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G E O P O L I T I C S**Jannatkhan EYVAZOV**

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**CENTRAL EURASIA THROUGH
THE PRISM OF SECURITY:
A REGIONAL SYSTEM OR A SUBSYSTEM?****A b s t r a c t**

The author proceeds from the theory of regional security complexes to answer the question of whether Central Eurasia should, or can, in the present conditions be described as a regional security system.

His studies of the political system of the post-Soviet space have made it possible for him to give a detailed description of its present development level, structural and functional specifics, and potential transformations.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The term “Central Eurasia” is a relative newcomer in academic and political parlance. According to Eldar Ismailov’s conception, its geopolitical structure consists of regions in the central parts of the European and Asian segments of Eurasia: Central Europe (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine); the Central Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).¹ The question is whether these post-Soviet regions can be

¹ Eldar Ismailov put forward a new idea about the Central Eurasian region and Central Europe as its sub-region (see: E.M. Ismailov, “Central Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Function in the 21st Century,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 2 (50), 2008, pp. 7-29).

brought together within a single Central Eurasian regional security system, or whether we should rely, today and in the future, on the traditional differentiation of these political spaces or look at them as subsystems within the common post-Soviet space?

These are the pivotal questions that I will try to answer with the help of the Theory of Regional Security Complexes (TRSC).²

Central Eurasian Regions: Geopolitical Factors of Development

So far, Central Europe, the Central Caucasus, and Central Asia are fairly independent of each other; this is primarily demonstrated by the different dynamics of security relations. Their security spheres have been developing in very different ethnoconfessional, socioeconomic, and geopolitical conditions. This is a fairly straightforward explanation; in theory, however, we can supply a much simpler answer based on purely geopolitical factors.

Geographically, the three spaces are separated by vast distances which the corresponding countries cannot neutralize because of their inadequate power projection and which does not allow us to look at them as a single, security-wise, macroregion. Their political structures were formed in the absence of direct land contacts among them, while in the past the Black and Caspian seas were an obstacle rather than a connecting link, which decreased the intensity of contacts among the regions' political actors. For obvious reasons, this interfered with forming sustainable amity/enmity perception vectors on a trans-regional scale. This conclusion, however, can be taken as correct if we disregard the external powers and their geopolitical activities in the regions identified above.

In fact, in the past, the regions often remained, and for a long time, the objects of geopolitics rather than geopolitical actors, which means that the exogenous powers played an important role in shaping their security spheres, particularly in creating the perceptual vectors mentioned above. On the one hand, throughout history, the geopolitical activity of external actors has disunited the regions, while bringing them together, on the other. Indeed, Central Europe and the Central Caucasus and Central Asia developed in different power contexts. From the point of view of a common external power configuration, it is much easier to discuss the latter two within a single security system than to attach the first to it.

As essentially permanent objects of geopolitics, the regions belonged to different spheres of power rivalry. The Central Caucasus and Central Asia developed within the power context of the Russia-Turkey-Iran triad, which means that Christian Orthodoxy and Sunni and Shi'a Islam were the main ideological factors that largely contributed to forming the amity/enmity vectors in the regional societies. Central Europe, on the other hand, developed amid a somewhat different set of external powers: Russia-Turkey-the European states (accordingly, the main ideological factors in this case were Orthodox Christianity, Sunni Islam, and Western Christianity).

² Barry Buzan identifies RSC as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely, so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another." In 1983, Buzan formulated the conception of the regional security complex in his *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1983). This, as well as the second edition of the same work (B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991), demonstrated a classical approach to the security complex conception. Much later, together with co-authors (B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. De Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 1998; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), he made an attempt to go beyond the limits of the classical conception of the security complex. The authors introduced, among other things, two types of security complexes (homogeneous and heterogeneous) and the securitization conception to remedy the current disparages with the classical conception of the security complex, such as concentrating on the military and political spheres of relations or inadequate attention to the non-state actors, which also create additional vectors of inter-sectoral interdependence.

The geographic proximity of Central Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Central Caucasus to the powers of Western civilization helped the two regions remain relatively open geopolitically. This, however, does not apply to Central Asia: until the 1990s, the set of external players remained narrow; the countries were closed to the Western powers.

This explains why in Central Europe and the Central Caucasus regional security systems (including all their basic constituents—national states, material components of security interdependence, and sustainable amity/enmity perceptual constructs between the regional countries and between them and the external powers) have been formed earlier than in Central Asia.

The above suggests that early in the 20th century (when the Russian Empire fell apart), these two Central Eurasian regions began forming their security systems, while Central Asia joined in the process much later, early in the 1990s.

On the whole, endogenous factors apart, these regional security systems largely developed under the impact of their geopolitical openness. Today, this remains one of the main exogenous parameters in the development of the regional security systems. The more open and the more pluralistic a political space, the lower the risk of its one-sided monopolization. By the same token, this creates a much better environment for the emergence of sustainable political actors and mutual ties and relations in the material and perceptual-behavioral spheres of security.

Geopolitical pluralism helps to balance out the region's political structure, which makes it fairly independent of the external environment, one of the parameters which make a space a regional system proper. Moreover, evolution toward maturity, moderation, and peaceful security relations among its elements cannot be achieved without balancing out the exogenous geopolitical impulses. The more unstable the power environment, the more chances for a regional system to evolve from "immature" to "mature" anarchy³ and the more stable the process of its security sphere development.

The empirics of the regions discussed here indicates that the overlay mechanisms⁴ which operated there under Soviet power can stabilize the system. However, this stabilization (which can be described as revolutionary) will only survive as long as the power of the dominant state remains functional and is capable of being projected. The prevailing conflict climate in security relations across the post-Soviet Central Caucasus is the best confirmation of this.

In fact, the Soviet Union by its very existence brought the security spheres of the three regions discussed here closer together. They belonged to one political system with one dominating ideology. Contacts and relations among the societies of these regions intensified and became even deeper within the single economic, cultural, and ideological space. For about 70 years the strictly hierarchical administrative and management mechanism of the Soviet Union was consistently planting common values and shaped common historical memory for the entire population of the vast country. The forced amalgamation of societies within the Soviet Union succeeded, to a certain extent, in setting up a trans-regional security community; this demanded and was accompanied by changes in the previous security perceptions.

The amity/enmity and threats/vulnerability perceptions ascended from the regional to the macro-regional level. This means that social securitization was not longer applied to the regional neighbors and their activity, but to the political actors who did not belong to the "Soviet community" and their attitude to the Soviet Union as a "common motherland." These ideas took root partly because the Soviet Union was constantly involved in geopolitical rivalry, first in Eurasia and, after World War II, at the global level, up to and including involvement in armed conflicts. This cannot but be accompanied by a high level of awareness of the threats and vulnerabilities created by active "hostile" external forces and internal "enemies."

³ For more about mature and immature anarchy, see, for example: B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, pp. 175-181.

⁴ In this situation the dynamics of the security relations among the members of the RSC is suppressed by force mechanisms of a certain outside power (see: *ibid.*, pp. 219-221).

Disintegration of the Soviet Union undermined the security community which existed there, but autonomous development of the former imperial periphery could not bring about equally rapid devaluation of the perceptual axiological basis of what was called Soviet society. An upsurge in national awareness and attempts to speed up the process of nation-building in the newly independent states on the wave of the fairly rapid collapse of the Soviet system failed to transform, within a short historical period, the values and perceptions well embedded over many decades. This explains why restoration of autonomous security systems in the post-Soviet regions went on amid certain surviving components of the Soviet amalgamated community.⁵ It should be said that today the main component of this sort is the regional states' certain bias toward the former metropolitan country. This is why Russia's geopolitical influence is generated there not only by geographic proximity and power projection capability, but also by virtue of the preserved social and cultural ties.

There are Russians⁶ and so-called Russian-speakers in all the newly independent states who are obviously very concerned about the relations between the countries they are living in and Russia; from time to time the Kremlin openly exploited this factor to increase its influence in the corresponding newly independent states.

The Russian language has remained the language of communication across the post-Soviet space (with the exception of the Baltic republics). It dominates at almost all international forums (the CIS, CSTO, EurAsEC, CAEC, SCO, GUAM, and others). The Russian media dominate the information space of the former Soviet Union.

In the late 1990s, the Russian Federation began overcoming its military and economic weakness and has acquired much clearer landmarks. It is too early to say how much time it will take Russia to revive while energy prices are still high and the United States and its allies remain tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan. One thing is clear: in the present conditions no discussion of security systems in former Soviet regions is possible without taking into account the active Russian factor.

Indeed, even in the early and mid-1990s Russia's weakness did not refute the fact that it was the only newly independent state that could project its influence onto all regions of the post-Soviet space. Today, this has assumed different forms: encouragement of separatism; alliance politics; military and economic assistance; and direct military intervention (as in August 2008 in Georgia).

The Regional Security System in the Former Soviet Space

The system that existed in the Soviet Union at the turn of the 1990s went through structural transformation which ended in the disintegration of the Soviet state and the appearance of fifteen newly independent states. In the context of security system evolution, this meant a transfer from one strictly hierarchical actor to a regional anarchical system or, to be more exact, to a regional security complex (RSC). The word "restoration" rather than "transition" is much more accurate in this context.

The RSC that came into being in the post-Soviet space was very specific; its size and the structural and political features set it apart from standard RSCs⁷ within which security interests are closely

⁵ In his conception K.W. Deutsch views the "amalgamated community" as an alliance of formerly independent states under the same governance achieved either through non-violent integration or as a result of the classical use of force (see: K.W. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, p. 6).

⁶ There is information that there were about 25 million ethnic Russians left outside Russia when the Soviet Union disintegrated (see: Ch. King, N.J. Melvin, "Diaspora Politics. Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy and Security in Eurasia," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1999/2000, p. 118).

⁷ The TRSC offers various types and forms of regional complexes; the most general typology distinguishes between standard and centered RSC. According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, in the centered RSC, the dynamics of secu-

connected because of geographic proximity⁸ and are localized by a geographically compact interstate constellation, and in which “the security dynamics of the region are not dominated from the unipolar power at its center.”⁹ According to Buzan and Wæver, the regional system of the post-Soviet space is a “centered great power regional security complex.”¹⁰

At the same time, the newly independent states formed their own local interstate systems—the regional security sub-complexes in the European part (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine); in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), and in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The regional sub-systems were relatively autonomous, however Russia preserved its function of a center which bound them together into a “web” interdependence of the Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex (PSM).

In this structure Russia was the only geopolitical actor that could consistently project its influence on the regional scale; it was the key security factor for all the newly independent states in all the sub-complexes. This meant that the development of local complexes and the dynamics of the security relations among the member states and their ties with the “external” powers were dependent not only on the endogenous factors but also on Russia’s geopolitical activities.

Evolution of PSM

Thus, one can admit that, first, the spaces described as Central Europe, the Central Caucasus, and Central Asia can be described as RSCs in full accordance with the development level of their security systems; second, despite their specifics and autonomy today they belong to a much more extensive RSC which covers the former Soviet space; third, in the early 1990s the hierarchical structure of the Soviet Union was transformed into an anarchic structure and formed, to borrow what Barry Buzan and Ole have to say, a “centered great power regional security complex,” which here is called the Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex.

Its evolution, however, revealed several conceptual problems which cast doubt on the PSM idea and provide more opportunities to consider it as a transition stage.

In the most general form they can be discussed within the PSM border issue.

For example, one wonders, while assessing the Caucasian segment of the PSM, whether the Caucasus as a whole should be seen as the RSC or the RSC is limited to three independent states—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia?

It must be said that in the post-Soviet period several authors tried to apply the TRSC to the Caucasus¹¹; some of them tended to include broad sections in the spatial-political borders of the security region. Bruno Coppieters has the following to say about the spatial outline of the Caucasian RSC: “Both the Transcaucasus and the North Caucasus may be thought of as parts of a larger security complex, comprising Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and part of Russia. The North Caucasus continues to play a decisive role in the future of the Transcaucasus and the Caucasian security complex as a

rity relations are determined by one power found in its center. The authors go on to identify three forms (depending on the specifics of “the central actor”) of this type: centered on a great power—Russia in the post-Soviet space; on a superpower—the United States in North America; and, finally, on an institution (institutional RSC)—the European Union (see: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., pp. 55-61).

⁸ See: B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, pp. 188, 189, 191, 195.

⁹ B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 55.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 55, 62, 343.

¹¹ See: B. Coppieters, “Conclusions: The Caucasus as a Security Complex,” in: *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, ed. by B. Coppieters, Vubpress, Brussels, 1996, pp. 193-204; S.E. Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, Surrey, 2001; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit.

whole.”¹² Svante Cornell goes even further: “...The Caucasus is a region; but more than being a region, it is a security complex: the national security of one of the Caucasian states cannot realistically be considered apart from that of the other two. As far as the three regional powers (Russia, Turkey, and Iran.—*J.E.*) are concerned, the security of the Caucasus does have a direct bearing upon the national security of these states that justifies their inclusion into the security complex.”¹³

Indeed, the security interests of these powers are involved in the region; or to be more exact, we are talking about an interdependence between them and the Caucasian states which, in some cases, ties together the central (existential) security interests of the three powers and the region. For example, Armenia’s territorial claims to Turkey¹⁴ and the perceived threats and historical insults caused by the 1915 events in the Ottoman Empire, which the Armenians call genocide, are an interdependence of this type. There is a fundamental interconnection between Iran and Azerbaijan created by the tens of millions of ethnic Azeris living in Iran in the territory which is called “Southern Azerbaijan.”¹⁵ In both cases, the reference is to the territory and population, two elements of the state’s physical base which cannot, by definition, be removed beyond the limits of the state’s key security interests.

A similar problem in the European segment of PSM (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine) is related to the closest geographical neighbors, former socialist allies which joined the EU (Poland and Rumania). We can hardly ignore the obvious national kinship between Moldova and Rumania and the two states’ perceptual-behavioral interdependence based on it. It is also impossible to ignore the Western Ukraine and Western Belarus issue with their Catholic Slavic populations, while looking at the web of interdependence which ties Ukraine and Belarus with Poland.

From this it follows that having accepted the above examples of interdependence between the PSM states’ security and “external” actors, we should treat not only Russia, but also Turkey and Iran (the Caucasian segment) as parts of the PSM, as well as Poland and Rumania, at least, in the European segment. Iran (with the ethnic Turkmen who live as a compact group in its northern part and a score of still unsettled Caspian problems) should be included in the Central Asian sub-complex together with China (because of the “Uighur factor”).

According to the TRSC, it is hardly realistic to expect that these actors can be treated as parts of the corresponding regional PSM sub-complexes; the theory rules out what is called “overlapping membership.”¹⁶ In other words, one and the same actor cannot belong to two or more RSCs. Hence Turkey and Iran, as elements of the Mid-Eastern RSC, and Poland and Rumania, as part of the European (institutional) RSC, cannot belong to the PSM. The theory describes any power’s actual involvement in interactions within different complexes as “overlay” or “penetration.”¹⁷

It goes without saying that at the theoretical level, any discussion of regionalization in any sphere (the security sphere in our case) calls for a clear delimitation between regional systems. When identifying a constellation of geographically close states as RSC, the TRSC proceeds from the assumption that security interdependence among the constellation’s parts is much stronger than between them and the external actors.¹⁸ Regional complexes are separated by what is described as a zone of “relative indifference,”¹⁹ otherwise any regionalization theory becomes senseless. A power

¹² B. Coppieters, op. cit., p. 195.

¹³ S.E. Cornell, op. cit., p. 391.

¹⁴ Armenia claims an eastern part of Turkey called Western Armenia associated with the parts of the Ottoman Empire populated by Armenians. Today they are the vilayets of Erzurum, Van, Agri, Hakkari, Muş, Bitlis, Siirt, Diyarbakir, Erzincan, Bingöl, Malatya, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, and part of Giresun (see: *Istoria Osmanskogo gosudarstva, obshchestva i tsivilizatsii*, ed. by E. Ihsanoglu, Transl. from the Turkish, Vol. 1, Vostochnaya literatura Publishers, Moscow, 2006, p. 87 (*History of the Ottoman State, Society & Civilization*, ed. by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Istanbul, 2001).

¹⁵ Under the Treaty of Turkmanchay of 1828, the territory of Azerbaijan was divided between the Russian Empire and Iran and came to be known as Northern and Southern Azerbaijan.

¹⁶ B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 48.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁸ See: Ibid., pp. 47-48.

¹⁹ B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 193.

might be involved in the security processes in several RSCs but, according to the TRSC, it can belong to only one regional system; in all other cases, it is a free geopolitical player involved in regional interactions in pursuance of its own interests.

The extent to which the actor depends on regional interaction or, to be more exact, the extent to which these interests are important, is of vital significance. What if the interests concentrated in an “alien” RSC are of an existential nature for it and there are stable amity/enmity perceptions between it and the states of the regional complex which might provoke consistent regional activities? This brings to mind, once more, Turkey and Iran with their potential PSM involvement described above.

The same question arises when one considers the Baltic region after its integration into the EU. If interpreted within the TRSC, the current security system in the Baltic region (with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia being EU members) does not give grounds to say that their security ties within the European Union are less important or looser than with the Russian Federation and other PSM elements. It would be wrong to believe, on the other hand, that integration has destroyed the security interdependence between the “new Europeans” and the post-Soviet space. Besides, the Baltic precedent makes it next to impossible to exclude its repetition with other PSM states.

Afghanistan can be described as another digression from the PSM idea (in the Central Asian segment). Should this state be regarded as part of the Central Asian PSM sub-complex?

Within the PSM conception, Afghanistan does not fit the structure of the local RSC in Central Asia. Buzan regards it as unrelated to any of the regional systems; it is an “insulator”²⁰ which separates one RSC from another, that is, a segment of the “relative indifference” zone wedged between the security complexes of Central Asia and South Asia. Today, however, this approach can be accepted with a certain amount of doubt.

Indeed, today, the country can be hardly described as an independent and homogeneous actor to the extent sufficient at least for the securitization and creation of common (all-Afghan) security interests in relation to its neighbors. It entered the post-Cold War period in a state of political chaos and inner fragmentation; the civil war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance was going on and was responsible for the country’s continued fragmentation. Chaos survived in the post-Taliban period and was intensified by the presence of foreign armed forces in its territory; we can hardly regard it as an actor.

This period in the history of Afghanistan and the question of whether it belongs to any of the regional complexes directly refers to one of the two main problems of identifying RSCs which Buzan described as: “...In some areas local states are so weak that their power does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries. These states have domestically directed security perspectives, and there is not enough security interaction between them to generate a local complex.”²¹ In the Central Asian space, Afghanistan looks like one of the weak states described by Buzan; while all the other states (even Tajikistan which lived through a civil war at the dawn of its independence) can be described as relatively more stable, their perceptions and security interests being oriented toward the outside world.

At the same time, there are enough weighty arguments which allow us to count the country among the members of the Central Asian RSC if we look at the region “not from Afghanistan” but from the other members of the same complex. The thesis of the “relative indifference” zone can be used as an argument in favor of Afghanistan’s inclusion in the Central Asian RSC.

According to the TRSC, the borders of the regional complexes are formed by “relative indifference” zones, while security interdependence inside the RSCs is much stronger than between them and the “external” states,²² including the “insulators” which form the “indifference” zone.

²⁰ B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 193; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

²¹ B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 197.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 193.

Interdependence, however, cannot be one-sided by definition; the same is true of securitization and involvement for the sake of the interests of security. If we agree that Afghanistan, for any internal reason, in particular because of its weakness as a state, does not concentrate its interests on its Central Asian neighbors and does not adjust its behavior accordingly, we should not think that the RSC members are equally uninterested in Afghanistan. From the very first day the RSC appeared in Central Asia, its members have regarded Afghanistan as a source of existential security threats and behaved accordingly in relation to their southern neighbor. They are interdependent at least in an ethnoterritorial sense (the northern part of Afghanistan is populated by Tajiks and Uzbeks) and by the so-called new threats: drug trafficking, religious radicalism, etc. This interdependence is objective, however the post-Soviet newly independent states are more aware of this than Afghanistan. This and the possibility that these perceptions (in Afghanistan in particular) will increase fit the securitization conception well.

Moreover, despite its current dependent and fairly pronounced amorphous conditions, Afghanistan is moving toward stronger statehood and a vertical of political power. This and the prospect of it becoming stronger, which will allow it to build up its potential of power projection, will help create a stronger security concept and reorient securitization from internal to external phenomena and processes. This will boost the perceptual-behavioral aspects of interdependence between it and the post-Soviet Central Asian states.

On the whole, current globalization and post-industrialism are pulling the rug out from under the “insulator-state” concept. Afghanistan and Mongolia (another “insulator” state according to Buzan), which historically belongs to Central Asia, serve as examples that this function is largely determined by the specifics of their internal development. The further a state has advanced toward post-modernity, the fewer the reasons to describe it as an “insulator.” This is fairly obvious because it presupposes its closer economic, social, cultural, and political interdependence with other states.

On PSM Transformation

The TRSC thesis on the “centered great power regional security complex” has been accepted as a model of the regional security system the post-Soviet space assumed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is equally obvious that including other powers besides Russia in these subsystems may devalue the PSM idea; this is true, however, only if we treat it as a relatively static system.

When talking about the present security system across the post-Soviet space we should proceed from its fairly pronounced dynamism and unsteady nature. The Baltic states, in particular, prove that structural transformations are possible.

Even if we agree with the TRSC that “overlapping membership” is impossible, we cannot exclude, in principle, a reorientation of Turkey and Iran’s security interests toward Central Eurasia, which might be needed for their involvement into the region’s security system. Since the TRSC does not regard the regional systems as static units, the principle of staticity should not necessarily be applied to regional concentration of the powers’ security interests.

The TRSC’s mechanisms of securitization make it possible to expect these developments. Buzan and Wæver have the following to say about RSC seen through the prism of this mechanism: “A set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”²³

In the theoretical-methodological respect, the securitization phenomenon allows the TRSC to rise from the “Procrustean bed” of positivism. In other words, Waltz’s structure or, to be more exact, distribution of power in the system is not the main stimulator of the elements’ behavior. It is not the

²³ B. Buzan B., O. Wæver, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

main trigger of securitization as well. As a relative phenomenon, the latter wholly depends on the actor: "Different actors securitize differently: different political and cultural situations enable securitization in different sectors and they have different dynamics."²⁴

While the central security interests of any actor are the product of the securitization process unfolding under the impact of numerous factors, any changes in these factors might transform the interests; hence they might become oriented toward an "alien" political space.

The geopolitical processes underway in Eurasia display dynamism and changeability which generate factors conducive to shifts in the interests of the Eurasian powers. The outlines can be discerned: the deepening energy crisis has already readjusted securitization in this sphere and stimulated interstate competition in Eurasia. It can be said that under the pressure of securitization of the energy, migration, and other non-traditional threats, the European Union has become a holder of clearly formulated security interests concentrated on the post-Soviet space.

Appearance of the Central Eurasian Security Macrocomplex (CSM) composed of three local sub-complexes (in Central Europe, the Central Caucasus, and Central Asia) and, probably, of some other new actors/regions can be accepted as one of the possible scenarios of the development of security relations in the former Soviet space. However, it is too early to assess the potential and, particularly, the timeframe of this sort of transformation. It is obvious that the current lack of balance in the post-Soviet security macro-system is the main obstacle to this transformation.

The unipolarity of the post-Soviet security system and the fact that the main vectors of the development of the security sphere in this space were geared toward Russia and its interests made the regional interstate systems subordinate to it and unable to create ties and relations independent of the only pole. The change in this parameter, that is, the loss of Russia's domination, is the main condition for transforming the "centered" RSC in the post-Soviet macro-region into a "standard" RSC in Central Eurasia.

On the whole, these changes in Russia's status in PSM can be brought about by its very much diminished aggregate national power and power projection capability caused by internal disintegration or by reorientation of the main securitization vectors toward a different space.

C o n c l u s i o n

The above suggests that the question of whether we should view Central Europe, the Central Caucasus, and Central Asia as subsystems of a certain regional security system should be answered in the affirmative. The question of what particular system we have in mind requires an answer: a centered RSC in the post-Soviet space—Russia plus the three sub-complexes discussed above (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)—because, at least today, these regions have not yet reached an adequate level of transregional interdependence in the spheres of their actors' key security interests to transform them into a single Central Eurasian security system.

However, this should not be taken to mean that this scenario cannot be realized in the post-Soviet space. The evolution of PSM has revealed certain problems in the explanation of the post-Soviet space as seen through the TRSC prism. Today, when the security interests of the neighboring powers (Turkey, Iran, and China) are also involved in the PSM sub-complexes, when the EU expanded to include the states of the Baltic RSC, and in view of the mounting dependence of the security interests of the states of the Central Asian sub-complex on Afghanistan, it has become much harder to identify the exact borders of the PSM. This speaks of instability of the present PSM structure, which provides more opportunities to consider it as a transition stage in the development of the security system in the post-Soviet macroregion.

²⁴ B. Buzan B., O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 87.

Transition to the structure of a “standard” RSC in Central Eurasia in the form of a Central Eurasian Security Macrocomplex is one of the possible alternatives for the present security system in the post-Soviet space, which can be realized if the only pole of power, viz. the Russian Federation, disappears. This might happen if its aggregate national power and power projection capability are diminished or if it reorients its main securitization vectors toward different spaces.

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THE SOUTH STREAM VS. NABUCCO: THE “PIPELINE WAR” GAINS MOMENTUM

A b s t r a c t

The authors scrutinize the hottest stage of one of the most acute geopolitical rivalries in the Caspian-Caucasian region between Nabucco (the EU’s pet project) and the South Stream promoted by the Russian Federation. We are watching another round of the real-life gas war that is unfolding in the context of the mounting demand for natural gas created by the technogenic disasters that damaged the nucle-

ar power stations in Japan and the string of statements on the repudiation of nuclear power coming from Europe, particularly Germany. The rivalry is dynamically escalating according to the “zero sum game” scenario, where the defeat of one side means the victory of the other. The conflict between the two gas pipelines is a result of the sides’ mutual dependence and the steadily depleting natural resources.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The South Stream vs. Nabucco is one the fiercest battles over Europe’s energy future, the impact of which on the destinies of the Caucasus and Central Asia cannot be overestimated. We have already

written about the intense struggle between the two routes,¹ in which Moscow seemed to be gaining the upper hand, while Nabucco, the symbol of Europe's energy freedom, has been sinking. Our own announcement of Nabucco's quiet death made at the turn of 2010 proved to be premature.²

The rivalry is unfolding amidst risky commercial deals, reckless bluffing, theatrical gestures, vague promises, and diplomatic fistfights; however the natural and technogenic disasters in Japan and the social revolutions in North Africa in the spring of 2011 supplied a very different background for a new bout of the old rivalry.

The interconnected events of the spring and summer of 2011 added fresh vigor to the already acute competition. Alarmed by the disaster at the Fukushima-1 nuclear power station, the world increased its demand for natural gas as a much safer option. The civil war in Libya put the local oil and gas industry out of business, which forced Italy to turn to Russia for larger amounts of natural gas, and the German government's statement late in May 2011 to the effect that all nuclear power stations in Germany would eventually be closed down added fuel to the fire by raising the demand for gas even more. Alexey Miller, who heads Gazprom, Russia's gas monopolist, informed President Medvedev that in the first five months of 2011 Russia had exported more than 25 bcm of gas compared to the same period of 2010. He specified that Europe's record gas demand was created by the events in the Middle East, North Africa, and Japan. In April of this year, Gazprom sold over 21 percent more natural gas to Europe than in April 2010. The company revised its own assessment of the European demand for natural gas, which coincided with the forecasts of the European energy companies. OMV AG Executive Director Dr. Gerhard Roiss, for example, corrected the previous forecast of an annual 150-bcm difference between gas demand and supply by the year 2025, saying that now the difference was predicted to be 180 bcm annually.³

One after another, Western journalists and analysts have begun talking about the "golden age of natural gas." Gay Chazan of *The Wall Street Journal* and Xavier Blas of *The Financial Times* were among the first, one day after the other, to trumpet the beginning of the golden age.⁴ International energy institutions echoed the media. The International Energy Agency (IEA) of the Western countries readily agreed that the events of the spring of 2011 had ushered in a "golden age of natural gas." It predicts that in the next 50 years the world might use over 50 percent more natural gas than today, which means that in 2035 natural gas will cover over a quarter of the world's total energy requirements compared to 21 percent today.

In the spring and summer of 2011, the Nabucco-South Stream rivalry began unfolding with unprecedented speed.

The Nabucco Gas Pipeline System: from a European Business Idea to Unrestrained Politicization

The pipeline with its memorable name was intended as Europe's response to its growing dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. The 3,900 km-long pipeline was expected to move a total of 31 bcm of

¹ See: A. Magomedov, R. Nikerov, "Caspian Energy Sources and the 'Pipeline War' in Europe in the 21st Century: Energy Geopolitics in Northern Eurasia," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2010, pp. 7-18.

² See: A.K. Magomedov, R.N. Nikerov, *Bolshoy Kaspiy. Energeticheskaya geopolitika i tranzitnye voyny na etapakh postkommunizma*, UIGTU, Ulyanovsk, 2010, pp. 204-208.

³ See: S. Kulikov, "'Gazprom' dovolen rostom prodazh. Rossiiskiy monopolist snova ispolnen optimizma," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 May, 2011, available at [http://www.ng.ru/economics/2011-05-30/1_gazprom.html].

⁴ See: G. Chazan, "Natural Gas Entering 'Golden Age'," *The Wall Street Journal*, 6 June, 2011; X. Blas, "Golden Age of Gas May Be a Call Too Soon," *The Financial Times*, 7 June, 2011.

Caspian and Mid-Eastern gas from Turkey to Austria, bypassing Russia, across Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary to a hub in Vienna from which the gas was to go on to EU members. The consortium consists of RWE of Germany, OMV of Austria, MOL of Hungary, BOTAŞ of Turkey, the Energy Holding of Bulgaria, and Transgaz of Rumania with equal shares of 16.67 percent each.


At an initial cost of about \$11 billion, the pipeline was expected to move Caspian and Mid-Eastern gas across the Anatolian Plateau to Europe; the European Union is actively promoting the project and is prepared to fund at least part of it; and the United States has moved in with political and moral support.

It started as a joint business venture of the countries seeking gas supplies from the Caspian and the Middle East, the prospect of collecting transit fees being an additional alluring factor.

In *The Great Pipeline Opera*, Daniel Freifeld tells the story of how the pipeline got its name. It all started when one evening in Vienna in 2002 the Turkish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian colleagues of a group of Austrian executives were invited to see a rarely performed Verdi opera which recounted the hard plight of Jews deported to Mesopotamia by King Nebuchadnezzar (Nabucco), who in the finale set the Jews free. “The officials had spent the day elaborating a plan for a 2,050-mile pipeline that could transport up to 1.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas every year across their countries to the European markets. The sources of this gas would not be Russia, but Azerbaijan”⁵ and the Middle East. The opera they heard after a day of arduous work was called *Nabucco*, the name the European managers chose for their project.

Map 1

The Rivaling South Stream and Nabucco Gas Pipelines



⁵ D. Freifeld, “The Great Pipeline Opera,” *Foreign Policy*, 24 August, 2009.

After a while the pipeline gathered political overtones, its business rationale being pushed onto the backburner. Nabucco became another political weapon to be used against Russia and its influence in Central and Eastern Europe. The Americans encouraged the European Nabucco-ites with talks about it being a symbol of European solidarity, “a modern-day Maginot pipeline” in the face of Russia’s domination in gas supplies. Some journalists went even further: Russian gas and oil replaced the Cossack squadrons of the 19th century and the tank divisions of the 20th century as instruments of political control over Europe.

In the fall of 2010, when in Brussels, the observers were baffled by the confusion among the Europeans.⁶ It looked like a Quixotic project to many, an *idée fixe* of the United States, or a secret (carefully concealed) mania of the European political establishment. The skeptics marveled at the enthusiasm over Nabucco, which never seemed to wane despite the obviously inadequate resource base, thus inviting numerous sarcastic comments. Alexey Miller of Gazprom allowed himself a condescending comment: “Nabucco is still an opera.”

Marcus Balsler of *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* wrote: “Was the name a wise choice? This is what managers are asking themselves along with many others. It became clear long ago that this multibillion project had many more things in common with the opera than its managers would have liked.”⁷ This is by far the most sarcastic comment. On 30 September, 2010, American observer Stephen Levine contributed an article to the *Foreign Policy* magazine under the telltale headline of “The Pipeline that Refuses to Die,” in which he wrote: “What do big Eurasian energy pipelines have in common with U.S. military projects? Once they’re proposed, they refuse to die—they assume a life of their own, and haunt us until someone manages to drive a stake into their hearts... Yet Nabucco’s diehard supporters, including the United States, refuse to get over the champagne days of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and its victory over Moscow.”⁸

It seems that the reference to the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline does not belong here: this is the success story of a project that attracted no less ridicule than Nabucco. In Russia it was dismissed as “an international affliction” and a “costly insanity.” Skeptics outside Russia indulged in sarcastic comments of the “unspecified amounts of oil will go to the West in exchange for vague political promises” type. The project was branded as a “geopolitical phantom” and a “pipeline leading to nowhere.”⁹ The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which bypassed Russia, was realized despite elaborate skepticism: the West scored a geopolitical victory and snubbed Moscow.

It is best not to take media assessments and elaborate journalistic metaphors into account when talking about things that matter, the resource struggle undoubtedly being one of them. The journalist community seems to be guided by political stimuli and geopolitical interests associated with this project. The BTC pipeline has taught us that geopolitical perseverance invariably wins the battle.

The South Stream in a nutshell. It is a joint pipeline project among Russia, Italy, and France which will bring gas across the Black Sea. It will pass along the bottom of the Black Sea from Novorossiysk in Russia to Varna in Bulgaria, where its two branches will cross the Balkans to reach Italy and Austria (their routes have not yet been specified). It is expected to be commissioned in 2015 and to carry 63 bcm of gas a year. As distinct from Nabucco, the South Stream avoided being immersed in historical drama and symbolic expressiveness.

⁶ Kyle Wingfield of *The Wall Street Journal* wrote in 2008: “Though EU leaders say it’s the Union’s highest priority project, Europe’s capitals are failing miserably to rally around it” (see: [http://www.gasandoil.com/news/central_asia/2840056a2be4b0a763a266492a06092b]).

⁷ M. Balsler, “Die Russen kommen,” *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 29 October, 2010, available at [<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/energieversorgung-die-russen-kommen-1.1017335>].

⁸ S. Levine, “Nabucco: The Pipeline That Refuses to Die,” *Foreign Policy*, 30 September, 2010.

⁹ About these assessments see: Yu. Alexandrov, D. Orlov, “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan: gde neft?” *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 4 October, 2002; RusEnergy.com, 25 June, 2002; D. Orlov, “Bolshaia truba dlya dyadi Sema,” *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 26 December, 2003, p. 10; S. Eduardov, “Zhazhda v trubakh,” available at [www.utro.ru/articles/2003/02/07/126422.html]; Washington Profile, available at [www.washprofile.org/arch0403/interviews/Kazhegeldin].

When compared, the pluses and minuses produce a riveting picture. After its first failure at the turn of 2010, Nabucco was revived on 6 September, 2010 when the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Finance Corporation (a branch of the WB Group) signed a letter on syndicated funding of the Nabucco consortium; this opened another round of talks about funding. The three financial structures promised to bring in EUR 2 billion, EUR 1.2 billion, and EUR 800 million, respectively. Together with the modest EUR 200 million the European Commission invested in March 2009, the money is expected to attract private investors with the remaining 70 percent of the total. Despite the considerable political support and international funding, the project has not yet achieved the main goal: access to large gas fields. The South Stream is in a similar quandary; despite the Russian leaders' persistent support, it is losing its economic rationale. The section to be laid on the seabed is too expensive, while the repeated attempts to draw a German company into the consortium (RWE and Wintershall are most frequently mentioned) show that the enterprise has not yet taken final shape. Gazprom and ENI, the two main partners, do not see eye to eye on many issues, which does not facilitate progress.

To better understand the chances of both, we analyzed each of the projects in detail.

Nabucco: Minuses

Its viability is doubtful for the obvious reason that the gas fields on which it relies (in Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan) are still undeveloped.

At the turn of 2010, when the project's fiasco was discussed far and wide, Azerbaijan began losing its interest in Nabucco. Early in September 2010, during President Medvedev's visit to Baku, Gazprom and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) signed a contract under which Azerbaijan pledged to double its gas export to Russia to reach 2 bcm in 2011. (In 2010, Russia bought 1 bcm of gas from Azerbaijan; the figure for 2009 being 500 bcm.) It turned out, however, that the September contract remained valid for a year. Despite the strong doubts about the viability of Nabucco, the agreement with Russia does not mean that Azerbaijan has abandoned the European project: it means that Baku is not ready for long-term agreements with Russia. It is prepared to revive its interest in Nabucco and send its oil to the West for better prices and more favorable transportation conditions.

This means that widescale international funding and corporate support cannot compensate for the absence of gas needed to sign the contract.

The latest news, which might pep up Gazprom, came in May 2011 when Executive Director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International Reinhard Mitschek said that "as soon as there are firm indications that the gas supply commitments are in place" the gas should start flowing through the pipeline in 2017.¹⁰ This means that the pipeline will be commissioned three years later than scheduled and that construction will start in 2013 at the earliest.

This is not the whole story: the later start will send up the cost. In May 2011, when speaking at a conference in Stuttgart, European Union Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger "warns that costs could rise as high as \$21.4 billion, up from an earlier estimate at about \$11.2 billion."¹¹ This makes the project, which still lacks the necessary volumes of gas, hardly profitable. Turkmenistan's promised reserves have not been confirmed, which makes Shah Deniz-2 of Azerbaijan the only and best hope; its exploitation will start no earlier than 2017.

Shah Deniz-2 in a nutshell: a gas field with 1 trillion cu m of gas operated by a consortium in which BP and Statoil of Norway play the main roles; gas production at Shah Deniz-1 started in 2006

¹⁰ [http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Business_1/A-Step-Toward-Irrelevance_printer.shtml].

¹¹ M.K. Bhadrakumar, "Russia Redrawing Europe Energy Map," *Asia Times*, 12 May, 2011, available at [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/ME12Ag02.html].

and reached 8.6 bcm a year. The annual yield of the second field, which will be commissioned in 2017, is expected to be 16 bcm.

Nabucco: Pluses

All the minuses notwithstanding, the consortium's executive group managed to brighten the prospects by signing, with great pomp, on 8 June, 2011 in Turkish Kayseri, an agreement between Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH and the corresponding ministries of five transit countries involved in the consortium (Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Turkey). According to Reinhard Mitschek, this was needed to create a legal basis for further funding; the bilateral agreements specify the construction standards and government guarantees in about 40 spheres, including acquisition of land, taxes, and import of construction materials. At the ceremony in Turkey, the ministers and the consortium's members did their best to dissipate the mounting pessimism about the pipeline's future fed by their own announcement two weeks earlier that the project would be completed two years later than planned.

