-2015 agenda has the chance to lay the path for an *inclusive and sustainable transformation*, accounting for the fact that any progress in human development can only be maintained if the social, economic and environmental sustainability of that progress is ensured. Humanity has

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[5] Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Colombia, Cuba, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Honduras, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
[6] Decoupling describes the process of separating economic growth from primary energy use.

'to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.' (UN, 1987: 15).

However, in view of this highly aspirational objective, it might be worthwhile to reflect the following. In order to provide a broader development narrative it might not be necessary to introduce a goal framework that addresses every single global challenge that the world might face. It might be recommendable to reflect which other frameworks are already in place that might be better suited to take care of specific challenges and to ensure that these frameworks are *mutually reinforcing* rather than trying to integrate them into one overall agenda.

Lesson one: Participation

As described in the second section, the MDGs were defined by the IAEG without the contribution of national governments. This fact severely undermined the acceptance of and commitment to the goals in most of the developing world. The MDGs were perceived as a mere donor agenda and a lack of ownership and commitment was a direct result of this perception.

Thus, while the MDGs had a highly motivating effect on donors, their effect on developing countries was much less promising. This fact is illustrated by a recent paper by Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2010). In order to estimate the effect that the MDGs had on national government's policies, the authors compare the rate of progress towards different indicators before and after the implementation of the MDGs. Their results are illustrated in the following figure.

Figure 3: Percentage of Countries with Accelerated Progress after MDG Implementation

Source: Based on Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2010: 10-11)

What becomes clearly obvious from the figure is that in the vast majority of countries progress did not accelerate after the implementation of the MDGs. In fact, only five of the 24 indicators showed accelerated improvement after MDG implementation for at least half of the countries: MDG7d Slum population (76%), MDG8 Debt service (65%), MDG1b Employment to population ratio (64%), MDG1a Extreme poverty (51%) and MDG3a Share of seats held by women in national parliaments (50%). A comparison with the Global Monitoring Report (2012) reveals that even in the case of two goals for which the world is on track (MDG3a Gender parity in education) or that have already been achieved (MDG7c Improved water source) progress did not improve in the majority of countries after MDG implementation. This fact raises at least doubts as to the actual contribution of the MDGs to these success stories.

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Summarizing, the overall effect of the MDGs on national policy agendas seems to have been rather mediocre, just as might be expected from the way in which they were developed. But what about countries in a close donor-recipient relationship? Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2010) conduct the same comparison for Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the focal regions for donors and specifically mentioned in the Millennium Declaration. The result is the clear opposite, as the following figure illustrates.

Figure 4: Percentage of Sub-Saharan African Countries with Accelerated Progress after MDG Implementation

Source: Based on Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2010: 13-14)

16 out of 24 indicators showed accelerated improvement after the implementation of the MDGs for at least half of Sub-Saharan African countries, compared to five out of 24 in case of all developing countries. For once, this highlights once again the injustice of referring to the region as a 'failure' in terms of the MDGs. But it also provides additional evidence for the fact that the MDGs had more effect on donor agendas – and thus on main recipients – than on

national politics of developing countries, clearly a result of the top-down approach in which they were developed.

Furthermore, even in the case of countries with a perceptible acceleration of progress considerable doubt has been raised whether this acceleration is the result of real national commitment or rather an effort of '*speaking the language*' in order to secure donor support. Indeed, the lack of ownership in many developing countries is supposed to have hampered progress towards the MDGs (ECA, 2012: 4).

Against this background, it seems to be highly recommendable to base and evolve any new agenda from a participatory process that should ideally span the whole globe. So far, participation has been quite impressive. The following is thought to provide a (very) rough impression about the variety of processes that are underway (without any claim on completeness).

The '*global conversation*' set up by the UN Development Group (UNDG) has so far been able to engage over 200,000 people in the discussions about a post-2015 development agenda. The process takes place on three levels:

i) *National consultations* have been conducted in 83 countries, with the aspiration to reach 100 countries until June 2013. 36 countries have already made interim results available, based on the contributions of about 130,000 people.

ii) *Thematic consultations* are underway, covering the following 11 topics: Conflict, Violence and Disaster; Education; Energy; Environmental Sustainability; Food Security and Nutrition; Governance; Growth and Employment; Health; Addressing Inequalities; Population Dynamics; and Water.

iii) *A Global Online Conversation* is being held on the worldwewant2015.org website, on Facebook and related forums, and through the MY World survey, which asks

individuals to rank their priorities by choosing six out of 16 possible issues that '*would make the most difference to their lives*' (UNDG, 2013: 7). So far, the worldwewant2015.org website has more than 50,000 members with 3,000 actively contributing. The MY World survey has been taken by roughly 75,000 people.

A report of the first results of the 'global conversation' has just been published under the name '*The global conversation begins: Emerging views for a new development agenda*' (UNDG, 2013).

Apart from the 'global conversation' numerous initiatives have been initiated worldwide. Some of them make concrete proposals for a future goal framework. The arguably most well-known being the 'Bellagio Goals', the 'Save the Children Goals', the 'Getting to Zero Goals', the 'Oxfam Doughnut', the 'People's Goals' and the 'Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)' proposed by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). Before turning to these specific proposals, the following provides a very highly aggregated overview of some of the countless initiatives that have been set up in preparation for the post-2015 process. Its sole purpose is to provide a slight impression of the eagerness with which international organizations, regions and countries engage in the discussions without any claim on completeness.

There are *international consultations* such as the online consultations of the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service[7], the public online consultation of the European Commission[8] or the 'Advancing the post-2015 sustainable development agenda: reconfirming rights – recognizing limits – redefining goals' conference in Bonn, bringing together about 250 civil

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[7] Conducted from 26 October – 7 November 2012, collecting 320 inputs from 135 organizations, international networks and individual respondents (http://www.un-ngls.org/IMG/pdf/NGLS_Consultation_Report_-_26_November_2012_-_final_PDF_version.pdf)
[8] Conducted from 15 June – 15 September 2012, counting 119 contributions from a wide range of organizations and individuals comprising public authorities, civil society organizations, the private sector and academia as well as several European Member States (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/towards_post-2015-development-framework_en.htm)

society activists and representatives from key stakeholders to collect civil society inputs on post-2015. International organizations such as Southern Voice, a network of 48 think tanks from South Asia, Africa and Latin America, formed specifically to contribute to the 2015 process.

There are *regional initiatives* such as the 'Africa we want' dialogue[9], the 'Asian Perspectives on the Post-2015 Development Agenda'[10], the 'Realizing the Future We Want in Latin America and the Caribbean'[11], the 'Manila Declaration'[12], the 'Dhaka Declaration'[13], or the 'Declaration of Civil Society Organizations from the Arab Region'[14].

There are *women's initiatives* such as the 2011 AWID Global Survey[15], the Communiqué from Africa Women's Regional Civil Society consultation[16], the 'Future Asia Pacific Women Want'[17]; or *youth initiatives* such as the 'Declaration on Health and Sustainable Development'

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[9] An African Civil Society mobilization that seeks to include all other dialogues on post-2015 that are taking place at regional, national and grassroots levels
(http://www.whiteband.org/sites/default/files/The%20Africa%20We%20Want%20-%20Monrovia%20%28Oct%202012%29.pdf)
[10] An initiative that brings together the perspectives of Cambodia, Central Asia, China, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mongolia and Thailand
(http://cid.kdi.re.kr/cid_eng/event/download.jsp?file_name=20364_Conference_Edition_Final.pdf&checkFile=eng_add_file)
[11] Outcome of a conference in Guadalajara, Mexico (17-19 April 2013) that brought together about 400 representatives from civil society, academia, indigenous peoples and the private sector from 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (http://participacionsocial.sre.gob.mx/post2015.php)
[12] Outcome of a meeting of 26 members of parliament and 32 civil society leaders from 13 Asian countries (20-21 November 2012) (http://www.whiteband.org/sites/default/files/Manila%20Declaration-Nov2012.pdf)
[13] Outcome of a meeting of 57 members of parliament and 38 civil society leaders from 12 Asian countries (10-11 December 2012) (http://www.whiteband.org/sites/default/files/Dhaka%20Declaration_Dec2012.pdf)
[14] Outcome of regional consultations adopted in Beirut (14 March 2013) (http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/Post2015-ArabRegion-CSODeclaration0313.pdf)
[15] The 2011 AWID (Association For Women's Rights in Development) survey is one of the most comprehensive surveys on issues prioritized by women, covering 1,119 women's organizations from over 140 countries. The top ten priorities identified in the survey were (in this sequence): Gender based violence (59%); women's leadership and empowerment (51%); women's economic empowerment (42%); reproductive rights and health (29%); sexual health (including HIV/AIDS) (27%); economic, social and cultural rights (26%); peace building and violence against women in conflict/ post-conflict (24%); access to education (24%); political participation (17%); and sexual rights (16%). (Pittman et al., 2012: 5).
[16] Outcome document of a consultation of representatives of women's organizations and networks at regional, national and grassroots levels in Monrovia (21-22 October 2012) (http://www.whiteband.org/sites/default/files/Africa%20Women%27s%20Regional%20Consultation%20-%20Monrovia%20%28Oct%202012%29.pdf)
[17] The outcome statement of women's and civil society networks at the regional dialogue on sustainable development and the post-2015 development agenda in Bangkok (3-5 November 2012) (http://www.fwrm.org.fj/content/publications/OutcomeStatementTheFutureAsiaPacificWomenWant.pdf)

of the World Youth Alliance[18], the North-East Asian Youth Vision[19] or the African Youth Declaration[20].

This is only a fragmentary overview of international and regional initiatives that does not even mention the countless national initiatives. The main challenge will be to ensure that all of these suggestions are carefully apprehended and reflected. A lot of effort has already been put into this task. A number of websites have been set up that seek to track the proposals on post-2015, for instance ODI's http://tracker.post2015.org/ and the North-South Institute's http://cidpnsi.ca/blog/portfolio/tracking-post-2015/.

Interestingly, despite all the differences that could be expected from a global exchange of views covering the full range of key stakeholders – from public authorities, civil society organizations, the private sector and academia – many proposals, declarations and consultations point in the same direction. The overwhelming majority of suggestions, in whatever form, call for ambitious universal goals with differentiated targets that reflect national realities, are derived in a participatory process, embedded in a human rights-based approach and address the main challenges most likely to shape the world's future over the next decade, such as climate change, urbanization, migration, population growth etc.

Specific issues that are repeatedly raised are, in no particular order: poverty, hunger/ food security, environmental sustainability, education, health (including sexual and reproductive health), employment, economic growth, equity, equality, gender, social protection, human rights (including access to justice), governance, water and sanitation, energy, peace and

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[18] Bringing together the thoughts of 56 members from around the world in New York City (15 - 18 April 2013) (https://www.wya.net/getinvolved/declarationsandstatements/WYA%20Declaration%20on%20Health%20and%20Sustainable%20Dev.pdf)

[19] Outcome document of the North-East Asian Youth Conference: 'The World We Want' at Korea University in Seoul (7-9 January 2013) that brought together 51 young people from China, Japan, Korea and Mongolia (http://www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/global/documents/NE_AsianYouthDeclaration.pdf)

[20] Outcome document of the Youth Conference on Post-2015 Development Agenda at the UN Gigiri (18-20 November 2012) by representatives of regional, sub regional and national youth organizations (http://www.whiteband.org/sites/default/files/African%20Youth%20Declaration%20on%20Post-2015.pdf)

conflict, transparency, partnerships (e.g. private sector; North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation; trade, investment, technology, finances), Information and Communication Technologies, freedom of information, corruption, resilience, sustainable production and consumption, fighting terrorism, predictable financing (ODA as well as new innovative forms of financing), land rights, infrastructure, drug and substance abuse.

