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Uncovering Women's Writings:
Two Early Italian Women Poets

by

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> If ever there [were] a time which teaches that one
> must know the history of women to understand
> the history of literature, it is now.[1]

The development of a feminist literary criticism in the last two decades has encouraged scholars to reexamine women's writings from both recent and remote periods. Many of the works coming under scrutiny have long been accepted as standard literature, while other texts have only lately gained their first appreciable audience. As Elaine Showalter affirms, "One of the most significant contributions [to the creation of a female literary tradition] has been the unearthing and reinterpretation of 'lost' works by women writers."[2] While such a recovery may prove relatively easy for works written in the last two centuries, the task facing scholars for works from earlier periods, and especially from the Middle Ages, is more problematic. Scant details on the lives of women writers of this period deter scholars from proving unquestionably not just the women's authorship but their very existence. Furthermore, most literary critics prior to our own era have been unwilling to accept either the existence or the authorship of women writers. Thus the task of defending writings by women has been made the more difficult.

Women writers in the Middle Ages were subject to disapprobation from several sides. Attempting to categorize public reproof, feminist critic Susan Schibanoff singles out two types of audiences operating in this period: the "primary," or professional audience; and the "secondary," or lay audience. The first group consisted of minstrels and scribes and the medieval equivalent of our editors and critics; they transmitted the "edited" texts to the public. As the professional audience was primarily composed of men, it is

probable that the male scribes modified texts or altered authorships to suit their own preference. They may also have extracted from these texts just what they considered to be palatable to the tastes of the lay audience. Schibanoff, upon examining the fate of the literary production of Marie de France, Christine de Pisan, Margery Kempe, and Julian of Norwich, concludes that

> these women were not merely the victims of inadvert[e]nt errors unavoidable in the processes of oral transmission, hand-copying, and early printing, nor merely of deliberate but minor textual changes. They were, in addition, subjected to major re-writings which erased their identities as women or changed them into men, ignored their stated preferences, selected out their positive views of women, and hid them safely away from the eyes of secondary readers.[3]

The old reluctance to accept female authorship on the part of the medieval professional audience parallels the uneasiness that some modern critics feel vis-à-vis texts written by women in that period. French historian Georges Duby, for instance, when asked about the women writers of the Middle Ages in France, could summon little enthusiasm: "Certes, il y a Marie de France. Je me demande ce qui se cache derrière ce nom ... Quant à Héloïse, tout donne à penser que ses lettres ont été écrites ou récrites par un homme."[4] In another interview on the same subject, Duby expressed his doubts on the very existence of Marie de France. Upon denying that *trobairitz* (or women poets) lived and wrote love lyrics in twelfth- and thirteenth-century France, he concluded, "Reste Marie de France. Peut-être, un murmure."[5]

Besides implying that texts written by women were "really written or rewritten by men," male critics troubled by female authorship ascribe to women's texts qualities that are different from, and implicitly inferior to, those accepted for male-authored works. Both accusations have also tainted the lyrics written by two Italian women poets of the Middle Ages: La Nina Siciliana and La Compiuta Donzella di Firenze.

In this study I shall analyze the extant poems by La Nina Siciliana and La Compiuta Donzella di Firenze. We have neither details about the lives of these two authors nor their real names. We know only that they lived in the thirteenth century and that, deducing from their names, La Nina lived in Sicily and La Compiuta in Florence.[6] In analyzing their verse, I shall let the texts "speak as lucidly and vitally as possible"[7] in their own terms, as well as in reference to the tradition from which the women writers drew.

Critics have argued the authorship of these two writers' poems for the last hundred years. Francesco Trucchi was the first scholar to attribute a thirteenth-century sonnet to La Nina Siciliana, and Francesco De Sanctis and other historians accepted such a conclusion.[8] A greater number of scholars have concurred on La Compiuta's authorship of three other sonnets of the same period.[9] Gianfranco Contini, in his introduction to La Compiuta's poetry, supports her existence since both Mastro Torrigiano and Guittone d'Arezzo wrote lyrics praising her poetic excellence.[10] Borgognoni, however, denies La Compiuta's existence solely on the grounds that such an "unusual" writer would surely have left more details on her life.[11]

La Compiuta's and La Nina's lyrics have become part of the Italian literary heritage thanks to the favorable review of the nineteenth-century critic De Sanctis. Yet "la perfetta semplicità" (the perfect simplicity) that De Sanctis admires, especially in La Compiuta's poems, constitutes an ambiguous element for praise.[12] Male critics, especially those in the nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth, deemed these qualities as feminine attributes of a literary work. Yet, as feminist critic Mary Ellmann reminds us, "every feminine virtue implies a feminine vice."[13] In stating that these poems are perfectly simple, De Sanctis implicitly suggests that they lack the complexity and the firmness which he and most male critics considered essential features of a superior literary work and as characteristic of men's texts.

Critics who deny the female authorship to La Nina's and La Compiuta's poems have suggested that they may be literary exercises written by various male poets posing as women. Poems written in a woman's voice, by either men or women, belong to the literary tradition of the *cantigas d'amigo*. These originated in Moslem Spain in the eleventh century and readily spread to Portugal, France, and Germany. In these lyrics, the female persona avows her love and her longing for the lover's physical presence with direct, warm appeal, without affectation or pretense. Critics agree on the impossibility of differentiating at times between a male and a female author of these early European poems. However, Peter Dronke affirms that from the twelfth century on, women writers have not only "taken the poetic language and conventions of aristocratic and masculine love-lyric as their point of departure, but fused them with that more direct and more overtly physical language of the passions which characterises the oldest surviving *winileodas* [*cantigas d'amigo*]."[14]

The synthesis described by Dronke is characteristic of lyrics by the *trobairitz*, a group of about twenty women poets who lived and wrote at the same time as the troubadours in Southern France. As the poems by these women writers are included in several Italian manuscripts, it is possible that La Nina and La Compiuta would have read some of these poems.[15] In their own poetry, La Nina and La Compiuta blend

4 Two Italian Women Poets

the refined formality of the Italian sonnet and the conventional language of the Occitan *canson* with the more candid and direct tone of the *cantigas d'amigo*.

The world of the Occitan lyric exerted a great influence on Italy's incipient literature. The Provençal poets bequeathed their poetic genres, a refined language, and an original ideology of love to their Italian counter-parts. Because of the frequent marriages and travels between the nobility of France and the nobility of Italy, both Occitan philosophy of *fin'amors* and *courtoisie* and the refined Occitan language had infiltrated the Northern and Southern Italian courts. After the Albigensian Crusade and the decline of Occitan literary prominence, many troubadours found refuge in the Italian courts, where they often settled for the rest of their lives. Some Italian *trovatori*, such as Sordello, undertook their poetic careers in Provençal. Until the second half of the thirteenth century, when the Italian vernacular gained a certain independence, the poetry of Provence remained for Italian writers synonymous with the highest linguistic achievement.

Although critics recognize the influence that the troubadours exerted on writers in Italy, Germany, and Spain, the extent to which the Pro-vençal women poets shaped the work of other female writers in Europe is still unresolved. Some critics concur that female writers have indeed read each other's works and influenced each other's writings through-out the centuries. They affirm that these women have thus kept alive a tenuous tradition different and apart from the mainstream literary practice of male writers. In the introduction to her study of the female literary tradition in the English novel since 1800, Showalter explains that "women themselves have constituted a subculture within the frame-work of a larger society, and have been unified by values, conventions, experiences, and behaviors impinging on each individual."[16] Ellen Moers adds that "women studied with a special closeness the works written by their own sex."[17] Although we cannot yet prove the existence of a well-developed female literature in the Middle Ages, we ought not to discard the possibility. As Schibanoff comments,

> Research has begun on medieval women as professional readers—patrons, bibliophiles, scribes, etc.—and it too will undoubtedly re-form our current conception of this aspect of literature. And it has just begun to occur to us that there may be cross-currents and patterns of influence among early women writers; as more of their works become available, we may be able to re-join the severed links.[18]

The results of more exhaustive research on women writers' influence could provide the vital links of the kind Schibanoff speculates.

An examination of the extant work of La Nina and La Compiuta seems to prove that the influence of the *trobairitz* on the early Italian women writers is significant. La Nina's only extant poem is part of a *tenzon*, the Italian version of the Occitan *tenson*, which consists of an exchange of lyrics between two poets on a particular subject. La Nina's poem is usually accompanied by a sonnet written by a fellow poet in response to her complaint.[19] The following is La Nina's poem:

> Tapina ahimè, ch'amava uno sparvero:
> amaval tanto ch'io me ne moria;
> a lo richiamo ben m'era manero,
> e dunque troppo pascer nol dovia.
> Or è montato e salito sì altero,
> as[s]ai più alto che far non solia,
> ed è asiso dentro uno verzero:
> un'altra donna lo tene in balìa.
> Isparvero mio, ch'io t'avea nodrito,
> sonaglio d'oro ti facea portare
> perché dell'uc[c]ellar fosse più ardito:
> or se' salito sì come lo mare,
> ed ha' rotti li geti e se' fug[g]ito,
> quando eri fermo nel tuo uc[c]ellare.
>
> (Contini, 1:442)

> Wretched me, who loved a sparrow-hawk:
> I loved him so much that I was dying because of it;
> he was very docile to my calls,
> and therefore I did not need to feed him too
>   much.
> Now he has flown and risen so high
> so much higher than he ever used to,
> and is seated inside an orchard:
> another woman holds him in her thrall.
> Oh my sparrow-hawk, you whom I fed,
> you whom I made wear golden bells
> to make you bolder in your hunt:
> now you have risen as high as the sea,
> and you have broken the bonds and have fled,
> you who used to be firm in your hunt.[20]

La Nina's lyric shows a striking example of linguistic assimilation from a poem by the *trobairitz* Alamanda. Both La Nina and Alamanda employ the

word "tame" or "docile" as one of the key words of their poems. The Provençal poet uses the adjective *maineira* in a *tenson* between herself and the troubadour Guiraut de Bonelh.[21] Directing the adjective to Guiraut's angry lady, Alamanda chides her for not behaving as yet "tame" enough to make peace with her lover. In La Nina's poem, the same adjective expresses the regret for a past situation in which the lover showed docility and tameness.

La Nina's view of love as expressed in this poem resembles the general attitude manifest in the *trobairitz* lyrics. Her pessimistic appraisal of love contrasts with the troubadours' premise that *fin'amors*, or pure love, should represent the only-true-and-lasting type of amorous relationship between men and women and that the man should be the only active partner in such a relationship. La Nina's more cynical judgment concurs with that of Castelloza, one of the most outspoken *trobairitz*. The Provençal poet presents different interpretations on this theme in the three songs which have survived of her oeuvre.[22] Both writers present in their lyrics a female persona who is forsaken by an arrogant, deceitful lover, usually in favor of a rival of a higher social status. Similarly, their female persona shows surprise and anguish at the lover's cruelty, while she affirms repeatedly her good faith, loyalty, and love. Unlike the traditional idealization of love relationships by the troubadours and the Italian male poets, La Nina and Castelloza probe into the ambiguous and complex realities of love and boldly present the woman's perspective.

In comparing the male lover to a bird of prey and specifically to the hawk, La Nina strikes a unique chord in Italian courtly lyrics.[23] Other poets of the period, such as Stefano Protonotario da Messina of the Sicilian School, and the Tuscan Chiaro Davanzati, freely made references to animals in their poetry.[24] But these earlier Italian writers and the troubadours usually turned to the deer, the bear, or the beaver in such comparisons. Among the birds, only the mythical phoenix appeared with regularity.

The earlier tameness of the hawk in La Nina's verse recalls the docility assumed by the *fin'amant* towards his lady in the relationship of *fin'amors*. This subdued state, however, proves deceitful because the hawk, true to its real nature, ultimately victimizes its owner. Not satisfied with one prey, he turns to another, in search of ever greater vindication. The male courtly lover is equally self-serving. His own moral and sentimental growth is paramount, at times at the expense of the woman he claims to love and obey.

In La Nina's poem the woman cries out against the ambivalence of her position in such a love relationship. On the one hand, the lady lover must show herself cold and proud in order to encourage her beloved always to better himself; yet, by doing this, she risks being forsaken because she does not grant him enough sexual concessions. On the other hand, she risks losing his respect and love if she chooses to show herself as a creature of flesh and blood who loves him physically.

The sonnet's final message is quite explicit: man's love cannot last long if it is not nourished by sexual contact. The choice of the *sparviero* as embodiment of the male lover clearly suggests the sexually aggressive nature of the lover as perceived by the poetic "I." The repeated use of the verb *uccellare*, a popular and crude term to suggest sexual intercourse, however, raises questions on the true motives behind the female persona's expressions of jealousy. When first used, this verb describes a situation controlled by the female lover, in which the *sparviero* is encouraged to *uccellare* by his mistress.[25] Such encouragement suggests a sexual relationship accepted by, and pleasurable to, both partners. When the verb is repeated in the significant position of last word of the poem, it expresses the regret for the past relationship while accentuating a present situation which is out of the woman's control. The male lover's overindulgence in sexual pleasure makes him guilty vis-à-vis his beloved of *demezura*, or the tendency to exceed the limits of propriety. Rather than chastising the man for having infringed this rule of the code of *fin'amors*, the female lover punishes him for having escaped from her power. When viewed in these terms, the sonnet reveals a conflictual level determined by sexual politics. The text then raises the issue—of particular concern to feminist critics—of the close connection between pleasure and power, sexual desire and violence.

The erotic imagery of the poem continues in the presentation of the "verzero" (orchard), the new residence of the faithless bird. In sexual terms, the orchard, the traditional literary *locus amoenus*, translates into the body of the rival woman. The high location of the "verzero" suggests that the new lover belongs to a social class superior to that of the persona herself. Behind its stylized and symbolic language, this sonnet hides a drama of love, betrayal, and power recounted from a woman's point of view.

The female poet's hand is evident in other thematic and stylistic traits of the sonnet. The terms "pascere" (to feed) and "nodrito" (fed), although used in an erotic sense, belong more to a woman's "domestic" terminology than to a man's "public" vocabulary. Furthermore, the author uses a traditional feminine image when she compares the ascending flight of the bird to the swelling of the sea. Finally, the circular structure of the sonnet emphasizes the woman's immobility as opposed to the man's soaring. The initial and final representations of the woman and the man frozen in their past love relationship enclose the image of the man-bird freeing himself from that stagnant situation and leaving the woman regretting the past.

Although writing in the more ethereal literary atmosphere of the *dolce stil novo*, La Compiuta Donzella di Firenze presents stylistic traits and a critical view of man's behavior analogous to that of La Nina and the *trobairitz*. In her poems the Florentine poet addresses a father's cruelty rather than a lover's unfaithfulness:

A la stagion che 'l mondo foglia e fiora
acresce gioia a tu[t]ti fin' amanti:
vanno insieme a li giardini alora
che gli auscelletti fanno dolzi canti;
    la franca gente tutta s'inamora,
e di servir ciascun trag[g]es' inanti,
ed ogni damigella in gioia dimora;
    e me, n'abondan mar[r]imenti e pianti.
Ca lo mio padre m'ha messa 'n er[r]ore,
e tenemi sovente in forte doglia:
donar mi vole a mia forza segnore,
    ed io di ciò non ho disio né voglia,
e 'n gran tormento vivo a tutte l'ore;
    però non mi ralegra fior né foglia.

(Contini, 1:434)

In the season when the world shows leaves and
    flowers
the joy increases in all courtly lovers:
together they go to parks and gardens when
the birds sing sweet songs;
    all noble people fall in love,
and offer themselves to love's service,
and every damsel lives in joy;
    but for me sorrows and tears abound.
Because my father has placed me in sorrow,
and keeps me often in deep sadness:
he wants to give me a lord against my will,
    and thereof I have no wish nor want,
and in great torment I live every hour;
    neither flower nor leaf gives me pleasure.

In this sonnet La Compiuta depicts spring as the background to a drama of intense feelings. Similarly, the troubadours and the early Italian poets present various images of cosmic rebirth and love, mating, and fertility in many of their poems. These descriptions serve to introduce either a parallel situation drawn between the season's beauty and the poet's emotions or a contrasting scene drawn between spring's glory and the poet's despair. The *trobairitz*, on the other hand, do not exploit the *topos* of spring to the extent of their male counterparts. In order to convey the female persona's rejection and despair—main themes of their verse—these women poets prefer to exploit images of winter. In one of her lyrics, Azalais de Porcairages names ice, snow, and mud as the main elements of a wintry scene, and she evokes the silence of birds and the absence of leaf and bud as an implicit

contrast with the happier season of spring.[26] In her lyric, La Compiuta mentions the same natural elements of leaf, flower, and birds, although she places them in the positive light of universal rebirth and harmony. In reiterating the initial image of "foglia e fiore" in the last line of the sonnet, the poet provides a circular framework to the lyric, while the negations that accompany it accentuate the tone of gloom and despair of the poem's ending.

Though opposite, La Compiuta's and Azalais's descriptions of nature echo each other by introducing similar details and evoking a comparable tone. Both poets want to accentuate the despair of the female persona: one by comparing her heart to a desolate, icy scene, and the other by contrasting her feelings to the beauty of spring. For the *trobairitz* "e.l aucellet estan mut"; for the Italian poet "gli auscelletti fanno dolzi canti." To Azalais's negative statement "que flors ni foilla noi nais," La Compiuta affirms that "foglia e fiora acresce." One sees the world as bleak and cold as her heart; the other describes a joyful world only to deepen her sadness. The former notices the absence of pleasant surroundings to underscore her want of happiness; the latter remarks on the cheerful signs of spring as they contrast with her intimate feelings. Azalais's persona cries out "Tant ai lo cors deseubut . . . ";[27] La Compiuta's young woman laments "e me, n'abondan mar[r]imenti e pianti." The two writers mourn a similar situation of powerlessness and despair, though for different reasons: Azalais's lady complains against a faithless lover and public disapproval of her conduct; La Compiuta's young lady berates her father's decision to marry her against her will. Each denounces the source of her unhappiness. Azalais accuses, "d'Aurenga me moc l'esglais";[28] and La Compiuta states, "Ca lo mio padre m'ha messa in er[r]ore."

In relating her father's wish that she marry against her will, the speaker of La Compiuta's poem reveals the situation of absolute helplessness and impotence of the unmarried woman of that time. We do know that marriages were then arranged by the parents based on economic, political, and social considerations, rather than the young people's preferences and choices. La Compiuta's poem is an example of one victim's likely reaction to this custom.

A theme analogous to the one presented in the first sonnet appears in another lyric by La Compiuta:

> Lasciar vor[r]ia lo mondo e Dio servire
> e dipartirmi d'ogne vanitate,
> però che veg[g]io crescere e salire
> mat[t]ezza e villania e falsitate,
>   ed ancor senno e cortesia morire
> e lo fin pregio e tutta la bontate:
> ond'io marito non vor[r]ia né sire,
> né stare al mondo, per mia volontate.

Membrandomi c'ogn'om di mal s'adorna,
di ciaschedun son forte disdegnosa,
e verso Dio la mia persona torna.
Lo padre mio mi fa stare pensosa,
ca di servire a Cristo mi distorna:
non saccio a cui mi vol dar per isposa.

(Contini, 1:435)

I wish to quit the world and serve God
and depart from all vanities:
because I see folly, iniquity,
and falsehood grow and rise,
and reason and courtesy die,
and the courtly virtues and all goodness:
therefore I do not wish husband or sire,
nor to remain in this world, willingly.
Remembering how all men adorn themselves
in evil,
I am spiteful of each and every one of them,
and I turn my person towards God.
My father makes me sad,
since he tries to turn me from serving Christ;
I do not know to whom he wants to give me
as a bride.

La Compiuta reveals in the two sonnets a comparable tone of refusal and rebellion against man's world; yet the speaker in the second lyric expresses both a deeper pessimism towards humanity and an attempt to regain control over her life in the only way left to her: leaving the world of men to become a nun.[29] At that time the convent was the only "career" left to the upper-class woman who could not or would not get married. As Angela Lucas writes, "The very uselessness of a noble lady for any occupation other than marriage and motherhood made the convent a significant outlet for the unwanted and unmarriageable daughters of upper-class families."[30]
The young woman's desire to leave the world derives from a deep conviction that the world of men has become a place of ugliness and corruption. Nothing and no one can be spared from the spreading evil, and she rejects every man as a possible contaminator. Although such scorn for mundane matters could be ascribed to the young lady's adherence to asceticism and to deep feelings of *contemptus mundi*, the speaker's refusal of a world in which reason and especially *cortesia* are absent reflects a view close to that of the Occitan poets. The *courtoisie* in the broadest sense of the word meant a way of life in which courtly people displayed superior moral and intellectual qualities which distinguished them from all others. The woman in this

sonnet believes that "lo fin pregio e tutta la bontade" (pure virtues and all goodness) are currently absent from the world and that the only way to safeguard these precious qualities is to avoid human contact.

Women's frustration at their inability to choose a place for themselves in society and at their being forced to acquiesce to the will of men reflects the woman writer's position vis-à-vis the literary tradition. Since the beginning of literature, women writers have been "the thieves of language," meaning of men's language.[31] They have, in fact, exploited literary forms, images, and vocabulary that male writers have invented or used first. An attentive analysis of women's texts, however, uncovers subtle deviations from male-authored paradigms, deviations that result in some instances of outright undermining of masculine models. Feminist critics have interpreted the literary interplay between imitation and deviation generated by sexual difference as a metaphor of a feminist theory of textuality or as a "translation" of the relationship between body and discourse. To this effect Jane Gallop argues that "not only is literature at the heart of sexual difference, but sexual difference is at the heart of literature as the absent original to which the translation must refer."[32]

The two poets considered here, for example, benefit from poetic forms and vocabulary already used by preceding or contemporary male poets. Yet such imitation is never unrestricted. As earlier remarked, La Nina's presentation of the image of the *sparviero* as a symbol of the male lover is original and rich in suggestiveness. The circular rather than linear development of La Nina's and La Compiuta's lyrics corresponds to a form generally accepted as more characteristic of female than of male writers. La Compiuta's portrayal of the young woman's emotional separateness from the world into which her father wants to force her presents another atypical and allusive situation. Her persona's feelings of anguish, clearly depicted in the first sonnet, impel her to reject such imposition and choose the convent as suggested in the second sonnet.

Similarly, the refusal and rejection of man-made values force the woman writer to search for different ways of expressing herself. As the contemporary French writer Marguerite Duras said about women writers in an interview, "We don't write at all in the same place as men. And when women don't write in the place of their desire, they don't write, they are plagiarizing."[33] Before finding "the place of their desire," women must pass through the phase of imitation of men's paradigms. Showalter expounds this chronological necessity as she defines the female tradition as a literary subculture. In her study, she analyzes the process which leads women writers from a "feminine" to a "female" phase after traversing a "feminist" stage. She identifies a prolonged initial phase of "imitation of the prevailing modes of the dominant tradition and internalization of its standards of art and its views on social roles," followed by a subsequent phase of "protest against these standards and values." She describes the next and final stage as one

"of *self-discovery*" or "a search for identity,"[34] which succeeds in detaching the subculture from the dominant tradition.

While this theory may prove acceptable and logical for the literary period after 1400, earlier poetry displays a curious combination of all these phases. This is due to men's and women's positions vis-à-vis literature and to the different social structures which regulated women's and men's relationships. In the Middle Ages the division between domestic and public domains for women and men was not yet prescribed, while women's contribution to the development of the *cantigas d'amigo* or the Provençal *cansones* was part of the common European literary tradition. The political and social scene of thirteenth-century Italy, however, shows the beginning of that "contraction of social and personal options" for women, which, according to feminist historian Joan Kelly-Gadol, led to the deterioration of Western woman's power and influence at all levels during and after the Italian Renaissance.[35]

In the poems analyzed in this study, we can detect a tense interplay between directness and restraint, overtness and concealment, protest and search for identity. La Nina's complaint over a broken relationship and La Compiuta's rejection of forced love and marriage question the masculine view and interpretation of love. The usually silent *domna* is the speaker of these poems. She laments the lover's betrayal or her father's cruelty and she refuses any forced relationship to a man. La Nina condemns the ideology of courtly love as her speaker recognizes the failure of keeping her lover through the behavior dictated by *fin'amors*; La Compiuta's young lady refuses to become a victim in the name of love.

The two poets studied here show a close association to the Provençal *trobairitz* in tone, vocabulary, and motifs. The possibility of crosscurrents has been suggested; further studies are necessary to clarify both the relationship and the degree of influence. The outcome of such analysis will help us acquire a clearer and fuller view of the poetic world of the Middle Ages as shaped by both male and female writers.

NOTES

1. Ellen Moers, *Literary Women* (New York: Doubleday, 1976), xiii.

2. Elaine Showalter, *A Literature of Their Own* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 8.

3. Susan Schibanoff, "Early Women Writers: Inscribing, or, Reading the Fine Print," *Women's Studies International Forum* 6 (1983): 482.

4. "To be sure there is Marie de France. I wonder who is hiding behind that name. And as for Heloise, everything would indicate that her letters were written or rewritten by a man." (The translation is mine.) Interview with *Le nouvel observateur*, 28 August / 3 September 1982, cited in Peter Dronke, *Women Writers of the Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 281 n. 3.

5. "We are left with Marie de France. Maybe, a whisper." Interview with *Le nouvel observateur*, 15 April 1983, 96.

6. The name "La Nina Siciliana" gives us the first name and the place of origin, while the name "La Compiuta Donzella di Firenze" translates into "the accomplished young lady of Florence."

7. This is Dronke's intent as he presents European women's literary texts from 1203 to 1310 in *Women Writers of the Middle Ages*, ix.

8. Francesco Trucchi, comp., *Poesie italiane di dugento autori dall'origine della lingua infino al secolo decimosettimo* (Prato: R. Guati, 1846–1847), 1:53–54, as cited in Francesco De Sanctis, *Storia della letturatura italiana* (Turin: Einaudi, 1958), 1:21. Gianfranco Contini in *Poeti del duecento* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1960), 1:441, is another scholar who indirectly attributes the poem to the "mythical" ("mitica") Nina Siciliana. Although he seems to question La Nina's very existence, Contini entitles the exchange of poems including La Nina's lyric, *Tenzone di donna e uomo anonimi*. Thus he does support the premise of this literary dispute: the poem was composed by a woman.

9. Natalino Sapegno in his *Compendio di storia della letteratura italiana* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1971), 1:61, not only accepts unconditionally her existence but sees her poems as linked to "apparently autobiographical" situations.

10. Contini, 1:433.

11. Adolfo Borgognoni, *Studi di letteratura storica* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1891), 166.

12. De Sanctis, 1:27.

13. Mary Ellmann, *Thinking about Women* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), 66.

14. Peter Dronke, *The Medieval Lyric* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 105.

15. Pierre Bec in "Trobairitz et chansons de femmes," *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* 22 (1979): 235–62, argues against Dietmar Rieger's opinion in "Die 'Trobairitz' in Italien: Zu den altprovenzalischen Dichterinnen," *Cultura neolatina* 31 (1971): 205–23, that the *trobairitz's cansones* are especially preserved in Italy because of the new cultural attitude toward women, an attitude that will culminate in the *dolce stil novo*. It is interesting to note that poems by the *trobairaitz* were indeed circulated and repeatedly copied in Italy at this time.

16. Showalter, 11.

17. Ellen Moers, "Women's Lit: Profession and Tradition," *Columbia Forum* 1 (Fall 1972): 28.

18. Schibanoff, 479.

19. The man's response to this sonnet consists of a traditional affirmation of loyalty and fidelity against the apparent lover's defection and others' accusations:

> Vis' amoros', angelico e clero,
> in cui regna savere e cortesia,
> non v'apellate di tapin mestero
> per creder cosa ch'e[s]ser non poria.
> Chi'io partisse da voi core e penzero?
> Inanti foss'io morto quella dia:
> ch'io altra gioia non voglio né spero
> se no la vostra gaia segnoria.

E ben confesso, sono alti salito,
pensando che cangiato son d'amare
da voi, cui sono fedele e gechito.
    Chi altro vi fa credere o pensare
è disleale, larone e traìto,
che vuol la nostra gioia disturbare.

<div align="right">(Contini, 1:442–43)</div>

Loving, angelic, and bright visage,
on which rules knowledge and courtesy,
do not make appeal to a vile mystery
in order to believe what cannot be true.
    That I take away from you my heart and thought?
May I be dead before that day:
since I don't wish or hope other joy
than your cheerful dominion.
    And I do confess that I have risen high
with the thought that I changed because of
            love
from you, to whom I am faithful and humbly
            submissive.
    Whoever makes you think otherwise
is disloyal, a scoundrel and a traitor,
who wants to trouble our joy.

20.   The translations of the Italian poems appearing in the text and notes are mine.
21.   Meg Bogin, *The Women Troubadours* (New York: Norton, 1976), 104.
22.   Bogin, 118–29. In "The Provençal *Trobairitz* and the Limits of Courtly Love," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 3 (Spring 1978): 565, Marianne Shapiro shows that the theme of the complaint and a conflictual attitude in general are more distinctive of the *trobairitz* than the toubadours: "Against the background of the dazzling variety of Provençal love topics, the *trobairitz* narrow their choices to those which emanate from an agonistic stance."
23.   In a comic vein the imprisoned poet Jacopone da Todi depicts himself as a *sparviero* who walks aimlessly in his prison and makes a new kind of music with his chains (*Laude* 11, in Contini, 2:98).
24.   Contini, 1:131–36, notices that they were probably influenced by the troubadour Rigaut de Barbezieux, who, especially in the *canso* "Altressi cur l'orifans," compares the Lover to different animals.
25.   In two novellas of the *Decameron*, ed. Cesare Segre (Milan: Mursia, 1974), 344 and 459, Boccaccio uses the image of the bird to represent the male sexual organ and the implicit verb *uccellare* in the same meaning as La Nina. In both novellas the woman plays the active role in a love relationship and succeeds in achieving sexual pleasure with the man of her choice. In Day 5, Tale 4, Caterina uses the coolness of the balcony and the singing of the nightingale as reasons to sleep outside where she meets Ricciardo. As Boccaccio writes, together they succeed in "molte volte faccendo cantar l'usignolo" (making the nightingale sing several times). In Day 7,

Tale 9, Lidia, in pursuing another man's sexual favors, cruelly kills her husband's hawk. In this act of symbolic castration, she takes revenge on Nicostrato's lack of attention to her sexual needs. Addressing herself to a male audience, she says, "Voi dovete sapere che questo uccello tutto il tempo da dover esser prestato dagli uomini al piacer delle donne lungamente m'ha tolto" (You must know that this bird has taken away from me the time that men must give to women's pleasure).

26. Bogin, 94–95.

27. Ibid., 95: "My heart is so disordered."

28. Ibid.: "my pain comes from Orange."

29. La Compiuta's third sonnet is an answer to an anonymous fellow poet who, in a *tenzon*, flatters her and provokes a poetic response. In her sonnet, La Compiuta reciprocates the first poet's praise, plays the role of the modest poet, and ends her lyric by declaring herself ready to serve all courtly lovers.

30. Angela M. Lucas, *Women in the Middle Ages* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 51.

31. Alicia Ostriker uses this expression in her article "The Thieves of Language: Women Poets and Revisionist Mythmaking," in *The New Feminist Criticism*, ed. Elaine Showalter (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 314–38, in which she analyzes how four contemporary American women poets have modified men's language.

32. Jane Gallop, "Critical Response: Sexual Difference," in *Writing and Sexual Difference*, ed. Elizabeth Abel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 289.

33. Marguerite Duras and Michele Porte, *Les lieux de Marguerite Duras* (Paris: Minuit, 1977), 102, in Sharon Willis, *Marguerite Duras: Writing on the Body* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 15.

34. Showalter, *A Literature of Their Own*, 13.

35. Joan Kelly-Gadol, "Did Women Have a Renaissance?" in *Women, History, Theory* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984), 20.

"Hevest up the Dore":
Overcoming Obstacles to Meaning in Chaucer's
Miller's Tale

by

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The tantalizing obliquity E. M. W. Tillyard observes in the *Miller's Tale* cannot be avoided if we look beyond the popular humor and artistry of the structured plot.[1] It is difficult to accept the Miller's joke as merely Chaucer's joke, especially when Chaucer includes frequent and indeed ambiguous references to "Goddes pryvetee" and repeated remarks that seriousness and harm have been turned into a joke.

These contrary elements are puzzling when we attempt to fit the odd pieces into this seemingly easy puzzle. But the tale is more than a sophisticated joke; it is a realistic narrative involving ambiguous characterizations and suggestions in a contrived sequence of events. The realism of the "intricate and intriguingly wrought" tale, as Morton Bloomfield sees it, causes readers to suspend quickly their disbelief.[2] But Bloomfield, while calling the tale realistic, also considers it incredible. "The story is incredible in the extreme but incredible not as the *Clerk's Tale* is incredible to a realistic mind, but incredible through its credibility. It is so real that it transcends the reality of life."[3] This paradox compels one to speculate about the meanings of the odd pieces of the puzzle and to recognize consequently the tale's tragic and moral implications.

A number of scholars readily point to the essential tragedy in the Miller's joke. David Williams, for example, sees the "image of sickness" raising a morality issue;[4] Joseph Bentley sees the tale as a tragedy in a Boethian sense;[5] Alvin W. Bowker interprets it as a comic illusion that disguises the tragic and cruel world of the real life of the tale.[6] Others, particularly Paul A. Olson, observe that the characters' adultery, stupidity, and lust and the subsequent poetic justice raise serious questions about morality.[7]

The wide variety of interpretations and the levels of meaning make the tale both oblique and clear. Contrary to the commonly expressed viewpoint that reading the *Miller's Tale* other than as a "masterpiece of bawdy, comic art" lessens Chaucer's accomplishment,[8] I believe that Chaucer yokes contradictory elements and obscures an underlying morality. If that yoking of the oblique and clear elements is intentional, then I suggest that Chaucer does so to make interpretation for his audience even more difficult in order to catch off guard his sophisticated readers—the "clerical and courtly elite"[9]—who were familiar with medieval exegesis. Patrick Gallacher argues that Chaucer presents readers with a pattern of perceptual mistakes and a "program of perceptual calisthenics," and maintains that "we usually think we know what's there, but we often don't."[10] I believe Chaucer constructs literary obstacles that cause those perceptual "mistakes" and obfuscate the allegorical symbolism. On one hand, the many obstacles obstruct the movements and lives of the characters; on the other hand, the highly structured, appealing comic tale obstructs and misdirects the readers' recognition that the tale is an allegory and not simply a joke. Thus I suggest that the *Miller's Tale* presents to the readers a highly sophisticated exercise in interpretation, an exercise that implicitly invites readers to seek those truths of the allegory beneath the cover of the fabliau. Further, I maintain that Chaucer obstructs our recognition that the tale demonstrates the healing of the malady of ignorance and the discovery of Boethian reasoning.

Chaucer creates such obstacles to parallel the stumbling blocks people face during their efforts to acquire a higher level of reasoning and understanding, a stage akin to what Boethius describes as the faculty of reason. With this faculty people achieve a freedom from transitory and material things. But, according to Boethius, achieving that freedom requires that the human mind overcome "the body's blindness" and detect the "delicate connections between things."[11] In the *Miller's Tale*, Chaucer constructs obstacles for the characters to dramatize the consequences of that blindness. Even more remarkable is Chaucer's clever strategy to obstruct the readers lest they overcome a blindness of sorts and detect the "delicate connections" in the tale. In showing the susceptible characters confronting a variety of obstacles that stand in their way of acquiring a higher level of understanding, Chaucer sets up for the susceptible readers events that limit and indeed test their abilities to see beyond the cover of fabliau.

From the beginning the tale is full of obstacles. According to the Host, the Miller impedes the game of the tales. "Some bettre man shal telle us first another" (3130),[12] the Host suggests when the drunken Miller, barely staying on his horse, insists that he will "quite" the tale of the Knight. But the Miller is an obstacle not only to the Host, but also to the Reeve, who demands that the Miller "Lat be [his] lewed dronken harlotrye" (3145). Indeed, the Miller admits to hindering himself by his drunkenness. He is quick to attribute the possibility of misspeaking to the "ale of Southwerk" (3140), but

obviously the pilgrims and the readers know that if he misspeaks it results more from his base character than from the ale, as the Host frankly exclaims, "Thou art a fool; thy wit is overcome" (3135).

From the sensual description of Alison to the kiss of Absolon and burning of Nicholas, Chaucer depicts the world of the tale with an abundance of physical barriers and obstacles, such as closed doors, walls, roofs, floors, and closed windows. Because of these obstacles, we sense a prevailing design of confinement that limits the characters' freedom of movement. Nicholas is first described living within a chamber "allone, withouten any compaignye" (3204); Alison is "heeld . . . narwe in cage" (3224); and John has "fallen in the snare" (3231). Chaucer further suggests the theme of confinement by the carpenter, who builds barriers—both physical barriers of houses and walls and figurative barriers, such as the jealousy John supposedly constructs around his young wife.

In the drama of the tale, the characters freely choose their propinquity to chambers, doors, windows, and walls, though Chaucer's dramatic manipulations are clearly at work. For instance, Chaucer confines Nicholas and Alison to the boundaries of the rooms by the "builder's" unwanted presence in the carpenter's house. Absolon is barred outside of those rooms by the walls of the carpenter's house and by Nicholas's unwanted presence. Just after daybreak, Absolon first goes and "dressed hym up by a shot-wyndowe / That was upon the carpenteris wall" (3358–59). He intends to woo Alison, but the carpenter awakes and asks if that is not Absolon who is singing and chanting under their "bourer wal." And later Absolon again faces the wall and the window when he delivers the kiss to Alison and the "hoot kultour" to Nicholas. While Alison, Nicholas, and Absolon are free to make these choices, their lives are most apparently influenced by these dominant physical obstructions. Those physical barriers are consistently present, as if the walls and windows were another character in the tale.

These physical obstacles and limitations depict the characters' lack of true freedom. Augustine explains that true freedom of the will is achieved "only when it is not a slave to sin and vice."[13] Nicholas, Absolon, and Alison limit their freedom by participating freely in sin. In effect, those characters lack a true freedom of the will because of their choice of infidelity, deception, and sensuality. Boethius further describes this form of freedom: "Human souls, however, are more free while they are engaged in contemplation of the divine mind, and less free when they are joined to bodies, and still less free when they are bound by earthly fetters. They are in utter slavery when they lose possession of their reason and give themselves wholly to vice."[14] Clearly, the characters are bound with earthly fetters, or, in other words, their cupidinous interests. Such slavery, which Boethius also describes, strikes us most when we observe the absence of Boethian reason and the ubiquity of vice in the tale. The "human fallibility," which Trevor Whittock says causes

the "sufferings" in the tale, is a fallibility brought on by the characters' loss of reason and chosen adherence to earthly fetters.[15] Chaucer dramatizes this loss of freedom by enclosing his characters behind the barriers, but by so doing, he does not deny their free will.

The obstacle for John and the sign of his limited freedom is the closed door. Literally, the closed door acts as a physical barrier or obstacle to his movement within his house. Figuratively, the image represents a barrier to understanding, or in Boethius's sense, a loss of the capacity for reason. John's feeble desire for the meaning of Nicholas's bizarre behavior in the locked room causes him to seek Nicholas behind the closed door. John discovers his own inability—whether that could be called naïveté or stupidity—to understand Nicholas's astrological explanations or to recognize the duplicity. His obstacle is a blindness to how others perceive and deceive him. Furthermore, his supposed jealousy can be figuratively described as a closed door behind which his young wife deceives him and participates in a plan for his demise. This closed-door mentality prevents John from recognizing Absolon's obvious cupidinous designs and Nicholas and Alison's complicity, from discerning erroneous scriptural interpretation and from avoiding the inevitable consequences of accepting Nicholas's explanation of the second flood.

John and the readers understandably "chese amys," as the narrator warns, in the confused and disorderly world of the tale, especially when the only literal meanings that exist behind closed doors and windows are plans of deceit, the naked "ers," and a "thunder dent." With such *in malo* meanings of the open door, Chaucer dramatizes why these people cannot overcome obstacles and gain Boethian freedom and why these characters initially are not capable of discerning or comprehending the hidden aspects of truth.

But Chaucer frequently refers to the human desire to see beyond the obstacles and contemplate and interpret the meaning of events. Nicholas supposedly contemplates divine will and receives "Cristes conseil" through his astrology; Alison attends church to do "Cristes owene werkes"; John contemplates the insecurity of the world when he sees the corpse. But Absolon contemplates nothing other than his lust for Alison until he recognizes the scheme of Nicholas and Alison. Moreover, the repeated references to knowing and disclosing "Goddes pryvetee" clearly draw attention, however ironically, to the human motive to contemplate or not to contemplate divine will. But the characters, perhaps with the exception of John, contemplate events only with their limited, lascivious, and selfish interests in mind. That feature of the tale reveals quite dramatically Chaucer's and Boethius's view of human fallibility.

Boethius's observation that men are less free when they are bound by earthly fetters than when they are contemplating the divine mind provides an expression of the argument developing in the tale—an argument about the nature of human contemplation, especially contemplation of the divine.

The processes of contemplation suggested in this tale resemble medieval allegorical interpretation as defined by Augustine and Hugh of St. Victor. In short, these processes exact a demanding scrutiny of the surface features in order to discover the hidden allegorical meanings. Augustine uses the metaphor of the husk and kernel to differentiate between the outer and inner meanings; Hugh of St. Victor in the *Didascalicon* calls the literal and figurative levels the "letter/sense" and "sentence."[16] The absence of such critical habits by the characters in this tale and the explicit references to God's "pryvetee" suggest that Chaucer's focus is on the absence of this analytical ability and on the inevitable consequences.

Recognizing the Miller's influence on the tale, we understand the reasons for this failure to overcome obstacles. We know that the Miller confronts barriers with brute force. In fact, the motif of forcefully breaking down doors reflects the character of the Miller as described in the *General Prologue*: "At wrastlynge he wolde have alwey the ram" (548), and "Ther was no dore that he nolde heve of harre, / Or breke it at a rennyng with his heed" (550–51). It is not surprising to see the characters of his tale using the same kind of force. Nicholas forces himself on Alison by grabbing her; John forces down the door to Nicholas's chamber; Absolon would have "hente anon" Alison if he were a cat and she a mouse. When a character uses force to gain entrance or overcome an obstacle, we recognize that is the Miller's way of doing things, not the correct way, as Chaucer subtly shows.

The Miller's way is shown during the scene in the barn, when Nicholas explains to John what he should do when the water comes:

> And breke an hole an heigh upon the gable
> Unto the garden-ward, over the stable,
> That we may frely passen forth oure way,
> Whan that the grete shour is goon away,
> Thanne shaltou swymme as myrie, I undertake,
> As dooth the white doke after hire drake.
>
> (3571–76)

Breaking a hole in the roof is obviously what the Miller, accustomed to ramming his head through a door, would do to escape the coming of the water. Symbolic of limited or ignorant perspectives, the Miller represents the foolishness of using physical force rather than intelligence to deal with those "earthly fetters." John errs seriously in assuming that he "may frely passen forth" through the hole to a salvation that the Miller ironically describes as ducks chasing drakes—a clear reference to cupidinous interests.

In addition, the Miller's drunkenness stands for more than a obstruction to speech; it represents the general character of the Miller and another way in which he confronts the obstacles. Perhaps Chaucer, when he created the Miller, had in mind this remark of Pope Innocent III on drunkenness:

"Or what is more shameful than a drunkard?—whose breath stinks, whose body trembles; who says silly things and gives away secrets; who loses his reason and distorts his face."[17] This description, with surprising accuracy, characterizes the Miller as well as expresses the major allegorical themes of the tale. For instance, from the perspective of a drunk, we are told a tale of stinking breath, trembling bodies, silly things said and believed, secrets exposed, and most importantly, characters who have lost their capacity for reason. In a Boethian sense, the Miller's loss of his capacity for reason is significant in this tale, in which the absence of reason contributes to the consequences of the plot.

Moreover, Chaucer appropriately ascribes to the Miller the characteristics of a pig. A pig, one may recall from Augustine, does not eat the kernel but rather the husks; the kernels are the food of men and women. The surface events of the joke or the husk of the narrative is the food of the Miller, the only meaning accessible to him; he is incapable of discerning the inner, allegorical meaning. Thus the readers have difficulty not being overcome by the narrator's limited view.

The Miller and the characters of the tale suffer the consequences of their ignorance, selfishness, and desire for the false images Boethius calls the limited goods of earth. Boethius explains that reason perceives universality, but the senses and imagination cannot "go beyond corporeal figures."[18] The fault of John, Nicholas, and the Miller is that they fix their attention on the limited goods of earth, and however hard they try, however many doors they break down, without reason, "withoute candel light," they will never be able to move above corporeal figures. Chaucer explicitly alludes to this human weakness in the description of the barn scene: "Lo, which a gret thyng is affeccioun! / Men may dyen of ymaginacioun, / So depe may impressioun be take" (3611–13). Chaucer depicts characters who are deeply rooted in both affection and imagination and who focus primarily on corporeal objects and not higher figures.

The full significance of the harm of the imagination to which Chaucer alludes can be understood in light of Boethius's definition of comprehension:

> A man himself is comprehended in different ways by the senses, imagination, reason, and intelligence. The senses grasp the figure of the thing as it is constituted in matter; the imagination, however, grasps the figure alone without the matter. Reason, on the other hand, goes beyond this and investigates by universal consideration the species itself that is in particular things. The vision of intelligence is higher yet, and it goes beyond the bounds of the universe and sees with the clear eye of the mind the pure form itself.[19]

Although there is talk of astrology and God's "pryvetee," most of the characters cannot comprehend the significance and indeed the existence of these elements; they do not have the ability to grasp "the figure alone without the matter." Nicholas and Alison rely only on their senses; Absolon, John, and the Miller, on their imagination.

To those ignorant characters who expect to get what they want when they peer through the hole of their particular obstruction, Chaucer delivers what they deserve. From the perspective of the Miller, their punishment literally is the obscene kiss and the "hoot kultour." But the underlying punishment, of course, is their own continued confinement to earthly fetters—a far more profound punishment, in a medieval sense, than the Miller could possibly perceive since he too suffers unknowingly from the same punishment. This interpretation solves the problems of poetic justice as identified by Olson; all of the characters, even Alison, receive the appropriate punishment.

With the moral depravity of the joke Chaucer subtly weaves into the tale a countermovement that presents an Augustinian suggestion of charity and hope. As we learn that John has reportedly fallen into the snare of marrying a young woman and becoming ruled by jealousy—if we can believe the Miller—Chaucer implicitly yet gradually helps him out of this snare without allowing the Miller to understand it. The Miller does not understand the significance of John's business of building the church at Oseneye. Augustine, however, teaches that God gives gifts for the building of His Church, an obvious virtuous trait of which the Miller is conveniently unaware. Nor does he emphasize that John is the only character truly concerned with the welfare of another character when he tries to help Nicholas whom he believed was sick in his room and when he expresses his anxiety for the safety of Alison.

The contrast of Nicholas, the deceiver, and John, the deceived, also suggests a hopeful, moral difference between the two characters. "It is obvious that in a given instance a man who is deceived is better than a man who lies," Augustine asserts, "because it is better to suffer iniquity than to perform it."[20] The differences between John and Nicholas reveal, however ingeniously, Chaucer's virtuous traits, because it would be out of character and would weaken the effect of Chaucer's ambiguous design on the readers.

But John is not free from fault. Both meanings of "sely" may help us understand the subtle differences found in the Miller's perceptions of John, the other characters' perceptions of him, and the readers' ambivalent interpretation of him. During Chaucer's time, "sely" could range in meaning from "innocent and blissful" to "stupid and miserable." Geoffrey Cooper concludes that the word generally indicates that John is ignorant and foolish rather than pitiable and naive.[21] Mary Brookbank Reed contends that the carpenter is "not pitiable but ludicrous."[22] Yet Bloomfield argues that John is pitiable and not deserving of his punishment. Whichever definition of

"sely" we accept, John's salient error or obstacle is that he "shette his dore withoute candel lyght" (3634). Chaucer allows John to overcome his inability to use reason and subsequently understand truth, even without the awareness of the listeners, the other characters, and, I suspect, many readers.

Within this world of disorder and ignorance, Chaucer expresses hope in the implied meaning of John's fall from the tub in the roof of the barn. Similar to Absolon, who is said to be "heeled of his maladie" (3757) when the misplaced kiss cools his hot love, John can be seen as "heeled" by his sudden fall from the roof. John's climb on the ladder to the roof of the barn symbolizes his climactic separation. He contemplates salvation in his foolish way, while Alison and Nicholas return to their earthly fetters in the bedroom of the carpenter's house. Though from the Miller's perspective John's climb is a highlight of the joke, from Chaucer's perspective the climb is the highlight of the allegory.

Suggestive of a spiritual rebirth (the cutting of the cord above a stable), John's climactic fall is not a fall from grace; rather, it leads to the implied understanding of his own foolishness in believing in Nicholas's story without using his own reason. Augustine explains that he who misinterprets the scriptures, as John did on the prompting of Nicholas, is deceived, but "he is to be corrected and shown that it is more useful not to leave the road."[23] In an Augustinian sense, John is shown and corrected dramatically when he falls from the tub in the barn.

The imagination that "men may dyen of," a state of mind that allowed John to be deceived by Nicholas, has finally been superseded rather abruptly and harshly with the capacity of reason. The closing lines of the tale suggest such a transformation: "It was for noght, no man his reson herde" (3844). Using the word *reson* for the first time in the tale, Chaucer draws particular attention to John's new-found ability, but he uses the term in such a way that its significance is not stressed to the Miller or even to the readers.

Similar to the dreamer who rejects Lady Reason of the *Romance of the Rose*, the crowd rejects the reasons of John and accepts the cupidinous explanations of Nicholas and Alison. Chaucer manipulates this final scene in order to maintain the probable literal rendition of the Miller as well as of the susceptible reader and the figurative interpretation of the more discerning reader.

The obstacle for the crowd, among whom is the drunken Miller, is the roof of the barn, which implies the limits to their understanding of the situation. They can only gaze and gape into the barrier of the roof and see the figurative transformation of John as a joke. This obstacle not only prevents the Miller from understanding the deeper meanings of his own tale, but also conceals, within the form of a highly sophisticated joke, the truth from the other pilgrims, who are described in the prologue to the *Reeve's Tale* as laughing and playing and not worrying at all about the harm of the carpenter.

Boccaccio theorized that the power of fiction "pleases the unlearned by its external appearances, and exercises the learned with its hidden truth."[24] Both aspects of Boccaccio's theory are present in the design of the *Miller's Tale*. But here Chaucer makes the external appearance or letter so appealing and so far removed from the Knight's world of allegory that it is tempting to take the "chaf" and not look for the "fruyt." Chaucer's "fruyt" in the *Miller's Tale* is more elusive and disguised than the obviously allegorical features in the *Knight's Tale* or the garden in the *Romance of the Rose*.

In this tale, as Bernard F. Huppé and D. W. Robertson, Jr., suggest of other works, the "sentence" is "often based on suggestions rather than on closely knit symbolic details."[25] Chaucer makes those suggestions by separating the letter from the inner meaning to the extent that the letter dominates and the meaning is lost. The effect of this separation is the ultimate obstacle to the readers' understanding of the meaning obfuscated beneath the literal in the allegory.

Huppé and Robertson rightly argue that Chaucer did adhere to the idea of the shell and fruit. This claim is particularly true of the *Miller's Tale*, in which the shell of the joke receives the most attention. The interpretation that the tale is intentionally oblique and clear is much more reasonable when we consider that the meaning of the tale exists in the perceptions of the observers—a multifarious group of readers and listeners who are conditioned by their own interpretations of the Miller's character, his purpose, and understanding.