The news about a new phase of American-Azerbaijani cooperation in the security sphere made the Nabucco supporters more optimistic: the two countries will protect the energy infrastructure in the Caspian Sea, particularly the planned Trans-Caspian pipeline between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza, one of the architects of George W. Bush's Caspian policy, told journalists on 11 June.¹²

Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline in a nutshell: it will be laid on the bed of the Caspian Sea between Tengiz (Kazakhstan)-Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan)-Baku (Azerbaijan). On the Azeri coast, it will join the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline, one of Nabucco's main stretches. The European Union and the United States are sparing no effort to advance the talks between Baku and Ashghabad.

The vigorous protests of Russia's Ambassador to Azerbaijan Vladimir Dorokhin against the plans to lay pipelines on the sea bottom invited a no less vigorous retort from the American ambassador, who reminded him that Richard Morningstar, Special Envoy of the U.S. Secretary of State for Eurasian Energy, had said earlier that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan were sovereign states free to decide which pipelines they needed and in which directions.¹³

On many occasions Russian officials voiced their doubts about the viability of Nabucco because of the absence of the necessary volumes of gas. Recently, it has become much harder, even for the key figures on the Russian energy scene, to voice such doubts publicly. On 20 October, 2010, during President Medvedev's visit to Ashghabad, Russia's Vice Premier Igor Sechin dismissed Nabucco as a project without a future; this produced a sharp rebuff from the Foreign Ministry of Turkmenistan, which accused the Russian official of interference in the energy policy of a sovereign state and of failure to fulfill the RF previous obligations. Dovlet Mommaev, head of Turkmengaz, demanded that Gazprom increase its gas purchases from 10-11 bcm a year to at least 18 billion, as the presidents had agreed.¹⁴

The South Stream: Minuses

Russia insists on the South Stream and is prepared to shoulder the huge cost; commission is planned for 2015, however the barriers on the road to the final goal are proving too high. The Kremlin

¹² [<http://contact.az/docs/2011/Politics/06116275en.htm>].

¹³ By that time, Richard Morningstar had already expressed his country's hopes that Azerbaijan and Turkey would sign the transit agreement needed to move Nabucco further.

¹⁴ [<http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1414836.html#ixzz1PGCFU4Tt>].

seems to be losing its nerve. A Russian newspaper, *Kommersant*, quoted Igor Sechin as saying that the South Stream, which was the Kremlin's pet project for a long time, might be pushed aside in favor of a Black Sea liquefied natural gas (LNG) project.

In fact, there has never been much clarity about the South Stream routes; today, in the absence of an agreement with Turkey, which remains elusive despite the long talks and numerous meetings, Russia's South Stream plans look much harder to realize because the pipeline is to be laid in Turkey's territorial waters, which makes it one of the key states. The issue was first discussed in May 2009 in Sochi by Prime Minister Putin and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan. At that time, Nabucco, which offered much stronger incentives for the development of the country's gas distribution network and energy production, looked more preferable for Turkey.

In May 2011, the Moscow talks with Erdoğan brought no results; it was in the wake of the talks that Igor Sechin told *Kommersant*: "Gazprom and the Russian government are discussing all sorts of options, including building an LNG plant on the Black Sea either as a supplement or an alternative to the South Stream." This came after the fairly unexpected statement Vladimir Putin offered after active negotiations in Brussels on long-term relations in the energy sphere between Russia and the European Union to the effect that Russia would look at the possibility of building an LNG plant on its Black Sea shores.¹⁵

Turkmenistan Holds the Keys to Nabucco

The repeatedly postponed final decision on Nabucco did not remove Turkmenistan from the agenda. In recent years this country has gained a lot of political weight in the Caspian to become the key of European energy policy. The Europeans still consider the republic's gas riches as the main reserves for their new gas pipeline¹⁶; the future of Nabucco hinges on what Ashghabad plans to do. On 25 May, 2011, when a large Russian delegation headed by Minister of Energy Sergey Shmatko arrived in Brussels to discuss the future relations in the gas sphere between Russia and the EU, European Union Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger said that Europe's energy future was geared, first, to gas and, second, to Central Asia.¹⁷

Azerbaijan will launch Nabucco by sending the first volumes of natural gas along it; the future of the pipeline and its chance of reaching the planned capacity are in the hands of Ashghabad. Turkmenistan, which wants diversification of export routes, has not joined Nabucco; it prefers to sell gas on the country's border, which means that the corresponding Nabucco structures will be responsible for transportation across a sea torn apart by political and territorial disagreements. The Trans-Caspian project is still alive even though Turkmenistan sells its gas to China, Russia, and Iran. To be realized, Nabucco needed Turkmen gas, while Turkmenistan needed a jolt into action. This happened when it detached its energy policy from Russia and turned to China (to which Russia never objected)¹⁸ and also to Europe.

Turkmenistan not only wants to sell its gas to Europe, it is moving in this direction. On the other hand, relations with Russia deteriorated when it refused to buy Turkmen gas between April and December 2009. Deprived of its usual inflows of gas money, Ashghabad began feverishly looking for new routes, the trans-Caspian being one of the options. Emboldened, in November 2010 at the Oil and Gas of Turkmenistan—2010 conference, Ashghabad went even further. Vice Premier of the Government of Turkmenistan Baymurad Hojamammedov announced that in five years' time his country

¹⁵ [<http://www.kommersant.ru/daily/61075>].

¹⁶ See: S.S. Zhiltsov, "Turkmenistan obostryaet igru. Ashkhabad prevrashchaetsia v kluchevuiu figuru v evro-proektakh," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 31 May, 2011, available at [http://www.ng.ru/energy/2011-05-31/13_turkmenistan.html?mprint].

¹⁷ See: "Günther Oettinger—o neizbezhnosti proekta Nabucco," *Kommersant*, 26 May, 2011.

¹⁸ See: A.K. Magomedov, R.N. Nikerov, *Bolshoy Kaspiy*, pp. 208-211.

would supply Europe with up to 40 bcm of gas every year. Ten billion cu m, the Turkmen official specified, would come from the off-shore fields in the country's west (in 2011 the Malaysian Petronas company would extract 5 bcm of free gas) and 30 bcm of gas from the rich fields in the country's east. Turkmenistan is building, and plans to complete by 2015, an East-West gas pipeline in its own territory with an annual capacity of 30 bcm to move gas from the gas-rich inner regions to the Caspian shores. The figures might be inflated (this often happens with the Caspian CIS countries), however Ashgabad clearly intends to start the trans-Caspian route along with Baku.

The country is not discouraged by the fact that the pipeline can cross the sea only after the legal status of the Caspian Sea has been determined and if all the coastal states agree. Turkmenistan has already stated that the agreement of the sides through the sectors of which the pipeline will be laid will suffice, that is, any two of the five coastal states may lay pipelines in their sectors without seeking the consent of the others. President of Turkmenistan Berdymukhammedov said this on 18 November, 2010 in Baku on the first day of the summit of the Caspian states. The pipeline in the national sectors of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan was a domestic issue of the two countries rather than a common problem of the five states. This means that skeptical remarks and irony should be forgotten; Turkmenistan has accomplished a breakthrough to the West.

Azerbaijan, which is on Nabucco's side, is quite satisfied; it is prepared to deliver its energy resources to Europe and offer supply lines for Turkmen gas.

The future of the southern energy corridor, which will bring Azeri and Turkmen gas and oil to Europe, bypassing Russia, is growing clearer along with its strategic dimension. Today, it is used by Azerbaijan for its energy resources and by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan for their oil. According to the State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, by 1 November, 2010, the BTC pipeline had moved 860.4 thousand tons of Turkmen oil under the contract signed in July 2010.¹⁹

Today, Russian politicians and top managers are no longer sarcastic; no matter what Putin, Sechin, and Miller (and their subordinates) have to say about the absence of guaranteed fuel sources, they understand that Nabucco is moving toward its realization. Yuri Shafranik, a man of immense practical experience and a veteran of Russia's oil and gas branch, has warned against treating Nabucco lightly: today South Stream has resources while Nabucco has not. Tomorrow new contracts may be signed to fill the pipeline bypassing Russia.²⁰

C o n c l u s i o n

The above refutes what looks like the premature conclusion offered by well-known Russian expert on the Caspian problem Prof. Zhiltsov. He writes that by 2011 the period of new pipeline projects in the Black Sea-Caspian region was completed because, he argues for not entirely clear reasons, "the regional countries will be confronted with the much more difficult task of finding hydrocarbon resources and tracing the final routes of the new pipelines."²¹

Today we are watching an intensive phase of one of the acutest geopolitical confrontations in the Caspian-Caucasian region: Nabucco of the European Union and South Stream of Russia. The present round is unfolding amid the skyrocketing demand for natural gas exacerbated by the technogenic disasters in Japan and the decision to abandon nuclear power production in Europe, particularly in Germany. The rivalry between the two pipelines is developing according to the "zero sum game" scenario, where the defeat of one means the victory of the other. The conflict is a product of mutual dependence and the depleting raw material resources.

¹⁹ See: S. Mamedov, "Ashkhabad i Baku gotoviatsia k Nabucco," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 24 November, 2010.

²⁰ See: V. Panfilova, "Ideia stuchitsia, a truba zovet," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 30 November, 2010.

²¹ S.S. Zhiltsov, "Epokha geopoliticheskikh truboprovodov. Kaspiyskie transportnye proekty otvoryvany ot dobychi syria," available at [http://www.ng.ru/energy/2011-04-13/13_truboprovod.html?mprint].

The recent trends—Moscow's shrinking influence on Ashghabad, the attempts to isolate Iran, and the gradually warming relations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan—promise shifts in the Caspian. In the past, Russia paved the way toward bilateral agreements by signing a contract early in the 2000s on border delimitation with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. This means that, all going well, a bilateral agreement between Baku and Ashghabad on the sea border and a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline cannot be excluded. This deal might invite the interference of extra-Caspian forces, the West and NATO in particular, which cannot but cause a lot of concern in Moscow and Tehran.

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THE PHENOMENON OF POST-BIPOLAR REGIONALISM IN EUROPE

A b s t r a c t

The author concentrates on the typical features of regional cooperation in Europe in the post-bipolar world. He relies on a vast body of academic writings to arrive at his own interpretation of the following terms: post-bipolar world; region; expanse; and regionalization and post-bipolar regionalism, the latter being discussed in the context of the Baltic-Black Sea international cooperation system. He

describes post-bipolar regionalism as a qualitatively new type of regional cooperation which emerged in the de-polarized global system of international relations and a restructured balance of power. Equal partnership on the international scene is described as a specific feature of post-bipolar regionalism, as opposed to the domination of regional leaders over their smaller neighbors.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The last decade of the 20th century witnessed a global tectonic shift: the Soviet Union fell apart to leave the United States the only and genuinely global power and spell the end of the bipolar world order. Western Europe, which has preserved a large share of the world's political and economic might, however, remains one of the geopolitical heavyweights. The same applies to other parts of the European continent. The geopolitical changes which, in the final analysis, created a new, post-bipolar world order unfolded in two stages:

- the end of the bipolar world order;
- the first post-socialist states joined NATO and the EU.

Some think that it is too early to talk about any more or less clear outlines of a new system of international relations, even though the old system has disappeared from the world scene. The same authors believe that there is no reason to describe the present system as a multipolar world: those who support the idea of a multipolar world, as opposed to the “unipolar domination of the United States” on the international arena, fail to contemplate the possible negative repercussions of any other international system.¹ The new post-bipolar system of international relations is described not as a result of someone’s consistent efforts. It is born by objective processes—disintegration of the bipolar system; appearance of new centers of power in some of the regions; and weakening of the two former superpowers. American political scientist Stanley Hoffmann writes about the growing number of new independent states and the greater role of the non-state actors, the mounting mutual dependence, and the changed correlation between the economic and military factors as the most typical features of the world today. It is also said that in the past the system of international relations was arranged as a hierarchy of power factors; in the 1970s, however, several functional hierarchies (based on economic, military, ideological, and socio-cultural factors) began taking shape.²

Typical Features of the Post-Bipolar World

Many academic communities, including the neorealists, are interested in the specific features of the post-bipolar and post-Cold War international system.³ At the same time, there is no agreement among the neorealists about the possible development trends in the post-bipolar world and the prospects of hegemonism in particular.

Some think that hegemonism cannot survive over the long run; on the other hand, it is believed that an effective foreign policy can help maintain America’s leadership for a long time. “The United States should seek the means to remain an acceptable leader in the military, economic and political spheres rather than to impose its will within an imperial model.”⁴

Regional cooperation, which came to the fore after the Cold War in the developing post-bipolar world order, is gaining weight; it has already caused even greater decentralization of the current system of international relations. The regional format of multilateral cooperation has already become one of the key factors of international relations today.

Decentralization and more or less consistent development have been and remain the reasonable and important tasks of international cooperation. Today, decentralization of economic development has become one of the pillars of sustainable development, which means that economic development of any region is a task of global dimensions related to the whole of mankind rather than to those living in the region.⁵

¹ See: *Mirovaya politika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, ed. by S.A. Lantsov, V.A. Achkasov, Piter Publishers, St. Petersburg, 2008, p. 136.

² See: *Ibidem*.

³ “Neorealism is one of the contemporary theories of international relations, a renovated version of political realism. As a scientific world outlook, it figured prominently in shaping the United States’ foreign policy in the last decade... When talking about our day and age the neorealists deem it necessary to point out that after the Cold War the international system preserved its main regularities” (I.N. Koval, “Postbipoliarnaia mezhdunarodnaia sistema: podkhody i otsenki ‘neorealitov’,” *Visnik Odeskogo natsionalnogo universitetu: Sotsiologia i politichni nauki*, Vol. 12, Issue 14, 2007, p. 139, in Ukrainian).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁵ See: J. Käkönen, “Local Dimension and Regionalisation: The Northern Peripheries,” in: *The New North of Europe*, ed. by L. Heininen, J. Käkönen, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Reports, No. 80, 1998, p. 63.

Fragmentation of the post-Soviet geopolitical expanse can be described as another typical feature of the post-bipolar era; this is confirmed by the emergence of new transnational regional organizations.⁶ Regional integration and coordination of innovation politics are conducive to resource saving and make it easier to sell new products. This means that economic growth in large and small countries is possible in regions which closely cooperate, on a global scale, with the developed, new industrial, and developing countries.⁷

“Nation-states continue to be the basic units of the world system... Geographic location is still the point of departure for the definition of a nation-state’s external priorities, and the size of national territory also remains one of the major criteria of status and power. However, for most nation-states, the issue of territorial position has lately been waning in salience.”⁸ This became especially obvious after the Cold War when the global system of international relations became depolarized, while the old balance of power was restructured. This pushed forward integration on a world and regional scale, while the process was free from global ideological pressure and the diktat of the superpowers. In the early 1990s, the old state alliances fell apart; their members formed new regional and sub-regional groups.⁹

Collapse of the communist system changed the geopolitical map of the world beyond recognition. The post-Soviet states with similar historical roots inherited from the Soviet Union its defective system of administrative-command economy, which lacked many of the indispensable state institutions. With practically no experience of independent statehood, they not only had to cope with numerous persisting domestic problems, but also with expanding globalization; this explains the regional alliances of states with similar interests. Together, they can more efficiently cope with their problems and achieve their aims.¹⁰

Here is what Zbigniew Brzezinski has to say about globalization and its possible effects: “‘Globalization’ in its essence means global interdependence. Such interdependence does not ensure equality of status or even equality of security for all nations. But it means no nation has total immunity from the consequences of the technological revolution that has so vastly increased the human capability to inflict violence and yet tightened the bonds that increasingly tie humanity together... But a gradual and controlled devolution of power could lead to an increasingly formalized global community of shared interest, with supranational arrangements increasingly assuming some of the special security roles of traditional nation-states... Global security dilemmas in the early decades of the twenty-first century are thus qualitatively different from those of the twentieth. The traditional link between national sovereignty and national security has been severed.”¹¹

The Concept of Region and Regionalization of International Relations in the World Today

The advent of the post-bipolar (post-Cold War) era made what the academic community had to say about political geography and geopolitics more pertinent. In the past, geographers described and

⁶ See: T. Beridze, E. Ismailov, V. Papava, *Tsentrалny Kavkaz i ekonomika Gruzii*, Nurlan, Baku, 2004, p. 49.

⁷ See: R. Abesadze, V. Burduli, “Innovative Activities and their Coordination under Advancing Globalization,” *The Caucasus & Globalization*, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 2009, p. 79.

⁸ Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp. 37-38.

⁹ See: S.V. Glebov, *Stanovlenie sistemy bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva v Chernomorskom regione i rol Ukrainy v etom protsesse (1990-e gg.)*, Ph.D. thesis, Odessa, 2002, p. 24.

¹⁰ See: V. Papava, “On the Role of ‘Caucasian Tandem’ in GUAM,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Special Issue, No. 3-4 (51-52), 2008, p. 47.

¹¹ Z. Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, Basic Books, New York, 2004, pp. ix, 2, 13.

classified geographic areas (internally homogenous with obvious and fundamental delineations and territorial divisions), the boundaries of which were nothing more than the lines which kept these areas apart inside the territory.¹²

Some of the researchers describe political geography as a science which permits the study of spatial perspectives.¹³ Graham Smith has described geopolitics as a geographic concept which attaches great importance to the mechanism and development of international relations, or as a concept that allows geographers to study the relations between geographic expanse and politics.¹⁴ Simon Dalby, in turn, has written: "Geopolitics is a complex cultural matter, where identities are formulated, represented, and repressed in contemporary political discourses."¹⁵

Geopolitics is not neutral: it studies political processes in different geographical contexts to identify geostrategy at the state level.¹⁶ Geopolitics is closely connected with progress in political geography; there are different ideas of geopolitics: it can be understood as a philosophical approach to history, or as fundamental political geography, or as a security policy which rests on geographical factors. Geopolitical location, for example, is understood as the location of a state in relation to:

- Various military-political groups and blocs;
- The key transportation and economic routes;
- States with different ethnic and cultural traditions.

From this it follows that politics and economics are the sum-total of varied dynamic processes, while the geopolitical location of states varies in time and space.¹⁷

It is becoming increasingly clear that the issues which used to belong to geography (including the emergence of new regions) have moved into the field of attention of political science. This is caused by more intensive international contacts, the increased importance of geopolitical factors, and security issues, and the continued drawing closer of the geographical and political sciences.¹⁸

The present geopolitical situation has stirred up an interest in the principles of regional structuralization of geopolitical and geo-economic expanses,¹⁹ which makes the contemporary scholarly interpretations of the term "region" extremely interesting. There is any number of interpretations ranging from philosophical (a world with a specific mentality, traditions, world outlook, and world perception) to formal legal as a legally identified sub-national unit. There are historical, geographic, geopolitical, economic, and other interpretations of the concept.²⁰ Jussi Sakari Jauhiainen of Finland has rightly noted that there are many contradictions in the way the term is defined and the essence of the phenomenon the term describes. This explains the continued and fairly intensive academic discussions.²¹

The region understood as a vast area, a group of adjacent countries or territories (areas) tied together by shared features, looks to be the simplest of the scholarly interpretations.²²

A more detailed interpretation of the term "region" (a word derived from the Latin *regio*) describes it as part of a country or any other vast territory which differs from all the others in its natural

¹² See: J.S. Jauhiainen, "A Geopolitical View of the Baltic Sea Region," in: *Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension*, ed. by H. Haukkala, Jean Monnet University of Turku, Turku, 1999, pp. 47-48.

¹³ See: P.J. Taylor, "Political Geography," in: R.J. Johnston, *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, ed. by G. Derek, G. Smith, 3rd ed., Longman, New York, 1994, p. 447.

¹⁴ See: G. Smith, "Geopolitics," in: R.J. Johnston, op. cit., p. 228.

¹⁵ S. Dalby, "Geopolitics and Global Security: Culture, Identity, and the 'Pogo Syndrome'," in: *Rethinking Geopolitics*, ed. by G. O'Tuathail, S. Dalby, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 295.

¹⁶ See: J.S. Jauhiainen, op. cit., p. 48.

¹⁷ See: A. Gegeshidze, *Geopolitics*, Tbilisi, 1999, p. 196 (in Georgian).

¹⁸ See: Z. Abashidze, *The Cold War: Past or Present?* Tbilisi, 2009, p. 47 (in Georgian).

¹⁹ See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, *Tsentralnaia Evrazia: geopoliticheskoe pereosmyslenie*, CA&CC Press, Stockholm, 2010, p. 123.

²⁰ See: Yu.N. Gladkiy, A.I. Chistobaev, *Regionovedenie*, Moscow, 2002, p. 16.

²¹ See: J. S. Juahianen, op. cit.

²² See: I.S. Ozhegov, N.Yu. Shvedova, *Tolkovy slovar' russkogo iazyka*, Moscow, 2002, p. 32.

or historically developed economic, social, and cultural features; a group of adjacent countries which forms a special economic-geographical, ethnocultural, and socioeconomic part of the world.²³

Some scholars look at the region as an expanse, the population of which is consolidated by a common history and strategic interests and challenges.²⁴ Others believe that the states in a region attach special importance to collective security.²⁵ Still others look at the region as a community of states defending their specificity in the face of mounting globalization.²⁶

Eldar Ismailov and Vladimir Papava rely on a descriptive approach to revise certain aspects of the geopolitical interpretation of the region unrelated to the interests of the world and regional powers.²⁷

The concept of region cannot be reduced to a simple sum-total of characteristics; its content depends on the task as formulated by the researcher. This explains why the region is not a particular entity but a certain systemic quality produced by cooperation among many factors. The region is not something immutable or eternal; its borders are flexible. This explains why S. Grinevetskiy, S. Zhiltsov, and I. Zonn have written that “new regions may appear due to all sorts of mechanisms; this means that in all cases the specific reasons of the emergence of a regional entity should be analyzed. The share of each factor potentially responsible for the systemic organization of an expanse should be identified.” The same authors deem it necessary to add that a region can change its configuration even if there were previously no objective prerequisites to treat it as a single whole.²⁸

There is the opinion that today regional boundaries can no longer be regarded as simple dividing lines on the map. Like political and other factors, the boundaries are conventional and do not play the main role in the complex process of region-building.²⁹ This makes the so-called post-modernity territorial units a doubly interesting trend associated with a clear understanding that mounting globalization makes regions highly vulnerable. This trend is manifested in the so-called virtual regions taking shape in the regional development of geographically close territorial units. Virtual regions are not territorial units limited by administrative borders. They are brought together by common interests envisaged by mutually advantageous agreements. This allows virtual regions to coordinate their efforts, effectively use their resources, and achieve short- and long-term aims much more efficiently than the traditional structures of centralized governance.³⁰

According to K. Mötölä, the concept of region-building which gained popularity in the 1990s presupposes that shared security (military, economic, and environmental) plays the leading role in the process. The author refers to the OSCE expanse as one of the examples of his interpretation of regions.³¹ According to Carl-Einar Stålvant, regionalization is a great achievement of the post-bipolar era. Winston Churchill placed the Iron Curtain between Trieste and Lübeck. The Berlin Wall made the division of Europe complete. Regionalism in our day and age has created a policy and strategy aimed at overcoming the effects of the postwar division of Europe.³²

²³ See: *Etimologicheskii slovar*, Moscow, 1996, p. 124.

²⁴ See: K. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1957.

²⁵ See: I.S. Ozhegov, N.Yu. Shvedova, op. cit., p. 33.

²⁶ See: S. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1987.

²⁷ See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, op. cit., p. 6.

²⁸ See: S.R. Grinevetskiy, S.S. Zhiltsov, I.S. Zonn, *Chernomorskiy uzel*, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, Moscow, 2007, p. 21.

²⁹ See: J.S. Jauhiainen, op. cit., p. 56.

³⁰ See: S. Boisier, “Postmodernismo territorial y globalizacion: regiones pivotales y regiones virtuales,” *CEPAL/ILPES*, Santiago de Chile, 1993, Documento 93, p. 19.

³¹ See: K. Mötölä, “Security around the Baltic Rim: Concepts, Actors and Processes,” in: *North European and Baltic Sea Integration. The NEBI Yearbook*, ed. by L. Hedegaard, B. Lindström, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1998, p. 364.

³² See: C.-E. Stålvant, “Security and Safety in the Baltic Sea Region: Transformation and Three Agents of Change,” in: *Challenges and Prospects for Nordic-Baltic Security Sector Reform—The Western Balkans, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Sub-Saharan Africa, Research Report*, ed. by M. Ekengren, C.-E. Stålvant, A. Helkama-Rågård, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, 2007, p. 34.

Other authors agree with the virtual region idea; they point out that the role of the nation-states is diminishing, their functions being limited to brokerage between foreign trading structures and the local population.³³

Here I shall present my idea of the terms “expanse” and “region”; these two concepts are not identical. Expanse is a territory which includes geographically close, but historically, politically, and economically alien states. For example, the Baltic and Black Sea expanses include the coastal countries. Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Russia, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland belong to the former; Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Rumania, Georgia, and Turkey belong to the latter. The region is, however, not only a geographically but also a geopolitically homogeneous entity consisting of states bound by shared political and economic interests and a common past. Since a region, as distinct from an expanse, is not a group of states consolidated by a common geography but by a set of several features (political, economic, cultural, historical, etc.), common interests rather than their geographical proximity should be viewed as the key factor of regional identity. This means that any region can be regarded as an entity in the broader sense of the word. The Greater Black Sea region is one of the best examples: it includes not only the coastal states but also Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, countries with no direct access to the Black Sea.

In the post-bipolar world, the rising regionalization of foreign policies is accompanied by the ever mounting opposition of the majority of states to new dividing lines in the world or any of its regions and by the emergence of an effective network of transborder cooperation, which makes new international regional organizations and initiatives even more important. Continued discussions have already convinced many political scientists that regionalism and regionalization are phenomena of the post-bipolar era (which began when the Cold War ended). Both, however, cannot be described as absolutely novel phenomena.

During the Cold War, these phenomena were studied in the context of integration theories; the so-called old regionalism was based on inter-state cooperation, while new regionalism (or post-bipolar regionalism) of the post-Cold War era is a much more complex phenomenon, hence the greater academic interest in it.³⁴

It should be said that in some cases regionalism is manifested in international relations in a highly ambivalent way, which explains the extremely divergent opinions about the issue. Ian Clark, for example, believes that regionalism differ greatly from globalization as a phenomenon “leading to regional blocs, and countering the formation of globalist institutions or agenda.”³⁵ According to A. Vysotskiy, regionalism contains two opposite principles: on the one hand, the states tend toward integration within certain geographical limits; while on the other, groups of states prefer to detach themselves from others.³⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski believes that in the contemporary world “geopolitics has moved from the regional to the global dimension.”³⁷ Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne view regionalism “as a step toward globalization rather than an alternative to it.”³⁸

It is not easy to come up with an adequate definition of the term “regionalization.” Jyrki Käkönen, for example, describes it as a typically modern phenomenon which has taken the form of a “complex European process”; in 1992, it assumed a visible form after the creation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). In the 1990s, regional cooperation in the Baltic area helped Lithuania,

³³ See: P. Wong-Gonzalez, “Integracion de america del norte: implicaciones para la competencia y competitividad internatinal de regiones,” *CEPAL/ILPES*, Santiago de Chile, 1997, Documento 93/19, p. 35.

³⁴ See: J. Käkönen, “Regionalization and Power in the Baltic Sea Region,” in: *Nordic-Baltic Region in Transition, New Actors, New Issues, New Perspectives*, ed. by S. Perko, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, Research Report, No. 75, 1999, p. 52.

³⁵ I. Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation*, New York, 1997, p. 30.

³⁶ See: A.F. Vysotskiy, *Morskoy regionalism (mezhdunarodno-pravovye problemy regional'nogo sotrudnichestva gosudarstv)*, Naukova dumka, Kiev, 1986, p. 15.

³⁷ Z. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 39.

³⁸ A. Gamble, A. Payne, *Regionalism and World Order*, Houndmills, 1996, p. 251.

Latvia, and Estonia integrate into NATO and the European Union, thus diminishing the threat of regional confrontation, which might increase due to the fact that Russia was left outside the European and Euroatlantic expanse. The Baltic region, writes the Finnish academic, reflects the dualism of post-Cold War Europe. On the one hand, the integration potential on the continent is growing (three post-Soviet Baltic states returned to Europe); while on the other, there are new dividing lines between Russia and Europe.³⁹

Jyrki Käkönen distinguished between “high” and “low” regionalization. The former refers to cooperation among the regional states at the government level; the other, to the involvement of mainly civil society entities (municipalities, chambers of trade and commerce, NGOs) in international cooperation. Regionalization provided small states with a better opportunity to set up all sorts of functional (or even multifunctional) regional structures. Some authors describe this process as regionalization. The Vyshegrad Group (Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) and to some extent the EU are pertinent examples.

The nature of regionalization depends on whether the states allow their sub-regions to be involved, in their own right, in setting up regional organizations or councils of transborder cooperation (designed to cope with local problems) or whether the state has monopolized this activity.⁴⁰

Today, borders are no longer as important as they were in the past, writes Käkönen, which is true of the world and of the European continent in particular. This means that security policy might lose some of its previous importance and transfer it to cooperation at the lower, transborder, level and the corresponding institutions; regionalization has obviously introduced new and non-traditional political actors into world politics.⁴¹

Björn Hettne believes that regionalization and “new regionalization” of the post-Cold War period in particular is connected with international transborder cooperation at the sub-regional level. More often than not, regionalization is associated with globalization and localization, that is, with “Glocalization.”⁴²

Arto Nokkala believes that regional policy geared toward “horizontal cooperation” within a region is a reasonable option and offered the North-South infrastructure across Europe as a pertinent example.⁴³

Regionalization is viewed as a strategy of the nation-state, which gives it a chance to decentralize its foreign policy. The large states, as regional leaders, will gain even more: this may alleviate the fears of the region’s smaller states that have good (including historical) reason to be afraid of the military potential of their larger neighbor.⁴⁴

The new regions are very different in terms of their characteristics, functions, and level of regionalization.

According to Jyrki Käkönen, regions may replace nation-states as active players on the international political scene.⁴⁵ In particular, transnational regionalism means that there is “subnational paradiplomacy,” which means more than a simple answer to new territorial economic ties and the globalization of markets. It is the answer to global interdependence and the limited possibilities of

³⁹ See: J. Käkönen, “Change and Continuity in the Baltic Sea Region. A Historical Perspective,” in: *Europe and the New Role of the Regions*, ed. by S. Camiz, T. Melasuo, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, Occasional Papers, No. 85, 2003, p. 80.

⁴⁰ See: J. Käkönen, *Regionalization and Power in the Baltic Sea Region*, p. 54.

⁴¹ See: *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴² See: B. Hettne, “The New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace,” in: *The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security*, Serial: Research for Action, ed. by B. Hettne, A. Inotai, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki, 1994, p. 62.

⁴³ See: A. Nokkala, *The European North—Challenges and Opportunities*, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Helsinki, 1997, p. 20.

⁴⁴ See: J. Käkönen, “Regionalization and Power in the Baltic Sea Region,” p. 62.

⁴⁵ See: *Ibid.*, p. 61.

nation-states and international organizations of the U.N. type to be effectively involved on the world political scene.⁴⁶

R.F. Chisholm deems it necessary to stress the importance of institutional transformations and the appearance of innovational alternative forms of governance in the cooperation process at the local and sub-regional level (transborder cooperation being one of its forms).⁴⁷ Ivo Duchacek believes that transborder (or transnational) interaction should be interpreted as informal rules and institutional structures conducive to specific “regional behavior.”⁴⁸

Regional cooperation permits the states to ensure their national interests in the most effective way, while remaining independent political players. By way of specifying the terms “regionalism” and “regionalization,” Susanna Perko writes that the term “regionalization” is ill-fitted to describe regional cooperation between states and suggested the term “regionalism.”⁴⁹

There is another interpretation of regionalism (or region-building): entities of interconnected states. Regionalism is a political concept related to specific identities and connected with realities at the regional and global levels. In the broad sense of the word, the term can be interpreted as stronger ties among geographically close countries with common economic problems and strategic interests typical of each of the regions.⁵⁰

Intensified international cooperation at the regional level (in other words, mounting regionalization of international relations) has become a more effective instrument of regional and global security and stability. States united into regional alliances have worked and are working together for the sake of geopolitical stability.⁵¹

Philippe de Schouteete accompanied his analysis of regional cooperation on the European continent with a new concept of a regional subsystem within one region and identified three types: hegemonistic, integrative, and protective. Moreover, he is convinced that one state can cooperate in several regional subsystems at the same time.⁵² T. Pedersen, who relies on the studies of de Schouteete, suggests that the number of types of regional subsystems on which he relied when studying Nordic-Baltic regional cooperation should be extended to six. The author identified hegemonistic, dominant, balancing, integrative, protective, and functional regional subsystems. The interrelation between the type of regional subsystem and the integration effect (pronounced, moderate, and negative, i.e. disintegration effect) is of particular interest.⁵³

The hegemonistic subsystem (T. Pedersen refers to the Franco-German axis within the EU as an example) has powerful integration potential; at the same time, there is a great risk of it degenerating into a dominant subsystem with a disintegration rather than an integration effect due to the fact that smaller countries find this type of cooperation unacceptable and unprofitable. NATO, within the European security system, is described as a classical example of a balancing regional subsystem with a moderate integration effect. Integration potential is slightly more pronounced in the subsystem of

⁴⁶ See: O.R. Young, “Global Governance: Toward a Theory of Decentralized World Order,” in: *Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience*, ed. by O.R. Young, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, p. 295.

⁴⁷ See: R.F. Chisholm, *Developing Network Organizations. Learning from Practice and Theory*, Addison-Wesley, Reading (Mass.), 1998.

⁴⁸ I. Duchacek, “International Competence of Subnational Governments: Borderlands and Beyond,” in: *Across Boundaries. Transborder Interaction in Comparative Perspective*, ed. by O.J. Martinez, Texas Western Press, El Paso (Texas), 1986, p. 18.

⁴⁹ See: S. Perko, “Verkostojen Itämeri,” Tutkimuksia, Rauhan-ja Konfliktitutkimuskeskus, Tampere, 1995, p. 119. (S. Perko, “Baltic Sea Network,” Research Paper, Peace and Conflict Research Center, Tampere, 1995, p. 119.)

⁵⁰ See: A.F. Vysotskiy, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵¹ See: D. Lake, P.M. Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA, 1997.

⁵² See: P. De Schouteete, “The European Community and Its Sub-systems,” in: W. Wallact, *The Dynamics of European Integration*, Pinter, London, 1990.

⁵³ See: T. Pedersen, “Sub-systems and Regional Integration—The Case of Nordic and Baltic Cooperation,” in: *Nordic-Baltic Region in Transition, New Actors, New Issues, New Perspectives*, p. 36.

the integrative type. The author cited the role the United States played in the early 1950s in the unfolding European integration and the stimulating role of the EU in Latin American integration as two examples of integrative regional cooperation systems. T. Pedersen has written that the protective and functional subsystems of regional cooperation have the most pronounced integration potential (using the example of the successfully functioning Nordic and Baltic subsystems).⁵⁴

K. Lahtenmaki reminds us that so far academic thought has not yet clarified the correlation between the role of hegemony and regionalism in the contemporary world. In its traditional form (the EU, etc.), regionalism appeared when hegemony was not yet doubted. It was a time when regionalism relied on hegemonism.⁵⁵ Some authors disagreed with this. Some of them regarded regionalism as confirmation of the domination of large powers over smaller ones; others described it as an attempt by the smaller countries to avoid patronage of this sort.⁵⁶

Regionalization and regional cooperation are based not only on geographic proximity; regionalization may appear between geographically remote countries with functional proximity; R. Cappellin calls them "mezzo regions."⁵⁷

Common identity is usually regarded as the key element of regionalization and integration; the role of "spread integration" is an important element of political integration.⁵⁸

The end of the bipolar world order in the early 1990s and the changes it caused in the geopolitical configuration of the contemporary world extended the limits of regional cooperation; a fundamentally new type of regionalism appeared. Even though this regionalism does not differ radically from regionalism in the traditional "old" meaning of the word, today it is acquiring qualitatively new features caused by global economic changes, which have increased the significance of economic cooperation at the regional level; democratization of the post-socialist East European countries; the appearance of new independent states in the post-Soviet expanse; and continued enlargement of the European Union.⁵⁹

What is Post-Bipolar Regionalism, After All?

By post-bipolar regionalism we mean the qualitatively new type of international cooperation which took shape in the post-bipolar epoch when the global system of international relations became de-polarized and the old world balance restructured. In this way, integration at the world and regional level received a powerful impetus no longer produced either by global ideologies or the diktat of the world or regional superpowers.

As distinct from hegemonism (domination of large states over smaller ones in the context of international cooperation), post-bipolar regionalism is based on equal partnership of all states. One can say that in this context "post-bipolar regionalism" comes close to "geopolitical pluralism," which has created a context in which an ever greater number of states (new "independent actors") are work-

⁵⁴ See: *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁵⁵ See: K. Lahtenmaki, "Baltic Cooperation in the Framework of European Integration: An Introduction," in: *Dimension of Conflict and Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Rim*, ed. by K. Lahtenmaki, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, Research Report, No. 58, 1994, p. 2.

⁵⁶ See: L.H. Miller, "The Prospects for Order through Regional Security," in: *Regional Politics and World Order*, ed. by R. Falk, S. Mendlovitz, W.H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1973.

⁵⁷ R. Cappellin, *Regional Economic Development, Regionalism and Interregional Cooperation: The Role of Regions in a Policy for European Cohesion*, University of Joensuu, Report presented for European Summer Institute in Regional Studies, 14-29 June, 1993.

⁵⁸ J.S. Nye, *Peace in Parts*, Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1971, p. 28.

⁵⁹ See: D. Triantaphyllou, "The Black Sea Region and its Growing Influence," 18 July, 2006, available at [http://icbss.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=79] (see also: ICBSS, *Black Sea Monitor*, Issue No. 1, July 2006).

ing hard on the international arena to protect their national interests amid the never-ending pressure of the regional leaders determined to preserve their domination at all costs (at the expense of the national interests of their “junior partners”).⁶⁰

The above can clearly be seen in the vast expanse comprising the Baltic and the Black Seas, which means that there is a new type of interstate cooperation: the Baltic and Black Sea states obviously intend to develop their bilateral and multilateral contacts. A new Baltic-Black Sea system of interstate cooperation is taking shape before our eyes with the stress on equal and mutually advantageous partnership. What is especially important is the fact that, within this system, all countries (big and small) can effectively protect their national interests at the regional level.

The regional structures of the countries of the Baltic and Barents seas in the framework of the Northern Dimension, of the Mediterranean countries within the Barcelona process and the Balkan states within the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe serve as another positive example of post-bipolar regionalism in Europe.⁶¹

This trend will accelerate, which means that after awhile the Barcelona and the Northern Dimension will blend with the EU European Neighborhood Policy into a single renovated common European foreign policy doctrine. The European Union’s rapid expansion and the new members, each with its own “dimension,” can be described as another attribute of post-bipolar regionalism. Despite the recent EU membership of Bulgaria and Rumania, this picture lacks an important fragment, viz. the Black Sea expanse which, in the post-bipolar era, has acquired attractive and stable regional structures such as the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development—GUAM (ODED-GUAM), as well as recent international regional projects, such as the Community of Democratic Choice; the Black Sea Forum; the Energy Dialogue of Three Seas, etc.