A similar pattern of congruency emerges once the arguably most well-known specific proposals for a future goal framework are compared: the 'Bellagio Goals' (CIGI and KDI, 2012), the 'Save the Children Goals' (Save the Children, 2012), the 'Getting to Zero Goals' (GAC, 2012), the 'Oxfam Doughnut' (Raworth, 2012), the 'People's Goals' (People's Goals, 2012) and the current 'SDSN's SDGs' (SDSN, 2013: *work in progress*). There is considerable overlap regarding the main topics.

Table 2: Comparison of Goal Systems of Selected Proposals[21]

Topics	Bellagio Goals	Save the Children	Getting to Zero	Oxfam Doughnut	People's Goals	SDSN SDGs
Environmental Sustainability	x	x	x	x	x	x
Food, Water, Sanitation	xx	xxx	x	xx	x	x
Education	x	x	x	x		x
Health	x	x	x	x		x
Equality/ Gender	x		x	x	x	x
Governance	x	x	x		x	x
Resilience/ Social Protection	x	x		x	x	
Income/ Poverty			x	x	x	x
Civil/ Political/ Human Rights	x			x	x	x
Employment/ Decent Work		x		x	x	
Security/ Peace	x	x			x	
Energy		x		x		x
Infrastructure	x		x			
Inclusive Growth	x	x				
Partnerships		x	x			
Social Equity				x		
Agriculture/ Rural Prosperity						x
Inclusive, Productive, Resilient Cities						x
Trade, Monetary, Financial Architecture[22]					x	

Source: Own compilation

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[21] An overview of the suggested goals according to the different proposals can be found in the appendix (tables 3-7, figure 5).
[22] This specific goal might be summarized under 'partnerships', which would create even more coherence between the different suggestions.

Lesson two: Universality

It seems to be clear that the top-down approach of the MDGs – which was never recommendable – is not even feasible anymore. Neither is an agenda that formulates a few, vague targets for developed countries and a whole catalogue of clearly specified targets for developing countries. The global power architecture has changed too much since the development of the MDGs. Almost any proposal for a new agenda requests this agenda to be universally applicable within the meaning of the 2012 Rio Declaration that requests: '*[…] global in nature and universally applicable to all countries while taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities.*'[23]

Indeed, a universally applicable goal framework seems to be the most appropriate way to address the challenges the world faces today. The world is highly connected, as the financial crisis made plainly clear, and many of the challenges we face today are global in nature and can only be addressed effectively in a joint effort. But what about poverty, the centrepiece of any development agenda? Is poverty really a universal issue? The answer seems to be yes.

While the world could easily be divided into poor and non-poor countries and aid-donors and -recipients when the MDGs were introduced, such a distinction is no longer feasible. High and persistent growth in almost all developing countries led to a considerable increase in average per-capita incomes.

Since the Millennium, 13 countries graduated from 'low income' to 'middle income countries' (from LICs to MICs), among those some of the most populous countries of the world like Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Lesotho, Nicaragua, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vietnam and Yemen. Whereas in 1990 79% of the

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[23] http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/774futurewewant_english.pdf

poor lived in stable LICs, the percentage decreased to merely 13% in 2010[24]. Instead, the majority of the world's poor today live in stable MICs (59%), only 14% live in fragile LICs or fragile MICs, respectively. In other words, poverty is no longer an issue of poor countries but rather of poor people and poverty today exists in many countries that are donors themselves.

Figure 6: Changing Patterns of Income Poverty

Source: Based on PovCal

Ratifiers of the Copenhagen Declaration of the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 5-12 March 1995 already acknowledged that '[…] *profound social problems, especially poverty, unemployment and social exclusion […] affect every country […].*'[25]

Current global trends like migration, demographic change, economic and financial crisis, budget austerity and climate change threaten human development in all countries. Inequality of opportunity and even income poverty in its most extreme form is perceptible even in the most advanced economies. For instance, in 2011, due to the recession, 800,000 households in the United States lived on $2 or less per person per day (Shaefer and Edin, 2012). Likewise,

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[24] Based on the most recent poverty data published by the World Bank.

the '60% of the median net equivalence income' poverty lines for a couple of European countries are surprisingly low: €1.71 in Romania, €2.22 in Bulgaria, €3.70 in Poland, €3.76 in Hungary, €4.09 in Latvia and Lithuania and €4.33 in Slovakia.

And awareness for these problems is rising. The Australian National Times from October 15, 2012 reports that '*Prominent Australians including Tim Costello and Janet Holmes a Court have called for Australia to set a target, similar to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, to reduce poverty.*'[26] (Langford, 2012: 4).

At the European Council in Lisbon 23-24 March 2000, European Member States inter alia committed themselves to:

> 'Modernising the European social model by investing in people and building an active welfare state. […] Investing in people and developing an active and dynamic welfare state will be crucial both to Europe's place in the knowledge economy and for ensuring that the emergence of this new economy does not compound the existing social problems of unemployment, social exclusion and poverty.'[27]

In order to ensure this commitment, 18 indicators were adopted at the European Council in Laeken 14-15 December 2001 in an effort to measure progress towards the commitments made in Lisbon. Finally, the European Council in Brussels 17 June 2010 agreed on a concrete poverty reduction target as one of five headline targets of the Europe 2020 strategy, requiring that until 2020 at least 20 million people were to be lifted out of poverty.

This commitment is reflected in the attitude towards a future development agenda. The Communication of the European Commissioners on Post 2015 requests a universally applicable framework exactly in the sense of the 2012 Rio Declaration:

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[25] Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, Introduction, point 2
[26] http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-news/more-than-two-million-living-in-poverty-20121014-27kpc.html
[27] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm#c

>'Poverty eradication and ensuring that prosperity and well-being are sustainable remain the most pressing challenges for the future. To be tackled successfully, they must be tackled together, within a new overarching framework that is universal and directly relevant to all countries, while recognising that different countries are affected to varying degrees and that their responses and contribution to global goals will vary.'[28]

However, while a universally applicable development agenda seems to be recommendable, it nevertheless raises some serious concerns that ought to be considered. Research in this area is still rare, an entry point into the discussion is inter alia offered by Langford (2012), Anderson and Langford (2013), and Pogge and Rippin (2013).

The first concern is that the clarity of the MDG framework might get lost in case national targets and indicators are not comparable. Also, in case national targets are set in a way that they are not comparable, the level of ambition is rather likely to be low as national governments tend to define targets that are easily achievable. In a way this tendency was demonstrated in the process towards the MDGs when the B-group and the G-77 were unable to reach agreement with regard to the level of aspiration of the respective goals and targets.

These concerns could be addressed by ensuring that targets are based on outcomes to which every country, as different as they might be, could easily commit. An example for such a target could be to 'increase Healthy Life Expectancy (HALE) by x%', with the percentage increase required depending on what is considered to be feasible at the national level. This is a target to which each country should be easily able to commit. It also ensures national ownership as it gives all countries the flexibility they need to formulate their own strategies to achieve the target in ways that reflect their national realties and priorities. But it also dispels the concerns: as the same outcome variable, i.e. HALE, is utilised, two methods could be applied that are able to determine which percentage increases would be fair and ambitious for

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[28] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/2013-02-2_communication_a_decent_life_for_all_post_2015_en.pdf

every single country. The two methods are i) *Adjustments to State Capacities* (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2009; Randolph et al., 2010; Langford, 2012; Anderson and Langford, 2013) and ii) *Transitions Paths* (Klasen and Lange, 2012), both of which will be presented in the following section seven (lesson three: fairness).

The second concern is that a universally applicable framework might reduce the commitment of developed countries in developing countries. If funds for human development can either be invested nationally or in developing countries there might be a natural tendency to invest nationally – especially considering current budget austerities.

This concern could be addressed by a clear dual commitment. Apart from the national responsibility to fight poverty in its multiple forms, poverty is also a global concern; it has to be ensured that poor countries are not left alone with their limited resources in order to deal with the crucial problems that they face. In other words, countries face the dual responsibility to fight poverty not only at home but also abroad in order to ensure that the most severe forms of poverty are eradicated as quickly as possible.

One way to implement a dual commitment could be to introduce additional targets that form a kind of '*global floor*'. In the case of HALE, such an additional target could be to 'ensure that every person has a healthy life expectancy of at least xx years at birth'. All countries are then called upon to contribute to these additional targets in a joint effort.

Another way to implement a dual commitment could be to call upon the international community to '*speed up*' the progress towards national targets in poorer countries. Again utilizing the example of HALE, in case a x% increase in HALE has been identified as a fair and ambitious national target, the international community is called upon to enable an additional x% increase in collaboration with the national government to accelerate progress in a joint effort.

Whatever ways are chosen to address the specific concerns, due care has to be taken in order to ensure a successful translation of global goals into national targets that are fair, reasonably ambitious and ensure a continuous commitment of developed countries in developing countries.

Lesson three: Fairness

As has been pointed out before, the MDGs were supposed to be global goals only. The majority of targets and indicators were chosen by projecting *global* progress in order to ensure that they are *globally* achievable – which doesn't imply that they have to be achievable at the national level as well. However, considering the compelling advantage of international comparisons it was almost impossible to prevent their interpretation at the national level. However, the *national interpretation* of the global goals is highly problematic, as for instance Vandemoortele (2011a: 17) criticizes:

> 'The blind adoption at the national level is mindless because it is equivalent to imposing development objectives set in New York or other faraway places on a country, thereby undermining the sense of ownership and sovereignty over the development process.'

Interestingly, similar clear statements have been made as early as at the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien (5-9 March 1990) that formulated global goals while at the same time claiming in its Framework for Action that '*countries may wish to set their own targets*'.[29] A few weeks later, the Action Plan of the World Summit for Children in New York (29-30 September 1990) elaborates on this statement, claiming in its Action Plan:[30]

> 'These goals will first need to be adapted to the specific realities of each country in terms of phasing, priorities, standards and availability of

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[29] http://ebookbrowse.com/gdoc.php?id=24025188&url=ada4f8819ccf8b69b165fb0dea21539b
[30] http://www.unicef.org/wsc/plan.htm

resources. The strategies for the achievement of the goals may also vary from country to country. Some countries may wish to add other development goals that are uniquely important and relevant for their specific country situation. Such adaptation of the goals is of crucial importance to ensure their technical validity, logistical feasibility, financial affordability and to secure political commitment and broad public support for their achievement.'

Unfortunately, the wisdom of these conferences got lost; the MDGs were without adaptation interpreted at the national level. This interpretation led to serious distortions as the global goals were highly *disadvantageous* to countries with bad starting conditions. This is especially problematic as those countries that are usually the main beneficiaries of development assistance are in a way set up for failure. Aid-fatigue is a likely result.

For instance, in the considerations for a post-2015 agenda for Africa, Atta-Krah (2011: 3) points to the fact that the MDGs set Sub-Saharan African countries up to fail, leading to the widely-used phrase that '*Sub-Sahara Africa is lagging behind*' in achieving the MDGs. This unfair treatment is considered to contribute to '*Afro-pessimism*' and there is a strong claim for a new agenda to be fair in evaluating countries' progress. Easterly's (2009) article '*How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa*' is probably the most prominent source in this regard.

Vandemoortele (2011a: 11) provides additional justification for the reproaches by demonstrating that the progress towards many MDG targets has been higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than the average progress of all developing countries (see figure 7 below).