Chaucer presents a grand joke, an ironic one, that makes the literal joke uncomfortably serious and the interpretation of the observers uncomfortably funny. The irony working in this tale is what Vance Ramsey calls "counter-currents."[26] These counter-currents in the meaning of the joke or game compel us to come to terms with this paradox that yokes the oblique and clear elements in the tale. If we do not reconcile both elements, we are as "sely" as John when we enjoy the duplicity and laugh along with the crowd. Realizing that we have been laughing at an old naive man in an unfortunate and crude situation makes us chuckle silently and regretfully at our error.

The Miller, though, does not and cannot realize his error. He is as ignorant and "sely" as his own depiction of John, for he does not recognize the subtleties in his joke. That he "does not realize its [comic irony's] presence is the final irony," Paul Siegel argues.[27] However, the final irony is not necessarily the Miller's ignorance but the ignorance of the less observant readers: the Miller is essentially a metaphor for such a reader. The readers' propensity to go along with the joke makes them similar to the teller of the joke and the laughing crowd who do not realize the serious import of the tale. In a sense, the readers are inebriated by Southwerk's ale and consequently ignorant of the moral implications suggested by the carpenter's strife.

Why would Chaucer go to such lengths to misdirect readers? One critic, Robert P. Miller, maintains that Chaucer "recognized ignorance, vanity, and 'experiential wisdom' in his audience. To them the truths of life's 'pilgrimage' were necessarily distorted or obscure."[28] Perhaps Chaucer employs this form of irony to demonstrate that those readers do have distorted and obscure views of those truths. Perhaps Chaucer does this to give the more perceptive readers of medieval allegory an insight into the veiled, pious meaning of life's pilgrimage. However, Chaucer clearly succeeds on one level to entertain readers by the comedy and on another level to instruct them by the more serious import of the tale. Hugh of St. Victor explains that the technique of mixing the comic with the serious sometimes causes the readers to retain the meanings more readily. Certainly these various effects of the tale demonstrate Chaucer's remarkable artistic ability to produce such radically different effects on different readers. The "essence" of Chaucer's joke, Roger Sell emphasizes, "is then pure pragmatics: the different significances one and the same verbal utterance can carry for people with different world-views or within different contexts."[29] But in whatever context, the repeated references to the interpretation of the joke, the exaggerated concern with seriousness, the parallels to Boethian philosophy, medieval exegesis and "sentence," and the highly suggestive narrative mixture of obliquity and clarity give this tale an attractive contradictory character that invites close examinations of meaning and hidden truth.

Most remarkably, Chaucer tells in the *Miller's Tale* a profound joke about one's tendencies not to take seriously a very real human game involving infidelity, deception, and dishonesty. A close analysis of the tale reveals Chaucer's own serious and scornful interpretation of such actions and consequences, his artistic intent to instruct mankind in the ways of the divine and to dramatize what it takes to open one's door *with* candlelight. If the readers do not gain the "fruyt" of the tale, Chaucer's last line then is appropriate, serious, and should not be turned into a joke: "This tale is doon, and God save al the rowte" (3854)!

NOTES

1. E. M. W. Tillyard, "Plot-Obliquity in Chaucer's *Miller's Tale*" in *Discussions of the Canterbury Tales*, ed. Charles A. Owen, Jr. (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1961), 45–48.

2. Morton W. Bloomfield, "The *Miller's Tale*—An UnBoethian Interpretation" in *Medieval Literature and Folklore Studies: Essays in Honor of Francis Lee Utley*, ed. Jerome Mandel and Bruce A. Rosenberg (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 205–11.

3. Ibid., 207.

4. David Williams, "Radical Therapy in the *Miller's Tale*," *Chaucer Review* 15.5 (1981): 227.

5. Joseph Bently, "Chaucer's Fatalistic Miller," *Southern Atlantic Quarterly* 64 (1966): 247–53.

6. Alvin W. Gowker, "Comic Illusion and Dark Reality in the *Miller's Tale*," *Modern Language Studies* 4.2 (1974): 27–34.

7. Paul A. Olson, "Poetic Justice in the *Miller's Tale*," *Modern Language Quarterly* 24 (1963): 225–36.

8. D. Thomas Hanks, Jr., " 'Goddes Pryvetee' and Chaucer's *Miller's Tale*," *Christianity and Literature* 33.2 (1984): 11.

9. Alice S. Miskimin, *The Renaissance Chaucer* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 102.

10. Patrick J. Gallacher, "Perception and Reality in the *Miller's Tale*," *Chaucer Review* 18.1 (1983): 38.

11. Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. Richard Green (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), 108.

12. This and other line citations of the *Miller's Tale* refer to *The Complete Poetry and Prose of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. John H. Fisher (New York: Holt, 1977), 57–68.

13. Augustine, "The Creation and Fall of Man," from *The City of God* in *Chaucer: Sources and Backgrounds*, ed. Robert P. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 27.

14. Boethius, 104.

15. Trevor Whittock, *A Reading of the "Canterbury Tales"* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 81.

16. Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor*, trans. Jerome Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

17. Innocent III, *On the Misery of the Human Condition*, trans. Margaret Mary Dietz, ed. Donald R. Howard (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 46.

18. Boethius, 113.

19. Ibid., 110–11.

20. Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958), 31.

21. Geoffrey Cooper, " 'Sely John' in the 'Legend' of the *Miller's Tale*," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 79 (1980): 1–12.

22. Mary Brookbank Reed, "Chaucer's Sely Carpenter," *Philological Quarterly* 41 (1962): 769.

23. Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, 31.

24. Giovanni Boccaccio, *Boccaccio on Poetry*, trans. Charles G. Osgood (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956), 51.

25. Bernard F. Huppé and D. W. Robertson, Jr., *Fruyt and Chaf: Studies in Chaucer's Allegories* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 30.

26. Vance Ramsey, "Modes of Irony in the *Canterbury Tales*," in *Companion to Chaucer Studies*, ed. Beryl Rowland, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 353.

27. Paul N. Siegel, "Comic Irony in the *Miller's Tale*," *Boston University Studies in English* 4.1 (1960): 120.

28. Robert P. Miller, "Allegory in the *Canterbury Tales*," in *Companion to Chaucer Studies*, ed. Beryl Rowland, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 336.

29. Roger D. Sell, "Tellability and Politeness in 'The Miller's Tale': First Steps in Literary Pragmatics," *English Studies* 66.6 (1985): 509–10.

Natural Law and Chaucer's
Physician's Tale

by

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Of all the *Canterbury Tales*, the *Physician's Tale* may well be the least appreciated. Its subject matter is distasteful in itself—a despicable judge abuses his position of public trust and authority by deliberately setting out to obtain an innocent young virgin as an object of lust, while to frustrate the event the victim's father beheads her after cold-blooded premeditation. But if that were not enough, the tale contains at least two apparently incongruous digressions, and the storyteller appends a moral that must make the reader suspect the Narrator has not been listening to his own story. Perhaps a modern reader's first reaction is to "turn over the leaf" hastily to get to the magnificent *Pardoner's Tale* which follows.

Still, there is something fascinating and puzzling about the *Physician's Tale*, and it has been the object of a number of scholarly "rescue missions" recently—salvaged, as it were, from the mire of critical neglect. Not that anyone has claimed that the *Physician's Tale* is one of Chaucer's greatest achievements,[1] but recent critics have recognized the importance of seeing the place of the story in the larger context of the *Canterbury Tales*, emphasizing the appropriateness of the tale to its teller,[2] and its thematic and structural relationship to the tales which precede and follow it.[3] I must agree, however, with Derek Pearsall when he stresses that the design of the *Canterbury Tales* itself grants the individual tales "the greatest possible degree of autonomy."[4] With this in mind I would say that the majority of recent criticism errs: we first need to determine what Chaucer is doing in the *Physician's Tale* itself, particularly in those passages which he adds to his sources—Nature's description of Virginia, the Narrator's digression on governesses, and the confrontation of Virginius and Virginia.

One aspect of the *Physician's Tale* which has received insufficient attention from recent critics, but which seems not only thematically central to

the tale but also critical for Chaucer's worldview, is the concept of Natural Law.[5] The Narrator introduces the theme early in the tale when Nature, admiring her handiwork in the perfect maiden Virginia, comments upon her own relationship with the Creator:

> For He that is the formere principal
> Hath maked me his vicaire general,
> To forme and peynten erthely creaturis
> Right as me list, and ech thyng in my cure is
> Under the moone, that may wane and waxe,
> And for my werk right no thyng wol I axe;
> My lord and I been ful of oon accord.
>
> (6.19–25)[6]

The words are similar to those in the *Parliament of Fowls*, in which Nature is called "the vicaire of the almyghty Lord, / That hot, cold, hevy, lyght, moyst, and dreye / Hath knyt by evene noumbers of acord" (379–81). This power of Nature as "vicaire" of God, which makes her law binding on all things under the moon, is, I realize, an extremely complicated topic. But I shall explore some of the wide range of opinions about the concept in order to suggest its implications for the *Physician's Tale*.

I. NATURAL LAW

Marie Collins, in an impressive recent article on Natural Law in Chaucer and Gower, separates the law of Nature or "kynde," "in its limited meaning as the forces and instincts controlling the physical world," from the "larger concept of Natural Law." Her definition of Natural Law is based on Thomas Aquinas's classification of law as Eternal, Natural, or Positive, where the Eternal Law is "the ruling idea of things which exists in God"; Natural Law, the participation in that eternal law by rational creatures; and Positive Law, "particular pronouncements by human reason on matters of detail."[7] But this definition assumes more unanimity of opinion than in fact existed, and there is no evidence that Chaucer ever used Aquinas as a direct source.

Kurt Olsson, in another recent article on Natural Law in Gower, acknowledges "various, sometimes opposed ideas about the *jus naturae* and . . . the ambiguity of the term and the multiple meanings assigned to it."[8] But Olsson suggests five definitions of the term, definitions which may be helpful in examining how the concept informs the *Physician's Tale*.

First, Natural Law is the "law of animal nature," including sexual love.[9] This is the sense in which Chaucer often uses the term "law of kynde," and in the *Roman de la Rose*, Chaucer's primary source for the main plot of his "Physician's Tale" as well as for Nature's speech as cited above, Nature's chief concern is the propagation of the species as a bulwark against the ravages

of Death.[10] By extension, Natural Law can be seen as "an instinct leading to charity . . . [a] social instinct that is extended first to those related by blood . . . and then to other members of the same species."[11] This aspect quite obviously pertains to the relationship between Virginius and his daughter in the *Physician's Tale*.

In its third meaning, Natural Law comprises the "primitive state of nature when all goods were shared."[12] This idea does not directly apply to the *Physician's Tale*, but the paradisiacal state implied suggests the fourth connotation of the concept, a connotation which is crucial to the tale: cosmic order and harmony.[13] The idea appears, for example, in Macrobius's *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*, in which the music of the spheres reflects the harmony of the created universe witnessed by Scipio after he had been whisked into space and received a lecture from his grandfather Africanus on the order of the heavens.[14] Since Natural Law is ordered harmony, all things have a specific place in creation: all objects in their naturally ordained spaces contribute to the harmony of the universe and obey Natural Law. Further, all things are *naturally inclined* toward their divinely ordained place in the cosmos. Chaucer's verbose Eagle explains in the *House of Fame*:

> every kyndely thyng that is
> Hath a kyndely stede ther he
> May best in hyt conserved be;
> Unto which place every thyng
> Thorgh his kyndely enclynyng
> Moveth for to come to
> Whan that hyt is awey therfro.
>
> (730–36)

Because of this harmonious interdependence of all created things, certain external powers, in particular the stars and elements, may help shape what human beings are and what they become. As Olsson points out, "Because all things are interdependent, man does not seem to be the cause of what he does. He is directed by the planets, natural things in his world, his place of origin, the elements, his complexion."[15] Thus, for example, the conditions and planetary configurations at the time of one's birth affect the direction of his or her life. The Narrator of the *Physician's Tale* dwells on precisely this aspect of Nature as he shows Nature's pride in *forming* Virginia: "Lo! I, Nature, / Thus kan I forme and peynte a creature, / Whan that me list; who kan me countrefete?" (6.11–13). Nature's greatest concern is giving life to things of beauty for the purpose of glorifying God. So in the *Physician's Tale* she can say of Virginia, "I made hire to the worshipe of my lord" (6.26).

A human being—for example, a physician, who could be telling this tale—may through studying Nature's secrets find ways of using these natural laws for the good of a patient. These are not *manipulations* of Nature, but

rather the use of Reason to apply the influence of natural laws to the good end of preserving life. This implies the fifth sense of Natural Law: "natural reason, the judgment of reason, free will, or the power to choose good over evil," that is, the *ratio naturalis* which modifies the law of animal nature in the human species.[16] It is *man's* proper nature (though somewhat obscured since the Fall) to use his divinely given gift of reason to resist malignant influences of the stars, or the "law of kynde" in the first sense if it compelled him to lechery. Virginia herself uses her natural gift of reason to shun evil of her own free will:

> In hire lakked no condicioun
> That is to preyse, as by discrecioun.
> As wel in goost as body chast was she.
>
> (6.41–43)

Thus in consciously choosing to avoid evil, Virginia is demonstrating one facet of proper human nature.

A final aspect of Natural Law concerns the mechanism by which Natural Law promulgates itself. What draws creatures to reproduce themselves, or to recognize their common bonds of humanity, or to recognize true goodness, or to keep their proper place in the cosmic harmony? What is it that should guide human reason in making judgments? According to Chaucer's favorite sources, it is love. That "kyndely enclynyng" which the Eagle spoke of in the *House of Fame* is love, which binds all things to their divinely ordained place in a harmonious cosmos. For Boethius, this binding force of love extends through the heavens and into human relationships.[17] In man, however, although he is naturally inclined toward the Highest Good, toward God, who is true love—that is, "the covetise of verray good is naturely iplauntyd in the hertes of men"—still "the myswandrynge errour mysledeth hem into false goodes" (*Boece* 3. p. 2. 22–25). This being the case, Dante, in a well-known passage in the *Purgatorio*, can discuss love as a motivating force even for sins.[18]

Thus human beings, created with free will, may go against reason and against natural desire for the good, which is desire for the harmony of the universe. In doing so humans go against Natural Law, and so against the will of God, for Natural Law is the perfect reflection of God's will—"My lord and I been ful of oon accord," says Nature.

II. GOVERNANCE: THE NARRATOR'S VIEW

Nature's description of Virginia should be read in this light. That description sets the story against a background of created Nature as the vicar of God and thereby gives the reader the standard against which to measure the tale's morality. But the Narrator's distorted moral view becomes apparent

in Chaucer's next major addition to the tale, his minisermon about how to rear children. While this passage seems to some "an absurd digression,"[19] familiarity with Chaucer suggests that what may appear irrelevant usually has its own subtle logic. In the first place, the passage on the relationship of governesses and parents to children continues a pattern that was introduced in Nature's governing creation and continues in Apius's governing the country, and Virginius's governing Virginia. The theme of governance seems to be a major concern of the tale.[20] But two particular aspects of that governance relationship are suggested by the "digression" on governesses and parents, and these aspects color the reader's perception of the other governing relationships in the tale. First, not so much virtue but knowledge of sin makes a good governess, for

> A theef of venysoun, that hath forlaft
> His likerousnesse and al his olde craft,
> Kan kepe a forest best of any man.
>
> (6.83-85)

In the Narrator's world, this special understanding of sin is gained by being a sinner, as Lee C. Ramsey has pointed out. But as Virginia's pathetic plight demonstrates, "Innocence does not survive in a world where personal knowledge of sin is the best qualification for parent, guardian, or judge."[21]

A close look at the tale reveals that the Narrator sees goodness as the avoidance of sin, rather than the active pursuit of virtue. Therefore, the reformed sinner is the best guardian of the maiden's virtue, since she knows all possible pitfalls. Further, Virginia's great innocence, lauded in lines 39-71, consists exclusively in *abstaining* from any situation in which the possibility for sinning could exist. Her "virtues" almost all consist in *not* doing something: she

> floured in virginitee
> With alle humylitee and abstinence,
> With alle attemperaunce and pacience,
> With mesure eek of beryng and array.
>
> (6.44-47)

She has abstained from sex, from strong food and drink, from proud bearing and raiment. She deliberately avoids parties and other social gatherings which could provide the opportunity for sinning:

> She hath ful ofte tyme syk hire feyned,
> For that she wold fleen the compaignye
> Where likly was to treten of folye,

As is at feestes, revels, and at daunces,
That been occasions of daliaunces.

(6.62–66)

But temperance proves to be no real match for the evil of the world. One of the ironies of the story is that the Physician Narrator himself does not recognize the insufficiency of his prescription as demonstrated in his own story: Virginia is destroyed in spite of her carefully sheltered life; but the tale's moral, as the Narrator sees it, is "forsaketh synne, er synne yow forsake" (6.286).

Nor is the Narrator's advice to parents any more sound. Again, his chief concern in caring for children who have "been under youre governaunce" (6.96) is to guard them well and not to be negligent in chastising them:

Beth war, if by ensample of youre lyvynge
Or by youre necligence in chastisynge
That they ne perisse.

(6.97–99)

Again, all stress is laid on protection from sin; and if sin appears, one must apparently beat it out of the child: thus any physical harm done to the child is justified by the goal of protecting him or her from sin. The *reductio ad absurdum* of this argument is Virginius's beheading Virginia in order to save her from the sin of unchastity—better she lose her head than her maidenhead. The Physician's absurd concluding moral indicates that he does not recognize this irony. But surely the reader must.

Conspicuous by its absence from any of the Narrator's advice on childrearing is the idea of love. As Anne Middleton says, "the peculiar absence of any mention of love as the root of parental discipline runs counter to the whole burden of Nature's speech."[22] That love which is the foundation of Natural Law, in the cosmos and in personal relationships, is not part of the Narrator's view of family bonds. Similarly, Virginia's abstinence is not motivated by love—she engages in no positive acts of charity, but only in "bisynesse / To dryve hire out of ydel slogardye" (6.56–57), apparently because the devil will find work for idle hands. But the Narrator does not seem to be aware that the *kind* of business in which one is involved makes a difference. It is instructive to see what Chaucer's Parson says about the sin of sloth: "Agayns this roten-herted synne of Accidie and Slouthe sholde men exercise hemself to doon goode werkes" (10.688). These "goode werkes" are deeds we never see Virginia perform.

III. THREE UNNATURAL CHARACTERS

If the early digressions in the story have established governance as the central theme and Natural Law as the context, it is fairly easy to see the

parallels between the various personal "governance" relationships in the tale. The five connotations of Natural Law already mentioned and the idea of love as binding all in harmony, from the cosmic spheres to society and family, emphasize these parallels. As Mandel points out, "Just as Nature is God's 'vicaire general,' so are Apius in the political and Virginius in the familial spheres."[23] So, for that matter, is Reason in the psychological sphere. Nature herself cannot err, since she is the perfect reflection of Divine Law: she and God are "of oon accord." But all the other governors may err: Reason, if it is clouded by love of things other than the Highest Good; magistrate or father, if his justice—necessarily consisting of Positive Law—fails to embody in it the precepts of Natural Law.

The first and most obvious example of a governor who perverts justice by flouting Natural Law is Apius. His blatant abuse of power is the central theme of all other versions of the legend: Collins calls the theme of the story "the perversion of law by one who should administer it, under the influence of irrational passion."[24] The evil judge violates Natural Law in two obvious ways. First, of course, he allows his passions to overcome his reason. Reason, transcending the "law of kynde" that pertains to our animal nature, "promotes married love" as Olsson puts it.[25] Boethius, as has been mentioned, saw that the same love that held the universe together also "knytteth sacrement of mariages of chaste loves" (2. m. 8. 23–24). Chaucer's Parson also associates true marriage with Natural Law: "verray mariage . . . was establissed by God, er that synne bigan, whan natureel lawe was in his right poynt" (10.920). Apius sins against God and Nature; when the Narrator advises his audience to "Forsaketh synne, er synne yow forsake," Apius is the one character in the story that the moral fits. Appropriately, Apius commits suicide in prison—the ultimate subversion of Nature's primary law of self-preservation.[26]

This perversion of natural reason in the individual is bad enough; but when it occurs in a ruler, "God's vicaire" in the commonwealth, the people must suffer. The governor, who should uphold a Positive Law that perfectly reflects Natural Law, engages instead in what Aquinas called *legis corruptio*.[27] The force of human law depends upon justice, and where human law strays from Natural Law, it loses its justice and becomes a perversion of law. The corrupting effect of such government upon the governed is reflected in the character of the "cherl" Claudius, whose relationship with Apius is a grotesque parody of Nature's relationship with God. Mandel first pointed out this similarity:[28] as Nature and the Creator "been ful of oon accord" (6.25), so that the law of Nature perfectly mirrors the will of God, so Claudius twice repeats his perfect submission to the evil will of Apius: "if that it be youre wille" (6.165, 189).

A second character who violates Natural Law, violently and inexcusably, is Virginius. Every sensitive reader must instinctively feel an aversion to Virginius's unnatural act, though critics have only recently given voice to

that disgust. Indeed, one critic of the past actually called Virginius "Nature's positive assertive force for good," because he acts "in accord with a higher principle of love than that which demands life at all costs."[29] While few would agree with this assessment, it is true that if one believes the Narrator's view of events to be Chaucer's, then one sees Virginius called "this worthy knyght" immediately before he murders his daughter in cold blood (6.203). But the Narrator has not shown himself to be particularly reliable: he has already demonstrated serious misunderstanding of love's importance in human relationships. Therefore, most recent critics have condemned Virginius, emphasizing his purely physical understanding of his daughter's virginity and his failure to see her as anything but an extension of himself.[30]

Two aspects of Virginius's character are immediately apparent in the scene (original to Chaucer) in which Virginius faces his daughter. First, in both Livy and Jean de Meun, Chaucer's chief sources for the tale,[31] Virginius is more sympathetic because he kills his daughter in a sudden impassioned rage. Chaucer's Virginius kills his daughter after cold premeditation:

> He gooth hym hoom, and sette him in his halle,
> And leet anon his deere doghter calle,
> And with a face deed as asshen colde
> Upon hir humble face he gan biholde,
> With fadres pitee stikynge thurgh his herte,
> Al wolde he from his purpos nat converte.
>
> (6.207–12)

The second point one must notice is the obvious parallel between Virginius's treatment of Virginia and his own treatment at the hands of Apius.[32] Like Apius, Virginius calls his victim before him. Like Apius, however, Virginius needs her there only to pronounce his sentence upon her—"Take thou thy deeth, for this is my sentence" (224)—a sentence predetermined and unalterable, like the Natural Law which it should ideally mirror but does not. Also like Apius, Virginius expects perfect obedience. And he gets it.

But Virginius, like Apius, violates Natural Law both in his twisted judgment of the case and in his failure in his relationship with Virginia. If Apius's sin was lust—love misdirected toward a lesser good, Virginius's sin is pride—love perverted into self-centeredness. Virginius possesses all the gifts of Fortune that Chaucer's Parson enumerates in his Tale as gifts from which Pride may spring: "richesse, hyghe degrees of lordshipes, preisynges of the peple" (10.453). Virginius is introduced as "Fulfild of honour and of worthynesse, / And strong of freendes, and of greet richesse" (6.2–4). Virginius seems to have allowed these riches and esteem, these gifts of fortune, to cloud his judgment and to affect his relationship with his daughter. That Virginius sees Virginia solely as an object belonging to him, one of his worldly

possessions,[33] is apparent in his speech to her, which contains no less than nine first-person pronouns, seven of them possessive:

> . . . allas, that *I* was bore!
> For nevere thou deservedest wherfore
> To dyen with a swerd or with a knyf.
> O deere doghter, endere of *my* lyf,
> Which *I* have fostred up with swich plesaunce
> That thou were nevere out of *my* remembraunce!
> O doghter, which that art *my* laste wo,
> And in *my* lyf *my* laste joye also,
> O gemme of chastitee, in pacience
> Take thou thy deeth, for this is *my* sentence.
> For love, and nat for hate, thou most be deed;
> *My* pitous hand moot smyten of thyn heed.
>
> (6.215–26; emphasis mine)

Virginius, perceiving the dilemma as "deeth or shame" (6.214), perceives his daughter's loss of virginity as a mark against his own "honour and worthynesse." True, the characters are pagan Romans, but the tale is being related in a Christian context to a Christian audience. It is therefore relevant that, as several critics have noted, in Christian theology dating back to Augustine, Virginia would still be a virgin in the eyes of God and of Chaucer's original audience.[34] Hence the issue is more accurately Virginius's esteem than his honor. He is worried about what the people will think of him. Perhaps this is why he commits the murder in the privacy of his own home, rather than in a public place as in Chaucer's sources. If Virginius's concerns are with keeping his possession (Virginia) and reputation or "preisyng of the peple," then his motives stem from cupidity and pride, a violation of Natural Law. When Virginius tells his daughter that she must die "for love and nat for hate," he is correct. But it is the wrong kind of love that motivates him—his love of self and of Fortune's gifts.[35]

More obviously, the family, like the commonwealth and the cosmos, should be knit in order by love. The second connotation of the Law of Nature discussed above emphasizes charity toward others, beginning with blood relatives. But that special love which must tie the father to daughter (which the Narrator had neglected to mention in his advice to parents) is cruelly violated by Virginius, despite the Narrator's constant stressing of his "fadres pitee." Virginius, in the position of "God's vicaire" in the family, should be "of oon accord" with God by governing according to the principles of Natural Law. But he commits a most *un*natural act, and his "subject," Virginia, suffers a fate far worse than Apius's Claudius: she loses her head in fact, not merely in threat.

This brings us to Virginia herself, the most enigmatic of the three main characters. Certainly the Narrator is at pains to build up our sympathy for Virginia: his chief embellishments on the tale—Nature's speech and the pitiful death scene—both push Virginia into the foreground, whereas in Livy and Jean de Meun she was little more than a pawn in the game between her father and Apius. The Narrator's Nature praises Virginia, but chiefly for the gifts of physical beauty which Nature has given her. The Narrator lavishes praise upon his heroine, or "this noble creature" as he calls her (6.34): four times he emphasizes her *beautee* (6.7, 39, 112, 127), four times her *vertu* (6.40, 54, 61, 114), and three times her great *bountee* (6.110, 112, 136). In addition, he pushes the pathos of her death scene to its limits: four times she is her father's "deere doghter" (6.205, 208, 218, 237). She looks upon him with that pathetic "humble face" (6.210) that causes even the monomaniacal Virginius to feel a "fadres pitee stikynge thurgh his herte" (6.211). And the poor child pleads for "mercy, deere fader!" (6.230), begging for "grace" or "remedye" (6.236), before she faints from fear.

Many critics have both followed the Narrator in their praise of Virginia and empathized with Harry Bailey, who "almoost . . . caught a cardynacle" (6.313) in pity for her. Those who take such a positive view of Virginia see her as making a deliberate choice, for death rather than dishonor;[36] they see her as a virgin martyr dedicated to chastity for the sake of the spiritual fruit it will yield her.[37] They see her final speech—

> "Blissed be God that I shal dye a mayde!
> Yif me my deeth, er that I have a shame;
> Dooth with youre child youre wyl, a Goddes
>   name!"
>
>   (6.248-50)

—as evidence that she has in fact achieved the "grace" she asked her father for (6.236), but in a spiritual, Christian sense.[38]

But this interpretation of Virginia cannot really be supported by the text of the tale. Virginia does not *make* a choice between death and dishonor.[39] When her father says "ther been two weyes, outher deeth or shame" (6.214), the question is academic. Virginius considers the decision his to make, and he already made it. Virginia is present only to hear her sentence. Indeed, her first reaction is understandably a kind of panic and a begging for mercy, as she tries everything to appeal to Virginius's natural human feelings:

> "O mercy, deere fader!" quod this mayde,
> And with that word she bothe hir armes layde
> Aboute his nekke, as she was wont to do.
> The teeris bruste out of hir eyen two,

> And seyde, "Goode fader, shal I dye?
> Is ther no grace, is ther no remedye?"
>
> (6.231–36)

At the unmoved "No, certes" (6.237) from her father, Virginia's mood changes again. Having gone through a denial—"O mercy, deere fader!"—and perhaps through anger—"Is ther no grace?"—Virginia passes into a stage of bargaining, asking her father for a reprieve to lament her death "a litel space" (6.239), like Jephthah's daughter. Realizing that she is grasping at straws, she "fil aswowne anon" (6.245), losing consciousness in deep despair. When she awakes from her swoon, she is finally willing to accept the inevitable, though Mathewson claims that her "Blissed be God, that I shal dye a mayde!" sounds somewhat hysterical.[40] What Virginia displays in this scene is not the active choice of death over shame, but rather the final typical stages of dying as outlined by Dr. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross.[41] The stages are telescoped in Virginia's case, since she has been given very little time to prepare, but in any case they are stages experienced by the terminally ill—those who must face an inevitable death, not one they have *chosen* for themselves. And the short time Virginia has to prepare does not allow her to reach a sincere acceptance, because after those brave lines telling her father to "Yif me my deeth," she pleads with him not once but "ful ofte / That with his swerd he wolde smyte softe" (6.251–52). Then from sheer terror she swoons again. This is not the boldness of the virgin martyr nor the serenity of the Christian saint. It is the abject terror of an innocent young virgin who never before has had actively to combat evil.

Nor is her virginity necessarily virtuous in itself. In spite of what some critics have tried to see, there is no indication that the pagan Roman Virginia conceives of her virginity as having anything to do with her relationship with God. Chaucer's Christian audience would have known that in medieval tradition virginity had value only in the context of such a relationship, wherein the virgin consecrates her maidenhood to Christ. Out of that context, Virginia's chastity is meaningless.[42] Nor, as pointed out above, would her forced yielding to Apius technically destroy her virginity in the eyes of the Church. This being the case, it is hard to see the point of her well-defended virginity.[43] The virginity is part of Virginia's whole negative approach to virtue, an approach which the Narrator shares. Evil is to be avoided, not faced and overcome. Thus Virginia must abstain from sex, revels, dancing, drink, life itself.

This brings me to my contention that surely Virginia too (though more subtly drawn) is a character, like Apius and Virginius, who violates Natural Law and so contributes to her own destruction. First, rather than pursuing positive acts of charity, she sees temperance and humility as all-sufficient virtues and virginity as a desirable end in itself. But Natural Law in its first sense clearly emphasizes the virtue of the reproductive act. Though clearly

man's reason must control his passions, this does not mean all should prefer celibacy. Unless the virginity is a deliberate choice wherein the will remains set on the Highest Good, that virginity is not a good in itself and is, in fact, unnatural.

Virginia's more harmful transgression of Natural Law is manifest in her relationship with her father. Because the father, like Nature and Apius, is "God's vicaire," the proper and natural attitude of the subject is to obey out of love and out of the knowledge that this is one's proper role. Indeed Virginia's words "Dooth with youre child youre wyl" (6.250) echo Christ's in Gethsemane and are surely intended to suggest that perfect relationship,[44] that "oon accord" that exists between Christ and the Father, just as it exists between Nature and God. But the allusion is ironic, particularly since Claudius has already used the same words twice in approaching Apius (6.165, 189). The clear parallel we are intended to see here is that between Virginia and Claudius. He is threatened with beheading; she is beheaded. He is subject to an unnatural master; she is subject to an unnatural father. But both follow perfectly their masters' will, for like Nature or Christ, they are "of oon accord" with their masters.

Such a comparison is not flattering to Virginia. If she is to be commended for the perfect obedience she shows to her father, as some critics would have it,[45] then Claudius too is to be commended for his perfect obedience to "God's vicaire" in Apius. No reader of the story feels compelled to absolve Claudius of his guilt and to spare him out of "pitee," as Virginius ironically does after executing his innocent child. But why should Claudius be condemned? Surely because when a positive law violates the precepts of Natural Law, it loses the force of law and absolves one of the obligation to follow it. That was Aquinas's view. And, as Mandel points out, John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* clearly asserts that when a ruler resists divine commandments and tries to force people to do the same, then the voice of God must be obeyed.[46] The alternative to obedience is demonstrated at the end of the *Physician's Tale*, when "right anon a thousand peple in thraste / To save the knyght" (6.260-61). When Natural Law is being violated, active resistance even to the point of open rebellion is permissible. Claudius was wrong. He should have refused.

By the same reasoning, so then should Virginia. Virginius's command was unnatural. She was not bound to obey it. In fact, since preservation of life is Nature's first rule, she was under an obligation to resist, to save her own life. Her death is as much a sin against Nature as is Apius's suicide. But it was simply not in Virginia's power actively to combat evil—her whole life had been spent in passive abstention. When the situation required more, she was not able to supply it, and so she died. But the rising of the people against Apius, which event immediately follows her death, supplies an alternative to her behavior for the audience to consider, while the ironic sparing of her foil Claudius brings our attention back to Virginia's undeserved fate and,

by extension, to her passive submission (like Claudius's) which caused it.

The theme of Natural Law which pervades the *Physician's Tale* reveals the unreliability of a narrator who fails to see the truth about his own tale. The ironic discrepancy between the theme and the Narrator's understanding also explains the apparently incongruous digression on childrearing and helps to shape our attitudes toward the main characters, particularly clarifying our reactions to Virginius and Virginia.

NOTES

1. Sheila Delaney, in "Politics and the Paralysis of Poetic Imagination in *The Physician's Tale*," *Studies in the Age of Chaucer* 3 (1981): 47–60, calls the tale a failure because Chaucer drops the political and social content that had characterized his sources. Anne Middleton, in "The *Physician's Tale* and Love's Martyrs: 'Ensamples Mo than Ten' as a Method in the *Canterbury Tales*," *Chaucer Review* 8 (1973): 14–15, sees the tale as typical of the *Canterbury Tales* in its forcing us to redefine or reexamine ethical abstractions which Chaucer's sources, and the Canterbury narrators themselves, may take for granted. This deliberate obscuring or confusing of values is noted by Lee C. Ramsey, who, in " 'The Sentence of it Sooth is': Chaucer's *Physician's Tale*," *Chaucer Review* 6 (1972): 185–97, sees strong tension between the Physician's moral and the deeper meaning of the story which lies in its many contradictions, mirroring life's uncertainty. Thomas B. Hanson, too, notes, in "Chaucer's Physician as Storyteller and Moralizer," *Chaucer Review* 7 (1972): 136–38, that the Physician obscures the story's moral by ignoring Virginia, while Emerson Brown, Jr., in "What Is Chaucer Doing with the Physician and His Tale?" *Philological Quarterly* 60 (1981): 138–40, sees in the story a tale of confused morality, indicting both Virginius and Virginia in his condemnation. More recently Joerg O. Fichte has suggested, in "Incident—History—Exemplum—Novella: The Transformation of History in Chaucer's *Physician's Tale*," *Florilegium* 5 (1983): 189–207, that the uncertain morality of the tale is typical of the *novella* genre: critics have been confused, Fichte argues, because they have assumed that the tale is an *exemplum*, which, in fact, it is not.

2. Beryl Rowland, in "The Physician's 'Historial Thing Notable' and the Man of Law," *ELH* 40 (1973): 165–78, sees the tale as the Physician's attack on lawyers, citing the strong rivalry between the two professions in the fourteenth century. Donald R. Howard, in *The Idea of the "Canterbury Tales"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 334, calls the story a tale of "misguided moralism" which reflects the mentality of the Narrator, who ironically "praises virtue in a tale that is morally revolting." Robert Longsworth, in "The Doctor's Dilemma: A Comic View of the 'Physician's Tale,' " *Criticism* 13 (1971): 232, contends that the tale falls apart because the Physician's morality is a sham and a fraud. Brown, 131–37, sees an irony in that the Physician, so excellent in his field and in his ability to find the cause of every malady, is unable to determine truly the cause of Virginia's death. Daniel Kempton, in "*The Physician's Tale*: The Doctor of Physic's Diplomatic 'Cure,' " *Chaucer Review* 19 (1984): 28, 32, notes that the depiction of Virginia and her temperance reads like an ideal self-portrait of the Physician and that Virginius's killing of Virginia to protect her chastity is the practical equivalent of medieval medicine, where the

cure was often a greater injury than the disease. All of these readings insist that the Physician of the *General Prologue* is the Narrator of the tale; his portrait, therefore, may be used to help explain the ambiguities of this tale. The entire "Dramatic Theory" has recently been called into question, particularly by C. David Benson in his *Chaucer's Drama of Style: Poetic Variety and Contrast in the "Canterbury Tales"* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). Certainly the unquestioning acceptance of the usefulness of the Dramatic Theory for all tales can lead to illogical excesses, and there is no clear link between the *Physician's Tale* and the Physician of the *General Prologue*; accordingly, no assumption of that relationship is made in this essay, and the explanation of the Tale's problems is sought elsewhere.

3.   Trevor Whittock, in *A Reading of the "Canterbury Tales"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 179, sees the *Physician's Tale* as a direct answer to the *Franklin's Tale*, in its preference of death above violation of chastity. Richard L. Hoffman, in "Jephthah's Daughter and Chaucer's Virginia," *Chaucer Review* 2 (1967): 20–31, interprets Virginia's allusion to Jephthah's daughter, which undercuts Virginius's resolution by mirroring it in Jephthah's rash and foolish vow, as recalling the equally rash vow of Dorigen, and sees Virginia as morally superior to Dorigen because of her resolve to die, like the women of Dorigen's complaint. Similarly, Peter G. Beidler, in "The Pairing of the *Franklin's Tale* and the *Physician's Tale*," *Chaucer Review* 3 (1969): 275–79, sees parallels in the plots and characters of the two tales and again sees Virginia as morally superior to Dorigen in that she chooses what to do instead of merely thinking about it. Jeanne T. Mathewson, in "For Love and Not for Hate: The Value of Virginity in Chaucer's *Physician's Tale*," *Chaucer Review* 10 (1976): 71, however, sees Arveragus's relationship with Dorigen as a more positive one than Virginius's possessive relationship with Virginia.

As for the connection of the *Physician's Tale* to the *Pardoner's Tale*, Katherine B. Trower, in "Spiritual Sickness in the Physician's and Pardoner's Tales: Thematic Unity in Fragment VI of the *Canterbury Tales*," *American Benedictine Review* 29 (1978): 67–86, notes both the Physician and the Pardoner are by occupation concerned with healing (physical and spiritual, respectively), but both fail to transcend death or evil. E. R. Amoils, in "Fruitfulness and Sterility in the *Physician's* and *Pardoner's Tales*," *English Studies in Africa* 17 (1974): 17–37, sees Virginia's spiritual fruitfulness as contrasting positively with the Pardoner's sterility. Brown, 141–44, sees the three tales— Franklin's, Physician's, and Pardoner's—as a triad of stories on the problem of evil: in the *Franklin's Tale*, evil is mere illusion or "temporary inconvenience"; in the *Physician's Tale*, evil is real but capricious and hard to understand; in the *Pardoner's Tale*, evil is seen and understood, but the Narrator refuses or is unable to do anything about it.

4.   Derek Pearsall, *The Canterbury Tales* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), xi–xii.

5.   See, for example, J. A. W. Bennett, *The "Parlement of Foules": An Interpretation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957); Gareth W. Dunleavy, "Natural Law as Chaucer's Ethical Absolute," *Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters* 52 (1963): 177–87; David Chamberlain, "The Music of the Spheres and the *Parliament of Foules*," *Chaucer Review* 5 (1970): 32–56; Marie Collins, "Love, Nature and Law in the Poetry of Gower and Chaucer," in *Court and Poet: Selected Proceedings of the Third Congress of the International Courtly Literature Society, Liverpool, 1980*, ed. Glyn S. Burgess et al., ARCA: Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers, and Monographs 5 (Liverpool: Cairns, 1981), 113–28; and my own article, "Chaucer's *Envoy to Scogan*: 'Tullius Kyndenesse'

and the Law of Kydne," *Chaucer Review* 20 (1986): 323–30, for aspects of Natural Law and universal harmony in Chaucer. See also Kurt Olsson's related article, "Natural Law and John Gower's *Confessio Amantis*," *Medievalia et Humanistica* 11 (1982): 229–61.

6.   Geoffrey Chaucer, *The Riverside Chaucer*, ed. Larry Benson, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987); all subsequent references are to this edition.

7.   Collins, 114–15.

8.   Olsson, 229.

9.   Ibid., 230.

10.
> Nature, qui pensoit des choses
> Qui sont dessous le ciel encloses,
> Dedens sa forge entree estoit,
> Ou toute s'entente metroit
> A forgier singulieres pieces
> Por continuer les espieces;
> Car les pieces tant les font vivre
> Que Mors ne les puet aconsivre,
> Ja tant ne savra corre apres.

(15893–901)

("Nature, who thinks on the things that are enclosed beneath the heavens, was entered within her forge, where she would put all her attention on forging individual creatures to continue the species. For individuals make the species live so that Death cannot catch up with them, no matter how much she runs after them.") The translation is that of Charles Dahlberg, in Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, *The Romance of the Rose* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 270.

11.   Olsson, 234. To illustrate this aspect of Natural Law, Olsson, 235, 258, cites Alain de Lille's *Summa de arte praedicatoria* (*Patrologia latina* 210:154). Alain's *Planctu Nature* is, of course, also the source of Chaucer's depiction of Nature in the *Parliament*.

12.   Olsson, 238.

13.   Ibid., 240. The original state of nature is described as a time before sin had corrupted men's vision to the point where they no longer recognized the truly good and in their avarice sought to possess those things originally intended to be held in common:

> Blisful was the firste age of men. They heelden hem
> apayed with the metes that the trewe feeldes broughten
> forth. They ne destroyeden ne desseyvede nat hemself
> with outrage. (*Boece* 2. m. v. 1–5)

14.   Ambrosius Theodosius Macrobius, *Comentarii in somnium Scipionis*, ed. Jacobus Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1963). Macrobius, 2:96, comments that "in caelo autem constat nihil fortuitum, nihil tumultuarium provenine, sed universa illic divinis legibus et stata ratione procedere" ("it is well known that in the heavens nothing happens by chance or at random, and that all things above proceed in orderly fashion according to divine law"). The translation is that of William Harris Stahl, in Macrobius, *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952).

15. Olsson, 241.

16. Ibid, 242.

17. "Al this accordaunce [and] ordenaunce of thynges is bounde with love, that governeth erthe and see, and hath also comandement to the hevene.... his love halt togidris peples joyned with an holy boond, and knytteth sacrement of mariages of chaste loves; and love enditeth lawes to trewe felawes" (2. m. 8. 13–25).

18. Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, vol 2. of *The Divine Comedy*, ed. and trans. Charles S. Singleton, Bollingen Series 80 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 17.9–105

19. Longsworth, 226.

20. Jerome H. Mandel, "Governance in the *Physician's Tale*," *Chaucer Review* 10 (1976): 317–18.

21. Ramsey, 197.

22. Middleton, 20.

23. Mandel, 323.

24. Collins, 123.

25. Olsson, 231.

26. Collins, 123.

27. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, Blackfriars ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 28:1a.2ae.95.2.

28. Mandel, 321.

29. Barbara Bartholomew, *Fortuna and Nature: A Reading of Three Chaucer Narratives* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), 53, 55.

30. For example, Brown, 139, notes that Virginius has a "purely physical and egotistical understanding of his daughter's virtue." Mathewson, 36, comments upon his "simple-minded bullheadedness" and his "inability to see Virginia as a person in her own right." In an effective understatement, Mandel, 323, remarks that "Virginius marks a moral extreme we are not meant to applaud."

31. See E. F. Shannon, "*The Physician's Tale*," in *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales*," ed. W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster (1941; reprint, New York: Humanities Press, 1958), 398–408.

32. See Mandel, 322.

33. See Mathewson, 37.

34. See, e.g., Brown, 138.

35. Perhaps Harry Bailey's rather confusing remarks about Virginia's death demonstrating "That yiftes of Fortune and of Nature / Been cause of deeth to many a creature" (6.295–96) might be interpreted in this context. The idea of the "yiftes of Fortune" may allude, in fact, to Virginius.

36. Beidler, 278; Amoils, 17.

37. Middleton, 16; Amoils, 22; Mandel, 319.

38. Hanson, 135; Gerhard Joseph, "The Gifts of Nature, Fortune, and Grace in the Physician's, Pardoner's, and Parson's Tales," *Chaucer Review* 9 (1975): 241.

39. See J. D. W. Crowther, "Chaucer's *Physician's Tale* and Its 'Saint,' " *English Studies in Canada* 2 (1982): 131.

40. Mathewson, 39.

41. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, *On Death and Dying* (New York: Macmillan, 1969).

42. Ramsey, 194; Longsworth, 229–30.
43. Kinney, 81, suggested that the story is like a "dream tale," which "presents the hesitation, perhaps refusal, of a young woman to accept sexual maturation." If such a Freudian reading is accurate, it would support my reading of Virginia's negative approach to virtue.
44. Mandel, 323.
45. Ibid., 319.
46. Ibid., 317.

Dreams, Stress, and Interpretation
in Chaucer and His Contemporaries

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As is well known, dreams are important components of many works of medieval literature. One or more dreams can be the subject of most of a poem, as in the *Roman de la Rose*, *Pearl*, *Piers Plowman*, the *Book of the Duchess*, and the *House of Fame*. Or one or more dreams can be a relatively small yet important part of a work; Dante's *Vita nuova* and *Purgatorio* are familiar examples, as are Chaucer's *Nun's Priest's Tale*, *Knight's Tale*, and *Troilus and Criseyde*. In many cases the transitions into or out of these dreams are narrative stress points. Narrators, who are often the dreamers, exhibit tension or anxiety about the dream—uncertainty about the nature of dreams, the sources of dreams, the truth (if any) of dreams, the possibility of interpretation or application of dreams, the appropriateness of writing down dreams, and so on. Their comments exhibit a special justificatory form of literary self-consciousness that appeared in England in the late fourteenth century.[1] In some cases the difficulties are clearly and explicitly resolved. More commonly the author evades them through a rhetorical tactic: appeals to authorities and analysis by classification are among the most frequent. This essay discusses a few English examples of these dreamers' narrative difficulties, relates the coping strategies of the poets to those in nonliterary medieval sources, and proposes an additional instance of these strategies in the early fourteenth-century biblical commentary of Nicholas of Lyra.

A relatively simple situation occurs in the *Book of the Duchess*; the dreamer–narrator falls asleep

and therwith even
Me mette so ynly swete a sweven,
So wonderful that never yit

> Y trowe no man had the wyt
> To konne wel my sweven rede.
>
> (275–79)[2]

No man can interpret this dream, not even the patriarch Joseph, who successfully interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh in Genesis 41, or Macrobius, who wrote about the dream of Scipio. Joseph and Macrobius, two of the most frequently cited "auctoritees" in discussions of dreams, are usually quoted to affirm the knowable truth of dreams. In spite of the uninterpretability of his dream, the narrator proceeds to recount it for us and concludes his poem with a brief statement of his waking up and resolving "to put this sweven in ryme" (1332), the poem we are about to finish reading. By asserting the uninterpretability of his dream, the narrator effectively questions the truth or authority of his text, yet he provides no suggestion as to how it is desirable or possible to turn his dream into poetry. A somewhat analogous situation—one would not want to call it a source—occurs in Dante's *Vita nuova*, in which the first dream is described in the first sonnet, which evokes a variety of interpretations from others.[3] Variety of interpretation is in effect no interpretation, here applied to the poem rather than the dream.

A different but still simple form of anxiety appears in the proem to the first book of the *House of Fame*. The narrator begins and concludes with a prayer that "God turne us every drem to goode!" (58) and explains the necessity for such a prayer by running in exasperation through some of the types, causes, and significances of dreams proposed by "grete clerkys" (53).[4] None of these classifications apply to his dream; its telling is justified only because it is "so wonderful" (62), a judgment reenforced by a later comparison to the dreams of six predecessors including Scipio, Pharaoh, and another recurrent "ensample," "kyng Nabugodonosor" from the book of Daniel (514–16).

More complicated situations abound. Three examples will illustrate something of the range. Early in book 5 of *Troilus and Criseyde*, just after Crisyede's departure from Troy, Troilus has an unspecified number of dreams of dreadful things: he is alone in a horrible place or captured by his enemies (5.246–52). Walter C. Curry suggests that this a meaningless *phantasma* and quotes the Pseudo-Augustinian comment on Macrobius's term.[5] It could as well be labeled a *somnium*, a prophetic yet enigmatic dream lacking an interpreter. Hearing of these dreams, Pandarus delivers a four-stanza attack on them. They proceed from Troilus's melancholy and have no meaning:

> "A straw for alle swevenes significaunce!
> God helpe me so, I counte hem nought a bene!
> Ther woot no man aright what dremes mene."
>
> (5.362–64)

He reenforces this view by skeptically tabulating some of the generally available theories of the sources of dreams. Priests say " 'that dremes ben the revelaciouns / Of goddes' " and that " 'they ben infernals illusiouns' " (5.366–68). Physicians say that—take your choice—dreams come from "complexiouns" (5.369), or fasting, or overeating. Others attribute dreams to impressions in the mind; still others say that dreams have something to do with the time of year or phase of the moon (5.372–77). To Pandarus the most appropriate response to the bewildering alternatives in fourteenth-century oneirology is partying at Sarpedon's palace.

The distraction is at best temporary, for later in book 5 Troilus is beset by "malencolye" while awaiting Criseyde's promised return. Immediately after a long scene (5.771–1099) in which she gives her heart to Diomede, Troilus dreams of

> a bor with tuskes grete,
> That slepte ayeyn the bryghte sonnes hete.
> And by this bor, faste in his armes folde,
> Lay, kyssyng ay, his lady bryght, Criseyde.
>
> (5.1238–41)

Reporting his dream to Pandarus, Troilus concludes that "my lady bryght, Criseyde, hath me bytrayed" (5.1247), a fact that "the blysful goddes, thorugh here grete myght / Han in my drem yshewed it ful right" (5.1250–51). Boccaccio's Troilo similarly has no trouble interpreting his dream.[6] However, Chaucer complicates matters by having Pandarus, not at all interested in this line of thought, counter that

> "Have I nat seyd er this,
> That dremes many a maner man bigile?
> And whi? For folk expounden hem amys."
>
> (5.1276–78)

He proposes an alternative interpretation, that the amorous boar may signify Criseyde's father " 'which that old is and ek hoor' " and that she is kissing him because he is about to die (5.1284, 1287).

Although Pandarus manages to distract Troilus into writing a long letter to Criseyde, her evasive answer brings Troilus back to his melancholy and what he continues to regard as his divinely sent dream of the boar. He turns to his sister Cassandra, who is known as a "Sibille." At some length she traces the boar from the Calydonian boar killed by Meleager, summarizing Statius's *Thebaid.* Diomede himself had earlier devoted a stanza to part of this history (5.932–38).[7] She concludes,

> "This ilke boor bitokneth Diomede,
> Tideus sone, that down descended is

> Fro Meleagre, that made the boor to blede;
> And thy lady, wherso she be, ywis,
> This Diomede hire herte hath, and she his.
> Wep if thow wolt, or lef, for out of doute,
> This Diomede is inne, and thow are oute."
>
> (5.1513–19)

Her interpretation, one of the bluntest lines in English literature, is quite true, as any reader who can remember what happened five hundred lines previously must recognize. Troilus, however, cannot stand the plain truth of his dream plainly stated and explodes: " 'thow sorceresse, / With al thy false goost of prophecye!' " (5.1520–21). The question of Troilus's understanding the truth of his dream and its possibly divine source is thereby evaded. The short-term result is the therapeutic effect of Troilus's anger—he forgets his "wo," gets out of bed, and carries on with his life. The narrator, incidentally, lets the characters do the talking about Troilus's dream and its interpretability and worries instead about our interpretation of Criseyde's behavior.