So far, the European Union has shown no intention of supporting these regional initiatives, which greatly limits the Black Sea Soviet successor-states’ opportunity to take advantage of international cooperation in the conditions of post-bipolar regionalism. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, the Western countries have been paying much closer attention to the Black Sea region, although they have not yet arrived at any clear strategy regarding it. Europe has not yet identified its strategic aims in the Black Sea basin. Within the regional format, the EU is obviously concentrating on the Baltic States; it is interested in the Mediterranean countries and the West Balkans. To borrow an apt comment from Ronald Asmus and Bruce Jackson, “in many ways the wider Black Sea region has been the Bermuda Triangle of Western strategic studies.”⁶²

The asymmetry of the integration processes in the post-Soviet expanse is an interesting feature of post-bipolar regionalism. The Soviet successor-states’ relations with Russia became the main factor of their regional post-Soviet cooperation. In the early 1990s, the emphasis was “on the Near Abroad as Russia’s central concern.” Some Russian politicians advocated “a form of Moscow-dominated economic integration” (the CIS being the product of this approach), while others expected “an eventual restoration of some measure of imperial control, thereby creating a power more capable of balancing America and Europe.”⁶³

According to Amelle de Tinguy, Russia has always tried to prevent integration in the post-Soviet expanse and will not abandon its efforts to achieve destabilization in Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbai-jan, and Moldova.⁶⁴ Khatuna Giorgadze believes that Russia will never abandon its tradi-

⁶⁰ See: B.S. Shin, “Russian Policy toward Near Abroad under Putin: With a Focus on Multi-layered and Strategic Balancing Approaches,” *Review of International and Area Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005, p. 105.

⁶¹ See: M. Aydin, “Europe’s New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighbourhood,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 2005, p. 260.

⁶² R.D. Asmus, B.P. Jackson, “The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom,” *Policy Review*, June & July 2004, p. 26.

⁶³ Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, pp. 98-99.

⁶⁴ See: A. Tinguy, “From Central Asia to GUUAM: The Relaunch of Russian Diplomacy,” *Defense Nationale*, Vol. 57, No. 8-9, Aug-Sept 2001, p. 79.

tional geopolitical bias toward domination in the post-Soviet expanse, which explains its failures when dealing with the post-Soviet states inside and outside the CIS. This was what forced Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova to unite for equal and mutually advantageous cooperation with-in GUAM.⁶⁵

International cooperation presupposes cooperation between two or more states, which rules out the use of force and calls for exerting common efforts to realize common interests.⁶⁶ The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (A/8082) of 24 October, 1970 obligates all states to develop “friendly relations among nations irrespective of their political, economic and social systems.”

Some think, however, that the share of the regional leaders in developing and implementing the projects within CIS or even BSEC is disproportionately large.⁶⁷ This means that the interests of the large and small countries will not be equally represented in such organizations and that the “deprived” countries will seek closer relations among themselves.

S. Glebov has written with good reason that “a combination of the levels of national separatism and contemporary regionalism is the main problem of post-Soviet republics. The former means that national interests should be protected even at the expense of neighbors; the latter means that these interests should be harmonized with the interests of neighboring states within the region.”⁶⁸ Lubomir Zyblikewicz has found an answer to this problem: unification of states which, within the framework of the organizations and initiatives they set up, could jointly address their political problems and other tasks on an equal footing.⁶⁹ This is the main specific feature of post-bipolar regionalism.

C o n c l u s i o n

As distinct from a geographic expanse, a region can be described as not only a geographic, but also a geopolitically homogenous unit. The factor of regional identity is not so much geographic proximity of the countries which belong to the same region, but their common geopolitical interests and shared past. The growing role of the regional format of international cooperation is directly connected with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the new post-bipolar world order.

Post-bipolar regionalism is a qualitatively new type of regional cooperation which came into being in the post-bipolar era in the context of the depolarized global system of international relations and restructured world balance. Post-bipolar regionalism is geared toward equal partnership of states, as opposed to the domination of large states over smaller ones in the process of regional cooperation. It is very close to the idea of “geopolitical pluralism,” in which the number of smaller states determined to actively defend their interests on the international arena is growing steadily under the continued pressure of regional leaders trying to preserve their dominating position at the expense of the national interests of their “junior” partners. This explains why deepening integration processes promoted bilateral and multilateral contacts between the Black Sea and the Baltic states. This laid the foundation for a new Baltic-Black Sea system of interstate contacts.

⁶⁵ See: K. Giorgadze, “Russia: Regional Partner or Aggressor?” *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Autumn 2002, p. 79.

⁶⁶ See: P.A. Tsygankov, *Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia. Uchebnoe posobie*, Novaya shkola, Moscow, 1996, p. 187.

⁶⁷ See: S. Celac, P. Manoli, “Towards a New Model of Comprehensive Regionalism in the Black Sea Area,” *South-east European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2006, p. 197.

⁶⁸ S.V. Glebov, op. cit.

⁶⁹ See: L. Zyblikewicz, “Globalism versus Regionalism in Contemporary World: The Environment for Change in Europe,” in: *The Transformational Future of Europe*, Lublin, 1992, pp. 159-199.

Equal and mutually advantageous cooperation within the above-mentioned system will allow all the Baltic and Black Sea countries, including the smaller ones, to effectively defend their national interests on the international arena.

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GEORGIAN NATIONALISM TODAY: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM

A b s t r a c t

This article takes an in-depth look at Georgian nationalism, its roots, and its present status at the national level in the context of the liberal, cosmopolitan, and traditionalist approaches of the political discourse in Georgia today.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Georgia became inundated by nationalism; in this respect it differed little from the other former Soviet republics; the ideas of ethnic and religious superiority were fed by the awakened and rising pride in the nation's past and deification of the country's history and its heroes.

In the 1990s, all sorts of structures, departments, and facilities were tagged as "national."

The independence proclaimed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first Georgian president, stirred up nationalist-minded leaders who came up with the idea that the country's name, different in different languages, should be the same as in Georgian. This meant that the Russian *Gruzia*, English *Georgia*, German *Georgien*, or Turkish *Gürcistan*, etc. should be replaced with the Georgian name Sakartvelo (which roughly translates as "the land of the Georgians"). Later the idea was abandoned for the simple reason that the world would be confused by a new name for a country well known all over the world under its old name.

It should be said that, more often than not, in the 21st century Georgian nationalism (which in the 20th century was driven by its antagonism with the metropolitan country) is identified with traditionalism, post-Soviet liberalism being its main ideological rival.

The Sources of Georgian Nationalism and Ethnogenesis of the Georgians

Georgian nationalism is rooted in the messianic idea of the 12th century which stated that Georgian was the language of Jesus Christ, that Georgia was the land of the Holy Mother, and that this was where Christ's Robe was buried. The fact that the Georgian alphabet is one of the world's 14 alphabets is treated as a nationalist argument.

In the 1980s, the revived conception of Georgian nationalism was inspired by the "heroic" past of a country that stretched from Nikopsia to Derbent.

Georgian nationalism of our days is rooted in the mid-19th century when Ilia Chavchavadze, an outstanding public figure of his time, put its idea in a nutshell: "Language, Motherland, Religion." The leaders of the national-liberation movement of the late 1980s-early 1990s (Zviad Gamsakhurdia among them) described themselves as his followers. As could be expected, literary critic Gamsakhurdia dressed the conception of Georgian nationalism in philological rather than political garbs. On 2 May, 1990, he gave a lecture called *The Spiritual Mission of Georgia*, which touched on the ethnogenesis of the Georgians, at the Idriart Festival in the Tbilisi Philharmonic House.

In the 20th century, the leading lights of Georgian academic science, academicians Ivane Javakhishvili and Niko Marr, arrived at a conclusion about the Georgian ethnogenesis which upturned everything Soviet orthodox science had been treating as the sacred truth.

In the Soviet Union, the findings of great German scholar Wilhelm Humboldt remained suppressed: his studies of the Basque tongue and history of the most ancient people living on the Iberian Peninsula convinced him that the earliest autochthonous population of Southern Europe (the Pyrenees, Italy, and the Mediterranean Islands) had been Iberian. These people were called proto-Iberians and were the ancestors of all the European people.

The academic community operates with the terms such as "the Mediterranean race," "the Caucasian race," "the palaeo-Caucasian race," "the earliest Caucasian race," and "the earliest Mediterranean race," the terms being interchangeable.

They lived on the Iberian Peninsula, along the Mediterranean coast, in the Balkans, in the territory that today constitutes Greece and India, and in the Caucasus, Asia Minor, and Palestine. Humboldt believed that the proto-Iberian race (or people), which had many offshoots, used the same language (the proto-Iberian language) with numerous dialects (Lusitanian, Turdetan, Etruscan, Pelasgian, etc.). Academician Marr added the Sumerian (the language of the ancient Iberian tribes who lived in Asia Minor or Mesopotamia).¹

Since that time, the hypothesis of the origin of the Basques, very popular in the 1990s, has lost much of its former attraction.

Significantly, post-Soviet nationalism regards myths as historical truth. Today, the Georgians indulge themselves in the myth of Prometheus, the tale of Amirani who was chained to a rock in the Caucasus. The Georgian leaders are fond of saying that even if Prometheus was not a Georgian, he was chained in Georgia. After the Rose Revolution, a monument was even erected to this mythological Greek hero in Tbilisi, although it was later moved to the small tourist town of Signaghi. From the very beginning, Georgia's Prometheus was obviously intended as a tourist attraction rather than a national hero.

In the late 1980s, the republican media helped to spread rumors about the Georgian origin of President George Bush; later the same was said about President Putin, who was allegedly born in the Georgian village of Metekhi and was half-Georgian.

¹ See: Z. Gamsakhurdia, *The Spiritual Mission of Georgia*, A lecture delivered at the Idriart Festival in Tbilisi Philharmonic House, 2 May, 1990 (in Georgian).

The Motherland or the State. Whence the Slogan “Georgia for the Georgians”

In the 1990s, the idea of an independent state was the Georgians' national idea; unlike the dissidents of Eastern Europe and Russia, who fought communism, the Georgians wanted to detach themselves from the Soviet Union, which explains why the collapse of communism revived the nationalist ideas in Georgia.

It should be said that, after gaining their independence, the Georgians retained the Soviet idea of their own country as a motherland rather than a state; in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the national anthem was much less popular than folk songs.

Throughout its history, Georgian nationalism assumed different forms. On 9 March, 1956, for example, Georgia rose against Khrushchev, who condemned the personality cult of Stalin (a symbol of Georgian national pride); the cruelly suppressed anti-Soviet manifestation in Tbilisi left about 150 dead.

On 12 April, 1978, Georgia protested against the Kremlin's intention to amend the Constitutional provision about the state language.

The leaders of the national-liberation movement were accused of ultra-nationalism. Their slogan “Georgia for the Georgians!” proved useful when it came to deposing Gamsakhurdia.

At all times, Georgia was one of the multi-ethnic Soviet republics, while the leaders of the national-liberation movement were apprehensive about the ethnic Georgians.

In 1991, when the crisis inside the country became exacerbated, the supporters of President Gamsakhurdia accused prominent Georgian film director Eldar Shengelaya, who was a member of the opposition, of promoting the idea of marrying Russian girls among Georgian young men in his films which appeared in Soviet times.

In 1999, under Shevardnadze, it was decided not to register nationality in national passports; this caused a lot of concern: the Georgian nationalists wanted to preserve their nationality, while the national minorities feared assimilation. It was explained that this was being done to strengthen equality among the ethnic groups and that it was a more or less normal international practice. Time has confirmed that no one lost their nationality, while none of the ethnic groups became assimilated.

Since Georgia's first day in the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), this structure has not discussed a single instance of discrimination against the ethnic minorities in the republic. The ECRI concentrated on violation of the rights of religious minorities and the fact that many of the national minorities do not know the Georgian language.

Even before the Rose Revolution, the U.S. Department of State expressed its concern about the mounting religious extremism in Georgia, mainly prompted by an excommunicated priest of the Georgian Orthodox Church, a self-appointed “custodian of Orthodoxy” who organized pogroms against members of new religious movements (the Jehovah's Witnesses among them).

Under Shevardnadze, religious nationalism invaded the sphere of political decision-making. For example, nationalist-minded politicians objected to using the music from two operas (*Daisi* and *Absalom and Eteri*) by prominent Georgian composer Zakaria Paliashvili as the national anthem: music written by a Catholic was unsuitable for an Orthodox state. In April 2004, after the Rose Revolution, the music was finally approved as the new national anthem of Georgia.

It was about the same time that a wave of Asian immigrants (the media reported some 40 to 50 thousand Chinese immigrants) caused quite a stir across the country.

In 2007, passions over the “yellow threat” reached their peak; the opposition capitalized on public concern to accuse the people in power of supporting Chinese immigration and betraying national interests.

It turned out that about 2 thousand Chinese had arrived in Georgia on their way to Europe.

The Georgians, who are very fond of their traditional national minorities (even though they sometimes succumb to outside political speculations), still regard Chinese and dark-skinned immigrants with suspicion, a prejudice that harks back to the days of the Iron Curtain: on the one hand, they are exotic, while on the other, they are seen as a demographic threat. The same can be said about religious nationalism: the traditional religious minorities are treated with a great deal of benevolence, while the nation has found it hard to accept the non-traditional minorities.

It should be said that NGOs accused President Saakashvili of racism on the strength of what he had said at a Cabinet meeting on 27 July, 2010. When commenting on the way customs officers at the Tbilisi airport had been handling the luggage of Georgian citizens, he said: "Are we Negroes or what? Explain to me why we are acting as savages?" The press service came forward with an official statement that the president had used an idiom and that his words had not been used in the context of racial discrimination.²

The president of Georgia takes satisfaction in saying that during the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 special units staffed with ethnic Armenians stopped a Russian motorized column heading to the south of Georgia.

It should be said that compact groups of ethnic minorities do not know Georgian, which is the state language, but they have never been fined; on the other hand, this prevents their complete integration into society. For several years now, the Georgian government has been working on a project for teaching various ethnic groups Georgian; those who intend to enroll in higher educational establishments enjoy certain privileges.

In 2009, Minister for the Diasporas Yulon Gagoshidze stirred up another scandal by saying that the Georgians and Abkhazians were the only two autochthonous peoples, while "the members of other nationalities living in Georgia should be regarded as diasporas of other countries." He wanted to say that as distinct from other nationalities, Georgia was the historical homeland of the Georgians and Abkhazians. The minister was removed from his post even though nothing of what he said smacked of nationalism.

Georgian political thought makes no mention of hatred of other nations, which means that tolerance is a stable trend. Prominent Georgian writer and public figure Yakov Gogebashvili (1840-1912) wrote: "Not infrequently Georgians treat one another dishonestly, but they have always respected the members of other tribes and this respect strengthened as Georgia became stronger."³

Liberalism as a Road toward Cosmopolitanism?

At all times, nationalism has been opposing liberalism and cosmopolitanism in Georgia's public and political discourse. Back in 1905, Georgian writer Vazha Pshavela wrote in his *Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism* that "we should understand cosmopolitanism in the following way: we should love our Motherland and work for it, but never hate other nations. Those who renounce their nationality because of their alleged cosmopolitanism are the worst enemies of mankind. Cosmopolitanism should not be understood as the rejection of one's nationality."⁴

In 2010, groups of people appeared who moved resolutely against the so-called liberals, the self-name for people with a Western education (or those who try to pass for such) who deem it neces-

² [http://rustavi2.co/index.php?option=com_news&task=gourl&id=1945].

³ Ya. Gogebashvili, *Selected Works*, in five volumes, Vol. 2, Tbilisi, 1990, p. 404 (in Georgian).

⁴ V. Pshavela, *Collected Works*, in five volumes, Vol. 5, *Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism*, Sabchota Sakartvelo, Tbilisi, 1987, p. 682 (in Georgian).

sary to actively interfere in the processes underway in the country and society. The liberal “intellectuals” (as they call themselves) do not bother to conceal their anti-Orthodox sentiments and reject national traditions.

The liberal camp is not united: some of the liberals serve as a public and ideological pillar of power; others are their opponents. Both publish journals which contain only liberal articles. Both groups, however, present a united front to the traditionalists.

On 7 May, 2010, the Orthodox Parents' Union became the talk of the day when its most active members attacked journalists at TV Kavkasia, one of the opposition media. The leader escaped to Russia, which gave the Georgian liberals reason to insist that the Kremlin was pulling the strings of the recently much more vigorous nationalist movements that manipulate the nation's religious and national feelings to spilt Georgian society.

Liberalism has become the latest rage in Georgia: absolutely everything should be privatized; people who call themselves writers indulge in scabrous writings.

The liberals insist that “there is in fact tension between the democrats and those who support the liberal values and institutions. Democracy speaks of the involvement of the masses in political processes which may or may not be liberal.”⁵

The liberals regret that the Georgian government is compelled to reckon with the will of the majority and pursue a policy of so-called civil nationalism instead of carrying out unpopular liberal reforms. The critics, however, have not clarified what they mean by “civil nationalism.”

One thing is clear: the liberals are convinced that the nation is largely nationalist-minded, and this is an evil that must be opposed.

They also say: “We have real enemies who have still not come out with a clear idea. They call us freemasons, homosexuals, and Soros people. Today, Georgian anti-liberalism is best described as nostalgia for Brezhnev; as nationalism of ‘the Georgian stock,’ ingratiating and superficially Orthodox; as envy, pure and simple, of successful young people who speak English and use the computer. They are not the opponents worth a real fight.”⁶

Nationalism can be detected in the economic discourse as well: the privatization or sale of forests or their renting out to foreigners causes a veritable storm of accusations (“they are selling off our homeland, our land”) raised by nationalist-minded political groups. Geopolitical rhetoric, likewise, is a field of battle between the defenders of traditional values and liberals: to become part of the political “West,” Georgia must revise its national traditions and reject certain stereotypes.

National Traditions in Georgian Politics

Recently, the nation has been asking itself what Georgia's traditions are and should they be protected? Some people say that many of Georgia's traditions and rituals were lost during Communist rule.

Some liberals, for example, insist that Georgian festive meals and Georgian cuisine, trademarks of the country and the nation, are nothing more than a vestige of Soviet times.

What was said after the Rose Revolution about Georgian festive meals traditions being an ideological communist distortion and the worst enemy of liberalism smacks of hypocrisy. In fact, folk dances and songs helped the Soviet Georgians preserve their national identity.

⁵ An interview with politologist Gia Nodia, *Solidaroba*, Journal of the Office of Ombudsman of Georgia (Tbilisi), No. 3 (36), 2010, p. 62 (in Georgian).

⁶ G. Nodia, “Liberalism and Its Etiquette,” *Tabula* (Tbilisi), 15-21 March, 2010, p. 39 (in Georgian).

In August 2010, the government, frequently accused of betraying the national traditions and values, suggested that folk dances be taught in school and popularized among national minorities.

The Chokha-Wearers Society (*chokha* is the Georgian national male costume), which appeared in 1991, developed in 2006 into a much larger organization called The Society of the Knights of All Georgia in Chokhas, with Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II as its elected chairman. The society intends to protect, develop, and popularize the moral, historical, and cultural values of the Georgians.

A strange thing happened in 2005 during President George W. Bush's visit to Georgia. He was greeted with folk dancing, but the president's personal bodyguard insisted that the swords (part of the *chokha* attire) should be removed. The nation took this as disrespect for the national traditions of the Georgians.

After the revolution, the new leaders made a failed attempt to introduce the national dress as part of the diplomatic protocol as is the case in some countries. In 2004, Valery Chechelashvili, who wore the national dress when presenting his credentials to President of Russia Putin, was a sorry sight with the sword attached to his belt in the wrong way.

The Russian press wrote that the president's bodyguard refused to let the ambassador attend the ceremony with the sword, but the latter insisted that it was part of the *chokha* and refused to part with it. Finally Foreign Minister of Russia Lavrov had to interfere to settle the problem.⁷

Moreover, the Georgian opposition criticized the ambassador for appearing before President Putin in a mini-*chokha* and with a sword of insufficient length. This quenched the Georgian leaders' passion for introducing "nationalistic" elements into the diplomatic dress-code.

On the whole, the national dress is very popular for weddings, religious holidays, and similar occasions. Politicians and the so-called new Georgians pose in national dress in front of TV cameras to demonstrate their loyalty (often insincere) to the national traditions.

"Georgia is the homeland of the grapevine and wine!" has become so deeply rooted in the Georgian consciousness that it has also become a national value. The opposition used one of the national TV channels to show a Georgian peasant who had to destroy his vineyard to vacate the space for more profitable crops, that is, he was forced to renounce a national value. The reverence of the grapevine goes back to St. Nino of Cappadocia, the Enlightener of Georgia and Equal to the Apostles. She baptized the local population of Georgia with a grapevine cross.

The Islamic Factor in Georgian Politics

There are several Muslim ethnic groups in Georgia: the Shi'a Azeris (the largest of the other Muslim groups), the Sunni Ajarians, and the Lezghians and Kistins (Chechens who have been living in Georgia from time immemorial).

Mosques are built in great numbers all over the country; in Tbilisi, the Sunnis and Shi'a share a mosque (inherited from Soviet times), which is described as a unique phenomenon.

Inspired by Georgia's independence and the revived status of the Georgian Orthodox Church, the Ajarians moved back into the fold of the Orthodox Church (a trend not infrequently dismissed as a manifestation of Georgian religious ultra-nationalism). However, it was quite natural that after 70 years of official atheism, Ajaria (a Muslim area under Soviet power) did not escape the religious catharsis along with the rest of the country.

Ajaria was the only Soviet autonomous republic based on the confessional, rather than ethnic, principle. How did a "religious" republic appear in an atheist state?

⁷ See: *Kommersant*, 10 February, 2005.

It was under Soviet power that attempts were made to split the Georgian nation. Strange as it may seem, Stalin, an ethnic Georgian, said: "We should apply the hot flat iron of the October Revolution to Georgia" and later, in 1925, at a Comintern Congress in Moscow: "The Georgians are chauvinists; they infringe on the rights of others—Armenians, Azeris, Abkhazians, Ajarians, and Ossets. The Georgian nationality is best described as a conglomerate."⁸

In the 1990s, Moscow revived the idea of a disunited Georgian nation; the Mingrelians and Svans, the core of the Georgian nation, were presented as two different and unconnected nationalities.

Back in 1992, amid the civil war which broke out as soon as Gamsakhurdia was deposed, Russia tried to play the Mingrelian card.

In 2006, the Kremlin tried its hand in Svanetia, where Georgia carried out an anti-criminal operation in upper Abkhazia (in the Kodori Gorge situated in Svanetia and controlled by Georgia). Emzar Kvitsiani, leader of an illegal armed unit who used to represent the president of Georgia in the Kodori Gorge, spoke about infringement of the rights of the Svans. He insisted that the Americans were also involved. Speaking on Russian TV he said: "The Americans are fighting us, a tiny nation!"

Another attempt to play the ethnic card to raise political tension in Georgia was made during the Rose Revolution when the Russian press did not exclude the possibility that Guria, the homeland of President Shevardnadze, might rebel against the new revolutionary power.

After the August war of 2008, the Georgians living in Russia were divided, in the official documents, into Georgians, Mingrelians, Svans, etc., with the emphasis on the two latter ethnic groups, which have dialects of their own.

In 1999, along with membership in the Council of Europe, Georgia pledged to join the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. By regional languages, the Georgians meant the languages of the ethnic minorities living compactly in their territory; later, however, the Council of Europe stopped short of recognizing Mingrelian and Svan as regional languages, which led to talk about raising their status.

It should be said that both languages are an important element of Georgia's ethnographic heritage and a matter of national pride (and, to a certain extent, a source of Georgian nationalism).

Mingrelian Konstantin Gamsakhurdia (father of the first president of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia) is one of the most prominent nationalist writers; the Mingrelians are fond of saying that they are "the most pure-bred Georgians" among the nationalities of Georgia and "direct descendants of the Colchians" (the most ancient of the Georgian tribes).

C o n c l u s i o n

During the period of its restored independence, Georgian nationalism has changed its makeup and opponents several times. Nationalist rhetoric, however, remains at the center of the Georgian political discourse and is exploited, with varying success, by all manner of forces.

Confronted with globalization, a very real threat to this small country's national specifics, Georgian nationalism today is very different from its predominantly ethnic predecessor of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which emerged among the rubble of the Union state.

Georgian nationalists and defenders of Georgian traditions are accused of fanning anti-Western sentiments; they are described as the enemies of Georgia's integration into the European and Euroatlantic structures. It should be said, however, that influential political opponents of the country's integration into the international structures are few and far between.

The nationalists reciprocate by accusing the pro-Western liberals of corrupting the idea of Georgia drawing closer to the West by denying the country's national values.

⁸ Quoted from: "How Stalin was Forged," *Tabula*, 15-21 March, 2010, p. 41.

The first McDonald's restaurant in Georgia illustrates the struggle between the Georgian nationalists and the globalists. Back in Eduard Shevardnadze's time, there were plans to build it in the very center of the Georgian capital; one of the parliamentarians organized a protest rally to prevent its appearance next to the monument to Shota Rustaveli, a Georgian poet of the 12th century of whom the nation is rightly proud. Later passions subsided, while McDonald's, in no way imposing on the monument to the great Georgian poet, has found its niche among the eateries based on traditional Georgian cuisine.

Today, Georgian nationalism is undergoing a crisis; it has lost its bearings and is looking for a new image and new ideas. A new Georgian idea is at the top of Georgia's political agenda; today, however, it is much more important to decide what kind of state the Georgians need.

GEO-ECONOMICS

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**ON THE INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH MANAGEMENT
IN THE POST-COMMUNIST CAPITALIST COUNTRIES**

A b s t r a c t

The purpose of managing economic growth in post-communist capitalist countries is not only to achieve higher growth rates, but also to raise the efficiency and quality of this process in the interests of society as a whole. This entails creating an institutional infrastructure that reduces transactional outlays and creates stimuli for sustainable economic development. The efficiency of economic growth ultimately depends on the economic institutions that function and on how effectively and appropriately they meet the development trends of the national economy, and also on the degree of democrati-

zation of society. This article defines the place of political and economic institutions in raising the efficiency of economic growth. It focuses attention on specific mechanisms of economic growth management that form the foundation of the institutional infrastructure. It also identifies the objective difficulties and unresolved problems of economic institutionalization in post-communist capitalist countries that are related in particular to the violation of property rights, institutional traps, the phenomena of the so-called necroeconomy and zombie economy, and the inability to fully realize comparative advantages.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Economic growth management has been studied in sufficient depth. It boasts a wealth of theories and models. However, economic growth management continues to attract both scientific and

practical interest. The problem is becoming more urgent due to the global recession that has inflicted the world economy recently.

In democratic societies, economic growth is associated both with a liberal economic system, in which free markets interact, and with competitive pressure on the innovation and investment behavior of the economic entities. However, economic prosperity is not achieved by democracy alone.¹ The market economy is by and large a rather indefinite phenomenon, which is why it must be regulated in order to raise the efficiency of economic development. This is particularly important in the case of long-run economic growth, since the market mainly solves tactical tasks (it is the best way to distribute production resources at any particular moment in time), but has little to offer when choosing strategic vectors of national economic development.

Recently, long-run economic growth management has become increasingly related to institutionalism, which organizes and regulates economic development and helps to reduce transactional outlays and form stimuli that influence the innovation and investment processes.² The institutional approach to economic growth management forms the foundation of contemporary endogenous models³ that look for internal mechanisms capable of generating additional economic growth. The efficiency of long-run economic growth ultimately depends on the economic institutions that function and how effectively and appropriately they meet the development trends of the national economy, and on the degree of democratization of society. In other words, the rates of economic growth and its quality are determined by how efficiently the economy is organized and how its development is managed.

Institutional ideas about how to maintain and manage economic growth are important today in the context of the marked economic slump, including in post-communist capitalist countries,⁴ which have borne the greatest brunt of the crisis.⁵ This article examines the formation of an institutional infrastructure of economic growth management.

The Methodological Foundation of an Institutional Infrastructure of Economic Growth Management

The studies carried out in recent years have been placing the main accent on a relative analysis of the differences in per capita income in different countries, whereby researchers resort to a large

¹ Several major studies are devoted to this rather complex problem, among which the following work can be singled out in particular: D. Acemoglu, J.A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006.

² The general problems of economic institutionalism and its development prospects in the context of post-communist transformation are examined, for example, in: O. Inshakov, D. Frolova, "Evolutsionnaia perspektiva ekonomicheskogo institutsionalizma," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 9, 2010, pp. 63-77.

³ Contemporary economic growth management models are based on an empirical analysis of the influence of various factors (institutional, political, resource, technological, international, etc.) using quantitative methods, in particular econometric, which make it possible to establish the vector and degree of the influence of each of the above-mentioned factors on economic growth. The main determinants of economic growth are defined on the basis of this analysis directly from the model, that is, economic growth is regarded as endogenous.

⁴ Post-communist capitalist countries imply those East European countries which, during more than two decades of market reforms, have not succeeded in coming up to the established European standards (see: V. Papava, T. Beridze, *Ocherki politicheskoi ekonomii postkommunisticheskogo kapitalizma*, Delo i Servis, Moscow, 2005; V. Papava, "Economic Transition to European or Post-Communist Capitalism?" *European Association for Comparative Economic Studies (EACES) Working Papers*, No. 1, March 2006, available at [<http://www.eaces.net/news/WP-1-06.pdf>]).

⁵ See: V. Papava, "Finansovyy krizis i postkommunisticheskiy kapitalizm," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 8, 2009, pp. 89-95.

amount of empirical data to explain this phenomenon. Particular emphasis is being placed on the role of institutions and governance,⁶ which is described using such indicators as rule of law, level of corruption, bureaucratic competence, degree of democratization, civil freedoms, governance efficiency, political instability, government accountability, etc.

In present-day conditions, institutions and governance are interpreted as the most important determinants of long-run economic growth. It is thought that differences in institutional infrastructure are the fundamental reason for the differences in standard of living among countries.⁷ Experts are discussing which institutional conditions are necessary for economic growth, what role the government plays in its management, how economic growth should be maintained and accelerated, how institutions and governance influence long-run economic growth, and how specific mechanisms should be elaborated for managing it.⁸ An analysis of existing viewpoints confirms the relation between economic growth and the institutional infrastructure.⁹

The discussion about the role of the institutional infrastructure in economic growth management essentially boils down to the following.

Economic institutions make use of certain regulations to determine the economic stimuli and vectors of the management process, to influence the distribution of production resources and investments, and to organize production. The institutional infrastructure of economic growth management varies greatly from country to country. This is because the emergence of economic institutions is a matter of social choice.¹⁰ Different social strata gain benefits from different economic institutions and so a conflict of interests arises between social groups during the distribution of resources. Economic institutions form the distribution of resources and economic phenomena. Economic growth is the main result of the functioning of the national economy.

What is meant by a “good economic institution”? Is it an institution that generates economic growth? This definition of a “good economic institution” is criticized in several fundamental works on the theory of contemporary economic growth.¹¹ The thing is that economic institutions are formed by the government in the interests of certain social groups. The government, in turn, is determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources in society. Political institutions de jure create the government, while the groups that have large resources de facto form the government. Political institutions, by nature, are exogenous determinants, since they are brought in from the outside and can change under the influence of external circumstances and conditions, social conflicts, culture, ideology, and so on. Economic institutions, on the contrary, are endogenous determinants that are specified by society or a segment of it, that is, they are the result of social collective choice.¹²

Political institutions are the basis for creating “good economic institutions.” The distribution of political preferences is important for economic institutions, while the distribution of economic preferences contributes to economic growth. Whereby property rights, an institutional component, play the most important role. “Good economic institutions” are based on wide-scale property rights, since they stimulate macroeconomic stability, economic activity, the effective distribution of resources, innovation and investment processes, and industrialization, which is particularly important in the fi-

⁶ See, for example: J. Pierre, B.G. Peters, *Governance, Politics and the State*, Macmillan Press LTD, Houndmills, 2000.

⁷ See: A. Rasanani, S. Searpetta, P. Hemmings, “Economic Growth: The Role of Policies and Institutions,” Panel Data Evidence from OECD Countries, *OECD Economics Department Working Paper*, No. 283, 2001, SSRN, available at [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=265091 <http://www.oecd.org/eco/eco/>].

⁸ See: D. Acemoglu, S. Jonson S., J. Robinson, “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,” *NBER Working Paper* 10481, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2004.

⁹ See, in particular: W.J. Henisz, “The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth,” *Economics and Politics*, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2000, pp. 1-31.

¹⁰ For more on the emergence of institutions, see: V. Tambovtsev, “Vozniknovenie institutov: metodologo-individualisticheskiy podkhod,” *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 11, 2010, pp. 83-96.

¹¹ See: D. Acemoglu, S. Jonson, J. Robinson, op. cit.

¹² See: Ibidem.

nal analysis for long-run economic growth. In other words, property rights can be regarded as the *causal (underlying) mechanism* of the influence of economic institutions on long-run economic growth. So “good economic institutions” should primarily protect property rights.

According to the latest institutional theory of economic growth, the creation of “good economic institutions” is related to the following.

- First, political institutions are needed that protect property rights and limit and control the government.
- Second, the number of citizens with extensive investment and innovation opportunities should be increased.
- Third, the property income of the ruling elite should be limited.
- Fourth, institutional reform is needed that will ensure the creation of “good economic institutions.”

In other words, economic institutions that increase the efficiency of economic growth will emerge when political institutions distribute their power keeping in mind the interests of the greater part of civil society, when political institutions limit and control their power, and when the government has relatively limited property income. A direct link can be traced among political institutions, economic institutions, economic activity (innovation and investment processes), and economic growth.¹³

In this way, the rates of economic growth, its efficiency, and its quality depend on how the economy is organized and how its development is managed, which economic institutions are functioning, and how they protect property rights. Long-run economic growth can be regarded as a function of “good economic institutions” that create stimuli for effective development.

It should be noted that the concept “good economic institutions” is relative. One and the same set of economic institutions might be satisfactory at one period in time and unsatisfactory at another, acceptable for one country and unacceptable for another. Relatively effective management of economic growth at a specific period in time might eventually become ineffective due to technological or market changes. One and the same set of economic institutions might have a very different effect on economic growth in different countries and at different periods of time. Consequently, we must weigh up the pros and cons of each specific institutional infrastructure of economic growth management.

While examining the role of the institutional infrastructure in economic growth management, the literature often criticizes traditional neoclassical theories and models.¹⁴ It is noted that they are not capable of fully explaining long-run economic growth, since the differences in per capita income are explained by the differences in production factors and in the level of physical capital accumulation in particular.

Traditional neoclassical models of economic growth try to show that the standard of living between the developed and developing countries will eventually converge, since these models regard capital formation as the main factor of economic growth. But there is not yet enough evidence to prove this process. The conception of convergence of standards of living can only be justified in certain conditions, that is, the matter concerns only provisional convergence. There is a connection between economic growth rates and initial development conditions. But the difference between countries in terms of standard of living is usually the result of an ineffective institutional infrastructure and inadequate political decisions, that is, a neoclassical traditional approach is clearly insufficient for explaining long-run economic growth.

By giving the political factor ever greater significance, later expanded versions of the neoclassical model somewhat downgraded the hypothesis about the exogenous nature of the innovation and

¹³ See: Ibidem.

¹⁴ See: Ibidem.

investment processes. These models accept political influence in the short and medium term. Moreover, some of the neoclassical models make it possible to assess the dependence of the efficiency of economic growth on the institutional infrastructure. They even talk of how political decisions can have an effect on the rates and quality of long-run economic growth. They also postulate that production requires not only targeted investments in physical capital, but also investments in human capital. Economic growth models become even more endogenous with the conception of broad capital, in the sense that economic growth rates depend on innovation and investment decisions that are made under the influence of economic institutions and politics.

An attempt is made with the help of the latest endogenous models of economic growth to explain why and how technological changes occur. Technology becomes endogenous, in contrast to models of neoclassical economic growth where technology is regarded as an exogenous factor. In so doing, the role of human capital as a catalyst of economic growth is singled out in particular, while the consequences of investments in human capital are discussed as a source of technological changes.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that political and economic institutions are the main determinants of long-run economic growth: the better the institutions, the higher the rates of economic growth and its quality. Some studies attempt to establish a correlation among the existing political and economic institutions, economic activity (innovation and investment processes), and economic growth. The results obtained show that economic growth greatly depends on the quality of the institutional infrastructure.

For example, well-known British economist Paul Hare examines the universal principles for creating institutional infrastructure and governance, as well as the possibility of adapting them to the conditions of specific countries.¹⁵ In his works, he presents convincing proof of the influence of the institutional environment and governance on economic growth and shows how a country's characteristics can impede or accelerate economic growth, and how institutions and governance influence the prospects for economic growth. In his opinion, the requirements of long-run economic growth can be summed up in five points:

- first, good government, with secure political conditions;
- second, credible macroeconomic stability;
- third, savings and investments high enough to maintain long-run economic growth;
- fourth, openness to the world economy;
- and fifth, the discipline of external engagement.

In so doing, this growth model needs to be underpinned by two main elements of democracy: protection of property rights and accountability of government. The author claims that any country that performs these theoretical management principles will always achieve high rates of economic growth and raise its quality.

So institutions (both political and economic) and governance are viewed as the fundamental determinants for explaining the differences in economic growth among countries. Inefficient economic institutions are related to political institutions that determine the choice of economic institutions depending on their benefit to the government. So today's explanation of the differences in economic growth and standards of living among countries should be based on an analysis of the structure of the country's government and the nature of its economic institutions.

As we know, in the context of developed democracy, the creation of suitable economic institutions is the result of political choice, which in turn is regarded as a market process. So the formation

¹⁵ See, for example: P. Hare, *The Political Economy of Growth and Governance*, Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, 2007, available at [http://www.case-research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/13866896_sa337.pdf].

of an adequate set of economic institutions is tied in with competition.¹⁶ Different economic institutions compete among each other, which leads to fundamental interaction, whereby the policy of each institution depends on the citizens supporting it, and citizens' choice of a particular institution depends on the policy of all the institutions.

In post-communist capitalist countries, the prospect of both achieving higher economic growth rates and raising its efficiency and quality largely depends on creating an adequate institutional infrastructure of economic growth management. This will help to realize comparative advantages more fully, on the one hand, and raise the interest of international capital in investing in the economy of these countries, on the other. Based on world experience, institutional reform of the political system can lead to the creation of more suitable and efficient economic institutions that best organize the economy and manage its development, which will ultimately promote long-run economic growth. "Good economic institutions," in turn, should be aimed at creating an institutional infrastructure of economic growth management based on a synthesis of different mechanisms.

Economic Growth Management Mechanisms

In recent years, scientific research has been studying the possibility of generating economic growth using different management mechanisms and a variety of empirical evidence of this has been presented.¹⁷ Econometric methods are being used to verify the main theoretical provisions regarding economic growth management and to assess how effective they are.¹⁸ Attempts are being made to establish bi-variant correlation and multi-variant causal regression links between specific regulation mechanisms and economic growth. Whereby during this research, management mechanisms are interpreted as the determinants of economic growth performance.