Figure 7: Change in Selected Indicators (1990 – 2008)

Source: Based on Vandemoortele (2011a: 11)

The suggestions of Jomtien and New York seem to gain broad acceptance. Many proposals for a new development agenda by now call for global goals and national targets. This is all the more the case as it fits smoothly with the claim for universally applicable goals. One example for such an approach is healthy life expectancy (HALE). HALE is a rather interesting candidate for a global health target. While all countries could easily commit to such a goal, the national targets – i.e. the respective percentage increases in HALE requested at the national level – would inevitably have to be rather different.[31]

However, what is unclear so far is how such an approach of global goals and national targets can facilitate a meaningful comparison of country performance. Such comparisons are very valuable. They not only reveal success stories that provide valuable *lessons learned* but are

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[31] Please note that there are other ways to implement a request for global goals and national targets. One would be to let national governments set their own national targets in order to contribute to global goals. Another would be to introduce a dashboard of targets for global goals from which countries are able to make their own selection according to their national priorities. However, since both approaches prevent country comparisons, considerations of how to ensure fair country comparisons are irrelevant in their case.

also powerful instruments to *maintain future commitment* to the goals – given they are fair. The question how fair and meaningful country comparisons can be achieved with national targets is closely connected to the questions around the formulation of universally applicable goals.

So far, two main methods have been developed to ensure a fair and meaningful formulation of national targets.

Adjustments to State Capacities

The first method estimates the state capacities of countries and clusters them accordingly, defining targets for each cluster (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2009; Randolph et al., 2010; Langford, 2012; Anderson and Langford, 2013). Fukuda-Parr et al. (2009) and Randolph et al. (2010) utilize the highest rate of progress achieved within a cluster as the target for this cluster whereas Anderson and Langford (2013) utilize the respective average rate of progress.

In order to estimate state capacity, Fukuda-Parr et al. (2009) and Randolph et al. (2010) utilize GDP per capita. Anderson and Langford (2013: 10) utilize five additional indicators – the ratio of disposable income to GDP, total population, land area, urbanization and the dependency ratio – showing that this process delivers even more precise evaluations.

Whatever indicators are chosen in order to cluster countries according to state capacity, this is a viable and rather easily explainable approach to set national targets that take country differences into account. Consequently, they lead to a much fairer ranking than the MDGs, tendentially leading to an upgrading in the ranking of poorer and a downgrading in the ranking of less poor countries.

Transition Paths

The second method measures the progress of countries against the progress that could be expected according to the transition path, i.e. the path that every country follows more or less

strictly on its way towards increasing development. A direct implication of the S-shape is that the initial position of a country explains a lot of the progress that the respective country is able to achieve (Meyer et al., 1992, Clemens, 2004, Clemens et al., 2007, Lay, 2010, Klasen and Lange, 2012). This is in line with the argument that the MDGs were disadvantageous to countries with bad starting conditions.

In a recent paper, Klasen and Lange (2012) utilize the S-shape of transition paths in order to evaluate the fairness of different MDG targets. The following figure provides an illustration of a typical transition path using under-five mortality rates based on World Development Indicator 2010 data (Klasen and Lange, 2012).

Figure 8: Fitted Transition Path Under-five Mortality Rates

Source: Klasen and Lange (2012: 13).

As the previous approach, this method provides a possibility to define targets that are ambitious and yet fair at the country level. In addition, the empirical results reinforce that Sub-Saharan Africa is in no way a region of '*stagnation, the greatest tragedy of our time*' (Commission for Africa, 2005). For instance, Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Malawi,

Mozambique and Niger are *clear overperformers* with regard to MDG 4 (under-five mortality) as their achieved progress distinctly exceeds expected progress. Nevertheless, due to their unfavorable starting conditions, they are still considered as *failure* according to the current formulation of MDG4.

Whereas the latter approach has the disadvantage that its methodology is not easily conveyed to the public, it has two important advantages. For once, it provides a sound method to determine which target would be fair and ambitious for every single country because it could always be evaluated against what could be expected from the respective country. In addition, the method provides a way to solve the accountability problem that automatically arises in the case of long-term goals: though goals with a long timeline are highly recommendable, they unavoidably reduce accountability as their achievement doesn't connect to the time in office of political decision-makers. In order to solve this problem, Vandemoortele (2012: 25), for instance, suggests to complement longer term targets with intermediate objectives. However, such a solution complicates the whole agenda and might be difficult to communicate to the public. The method described here would provide a straightforward solution to the problem as progress towards the goal can be evaluated in any given year in an impartial and fair manner, creating an even higher level of accountability than interim targets.

Lesson four: Focus

One of the main strengths of the MDGs was their focus on a limited number of targets which made the framework *clear* and *manageable*. Almost every proposal stresses that this strength has to be maintained in any new development agenda. Otherwise it would lose its appeal to the public, as an endless list of goals and targets is neither communicable nor effective in galvanizing public support. Also, such an endless list will confront national governments with

a virtually impossible implementation task that is likely to lead to a selective approach in which governments choose to comply with those indicators that they feel comfortable to comply with and ignore the rest. Thus, a limited number of goals and targets is considered crucial for the success of a new agenda; yet, a development agenda that is universally applicable and based on an extensive participatory process with its countless number of contributions inevitably holds the danger of an overloading of the agenda.

The renegotiations of the MDGs at the General Assembly Summit of 14-16 September 2005 already provided a little taste of what can be expected to happen during the negotiations for a new agenda. Outcomes of negotiation processes tend to be distorted by bargaining power and this seems to have also been the case in 2005. *Intense lobbying* and what Duffield called *'petty sovereignty'* (Duffield, 2007: 233) led to a couple of targets and indicators that were not well elaborated Vandemoortele, 2011b: 11). Textbook examples are the employment and the new indicator for the slum dweller target.

'*Decent work*' is not defined, '*full employment*' seems to be overambitious. In addition, the way this target is defined – as employment to population ratio – it is not even desirable, considering issues like retirement, maternity leave, advanced training etc. In the case of the slum dweller target, the initial indicator '*proportion of households with access to secure tenure*' was, due to a lack of data, replaced by the highly problematic current indicator '*proportion of urban population living in slums*' (compare table 8 in the appendix). The way this indicator is formulated, it induced in some cases even human rights violations, for instance in the case of Vietnam whose Fourth MDG Report lists slum clearance among the country's efforts in achieving the MDGs (Langford, 2010: 88; Viet Nam, 2005: 48).

The trend towards overloading seems to continue. Vandemoortele (2012: 23) rightfully observes that the outcome document of the MDG-summit in 2010 comprises 124 commitments and is four times longer than the Millennium Declaration. The report that

introduces the Bellagio goals acknowledges that its eleven post-2015 goals '*may still be too many.*' (CIGI and KDI, 2012: 6). The number of eleven goals might even count as actionable; however, the number of targets (almost 70) and indicators (more than 270) is clearly not.

It will be the – very ambitious – task of any new agenda to provide a clear methodology of how the results of the broad participatory process with its countless number of suggestions and proposals can be translated into a limited number of goals and targets. The world-wide consultations seem to provide a rather clear message of which overarching objectives are the most important ones. These issues could provide the building blocks for the development narrative of a new agenda. But how could these building blocks translated into a limited number of goals and targets?

A starting point could be provided by the criteria for successful measurement drawn from the lessons learned from the MDGs and presented in section eleven (lesson seven: measurement). The requirements to satisfy these criteria would perceptively reduce the number of possible goals and targets. However, the final selection should not be based on merely technical requirements.

Unfortunately, almost all of the numerous proposals on a post-2015 agenda that have been made so far fail to provide any kind of methodology that would give some indication of how the results of their often very broad consultations processes were translated into the goals and targets and that they finally suggest.

One exception is provided by the contribution of 'Save the Children' that describes that its goals are not only based on consultations spanning 120 countries, but also on an '*analysis of longitudinal datasets that have tracked changes in children's lives since the year 2000*' as well as country case studies (Save the Children, 2012: 10). The suggestion of the SDSN working group hints into the same direction: '*Sustainable development requires quantification. At what pace should de-carbonization occur? […] Which are the most*

effective techniques for reducing and managing disaster risks? These questions, and many others like them, require a quantitative assessment [...].' (SDSN, 2012: 10).

Impact evaluations like those suggested by 'Save the Children' and the SDSN working group seem to be a rather interesting selection tool. It would allow to base the selection of goals and targets on their respective estimated impact in achieving the overarching objectives identified in the consultation processes and prevent perverse side-effects like the ones induced by the slum dweller target.

Another interesting tool could be provided by statistical methods. The correlation between goals and targets measuring progress towards the same overarching objective is usually rather strong, implying that already a limited number of them would be sufficient to effectively capture it. This does by no means suggest that some of them are unimportant, but rather that they provide very little additional information and might be excluded in order to ensure the clarity and manageability of the agenda.

A statistical method that might be interesting in this context – and that provides a rather good illustration of the last point – is explanatory factor analysis like the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). In a rather simple summarization, what PCA does is to decompose variables in a data set by its Eigen values in decreasing order. The variable that has the largest Eigen value captures the largest variance in the data set – i.e. has the highest explanatory power – and is called the first principal component. The second principal component accordingly captures the second largest variance, and so on. Through the ordering, most of the variance in the data is already captured by the first principal components. Thus, there will be a number of components that are information poor i.e. that do not have a lot of explanatory power when compared to the other components. This way, information poor variables are removed while it is at the same time ensured that essential variables are retained. Again, this does by no means

imply that these variables are unimportant but rather that they do not contain enough additional information that they have to be considered.

Lesson five: avoiding Silos

As pointed out before, one of main challenge for the negotiations of a new development agenda will be the restriction on a limited number of goals and targets in order to ensure clarity and manageability. The often criticized sectoral approach of the MDGs, however, promotes exactly the opposite as it encourages intense lobbying around specific sectors and priorities in an effort to secure future funding. Thus, the avoidance of a sectoral approach might help to ensure the focus of a new development agenda.

The main reason, however, why the sectoral structure of the MDGs has been severely criticized and repeatedly identified as one of the weaknesses of the current agenda is that it disregards the close correlations that exist between the different goals. The first key message of UNDP's 2010 report *'What Will It Take to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals? – An International Assessment'* is:

> 'This Assessment notes that there are important synergies among the MDGs - acceleration in one goal often speeds up progress in others. In households where women are illiterate, child mortality is higher, implying the links between education, the empowerment of women and the health of children. Given these synergistic and multiplier effects, all the goals need to be given equal attention and achieved simultaneously. This requires multisectoral approaches and coordination among various implementing agencies.'

In the same manner, World Health Report (2010) acknowledges that much of what has been achieved with regard to health improvements was actually due to achievements outside the health sector (WHO, 2010: ix). Based on an analysis of more than 40 countries UNICEF (2012) comes to find that children that are born to mothers with no education are almost three

times as likely to die before age five as children born to mothers with secondary or higher education. This is a telling example of the close connection between education and under-five mortality. Likewise, Save the Children (2012: 13) point out that children who are not adequately nourished in the first 1,000 days following conception will suffer irreparable damages that irrevocably reduce their learning abilities, pointing out the close connection between undernourishment and education. These are only but a few examples of numerous studies demonstrating the close connections between the various dimensions of human development.

Drawing on these findings, international agencies like the WHO[32], UNDESA[33], the European Commission[34] and others, strongly criticize the sectoral or 'silo structure' of the MDGs, i.e. their concentration on separate goals that in reality are closely related. Gore (2010: 75) warns:

> 'Another problem is that donors are taking a sectoral approach to MDGs, focusing on, e.g. basic health, or primary education, or water, or even a favourite disease. With this approach, it is possible selectively to achieve targets but this does not add up to comprehensive progress.'