In *Piers Plowman*, the dreamer–narrator has frequent opportunities to reflect on his disturbing dreams and dreams within dreams. He also says several times that he writes down his dreams soon after awakening: "And I awakned therwith and wroot as me mette" (19.481),[8] a typically concise statement that offers little about just how or why dreams become poetry. A more substantial discussion occurs after the dreamer is awakened by the argument between Piers and the Priest over the pardon that Piers has (7.119) or has not (C text) pulled asunder. The dreamer reflects on this dream at length, wondering if it might be true (7.148–56), allowing that he has no taste for "songewarie [interpretation of dreams] for I se it ofte faille" (7.154) and citing the much-quoted distich of Cato, *somnia ne cures* (do not heed dreams). He then reflects on the biblical precedents of Daniel and Joseph. Langland retells the second of Joseph's two prophetic—and provocative—dreams in Genesis 37:

> And Ioseph mette merueillously how the moone
>   and the sonne
> And the eleuene sterres hailsed hym alle.
> Thanne Iacob iugged Iosephes sweuene:
> "*Beau fitz*," quod his fader, "for defaute we
>   shullen,
> I myself and my sones, seche thee for nede."
> It bifel as his fader seide in Pharaoes tyme
> That Ioseph was Iustice Egipte to loke;
> It bifel as his fader tolde, hise frendes there hym
>   sought.
>
> (7.165–72)

A minor point about this passage is that although a subservient role of Joseph's mother, "his dame," is included in Jacob's interpretation of the dream in Genesis 37.10, Rachel's death-giving birth to Benjamin had already been reported in Genesis 35.19, so Jacob's comment presented quite a little puzzle to commentators: since Rachel was obviously not able to seek Joseph in Egypt (Gen. 42), the dream was not completely fullfilled. Nevertheless, these precedents lead Langland's dreamer to take his dream seriously, to comment upon it at some length, and to seek Dowel, a quest that becomes the action of his next dream. The validity or appropriateness of his reasoning by analogy in this case remains unexplored.

These statements from the end of passus 7 are among the materials from *Piers Plowman* which, as editors have noted, reappear in *Mum and the Sothsegger* (ca. 1400).[9] After an extended survey of the corruptions of society and the role of Mum, the silence that says nothing about them, the narrator falls asleep. His dream, something over four hundred lines, is primarily a dialogue with a gardener who discourses extensively on bees, especially the useless drones. Although this clearly refers to the idle courtiers of the recently deposed Richard II, the narrator says that this "wise tale . . . is to mistike for me" (1087–89). The gardener, in response to a question, admonishes the narrator to follow the truthteller and encourages him in the "blessid bisynes of thy boke-making" (1281). The narrator frames his dream with statements about the validity of dreams. At the beginning he briefly sets the experience of Daniel against the objection of Cato (874–75). At the end he again cites Daniel briefly (1311–12) and the example of Joseph's dream of the sun, moon, and eleven stars at greater length (1313–30). He concludes that some dreams are true and determines to obey the gardener and to tell the truth of how the land is governed. Affirming the truth of dreams leads the narrator to a major decision about his life, particularly its literary aspect. His metaphor for telling the truth to the new king is opening a bag of books "in balade-wise made, / Of vice and of vertue fulle to the margin" (1345–46), which extends to the end of the poem. True dreams lead to true poems that lead to true politics.

The best-known dream in Middle English literature is, of course, in the *Nun's Priest's Tale*, in which Chauntecleer has a terrifying dream of " 'a beest . . . lyk an hound' " who " 'wolde han maad areest / Upon my body, and wolde han had me deed' " (B 4088–91). His terror touches off a long and hilarious "disputacioun" between Chauntecleer and Pertelote about the sources and significance of dreams. Classifications and citations of "auctoritees" proliferate. Dame Pertelote, appalled by her heartless husband's apparent cowardice, asserts that " 'swevenes engendren of replecciouns, / And ofte of fume and of complecciouns' " (B 4113–14). She takes the line of analysis preferred by physicians. Too much red choler has caused Chauntecleer to dream of a red beast, as too much melancholy might cause a dream of a black bear or a black devil. After quoting Cato, she prescribes a laxative:

" 'Dredeth no dreem, / I kan sey yow namoore' " (B 4159). Chauntecleer responds that we may read in old books of men of more authority than Cato,

"That dremes been significaciouns
As wel of joye as of tribulaciouns
That folk enduren in this lif present."
(B 4169-71)

He launches into a series of "ensamples," including a section that juxtaposes Macrobius, Daniel, and Joseph:

"Reed eek of Joseph, and ther shul ye see
Wher dremes be somtyme—I sey nat alle—
Warnynge of thynges that shul after falle.
Looke of Egipte the kyng, daun Pharao,
His bakere and his butiller also,
Wher they ne felte noon effect in dremes."
(B 4320-25)

This most impressive rooster makes a most impressive argument; but, distracted by his appetites for corn and sex, he ignores it, and barely escapes from the mouth of the fox. That Chauntecleer was warned by his dreams leads the Nun's Priest into an inconclusive discussion of free will and divine foreknowledge and the provocative challenge to take the fruit of this tale and let the chaff be still, without much guidance as to how the reader is to tell one from the other.

There are, of course, other types of narrative stress associated with dreams in Middle English poetry. For instance, in *Pearl* we have the dreamer-narrator's difficulties in accepting the identity and authority of the Pearl maiden. He treats what Macrobius would call an *oraculum* as a *somnium*, an enigmatic dream, with the additional twist that authoritative dreams rarely have children as speakers. By the end of the poem, after he has awakened, he affirms "this veray avysyoun"—not necessarily a redundant construction—but immediately qualifies his conclusion: " 'If hit be veray and soth sermoun' " (1184-85).[10] In the *Knight's Tale* we have the opposite situation as Arcite accepts as authoritative Mercury's admonition to return to Athens. Subsequent events point to the ambiguous nature of his dream; " 'of thy wo an ende' " (A 1392) turns out to mean his death, not his marriage to Emelye. In the Miller's quitting of this tale, Absolon dreams " 'I was at a feeste,' " which he takes as " 'a signe of kissyng atte leeste' " (A 3684, 3683). This interpretation, and his itching mouth, encourage him to a quite unanticipated form of kissing. In *Troilus and Criseyde*, Criseyde's dream (2.925-31) of hearts and a white eagle is conspicuous for its one-line introduction and the complete lack of any reaction to it by either Criseyde or the narrator, who shifts the

narrative abruptly to Troilus. As Allan Frantzen has recently noted, the exchange of hearts in the dream is anticipated by the reference to hearts growing in each other in Antigone's song (2.871-73).[11] We can see a reversal of the usual situation in which dream becomes poetry, but the narrator takes us no further.

In general, dreams in medieval literature can provoke anxiety or greater distress in the dreamer, who turns to discussion at greater or lesser length to assert some sort of control over the experience. The narrator, often but not always the dreamer, is also regularly concerned with an analogous control over the narration at points of stress. Here, of course, is where things become complicated.

As has appeared from my quick survey of a few passages, two of the most common medieval responses to the stress and anxiety of literary dreams are classification and the citation of authorities. These responses are efforts to assert intellectual control over obviously uncontrollable, irrational experiences. They are also attempts to counter a tradition of classical and biblical texts that flatly deny validity of any sort to dreams. Classification and the citation of authorities might be the initial steps of interpretation although in some cases, such as those of Pertelote and Pandarus, they justify denying interpretation. And the two responses overlap, as authorities are invoked as part of the presentation and validation of schemes of classification. These situations do not become occasions for making special claims for the truth either of dreams or the poems that recount them. Neither experience nor literary texts are explicitly privileged. As several scholars have observed, medieval poetry generally avoids making special claims for itself.[12] Poetic practice parallels and in some cases explicitly derives from treatments of dreams in nonliterary sources—philosophical, medical, psychological, or exegetical.

By the end of the fourteenth century there was a fair number of classificatory schemes available, varying in complexity and using a less-than-stable vocabulary. (It would be asking too much for words like *somnium* and *visio* not to change their meanings from the time of Macrobius and Augustine to the time of Langland and Chaucer.) Generally these classificatory systems are concerned with two points—the variety of causes of dreams and the use or truth (including the accessibility of truth through interpretation) of dreams. Macrobius, for instance, has three types of predictive dreams, the *somnium* (enigmatic dream), the *visio* (prophetic dream), and the *oraculum* (oracular dream); and two with no significance, the *insomnium* (nightmare) and the *visum* or *phantasma*.[13] The *somnium* is divided into five types—personal, alien, social, public, and universal. Also widespread was Gregory the Great's six-part division:

> For sometimes dreams are engendered of fulness
> or emptiness of the belly, sometimes of illusion

> [from the devil], sometimes of illusions and
> thought combined [our daily worries], sometimes
> of revelation [Old and New Testament Josephs],
> while sometimes they are engendered of imagina-
> tion, thought and revelation together [Daniel].[14]

Gregory's scheme reappears, for example, in William of Waddingham's Anglo–Norman *Manuel des Pechiez* and its translation in 1303 in Robert of Brunne's *Handlyng Synne*.[15]

From Chaucer and the *Roman de la Rose*, one might gather that the five-part division proposed by Macrobius was extremely popular in the late fourteenth century. He appears to be Chaucer's favorite authority on dreams, and a number of scholars have inferred from this a more general popularity.[16] A recent article by Alison Peden, however, suggests that this inference is quite incorrect for English literature of the fourteenth century. Considering the dates of the production of Macrobius's manuscripts, she suggests that the eleventh and twelfth centuries were the period of Macrobius's greatest popularity and influence and that very few manuscripts were produced thereafter. Peden concludes, "But Macrobius' *Commentary* does not appear to have been a source he [Chaucer] made much use of: he was more up to date."[17]

"Up to date" refers to several things that replaced Macrobius's influence after the twelfth century. At a relatively sophisticated level is the introduction of Aristotelian psychology and physiology. As good an example as any of this is book 26 of Vincent of Beauvais's thirteenth-century encyclopedia, *Speculum naturale*.[18] Among much else, Vincent provides a definition of dreams attributed to Aristotle (ch. 2), six causes of dreams (chs. 12–24), other causes from writers such as Avicenna (ch. 25), seven Aristotelian questions about dreams, the fifth of which is whether one can foresee the future in dreams (chs. 53–55). After this Vincent makes an abrupt transition to biblical examples of significant dreams—those of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar and Daniel (ch. 56)—and to discussions of dreams by authors explicitly in the Christian tradition, such as Jerome, Augustine, Gregory, Bede, and Thomas Aquinas.

In the fourteenth century one influential body of material is Robert Holkot's commentary on Wisdom, which a decade ago Robert A. Pratt analyzed as a major source of the dream lore in the *Nun's Priest's Tale*.[19] As a further example of the discussion of dreams in the early fourteenth century (slightly earlier than Holkot), I would like to propose a passage in Nicholas of Lyra's *Postilla literalis*, the most widely available commentary on the whole Bible from this period.[20] Nicholas uses Joseph's interpretation of the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and the baker (Gen. 40.23) as a springboard into a six-hundred-word essay on dreams in general. These comments exemplify concisely many of the rhetorical and interpretive concerns of medieval poets,

and for this reason I have included and translated Nicholas's essay in its entirety in the Appendix to this article. After quoting Deuteronomy 18.10 ("Neither let there be found among you any one . . . that observeth dreams and omens") and mentioning other texts, Nicholas contrasts the predictive interpretation of dreams by Joseph and Daniel (Dan. 2, 4) and sets out to classify dreams according to their causes, thereby assessing their predictive value. Just how dreams may be significant is explained by a bit of medieval sign theory: "somnium est signum naturaliter representans effectum futurum" (a dream is a sign naturally representing a future effect).

A series of two-part divisions yields six types of dreams. There are two kinds of internally caused dreams. The first is the phantasy (which has no predictive value at all), which Nicholas links to Ecclesiastes 5.3 ("ubi multa sunt somnia, ibi plurimae vanitates"; where there are many dreams, there is much vanity) echoed by Pertelote's "Nothyng . . . but vanitee in sweven is" (B 2922) and Chauntecleer (B 3129). Nicholas then quotes the tag from Cato also used by Chaucer and Langland. The second internal dream is caused by the state of the body. A person who is cold might dream of ice or snow, or a person with too much black choler in his system might dream of having black pitch on his chest, an example supported by a reference to Aristotle's *Physics*. Such dreams are medically predictive, as Pertelote also noted; *choleram nigram*, the "humour of melancholie" may evoke certain figures in dreams. There are two types of externally caused dreams, bodily and spiritual. The bodily is linked to the state of heavenly bodies; as the stars and planets have predictive value, so do dreams caused by them. Dreams with external spiritual causes can be good, sent by God or an angel to advance some divine purpose. Again there are two types. The fanciful vision that is not understood by the dreamer includes those of Pharaoh, the butler, and the baker. Others are intellectually known or knowable, such as those of Joseph and Daniel. The final category, spiritual dreams sent by the devil, is not lawful for interpreting or predicting. The devil cannot send true dreams, according to Nicholas. If Hamlet had extrapolated from this to ghosts, he might have saved himself a good deal of bother.

A final observation is that Nicholas's little essay offers no clue about the relative frequency of the six types of dreams and not much about how one would distinguish them in practice. As a result, arguing by analogy from biblical precedent to present experience is not facilitated. Moreover, Nicholas avoids allegorical readings of any of the six dreams associated with Joseph, although they had been extensively interpreted allegorically, especially typologically, in earlier centuries. At the least this does not reenforce allegorical readings by modern critics of fourteenth-century dream poetry.

Generally, fourteenth-century English poets use the materials and strategies of nonliterary discussions of dreams with great flexibility and wit; Chaucer could and did turn biblical commentary into the stuff of mock heroic. But the English poets did not transcend their contemporaries to claim

special or alternative truth for dreams and the poetry in which dreams can be communicated.

NOTES

A version of this article was read at The Sixth Citadel Conference on Literature in March 1988 in Charleston, SC.

1.   A. C. Spearing, *Medieval Dream–Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 5.

2.   All Chaucer quotations are from *The Riverside Chaucer*, ed. Larry D. Benson, 3 ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987).

3.   Dante Alighieri, *Vita nuova*, ed. Fredi Chiappelli (Milan: Mursia, 1971), 23: "A questo sonetto fue risposto da molti e di diverse sentenzie."

4.   B. G. Koonce, *Chaucer and the Tradition of Fame: Symbolism in "The House of Fame"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), esp. 46–57.

5.   Walter C. Curry, *Chaucer and the Mediaeval Sciences*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 209, citing *Patrologia latina* 40:798.

6.   Elizabeth R. Hatcher, "Chaucer and the Psychology of Fear: Troilus in Book V," *ELH* 40 (1973): 319.

7.   Winthrop Weatherbee, *Chaucer and the Poets: An Essay on "Troilus and Criseyde"* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 128–34.

8.   *"Piers Plowman": The B Version*, ed. George Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson (London: Athlone Press, 1975). See John M. Bowers, *The Crisis of Will in "Piers Plowman"* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 26–30.

9.   *Mum and the Sothsegger*, ed. Mabel Day and Robert Steele, Early English Text Society 199 (London: Oxford University Press, 1936). While affirming the truth of some dreams, the poet rejects attempts to interpret old prophecies, such as those of Merlin (lines 1723–33).

10.   *Pearl*, ed. E. V. Gordon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953).

11.   Allen J. Frantzen, "The 'Joie and Tene' of Dreams in *Troilus and Criseyde*," in *Chaucer in the Eighties*, ed. Julian N. Wasserman and Robert J. Branch (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 108–10.

12.   Judson B. Allen, *The Ethical Poetic of the Later Middle Ages: A Decorum of Convenient Distinction* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 181, 205; Umberto Eco, *Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages*, trans. Hugh Bredin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 105–6.

13.   Ambrosius Theodosius Macrobius, *Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*, trans. William H. Stahl, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 87–90. See the general survey of medieval dream interpretation by Constance B. Hieatt, *The Realism of Dream Visions: The Poetic Exploitation of the Dream–Experience in Chaucer and His Contemporaries* (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), 23–33.

14.   *Morals on the Book of Job* (Oxford, 1844–50), 1:448–49. Bk. 8.24.

15.   *Robert of Brunne's "Handlyng Synne,"* ed. Frederick J. Furnivall, Early English Text Society 119 (London: Kegan Paul, 1901), lines 387–416. The tag from Cato is quoted in lines 421–23.

16.   Spearing, 8–11; James Winny, *Chaucer's Dream–Poems* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), 19–30; cf. Curry, 195–203.

17. Alison M. Peden, "Macrobius and Mediaeval Dream Literature," *Medium aevum* 54 (1985): 69.

18. Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale* (1624; reprint, Graz: Akademische Druck, 1964).

19. Robert A. Pratt, "Some Latin Sources of the Nonnes Preest on Dreams," *Speculum* 52 (1977): 538–70.

20. Nicholas of Lyra, *Postilla litteralis*, *Biblia sacra* (Venice, 1588), 1:8v; see Douglas Wurtele, "Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* and Nicholas of Lyre's *Postillae litteralis et moralis super totam Bibliam*," in *Chaucer and Scriptural Tradition*, ed. David Lyle Jeffrey (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1984), 89–107.

APPENDIX

Biblia sacra cum glossis interlineari, et ordinaria, Nicolai Lyrani postilla... (Venice, 1588), 1:8v.

Genesis 40.23. *Oblitus est.*... Dicunt hebraei, quod hoc fuit, quia nimis confisus fuerat Ioseph de auxilio humano. Ad maiorem intellectum eorum quae dicta sunt in hoc ca. & eorum quae dicentur in se, hic queritur, utrum interpretatio somniorum per ea iudicando de futuris sit licita, et videtur quod non, quia dicitur Deut. (Deut. 18) Non inveniatur in te qui observet somnia, et similes auctoritates inveniuntur in pluribus locis in sacra scriptura. In contrarium est, quod Ioseph hic interpretatus est somnia modo praedicto, et Daniel interpretatus est somnia Nabuchodonosor, ut habetur Dan. (Dan. 2 & 4). Dicendum ad hoc, quod causae rerum sunt latentes, & effectus earum magis noti: & ideo ducunt in cognitionem causarum, sicut signa naturaliter eas representa sentia.

Videmus enim quod fumus exterius prorumpens est effectus ignis intra caminum latentis: & ducit in cognitionem eius, sicut signum ipsum naturaliter representans. Contingit enim aliquando quod una causa producit duos effectus, ordinate tamen unum post alium, sicut in febricitante vigoratio naturae est causa digestionis urinae primo, et consequenta postea sanitatis, et tunc primus effectus non solum est signum ducens in cognitionem causae, sed etiam cum hoc in cognitionem secundi effectus, sicut digestio urinae non est solum signum vigorationis naturae, sed etiam sanitatis futurae. Quando igitur una et eadem est causa somnii & effectus alterius consequentis, tunc illud somnium est signum naturaliter representans effectum futurum, & ideo per tale somnium licite potest praegnosticari de effectu futuro, sicut medicus licite praegnosticat per conditionem urinae de sanitate vel morte futura.

(*Somniorum causa*) Propter quod ulterius videndum est de causam somniorum, quorum duplex est causa in generali, sicut intrinseca & extrinseca: intrinseca vero duplex est, una est motus casualis fantasmatum in dormiendo: et talis causa non est causa alicuius effectus alterius sequentis, et ideo per talia somnia nihil potest praegnosticari de futuris: et quia somnia, ut plurimum hoc modo contingunt, ideo dicitur Ecclesiastes (Eccles. 5.c [5.3]) Ubi multa sunt somnia, ibi plurimae vanitates. Et Cato dicit, Somnia ne cures. Alia causa somniorum intrinseca, est dispositio corporis, sicut homines frigidi frequenter somniant, quod sint in glacie vel in nive: quia fantasmata formantur conformia tali dispositioni. Propter quod dicit Phil. (*Phil de som. et. vig.*) quod medicorum gratiosi dicunt valde attendum ad somnia: et commentator Alb[ertus Magnus] super librum illum dicit, quod quidam somniavit, quod pix nigra fundebatur super pectus suum: et postea in vigilia sequenti evomuit, choleram nigram in magna quantitate. Et ideo ex talibus somniis potest praegnosticari de futura santitate vel infirmitate ipsius somniantis.

Causa autem extrinseca somniorum duplex est, una corporalis, alia spiritualis: corporalis est corpus coeleste, et aer continens. Sicut enim per eorum influentiam producuntur formae diversae in materia corporali: ut plantarum, et mineralium et huiusmodi, ita et per eorum influentiam in virtute fantastica quae est organica causantur forme, sive fantasmata conformia dispositioni coelesti ad causandum effectum aliquem futurum, et per consequens per talia somnia potest de futuris praegnosticari. Advertendum etiam, quod istae causae somniorum, scilicet dispositiones corporis somniantis et influentiae corporis coelestis et continentis, magis habent effectum in virtute fantastica dormientis, quam vigilantis, quia in vigilia propter occupationem circa exteriora non percipiuntur: sed magis effectus eorum impediuntur, quia motus maiores expellunt minores.

Causa autem spiritualis extrinseca somniorum duplex est: una bona, scilicet Deus per se vel per ministerium angelorum immittens alicui imaginarias dispositiones ad significandum aliqua futura. Et hoc fit dupliciter. Uno modo sic, quod uni soli sit imaginaria visio, alteri autem datur intellectus talis visionis, quod fuit in propositio: quia Pharo et ministri eius haberunt solam visionem imaginariam, sed Ioseph de his habuit cognitionem intellectivam: et ideo ipse habuit in hoc donum prophetiae, non autem illi: quia illustratio intellectus requiritur ad prophetiam, secundum quod dicitur Dan. (Dan. 10) Intelligentia opus est in visione. Aliquando autem eisdem fit imaginaria visio, et cognitio intellectiva eiusdam visionis, sicut Danieli factum est: Dan. (Dan. 10) et hoc etiam pertinet ad prophetiam.

Alia est causa spiritualis extrinseca somniorum mala, scilicet quando a daemonibus immittuntur visiones aliquae imaginariae in dorminiendo, et talibus utuntur artes magicae, sicut dicitur Phisic. de illis qui dormiebant in Sardis, et in historia Britonum de sacrificantibus idolis. His dictis dicendum est ad questionem, quod praegnosticare de futuris per somnia quae sunt signa alicuius futuri eventus, inquantum causantur ex dispositione corporis somniantis, vel impressione corporis coelestis, non est illicitum cum istud possit fieri via naturalia, nisi aliquis in talibus excedat limites virtutis naturae, magis afferendo quam natura rei patiatur: quia tales effectus futuri designati per somnium possunt impediri: sicut sanitas aegrotantis praegnostica per urinam aliquando impeditur. Per somnia vero a Deo praedictis modis immissa ad significationem alicuius futuri potest aliquid futurum certitudinaliter praedici. Ab eo tamen qui illustratur a Deo ad talia cognoscendum, et ei licitum est talia exponere et praedicere. Per somnia vero a demonibus immissa aliquid futurum predicere superstitioseum est et illicitum, et sic patet quod dicendum est de questione. Patent etiam argumenta facta ad utramque partem, quia procedunt viis suis.

TRANSLATION

Genesis 40.23. He forgot.... The Hebrews say this was because Joseph had trusted too much in human assistance. To the greater understanding of the things which have been mentioned in this chapter and of those which will be mentioned in it, the question here is whether the interpretation of dreams for discerning the future is lawful. It seems that it is not, for in Deuteronomy (Deut. 18) it is said, "Let no one be found among you who takes notice of dreams," and similar proofs are found in many passages in the sacred scriptures. On the contrary, Joseph himself interpreted dreams in the manner spoken of, and Daniel interpreted the dreams of Nebuchadnezzar, as is found in Daniel (Dan. 2 & 4). In support of this, one must add that causes are hidden, and their effects are more obvious; and, therefore, they [effects] reveal causes as signs that naturally represent them [the causes].

For we see that when smoke billows out of a chimney, it is the effect of a fire hidden within the fireplace: the smoke leads to a recognition of the fire, being a sign naturally representing it. Sometimes it happens that one cause produces two effects—in order, however, one after another. Such is the case with a feverish man when the return of his vitality is first of all the cause of the dissolving of his urine and consequently the cause of later health. Then, the first effect is a sign revealing not only the first cause, but even the second effect as well, just as the dissolving of the urine is a sign not only of the return of vitality but also of future health. When, therefore, the cause of a dream and the cause of the second consequent effect are one and the same, then that dream is a sign naturally representing a future effect; therefore, one may lawfully predict a future event through such a dream, as a doctor lawfully predicts future health or death through the condition of the urine.

(*The cause of dreams*) Wherefore, we must look further into the cause of dreams, whose cause in general is twofold, namely, internal and external. Indeed, the internal cause is twofold: one is the chance movement of phantasies in sleep: and such a cause is not the cause of any consequent second effect. Therefore, through such dreams one can predict nothing about the future. And since dreams are such, for most of them happen in this fashion, it is said in Ecclesiastes (Eccles. 5.c [5.3]), "Where there are many dreams, there is much vanity." And Cato says, "Do not heed dreams." The second internal cause of dreams is the state of the body, just as men who are cold often dream that they are in ice or snow: for phantasies are formed similar to such a state. Wherefore the Philosopher [Aristotle] says (*On Dreams and Vigils*) that influential doctors say that dreams must be given great heed. And Albertus Magnus the commentator says concerning this book that a certain man dreamt that black pitch was poured onto his breast, and afterwards, when he awoke, he vomited black choler in great quantity. Therefore, through such dreams one may predict the future health or illness of the dreamer.

Moreover, the external cause of dreams is twofold: the one bodily, the other spiritual. The bodily is a heavenly body, which contains aether. For just as different shapes are brought forth through their [the heavenly bodies'] influence into bodily matter such as plants, minerals, and things of this kind, so through their influence by the dream-producing faculty, which is organic, phantasies are formed, or phantasies similar to the heavenly state capable of producing some future effect, and consequently through such dreams one may predict the future. We must note that these causes of dreams, that is, the state of the sleeping body and the influences of a heavenly body containing aether, have greater effect on the dream-producing faculty of the dreamer, than of one who is awake, for when one is awake they are not perceived because of distractions all around: but their effects are diminished even more because greater movements drive lesser movements away.

Moreover, the external spiritual cause of dreams is twofold: the one is good, namely God by himself or through the ministry of angels instills in someone fanciful dispositions capable of signifying future events. And this comes about doubly. Thus, in one manner, an imaginary vision is seen only by one man, while to another is given the interpretation of such a dream, that is, what it represented: for Pharoah and his ministers had only fanciful visions, but Joseph had intellectual knowledge concerning them. And thus he had in this the gift of prophecy, while they did not. For the enlightenment of the mind is required for prophecy, according to what is said in Daniel (Dan. 10.1), "There is need of understanding in a vision." Sometimes, however, He sends a fanciful vision, as happened to Daniel (Dan. 10), and this also pertains to prophecy.

The external spiritual cause of bad dreams is different, namely, when fanciful visions are sent in sleep by demons (the magic arts employ them as well) as is said in the *Physics* of those who slept in Sardis, and in the history of the Britons concerning those who sacrificed to idols. Now that this has been said, we must address the question: to predict the future through dreams which are signs of some future event, provided they are caused by the sleeping body's state or by the influence of heavenly bodies, is not unlawful, provided that this occurs in a natural manner, unless in so doing someone exceeds the limits of natural faculty by asserting more than the nature of the thing allows. For by such effects the future events heralded by a dream can be misinterpreted: as a sick man's health predicted by his urine is sometimes misinterpreted. Through a dream sent by God to signify a future event in the manner spoken of, a future event can be predicted with certainty by him who is enlightened by God that he might understand; and for him it is lawful to expound and predict such matters. It is unlawful, however, and superstitious to predict the future through dreams sent by demons. Thus all that needs to be said about the question is evident. And even the arguments made for each part are evident, for they follow their own paths.

Sodom and Gomorrah:
The Use of Mandeville's *Travels*
in *Cleanness*

by

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The *Pearl*-Poet's late fourteenth-century appropriation in *Cleanness* of a mid-fourteenth century work, Mandeville's *Travels*, has been an established fact since the publication of Robert J. Menner's edition of the poem.[1] The poet uses the *Travels* as a source for two important episodes: the description of Sodom and Gomorrah's cataclysmic destruction and the description of Belshazzar's brief and idolatrous reign in Babylon. While many points of connection between the *Travels* and *Cleanness* in the Sodom and Gomorrah episode have been identified, the poet's dependence on Mandeville in this scene raises two questions that have not yet been satisfactorily answered. The first of these is, Why does the poet borrow details from a book virtually unknown in England before 1371? The second is, Why does the poet significantly alter parts of this source as he includes them in his description of apocalyptic devastation?

As early as 1920, Menner partially answered the first question when discussing the *Pearl*-Poet's borrowing of Mandeville's tale of Oriental splendor in the description of Belshazzar's feast, the second significant example of borrowing from Mandeville in the poem. The use of Mandeville's description, he pointed out, provides ornamentation lacking in the Vulgate text of the Bible, the chief source of *Cleanness*.[2] This point of view, since then, has not been unpopular. In discussing the *Pearl*-Poet's use of available sources, Margaret Williams, for example, reiterates the view that the poet chooses Mandeville's *Travels* for its legendary matter and descriptions of Oriental glamor, both of which appealed to the medieval English sensibility.[3] However, while it is now clear the poet uses the French work for the richness of its narrative descriptions, we also know he chooses the *Travels* because, as Donald Howard has recently demonstrated, it possesses a convincing

authenticity, like other contemporary travel literature.[4] By appropriating passages from the *Travels*, the *Pearl*-Poet employs a ready, authoritative means of furthering the miraculous in his poem without minimizing the work's narrative realism.

While the *Pearl*-Poet's concern for realism is easily understood in light of the nature and purpose of homiletic art, his reasons for noticeably choosing and creatively altering parts of this "authentic" source are not. Indeed, the way in which he appropriates this source, though characterized as an example of artistic freedom,[5] appears to be at cross-purposes with the very reasons he chooses this source in the first place. That is to say, the degree to which he alters his source appears to invalidate its authenticity. However, if the poet's creative appropriation of Mandeville in this episode is viewed as a means by which he introduces the commonplace medieval doctrine of the *secunda mors*[6] for the purpose of reinforcing the eschatological dimension of apocalyptic destruction, then his reasons for choosing and altering this source and for combining the result with the biblical source of the Sodom and Gomorrah destruction episode become clear. Before investigating these reasons, however, it will be necessary, first, to recall what the poet specifically borrows and how he alters it.

Carleton F. Brown lists six significant instances of borrowing from Mandeville's *Travels*. The first of these is the description of the floating lead and sinking feather; the second, of the barren coastal region; the third, of the undying submerged man; the fourth, of the fruit of Sodom; the fifth, of marine bitumen; and the sixth, of the sea's bitterness. The *Pearl*-Poet borrows the first two examples nearly verbatim, the only significant difference being the absence in the poem of the explanatory sentence "Et ce sont choses contre nature"[7] following the description of the lead and feather. The third passage, on the other hand, is considerably altered. In the *Travels*, Mandeville states that beast, man, or any other living creature cannot die in the sea, as has been proven many times by men who have not died after having been left by way of punishment in the sea for three or four days. The *Pearl*-Poet states that living things may not linger in the sea; he adds, however, that though one dwell in the sea a month, one must live there forever without experiencing death, in a perpetual state of perdition ("losying evermore"). Though the poet does not dramatically depart from his source in the remaining instances of borrowing, his further appropriations also do not lack subtle additions or deletions.

In his borrowing of the fruit of Sodom, for example, the poet uses the rhetorical device of *amplificatio*, lengthening the list of coastal fruit trees one can see near the Dead Sea. In addition, he departs from the original by identifying the Dead Sea as "þat terne of traytoures" (1041). In his borrowing of the description of marine bitumen, the poet subtly departs again from Mandeville by describing the caustic effect of the soil which contains the bitumen (1040) and by deleting a size comparison between pieces

of bitumen and a horse, on the one hand, and by adding a reference to "aspaltoun" and "spyserez," on the other. In his final borrowing, the poet appears to follow his source carefully, lifting the phrase "alum and alkaran" directly from the French. Yet, instead of using the phrase as Mandeville does to describe what grows ("croissent") around the sea, the *Pearl*-Poet incorporates it in a sentence describing the cursed nature of the sea and of the chemical effect the sea water has on coastline clay.

The moralizing element in these appropriations of the *Travels* needs hardly be remarked. The way in which the *Travels* enables the poet to weave the doctrine of the *secunda mors* into the fabric of his narrative, however, demonstrates an artistic subtlety and purpose that command our attention. The poet's description of the unnatural physics of the Dead Sea is one notable example. From the standpoint either of modern or of medieval physics, the sinking of the feather in the sea or the lead's floating on the sea's surface is absurd. Lead's density is far greater than that of the feather. However, the poet ignores this obvious law of physics. Indeed, he does not include in his poem the explanatory sentence "Et ce sont contre nature" found in the source. This alteration of the source does not leave him with a simple, bare miracle. Rather it provides him with an analogy of the effect of the *secunda mors*, which he carefully includes in the middle of the episode.

According to Augustine, the author of the doctrine, physical death results from the parting of the soul and body at the moment of the cessation of mortal life. This separation he designates as the *mors prima*, or the first death.[8] Accordingly, spiritual death occurs before the first death when the soul, through the perverse act of the will, has allowed itself to be bereft of the life it derives from God. The "Death of the Whole Man," the intermediate stage between the *mors prima* and the *secunda mors*, follows when one who is suffering a spiritual death experiences the *mors prima* (510). What distinguishes the *secunda mors* from the *mors prima* and the "Death of the Whole Man," for Augustine, however, is his understanding of the effect physical death has on a soul that is bereft of the life it derives from God. For Augustine, and for all of the theologians and artists who believed in and transmitted this doctrine,[9] dying in this perilous condition causes the dead body and dead soul to cohere and exchange properties so that they might suffer eternal mutual pain (510–11). This eternal mutual pain, Augustine adds, becomes grievous because in their postmortem cohering the body is enabled to perceive pain while the soul is enabled to feel torment (511).

Now, while the *Pearl*-Poet appropriates the lead/feather description to demonstrate how the sea wars against all properties of nature, he also deftly uses the description as a subtle analogy of the *secunda mors*'s full effect. This certainly does not come as any surprise since the Dead Sea's description is intended to depict the destruction of abject sinners and malefactors. Thus, the transformed properties of the piece of lead and of the feather correspond directly to the transformed properties of the body and soul in this state. That

is to say, the transformed property of the piece of lead corresponds to the transformed condition of the body, an occurrence that results in the body's perception of pain; the transformed property of the feather corresponds to the transformed condition of the soul, an occurrence that results in the soul's feeling torment.

The description of the unnatural flora around the Dead Sea also provides the poet with an analogy of the state leading to the *secunda mors*. His addition of the phrase "by þat terne of traytores" (1041) to Mandeville's lines introduces the *secunda mors* by recalling those whose portion is being cast into the apocalyptic pool of fire (Apocalypse 21.8). But, while he tells us the fruit trees are the most beautiful to behold, he also adds that when the fruit is either bruised, broken, or bitten into, there is "No worldez goud hit wythinne, bot wyndowande askes" (1047–48). A close comparison of the *Travels* and *Cleanness* reveals that the poet does not depart from his source except in his use of the term *askes*. In this instance there is no real reason to alter imaginatively the source, for the lines here borrowed from Mandeville provide him with the apt analogy he once again seeks, this time to conclude the destruction episode. The Dead Sea coastal trees, he tell us, are bereft of the source of their propagatory power, their seed. This condition corresponds to the death of the soul, the perilous condition in which the body is alive but the soul is dead since it is bereft of the source of its propagatory spiritual power, the life it derives from God. Thus, lacking the power to reproduce themselves, the fruit trees offer an ironic symbol of the absence of resurrection, for it is through a tree, the Cross, that eternal life is given to humankind. What is more, this ironic symbol establishes another point of connection between the barren trees and the doctrine, inasmuch as the absence of propagation—that is, the absence of resurrection—is a direct analogy of the condition the body and soul experience in an eternity of torment.

The *Pearl*-Poet's appropriation of the undying submerged man, a demonstrably remarkable element in the poet's description of Sodom and Gomorrah's cataclysmic destruction, is the most artistically subtle means by which the poet enriches his narrative with the representation of the eschatological peril implicit in a life of sin. Following his source, he states that if anyone is pushed into the sea by way of punishment he must remain in that submarine world without ever dying. Departing from his source, however, the poet adds that one must remain in the sea "in losying evermore" (1031). That he describes this submarine confinement as perdition ("losying evermore") establishes an exact correspondence to the doctrine, for the *secunda mors* and perdition are synonymous. This exact correspondence, in turn, sheds new light on one's inability to die in the sea. In other words, by establishing this correspondence, the poet deftly shifts the emphasis from Mandeville's view that no living thing can die in the sea to the doctrine that the punished man can never find release by suffering death or the

mors prima, the necessary evil which allows for the union of the soul and spiritual body at the Last Judgment. Thus, by subtly and significantly changing the stress in his source, the poet creates an emblem of the conditions of the "Death of the Whole Man" and the *secunda mors* or being "in death," which the physics of the punished man's submarine confinement suggests metaphorically.

Overlooked by Brown also is the creatively appropriated anecdotal history of the Dead Sea's naming, which the *Pearl*-Poet incorporates in the initial lines of this episode for the purpose of introducing the doctrinally transformed account of destruction.[10] In the *Travels*, Mandeville indicates that the Dead Sea is so named because it neither runs nor is movable: "Et ce est vn lac" (283). In other words, the sea's most obvious physical property is the source of its name. In *Cleanness*, however, the poet indicates the sea has received its name partially because it destroyed sin and partially because the "dedez of deþe" endure in it yet:

> a stynkande stanc þat stryed synne,
> þat ever of s[mell]e and of smach, smarte to fele.
> Forþy þe derk Dede See hit is demed evermore,
> For hit dedez of debe þuren þere ȝet.
>
> (1018–21)

While the sea's destruction of sin, conspicuously missing in Mandeville (283),[11] is reminiscent of the apocalyptic pool of fire, the persistence of the deeds of death directly corresponds to the doctrine of the *secunda mors* in that it provides an analogy of the dead body and dead soul's eternal postmortem cohering, the source of their eternal mutual pain. In other words, it is a concise analogy of the state of being "in death," the most horrifying aspect of perdition. Accordingly, the poet's subsequent assertions—nothing living can remain in the sea and the sea wars against all properties of nature, an imaginative addition to the episode—take on new meaning. The sea's warring against nature offers another implicit way of understanding the eternal mutual pain suffered by the soul and body in the *secunda mors*, inasmuch as the pain, as Augustine indicates, results from the soul's being "held in the body against her will."[12] That "noȝt may lenge in þat lake þat any lyf berez" (1023), likewise, suggests the *secunda mors*, since the living—that is, the individual whose soul is not bereft of the life it derives from God—can only experience the *mors prima*. Thus, the poet achieves another irony here, not by altering the line from his source, but by carefully altering the context in which he reworks the borrowed line.

While the *Pearl*-Poet's appropriation of the *Travels* obviously gives his work ornamentation and authenticity, it is also demonstrably clear that the incorporation of lines from the *Travels* enables the poet to introduce the commonplace doctrine of the *secunda mors*. Why the poet weaves this

doctrine into the fabric of this episode can be partially explained by the emphasis the poet places in the entire work on the need for salvation through repentance and the avoidance of sin.[13] It is true, too, as Daniel W. O'Bryan shows, that the poet uses "dramatic expansion" as a way of transforming "an essentially stark, monochromatic account of God's wrath into dynamic poetry."[14] From what we have just seen, it is not difficult to understand how the incorporation of the lines from the *Travels* might comprise another part of this program. But the poet's principal reason for using Mandeville to introduce the salient features of the doctrine into the lines of this episode is to establish an anagogic dimension to this rendering of cataclysmic destruction. By doing this, he not only creates powerful, dynamic poetry that reveals the creative complexity of the homiletic imagination, but he also achieves his purpose as homilist by thoroughly educating his audience regarding the mysteries of postmortem damnation in an intellectual as well as an affective way.

NOTES

1.   *"Purity": A Middle English Poem*, ed. Robert J. Menner (1920; reprint, n.p.: Archon, 1970), 100–101; hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, all reference to the lines of this edition of the poem will appear parenthetically in the text. For further discussion of this episode, also see Carleton F. Brown, "Note on the Dependence of *Cleanness* on the *Book of Mandeville*," *PMLA* 19 (1904): 149–53; George Neilson, *Huchown of the Awls Ryale, the Alliterative Poet. A Historical Criticism of Fourteenth Century Poems Ascribed to Sir Hew of Eglintoun* (Glasgow: J. Maclehose & Sons, 1902), 45 n. 1.

2.   Menner, xxxix and xli; for a general analysis of the way in which the poet handles this source in the entire Sodom and Gomorrah episode, see Daniel W. O'Bryan, "Sodom and Gomorrah: The Use of the Vulgate in *Cleanness*," *Journal of Narrative Technique* 12 (1982): 15–23.

3.   *The "Pearl"-Poet: His Complete Works*, trans., with an introduction by Margaret Williams (New York: Vintage, 1970), 36–37.

4.   *Writers and Pilgrims: Pilgrimage Narratives and Their Posterity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 53–76, especially 53–61.

5.   Brown, 152.

6.   For a general discussion of the doctrine and of medieval and Renaissance French writers' borrowing of the doctrine, see Edelgard Dubruck, *The Theme of Death in French Poetry of the High Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (The Hague: Mouton, 1964), 40–45, passim.

7.   *Mandeville's "Travels": Texts and Translations*, ed. Malcolm Letts (London: Hakluyt Society, 1953), 283.

8.   Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson, ed. David Knowles (New York: Penguin, 1972), 510.

9.   Gregory the Great presents the doctrine in the *Moralia* (book 9); Innocent III, in the *De miseria* (3:12); Aquinas, in the *Summa theologica* (2:1); Dante, in the *Inferno*; the author of the *Debate between the Body and Soul*, in the dialogic exchange between the body and soul; Chaucer, in the *Parson's Tale* and in the figure of the Old Man

in the *Pardoner's Tale*; the *Pearl*-Poet, in the theological debate between the Maiden and Dream–Narrator in *Pearl*; Traini, in the Camposanto fresco depicting hell and the damned; Fra Angelico, in the "Last Judgment" Padua frescoes (Scrovegni Chapel); Orcagna, in "The Triumph of Death."

10.   Letts, 283.

11.   Ibid. Mandeville introduces the idea of sin in the third paragraph of chapter 12. However, he presents it as the reason that the cities were lost: "Et aussi estoient illeuques les cites perdues pour le pechie contre nature."

12.   Knowles, 966. Augustine actually describes this condition as being like war in his analysis of the end of the wicked:

> . . . the wretchedness of those who do not belong to this City of God will be everlasting. This is called also "the second death," because the soul cannot be said to be alive in that state, when it is separated from the life of God, nor can the body when it is subjected to eternal torments. And this is precisely the reason why this "second death" will be harder to bear, because it cannot come to an end in death. But here a question arises; for just as wretchedness is the opposite of blessedness, and death of life, so war is evidently the opposite of peace. And the question is rightly asked: What war, or what kind of war, can be understood to exist in the final state of the wicked, corresponding, by way of contrast, to that peace which is proclaimed with joyful praises in the final state of the good? Now anyone who puts this question should observe what it is that is harmful and destructive in war; and he will see that it is precisely the mutual opposition and conflict of the forces engaged. What war, then, can be imagined more serious and more bitter than a struggle in which the will is so at odds with the feelings and the feelings with the will, that their hostility cannot be ended by the victory of either—a struggle in which the violence of pain is in such conflict with the nature of the body that neither can yield to the other? For in this life, when such a conflict occurs, either pain wins, and death takes away feeling, or nature conquers, and health removes the pain. But in that other life, pain continues to torment, while nature lasts to feel the pain. Neither ceases to exist, lest the punishment also should cease.

13.   T. D. Kelly and John T. Irwin, "The Meaning of *Cleanness*: Parable as Effective Sign," *Medieval Studies* 35 (1973): 260.

14.   O'Bryan, 21.

The Harrowing of Peter:
An Extrabiblical Encounter
between Christ and Peter

by

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Of all the events surrounding the life of Christ, none sees more elaboration and embellishment during the Middle Ages than the Passion. Many of these familiar stories take their place in prayer book miniatures, preacher's manuals, and on the stage. The image on Veronica's veil, the dream of Pilate's wife, the healing of the blind Longinus, the ominous events preceding the harrowing—all show a tendency to surround the simple yet dramatic story of Christ's Passion with corresponding incidents that reflect aspects of the meaning of the Passion and at the same time are themselves informed by that Passion.

The stories of Longinus, Veronica, and Pilate's wife were well known during the Middle Ages, having become part of the cultural understanding of the Passion. But other tales, though equally dramatic and carrying similar meanings, were not as successfully transmitted, as shown by their infrequent appearance in art and literature. One such legend, quite obscure in our own day, deals with the events immediately following Peter's three denials of Christ.

According to this tale, Peter goes out from the courtyard after the cock crows. Weeping bitterly, he flees to a cave called Gallicantus—literally, the "song of the cock"—and weeps with tears so hot that they burn furrows down his cheeks. Here the earliest versions of the legend end, but later versions include a visitation by Christ, who appears to Peter in the cave. Though no one knows what words were supposedly spoken at that meeting, the legend suggests that it is at this moment that Christ forgives Peter his denials.

Like so many of the apocryphal tales, the flight of Peter to Gallicantus has no firm scriptural basis. But unlike others, there are some scriptural pegs

on which the story can be hung. After Peter's third denial, the Gospels of both Matthew and Luke record he "egressus foras, flevit amare" (Matt. 26.75; Luke 22.62; "He went outside and wept bitterly"). Apparently Peter left the courtyard where he had been questioned, but the passage does not indicate where he went.

The Gospel of Luke gives the fullest account of Christ's resurrection appearances, and the order of appearances that is sometimes illustrated in medieval art—to the Marys, to Peter, and then to the pilgrims on the road to Emmaus—is taken from the twenty-fourth chapter of Luke. There, two men in gleaming clothes announce the Resurrection to the women. They, in turn, bring the news to the disciples, and Peter runs to the tomb. (In the Gospel of John, Peter is accompanied by John, who reaches the tomb first, though he does not enter until after Peter.) When he sees the empty tomb, Peter "abiit secum mirans quod factum fuerat" (Luke 24.12; Peter "went away, wondering to himself what had happened"). The appearance to the pilgrims on the road to Emmaus follows.

Neither of the first two incidents indicates that Christ himself appeared; even the angels have gone by the time Peter reaches the tomb (though Matt. 28.9 does record that Christ appeared to the women after they left the tomb). However, there is apparently an appearance unrecorded in scripture, which forms the base for the legend of Peter in the cave. After Christ reveals himself to the Emmaus pilgrims, they return to the disciples and announce that the news of the Resurrection is indeed true: "Quod surrexit Dominus vere, et apparuit Simoni" (Luke 24.34). The final clause—"He has appeared to Simon"—is curious, since there has been no mention of such a meeting. These pilgrims could have known this only if Christ himself had told them that he had appeared to Peter. When this appearance took place and what was said remains unrecorded.

One of the early explanations for this appearance was that it occurred after John and Peter had left the tomb. According to this explanation, John and Peter must have separated and Christ appeared while Peter was on the road alone. This legend is developed in *The Mirrour of the Blessed Lyf of Jesu Christ*, a translation of Bonaventure's thirteenth-century *Meditations on the Life of Christ* made by Nicholas Love before 1410. He writes,

> Peter that was most fervent in love, inwardly
> sorrowing that he saw not his Lord, and being
> unable to rest because of his great love, took his
> way alone towards the sepulchre, for he did not
> know where else to seek him. And soon after our
> benign Lord Jesus, having compassion on his
> sorrow, appeared to him in the way and greeted
> him saying, "Peace to thee Simon." And therewith
> Peter, smiting himself sadly on the breast, and

falling down on the ground, with weeping said, "Lord, I acknowledge my great trespass in that I cowardly forsook thee and other times falsely denied thee," and therewith he kissed his feet. And our Lord, benignly lifting him up, said, "Be in peace, and dread not, for all thy sins are forgiven thee. I knew thy infirmity better than thyself, and therefore I told thee before. But now go and strengthen and comfort your brothers, for I have overcome death and all your adversaries and enemies."[1]

This encounter also appears in some of the French Passion plays. It first occurs in the mid-fifteenth-century *Passion of Arras*, in which the disciples reject the announcement of the three Marys because the doctrine of the Resurrection could not be founded on the testimony of women. Peter goes to the sepulcher and prays that God will give him proof of the Resurrection. In answer, Christ appears to Peter.[2] The late fifteenth-century *Greban Passion* tells how Peter prays that he might see Christ only out of affection for his Lord.[3] In Britain the legend is found in the *Southern Passion*, from the first quarter of the thirteenth century, in which Peter, who loved his Lord most, goes sorrowfully to the sepulchre. Christ appears and forgives the saint for his denial. The author suggests that the sinful reader might take hope from this example.[4]

Peter Comestor in his twelfth-century *In evangelia*, part of his *Historia scholastica*, recounts a different, nonbiblical legend involving Peter. This encyclopedic work, written between 1169 and 1173, was designed to supercede the *Glossa ordinaria* and provide a compendium of biblical commentary. One of its great virtues is its extraordinary completeness: it leaves hardly any area of medieval knowledge untouched. Comestor's methodology involves citing a passage and then discussing its theological implications. In these citations, Comestor incorporates a great deal of legendary material into traditional commentary.[5]

In the chapters of *In evangelia*, Comestor organizes the story of the Passion week into a chronicle of the events of each successive day and presents events subsequent to the Resurrection as a series of ten *apparitiones*. Here we find one of the earliest references to Peter and a cave. Comestor makes the first extant reference to the legend of Peter's flight to Gallicantus when he writes that, after the third denial, Peter "departed out crying bitterly, and fled alone to a cave called Gallicantus [the pit of cock's crow], in which place a church has been built."[6]

Comestor gives no motive for this flight other than an implied despair. However, several other medieval works use Peter's flight to the cave as evidence of his confusion and moral despair following his denial. The

Dialogue between the Blessed Virgin and St. Anselm, by the Pseudo-Anselm, notes that Peter fearfully ran to conceal himself in the rock known as Gallicantus and did not appear as long as Christ was dying on the cross.[7] The *Cursor mundi*, written around 1300, suggests that Peter went to rest under a rock on the night of the denial, "for he ne wijt quider-ward to weind ne quat that him war best."[8] The *Southern Passion* has Peter flee to an old pit, and "wepyng ther he lay, / That is the put of cokkes crowe / ycluped yet to this day."[9] And in the fourteenth century, the French *Livre de la passion* has Peter flee to the rock "pour sez pechiez."[10]

These references do not mention an encounter with Christ, but instead concentrate on Peter's motivation for flight to the cave. One motive is clearly fear for his own life and his confusion about where to go; here the cave is a safe place. Another motive makes the cave a place of penitence, where Peter lies on the ground and weeps. And yet another seems to make it a purgatorial place, where Peter goes because of his sins. In each case Peter flees alone into the cold and darkness, in contrast to his earlier desire to move closer to the communal fire, where he was queried about his association with Christ.

Peter's solitary repentance in the cave of Gallicantus was not a popular scene in art. It does appear in the fifteenth-century *Hours of Catherine of Cleves*, but only in the marginalia. The image is included in the lower margin of a miniature depicting Christ before Caiaphas (fol. 52v).[11] There, Christ wears a mantle whose long sleeves cover his bound wrists as he is held around the waist by a soldier; just behind him, Peter, seemingly within earshot of Christ, makes his denial to a turbaned woman. He holds his red robes around himself protectively. In the lower margin Peter, weeping and repentant, kneels in a dark cave; his robes are loosely scattered around him. This is one of only two such apocryphal scenes in the margins of the miniatures in this Book of Hours; the other, that on fol. 65, depicts a woman who brings bread to Christ while he is imprisoned.[12]

But this movement into darkness and despair is still only half the legend. In one sense, the second half announces resurrection both for the risen Christ and the forgiven Peter, as Christ redeems Peter from out of the darkness of the cave. This meeting is first chronicled in the *Golden Legend* of Jacob of Voragine, who completed his work before 1270 and possibly as early as 1255. The *Golden Legend* is a composite work, drawing on many sources undoubtedly still current in the thirteenth century. One of these anonymous sources contains the legend of Christ's appearance to Peter, and Jacob lists it as the third meeting between the resurrected Christ and his disciples. The following passage is from William Caxton's translation.