The results of the studies carried out show how important such vectors as macroeconomic management (monetary and fiscal), management of financial systems (innovation and investment processes), management of the economic activity of businesses, regional management, microeconomic management, and so on are for economic growth. The management of economic growth in each of these vectors is carried out by means of a corresponding policy. Whereby the *causal* correlation between different management mechanisms and economic growth is brought about by means of physical and human capital formation, which is confirmed by econometric analysis.

Macroeconomic management and economic growth. Traditional macroeconomic management oriented toward stability creates general favorable conditions for the development of the national economy. The literature covers this economic growth management mechanism in great depth. There is convincing empirical confirmation of the hypothesis that interrelated monetary and fiscal policy has an impact on economic growth. Taxes are needed to support government spending, but they distort the stimuli, lower the efficiency of resource distribution and, consequently, decrease economic growth. Distorted taxes can have a negative impact on the innovation and investment decisions

¹⁶ See: A. Caplin, B. Nalebuff, "Competition among Institutions," *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 72, Issue 2, 1997, pp. 306-342.

¹⁷ See: G. Nicoletti, S. Scarpetta, "Regulation, Productivity and Growth: OECD Evidence," *Policy Research Working Paper* 2944, OECD Economics Department, The World Bank, Human Development Network, Washington, D.C., 2003, available at [http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/03/07/000094946_03012304282753/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf]

¹⁸ See: H. Jalilian, C. Kirkpatrick, D. Parker, "The Impact of Regulation on Economic Growth in Developing Countries: A Cross-Country Analysis," 2006, available at [<https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/bitstream/1826/1455/1/Impact%20of%20regulation-Economic%20growth-March06.pdf>].

of economic entities, on how well the national economy's production and technological potential is used, and ultimately on macroeconomic equilibrium.¹⁹

However, the existing macroeconomic theories and models do not make it easy to manage long-run economic growth. As the experience of different countries shows, including post-communist capitalist countries, despite government efforts, macroeconomic management does not always ensure stable economic growth rates and achievement of the desired standard of living. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that macroeconomic management does not fully take into account the impact of other key factors, which will be discussed below.

Regulation of financial systems and economic growth. Empirical studies confirm the importance of financial systems for economic growth, the impact of which is manifested through innovation and investment processes that promote capital formation and raise the efficiency of its use under the influence of technological progress. A strict correlation has been proven among the degree to which financial systems are developed, the rates at which physical capital is formed, and economic growth,²⁰ as well as between innovation and investment processes and the quality of economic growth.²¹

The rate of physical capital formation (which is usually determined as the share in investments in GDP) is one of the most important factors of economic growth. But an increase in investments only generates economic growth up to a certain point in time. Then stability sets in, whereby gross investments are only enough to cover the physical outflow of capital. The expanded neoclassical model adds human capital to physical capital, which improves the model's reliability and increases its legitimacy. In so doing, the role of human capital is tantamount to the role of physical capital, since its formation is associated with growth acceleration and movement toward new stability.

Investments in human capital, in particular spending on education and training sessions, play a significant role in economic growth. Technological progress closely correlates with education, since education can not only promote an increase in the qualifications and skills of the workforce, but also have an influence on the innovation processes. In terms of human capital, stable economic growth rates are explained by knowledge externalities with which technological progress is associated. The latest endogenous models link the financial system to economic growth through investments in education and show that the social and economic consequences of raising the overall level of education are rather high.

Regulation of the economic activity of businesses and economic growth. The ambiguous nature of the business environment is a serious threat to economic growth.²² Management of the economic activity of businesses is associated with administrative and bureaucratic procedures for registering newly established enterprises. In many countries, these procedures are too complicated (they require passing through a multitude of stages and applying to all kinds of different agencies), which impedes the population's economic activity. Small and medium businesses are particularly adversely affected by the time it takes to get through these procedures and the corruption they entail. So simplifying the registration of new enterprises and providing them with access to the market has a significant impact on the economic activity of businesses and their integration into the world economy, which undoubtedly has an effect on economic growth.²³

Regulation of international trade and economic growth. Trade efficiency is associated with comparative advantages, the use of which determines a country's place in the world economy and

¹⁹ See, in particular: Iu. Ananiashvili, V. Papava, "Modeli otsenki vliianiia nalogov na rezultaty ekonomicheskoi deiatelnosti," *Ekonomika. Nalogi. Pravo*, No. 2, 2010, pp. 67-79; idem, *Nalogi i makroekonomicheskoe ravnovesie: Laffero-Keynsianskiy sintez*, CA&CC Press, Stockholm, 2010.

²⁰ See: A. De Serres, S. Kobayakawa, T. Sløk, L. Vartia, "Regulation of Financial Systems and Economic Growth," *OECD Working Papers*, No. 506, 2006, available at [<http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/5191xvc56nf6.pdf?expires=1294241983&id=0000&accname=guest&checksum=93E37D4AA71F60415E89D7A5A0BC993>].

²¹ See: *Innovatsii i ekonomicheskii rost*, ed. by K. Mikulskiy, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2002.

²² See, for example: V. Papava, M. Tokmazishvili, "Neconomic Foundations and the Development of Business in Post-Revolution Georgia," *The Caucasus & Globalization*, Vol. 1 (4), 2007, pp. 84-95.

²³ See, S. Djankov, S. McLiesh, R. Ramalho, *Regulation and Growth*, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2006.

presupposes additional trade gains generated by scale effects. International trade could be endogenous to economic growth if it is the result of a trade policy that reflects restriction in the form of various trade barriers. We are well aware of the ambitious connection between trade policy and economic growth in the European Union (EU) countries. But relatively small countries (for example, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova) are more willing than large countries to engage in international trade regardless of their trade policy. The intensity of international trade in these countries is more likely a result of the development of market processes than of a targeted trade policy.

International relations in the broader sense also have an impact on economic growth, which is associated with the international economic function of specific countries. It often happens that a particular country cannot fully realize its comparative advantages if its international relations both with direct neighbors and with states that have an influence on the world economy and politics do not promote this. It stands to reason that this has a negative effect on economic growth.

Management of R&D and economic growth. In recent years, the range of determinants of economic growth has expanded to include R&D. It is shown that economic growth is higher in countries where R&D is being actively carried out.²⁴ In developed countries, governments are not only involved in research directly, but also indirectly through tax stimuli and the protection of intellectual property rights in order to encourage the private sector to engage in R&D. This policy is leading to a constant rise in how much the private sector is spending on R&D, in the EU countries, for example.

However, government investments continue to make an important contribution to R&D. Whereby some government studies are not directly associated with economic growth since they serve defense, the energy industry, medicine, university research, etc. However, R&D that is not oriented toward business generates basic knowledge with high externality, which will have an impact on economic growth in the long run.

Regional management and economic growth. The scientific literature on the regional economy presents different viewpoints regarding the management of regional economic development, forecasts of the development of specific regions, and ways to make decisions and have an impact on optimizing the development of certain regions using economic tools, which will help to raise the efficiency of the development of the national economy as a whole.²⁵ However, the management of regional economic development is not directly associated with economic growth. The matter mainly concerns the development problems faced by specific regions and how positive examples of resolving specific regional problems can be applied to other regions. But in practice, successful development of even the most progressive regions, as subsystems of the national economy, does not guarantee efficient development of the entire system. The successful development of some regions may be cancelled out by the underdevelopment of other regions, resulting in no overall economic growth at all or it being insufficient. So a close connection must be established between the management of regional economic development and economic growth,²⁶ that is, the systemic effect of regional development must be identified and qualitatively assessed from the viewpoint of economic growth.

Environmental protection management and economic growth. The influence of environmental protection on economic growth can be manifested through various channels. There are two viewpoints on economic growth management keeping in mind negative environmental effects:

- first, the environment does not limit economic growth and the income it subsequently generates makes it possible to resolve any environmental problems that may arise;
- second, the environment does limit economic growth because production resources are spent on environmental protection.

²⁴ See: C.I. Jones, "R&D-based Models of Economic Growth," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 103, Issue 4, 1995, pp. 759-784.

²⁵ See, for example: A.G. Granberg, *Osnovy regional'noi ekonomiki*, TACIS, Moscow, 2001.

²⁶ See, for example: M. Achelashvili, K. Achelashvili, "Regional Management of Economic Growth," *The Caucasus & Globalization*, Vol. 1 (5), 2007, pp. 54-65.

Technological progress, which makes it possible today to create environmentally pure and reliable production units, plays an important role in resolving the conflict between economic growth and environmental protection. So it is expedient from the beginning to try and avoid or minimize the undesirable external effects and negative consequences of economic growth. A corresponding government policy could play an important role in this. But the existing models do not make it easy to show the influence of environmental factors on economic growth. Alternative models must be created that take into account both economic growth and the resolution of environmental problems.

Other management mechanisms and economic growth. The use of microeconomic economic growth management mechanisms proposes solving more specific practical issues, in particular by having an impact on production factors. Management of the market's ability to adapt to new technology and innovations, or management of the redistribution of resources (for example, the redistribution of financial capital to new markets, etc.) can play a specific role in economic growth. Economic growth can be viewed as a function of the population and per capita consumption, that is, economic growth management presumes control over both of these factors.

So each of the mechanisms examined above has a specific function in overall economic growth management and all the intercoordinated and complimentary mechanisms put together should form the basis of the institutional infrastructure of economic growth management. However, we do not yet have a single institutional infrastructure that unites the coordinated mechanisms of economic growth management.

Role of the Institutional Infrastructure of Economic Growth Management in Post-Communist Capitalist Countries (A Georgian Case Study)

In post-communist capitalist countries, long-run economic growth largely depends on the economic function each of these countries performs and the extent to which its comparative advantages are realized. Defining the economic function which is based on comparative advantages largely depends on the institutional infrastructure of economic management. This is a fundamental factor, particularly for relatively small countries, when defining national economic development strategy. However, the state of the economies of the post-communist capitalist countries as relatively new state formations makes this a difficult task to solve. Although it stands to reason that after the collapse of the socialist system, certain economic ties have been preserved and, what is more, integration relations are being established with the world community. However, the current degree of international integration of the post-communist capitalist countries into the world economy is clearly not sufficient for realizing their comparative advantages,²⁷ which naturally has an effect not so much on the rate of economic growth as on its efficiency and quality. So now it is becoming particularly important for the post-communist capitalist countries to interact among themselves in order to create conditions for long-run economic growth. A strategy toward economic partnership among these countries could become a foundation for further development, as well as ease the search for and, most important, the realization of comparative advantages. A good case in point are the projects to create regional clusters in the Central Caucasus,²⁸ the purpose of which is to raise the competitiveness of this region's countries in terms of long-run economic growth.

²⁷ For example, the prospects for realizing comparative advantages and integration of the Central Caucasian countries into the world economy are examined in the following monograph: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, *Tsentral'niy Kavkaz: istoria, politika, ekonomika*, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2006, pp. 117-114.

²⁸ See: *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.

Resolving the problem of economic growth in post-communist capitalist countries also requires reinforcing the private property institution, which is extremely important in terms of liberalizing the economy and raising long-run economic growth rates. In some of these countries, more or less contemporary institutions that ensure the protection of property rights and limit corruption have already formed. But in many countries, property rights are frequently violated, whereby every time the redistribution of property is carried out in favor of the newly formed ruling elite. Drawing up liberal laws capable of forming and developing a market environment should become the basis for reinforcing the institution of private property.

Post-communist capitalist countries also have the problem of so-called institutional traps, which imply the stable functioning of inefficient institutions.²⁹ Institutional traps are the unforeseen result of inadequate economic policy. The emergence of institutional traps and, most important, their stable functioning is extremely detrimental when carrying out reforms, since it slows them down and makes them ineffective. Extrication from institutional traps often presumes fundamental and extensive organizational changes.³⁰

In so doing, mechanisms might eventually spontaneously form in the adapted economic system that help the economy to extricate itself from institutional traps. However, if the market structure is deficient, the economic system might begin to move in an inefficient direction and continue this movement until a critical phase in its development begins. A classical example of this is the development and collapse of the command-administrative economy.³¹ Whereby the inability of governments to find a way out of institutional traps could become a reason for economic crises not only in the post-communist capitalist countries, but also in developed countries. This is shown in particular by the global financial and economic crisis that has been unfolding in recent years.

When carrying out institutional changes in the post-communist capitalist countries, institutional traps must be forecast and avoided as much as possible by means of corresponding economic policy. In order to prevent institutional traps from becoming a permanent feature, timely dismantling of inefficient institutions should be planned from the very beginning. For this purpose, diversity must be maintained in institutional forms, since in post-communist capitalist countries it is not always clear what role a particular institution plays in achieving institutional equilibrium and how effective a particular institution will be in the long run.³² The more flexible the institutional infrastructure, the more opportunities there are for getting out of institutional traps. In so doing, it should be kept in mind that institutions that are efficient in some post-communist capitalist countries are not always capable of efficiently functioning in others.

In this context, post-communist transformation is accompanied by the emergence of several specific problems, one of which is a necroeconomy (dead economy).³³ This phenomenon is associated with the manufacture of uncompetitive products, for which there is essentially no market due to the low quality and high costs. The necroeconomy formed on the material and technical foundation of the command-administrative economy and continues to function today. The key to finally resolving this problem is seen in the evolutionary theory of change.³⁴

A necroeconomy serves the interests of certain social groups that are interested in its existence and maintenance. It goes without saying that it has a negative effect on the level and quality of eco-

²⁹ See: V.M. Polterovich, "Institutsionalnye lovushki i ekonomicheskie reformy," *Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody*, Vol. 35, Issue 2, 1999, pp. 3-20.

³⁰ See: E.V. Balatskiy, "Funksionalnye svoistva institutsionalnykh lovushek," *Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2002, pp. 54-72.

³¹ See, V.M. Polterovich, op. cit.

³² See: Ibidem.

³³ See: V. Papava, "Nekroekonomika—fenomen postkommunisticheskogo perekhodnogo perioda," *Obshchestvo i ekonomika*, No. 5, 2001, pp. 22-30; V. Papava, *Necroeconomics. The Political Economy of Post-Communist Capitalism (Lessons from Georgia)*, Universe, New York, 2005.

³⁴ See: Ibidem.

conomic growth. So continuing to maintain inefficient enterprises means cancelling the prospects for efficient development of the national economy as a whole. A necroeconomy can only be destroyed by carrying out corresponding institutional reforms, which is primarily associated with resorting to bankruptcy legislation. However, eliminating a necroeconomy must be accompanied by forming a stable macroeconomic environment for the newly created progressive companies.

In recent years, the global financial and economic crisis has been leading to the development of so-called zombie economies,³⁵ which have become widespread not only in developed, but also in developing countries.³⁶ The zombie economy phenomenon implies that the government supports essentially bankrupt enterprises through the banking system. This results in the creation of a network of zombie banks and zombie enterprises which form the basis of a zombie economy. Zombification of the economy is particularly dangerous for the post-communist capitalist countries, since it means the merging of both the zombie economy and the necroeconomy.³⁷ Zombification of the necroeconomy in the post-communist capitalist countries could lead to more serious consequences than in developed countries since it aggravates crisis manifestations, which will naturally have a negative effect on economic growth.³⁸ So both of these extremely undesirable phenomena of present-day economic reality should be taken into account when forming the institutional infrastructure of economic growth management in post-communist capitalist countries.

Eliminating the necroeconomy and zombie economy will make it possible to stimulate development and efficient economic growth. Specific management mechanisms are needed that will decrease the negative impact of the necroeconomy and the zombie economy on long-run economic growth. But this requires that the governing elite manifests the corresponding political will. Efficient bankruptcy laws are the only effective way to get rid of both the necroeconomy and the zombie economy.

Moreover, institutional reforms are often criticized for their forced and simplified approach,³⁹ which hampers the establishment of a market economy in post-communist capitalist countries. The thing is that new institutions, which are usually created under the pressure of authoritative international organizations and imitate the developed market standards of their Western originals, often turn out to be unacceptable in local conditions and can even have negative side effects in terms of economic growth. In particular, the IMF has been extremely stubborn about imposing a formal approach to institutional reforms on the post-communist countries, in particular in the tax sphere, which has not helped to accelerate market processes and has even hampered economic growth to a certain extent.⁴⁰

In Georgia, for example, no active efforts were made before the Rose Revolution to create an institutional infrastructure, although it was deemed necessary to form institutions that would stimu-

³⁵ The zombie economy phenomenon as such emerged at the beginning of the 1990s in Japan after the financial crisis (see, for example: A.G. Ahearne, N. Shinada, "Zombie Firms and Economic Stagnation in Japan," *International Economics and Economic Policy*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2005).

³⁶ See, for example: T. Hoshi, "Year of the Zombie," *Roubini Global Economics*, 21 January, 2009, available at [http://www.rgemonitor.com/asia-monitor/255220/year_of_the_zombie]; F. Poschmann, "Beware of Zombies," *Financial Post*, 26 January, 2009, available at [<http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpcomment/archive/2009/01/26/beware-of-zombies.aspx>]; J. Stepek, "How Zombie Companies Suck the Life from an Economy," *MoneyWeek*, 18 November, 2008, available at [<http://www.moneyweek.com/news-and-charts/economics/how-zombie-companies-suck-the-life-from-an-economy-14089.aspx>].

³⁷ See: V. Papava, "Problema zombirovaniia postkommunisticheskoi nekroekonomiki," *Vestnik instituta Kennana v Rossii*, Issue 15, Moscow, 2009, pp. 37-49.

³⁸ See: V. Papava, "Economy of the Post-Communist Capitalism under the Financial Crisis," *Studies in Economics and Finance*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2010, pp. 135-147.

³⁹ See: V. Papava, T. Beridze, *Ocherki politicheskoi ekonomii postkommunisticheskogo kapitalizma*, Delo i Servis, Moscow, 2005, p. 193.

⁴⁰ See, for example: V. Papava, "O nekotorykh oshibkakh Mezhdunarodnogo valiutnogo fonda v Gruzii," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 3, 2002, pp. 99-112.

late the development of a market economy.⁴¹ After the revolution, real institutional reforms began in state-building.⁴² For example, the legal foundations of economic development management were drawn up; institutions that control tax collection and tax discipline were formed; reform of the business environment was carried out; the bureaucratic procedures and registration regulations for new companies entering the market were simplified, and so on. These reforms were aimed at bringing down the barriers hindering economic business activity and stimulating the innovation and investment processes in the country. It resulted in a rise in Georgia's competitiveness on the international arena, which made it easier for the country to integrate into the world economy. This brought about a noticeable rise in economic growth rates up until the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008 and before the beginning of the global recession in the world economy.⁴³ However, despite the relatively high economic growth rates, many mistakes were made in reforming post-revolutionary Georgia,⁴⁴ which have done nothing to raise the country's standard of living.

I n L i e u o f a C o n c l u s i o n

The creation of an efficient institutional infrastructure of economic growth management in post-communist capitalist countries is a long and often contradictory process, aggravated by the problems encountered during the transition to a market economy and the recent economic crisis. The main attention of the reformative governments of these countries should be focused on forming an adequate institutional infrastructure that ensures the necessary political and practical conditions for long-run economic growth. The ruling elites should clearly understand the role of political and economic institutions in contemporary development and have a responsible attitude toward their creation, particularly when carrying out reforms.

Introducing a new institutional infrastructure of economic growth management requires a certain amount of adaptation time. During institutional innovations, which affect the interests of different social groups, plans for so-called intermediate institutions should be drawn up. Whereby state paternalism should not predominate when forming the institutional infrastructure, as is the case in many post-communist capitalist countries, but rather a synthesis of market and institutional approaches to management. It is also important that the institutional infrastructure of economic growth management meet the contemporary trends in national and global economic development.

The interdependence of the different economic institutions among themselves, the certain amount of inertia in their development and, consequently, the likelihood of institutional conflicts arising should also be kept in mind. This will make it possible to gain a better understanding of the reasons for economic crises and forecast their consequences.

⁴¹ See: P. Leishvili, *Georgian Reforms in the "Institutional Trap,"* Aisi, Tbilisi, 2003 (in Georgian).

⁴² See: V. Papava, "Ob osnovnykh makroekonomicheskikh indikatorakh 'revoliutsii roz' v Gruzii," *Obshchestvo i ekonomika*, Nos. 7-8, 2004, pp. 103-112.

⁴³ See: V. Papava, "Georgia's Economy: Post-Revolutionary Development and Post-War Difficulties," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2009, pp. 199-213.

⁴⁴ See: V. Papava, "'Rozovye' oshibki MVF i Vsemirnogo banka v Gruzii," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 3, 2009, pp. 143-152; V. Papava, "Anatomical Pathology of Georgia's Rose Revolution," *Current Politics and Economics of the Caucasus Region*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 1-18.

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ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL FOR REALIZING NATIONAL INTERESTS

A b s t r a c t

This article studies economic diplomacy as one of the most important instruments by which states realize their national interests. Several aspects of Azerbaijan's foreign economic policy are also analyzed from this perspective. Summing up the positive ex-

perience of economic diplomacy in several countries, it reveals the objectives and tasks of contemporary diplomatic activity as a whole, as well as its close contingency with the country's multilevel system of economic interests in the global economic expanse.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Diplomacy like politics is the art of the possible, that is, the ability to construct arguments and implement practical measures in a way that yields maximum payoff. But the payoff in this case can only be expressed in the realization of interests, be they tactical or strategic, short-term or long-term, local or systemic. In other words, diplomacy is motivated by interests, while economic diplomacy, correspondingly, by economic interests. Since it is precisely these interests that form the framework within which contemporary international relations are structured, economic diplomacy is becoming particularly pertinent in carrying out research studies and elaborating rational policy.

The global world is stretching the boundaries of the possible in every direction, particularly in the economy, and it is vital to find out how the "art of the possible" is taking advantage of this fact. Will it make it possible for us to construct a thrifty, volatile, investment, and economic component of the country's foreign relations? In this respect, certain aspects of Azerbaijan's foreign economic policy are extremely interesting, since it is aimed at protecting the country's political sovereignty and economic independence while continuing its course toward integration.

Characteristics of Economic Diplomacy in Globalization Conditions

If the economic component is removed from diplomacy, only its perfunctory and conventional side will be left, which, in turn, will lose all meaning since it will be unable to resolve any of the urgent problems of international relations, including conflict situations. Guy Carron de la Carrière, a well-known researcher of this problem, says that as the economies of certain countries become more open to the outside world and international division of labor intensifies, the role of economic diplomacy will inevitably grow, replacing the traditional, primarily forceful, ways of settling interstate conflicts.¹

Nevertheless, economic diplomacy requires special skills and capabilities from the people who engage in it. Priorities must first be identified that proceed from criteria established by national interests. In this respect, both the economic and the political and socio-cultural contexts of common interests are very important. This is achieved by creating a semantic field that is common for all the entities participating in coordinated interaction. This common field of interaction emerges under the influence of the common goals of its participants, without which their single economic motivation loses its bearing and they no longer have a basis for coordinating their action in the global expanse.

This primarily requires precise designation of the macro-objective parameters of national interests within the framework of which economic entities can interact in terms of resource, factor, and institutional values, as well as find an established market, a steady source of income, and, finally, state and legal guarantees of right protection. The country's economic whole serves as the target of national economic interests, which is primarily developed by the efforts of domestic manufacturers and is supported in their interests by the state's economic and social policy. Only with this kind of mechanism of interaction is it possible to ensure economic self-development based on an identified economic model, which is the highest and natural goal of the national economy. However, interests aimed at developing both the whole and the parts of the national economy in the contemporary world cannot be realized by means of unilateral protectionism and require comprehensive economic cooperation on the international arena.

By reinforcing the instruments of traditional diplomatic work with economic factors, economic diplomacy promotes a more profitable solution to international problems. Today the economy is ahead of politics and is achieving the set goals by means of successful competition rather than wars and conquests in order to acquire as large a share as possible of the world GDP. Some states, however, still persist in pursuing a belligerent and aggressive policy, but this approach is less effective than advancing capital, goods, or services into the territory of other countries.

At the beginning of the 21st century, ideological contradictions in relations among states have been receding into the background, while the role of the economic component in foreign policy is increasingly rising. Diplomacy is being made economic by countries taking more active part in the international division of labor and by greater integration of their national economies in the world economy in the context of globalization.²

In the contemporary world, economic diplomacy is one of the most effective ways to realize national economic interests. We can only agree with the opinion that "economic diplomacy" implies diplomatic efforts concentrated on confirming the country's economic interests at the international

¹ See: G. Carron de la Carrière, *Ekonomicheskaja diplomatija. Diplomati i rynek*, Rosspen, Moscow, 2003, p. 27 (G. Carron de la Carrière, *La diplomatie économique—Le diplomate et le marché*, Economica, Paris, 1998).

² See: D. Degterev, *Ekonomicheskaja diplomatija zarubezhnykh gosudarstv v Zapadnoi Afrike*, dissertation of Ph.D. in Economics, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Moscow, 2008, 189 pages : 61 09-8/510.

level.³ In this respect, it is very important to use national competitive advantages, as well as specialization and cooperation of production to achieve the country's overall strategic and current interests. States, especially those that formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, are finding it easier to join the current and relatively balanced system of international economic interests, first, by virtue of their own economic opportunities and, second, by participating in specific regional and international organizations. These organizations serve not only as a source of funding, but also as a means of adaptation to the international economic environment. This environment is largely institutionalized today and joining it in efficient ways requires keeping the balance of forces among the competing global centers in mind. The main task of economic diplomacy is to achieve optimal, from the viewpoint of achieving national interests, focusing of the interests of these centers on the country's economic potential and geo-economic position. In other words, economic diplomacy is needed for realistically evaluating one's own opportunities and elaborating methods for handling the competitive advantages that are available. These are primarily factor advantages, among which raw material sources and production potential consequently come forward as interchangeable priorities for countries with a transition economy.

Economic diplomacy must be carried out with respect to all areas and vectors of international economic relations,⁴ since national economic interests reflect the reproduction process in which all the economic entities are involved. So it is legitimate to subdivide the diversity of economic diplomacy tasks into two levels of implementation—macro- and microeconomic. Whereas microeconomic diplomacy implies support of certain enterprises, the macroeconomic level covers questions of analytical elaboration and defense of the national position (interest) when resolving problems relating to integration of the country's economy into the world economy and is concentrated on the interaction among national economic systems.⁵ In this context, it is very important to, first, present economic diplomacy with scientifically substantiated, rather than imaginary objectives that could ultimately lead to irretrievable losses and, second, anticipate events that could pose threats to the realization of national economic interests from the outside.

Today, we can talk about the achievements of economic diplomacy from the viewpoint of finding a balance of interests that can be reached where the objectives of individual states or their economic integration intersect, and not from the perspective of pressure or discrimination. In this system each country follows its own interests, but they are only achieved to the extent that the country's internal potential and capabilities make this possible. Given that each country's production opportunities are limited, G. Haberler talked about how the extent they are taken advantage of depends on the efficiency of economic diplomacy.

In economic diplomacy, it is important to find factors that will yield the greatest payoff both today and tomorrow, in the short term and in the long term. At the time it acquired its independence, raw energy resources were that factor for Azerbaijan. The objective need for their maximum use was also understood. It was more difficult to decide how this should be achieved. And how to do it in such a way so as not to become unilaterally dependent in the future on the export of oil. Much also depended on evaluations of the oil factor from the political viewpoint, keeping in mind the balance of power in the region in the West-Iran-Russia triangle. Strategic calculations of "oil diplomacy" were compiled—a widely used concept that today covers not only international, but also domestic economic policy. Here it is appropriate to recall the terms "dollar diplomacy," "textile diplomacy," and others, which, being oriented toward the outside, were ultimately used to resolve the economic problems of the countries that pursued them. In this respect, economic diploma-

³ See: P. Baranai, N. Filini, "Sovremennaiia ekonomicheskaia diplomatiia," available at [<http://www.proza.ru/2010/10/30/706>].

⁴ See: D.A. Degterev, D.U. Musaev, "Diplomat, a takzhe 'economist, kommoivoiazher, reklamnyy agent'," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, Nos. 2-3, 2009, pp. 84-95.

⁵ See: *Ibidem*.

cy is the integral component of economic policy and, on the contrary, these two elements are inseparable in the structure of factors for realizing national interests. From this viewpoint, diplomacy, which is based on raw material advantages, including "oil diplomacy," looks extremely acceptable and is widely used.

It is a foregone conclusion that the oil factor occupies a predominant position in Azerbaijan's economy and foreign economic relations. It can be evaluated in different ways, but it is more pertinent to identify how it can be positioned in the interests of the nation. After all, every nation moves ahead using the factor advantages it has. So there is no point in complaining about "the resource curse." The main thing is to make the country's energy resources a national-communicative means for ensuring economic growth and citizen wellbeing rather than accepting them as natural-presupposed "givens."

Oil is a raw material, the production yield of which is generated in combination with the technology used. But history has seen to it that raw material sources are mainly concentrated in economically underdeveloped areas of the world, while technical-technological capabilities are found in the industrially developed countries. Consequently, the flow of raw material to the centers of its intensive use is an objective process. Accompanied by the reverse movement of goods often manufactured using this raw material, energy and industrial cycles appear to complement each other in today's international economic system. Countries that are able to carry out both of these cycles, thus developing the national economy, will naturally ensure the most favorable opportunities in economic and social development and in self-assertion in the widest geo-economic sense of this word. Self-assertion in the world economy is a necessary prerequisite of progress in all spheres in contemporary conditions, whereby "during international cooperation, the nation will either acquire the stimulus to develop or collapse, there is no third alternative."⁶

In this case, the stimulus to develop consists in prerequisites that ensure the country's self-assertion in the expanse of world economic cooperation. These are primarily natural-raw material and production prerequisites. Second, they are political and ideological indicators of predictable stability. However, the mental aspect and characteristics of the population in terms of how it perceives other people's life values and culture also play a significant role in the country's self-assertion in the international economy. The conducive factors should be widely exposed in the representative activity of diplomatic services that characterize the country's image and its propensity for cross-cultural cooperation, which plays an important role in establishing and developing business cooperation.

International Experience of Economic Diplomacy in the Vector of National Interests

The development of economic diplomacy and the ways it is carried out can be traced based on the example of different countries. They include both developed and developing states. Every country has its own approach to understanding economic interests and economic diplomacy. While some countries proceed from historical factors in the description of these interests and political-diplomatic methods of achieving them, others rely on ideological imperatives, while still others are aimed at pragmatics. This implies pragmatic goals of preserving or achieving leadership, protecting the coun-

⁶ *Natsionalnaia ekonomika*, ed. by Prof. P.V. Savchenko, Ekonomist, Moscow, 2005, p. 112.

try's sovereignty and territorial integrity, carrying out reforms, and ensuring socioeconomic well-being. The last alternative appears to be the most effective, where the main postulates of diplomacy, and foreign policy as a whole, are not dogmas of mythical grandeur or precepts advanced by theological imperatives, but an increase in national production and standard of living.

The people's real interests and the economic means for achieving them can be institutionalized in a civil society, as well as with the help of democratic regulations. In this way, prerequisites of sociopolitical stability in the country and national consent are acquired, and, in the end, the possibility of independently solving both internal political, economic, and social tasks and realizing national interests on the international arena. As a result, a compromising, rather than confrontational, view of the outside world is formed, while diplomacy acquires weightier arguments and is supported by public opinion. However, much here also depends on the country's geo-economic position, the tasks it puts forward on the world arena and, to a great extent, the nature of the political structures and people in power.

The view of the diplomatic traditions of several countries is interesting from this perspective. The U.S., as the largest entity of the world economy, is the leader of economic diplomacy today. There can be no arguing that Washington does indeed "determine the world's fate and the domestic and foreign policy of many countries" by means of economic methods, its role in international economic organizations, and assistance programs.⁷ U.S. economic diplomacy has had a significant impact on the creation of the trans-Atlantic community and global economy. According to *The Washington Post*, around 59% of Americans support this diplomacy, convinced that it is providing the U.S. economy and they themselves with real dividends.⁸ There can be no doubt that all the main achievements of American foreign policy rest on a solid economic foundation; and economic diplomacy has been very significant in creating this foundation. The financial-economic potential and role of American currency also help the U.S. to carry out economic diplomacy. The latest historical period shows that the U.S. dollar is indeed the "strategic offensive weapon" of the American civilization.⁹ As the basis of the international monetary system, the dollar has made it possible for the U.S. to maintain its troops abroad and participate in military action far beyond its borders.¹⁰

From time to time, economic diplomacy is an instrument for realizing imperial interests. In the 2000-x, this trend could be very clearly seen in Russia's policy toward its so-called Near Abroad. Academic arguments such as, empire-imperial expanse-imperial world-imperial economy-economic empire, are a case in point. "There is nothing bad for Russia either in the nation or in the empire; moreover, with them Russia will only survive, become stronger, and move ahead."¹¹ Admittedly, the author of this quote does not specify what this "ahead" implies, but it becomes understandable at a more specific level of politics, for example, in buying up enterprises and the energy-transportation infrastructure in exchange for their debts and in the use of the country's monopoly position in the energy sphere in favor of geopolitical interests.

Contemporary European diplomacy significantly differs from the previous example. This is primarily related to the existence of the great capabilities of the competitive economy of united Europe and the existence of production micro entities, advanced technology, and scientific-technical achievements in demand in the world markets. Predominating microeconomic diplomacy, which directly assists business and helps to strengthen its export advantages, also proceeds from this.

⁷ See: A. Plashchinskiy, "Ekonomicheskaiia diplomatia SSHA. Plan Marshala i doktrina Trumena kak elementy odnoi strategii," *Belarusian Journal of International Law and International Relations*, No. 4, 2003, available at [http://www.evolutio.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=908&Itemid=215].

⁸ Quoted from: A. Plashchinskiy, op. cit.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ See: *Ibidem*.

¹¹ Iu.M. Osipov, "Filosofiiia khoziaystva kak dostoiianie razmyshliaiushchego chelovechestva," *Filosofiiia khoziaystva*, Almanacs of the Center of Social Sciences and Economic Department of Moscow State University, No. 4, 2008, p. 21.

State subsidies are widely used for this purpose, information offices for foreign trade issues are being formed, and round tables with the participation of representatives of business circles and professional diplomats are being held in foreign countries. These events are aimed at drawing up a global strategy for advancing European business. For example, the Economic Department of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed a working group (Arbeitsstab) as a component of the general reforms, some of the tasks of which are to accompany trade delegations, support various regional business initiatives, and create an image of the country that would be attractive to investors.¹²

Rotating economic-diplomatic personnel with private businessmen has become widely practiced in France. Work experience with respect to foreign economic cooperation in leading French corporations (Renault, Cardin, Air France) is helping to develop a more profitable approach to realizing the country's economic interests abroad.¹³

European economic diplomacy can be called conservative in terms of the spirit of the methods it uses, but it is also sufficiently moderate from the viewpoint of its insignificant accents on aggressiveness. It is also stable and appealing to partners, since it does not have a lot of obvious political motivation.

Diplomacy of the economic link between the East and the West is characteristic of Turkey, which is being increasingly designated as the Middle Eastern tiger, outstripping the new industrial countries of the APR in terms of several macroeconomic indices. Its export-oriented and investment-attracting strategy and timely debut on the East European and Eurasian markets of the post-socialist countries have helped to turn Turkey into one of the 20 largest economies of the world. This country's effective economic diplomacy, along with the foreign political doctrine espousing "no problems with neighboring countries," is providing instructive experience on how to quickly react to the changing regional reality and making skilful use of it in national interests.

Azerbaijan's Experience in the Economic-Diplomatic Realization of National Interests

The Azerbaijan Republic also has a certain amount of experience in economic diplomacy, the current stage of which is related to restoring its state sovereignty and policy of national interest protection. The personal factor has played an important role in efficiently servicing these interests. It can play a decisive part in diplomacy and throughout political and social life as a whole. In the difficult conditions of acquiring independence, transition to market relations, the absence of institutional regulators, and military aggression, Azerbaijan found itself surrounded by sacramental problems. Only an experienced statesman with the ability to correctly evaluate the potential, the reality of the objectives, and the effect to be gained from each practical step toward their realization could comprehend these problems and find the only rational measures in domestic and foreign policy to resolve them. This person was president Heydar Aliiev, a politician and diplomat well informed about the situation in the country and about the sources of the threats coming from abroad.

¹² See: "Auswartiges Amt. Aauserwirts-chatsforderung der Bundesregierung," available at [<http://www.auswaertiges-amt/>], 18.07. 2000.

¹³ See: T.V. Zonova, "Ekonomicheskaiia diplomatiia," *Vneshneekonomicheskie sviazi*, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 14-16.

However, there were not many ways available for organizing both domestic life and the external situation around Azerbaijan. Oil was again the main means, but now the head of the sovereign state was managing it, which had never before been the case in Azerbaijan's more than 200-year history of colonial dependence. An exception was the short period between 1918 and 1920 after the collapse of the czarist regime in Russia, but the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic that formed at that time was destroyed by the Russian revolutionary advance into the territory where the empire had previously reigned. As early as that time, Azerbaijan occupied first place in the world in terms of oil production, and the Bolshevik leaders were particularly intent on seizing Baku. This resulted in the collapse of the ADR before it succeeded in putting its progressive undertakings into practice.

Another upheaval occurred in the changing world of the end of the 20th century—the collapse of the Soviet Union—and this time Azerbaijan's sovereignty proved real and recognized by the world community, but once more not without its problems. Azerbaijan again attracted the attention of the leading states, neighboring countries (apart from Turkey and Georgia) were jealous of its sovereignty, as before, made territorial demands, and waged war to divvy up its incontestable territory. It would seem that in this situation there can be no talk of a positive investment climate or foreign investments in offshore oil production without direct access to international transportation routes and, what is more, in a country squeezed between two of the largest oil nations—Russia and Iran. But it was able to achieve this by virtue of its well-considered diplomacy of mutual compromises and the creation of positive expectations. Moreover, a competitive environment was created around Azerbaijan oil, due to which the largest transnational companies and capital from the most diverse countries that seemed incompatible for economic cooperation (for example, the U.S. and Iran) were drawn into the very first contracts to develop the country's oil supplies.

Signing the Production Sharing Agreement on 20 September, 1994 with respect to the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil field was one of the greatest achievements of the overall economic strategy designating Azerbaijan's advance onto the world economic arena as one of its conspicuous entities. That is, the agreement aroused interest not only in Azerbaijan's resources, but also in its statehood. This was the first time such a thing had happened, and it became the unseen guarantor of international support of the country's legitimacy as a legal entity.

The oil aspect of Azerbaijan's economic diplomacy grew. In the summer of 2006, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline with a throughput capacity of 1.2 million barrels a day was officially opened in Ceyhan (Turkey). From the geo-economic viewpoint, the oil pipeline created a new situation in the extensive post-Soviet region, since this was the first case of transporting crude resources to foreign markets without passing through Russia. Moreover, the project was part of the conception about the need to diversify export routes of energy resources and stabilization of the world energy market. This was how an entirely different system of relations independent of the past attachments developed, of which oil strategy was only a part.