One of the easiest ways to avoid the silo structure of the MDGs would be to take the concept of human development as what it really is, a human-centered approach. Thus, instead of thinking about sectors, it would be more coherent to think about people, i.e. precisely to form clusters according to the three *main transition phases* of human life. These are the crucial times in life in which future paths are laid and deprivation has the strongest detrimental effect. Overcoming deprivation in the transition phases therefore promises the highest returns regarding progress in human development while at the same time ensuring cross-generational justice that takes due care of any demographic changes in the future.

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[32] http://www.fip.org/files/fip/WHO/Intervention%20on%20MDGs.pdf
[33] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/asg/statements/asg-2012-post2015.shtml
[34] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/millenium-development-goals/documents/12-12-06_report-final.pdf

It also provides a structure that takes due care of whatever the age-pyramid in a specific country might look like. While especially Africa has to address the challenges of a youth population, in particular the challenge to create jobs for a successful youth transition, developed countries as well as many countries in East Asia and the Pacific are confronted with the challenges of an ageing population, in connection with all the challenges related to pension payments, burgeoning health costs etc. The following provides a list of the three clusters according to the three main transition phases of human life.

Cluster #1: *Childhood Well-being* (e.g. mortality, nutrition, education, living conditions including access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation, birth registration, healthy life expectancy at birth)

Early childhood already predetermines a significant part of future life's quality. Malnutrition in early ages can cause irreparable damages that significantly limit future life chances. Insufficient promotion at early education stages leads to failures that are extremely difficult to rectify and waste human capital. Poor living conditions are likely to keep children from building relationships, thereby threatening the development of their social skills.

Cluster #2: *Youth Transition* (e.g. healthy life expectancy for persons aged 14-20, higher education, vocational training, non-cognitive skills, access to information and communication technologies)

Young people who are insufficiently trained and educated, who are in poor health or lack non-cognitive skills are often forced in either inactiveness or precarious jobs. Their exclusion from productive employment wastes human capital and provides a source for future poverty and inequality, burdens social protection schemes and threatens social stability.

Cluster #3: *Retirement* (e.g. social protection, healthy life expectancy for persons aged 60 and over, participation in social life)

It is one of the duties of the state to take care of the elderly population. Aging populations, however, provide an increasing challenge to social protection systems. If not taken proper care of, the challenge could develop into a serious threat to the stability of a country.

In addition to these three clusters, there should be a fourth, a gender cluster. Though gender should be given special attention in all three clusters of transition phases, it is nonetheless a crucial, cross-cutting issue that – even if integrated in all three clusters – would not receive adequate attention:

Cluster #4: *Gender* (e.g. female employment, maternal and reproductive health, violence, voice, participation)

Another way to account for the correlation that exists between the different sectors would be to calculate a composite index. Please note that this is not a suggestion to replace the dashboard approach of the MDGs with a composite index. A composite index has the advantage to effectively capture the synergistic and multiplier effects that are described in the 2010 UNDP report. This is especially helpful for impact evaluations as it allows to estimate the impact of different policies on a number of sectors at the same time. However, besides very high data requirements, it additionally has the clear disadvantage that, consisting of only a single number, it is not easily communicable to the public and obscures a lot of information – for instance with regard to the actual performance in the different sectors. It might be worthwhile, however, to consider having a composite index *in addition* to the future goal framework.

Especially qualified would be composite indices that measure achievements – or failures – at the individual or at least household level. Individuals might face a considerable number of deprivations at the same time. Such simultaneous deprivations threaten to lastingly exclude parts of the population from progress in human development, just as the 2010 UNDP report

describes. But any composite index that is able to capture the correlation between the different areas of well-being would do the job.[35]

Among the most well-known indices that build on household data sets are those proposed by Tsui (2002); Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003); Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio (2006) and Bossert, Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio (2009). A disadvantage of these indices, however, is that they are not decomposable according to the different areas of well-being, i.e. it is impossible to tell how much of the overall deprivation is due to failures in a specific area, for instance education, health, etc. The only index developed so far that is able to capture the correlations between different dimensions of well-being while still being decomposable according to these dimensions is the Correlation Sensitive Poverty Index (CSPI) (Rippin, 2010, Rippin, 2013).

The CSPI provides a detailed picture of the multidimensional poverty profile as well as the opportunity to evaluate policies according to their effectiveness to address several targets at the same time, i.e. those that are able to speed up overall progress by effectively realising multiplier effects. The following figure provides an illustrative example of the main characteristics of the CSPI. Based on data from the Indian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conducted in 2005, it shows the different poverty profiles of the two Indian States Kerala and Bihar.

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[35] Please note that though often suggested the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is not suited for this task as it is unable to capture the correlations between the different areas of well-being.

Figure 9: The CSPI and Selected Decompositions for the Indian States Kerala and Bihar (DHS 2005)

Source: Own calculations

The CSPI is based on the same poverty dimensions as the MPI, i.e. schooling, enrolment, mortality, nutrition, electricity, sanitation, water, flooring, cooking fuel and assets. The selection of dimensions is of course debatable – and restricted by data limitations. The CSPI differentiates three categories of deprivation, i.e. i) the vulnerable (those who are deprived in up to one third of poverty dimensions), ii) the poor (deprived between one and two thirds of poverty dimensions), and iii) the severely poor (deprived in more than two thirds of poverty dimensions).

According to this differentiation, severe poverty does not exist in Kerala, 12% of the population are poor, and 73% are vulnerable. In Bihar, on the contrary, almost 30% of the population live in severe poverty and more than half of the population is poor. Special efforts

will have to be made in order to reach the severely poor who are deficient in almost every area of wellbeing captured by the index.

Based on the correlation between the different poverty dimensions, overall deprivation is much higher in Bihar (0.323) than in Kerala (0.041). Also, the main sources of deprivation are different in the two countries: In Kerala, one third of overall deprivation can be attributed to undernutrition, another 19% to cooking fuel. These seem to be the two main areas that need urgent attention. In Bihar, on the contrary, schooling, enrolment, under-five-mortality and nutrition constitute the main areas of concern.

Lesson six: Equality

According to the Global Risks 2013 report, the global risk that is '*most likely to manifest over the next 10 years is severe income disparity*' (WEF, 2013: 10). Since 1990, income inequality increased in almost every world region.

Figure 10: Changing Patterns of Inequality

Lighter area indicates data from 1990; darker area indicates data from 2010 or latest data available
Source: Own calculations based on data from SECLAC and UNU/WIDER and on the methodology applied by
Gasparini, Cruces and Tornarolli (2009: 24)[36]

Considering this fact, it comes as no surprise that the MDGs continue to be strongly criticized for their exclusive focus on *national averages* that implies a complete neglect of inequality. The MDG framework is unable to catch whether progress had been achieved through improvements of the situation of the poor or through additional improvements of the situation of the wealthy and privileged.[37]

Perhaps one of the most telling illustrations at the national level is provided by the following example (Vandemoortele, 2011a). Nigeria has faced a decline in the percentage of children who received measles vaccination, from 47% in 1990 to 44% in 2008. The small national decline, however, was solely due to sweeping declines in the coverage rate of the bottom two

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[36] I deviated from the methodology proposed by Gasparini, Cruces and Tornarolli (2009) only in the point that I disregard equivalence-based Gini values instead of adjusting them.

quintiles. The immunization rate of the bottom quintile actually halved, the loss of the fourth

quintile was about 25%. The first three quintiles, however, saw increases in their vaccination

rates (figure 11). This fact is obscured by the MDGs focus on national averages.[38]

Figure 11: Quintile specific measles immunization rates in Nigeria

Source: Vandemoortele (2011a: 19).

The importance to address inequality is all the more urgent as rising inequality is actually

an automatic byproduct of economic growth, i.e. in order to prevent rising inequality it has to

be actively counteracted (Kanbur, 2011: 8):

> 'The basic stylized facts of the past quarter century can be summarized as
> follows. Where there has been no growth, there has been no poverty
> reduction. However, the tendency for increasing inequality in growing
> economies has been present, unless actively counteracted by policy.'

Vandemoortele (2008) goes as far as to suggest that rising inequality is the main reason why

the world is unlikely to achieve most of the MDGs. The same progress as has been achieved

in the 1970s and 1980s would have been sufficient to reach the MDGs, however, despite

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[37] The criticism is justified though strictly speaking it does not tell the whole story. The MDGs did include a target on inequality, i.e. the 'share of national consumption that accrues to the bottom 20 per cent of the population', though it has been largely ignored (Vandemoortele, 2011a; Vandemoortele, 2011b).

[38] Another example is provided by the most well-kwon MDG target, i.e. halving the proportion of the population below $1 (PPP) per day. Whereas the overall number of people living in extreme poverty decreased from 1.9 billion (43%) in 1990 to 1.2 billion (21%) in 2010, most of this overall reduction is due to China. With China left

unprecedented growth rates in the new Millennium progress has slowed down considerably in comparison to these early years. Vandemoortele (2008: 223) provides the following explanation:

> 'Unlike income, social indicators have upper limits – for example, the life expectancy of a billionaire is not significantly higher than that of a middle-class person. Because public investments have continued to disproportionately benefit better-off people, they have started to yield fewer results as their social indicators are approaching the natural bounds. As long as investments and policy reforms do not prioritize the poor and the most disadvantaged, then 'average' progress for a country will continue to slow down.'

One of the main concerns with regard to policies counteracting inequality is that they might slow down economic growth. Empirical literature has for a long time not been able to erase this concern: even after years of research empirical results continue to demonstrate a surprising unambiguity regarding the relationship between income inequality and economic growth (e.g. Banerjee and Duflo, 2003). A recent study by Marrero and Rodríguez (2010), however, suggests that the reason for this unambiguity may be due to the fact that there is a coexistence of 'good' and 'bad' or 'fair' and 'unfair' inequality.

It is a well-known phenomenon that people assess distributions differently, depending on whether they perceive the outcome to be fair or unfair. Fong et al. (2006), for instance found that political support for redistribution doesn't depend in the first place on the availability of funds, but rather on the question whether recipients are considered to be responsible for their situation or not.

Marrero and Rodríguez (2010) were among the first to apply this differentiation to economic growth theory. They differentiate between 'inequality of returns to effort' ('fair' inequality)

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aside, only 160 million people have been lifted out of poverty in 20 years. The concentration on averages obscures this important fact.

and 'inequality of opportunity', i.e. inequality that is due to circumstances beyond the individual responsibility ('unfair' inequality). Utilizing data for 23 U.S.-American states in 1980 and 1990 they demonstrate that whereas no relationship between overall inequality and economic growth could be established, robust support exists for i) a *positive* relationship between inequality of returns to effort and economic growth and ii) a *negative* relationship between inequality of opportunity and economic growth. In other words, the authors provide evidence that policies counteracting inequality of opportunity (unfair inequality) increase economic growth.

The principle is rather simple: fair inequality rewards individual efforts, investments and creativity, thereby providing incentives that spur economic growth through enhanced productivity, investments and innovation. Unfair inequality, on the other hand, discourages individual efforts, investments and creativity, wasting human capital and hampering economic growth. In addition, as unfair inequality is nothing else than discrimination, it also has a psychological component as individuals tend to conform to stereotypes, thereby again wasting human capital. For instance, Hoff and Priyanka (2004) demonstrate how caste-based discrimination provokes under-performance among junior high school students (6th and 7th grade): when tests were taken anonymously, high- and low-caste students showed the same level of performance; however, in case caste-affiliation was revealed, there was a deep performance gap between them.

But how big is the share of inequality of opportunity in overall inequality? Few studies exist so far that provide estimates. Brunori et al. (2013) provide an overview of those studies that calculate estimates for inequality of opportunity of household income and are thus roughly comparable: Cogneau and Mesple-Somps (2008)[39], Pistolesi (2009)[40], Checci et al. (2010)[41],

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[39] Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Uganda
[40] USA

Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)[42], Ferreira et al. (2011)[43], Singh (2012)[44], Belhaj-Hassine (2012)[45] and Piraino (2012)[46].