> He appered to saynt pieter, but whan ne in what
> place it is not knowen, by yf it were by auenture
> whan he returned fro the monument wyth saynt
> Johan. For it myght wel be that saynt peter

in summe place torned fro saynt johan where god appiered to hym, or by auenture whan he was allone in the monument. Lyke as it is sayd in scolastica historia, or parauenture in a caue or a fosse. For it is redde in thistoryes, whan he renyed and forsoke our lord, that he fledde in to a caue where as ther montayn is whiche is called the montayne of the cocque, or ellis after that it is said, that he wepte thre dayes contynuelly after that he had renyed god, and there Jesus appered to hym and comforted hym sayeng, Peter bere the vertu of obedyence, to whome our lord sheweth hym.[13]

Jacob is not particularly selective, giving us three options to choose from when dealing with the appearance of Christ to Peter. The first is the more commonly accepted appearance to Peter after he had separated from John. The second is the legend of Christ meeting Peter at the mouth of a cave. The third suggests no geographical location of Peter's flight but does stress the nature of the meeting, which was one of repentance and forgiveness.

This addition to the legend completely reverses its tone. Peter's purgatorial weeping and descent into darkness work towards his redemption; he is forgiven because of his repentance. This legend, then, becomes a case in point of the larger story of Christ's Passion as a prelude to man's redemption. Peter is a type of the larger dimension and significance of the story to which the legend is appended.

Early Christian artists see Peter in much the same way. The scene they most often depict is the apostle and Christ on the night of the arrest. Peter generally faces Christ, who holds up three fingers to indicate the number of times that Peter will deny him. Peter makes some sort of gesture of disbelief, sometimes holding his hand over his mouth. To make sure there is no mistake about the meaning of the scene, a cock is often in the foreground; sometimes it is elevated on a column.[14] These images are often linked to another meeting between Christ and Peter, when the saint is given the keys of the kingdom. Christ gives the sinner the right to remit the sins of other sinners, and the linkage expresses the central notion of Christian redemption. The image of the metamorphosed sinner calls other men to repentance.

These early scenes do not show Christ confronting Peter after the denial, so the notion of forgiveness is dependent upon the association between the two meetings. After the Carolingian period, the depiction of Christ gesturing with three fingers and Peter making his denial virtually disappeared. Thus another image had to take on the burden of carrying the theological

notion of forgiveness, and in some cases it was the encounter within the cave that carried it.

The earliest scene of the confrontation between Peter and Christ is from the thirteenth century and figures in the choir enclosure of Notre Dame at Paris. Here the sculptor has tried to reproduce scenes from the life of Christ by carefully following their order in the *Golden Legend*; he has thus introduced both authentic and apocryphal scenes. In the bas-relief showing Peter, the artist includes both elements of the version in the *Golden Legend*. In the left-hand scene, Peter sees Christ in the tomb as John hesitates outside. To the right, a larger-than-life Christ, garbed in the robes he wore during his harrowing of hell, blesses Peter, ensconced in a rock; the saint has his hands lifted in prayer. Except for the position of the hands the scene is very similar to that of a window at St. Godard in Rouen, in which Christ appears to Peter, refuged in a grotto. Emile Mâle, in describing the two Notre Dame scenes, suggests that the artist was unable to choose between these two versions.[15] However, if the artist were making visual the text of the *Golden Legend*, he would not want to choose between these appearances, but instead portray both as possible, since both have the authority of one of the most popular texts of the thirteenth century.

The scene also is shown in a late fourteenth-century manuscript of *Le livre de la passion*, held in the Vatican Library (Codex Reginensis 473, fol. 18r). In this illustration, Christ is larger than any of the other figures and makes three appearances: to Mary Magdalene and the apostles, to the pilgrims from Emmaus, and to Peter. Peter is half-hidden in a grotto outlined in the same billowy fashion as the rocks of the *Utrecht Psalter*. The caption reads, "How Our Saviour appeared on Easter Day to a number of persons, as to his apostles, to the pilgrims, to the Magdalene and to several others."[16]

Christ's appearance to Peter in a grotto also figures prominently in an early fifteenth-century *Biblia pauperum* (MS. 333 from the University Library, Freiburg im Breisgau, and MS. 719–720 from the Pierpont-Morgan Library in New York).[17] The manuscript was produced between 1390 and 1410, most probably after 1400, and though there is no direct internal evidence to indicate the place of origin, artistic and historical investigations have concluded that it comes from Strasbourg.[18] In the miniature, Christ is clad in his harrowing-of-hell robes and clutches his *vexillum*; he confronts Peter, who kneels at the mouth of a dark cave. Christ stands absolutely, rigidly straight and holds his *vexillum* perpendicular to the ground. Peter, kneeling, leans forward only slightly. Instead of holding out his hands to Peter, Christ shows his wounds, thus testifying to his bodily resurrection. Peter is the orant, both hands held out in prayer rather than reaching out to Christ. The miniature is captioned "Jesus erschein petro alleine" (Jesus appears to Peter alone).

Peter's portrait is very traditional. Emile Mâle notes that the apostle is often depicted as a well-built figure, with short hair and a beard which is both abundant and curly. He has dark, though sometimes reddened,

eyes and a strong though not prominent nose. This depiction corresponds to the scriptural description of the saint, whose nature is sanguine, impulsive, and rather headstrong.[19] It also corresponds to the image of Peter in this manuscript, where he appears in a large number of its illustrations, always in the forefront, always identifiable by his curly hair. In the scene of the encounter in the cave, the halo around his head reveals the curly hair against the darkness of the cave entrance.

The artist of the Freiburg manuscript had a limited number of models from which to choose as he drew this image. Perhaps the model for the figures of Christ and Peter came from a manuscript of the *Historia evangelia* copied and illustrated in 1399 by Rudiger Schopf, a secular priest in Freiburg, who copied manuscripts there between 1392 and 1415.[20] This manuscript—now Badische Landesbibliothek MS. Tennenbach 8—is copiously illustrated. Though it frequently includes images of Christ and Peter, it merely mentions Peter's flight to the cave called Gallicantus on fol. 82r; it does not illustrate the scene.

The *Golden Legend* had, however, a definite influence on the work. For although the manuscript includes very few apocryphal scenes after the initial section on Mary, it does contain both legends concerned with Christ's appearance alone to Peter. And the manuscript follows the order of the *Golden Legend* appearances to the Marys, to the pilgrims, and to Peter, though it includes other scenes that correspond to the scriptural account. A miniature depicting the arrival of Peter and John at the empty tomb (fol. 40v) is followed by one depicting Christ's appearance to Mary Magdalene (fol. 41r), to the three Marys as a group (fol. 41r), and to the Emmaus pilgrims (fol. 42r). Christ's appearance to Peter occurs at fol. 42v.

That the artist includes this triumvirate of resurrection scenes does not indicate a slavish following of the *Golden Legend*. In choosing to include these images, he also chooses to omit many other apocryphal scenes included elsewhere in the text. This suggests that the ordering principle behind the work is the central theme of redemption, the reinstatement of sinful man to a proper relationship with his Lord. The work is not concerned with the merely sensational or the merely vivid.

This principle orders the entire Freiburg *Biblia pauperum*. Many of the miniatures are devoted to scenes where Christ confronts a single character: the individual disciples, the Samaritan woman at the well, Jairus, Nicodemus, the rich young ruler. The artist devotes nine scenes to healings and seven to the driving out of demons. Three scenes depict encounters with Mary Magdalene and Zaccheus. These are included at least partially because the artist saw them as important parts of Christ's ministry. Except those scenes in which demons fly out of mouths, however, the miniatures are all undramatic reinstatements of proper relationships.

In making this emphasis, the artist is consciously calling for a devotional response from the reader, and the notion of the *Biblia pauperum*'s being a

devotional tool is at the very heart of the manuscript. The manuscript is in many ways a reflective storybook, a product of a medieval contemplative mind that used tools in order to channel and focus religious feeling. The numerous Passion scenes, with their abundant use of red ink and sorrowful and demonic faces and instruments of torture, are in particular an expression of the profound religious feeling that characterizes the period and the manuscript. Some thirty scenes starkly depict a torment. These scenes are calling for a response; the reader is to contemplate the wounds of Christ and to recognize his corresponding debt.

Christ's appearance to Peter in the cave is quite different from the Passion scenes. It is one of many instances in which the artist has Christ appear to a single character, and here the emphasis is clearly on the restoration of Peter. The tone of the image is one of gentleness and calm, quite different from the extreme, violent images of the ten folios dedicated to crucifixion scenes. Christ's face is tranquil, but there is also an energy which propels him forward to the saint. Christ's left hand reaches out, his head leans towards the cave, and his right foot steps eagerly forward; the wounds on his foot and hand still bleed. Peter, kneeling in the mouth of the cave, is also eager, and his desire is shown by his outstretched hands, held palms up and open in a gesture of loyalty and obedience. His body leans slightly forward, the angles of the rocks and the two trees on the hill above him accentuate this stance, for they also lean towards Christ.

The *Biblia pauperum* miniature is one of the few illustrations of this encounter where Christ and Peter are very close, almost touching; and it sets up the image on the next folio, where Christ, seated and surrounded by all of his disciples, is seen robed in the garments he wore when he harrowed hell. Peter is at his right hand. From then on Peter appears near Christ on every folio until after the Ascension. The illustration of Peter within the cave has established the tenor of repentance, forgiveness, and redemption which permeates the final folios of the manuscript and which is an important devotional aspect of the work. The restoration of Peter works as the archetype of the restoration of the fallen soul.

On one level, however, the inclusion of this legend in the *Biblia pauperum* is curious. Unlike most manuscripts of this sort, the Freiburg and Pierpont-Morgan MSS do not have a great deal of apocryphal material; indeed, after the early scenes of the life of Mary, there is almost none. Even scenes of the death and assumption of the Blessed Virgin, which conclude so many of these works, are not present, though admittedly the manuscript might not have been finished; the last folio does have an empty space for an additional miniature. And what is perhaps most surprising, there are no illustrations showing Christ's harrowing of hell, an almost ubiquitous image elsewhere. The vast majority of *Biblia pauperum* do include this scene of Christ's descent into hell, usually depicting the entrance to the underworld as either a Leviathan-like mouth, a crenellated castle, or, most often, a cave. Christ,

leading the soul out of the darkness of hell to heaven, typically leans down and clasps the hand of either Adam or an anonymous saint.

It would seem that this subject would have appealed to the artist of the *Biblia pauperum* discussed above, for he had already shown his adeptness at drawing devils in the temptation scenes and for placing characters in dramatic confrontations in the Passion scenes. However, there is no such scene here. Yet in the midst of this orthodoxy—in the midst of those illustrations which follow the scriptural tale so closely—the artist did choose to include the obscure apocryphal image of Christ appearing to Peter as he hides in a cave following his denial of his Lord. The subject seems oddly out of place, for though no harrowing scene has preceded this image, Christ appears in the robes worn during his harrowing of hell.

The scene discussed is the only real hint of the harrowing of hell in the Freiburg manuscript. Otherwise, it moves directly from the deposition, to the guarded tomb, to the Resurrection, and then proceeds to the resurrection appearances. The omission at first seems curious, for although the artist of the Freiburg manuscript does not include many apocryphal scenes, he has here chosen to omit a common tale with universal acceptance and to include instead a somewhat obscure meeting between Christ and Peter.

However, given that the manuscript was intended to be used as a devotional tool—one which channeled and focused religious feeling and thought and perception—the exclusion is valid. In pursuing his aim, the artist chooses to include an image which focuses more clearly on individual repentance and subsequent forgiveness than the harrowing scene, which really has little to do with personal repentance. It is at the same time very interesting that if the artist had replaced the image of Peter by a line of anonymous souls, he would have had to change nothing else to have a conventional depiction of the harrowing. The posture of Christ and the presence of the cave would be enough to suggest the apocryphal rescue.

This suggests a number of things about what the legend of the meeting between Christ and Peter had come to mean by the fifteenth century. Peter flees to the cave principally because of his shame and his sin of denial, not necessarily because of his fear of detection. His flight and descent are both a physical withdrawal from the situation of his betrayal and his potential accusers and a spiritual withdrawal from his own inescapable conscience and from Christ himself. This is a purgatorial place for Peter, in that he recognizes his own guilt and rejection of his proper relationship to his Lord. Thus the cave is more than just an element of topography; its darkness, its hiddenness, its emptiness, its isolation, its barrenness are physical manifestations of Peter's spiritual state.

But the moment of seeing Christ is simultaneously the moment of repentance and forgiveness. Most often Peter is pictured as coming out from the cave, thus abandoning his despondent spiritual state. Peter's gesture towards Christ is both spontaneous and sincere; it suggests that the bonds

of loyalty, love, and obedience have been reestablished. Christ comes to release Peter from his self-inflicted hell. The apostle thus becomes one more blessed soul delivered from the darkness of hell. Though his has not been a physical death, it has certainly been a spiritual death. His release combines elements of both, as Christ calls Peter from the physical cave and spiritual despair.

The final effect of this legend and image is complex. In the individual act of forgiveness and salvation is the germ of the corporate salvation offered to the blessed souls held in hell before the harrowing. Christ's appearance foretells the coming resurrection and emphasizes his role as a redeemer. The entire scene is a paradigm of the act of Christian salvation itself, universalizing what at first seems unique.

NOTES

1.   Nicholas Love, *The Mirrour of the Blessed Lyf of Jesu Christi*, ed. Lawrence F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), 271–72. A modern translation of Bonaventure's work is *Meditations on the Life of Christ*, trans. Isa Ragusa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 364–65. In this same section, Bonaventure includes discussions of resurrection appearances to Joseph of Arimathea, James Minor, and Peter. Bonaventure also includes a disclaimer about an appearance to Mary, noting that, though it is not mentioned in the Gospels, the Church seems to hold to it. Nicholas Love applies this disclaimer to Peter, mentioning nothing about Mary, and notes that he has included the legend "by deuoute ymaginacioun."

2.   Jules-Marie Richard, ed., *Le mystère de la passion* (Arras: Société du Pas-de-Calais, 1891), lines 22132–96. See the discussion of this scene in Jean Gray Wright, *A Study of the Themes of the Resurrection in Medieval French Drama* (Bryn Mawr, PA: Bryn Mawr University Press, 1935), 135.

3.   Omar Jodogne, ed., *Le mystère de la passion d'Arnoul Greban* (Brussels: Palais des Academies, 1965), vol. 1, lines 29603–48.

4.   Beatrice Daw Brown, ed., *The Southern Passion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), 73.

5.   For discussions of the significance of Comestor's work, see A. M. Landgraf, "Recherches sur les écrits de Pierre le Mangeur," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 3 (1931): 62–73; Saralyn R. Daly, "Peter Comestor: Master of Histories," *Speculum* 32 (1957): 62–73; Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), 179; and David Luscombe, "Peter Comestor," in *The Bible in the Medieval World: Essays in Memory of Beryl Smalley*, ed. Katherine Walsh and Diana Wood (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 109–29. The popularity of this work is evidenced by the enormous number of surviving manuscripts and by its many citations in medieval wills. See Friedrich Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicam medii aevi* (Madrid: Francisco Suarez, 1954), 4:280–300.

6.   Peter Comestor, *Historia scholiastica in evangelia*, ch. 159, in *Patrologia latina* 198:1624. No mention is made of the flight to Gallicantus in the *Glossa ordinaria*. See the commentary on Luke 22.62 in *Patrologia latina* 114:343.

7.   Pseudo-Anselm, *Dialogus Beatae Mariae et Anselmi de passione Domini*, ch. 3, in *Patrologia latina* 159:276. This work was known under a number of names. It was printed by Johan Petri in 1486 as *Dialogus de passione Christi sive tractatus de planctu Mariae*. The only recent edition besides that of Migne is Oskar Schade, ed., *Interrogatio Sancti Anselmi de passione Domini* (Konigsberg, Germany: University of Konigsberg, 1870). The passage referring to Peter's flight to Gallicantus occurs on page 7.

8.   Richard Morris, ed., *Cursor mundi* (1874–93; reprint, Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint, 1966), 3:912.

9.   Brown, *Passion*, 45.

10.   Grace Frank, ed., *Le livre de la passion* (Paris: Les classiques français de Moyen Age, 1930), line 2238.

11.   John Plummer, ed., *The Hours of Catherine of Cleves* (New York: George Braziller, 1966), pl. 18.

12.   Ibid., pl. 57. This miniature deals with the spiritual gift of piety, as evidenced through charitable acts.

13.   Jacob of Voragine, *Golden Legend*, trans. William Caxton (London: Kelmscott Press, 1892), 1:56.

14.   See, for example, Georg Stuhlfauth, *Die apocryphen Petrusgeschichten in der altchristlichen Kunst* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1925), pl. 7.

15.   Emile Mâle, *The Gothic Image: Religious Art in France in the Thirteenth Century*, trans. Dora Nussey (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958), 226–27.

16.   Grace Frank, "Popular Iconography of the Passion," *PMLA* 46 (1931): 333–40, pl. 12.

17.   This image occurs on fol. 42v of Freiburg University Library, MS. 334. The entire *Biblia pauperum* is published in Josef Beckmann and Ingeborg Schroth, eds., *Picture Bible of the Late Middle Ages* (Bodensee: Jan Thorbeke Verlag Konstanz, 1960). This MS is one of a large number of picture Bibles that found a wide circulation at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries. Most of them were created rather hurriedly, perhaps because they were generally used for teaching purposes. As a result of this and the practice of appointing less-skilled illustrators to these tasks, their illustrations were substantially cruder than those of their more expensive predecessors. But their hurried nature did not always mean a low level of artistic quality, as is the case with this MS. The outline drawings of this *Biblia pauperum*, executed with pen and brush, have a rather astonishing vigor about them.

18.   See the discussion of these investigations in Beckmann and Schroth, 1–4. The manuscript was probably removed from its monastic library during the secularization of the monasteries or the revolutionary wars, and perhaps then split into two parts which were eventually separately bound. The Freiburg MS, which contains 177 illustrations of Christ's adult life, found its way to the university library. The New York portion, containing 33 illustrations of the Virgin and the childhood of Jesus, traveled first to Britain and then, by the end of the nineteenth century, to America. It has been held by the Pierpont-Morgan Library since 1927.

19.   Emile Mâle, *Les saints compagnons du Christ* (Paris: Hartmann, 1958), 88. Note the additional discussion of these investigations in Beckmann and Schroth, 1–4.

20.   This manuscript was in the possession of the Carthusian monastery in Freiburg until 1789 and was produced in the same workshop as the Freiburg *Biblia pauperum*.

A Document of Humanist Education: Erasmus's Commentary on the *Disticha Catonis*

by

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The part the *Disticha* (or *Dicta*) *Catonis* played in Erasmus's career is only one event in the work's long and honorable history.[1] The *Cato* was composed by an anonymous author during the later Roman principate.[2] As presented in the oldest manuscripts, the work consists of prose *sententiae* followed by four books of hexameter couplets. The whole is ornamented with a prose preface, and the second, third, and fourth books of hexameters have verse prologues of ten, four, and four lines respectively.[3] The "Cato" to whom the work is attributed is probably either that redoubtable critic of Roman morals, Cato the Censor (234–149 B.C.), or the Stoic hero Cato of Utica (95–46 B.C.).[4]

Each sentence or couplet lays down a different rule of practical conduct. For example, the reader is commanded, "Do not ignore an opportunity which is good for you. For fortune, though she has curls in the front, is bald in the back" (II.26). Elsewhere he is exhorted, "While the fatal pleasures of Venus detain you, do not indulge the throat, which is sister to the belly" (IV.10). Neither the division of the work into books nor the arrangement of the couplets within the books follows any discernible design, but the poems are lent a certain unity by the frequent reappearance of several themes: the right uses of speech and silence (e.g., I.3, I.10, II.11, II.15, III.3, III.18, III.22, V.20), the proper conduct of friendship (e.g., I.9, I.20, I.23, I.26, I.34, II.1, II.22, III.2, IV.15, IV.28, IV.36, IV.41), the prudent management of business affairs (e.g., I.24, I.28, I.35, I.39, II.5, IV.7), the vicissitudes of fortune and the imminence of death (e.g., I.18, I.19, I.22, I.33, II.3, II.12, II.23, II.26, IV.3, IV.19, IV.22, IV.37).

The straightforward Latinity and stern morality of the *Cato* commended it to generations of schoolmasters who wished to expose their students to improving sentiments while introducing them to simple Latin. Thus the *Cato* became one of the most widely read Latin primers of the Middle Ages. In

the twelfth century it was included among the standard *auctores* in both the anonymous *accessus ad auctores* (introductions to authors), written at Tergensee, and Conrad of Hirsau's *Dialogus super auctores*. The latter recommends the *Cato* as a first reader for students who have mastered Donatus.[5] Even when its unvarnished prose fell afoul of the late medieval taste for florid Latin, the *Cato* was recommended for its noble sentiments. Eberhard the German wrote in his *Laborintus* (before 1280), "Prudent Cato is a path to the virtues, a measuring-stick of morals, though the brevity of his verse keeps him from polishing his words" (lines 603–4).[6]

In 1514, Erasmus published a collection of Latin readers at Louvain; for his lead text he made an edition of the *Cato* with notes.[7] This choice is significant and, at first sight, surprising, given his scathing criticisms of other school texts popular in the Middle Ages.[8] My purpose is to show from Erasmus's correspondence why he considered the *Cato* an appropriate educational text and to examine how his edition and commentary transformed it into a suitable vehicle for Humanist education. Erasmus's *Cato* furnishes a concrete example not only of reform of medieval educational practices but also of the broad continuity between medieval educational values and his own.[9]

Erasmus's opinion of the *Cato* emerges from correspondence with French Humanist Guillaume Budé, who roundly criticizes Erasmus's interest in the little work. In Letter 403, Budé reproaches Erasmus for wasting time on the *Cato* and other trivial pieces, thereby depriving lesser men of opportunities, wasting his talents, and blurring the distinctions of language and thought by honoring inferior texts with his attention (*Correspondence*, 3:279–280). In reply, Erasmus concedes that "nothing could be more trifling" than his *Cato*, and his defensive claim "to have spent one short day on it" tacitly admits Budé's charge that Erasmus's talents are superior to the material (Letter 421, *Correspondence*, 3:307). The cynical person may guess from this that, in writing a school edition, Erasmus is attempting to escape the thrall of Lady Penury to whom, he tells Budé, he has been long and unhappily married (ibid., 308).

From the thrust and parry of the two Humanists emerges something more than Budé's disapproval of Erasmus's *Cato* and the latter's possibly mixed motives in undertaking it. It becomes clear that, though an edition may not require the genius of an Erasmus, the work is appropriate for Humanist education. Budé's charge that his fellow Humanist is depriving lesser men of opportunities implies his own possible approval of an edition by someone else. Erasmus's enthusiastic reply musters the intrinsic educational value of the work as part of his defense: "These light pieces," he says, "however trifling, I set above Scotus and all his quillets" (ibid., 307).[10]

The punning allusion to Scotus (*ho skotos* in Greek means "the darkness") indicates not merely a difference in degree, but a radical opposition in kind, between the works of Scotus and the *Cato*. So far as Erasmus is concerned, the latter is on the side of light, challenging the darkness of the former. The criteria by which books are assigned to one side or the other are stated more

explicitly in the *Antibarbarorum liber* (45). Here, the opposition between good and bad books is expressed in a metaphor dear to the Humanists, that of barbarism and civilization. Roman priests address monkish schoolmasters in dramatic terms: "Hear, ye Goths! By what right have you crossed your frontiers and not only occupied the domains of the Latins—I mean liberal studies—but dared to invade the city which rules all, Latinity itself?" (*Antibarbarorum liber*, 45).[11] Barbarians, in short, perpetrate bad Latin. Good Latin is found above all in the Roman authors, and they are not to be eschewed in schools for inferior works, even on the excuse of offering Christian teaching (*Antibarbarorum liber*, 33–34). By this criterion, the *Cato* is a good book for Erasmus. Its attribution to the ancient Roman Cato is uncertain, as Erasmus admits in the preface, but the *Cato*'s classicism is justified on interior grounds: the language and thought are worthy of the ancient Roman.

For Erasmus, the correct style of the *Cato* corresponds to its correct morality. It is, as he says at the end of the preface in a compliment to the dedicatee, Jeun de Meun, useful for the schoolmaster who wishes to protect his students from barbarism in literature *and* in conduct ("litterarum, morum barbarie," pref. 3) These verses are "as conducive to purity of Latin style as to good character" ("tanta Romani sermonis munditie, tanquam ad bonos mores conducibiles," pref. 2). Comparison of these sentiments with Eberhard's opinion of the work shows both continuity with the medieval tradition and departure from it in Erasmus's attitude. Like the earlier writer, he awards the *Cato* a medal for good conduct; but the simple style criticized by Eberhard is for Erasmus an example of classical purity. It realizes the virtues by which David H. Thomas has characterized Erasmus's own *Colloquia* as "not only a primer of correct Latin usage, but also, and more importantly, a vehicle for moral philosophy, for satire, and for polemic."[12]

Though he does not say so explicitly, it can be further inferred from Erasmus's pedagogical theory and practice that he approved of the form of the *Cato* as well as its contents. In *De pueris instituendis* (510b) he includes in his list of readings suitable for young students "brief and attractive sayings ('sententiae'), to which group belong most proverbs and the pronouncements ('apothegmata') of illustrious men." This approval must certainly be extended to the distichs, which are truly brief *sententiae*, and, because of their attribution to Cato, *apothegmata* in the Erasmian sense. This theoretical seriousness about short moral sayings in good Latin is confirmed by Erasmus's own oeuvre. Fourteen years before Erasmus published the *Cato*, he had already published a collection of 818 *Adagia*, popular sayings, epigrams, proverbs, and anecdotes; the collection would grow to 4,151 items by the 1536 edition.[13]

The apparent ambivalence of Erasmus's attitude toward the *Cato* should now be more understandable. On the one hand, Erasmus accepts, at least implicitly, Budé's notion that the edition is no challenge to a great Humanist's powers. On the other, Erasmus believes that a proper introduction to Latin literature is an integral part of the Humanist curriculum, and he is convinced

that his edition furnishes this introduction. Both these attitudes appear in his second reply to Budé: "I will not shrink from tasks even more despicable than my despised Petty Cato, provided I can see that they help to promote liberal studies" (Letter 480, *Correspondence*, 4:104–5).

In tracing the steps Erasmus took to transform the *Cato* from a medieval to a Humanist schoolbook, we can follow the lead of the author. As he explains in the preface (1), his first task was to correct the text ("a mendis repurgavimus"). That is, he aimed to produce the critical edition necessary for accurate reading of the *Cato*. If he followed his typical procedure, he did not arrive at a text, as a critic would today, by the collection, collation, and stemmatization of a large number of manuscripts. Rather, he corrected a *Vorlage*, a base manuscript or printed edition, by codices and other editions at his disposal, and by his own instincts.[14] As to what this *Vorlage* was, he gives no hint. It is clear, however, that he was able to correct it from a wide variety of readings. In the preface, he mentions two earlier, inferior editions of the *Cato* (pref. 1). In his comment on prose saying 6, he supports a reading found "in very old codices" ("in quibusdam vetustissimis codicibus"), and in his comment on prose saying 20 he offers a variant reading culled from several manuscripts.[15] His remarks on II.23 imply that he was familiar with the work of many editors on that proverb (cf. "multi laborant"), and had classified their readings (cf. "quidam . . . elidunt"). He also had before him Maximus Planudes's Greek translation of the *Cato*, but he found little use for it.[16]

Petitmengin aptly describes this editorial technique, which makes *ad hoc* rather than systematic use of manuscript evidence and earlier editions, as "emendation assisted by codices."[17] Texts edited in this fashion are even more likely to reflect the personal views of the editor than those whose corrections are buttressed by the authority of a systematically ranked family of manuscripts. To his attempts to uncover genuine readings (*germanae lectiones*, cf. 6, I.6) in the *Cato*, Erasmus brings two noticeable if unstated predilections. The first is for the sharpest possible expression of sense, even at the expense of other criteria. At III.17, the *textus receptus* reads, "See that you read many things, and when they have been read thoroughly ('perlectis'), read them thoroughly ('perlege') many times, for the poets sing things to be marvelled at but not believed." Erasmus wishes to stress the idea of critical reading in the first line of the proverb by changing *perlege* to *perline*, giving the sense, "and when they have been read through thoroughly, correct them many times." To gain this sharpening of sense he willingly replaces a common verb (*perlegere*) with a comparatively rare one (*perlinere*, "to salve") used in an unusual metaphorical sense[18] and sacrifices the rhetorical *variatio* (retention of verb with change of syntax) "perlectis . . . perlege."[19]

His second great criterion in making conjectures is sound syntax and style. For example, at III.19 he excises the superfluous *tu* (you) in the command "noli tu" (do not wish to, do not think to) by changing it to the future

imperative "nolito" (thou shalt not wish to); this new word is the archaic verb form appropriate to legal, religious, and moral formulas. At II.23 he simply excises the *tu* from "noli tu," thus regularizing not only the imperative but also the meter of the line by removing an extra syllable.[20]

Through his editing and comments, Erasmus transforms the *Cato* into a text readable by Humanist standards; in the body of his commentary he interprets it in accord with the special interests and techniques of Humanist pedagogy. Once again, he himself is the best guide to his special preoccupations: "We have also added notes, brief to be sure, but rather more useful, unless I am mistaken, than those commentaries with which two particular men have sullied this little work. One of them engages in rhetoric most dully, a man more speechless ('infantior') than infancy itself; the other philosophizes most ineptly, and neither says anything relevant to the poem" (pref. 1).

It is perhaps natural to connect the brevity of the commentary with Erasmus's admission that he spent little time on his edition (Letter 421, *Correspondence*, 3:307). But if brevity were a matter of expediency, it was an expediency that can be defended by his pedagogical experience. In a letter to Budé, commenting on the reception of the *De copia* (1512), Erasmus remarks that he omitted many examples from the best authors, although they would have added greatly to the dignity of his work, partially because he was afraid it would lose its value for its intended audience. He adds that, despite this precaution, some teachers still complained that the book was too difficult for readers of moderate attainments (Letter 480, *Correspondence*, 4:106). These difficulties encountered with *De copia* may go as far or farther than hasty production in explaining the infrequency of classical citations in the *Cato* of 1514. Of Greek authors, Hesiod, Homer, Solon, and Aristotle are cited briefly, paraphrased, or alluded to in passing (at I.24, II.27, and IV.22 respectively). Among Latin authors, Pliny, Plautus, Terence, and Ovid are each honored by a single mention (at I.2, I.32, II.18, and II.25 respectively). *Aeneid* VI is explicitly mentioned once (I.1). *Sententiae* are attributed to Socrates, Pyrrhus, Plato, and "a certain philosopher" (II.2, II.4, I.37, and, again, I.37).

In Erasmus's view, the need for brevity should affect the treatment not only of classical citations but of all the subjects in a school commentary. Conciseness defines the form, just as appropriateness defines the content of successful scholia. He censures the schoolbooks of his youth by these criteria. "Immortal God," he exclaims at *De pueris instituendis*, 514e–f, "what a time was then, when with great flourish the couplets of John of Garland were taught to youths, with laborious and verbose commentaries ('operosis ac prolixis commentariis')!" The commentaries were laborious because of the absurd dialectical subtlety with which they treated grammar. Verbosity seems to have been an inescapable characteristic of the method.[21]

The *Cato* commentary can be seen as a reaction to both these faults. The explanatory material is brief. Twice Erasmus calls attention to the literary effect of a couplet. At I.11 he comments on the contrast between the

consonance of the first verse, which has "dilige" as the first word and "amicus" as the last, and the discord of the second, which has "bonus" toward the beginning and "mala" toward the end. Concerning I.34 he makes the more general aesthetic comment, "nothing more elegant than this couplet could be fashioned." There is more historical commentary. Background is given for 9 of the 198 couplets he comments on. Of these, 3 give such basic information as what a *paidagogus* was (4, 6, 23). The remaining 6 contain some interesting comparisons between ancient pagans and Renaissance Christians, usually in favor of the former (45; I.1, II.27, III.11, IV.14, IV.38).

For Erasmus's own notion of the appropriateness of these remarks, we can refer to his list of topics that readers of the classics ought to note: "you will carefully observe when reading writers *whether any striking word occurs*, if diction is archaic or novel, if some argument shows brilliant invention . . . *if there is any brilliance of style*, if there is any adage, *historical parallel*, or maxim worth committing to memory" (*De ratione studii*, 670–71; my italics).

As James McConica remarks, the identity of the two commentators on the *Cato* whom Erasmus claimed to surpass "must be left to conjecture."[22] However, a useful comparison in assessing the difference between Erasmus's school notes and those of his competitors is afforded by the fifteenth-century Pafraet edition, with a commentary by Robertus de Euremodio.[23]

The qualities for which Erasmus praises his own *Cato* and damns his rivals'—sound style and sound moral philosophy—are the same that attracted potential readers of Pafraet's edition. The colophon advertises the pseudo-Cato as "moralissimus" and Euremodius's commentary as "elegantissimus." Euremodius's method, serial explanation of the text, is also Erasmus's. However, Erasmus differs from the older commentator radically in the thoroughly Humanist slant he gives to the form and content of his commentary.

Euremodius's presentation consists of vocabulary and syntactical notes printed over the words of each distich, with a moral commentary following in a separate paragraph: *glossae* over the text followed by a *moralisatio*. In his commentary, we seem to have an example of the kind of school texts Erasmus used in his youth: burdensome in the array of theological texts and arguments, wordy in their presentation. The word-by-word grammatical glosses lend themselves perfectly to the kind of classroom instruction deplored by Erasmus in *De pueris instituendis*, 514f: dictation by the master, repetition by the students, and analysis by the master.[24]

Erasmus's approach is drastically reductive by comparison. Usually he begins with a paraphrase of the couplet under discussion. Information relevant to the interpretation of the couplet follows. His comments can include not only historical information, citations from classical authors, and literary comments destined for students, but also textual observations destined for teachers, for his fellow Humanists, or even for future editors. Only when the interpretation is vexed, or textual clarification is needed, are words, phrases, lines, or couplets glossed. Such glosses are usually the last

item in the note.[25] Nowhere is it stated that the commentary is intended for a specific method of classroom use, and Erasmus's main concern seems to have been to provide the information necessary for any fruitful reading—an accurate text, support of that text where controversial, and background information necessary for understanding. Yet a certain accord can be discerned between the arrangement of material within his notes and pedagogical principles he expresses elsewhere. Omission of the linguistic glosses favored by Euremodius or their relegation to the end of a note shows an analogy to the economical method of Latin instruction he espouses in *De pueris instituendis*, 510d–f. At the elementary level, he favors an environment that allows very young students (three or four years old) to apprehend the meanings of Greek and Latin words as directly as possible. For example, he recommends that children be taught the names of animals, trees, and other objects, as well as declensional endings, from illustrations on tablets.[26] For older students of 13 or 14 who read the *Cato*, words have assumed primacy over things. However, elimination of the initial word-by-word translation has removed a barrier between the students and the text and allows a more direct reading, which can be amplified by the ensuing paraphrase and corrected where the thought is difficult by the concluding glosses. Here, as in the students' earlier exposure to the rudiments of Latin, pupils are to experience meaning as directly as possible.

To some degree the connection made between the absence of old-fashioned glosses in Erasmus's *Cato* and his pedagogical theory must be speculative, as we have no explicit statement from him on the pedagogical intentions of his commentary. Still, the usefulness of Erasmus's commentary for language instruction can be confirmed by the enthusiastic response of a contemporary. Adriaan van Baerland wrote that the notes to the *Cato* were reprinted twice in 1516 alone and that he himself had found them profitable in teaching the *Cato*, not only in forming his students' minds for virtue but also in preparing their tongues for correct speech (*Correspondence*, 4:136).

The comments in Erasmus's notes encourage students to put aside medieval preconceptions and to see the ancient author on his own terms. A good illustration of both tendencies is furnished by the contrast between Erasmus's commentary and Euremodius's on the first distich: "If God is a spirit, as poems ('carmina') tell us, then you must worship him especially with your mind" (I.1).

In the glosses inscribed over the text of this couplet, Euremodius flatly identifies the "carmina" as "Sacrae scripturae." The first sentence of his *moralisatio* (*ad* I.1) appears to grapple with the thought of the pseudo-Cato on its own terms. The notions that God is one, omnipotent, and deserving of heartfelt love and worship are supported on grounds congenial to a late Latin writer tinged with Stoicism, these grounds being natural reason ("naturalis ratio"), the decrees of law ("legalis institutio"), and ideas held by all men ("communis conceptio animorum").

All of these factors, however, were at best shared by pagans and Christians; they contain only so much of non-Christian thought as is allowable by natural theology. Thereafter, the interpretation of the distich is frankly theological, bolstered by references to Solomon and Augustine, among others. God, writes Euremodius, "is the first origin of being, who, according to the word of Solomon, disposes all things in number, weight and measure, embracing all and embraced by nothing. And, if it may be permitted to use the words of Augustine, God is not included within heaven, is not excluded outside of heaven, is not raised above heaven, is not pressed down below heaven" (Euremodius, *ad* I.1).[27]

Erasmus, by contrast, attempts to place the couplet in its true ancient context. The "carmina" of the first line, which describe God as spirit, he identifies with *Aeneid* VI. Whether the author of the distich is indeed alluding to Virgil here is a moot point; the importance of the identification lies in Erasmus's attempt to situate the poem in a historical, Roman context rather than a timeless, Christian one. So Erasmus's first sentence is an attempt to explain the verse from the Roman author's point of view: "The common herd think that God is appeased by immolations of sheep, and bodily things. In truth, since God himself is spirit, i.e., mind, not body, and like is suitable to give pleasure to like, then indeed he must especially be worshipped with purity of mind" (Erasmus, *ad* I.1).

Criticism of contemporary Christian practice follows, but habits of sixteenth-century Christians are firmly portrayed as analogical to, rather than identical with, those of the Romans Cato discusses: "And indeed, nowadays, the common run of Christians worships God with certain bodily ceremonies, although the most pleasing worship is piety of soul" (Erasmus, *ad* I.1).

From this brief comparison, it is clear that Erasmus's *Cato* moves in a different world from Robert's. For Erasmus, Cato's proverb is not, as it is for Robert, another moment in the timeless, orthodox conversation about God that runs from Solomon to his own day. It is an utterance to be placed in its own historical context. Once this has been done, historical comparison and criticism of one's own time becomes possible. The dour attitude towards the sixteenth century which Erasmus develops as he compares it to ancient Rome appears even more decidedly and more amusingly in Erasmus's comment on a couplet dealing with dice. He says dice were condemned by the ancients but in his day are the common sport of princes and of some priests (45).

A schoolboy who began reading Latin from Erasmus's *Cato* had a different experience from the one who began reading Latin from the commentary of Robertus de Euremodio. Erasmus's student read Latin more fluently than Robert's and had a clear-eyed vision of the ancient author inaccessible to students of earlier commentaries. Erasmus's student had at least a suspicion that the ancient world was to be valued for its own sake and was a useful touchstone for his own experience. He had, in short, been initiated into the world of Humanism. It was the contribution of Erasmus

to Humanist education both to perceive this possibility of initiation in the hoary old text and to realize it by his genius as an editor and commentator.

NOTES

1. The standard edition of the *Cato* is *Disticha Catonis*, ed. Marcus Boas (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1952). Since Erasmus's editing and commentary are under discussion, I have used, instead of Boas, the most accessible edition: *Catonis moralia cum scholiis Des. Eras. Rot.* (London: Wynkyn de Worde, 1532). In the absence of pagination or complete signature marks, I have created my own system of citation. Arabic numbers have been assigned to the prose sayings by the order of their appearance in the edition. The hexameter couplets are cited by book (Roman numerals) and by the order of their appearance in each book (Arabic numbers). The verse prologues to each of the books are designated by book number and "prol." (e.g., II. prol.). The preface is designated by "pref." and page number (1, 2, 3). The following works are cited from the *Collected Works of Erasmus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974–): vols. 3 and 4, *The Correspondence of Erasmus*, trans. R. A. B. Mynors and D. F. S. Thomson, annot. J. K. McConica; 23:1–122, *The Antibarbarians* (*Antibarbarorum liber*), trans. and annot. Margaret Mann Phillips; 24:661–91, *On the Method of Study* (*De ratione studii ac legendi interpretandique auctores*), trans. and annot. Brian McGregor. But *De pueris instituendis* is cited by section number and letter (e.g., 510d) from *Declamatio de pueris statim ac liberaliter instituendis*, ed. and trans. J.-C. Margolin (Geneva: Droz, 1966). Works by Erasmus appearing in the Toronto series are quoted from the translators listed above. All other translations from Latin are mine.

2. Franz Skutsch, in "Dicta Catonis," in *RealEncyclopaedie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmiller Verlag, 1893–), 5:358, argues the collection's nucleus was produced c. A.D. 200 because *Cato* II.3 resembles an inscription from that period. Robert Browning, in *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature II: Latin Literature*, ed. E. J. Kenney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 695, attributes the collection to the late third or early fourth century A.D.

3. For the *Cato*'s literary and their earliest arrangement, see Skutsch, 5:360–61.

4. Skutsch, 5:365, believes the collection was attributed to Cato the Censor because the prose *sententiae* stylistically resemble other sayings attributed to Cato both individually and in collections which circulated under his name. Browning, 695–96, simply asserts the *Disticha* were attributed to Cato of Utica. Elsewhere in the *Cambridge History of Ancient Literature*, 143, A. S. Gratwick states that by imperial times memories of Cato the Censor and Cato of Utica were easily confused.

5. See the "Accessus Catonis" and *Dialogus super auctores*, lines 322–81, in *Accessus ad auctores, Bernard d'Utrecht, Conrad d'Hirsau*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 21–22, 82–84. Cf. Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. W. R. Trask, Bollingen Series 36 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), 49 ff.

6. The text is in *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle*, ed. Edmond Faral (Paris: Edouard Champion, 1924), 358, but the translation is mine.

7. For the printing history of the *Disticha*, see *The Correspondence of Erasmus*, 3:2.

8. *Antibarbarorum liber*, 33, 34, 36, 66, 68; *De pueris instituendis*, 594–97 nn. 863–65.

9. Charles Béné, in "Culture humaniste et culture médiévale" in *Etudes seiziémistes*, ed. Robert Aulotte (Geneva: Droz, 1980), 5–18, notes that broader continuity existed between medieval and Humanist culture than is often realized.

10.   The Latin text reads "ego sane *tou skotou* quodlibetis antepono." *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, ed. P. S. Allen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906–1958), 2:254.

11.   For the motif of barbarism in Humanist writings, see Gilbert Schrenck, "Profils d'Humanistes: Budé, Erasmus, More, d'après leur correspondance (1500–1530)," *Travaux de linguistique et de littéraire*, 21 (1983): 108–10. For Erasmus's contrasting of Scotus's style and theology with good literature, see A. H. T. Levi, "Erasmus, the Early Jesuits and the Classics," in *Classical Influences on European Culture, A.D. 1500–1700*, ed. R. R. Bolgar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 230.

12.   David H. Thomas, "John Eliot and Erasmus," *Erasmus in English* 9 (1978): 2. For Erasmus's notion of "good literature" (*bonae litterae*) as embracing both good style and moral content, see Maria Cytowska, "Erasmus Grammarien," *Eos* 64 (1976): 223–29.

13.   On the date and major editions of the *Adagia* in Erasmus's lifetime, see Richard L. Demolen, "Omnia opera Desiderii Erasmi," in *Essays on the Works of Erasmus*, ed. Richard L. Demolen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 11.

14.   For Erasmus's editorial procedures, see Pierre Petitmengin, "Comment étudier l'activité d'Erasme éditeur des textes antiques?" in *Colloquia erasmiana turonensia*, ed. J.-C. Margolin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 1:218.

15.   Cf. also 30, where he prints two versions of the proverb with the comment "Nam duplex est lectio."

16.   For Erasmus's knowledge of the *Cato* of Planudes, see *Correspondence*, 3:3. Erasmus is rather condescending to Planudes in the Preface (1–2). Erasmus uses Planudes once for secondary corroboration where Erasmus has other sources (6), and he disagrees with Planudes several times (I.7, I.33, II.7, III.17, IV.46, IV.49).

17.   Petitmengin, 218.

18.   The *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed. P. G. W. Glare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968–1982), has only two citations under *perlinere*: one from Columella (1st c. A.D.) and another from Apuleius (2nd c. A.D.).

19.   Other corrections for the sake of sense are found at I.7, I.33, and IV.25. At II. prol. he suggests mending *Punica* to *civica* for the sake of historical accuracy.

20.   Other emendations for style and syntax are found at II.3 and II.5.

21.   Margolin on *De pueris instituendis*, 514e-f: 592–93 nn. 849–51.

22.   McConica on Letter 298, in *Correspondence of Erasmus*, 3:3 n. 8.

23.   *Cato moralissimus cum elegantissimo commento*, commentary by Robertus de Euremodio (Deventer: Richardus Pafraet, c. 1495).

24.   Cf. "Quum ineptis versiculis dictandis repetendis et exigendis magna pars temporis absumebatur" (When a great part of the time was wasted in faulty verses being dictated, repeated, and dissected) in *De pueris instituendis*, 514.

25.   Single words are glossed at II.1, II.18, IV.25, IV.42, IV.47; a single phrase at I.20, IV.3; several phrases within a couplet at I.1, I.33, III.8, IV.27; a line as a whole at III.23; whole couplets by a phrase, with some words omitted and not in order, at I.40, III.7.

26.   On this passage see Margolin's introduction to *De pueris instituendis*, 54–56, and his "The Method of 'Words and Things' in Erasmus's *De pueris instituendis* (1529) and Comenius's *Orbis sensualium pictus* (1658)," in DeMolen, 221–38.

27.   This is my translation of "qui iuxta Salominis eloquium omnia disponit in numero pondere et mensura comprehendens omnia et a nullo alio comprehensus. Et ut verbis Augustini uti liceat Deus est intra celum non inclusus, extra celum non exclusus, supra celum non elatus, subter celum non depressus."

The Elizabethan Diplomatic Service

by

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The critical early years of Elizabeth's reign witnessed a watershed in European history. The 1559 Treaty of Cateau–Cambrésis, which ended the long Hapsburg–Valois conflict, resulted in a sudden shift in the focus of international politics from Italy to the uncomfortable proximity of the Low Countries. The arrival there, 30 miles from England's coast, in 1567, of thousands of seasoned Spanish troops presented a military and commercial threat the English queen could not ignore. Moreover, French control of Calais and their growing interest in supplanting the Spanish presence in the Netherlands represented an even greater menace to England's security. Combined with these ominous developments, the Queen's excommunication in May 1570 further strengthened the growing anti-English and anti-Protestant sentiment of Counter-Reformation Europe. These circumstances, plus the significantly greater resources of France and Spain, defined England, at best, as a middleweight in a world dominated by two heavyweights. Elizabeth and her chief counselors eventually concluded that an imaginative foreign policy combined with an effective diplomatic system would provide the most telling and least expensive means of counteracting these worrisome developments.[1]

Building upon the foundation laid by her father and sister, Elizabeth presided over the creation of a highly trained and surprisingly professional diplomatic corps, truly a remarkable achievement of the Elizabethan Age. Together with Lord Burghley and Sir Francis Walsingham, she guided the ship of English foreign relations fully into the mainstream of Continental diplomatic tradition. Moreover, as France increasingly suffered from civil–religious conflict, financial chaos, and mediocre leadership, and as Spain endured the fatal flaw of a paper-shuffling administration and the blinding

religious fanaticism and arrogance of both king and diplomats, England, in contrast, often excelled, especially in diplomacy.[2]

While the contributions of Elizabeth and her counselors to England's diplomacy have been carefully studied, much remains to be said concerning the diplomats they directed.[3] Space does not permit an in-depth study of all the men who served on missions between 1558 and 1603, but a singular document in the British Library offers a ready-made, complete, and revealing roster of that diplomatic corps for the middle years of Elizabeth's reign. Located in a Privy Council ready-reference guide known as Lansdowne MS. 683 (fols. 48–49) and dating from August 1579 (see Table), it contains a list of 48 "Noblemen and gentlemen that have served and are fitt to be employed in forrein messages."[4] Subdivided into 8 noblemen and 23 gentlemen "that have served" and 8 noblemen and 19 gentlemen "that have not served but are fitt to serve," this roster has the advantage of containing men who, in large part, served primarily in Elizabeth's reign.[5]

This document reveals the names of few churchmen. Because religious issues predominated in this period of European history, Elizabeth rarely used ecclesiastics as diplomats after the first years of her reign. Men of such pronounced religious views were not the "fittest ambassadors for peace."[6] She also reduced the role of the nobility in diplomatic concerns, using them primarily for ceremonial missions to ratify agreements, bestow gifts, and offer expressions of good will or condolence. This did not preclude them from more traditional diplomatic business, however, as seen in Lord Buckhurst's 1581 embassy of peace to Henry IV of France and his expostulatory mission to the Low Countries in 1587. But these were rare exceptions. Out of 22 missions served by the 8 noble diplomats, only 6 involved negotiations, and of these, Lord Henry Norris's 2 missions came before he was raised to the peerage. As Abraham de Wicquefort concluded in his famous study of early modern diplomacy, even though noble birth "is a great ornament to the Embassador [which] gives great lustre to the Embassy,"[7] few such men apply themselves sufficiently to acquire the qualities necessary to be successful diplomats. They are better used for "Parade than of negotiation."[8]

The major emphasis of this study is therefore the 23 diplomats of gentry status who were the real workhorses of the Elizabethan diplomatic corps.[9] They were middle-ranking men who helped form the core and framework of government and society—men who helped establish the standards, values, and tone of Elizabethan foreign relations. They supplied the second in command and the important followers of the great figures of the day. Without them, Elizabeth, Burghley, and Walsingham could not have hoped to accomplish many of the things they set out to do. Their careers reveal a conscious government policy of selecting men who were widely traveled, intelligent, highly educated, and, when compared to their French and Spanish counterparts, remarkably proficient in foreign languages (see the Appendix

TABLE

"Noblemen and gentlemen that have served and are
fitt to be employed in forrein messages" (August 1579)

Noblemen that have served:

L. Admirall
L. Chamberlaine
Earle of Bedford
Earle of Worcester
L. of Hunsdon
L. of Buckhurst
L. Northe
L. Norreis

Gentlemen that have served:

Sr. Henry Cobham
Sr. Amyce Pawlet
Sr. William Wynter
Sr. Tho: Chamberlayne
Mr. Wylson
Mr. Randolphe
Mr. Henry Killegrew
Sr. Edward Horsey
Sr. Tho: Leighton
Mr. Middlemore
Mr. Henry Knolles thelder
Mr. John Hastings
Mr. Somers
Mr. Corbet
Mr. Beale
Mr. Herbert
Mr. William Davison
Mr. Daniell Rogers
Sr. John Smithe
Mr. Philip Sidney
Mr. Edward Wootton
Sr. William Druery
Mr. Thomas Wilkes
Mr. Robt Beale

Noblemen that have not served but
are fitt to serve:

Earle of Oxford
Earle of Derbye
Earle of Hertford
Earle of Northumberland
Earle of Rutland
L. Howard of Effingham
L. Graye
L. Cobham

Gentlemen that have not served but
are fitt to serve:

Sr. Walter Mildmay
Sr. Henry Lee
Sr. Henrye Wallop
Mr. Roger Manners
Sr. John Clifton
Sr. Thomas Gresham
Mr. Bertye
Mr. Tremayne
Mr. Willm. Killegrew
Mr. Beddingfield
Mr. Francis Caro
Mr. Michaell Blunt
Mr. Fortescue
Mr. Wyndebanck
Mr. Raufe Warcupp
Mr. Shute
Mr. Edward Lewknor
Mr. Wollye
Mr. Frances Alforde

for a summary of their backgrounds). Their careers also reveal the employment of an apprenticeship training program, an emphasis upon long years of diplomatic service, a calculated stress upon nonresident diplomacy, and a strong government commitment to adequate and regular diplomatic remuneration including "enablements," per diem payments, extraordinaries, gifts, and postmission rewards. Such policies help to explain why this branch of the Elizabethan civil service attracted not only the most highly skilled but also some of the most fascinating men found in the Queen's service.[10] The other list of 19 men who had not served became an emergency reserve that as a last resort could be called upon if a seasoned or apprenticed diplomat proved unavailable.[11]

Dominating her government as few English monarchs ever have, Elizabeth loved the practice of diplomacy as a royal game of chess and participated in all diplomatic decisions, even the selection of personnel. In keeping with her father's tradition and the Renaissance stress on civic Humanism, Elizabeth, who explained that when a resident ambassador was called she would nominate a university graduate to be his secretary or chaplain, early on instructed the chancellors of both Oxford and Cambridge to compile a list of promising young graduates, along with their colleges and standings. To these young aspiring diplomats, the possibility of being chosen for such a prestigious assignment was a "switch and spur on their industries."[12]

Consequently, 19 of the 23 diplomats are known to have studied at one or more institutions of higher learning at Oxford or Cambridge, the Inns of Court, and on the Continent. This is a larger percentage than found among any other group of Elizbethan civil servants. Even Members of Parliament could not match it.[13]

While the English Reformation somewhat reduced the number of English Protestants taking degrees in European universities, Marian exile had assisted several others, including Wilson, Randolph, Drury, and Beale, to study on the Continent. Other younger diplomats, such as Wilkes, Rogers, Sidney, and Wotton, studied abroad in the early years of Elizabeth's reign. These 23 diplomats represent Oxford and Cambridge equally, while at least 8 studied law in Italy, at the Inns of Court, or took B.CC. or LL.D. degrees at Oxford or Cambridge. While no educational records survive for Hastings, Horsey, Middlemore, or Winter, their careers reveal highly articulate men who quite probably undertook some form of advanced education.[14] Indeed, several of their number were celebrated for their learning. Chief among them were Henry Knollys, a gifted linguist; Thomas Wilson, author, translator, and economist; Philip Sidney, poet, linguist, soldier, and patron of the arts; and chief clerk of the Privy Council and expert Parliamentarian Robert Beale.[15]

Foreign travel was another important prerequisite for future diplomatic service as it brought a familiarity with geography, peoples, courts, and languages. As the aspiring diplomat Thomas Bodley explained in 1576,

> I waxed desirous to travell beyond the Seas, for attaining to the knowledge of some speciall moderne tongues, and for the encrease of my experience in the managing of affaires, being wholly then addicted to employ myself, and all my cares, in the publique service of the state.[16]

Unlike Sidney, Cobham, or Wilkes, not every future diplomat could afford a grand tour of the Continent; still most of the rest gained their foreign exposure as Marian exiles, diplomatic couriers, commercial agents, soldiers, or governors of Channel Islands.[17]

Often these young students of diplomacy sought to attach themselves to the train of a special embassy or to the household of a resident ambassador. They went not as members of the embassy staff but as guests hoping to learn by observation. Several English residents' correspondence, especially Nicholas Throckmorton's, is sprinkled with reports to parents and patrons concerning their progress in languages, manners, and statecraft. Such guests burdened the embassy's finances and also took a great deal of the ambassador's time. Still, the value of introducing these young travelers to the rudiments of international relations outweighed any inconvenience.[18]

Sir Amais Paulet, the newly appointed ambassador to France, had traveled no farther than Calais before he wrote Burghley complaining of the excessive size and cost of his train:

> I confess that in this little journey between London and Dover I already . . . feel the weight of my heavy train . . . being accompanied with an extraordinary number some of whom were recommended to me by the Queen and others by noblemen. . . . My ordinary train is no greater than of necessity, being augmented by some young gentlemen, whereof one is Sir Nicholas Throckmorton's son, who was recommended to me by Her Majesty and therefore I could not refuse him. The others are so dear to me, and the most part of them of such towardness, as my good hope of their well doing, and that hereafter they will be able to serve their Prince and country, persuades me to make no great account of the charge.[19]

Such an experience was quite normal for resident ambassadors, whose trains were always much larger than those of nonresident envoys, who had to travel quickly and negotiate with a minimum of ceremonial routine.