It stands to reason that Azerbaijan's economic diplomacy also includes other vectors of foreign economic diversification. For example, significant attention is being given to international transport projects, such as TRACECA, a West-East transport corridor going from Europe along the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia. The Nabucco project also looks ambitious, around which a real diplomatic war has unfolded.

Why do what would seem to be exclusively economic processes become part of intense diplomatic contradictions? The thing, in our opinion, is that the South Caucasian region and Central Asia contiguous to it are a target of not only geo-economic, but also geopolitical global demands. Here outmoded imperial and dynamic Euro-Atlantic interests, and perhaps in the future also the interests of the APR nations, are clashing.

In this situation, balanced, multivectoral, economic diplomacy is becoming particularly important for the long-term manifestation of national economic interests. It must be kept in mind that

possessing large oil and gas resources (Azerbaijan's potential hydrocarbon resources amount to 27 billion tons)¹⁴ and keeping in mind their higher level of liquidity in the world markets, the country's strategic economic development course is characterized by utilizing the absolute advantages in natural factors in order to modernize all the components of the economy and diversify and restructure the technological production base and create its competitive advantages. As a result, Azerbaijan has become a leading state in a region of substantial size and mega-economic significance (3/4 of the Southern Caucasus' GDP is produced in Azerbaijan).

New areas of direct manifestation of Azerbaijan's national economic interests have appeared in the Caspian basin, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Mediterranean region, and the European economic expanse. The main energy and transport corridors of Eurasia, which pass through the country along the West-East and North-South axes, have strengthened sovereignty and increased Azerbaijan's integration into the global economy. The adoption of economic-diplomatic decisions, based on the current reality, is leading to more independent steps, since the range of possibilities has widened. In our view, this is manifested in several vectors, particularly in resolving the question of Azerbaijan joining the WTO.

The negotiation process is continuing in this vector, including with the U.S., the European Union, Switzerland, Norway, and Japan. Many of the problems here are related to membership status in the organization, assistance in developing the non-oil sector of the country's economy, and diversification of production along the entire perimeter of the national economy.

Head of the EU Representative Office in Azerbaijan Roland Kobia believes that joining the WTO will have a strong impact on business in Azerbaijan, including on increasing GDP.¹⁵ But everyone knows that there are also difficulties involved, in particular with respect to the emergence of competitive pressure on the developing branches of end product manufacture.

Azerbaijan's economy overcame the consequences of the world financial crisis with relative ease. The International Monetary Fund recognized the anti-crisis policy of Azerbaijan's Central Bank as one of the most effective in the post-Soviet expanse.¹⁶ Of course, hydrocarbons form the basis of economic prosperity, but it should be noted that far from all countries with large energy resources have been able to recover from the crisis with ease. Azerbaijan has succeeded in doing this, and now the republic accounts for more than 80% of all the currency reserves of the South Caucasian region.¹⁷

All of these achievements are directly or indirectly related to the oil factor and economic oil diplomacy. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan faces a rather difficult transition to the diplomacy of a multi-branch and competitive economy. The thing is that the economic growth we are seeing today is to a significant extent the result of the interaction among technology, formal (market) and informal (adapted traditional) institutions, and international competitiveness. The country's success depends on whether this interaction is constant and fortifying, with respect to which a corresponding multi-factor flow sheet of economic growth is presented (see p. 62).

This flow sheet could also serve to elaborate a model of stage-by-stage use of resources for the purpose of national economic development. The first stage—the high share of raw material in the export product is leading to an increase in consumer goods and investments due to export earnings; the second stage—an increase in investments in production intended for internal consumption and the development of technology; the third stage—an increase in the manufacture of competitive products leading to an increase in the export of finished products. A smooth transition from the first to the second and third of these stages has ensured Azerbaijan tactical steps of


¹⁴ [http://www.ng.ru/energy/2008-06-10/20_azerbaijan.html].

¹⁵ See: Expert on Azerbaijan joining the WTO, available at [<http://news.day.az/economy/254629.html>].

¹⁶ See: A.V. Vlasov, "Azerbaidzhan—itogi 2010 goda," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 24 December, 2010, available at [http://www.ng.ru/cis/2010-12-24/6_azerbaijan2010.html].

¹⁷ See: *Ibidem*.

Figure



development accompanied by the economic-diplomatic measures necessary for the fuller realization of national interests.

C o n c l u s i o n

Knowledge of the fundamental principles and methods of economic diplomacy is pertinent not only for diplomats as such. The objectives, tasks, and instruments of economic diplomacy are important for all entities and functionaries of economic policy with its different aspects and vectors.

Using Azerbaijan's experience, it can be seen that the method for engaging in economic diplomacy is very closely intertwined with the understanding of national interests in their multifaceted manifestations. In so doing, it must be noted that only by acquiring diplomatic skills can a civil servant or participant in international economic relations protect his own and national interests.

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ENERGY RESOURCE TRANSPORTATION BY COUNTRIES WITH NO ACCESS TO THE OPEN SEA (An Azerbaijan Case Study)

A b s t r a c t

Azerbaijan is pursuing a targeted policy that envisages maintaining reliable transport corridors and diversification of hydrocarbon deliveries to the world markets. This article looks at the strategies and tactical steps Azerbaijan is taking to reach the above-mentioned goals.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

One hundred and fifty years ago, Azerbaijan was the first country in the world to begin producing oil on an industrial basis. After restoring its independence, the republic became one of the main Eurasian players in the energy sphere. But the fact that Azerbaijan has no direct access to the open sea means that relevant transportation infrastructure, mainly pipelines, must be built.

The main task of countries that do not have access to the open sea (including Azerbaijan) is to draw up a strategy that ensures reliable and stable delivery of energy resources to the world markets without any political or economic losses. This requires diversifying transport routes as much as possible, as well as creating transport corridors that are economically profitable and commercially appealing.

So one of the main tasks of Azerbaijan's energy policy has been to diversify its transport corridors. Time has shown that this strategy has been instrumental in carving out a substantial niche for the country in the world energy market.

1. Azerbaijan's Energy Policy as an Instrument of Balanced Foreign Policy

1.1. Russia's Influence in the Region and in Azerbaijan

After regaining its independence, Azerbaijan has had to deal with a whole slew of problems inherited from the Soviet Union, among which are the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, the economic slump accompanied by a sharp drop in GDP and hyperinflation, and political instability. However, Russia has retained a strong influence in the region and in 1992 declared the territory of the former Soviet Union its Near Abroad.

The situation was aggravated even more by the fact that Russia chose to support Armenia in the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During Ayaz Mutalibov's rule (1991-1992), Moscow's priorities with respect to Azerbaijan and Armenia were not yet clearly defined. However, in the fall of 1991, Mutalibov attempted to sign an oil contract with Western companies without Russia's participation, which complicated relations between the two countries.¹

During the night of 25-26 February, 1992, Armenian armed forces, with the support of the 366th motorized rifle division of the former Soviet army, carried out a massacre in the town of Khojali; more than 600 peaceful citizens were killed, several hundred were wounded and maimed, and several more hundred went missing.² On 6 March, 1992, Ayaz Mutalibov was forced to leave his post.

In June of the same year, Abulfaz Elchibei, who was known for his pan-Turkic views, became president of Azerbaijan, after which Russia began openly supporting Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.³ Elchibei was in power for only a year and was removed as the result of a revolt in Ganja organized in May 1993 by Colonel S. Huseinov⁴ after the Russian 104th air-borne division withdrew from the city on 24-25 May, 1993, leaving all its weapons to the participants in the uprising.⁵

Due to the situation that developed, Elchibei invited Heydar Aliiev, who was to replace retired I. Gambar as parliamentary speaker of the Azerbaijan Republic, to Baku. At the same time, President Elchibei left Baku and went to his home village of Keleki in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.

In August 1993, Elchibei's position as president was put to a vote of confidence at a national referendum and 97.5% of the country's citizens voted for his retirement. As a result of the election held on 3 October, 1993, Heydar Aliiev became the country's president.⁶

Despite the many difficulties, on 20 September, 1994, the Contract of the Century was signed in Baku, in which 13 oil companies from 8 countries of the world were represented. The agreement envisaged the development and production of oil at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli fields.

But the situation in the country remained unstable. After he became prime minister, S. Huseinov again raised a revolt, this time against Heydar Aliiev. In order to prevent another state coup, the president addressed the people on national television, accusing Russia of what was happening, and within a short time thousands of people formed a human shield around the president's palace; the coup was intercepted.⁷

1.2. The Contract of the Century

The Contract of the Century involving the offshore fields of Azeri and Chirag, and the deep-water part of Gunashli was signed on 20 September, 1994, for a term of 30 years. The following companies were the initial members of the consortium that participated in the signing ceremony: State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaijan) with a 20% share, British Petroleum (Great Britain)—17.127%, Amoco (U.S.)—17.01%, LUKoil (Russia)—10%, Pennzoil (U.S.)—9.82%, Unocal (U.S.)—9.52%, Statoil (Norway)—8.563%, McDermott International (U.S.)—2.45%, Ramco (Great Britain [Scotland])—2.08%, TPAO (Turkey)—1.75%, and Delta-Nimir (Saudi Arabia)—1.68%.⁸ After signing the Contract of the Century, its participants created the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC).

¹ See: V. Shorokhov, "Energy Resources of Azerbaijan: Political Stability and Regional Relations," *Caucasian Regional Studies*, Issue 1, 1996, available at [<http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0101-04.htm>], 30 March, 2011.

² See: S.E. Cornell, *Azerbaijan Since Independence*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 2011, pp. 62-63.

³ See: Th. De Waal, *The Caucasus. An Introduction*, Oxford University, Oxford, 2010, pp. 117-118.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁵ See: S.E. Cornell, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

⁶ See: *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁷ See: *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

⁸ See: N. Sagheb, M. Javadi, "Azerbaijan's 'Contract of the Century' Finally Signed with Western Oil Consortium," *Azerbaijan International*, 1994, pp. 26-27, available at [http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/24_folder/24_articles/24_aioc.html].

The members of the consortium and their shares changed over time. For example, the Turkish TPAO Company acquired a 5% share of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR)⁹; according to the agreement signed in Baku in November 1994, another 5% was transferred to the Iranian National Gas Export Company.

The main objective of President Heydar Aliiev's policy was to try and balance out the main powers in the region by providing equal terms for all the interested sides. However, the U.S. government found fault with this policy, since it could not accept the idea of American and Iranian companies working together, which resulted in Iran's exclusion from the Contract of the Century. Instead, Iran was granted a share in the Shakh Deniz field.¹⁰

Drawing Western companies into the Contract of the Century has made it possible for Azerbaijan to achieve internal stability and carry out a balanced foreign policy.

By supporting the countries of the former Eastern bloc, the West did everything it could to facilitate their integration into the Euro-Atlantic expanse. The line formed by these new spheres of influence was drawn imperceptibly along the former Soviet border (with Russia's tacit consent), but no steps were taken to interfere in the development of events in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The hot spots in this area, as well as the need to settle the conflicts in the Balkans after the collapse of Yugoslavia, prevented the West's active policy in the region.

On 12 February, 1991, during his brief official visit to Baku, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said that the U.S. had still not defined its priorities regarding the region and that the Southern Caucasus was outside its sphere of interest. At the same time, the pro-Armenian lobby in U.S. Congress stepped up its activity. The 907th amendment (prohibiting assistance to the official structures of Azerbaijan) was adopted to the Freedom Support Act that regulates various forms of government assistance to the new countries that acquired their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and is aimed at developing democracy and a market economy in them.¹¹

Azerbaijan understood that it had to draw the West's attention both to the country itself and to the region as a whole in order to resolve the existing problems. The republic's rich oil fields played a decisive role in attracting the West's attention (first the attention of its oil companies, and then of its governments).

Azerbaijan's balanced foreign policy made it possible to later build transport corridors for exporting oil and gas to the world markets.

2. Building Alternative Transport Corridors as a Guarantee of Azerbaijan's Independent Foreign Policy

2.1. Creating Infrastructure for Exporting Early Oil¹²

One of the important problems Azerbaijan had to resolve was building alternative routes for delivering energy resources to the world markets, thus ensuring the country's national security and allowing it to pursue a more independent foreign policy.

⁹ See: *Günün Olayları*, 12 April, 1995, available at [<http://www.haberkazani.com/kazandan-12-nisan-1995-gundemi.html>], 24 March, 2011.

¹⁰ See: Th. De Waal, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

¹¹ See: F. Rzaev, "907-ia popravka: istoria i perspektivy," *Tsentralnaia Azia i Kavkaz*, No. 3 (4), 1999, pp. 148-153, available at [http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-04-1999/st_21_rzayev.shtml], 5 February, 2011.

¹² The term "early oil" appeared for describing the oil produced at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli fields that does not need extra money to be spent on building infrastructure for carrying out the necessary work. Moreover, keeping in mind

When the Contract of the Century was signed, the problem arose of transporting Azeri oil to the European markets, since the country does not have direct access to the open sea.¹³

- The first batch of oil was produced as early as the 4th quarter of 1997 from the Chirag-1 platform; a pipeline with an output capacity of no less than 5 million tons a year was needed to export it.¹⁴ An agreement was reached between the government of Azerbaijan and members of the consortium on building oil pipelines in two directions at the same time. One such pipeline was Baku-Novorossiysk, 1,347 km in length (231 km of which pass through Azerbaijan); its capacity amounts to up to 6 million tons of oil a year. Oil was to be transported from Novorossiysk by tanker to the Black Sea and on through the Straits to the Mediterranean ports.
- The second route was the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, 917 km in length (492 km of which pass through Azerbaijan), with a throughput capacity of around 5.5-6 million tons of oil a year. Oil was to be transported by tankers from Supsa to the Mediterranean ports.¹⁵

The need to build two pipelines with a relatively small amount of early oil at the same time was explained by the desire to decrease the country's potential economic dependence on Russia with the understanding that Azerbaijan would not be able to reject the northern route entirely for political considerations.

Building the Baku-Supsa pipeline made it possible for Azerbaijan to diversify its transport policy, as well as pursue a more independent foreign policy, including in the energy sphere. Consequently, building alternative transport routes was to become the main vector in Azerbaijan's energy policy.

2.2. Main Transport Route Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Its Alternative

As oil production at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli fields grew, the need arose for building another pipeline. The Baku-Novorossiysk and Baku-Supsa routes were capable of transporting no more than a total of 11 million tons of oil a year, while beginning in 2005 Azerbaijan was supposed to transport up to 20 million tons.

Russia suggested increasing the capacity of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, but the northern route had several shortcomings. In particular, Turkey restricts the passage of tankers from Novorossiysk and Supsa through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for security reasons.

According to statistics, the potential annual volume of oil that can be transported through the Straits is around 200 million tons, and the width of the inlet is only 600 meters in some places.¹⁶ It should be noted that between 1 May, 1982 and 18 October, 1994, there were around 210 accidents of varying degrees of severity in the Bosphorus Strait.¹⁷ And on either side of the Bosphorus lies the city of Istanbul with a population of more than 10 million!

that the main oil from these fields would not be produced until 2005, Azerbaijan, faced with urgently resolving the serious economic problems that arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union, needed a steady source of revenue.

¹³ See: R. Ibrahimov, "Azerbaijan: Happiness is the Availability of Export Corridors," *Turkish Weekly*, 18 March, 2007, available at [<http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/2536/azerbaijan-happiness-is-the-availability-of-export-corridors.html>], 1 November, 2010.

¹⁴ See: I. Aliev, *Kaspiiskaia neft Azerbaidzhana*, Izvestia, Moscow, 2003.

¹⁵ See: R. Ibrahimov, "Azerbaijan Energy Strategy and the Importance of Diversification of Exported Transport Routes," *Journal of Qafqaz University*, No. 29, 2010, p. 25.

¹⁶ See: F. Turan, "Türkiye-Türk Cumhuriyetleri Ticari ve Ekonomik İlişkileri Hakkında Değerlendirme," *Diş Ticaret Dergisi*, Special Issue, January 2002.

¹⁷ See: "Bitva za Rynok," *Caspian Energy*, No. 5, September-October 2004.

So all the oil from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan could not be exported through Novorossiysk. A pipeline had to be built that bypassed the Straits.¹⁸

In 2002, construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline began with access to the Mediterranean Sea bypassing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The shares of the participants in the consortium contracted to build the pipeline were divided as follows: BP—34.76%, SOCAR—25%, Statoil—8.71%, Unocal—8.90%, TPAO—6.87%, Eni—5%, TotalFinaElf—5%, Itochu—3.40%, and Amerada Hess—2.36%.¹⁹ Construction of the pipeline, which was more than 1,730 km in length, was completed in 2005; as early as December 2006, Azerbaijan was able to forego use of the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline. But Russia demanded that Azerbaijan either increase the volumes of oil transshipped via the Novorossiysk route, or pay the transport fee for pumping 5 million tons of oil a year.

Construction of the BTC pipeline gave the Caspian states access to alternative oil transport routes to Europe. Moreover, by means of this route, the EU countries acquired another source of oil import in addition to Russia and the Middle East. In 2008, Kazakhstan oil began being transported along the BTC pipeline and, in 2010, Turkmen oil.

But Azerbaijan does not regard the BTC as the only priority of its export policy, particularly after the explosion in the Turkish sector of the oil pipeline in August 2008, which brought oil transportation along it to a complete halt.²⁰

An alternative to the BTC might be the Ukrainian Odessa-Brody pipeline, which also bypasses the Straits. It was initially to be used for transporting oil from the Caspian region to Europe, but for several reasons this project was not implemented, and Ukraine began to pump Russian oil along it in the reverse direction (to the Black Sea).

The Odessa-Brody pipeline is one of the possible alternative transit routes for energy deliveries from the countries of the Caspian Basin, mainly from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. It is presumed that this route will be extended to the Polish city of Gdansk, where oil refineries are located²¹ capable of theoretically refining up to 6-7 million tons of oil a year.²²

Moreover, there were plans for Ukraine to purchase up to 5 million tons of oil for further refining at the Galichina and Naftokhimik Prikarpatia plants.²³ Azerbaijan, in turn, is also interested in delivering oil to Ukraine's oil refineries. SOCAR has opened its own gas stations in this country,²⁴ the number of which will increase with each passing year (there are plans to open 17 such stations before the end of 2011). SOCAR is also hoping to open another 300 gas stations in Rumania.

It should also be noted that SOCAR is the main shareholder of the Petkim petrochemical complex in Izmir,²⁵ and, until its construction is complete, Azerbaijan will be interested in refining its oil at Ukraine's plants.

On 7 January, 2011, Ukraine's Ukrtransnafta and the Belarusian Oil Company signed a contract on rendering services for transporting oil via the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to the Belarusian refinery in Mozyr.²⁶

¹⁸ See: R. Ibrahimov, "Azerbaijan: Happiness is the Availability of Export Corridors."

¹⁹ See: "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan—Khronika proekta," *Caspian Energy*, No. 3, July-August 2002.

²⁰ See: "Nefit dorozhaet posle vzryva na nefteprovode Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan," 11 August, 2008, available at [http://tbu.com.ua/news/neft_dorojaet_posle_vzryva_na_nefteprovode_baku_tbilisi_djeihan.html], 2 April, 2011.

²¹ See: R. Ibrahimov, "Energy Security Summit in Kiev and Expectations," 12 July, 2008, available at [<http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/2939/energy-security-summit-in-kiev-and-expectations.html>], 5 April, 2011.

²² See: F. Asim, "Nefteprovod Odessa-Brody-Plotsk zhdet uglevodorody," 20 August, 2008, available at [<http://www.zerkalo.az/rubric.php?id=35283>], 3 April, 2011.

²³ See: V. Kashin, "Obratny avers. Konflikt Iu. Timoshenko s V. Iushchenko ne dal zapolnit trubu Odessa-Brody kspiiskoi neftiu," 18 July, 2008, available at [<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1216361040>], 5 April, 2011.

²⁴ It should be noted that there are dozens of SOCAR gas stations in Georgia.

²⁵ See: N.E., "GNKAR otkroet v Rumynii okolo 300 benzokolonok," 2 April, 2011, available at [http://www.1news.az/economy/oil_n_gas/20110402124523008.html], 5 April, 2011.

²⁶ See: "'Odessa-Brody' bolshe ne nuzhen Belarusi?" 26 March, 2011, available at [http://www.1news.az/economy/oil_n_gas/20110326112408848.html], 3 April, 2011.

Since the end of January 2011, Azeri oil has been delivered via the Odessa-Brody pipeline, which, according to an oil swap contract, is a substitute for the Venezuelan oil delivered to Belarus (which now goes to the U.S. markets as Azeri). There are plans to pump a total of around 4 million tons of raw hydrocarbons.²⁷ Despite the fact that it became known at the end of March 2011 that Belarus might refuse to buy Venezuelan oil due to the more advantageous offers from Russia,²⁸ Azerbaijan is still bent on evaluating new routes and oil export technology.

Azerbaijan is interested in further transporting its oil via the Odessa-Brody pipeline, since this correlates with the policy of export route diversification. Moreover, with the help of the BTC pipeline, Turkey has essentially monopolized the transit of Azeri oil to the world markets. Despite the friendly relations between the two countries, there are several reasons for concern relating to Turkey's decision to re-export Azeri gas to the European markets, as well as the disagreements over the price and transportation fees of natural gas.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Turkey will use its exclusive transit position as a lever of pressure on Azerbaijan.

3. Production of Natural Gas in Azerbaijan and the Search for Alternative Export Routes

The abrupt increase in natural gas production in Azerbaijan is associated with the opening of the Shakh Deniz field, which is 860 sq. km in area and located 70 km from Baku in the southwestern part of the Caspian Sea at a depth of 50 to 600 meters.

On 4 June, 1996, a production sharing agreement was signed between Azerbaijan and foreign companies²⁹; the following companies belonged to the Shakh Deniz consortium: SOCAR (10%), BP (25.5%), Statoil (25.5%), the National Oil Company of Iran (10%), LUKAgip N.V. Joint Russian-Italian Venture (10%), and TPAO (9%).

In order to transport large amounts of Azeri gas to the world markets, still one more transport corridor had to be built. In 2006, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline was completed, and on 21 March of the same year, Azeri gas began being pumped to Turkey.

Beginning in 2008, disagreements arose between Azerbaijan and Turkey with respect to transit prices, fees, and terms, as well as to the amounts of gas to be delivered. This was prompted by Turkey's striving to play the role of regional energy transport hub. But Azerbaijan did not like the fact that Turkey was reselling its gas in the European market, since the price difference was often excessive.

Due to the discord that arose, building of the second line at the Shakh Deniz field was postponed, as a result of which Azerbaijan suffered financial losses. This situation forced Azerbaijan to look for alternative export routes for its natural gas.

On 27 March, 2009, Gazprom and SOCAR signed a contract on the delivery of Azeri gas to Russia via the Baku–Novo-Filia gas pipeline (an approximately 200-km section of Azerbaijan's gas-transportation system that passes from Baku to the Russian border along the coast of the Caspian Sea). In January 2010, Azerbaijan began exporting natural gas to Russia³⁰; at the initial stage, the delivery volume amounted to 500 million cu m.

²⁷ See: "Neft iz Azerbaidzhana pridet v Belarus zavtra," 28 January, 2011, available at [<http://www.charter97.org/ru/news/2011/1/28/35590/>], 2 April, 2011.

²⁸ See: "'Odessa-Brody' bolshe ne nuzhen Belarusi?" 26 March, 2011.

²⁹ See: F. Asim, "Azerbaidzhan vse aktivnee vnedriaetsia na gruzinskii rynek," 26 April, 2011, available at [<http://www.zerkalo.az/rubric.php?id=32208>], 5 April, 2011.

³⁰ See: R. Ibrahimov, "Nabucco as a Chess Game: Azerbaijan's Next Move," 12 November, 2009, available at [<http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3135/nabucco-as-a-chess-game-azerbaijan>], 5 April, 2011.

In September 2010, during Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Baku, an additional agreement was signed to the Azeri natural gas buy-sell contract that envisaged an increase in its deliveries to Russia of up to 2 bcm a year, with the further possibility of increasing the export volume.

Moreover, Azerbaijan intends to export gas to Iran. In January 2011, a corresponding contract was signed, in accordance with which Iran will receive more than one billion cu m of gas in 2011. As in the case with Russia, it is expected that the amount of gas export to Iran could double in 2012.³¹

On 14 September, 2010, a Memorandum was signed during a meeting among the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Rumania, and in the presence of the prime minister of Hungary, aimed at establishing a joint venture to determine the possibility of exporting natural gas from Azerbaijan and Georgia along the bottom of the Black Sea to the Rumanian port of Constanța. Signing this document was an important step in the search for alternative Azeri gas export routes and will make it possible to insure the republic against losses and possible dependence in the future.

According to the new project known as the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Rumania Interconnection (AGRI), natural gas from Azerbaijan will be delivered by pipeline to the Georgian port of Kulevi (Azerbaijan has rented it), then compressed or liquefied and transported further by tanker to the Rumanian port of Constanța. According to preliminary assessments, the estimated cost of the project will amount to between 4 and 6 billion euro.

As we know, the amounts of gas that can be transported by pipeline are limited, so if the AGRI project is implemented, Azerbaijan will be able to diversify not only its transport routes, but also the resources it exports (in particular make a partial shift to delivering compressed or liquefied gas).

In addition to the Shakh Deniz field, other deposits of natural gas have been found in Azerbaijan. In December 2010, SOCAR announced the opening of a new gas field, Umid, located at a depth of 6,500 meters; the Azerbaijan oil and gas company carried out all the surveying work related to this field independently.³²

According to preliminary assessments, the gas supplies at the Umid field amount to 200-300 bcm. It is also worth mentioning Babek, another very promising natural gas field, the reserves of which might be twice as high as those at Umid.³³

Another promising field is the Absheron offshore structure situated 100 km from Baku at a depth of 500 meters. The participants in the consortium are SOCAR (40%) and France's Total (40%) and Gaz De France Suez (20%) companies. According to the assessments of SOCAR's geologists, the reserves of the Absheron field might be as high as 300 bcm of gas and 45 million tons of condensate.

Moreover, as Azerbaijan's Minister of Industry and Power Engineering said, development of gas, the reserves of which might be as high as 500 bcm, is being envisaged at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli fields at the same time as oil production.³⁴

The increase in natural gas production in Azerbaijan prompted by the growing world demand for this type of energy resource is possible thanks to the infrastructure in this republic. In this respect, transport corridors are needed via which Azeri gas can freely be exported to the European markets; this means that the search for alternative routes is related not only to the republic's political, but primarily to its commercial and economic interests.

³¹ See: Z. Agayev, L. Nasser, "Azerbaijan Signs Gas Supply Contract with Iran Before EU Visit," 12 January, 2011, available at [<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-12/azerbaijan-signs-gas-supply-contract-with-iran-before-eu-visit.html>], 5 April, 2011.

³² See: N.E., "SOCAR zaiavila ob otkrytii krupnogo gazovogo mestorozhdeniia 'Umid' v Azerbaidzhane," 24 November, 2010, available at [http://www.1news.az/economy/oil_n_gas/20101124043856510.html], 7 April, 2011.

³³ See: A. Salaeva, "Mestorozhdenie 'Babek' vdvoe bolshe 'Umid,'" 25 November, 2010, available at [http://www.1news.az/economy/oil_n_gas/20101125105006328.html], 6 April, 2011.

³⁴ See: F. Asif, "Nachalos burenie na 'Absherone'," *Zerkalo*, 19 January, 2011.

C o n c l u s i o n

Azerbaijan's energy policy has proven its viability; the diversification of transport routes has made it possible for the republic not only to carry out a relatively independent foreign policy, but also to insure it against possible economic and political losses.

Building the corresponding infrastructure is enhancing sustainable development and the implementation of new projects capable of reinforcing relations among states, as well as extending cooperation to other spheres of activity.

Countries that do not have access to the open sea can benefit from this kind of cooperation, particularly if there are alternative access routes to the world sales markets. Otherwise, the production country could find itself in an extremely vulnerable position if the transit state, by taking advantage of its monopoly on the transportation infrastructure, has its own interests with respect to implementing energy projects.

The only solution is to create export corridors that give the energy resource production country room for maneuver if necessary, thus reducing any potential political or economic losses.

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SOME THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A b s t r a c t

This article examines some theoretical and applied issues of economic development with special emphasis on the relationship between economic development and economic growth, the factors and indicators of economic development, and its peculiarities in developed, developing and transition countries, including Georgia.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Researchers in post-communist countries, including Georgia, have so far paid much more attention to economic growth than to economic development. And this is only natural because until recently the changes associated with economic development occurred very slowly, almost imperceptibly, and their analysis was much more difficult. It is no accident that before the emergence of post-in-

dustrial society there was a similar situation in the developed countries as well. True, in studying economic growth researchers sometimes also considered qualitative changes in the economy, or economic development.

The term “economic development” is often identified with the name of an educational discipline taught at colleges and universities throughout the world. As a discipline, “economic development” mainly relates to the economy of developing countries. But economic development takes place under any economic system and in countries at any level of development. The only significant difference lies in its goals and objectives.

Another frequently used term is “development economics,” which also seems incorrect because it refers not to problems in the development of the economic system but to the economic problems of the development of something (no one knows what exactly).

In the economic literature, the very essence of economic development is under-researched, as well as the interdependence of economic development and economic growth, the factors and indicators of economic development, etc.

The Essence of Economic Development

Since we are used to focusing on quantitative rather than qualitative economic indicators, the concept of “economic development” is often confused with the concept of “economic growth.” As noted above, such was the state of affairs throughout the world until the economy of the developed countries entered the phase of post-industrial development.

The difference between these two categories lies in the very meaning of the words that express them. The word “growth” means an increase in some quantity over time, a quantitative increase. Thus, it refers only to quantitative changes in an object or phenomenon. As for “development,” this word means the transition of something from one state to another, more perfect state. Consequently, it reflects a mostly qualitative change in an object or phenomenon toward greater perfection. *One may conclude that economic growth means a quantitative increase in the size of the economy, while economic development means an improvement in the economy, a transition to new properties.*

In the literature, economic growth in its broad sense implies qualitative growth as well. Such an expansive interpretation is dictated by a desire to invest this term with greater meaning. But there is no point in using the concept of economic growth in this broad sense: after all, there is a more suitable term—economic development—for expressing qualitative improvements in the economy.

This does not mean that there is no deep-rooted connection between economic growth and economic development. The very fact that quantitative changes eventually transform into qualitative changes indicates that economic growth is one of the factors of economic development. For example, the emergence of a post-industrial economy would have been impossible unless the world had first reached a certain level of industrialization. For its part, economic development creates unlimited conditions not only for qualitative improvements in the economy, but also for its further growth. However, economic growth can also occur without economic development, as under extensive growth of production factors. A case in point is the functioning of economic systems in pre-industrialization eras. Special mention should be made of the traditional economy: for thousands of years, its size grew almost without economic development. Yet in the final analysis the unprecedented acceleration of economic growth nevertheless occurred as a result of economic development.

For its part, economic development is possible without economic growth and even during an economic recession. Take the process of economic transformation (qualitative improvement of the economy) in most post-industrial countries that took place during an economic recession. Economic development without economic growth can occur in developed countries because population growth rates in

these countries are low and living standards can rise due only to the use of the latest technologies, a reduction in the material and energy intensity of products, an improvement of their consumer properties, and other qualitative changes. But this relationship will not last for long: in the longer term, economic development will inevitably be followed by economic growth, and vice versa. *Consequently, in the long-term perspective economic development and economic growth do not exist without each other.*

Economic development is accompanied by changes in the economic system, which itself is based on the set of its components. These are *forms of ownership, physical and human capital (and factors of production in general), technology, information and institutions*. All of them are present under any organizational structure of the economic system. But under each of these structures their role and importance are different. Under “pure” capitalism, for example, economic relations are determined by physical capital; in a mixed economy, by human capital; and in a traditional economy, by institutions.

In the process of economic development, progressive changes occur precisely in the elements of the economic system, and this is reflected in the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the economy. The main driving force behind this development is the irresistible desire of people for greater satisfaction of their spiritual and physical needs. The necessity to improve the economic system is also dictated by the fact that economic resources are limited while human needs are unlimited. *The scarcity of economic resources necessitates their ever more efficient use, and also their preservation for the benefit of future generations.*

If various elements of the economic system change simultaneously, this produces a synergistic effect, which accelerates the economic development process. And if tensions arise between various elements, this calls for a change in the organizational structure of the whole economic system, which may be either revolutionary (abrupt) or evolutionary (gradual). In the first case, there are rapid changes in elements of the economic system, followed by an equally rapid change of the social order (as in the transition from feudalism to capitalism). In the second case, changes occur gradually and the social order changes imperceptibly though significantly (as in the transition from industrial to post-industrial society). In both cases, we get a qualitatively new state of the economy that provides opportunities for faster economic development. New forces come on the scene, accelerating the economic development process still further. As a result, we have to deal with qualitatively new forms of ownership, physical and human capital, technologies, institutions, etc.

* * *

The rate of economic development is influenced by numerous factors, among which the following are of particular importance:

Natural Resource Potential

Natural resource potential is one of the basic, universal factors of economic development. Natural resources are diverse. This concept covers resources such as land, soil, water, forests, biological resources (plants and animals), minerals, and climatic, recreational, planetary and space resources. It can be said that today this factor is not critically important to an individual country because the internationalization of the economy has enabled high technology countries poorly endowed with natural resources (like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, etc.) to use the natural resources of other countries. But all other things being equal, a country rich in natural resources has additional advantages. In Kuwait, for example, living standards are high because of its abundant oil reserves, while economic development in the countries of tropical Africa is significantly retarded because they are very poor in natural resources. If we picture the world economy as the economy of a single country, we will find

that not only the development of this economy, but also its very existence would be impossible without natural resources.

The special role of natural resources is expressed in the fact that new types of resources (such as nuclear energy, solar energy, bioenergy, etc.) that are often of great importance to economic development are harnessed in the course of economic activity; natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, are not unlimited, which is why they should be used rationally: renewables so as to allow their replenishment, and non-renewables in the most economical way, so that they would last as long as possible. At the same time, it is necessary to look for alternative sources of non-renewables so that mankind would not be faced with a disaster when they are fully depleted; in the use of natural resources, we should take account of the laws of nature because man cannot change them; for the rational use of natural resources, it is sometimes necessary to create appropriate sectors of the economy, which has a serious effect on its structure and thereby leads to progressive changes in the economy.

Physical Capital

Physical capital is another basic and universal factor of economic development. It refers to assets such as machinery, plant, equipment, buildings, structures, etc., used by people to produce goods and services. Any progressive change in physical capital has a direct effect on economic development because it serves to increase labor productivity, improve product quality, reduce the material and energy intensity of goods and services, improve working conditions, etc.

Quantitative and qualitative changes in physical capital consistently reduce the share of manual labor in the process of production and its direct impact on the nature of output. Hence an increase in the control function performed by man in the process of production as it requires intellectual rather than manual labor. Intellectual labor is primarily based on knowledge and experience gained by people in the course of education and work. That is why it is not only human knowledge and experience in their pure form that play an increasing role in economic outcomes, but also physical capital, which embodies the knowledge and experience accumulated by mankind.

Science, Technology and Technological Knowledge

Technology is a set of rules, procedures and means used to transform input materials into goods or services. More precisely, technology is a combination of qualifications, devices, infrastructure, tools and relevant technical knowledge needed to bring about the desired transformations in materials, information and people.¹ The components of technology are machines, instruments and raw materials, but the main thing is the set of rules and procedures according to which these transformations are performed.

Technological knowledge means an ability to select the best technologies for the production of goods and services.

Technological improvements boost productivity, change the role and functions of man in the production process, and increase the country's industrial capacity. Technological progress is achieved through innovation. Some of the major innovations in mankind's history were the *industrial revolution*, *standardization*, *mechanization* and *conveyor belts*. They laid the groundwork for contin-

¹ See: M.H. Mescon, M. Albert, F. Khedouri, *Management: Individual and Organizational Effectiveness*, Harper-collins College Div; 3 Sub edition, New York, May 1988.

uous, flexible automated manufacturing based on electronization, computerization and robotization of production. Today the focus is shifting to non-waste technology, which is of great importance for sustainable global economic development.

The basis for inventions and innovations is provided by discoveries, primarily in basic and then in applied sciences. *Thus, the development of science is the cornerstone of economic development.* One can say that the process of economic development is a process of innovation both in physical capital and in the forms of industrial organization, human capital, technologies, institutions, etc. Progressive changes in technology, human knowledge, skills, traditions, legal and cultural norms, etc., are effected precisely through innovation.

Human Capital

Human capital is the stock of a person's natural abilities and his/her knowledge and skills acquired through education and practical experience and used in the process of production. The new economy requires a very high level of human capital, which should be oriented toward advanced machinery and technology, wide use of computerized information systems, flexible manufacturing, and implementation of innovation systems. The key component of human capital is education. It is very important for economic development because of its positive external effect. An educated person has more opportunities to create new ideas aimed at technological improvements and the development of new management and organizational methods. That is why a brain drain (the emigration of educated people from a country in search of a better life) is highly undesirable for the country. Qualitative and quantitative growth of human capital is the main factor in transforming the economy toward modernization and improving economic and legal institutions.²

Human capital includes the following elements:

- (1) physical and spiritual health;
- (2) mental and physical abilities;
- (3) professional and institutional skills;
- (4) professional and life experience;
- (5) professional and general knowledge;
- (6) motivation, and others.

Physical and spiritual health depends on the level of development of health care in the country, the moral and psychological climate in society, the individual's material status, the amount of spare time, etc.

Mental and physical abilities are determined by the individual's personal qualities. There are no two people with the same mental and physical abilities.

Professional skills are naturally acquired in the process of work, while institutional skills are determined by the country's institutional level, by the sophistication of its formal and informal institutions.

Professional experience is also gained in the performance of work, and life experience is shaped by the individual's entire practice. Life experience plays a fairly important role in how people perform their official duties and in their career development.

Knowledge is gained by learning and consolidated through its practical implementation. Motivation determines how conscientiously people perform their duties. It depends both on personal qualities and on the level of industrial organization and moral and material incentives.

² See: *Ekonomika razvitiia: modeli stanovleniia rynochnoi ekonomiki*, Infra-M, Moscow, 2001.

Along with other factors, the nature and structure of employment is of great importance for creating and improving human capital.

All elements of human capital are closely interrelated. For example, if a person is physically or spiritually unhealthy, there is no point in talking about the implementation of other elements. But in different economic systems the elements of human capital are of different importance. Under slavery and feudalism, for example, the greatest importance was attached to physical abilities and health, and in the traditional economy, to the customs, laws, religious views and, consequently, skills that existed in a particular society.

Under capitalism, the role of knowledge gradually increases, and in post-industrial society it becomes decisive. Whereas in the pre-capitalist economic system the main economic category was land, and under capitalism it is capital, in the new (post-industrial) economy the main economic category is knowledge. That is why in the developed countries so much importance is attached to human capital.

The creation and improvement of human capital and its effective use calls for an appropriate social and economic situation in the country. This applies both to the educational and health care system and to the level of development of science, employment moral and psychological climate, forms and methods of industrial organization, etc.