All studies emphasize two facts: first, that inequality of opportunity is universal and second, that it is of considerable size. The share of inequality of opportunity was estimated to be as high as one third of overall inequality. This is rather high, considering the fact that all estimates of inequality of opportunity are in fact lower bound estimates that considerably underestimate 'true' shares.[47] The following figure provides an overview of the lower bound estimates of inequality of opportunity in comparison with overall income inequality.

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[41] Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK
[42] Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru
[43] Turkey
[44] India
[45] Egypt
[46] South Africa
[47] All estimates of inequality of opportunity are lower bound estimates. This is a direct consequence of the fact that data on discriminatory circumstances are incomplete: what is not explicitly captured as discriminatory is automatically defined as inequality of returns to effort. Utilizing inequality in earning wages for individuals aged 25-55, Niehus and Peichl (2011) estimate upper bounds for inequality of opportunity that are significantly higher than the lower bounds, suggesting that studies considerably underestimate the 'true' shares of inequality of opportunity.

Figure 12: Total Inequality and Inequality of Opportunity in Selected Countries

Darker areas indicate the lower bound estimate of inequality of opportunity on total inequality
Source: Belhaj-Hassine (2012); Brunori et al. (2013); Checci et al. (2010); Cogneau and Mesple-Somps (2008); Ferreira and Gignoux (2011); Ferreira et al. (2011); Piraino (2012); Pistolesi (2009); Singh (2012)

It is easily comprehensible why almost every post-2015 proposal requests that the fight against inequality of opportunity, or discrimination, takes center stage in any new development agenda. Not only from a moral perspective, but also in order to avoid the waste of human capital and boost economic growth. This can be achieved by following a suggestion that has repeatedly been made in the literature as well as during public consultations: to *disaggregate* targets according to the main *discriminating factors* such as race, caste, disability, region and economic status. Non-discrimination could then be ensured by not only focusing on overall progress towards the targets, but in addition on the *distribution* through

which this progress is achieved. In other words, targets would be set for the society as a whole as well as for disadvantaged groups.[48]

But there is yet another side to inequality. If inequality, no matter of which form, is too high, it hampers economic growth, especially by creating social tensions and conflicts (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). This result is actually linked to another aspect of the differentiation between inequality of opportunity and inequality of returns to investments: It is not very controversial that higher investments and efforts should be rewarded with higher income, but what is highly controversial is how big this reward may get. Or, how much inequality is appropriate?

This question is emotionally charged and as much fancied as the policies related with it, e.g. the limitation of top salaries, promotion of progressive tax systems, reduction of global tax evasion and avoidance etc. A recent interview that Chrystia Freeland conducted with Branko Milanovic, economist at the World Bank, reveals the whole uneasiness that is concerned with this topic (Freeman, 2012: ix-x):

> "'I was once told by the head of a prestigious think tank in Washington, D.C., that the think tank's board was very unlikely to fund any work that had income or wealth inequality in its title," Milanovic […] explained in a recent book. "Yes, they would finance anything to do with poverty alleviation, but inequality was an altogether different matter." "Why?" he asked. "Because 'my' concern with the poverty of some people actually projects me in a very nice, warm glow: I am ready to use my money to help them. Charity is a good thing; a lot of egos are boosted by it and many ethical points earned even when only tiny amounts are given to the poor. But inequality is different: Every mention of it raises in fact the issue of the appropriateness or legitimacy of my income.'"

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[48] Please note that such an approach requires the expansion of current surveys in order to provide data sets that can be disaggregated according to disadvantaged people groups.

Just as Milanovic expressed, the issue is about the appropriateness – or fairness – of the reward for investments and efforts. The following two figures provide an illustration of the extent of the gap between what people perceive to be a fair distribution and the actual distribution in a country. In two national surveys conducted in Australia and the United States, respondents were asked to indicate what percentage of the nation's wealth they thought each of the quintiles of the distribution actually had and what they thought they should have. The results were compared to the actual distribution of the respective country.

Figure 13: Ideal, Estimated and Actual Wealth by Quintile in the US and Australia

Source: Based on Neal et al. (2011), and Norton and Ariely (2011).

Two facts are especially interesting. First, respondents in neither country supported an equal distribution of wealth. Though Australians tend to prefer a more equal society than the US, respondents in both countries expressed their preference for a wealth distribution that provided the top quintile with the highest share of wealth (32% in the US, 24% in Australia) and the lowest quintile with the lowest (11% in the US, 14% in Australia). This result seems to indicate that rewards for higher investments and efforts are considered to be fair and just.

Second, respondents in both countries heavily underestimated the actual inequality in their home country which diverges greatly from their ideal distribution. In other words, inequality has grown to an extent that is perceived to be highly unfair and could become the source of social tensions. Indeed, in a recent study Tayler et al. (2012) come to find that a rising share of Americans see a conflict between rich and poor.

Those who would like to have a new development agenda not only reduce inequality of opportunity, but overall inequality as well request the introduction of a separate goal or target on inequality. Interestingly, a separate target on inequality is already included in the current MDG framework: the third indicator of the first target requires the reduction of '*the share of national consumption that accrues to the bottom 20 per cent of the population*'. Yet, this target has been seldom mentioned or measured.

Nevertheless, a group of 90 renowned academics recently requested the High Level Panel on the Post 2015 Development Agenda in an open letter to suggest the introduction of a target on inequality in their report.[49] In particular, they suggest utilizing an inequality target based on the Palma index (Palma, 2006; Palma, 2011), i.e. the ratio of the income share of the top 10% to the bottom 40% of a population.

Lesson seven: Measurement

Table 8 in the appendix provides an overview of the MDGs, the original as well as the extended versions of 2002 and 2007, based on the respective reports of the Secretary-General (new targets and indicators are shaded). It also includes an overview of data availability for each single indicator as well as a brief discussion of their respective quality. As already pointed out, RBM requires indicators to be SMART, i.e. specific, measurable, agreed,

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[49] http://post2015.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/inequality-letter-final-190313.pdf

realistic, time-limited. Some MDG indicators do not even satisfy the SMART criteria. This applies in particular to those indicators that were belatedly introduced at the 2005 World Summit. For instance, as has already been pointed out, the indicator 'decent work' is not specific, neither is the objective of a 'significant improvement' in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. As a result, the indicators were either neglected or, worse, interpreted in an even harmful way like in the case of slum clearances. Thus, any new goal framework should ensure that the indicators it builds upon satisfy the SMART criteria. In addition to this, however, there are still a couple of lessons that can be learned from almost 15 years of MDG monitoring.

One of the weaknesses of the MDGs is that indicators were optionally based on outcomes, outputs and sometimes even inputs. It should be one of the first preferences for the selection of indicators to choose indicators that are based on a specific outcome. These indicators are usually those best suited to fulfil the purpose of any goal and target as they measure directly what the goal and target is about. Thus, a specific feature of outcome-based indicators is that there is usually not much of a difference between the actual goal, target and the respective indicator. One example is provided by MDG4: 'reduce child mortality'. Target 4a requires to 'reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate'. The respective indicator is the under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births). Indeed, the under-five mortality rate is usually considered to be one of the clearest and most unobjectionable indicators of the MDGs (e.g. Vandemoortele, 2008; Klasen, 2012).

One example for input-based indicators is connected to MDG2 'Achieve universal primary education'. Among the indicators to measure this goal are 'net enrolment ratio primary education' and 'primary completion rates'. Both of them are clearly input factors as they grant access to a specific service, in this case primary school, without ensuring the quality of this service. But the quality is what actually matters. The real interest is not in whether children

spend their time in school but in what they are learning. Focussing on the input alone could actually have a deteriorating effect on the outcome we are ultimately concerned about.

For instance, in many cases the rapid expansion of schools aimed to grant an increasing number of students access to primary schools had in many cases a deteriorating effect on the learning quality, first and foremost due to teacher shortages, resulting in single teacher schools with one teacher responsible for one multigrade classroom, or the hiring of so called para-teachers with considerable less educational qualification as regular teachers. According to UNECSO (2012: 7), 120 million of all children enrolled did not complete primary education, an additional 130 million children completed primary education but without being able to read or write.

Any new goal framework should not only ensure that all children in school-age are enrolled in school but also that they achieve international learning standards. There are two main reasons for a focus on international learning standards. First, it is a direct result of the principle of equal opportunities. In many countries low-quality public and high-quality private schools exist side by side. This coexistence creates a system in which only the children of the upper quintiles have access to high quality education which the parents of the lower quintiles cannot afford. As a consequence, existing inequalities are cemented. To require that all children have the opportunity to learn according to international learning standards would counteract these inequalities and contribute to a level playing field of equal opportunity for future generations.

Second, international learning standards are able to reveal the quality of national school systems and are consequently a powerful instrument for public awareness. A prominent example is the case of Brazil. In 2000 then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso took a courageous step by arranging for Brazil to join the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) as one of the first non-OECD countries. Learning achievements were for the first time consistently measured across the whole country. The results, though disastrous,

were crucial for Brazil's progress: they produced a 'healthy shock', asserting pressure on the government through the creation of public awareness and the concern with regard to international reputation. The reform that followed has been promising enough for the OECD to select Brazil as a case study for '*encouraging lessons from a large federal system*' (OECD, 2011: 177).

Several internationally comparable programmes for assessing learning achievements exist, for instance MLA (Monitoring of Learning Achievement), PASEQ, PISA, SAQMEQ (Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality) and TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study). Since these data are not yet available for all countries, it would be one task for the new development agenda to collect the respective data. Once they become available, targets on learning achievements could take the place of completion rates. In a way, they would be 'subsidiary' or 'whish' targets that would take the place of existing targets once data become available (Klasen, 2012: 10).

However, what the experience with the MDGs also taught is that despite their huge advantages there might be cases in which outcome-based indicators should not be the first choice. One reason is that every indicator consists of two basic ingredients, *observations* – the quality of the data that are available for the calculation of a specific indicator –, and *transformations* – the number of calculations that have to be conducted in order to derive the final indicator from these observations (Vandemoortele, 2011b: 14). Thus, the overall quality of any indicator depends on its performance in both areas. If the performance in any of the two areas is very low, there might be good reasons to reject the indicator even if it is an outcome-based indicator. Otherwise, one might end up with fuzzy statistics that provide room for a debate influenced by subjective ideology rather than objective observations.

The maternal mortality rate is a telling example for an indicator that – though directly focussing on the outcome of interest – is derived from highly unreliable observations. Many

developing countries lack a death (and often also birth) registration system (Klasen, 2012: 6), which makes it virtually impossible to derive a reliable number of maternal deaths. Even in case a death is registered, evidence suggests that the error rate in identifying the cause of death is likely to be very high. For instance, maternal mortality rates increase during raining seasons, i.e. those seasons when malaria spreads (Cross et al., 2010). As a consequence, almost any message can be derived from the existing data, as the following two studies – both published in 2010 – demonstrate (Vandemoortele, 2011b: 13):

i) '[T]here has been little progress in reducing maternal deaths.' (Ban, 2010: 8).

ii) 'Substantial, albeit varied, progress has been made towards MDG 5.' (Hogan et al., 2010: 1).

There is no way to say which of the statements is more reliable as both results are based on highly unreliable observations. In fact, Hogan et al. (2010: 1) provides uncertainty intervals for his results that range from 446,400 to 629,600 (1980) and from 302,100 to 394,300 (2008) maternal deaths. The ranges are huge, already indicating the variety of results that could be derived from fuzzy statistics like these. Consequently, many health experts would rather prefer the MDG indicator 'proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel' over maternal mortality rates – though the former is a clear input indicator.