Particularly important to any future English diplomat was a working knowledge of the diplomatic languages of Western Europe. The unacceptability of English as a language of diplomacy combined with Elizabeth's heavy reliance on nonresident, peripatetic diplomacy required her diplomats to be prepared to serve in several countries and in several languages. Consequently, 19 of these 23 diplomats spoke at least two foreign languages, and 13 were competent in three or more tongues besides their own. Wilkes, Cobham, and Wotton each spoke four languages fluently; Sidney, Rogers, and Wilson spoke five; and Knollys, six. Taken together, these men averaged three foreign languages each. There is no evidence that Sir William Winter spoke anything but English, while Horsey and Hastings spoke but one foreign tongue each. At least 11 spoke Italian, 19 knew Latin, and 19 conversed in French. Though Greek was a language to which all university students had been exposed, only 4 (Knollys, Rogers, Sidney, and Wilson) were competent in that ancient language and only Knollys knew Hebrew.[20] Greek and Hebrew were not languages of diplomacy in Western Europe, yet they did add a measure of luster to the diplomat who knew them.

This uncommon facility with languages continued through Elizabeth's reign into James I's. But once Robert Cecil died in 1612, the Cecilian system of diplomacy began to suffer from lack of leadership. Consequently, the language prowess of English diplomats started to slip, until by the reign of Charles II and James II only 15 of 118 diplomats "drew special notice for their language skills." These 15 averaged but two languages each, and only 2 of them spoke four languages besides their native tongue.[21]

Protestant religious persuasion also conspicuously qualified men for the Elizabethan foreign service. In an age when religious bigotry inflamed international tensions and the certainty of a diplomat's faith was often felt to be as important as his abilities, Elizabeth sensed the importance of selecting diplomats whose religious sympathies served as a guarantee against possible collusion with a Roman Catholic enemy. Only Sir John Smith, the Queen's cousin, professed Roman Catholicism, and he served but one special mission, to Spain from November 1576 to July 1577.[22] It is fairly certain that 15 of the 23 diplomats had puritan sympathies, and at least 10 of these are known to have been Marian exiles.[23] Such a high percentage of dissenters should not be surprising in view of Walsingham's and Leicester's roles in recommending names for diplomatic appointment. It also suggests that Elizabeth too saw some value in having diplomats whose pronounced religious convictions guaranteed a paramount interest in Protestant England's survival. Indeed, in the first two decades of her reign, Elizabeth had diplomats negotiate with Huguenots whose activities in France "reduced the likelihood and effectiveness of French assistance to her arch enemy Scotland."[24] While it is possible that in some cases pronounced differences in religious persuasion between Puritan and Roman Catholic may have

limited English diplomatic contacts, it also made it all the more necessary that English diplomats be men of unusual tact and ability.

The final imperative leading to full diplomatic stature was foreign service as a diplomatic apprentice. Such an apprenticeship began and occasionally ended an aspiring diplomat's career. Service as the secretary to a resident ambassador's embassy was one instructive and realistic apprenticeship. As we have seen, Elizabeth generally chose these apprentices from among the best graduates of Oxford and Cambridge. Unlike the Venetians, whose young men learned the craft of diplomacy by accompanying their fathers or uncles on assignment, Elizabeth, in keeping with the English practice of rearing young men, relied on nonrelated ambassadors to serve as diplomatic tutors. For example, the need for a secretary skilled in the French language was so great in Doctor Valentine Dale's 1573–1575 embassy that Thomas Wilkes was pulled out of graduate studies at All Souls, Oxford, against the strenuous objections of its warden and fellows, to accompany Dale to France.[25] There he fulfilled the normal secretarial duties associated with correspondence, intelligence gathering, supervision of embassy staff, and accompanying Dale on his regular visits to the French court.

While serving the Paris embassy, Wilkes was ordered by Elizabeth to arrange secretly the escape of the Duke of Alençon and Prince Henry of Navarre, who had been imprisoned in the Chateau of Bois de Vincennes following the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 24 August 1576.[26] All went well until, following Charles IX's death, Catherine de' Medici transferred the two princes to closer confinement in the Louvre. There, increased surveillance led to the near capture of Wilkes. Only Henry of Navarre's timely warning that a trap had been set for Wilkes allowed him to escape to England.[27]

Having proven his abilities as Doctor Dale's embassy secretary, Wilkes was subsequently given a more difficult assignment. In 1575 he was sent on a two-year secret assignment to Germany, empowered to seek security for an English loan to the Palatinate to raise troops for a Franco–German Protestant military invasion of France.[28] The thirty-thousand man invasion force that resulted drove a terrified Henry III of France to sue for terms and accept the Peace of Monsieur, which Wilkes helped to negotiate.[29] In all future assignments, he received the regular 40s. per diem wage, which in Elizabethan England signified that the apprenticeship was completed and full diplomatic stature achieved.[30]

Philip Sidney and John Smith had their first tastes of diplomatic service as part of the entourages of the munificent ceremonial embassies that ratified the treaties of Cateau–Cambrésis and Blois.[31] Sir Henry Cobham joined Thomas Radcliffe, the Earl of Sussex, in Austria in 1567 to deliver the Garter and to reopen marriage negotiations with the Archduke Charles.[32] While their apprenticeships were not very prolonged or rigorous, these men were, at least, introduced to the workings of diplomatic give and take and, more especially, learned the importance of ceremony in international relations.

Of the 11 diplomats on the Lansdowne list who served as embassy secretaries only Killigrew was called upon to face the acid test of service as a chargé d'affaires. Thrice during the prolonged absence of ambassadors Throckmorton and Walsingham, he assumed charge of the Paris embassy and each time acquitted himself well.[33] On the other hand, Hugh Fitzwilliam, who became chargé after the unexpected death of Sir Thomas Hoby in July 1566, did not fare so well.[34] He had not served as Hoby's secretary long enough to learn wisdom and soon found himself desperately short of funds. Unwisely he questioned Sir William Cecil's integrity over the matter in a letter to Elizabeth. Neither the Queen nor Cecil was amused, and as soon as Sir Henry Norris, Hoby's replacement, arrived in Paris, Fitzwilliam faded into permanent obscurity. Elizabeth seldom forgave or forgot the indiscretions of lesser personalities. No apprentice diplomat could hope to survive if he failed to display complete confidence in and loyalty to his superiors.[35]

Diplomats such as Paulet and Leighton, who served as governors of Jersey and Guernsey, fulfilled their semiofficial apprenticeships through frequent trips to nearby France to settle the always persistent questions of commerce, religion, and politics that arose between such close neighbors.[36] Yet another way to serve part of a diplomatic apprenticeship was as a commercial agent of the crown, working, for example, to recover seized merchandise, or even as Elizabeth's resident commissary in Antwerp.[37] Beale, Wilson, and Chamberlain all had early experiences in matters such as these, and it stood them on solid ground in their later, more political assignments.

All but Robert Corbet are known to have served an apprenticeship in one form or another. And since Corbet was one of the better-traveled young men patronized by Walsingham, he more than likely had served the Principal Secretary as a Continental agent during those travels.[38] Whatever their apprenticeships consisted of, these diplomats averaged seven years each of this type of hands-on diplomatic schooling before achieving full diplomatic status. However long a man's apprenticeship, Elizabeth alone had the final say as to who would serve a full-fledged mission. Sir William Cecil, writing to Ambassador Norris in Paris in August 1571, said, "I have named to the Queen's Majesty two to be your successor. . . . The one is Mr. F. Walsingham, the other is Mr. Killigrew."[39] As it turned out, Elizabeth's choice fell upon the former.[40]

Finally, expendability characterized Elizabeth's gentry-laden diplomatic corps. Knowledge of their vulnerability kept these men especially alert in the difficult task of negotiation. They knew that any diplomatic faux pas that harmed or embarrassed their Queen could lead to their immediate repudiation. Conversely, the probable domestic repercussions of so dishonoring a titled diplomat must have given the Queen pause when selecting a headstrong and arrogant nobleman such as Leicester, who was chosen to oversee English involvement in the Netherlands in 1585. Aside from economic

considerations, this may explain why the critical business of negotiation was generally left to specialists of moderate social standing.[41]

Occasionally, Elizabeth did not hesitate to throw her diplomats to the wolves even when they had carried out her instructions to the letter. A case in point is the incident mentioned above of Thomas Wilkes's near capture by French authorities while secretly contacting the imprisoned Alençon and Navarre. Beating a hasty retreat back to what he thought was the safety of the English court, Wilkes arrived only to discover that an angry letter of protest from Catherine de' Medici had already reached Elizabeth.[42] Embarrassed at having an embassy secretary caught in such questionable activities, Elizabeth gave Wilkes a good tongue-lashing and then answered Catherine's letter by expressing her "astonishment" at Wilkes's clandestine behavior.[43] She then ordered the frightened secretary back to Paris to clear her good name with the French court. So angry was Catherine in her interview with Wilkes that he feared for his life during his remaining months at the Paris embassy, especially after Elizabeth ordered him once again to resume his secret contacts with the prisoners![44]

A second brush Wilkes had with royal anger came when he was sent to the court of Philip II in December 1577, and it demonstrates that other monarchs came to suspect Elizabeth of such duplicity. Upon his arrival in Madrid there was a mix-up over his diplomatic rank.[45] Philip, thinking Wilkes to have come with the title *Legatus*, ordered that the English envoy be escorted to his first audience by one of the king's major-domos and "a great troop of gentlemen of the Household."[46] To the sixteenth-century mind, *Legatus* was equivalent to *Ambaxador* and one who held either title was of the highest diplomatic rank. Philip had no love for these English heretics; political necessity alone forced him to receive such envoys. Having read Wilkes's letter of introduction, Philip was mortified to realize that he had so honored an Englishman who held only the minor rank of *Nuncio*. In anger he exploded to one of his secretaries:

> I believed the Englishman has deceived us . . . he
> is not called Legatus but Nuncio . . . so that much
> of that which we may arrange with him may be
> repudiated. . . . It will be well to send the man off
> long before his fortnight is up, and this before
> he commits some impertinence which will oblige
> us to burn him.[47]

While it is doubtful that Philip would have dared commit so extreme a breach of diplomatic immunity, this incident demonstrates the dangerous emotions that could be stirred at a Counter-Reformation court and reveals Philip II's suspicion that Elizabeth sent diplomats of lesser rank in order to preserve her freedom to disavow any arrangements that later proved inimical

to English interests. Nor was Wilkes the only one to suffer in this way. Daniel Rogers and William Davison experienced similar repudiations before the latter's diplomatic career was eventually shattered when in 1587 Elizabeth selected him to be the scapegoat for Mary Stuart's execution.[48]

Another reason for the success of Elizabethan diplomacy is that in a time when resident diplomacy was in vogue throughout Western Europe, Elizabeth deliberately broke step with this trend. Certainly, political–religious circumstances played a role, but her personal preference for the more traditional, manageable, and less expensive nonresident diplomacy kept permanent embassies to a minimum throughout her long reign. Of the 111 missions served by these 23 men, only 9 were resident while 15 of the 23 men served no resident assignments at all.[49]

Geographically, England did not have as much to gain from resident diplomacy as the neighboring Continental states, where the conditions that produced the Italian diplomatic system (time, distance, and probable military surprise) existed. Behind the safety of the Channel moat, Elizabeth had a freedom of diplomatic maneuvering unavailable to most European states. She certainly sensed this better than her father had and felt that "no commitment was more than tentative, no alliance irrevocable, and at each new shuffle in the diplomatic game, the other players had to bid all over again for England's friendship or neutrality."[50] Elizabeth's determination to keep power in her own hands by negotiating on her own terms and in her own time, not on the advice of a resident ambassador, certainly played a large part in her stress upon peripatetic, ad hoc diplomacy. Due to the brevity of their missions and freshness of instructions, nonresident diplomats proved more manageable than residents, whose long tenure could breed individualism, rarely considered a diplomatic virtue.[51]

Normally, sending resident ambassadors proved more advantageous for princes than receiving them since the latter represented the receipt of an official spy in their capital city. But in the atmosphere of Counter-Reformation Europe, Elizabeth's lack of residents in most European capitals reduced the likelihood of trouble with suspicious monarchs. This is one of the reasons she recalled John Man from Spain and never sent a replacement.[52]

Nonresident missions generally succeeded because they were traditionally and primarily errands of peace. Their short duration posed less of a threat to the religious orthodoxy and internal security of the host government. Evidence that permanent embassies often aroused the suspicion of and even proved dangerous to a foreign prince fills diplomatic correspondence.[53] The residences of these "ambassadors of ill-will" often served as centers of foreign intrigue and a gathering place for the disaffected of the kingdom.[54] His was "the trade of an honest spy, sent to lie abroad for his country's good."[55] No one understood this better than Elizabeth. The role of Spain's embassy in London in plots against the Queen's life, as well as the trouble caused in France by one of her own resident ambassadors, Nicholas Throckmorton,

provide cases in point. Add to these considerations the emotions stirred at a Roman Catholic court over the presence of a resident English heretic practicing his infectious religious principles, and it is small wonder that Elizabeth preferred nonresident diplomacy. To be sure, there would have been serious disadvantages in relying exclusively on it. A permanent ambassador was valued primarily for gathering intelligence and training apprentice diplomats. Elizabeth took advantage of the best of both forms of diplomacy by always maintaining a resident in Paris, which, by the time of her reign had become the fulcrum of European diplomatic activity and intelligence.[56]

Elizabeth's unusual linguistic abilities also encouraged her to conduct foreign policy on a personal basis as few of her fellow monarchs could. Thus she preferred to handle as much diplomacy as possible at home. The presence there of foreign residents and their embassy personnel did not pose as serious a threat to her internal security as might be expected because of their reluctance to master the English language. Philip II, on the other hand, because of geographic remoteness and his pronounced distaste for the presence of heretical English diplomats, eventually chose to conduct his diplomacy abroad through titled, resident, and necessarily independent diplomats. The opposite approaches of the two countries dovetailed nicely, but they created the mistaken notion that Spanish diplomats and diplomacy excelled English when in fact the Elizabethan system maximized the country's resources and controlled the conduct of her diplomats in a way which the Spanish system did not.[57]

English itinerant diplomats, primarily negotiators, served in more varied and often more challenging situations than residents. Frequent missions allowed little time for preparation. Therefore, diplomats had to stay always prepared and informed. A case in point was Elizabeth's hasty dispatch in December 1577 of Thomas Wilkes to Spain in hopes of salvaging the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Low Countries. He carried a letter to Philip from Elizabeth explaining the reason for such haste. She wrote,

> We have therefore thought fit to avail ourselves
> of his services in this embassy, in order that he
> may return with all possible speed with Your
> Serenity's answer. We should have sent a more
> formal embassy if, as is usual with acute diseases,
> such a rankling wound as this did not need a
> speedy means of cure.[58]

These men became sixteenth-century ambassadors-at-large, specialists in crisis diplomacy, ready to follow the camp and brave the guns of a turbulent era in European history. For such rushed assignments, a quick mind and a solid grasp of European politics and personalities held more importance than the high-sounding titles, sophisticated manners, and lavish display inherent in

the success of ceremonial ambassadors or the less spectacular day-to-day tasks of the resident diplomats.

Nonresident diplomats had to gather their intelligence and the confidence of the host prince quickly and accurately. Their hurried negotiations allowed little margin for error. Consequently, they proved to be men of judgment, not easily deceived, astute in the politics of the day, aware that any misstep would be repudiated by an angry government at home. Their missions deprived these ambulatory diplomats of the comfort and convenience of an official residence, a sizable retinue, wives and children, and sufficient time to adjust to the conditions of an alien environment.[59] Instead, long and hurried journeys, prolonged exposure to inclement weather, and hard riding to avoid brigands and enemy patrols repeatedly faced them. Such hardships eventually destroyed the health of all but the strongest of men and may reveal why Elizabeth chose for her diplomatic service considerably younger men than those chosen by other monarchs.[60]

Lower cost provided for Elizabeth and her advisers another decided advantage of nonpermanent diplomacy. With the exception of the rare ceremonial embassies, nonresident diplomats received an average of 26s. 8d. less per day than their resident counterparts. Shorter duration, more limited size, and less need for the accouterments of resident embassies show how such assignments, though more numerous, definitely saved Elizabeth money.[61]

Not surprisingly, some of these men began to specialize. Killigrew, Wilkes, Cobham, Leighton, and Somers became the French experts because of their mastery of the culture and repeated service there. Cobham, an accomplished courtier, was especially successful at the elegant court of Henry III. Long a member of Elizabeth's household, Cobham established with the king a relaxed and personal relationship, which bore much diplomatic fruit.[62] Wilkes' friendship with Henry of Navarre, formed in the trying months of his post-St. Bartholomew's imprisonment, later resulted in repeated missions to his royal friend after he became King Henry IV.[63] Wilkes, along with Davison and Rogers, gained a reputation as an authority on the Low Countries. The Spanish expert was Chamberlain, while, close to home, Randolph, Killigrew, and Drury specialized in Scottish diplomacy.[64] Doctor Wilson, who was also the government authority on maritime disputes and international law, best understood Portuguese matters. As a civil law specialist and a Master of Requests, he, along with legal expert Robert Beale, became the Privy Council's chief adviser on such matters. Thomas Chamberlain, England's former commissary in Flanders and Governor of the Merchant Adventurers, also counseled the Crown on these matters until his death in 1580. John Somers earned his name for his ability to decipher purloined documents collected by Walsingham's extensive European intelligence organization as well as for an ability to formulate precise diplomatic instructions.[65]

Given the hardships, risks, and frustrations common to all diplomats, one has to ask why so many men of quality gravitated to the Elizabethan diplomatic service. The answer is quite simple—the rewards for such service were often very lucrative. Though such a statement flatly contradicts the conclusions of most diplomatic historians and even the official correspondence of the diplomats themselves, most diplomats suffered little because of straitened circumstances.[66] Research in the "Dormant Privy Seal Books" of the Exchequer indicates that these men were adequately and regularly compensated and accepted repeated assignments as their best avenue to financial independence.[67]

After an erratic start, the procedure and practice of Elizabethan diplomatic pay became surprisingly sophisticated. Per diems averaging £4–6 for noblemen on ceremonial embassies, 66s. 8d. for resident ambassadors, and 40s. for nonresident envoys, were paid with unprecedented regularity. The Queen paid cash advances on these per diems of from one to three months for special envoys and six months for residents to enable a diplomat to equip himself properly for important assignments. Extraordinary expenses—including transportation costs, intelligence gathering, posting expenses, the charge for bringing one's family abroad, renovating the Queen's silver plate at the embassy, money lost in exchanging English pounds for foreign currency, and even the costs of embalming and returning the diplomat's body to England for burial—were all promptly paid.[68]

Such payments do not take into account the willingness of some foreign courts to assume a portion of the diplomat's living expenses while at court or the often lucrative gifts of gold chains or silver plate that could be expected at the hand of a foreign prince upon a diplomatic leave-taking.[69] Nor do they include the eagerly anticipated and diligently sought-for gifts bestowed by Elizabeth before, during, and after their missions. Loans, cash gifts, and lucrative cathedral deaneries were frequently given before the mission to "enable" a man to meet the high costs of equipping himself.[70] Duty-free export licenses, cash grants, and even gifts of jewelry to an ambassador's wife could occasionally be expected during the mission, especially a resident mission.[71] Upon returning home, offices, grants of wardship, leases on crown lands, and monopolies awaited the diplomat.[72] Such gifts, so widely expected among English diplomats, argue compellingly in favor of Elizabeth's generosity to her diplomatic corps.

Research also shows that a diplomat's allowances were sufficient to cover the ordinary everyday costs of conducting a mission—especially if the diplomat exercised a modicum of thrift. Furthermore, all the other gifts and grants that came with diligent and repeated service abroad left most of these 23 diplomats in surprisingly comfortable circumstances by the end of their diplomatic careers. Only those who served few missions or died on their only assignment or soon after returning lacked the time to capitalize on their service. Constant complaints of need from most Elizabethan

diplomats should not deceive the historian. This was simply the expected and accepted procedure for wrangling nonsalaried remuneration from England's otherwise frugal Queen.[73]

Elizabeth's conservatism expressed itself in a policy of keeping men in their offices as long as possible. "New blood entered only when vacancies were created," and thus the government "aged steadily with the Queen."[74] This stress on longevity unlocks our understanding of the significance of the Elizabethan diplomatic achievement. Competing in a threatening world of Counter-Reformation politics and religious wars, the Queen found comfort in using experienced diplomats repeatedly. The Spanish and French courts might smile or even protest the English diplomats' lack of noble blood and elevated titles, but they rarely faulted their abilities. Between 1570 and 1590 an average of only one new name every two years appeared on the active diplomatic list. Together, these 23 diplomats averaged five missions each. Eliminating those who served only one or two missions, because of early death, old age, excessively pronounced religious views, or appointment to other important government offices, the average climbs to eight missions each. Four (Killigrew, Randolph, Wilkes, and Rogers) served 10 or more missions, with Killigrew at 19. Several had diplomatic careers that spanned over a quarter-century.[75] Such figures speak volumes concerning the professionalism of the Elizabethan diplomatic service.

Clearly, significant institutionalization of diplomatic procedures occurred during Elizabeth's rule. The very length of her reign allowed such institutionalization to come to fruition. Counter-Reformation politics did not result, as some have suggested, in a reduction of diplomacy, only in its complication. The issues between Protestants and Roman Catholics became so serious, the possibilities of unending religious war so frightening, and the threat of Spanish hegemony so real, that English diplomacy actually expanded during the second half of the sixteenth century.[76] Elizabeth and her counselors met these threats through a unique blend of permanent and peripatetic diplomacy combined with a diplomatic corps of highly educated, traveled, and linguistically skilled men whose long apprenticeships, numerous foreign assignments, and key domestic offices made them more than a match for other diplomats of Early Modern Europe. Together they strengthened England's powerbase, enhanced her international prestige, and helped prevent the Hapsburg domination of Europe.

That so much of the Elizabethan diplomatic structure withered away after Robert Cecil's death, in 1612, should not confuse historians into believing it never existed. Nor should it blind them to the degree of sophistication it achieved. It was a system singularly attuned to the needs and resources of early modern England.[77]

NOTES

1. Cf. Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964), chap. 20. Richard B. Wernham, *Before the Armada* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 234–89. Paul S. Crowsen, *Tudor Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1973), 158–214.

2. One has only to think of the bungling Spanish ambassador to London, Don Guerau de Spes (1568–1572), who in a matter of months managed to destroy the long-standing Tudor–Hapsburg alliance, or of the arrogant dogmatism of Bernardino de Mendoza (1578–1584) in aiding and abetting those who tried to murder Elizabeth. Cf. De Lamar Jensen, *Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964). Mattingly, 196–97, speaks of Philip II's "jealous secrecy and fatal industry, his passion for seeing and handling, annotating and eventually answering all important correspondence himself, [all of which] lay like a dead weight on the conduct of his foreign policy."

3. Cf. Conyers Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925); *Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955); and "Walsingham and Burghley in Queen Elizabeth's Privy Council," *English Historical Review* 28 (January 1913): 34–58. John B. Black, *The Reign of Elizabeth, 1558–1603* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936). Martin A. S. Hume, *The Courtships of Queen Elizabeth* (New York: Phillips & Company, 1904) and *The Great Lord Burghley: A Study in Elizabethan Statecraft* (London: J. Nisbet, 1898). John E. Neale, *Queen Elizabeth* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1934). Wernham, *After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the Struggle for Western Europe 1588–1595* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) and *The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558–1603* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Wallace T. MacCaffrey, *The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) and *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572–1588* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

4. This Lansdowne MS cannot be dated later than October 1579, the death date of Sir William Drury, nor earlier than May 1579, the date Sir Thomas Leighton was knighted. Because another page of Lansdowne MS. 683 (fol. 44) contains a 10 August 1579 list of "The names of the Lordes and others of hir Majestys Privey Counsell," it is quite likely that the list of diplomats which appears on fols. 48–49 was composed only shortly thereafter. The British Library—Stowe MS. 570, fol. 129—contains an earlier but comparable 1576 roster of active and potential diplomats. It can be dated between the seventh and twenty-second of September 1576, as Sir Amais Paulet, who appears on the "have served" roster, began his first and only diplomatic assignment on 7 September 1576, and the Earl of Essex, who died 22 September 1576, is also listed with the notation "deade" to the side of his name. In the Lansdowne roster Robert Beale's name is mistakenly listed twice, and Francis Carew should be designated as "Sir," having been knighted in 1576.

5. Most of Elizabeth's old-guard diplomats, many of whom had served under previous monarchs, were dead by May 1579. These include Peter Mewtas (d. 1562); Thomas Chaloner (d. 1565); Thomas Hoby (d. 1566); John Mason (d. 1566); Nicholas Wotton (d. 1567); Armigal Waad (d. 1568); John Man (d. 1569); Thomas Danett (d. 1569); Thomas Thirlby, Bishop of Ely (d. 1570); Nicholas Throckmorton (d. 1571); William, Lord Howard of Effingham (d. 1573); and Thomas Smith (d. 1577). Several

pre-Elizabethan diplomats, including Lord William Paget (d. 1563), Peter Vannes (d. 1563), and William Pickering (d. 1575), lived on into Elizabeth's reign but never served her diplomatically. Cf. Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds., *Dictionary of National Biography* [hereafter: *DNB*] (London: Oxford University Press, 1917), and P. W. Hasler, ed., *The House of Commons 1558–1603* [hereafter: *HoC*] (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office [hereafter: HMSO], 1981), chaps. 1–3.

6.   Mattingly, 174. Thomas Thirlby, Bishop of Ely, who was already at Cateau–Cambrésis upon Elizabeth's accession, refused to take the Oath of Supremacy after his return to England and so was deprived of his ecclesiastical office, excommunicated from the English church, and later died under house arrest. *DNB*. *HoC*. This policy is in marked contrast to Henry VIII's heavy reliance on ecclesiastical diplomats such as Wolsey, Gardiner, Bonner, Tunstall, and Thirlby.

7.   Abraham van Wicquefort, *The Embassador and His Functions*, trans. John Digby (London: B. Lintott, 1716), 47–48.

8.   Elizabeth could hardly expect noblemen to serve prolonged resident assignments. They were often difficult to control and perceived diplomatic service as an irksome duty, interesting at best, but always excessively expensive due to the expected extravagance of any titled mission. Unlike gentlemen diplomats, an English nobleman never perceived diplomatic service as a steppingstone to greater honors and emoluments. Also, Elizabeth insisted that her diplomatic regulars be highly educated, extensively traveled, proficient in foreign languages, and that they had served some form of diplomatic apprenticeship. Noblemen rarely possessed such qualities. Cf. George D. Ramsay, "The Foreign Policy of Elizabeth I," in *The Reign of Elizabeth I*, ed. Christopher Haigh (London: Macmillan, 1984), 151–52.

9.   Several aspiring diplomats, including Edward Stafford, Robert Bowes, George Carey, William Waad, and William Herle, were still involved in their diplomatic apprenticeships and so not yet included on the roster of men fit to be employed. Others who would serve later in Elizabeth's reign and even into subsequent reigns were Bartholomew Clerk (d. 1590), Roger Williams (d. 1595), Henry Unton (d. 1596), Robert Cecil (d. 1612), Thomas Bodley (d. 1613), Thomas Parry (d. 1616), Anthony Mildmay (d. 1617), Christopher Perkins (d. 1622), Robert Sidney (d. 1626), Stephen Lesieur (d. 1627), and Thomas Edmondes (d. 1639). Cf. *DNB* and *HoC*.

10.   Historians mistakenly classify William Harborne, Edmund Hogan, Anthony Jenkinson, Daniel Sylvester, and Jerome Bowes as members of the Elizabethan diplomatic corps. As evidenced by the Lansdowne list, the Privy Council thought otherwise. So did Wicquefort, who makes clear that such temporary and resident commissioners of the Merchant Adventurers and Levant or Muscovy companies were not diplomats though often asked by the Privy Council to deliver government dispatches and oral messages on political matters to their host prince (46). Instead, these men were primarily commercial agents, paid by the mercantile concerns who sent them to Constantinople, Morocco, and Russia. Thus none of their names appears on diplomatic rosters. Cf. Hugh G. Rawlinson, "The Embassy of William Harborne to Constantinople," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th ser., 5 (1922): 1–27; Arthur L. Horniker, "William Harborne and the Beginning of Anglo–Turkish Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," *Journal of Modern History* 14 (September 1942): 289–316; Thomas S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553–1603* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), 118–19, 147–52; Lloyd E. Berry and

Robert O. Crummey, eds., *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth Century Voyages* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 43–58, 289–99; *DNB*.

11.   Among the gentlemen listed as fit to serve but having not yet served, only two may have possibly served later in Elizabeth's reign. The first, "Mr. Bertye," is probably Peregrine Bertie, later Lord Willoughby, who in the 1580s, after being raised to the peerage, served two missions to Denmark. The other, "Mr. Wollye," may be the same John Wolley who was one of Elizabeth's Latin secretaries sent in June 1586 to Scotland to reassure James VI regarding the treatment of his imprisoned mother. Sir Thomas Gresham served missions in 1552 and 1559 but was subsequently considered too valuable a financial adviser to be included on the list of those having served. His placement on the Lansdowne roster must indicate the Council's willingness to consider him in an emergency. Cf. *DNB* and *HoC*.

12.   Montagu Burrows, *Worthies of All Souls* (London: Macmillan, 1874), 105. Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on the Pepys Manuscripts* (London: HMSO, 1911), 35.

13.   See the Appendix and also *HoC* 1:4–6. Of this sample of Elizabethan diplomats, 82 percent are known to have had some form of further education; 70 percent studied in English universities, while 37 percent of these same men also studied in foreign universities. Only 21 percent are known to have attended the Inns of Court, and 60 percent of these also had university educations. Such figures continued to rise throughout Elizabeth's reign. By comparison, only 48 percent of the 1584 House of Commons had undergone any kind of advanced studies at the universities, Inns of Court, or both. By 1601 these figures for the Commons had risen to 47 percent attending a university and 55 percent the Inns of Court. The crossover factor of the portions of these Parliament men studying at both the universities and Inns of Court rose to approximately 50 percent by this same year, giving a total of 347 Members of Parliament (74 percent) who had undergone some form of advanced education. Not surprisingly, Elizabethan diplomats were heavily weighted in favor of a classical university education (70 percent), as opposed to studying at the Inns of Court (21 percent). By contrast, only 47 percent of the 1601 House of Commons had studied at the university level, while 55 percent had attended the Inns of Court. Also of interest is the fact that while 37 percent of Elizabethan diplomats studied in foreign universities, only a maximum of 2 percent of the Commons ever studied abroad.

14.   Cf. *DNB*; *HoC*; and Christina H. Garrett, *The Marian Exiles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938).

15.   Cf. *DNB* and *HoC*. Several early Elizabethan diplomats who were no longer living were also known for their learning. They included Thomas Smith, Nicholas Wotton, Armigal Waad, Thomas Hoby, and Peter Mewtas. Others, including Thomas Bodley, the noted Hebraist, the poet Edward Dyer, and the rhetorician Bartholomew Clerk had yet to make their appearances as diplomats. Valentine Dale, a noted specialist in international law, continued to serve as the Privy Council's legal expert on foreign affairs.

16.   Thomas Bodley, *The Life of Sir Thomas Bodley* (Oxford: Henry Hall, 1647), 4.

17.   Cf. *DNB* and *HoC*. See Garrett, passim; E. J. B. Allen, *Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972), chaps. 2, 4, 7, and appendix 1; and Great Britain, Public Record Office, State Papers [hereafter: PRO, SP],

2/246, #154. During the reigns of Charles II and James II, only 26 percent of English diplomats traveled the Continent before entering foreign service. Phyllis Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II and James II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 58. See Appendix to my article.

18.   Great Britain, Public Records Office, *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series* [hereafter: *Cal. S. P. For.*] *of the Reign of Elizabeth*, 1558–1565, ed. Joseph Stevenson (London: HMSO, 1863–1870), passim. Clare Howard, *English Travellers of the Renaissance* (New York: J. Lane, 1914), chaps. 2–3. Not all grand tours proved beneficial. Sir William Cecil's errant eldest son, Thomas, was sent to Paris to learn from Throckmorton. The young man's antics nearly drove his father and the ambassador to distraction, especially when he bedded a French nobleman's daughter, causing no end of embarrassment.

19.   Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series* [hereafter: *Cal. S. P. Dom.*], *Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth I, and James I*, Addenda, 1566–1579, ed. Everett Green (London: HMSO, 1871), 504. In the later years of Elizabeth's reign the English ambassador in Paris charged such young hangers-on 100 crowns a year each for their board. *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1601–1603, 200.

20.   Mattingly, 186–87. Garrett, 21. Jean J. Jusserand, *The School for Ambassadors and Other Essays* (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), 18. Even Turkish was considered a more important language for European diplomats than English. One historian of Louisquatorzien diplomacy has written: "French diplomats of the seventeenth century knew Latin but rarely the language of the country to which they were accredited. Even those ambassdors who did have a foreign language seldom knew it before they were chosen. Rather they learned it after they arrived in the country." William J. Roosen, "The True Ambassador: Occupational and Personal Characteristics of French Ambassadors under Louis XIV," *European Studies Review* 3, no. 2 (1973): 129–30. See Appendix.

21.   Lachs, 54–55.

22.   Cf. *DNB*. It is also felt that Wotton leaned toward Roman Catholicism, especially after the death of Elizabeth.

23.   Lansdowne MS. 17, fol. 135. The term *puritan* is here used in the sense of one whose religious outlook colored his entire view of foreign policy. Such a diplomat often placed a high priority on the survival of English Protestantism. Patrick Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 25–27, 166. William Hunt, *The Puritan Movement: The Coming Revolution in an English County* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 92, 146.

24.   De Lamar Jensen, in "Franco–Spanish Diplomacy and the Armada," in *From the Renaissance to Counter–Reformation*, ed. Charles H. Carter (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), 206, states that between 1581 and 1584 Robert Beale "was employed in negotiation with the Queen of Scots at Sheffield. Campden suggests that he was chosen for this business on account of his notorious bias in favor of puritanism."

25.   Charles W. Boase and Andrew Clark, eds., *Register of the University of Oxford* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885–1888), 1:274; 2:iii, 25. *DNB*. PRO, SP 70/127, fol. 39. James C. Davis, *Pursuit of Power: Venetian Ambassadors' Reports on Spain, Turkey and France in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 6–7. See Appendix. The web of intermarriage and family connections that bound most Elizabethan diplomats together reveals the involvement of Burghley, Leicester, and Walsingham

in the selection process. During Burghley's early tenure as Principal Secretary his men predominated with the likes of Killigrew, Hoby, and Dannet, all related to him by marriage. Later, Leicester's and Walsingham's men prevailed, especially in the nonresident missions to the Low Countries, to the Huguenot princes, and to the Protestant leaders of the German world. However, Burghley's pronounced interests in Anglo–French relations led to his appointees' continuing service there, mainly as residents. Read, "Walsingham and Burghley in Queen Elizabeth's Privy Council," 34. Randolph, Beale, Sidney, and Corbet were kinsmen of Walsingham, while Davison, Leighton, Knollys, and Sidney were related to Leicester. Wilson, Winter, Corbet, Sidney, Leighton, Middlemore, and Knollys were all related to each other. A few (Knollys, John Smith, and Hastings) had the distinct honor of being kinsmen to Elizabeth.

26. Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Preserved Principally at Rome in the Vatican Archives and Library* [hereafter: *Cal. S. P. Rome*], 1572–1578, ed. J. M. Rigg (London: HMSO, 1926), 149–50, 175. Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in Other Libraries of Northern Italy* [hereafter: *Cal. S. P. Ven.*], 1558–1580, ed. Rawdon Brown and G. Cavendish (London: HMSO, 1890), 500–504, 513–17. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1572–1574, 487, 491, 512, 529; ibid., Addenda, 1583, 498–99. PRO, SP 70/130, fols. 70, 206, 215. British Library, Additional MS. [hereafter: Add. MS.] 4104, fol. 61b. MacCaffrey, *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy*, 180–81. Hector de la Ferrière, "Les dernières conspirations du règne de Charles IX, 1573–1574," *Revue des questions historiques*, 2nd seq., 48 (1890–1891): 421–70. Hector de la Ferrière and Comte Baguenault de Puchesse, eds., *Lettres de Catherine de Medicis* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1901), 5:12–14, 53–54.

27. PRO, SP 12/246, #154.

28. Ibid.

29. *Cal. S. P. Rome*, 1572–1578, 194; 1577, 118 and passim. Add. MS., 4104, fols. 117, 230, 251–52. PRO, SP 12/246, #154. Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Acts of the Privy Council of England* [hereafter: *APC*], 1556–1558, ed. J. R. Dasent (London: HMSO, 1893), 456. Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquis of Salisbury, Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire* [hereafter: *Salisbury*] (London: HMSO, 1888), 2:119. William Murdin, ed., *A Collection of State Papers Relating to Affairs in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, 1571–1596* (London: William Bowyer, 1759), 2:291, 298.

30. Public Record Office, Exchequer [hereafter: PRO, E.] MS. 403/2559, fols. 126, 245, 313, 336, 351.

31. John Buxton, *Sir Philip Sidney and the English Renaissance* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1966), 43–50. *DNB*.

32. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1566–1568, 389–90. *DNB*.

33. Somers, Killigrew, Middlemore, Rogers, Beale, and Wilkes all served the Paris embassy as secretaries. Only Davison served in Scotland under Ambassador Randolph. Amos C. Miller, *Sir Henry Killigrew: Elizabethan Soldier and Diplomat* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963), 49–58, 123–48.

34. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1566–1568, 606, passim.

35. Ibid.

36.   See *DNB* and Arthur J. Eagleston, *The Channel Islands under Tudor Government, 1485-1642: A Study in Administrative History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949), 56, 72-85.

37.   *DNB* and *HoC.*

38.   Read, *Walsingham*, 1:314-15. *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, Add., 1566-1579, 494. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1575-1577, 167, 181, 199. Buxton, 70, 74, 82.

39.   Dudley Digges, ed., *The Complete Ambassador* (London: Thomas Newcomb, 1655), 5-9. Cabala, *Sive scrinia sacra: Mysteries of State and Government* (London: Thomas Sawbridge, 1691), 162. Charles Wilson, *Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 123. Joel Hurstfield and Alan G. R. Smith, *Elizabethan People: State and Society* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), 140-41.

40.   Read, *Walsingham*, 1:94.

41.   Wilson, 87-90. Only Henry Cobham, John Smith, Henry Norris, and Henry Knollys were of noble stock.

42.   *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1572-1574, 529.

43.   *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1572-1574, 538-39.

44.   La Mothe-Fénélon, Bertrand de Salignac de, *Correspondance diplomatique de Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe Fénélon, Ambassadeur de France en Angleterre de 1568 a 1575*, ed. A. Teulet (Paris: Bethune, 1840), 6:199-200. PRO, SP 12/246, #154. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1572-1574, 539-40, 567. PRO, SP 70/132, fols. 7-10, 18-19. British Library, Harleian MS. 287, fol. 14. Add. MS. 4101, fols. 101-6, 116.

45.   *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1577-1578, 388-92, 399-400. Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Letters and State Papers Relating to English Affairs, Preserved Principally in the Archives of Simancas* [hereafter: *Cal. S. P. Spain*], 1568-1679, ed. Martin A. S. Hume (London: HMSO, 1894), 552-53.

46.   *Cal. S. P. Spain*, 1568-1579, 552-53.

47.   Ibid.

48.   Cf. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1579-1584; *DNB*; and *HoC.* James I willingly sacrificed Sir Ralph Winwood's diplomatic career by using him as the scapegoat for a serious dispute created between the English and Dutch governments by the King's own unguarded theological enthusiasm. Maurice Lee, Jr., "The Jacobean Diplomatic Service," *English Historical Review* 72 (July 1967): 1269-72.

49.   Jensen, "Power Politics and Diplomacy: 1500-1650," in *The Meaning of the Renaissance and Reformation*, ed. Richard L. DeMolen (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 350. Mattingly, 63. See Appendix.

50.   Mattingly, 112.

51.   Wicquefort, 11. Jensen, "Power Politics and Diplomacy," 330.

52.   Gary Bell, "John Man: The Last Elizabethan Resident Ambassador to Spain," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 7 (October 1976): 75-93.

53.   Betty Behrens, "The Life of the English Resident Ambassador," *Royal Historical Society: Transactions*, 4th ser., 16 (1953): 161-92.

54.   Ibid. Wicquefort, 6, 200.

55.   Logan P. Smith, *Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1907), 1:49.

56.   Mattingly, 58, 61-62, 77, 96, 99.

57.   Charles H. Carter, "The Ambassadors of Early Modern Europe: Patterns of Diplomatic Representation in the Early Sixteenth Century," in *From the Renaissance*

to the *Counter–Reformation*, ed. Charles H. Carter (London: Random House, 1965), 182–84. John E. Neale, "The Diplomatic Envoy," *History* 13 (October 1928): 210–11.

58. *Cal. S. P. Spain*, 1568–1569, 549–50.

59. Ibid., 112; 1569–1571, 43, 70, 150; 1575–1577, 395; 1581–1582, 352; 1583–1584, 117, 264; 1586–1588, iii, 5–6.

60. While Elizabeth had diplomats whose ages ranged from 25–60 years, the largest group was in the 33–37 year range.

61. Jensen, "Power Politics and Diplomacy," 350.

62. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1575–1577, 387; 1579–1580, 161–64, 174–76.

63. PRO, SP 12/246, #54.

64. Ibid. Wernham, *The Making of Elizbethan Foreign Policy*, 14. *DNB. HoC.*

65. Albert J. Schmidt, "Thomas Wilson, Tudor Scholar–Statesman," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 20 (May 1975): 205–18, and "A Treatise on England's Perils, 1578," *Archives für Reformations Geschichte* 46 (1955): 243–49. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1564–1565, 80–82, 126, 170, 313; 1575–1577, 564. *APC*, 1556–1558, 277. *DNB.*

66. Edward R. Adair, *The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929), 76, 270. Neale, "The Diplomatic Envoy," 218. Mattingly, 201, 231, 233. Mary Dewar, *Sir Thomas Smith: A Tudor Intellectual in Office* (London: Athlone Press, 1964), 117. Miller, 168, 181. Ralph M. Sargent, *At the Court of Queen Elizabeth* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 50. Winthrop S. Hudson, *The Cambridge Connection* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1980), 24. Neale, "The Fame of Sir Edward Stafford," *English Historical Review* 44 (April 1929): 207.

67. PRO, E. 403/2420–2425; 403/2559–2560; 403/2597; 403/2655; 403/2657; 404/229; 404/477; 405/511; 405/2421.

68. Ibid.

69. *Cal. S. P. Ven.*, 1558–1580, #388, #520; 1592–1603, #1573. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1558–1559, #732; 1564–1565, #546; 1569–1571, #1573; 1572–1574, #431; 1575–1577, #684. *Salisbury*, 12, 3 Feb. 1602. *Cal. S. P. Spain*, 1568–1569, 308–10. Mattingly, 128. Dewar, 103, 133. Miller, 109–10.

70. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1558–1559, #598, #625; 1562, #1, #2, #884; 1572–1574, #999; 1575–1577, #13, #25. PRO, E. 403/2559, fols. 316, 315. Lansdowne MS. 68, fols. 171–72; Lansdowne MS. 683, fol. 11. Stowe MS. 570, fol. 94. PRO, SP 70/17, fol. 128. Bell, "John Man," 78.

71. Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of Patent Rolls* [hereafter: *Cal. Patent Roll*] : *Elizabeth I* (London: HMSO, 1939), 1558–1560, 93. *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1559–1560, #836; 1579–1580, #315; 1582, #156; 1583, #170. PRO, E. 405/511, fol. 41; 403/2559, fol. 362.

72. *Cal. Patent Roll*, 1569–1572, #2436, #3140; 1566–1569, #691, #918. *Cal. S. P. Dom.*, 1591–1594, 181; 1595–1597, 48; 1601–1603, 109, 267. British Library, Egerton MS. 5753, fol. 225. *Salisbury*, 2, 187–88. APC, 1597–1598, 602–3. Winchester College MS. 4970. PRO, Signet Office Docquets, 1, Ind. 6800, fols. 542, 570. PRO, Patent Roll C. 66/1451, membranes, 35–38. *Cal S. P. For.*, 1563, #847. PRO, SP 12/136, fol. 135; 12/225, fols. 93, 95; 12/252, fol. 115; 12/225, fol. 145; 12/260, fols. 70–73. Lansdowne MS. 62, fols. 49–50, 192–93; 683, fol. 24; 155, fols. 432–34. PRO, E. 403/2559, fol. 272; 405/511, fol. 24. Miller, 66–67, 169, 181, 231. Edward Hughes, *Studies in Administration and Finance, 1558–1825* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1934), chap. 2.

73.   See Bell, "Elizabethan Diplomatic Compensation: Its Nature and Variety," *Journal of British Studies* 20 (Spring 1981): 1–25, and "Sir Thomas Chaloner's Diplomatic Expenses in Spain," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Reasearch* 53 (May 1980): 118–27. On page two of the first article Bell concludes that Elizabeth's "conscientious attention to diplomatic emoluments stood in marked contrast to how the Spanish, French, and Imperial monarchs treated their diplomats."

74.   Simon Adams, "Eliza Enthroned? The Court and Its Politics," in *The Reign of Elizabeth I*, ed. Christopher Haigh (London: Macmillan, 1984), 60.

75.   *Cal. S. P. For.*, 1558–1589, passim. Great Britain, Public Record Office, *List and Analysis of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth I*, 1589–1592, ed. Richard Bruce Wernham (London: HMSO, 1964–1969), passim. Miller, 252. *DNB. HoC*. At least 5 of the 23 diplomats can be classified as career diplomats—that is, men whose long years of public work were devoted primarily to diplomatic service. These were Wilkes, Cobham, Killigrew, Rogers, and Randolph. Diplomatic service involved not only overseas missions but also domestic assignments which included the welcoming and escorting of foreign diplomats to and from London as well as service as a Council or Signet clerk, each of which constantly handled foreign correspondence for the Principal Secretary and was consulted regularly as an expert in foreign affairs. See F. Jeffrey Platt, "The Elizabethan Clerk of the Privy Council," *Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association* 3 (January 1982): 123–42.

76.   Jensen, "Power Politics and Diplomacy," 350.

77.   Lee, 1268–69.

APPENDIX

Gentlemen Diplomats	Resident Missions	Nonresident Missions	Puritan	Advanced Education	Diplomatic Apprentice	Foreign Languages	Member of Parliament	Embassy Secretary	Prediplomatic Foreign Travel	Marian Exile
Henry Cobham	1	7		*	*	4	*	*	*	
Amais Paulet				*	*	2	*		*	
William Winter		1			*		*		*	
Thomas Chamberlain			*	*	*	3	*			*
Thomas Wilson		3	*	*	*	5	*		*	*
Thomas Randolph		12	*	*	*	3	*		*	*
Henry Killigrew		17	*	*	*	1	*		*	*
Edward Horsey		3	*	*	*	1	*		*	*
Thomas Leighton		5	*	*	*	2	*			
Henry Middlemore		3	*	*	*	1	*		*	*
Henry Knollys		2	*		*	6	*		*	*
John Hastings		1		*	*	1				
John Somers		7	*	*	*	2		*	*	
Robert Corbet		1		*	*	2	*		*	*
Robert Beale		5	*	*	*	3	*	*	*	
John Herbert		8		*	*	3	*	*	*	*
William Davison	1	5		*	*	3		*	*	
Daniel Rogers		10	*	*	*	5	*		*	
John Smith		1			*	2	*		*	
Philip Sidney		2	*	*	*	5	*		*	
Edward Wotton		3	*	*	*	4		*	*	*
William Drury		6	*	*	*	2			*	
Thomas Wilkes		10	*	*		4	*	*	*	
TOTAL	9	112	15	19	22		18	11	19	10
PERCENTAGES	8	92	65	82	96	91	78	48	82	43

What the Gardener Knew: Pruning and Power in *The Troublesome Raigne of King John* and *Richard II*

by

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Lack of knowledge is a chief concern of *Richard II*. Throughout, what the audience knows is provocatively matched or exceeded by what it does not know. Information seemingly deferred remains undisclosed in a discourse of permanent deferral. Bolingbroke's purpose in accusing Mowbray, the duration and extent of Bolingbroke's ambition, Richard's reasons for exiling Mowbray, Richard's feelings towards him, Richard's sexual predilections, the truth or falsity of Bagot's accusation of Aumerle, York's reasons for demanding Aumerle's death—such questions as these the play refuses to answer. In consequence, from the onset, personal and political motives in *Richard II* are murky; the play's ambiguity teases its spectators to construct plural meanings.