Institutions

The foundations of institutionalism were laid in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Its founder was the American economist Thorstein Veblen, and its most prominent representatives were John Commons, Wesley Mitchell, Max Weber, Werner Sombart, John Kenneth Galbraith, Gunnar Myrdal, Ronald Coase, Armen Alchian, Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan, Douglass North, Joseph Stiglitz, Oliver Williamson, and others. Institutionalism holds that the economic behavior of people is determined in large part by society's socio-legal system, and also by traditions, customs, habits, etc. Thus, the concept of institutions covers informal institutions (traditions, customs, habits) and formal ones, which include, on the one hand, the system of structures and organizations (markets, market infrastructure, firms, labor unions, government regulatory agencies), and on the other, the system of legal norms (laws, decrees, orders, regulations, etc.). *Formal* institutions are those presented in the form of written laws, whereas *informal* institutions are those which are not recorded in legal documents but determine to a significant extent the daily behavior of people, their actions and decisions.

Formal institutions can be transformed into informal ones and vice versa. Those formal institutions which have emerged from informal ones are most consistent with human nature.

Of course, a reflection of all informal institutions in formal ones is impossible (and unnecessary). But the more informal institutions are formalized and legalized, the more natural and consistent with the interests of economic development they will be.

When formal institutions are imperfect, their deficiencies lead to the emergence of new and an increase in the activity of existing informal institutions destructive to the economy, which seriously hinders economic development. Generally speaking, the creation of absolutely perfect formal institutions is impossible, and this is why an informal sector emerges in any country, though naturally on a different scale. When an economic system gives way to another system, institutions (especially formal ones) crumble. The creation of new institutions is a fairly difficult process. Difficulties are often caused by lack of knowledge about the new options or by deliberate mistakes. The faster the progressive change in both formal and informal institutions, the faster will the conditions for economic development be created.

Ecological Factor

The word “ecology” comes from the Greek and means a branch of biology concerned with the relation of living organisms with the environment. In a broader sense, the concept of ecology is used in studying the economic problems of nature management and conservation. *The ecological (environmental) factor in economic development reflects the economic impact of the requirements of rational nature management and environmental protection.*

When the ecological factor is taken into account, the economy moves into a totally new state with subsequent qualitative changes in almost all its elements, even including forms of ownership. The latter is due to the fact that compliance with the requirements of rational nature management and environmental protection is easier and more comprehensive under appropriate forms of ownership. For example, it is known from theory that “the tragedy of the commons” is associated with the absence of private ownership of economic resources. But as it turns out, public ownership is often preferable for the same reasons.

The ecological factor causes changes in the allocation of resources and facility location, in the economic structure, physical and human capital, product quality, etc. A substantial part of resources is used to implement nature conservation measures, while the location of production facilities is preferable in areas where the requirements of rational use of resources and environmental protection will be met to the fullest possible extent. Entire industries are created to address the problems of nature conservation, which leads to significant structural changes in the economy. Environmental requirements encourage the development of fundamentally new material- and energy-saving non-waste technologies and other eco-friendly technologies. Special equipment and instruments are created to protect the environment, and their maintenance is associated with the emergence of new categories of professional staff (environmental engineers, green energy specialists, environmental economists, environmental experts, etc.). The same tasks cause changes in institutions (laws, economic management agencies, human habits and way of life, traditions, etc.). The ecological factor can either retard or accelerate economic growth: retard because it requires additional expenditure, reducing the profitability of production and, accordingly, total supply; and accelerate because, first, the demand for eco-products is increasing and, second, compliance with environmental requirements leads to the creation of entire new industries. But at the initial stage of nature conservation measures their retarding effect on economic growth is much stronger than their accelerating effect. This gap is gradually narrowing, and when the greening of the whole economy is completed, it will disappear altogether. By that time, nature conservation processes will probably cease to be an “externality” for the market system, because every economic agent will realize that the Earth is our common home and any kind of harmful pollution will cause damage to all.

The requirements of rational nature management and conservation are associated with the scarcity of economic resources, pollution of the environment and the effect of destructive natural forces. From this perspective, the history of world economic development can be divided into three stages.

- At the first stage, natural resources were believed to be inexhaustible and attention was mainly paid to an increase in production capacity.
- At the second stage, the requirements of rational nature management and conservation were already taken into account but not yet fully implemented.
- At the third stage, the economy has entered a phase of sustainable economic development, which continues to this day.

Special attention to this problem began to be paid only in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1972, a United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm. Its participants expressed concerns that maintenance of the existing economic development rate could lead to a global disaster and adopted a program of “zero growth,” which provided for a reduction in the rate of

both economic and population growth. Naturally, this program was not destined to be carried out. In 1987, the U.N. World Commission on Environment and Development issued a report entitled *Our Common Future* and proposed a strategy for sustainable development. In 1992, the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (also known as the Earth Summit) developed and adopted a program called Agenda 21 (an agenda for the 21st century), which formulated the essence and goals of sustainable development. Its message is that society should meet its current needs without jeopardizing the needs and the very existence of future generations.

The requirements of sustainable development can be met only through a rational exchange of substances and energy between society and nature. This can be achieved when human needs are determined by the patterns of self-regeneration and self-reproduction of nature. Consequently, the order of the day is *coevolution*, or joint development of society and nature. The biosphere of our planet is moving into a new state known as the noosphere, in which people try to offset the negative effects on the biosphere not only from their own activities, but also from the operation of natural forces.

International Factors. Globalization

The basis of international economic relations was laid in the distant past. But the world economy in the modern sense of the word took shape after the emergence of a world market of goods and services, when factors of production began to move across borders, followed by increasing internationalization and transnationalization of the economy and a trend toward the creation of a single market of goods, services, capital, labor, knowledge, etc., in other words, toward a globalization of the economy.

In the economic literature, there are different views on the causes of globalization. Some hold that globalization is an objective result of historical development, while others believe that it was "organized" by the major powers in order to use the national resources of other countries in their own interests and ultimately to abolish nation states altogether and establish a single world government.

In our view, globalization is an objective result of the development of national economies and its main causes are:

- (1) the internal needs of economic development, the need to raise real living standards, which is of interest to all countries;
- (2) the desire to maximize profit; and
- (3) the existence of global problems that cannot be solved by individual countries.

Everyone knows about the benefits from foreign trade gained by the participating countries. It enables each person to consume more diverse goods and services in larger quantities. Producers can use their possibilities not only within the country, but also abroad. Today there are many global problems that can be solved only by a joint effort: elimination of poverty and backwardness; establishment of peace and disarmament; food security; supply of natural resources; environmental and population stability; development of the human potential; exploration of the World Ocean and outer space, etc.

But although all countries benefit from globalization, the quality and amount of these benefits vary from country to country. The developed countries are in the most advantageous position because they have larger quantities of higher-quality factors of production. As a result, globalization allows them to:

- (1) use the much cheaper labor and cheap resources of other countries;
- (2) attract highly skilled labor from other countries;
- (3) export used goods and low-quality products for which there is no demand at home to other countries;

- (4) export obsolete and worn out equipment; and
- (5) create favorable conditions at home for accelerating scientific and technological progress by attracting the vast resources required for this purpose from other countries and regions of the world.

Other countries in the process of globalization:

- (1) use world experience and the latest achievements of scientific and technological progress;
- (2) receive significant financial assistance; and
- (3) solve many problems (of poverty, environmental protection and health care).

But globalization also creates serious problems:

- (1) as it spreads to almost all areas of the national economies, it limits the scope of government regulation;
- (2) negative phenomena arising in one country can spread rapidly to all other countries in the world;
- (3) the scale of economic flows in the process of globalization is so large that in some cases they can have a destructive effect on some (especially weak) countries;
- (4) the scale of emigration from developing countries, including that of highly qualified specialists, increases;
- (5) migration flows caused by globalization create demographic problems in many countries;
- (6) globalization often has a different effect on different countries and sectors, significantly distorting the development of some countries and sectors; and
- (7) globalization is characterized by financial market instability, and an increased outflow of "hot money" may cause not only fluctuations in capital markets, but also a banking, monetary and general financial crisis.

Some analysts also say that the major states plunder the natural resources of developing countries, worsen the environmental situation and working conditions in these countries, reduce their competitiveness and increase poverty; that national culture degenerates due to globalization, and that countries lose their traditions and their national identity in general. Naturally, such a danger exists in a globalized world, but it should be taken into account that globalization is an objective process that cannot be abolished by any individual country. Globalization means increasing competition, but at the same time it leads to greater cooperation between actors in the global market and between states. That is why instead of rejecting globalization out of hand the states should try to win out in the competition, naturally not by force but by means of knowledge, by developing science, creating high technologies, improving culture, enhancing intellect, etc. It is true that under globalization some functions of the state are restricted, but it acquires a new and important function: to offset the negative impact of globalization, ensure effective use of foreign assistance, increase competitiveness, and maintain and develop the best national traditions. Unless this is done, the country may face economic collapse, followed by degradation of science, culture, traditions, etc.

* * *

A quantitative assessment of economic development is very difficult because qualitative changes sometimes cannot be expressed in figures. It is particularly difficult during the transition period, when one economic system is replaced by another with an accompanying economic recession. Here we have to deal with two opposite processes: the economic system moves into a new and more perfect

state while the country's economic and social indicators deteriorate. Another possible situation is when the country's economic indicators improve but the social situation worsens, etc.

First of all, we must determine when exactly economic development occurs: when economic indicators improve; when the social situation improves; when progressive changes take place in the economic system; when two of these conditions are met or only when all three conditions are met simultaneously.

There is no doubt that the economic system as a whole should serve the individual and ensure individual well-being. However, we must also take into account that it is not private interests but the interests of the whole country that should be the main focus of attention. The results of economic development may be confined to changes such as increased defense capability, improved environmental situation, etc., without being reflected in social indicators.

Thus, it is impossible to speak of economic development based on only one category of indicators. Economic, social and qualitative indicators should be considered separately.

Economic Indicators

Among these indicators, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita should be mentioned in the first place. Naturally, an increase in this indicator—even when the population is decreasing—is the result of economic development. But this indicator has its limitations as well. First, its reduction does not always mean a failure of economic development (as with a reduction in material and energy intensity, an improvement in product quality, etc.), and second, its increase does not mean that the condition of all strata of the population has improved; moreover, the condition of the poorer strata may even worsen. Increases or decreases in income inequality are not reflected in this indicator either.

Despite its shortcomings, it would not be right to ignore this indicator. It can well be used together with indicators showing whether the per capita income of the least well off groups has risen or fallen and whether income inequality in the country has increased or decreased. Such indicators primarily include:

- (a) *absolute per capita income of the poor strata; and*
- (b) *the Gini coefficient, a numerical measure of income inequality ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality).³*

From the perspective of economic development, the best situation is when GDP per capita and the per capita income of poor households increase while the Gini coefficient decreases. But in any other case as well an improvement in these two indicators (simultaneous or independent) points to positive qualitative changes in the economic system.

Other economic indicators that can be used in this context include national income, net national product, volume of exports, investments in innovation, education, research and development, etc.

Social Indicators

The best-known social indicator is the Human Development Index (HDI). It has three dimensions:

- life expectancy at birth;
- composite education index;
- GNI per capita;
- the HDI is calculated by the United Nations and published annually.

³ See: M. Todaro, *Economic Development*, 6th Edition, Longman, London, 1997.

There are also many other social indicators of economic development:

- secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio;
- newspaper circulation per capita;
- occupational employment rates;
- electricity consumption per capita;
- average number of persons per room;
- daily animal fat consumption per capita;
- life expectancy;
- total fertility rate;
- stability of democratic institutions, etc.

Indicators Reflecting Qualitative Changes

As noted above, in some time periods the economic development process may not be accompanied by an improvement or worsening of social or economic indicators, which is why we need indicators that would reflect qualitative changes in the economic system.

These include:

- changes in forms of ownership;
- adoption of new technologies;
- industrial restructuring;
- privatization of enterprises;
- reorganization and modernization of production;
- institutional changes;
- innovation investment as a percentage of total investment;
- spending on education as a percentage of GDP;
- spending on science as a percentage of GDP;
- education level;
- progressive structural changes, etc.

* * *

Groups of countries with developed, developing and transition economies differ widely in terms of their economic development peculiarities.

Developed Countries

Developed countries are those with a highly developed market economy and a very high level of socio-economic development.

In the 1950s, the developed countries entered the stage of post-industrial development. Post-industrial society is characterized by an increasing share of the tertiary sector (the service sector) in the economy, whereas in traditional society the dominant sector was the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing), and in industrial society, the secondary sector (industry and construction). Whereas in traditional society the basic economic relations were associated with land, and in industrial society with capital, in post-industrial society they are associated with the *priority development of knowledge and skilled labor, information and high technology industries*. The goal of this society is all-round development of the individual based on social equality, intellectual improvement, rising living standards and improving quality of life. One of its main goals is to provide for future generations through sustainable economic development.

The post-industrial economic system was formed through the development of the industrial economic system, a gradual improvement of its elements. Profound changes have taken place in both physical and human capital, in technology, forms of ownership and institutions. Physical capital here is based on high technologies. E-manufacturing, large-scale computerization and robotization free people from the need to take a direct part in production processes and enable them to regulate and control these processes. Hence the growing demands on the intellectual and educational level of the working population and increasing intellectualization of production, labor and products. Individual ownership is losing its former importance as it gives way to collective forms of ownership (cooperative, joint stock, partnership, corporate, mixed). There is a significant increase in the role of institutions, especially the state, which helps to overcome the shortcomings of the market and gives a social orientation to the market economy. Accordingly, the post-industrial economic system has a "social" and "mixed" character. In fact, we are dealing with a *new, mixed economy*.

The differences between developed countries are primarily manifested in the degree of government intervention in the economy. Hence, there are several models of a mixed economy: American, German, Japanese, Swedish, Korean, and others. The most liberal one is the American model, and the least liberal, the Swedish model.

The economic development process depends in large part on the initial level. For example, economically backward and developing countries can use the existing experience of developed countries, their technological and institutional achievements, etc., while developed countries have no such opportunity.

In the developed countries, the current financial crisis may adjust the direction of economic development, bringing the service sector into greater balance with the industrial sector of the economy, optimizing economic growth rates, government regulation of the economy, etc. Overall, the share of high technology industries will resume its growth, and the importance of education, knowledge and human capital will continue to increase. Informatization, computerization and robotization processes will accelerate still further, and transport and communications facilities will improve. The process of transition to sustainable economic development will be completed, for which purpose great attention will be paid to the creation of environmentally clean technologies and the search for and use of new sources of energy.

Developing Countries

Developing countries are those with a market economy and a low level of economic development. Countries in this group differ markedly from each other in terms of economic development level, and their differentiation along these lines is continuing.

According to the U.N. classification, the group of developing countries is divided into the *least developed countries and newly industrialized ("rapidly developing") countries; oil exporting countries are singled out into a special subgroup*. Under the classification of the Organization for Eco-

conomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), developing countries are grouped into *low-income countries, middle-income countries and newly industrialized countries; oil exporters are also singled out into a separate subgroup.*

The latter, with their huge oil revenues, have been able to modernize the economy and raise living standards and education levels. But measures taken by the developed states to reduce energy intensity, implement energy-efficient technologies and increase the production of energy resources have significantly weakened the monopoly position of these countries.

The newly industrialized countries have managed to develop manufacturing, especially its export sectors, and are gradually increasing their competitiveness.

The least developed countries are characterized by the lowest living standards (extremely low income, very poor living conditions, unsatisfactory state of health, inadequate education or its complete absence, high child mortality rate, low life expectancy, etc.). Their economy is based on backward, including archaic, forms of agriculture; industry is very poorly developed, and exports mainly consist of traditional products.

Countries with Transition Economies

Countries with transition economies (transition countries, transition economies) are those which have rejected the administrative-command system and have taken the path of building a market economy. Although these processes differ significantly from country to country, they have the same goal: to accelerate economic development based on an optimal combination of market and government regulation of the economy, i.e., to build a *mixed or new economy.*

The first attempts to transform the planned economy were made in the 1950s in Yugoslavia, and then in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Serious economic reforms, which eventually produced significant results, were launched in China in 1978.

Large-scale transformations leading to momentous political changes, which to some extent continue to this day, began in the Soviet Union in 1989. They have affected all countries of the communist camp and are thus usually known as “*post-communist transformation.*”⁴ On the path of reform, these countries have already overcome many difficulties and achieved some successes.

The post-communist transformation process in most countries proceeds against the background of a radical collapse of the old system, which is why its first stage always involves an economic recession and accelerating inflation processes caused by hidden inflation. *One can say that the initial stage of transition to a market economy takes place in conditions of transitional stagflation.*

The post-communist transformation involves profound institutional changes. Formal institutions change faster than informal ones. For example, there are changes in such formal institutions as the legislative and regulatory framework and the structure and functions of economic regulatory agencies; a market infrastructure is created, etc. Changing informal institutions include established traditions, human behavior, aesthetic and ethical values. Of great importance is the transformation of the type of man known as *homo soveticus*, formed in the communist countries, into *homo economicus.*⁵ Naturally, this fundamental process cannot take place immediately because people’s mentality remains the same for a long time. As a result, the transformation gives rise to a new type of man who could be called *homo transformativus*, a man who has not yet developed into *homo economicus* but is no longer *homo soveticus* (an economic agent of the Soviet period, a “delets” in the sense given to this word by Vladimir Papava).

⁴ L.T Geiger, *Macroeconomic Analysis and Transitional Economy*, Eastern College, St Davids, 1992.

⁵ See: V. Papava, *Necroeconomics: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Capitalism (Lessons from Georgia)*, iUniverse, Inc., New York, 2005.

Based on the regularities of market transformation, the following changes are implemented in the transition period: price liberalization; elimination of the state budget deficit; reduction and elimination of inflation; creation of a legislative framework appropriate to a market economy and its improvement; introduction of a national currency (in countries which had no such currency); liberalization of foreign trade; formation of a stratum of industrialists; privatization; restructuring of the monetary and financial system (creation of a new banking system and a capital market); restructuring and improvement of the tax system; creation of a social protection system; implementation of an anti-monopoly policy and increase in competitiveness; improvement of government regulation of the economy; recovery from the economic crisis and maintenance of steady growth rates; state budget participation in financing priority industrial projects, etc.

There are two ways of post-communist transformation: *shock therapy* and *gradualism*. Under shock therapy, the changes should be implemented in a very short time, which implies a tight monetary policy in the conditions of a fight against the budget deficit and a fixing of the nominal money supply or the exchange rate. Gradualism means gradual, step-by-step reforms. The first way was applied in Germany after World War II, and then in Poland and, with varying success, in other post-communist countries. The second way was successfully applied in China and is now being implemented in Tajikistan.

Problems of Economic Development in Georgia

Since Georgia gained independence almost 20 years ago, its economy has developed unevenly, with both successes and failures. This process can be divided into several stages.

The first stage covered the period from independence to the second half of 1994. At that time, the country had to restore its statehood with a simultaneous transition to a new economic system. All of this had to be done against the background of internal political tensions and a war to maintain territorial integrity. The country's economy fell into the hands of various criminal groups, suffering irreparable damage. The authorities managed to alleviate the severe social and economic problems mainly through foreign aid and loans.

An important point is that the economic reforms at the first stage were not comprehensive, and the authorities committed many strategic mistakes. For example, it was decided to use a shock therapy approach based on the Russian model. But first, the country at that time had no monetary system of its own, and second, the shock therapy itself was incomplete and inconsistent. In particular, one of its most important and necessary elements—a tight monetary policy—was not put into effect. No serious measures to restrict the money supply and cut budget spending were taken either when Georgia was still in the ruble zone or later, after the introduction of the coupon (kupon). On the contrary, there was a totally unwarranted issue of currency and government securities, and foreign loans were misused. This version of reform can be called semi-chaotic, which was due to many objective and subjective factors operating at that time (initial steps to establish statehood, lack of experience in implementing reforms, the need to take into account various political and clan interests, the internal war and the war for territorial integrity, provision of social assistance to refugees, banditry, racketeering, corruption, and many other factors). It brought the country to an economic crisis.

In spite of this, a number of important measures were carried out to ensure the transition to a new economic system: price liberalization, creation of a national monetary system, reform of land use in agriculture, housing reform, small-scale privatization (first phase), etc.

The second stage lasted from the second half 1994 to 1998. At that time, a new reform policy based on a program developed by Georgian economists and international organizations (primarily the International Monetary Fund) was launched in the country. This made it possible to curb the inflation

of the coupon, paving the way for the introduction of a national currency, the lari. After its introduction, inflation was reduced still further, and the exchange rate between the national currency and the U.S. dollar stabilized.

In addition, at that stage:

1. The legislative framework for transition to a market economy was significantly improved and expanded;
2. The privatization of small and medium-sized enterprises was largely completed;
3. A reform of land ownership was carried out;
4. The state budget deficit was reduced;
5. The inflow of foreign investment increased;
6. The monetary system improved;
7. A floating exchange rate was introduced for the lari;
8. The investment climate improved, etc.

As a result, the collapse of production was halted, giving way to a positive trend: in 1996-1997, the gross domestic product grew by an average of 11% a year under a strong national currency and low inflation.

The third stage began in 1998 and lasted until 2004. In 1998, the previously achieved high rates of economic growth began to decline, and this was followed by a decline in the value of the national currency, rising inflation, and a budget, financial and energy crisis. The main cause of these negative processes was a slowdown in the economic reforms due to ineffective government regulation.

The fourth stage began after the Rose Revolution and lasted until the Russian-Georgian war (from 23 November 2003 to 8 August 2008). In that period, some obviously negative phenomena characteristic of earlier periods, especially the end of the previous stage, were eradicated. In particular:

1. The financial and budget crisis was overcome (the budget deficit was eliminated, pension and wage arrears were paid off, etc.);
2. The national currency strengthened significantly;
3. The energy crisis was overcome (uninterrupted electricity and gas supply to households and enterprises was restored);
4. GDP growth rates averaged 9-10%. In real terms, GDP grew by 42.6%;
5. Household income increased and average wages more than tripled while inflation stood at 37%;
6. Most highways and urban roads were repaired;
7. The macroeconomic situation continued to stabilize; the tax code and licensing and authorization procedures were simplified and liberalized;
8. The privatization process deepened; the banking sector strengthened.

But there were also certain shortcomings characteristic of that period. In particular:

1. The principle of inviolability of private property—the cornerstone of the market economy—was undermined;
2. The de facto abolition of antimonopoly legislation led to a decline in competition, threatening the further development of the market economy;
3. The trade deficit continued to increase;
4. The forms and methods of macroeconomic management did not fully meet market requirements. The reforms were not systemic.

The fifth stage began after the Russian-Georgian war and takes place against the background of the world financial crisis. Naturally, both these large-scale phenomena would have had a strong effect on the economy of any country. To Georgia's credit, one must say that its economy has stood these two blows, which have not developed into a full-scale economic crisis. But their consequences are nevertheless in evidence:

- According to preliminary data, the war caused damage to Georgia in the amount of \$1 billion;
- Economic growth slowed as the result of a reduction in both domestic and foreign investment;
- The lari exchange rate began to decline, causing a rise in the prices of imported products;
- Problems in the banking sector led to a contraction of credit and, consequently, of investment; the construction business was almost on the verge of bankruptcy;
- The environmental situation in the country worsened;
- The health resort sector suffered significant losses, etc.

For our economy, the negative aspects resulting from misguided reforms implemented over the years are much more significant. The most important of these are:

1. Low level of development of market institutions, which results in ineffective operation of the market mechanism. Special mention should be made of the low development level of the securities market (stock exchange), which has a strong negative impact on domestic investment;
2. The creation of a non-progressive structure of the economy. This applies both to its sectoral structure and to the structure of business and the social sphere;
3. Low national competitiveness.

In order to remedy the situation, the reforms should be further accelerated. They should be systemic. Special attention should be paid to the development of the real sector of the economy, with a significant part of foreign aid channeled into this sector. An infrastructure for government support of small and medium business should be created without delay, combined with certain protectionist measures. At this stage, it is necessary to prepare, with the participation of researchers, an economic development program for Georgia that would provide a basis for further development of the national economy.

C o n c l u s i o n

Economic growth means a quantitative increase in the size of the economy, while economic development means its improvement, a transition to new properties. In the short term, economic growth and economic development can exist without each other, but in the long term it is economic development that creates conditions for further economic growth.

The special role of natural resources is expressed in the fact that new types of resources (such as nuclear energy, solar energy, bioenergy, etc.) that are often of great importance to economic development are harnessed in the course of economic activity; quantitative and qualitative changes in physical capital consistently reduce the share of manual labor in the process of production and its direct impact on the nature of output. Hence an increase in the control function performed by man in the process of production as it requires intellectual rather than manual labor.

Economic development is a process of innovation both in physical capital and in the forms of industrial organization, human capital, technologies, institutions, etc.

The ecological (environmental) factor in economic development reflects the economic impact of the requirements of rational nature management and environmental protection, because compliance with these requirements causes significant qualitative changes in the economy.

Globalization means increasing competition, but at the same time it leads to greater cooperation between actors in the global market and between states. That is why instead of rejecting globalization out of hand the states should try to win out in the competition. Unless this is done, the country may face economic collapse, followed by degradation of science, culture, traditions, etc.

It is impossible to speak of economic development based on only one category of indicators. Economic, social and qualitative indicators should be considered separately.

Economic development takes place under any economic system and in countries at any level of development. The only significant difference lies in its goals and objectives.

In the developed countries, the current financial crisis may adjust the direction of economic development, bringing the service sector into greater balance with the industrial sector of the economy, optimizing economic growth rates, government regulation of the economy, etc. Overall, the share of high technology industries will resume its growth, and the importance of education, knowledge and human capital will continue to increase. Informatization, computerization and robotization processes will accelerate still further. Transport and communications facilities will improve. The process of transition to sustainable economic development will be completed, for which purpose great attention will be paid to the creation of environmentally clean technologies and the search for and use of new sources of energy. Although transformation processes in transition economies differ significantly from country to country, they have the same goal: to accelerate economic development based on an optimal combination of market and government regulation of the economy, i.e., to build a mixed or new economy.

Georgia needs an acceleration of the reforms. They should be systemic. Special attention should be paid to the development of the real sector of the economy, with a significant part of foreign aid channeled into this sector. An infrastructure for government support of small and medium business should be created without delay, combined with certain protectionist measures. Today it is necessary to prepare, with the participation of researchers, an economic development program for Georgia that would provide a basis for further development of the national economy.

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**BELIEFS, CUSTOMS,
AND RITES OF 7TH-12TH CENTURY TURKS
(According to Syrian Sources)****A b s t r a c t**

The author discusses the ethnic-cultural traditions which the Turks of Central and Hither Asia acquired during Antiquity and the Middle Ages and passed down from generation to generation as described by the Syrian written records of the 12th-13th centuries.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The Syrians are one of the autochthonous peoples of Hither Asia; Syria and Mesopotamia were their homeland, where Syrian princedoms emerged and disappeared in Antiquity. Osroe (the Edessa Kingdom, 132 B.C.-A.D. 244), with its capital in Edessa (Urfa, now Şanlıurfa in Turkey), was the most prominent of them. The Syrian cities of Palmyra, Petra, and Melitene (now Malatya in Turkey) were well known as important trade and crafts centers and hubs of political, ideological, scientific, and cultural activities. The Syrians, one of the most cultured Oriental peoples, authored many works in all spheres of Ancient and Medieval knowledge. Two of them are intimately connected with the present subject. I have in mind *The Chronicle* by Michael the Syrian (1126-1199) who lived in the state of the Seljukids in Asia Minor (1077-1307), where he closely cooperated with the Turks (Syrian *Turkiye*, his own name for the Seljuks) and could observe their daily life. He spoke the Oghuz language, which means that he

described what he observed and heard directly from the Seljuks. Another, no less important work, *Chronography (Makhtbhanuth Zabhnē, Chronicon)*, was written by encyclopedic scholar Bar Hebraeus Abu-al-Faraj (1226-1286), known in the Islamic world as Ibn al-'Ebroyo, a polyglot who had a good command of the Oghuz and Arabic languages. He traveled far and wide across Hither Asia where he contacted Turkic tribes and learned a lot about the daily life of the Oghuz-Seljuk Turks.

Both books provided valuable material on the history and material and spiritual culture of the Oghuzes and Seljuks. They confirm that the system of beliefs, customs, and rites of these peoples were, in fact, an intertwining of pre-Islamic and Islamic norms which developed over time into a typically Turkic complex of ideology and everyday life.

Beliefs

Michael the Syrian writes that *Sky* was the supreme deity of the Turks, which they called *Kan Tangri*: *kan* in their language being sky or sky blue (*gök/kök*), while *Tangri* meant God, Sky, and Great.¹ For this reason, the Turks believed that sky was the only, that is, supreme, deity. In other words, the Turks were monotheists who worshiped the visible sky as their only deity. It should be said in this connection that Ibn Fadlan wrote about the Turks of the 10th century that if any of them suffered from injustice or misfortune he would raise his head toward the sky and say, "Bir Tangri," which meant "O, the Only God!"² In Central Asia there is a mountain called *Khan Tengri* (6,995 meters above sea level); it belongs to the *Tengri Dag* range in the eastern part of Central Tien Shan in Kyrgyzstan.³

After embracing Islam in the 10th century, the Seljuk Turks did not abandon their pre-Islamic traditions. No wonder Michael the Syrian wrote that until his time, that is, the latter half of the 12th century, any Turk, when asked about his faith by someone who knew nothing about Islam, invariably answered, "Kan Tangri!"⁴ As monotheists, wrote Michael the Syrian, the Turks easily accepted Islam because "they [the Turks] always worshipped one deity; they united with the Arabs in their religion and adopted Islam." He also pointed out that, in fact, the Turks adopted Islam because allegedly they had heard from the Arabs the Word of the Prophet Muhammad, who said, "Those who give up their worshipping of idols and other creatures and embrace My faith will receive good and rich soil and will rule on it!" Michael the Syrian said that this was why the Turks had become Muslims.

Magic Rites Connected with the Sky

The Chronicle describes the institution of meetings of leaders and the ritual of electing the "king," chief of the Turkic tribal union. According to Michael the Syrian, emirs of the tribes, 70 in all, the most noble and respected people, gathered to elect one of them as chief. They arranged themselves in a circle, each holding his staff (a symbol of power), drew a circle on the ground, which represented the Sky, and agreed that the person whose staff fell in the center would become their "king." Then they all threw their staffs up into the Sky, where, they believed, the supreme deity resided. One of the staffs would stick vertically in the very center, making its owner the chief.

¹ The same can be found in Mahmud al-Kashgari (see: *Divanü Lugat-it-Türk*, Translation and introduction by Z.-A.M. Auezova, index by R. Ermers, Almaty, 2005; *Divanü Lugat-it-Türk Tercümesi*, Çeviren: Besim Atalay. Ankara: Cilt I, II, III, IV, 1939-1941).

² A.P. Kovalevskiy, *Kniga Ahmeda ibn Fadlana o ego putesthestvii na Volgu v 921-922 godakh*, Kharkov, 1956, pp. 125-126.

³ See: *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia*, 3rd ed., Vol. 28, Moscow, 1978, p. 188.

⁴ *Drevnetiurkskiy slovar* (Leningrad, 1969, p. 312) says *Kög Tängri*—blue sky; the same can be found on the monument erected in honor of Kyul Tegin (8th century).

The Chronicle contains a description of another ritual: willing to divide the spheres of conquest and migration, the chiefs of three tribes threw three marked sticks up into the Sky. They fell down to indicate the directions: one tribe remained where it was; the other moved to Central Asia, and the third to Hither Asia, including Asia Minor. It was decided that each of the tribes would accept the gods it found in the new places. The Turks who stayed behind in their historical homeland (in Orkhon-Enisey and Altay) remained shamanists like their ancestors. Those who moved to Central Asia became Nestorian Christians. This is confirmed by the necropolises testifying that the ancestors of the Turkmen, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz were Nestorians and that Syrian missionaries preached among them.⁵ Those who moved to Hither Asia, the Seljuk Turks, embraced Islam. In other words, religion was not an issue of prime importance for the Turks; its choice depended on political expediency. It should be said that the Turks appeared on the historical arena in the 4th century; they soon appeared in Hither Asia among those who marched westward and as mercenaries in Byzantine and Caliphate armies.⁶ Greek sources, for example, mention noble Byzantine families of Turkic origin: the Alakases, Axuches, Aplesphars, Aspiets, Kamitzes, Karajis, Karamalys, Maniaks, Tarchaneiotas, Tatikiis, Urans, Hasans, and Tsits.⁷ In the Arabian Caliphate, there was a Turkic army and Turkic military commanders.⁸ The Seljuks of Asia Minor later replaced the Arabs with their sultanate (1077-1307), which had its capital in Konya.

The Kög Böri Totem and the Term “Qoş!”

The pre-Islamic beliefs of the Turks are closely connected with the idea of their ancestor-forefather, who occupied one of the central places in their religious system. This is *kög böri* (grey wolf),⁹ one of the most important of the Turkic totems that retained much of its meaning even when the Turks became Muslims. Michael the Syrian, who learned about the totem from the oral epic tradition, called it “an animal that looked like dog,” in which the grey wolf of the Oghuz epic cycle is easily recognizable.

Significantly, Salor-Kazan, a character in the Oghuz heroic epos *Kniga moego deda Korkuta* (Book of Dede Korkut), when talking about his roots, said, “One of my roots goes back to a cub he-wolf.”¹⁰ According to the Turks, the grey wolf (in the modern Turkic languages *bos gurd*) led them to new lands and headed migrations and military campaigns. No wonder the Turkic army was always described as being led by a bek on a light grey (like a wolf) horse.¹¹ Mentions of a *grey wolf* can be found in many written sources, including the Oghuz epic cycle.¹² *Oghuz-name* describes the *Kög Böri!* (grey wolf) as a war cry (*uran*) of the Turks, with which they attacked the enemy.¹³

Michael the Syrian preserved one of the most typical Turkic military nomadic terms *Qoş!*, which signaled the beginning of coordinated movement. Survivals of the tribal system among the Turks were tenacious to the extent that even much later stories (registered in the 12th century) as-

⁵ See: D.A. Khvolson, *Nestorianskie nadpisi iz Semirechya*, St. Petersburg, 1887; Ch. Jumagulov, “Nestorianskie pamiatniki,” in: *Epigrafika Kirgizii*, Issue I, compiled by Ch. Jumagulov, Frunze, 1963, pp. 43-58; idem., *Yazyk siro-tiurkskikh (nestorianskikh) pamiatnikov Kirgizii*, Frunze, 1971.

⁶ See: N.V. Pigulevskaya, *Araby u granits Vizantii i Irana v IV-VI vekakh*, Moscow, Leningrad, 1964, pp. 215-228.

⁷ See: V.A. Gordlevskiy, “Gosudarstvo Seldzhukidov Maloy Azii,” in: V.A. Gordlevskiy, *Izbrannye sochinenia*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1960, p. 49; A.P. Kazhdan, *Sotsialny sostav gosподstviushchego klassa Vizantii XI-XII vekov*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 116-121.

⁸ See: N.Ch. Akhundova, *Tiurki v sisteme gosudartvennogo upravleniya Arabskogo khalifata (VIII-seredina X vekov)*, Baku, 2004, Ch. III, Para 3; B. Spuler, *The Muslim World*, Part I, *The Age of Caliphs*, Leiden, 1960, p. 62.

⁹ See: M. Kashgari, op. cit.; *Drevnetiurkskiy slovar*.

¹⁰ *Kniga moego deda Korkuta. Oguzskiy geroicheskiy epos*, Transl. by Academician V.V. Bartold, Moscow, Leningrad, 1962, p. 98; according to a different version (ibid., p. 279, footnote 33), “I am of the same root as the loud-voiced he-wolf puppy”).

¹¹ See: Ibid., pp. 99, 100.

¹² See: A.M. Shcherbak, *Oghuz-name. Mukhabbat-name*, Moscow, 1959.

¹³ See: Ibid., p. 32.

cribed this command to the *grey wolf*. It comes up in a story every time migration or the military movement of Turkic tribes is mentioned. Michael the Syrian writes, "They say that when they [the Turks] were moving from the East to the West, they saw an animal that looked like a dog marching in front. They did not know what it was and where it came from; they could not approach it either. When the time came to begin moving again, it said to them in their language, 'rise!' They rose and followed it. While it moved, they followed it in the direction it was going. When it stopped, they set up camp, and so it went on until they reached the areas where they were to begin their rule. The leader did not reappear, so they remained where they were.

"...When the Turkic people [the Seljuks] up and left, they covered the whole land and even pushed out the Turks who arrived earlier, because the land could not support them all; those [who arrived earlier] were pushed to the West. When they began moving, they saw that what had been the guide for the people before them [the Turks] and looked like a dog was marching in front and they could not approach it. When it wanted to go, it turned to them and said in a loud voice '*Qoş!*' in their language, that is, 'rise!' They rose and followed it until it stopped; when it stopped, they set up camp. It led them for many days and then disappeared; after that we read or heard nothing more about it. We only know that each group of people is led to something useful by means of what is familiar to it. The Judaists are led by sacrificing sheep and calves; the magi by the stars; in the same way, these [the Turks] were led by animals that look familiar."¹⁴

The Hadiths about the acts and pronouncements of the Prophet Muhammad offer a more or less similar idea. Some of them speak about Turkic hegemony in world history: "They [the Turks] will reach the Arabian Peninsula three times. During the first of their conquests, those who escape will be safe; the second time, those who manage to escape will save their lives, but the third time, no one will escape."¹⁵ Judging by the Ancient and Medieval history of the Turks, by "first conquest" the Prophet Muhammad meant the Turkish campaigns of the 4th-5th centuries; by the second, he predicted what the Oghuzes would accomplish, while the "third conquest" was the Seljuks' campaigns in Central and Hither Asia.

The places found in *Oghuz-name* parallel to the passage quoted above from *The Chronicle* of Michael the Syrian say that the *grey wolf* totem was a herald of the organized movement of the Turks, "At dawn, a ray very much like a ray of the sun penetrated the tent of Oguz-Kagan; a big great wolf appeared from the ray and said to Oguz-Kagan, 'O, Oguz! You are going to move away from Urum. O, Oguz! I will go ahead of you.'" After that Oguz-Kagan folded up his tent, moved on, and saw a huge grey wolf walking in front of his army. [All the others] were marching behind this wolf. Several days later, the grey wolf stopped. Oguz and his army stopped too...

"And again [Oguz-Kagan] moved on... Then Oguz-Kagan saw a grey wolf. This grey wolf said to Oguz-Kagan, 'Oguz-Kagan, now move on with your troops. Lead your people and the beks here and I will show you the way,' he said. At dawn, Oguz-Kagan saw that the wolf was already marching in front of the troops. Gladdened, he moved on too...

"...Once the grey wolf, without moving [on], stopped. Oguz-Kagan also stopped and set up camp."¹⁶

The command *Qoş!* is the imperative of the verb *qoşmag*, which some of the Turkic languages used in the past and are still using. This is true mostly of the Western Hun branch. The fact that the Turkic term *Qoş!* appeared in a Syrian text means that it was not a common word, but a command which meant "let's move." Since the Turks preserved many vestiges of the tribal system, the *Qoş!* command is ascribed to a totem, the *grey wolf*, which appears every time the epic describes Turkic marches or migration. This is how the presence of the term, the meaning of which was clear to the Turks but did not belong to the Syrian vocabulary, appeared in the Syrian text.