A telling example for an indicator that – though again directly focussing on the outcome of interest – is derived from highly unreliable transformations is the income poverty rate. As any transformation relies on assumptions, any transformation comes at the expense of a loss in reliability and accuracy of the final indicator. Thus, the income poverty rate that relies on a high number of transformations is rather unreliable. For instance, one transformation is based on the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) which is calculated every few years. Any time the new data are published, income poverty data have to be revised as well. The last revision took place in 2008 and overnight increased the number of those living in extreme poverty by 430

million (Chen and Ravallion, 2010). This is by no means a minor correction. The next revision of poverty data can be expected this year when the new PPP data become available.

Again it is not surprising that – given the fuzziness of the income poverty rate – almost any message can be derived from this indicator. For instance, the following two studies – published in short succession in 2009 and 2010 – come to the following contradictory conclusions (Vandemoortele, 2011b: 13):

  i) 'Sub-Saharan Africa counted 100 million more extremely poor people in 2005 than in 1990, and the poverty rate remained above 50 per cent.' (UN, 2009: 7);

  ii) '(1) African poverty is falling and is falling rapidly. (2) If present trends continue, the poverty Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people with incomes less than one dollar a day will be achieved on time.' (Sala-i-Martin and Pinkovski, 2010: 1).

Again, it is rather difficult to say which of the statements is more reliable. Consequently, many researchers suggest that whatever indicator is chosen in order to measure income poverty in a new framework, a utilisation of the $1.25 PPP income poverty line is not recommendable (Saith, 2005; Kanbur, 2009; Fischer, 2010; Reddy and Pogge, 2010).

But even if indicators are based on outcomes and are reliable they can still be misleading in case they are inappropriate to precisely capture a target. This can either be the case if the indicators only capture a part of the actual target or in case they overlap.

A telling example for the former is MDG 6 'Combat HIV/AIDs, malaria and other diseases'. As it is impossible to capture every existing disease, MDG indicators concentrate on HIV/AIDs, malaria and tuberculosis, with a specific emphasis on HIV/AIDs. The concentration on only three diseases constitutes no problem in those countries in which these are indeed the main diseases. It can, however, have serious implications for those countries in which they are not the predominant health problem, especially if these countries are rather

donor-dependent. In this case the concentration can lead to serious distortions of national priorities.

A textbook example is provided by Rwanda. According to UNICEF[50], about 170,000 people lived with HIV in 2009, about 1.6% of the total population; the adult (aged 15-49) HIV prevalence rate is an estimated 2.9%. Rwanda spent US\$ 73 million of its total health expenditure of US\$ 307 million on HIV/AIDS, which is about 24%.

An example for overlapping indicators is provided by the education indicators universal education and gender parity: once universal primary education is achieved, gender parity is achieved as well. This overlap leads to a double pay-off for those countries, which achieve this target – and a double penalty for those that don't. The overlap has even perverse effects: in case school attendance of boys is decreased, gender parity is actually increased, thereby offsetting the negative effect of the former.

Summarizing the measurement experience of the MDGs, indicators should i) satisfy the SMART criteria, ii) be based on outcomes, iii) be based on reliable high quality data, iv) be derived from a low number of transformations, and v) precisely capture the respective target.

A fact which should not be underestimated in this context is that there is considerable more time and possibilities when compared to the formulation of MDGs to not only select indicators but also to create the data that are needed to monitor them. Statistical capacity building was one of the great achievements of the MDGs and this advantage should be exploited. With new technologies available, even the considerable 3-5 year time lag in the generation of global statistics may be considerably reduced.

In other words, different from the time when the MDGs were formulated, the choice of indicators does not need to be limited by the availability of existing data. Instead, efforts of

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[50] http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda_statistics.html, accessed 12 March 2013.

statistical agencies ought to be directed at the provision of data that would be required in order to monitor the indicators that seem to be the most appropriate. It has to be kept in mind, though, that the extension of existing surveys to collect new data is costly and limited. This fact again stresses the necessity of focusing only on what is considered crucial.

Conclusion

Almost 15 years' experience with the MDGs has revealed a lot of strengths and weaknesses. The lessons that can be learned from this experience are highly valuable for the formulation of any new development framework, however it might look like in the end. This paper provided an overview of these lessons and suggested different possibilities of how a future framework might build upon the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of the MDGs.

In particular, the paper provided a brief overview of the process that led to the MDGs and analysed their success in fulfilling their double purpose for which they were developed. Their first purpose was to save the Millennium Declaration from oblivion and it is fair to say that MDGs were a full success in this regard. In fact, the MDGs created a *momentum* that brought the issue of development back on the international agenda, mobilized public attention and overcame aid fatigue. It is this momentum that is arguably the main legacy of the MDGs and any new development agenda should be very careful to preserve this legacy.

However, regarding the second purpose, to create a broader development narrative, the MDGs clearly missed the mark. Seeking to provide a broader interpretation of human development beyond economic growth, they were soon reduced to social service provision that neglected economic development and, for that matter, the whole issue of sustainability.

Most proposals today claim that it will now be the task of the new agenda to provide such a broader, universally applicable development narrative that builds upon the three pillars of

economic, social and environmental sustainability as well as peace and security and takes into account the global trends and challenges that are likely to shape the future over the next decades in order to ensure its relevance over the years to come. Building on the experience with the MDGs, there are seven major challenges ahead that any new development agenda has to face and for which important lessons learned exist from the MDG process.

The *first challenge* will be to ensure that any process towards a broader development narrative is truly participatory. This is a major lesson learned from the MDGs top-down approach that had a strong impact on donor policies but a much lesser impact on national policies in developing countries. In order to ensure national ownership of and commitment towards any new agenda, there is no getting around a truly participatory process.

So far, participatory processes have been rather promising so that the *second challenge* of the post-2015 process will be to bring the numerous proposals and suggestions together in order to ensure a clear focus of the new agenda. A clear methodology for the selection of goals and targets should be developed that would ideally comprise some kind of impact evaluation. This methodology could even be supported by statistical methods such as PCA.

A *third challenge* relates to the challenges that arise in case a new development agenda is to be universally applicable. The paper provided some argumentation of why a universally applicable framework might be preferred over the current MDG framework. It then addressed the challenges by first suggesting different possibilities of how the commitment of developed countries in developing countries might be ensured even in the context of a universally applicable framework. It then turned to suggest different methods of how universal goals might still be broken down into realistic and fair national targets, which actually already provides the bridge to the *fourth challenge*: fairness.

Against their intention, the MDGs were utilized as national targets, a misinterpretation of their purpose that was highly disadvantageous for countries with bad starting conditions. The result

was a decrease in commitment and ownership at the national level as well as a measure of aid fatigue as the main recipients of aid were set up for failure. A universal framework that does not only apply to developing countries with their different starting conditions but also to developed countries would multiply this problem. Thus, the paper suggested two possible ways to ensure fair and ambitious target formulation at the national level: i) the adjustment of national targets according to state capacity and ii) the derivation of national targets from their respective transition paths.

The MDGs have been highly criticised for their concentration on separate goals that in reality are closely related. In case this criticism shall be addressed, a *fifth challenge* will be to avoid the silo structure of the MDGs and the paper suggests two ways how this could be achieved. The first proposal is to cluster a future agenda not according to sectors but according to people's life transition phases. These phases, i.e. childhood well-being, youth transition and retirement, are arguably the crucial times in life in which future paths are laid and deprivation has the strongest detrimental effect. A fourth cluster could be gender as a crucial cross-cutting issue. This moves people into the centre of attention instead of specific sectors, thereby accounting for the close relationship between sectors such as education, health, living standards etc. while at the same time helping to ensure the focus on what is crucial. The second proposal is to utilise a correlation-sensitive multidimensional poverty index to complement a sector-based framework. Such an index allows the estimation of the impact of different policies on a number of sectors at the same time. An index that seems to be especially suited for this purpose is the Correlation Sensitive Poverty Index (CSPI) as it is correlation-sensitive and can still be decomposed according to its dimensions, identifying those that contribute most (or least) to overall poverty.

The MGDs received even more criticism due to their concentration on national averages, neglecting any kind of inequality. To address this failure is a *sixth challenge*. This paper

suggests the formulation of targets that are disaggregated according to the main discriminating factors such as race, caste, disability, region and economic status. Thus, instead of merely requiring a certain overall progress within a country, these targets would additionally require (at least) the same rate of progress for the bottom quintile of the income distribution, for socially or geographically excluded people groups etc. This seems to be an effective way to address inequality of opportunity (or inequity). Quite a number of researchers claim to additionally address overall inequality through a separate target on inequality, so this paper discusses the advantages and caveats of such an approach.

Finally, the *seventh challenge* will be to formulate goals, targets and indicators that are SMART (i.e. specific, measurable, agreed, realistic, time-limited), precise and reliable. There are quite a couple of lessons that can be learned from almost 15 years' experience of MDG monitoring. This paper utilises this experience to formulate some guiding principles to support the selection process.

Thus, rather than suggesting a specific outline for a future development agenda, this paper seeks to contribute to the process of developing such an agenda. In particular, it highlights the lessons that can be learned from almost 15 years experience with the MDGs and suggests different ways of how these lessons could inform and enrich the process towards the formulation of a new development agenda.

Table 1: International Conferences and Summits Leading to the MDGs

Topic	International Conferences and Summits			Millennium Declaration	MDG Targets
Eradicating poverty, hunger and malnutrition	World Summit for Children	New York	1990	-Make the right to development a reality for everyone and free the entire human race from want -Halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	-Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
	International Conference on Nutrition	Rome	1992		
	4th World Conference on Women	Beijing	1995		
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995		
	World Food Summit	Rome	1996		
Advancing education and literacy	World Summit for Children	New York	1990	-Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling and will have equal access to all levels of education	-Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling
	World Conference on Education for All	Jomtien	1990		
	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development	Rio de Janeiro	1992		
	International Conference on Population and Development	Cairo	1994		
	Fourth World Conference on Women	Beijing	1995		
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995		
	World Education Forum	Dakar	2000		
Providing health services, preventing disease and reducing mortality	World Conference on Education for All	Jomtien	1990	-By 2015, have reduced maternal mortality by three quarters, and under-five child mortality by two thirds, of their current rates -To have, by 2015, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity -Help Africa build up its capacity to tackle the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases -Provide special assistance to children orphaned by HIV/AIDS	-Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate -Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio -Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other major diseases
	World Summit for Children	New York	1990		
	World Conference on Human Rights	Vienna	1993		
	International Conference on Population and Development	Cairo	1994		
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995		
	4th World Conference on Women	Beijing	1995		
	World Food Summit	Rome	1996		
	World Summit on Sustainable Development	Johannesburg	2002		
Promoting gender equality and empowering women	World Summit for Children	New York	1990	-Promote gender equality and the empowerment of women as effective ways to combat poverty, hunger and disease -Take measures to combat all forms of violence against women and to implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	-Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015
	World Conference on Human Rights	Vienna	1993		
	International Conference on Population and Development	Cairo	1994		
	4th World Conference on Women	Beijing	1995		
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995		
	2nd World Assembly on Ageing	Madrid	2002		
Promoting Employment	International Conference on Population and Development	Cairo	1994	-Develop and implement strategies that give young people everywhere a real chance to find decent and productive work	-In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995		
	4th World Conference on Women	Beijing	1995		