Plagued by nescience no less than the audience, nearly all the characters of *Richard II* are taken by surprise. To consider the first act, for example: Gaunt never suspects how harshly Richard intends to deal with Bolingbroke; Bolingbroke and Mowbray do not suspect that Richard will countermand their trial by combat; and Mowbray does not suspect that his reward for serving Richard will be lifetime exile. While fictional characters, who are unaware that they *are* fictional, necessarily possess limited knowledge of their texts to allow for suspense, *Richard II* appears peculiarly marked by the uncertain and the unexpected.

The scene that most prominently calls attention to the problem of limited knowledge is 2.1, in which Northumberland, if he is to be of use to Bolingbroke, must learn what others are thinking. Before he can let Willoughby and Ross know of Bolingbroke's embarkation from France, he must know whether they would support Bolingbroke. Warily he begins, first stating the neutral fact of Gaunt's death. When Ross expresses concern for

Gaunt's heir, Northumberland asserts the justice of Bolingbroke's claim then promises secrecy in order to encourage Ross to divulge his true feelings: "Nay, speak thy mind, and let him ne'er speak more / That speaks thy words again to do thee harm!" (2.1.230–31).[1] Once assured that Willoughby's and Ross's sympathies are with Bolingbroke, cautiously and gradually Northumberland proceeds to discern their willingness to take political action. To that end he brings up the flatterers; they, he says, are misleading the King. More subtly, he reminds the lords of the King's preference for these men of lesser birth: Richard is "basely led" (2.2.241). Moreover, the flatterers are a threat to the aristocracy, not only as royal advisers but as malicious informers to whom Richard credulously listens. Responding to Northumberland's allegation that Richard would misguidedly prosecute "our children, and our heirs" (2.1.245), the lords lament Richard's economic abuses. Northumberland now chimes in, directly accusing Richard of waste and pacifism. Even though this too goes down well with the lords, Northumberland still hedges before finally confiding to these potential allies the news of Bolingbroke's return. All this he does to know for certain where they stand:

> *North.*   I dare not say
> How near the tidings of our comfort is.
> *Will.* Nay, let us share thy thoughts as thou dost ours.
> *Ross.* Be confident to speak, Northumberland:
> We three are but thyself, and, speaking so,
> Thy words are but as thoughts; therefore be bold.
> *North.* Then thus....
>
>   (2.1.271–77)

Among the many characters who lack certain knowledge, the gardener stands out as one who does know. He serves as a font of information to his assistants and to the Queen. What the gardener knows is dangerous, a matter for metaphor that yields itself the more fully when we compare situations and language in *Richard II* with those of an earlier anonymous play *The Troublesome Raigne of King John*, a likely source for Shakespeare's *King John*. After discussing *The Troublesome Raigne* as a source for *Richard II* as well, I shall argue that murder as a necessary survival strategy is covertly acknowledged in *Richard II*'s garden scene, a site of contestation between moral and political meanings. I shall also submit that even a scanty acquaintance with the history of Tudor absolutism would have allowed the Elizabethan spectator access to the scene's darker truths.

I.

Over the past half century, E. K. Chamber's assumptions about the relationship between the anonymous *Troublesome Raigne of King John* (1591)

and Shakespeare's *King John* have become the prevailing opinion: "The principal source [for *King John*] was *T.R.* which is followed pretty closely as regards historical events, the selection of scenes, and even the logical run of many of the dialogues. The writing itself is all new, but Shakespeare must have kept the old book before him."[2] Most scholars date *King John* between 1594 and 1595 and consider it politically and dramaturgically a transition from the first to the second tetralogy.[3] But Peter Alexander and E. A. J. Honigmann demur, holding that *King John* preceded *The Troublesome Raigne*;[4] and Honigmann goes so far as to backdate the completed Folio text of *King John* to 1590.[5] Although these hypotheses have gained few adherents over the past 30 years, one influential adherent is Peter Ure, Arden editor of *Richard II*. Because Ure denies that *T.R.* was chronologically available as a source for *King John*,[6] he explains the similarities he notes between two passages in *T.R.* and *Richard II* as follows: they demonstrate merely that their informing garden metaphors were in general circulation in the sixteenth century. Similarities of language between five other passages from *T.R.* and *Richard II* remain unremarked, yet these additional similarities further strengthen the case for the conventional dating of *King John*. It is improbable that Shakespeare would have come so near the text of the 1591 *T.R.* in seven passages from *Richard II* (1595-96) unless quite recently he had used *T.R.* as a close source for *King John* and thus had *T.R.* in his memory when shortly thereafter he wrote *Richard II*.[7] If we accept Chambers's view and the conventional dating of *King John*, then the similarities may be regarded as verbal echoes of *T.R.*, elicited by situational parallels between John's history and Richard's.

Ure's citation of 17 passages from *King John* indicates that Shakespeare had not forgotten his earlier play when writing *Richard II*.[8] But the five paired passages I now cite—those which Ure does not mention—borrow their phrasing and point not from *King John* but from *T.R.* I shall discuss these passages in the order in which they appear in *Richard II*. In the first pair, John's rebel nobles have just learned from the dying Meloun that Lewis has betrayed them; they will be the first victims of a French conquest. However, they believe neither in John's pardon nor in his victory. Pembroke expresses their dilemma: "If we persever, we are sure to dye: / If we desist, small hope againe of life" (*T.R.* Pt.2.5.776-77 [57-58]).[9] Richard faces a similar situation when he returns from Ireland to discover that his Welsh army has disbanded, his English subjects have rebelled, and his favorites have been killed. Feeling himself betrayed, marked for death whether he fights or surrenders, he collapses. *T.R.*'s Salisbury and *Richard*'s Carlisle, both of whom are members of the beset party, offer the same advice; that they also alliterate their *w*'s argues for the influence of the anonymous play on Shakespeare:

> *Sals.* And stand not wayling on our present harmes,
> As women wont: but seeke our harmes redresse.
>
> (*T.R.* Pt.2.5.780-81 [61-62])

> Car. My lord, wise men ne'er sit and wail their woes,
> But presently prevent the ways to wail.
>
>   (R2 3.2.178–79)

Act 5, scene 4, of Shakespeare's *King John*, where Meloun confesses, contains no similar passage.

Under pressure *T.R.*'s John and Shakespeare's Richard learn to regard all comforting words as flattery, which they refuse to hear. In *T.R.* London has fallen to the French, Lewis has defied Pandolph's injunction to withdraw, and John is already ill when the Bastard enters with news from the battlefield. John's response is much like Richard's when Scroope announces the final piece of devastating news—that York has joined Bolingbroke. Both kings reject hope and invite despair:

> John What news with thee? If bad, report it straite:
> If good, be mute, it doth but flatter me.
>
>   (*T.R.* Pt.2.6.806–07 [21–22])

> Aum. My liege, one word.
> Rich.   He does me double wrong
> That wounds me with the flatteries of his tongue.
>
>   (R2 3.2.215–16)

Again, no corresponding passage can be found in *King John*. Instead, Shakespeare's John tells the Bastard, "My heart hath one poor string to stay it by, / Which holds but till thy news be uttered" (5.7.55–56). John dies as Faulconbridge recounts the English losses.

Both *T.R.*'s John and Shakespeare's Richard eventually perceive kingship as the source of their griefs. John achieves this realization in the soliloquy he delivers after his nobles desert in the belief that he has had Arthur murdered. During his forced abdication Richard discovers that the "kingly woe" he had suffered in Wales is an ineluctable consequence of kingship itself. Both kings play on "crown" and "care":

> John Curst be the Crowne, chiefe author of my care,
> Nay curst my will that made the Crowne my care.
>
>   (*T.R.* Pt.1.13.1709–10 [256–57])

> Bol. Part of your cares you give me with your crown.
> Rich. Your cares set up do not pluck my cares down.
> My care is loss of care, by old care done;
> Your care is gain of care, by new care won.

> The cares I give, I have, though given away,
> They 'tend the crown, yet still with me they
>   stay.
>
>   (*R2* 4.1.194–99)

Shakespeare's *King John* has no comparable crown-care passage.[10]
    Both John's and Richard's identities and follies are the subjects of
rhetorical questions, John's by the monk who kills him, Richard's by himself.
Both kings are defeated. John loses his barons to Lewis and his troops to
the Wash; Richard loses his crown to Bolingbroke:

> *Monk*   Is this the King that never lovd a Frier?
>   Is this the man that doth contemne the Pope?
>   Is this the man that robd the holy Church
>   And yet will flye unto a Friory?
>   Is this the King that aymes at Abbeys lands?
>   Is this the man whome all the world abhorres,
>   And yet will flye unto a Friorie?
>   (*T.R.* Pt.2.6.869–75 [84–90])

> *Rich.*   Was this face the face
>   That every day under his household roof
>   Did keep ten thousand men? Was this the face
>   That like the sun did make beholders wink?
>   Is this the face which fac'd so many follies,
>   That was at last out-fac'd by Bolingbroke?
>   (*R2* 4.1.281–86)

Although Richard's speech immediately recalls Faustus's encomium on Helen
of Troy, the sheer repetition of *T.R.*'s "Is this" construction argues for
Shakespeare's remembering the *T.R.* speech as well. Moreover, recall that
Mephostophilis, who gives Helen to Faustus, appears as a friar; his religious
habit would account for an association in Shakespeare's mind with *T.R.*'s
monk. Unlike *T.R.*, *King John* contains neither monk nor abbey scene.
    Another parallel between the two plays is the stage image of kneeling.
In *T.R.*, Philip the Bastard kneels to the Kings of France and England for
permission to fight the Duke of Austria, his father's captor. Begging pardon
for his participation in the Oxford conspiracy, Aumerle—of an age with the
Bastard, like him of royal descent, and like him the favorite of a king—also
kneels to a King of England whose title is in dispute:

> *Philip*   a boone doth Philip beg
>   Prostrate upon his knee: which knee shall cleave
>   Unto the superficies of the earth,

> Till Fraunce and England graunt this glorious
>   boone.
>
> <div align="right">(T.R. Pt.1.5.918–21 [15–18])</div>

> *Aum.* For ever may my knees grow to the earth,
>   My tongue cleave to my roof within my mouth.
>
> <div align="right">(R2 5.3.29–30)</div>

In each case, the speaker is determined to become and remain one with the ground until his request is granted, and both associate "knee/knees," "cleave," and "earth." Significantly, only in *Richard II* does Shakespeare juxtapose these three words.[11]

These passages suggest not only that Shakespeare was familiar with *T.R.* but also that he saw an affinity between the scenes in *T.R.* and *Richard II*. Beyond that, the two passages that Ure cites, only to dismiss as instances of a commonly used trope, may be evidence of a considerably closer and more complex intertextual relationship. Here, too, are what seem to be verbal echoes of *T.R.* evoked by the analogous problems John and Richard confront. Moreover, a contextual study of these verbal analogues reveals that the garden metaphor is far less straightforward than Ure assumes. Alert to the likely provenance of the echo, we discover an alternative way of understanding Shakespeare's play. Like Bushy's perspective pictures, *Richard II* offers multiple perspectives on the political world Shakespeare represents. Reading *Richard II* through *The Troublesome Raigne*, we can discern a radically cynical meaning of the gardener's speeches and a chilling subtext of *Richard II*.

II.

The passages from *Richard II* that Ure compares with *T.R.*'s are both from the garden scene:

> (1) You thus employed, I will go root away
>   The noisome weeds which without profit suck
>   The soil's fertility from wholesome flowers.
>
> <div align="right">(R2 3.4.37–39)</div>

> Once since that time ambicious weedes have sprung
> To staine the beautie of our garden plot.
>
> <div align="right">(T.R. Pt.1.13.1543–44 [90–91])</div>

> (2)   our sea-walled garden, the whole land,
>   Is full of weeds, her fairest flowers chok'd up,
>   Her fruit-trees all unprun'd.
>
> <div align="right">(R2 3.4.43–45)</div>

> Sith we have proyned the more than needful braunch
> That did oppresse the true wel-growing stock.
> (*T.R.* Pt.1.13.1481–82 [28–29])

The first *T.R.* passage, Ure notes, illustrates the contemporary prevalence of the "comparison of bad political elements to 'weeds' in the common-wealth."[12] Ure explains the second *T.R.* passage as referring only "to [John's] anti-papal measures."[13] Ure's reader must conclude that resemblances between *The Troublesome Raigne* and *Richard II* are coincidental, not integral.

This conclusion is disproved when we examine these passages in the larger context of the play. John's opening speech of part 1, scene 13, suggests that John's difficulty with Arthur prefigures Richard's problem with Bolingbroke, and finally Bolingbroke's with Richard: King John, King Richard, and King Henry are all vulnerable to deposition by or on behalf of their kin. John begins by asking, "Now warlike followers resteth ought undon / That may impeach us of fond oversight?" (1453–54 [1–2]). "Oversight" is the operative word, reminding us that John has already commissioned Hubert to blind Arthur. John first boasts that he has terrified the French, then denigrates the Pope, and finally uncovers the real purpose of his address to his nobles:

> But now for confirmation of our State,
> Sith we have proynd the more than needfull
>   braunch
> That did oppresse the true wel-growing stock,
> It resteth we throughout our Territories,
> Be reproclaimed and invested King.
> (*T.R.* Pt. 1.13.1480–84 [27–31])

To Pembroke's advice against a second coronation, John replies, "Thou knowst not what induceth me to this" (*T.R.* Pt.1.13.1494 [41]). But the audience knows what Pembroke does not: John expects shortly to hear that Arthur had died from the torment of blinding. John has committed no "fond oversight"; he plans to confirm his state over the dead body of his competitor, his young nephew. "The more than needfull braunch / That did oppresse the true wel-growing stock" may allude to Rome but can more readily be understood to refer to a branch of John's own family tree. Note that Essex uses the same metaphor when greeting Faulconbridge, son of Richard I: "Cheerely replied brave braunch of kingly stock" (*T.R.* Pt.2.3.378 [30]). John employs the metaphor to predict the triumph of his descendant over the Pope: "From out these loynes shall spring a Kingly braunch / Whose armes shall reach unto the gates of *Rome*" (*T.R.* Pt.2.8.1084–85 [109–10]). Ure's gloss is incomplete; among the signifieds of "pruning" in *T.R.* is murder, and more specifically familial murder.

John confirms his state; Richard does not. The garden scene in *Richard II* exposes the reason behind Richard's failure; although Richard has "pruned" his uncle Gloucester, there still remains Bolingbroke, the more than needful branch of Richard's family tree. The gardener's first lines establish a connection between Richard's situation and John's:

> Go, bind thou up young dangling apricocks,
> Which like unruly children make their sire
> Stoop with oppression of their prodigal weight,
> Give some supportance to the bending twigs.
> Go thou, and like an executioner
> Cut off the heads of too fast growing sprays.
>
>   (*R2* 3.4.29–34)

Ure accepts A. W. Pollard's resolution of the crux at line 29 (Q1's "yong" over F1's "yond" and Q2-5's "yon"), agreeing that "yong" suggested "unruly children" to Shakespeare.[14] We may further note the association with "too fast growing sprays" and "twigs." All these evocations of youth (especially "unruly" and "too fast growing") imply the need for the gardener/king to cultivate his garden "like an executioner," i.e., like John. Notably, John's rival Arthur is also a young, unruly, too fast growing spray, who "did oppresse the true wel-growing stock," and whose "executioner" Hubert (*T.R.* Pt.1.12.1318 [5]) orders him bound up (*T.R.* Pt.1.12.1323–24 [11–12]; *Jn* 4.1.4–5, 77); Shakespeare, therefore, may have written the garden scene with Arthur in mind, either from *T.R.* directly or from *T.R.* filtered through his own *King John.* As a corollary, this passage—and indeed the entire play—can signify not only Richard's error in encouraging his flatterers but also, at least subtextually, his oversight in not pruning the relative who eventually makes Richard—Bolingbroke's monarchial "sire"—"Stoop with oppression."

In *The Troublesome Raigne* the "ambicious weedes" that mar John's garden are the French, the Pope, Constance, and above all Arthur, whose lineage gives life to their ambitions. The weeds in Richard's garden are his flatterers, also described as caterpillars, tree trunks, and branches. Bolingbroke, if no flatterer or weed, is surely a tree and branch:

> We at time of year
> Do wound the bark, the skin of our fruit-trees,
> Lest, being over-proud in sap and blood,
> With too much riches it confound itself;
> Had he done so to great and growing men,
> They might have liv'd to bear, and he to taste
> Their fruits of duty. Superfluous branches
> We lop away, that bearing boughs may live;
> Had he done so, himself had borne the crown.
>
>   (*R2* 3.4.57–65)

As son of the Duke of Lancaster, Bolingbroke is "over-proud in . . . blood" and heir to "too much riches" for Richard to leave unconfiscated. Richard banishes Bolingbroke but does not "lop away" the branch. Like the author of *The Troublesome Raigne*, Shakespeare uses "branch" traditionally in *Richard II* to signify a family relation.[15] Of the "great and growing men, / . . . who might have liv'd to bear" (the dead Wiltshire, Bushy, and Greene), the primacy belongs to "great Bolingbroke" (3.4.87), who lives but does not bear for Richard. In fact, Richard loses his crown not to the weeds but to his "more than needfull braunch." The gardener, then, functions less as a choral voice of old and homely wisdom than as an explicator of the new order of *Realpolitik* that Bolingbroke will inaugurate.

Some members of Shakespeare's audience, increasingly skeptical about absolutism, may have rejected *Richard II*'s loosely prescribed "subject-position"—a term Catherine Belsey uses to designate the power of a text to induce us to adopt a particular angle of vision, to limit the range of possible meanings, in order to produce an immediate, pat interpretation.[16] If in 1601 *Richard II* was construed as so unstable a text that Essex's followers regarded it as an incentive to insurrection, surely skeptical playgoers could have interpreted the garden scene as more than a disparagement of the flatterers and of Richard for entertaining them. Under Elizabeth, theatrical interrogations of a monarch's actions, if the monarch had not been officially certified a tyrant, were safest when veiled. Leonard Tennenhouse writes, "Whenever the Master of the Revels or the Privy Council construed dramatic material as the least bit offensive, the government did not hesitate to seize the playbooks, imprison the author, and punish the players. Thus the [acting] companies . . . felt the full force of an authoritarian government ready to descend upon them."[17] For author and players, an attack on the men surrounding the monarch must have seemed to provide a convenient veil: "The king is not himself, but basely led / By flatterers," explains Northumberland (*R2* 2.1.241–42). Nevertheless, throughout the first two acts the audience has watched Richard taking affairs into his own hands, having things his own way. He does not solicit the advice of Bushy, Bagot, and Greene, let alone accept it. They play his game, not he theirs. Not the flatterers but "great Bolingbroke"—a branch of the royal tree—brings down Richard; the flatterers are secondary. For playgoers who suspect that focusing on the flatterers is a screen for criticism of Richard's ineffectuality in dealing with Bolingbroke, the gardener's speech slides from moral injunction to amoral political observation.[18]

In *The Troublesome Raigne*, as in Shakespeare's *King John*, Machiavellianism is not subtext but text. John follows the law of *Realpolitik* when he orders Arthur's death: "murder him that seekes to murder thee" (*T.R.* Pt.2.6.883 [98]); so the monk, John's double and assassin, puts it. Within limits, *Realpolitik* works. Arthur dies a claimant, John a king: only death, says John, "will depose my selfe a King from raigne" (*T.R.* Pt.2.8.1027 [52]). John's mistake is to forget

that despoilers of abbeys had best find their night's lodging elsewhere. Richard is guilty of a more basic political oversight: he leaves at large the man he knows to be his rival, the man who woos the people "as were our England in reversion his" (*R2* 1.4.35). In consequence, unlike John, whose situation initially resembles Richard's, Richard is "depress'd . . . already, and depos'd / 'Tis doubt he will be" (*R2* 3.4.68–69).

The Richard/John and Bolingbroke/Arthur parallels, undercurrents in the garden scene, resonate throughout the play, generating a somber commentary on the maintenance of autocratic power. Bolingbroke does not commit Richard's error. He confirms *his* state by commissioning his executioner, Exton, to murder Richard, now the new king's rival and now a superfluous branch. Bolingbroke speaks of poison—John's nemesis—in his attempted evasion of responsibility: "They love not poison that do poison need" (*R2* 5.6.38). Yet Bolingbroke's final botanical metaphor acknowledges the murder that is the source of his ascendancy: "Lords, I protest my soul is full of woe / That blood should sprinkle me to make me grow" (*R2* 5.6.45–46).

By sharply exposing the reality behind the pruning metaphor, Bolingbroke leads us to consider the dialogue between metaphor and history. Why do the gardeners conclude, like Robin Starveling, that "we must leave the killing out" (*MND* 3.1.15)?[19] Granted that pruning is an appropriate vehicle for gardeners given to blank-verse allegorical speechifying. But why have gardeners, additions to Shakespeare's ascribed sources, who speak opaquely but nonetheless *do* speak at the levels of both surface and subtext? Like Starveling, the gardeners are "hard-handed men" (*MND* 5.1.72), workingmen enacted by workingmen of the theater and conceived by the greatest workman of verse drama. Fictional or real, professionalized or not, all have reason to be wary, yet, however darkly, all speak, saying what cannot be said in Tudor England.

If we can believe Stephen Gosson, the gardeners of *Richard II* were heard by "the common people which resorte to Theaters . . . á assemblie of Tailers, Tinkers, Cordwayners, Saylers"[20] and perhaps gardeners too. Minimally we may assume that *some* members of that assembly had *some* familiarity with the history of the ruling dynasty, specifically with its ultimate means of maintaining power against potential challengers. Consider the more notable examples of Tudor "pruning": Henry VII executed the Yorkist heir Edward, Earl of Warwick, eldest son of George, Duke of Clarence; he also executed Yorkist supporters Sir William Stanley, Lord Fitzwater, and Sir Simon Montfort. Henry VIII completed the destruction of the line, executing Margaret, Countess of Salisbury, daughter of Clarence and mother of Lord Montague; her son Henry Pole, Lord Montague; Edmund de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk (the lineal heir of York); and Henry Courtenay, Marquis of Exeter and grandson of Edward IV. The Duke of Buckingham was executed for his descent from Edward III. Thomas Howard, brother of the Duke of Norfolk, died in the Tower, to which he was committed for betrothing

himself to Henry VIII's niece. Mary Tudor executed John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, who married his son Guildford to Lady Jane Grey, the pawn intended to supplant Mary. Lady Jane, her father the Duke of Suffolk, and Guildford Dudley were also beheaded. Elizabeth executed Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, for offering to marrȳ Mary Queen of Scots; eventually Elizabeth had Mary beheaded; and Essex was killed for his attempt to take power.[21] If none other, these last two executions would have been well known to the penny public. Tudor history teaches that successful rulers destroy their rivals lest they themselves be unseated. The lesson is affirmed by *Richard II*, based on Plantagenet history.

Through the gardeners, *Richard II* establishes the voice of the commons of England, revealing the commons' keen political awareness which the aristocracy preferred not to recognize. Witness the Queen, who is furious at the gardener, to her a "little better thing than earth" (3.4.78); what upsets Isabel about the gardener is that he *knows too much*. Ideology prefers to mystify political murder, to obscure the lopping away of more than needful branches as a condition of gaining or preserving authority; figurative language strategically encodes what literal language renders dangerously—even seditiously—explicit. Wisely then, the gardeners leave the signified "killing" out, employing the safer signifier "pruning." Even so, *Richard II*, like *The Troublesome Raigne of King John*, teaches that the price of power is unremitting violence, that the great must kill or be killed, and that the commons know it. Perhaps these texts played some part in effecting historical change, for within six decades of their first productions, the commons pruned a king and monarchism as well, making "all . . . even in our government" (*R2* 3.4.36), and bettering the instruction of the playhouse.[22] Cromwell's England, no less than the England of John, Richard, and the Tudors, was a bloody garden, for as with likely dramatic sources, so with political *modi vivendi*: "what's past is prologue."

NOTES

1. References are to the Arden text, *King Richard II*, ed. Peter Ure (London: Methuen, 1956).

2. E. K. Chambers, *William Shakespeare: A Study of Facts and Problems* (1930; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 1:367. R. L. Smallwood's 1974 introduction to the New Penguin *King John* provides a more recent analysis of the relationship between the two texts and upholds Chambers's view.

3. See, for example, Edward I. Berry, *Patterns of Decay: Shakespeare's Early Histories* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), 113–22; and Virginia Mason Vaughan, "Between Tetralogies: *King John* as Transition," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 35 (1984): 407–20.

4. See Peter Alexander, *Shakespeare's Life and Art* (1939; reprint, New York: New York University Press, 1961), 85; and E. A. J. Honigmann, ed., *King John* (London: Methuen, and Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), xviii–xix and liii–lviii.

5. Honigmann, *King John*, xliv. Sidney Thomas's assertion of *T.R.*'s precedence in "*Enter a Sheriffe*: Shakespeare's *King John* and *The Troublesome Raigne*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 37 (1986): 98–100, generated the following exchange: E. A. J. Honigmann, "*King John, The Troublesome Raigne*, and 'Documentary Links': A Rejoinder," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 38 (1987): 124–26; Paul Werstine, " '*Enter a Sheriffe*' and the Conjuring Up of Ghosts," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 38 (1987): 126–30; and Sidney Thomas, " '*Enter a Sheriffe*': A Shakespearean Ghost," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 38 (1987): 130.

6. Ure, *King Richard II*, note at 2.1.65–66.

7. It is of interest that John Dover Wilson conjectures the existence of a lost source play for *Richard II*, by the anonymous author of *The Troublesome Raigne*. See his *Introduction to "King Richard II"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), lxxii–lxxvi. Although Matthew W. Black argues cogently against Wilson's theory in "The Sources of Shakespeare's *Richard II*," in *Joseph Quincy Adams Memorial Studies*, ed. James G. McManaway, Giles E. Dawson, and Edwin E. Willoughby (Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1948), 199–216, and Ure ignores it, Wilson's intuition may have been sparked by an unconscious awareness of the verbal resemblances between the two plays.

8. See Ure's notes at 1.2.43 and 55; 1.4.29 and 39; 2.1.44, 46, 65–66, and 170; 2.3.90; 3.2.160–62; 3.3.32 and 52; 3.4.5; 5.1.11 and 48; 5.5.36; and 5.6.34.

9. My text for *The Troublesome Raigne* is Geoffrey Bullough's emendation of C. Praetorius's facsimile edition of 1888: *Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1964–1975), 4:72–151. Because Bullough uses through-line numbering in each of *T.R.*'s two parts, to clarify Ure's citations I have added bracketed scene lineation from F. J. Furnivall and John Munro, eds., *"The Troublesome Reign of King John": Being the Original of Shakespeare's "Life and Death of King John"* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1913).

10. In *King John*'s scene corresponding to *T.R.*'s, we hear what may be an echo of *T.R.*'s language. Shakespeare's John uses the word *curse*, but he does not curse the crown; rather, John is cursed by the compliancy of servants like Hubert:

> It is the curse of Kings to be attended
> By slaves that take their humours for a warrant
> To break within the bloody house of life.
>
> (*Jn* 4.2.208–10)

I use Honigmann's edition as my text for *King John*.

11. An arresting situational similarity may be observed between the banishment of the Earl of Chester in *T.R.* (not mentioned in *King John*) and the banishment of Bolingbroke in *Richard II*. John's sentence on Chester is cited by the rebellious Essex as reason for deserting John. Although it is only one among a myriad of "our private wrongs" (*T.R.* Pt.2.3.401 [53]) that John has perpetrated, it is the only *named* wrong: "First I inferre the *Chesters* bannishment, / For reprehending him in most unchristian crimes" (*T.R.* Pt.2.3.395–96 [47–48]). The Bastard defends John's decision, explaining, "For *Chesters* exile, blame his busie wit, / That medled where his dutie quite forbade" (*T.R.* Pt.2.3.451–52 [103–04]). From Richard's point of view "medled" would precisely describe Bolingbroke's accusation of Mowbray and justify Bolingbroke's exile. As for "unchristian crimes," while Bolingbroke never directly

reprehends Richard for commissioning the murder of his uncle, he does reprehend Richard's tool. Moreover, in accusing Bushy and Green of coming between Richard and Isabel (3.1.11–15), Bolingbroke is in effect accusing Richard of infidelity by acceding to the flatterers. Murder and adulterous homosexual fornication are Richard's "unchristian crimes" as, according to Holinshed's Chester, "cruell dealing, and also his accustomed adulterie" are John's; see *Holinshed's Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland,* 2nd ed. (London: J. Johnson et al., 1807), 2:319.

12. Ure, 119–20.

13. Ure, 120.

14. For an opposing view, see Matthew W. Black, ed., *A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare: The Life and Death of King Richard the Second* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1955), 235.

15. Note the Duchess of Gloucester's allusion to Edward III's sons as "seven fair branches springing from one root" (*R2* 1.2.13), of which her husband was "one flourishing branch of his most royal root / . . . hack'd down, and his summer leaves all faded" (*R2* 1.2.18, 20). And compare John's lines:

The roote doth live, from whence these thornes spring up

. . . .

The brat shall dye that terrifies me thus.

(*T.R.* 1.13.1651, 1654 [198, 201])

16. Catherine Belsey, *Critical Practice* (London: Methuen, 1980), 55.

17. Leonard Tennenhouse, *Power on Display: The Politics of Shakespeare's Genres* (New York: Methuen, 1986), 38.

18. In "The 'Parasitical' Counselors in Shakespeare's *Richard II*: A Problem in Dramatic Interpretation," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 33 (1982): 142–54, Paul Gaudet warns against accepting the gardener's simplistic conception of "the ideal politician" (152) as executioner, lest we take the gardener's voice for the playwright's. But to infer from the gardener's speech that Richard's error was leaving Bolingbroke alive is not, as Gaudet fears, to assume that Shakespeare endorses ruthlessness. Rather, Shakespeare presents the realities of political survival in the persons of an unsuccessful politician and a successful one, neither of whom is "ideal."

19. Quotations from *A Midsummer Night's Dream* are from David Bevington's edition of the *Complete Works,* rev. ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1973).

20. *Playes Confuted in Fiue Actions* [1582] in Arthur F. Kinney, *Markets of Bawdrie: The Dramatic Criticism of Stephen Gosson,* Salzburg Studies in English Literature, no. 4 (Salzburg: Institut für Englische Sprache und Literatur, 1974), 164.

21. My source is the *Dictionary of National Biography,* ed. Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee (London: Oxford University Press, 1917).

22. I am indebted to David Scott Kastan's instructive essay "Proud Majesty Made a Subject: Shakespeare and the Spectacle of Rule," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 37 (1986): 459–75.

Shakespeare's Romance of Knowing

by

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From time to time literary critics have claimed that Shakespeare's undisputed last plays—*Cymbeline, The Winter's Tale,* and *The Tempest*—are, to varying degrees, concerned with the main characters' learning experiences. These claims range, for example, from Stephen Orgel's argument that adversity schools Alonso and Prospero in humility to Northrop Frye's assertion that education provides the means for the protagonists of the last plays to recover some sort of paradise.[1] In other words, critics over the years have claimed in different ways that the last plays are either educational or epistemological romances. And yet no one, to my knowledge, has tried to explain why Shakespeare was inclined to make dramatic romance so especially concerned with various and complex ways of knowing. In this essay I argue that Shakespeare, in his last plays, established a kind of play—a "romance of knowing"—previously not seen in a fully articulated form on either the Elizabethan or the Jacobean stage. In fact, in establishing this new kind of play, Shakespeare was adapting a hybrid genre created by sixteenth-century nondramatic writers. Criticism has yet to explain how this hybrid genre developed so that Shakespeare near the end of his career could fit his interest in the limitations and the redemptive potential of human learning with a form ready made for it.

I.

If the last plays have been regarded as "romances of knowing," they have been considered so primarily from Northrop Frye's perspective. Despite claims to the contrary, no one has yet replaced Frye's vision of the "summer" of romances and the genre's upward movement toward a perfected world

with any alternative view and motive force. The following passage conveys Frye's opinion about the relation between formal knowledge and the transcendental desires upon which romantic fiction is usually based:

> In Shakespeare, as in all his contemporaries, the
> ordinary cycle of nature that rolls from spring to
> winter to spring again is the middle of three
> modes of reality. It is the ordinary physical world
> that, according to the theologians, man entered
> with his fall. Above it is the nature that God
> intended man to live in, the home symbolized by
> the biblical Garden of Eden and the Classical
> legend of the Golden Age, a world of perpetual
> fertility where it was spring and autumn at once.
> To this world, or to the inward equivalent of it,
> man strives to return through the instruments of
> law, religion, morality, and (much more impor-
> tant in Shakespeare's imagery) education and the
> arts. Thus it is said of Posthumus that he took so
> readily to his education that "in's spring became
> a harvest."[2]

The passage is vintage Frye, forcing an important critical question upon us, as his writing so often does. In *Cymbeline*, does Posthumus return to either an inner or outer golden world through knowledge given by his exceptional education? An attempt to answer this question might begin with the speech containing the arresting phrase about the seasons that Frye quotes.

One of the gossipy gentlemen who obligingly provide background information in *Cymbeline* claims that the King has put Posthumus to

> all the learnings that his time
> Could make him the receiver of, which he took,
> As we do air, fast as 'twas minister'd
> And in's spring became a harvest: liv'd in court
> (Which rare it is to do) most prais'd, most lov'd;
> A sample to the youngest, to th' more mature
> A glass that feated them, and to the graver
> A child that guided dotards.[3]

(1.1.43–50)

Sowing and reaping in the same instant, Posthumus, in the gentleman's opinion, has already attained that Edenic inner state that informs Prospero's pastoral Masque of Ceres. The gentleman's praise acquires a spiritual resonance once the listener hears a vague allusion, in the last words, to the

young Christ amazing teachers in the temple with his wisdom (Luke 2.41–52). Yet nothing further is dramatically made of this portrait of a greatly learned young man. On the contrary, a certain thick-wittedness marks Posthumus's decision needlessly to test Imogen's faith, as well as his easy belief in Iachimo's desperate lies—a thick-wittedness made more apparent by the relatively uneducated Pisanio's healthy skepticism about the Italian's boasts to have enjoyed Imogen. Furthermore, Posthumus's speech throughout the play is somewhat wooden and unimaginative for that of an excellently learned man. This is especially true when his poetry is compared to the language of the rhetorically inventive Iachimo and the musical Imogen. Finally, and most importantly, Posthumus's learning neither offers a defense against naive jealousy, bestial thoughts, and murderous desires, nor does it suggest any remedy for his despair once he realizes how degenerate he has become.

Shakespeare's depiction of Posthumus represents the extreme example of a basic kind of characterization found in other late plays. Pericles, Cerimon, and Prospero are also masters of learning, especially in the liberal arts. Marina's excellence in song, dance, and the fine arts links her to this group; moreover, like Posthumus, she dumbfounds "deep clerks" with her learning (*Per.* 5. Chor.5), becoming (unlike him) a sought-after teacher whose wages preserve her chastity. Cerimon's special knowledge, constantly trumpeted by the idle lords around him, helps him to revive Thaisa, an act which makes his learning a stage reality as great as Prospero's bookish magic. In a similar vein, Pericles's offstage display of his learning and mastery of music makes such an impact upon Simonides that the King, without hesitation, enlists the stranger as Thaisa's schoolmaster.

With the possible exception of Cerimon's art, Shakespeare, however, attenuates these accomplishments, which he has taken dramatic pains to fix in the viewer's mind. The playwright narrates Pericles's and Marina's expressions of their educations; learning never becomes a strong onstage image, except perhaps in Marina's attempt to rouse her father by singing. But that perfection, her song, moves him not at all; it is her story of suffering that animates her forlorn father. The references to Pericles's learning, moreover, take up no more than a few lines of the play. True, in the Masque of Ceres, the transcendence associated with romance depends on Prospero's mastery of the liberal arts, upon which his magic is chiefly based. Formal knowledge, however, fails the mage; it seemingly cannot accommodate the brutal element portrayed by Caliban, whose recollected plot causes Prospero to interrupt the Masque before it fully presents its message about perpetual spring. Furthermore, Prospero, as so many critics have recently noted, needs special grace to loosen the grip of anger about his heart, to prompt acts of pity and forgiveness, and to return him to his dukedom, from which his immense learning, both in Milan and on the island, has isolated him.

In the light of this evidence, one can only conclude that Shakespeare characterizes Posthumus as a paragon of learning so that his later moral decline will be particularly surprising. But Posthumus's supremacy in arms, in diplomacy, or in the courtier's gracious arts could have equally well served Shakespeare's dramatic purpose. Clearly, in making Posthumus a paragon of knowledge, Shakespeare desired to comment upon the redemptive potential of formal learning. For Posthumus, Prospero, and Pericles, their singular learning offers no hedge against personal disaster. Shakespeare in fact appears to make them gifted mainly to show that formal knowledge cannot resolve the dilemmas in which they become enmeshed. Like the learned professor in Samuel Johnson's *Rasselas*, Pericles, for example, finds that his acquired knowledge gives him no comfort for the seemingly absolute loss of an only daughter.

We must seriously question, then, Frye's claim for the redemptive power of formal education in Shakespeare's late romances. Rather than formal education, painful suffering becomes the catalyst for feats of learning in the last plays. The recent scholarship of Barbara Kiefer Lewalski can help us to understand the Renaissance context within which suffering could be instructive. In *Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric*, Lewalski stresses the significance of a Protestant "paradigm of salvation" for such metaphysical poets as Donne, Herbert, Vaughan, and Traherne. It was the Reformation, Lewalski asserts, that stressed "the application of all scripture to the self, the discovery of scriptural paradigms . . . in one's own life." According to Lewalski, election, calling, adoption, sanctification, and glorification made up the paradigm of salvation. In order to realize the paradigm, the Protestant was obliged to undergo a plunge into depravity and ignorance, a great spiritual crisis, conversion, heartfelt sorrow and repentance, and receptive faith.[4] These affective phases of the paradigm are perhaps familiar to the reader, for they have served as the unacknowledged ground for those "beyond-tragedy" readings of Shakespeare's last plays that discover the stages of prosperity, destruction, and regeneration in them.[5] Students of Shakespeare's plays are indebted to Lewalski for finally locating in cultural history the bedrock upon which *Cymbeline*, *The Winter's Tale*, and *The Tempest* were laid. Scholars are only beginning to realize how often Renaissance authors, regardless of genre, employed the Protestant paradigm and its phases in their works. By revealing the value of the phases of the paradigm for such a mode as seventeenth-century lyric poetry, Lewalski suggests that Renaissance authors may have incorporated them into a variety of literary kinds. It is possible that the problematic nature of a Claudio's or a Bertram's character springs from his embodying the serious phases of the paradigm in the world of Shakespearean comedy. In any case, Spenser, in book 1 of the *Faerie Queene*, invests the beginning and ending phases of the paradigm with epistemological values. The Redcrosse Knight's exposure to serpentine Error has symbolic meaning at the start of his mission to slay

the dragon threatening Una's commonwealth. The Knight repeats Adam's original sin whenever he proudly judges by such misleading appearances as Archimago's pious mannerisms and Duessa's enticing beauty. His proud errors of knowing aptly lead to great suffering in his bondage to Orgoglio. Released at last by Arthur (Grace), the Redcrosse Knight contritely repents in the House of Holiness, purifying himself to such an extent that he has a vision of the Heavenly Jerusalem as the gift of Contemplation.[6]

Epistemological aspects of the phases of the paradigm are also apparent in Sidney's *Old Arcadia*.[7] Like the Redcrosse Knight, Pyrocles and Musidorus are Elizabethan Protestants in their earthly voyage.[8] Sidney's heroes err in believing that they do not need to seek outside themselves for wisdom, in not truly knowing that the beginning and end of their bodies is earth. They suffer greatly when passionate love overcomes reason, and their self-losses are figured in their demeaning metamorphoses into an Amazon and a shepherd respectively. After enduring despair and suicidal feelings, they repent during their trial before Euarchus and finally grasp their need for spiritual grace.[9] Sidney's major modification of the phases of the paradigm involves the final stage; self-knowledge, rather than expressed faith in the reality of Providence, constitutes Pyrocles's and Musidorus's special victory. Sidney argues in *An Apology for Poetry* that all the sciences are "directed to the highest end of the mistress-knowledge, by the Greeks called *architectonike*, which stands . . . in the knowledge of a man's self, in the ethic and politic consideration, with the end of well-doing and not of well-knowing only."[10] For Sidney, *Arcadia* depends upon Pyrocles's and Musidorus's understanding that they are creatures who almost always reason darkly and that they, by themselves, will always be sadly inconstant and insufficient.[11]

In summary, the general model of character development for Shakespeare's late romances possessed an epistemological dimension by the seventeenth-century—a substratum within which the loss and finding of the self was important. The *Arcadia* again may help to recreate the romantic form within which a character progresses from error to self-knowledge. Versions of the book that almost every literate Elizabethan owned can best reveal the epistemological features of romance and pastoral upon which Shakespeare capitalized in *Cymbeline*, *The Winter's Tale*, and *The Tempest*. By conceiving of pastoral as an educational world within the larger framework of romance, Sidney leads us directly to Shakespeare's plays.

"It is no exaggeration to say," according to Walter R. Davis, "that in Elizabethan romances the pastoral land is first and foremost a symbol of an explicit ideal or desirable state of mind."[12] Beginning with Virgil, one of the many stock contrasts inherent in pastoral was the contemplative versus the active life.[13] By the 1570s in England, pastoral as represented in Spenser's *The Shepheardes Calender* could portray a complex landscape of the mind.[14] Yet it was Sidney, as Davis has demonstrated, who first transformed the mildly meditative world of Continental pastoral romance into the realm of

contemplation—the contemplation of Platonic Ideas.[15] Thoughtful pastoral *otium* in Sidney's treatment for the first time became earnest intellectual *negotium*.[16] To experience the pastoral retreat is for Sidney's heroes "to begin a journey out of this world into the world hereafter and thus to start toward union with God."[17] A song by Musidorus reflects the education resulting from this pastoral ascent:

> O sweet woods, the delight of solitariness!
> O how much I do like your solitariness!
> Where man's mind hath a freed consideration
> Of goodness to receive lovely direction;
> Where senses do behold th'order of heav'nly host,
> And wise thoughts do behold what the creator is.
> Contemplation here holdeth his only seat,
> Bounded with no limits, borne with a wing of hope,
> Climbs even unto the stars.[18]

At what point does pastoral education occur in characterizations based upon the Protestant paradigm? It usually appears as an interlude between the plunge into depravity and ignorance and the stage of spiritual conversion. Within Sidneyan romance, its place is more central.

Renaissance pastoral has been "imaged as a center with two concentric circles surrounding it, implying a kind of purification of life proceeding inward: from the gross and turbulently naturalistic outer circle, to the refined pastoral inner circle, and then to the pure center of the world."[19] Girt by the iron-age world of war and death, Arcady possesses a supernatural heart, "a shrine like the Cave of the Nymphs or the dwelling of a magician," or that of the pastoral god himself.[20] After analyzing a number of sixteenth-century pastoral works, Davis concludes that the standard Continental pastoral consists of the hero's "disintegration in the turbulent outer circle, education in the pastoral circle, and rebirth at the sacred center."[21] The sojourner in the pastoral circle "learns certain basic truths that show him how to reconcile his conflicts. He usually does this by a process of *analysis*— by seeing his situation reflected in those of other people around him, and then coming face to face with his own divided mind."[22] In Sidney's adaptation of this scheme, the innermost circle, the pastoral retreat, is more significantly a place of learning, simply because the education is contemplative as well as analytical. The hero's return from the sacred center to the pastoral land proper—and thence to the tragic or heroic world from which he originated—completes the Sidneyan pastoral action. Renewed by contemplation and love, he commits himself to turning knowledge gained into virtuous social action.[23]

The Sidneyan scheme of pastoral action was notably popular in the sixteenth century. It has been discovered, for example, in book 6 of the

Faerie Queene.[24] Sir Calidore's heroic pursuit of the Blatant Beast is inter-rupted by a pastoral interlude (cantos 9–10), during which the knight witnesses a contemplative vision crucial for his mastery of his slanderous adversary. A formal dance of a hundred naked maidens and the three Graces, arranged in concentric rings about a gemlike central figure, who is simul-taneously Venus, Elizabeth I, and Elizabeth Boyle, allows Colin Clout and Spenser's reader to intuit not only "the harmony of the created universe and an awareness of the spirit which moves it, the grace of God," but also the Idea of Charity informing Courtesy.[25] Colin Clout's pastoral vision of the Graces dancing on Mount Acidale can be compared to Prospero's Masque of Ceres, mainly because each appears to carry overtones of Neoplatonic knowledge, because each includes an orchestrator (Colin, Prospero) who can be regarded as the author's alter ego, and because in each an outsider (Calidore, Caliban) shatters the vision before completion.[26] In each instance, this shattering of the vision nonetheless does not keep the beholder (Calidore, Ferdinand) from wishing to remain forever with the creator in his ravishing greenworld.

It is important to realize that pastoral education—regardless of its intellectual nature—is chiefly an interlude in Sidneyan romance. Pyrocles and Musidorus, for example, cannot sustain or act reliably upon con-templative vision. Subsequent suffering occurs, leading to heartfelt sorrow, repentance, and ultimately self-knowledge. Pyrocles's and Musidorus's problem is precisely that of Colin Clout. Prior to his ruinous love for Rosalind, Spenser's shepherd evidently was capable of inspired pastoral con-templation. Piers, in the October eclogue of the *Calender*, believes that love teaches Colin to "climbe so hie,"

> And lyftes him up out of the loathsome myre:
> Such immortall mirrhor, as he doth admire,
> Would rayse ones mind above the starry skie.
> And cause a caytive corage to aspire,
> For lofty love doth loath a lowly eye.
>
> (92–97)

But the "immortall mirrhor"—Rosalind—clouds Colin's understanding, and a love other than "lofty" casts down the swain's mind.[27] In the cases of Spenser's and Sidney's pastoral characters, an infected will, working through earthly love, limits their abilities to act out their insights.

Infected will is the sticking point in Renaissance romance, whether narrative or dramatic. The Elizabethan infected will most memorably surfaces in Sidney's *Apology*:

> Neither let it be deemed too saucy a comparison
> to balance the highest point of man's wit with the

> efficacy of Nature; but rather give right honour
> to the heavenly Maker of that maker, who having
> made man to His own likeness, set him beyond
> and over all the works of that second nature:
> which in nothing he showeth so much as in
> Poetry, when with the force of a divine breath he
> bringeth things forth far surpassing her doings,
> with no small argument to the incredulous of that
> first accursed fall of Adam: since our erected wit
> maketh us know what perfection is, and yet our
> infected will keepeth us from reaching unto it.[28]

In poetically rendering the ideals of the incomplete Masque of Ceres, Shakespeare exemplifies the erected wit, which was both a Renaissance "instrument of education" and a means to divine contemplation. The well-known words from the *Apology* lie behind the critical opinion of Frye with which this section began, and they underscore a fact easily overlooked in it—that mankind can only *strive* to return to the original nature in which God intended him to live. For that reason suffering in Shakespeare's last plays must take the place of formal education as divine schoolmaster. For the Renaissance author, the infected will usually prevented the realization of the supreme thoughts of the erected wit.[29] Shakespeare appears to have been well aware of the tensions reflected in Sidney's writing on human knowing.[30] The infected will in the shapes of Autolycus and Caliban, for example, indirectly ends such educational visions of perfection as the dance of Florizel and Perdita and the Masque of Ceres. Still, the wisdom gained through those insights lingers with characters and readers alike, testifying to the epistemological nature of evolved pastoral romance.

It is this evolved genre, a "romance of knowing," that Shakespeare fully recreates on the stage at the close of his career. While, admittedly, the forest of Arden is an educational greenworld in *As You Like It*, Rosalind and Orlando do not suffer adversity because of their intellectual errors or their false ways of knowing. Rosalind's role as Ganymede richly allows her in Arden to discover new facets of her character, and Orlando slowly learns the essence of love from her tough instruction. Yet the epistemological phases of a model for character development are missing in this middle romantic comedy. Only with the staging of *Cymbeline* did an articulated romance of knowing constitute part of the King's Men's repertory. In this ambitious play, and in his late romances in general, Shakespeare develops characterizations based upon the affective phases of the Protestant paradigm of mankind's spiritual journey while dramatizing the Sidneyan scheme of pastoral action.

II.

In *Cymbeline*, Posthumus progresses through the affective phases of the Protestant paradigm, losing himself in a plunge into depravity and a great spiritual crisis only to acquire, after heartfelt sorrow and repentance, a new spiritual identity and, by act 5, a degree of self-knowledge. Like those of the Redcrosse Knight, Posthumus's catastrophic errors are intellectual ones— false ways of knowing. In Shakespeare's complex staging of the first phase in a journey of understanding, falsifying ways of conceiving and expressing values create distorted ideas. Specifically, Posthumus makes the mistake of reducing his unparalleled idea of Imogen's rarity to symbolic words and objects which necessarily slander it. Iachimo capitalizes upon the disparities between Posthumus's incomparable image of Imogen and the alien words and jewel by which the protagonist struggles to make it understandable. Imogen can be known truly only in terms of Imogen; she is her own precious self-referent. She exists, after all, on a plane of value different from that of the diamond ring and bracelet to which Posthumus and Iachimo's wrangling reduces her. At the beginning of the debate, Iachimo seizes upon Posthumus's diamond ring as a symbol for his belief that Imogen is not the perfect woman: "if she went before others I have seen, as that diamond of yours outlustres many I have beheld, I could not believe she excelled many; but I have not seen the most precious diamond that is, nor you the lady" (1.5.74–79).

By dwelling upon the ring, Iachimo encourages Posthumus to equate Imogen's worth with an inappropriate object, just as Iago did when he insinuated that Desdemona's handkerchief symbolized her honor. At this point Iachimo does not succeed in getting Posthumus to identify Imogen with the diamond:

> *Post.* I prais'd her as I rated her: so do I my stone.
> *Iach.* What do you esteem it at?
> *Post.* More than the world enjoys.
> *Iach.* Either your unparagon'd mistress is dead,
> or she's outpriz'd by a trifle.
> *Post.* You are mistaken: the one may be sold or
> given, or if there were wealth enough for
> the purchase, or merit for the gift. The
> other is not a thing for sale, and only the
> gift of the gods.
>
> (1.5.80–88)

After Iachimo has returned from Britain with his evidence, Posthumus uses the diamond ring to symbolize Imogen's honor. He thus makes the association that Iachimo contrived in the first wager scene. Concerning Iachimo's

success, he asks, "Sparkles this stone as it was wont, or is't not / Too dull for your good wearing?" (2.4.40–41). In his mind, Imogen's chastity now gives luster and hence worth to the ring. Rather than properly being on another value level, her chastity has become synonymous with the diamond. Now Iachimo insists that Imogen and the ring cannot be equated: "If I have lost it, / I should have lost the worth of it in gold" (2.4.41–42). Upon her discovery that her bracelet is missing, Imogen had said, "I hope it be not gone to tell my lord / That I kiss aught but he" (2.3.148–49). Once a material object expresses values, those values are subsequently known chiefly in terms of the object. Because Imogen's chastity has come to be esteemed as a material article (a ring), another material article (a bracelet) appropriately proclaims her alleged adultery.