¹⁴ *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, Vol. IV, ed. par J.-B. Chabot, Paris, 1910, pp. 567, 569-570.

¹⁵ Quoted from: N.Ch. Akhundova, op. cit., p. 42.

¹⁶ A.M. Shcherbak, op. cit., pp. 37-39, 45-46, 50.

Qoş! means a command to perform a *repeated* action, which is suggested by the semantics of the verb *qoşmaq* and its derivatives in some of the medieval and contemporary Turkic languages. Such are the verbs meaning “harness” or “join” in the form of *koşmak* (Oghuz, Kypchak, Turkish), *koşmak* (Jagatai, Ottoman, and Uighur); *qoşmaq* (Azeri and Turkmen); *қўу.мақ* (Uzbek). There are other meanings: *koş* (Jagatai) means a “camp” or an “army”; *koşuluk* (Jagatai) means “unification”; *koşu* (Ottoman)—a “crowd” and a “cart”; *goş* (Turkmen)—“camp” and “team of horses”; *koşum* (Turkish)—“team of horses.” The Azeri and Turkmen languages use *goşun* for “troops”; the Jagatai and Ottoman languages used the word *koşun*; the Turks, *koşun*, and the Uzbeks, *қўуун*.¹⁷

The above suggests that the largest number of meanings of *Qoş!* and *Qoşmaq* meant *organized* movement—either migrations or military marches.

Marriage Rites

In the 11th and 12th centuries, the Turks living on the vast territory from Central Asia to the Mediterranean and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf followed the marriage rites that contained elements of the marriage rites of other people but preserved typical Turkic features. This explains why they survived among the peoples related to the Oghuzes and, therefore, the Seljuks.

It is rare that the evolution of everyday life can be traced over 800 years, which makes the information contained in the written sources of the 11th-14th centuries, including the writings of Ibn al-‘Ebroyo, doubly interesting. He supplied us with the earliest, among those known so far, descriptions of the Oghuz marriage rite: the marriage in 1063 of the first Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid (1038-1063) and Seyyeda, the daughter of Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid (1031-1075).¹⁸ The fact that his description is confirmed by other sources means that marriage rites survived unchanged among the Turks for centuries. From this it follows that the Turkic marriage cycle had certain pre-Islamic specifics and bore the stamp of a nomadic lifestyle and the norms of tribal society. After adopting Islam in the 10th century, the Turks followed the old marriage rites; fiqh served as the official basis for the marriage contract.

The descriptions found in the written sources described the Turkic marriage rites customary among nobles rather than among common people, however those rites still practiced suggest that they were essentially the same in all social groups. The descriptions of marriage rites found in the written sources and the contemporary Turkic marriage cycle are in fact identical. This means that they remained unchanged and are very different from those practiced by other peoples. This statement is confirmed by the fact that some of the contemporary peoples, the languages of whom are close to those of the Oghuzes (Azeris, Turkmen, and Turks) still largely follow the same marriage ritual.

In the past, 15 years was the minimum age for the bridegroom, while the bride could be even younger.¹⁹ Not infrequently, babies were betrothed. In the 11th-12th centuries, the marriage rites of the Turks consisted of the following elements:

Matchmaking. Consent of the bride’s family had to be obtained; this was an important stage. This is confirmed by one of the wedding songs still alive among the Salars (descendants of an eponymous Oghuz tribe that lives in Xinjiang. “It is said in Turkic that if there is no cloud in the sky, there will be no plenty on Earth; if there are no matchmakers, there will be no relatives!”²⁰ The bride’s family used this time to acquire the maximum advantages. If the bride’s relatives wanted too much and made the marriage disadvantageous for the bridegroom, his side would use all sorts of arguments up to and including threats in order to trim the appetite of the other side. This happened when Great

¹⁷ See dictionaries of these languages; see also: L. Budagov, *Sravnitelny slovar turetsko-tatarskikh narechiy*, St. Petersburg, 1868-1871; V.V. Radlov, *Opyt slovaria tiurkskikh narechiy*, St. Petersburg, 1890-1911; M. Kashgari, op. cit.

¹⁸ See: G. Barhebraei, *Chronicon Syriacum*, ed. by P. Bedjan, Parisitit, 1890, p. 255.

¹⁹ See: *Kniga moego deda*, pp. 34, 39, 73; *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, p. 699.

²⁰ E.R. Tenishev, *Salarskie teksty*, Moscow, 1964, pp. 87, 89.

Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid sought the hand of Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid's daughter in marriage: only the sultan's broad hints that he would wage war forced Abbasid to give his consent to the marriage.²¹

Before seeking a bride for his son, an emir sought advice from his closest circle, "Son, let us call to our tent all the beks of the Oghuzes: we shall follow their decision." The folklore of the Salars says that the young man first informed his father that he intended to marry, after which matchmaking began.²²

Among the rich and mighty, it was viziers, military leaders, atabegs, emirs, and qadis who acted as matchmakers. The case when the father himself performed this duty goes back to the pre-Islamic past of the Turks.²³ An Oghuz epos relates how a father tells his son the following: "It is for you to find a girl; it is for me to give you money and food."²⁴ Matchmakers were received with honors, especially if they represented royalty or another influential person. Emir of Arzinjan Bahram Shah Mangujakid personally headed the ceremonial procession to meet the matchmakers of Konya Sultan Kay Kaus I Seljukid (1210-1219) who sought his daughter's hand in marriage and personally accompany them to the palace. This was an unequalled honor.²⁵ The unfaithful who arrived in Asia Minor at the time of the Crusades of the 11th-14th centuries paid equal honor to those who came to engage in matchmaking: they rolled out carpets, slaughtered white sheep, and poured red wine.²⁶

After the traditional greetings, the matchmaker addressed the eldest man in the house of the future bride, "On the instructions of Allah and the word of the Prophet, I have come here to seek the hand of [name followed] in marriage, who is purer than the new moon and brighter than the sun."²⁷ The matchmakers had to obtain the consent of the bride's family. If the girl being pursued was given in marriage to another, the offended side might even "go at war."

In some cases, a powerful noble or even royal bridegroom might inform the bride's family that the contract had been signed even before the talks were completed. This happened in 1062 when Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid, irritated by the prolonged talks and aware of his power, merely informed everyone that he would marry Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid's daughter.²⁸

There was a cycle of love songs better described as wedding love songs; the Salars had a special term for this type of song—the *yir*: the bridegroom sang while addressing his bride in his thoughts: "I will marry you! If I do not marry you, what shall I do?" Another song goes, "Even when I do not think about you our souls are still one. When I think I go crazy and my soul is in confusion. If they ask why this confusion [I shall answer]: because of your black hair."²⁹

Drawing up the marriage contract: this was a very important stage at which the true intentions of the sides became clear. Both sides sought the maximum advantages, some of them fairly surprising. Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid, for example, demanded that Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid return the occupied Vasis region.³⁰ The contract was done in writing, then signed and stamped by empowered and experienced representatives of the sides. As a rule, this was done in the bridegroom's house in the presence of a faqih, qadis, and representatives of the houses of the bride and the bridegroom.³¹ In 1056, Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid, who sought the hand of Arslan-hatun, the niece of Grand Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid, in marriage, gathered his closest circle in the palace. Then, after the sultan gave

²¹ See: G. Barhebraei, op. cit., p. 241; *İrak ve Horasan selçukluları Tarihi* (History of Seljuks of Iraq and Horasan), İstanbul, 1943, S. 18-20.

²² See: *Kniga moego deda*, p. 36; E.R. Tenishev, op. cit., p. 137.

²³ See: *Kniga moego deda*, p. 64.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 63; Rashid ad-Din, *Jami at-tavarikh*, Vol. I, Book I, Moscow, Leningrad, 1952, p. 81.

²⁵ See: *Kniga moego deda*, pp. 36-37; İbn Bibi, *Selçukname* (Seljukname), Çeviren M.N. Gencosman, Ankara, 1941, S. 71.

²⁶ See: *Kniga moego deda*, p. 65.

²⁷ A.N. Kononov, *Rodoslovnaia Turkmen. Sochinenie Abu-l-Gazi khana Khivinskogo*, Moscow, Leningrad, 1958, p. 59.

²⁸ See: *İrak ve Horasan*, S. 18.

²⁹ E.R. Tenishev, op. cit., pp. 69-70, ff.

³⁰ See: *İrak ve Horasan*, S. 18.

³¹ See: *Kniga moego deda*, pp. 13, 30; İbn Bibi, op. cit., S. 72-73; *İrak ve Horasan*, S. 9, 21, 43, 72-73.

him a sign, the vizier of Seljukid Amid al-Mulk, who came to draw up the marriage contract, girdled himself, took a lash, and called in the Turkic emirs who had come with him. In the presence of the representatives of both sides, the vizier started drawing up the contract. According to the custom, first the bridegroom expressed his agreement with all the points, then everyone else expressed their consent. The contract was signed and came into force.³²

Ibn Bibi informed everyone of the details of the contract and cited the formulas it envisaged. When describing the wedding of Konya Sultan Kay Kaus I Seljukid and Seljuk-hatun, he wrote, "They called the agents and witnesses of both sides. The person empowered to sign the marriage contract [in the name of the sultan] turned to the qibla and, after describing some of the marriage contracts drawn up in the family of Caliph al-Mammun [Abbasid, 813-833], prayed. When he had finished, he said, 'You know quite well that Sultan Izz ad-Din Kay Kaus ibn Key-Khosrow of the Kilij-Arslan clan, the conqueror and victor, reasonable and sensible, wants to ask the noble clan of Melik Fahr ad-Din Bahram Shah ibn Daud for Seljuk-hatun's hand in marriage for a kalym of 100 thousand gold dinars.' The bride's side answered, 'We accept the offer and consent to the marriage. Let virtue reign over them!' The marriage contract was concluded and the couple were joined in matrimony. Then they were showered with good wishes of 'Let them be happy and have children!'"³³

The articles dealing with the bride price (Turkic term *kalym*) and *mahr* or *mehr* (support of the wife in the event of divorce on the husband's initiative or his death) were described by Mahmud al-Kashgari in his *Divanü Lugat-it-Türk*. The size of the kalym and mehr depended on the social and property status of the bride and the bridegroom and their future gains. Sometimes demands for excessive kalym or mehr or other uncommon demands from the bride's side were intended as a veiled refusal. Until the bridegroom paid the entire kalym, he could not claim his bride.³⁴ There were cases when future spouses lived together after the marriage contract had been signed but the marriage rite had not been performed.³⁵ The custom gradually died away under the pressure of Islamic injunctions. The kalym and the mehr were in fact an act of buying and selling the woman, a trade deal.

Kalym and mehr were normally paid in cash. In some cases, huge sums were involved (up to several hundred thousand gold dinars) and even larger quantities of silver dirhams. In 1081/82, Caliph al-Muqtadi Abbasid (1075-1094) sought the hand of one of the daughters (her name is unknown) of Great Sultan Melik Shah Seljukid (1072-1092) in marriage; his matchmakers were informed that they had two rivals and that each of them was offering 400 thousand gold dinars as a kalym, "If the Caliph can pay this or a similar sum, he will be preferred because he is the most noble of the suitors." This case was probably an exception because the skilful matchmakers convinced the bride's family that it was a great honor and a great advantage to become a relative of the Abbasid Caliph, a religious leader in the world of Islam; no kalym was paid.³⁶

An eyewitness related an interesting fact about the size of the kalym in the Ottoman Empire: the bridegroom had to pay the bride's father a sum in silver coins that weighed as much as his future wife.³⁷ This was called *agirlik* (weight or heaviness). Today in Turkey, this term means "bride's dowry" or "jewelry."

Kalym also included expensive clothes, thoroughbred racers, male and female slaves, servants, jewelry, silk cloth and kerchiefs and, in some cases, real estate. Seljuk-hatun, the daughter of Konya Sultan Kilij Arslan IV Seljukid (1248-1264), brought her father part of Eastern Anatolia when she arrived at the house of her bridegroom Argun, son of Mongol Ilkhan Abag Khan Hulagid (1265-1292).³⁸

³² See: İrak ve Horasan, S. 8-9; Sadruddin, *Ahbar-ü'd-Devlet is-Selçukiyye* (Chronicle of the State of the Seljiks), Çeviren N. Lüğal, Ankara, 1943, S. 12-13.

³³ İbn Bibi, op. cit., S. 72-73.

³⁴ See: A.P. Kovalevskiy, op. cit., p. 126; G. Barhebraei, op. cit., p. 241.

³⁵ See: *Kniga moego deda*, pp. 35, 39, 69.

³⁶ See: İrak ve Horasan, S. 72.

³⁷ See: Osman-bey, *Turki i ikh zhenshchiny*, St. Petersburg, 1874, p. 67.

³⁸ See: İbn Bibi, op. cit., S. 279, 283.

In most cases, the sources say nothing about the bride's dowry even if it was specified in the marriage contract; it was probably considered unimportant when noble or royal houses wedded their offspring. According to indirect information, however, Iraqi Sultan Mahmud I Seljukid (1118-1131) was married consecutively to two daughters of his parental uncle, Great Sultan Sanjar Seljukid (1118-1157). When they died, the uncle demanded that the nephew return the dowry and jewelry he had received.³⁹

The dowry of a noble bride included "household appliances and other items of everyday use which suited her rank," as well as "headwear strewn with pearls; fragrant [ankle] bangles; precious rings and [wrist] bracelets; gold-brocaded and pearl-studded personal items; exquisite clothes, ambler mules shod in gold; horses faster than the wind; and innumerable quantities of all kinds of other precious objects and gold."⁴⁰

After signing the marriage contract, the bridegroom had to give presents to the bride and her family, as well as to those who participated in drawing up the contract. Not specified by the contract, this ceremony was repeated several times at all stages of the marriage rite. The bride's family presented a red caftan to the future spouse. The noble bridegroom put it on while his retinue addressed him with: "You wear a red caftan while we are clad in white caftans;" the bridegroom responded: "You should not be bothered by such trifles: today I put it [the caftan] on; tomorrow my deputy; for forty days you should wear it in turn." This is an old custom among the Turks which goes back to the vestiges of group marriage.⁴¹

In the medieval and contemporary Muslim East, there was a special expression "to give a *khalat* [chapaan]" that described gift-giving. The custom of "presenting a *khalat*" has survived to this day: gifts are presented at weddings or to people who bring good news. In *Kniga moego deda Korkuta*, one of the characters says, "I will give a horse and clothing to anyone who brings good news."⁴² Normally, gifts included expensive clothing, thoroughbred race horses, expensive saddles, servants, gold and silver coins, silk kerchiefs, jewelry and, by way of exception, real estate. Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid, for example, after signing the marriage contract, presented his father-in-law Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid with thirty Turkic boys and girls, thirty horses, two servants, a race horse with a gold saddle encrusted with pearls, and 10 thousand gold dinars. He gave his bride Seyyeda 10 thousand gold dinars, a necklace of thirty pearls each weighing 1 miskal (4 grams), and "everything that belonged to his dead wife in Iraq."⁴³

Ibn Bibi mentioned sugar-loafs among the bridegroom's gifts. Konya Sultan Kay Kaus I Seljukid, in particular, presented sugar-loafs to those who drafted the marriage contract. Vladimir Gordlevskiy commented on this with the following: "Sugar was a symbol of restored peace and goes back to the epoch when wives were abducted, which caused squabbles and enmity between the two clans," and explained that sugar meant that the spouses were wished a sweet life. Late in the 19th century, when he visited the Ottoman Empire for academic purposes, he pointed out that among the Ottoman Turks sugar was regarded as one of the gifts.⁴⁴ Today, in the Caucasus, sweetmeats (sugar, nabat, and confectionary) are an inevitable component of gifts.

A ceremonial procession concluded the talks and marked the signing of the marriage contract. During the feast, which crowned the ceremony, the following traditional solemn formula was uttered: "Let them [the bridegroom and bride] be happy and have children!"

Kerchiefs, nearly always silk kerchiefs, were invariably among the gifts presented as part of the kalym; kerchiefs were also part of the dowry. This custom has survived to the present day. In the past, noble emirs presented their guests at the feasts with gold-embroidered silk kerchiefs. Among the Seljuks, kerchiefs were presented as a sign of good news or a joyous occasion. In Azerbaijan, the bride receives a white

³⁹ See: İrak ve Horasan, S. 144.

⁴⁰ *Rodoslovnaia Turkmen*, p. 59; İbn Bibi, op. cit., S. 72.

⁴¹ See: *Kniga moego deda*, p. 38. The *white caftan* means that the man was not married.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁴³ İrak ve Horasan, S. 21.

⁴⁴ See: V.A. Gordlevskiy, "Iz kommentariiev k staroosmanskomu perevodu khroniki maloaziatskikh Seldzhukidov, tak nazываемoy 'Khroniki İbn Bibi'," in: V.A. Gordlevskiy, *Izbrannye sochinenia*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1961, p. 163.

silk shawl (*kelagai*) on the day of the preliminary agreement; on the day of betrothal, she is presented with another similar shawl. The custom is widespread among the Kumyks of Daghestan.⁴⁵ It is not by chance that many of the Oriental peoples share the tradition of presenting kerchiefs or lengths of cloth: they signify happiness and wellbeing and probably perform the function of a wedding veil: to protect against “evil spirits” and the “evil eye.” On the whole, they had a religious and magical function.

This ritual is obviously connected with another, no less important, custom in which cloth plays an important role. Throughout almost the entire ceremony, the bride remained concealed behind a curtain or veil; terminologically this can be described as a *taboo*: the ban related to the girl who was betrothed and is consequently somebody’s property. This is a custom of religious heterism: the bride is transferred to a deity; she is protected from “evil spirits” and the “evil eye”; it is also a vestige of the ancient custom of abduction. The bride is kept behind a curtain or is veiled to protect her and the bridegroom against magic because, it was believed, the wedding provided an opportunity to cast spells. This custom is very much alive: in Azerbaijan, the bride is kept in the parents’ house under a veil; her face is concealed during her trip to the house of the bridegroom and at the wedding feast. At home, she puts on her wedding dress behind a white curtain; then she moves into another room where she, still veiled, receives good wishes standing in a special place; in the third room, she sits behind a curtain. Before she comes out to be driven to the bridegroom’s house, her head is covered with a kerchief and a shawl.⁴⁶ In the past, in her husband’s house, the new wife never bared her head until the first child was born.

Wedding feasts in the house of the bride. For a common Turk, marriage was a financial burden, which explains why there was often several years between the signing of the marriage contract and the wedding. By the time the contract was signed, the bridegroom had to accumulate enough money to buy presents and pay for the wedding in his house. For obvious reasons, the noble and wealthy never thought twice about the kalym, repeated gifts, or other expenses; a wealthy bridegroom normally had enough money to pay for the wedding once the marriage contract was signed.

The mounted bridegroom and his retinue arrived at the house of the bride and were accompanied to special wedding premises. If the bridegroom or his future father-in-law were titled persons, the ceremony was even more pompous. The bridegroom was met outside the city, sometimes at the distance of several days’ travel, by specially appointed dignitaries and a military unit. Once more, gifts, silk kerchiefs, and gold coins, among other presents, were presented to the bride and distributed among the members of her house.

All this time, the bride, concealed from the others by a shawl, remained in a separate room in the house of her parents. At night, on the eve of the wedding feast, she was brought to the wedding premises and, clad in white, was seated on a “golden throne.” The bridegroom approached her, kissed the ground at her feet, and for some time served her. After performing the ritual, he took his place on a “silver throne.” The “silver” and “golden” thrones might be an echo of Turkic folklore which likens the girl to the Sun (“red” and “golden”) and the young man to the Moon (“white” and “silver”). One of the Oghuz epic songs says that, at a feast, Khan Bayundur placed the beks who had sons by a white banner; those who had daughters were seated by a red banner, while those who were childless sat by a black banner. During the wedding, red tents were put up in the house of the bride and white tents in the house of the bridegroom.⁴⁷

If, before the wedding, the bridegroom “retreated to the places where his ancestors roam,” the bride changed her white wedding clothes for black ones and mourned him by scratching her cheeks until she drew blood, lamenting: “Alas, the master of my crimson lips! Alas, the hope of my brow and head! Alas, my king and my dzhigit! Where did you go, why did you leave me alone, my soul, my

⁴⁵ See: *Kniga moego deda*, p. 49; *Narody Kavkaza*, Part II, Moscow, 1962, p. 135; S.Sh. Hajieva, *Kumyki*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 270-271.

⁴⁶ See: Osman-bey, op. cit., p. 80; S.Sh. Hajieva, op. cit., pp. 275-176; *Narody Kavkaza*, p. 138; R. Babayeva, *Quba şəhərinin toy adətləri* (Marriage Rites of the City of Quba), Baku, 1946, pp. 22-23, 32 (in Azeri).

⁴⁷ See: *Kniga moego deda*, pp. 14, 39, 69; İbn Bibi, op. cit., S. 7.

dzhigit; you whom I loved with all my heart as soon as I opened my eyes; you with whom I shared my pillow; who perished on his road and who became its victim!"⁴⁸

Transfer to the house of the bridegroom took place after the feast in the bride's house. The wedding cortege went to a special room, while the bride was invariably accompanied by the bridegroom, although exceptions were made: emir-i mejlis and the wives of top officials of the Konya sultanate accompanied the bride of Konya Sultan Kay Kaus I Seljukid instead of the bridegroom, who could not attend the wedding feast in Arzinjan at the bride's house. The bridegroom was expected to meet his bride in any case. For example, Iraqi Sultan Muhammad Seljukid (1153-1160), although ill, personally greeted his bride sitting in a palanquin close to his capital, the city of Hamadan in Azerbaijan. Iraqi Sultan Togrul I Seljukid (1132-1134), accompanied by his emirs, met his bride outside the capital. Among the Salars, the bride moved to the bridegroom's house sitting on a camel inside a *gejebe* (imitation of the Salar dwelling).⁴⁹

Wedding feast in the bridegroom's house. From the house of her parents, the bride was ceremoniously escorted to the wedding premises in the house of her bridegroom (an already existing or newly built palace or pavilion). It was the custom among the Oghuzes to set up a white tent for the bridegroom at the place where "an arrow sent by the dzhigit fell to the ground."⁵⁰ This means that the choice of place for the wedding feast in the bridegroom's house was a ritual. There is a custom among some of the present-day Turkic peoples of organizing the wedding feast in special premises; in Azerbaijan, mainly in the countryside, a *toyhana* (a wooden pavilion) was built for the occasion, its walls and floor covered with carpets. The tradition goes back to the 12th century; Nizami Ganjavi wrote about this at one time.⁵¹ The guests took their places at the tables arranged along the walls; professional musicians and singers performed in the same room; those who wanted to dance went into the center.

Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid built a palace in Baghdad for his wedding feast with Seyyeda, the daughter of Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid. Seljuks illuminated the palace and streets for such occasions; buildings, mainly palaces, were lavishly decorated. In 1159, for example, pavilions were built for the wedding of Iraqi Sultan Muhammad Seljukid and Hatun-i-Kirman, daughter of Melik of Kirman in Hamadan, the capital of the sultanate; the city was illuminated.⁵²

The "*bath ritual*" in the bridegroom's house on the eve of the wedding was another tradition. Konya Sultan Kay Kaus I Seljukid went to the bathhouse before going to the wedding.⁵³ Even today, in Azerbaijan the bridegroom, along with his mates and musicians, goes to the bathhouse; the ritual is known as "*bey hamami*" (the bridegroom's bath ritual) and is accompanied by gift-giving.

In the wedding premises, the bride was led into a separate room and put on the "golden throne" ("the throne of honor and bliss," according to Ibn Bibi), where she remained concealed behind a curtain. In Azerbaijan, this expression is known from a wedding song of the people of Quba (a city in Azerbaijan). In the bride's house, people sing, "We congratulate you, the bride, on being seated on the throne and wish you happiness."⁵⁴ Among the Salars, the bride's father sings *oruh-ses* (song of praise) in honor of the bridegroom and the bride. The bridegroom and his friends dance and sing in front of the bride.⁵⁵ It should be said that Ibn al-'Ebroyo supplied information that was not contained

⁴⁸ *Kniga moego deda*, p. 39.

⁴⁹ See: Sadruddin, op. cit., S. 129; "Histoire des Seldjoudides. Extraite du Tarikhi-Guzideh d'Hamd-Allah Mustaufi," Trad. par M. Defréremy, *Journal Asiatique*, tome XII, 1848, pp. 362-364; *Irak ve Horasan*, S. 256.

⁵⁰ *Kniga moego deda*, pp. 38, 54.

⁵¹ See: N. Ganjavi, *Iskender-name* (The Book of Alexander), Part I, Baku, 1953, pp. 191-192; idem, *Sem krasavits* (The Seven Beauties), Baku, 1959, p. 243.

⁵² See: Ravendi, *Rahat-üs-Sudur ve Ayet-üs-Sürür* (Lightening the Hearts and Creating Joy), I-II Cilt, Çeviren A. Ateş, Ankara, 1957-1960, S. 259.

⁵³ See: İbn Bibi, op. cit., S. 74.

⁵⁴ *Kniga moego deda*, p. 35; N. Ganjavi, op. cit., p. 256; A.A. Volodin, *Trukhmenskaia step i trukhmeny. Sbornik materialov dlia opisaniia mestnostey i plemen Kavkaza (SMOMPK)*, Issue 38, Tiflis, 1907, p. 238; R. Babayeva, op. cit., p. 22; İbn Bibi, op. cit., S. 74.

⁵⁵ See: E.R. Tenishev, op. cit., pp. 87-90; G. Barhebraei, op. cit., p. 241.

in other sources or among other peoples. When the bride of Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid “arrived at his palace, the sultan and noble Turks rose and danced as was the custom among them: they knelt and rose and sang songs according to the Turkic custom.” Dated 1063, this is the earliest information about wedding songs and dances among the Turks; kneeling as a dance element can still be seen among the Azeris and many other Caucasian peoples.

In the bridegroom’s house, the wedding feast began late at night and went on for several days to the accompaniment of music, dancing, and sings. Among the Turks of the Caucasus and Central Asia, dancing and singing performed by one person is still popular. As far as we know, it was only among the Seljuks that the future spouse danced and sang in front of the bride. Among other Turkic people, dancing in front of the bride, without singing, is performed by the bridegroom’s closest friends and relatives.

During the feast, which lasted many days or even a week, and after it, gifts were presented. The bridegroom sent his gift to the bride through one of his close female relatives. Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid, for example, sent his bride two precious necklaces, a gold goblet, and a head shawl embroidered with gold and decorated with pearls through his niece Hadija Arslan-hatun, the Caliph’s wife. Those present at the wedding feast were mainly given expensive clothing.⁵⁶

Viewing and uncovering the face. Throughout the wedding feast in the bridegroom’s house and after it, the bride was kept in a special chamber concealed behind a curtain. Here is a typical detail: after the wedding the spouse stayed away from his wife for several days (up to a week in some cases). For example, Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid, when entering the room where his wife sat on a golden throne, bowed to the ground to demonstrate his respect, but never sat down, leaving the room without saying a word. This went on for seven days, throughout which the wife never showed her face. This custom, and many other wedding rituals typical of the Turks, demonstrated respect for the woman. The face uncovering ceremony took place after an interval specified by tradition; terminologically this meant the first night, which probably took place in a tent set up for this purpose.⁵⁷

The wife’s temporary return to her parent’s house. In some cases, the sides agreed that after the wedding feast in the bridegroom’s house the wife would return, for a specified period, to her parent’s house, or would not be taken away from her native town by her husband (if the wedding took place in the bride’s native town).⁵⁸ It is hard to say whether this was observed, since the sources mention it only when the husband broke it. This custom preserved the remnants of the transition stage between the matrilocal and patrilocal forms of residence. The patrilocal form is typical of class society, which explains why in the past the husband frequently neglected the custom. According to Ibn al-‘Ebroyo, for example, when, after the wedding, Togrul bek “left Baghdad to return to Horasan, he took the Caliph’s daughter, his wife, with him. The sultan broke his promise to let her stay in Baghdad.”

This is the last of the marriage rites.

Other elements of the wedding cycle. Music, dancing, and singing were invariable components of the Turkic marriage cycle performed by professional singers and musicians who played the kobyz, zurna, and drums. The Salars have preserved a cycle of wedding lyrics called *sagiş* (the bride’s lamenting).⁵⁹ In one of them the girl pleads with her parents, “Why I am being married off so early?”; in another she addresses her friends, “Tell my parents that I am too young to marry”; the third again is addressed to the parents, to whom she says, “My life in my husband’s house will be a hard one if he does not like me.” There was a *sagiş* performed while the girl was dressed for the wedding feast. She addresses her relatives, father, mother, and brothers, “Please help me, do not abandon me, and do not forget me when I move to my husband’s house; come and see me!”

These songs and songs of praise were performed throughout all stages of the wedding ceremony. In the 13th century, for example, Ibn Bibi registered the following formula in Asia Minor that was pronounced at the feast when the wedding contract was signed:

⁵⁶ See: *İrak ve Horasan*, S. 24.

⁵⁷ See: *Kniga moego deda*, p. 39; N. Derzhavin, op. cit., p. 173; G. Barhebraei, op. cit., p. 241.

⁵⁸ See: G. Barhebraei, op. cit., p. 241; *İrak ve Horasan*, S. 24.

⁵⁹ E.R. Tenishev, op. cit., pp. 32-35; 91-94.

“Кутлу ве њѡуклу олсунлар!”

(“Let them [the bridegroom and bride]
Be happy and have children!”).⁶⁰

Late in the 19th century, Vladimir Gordlevskiy attended an Ottoman wedding in Asia Minor where he heard a song with a similar refrain:

*“Кутлу олсун, йарым, олсун!
Диѡици миѡбарек олсун!”*

(“Be happy, my love,
Let your wedding be blessed!”).⁶¹

One may even say that both formulas recorded at different times in the same locality (Asia Minor) testify to the fact that in the 19th century an echo of the songs of praise of a much earlier (Middle Ages) period was still heard. In Azerbaijan, for example, the singer addresses the bride with a song of praise:

*“Эялин, сянин тяхтин миѡбаряк олсун!
Эялин, сянин бяхтин миѡбаряк олсун!”*

(“We congratulate you, the bride, on being seated on the throne!
We wish you, the bride, happiness!”).⁶²

Similar wording and identical formulas used in Asia Minor in the 13th and also in the late 19th century and in Azerbaijan in the mid-20th century cannot but attract attention. This means that throughout the centuries, wedding songs and dances were passed down to the next generation and were popular in places populated by Turkic tribes (the Caucasus being one such place) who used kindred languages and followed similar customs.

Wedding feasts were accompanied by all sorts of games and contests, including equestrian events, such as dzhigiting (stunts on horseback) and racing.⁶³ For example, in 1172, during the wedding between Emir of Melitene Abu-i-Kasim and the daughter of the ruler of the Hisn-Ziyyad fortress Kara Arslan, “everyone came out to organize games according to the customs of the Turks and warriors.” There is a custom among the Caucasian peoples to start games or dance in pairs. The Ottoman Turks invited musicians; they danced and took part in games and watched horse racing and dzhigiting.

There were competitions among those who wanted to marry the girl; they were expected to answer questions and solve riddles and take part in various contests. What the Oghuzes wrote about the single combat between the bridegroom and monsters was the most archaic form of heroic matchmaking, which goes back to the ancient fairy tales about bogatyrs popular among the Turkic and Mongolian people. It is known that the bridegroom and the bride competed in quick-wittedness (a dialog-competition), riding, archery, and wrestling. Typically, the bridegroom would say, “If this girl wins, the rest of the Oghuzes will ridicule me forever.”⁶⁴ Among the Islamized Turks, this competition was an archaism and a vestige from pre-Muslim times. This very distinctive tradition survived until the 11th-12th centuries. Michael the Syrian wrote that during the wedding feast in the bridegroom’s house, equestrian events were organized “according to the customs of Turks and warriors.”⁶⁵ The Salars preserved the custom until our day and age in the form of wedding “camel games” which in-

⁶⁰ İbn Bibi, op. cit., S. 73074.

⁶¹ V.A. Gordlevskiy, “Osmanskaia svadba,” in: V.A. Gordlevskiy, *Izbrannye sochinenia*, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1968, pp. 98, 109-110.

⁶² R. Babayeva, op. cit., pp. 3-4, 22.

⁶³ See: *Kniga moego deda*, pp. 38, 42, 44-47; A. Kiiasbekov, *Svadebnye obriady Nukhinskogo uezda (SMOMPK)*, Issue 31, Tiflis, 1902, p. 180; V.A. Gordlevskiy, “Osmanskaia svadba,” pp. 97, 100; *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, p. 699.

⁶⁴ *Kniga moego deda*, pp. 35-38, 64-69, 72.

⁶⁵ *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, p. 699.

cluded tales and songs in honor of the bridegroom and bride.⁶⁶ Competitions during weddings were a very distinctive reflection of the lifestyle of the Turks, who spent the larger part of their lives on horseback; they were always ready to fight, hunt for prey, or clash over pastures. These games were not merely a demonstration of prowess, agility, and proficiency; there was another meaning in all of this connected with so-called wedding dzhigiting (one of the vestiges of the custom of bride abducting). The games and dances, in particular, were magic rites much more ancient than class society.

Specifics of marriages among the feudal lords. Marriages between the houses of feudal lords pursued other aims than starting a family. They sought allies, wealth, power, economic might, and political clout, sharing the spoils of war, distributing material boons and territory, and acquiring connections, sinecures, crowns, or land. This is amply testified by the dynastic and other forms of marriages among Muslims and with “infidels.”⁶⁷ For example, a Turkic kagan gave Sassanid Emperor Khosrow I Anushirvan (531-579) his daughter’s hand in marriage in the hope of “winning his favors as a relative and averting possible evil on his part.”

Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid married Hadija Arslan-hatun, the niece of Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid, to “strengthen his contacts with the Seljuks and to show his enemies that he did not intend to cut short his friendship with the Turks.” The Great Sultan, in turn, married the Caliph’s daughter Seyyeda to become a relative of the Abbasids and legalize, in the eyes of the Muslim world, both usurpation of secular power of the imam of the faithful and his conquests.

In 1064, when Great Sultan Alp-Arslan Seljukid (1063-1092) led his army to the Southern Caucasus, the local rulers, in an effort to protect themselves and their domains, decided to pledge their loyalty to him and become related to him. Georgian King Christian Bagrat IV (1027-1072) accepted this Seljukid as his suzerain, signed a peace treaty with him, and gave him a Georgian princess’s hand in marriage. The wedding took place in the Azeri city of Hamadan. Later, Alp-Arslan gave one of his dignitaries the princess’s hand in marriage.⁶⁸

Great Sultan Malik Shah Seljukid negotiated a peace treaty with Emperor of Byzantium Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118), who wanted the Seljuks to stop their inroads into imperial territory. Malik Shah agreed on the condition that his elder son would be wedded to one of the Komnenian princesses. The emperor accepted the condition, but Malik Shah was murdered in 1092 before the matrimonial plans were realized.⁶⁹

Caliph al-Muqtadi Abbasid (1075-1094) had two Turkish wives: Sara, the daughter of Great Sultan Alp-Arslan Seljukid, and the daughter of his successor Malik Shah. Caliph al-Mustajir Abbasid (1094-1118) was married to Hatun al-Ismat, Malik Shah’s other daughter.⁷⁰ Iraqi Sultan Daud Seljukid (1131-1132) married his cousin Jauhar-hatun, the daughter of Iraqi Sultan Masood Seljukid (1134-1152). Iraqi Sultan Suleyman Shah Seljukid (1160-1161) was married to a Christian, the daughter of Georgian King David IV the Builder (1089-1125) and a niece of Khwarazmshah Atsiz (1127-1156). Arslan Shah, who succeeded Suleyman, married a daughter of Caliph al-Muqtafi Abbasid (1136-1160); Iraqi Sultan Muhammad I Seljukid (1153-1160) was betrothed to daughter of Caliph al-Muqtafi Abbasid.⁷¹

Atabeg of Azerbaijan Shams al-Din Ildeniz (1136-1176) married the widow of Iraqi Sultan Togrul I (1132-1134) and, as a relative of the Seljukids, strengthened his position in Iraq. He had two sons by her—Jahan Pahlavan and Qizil-Arslan—maternal half-brothers of Iraqi Sultan Arslan Shah Seljukid. For political reasons, in 1186, the last Iraqi sultan of the Seljukid dynasty, Togrul II (1176-

⁶⁶ See: E.R. Tenishev, op. cit., pp. 32-35, 36-37, 87-94, 137.

⁶⁷ G. Barhebraei, op. cit., p. 233; *Irak ve Horasan*, S. 8, 26, 43, 72-73, 212; Sadruddin, op. cit., S. 12-13, 57, 94, 129; *Histoire des Seldjoucides*, Vol. XII, p. 352.

⁶⁸ See: *Irak ve Horasan*, S. 31; G. Barhebraei, op. cit., p. 244; *Histoire des Seldjoucides*, Vol. XI, pp. 436-437.

⁶⁹ See: *Vizantiyskie istoriki. Anna Komnina. Alexiada*, Part I, St. Petersburg, 1859, pp. 303-304.

⁷⁰ See: E. de Zambaur, *Manuel de Généalogie et de Chronologie pour l’Histoire de l’Islam*, Hannover, 1927, Tableau Généalogique “R”.

⁷¹ See: *Ibid.*, Tableaux Généalogiques “G” et “R”.

1194), married Inanj-hatun, the widow of his Atabeg Jahan Pahlavan and daughter of powerful Emir of Asia Minor Bek Timur.⁷²

In the latter half of the 12th century, the Georgian dynasty of Bargatids became related to the Iraqi Seljukids. Princess Rusudan, the sister of King Georgy III (1156-1184), married Sultan Arslan Shah (1161-1176). After realizing that they were no match for the Iraqi state of the Seljukids and the Ildenizids who ruled it, the Shirvanshahs preferred to become the relatives of their fearful neighbors. This explains why Emir Umar, the younger son of Atabeg Jahan Pahlavan, who ruled in Ganja, married the daughter of Shirvanshah Garshasp (1179-1225). When Atabeg Abu-Bakr Ildenizid lost much of his former might and could no longer keep the Georgian feudal lords in check, he married a Georgian princess to discontinue military inroads into his domains.⁷³

A gold medal was minted to commemorate the wedding of Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid and Seyyeda, the daughter of Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid, a unique case in the history of the Seljuks.⁷⁴ It is 47 mm in diameter and weighs 23.74 grams. The obverse shows Caliph al-Qaim Abbasid and a circular Arabic inscription in Kufi style: "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad, Peace be upon Him, is the Messenger of Allah. Al-Qaim bi-Amrillah, Head of the Faithful." The reverse carries a portrait of the first Great Sultan Togrul bek Seljukid wearing a typically Turkic felt hat. The circular Arabic inscription in Kufi style says: "Powerful Sultan, Shahinshah, Pillar of Peace and Religion Togrul bek. Minted in Madinat al-Salam [Baghdad] in 1063."

Some of the customs provide an insight into the wedding rites of the Turkic cycle.