	World Conference of Ministers Responsible for Youth	Lisbon	1998	
	International Conference on Financing for Development	Monterrey	2002	
Achieving social integration and addressing the vulnerabilities of social groups	World Summit for Children	New York	1990	-Global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice
	World Conference on Human Rights	Vienna	1993	
	4th World Conference on Women	Beijing	1995	
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995	-Human beings must respect one another, in all their diversity of belief, culture and language. Differences within and between societies should be neither feared nor repressed, but cherished as a precious asset of humanity
	2nd Conference on Human Settlements	Istanbul	1996	
	World Conference of Ministers Responsible for Youth	Lisbon	1998	
	World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance	Durban	2001	-Take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families; eliminate the increasing acts of racism and xenophobia and promote greater harmony and tolerance in all societies
	Second World Assembly on Ageing	Madrid	2002	
	World Summit on Sustainable Development	Johannesburg	2002	
Ensuring environmental sustainability and managing the natural resource base for development	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development	Rio de Janeiro	1992	-Manage all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the precepts of sustainable development and change the current unsustainable patterns of production and consumption	-Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources
	World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction	Yokohama	1994	
	Global Conference on Small Island Developing States	Bridgetown	1994	-Halve by 2015, the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water and stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources by developing water management strategies	-Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
	2nd Conference on Human Settlements	Istanbul	1996	
	World Summit on Sustainable Development	Johannesburg	2002	
	World Conference on Disaster Reduction	Kobe	2005	-Have achieved significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers by 2020	-By 2020, achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers
	International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States	Port Louis	2005	-Ensure entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol -Intensify collective efforts for management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests -Call for full implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa -Intensify cooperation to reduce the number and effects of natural manmade disasters	
Promoting democracy, good governance and human rights	World Conference on Human Rights	Vienna	1993	-Respect fully and uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights	-Commit to good governance, development and poverty reduction —
	World Conference of Ministers Responsible for	Lisbon	1998	-Strive for full protection and	

				promotion of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all -Strengthen the capacity to implement principles and practices of democracy and respect for human rights, including minority rights -Promote democracy and the rule of law -Ensure the freedom of the media to perform their essential role and the right of the public to have access to information	both nationally and internationally
	Youth				
	World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance	Durban	2001		
	International Conference on Financing for Development	Monterrey	2002		
	Second World Assembly on Ageing	Madrid	2002		
	World Summit on Sustainable Development	Johannesburg	2002		
Addressing challenges of countries with special needs	Global Conference on Small Island Developing States	Bridgetown	1994	-Address the special needs of least developed countries, including adoption of policy of duty- and quota-free access for essentially all exports from least developed countries -Address the special needs of small island developing countries and landlocked developing countries -Address the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa, including debt cancellation, improved market access, enhanced ODA and increased flows of FDI, as well as transfer of technology	-Address the special needs of least developed countries, including adoption of policy of duty- and quota-free access for essentially all exports from least developed countries and address the special needs of small island developing States and landlocked developing countries
	3rd United Nations Conference on the Least Developing Countries	Brussels	2001		
	World Summit on Sustainable Development	Johannesburg	2002		
	4th Annual Ministerial Conference of Landlocked Developing Countries	Almaty	2003		
	International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States	Port Louis	2005		
Strengthening global partnership for development	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development	Rio de Janeiro	1992	-Responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally -Create open equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial system -Grant more generous development assistance, especially to countries that apply their resources to poverty reduction -Implement the enhanced programme of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief without further delay and deal comprehensively and effectively with the debt problems of low- and middle-income countries, to ensure long-term debt sustainability -Be committed to transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems, and good governance within countries and at the international level	-Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and financial system (including good governance, development and poverty reduction both nationally and internationally) -Deal comprehensively with the debt problems to make debt sustainable in the long term, including through enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPCs and cancellation of official bilateral debt -In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially ICT -In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995		
	4th World Conference on Women	Beijing	1995		
	International Conference on Financing for Development	Monterrey	2002		
	World Summit on Sustainable Development	Johannesburg	2002		
	World Summit on the Information Society	Geneva	2003		

Making macroeconomic policies work for sustained employment-generating economic growth	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development	Rio de Janeiro	1992	-Create an environment, at the national and global levels, conducive to development and poverty elimination -Responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995	
	International Conference on Financing for Development	Monterrey	2002	
	World Summit on Sustainable Development	Johannesburg	2002	
Promoting science and technology for development	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development	Rio de Janeiro	1992	-Ensure that the benefits of new technologies, especially ICT are available to all -Encourage the pharmaceutical industry to make essential drugs more widely available and affordable by all who need them in developing countries
	Global Conference on Small Island Developing States	Bridgetown	1994	
	4th World Conference on Women	Beijing	1995	
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995	
	International Conference on Financing for Development	Monterrey	2002	
	World Summit on Sustainable Development	Johannesburg	2002	
	World Summit on the Information Society	Geneva	2003	
	International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States	Port Louis	2005	
	World Conference on Disaster Reduction	Kobe	2005	
Enhancing the role of civil society and the private sector for development	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development	Rio de Janeiro	1992	-Develop strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil society -Work collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation by all citizens in all countries
	World Summit on Social Development	Copenhagen	1995	
	4th World Conference on Women	Beijing	1995	
	International Conference on Financing for Development	Monterrey	2002	
	World Summit on Sustainable Development	Johannesburg	2002	
	World Summit on the Information Society	Geneva	2003	

Table 3: The 'Bellagio' Goals

No.	Goal	Description
01	Inclusive Growth	Inclusive growth for dignified livelihoods and adequate standards of living
02	Food and Water	Sufficient food and water for active living
03	Education and Skills	Appropriate education and skills for productive participation in society
04	Health	Good health for the best possible physical and mental well-being

05	Security	Security for ensuring freedom from violence
06	Gender Equality	Gender equality, enabling men and women to participate and benefit equally in society
07	Resilient Communities	Building resilient communities and nations for reduced disaster risk from natural and technological hazards
08	Infrastructure	Improving infrastructure for access to essential information, services and opportunities
09	Civil and Political Rights	Empowering people to realize their civil and political rights
10	Environmental Sustainability	Sustainable management of the biosphere, enabling people and the planet to thrive together
11	Global Governance	Global governance and equitable rules for realizing human potential

Table 4: The 'Getting to Zero' Goals

No.	Goal	Description
01	Income	Zero goal for income poverty
02	Hunger	Zero goal for hunger
03	Health	Goal of basic health for all
04	Education	Goal of education for all
05	Equality	Goal of gender equality
06	Infrastructure	Zero goal for infrastructure
07	Sustainable Environment	Goal of clean and sustainable environment for all
08	Partnership and Good Governance	Goal of global partnership and good governance

Table 5: The 'Save the Children' Goals

No.	Goal	Description
01	Inclusive Growth and Decent Work	By 2030 we will eradicate extreme poverty and reduce relative poverty through inclusive growth and decent work
02	Food, Water and Sanitation	By 2030 we will eradicate hunger, halve stunting, and ensure universal access to sustainable food, water and sanitation
03	Health and Mortality	By 2030 we will end preventable child and maternal mortality and provide healthcare for all
04	Education	By 2030 we will ensure all children receive a good-quality education and have good learning outcomes
05	Security	By 2030 we will ensure all children live a life free from all forms of violence, are protected in conflict and thrive in a safe family environment
06	Governance	By 2030 governance will be more open, accountable and inclusive
07	Partnerships and Finances	By 2030 we will have robust global partnerships for more and effective use of financial resources
08	Resilient Societies	By 2030 we will build disaster-resilient societies
09	Sustainable Environment	By 2030 we will have a sustainable, healthy and resilient environment for all
10	Sustainable Energy	By 2030 we will deliver sustainable energy to all

Table 6: The 'People's Goals'

No.	Goal	Description
01	Human Rights	1. Adopt and enforce laws and policies that protect, promote and realize the full range of civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights, backed by maximum resources; 2. Support the realization of human rights universally through international cooperation including the provision of financial and technical resources; and 3. Respect the right of nations to their own development and over

		their natural resources
02	Poverty & Inequality	1. Implement asset redistribution and reform; 2. Implement income redistribution through progressive fiscal policy; 3. Rectify bias against peoples from poor communities, minorities, migrant groups, disabled persons or based on their gender, race, sexual orientation or for other reasons; and 4. Implement reforms to redress inequality between countries
03	Food Sovereignty	1. Adopt food sovereignty as policy framework towards adequate, safe, nutritious food for all, including policies and investments to support small-scale farmers and women producers; and 2. Carry out agrarian reform and secure workers', farmers', and rural peoples' democratic access to land, water resources and seeds, as well as to finance and infrastructure in line with but not limited to the recommendations of the 2006 International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
04	Full Employment & Decent Work	1. Ensure full employment and decent work for all; 2. Uphold workers' rights
05	Universal Social Protection	1. Achieve universal social protection in line with but not limited to the recommendations set in the Bachelet Report and ILO Recommendation 202; and 2. Protect and assist workers by pursuing labor market interventions.
06	Gender Justice	1. Take steps to fully implement international commitments on gender equality and women's rights, including the Convention for Discrimination against Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; 2. Ensure equal access and opportunities in employment, land tenure, education, health, governance, and access to sexual and reproductive health services for women; and 3. Pursue Policies to realize the rights of LGBT people
07	Environmental Sustainability	1. Commit to adequate action on climate; 2. Ensure sharing of safe, appropriate and ecologically and socially sound technologies; and 3. Take steps to transform patterns of production and consumption towards sustainability while securing people's livelihoods and access to resources
08	New Trade, Monetary & Financial Architecture	1. Reform trade relations to promote equality among trade partners, uphold special and differential treatment of developing countries and help economic development in poor countries; and 2. Implement democratic and pro-developing country reforms of international financial and monetary system
09	Democracy & Governance	1. Institute measures for accountability, transparency, democracy and justice in governance; 2. Strengthen rights and opportunities of people especially traditionally underrepresented groups to take greater part in governance and affairs of the community, nationally and internationally; and 3. Strengthen corporate accountability and human rights adherence
10	Peace & Security based on Justice	1. Promote inclusive and equitable development processes; and 2. Adopt policy of eliminating nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction and arms trading

Table 7: 'SDSN's SDGs'

No.	Goal	Description
01	End Extreme Poverty including Hunger	End extreme poverty in all its forms, including hunger and child stunting, and support highly vulnerable states (MDGs 1-7)
02	Achieve Development within Planetary Boundaries	All countries have a right to development that respects planetary boundaries and that helps to stabilize the global population by mid-century
03	Ensure Effective Learning for All Children and Youth for Life and Livelihood	All children participate in adequate early childhood development programs, and receive primary and secondary education to prepare them for the challenges of modern life and decent livelihoods All youth and adults have access to continuous lifelong learning to acquire functional literacy, numeracy and skills to earn a living through decent employment or self-employment
04	Achieve Gender Equality, Social Inclusion, and Human Rights	Ensure gender equality, human rights, the rule of law, and universal access to public services Reduce relative poverty and other inequalities that cause social exclusion Promote freedom from violence, especially for women and children
05	Achieve Health and Wellbeing at all Ages	Achieve universal health coverage at every stage of life, with particular emphasis on primary health services, including reproductive health All countries promote policies to help individuals make healthy and sustainable decisions regarding diet, physical activity, and other individual or social dimensions of health
06	Improve Agriculture Systems and Raise Rural Prosperity	Improve farm practices and rural infrastructure to raise yields, reduce environmental impacts, promote rural prosperity, and ensure resilience to climate change
07	Empower Inclusive, Productive and Resilient Cities	Make all cities socially inclusive, economically productive, environmentally sustainable, and resilient to climate change and other risks Develop participatory, accountable, and effective city governance to support rapid and equitable urban transformation
08	Curb Human-Induced Climate Change and Ensure Clean Energy for All	Curb greenhouse gas emissions from energy, industry, agriculture, built environment, and land-use change to head off the rapidly growing dangers of climate change, while promoting access to clean energy for all
09	Secure Ecosystem Services, Biodiversity and Good Management of Natural Resources	Marine and terrestrial ecosystems as well as natural resources are inventoried, managed, and monitored to ensure the continuation of robust planetary life support systems, and to support inclusive economic development
10	Transform Governance for Sustainable Development	The public sector, business, and other stakeholders commit to transparency, accountability and good governance without corruption The international rules governing international finance, trade, corporate reporting, technology, and intellectual property are made consistent with achieving the SDGs The financing of poverty reduction and global public goods including climate change are strengthened and based on a graduated set of global rights and responsibilities