In summary, Shakespeare's staging of the initial phase of his epistemological model is highly original, reflecting a special interest in the limitations of expressive mediums. His version of pastoral education is equally unorthodox in *Cymbeline*. In this play, Imogen, rather than Posthumus (the enactor of the phases of the Protestant paradigm), undergoes the central pastoral learning experience. The metaphor of tree and fruit through which Shakespeare expresses Imogen's reunion with Posthumus suggests late in the play that two parts of a single self are joining again.[31] Imogen passes from the turbulent heroic circle of Britain to the almost equally tumultuous but nonetheless pastoral realm of Wales, complete with its mystical heart, Belarius's cave, a place appropriately containing a three-footed stool reminiscent of that of the priestess of the Delphic Oracle.[32] In keeping with Shakespeare's unorthodox adaptation of his epistemological form, Imogen does not ascend to Neoplatonic contemplation. In pastoral Wales, Imogen's education primarily depends upon her acting out the role of Fidele before her return to the outermost circle of Britain, which is renewed by the deeds of the penitent Posthumus and the Welsh "naturals," Arviragus and Guiderius. In Wales, Imogen is instructed in faithful love. Once her husband has accused her, she too easily believes that some Italian whore has betrayed him (3.4.49–50). Faithful Pisanio is not so credulous. Shakespeare introduces Pisanio into *Cymbeline* partly as a measure of loyalty revealing that the main characters lack ideal faith. The good servant correctly suspects that

> it cannot be
> But that my master is abus'd: some villain,
> Ay, and singular in his art, hath done you both
> This cursed injury.
>
> (3.4.120–23)

Imogen, on the contrary, believes that "some Roman courtezan" has, and Pisanio must repeat, "No, on my life" (3.4.124). By comparison, her view is not so complimentary to her husband. Although she never loses her love

for him, once in Wales Imogen continues to doubt Posthumus's faith. Imogen pardons the two beggars who gave false directions to Milford Haven. Poor people may be driven by need; Posthumus's great lies of love have no imaginable cause (3.6.9–15). And she would change her sex to be the rustics' companion since she thinks her husband has broken his vow (3.7.59–61).

When Imogen adopts the alias Fidele as part of her masculine disguise, she indicates that her experience in Wales involves her faith. After Guiderius proves himself the best woodsman during the deer hunt, he becomes lord of a feast at which Arviragus and Belarius play the cook and servant, respectively. Imogen acts the role of their housewife, dutifully cutting their root diet into letters for an alphabet soup that symbolizes the nurture she would give them (4.2.48–51). By this experience her wifely faith, which has been thrown into question, is practiced and strengthened. Her faith is therefore not reaffirmed by any miraculous means; suffering Posthumus's imagined death teaches her how much she loves him. When Imogen thinks that Cloten's trunk is her husband's, Jupiter is doing much more than perversely demonstrating that ocular knowledge controls love. In contrast to the depraved experimenter, the Queen, who poisons her soul by her noxious testing of animals, Jupiter probes mortals relentlessly to discover their spiritual mettle. His trials always have this humane end. Imogen learns that her husband's supposed infidelity is a minor evil compared with his ultimate loss.

Thus when the Roman Lucius demands that she identify the body upon which she is stretched, Imogen speaks of her husband in the noblest terms:

> Richard du Champ: [*Aside*] if I do lie and do
> No harm by it, though the gods hear, I hope
> They'll pardon it.
>
> (4.2.377–79)

Giving her husband a knight's name, Imogen confers upon him the honor that his deeds in battle will soon show that he deserves. Lying for necessity exposes Imogen's revived love as well as the truth of Posthumus's character. Lucius suggests that such devotion is an extreme example of faith. Learning her assumed name, Fidele, he pronounces, "Thou dost approve thyself the very same: / Thy name well fits thy faith; thy faith thy name" (4.2.380–81). In other words, in Wales Imogen has come to know the *idea* of Faith.

Late in the play, Posthumus achieves architectonic knowledge when he miserably acknowledges his mortal frailty and need for modesty. When he awakens in prison, Posthumus first construes his bizarre dream–vision in terms of a courtly truism. Dejected, he says that

> Poor wretches, that depend
> On greatness' favour, dream as I have done,
> Wake, and find nothing.
>
> (5.4.127–29)

Such a mental set threatens to keep Posthumus from giving any importance to the dream–vision. But he chides himself before a commonplace obscures it:

> But, alas, I swerve:
> Many dream not to find, neither deserve,
> And yet are steep'd in favours; so am I,
> That have this golden chance, and know not why.
>
> (5.4.129–32)

Posthumus's remorse for his rash command for Imogen's death has forged a new humility. Immediately before the dream–vision, he entreats the gods: "For Imogen's dear life take mine" (5.4.22). Genuine modesty and penitence offer a better context for appreciating the dream–vision and tablet than any court idea does. The hero understands one of the play's most crucial events by means of his own special punishment for proudly testing his wife. In the manner of an empiricist, he lucidly interprets his experience in terms of the unique context out of which it emerges. Concerning the oracle, Posthumus announces that

> Be what it is,
> The action of my life is like it, which
> I'll keep, if but for sympathy.
>
> (5.4.149–51)

He thus retains the arcane tablet about a lion's whelp embraced by tender air that will be the sole proof that Jupiter has assisted the characters from despair to happiness. Posthumus's architectonic knowledge of his own fallibility and fragmented life provokes a humility, a sympathy that aptly leads to his preserving the romance means for establishing his ultimate joy.

Like Posthumus, Leontes in *The Winter's Tale* follows the trajectory of the Protestant paradigm. Initially, Leontes's complicating intellectual error involves his mad idea of Hermione's adultery, an idea presented in one of the most difficult passages in the Shakespearean canon (1.2.135–46). After suffering painfully, feeling remorse, and undertaking penance, he, again like Posthumus, does not directly achieve the new ways of knowing which occur in the middle pastoral episode. Nonetheless, the regenerative modes of speech and thought experienced there by Florizel and Perdita bear directly upon his misfortune. The theater audience has the impression that, in Bohemia, the faculties that justified Leontes's jealousy are bringing forth ideal truths and that they are doing so, for the most part, by combining in the exact manner that they had when they confirmed the King's black suspicions. One ecstasy of mind, produced by Florizel's vision of Perdita as Flora, appears to displace, and thus redeem, a corresponding mental rapture.

Leontes's fall is an epistemological one. In one of the most difficult speeches of the play, the King states,

> Come, sir page,
> Look on me with your welkin eye: sweet villain!
> Affection! thy intention stabs the centre:
> Thou dost make possible things not so held,
> Communicat'st with dreams;—how can this be?—
> With what's unreal thou coactive art,
> And fellow'st nothing: then 'tis very credent
> Thou may'st co-join with something; and thou dost,
> (And that beyond commission) and I find it,
> (And that to the infection of my brains
> And hard'ning of my brows).
>
> (1.2.135–46)

Leontes's tortuous musings seem to "prove," at least in the King's mind, that Hermione is an adulteress. The dense speech appears to imply discovery, and the comment about hardening of the brows explicitly alludes to being cuckolded. In light of Leontes's abstract diction, the precise meanings of "affection" and "intention" are considered the keys for unlocking the passage's significance. These terms, however, seem to carry special, perhaps technical, meanings.[33] For instance, Hallett Smith, quoting Cooper's *Thesaurus linguae romanae et britainicae* (1582 ed.) equates Leontes's "affection" with the Ciceronian notion of *affectio*: an abrupt mental seizure which, in Smith's reading, the King is addressing in the passage.[34] Yet instead of a sudden perturbation of mind or body, animosity, or lust—all possible seventeenth-century glosses for the word—the play suggests that the term "affection" bears its common meaning of "liking" or "love."[35]

Leontes is preoccupied in his musings on affection with verifying an existing doubt. His doubts momentarily vanish under the benign influence of Mamillius's "welkin eye," into which Leontes gazes. When the King's thoughts return to the question of Hermione's constancy ("Can thy dam?—may't be—?"), the affection that he has been feeling for Mamillius enters them; and he skeptically theorizes about love's nature. Leontes judges that love combines with dreams in lovers' minds and gives birth to fantasies—to nothing real. The wispy blending of affection and dream gives Leontes precedent for his belief that affection enters into something actual, his wife and friend's scheming: " . . . then 'tis very credent / Thou mayst co-join with something; and thou dost, / (And that beyond commission)." Swayed by this reasoning, Leontes sets his heart against Hermione. "Affection! thy intention stabs the centre," Leontes cries out. *Intention* was a technical term in Renaissance philosophy for the conceptions of the imagination. "The images or conceptions of phantasy, possessing a kind of pre-conceptual determination,"

Paul Oskar Kristeller writes in his account of Neoplatonic philosophy, "are called intentions, after the scholastic tradition. In forming these intentions the Soul shows its productive force; for it forms the images of the sense impressions 'through phantasy and preserves them in memory.' "[36] In terms of a popular Renaissance doctrine, the word *intention* was a synonym for "image"—the product of an active fantasy. Leontes's exclamation thus concerns love's fantastic image. In the speech, love's image, its intention, is primarily a dreaming lover's fantasy. By means of this image, Leontes believes he "stabs the center" (discovers the "truth" about Hermione). The King deduces evil from the reality of love's innocent image; if something romantically ideal and ephemeral exists, then something coarsely selfish and tangible must be an equal, or greater, possibility. Or so Leontes believes.

In summary, Shakespeare portrays Leontes's demise as a corruption of knowing, in which several intellectual faculties degenerately cooperate. Devastated by the shocking loss of his wife and son, a suddenly penitent Leontes acquires the architectonic knowledge of personal fallibility at the play's midpoint rather than near its conclusion. Nevertheless, the image of Leontes, grieving over Hermione's grave, eventually gives way to a new set of characters and another country. Although he reasons corruptly, Leontes employs his imagination; and the imagination finally triumphs in this late dramatic romance. Major events and ideas in the Sicilian episodes have their repetitions, usually with regenerative differences in the Bohemian scenes.[37] In *The Winter's Tale*, a pastoral episode exists in which love's image—its "intention"—is so moving that it redeems a world of suffering. The key episode concerns Perdita as something like the Roman goddess Flora, distributing flowers to her guests at the sheep-shearing festival. When Florizel observes her in this heightened role, his love for her informs his imagination, creating a fantastic truth beyond the reach of Polixenes's and Leontes's old and angry perceptions. Earlier, in Leontes's difficult speech, Shakespeare used the verbal form of endearment in the line—"With what's unreal thou coactive art." This form suggests that affection and art combine—"coact"— to produce the illusory. Florizel's breathtaking idea of Perdita, voiced in his speech about her royal deeds (4.4.135–146), results mainly from his intense love and from her role as an embodiment of Flora. The power of Perdita's role derives largely from the artistry of her costuming. Made possible by affection and art, Florizel's idea is a Sidneyan vision of a golden reality— the contemplative insight proper to the special pastoral realm. In Florizel's imagination, love makes possible an ideal image—Perdita as a wave of the sea, mystically holding motion and stillness in eternal tension.[38]

The power of this tantalizing image undermines Leontes's claim, in his speech on affection, that love and imaginative thinking bring forth nothing. Florizel's "nothing," his ideal image of Perdita, proves to be everything when it confirms and strengthens his feelings for his mistress. Leontes has a similar experience late in the play. The penitent King is at last shown the "statue"

of Hermione, upon which he longingly gazes. Prompted by Paulina's remarks about the rarity of the "artifact," Leontes artistically perceives his motionless wife:

> Her natural posture!
> Chide me, dear stone, that I may say indeed
> Thou art Hermione; or rather, thou art she
> In thy not chiding; for she was as tender
> As infancy and grace.
>
> (5.3.23–27)

The artistic vision evokes again Leontes's love; he affectionately remembers Hermione's exquisite tenderness. Art and love thus bring forth an idealized image in Leontes's mind—that of his compassionate and gentle wife. His sensitive imagination resembles that of Florizel concerning Perdita; both images are strong realities created by art and affection. Leontes in act 5 dramatizes his original musing about affection and intention in a marvelous way, one which, in his rage, he would never have supposed was possible. Sixteen years of suffering prepare Leontes's mind for the rich act of knowing and thus recovering not only his wife but Apollo's earthly paradise as well.

In *The Tempest*, the affective phases of the Protestant paradigm do not readily appear in the character figuratively analogous to Posthumus and Leontes. Alonso's error is not staged, and the King of Naples may not feel contrition and penance in his frantic madness.[39] Alonso, however, is a secondary character in the play. Prospero comes closest to enacting the spiritual progress of a Posthumus or a Leontes. His intellectual and perhaps prideful error of isolating himself in the liberal arts, denying responsibility for coming to terms with the Antonios of this world and the disasters resulting from a naive trust in them, repeats itself in his garbing himself as a magician and in his hermitlike conjuring in his cell. In many respects, Prospero's island is an inverted pastoral land. Brutal Caliban, for example, travesties the benign swain, like Montanus or Silvio; and contradiction riddles the idea of utopia that the island inspires in Gonzalo. This inversion includes the scheme of pastoral action. It is true that tragic Virgilian history surrounds Prospero's "Arcady," his isle purified to some degree and controlled by his white magic. The island's core is Prospero's cell, ringed by lime trees, the home of the sorcerer. Miranda's and Ferdinand's educations do take place in the pastoral circle of *The Tempest*, but its innermost heart, Prospero's cell, is not a place of rebirth for the magician. Instead, it is a place of severe isolation, in which Prospero's mysterious powers come at the price of self-knowledge and the understanding of what binds him to his kind.[40] As he does with so many received motifs and conventions, Shakespeare employs the scheme of pastoral action at the same time that he turns it inside-out.[41]

Shakespeare's unique adaptation of the epistemological scheme can be seen in Ferdinand's and Miranda's singular educations. Miranda and Ferdinand reveal quite early in the play that the comparison of contrary ideas can make their marvelous love even more admirable. Cloistered from any contact with young suitors and society in general, Miranda knows no more about Ferdinand than mere seeing offers; she first mistakenly knows him as one of her father's spirits, who are daily seen upon some magical errand:

> What is't? a spirit?
> Lord, how it looks about! Believe me, sir,
> It carries a brave form. But 'tis a spirit.
>
> (1.2.412–14)

Ferdinand, in turn, at first suspects that she may be a deity of the island. He begs that she might

> Vouchsafe my prayer
> May know if you remain upon this island;
> And that you will some good instruction give
> How I may bear me here: my prime request,
> Which I do last pronounce, is, O you wonder!
> If you be maid or no?
>
> (1.2.425–30)

Because Miranda has the beauty of a goddess upon whom heavenly airs attend, Ferdinand's question is sincere. It is not simply calculated courtly flattery. Upon first sight—their intuitive "changing of eyes"—each young lover experiences a feeling of wonder that works against a more exact knowledge of the beloved.

Miranda knows Ferdinand as a spirit mainly because she has had acquaintance only with mysterious sprites, her father, and also Caliban, whom, as the following quotation makes clear, she does not regard as a man. Consequently, she has difficulty recognizing Ferdinand's human appearance and gauging his nature by contrast with those of other men whom she would inevitably have met in ordinary society. In a central speech, she tells Ferdinand,

> I do not know
> One of my sex; no woman's face remember,
> Save, from my glass, mine own; nor have I seen
> More that I may call men than you, good friend,
> And my dear father: how features are abroad,
> I am skilless of; but, by my modesty,

> The jewel of my dower, I would not wish
> Any companion in the world but you;
> Nor can imagination form a shape,
> Besides yourself, to like of.
>
> (3.1.48–57)

Were she living in society, Miranda would have some knowledge of mankind and thus a partial context for judging Ferdinand's nature. Deprived of this context by her isolated life on the enchanted island, however, she must blindly trust her instincts for her love. Were Ferdinand not a noble young man but perhaps a handsome opportunist like Antonio, Miranda could not deduce truth from beauty; here she might be choosing and loving a vicious youth. The last lines of the above passage imply that an abundance of imagined shapes can, by the contrasting examples that they provide, help one to define more clearly the nature of an object. As Miranda testifies, a dearth of them, conversely, leaves one dangerously gullible.

Prospero initially adopts the role of the irate father so that Miranda's vulnerability might be minimized and the young couple know a more perfect love. This knowledge, so originally fashioned, constitutes the education identified with the pastoral sojourn. The principle that Prospero employs in aiding the love affair's progress is expressed by Gonzalo when he portrays his Golden Age to Alonso and the other lords of his party: "I'th' common-wealth I would by contraries / Execute all things" (2.1.143–44).[42] By means of contrary comparisons, Prospero directs Miranda's and Ferdinand's love so that humility and gentleness, the fruits of culture, are not sacrificed to natural passion.[43] The magician tells his daughter,

> Thou think'st there is no more such shapes as he,
> Having seen but him and Caliban: foolish wench!
> To th' most of men this is a Caliban,
> And they to him are angels.
>
> (1.2.481–84)

The contrary terms *Caliban* and *angels* are comparisons helping Miranda to construct an elementary ratio: as angels are to most men, so most men are to Ferdinand. In comparison with divine creatures she has yet to see, divine Ferdinand is simply a beast. Upon first consideration, Prospero seems to be trying to play down Ferdinand's noble nature, apparently meaning to counter drastically Miranda's excessively fantastic vision of the Prince as a spirit. Toward such a supposed end, he has already asserted that "the spirit"

> eats and sleeps and hath such senses
> As we have, such. This gallant which thou seest
> Was in the wrack; and, but he's something stain'd

> With grief (that's beauty's canker), thou mightst call him
> A goodly person: he hath lost his fellows
> And strays about to find 'em.
>
> (1.2.415–20)

By calling Ferdinand a "gallant" and "a goodly person"—rather common, colorless terms in contrast with Miranda's—and by likening him to an animal in the passage's last two lines (livestock "stray" to rejoin a herd), Prospero appears to be giving his daughter new categories—"shapes" to use her word—by which she might more realistically imagine her lover's nature.

However, Prospero's shaping of his daughter's thoughts has a different instructive end. When Prospero tells his daughter that Ferdinand is a Caliban compared to most men and that they, juxtaposed with him, are angels, she replies, "My affections / Are then most humble; I have no ambition / To see a goodlier man" (1.2.484–86). When Miranda imagines Ferdinand in the shape of Caliban, a humble condition suggests to her a humble love; and she has no ambition to see a better man. Prospero's use of contrary comparisons—Caliban and angels—gives Miranda a perspective by which she might better understand her natural passion for the Prince. Even though her image of him and her love for him are limitless, enjoying all the benefits of wonder, Miranda now knows her affection as a humble passion and so avoids the ambitious desires that we see driving creatures like Antonio, Sebastian, Trinculo, and Stephano toward vice. Miranda's way of knowing her love is a buffer against the adverse effects of boundless feeling, which she enjoys in the forms of generosity and pity. Ferdinand also profits from Prospero's method. Unreasonably accused of plotting to win the island from the magician and condemned to an endless, menial task of carrying logs as a punishment, Ferdinand discovers that Miranda is "Ten times more gentle than her father's crabbed, / And he's composed of harshness" (3.1.8–9). Prospero charitably makes himself into a base comparison that by contrast increases Miranda's excellence in her lover's mind.

Realizing the extent of his inconstancy and insufficiency, Prospero at last acquires self-knowledge, which—in keeping with Sidney's definition—issues in right action. A variety of passions, mainly vengeful anger, course through the alienated Prospero's "beating" mind, until Ariel helps him to feel remorse and the desire to forgive his enemies. The climax of *The Tempest* thus involves the education of the wonderful but imperfect educator. In the final act of *The Tempest*, Prospero's angelic servant shows the magician, who is adept at contrary comparisons, a further refinement in their employment. Ariel begins the conversion of Prospero's vengeful feelings into merciful desires when he describes to his master the suffering Gonzalo, bruised and led astray by bewitching visions and voices:

> His tears run down his beard, like winter's drops
> From eaves of reeds. Your charm so strongly
>   works 'em,
> That if you now beheld them, your affections
> Would become tender.
>
> (5.1.16–19)

Ariel's pathetic portrayal of Gonzalo moves Prospero chiefly because a simile makes Gonzalo's acute distress more vivid: "His tears run down his beard, *like* winter's drops / From eaves of reeds" (italics mine). The spirit does not actually give Prospero a direct vision of Gonzalo by which the magician might be led to new ideas. He requires that his master imagine what Gonzalo in his misery looks like; the simile helps Prospero to do precisely this. Ariel is performing for Prospero a service like that which he enacted for the lovers during their courtship. He is giving his master another "shape" —the image of weeping Gonzalo—by which he might imagine new ideas and more refined affections. Even as he released Miranda—only knowing a woman by gazing, Narcissus-like, upon herself in a mirror—from a constrictive emotion, Prospero himself is educated out of his self-centered revenge by a wiser, loving teacher.

When Ariel says that Prospero's affections would become tender if the latter could see Gonzalo, the magician questions, "Dost thou think so, spirit?" And Ariel answers, "Mine would, sir, were I human" (5.1.19–20). The mortal then concludes,

> And mine shall.
> Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling
> Of their afflictions, and shall not myself,
> One of their kind, that relish all as sharply
> Passion as they, be kindlier mov'd than thou art?
> Though with their high wrongs I am struck to th'
>   quick,
> Yet with my nobler reason 'gainst my fury
> Do I take part: the rarer action is
> In virtue than in vengeance.
>
> (5.1.20–28)

For a moment, Ariel, who embodies Art throughout the play,[44] seems to Prospero to feel human passion. But this is only for a moment. Art that seems alive with human passion only serves to remind Prospero that passion is exclusively the expression of human nature. Passion allows Prospero to distinguish the human from the nonhuman, set up comparisons, and reason a happy conclusion.[45] When he finds by comparison that something contrary to himself, the nonhuman Ariel, can experience a touch of human

pity over a human plight, Prospero discovers that he, a man, should all the more intensely feel the same redemptive compassion. He should be "kindlier" moved than Ariel in both Renaissance senses of that word: more pitifully and more humanly. One last time in *The Tempest* an elementary ratio helps give the dramatic action a major turn. Just as mankind is more moved than a nonhuman creature, so mankind's affections should be more human than any felt by the creature. Such a classic ratio appears to form in Prospero's mind, prompting him to deduce that forgiveness is more humane than vengeance. This deduction reveals that Prospero finally is not the passive slave, depicted as mankind at large in his revels speech, who depends upon mysterious dreams for his deeper understanding. By personally and richly determining his saving knowledge, Prospero fittingly concludes Shakespeare's exploration of possibilities for learning within the romance of knowing—a literary form he brilliantly adapted to the stage.[46]

NOTES

1.   See, respectively, Stephen Orgel, "New Uses of Adversity: Tragic Experience in *The Tempest*," in *In Defense of Reading*, ed. Reuben Brower and Richard Poirier (New York: Dutton, 1963), 110–32; Northrop Frye, *A Natural Perspective: The Development of Shakespearean Comedy and Romance* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), 136–59, passim.

2.   Frye, *A Natural Perspective*, 136. Frye elaborates on this movement of romantic aspiration in "Romance as Masque," in *Shakespeare's Romances Reconsidered*, ed. Carol McGinnis Kay and Henry E. Jacobs (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), 22–26, 30–31, 36–37.

3.   All references to the late romances are to the New Arden editions: *Pericles*, ed. F. D. Hoeniger (London: Methuen, 1963); *Cymbeline*, ed. J. M. Nosworthy (London: Methuen, 1955); *The Winter's Tale*, ed. J. H. P. Pafford (London: Methuen, 1963); and *The Tempest*, ed. Frank Kermode (London: Methuen, 1962). All other references to Shakespeare's plays are to *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G. Blakemore Evans et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974).

4.   Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 131, 13–18, 15–16, 21–22. Lewalski clarifies the paradigm on 13–27 and 131–44 especially.

5.   For an account of the "beyond-tragedy" approach to the last plays, see Philip Edwards, "Shakespeare's Romances: 1900–1957," *Shakespeare Survey* 11 (1958): 12–14; and Robert W. Uphaus, *Beyond Tragedy: Structure and Experience in Shakespeare's Romances* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1981), 3, 141 n. Uphaus's book is an excellent representative example of the approach. Derek Traversi actually belongs in the beyond-tragedy camp first pitched by E. M. W. Tillyard in *Shakespeare's Last Plays* (1938), as indicated by the importance of *King Lear* for his thesis in *Shakespeare: The Last Phase* (1955; reprint, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 5–18.

6.   Isabel G. MacCaffrey, in *Spenser's Allegory: The Anatomy of Imagination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 134, argues that "coming to know is a major aspect of the theme of Book I" of the *Faerie Queene*. "In the epistemological allegory of

Book I, Spenser compels both his reader and his hero to confront the duplicity of seemings" (154–58) before he learns how to read reality faithfully under Fidelia's tutelage in the House of Holiness (188–90). Kathleen Williams, in *Spenser's World of Glass: A Reading of The "Faerie Queene"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 28–30, describes the educational effects of the House of Holiness. A. C. Hamilton, in *The Structure of Allegory in the "Faerie Queene"* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 102, points out that "Heavenly contemplation teaches the Red Cross Knight his 'name and nation' "; in other words, Contemplation teaches the Knight his true identity. For an excellent discussion of Contemplation's instructions, see Judith H. Anderson, *The Growth of a Personal Voice: "Piers Plowman" and the "Faerie Queene"* (New Haven: Yale University Press), 40–49.

7. Hallett Smith, in *Shakespeare's Romances: A Study of Some Ways of the Imagination* (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1972), 55–69, has shown us that the *Arcadia* may have greater bearing upon Shakespeare's late dramatic romances than was previously supposed.

8. See Andrew D. Weiner, *Sir Philip Sidney and the Poetics of Protestantism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978).

9. Weiner, 3–50, 147–85.

10. Sir Philip Sidney, *An Apology for Poetry*, ed. Geoffrey Shepherd, Nelson's Medieval and Renaissance Library (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1965), 104.

11. Weiner, 49–50, 154–55, 179–84. Calvin declared that "nothing is more inconstant than man. . . . Adam could have stood if he wished, seeing that he fell solely by his own will. But it was because his will was capable of being bent to one side or the other, and was not given the constancy to persevere, that he fell so easily" (*Institutes* 1. 15. 5 and 8). Cited by Roland Mushat Frye, *Shakespeare and Christian Doctrine* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 186–87.

12. Walter R. Davis, *Idea and Act in Elizabethan Fiction* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 60.

13. See Edwin Greenlaw, "Shakespeare's Pastorals," *Studies in Philology* 13 (1916): 148–54; Frank Kermode, *English Pastoral Poetry from the Beginnings to Marvell* (London: Harrap, 1952), 17–19; Patrick Cullen, *Spenser, Marvell, and Renaissance Pastoral* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 12; and David Young, *The Heart's Forest: A Study of Shakespeare's Pastoral Plays* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 3, 29–31.

14. Nancy Jo Hoffman, in *Spenser's Pastorals: "The Shepheardes Calender" and "Colin Clout"* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 5, 30, 78–103, explains how pastoral can be a natural mirror in which the mind recognizes and understands its moods and ideas. Mary Lascelles, in "Shakespeare's Pastoral Comedy," in *More Talking of Shakespeare*, ed. John Garrett (New York: Theater Arts Books, 1959), 85, argues that "the world of true pastoral is always known for a country of the mind, to be attained only by force of the imagination." Pastoral retained this epistemological value well into the seventeenth century. "When Marvell uses pastoral figures to shape a poem," Donald M. Friedman concludes, in *Marvell's Pastoral Art* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 31–32, "he is often employing them as metaphors for faculties and processes of the mind." Marvell's concern with "the problem of knowing, of reconciling the operations of the mind with the external world it must know, seems also to demand its expression within the pastoral mode, the mode sanctioned

by decorum and rendered appropriate by philosophical necessity." Thus "The Garden."

15.   Davis, *Idea and Act in Elizabethan Fiction*, 59. Richard Cody associates Platonic Contemplation and Pastoralism in *The Landscape of the Mind: Pastoralism and Platonic Theory in Tasso's "Aminta" and Shakespeare's Early Comedies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 3–11, 23–24, 51, 155–57.

16.   The association of idealistic contemplation with pastoral was so strong after Sidney that, in book 1 of the *Faerie Queene*, Contemplation pastoralizes his revelation: "Now are they Saints all in that Citie sam, / More deare unto their God, then younglings to their dam" (10.57). See Anderson, 44.

17.   Walter R. Davis, "A Map of Arcadia: Sidney's Romance in Its Tradition," in *Sidney's Arcadia*, Yale Studies in English 158 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 60–63.

18.   Philip Sidney, *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia*, ed. Jean Robertson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 166.

19.   Davis, "A Map of Arcadia," 35.

20.   Ibid. Davis points out that the innermost center is a cave, the source of miraculous waters, in Sannazaro's *Arcadia*, for example, but the Temple of Diana in Montemayor's *Diana*.

21.   Ibid., 38. Davis, 50–53, notes that Sidney, while modifying this pastoral action in the *Arcadia*, essentially represents it.

22.   Ibid., 38–39.

23.   It was Northrop Frye who, over 30 years ago, helped us to understand that Shakespearean pastoral has regenerative virtues for the Valentines and Duke Seniors who dwell there before returning to the corrupt courts and cities from which they fled. See "The Argument of Comedy," *English Institute Essays: 1948*, ed. D. A. Robertson, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 67–73; and "Romance as Masque," 29–30. Young, 18–21, also recognizes the importance of the Sidneyan pastoral action for Shakespeare's plays. In general, his work provides an excellent account of the diverse value of the greenworld in Shakespeare's art.

24.   Humphrey Tonkin, *Spenser's Courteous Pastoral* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 289, 300–306.

25.   Tonkin, 247–57, explains how the Graces in the dance inculcate the charitable Idea "that good should from us goe, then come in greater store" (*Faerie Queene* 6.10.24.9) and that Faith and Hope are required for· *agape*. For the educational function of Spenser's pastoral and the vision of the Graces in particular, see Tonkin, 124–42, 217–18, 230–80, 298–302, 305–6.

26.   For the comparison, see, for example, Howard Felperin, *Shakespearean Romance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 267; and Gary Schmidgall, *Shakespeare and the Courtly Aesthetic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 178–80, 203–7.

27.   See Cullen, 73–74. The quotation from the October eclogue is taken from *The Works of Edmund Spenser*, ed. Edwin Greenlaw et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1943), 1:98.

28.   Shepherd, 101.

29.   For more on this prevention, see Lawrence Babb, *The Elizabethan Malady* (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1951), 1–20; and Herschel Baker, *The Image of Man* (1947; reprint, New York: Harper and Row, 1961), 258–92.

30. Sidney certainly knew that, strictly speaking, his eloquent judgment was a radical contradiction in terms. Like other sixteenth-century thinkers, Sidney blended ideas that derived from philosophies resisting synthesis. In the passage from the *Apology*, Sidney combines the Neoplatonic and the Christian concepts of Will, which were at basis irreconcilable. If one believed in the infected will, one believed in the Fall that, according to Christian teaching, shortcircuited the intuition of divine ideas—ideas that from the time of Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola had been a hallmark of Neoplatonism. For a devoutly Neoplatonic writer like Castiglione, Intellect easily becomes Will. See *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. Charles S. Singleton (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959), 336. Castiglione believed that mankind can do more than actually "communicate with the angels"; he can climb the Ladder of Platonic Love and share the angels' overview of earthly affairs. Mankind's soul thereby becomes "transformed into an angel, it understands all things intelligible, and without any veil or cloud views that wide sea of pure divine beauty, and receives it into itself, enjoying the supreme happiness of which the senses are incapable" (354). The infected will was not a troubling reality for the complete Neoplatonist.

31. D. E. Landry, in "Dreams as History: The Strange Unity of *Cymbeline*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 33 (1982): 70–74, argues that, as alter egos, Posthumus and Imogen together dramatize the experience of a single character.

32. Belarius's "three-foot stool" (*Cymb.* 3.3.89) and cave resemble similar attributes of the Delphic Oracle. See H. W. Parke, *Greek Oracles* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967), 77–80. By the allusion, Shakespeare implies that Belarius imagines himself to be an inspired speaker.

33. In *The Winter's Tale*, ed. Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch and John Dover Wilson (1931; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 134–35, the editors note that "We must . . . realize that 'affection' and 'intention' are technical terms in Elizabethan psychology: affection = natural tendency, instinct, (here) the sexual instinct . . . intention = mental aim or purpose based upon the physical 'affection.' "

34. Hallett Smith, "Leontes's *affectio*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 14 (1963): 163–66.

35. For the possible glosses, see the OED, especially 3, 7, and 10. Pafford, 166–67, and Smith, 163, review the many meanings proposed over the years for the term *affection* in the passage under discussion. They cite no fewer than seven different interpretations ("emotion," "burning love," "lustful passion," "troubles," "mental seizure," "passion," and "natural propensity").

36. Paul Oskar Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*, trans. Virginia Conant (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 235–36.

37. The subjects of thematic and stylistic repetitions in *The Winter's Tale* have been explored by Ernest Schanzer, "The Structural Pattern of *The Winter's Tale*," *Review of English Literature* 5 (1964): 72–82; by Fitzroy Pyle, "*The Winter's Tale*": A Commentary on the Structure (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969); by James E. Siemon, " 'But It Appears She Lives': Iteration in *The Winter's Tale*," *PMLA* 89 (1974): 10–16; and by Richard Proudfoot, "Verbal Reminiscence and the Two-Part Structure of *The Winter's Tale*," *Shakespeare Survey* 29 (1976): 67–78.

38. See Maurice Hunt, " 'Standing in Rich Place': The Importance of Context in *The Winter's Tale*," *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature* 38 (1984), especially 26–30.

39.   An unrepentant Alonso is becoming a critical commonplace. See, for example, Harry Berger, Jr., "Miraculous Harp: A Reading of Shakespeare's *Tempest*," *Shakespeare Studies* 5 (1969): 273–74; and D'Orsay W. Pearson, " 'Unless I Be Reliev'd by Prayer': *The Tempest* in Perspective," *Shakespeare Studies* 7 (1974): 273.

40.   Cf. Carol Gesner, "The Tempest as Pastoral Romance," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 10 (1959): 531–39, for another view of the pastoral structure of Shakespeare's final romance.

41.   Nonetheless, Davis's description of the typical pastoral education precisely captures Prospero's major analytical action of learning. Prospero sees his situation reflected in the image of weeping Gonzalo as described by Ariel. Literally coming face-to-face with the need for compassion, Prospero reasonably reconciles his mind, which has been divided between pity and vengeful desires.

42.   Gonzalo merely means that primitive life on his fantastic island paradise will be contrary to existence in civilized states:

> for no kind of traffic
> Would I admit; no name of magistrate;
> Letters should not be known; riches, poverty,
> And use of service, none; contract, succession,
> Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none;
> No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil;
> No occupation; all men idle, all;
> And women too, but innocent and pure:
> No sovereignty.
>
> (2.1.144–52)

There is a specific recollection of *Timon of Athens* here. When saturnine Timon, deserted by his false friends, leaves Athens in rage for the woods, he commands the rich city to "decline to your confounding contraries" (4.1.20), to the raw materials out of which its grandeur was created. In a state of nature contrary to a corrupt urban world, Gonzalo, however, believes that man would lead a better life. Still, within the realm of the play Caliban and the savagery that he incarnates argue for some modicum of cultivation.

43.   *Contraria* was an Aristotelian category in Renaissance formal logic. T. W. Baldwin cites Gonzalo's speech as an example in *William Shakspeare's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), 2:115–16. Also see Robert Grudin, *Shakespeare and Renaissance Contrariety* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), especially 185–208.

44.   The familiar form of *are* in the passage works to identify Ariel with art ("which art but air" and "Kindlier moved than thou art").

45.   David Horowitz, in *Shakespeare: An Existential View* (London: Tavistock, 1965) also believes that Prospero's new idea of humanity is made possible by passion: "Here Prospero names the well-spring of his pardon, which is to follow. It is his kindness, his nature which he shares with them. For he feels afflictions as they do, passions as they (where 'passions' has a verbal emphasis, suggesting 'to experience feeling') and thus is moved by the image of himself, suffering in their agony" (87).

46.   Finally, a word about *Pericles*. On occasion critics portray Pericles as a Jacobean Everyman or Juventus-like figure, pursuing a morality course from temptation to election to beatitude. G. Wilson Knight, for example, in *The Crown of Life* (1947; reprint New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), 36, 38, 52, 73–74, states his belief that the passage of Pericles from a "lustful and cheating fantasy," which plunges the Prince into a world of sin, represented by incest, to divine intuition delineates a morality play written around Shakespeare's "own poetic symbolism as dogma"—around, that is, image-clusters of Tempest which give way to those of Music. Howard Felperin in "Shakespeare's Miracle Play," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 18 (1967): 367, classifies the character Pericles as a neo-Morality Juventus. Equating Pericles and Everyman of course relates Shakespeare's character to the Protestant paradigm and its affective phases. Identifying Pericles with the Morality hero is difficult, however, for several reasons, the primary one that the Prince does not commit a sinful error resulting in deserved suffering. Several critics have commented upon the blameless character of Pericles and the seemingly accidental nature of his painful adventures as a wandering knight. See, for example, Robert Grams Hunter, *Shakespeare and the Comedy of Forgiveness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 140–42; and J. H. P. Pafford, Introduction to the New Arden edition of *The Winter's Tale*: "in *Pericles* the king does not sin or cause the separations [of family members] and therefore the question of final forgiveness and reconciliation does not arise" (xlv). "Pericles has no active evil to be purged from his nature," D. G. James judged in *Scepticism and Poetry* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1937), 229. Moreover, while Pericles expands his capacity for poetic expression during the vivid tempest of act 3, new ways of knowing, like those appearing in middle scenes of other late romances, are basically absent from this uneven, perhaps collaborated work. Since the greenworld forms no part of the topography of *Pericles*, the scheme of pastoral action cannot clarify the play. "The world of *Pericles* is morally inscrutable," according to Kenneth Semon in "*Pericles*: An Order Beyond Reason," *Essays in Literature* 1 (1974): 17; "during the course of the play many of the characters, besides Gower, seek to impose some kind of formula or rational explanation upon the fantastic events. All of their attempts fail. Only when one accepts the events without trying to explain or control them does one come to some kind of understanding; and that understanding is always beyond rational explanations" (ibid.). Through four acts, the play thus is mainly a "romance of *unknowing*" for Pericles. This fact argues against including *Pericles* among Shakespeare's romances of knowing.

Book Reviews

GENERAL

Leonard Barkan, *The Gods Made Flesh: Metamorphosis & the Pursuit of Paganism*, Yale University Press, 1986.

Barkan explores philosophical, theological, and anthropological aspects of metamorphosis as he traces images of physical transformation in art and poetry from Ovid to Shakespeare. Employing diverse critical approaches, he identifies the complexity of mythic transformation while demonstrating that metamorphosis is centrally important to the works of numerous poets and painters. Chapter 1, "Tapestry Figures," meditates on Velasquez's *Las hilanderas* (*The Spinners*), a painting used to introduce aesthetic and structural principles beyond its ekphrastic subject, the tapestry of Arachne. Paradigmatic artist and victim of metamorphosis, Arachne illuminates the central concern of the book: metamorphosis as a self-referential metaphor for artistic creation.

Barkan treats many other myths in three chapters devoted to the "metamorphic aesthetics" of Ovid, Dante, and Shakespeare. Interstitially, he gives a history of opposing medieval views of metamorphosis from Augustine to the *Carmina burana* and a theory of "Ovidian Renaissance," circa 1520, centered on Correggio and Titian. He also examines the centrality of metamorphosis in poetry by Petrarch, Ronsard, and Spenser. He analyzes structural elements as well as imagery in numerous texts, providing translations for Latin, Italian, and early French passages. Heavily documented, the book draws examples from decorated *cassoni*, manuscript illuminations, *ekphraseis*, and emblem books, redefining metamorphosis as Ovid's "infusion of human personality and destiny into the universe" (35), "the basic principle ... upon which Dante builds hell" (140), and Shakespeare's paradigm "of selfhood and love" (280). Allegorical metamorphosis may involve etiological and euhemeristic demystification or Platonic, occult integumentation. More dynamically than the microcosms Barkan analyzed in his earlier work, metamorphoses embody "the ultimate transfer" between nature and art (114) or manifest human "union with the divine" (233). Binding violence and sanctity to human identity, metamorphosis balances art between forces of life and death or resolves crises of sexual identity in triumphant celebration.

Barkan's many close readings and eclectic methodology are most effective in showing the continuity of pagan myth into the Renaissance. The preface honestly describes the book as neither short nor comprehensive, but it is usually judicious and often provocative, always avoiding oversimplification. Because the book is itself a densely woven tapestry of variable images, it may be ungrateful to lament omissions. But one thread has not been pulled through. Barkan sees voyeuristic elements in works by Titian and finds exogamy behind some myths, but he never squarely confronts salient issues of gender and power with which the myths are replete. Although he quotes Mary R. Lefkowitz's *Heroines and Hysterics* (1981) in an endnote (293 n. 31), Barkan minimizes the violence of mythic rape that is all too obvious in the portrayal of female victims by male artists. For example, the mutilations of Philomel and Lavinia are central to Barkan's analysis of *Titus Andronicus*, but he discusses the Tereus myth primarily as a vehicle for Shakespeare's reexamination of dramatic art. The brutally disfigured Lavinia seems to cry out for deeper analysis.

A bibliography or complete indexing of the notes would make the book a more usable resource. Its numerous black and white illustrations are only adequately reproduced, and some typographical errors can be found in the text. Limitations aside, this learned book should renew interest in metamorphosis as a powerful force in literature and art.

Steven Max Miller
Millersville University of Pennsylvania

Gillian R. Evans, Alister E. McGrath, and Allan D. Galloway, *The History of Christian Theology, Vol. I: The Science of Theology*, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986.

This volume introduces what promises to be a valuable addition to the ever-increasing corpus of theological literature. Paul Avis, the general editor, has chosen well among his British colleagues in launching this series, for they very effectively achieve the major objective he has identified: to provide "an extensive introduction to religious thought in the Christian tradition from a historical perspective."

In roughly three equal parts Gillian R. Evans deals with "Patristic and Medieval Theology," Alister E. McGrath with "Reformation to Enlightenment," and Allan D. Galloway with "Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Theology." Two useful indexes, subject and name, complete the volume. Because of the focus of the *Journal of the Rocky Mountain Medieval and Renaissance Association*, this review will concentrate on the patristic, medieval, Renaissance, and Reformation sections.

Evans brings to her portion of the book great expertise, for she is one of the most productive of young scholars who are working in medieval theology and intellectual history. She is thoroughly conversant with the sources and scholarly literature of medieval religious history. Her several monographs on Augustine of Hippo, Pope Gregory the Great, and early Scholasticism amply demonstrate her unique qualifications to provide a work of synthesis.

In 10 short chapters Evans distills an enormous amount of information with a narrative that is always lucid. Her leitmotif is the constant interaction between Christian theology and classical philosophy. Her first five chapters provide a thoroughly understandable account of just how much "Athens has to do with Jerusalem"—pax Tertullian! Evans's sixth chapter, "The End of the Roman World," describes the attrition of philosophical interests in the era extending from Boethius to John Scotus Eriugena. She then turns to "The Beginning of the Medieval World," in chapter 7, with the intellectual ferment which resulted from the "Revival of Logic" and the careers of Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abelard. Her concluding chapters bring the reader to the apogee of Scholasticism as she evaluates the impact of "The Arrival of Aristotle" and the quintessential Scholastic, Thomas Aquinas. Her concluding chapter is devoted to "The Modern Way," in which she focuses on William of Ockham, Jean Gerson, and Nicholas of Cusa.

Alister E. McGrath, in his introductory chapter "The Renaissance Background," incisively describes the relationship between Renaissance Humanism and the Reformation. Much of the prolix popular discussion today about "secular humanism" would be enlightened by the reading of McGrath's informative account of the nature of Renaissance Humanism. His second chapter, "The Theological Method of the Reformers," demonstrates definitively Humanism's absolutely essential role in *intellectually* preparing the way for the Reformation's *theological* developments.

The remainder of this lively volume upholds the level of performance described above: in succinct and lucid chapters the significant ideas and individuals who shaped Christian theology down through the centuries are accounted for. Each chapter is followed by a short bibliography, mostly English language items, which will enable the serious student to pursue a topic at a more detailed and sophisticated level.

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Harry Rosenberg
Colorado State University

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Charlotte F. Otten, ed., *A Lycanthropy Reader: Werewolves in Western Culture*, Syracuse University Press, 1986.

This interesting, if uneven, collection of 26 selections is divided into six categories: (1) medical cases, diagnoses, descriptions; (2) trial records, historical accounts, sightings; (3) philosophical and theological approaches to metamorphosis; (4) critical essays on lycanthropy; (5) myths and legends; (6) allegory.

The book is weighed heavily in favor of literature and essays from the sixteenth century on. The classical and medieval periods are represented by Ovid and Petronius, Giraldus Cambrensis, the *Malleus maleficarum*, Marie de France, and a 1904 Milne translation of the fourteenth-century legend, *Arthur and Gorlagon*. It is too bad that Marie de France appears in an irritating 1911 mock-Gothic translation instead of the delightful recent version by Ferrante-Hanning (with excellent notes).

Of the remaining original sources, four are from the sixteenth century, five from the seventeenth, two from the nineteenth, and four from the twentieth. It would be interesting to know if people in the eighteenth century had lost interest in werewolves or simply did not write appropriate works on them.

Section 4 has five studies from 1964–83, three dealing with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one with the medieval period. The fifth, which one might logically expect to find in section 1, describes the disease of porphyria, a medical condition which certainly contributed to the werewolf and vampire legends. This interesting approach is given rather short shrift with a selection of two pages. Section 6 contains only one entry.

The reader and its individual sections are each introduced by a short, lucid essay explaining background and content. There is a brief selected bibliography and excellent index. A worthy effort and a convenient introduction to a fascinating topic, this collection will prove most rewarding to those whose interests tend to the literary, theological, or philosophical aspect of werewolves, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Melanie Shirk
University of New Mexico

MEDIEVAL

John F. Wippel, ed., *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, Vol. 17: Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, Catholic University Press, 1987.

This volume contains 12 highly interesting and self-contained studies on various topics of medieval philosophy. Most of them deal with metaphysics, but there is also one article on logic, two articles which touch substantially on concepts of ethics, and one on philosophical psychology. Most studies deal with the philosophical tradition of the Latin world, but there are two articles which deal with philosophical problems outside that tradition, one on an Islamic author ("Al-Farabi and Emanationism" by Thérèse-Anne Druart) and the other on a Jewish author ("Maimonides on Creation and Emanation" by Arthur Hyman).

The editor, John Wippel, arranged the studies as much as possible according to a chronological plan. Some of the articles involve philosophical discussions reaching into several centuries, e.g., "Plato or Aristotle—A Real Alternative in Medieval Philosophy?" by Georg Wieland, "The Divine as a Measure of Being in Platonic and Scholastic Thought" by James McEvoy, and "The Tradition of Mediaeval Nominalism" by Calvin C. Normore; these are used as "bridge articles." The result is an integrated kaleidoscope of some very interesting philosophical ideas.

Eleonore Stump discusses the problem of interpretation of the Stoic "undemonstrated" arguments. She examines the recent literature on the subject and then argues convincingly that the most plausible, historically accurate, and coherent interpretation of the Stoic "indemonstrables" is still that which had been given by Boethius. John Wippel undertakes a critical examination of one of the central ideas of Aquinas's metaphysics, the idea of participation, which has been neglected by most of the revivalists of Thomism in favor of other themes. B. R. Inagaki, interpreting Aquinas, defends the view that a habit is not caused simply by repetition of acts, but rather by human nature conceived of as final cause. James F. Ross offers an analysis of the concept of annihilation. Calvin Normore's essay presents a most insightful picture of the twelfth- and fourteenth-century *nominales*. He replaces the stereotyped accounts of medieval nominalism as one of the positions on the "problem of universals" by an account of nominalist refusal to reify dicta, statuses, the *complexe significabilia*, and other "hows" of things. Marilyn Adams scrutinizes the question of whether Ockham is a voluntarist or a naturalist. Stephen F. Brown offers an interesting philosophic discussion of the nature of final causality intertwined with questions about the authenticity of several texts of Ockham. Finally, Edward P. Mahoney presents

John of Jandun's understanding of the structure of man and of the plurality-of-forms doctrine within the historical context.

Indices of authors and subjects conclude this volume which should prove most valuable for use in courses on medieval philosophy and on intellectual history.

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Ivan Boh
Ohio State University

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Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. Michael Jones, Basil Blackwell, 1984.

Michael Jones has provided the English reading public with an excellent translation of Philippe Contamine's *La guerre au Moyen Age*, which first appeared in 1980. In addition, the translation has appeared in a relatively short time since the original publication in French. One has only to remember that 22 years passed before J. F. Verbruggen's classic study of medieval warfare, *De Krijskunst in West–Europa in de Middeleeuwen (IXe tot begin XIVe eeuw)*, was issued in an English translation.

Contamine, whose main interest is fourteenth- and fifteenth-century warfare, here surveys medieval combat from the late fourth century, when the Germans entered the Roman Empire, through the early sixteenth century and the beginning of the modern army. For the most part he concentrates his attention on what today is called "Western Europe"—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and England, with occasional comments on developments outside these five areas. The book is divided into three parts. The first is a chronological treatment of the period. In the second part, Contamine examines a series of topics: military equipment, the art of war, the impact of war on society, courage, and medieval thought on warfare. The third part consists of a 50-page bibliography that contains 34 sections; this alone is worth the price of the book.

This is not a book about grand strategy, campaign marches, and battlefield tactics. Instead it is an examination of military developments as European society changed through the thousand years of the Middle Ages. As one reads, one is struck time and again by the reality that medieval warfare happened in miniature when compared to more recent times. From bands of a few thousand Germans to armies of a few dozen knights in plate armor supported by infantry often numbering in the hundreds and the odd artillery piece, warfare of the period was on a very small scale. Yet, kings and city–states devoted considerable attention and money to it. Repeatedly rulers raised vast sums to put tiny forces into the field. The lack of national armies made the use of military power almost the exception rather than the

norm. Ironically as late medieval governments created ways of fielding larger, more professional forces, the number of actual battles fought decreased. The solution to this "problem" came in the early modern period when countries found ways of raising the money necessary to keep these larger armies in the field longer than medieval states were able to do.

K. G. Madison
Iowa State University

Juliet R. V. Barker, *The Tournament in England, 1100–1400*. Boydell & Brewer, 1986.

Nothing is more important, and more neglected, in modern chivalric and military histories than the tournament. Certainly historians, among them Maurice Keen and Richard Barber, have mentioned the tournament within the context of their recent works on chivalry, but both fail to discuss adequately the historical origins, terminology, weaponry and participants of the tournament itself. Nor do they attempt, within these discussions of chivalry, to link the tournament with any actual military activity. In order to fill this gap in modern historical writing, as well as to correct previous misconceptions left by early twentieth-century tournament histories written by F. H. Cripps-Day (*The History of the Tournament in France and England* [London, 1918]) and R. C. Clepham (*The Tournament: Its Period and Phases* [London, 1919]), Juliet R. V. Barker has written a study of English tournaments in the period 1100 to 1400. In doing so she has given us a work which, despite its chronological and geographical limitations, answers most of the questions historians (and scholars of courtly literature) might pose concerning the history of medieval tournaments.