Table 8: MDGs: Goals, Targets, Indicators

Target	Indicator	Data Availability	Evaluation
Goal 1: ERADICATE EXTREME HUNGER AND POVERTY			
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day	Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 86 countries (UNSTATS)	Most problematic, flawed, misleading (Fischer, 2010; Kanbur, 2009; Reddy and Pogge, 2010; Saith, 2005)
	Poverty gap ratio		
	Share of poorest quintile in national consumption	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 86 countries (UNSTATS)	Good but neglected indicator (Vandemoortele, 2008)
Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people	Growth rate of GDP per person employed	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 84 countries (UNSTATS)	Full employment overambitious and ill-defined (Manning, 2009; Vandemoortele, 2011a; Klasen, 2012)
	Employment-to-population ratio	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 108 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Proportion of employed people living below $1 (PPP) per day	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 54 and 103 countries, respectively (UNSTATS)	Decent work vague formulation, impossible to measure and badly captured by the two indicators (Vandemoortele, 2011a)
	Proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment		
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 93 countries (UNSTATS)	Underweight superior to undernourishment but still biased, stunting considered best (Vandemoortele, 2011a; Klasen, 2012)
	Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 176 countries – although all of them are estimates only (UNSTATS)	Most problematic, flawed, misleading (Vandemoortele, 2011a; Klasen, 2012)
Goal 2: ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION			
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	Net enrolment ratio primary education	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 168 countries – although some of them are estimates only (UNSTATS)	Reliable indicator though the fact that it is an input indicator might lead to problems (Vandemoortele, 2008; Manning, 2009; Klasen, 2012)
	Primary completion rates	Reliable indicator but disregards learning achievements Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 138 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Literacy rates of 15-24 year olds	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 145 countries – although most of them are estimates only (UNSTATS)	
Goal 3: PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER WOMEN			
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015	Ratio of girls to boys in Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Education	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 192, 177 and 163 countries, respectively (UNSTATS)	Reliable indicator, but overlapping with NER (Vandemoortele, 2008)
	Ratio of literate females to males, 15 to 24 years old		
	Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 131 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Proportion of seats held by women in national legislature	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 193 countries (UNSTATS)	
Goal 4: REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY			
Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between	Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 195 countries – although all of them are	In many ways clearest and most unobjectionable of

1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate		estimates only (UNSTATS)	current MDGs (Klasen, 2012; Vandemoortele, 2008)
	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 195 countries – although all of them are estimates only (UNSTATS)	
	Proportion of 1-year old immunized against measles	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 195 countries – although all of them are estimates only (UNSTATS)	
Goal 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH			
Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio	Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 births)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 181 countries – although all of them are modeled only (UNSTATS)	Most problematic, highly unreliable, misleading (UN, 2009; Vandemoortele, 2011a; Klasen, 2012)
	Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 143 countries (UNSTATS)	Experts prefer this indicator over maternal mortality rates even if it's not an outcome measure (Vandemoortele, 2011a)
Target 5.B: Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health	Contraceptive prevalence rate (%)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 107 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Adolescent birth rate (%)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 157 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit and at least four visits)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 139 and 79 countries, respectively (UNSTATS)	
	Unmet need for family planning	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 60 countries (UNSTATS)	
Goal 6: COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASES			
Target 6.A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	HIV prevalence among adults (15-49) (%)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 146 countries – although all of them are estimates only (UNSTATS)	As far as this special disease is concerned, targets and indicators are logical; but draws attention from investment in health systems in general (Manning, 2009)
	HIV prevalence among pregnant women (15-24) (%)		
	Condom use as contraceptive prevalence rate (%)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 50 (women) and 34 (men) countries (UNSTATS)	
	Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS		
	Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS (%)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 82 (women) and 46 (men) countries (UNSTATS)	
Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it	Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 112 countries – although all of them are estimates only (UNSTATS)	See above
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with malaria	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 100 countries – although all of them are estimates or modeled only and many are not relevant (UNSTATS)	
	Proportion of population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures		
	Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 44 countries (UNSTATS)	

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	bednets		
	Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are treated with appropriate anti-malarial drugs	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for only 51 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 209, 213 and 210 countries, respectively – although all of them are estimates only (upper and lower bound) (UNSTATS)	
	Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment short course (%)	Most recent data (2006-2012) on detection available for 208 countries – although all of them are estimates only (upper and lower bound). Most recent data (2006-2012) on cure available for 198 countries (UNSTATS)	

Goal 7: ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	Proportion of land covered by forest (%)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 223 countries – although many of them are estimates only (UNSTATS)	Target 7.A. odd formulation as 'sustainable development' and 'reverse the loss of environmental resources' is a doubling, no date exists for the target (Manning, 2009)
	CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per $1 GDP (PPP)	Most recent data (2006-2012) on total and per capita emissions available for 214 (CDIAC) and 40 (UNFCCC) countries; for $1 GDP for 195 (CDIAC) and 38 (UNFCCC) countries (UNSTATS)	
	Consumption of ozone-depleting substances	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 169 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Energy use (kilogram oil equivalent) per $1 gross domestic product (PPP)		
	Proportion of population using solid fuels		
	Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological limits	No country level data available (UNSTATS)	
	Proportion of total water resources used	Most recent data (2005 & 2010) available for only 68 countries (UNSTATS)	
Target 7.B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss	Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas protected	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 226 countries – although all of them are estimates only (UNSTATS)	Target 7.B. ill-specified as it is not clear what a 'significant reduction' is (Manning, 2009)
	Proportion of species threatened with extinction	No country level data available (UNSTATS)	
Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation	Proportion of people with sustainable access to improved water sources (%)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 192 countries (UNSTATS)	Solid targets, but somewhat out of place under this heading (Manning, 2009)
	Proportion of people with access to improved sanitation (%)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 192 countries (UNSTATS)	
Target 7.D: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers	Proportion of households with access to secure tenure		
	Proportion of urban population living in slums *Def.: urban population living in households with at least one of the four characteristics:(a)lack of access to improved water supply (b) lack of access to improved sanitation; (c) overcrowding (3 or more persons per room); and (d) dwellings made of non-durable material*	Most recent data (2007 & 2009) available for only 61 countries, all of them estimates only (UNSTATS)	Ill-specified, therefore impossible to measure (Vandemoortele, 2011a)

Goal 8: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT

Target 8.A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally Target 8.B: Address the special needs of the least developed countries Includes: tariff and quota free access for the least developed countries' exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction Target 8.C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly) Target 8.D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term	Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as percentage of OECD/DAC donors' gross national income	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 23 countries (UNSTATS)	'Kitchen sink' (Manning, 2009), no targets, no timeframe, questionable distortion towards basic social services and trade capacity, neglecting infrastructure, agriculture etc. Questionable distortion towards basic social services and trade capacity, neglecting infrastructure, agriculture etc.
	Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 23 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Proportion of bilateral official development assistance of OECD/DAC donors that is untied	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 23 countries (UNSTATS)	
	ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of their gross national incomes	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 31 countries (UNSTATS)	
	ODA received in small island developing States as a proportion of their gross national incomes	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 32 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and least developed countries, admitted free of duty	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 166 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries	No country level data available (UNSTATS)	
	Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a percentage of their gross domestic product	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 13 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 23 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 43 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Debt relief committed under HIPC and MDRI Initiatives	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 36 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 113 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Unemployment rate of young people aged 15 to 24 years, each sex and total		
Target 8.E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide	Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis	No country level data available (UNSTATS)	

access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries			
			75
Target 8.F: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications	Fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 217 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Mobile cellular subscription (per 100 people)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 208 countries (UNSTATS)	
	Personal computers (per 100 people)		
	Internet users (per 100 people)	Most recent data (2006-2012) available for 210 countries (UNSTATS)	
Legend:		Added in 2002	
		Added in 2007	
		Removed in 2007	

Figure 5: The ʿOxfam Doughnutʾ

Figure 6: MDG Progress Chart

Goals and Targets	Africa		Asia				Oceania	Latin America & Caribbean	Caucasus & Central Asia
	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Eastern	South-Eastern	Southern	Western			

GOAL 1 | Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Reduce extreme poverty by half	low poverty	very high poverty	moderate poverty	high poverty	very high poverty	low poverty	very high poverty	moderate poverty	low poverty
Productive and decent employment	large deficit in decent work	very large deficit in decent work	large deficit in decent work	large deficit in decent work	very large deficit in decent work	large deficit in decent work	very large deficit in decent work	moderate deficit in decent work	moderate deficit in decent work
Reduce hunger by half	low hunger	very high hunger	moderate hunger	moderate hunger	high hunger	moderate hunger	moderate hunger	moderate hunger	moderate hunger

GOAL 2 | Achieve universal primary education

Universal primary schooling	high enrolment	moderate enrolment	high enrolment	high enrolment	high enrolment	high enrolment	–	high enrolment	high enrolment

GOAL 3 | Promote gender equality and empower women

Equal girls' enrolment in primary school	close to parity	close to parity	parity	parity	parity	close to parity	close to parity	parity	parity
Women's share of paid employment	low share	medium share	high share	medium share	low share	low share	medium share	high share	high share
Women's equal representation in national parliaments	low representation	moderate representation	moderate representation	low representation	low representation	low representation	very low representation	moderate representation	low representation

GOAL 4 | Reduce child mortality

Reduce mortality of under-five-year-olds by two thirds	low mortality	high mortality	low mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality

GOAL 5 | Improve maternal health

Reduce maternal mortality by three quarters	low mortality	very high mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality	high mortality	low mortality	high mortality	low mortality	low mortality
Access to reproductive health	moderate access	low access	high access	moderate access	moderate access	moderate access	low access	high access	moderate access

GOAL 6 | Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	low incidence	high incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence
Halt and reverse the spread of tuberculosis	low mortality	high mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality	moderate mortality	low mortality	high mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality

GOAL 7 | Ensure environmental sustainability

Halve proportion of population without improved drinking water	high coverage	low coverage	high coverage	moderate coverage	high coverage	moderate coverage	low coverage	high coverage	moderate coverage
Halve proportion of population without sanitation	high coverage	very low coverage	low coverage	low coverage	very low coverage	moderate coverage	low coverage	moderate coverage	high coverage
Improve the lives of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	very high proportion of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	high proportion of slum-dwellers	high proportion of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	–

GOAL 8 | Develop a global partnership for development

Internet users	high usage	moderate usage	high usage	moderate usage	low usage	high usage	low usage	high usage	high usage

The progress chart operates on two levels. The words in each box indicate the present degree of compliance with the target. The colours show progress towards the target according to the legend below:

- Target already met or expected to be met by 2015.
- Progress insufficient to reach the target if prevailing trends persist.
- No progress or deterioration.
- Missing or insufficient data.

Source: UN, 2012: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/2012_Progress_E.pdf

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