Barker divides her book into eight chapters. Five chapters serve as a history of the tournament in medieval culture, discussing it as a spectacle and its relationship to war, to politics, to the Church and to society. Three chapters—numbers one, seven and eight respectively—are left to introduce the terminology, forms, arms, and armor of the tournament. While the book's historical chapters serve the reader well, composed as they are from Barker's keen knowledge of the narrative, literary, and diplomatic sources (many of which exist only in manuscript form), its introductory chapters are often repetitive and poorly placed in the book. Why, for example, must we wait until the seventh chapter before we are told the difference between a hastilude and a joust, between a tournament *à plaisance* and a tournament *à outrance*? Had Barker begun her work with this chapter and the one following it on the arms and armor of the tournament participants, much duplication and confusion would have been avoided.

It has been said, "If you want to study a man, study the games he plays." By this reasoning then, the tournament becomes a mirror in which modern historians can look on medieval English noble society; and despite its organizational difficulties, *The Tournament in England, 1100–1400* fulfills this reflective purpose. We see, for example, that strong English kings like Edward I and Edward III patronized the sport, sponsoring and participating in a number of tournaments in their kingdom. On the other hand, weaker kings, namely Henry III and Edward II, feared that the gathering of too many knights and nobles in a quasi-military sport would bring rebellion. A similar dichotomy can be seen in the English Church; while some of the clergy supported the papal bans on tourneying and preached against it, others aided the organization and pageantry of the tournament and frequently used it as a podium to recruit for the Crusades.

Barker also adeptly traces the trends apparent in the tournament and its participants. Indeed, it is not until quite late in its history that the tournament can be said to resemble the pageants seen so frequently in medieval courtly literature. For this revelation alone, Barker should be thanked, for the tournament thus becomes more than simply a device used by chivalric society to show its splendor and manliness.

For only one failing this book must be held accountable. In the second chapter, Barker attempts to link the tournament with war. A cart-and-horse argument at the best of times, this chapter fails to connect successfully the two. Most of her evidence for this linkage comes from George Duby's study of the battle of Bouvines entitled *La dimanche de Bouvines*. This in itself may be where the error of her logic lies, for Duby's study is poor at best on the historical account of the battle. Moreover, even if one-third of the battle was fought between knights on horseback in a manner imitating a tournament, as Duby and Barker contend, two-thirds of the battle was fought by groups of soldiers (both on horse and on foot), which in no way imitated a tournament.

Unhappily, this chapter comes very early in Barker's book, another failure of organization which is liable to drive away some readers. Were this to happen it would be a shame, for *The Tournament in England, 1100–1400* is a work both historians and literary scholars will find worth reading. We can only hope that Barker will now turn her eye to the Continent and as a sequel write a history of the tournament there.

Kelly Robert DeVries
Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies
University of Toronto

R. Allen Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest*, Boydell Press, 1985.

In this updated edition of R. Allen Brown's 1969 monograph with the same title, he reminds us that Duke William of Normandy's conquest of England in 1066–1070 was a pivotal point in the historical transformation of Western Europe and Latin Christendom and a critical point of juncture in launching the modern English nation–state. In fact, the writer points out, the defeat of England's "somewhat effete Wessex dynasty" (177) in 1066 belongs historically with the Normans' similarly dramatic and equally momentous advances elsewhere in Europe at the expense of Byzantine princes and Islamic rulers. Brown takes advantage of much new scholarship to explain the Normans' startling achievements. Perhaps most notably, he cites John LePatourel's findings on Norman feudalism and socio-political institutions to account for Norman military triumphs and to explain how these warrior–statesmen then effected social revolutions within conquered lands by imposing their own cultural values of socio-political unity, administrative tidiness, intellectual rigor, and Christian evangelism.

Brown also plausibly depicts Anglo–Scandinavian England as ripe for Norman plucking. He believes that cultural circumstances largely explain Anglo–Scandinavian weaknesses as contrasted to Norman superiority. In this volume, therefore, Brown traces Anglo–Scandinavian denouement to specific conditions within England. On the one hand, Anglo–Scandinavian culture was intellectually benign, little influenced by monastic revivalism of the tenth century. In any event, it supplied no compensation for the society's other shortcomings. Furthermore, England's Teutonic and Scandinavian cultural heritage fostered obsolescence in the Anglo–Scandinavian nation–state; and English faith in Teutonic traditions produced endemic weaknessess in English military organizations and blinded Anglo–Scandinavians to such superior military technologies as the Normans' dependence on corps of mounted knights. However, even more fundamental a shortcoming of Anglo–Scandinavians, in the author's eyes, was the spurning of the new social order of feudalism. And without the "centralising discipline" of feudalism on which Normans capitalized, Anglo–Scandinavians were outclassed on battlefields and unable to deter Normans from imposing their cultural pieties, social prescriptions, and socio-political institutions on England in post-Conquest times.

Finally, in what probably comprises the most historiographically distinctive of his chapters, Brown analyzes the post-Conquest social revolution that the Normans waged in their thorough transplantation of feudalism to England. The Normans were so methodical that scarcely any socio-cultural dimension of English society remained untouched. Hence, the writer concludes, England was transformed culturally into a Norman land, and the country was put on the road toward modern nationhood. Only in the

same "foolish quarters" (227) that Thomas Carlyle once deplored are the consequences of this fundamental social revolution in England still discounted.

The historiographical strengths of this volume alone make its reissuance welcome, but its methodological strengths also commend it. For instance, this edition of the book is so handsomely documented that it is a first-rate primer to recent monographic literature and primary source materials.

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Hugh T. Lovin
Boise State University
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P. R. Cross and S. D. Lloyd, eds., *Thirteenth Century England I: Proceedings of the Newcastle upon Tyne Conference 1985*, Boydell Press, [1986].

As its title suggests, the 16 articles which comprise this book were presented at the first Conference on Thirteenth-Century England held at Newcastle upon Tyne in September 1985. Since there was no more specific theme for the conference, the resulting papers are equally diverse and cover a fascinating variety of topics. In the brief space allotted here there is no way to do justice to each article, but it is possible to indicate the scope of the topics contained in the book.

The majority of the articles relate to royal rule, and the Barons' Revolt becomes the focal point of several of them, e.g., "Edward I and the Lessons of Baronial Reform: Local Government, 1258–1260" by J. R. Maddicott, "Provision for the Families of the Montfortians Disinherited after the Battle of Evesham" by Clive H. Knowles, and "Ireland and the Barons' Wars" by Robin Frame. Henry III is also represented in "Henry III and the End of the Norman Earldom of Chester" by Richard Eales and "The Gold Treasure of Henry III" by D. A. Carpenter.

Several articles discuss English towns, e.g. "Rulers of Thirteenth Century Towns: the Cases of York and Newcastle upon Tyne" by Edward Miller and "The Place of Carlisle in the Commerce of Northern England in the Thirteenth Century" by Henry Summerson.

In "Some English Evidence of Attitudes to Crusading in the Thirteenth Century," Christopher Tyerman discovers that almost the only place that inspired any zeal for crusading was the Holy Land, not any of the other papal crusading destinations.

Two other articles attempt to provide a social context for manuscripts. In "The Social Context of Vernacular Writing in Thirteenth Century England: the Evidence of the Manuscripts," John Frankis concludes that the surviving vernacular writing in both French and English is mediated to the clergy and laity by other clergy, since this was the literate segment of the population.

Annie Samson's "The Southern English Legendary: Constructing a Context" examines a popular work and tries to put it within the framework of the thirteenth century.

In any collection of articles, especially one diverse as this one, it is impossible to analyze the contents in a brief space. Together these articles provide useful and interesting insights into the life of thirteenth-century England.

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Kristine T. Utterback
University of Wyoming

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Caroline Walker Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women*, University of California Press, 1987.

A companion work to Rudolph Bell's *Holy Anorexia* (University of Chicago Press, 1985), Bynum's latest book studies food-related religious practices (e.g., rigorous fasting, eucharistic devotion, and feeding miracles) and food imagery (e.g., lactation) in the spirituality of medieval women. From a feminist perspective, Bynum argues the thesis that food was a more important motif in the piety of medieval *women* than of men. More generally, she presents her study as a corrective to the view that medieval spirituality focused on poverty and chastity as the central practices of religious life.

Many will recognize Bynum as a reputable scholar in women's studies from her previous book *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (University of California Press, 1982). Bynum there described the use of *female* imagery for the divine by both women and men during the Middle Ages. The results of that study can easily be appropriated by contemporary feminist theologians as an enrichment of religious language. *Holy Feast and Holy Fast*, while no less scholarly, presents an account of medieval women's spirituality likely to be perceived as disquieting.

Bynum recounts case after case of women reported as living without food, except perhaps for partaking of the eucharist; as engaging in abstinence to the point that certain normal bodily functions ceased; and as drinking pus from the sick they tended in place of ordinary food. While many of these accounts come from *legends* about holy persons and may well represent exaggerations of the actual facts, such legends still merit attention as setting out a vision of the ideal spiritual life. And the vision is of a spirituality which glorifies apparently pathological conditions. The impression of the unhealthiness of medieval women's spirituality is reinforced by Bynum's contention that women used food behavior as a means of *manipulating* their environment, for example, as a way of rejecting unwanted marriages

or avoiding menial familial duties, or of appropriating teaching and reforming roles which the religious tradition reserved for men.

Bynum's study leaves the reader challenged. The Middle Ages, particularly in contrast to our contemporary society, is often considered a paradigm of religious devotion. How is one to make sense of the type of spirituality Bynum describes?

Bynum constructs much of her account from medieval sources considered obscure. The text is appropriately accompanied by extensive reference notes. The study is commendable and useful in calling attention to a fascinating body of medieval literature that has largely been ignored. In addition to using the written records that are the standard materials of the historian, Bynum examines medieval visual art, perceptively describing the ways in which such works reflect and embody the spirituality of the period.

Bynum's book is definitely not for a student audience but should prove intriguing to a wide range of scholars. As well as appealing to those engaged in women's studies, it can be profitably read by medievalists, by theologians interested in asceticism, hagiography, or sacramental theology, and by psychologists attracted to the varied phenomena of religious experience.

<div align="right">Janine Marie Idziak
Loras College</div>

Graciela S. Daichman, *Wayward Nuns in Medieval Literature*, Syracuse University Press, 1986.

In her revised doctoral thesis, Daichman argues that the wayward nun in medieval literature is a reflection of the women found in Western European nunneries of the later Middle Ages. Daichman examines nuns cited in episcopal reports for infractions of bishopric rules ranging from wearing too much jewelry to becoming pregnant. The Church hierarchy considered these nuns potentially dangerous because they might lead other nuns away from the religious life.

In the historical tradition of Eileen Power's *Medieval English Nunneries* and Derek Baker's *Medieval Women*, Daichman offers a closer look at the social background and character of the women who became nuns in the later Middle Ages. Yet, like the literary scholars John Steadman and Roger Walker, Daichman also uses the historical perspective and the literature of this period to examine miscreant nuns who were represented in medieval literature.

Historians will not find much new information in this work, but both historians and literary scholars will benefit from the cross-disciplinary approach. A lecturer in Spanish and English at Rice University, Daichman studies the types of women who entered Western European nunneries

during the late Middle Ages where they were forgotten by the world and left to cope with their longings for the world they had known. Using wills and visitation reports, Daichman provides historical background of women who were placed, usually unwillingly, in the convent. For many women, the choices were limited to either marriage or the nunnery (13). Since a large proportion of the women in convents were unsuited for religious life, it is understandable that they might easily stray from its restrictions (26).

Daichman surveys the image of wayward nuns in satire, ranging from the morally indignant to the humorous (xiv). She is concerned with the literary styles of the medieval *chansons de nonne* (65) and the fabliaux (102). The *chansons de nonne* were light, frivolous songs and poems, while the fabliaux often turned into ribald tales. Her analysis of Juan Ruiz's portrayal of Dona Garoza in *El libro de buen amor* and Chaucer's portrayal of Eglentine in *The Canterbury Tales* provides convincing support for Daichman's thesis that these two characters are portrayals of actual nuns (160).

This book raises more questions than it answers. Did medieval nuns have any socially acceptable outlets for their sexual desires? Are there additional literary figures, perhaps less well known, who fit into this historical context? All quotes are in their original language with an English translation that is helpful for nonspecialists. Daichman accomplishes her purpose with an elegant writing style and contributes to both disciplines of history and literature.

Kay Rogers
Northern Arizona University

Richard Kieckhefer, *Unquiet Souls: Fourteenth-Century Saints and Their Religious Milieu*, University of Chicago Press, 1987.

In the three years since the publication of the original clothbound edition of this book, it has been widely reviewed and, while receiving important criticism, justly praised. There seems little reason to repeat what has already been said elsewhere: for well-thought-out reviews see especially *Catholic Historical Review* 71 (1985): 646–48, and *Speculum* 61 (1986): 672–74. Presumably the appearance of a paperback edition signals its use in college courses, and the present review is intended to give some guidance to this end supplementary to what has been said already by others. For description of the book's contents, I refer the reader to the reviews mentioned.

The book's great merit, as far as the student is concerned, is that it discusses much in fourteenth-century religion which has been viewed as simply pathological or repugnant by a long line of impressionists from

William James and Johan Huizinga to Barbara Tuchman and Umberto Eco. Although Kieckhefer is not completely free of his own form of impressionism, he sets the fourteenth-century context with such understanding and sympathy that all but the most bizarre behavior is seen to have its own cultural and religious rationale.

Sometimes one wishes that Kieckhefer would have probed more deeply or written more precisely. It is imprecise, for instance, to say that the Franciscan literature shows "the same recognition of the sacramental and sacral character of the created world" (11) as we find in Augustine or to equate this with Augustine's idea that the creation gives evidence of the creator. Indeed, in a book that most commonly cites the Church Fathers in translation or in an edition other than the best critical edition, one should be somewhat wary of the comparisons of the patristic period and early Middle Ages with the fourteenth century. This is especially true of the chapter on patience, which in spite of its great wealth of source citation seems to me the weakest of the thematic chapters in terms of its success in establishing its thesis that "patience tended to become a sustained theme, explicitly given central importance" (85). I do not see that the claim of centrality actually follows from the piles of evidence given. That is, while there is no doubt that patience was a sustained theme, I am not sure it was thus for the first time or that any methodology has been developed for showing centrality of importance—hence the charge of a continuing form of impressionism. One wonders, for instance, if the thesis could be sustained had either the influence of Gregory the Great's *Moralia in Job*—a work never explicitly mentioned in this book—been traced in earlier centuries or had whole classes of religious literature hardly if at all examined in the present work—biblical commentaries, for instance, or earlier monastic writings—been systematically examined.

In sum, Kieckhefer makes a fair number of statements that imply a degree of certitude in interpreting the documents that might hide from the unsuspecting reader the presence of a good deal of intuitive reading and, in spite of all the materials cited, generalization to society as a whole from fairly limited and specific kinds of evidence. Central is how the reader judges the claims made on page 49. Eschewing a "rounded survey" of the religion of the age, Kieckhefer wishes rather to examine what was most distinctive. I have no difficulty with the proposal that common ideas in a society may be exemplified in the exaggerated lives of certain individuals. However, there is some danger in claiming that such people really "typify their society"—as opposed, for instance, to certain streams of spirituality in their society—without pursuing the admittedly laborious task of surveying "all the strands that make up the religious fabric of the age." Therefore, simply in the spirit of suggesting the limits of a very fine book, I state that I do not think it completely

establishes how marginal or central, how "distinctive," the themes it deals with were.

Glenn W. Olsen
University of Utah

Constance Hoffman Berman, *Medieval Agriculture, the Southern French Countryside, and the Early Cistercians: A Study of Forty-Three Monasteries*, Vol. 76, Part 5: Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1986.

Cistercian studies have grown considerably in recent years thanks to important contributions to the literature and to the establishment of centers of studies such as the Cistercian Studies Institute in Kalamazoo. This monograph must be counted among those important contributions. The author's study of 43 male houses (16 of which are critically important for her conclusions) and over seven thousand charters from southern France, ca. 1110 to 1249, lead to some important conclusions. The most note-worthy of these is that, contrary to accepted views, the Cistercians did not acquire land for their granges through land clearance or reclamation of unoccupied land. Rather the order constituted its estates through purchase and reorganization of already cultivated land. This process of reorganization is reminiscent of the amalgamation of contiguous lands observed by David Herlihy in the same region for an earlier period. The accepted view, which is based upon the early traditions of the order and its own statutes, is also challenged by Robert Fossier and Charles Higounet, among others.

After presenting her case on land reorganization in the first two chapters, the author discusses the important issue of management in chapter three. Given her thesis, that Cistercians in southern France did not build granges through land clearances and reclamation, management becomes a vitally important concern. She observes that the Cistercians expended surprisingly large sums of cash on land acquisition and notes that cash transactions had almost entirely replaced property exchanges in the twelfth-century Midi. It was primarily through purchase that the Cistercians pieced together their large corporate estates. In chapter four the author discusses the profits of grange agriculture which enabled the order to grow rich through good management and economies of scale: consolidation of land, use of lay brothers (*conversi*) as labor, exemption from tithes and taxes, and improved technology (better tools, improved drainage, sturdier plow teams, control of mills, etc.). The financial strength of the order helped improve the region's economy.

Berman takes up the importance of pastoralism and transhumance in chapter five. The author finds that pastoralism made a major contribution to the success of early Cistercian houses in southern France primarily because it was a source of cash. The last chapter contains her conclusions and discusses the impact of the Cistercians on regional economic growth. Berman concludes that the Cistercians benefited the region's growth by offering peasants new opportunities, using time more efficiently than the Cluniacs who devoted more time to liturgy, reinvesting wealth in agriculture rather than treasure hordes, and founding new towns as a result of a more urban outlook than the order is usually credited as having. While evidence is lacking to prove conclusively these contributions, the author does draw logical conclusions from the evidence that she has.

Berman's book is provocative and informative. In arguing her thesis, Berman clears new ground and drains a few swamps of outmoded attitudes. At the same time she provides us with a realistic picture of Cistercian adaptation to the southern French environment. The book is written with intelligence and affection for her subject and region. It is supported by five maps, three tables, two appendices, a comprehensive bibliography, and a useful index.

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Francis X. Hartigan
University of Nevada–Reno

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Umberto Eco, *Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages*, trans. Hugh Bredin, Yale University Press, 1986.

Written in 1958 as "Sviluppo dell'estetica medievale," Eco's book is now for the first time available to the English-speaking audience in a very readable translation by Hugh Bredin.

Originally conceived as a single chapter in a handbook on the history of aesthetics, Eco's text attempts to establish a synthesis of medieval science, theology, and poetics which formed the core of medieval aesthetic thought. Going a step further, Eco shows that beauty was integrated in the scientific, theological, and poetological views of the time. The leitmotif of this survey depicts the attempt of medieval thought to reconcile disparate philosophical concepts and, further, to eliminate the inconsistencies between aesthetic theory and artistic practice.

"What I tried to do," says Eco in the preface, "was to provide a personal interpretation (and a very synthetic one) of a series of texts that in the previous decades had been discovered or rediscovered by other scholars" (ix). As revealed in the index, Eco interprets texts by such diverse authors as Alan of Lille, Augustine, Boethius, Richard of St. Victor, Heinrich Suso,

and Thomas Aquinas, to name only a few. Eco's emphasis lies, however, not on the individual philosopher, but rather on specific themes (e.g., transcendental beauty, the aesthetics of light, symbol and allegory), and their evolution, throughout the period ranging from the sixth to the fifteenth centuries.

In the introductory chapter, "The Medieval Aesthetic Sensibility," Eco attempts to demonstrate in a general way how medieval man tried to integrate apparent disparities and contradictions, such as sensible and nonsensible beauty, natural and artistic beauty, or external and internal beauty. According to Eco, "one of the main problems of Scholastic aesthetics was the problem of integrating, on the metaphysical level, beauty with other forms of value. Their discussion of the transcendental character of beauty constituted one of the main attempts to establish a ground of their integrated sensibility" (16).

In the subsequent chapters of his book, Eco focuses on single aspects of medieval aesthetic theory. "The Aesthetics of Proportion," to name only one example, analyzes the quantitative conception of beauty as it is expressed in the concepts of *misica mundana, ornatus mundi*, or *homo quadratus*. Eco argues that these concepts do not reflect a mere abstract, mathematical system, but that numbers and geometrical figures express the concrete harmony and the specific structure of the cosmos.

Eco ends his survey by discussing the decline of the Scholastic system where "the harmonious dependence of things upon one another" was denied for "a universe of particulars" (89). Aesthetic values that had been interpreted in relation to the divine gradually became secularized. Eco suggests that the "systematic theories" that had characterized the "world of the *Summae*, where everything was in its proper place, necessarily lagged behind the ferments and the tensions of practical life" (117).

Eco's text cannot claim and does not claim to be new, neither today nor at the time of the composition. The specialist will notice Eco's indebtedness to Edgar De Bruyne, E. R. Curtius, Johan Huizinga and will not, I am afraid, gain considerably new insights from the reading. Eco's book is nonetheless pleasant to read and provides the sophisticated but nonspecialist audience with a quite valuable introduction not only to medieval aesthetics but also to the medieval *Weltanschauung* in general.

Martine P. Rey
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Alison Adams, Armel H. Diverres, Karen Stern, and Kenneth Varty, eds., *The Changing Face of Arthurian Romance: Essays in Arthurian Prose Romances in Memory of Cedric E. Pickford*, Vol. 16: Arthurian Studies, Boydell and Brewer, 1986.

The theme that governs this eclectic volume is stated in the preface: "the development of the Arthurian prose romance, from soon after the death of Chrétien de Troyes up to the end of the medieval period," demonstrating how "medieval writers adapted prose romances to changing tastes and fashions" (vii). There are essays of interest to students of Old French (Elspeth Kennedy, "The Re-writing and Re-reading of a Text: The Evolution of the *Prose Lancelot*"; Renée L. Curtis, "Tristan *Forsené*: The Episode of the Hero's Madness in the *Prose Tristan*"; Fanni Bogdanow, "An Interpretation of the Meaning and Purpose of the Vulgate *Queste del Saint Graal* in the Light of the Mystical Theology of St. Bernard"; Jane H. M. Taylor, "Faith and Austerity: The Ecclesiology of the *Roman de Perceforest*"); Middle High German (David Blamires, "The German Arthurian Prose Romances in Their Literary Context"); medieval Welsh (Ceridwen Lloyd-Morgan, "Perceval in Wales: Late Medieval Welsh Grail Traditions"); and English (Carol M. Meale, "The Manuscripts and Early Audience of the Middle English *Prose Merlin*"; Karen Stern, "The Middle English *Prose Merlin*"; Derek Brewer, "Malory's 'Proving' of Sir Lancelot"; Faith Lyons, "Malory's *Tale of Sir Gareth* and French Arthurian Tradition"; Roger Middleton, "Chrétien's *Erec* in the Eighteenth Century").

The approaches taken by the authors are eclectic. Kennedy emphasizes the importance of reading works in their manuscript context, showing how a passage has "a new meaning . . . once the [noncyclic] romance . . . becomes incorporated into a cyclic romance" (2). Blamires discusses the manuscript tradition of the German romances, and Meale discusses that of the Middle English *Merlin* to show how translators adapted material for their respective audiences. Stern examines the manuscripts of *Merlin* and suggests that "Elyanor Guldeford's intense interest in her copy" could lead us to investigate "women as readers and shapers of romance narrative" (121). Middleton studies the eighteenth-century rediscovery of Chrétien's manuscripts and their influence on modern medieval studies.

From a more literary angle, Curtis shows how the *Prose Tristan* adapts Chrétien's depiction of Yvain's madness to Tristan. Lyons explains how Malory—or the lost French author he was translating—merges various elements from French romances to create the *Tale of Gareth*. Lloyd-Morgan argues that the Middle Welsh author of *Y Seint Greal* adapts French tales to Welsh sensibilities by adding "features characteristic of earlier native tradition . . . which have no counterpart in the French" (185). Literary studies of medieval texts often consider the relationship of religious and literary works. Bodganou suggests that Bernardian theology informs the *Queste del Saint Graal*,

and Jane Taylor, that the ideas of the Béguines and Beghards inform the *Perceforest*. In a subtle literary argument, Brewer shows that Malory simplifies his sources and adds incidents so that "the artistic 'rules' " of his *Morte* are "broadly those of traditional literature" (123), freeing us from trying to find a novelistic unity in the work.

By introducing readers to many Arthurian works and by approaching topics from various angles, the authors illuminate a complex tradition for modern readers.

Alexandra Hennessey Olsen
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RENAISSANCE

Jane P. Davidson, *The Witch in Northern European Art, 1470–1750*, Luca Verlag Freren, 1987.

At the outset it may be stated that this little book, a monographic art-historical study of the iconography of witches through the course of three centuries, is quite delightful. Indeed, one's only significant complaint about it (other than the many unnecessary typographical errors, plus a plethora of missing diacritical markings, and some often illegible illustrations) is that there is not enough of it! Since I am writing this during the Halloween period, I am also forcibly reminded how very much this material fits in with a truly popular consciousness, obviously one very much alive today. Perhaps that "popularity" is precisely why one so seldom finds serious, comprehensive studies of such literally esoteric materials—at least so very few by art historians. In any event, when somebody's little child comes to your door begging for candy on a chill All Hallow's Eve—and dressed as a witch—you now will have a convenient art historical framework by which to size up this mythic transaction.

As the author stresses, in the first place the so-called "witch craze" of the Renaissance occurred simultaneously with the widespread and seemingly sudden popularity of the products of the printing press. Secondly, and as Davidson points out repeatedly, witchcraft iconography was inevitably text-derived. Therefore, as I believe, we should now properly *re*-envision the much-studied historical phenomenon of the persecutions of witches as the primordial "media event." Although literally hundreds of publications (many of which were illustrated) eventually poured forth from the presses to deal with the new witch phenomenon, the most important source remains the

treatise of 1487 by Heinrich Kramer ("Institoris") and James Sprenger: *Malleus maleficarum* (The Hammer of Witches). Their luridly vivid verbalizations (although frequently reprinted, the book remained unillustrated) spurred on numerous artists to compete through their own strictly pictorial means. The content of the horrific new imagery frequently was both misogynist and pornographic, just as we learn from the *Malleus* (I, quaes. 8; incidentally showing the real origins of an ubiquitous *topos*, "The Devil made me do it!"):

> The devil . . . can excite a man to that act [i.e., sex] or freeze his desire for it, . . . can so disturb a man's imagination as to make the woman appear loathsome to him, . . . can directly prevent the erection of that member which is adapted to fructification. . . . It is the same in the case of a woman, for the devil can so darken her under-standing that she considers her husband so loathsome that not for all the world would she allow him to lie with her. . . . [Nevertheless,] the greater part of witches being women, they lust more for men . . . and similarly the wife also has to seek other lovers.

Davidson shows how, even if only infrequently, many major artists were attracted to this striking and inherently popular new kind of imagery: Drer, Altdorfer, Baldung Grien, Urs Graf, Brueghel, Francken, Teniers, Callot, Rosa, et al. The products of their bewitched (and sometimes bewitching) art are studied in some detail here, just as are the much lesser-known products of many illustrators of the post-*Malleus* publications. As Davidson forcefully demonstrates, "witchcraft was an extremely popular intellectual theme in Europe between 1470 and 1750" (98). Quite usefully, Davidson also discards many present-day stereotypes of how witches "should" look (i.e., always "ugly"), showing that the Renaissance's ideas were often rather different from ours. All in all, this is a charming and useful introductory survey of a visually prolific field with which we should have long ago become more familiar. Having stated that, I may now briefly mention some of the lacunae.

If one is going to close the survey with Goya, bringing us well into the nineteenth century, then why not at least mention Henry Fuseli's deliciously *frisson*-ridden "Nightmare" of 1781 (in Detroit, with a variant in Frankfurt)? Besides obviously dealing with "bewitchment," Fuseli's image is "popular," summing up a broad cultural response, to the same degree that Rodger Corman or Vincent Price do for our own media-generated age. In this famous painting, a scantily clad (and very *zaftig*) maiden swoons supinely across a rumpled bed; upon her heaving abdomen there crouches a pointy-eared

incuboïd demon while a stallion, with eerily blazing eyes, thrusts his head through the curtains hanging behind the couch. (For possible interpretative approaches to such proto-Freudian motifs, see my review of N. Powell, *Fuseli: The Nightmare*, in *Burlington Magazine*, July 1976.) In the case of Goya, I find another significant omission: his *first* venture into *la brujeria*, his large canvas of 1788, *San Francisco de Borja Exorcising a Demonized Dying Man* (Valencia, Cathedral). As I have previously shown (*Goya: Revista de Arte*, August 1981), Goya's first confrontation with such "demonic" imagery—unmistakably "exorcistic" in this case—had been derived from crude prints illustrating the popular versions of the *Ars moriendi*.

No matter: Davidson's fact-filled survey remains a wonderful introduction to an exciting field much in need of further iconological reconnaissances. Ergo, Professor Davidson, may we have another book from you now—one showing the later course of witchworks in nineteenth- and twentieth-century art? We can use it.

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John Moffitt
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Murray Roston, *Renaissance Perspectives in Literature and the Visual Arts*, Princeton University Press, 1987.

Along with the advent of the "new historicism" in Renaissance studies has been a growing parallel interest in the interart relationship. Over the past several years new interdisciplinary studies on the complex relationship between art and literature in the Renaissance have emerged. Roston's latest work is one of those new studies. Roston has already published two other books on Renaissance literature and art, one on Donne and another on Milton. This third book follows the earlier two works in being an important but perplexing study. In this "Introduction," he admits that such studies have been looked upon in the recent past with suspicion and that his study will do much to correct the superficial and sometimes impressionistic approach of older scholars, such as Wylie Sypher or Mario Praz. In a brief nine pages Roston tries to explain his theoretical approach as constituting "a process of inferential contextualization" (6) that will correct those who simply define a spirit or theme in an age and then proceed to find parallels in art and literature. According to Roston, knowledge of stylistic changes in the arts and the historical reasons for them can provide clues to literary interpretation. Arguing that a writer need not know any specific art work or artist because that writer can share in the same historical pressures that created change, Roston analyzes literary works from Chaucer and the mystery play through

Spenser, Shakespeare, and on to Herbert from Roston's "perspective" of a synchronic Zeitgeist.

In the first chapter Roston tackles the critical debate over an allegorical or a realistic reading of Chaucer by showing how paintings of the Adoration of the Magi reveal a significant change from being unmindful of spatial or temporal distinctions under traditional medieval allegory to revealing a new concern for depicting more realistically the things of this world. This change reflects the replacement of the older medieval concern over *concupiscentia oculorum* by a newer and growing interest in the physical world—hence the duality of allegory and realism in Chaucer and his contemporaries. Here, Roston's approach opens up new ways in which one can explain major cultural shifts by fruitfully bringing together art and literature.

In a chapter on "The Ideal and Real" Roston explores the shift from medieval concerns for things otherworldly to the new humanistic interests in the phenomenal world as "a source of intellectual and spiritual nourishment for the soul seeking after the divine" (83). Roston sees a parallel shift in the arts where a new apprehension of the divine through worldly realities is made possible by the new perspective. Similar developments appear in Sidney and Shakespeare where there is a union of the ideal and real. In the new Neoplatonic allegories of the pagan gods and subsequent paintings Roston finds the key to Spenser's repudiation of the new realism in preference for an older, more medieval approach to reality that will allow him to distinguish reality from appearances. In the fifth chapter Roston perceives a parallel between the Renaissance artist's development of multiple perspectives or narratives and the development of the main plot and subplots in the drama. Roston's chapters on Shakespeare, prose, and Herbert establish potentially significant parallels between art and literature that can illuminate both.

On the one hand, this is an important and valuable study in that it synthesizes the older tradition of literary interart approaches and an older tradition of art history while striving to delineate a new approach to the interart problem. This might prove particularly useful for those who want to learn more about interart relationships and do not have the necessary knowledge of art history. On the other hand, Roston's study would better serve the reader by being more current on the scholarship of art history. Just as literary studies have and are undergoing changes brought about by different critical and theoretical concerns, so too have similar changes come (although more slowly) to art history. Roston overlooks innumerable art historical studies that well might have supported some of his potentially significant generalizations and conclusions. In particular, a stronger grounding in art history would have allowed Roston to delineate more concretely the historical contexts that created the pressures for changes in style and to move his study away from a slightly formalist approach. For example, the admirable discussion of the new concept of space and time adapted to the

Christian vision and emerging in late medieval painting and the mystery plays would have profited from the work on Jan van Eyck of Lotte Brand Philip, Carol J. Purtle, and Robert Baldwin, among others. Similarly, Roston's attempts to correct the older view of Wölfflin do not acknowledge the seminal work of John Rupert Martin. I suppose one of the difficulties for any person undertaking a significant interart approach is that of mastering two fields. Nevertheless, Roston's study, well written and lucid, illuminates a complex problem and cannot be adequately summarized in a brief space. He moves easily from art to literature and vice-versa as he brings together a complex of ideas in theology, philosophy, mythology, and hermeneutics in order to explain particular problems in art and literary works. While looking back at older approaches, his study generates the potential for new approaches and should be read by any person with a serious interest in the relationship between Renaissance art and literature.

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Peter Lindenbaum, *Changing Landscapes: Anti-Pastoral Sentiment in the English Renaissance*, University of Georgia Press, 1986.

Without being excessively inaccurate, one might claim that Professor Lindenbaum seeks to demonstrate that Dr. Johnson's opinion of the pastoral as "easy, vulgar, and therefore disgusting" was in fact shared by such major Renaissance practitioners of the pastoral as Sidney, Shakespeare, and Milton. More accurately, however, Lindenbaum's purpose is to show that the writers in questions respond negatively to the pastoral ideal as annunciated by Virgil and Sannazaro and "announce their opposition to the kind of life it is necessary to picture if one is to write pastoral at all" (ix).

The first chapter, "Pastoral and Anti-Pastoral," establishes the argumentative arena, using Virgil and Sannazaro as primary definers of the pastoral world and establishing the fields of Arcadia, the Golden Age, its Edenic Christian parallel, and *otium*. "An anti-pastoral attitude marks a commitment to talk about man as he is and not as he might be in some perfect moral state" (17) and therefore is to be seen as "more than an exclusively literary phenomenon" (18). Rather, Lindenbaum argues, the anti-pastoral represents a major moral and intellectual thrust of the English Renaissance. Of course, the pastoral itself makes inevitable or contains the anti-pastoral; Lindenbaum, however, sets the inevitable anti-pastoralism in specific and illuminating authorial context. Moreover, he ends the chapter with the useful qualification that "what I am calling the 'anti-pastoral' throughout this study might as easily be called 'pastoral' simply defined" (21).

Lindenbaum devotes two chapters to Sidney, one to the *Old Arcadia*, the other to *New Arcadia*. In the *Old Arcadia* he finds that Sidney "has systematically deprived the pastoral experience of any ethical underpinnings" (52) and concludes that in the *New Arcadia* "the recognition of human frailty is, in fact, what heaven itself explicitly demands of man" (86). The detailed readings of the *Arcadia*s will be of particular interest to Sidney specialists.

The force of chapter 4, "Shakespeare's 'Golden Worlds,' " is perhaps reduced by the qualification of the first chapter that the anti-pastoral is the pastoral. Some readers will be bothered by the deliberately undramatic, untheatrical reading of Shakespeare; the obvious dramatic reasons for "I pray thee, mark me" (*The Tempest* 1.2.67) inevitably must be ignored for the sake of the thesis. Nonetheless, Lindenbaum develops the argument for Shakespeare's anti-pastoralism with care and detail.

"Milton's Paradise," the fifth chapter, argues effectively that "Eden is a version of the pastoral, an image of our normal, complex life in simplified form" (140). This chapter exemplifies Lindenbaum's close reading and command of Miltonic literature but immerses the reader in perhaps more critical combat than one wants—"the ire of Waldock, John Peter, and R. J. Werblowski" (146–47)—and in issues over which "even readers who are not Waldocks are likely to bristle" (169). Robert Burton's "sound drums and trumpets" inevitably comes to mind. A good deal of critical debate is tucked into the thorough footnotes, which debate might have been more happily integrated into the text. This chapter is the richest and most polemical and the one in which the reader is likely to be most involved and sometimes resistant. That "Milton is engaged . . . in providing a statement of the human condition, and that in turn has a liberating effect upon *Paradise Lost*" (179), is, however, a conclusion with which few readers will quarrel. The concluding chapter, "English Anti-Pastoralism: Sources and Analogues," points to a distinct preponderance of English criticism of the pastoral and further develops the parameters of the attack on the pastoral's advocacy of the contemplative life, equating these English attitudes with the "Civic Humanism" of fifteenth-century Florence and stressing both the influence of Protestantism and "Ciceronian commitment to active service" (189) as additional determining factors. One of the merits of *English Anti-Pastoralism* is the wide and thoughtful critical reading it displays. A bibliography collecting the references in the notes would have distinctly enhanced this attractive and valuable study of English pastoralism.

Charles L. Squier
University of Colorado

Wendy Griswold, *Renaissance Revivals: City Comedy and Revenge Tragedy in the London Theatre 1576-1980*, University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Renaissance Revivals provides the reader with a comprehensive history of revivals of Renaissance city comedies and revenge tragedies in addition to a useful discussion of the social and cultural contexts contributing to the choice of those plays for revival. The text is supported by some excellent illustrations, including Carlo the Hero Dog at Drury Lane, and by numerous figures and charts dear to the hearts of sociologists. The author is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Chicago, and *Renaissance Revivals* is both literary history and sociology. In this case it is a happy wedding but one that explains both its strength and weakness. The strength lies in the effective union of the two disciplines, and the weakness in that for the literary reader the highly competent review of theatrical history is sometimes overly familiar. And one suspects that the sociologist may find the sociological grounding, necessary for the nonspecialist, equally familiar.

This almost inevitable qualification aside, *Renaissance Revivals* succeeds in its aim of showing "how the meaning of a cultural object such as a genre is created, shared, and changed over time by the community of dramatic producers and consumers" (4). Griswold divides the problems into two phases: defining the cultural meanings of plays for author and audience in the original context and seeing how cultural meaning changes over a period of time in the revivals. Recognizing that a cultural object is both *archive* and *activity*, she proposes in the first figure in the book, a "cultural diamond" expressing the nexus of social context (world), the artist, the audience, and the cultural object. The points of the diamond are linked both externally and internally, the necessary relationships expressed by a diamond and a parallelepiped. "Thus," Griswold writes, "the method of this study entails moving the cultural diamond over time by examining the artists, audiences, and social contexts of the cultural object's history" (9).

The first chapter, "Timbers," metaphorically recalling the timbers of the Theatre reused to build the Globe, establishes the methodology and the value of Renaissance revivals for the study of "the reconstruction of meanings, from the most occasional to the most universal" (11). Griswold then devotes a chapter each to city comedies and to revenge tragedies in which she discusses each genre's basic characteristics, the institutional context, and the appeal of each genre. Three succeeding chapters recount the history of Renaissance revivals from the Restoration to the Arts Council of the twentieth century. In the last chapter, "Revivals and the Real Thing," she summarizes the conditions under which Renaissance revivals are likely to increase and her conclusions as to why revivals of a specific genre flourish at a certain time. *Renaissance Revivals* places the events of traditional theatrical history in an illuminating social perspective. If the tables are sometimes daunting—$x^5 7.34$; $P(x2)^5 .007$ will mean more to some readers than to others—the application

of wider considerations to the history of Renaissance dramatic productions is illuminating and rewarding. The book can be recommended to students of Renaissance theatrical history for its useful interdisciplinary approach.

Charles L. Squier
University of Colorado

Katharina M. Wilson, ed., *Women Writers of the Renaissance and Reformation*, University of Georgia Press, 1987.

Were there any women writers of note in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, or was patriarchy so pervasive that only men were able to write well? Although many staunch feminists will remain unconvinced, Katharina Wilson's collection of essays on 25 writers—mostly from Italy, France, Germany, and England—provides ample evidence that women excelled as writers. The book is divided into 24 sections, each containing an introduction, a selection from the writer (or, in one case, two writers), and a bibliography of primary and secondary sources. The bibliographies alone make the volume an indispensable reference guide.

The Italian women fall into three distinct categories. Gaspara Stampa, like Veronica Franco (who is not discussed in the book), was a *cortigiana onesta*. As a respectable courtesan, she was expected to be educated, and her erotic poetry helped to develop the admiration of her protectors. Vittoria Colonna and Veronica Gambara represent a second type, the woman of breeding and culture. Colonna was a friend of Michelangelo and appeared in the *Orlando furioso*. Gambara had Pietro Bembo as a mentor. St. Catherine of Genoa and St. Catherine of Bologna comprise the last division, female mystics. They might well be joined by St. Teresa of Jesus, who appears separately and alone under "Spain."

While many of the introductory essays are biographical rather than critical, Marcel Tetel's analysis of the problems of interpretation in Marguerite of Navarre's *Heptameron* clearly demonstrates that this woman writer was extremely sophisticated and no slavish imitator of the fiction of Boccaccio. France is, in fact, heavily represented in Wilson's collection. Along with familiar figures like Louise Labé and the mother and daughter des Roches are to be found less-well-known writers, Dianne de Poitiers, Helisenne de Crenne, Pernette Du Guillet, and Marie Dentiere. The French women use a variety of styles to discuss religion and women's rights.

Most of the German writers appear during the Reformation. Caritas Pirckheimer fought a losing battle to save the house of her religious order in Nuremberg, while Anna Hoyers entertained Anabaptists at her home, Hoyersworth. Other women were engaged in politics. Margaret of Austria,

who read Christine de Pizan, ruled the Netherlands for 20 years. Most vivid, perhaps, are the memoirs of Helene Kottaner, a chambermaid to Queen Elizabeth of Hungary. She stole the Crown of St. Stephen from a vault in Plintenburg, so that the Queen's son might use it to be crowned King of Hungary. The one Dutch speaker, Anna Bijns, was strictly Catholic. She felt that "Lutherans stink like goats."

Among the Englishwomen, Margaret More Roper and Mary Sidney Herbert have been known for years but insufficiently valued. Elizabeth McCutcheon shows that Thomas More corresponded with his daughter as an equal. Cobern Freer outlines the importance of Herbert as a woman whose poetry influenced writers of the stature of John Donne. Her translation of Robert Garnier's *Marc Antoine* anticipates the later style of Shakespeare. These two women had no difficulty working with their male contemporaries. Lady Mary Wroth, however, found herself in deep trouble with various men, including Lord Denny, when she wrote a *roman à clef* about court. The *Urania* still retains some of its original bite: "Being a man, it was necessary for him to exceed a woman in all things, so much as inconstancie was found fit for him to excell her in, he left her for a new."

The volume does not give proper attention to a writer who deserves recognition, Elizabeth Cary. Some of the introductory essays are so brief as to be little longer than dictionary articles, and the editor may have tried to include too many writers, even though the book runs to more than six hundred pages. Her point, nevertheless, is driven home. There were many women writers of the Renaissance and Reformation who deserve to be read.

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James B. Fitzmaurice
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E. A. J. Honigmann, *John Weever: A Biography of a Literary Associate of Shakespeare and Jonson, Together with a Photographic Facsimile of Weever's "Epigrammes" (1599)*, St. Martin's Press, 1987.

This study, part of the Revels Plays Companion Library, makes two significant contributions to Renaissance scholarship: it offers the first detailed biography of John Weever, poet and antiquarian, and provides an accessible photofacsimile, along with bibliographical and historical documentation, of the most complete copy of *Epigrammes*, Weever's earliest work.

John Weever (1575 or 1576-1632) is best known for his *Ancient Funerall Monuments* (1631). He also authored five works, printed 1599-1601: three satires, including *Epigrammes* (1599), a versified life of Sir John Oldcastle in the mirror tradition, and a simplistic biography of Jesus Christ. This eclectic bibliography supports one of Honigmann's theses: that Weever's two loves, poetry and the church, inform his self-portrayal in all his writings.

After sketching Weever's youth in Lancashire prior to his Cambridge years (c. 1594–1598), Honigmann places Weever in a London literary circle of writers, printers, and publishers comprised of Cambridge people and their contacts (including Michael Drayton, Francis Meres, and Valentine Simmes). He argues that this group practiced a kind of round-robin literary back-scratching, in which these writers wrote dedicatory verses for each other's works and included each other's writings in poetical anthologies. This is perhaps the most exciting section in the book for scholars interested in Renaissance habits behind publishing and patronage.

Honigmann then argues that Weever, attempting to cultivate friends as a means to achieving literary recognition, became an identifiable character in London: a short man, a tobacco smoker, an admirer of Jonson. These attributes fit at least three characters in plays in the Poetomachia and perhaps in several other plays' characters as well. Although the evidence is persuasive, Honigmann himself calls attention to the fact that much of his argument is circumstantial.

In his chapter on *Ancient Funerall Monuments*, Honigmann demonstrates that the papers in the Society of Antiquaries are not the original manuscript, but Weever's notebooks, which apparently Weever intended to mine for at least two more volumes. Not merely an anthology of epitaphs, *Monuments* is an "intellectual ramble—a magnificently self-centered display of John Weever's passion for church history, poetry, pedigrees, and heraldry" (76). As such, it takes its place beside works like *The Anatomy of Melancholy* and *Religio medici* that start out with a learned purpose, but whose "continuing appeal . . . depends not merely on the information they offer, [but on] the author's personality" (76).

The book concludes with a clear and clean photofacsimile of the Bodleian Library copy of *Epigrammes*, together with bibliographical and historical commentary. Honigmann admits that his interest in this work is historical and does not attempt any literary analysis or commentary. Given the probability that no other such volume will be dedicated to *Epigrammes*, this omission is regrettable.

John Weever is fascinating, not only for its meticulous and well-researched discussion of a late Renaissance man of letters, but also for the occasional provocative insights that this research suggests: that a dwarfish actor in Shakespeare's company played particular roles written for him and that certain new evidence makes more plausible Shakespeare's authorship of an epitaph on Sir Edward Stanley and his father Thomas. This slim volume has been carefully printed (I found only one printing error, on p. 9), and is unfortunately rather expensive for its size. Nevertheless, it is a fine addition to the Revels series and to Renaissance studies.

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Toshiyuki Takamiya and Derek Brewer, eds., *Aspects of Malory*, Vol. 1: Arthurian Studies, Boydell & Brewer, 1986.

Recognizing the growth in the field of Malory studies, the editors "proposed a collection of essays which should represent and advance our growing understanding, though without attempting 'coverage' or representing any single school of thought" (ix). To be fair, one can judge a work only by what it claims to do and then by what it in fact accomplishes. Since the editors make no pretense of "coverage," we should not expect it. Although the editors state no allegiance to any one "school of thought," there is certainly a particular scholarly orientation, and that orientation is perhaps best represented by the scholar to whose memory this volume is dedicated: Eugene Vinaver.

The "Aspects of Malory" primarily discussed are what Brewer calls "historical and, as it were, technical" (7). The lead essay by Vinaver demonstrates this approach by examining Malory's prose as distinctly English in sentence structure, that is, as a distinctive adaptation of his French source, the *Queste del Saint Graal*. This may be the last article we have of Vinaver, and that in itself gives it importance.

Despite Brewer's promising introduction, which considers the lack of serious academic consideration Malory has received as a result of a neoclassical critical bias, most of the volume is devoted to scholarship, not criticism. This emphasis is evident from the two reprinted articles, "The Malory Manuscript and Caxton," in which Lotte Hellinga argues for the Winchester manuscript having been in Caxton's print shop and provides the evidence for this discovery; and Hilton Kelliher's "The Early History of the Malory Manuscript," which traces the manuscript's journey from Caxton's print shop to the library at Winchester. Textual studies include Takamiya's brief note arguing that "Astolat" should be "Ascolat" and Hynes-Berry's consideration of Malory's adaptation of his Cistercian French source, *Queste del Saint Graal*. Source studies are represented by P. J. C. Field's study of the *Tale of Sir Gareth*. The final article, by Richard R. Griffith, considers the biographical question of authorship.

All these papers represent competent scholarship. The only questionable article on the grounds of scholarship might be Noguchi's "The Englishness in Malory"; it is rather painfully impressionistic. On the other hand, the most provocative article is by Jill Mann, who considers the ideological implications of Malory's radical condensation of the French. She attributes Malory's deletion of the French explanations and rationale of action to his literalizing definition of *aventure* as "chance."

The volume concludes with a revised bibliography and a helpful index. All in all, it represents the work of professionals: there are very few typographical errors, and the volume itself is handsome.

Nevertheless, the results may not fully reward the expectation, "that the present collection will advance appreciation of an author who has always been enjoyed by the common reader 'uncorrupted by literary prejudice,' but who is still sometimes underestimated by literary critics" (x). Only Mann's article, and perhaps Brewer's introduction, could really be said to challenge assumptions regarding Malory's abilities as a writer versus translator. If the other articles do not fulfill such promise, we can hope that the scholars' work represented here facilitates the work of future literary critics.

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Margaret J. M. Ezell, *A Patriarch's Wife: Literary Evidence and the History of the Family.* University of North Carolina Press, 1987.

In the introduction Ezell states that she wrote her book "to explore the current model of domestic patriarchalism from the perspective of . . . the literate women of the middle and upper classes" and "to assess the methods used to arrive at this impression of . . . the 'patriarch's wife' . . . in particular the use of literary evidence in creating it" (2). Responding to Lawrence Stone and other scholars who have emphasized the dire effects of patriarchalism on Stuart women, Ezell does not refer in the text or in the bibliography to several authors who have already successfully challenged that view, as, for example, Lois Schwoerer's prize-winning article, "Seventeenth-Century Englishwomen Engraved in Stone?" in *Albion* 16 (1984): 398–403. Ezell also fails to note that recent Tudor scholarship has questioned whether Elizabethan England was a Golden Age for women.

Despite these lapses in secondary research, Ezell's book is a welcome addition to the growing number of works that indicate Tudor/Stuart women led ambiguous lives that did not always fit the patriarchal theory expounded in contemporary political treatises, sermons, and literary works. The patriarchal model, which for some seventeenth-century writers represented the ideal family, was, as Ezell asserts, challenged in other writings and did not reflect the reality of women's lives. Citing sociological evidence, she claims, for example, that a parental society rather than a patriarchal society prevailed in the case of marriage negotiations, since the death of fathers and female migration to towns left many young women or their mothers in charge of these arrangements. In an interesting section exploring the reasons why so few women published, Ezell discusses the "conservatism" (100) that causes many men but a far greater percentage of women to choose not to print their manuscripts for fear of losing control over who read them. She does not attempt to wrestle with the problem of why more women than men adopted

this form of "conservatism" but does admit that there is evidence, especially for women who wished to publish drama, that "Patriarchal sentiments may have dissuaded some women" (82). Far from being silent, many women, as she proves, wrote manuscripts, including essays in letter form, for private circulation.

Ezell's last major chapter has a lively and interesting study of three manuscript essays. The first, "In Praise of the Vertuous Wife," was by Sir Robert Filmer, who is better known as the author of *Patriarcha*. Although Filmer approved the husband's control over his wife's activities, he offered a more balanced view of male power than one might expect. Indeed, he was willing to claim that because Eve was created from the rib of Adam, woman represented "God's perfection of humanity" (134). The final two manuscripts are Mary More's "The Womans Right" and her antagonist Robert Whitehall's "The Womans Right Proved False." More claims that a happy marriage was based on a love relationship and that it was a partnership ordained by God, who had assigned different family roles to the two sexes. She criticized the laws that gave husbands control over their spouses' property and refused to concede men parental power over their wives, permitting them only an "Eldership" (153), the relationship of younger brothers to their elder siblings. Besides denouncing More's scriptural analysis, Whitehall, whose treatise was almost twice as long as hers, denied the "Eldership" and advocated the political analogy that a wife is subject to her husband as a magistrate is to his prince.

In her final chapter, Ezell concludes that in Stuart England a gap existed between theory and practice. The patriarch's wife, as she asserts, "wielded considerable power . . . but that power was to a large extent displayed on a private level" (163).

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