Marrying a widow. The procedure was shorter and the wedding less pompous; the kalym was half of the normal size; there were no feasts in the bride's house, no exchange of gifts, no bridegroom's trips for his future wife, and no face uncovering. When Iraqi Sultan Togrul I Seljukid married Inanj-hatun, the widow of his Grand Artabeg, Jahan Pahlavan Ildenizid (1176-1187), he dispatched his agents to accompany her to Hamadan, the capital of his sultanate, and greeted her personally outside the city walls together with emirs and their wives.⁷⁵

Divorce. The reasons were varied, the main one being childlessness. It comes as no surprise that Oghuz Khan Bayundur placed his childless beks under a black banner (for the pre-Islamic Turks black was the color of mourning). It was the custom among the Turkic nobility to send a childless wife back to her parents with a lavish mehr.⁷⁶ In 1181, the daughter of Konya Sultan Kilij-Arslan II Seljukid (1156-1192) and her husband, ruler of Hisn-Kaifa Emir Noor ad-Din Artukid, divorced because of the husband's "satanic love for a prostitute,"⁷⁷ a legally untenable reason, which caused a scandal between her father and his son-in-law.

There was an instance of formal divorce in the history of the Atabegs of Azerbaijan Ildenizids. In 1225, Khwarazmshah Jalal ad-Din (1220-1231) besieged the Azeri city of Tabriz; its ruler Uzbek (1210-1225), the last of the Atabegs, fled the city leaving behind his wife Melike-hatun, the daughter of Iraqi Sultan Togrul II Seljukid. She agreed to surrender the city to the khwarazmshah if she could become his wife. Jalal ad-Din accepted the offer, but Melike-hatun first needed a divorce. City qadi Kavam as-Din Haddadi refused to dissolve the old marriage and prohibited the new one. A certain Izz ad-Din Kazvini offered his services in exchange for the position of city qadi.

⁷² See: G. Barhebraei, op. cit., p. 233; *Irak ve Horasan*, S. 8, 26, 43, 72-73, 212; Sadruddin, op. cit., S. 12-13, 57, 94, 96, 129; *Histoire des Seldjoudes*, Vol. XII, p. 352.

⁷³ See: V.F. Minorskiy, *Istoria Shirvana i Derbenda X-XI vekov* (A History of Sharavan and Darband in the 10th-11th Centuries), Moscow, 1963, pp. 180, 186; *Histoire de la Géorgie, depuis l'antiquité jusqu'au XIXe siècle*, St. Petersburg, 1849, pp. 395, 435.

⁷⁴ See: S.G. Agajanov, "Unikalnaia medal s izobrazheniem seldzhukskogo sultana Mudammeda Torgul-beka," *Izvestia AN Turkmenskoy SSR, Seria obshchestvennykh nauk*, No. 4, 1964; F.A. Walker, "Unique Medal of the Seljuk Tugribeg," in: H. Ingholt, *Centennial Publication of American Numismatic Society*, New York, 1958.

⁷⁵ See: Sadruddin, op. cit., s. 129.

⁷⁶ See: *Rodoslovnaia Turkmen*, pp. 75-76.

⁷⁷ *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, p. 725.

The appointment and divorce were equally prompt; Melike-hatun and Khwarazmshah Jalal ad-Din got married.⁷⁸

Levirate and sororate marriages. These types of marriages were practiced by the top crust of the Turkic feudal lords, mostly for political and economic reasons. Oghuz Khan (Oguz-Kagan), the legendary forefather of the Oghuz tribes, married his cousins who were the daughters of his three parental uncles. Among the pre-Islamic Oghuzes, the elder son was duty-bound to marry the widow of his late father (if she was not his mother). Iraqi Sultan Suleyman Shah Seljukid (1160-1161) married the widow of his brother, the daughter of a Georgian king. Another Iraqi Sultan Mahmud I Seljukid married two of his cousins, the daughters of Great Sultan Sanjar Seljukid. In 1149, the ruler of Mosul Seyf ad-Din Zangid married the daughter of ruler of Mardin Timur Pasha, whom he had defeated. When he died, his brother Qutb ad-Din Maudud married his widow. Atabeg Qizil-Arslan Ildenizid (1187-1191) married Inanj-hatun, the widow of his brother Jahan Pahlavan.⁷⁹

Polygamy. According to the sources, polygamy based on customs was practiced among the Turkic tribes in pre-Islamic times. Oghuz Khan, the forefather of the Oghuz tribes, had three wives; the great, as well as the Iraqi and Konya, Seljukid sultans had several wives each at any one time. Harems were an inalienable part of sultanic palaces. Normally sultans had four legal wives and several concubines, the children then being accepted as legal with the right to inherit property or even the throne. Great Atabeg of Azerbaijan Jahan Pahlavan Ildenizid had two sons—Kutlug-Inanj and Amiran Umar—by his legal wife and two other sons—Abu-Bakr and Uzbek—by concubines. All of them were considered legal and equal heirs. Abu-Bakr (1195-1210) and Uzbek (1210-1225) became atabegs and rulers of the Azerbaijani Sultanate, while Kutlug-Inanj and Amiran Umar never rose that high.⁸⁰

Polygamy ruled out the problem of infidelity. Michael the Syrian wrote, “The Turks are wise and have skillfully arranged their family life. They avoid infidelity and few indulge in fornication because they have no laws that prohibit second and third marriages or polygamy.” Infidelity was punished.⁸¹ An unfaithful wife was evicted from the family home; on the khan’s orders, she was tied by the neck, arms, and legs to the tails of five wild mares, the hind legs of which were punctured by spears. They started rotating on spot until they tore the woman apart. Nor did an unfaithful husband avoid punishment: “If they [the Turks] open a case against someone they tear him apart: he was tied to the top branches of two trees which were then allowed to straighten; the tied man was thus torn apart.”

Respect for the woman. Turkic marriage rites testify to the tradition of respecting the woman. Vassily Bartold wrote that among the nomads the woman had more influence than among the settled peoples because of their frequently greater role in cattle-breeding.⁸² *Kniga moego deda Korkuta* says the same; it contains no mention of polygamy among the Oghuz Turks.

Pre-Muslim Turkic marriage ceremony. The marriage rites described above and related customs were typical of the Islamized Turks. There were earlier rites which survived, on the whole, among the Oghuz tribes until the 11th-12th centuries. For example, a contemporary wrote, “There is the following custom among them: if one of them is seeking the hand of a woman from the family of another man (his daughter or sister or any other woman on which he has influence) for a certain amount of Khwarazm clothing and he pays this, he can take this woman to his home. Sometimes kalym is paid in camels or horses or something else. No one can collect his wife until he has paid the kalym agreed on with the ‘guardian.’ If he pays it, he can boldly enter the house in which this woman lives and take

⁷⁸ See: Rashid ad-Din, op. cit., Vol. I, Book 2, p. 242; Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens orientaux, Vol. I, Paris, 1872, p. 100.

⁷⁹ See: A.P. Kovalevskiy, op. cit., pp. 126, 129; Rashid ad-Din, op. cit., Vol. I, Book 1, p. 82; *Rodoslovnaia Turkmen*, p. 41; G. Barhebraei, op. cit., pp. 252, 317; *Irak ve Horasan*, S. 144, 212; *Histoire des Seldjoudes*, Vol. XII, p. 344; Vol. XIII, p. 19.

⁸⁰ See: Rashid ad-Din, op. cit., Vol. I, Book 1, p. 83; *Rodoslovnaia Turkmen*, p. 41; İbn Bibi, op. cit., S. 74; *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, p. 568; G. Barhebraei, op. cit., p. 244; *Histoire des Seldjoudes*, Vol. XI, p. 436; Vol. XII, p. 368; Sadruddin, op. cit., S. 121.

⁸¹ See: *Rodoslovnaia Turkmen*, p. 64; A.P. Kovalevskiy, op. cit., p. 126; *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, p. 568.

⁸² See: V.V. Bartold, “Turkestan v epokhu mongolskogo nashestviia,” in: V.V. Bartold, *Sochinenia*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1963, p. 372.

her in the presence of her father, her mother, and her brothers and they do not prevent this. If a man who has a wife and sons dies, the eldest of his sons must marry his wife, if she is not his mother.”⁸³

C o n c l u s i o n

The above suggests that throughout the ancient and medieval history of the peoples of the Turkic world, they developed, consolidated, and passed down from generation to generation ethnocultural traditions which, even though they came from different sources, gradually shaped ethnically distinctive specifics.

It was at that time that these people determined the optimal forms of their economic activity, acquired a material culture, and put the final touches to their spiritual culture, social and family order, folk ethics, visual arts, and folklore. This ethnocultural complex is confirmed by information from Syrian sources about the religious beliefs, customs, and rites of the Turks of the 7th-12th centuries.

⁸³ A.P. Kovalevskiy, op. cit., p. 126.

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THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT FROM THE POSTMODERNIST PERSPECTIVE: CULTURAL GROUNDS FOR BIASED INTERPRETATIONS

A b s t r a c t

A ccording to the theoreticians of post-modernism, social reality is the product of dialogical, communicative socialization and coordination of the ideas expressed by the participants in the discourse. Based on this view, the idea has gained currency that

the functioning of different forms of knowledge can only be understood by examining their narrative and declarative nature. On the strength of these ideas, this article attempts

to reveal certain cultural grounds for biased interpretations based on an analysis of the narrative structure of a BBC video report about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

So much has been written about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Google offers 1,400,000 references in Russian alone, and 1,550,000 in English) that it appears impossible to add anything new. However, we are addressing this topic again, although admittedly not as researchers of the conflict, but rather of its interpretations, or, to be more precise, of one interpretation presented in a recent video report by the BBC Russian Service.¹ What made us pick this report? For one thing, although it claims to be neutral, it is another example of the biased attitude (conscious or not) inherent in most of what has already been written, is being written, and will be written about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. What is more, our intention is a little more ambitious: we would like to try and reveal, based on an analysis of this report, some of the cultural grounds² underlying this kind of interpretation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Social Construction and Narrative Analysis

The new ways of comprehending and analyzing social phenomena that have emerged today, a time often referred to as the postmodernist era, will help us to solve the set task. In particular, the matter concerns viewing social reality as a social construction process.³ Based on this view, the idea has gained currency that the functioning of different forms of knowledge can only be understood by examining their narrative and declarative nature. The end of the 20th century was designated as the beginning of a “narrative turn” in the social sciences and saw the emergence of a new social epistemology that pays particular attention to different forms of narratives. We will briefly formulate several postulates of this new epistemology:

1. *Events, facts, and history are the product of our narration. Otherwise they are beyond our grasp⁴;*
2. *In turn, any narration is the result of a certain construction⁵;*
3. *In so doing, any narration always contains an interpretation⁶;*
4. *The more ingeniously the narration is constructed, the more reliable and in keeping with what actually happened it seems.⁷*

¹ The matter concerns the video report of 18 April, 2011 called “Karabakh: istoria pishetsia v dvukh versiiakh,” (Karabakh: Two Versions of the Story) prepared by correspondent of the BBC Russian Service Oleg Boldyrev, available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/multimedia/2011/04/110415_v_karabakh_war_history.shtml], 2 May, 2011

² Of course, there may be political or other grounds for biased interpretations, but we will not discuss them here.

³ See: P. Berger, T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Anchor Books, Garden City, NY, 1996.

⁴ See: *Ibidem*.

⁵ See: W. Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986.

⁶ See: K.J. Gergen, “Narrative, Moral Identity and Historical Consciousness: A Social Constructionist Account,” available at [http://www.swarthmore.edu/Documents/faculty/gergen/Narrative_Moral_Identity_and_Historical_Consciousness.pdf], 25 April, 2011.

⁷ See: W.L. Bennet, M.S. Feldman, *Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1981.

5. *The visual and sound (music, tone of the reporter's voice, background noise, and so on) impressions created by the media can provide significant conceptual content that is at times equal in relevance to the accompanying text.*⁸

We will analyze the report based on these postulates. Our analysis uses the so-called chronotopos method we developed and have presented in other works.⁹ This method consists of the following: we break down the narrative text into separate blocks or topics which form complete expressions. Then we identify the meanings contained in them, generalize them, and determine the overall meaning of the narration. In this case, our task is made easier since we have a text that has been assembled, that is, literally put together, from separate elements; this makes it easier to break the narration down into fragments (episodes).

Study Target: "Karabakh: Two Versions of the Story"

The report begins with a video series accompanied by the following voice-over¹⁰: *"The pomegranate trees are running to seed, but we cannot help them. The local residents know that the area has been mined. This blackened orchard has been the victim of war for 20 years now. Five mines and several projectiles were found in the field next to it. And there are many more fields like this in Karabakh."* The meaning of this fragment at the beginning of the narration can be provisionally designated as *"farming difficulties in Karabakh."*

Then a voice accompanied by scenes of gunfire exchange, followed by women (Azeris) lamenting over freshly dug graves and trucks full of refugees (also Azeris), continues: *"At first they fought with sticks and stones, then they began shooting, then cannons and tanks, stolen or bought at Soviet military bases, came in to back up the machineguns. In the end, this war was fought by the armies of unrecognized Karabakh and Armenia, on the one side, and Azerbaijan, on the other. The hostility between two once fraternal republics has taken more than 20,000 lives, and more than a million people have become refugees."* This fragment, which dispassionately presents statistics of the losses, can be provisionally designated as *"escalation of the conflict and losses."* Admittedly, nothing is said here about the reason for the conflict, which could give the uninitiated viewer or listener the impression that people were suddenly filled with mutual hatred and began killing each other. Nor is anything said about the fact that most of the refugees are Azeris, who have been driven from their homeland.

A voice off screen goes on to say: *"Now the capital of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is like any other provincial center. But as soon as you turn off the main street, evidence of the past fighting is still all too obvious (walls pockmarked with bullet and projectile holes are shown). The capital is in a valley, 10 km up the hill is the city of Shusha. In September 1988, within three days, Armenians left Shusha and Azeris abandoned Stepanakert. A front line formed. Grad projectiles were fired from Shusha on Stepanakert (video series—firing of Grad projectiles, people hiding in their homes), at night people hide in shelters, in the morning they come out to see what is left of their homes (video series—two middle-aged Armenian women are standing in a doorway; the reporter asks them): "What are you doing out in the street?"— (One of the women answers): "I'm not out in the street,*

⁸ See: G. Kress, Th. Van Leeuwen, *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design*, Routledge, New York, 1996. 289 pp.

⁹ See: R. Garagozov (Karakozov), *Development of Sense Comprehension in Reading*, SPIEL: 13, 1996, H. 1, pp. 114-123.

¹⁰ Since this video report did not have a written transcript, we had to transcribe it in writing ourselves (in italics), retaining the style of the statements as much as possible. We underlined some of the words and phrases in the written text in order to analyze and draw the reader's attention to them. Our comments and explanations to the transcribed text are given in parentheses.

I've been standing around here for an hour, I can't go home or get to work." This fragment, which concentrates entirely on the vicissitudes of the life of the Armenian population of Stepanakert during the active stage of the conflict, can be designated as **"the crisis situation in Stepanakert caused by shelling from Shusha."** In the next fragment, which shows a tank, we are told: *"A tank that began the Armenians' victorious attack on Shusha 19 years ago still stands on the outskirts of the town. But there are enough other reminders. The life of Shusha can hardly be called urban. Although people somehow still manage to live here, many homes have been abandoned forever. The ruins of this mosque and this abandoned armored artillery vehicle are just a small reminder of the town's former inhabitants. The most important thing for the Armenians' self-identity has been restored (shot of an Armenian church). When Bishop Parkev returned to Shushi (for some reason the reporter pronounces the name of the town of Shusha in the Armenian way—Shushi), Grad projectiles were kept in the wrecked Christ the Savior church. The church was rebuilt. (For the first time, we see the reporter.) The bishop is sure that the entire town will follow suit and be rebuilt. Shushi, according to him, will become the cultural center of Karabakh. And peace will be possible."* It is worth noting both the verbal statements chosen for the narration (*...many homes have been abandoned forever. "The ruins of this mosque and abandoned armored artillery vehicle are just a small reminder of the town's former inhabitants," "The most important thing for the Armenians' self-identity has been restored"*) and the visual shots accompanying this fragment: a destroyed mosque and a restored Armenian church shown in all its splendor. All of this makes it possible to designate this fragment as **"overcoming the crisis by capturing the town of Shusha and driving out its former inhabitants (Azeris)."**

However, judging from the next fragment, it is still too early for the Armenians to feel so reassured. Azerbaijan is destroying the idyll, which "for some reason" does not want to reconcile itself with the current state of affairs. The narration goes on to say: *"But like everyone here, the bishop believes that Azerbaijan must take the first step. (Shot of Bishop Parkev, who says): "Until the situation is resolved, no one can feel very confident of course. The hostilities might flare up again at any moment, since we often hear aggressive outbursts from the leader of the Azerbaijan Republic. If we go for a compromise for the sake of peace, it should be mutual. But today the president of Azerbaijan is putting forward unreasonable demands that look nothing like a compromise."* This fragment can be designated as **"the uncompromising Azeris, who have no wish to make peace, are preventing the restoration of a peaceful life."** The narration continues as follows: *"This house is occupied (shot of a sign in Russian on the gates of the house). Shusha is Armenian; the people of Karabakh believe that history has already been rewritten. On the outskirts of the city stands the house of famous Azeri composer Bülbüloğlu. In the garden is a bust of his father destroyed by shelling. Now postal worker Liuda from Stepanakert lives there. Her house was destroyed by a bomb. 'How can I go back, where can I go if my apartment no longer exists,' says Liuda. 'You mean it has been completely destroyed?' asks the correspondent. 'Yes, there is nothing left but bare ground,' replies postal worker Liuda."* This fragment can be called **"Armenians are taking up residence in Shusha."** So far we have been seeing and hearing the voices of the Armenian side. In the next episode, Bülbüloğlu presents the Azeri viewpoint, managing to say, *"Of course it is very painful to see my father's home..."* before his voice is drowned out by the correspondent's voice-over, saying, *"Bülbüloğlu, Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Russia. He, which is unique for the Azeris, managed to visit his father's home. He visited Shusha twice with a delegation of cultural figures and spoke to the woman now living in the house. He says their conversation was genial. But relations on a personal level are one thing, and the ambassador's official position is another."* Again there is a shot of Bülbüloğlu, who says, *"When they talk about a compromise, what does this compromise consist of? Giving up a piece of your land and saying, go and live on it as you wish? What sort of compromise is that? We are the ones offering a compromise. We are willing to see the Armenians living there alongside the Azeris who lived there as part of Azerbaijan in conditions of the highest autonomy. This is the only solution to the situation. But in order for it to work, the occupied territories taken under fire must first be returned. Today the goodwill of the Azeri leadership and the president of Azerbaijan is conducive to resolving this issue peacefully."*

And to be frank, society is ready for this, the people are fed up with the whole thing, they say that enough is enough, the problem must be resolved." In this fragment, we hear the opinion of the opposing side in the conflict, that is, the Azeris, for the first time, albeit with cut-ins and innuendos (see the underlined phrases in the narration). The latent meaning to be drawn from the reporter's comments can be defined as follows: **"at the personal level, the Azeris can socialize and make peace with the Armenians, but the government's official irreconcilable position is preventing this."**

The narration then returns to Stepanakert (video series: airport in Stepanakert; voice-over): *"Here is a new point of tension. For the first time in 20 years, the airport in Stepanakert is preparing to receive civilian flights. The runway destroyed by bombs has been restored and, at the beginning of May, an airplane, flying over the mountains from Armenia, is due to land here. Baku is protesting—a breakaway community cannot control Azerbaijan's sky. The people of Karabakh are saying that this land and sky is theirs."* Shot of one of the local Armenian leaders, who says, *"The people of Karabakh have their own main question—the future of NKR. If we find a solution to the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, it must be higher than the current status, and then all the other questions that result from or might be consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be much easier to resolve."* This fragment can be designated as **"Azerbaijan is preventing the restoration of peaceful life in Nagorno-Karabakh."**

In the next fragment, the reporter's narration begins almost heroically, *"When the time came to defend his home village, Alexander (an invalid on crutches appears on the screen) ascended these hills and took up defense against the enemy ensconced on the nearby summits."* A phrase follows that does not entirely jive with the previous, *"In February 1992, refugees from the village of Khojali stretched out along this valley."* (It is not clear why Azeris began fleeing Khojali, if the talk before this was about Armenians defending their village.) Alexander continues talking on screen: *"And when they approached Agdam, the Azeris began attacking us. And there was artillery fire."* (Again, this does not jive with the former statement. It is difficult to imagine how refugees from Khojali could attack Armenian positions set up in advance. Evidently understanding the weakness of this statement, the reporter says), *"Alexander is talking about the most bloody events of that war. But this is only one of two opposing versions of what happened. In two days, 500 residents of Khojali were killed or later froze to death. (Video series—Azeris lamenting over the bodies of the perished residents of Khojali.) The Armenians claim that there was firing from the crowd of refugees. The Azerbaijani side is sure that peaceful citizens were deliberately killed. The people of Karabakh are indignant about these statements. They call the accusations that many residents were shot point blank a fabrication."* This fragment can be designated as **"there are different versions of what happened in Khojali."**

This fragment deserves special attention since it is one of the key elements of the report. Although it is called *"Karabakh: Two Versions of the Story,"* this is the first time we are told there are *"opposing versions of what happened."* This assertion, as we believe, is of special significance in understanding the entire narration, which we will discuss in more detail a little later. But let us return to the report. The reporter goes on to say, *"The evidence of fighting is still so obvious it is as though it happened just yesterday. And the venom with which the Armenians and Azeris defend their truth is also as strong as ever. Fifteen years after the war, there are still two versions of the story. There on a promontory stands a monument to one of the 60 Armenian soldiers who were killed. The path goes past positions where now Armenians, now Azeris were entrenched for 4 years. Alexander believes that it is best not to dig up the past, then peaceful coexistence will be possible. But, as always, there must be the right conditions for this. (Alexander says), 'Nothing good will come of digging up the past again. Digging up the past... But it still has a way of revealing itself. The best thing is to come to terms. Come to terms on how we can live here independently. Let them live here if they want. But it is our land, we will never leave.'"* This fragment can be designated as **"there is no need to dig up the past, the Azeris should agree to our conditions."** We are then informed that *"people are digging up history, sometimes literally. Historian Vagram Varitsian (he appears on screen) took me to the ruins of the town of Tigranakert. The foundations of a 5th-6th-century church can be found here. On the hill is a citadel founded in the first century BC. The archeological searches appear to be peaceful, but Varitsian admits that there are also political implications. It must be proven that Armenians have also*

lived in lowland Karabakh from time immemorial. At the foot of the ancient city, fresh history is in evidence. A row of entrenchments still not overgrown with grass. Here ancient stones sleep. Here two enemies stand side by side." This fragment, which contains a historical excursion of dubious nature (Varitsian's confession that the archeological digs have political implications) can be designated as "**Karabakh is time-honored Armenian land.**" Then the reporter appears again and says, "*There, on the horizon, in the mountains, is one of the best fortified frontiers in the world, the so-called line of contact between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. The war came to an end in 1994, when the sides stopped firing. But, of course, there is no contact there. Tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides are separated by hundreds of meters of mine fields.* (Again the reporter's voice can be heard off screen): *And these tens of thousands of soldiers still wait in full combat-readiness.*" The meaning is as follows: "**The crisis has still not been fully resolved.**" (V. Kazimirov¹¹ appears on screen): "*Of course, I think that peaceful settlement can be reached. But this primarily requires a solution to question number one ... exclusion of the possibility that the hostilities will be resumed. As soon as the possibility of renewed hostilities is excluded, the Azeris will have no other choice but to look for solutions at the negotiation table, while the Armenians will have no reason to hold onto the territory they gra... (quickly corrects himself) occupied during the hostilities.*" This peace-keeping appeal to the Azeris by Kazimirov, who almost made a blunder, is essentially a call "**to the Azeris to recognize and reconcile themselves with the current situation.**" Then we hear the reporter's voice again: "*There in the distance is the destroyed town of Agdam that once supplied the Soviet country with magnificent port wine. Before the war, almost 30,000 Azeris lived there. During the war, the Armenian positions were fired on from there using heavy artillery. In 1993, tens of thousands of Agdam residents became refugees. The Soviet constitution (it appears that everyone eulogizes it here) could do nothing to help them. The town was razed to the ground. Now for the people of Karabakh this dead landscape is just part of a defense complex that keeps the enemy's cannons at a safe distance.*" This fragment is worth noting for the fact that it continues the Armenian version of events (during the war, the Armenian positions were fired on from there using heavy artillery). But for some reason, it is not explained why in particular "*tens of thousands of Agdam residents became refugees.*" The meaning of this episode is as follows: "**Agdam was destroyed because the Azeris fired on the Armenians.**" And, finally, the reporter's concluding phrase, "*People can talk for hours about what happened on this land 200 or 500 years ago. But they are unwilling to talk about what the future will be like (shot of a blossoming tree), except perhaps to compare Karabakh to the Middle East conflict. If this is so, it turns out that the main heritage of the Soviet empire in these environs is mutual hate and mistrust.*" To sum up the reporter's thought, "**the future of these environs is uncertain, and the main heritage of the Soviet empire is mutual hate and mistrust.**"

Conceptual Plan and Moral Implications of the Report

Following our chronotopos method, the conceptual definitions identified in our analysis can be grouped into the following general semantic blocks (A, B, C, D):

- (A) "**Period of crisis and suffering for the Armenians that has been overcome:**"
- (1) "*the crisis situation in Stepanakert caused by shelling from Shusha;*"
 - (2) "*overcoming the crisis by capturing the town of Shusha and driving out its former inhabitants (Azeris);*"
 - (3) "*The town of Agdam was also destroyed because Azeris fired on Armenians from there;*"

¹¹ Ex-cochairman of the Minsk OSCE Group for Russia, retired diplomat who is known for his pro-Armenian position shown in his calling for the Azeris to proceed from the current reality and recognize the status quo that developed during the war.

- (B) **“Restoration of a peaceful life:”**
- (1) *“Armenians take up residence in Shusha;”*
 - (2) *“Karabakh is time-honored Armenian land;”*
- (C) **“The crisis is not entirely over since the Azeris, who do not wish to make peace, are preventing the restoration of a peaceful life:”**
- (1) *“farming difficulties in Karabakh;”*
 - (2) *“Azerbaijan is preventing the restoration of life in Karabakh;”*
 - (3) *“uncompromising Azeris who do not wish to make peace;”*
 - (4) *“the crisis has still not been entirely resolved.”*
- (D) **“The Azeris should recognize and reconcile themselves to the current situation:”**
- (1) *“there are different versions of what happened in Khojali;”*
 - (2) *“there is no need to dig up the past, the Azeris should agree to our (the Armenians’) conditions;”*
 - (3) *the Azeris can make peace with the Armenians on a personal level, but the government’s official position prevents this;”*
 - (4) *“the Azeris should recognize and reconcile themselves to the current situation.”*

So, this report, which presents a narration of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, primarily expresses the position of one side in the conflict—the Armenian. This position is voiced by the Armenians, Kazimirov, and, finally, the reporter himself, which goes beyond the bounds of neutrality dictated by journalistic ethics. The reporter’s “pro-Armenian” position is shown in how the narrative is constructed. For example, we are told how the Azeri side fired on the Armenians from Shusha and Agdam, but there is no talk about the Armenian side firing on the Azeris, although it was the Azeris who were forced to flee from Karabakh. Essentially (apart from Bülbüloğlu’s words), we do not hear what the Azeris have to say. On the whole, the narrative itself is internally contradictory. The verbal and visual elements of the report contradict each other to a certain extent: we are always being told that “the Azeris are attacking and the Armenians are defending themselves,” however, we see pictures of sobbing Azeri women and men and Azeri refugees. The biased nature of the report reaches its peak in the episodes that relate the Khojali events. Here it is not so important that, consciously or not, the number of people killed in this war is downplayed, although this characterizes the author of the report to some extent. The reporter’s claim that *there are different versions of what happened in Khojali* is much more important and serious in its consequences.

There may seem to be nothing particularly wrong in this, the reporter is only presenting the opinion of the sides: the Azeri (*“peaceful residents were deliberately killed”*) and the Armenian, even if the argument the Armenian side resorts to in an attempt to justify the mass slaughter of the people of Khojali looks absurd (*“the Armenians claim that people fired from among the crowd of refugees”*).

The reporter’s claim that *there are different versions of what happened in Khojali* makes the most terrible and tragic event of the Karabakh war—the destruction of the Azeri town of Khojali and the mass slaughter of its peaceful population—relative, thus, in some measure, casting doubt on its virtuality. The deaths of hundreds of peaceful residents of Khojali (a total of 613 people, including 106 women, 63 young children, and 70 old people) at the hands of Armenian soldiers is not a **version**, but a **fact** that everyone knows about.¹² To doubt this means reducing man’s moral nature to naught

¹² According to the data of authoritative international organizations, in the small hours of 26 February, 1992, the Azeri town of Khojali was razed to the ground in just a few hours by Armenian fighters with the support of servicemen of the 366th regiment of the CIS Joint Forces, and hundreds of its peaceful residents were brutally slaughtered. During these

and glossing over the moral aspects of the evil committed. But can we count on achieving stable and long-term peaceful settlement of the conflict if crimes against humanity, no matter who committed them or for what cause, are not named as such? Did the author of the report comprehend this aspect and, if so, what objective was he pursuing in his report? However, we will not dig into what motivated the author.

We can presume that the author of the report did not consciously set himself the task of questioning the fact of the Khojali tragedy. He could have been the victim of the biased nature of his report, which reflected the Armenian version of the story. The thing is that any historical narration performs a whole series of social functions, one of which promotes the configuration of our identity and our endowment with moral qualities. Revealing the logic of the moral function of the historical narrative, K. Gergen notes, "People with our history do not engage in X; we uphold the ideals of Y; as you chose Y over X, you are one of us; you are a good and worthy person, a moral being."¹³ This is precisely why the fact of the Khojali slaughter does not jive with the Armenian idea of identity and history and, correspondingly, does not fit into the framework of this biased "pro-Armenian" version of the history of the conflict offered us in this report and in many other interpretations.

Enough has been said, we think, to recognize the "one voice-ness" of the report, its one-sided approach, and, so, its biased nature.

Cultural Grounds for Biased Interpretations

Frankly speaking, biased reports on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are nothing new, so this report can shed no extra light on the matter. But a narrative analysis of this report makes it possible to see the cultural grounds for the biased interpretations. By virtue of this, we will look at only a few.

At one time, research studies¹⁴ showed that people perceive a well-structured narrative (clear topic, well-defined beginning and end, logical connections between the parts, and so on) relating a fictional story as more legitimate and real than a poorly structured rendition of real events. The narrative constructed by the BBC reporter certainly has its flaws. For example, it is internally contra-

events, according to official data, 613 people were killed and 1,000 peaceful citizens of different ages were maimed by bullet wounds. On the night of the tragedy, 1,275 peaceful citizens were taken prisoner and nothing is known about the fate of 150 of them to this day. International organizations reported the particular cruelty with which the Armenians treated the defenseless civilian population of Khojali, including the many instances of desecration of the bodies of the perished Azeris (see: *Human Rights Watch World Report*, 1993; Th. Goltz, "Nagorno-Karabagh Victims Buried in Azerbaijani Town," *The Washington Post*, 28 February, 1992; [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khojali_Massacre#cite_ref-4], 3 May, 2011; BBC1 Morning News at 08:12, Tuesday, 3 March, 1992; "Massacre by Armenians Being Reported," *The New York Times*, 3 March, 1992; *Human Rights Watch / Helsinki. Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh*, New York, 1994, available at [<http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/WR93/Hsw-07.htm>], 3 May, 2011; finally, there is a confession by Serzh Sarkisian, who at that time was one of the leaders of the Armenian armed contingents that attacked Khojali and now president of Armenia, who noted, "Before Khojali, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype]. And that's what happened." English researcher Thomas De Waal, who presented these words, notes, "Sarkisian's account throws a different light on the worse massacre of the Karabakh war, suggesting that the killings may, at least in part, have been a deliberate act of mass killing as intimidation" (Th. De Waal, *Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War*, New York University Press, New York, London, 2003, p. 172).

¹³ K.J. Gergen, op.cit.

¹⁴ See: W.L. Bennett, M.S. Feldman, op. cit.

dictory. The verbal and visual elements of the report contradict each other to a certain extent: we are always being told that “the Azeris are attacking and the Armenians are defending themselves,” but we see pictures of sobbing Azeri women and men and Azeri refugees. However, any viewer or listener unfamiliar with the conflict details is unlikely to be able to identify the ethnic affiliation of the sobbing and fleeing people shown on screen, so this video report could generate a certain impression of “reality:” *the Azeri side, “due to stubbornness, government pressure, or some other unknown reason, is preventing the restoration of peaceful life in Karabakh.”* In this respect, when talking about the cultural grounds for the biased attitude, another important aspect should be noted. Armenian culture has a long tradition of constructing historical narratives, particularly those built on the concept of “victimization,” while the Azerbaijani culture is relatively young.¹⁵ And “well-constructed” “victimization” narratives of the Armenian side doubtlessly have an advantage (apart from anything else, “victimization” narratives always arouse empathy among the public); it is easier for them to convince an uninitiated audience of the reconstructed “reality.” But it in no way follows from this that the author of this report, as incidentally the authors of other *narrations* about the conflict, should go along with what seems to be a legitimate story, if, of course, they want to show their competence and remain loyal to their professional ethics, or, simply, their humanness. In this respect, an important way to avoid the narrative trap to a certain extent is to create narratives that present many voices that convey different views and perspectives.

I n L i e u o f a C o n c l u s i o n

In the final analysis, a story told from the viewpoint of just one of the sides in the conflict can hardly make this conflict easier to understand, find dialogical points of contact, or discover a way to truly resolve it. For reality, as the theoreticians of postmodernism tell us, is the product of dialogical, communicative socialization and coordination of the ideas expressed by the participants in the discourse.

In conflict situations like Nagorno-Karabakh, particular types of dialogical narratives are needed which reveal, rather than gloss over, the truth. It is obvious that the voices of the other side, in our case, the Azeris, have to be included for a dialog to take place. In so doing, it is important to hear their version of the story, even if they are not as proficient in relating it. And then we may find out how, at the end of the 20th century, the Armenian ethnic nationalism card was played on the Karabakh stage; how ethnic cleansing of villages populated by Azeris took place; how the tragedy in Khojali was played out; and how dear and important Shusha and Karabakh itself, and much more, are for the identity of the Azeris. In such a dialog, the sides will most likely hear many unflattering stories about each other. But only in this way, by creating a space for dialog (and here journalists and international organizations claiming impartiality should not interfere with the sides in the conflict, but help them), can we hope that the mutual hate and mistrust between the sides in the conflict the author talks about at the end of his report will be overcome.

¹⁵ See: R. Garagozov, *Metamorfozy kollektivnoi pamiati v Rossii i na Tsentralnom Kavkaze*, Nurlan, Baku, 2005.

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THE ETHNIC SITUATION IN THE CAUCASUS: PAST AND PRESENT

A b s t r a c t

This article reviews the ethnic processes in the Caucasus from the distant past to the present day.

The Caucasus, which is situated at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, has always drawn the attention of large empires. The frequent invasions of conquerors (Huns, Mongols, Arabs, Seljuk Turks, and Persians) had a strong impact on the ethnic and demographic situation in the region: several of the local ethnic groups entirely disappeared, while other ethnicities, which even-

tually became Caucasians, settled in their place. During Russia's two-hundred-year domination in the Caucasus, the ethnic situation underwent significant changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union also took its toll.

Recently, the history and ethnology of the Caucasus have been subjected to increasing distortion. The members of those ethnic groups that became Caucasians later than others were particularly good at this; cases of appropriating the cultural heritage of other ethnicities are also known.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The Caucasus, which is situated between the Black and the Caspian seas, has always been one of the most important hubs of the world. The Kumo-Manych Depression and lower reaches of the Don are usually considered its northern border, while the former Soviet Union's border with Iran and Turkey is regarded as its southern frontier. Of course, these boundaries are provisional. For example, the territories of present-day Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan belong to the Central Caucasus. However, from both the geographic and cultural-historical viewpoints, the extensive expanses to the south of these countries are an inalienable part of the Caucasian region. The Chorokhi Gorge and the sources and upper reaches of the Mtkvari (Kura) and Araks rivers are intrinsic parts of the Caucasus.

So the borders of the present-day Caucasus are determined by natural landscape (in the north) and political (in the south) factors. Within these boundaries, the area of the region (geographical and cultural-historical) covers approximately 400,000 sq. km. In this respect, it is worth thinking about a new model of geographical division of the Caucasus.¹

¹ See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, *The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy*, Tbilisi, 2007, pp. 34-39 (in Georgian).

It is logical to ask why the land that territorially belongs to Turkey and Iran is not included in the Caucasian region? This question deserves attention since applying the terms “political” and “geographical” to territorial formations gives them entirely different meanings. The definition of the Caucasus’s southern borders according to the political principle began when the region was conquered by the Russian Empire: the imperial government regarded the basins of the Chorokhi, Kura, and Araks rivers, which joined its territory in the 19th century, as part of the Caucasus.²

We believe this to be a very serious problem. Scientific terminology is conventional, i.e. it is formed on the basis of a consensus among scientists. It is very possible that researchers and politicians today too will unanimously concede that the Caucasus should be divided into three geographical units (which indeed corresponds to reality): the Northern Caucasus, the Central Caucasus (which we now call the Southern Caucasus), and the Southern Caucasus (i.e. the territory of the Lesser Caucasus that belongs to Iran and Turkey).

The Caucasus— An Ethnically Diverse Region

From time immemorial, the Caucasus has been populated by numerous ethnic groups, large and small. In addition to the indigenous people, migrants who gradually became indigenous Caucasians (Ossetians, Balkars, and Karachays) have also lived in the region. So the Caucasus can be considered one of the polyethnic regions of the world. This is due to its geographical location, natural-climatic conditions, and foreign invasions.

Much has already been written about the ethnic history of the Caucasus, but the problem is still pertinent and requires further research, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and other political processes have given rise to new migration of ethnic groups in the region.

The Caucasus is also heterogenic in the religious-confessional respect. The conquerors tried to propagate their own religion there; it is enough to recall how the Sassanid Empire enforced Zoroastrianism in the region. The only exception were the Mongols: they did not try to underpin their conquests with religious and ideological precepts and so were able to blend in with the conquered people with relative ease.

Today, approximately 50 ethnicities live in the Caucasus, each of which has retained its own culture and language. This region, which is situated between Europe and Asia, has been populated by a large number of different ethnic groups from time immemorial.

Running ahead, the information that the Jikks (Abkhazian-Adyghe tribes) living on the Black Sea coast used to populate the valleys of Sarmatia is extremely important. This fact entirely coincides with the data of Georgian chronicler Juansher, who claimed that “at that time, Pachaniketi bordered on Ovsetia, on the other side of the Ovset River, and Jikketi was also situated there. Much later, the Turks pushed out the Pachaniks and Jikks. The Pachaniks went west, while the Jikks settled at the edges of Abkhazia.”³

According to Arabian author of the 10th century al-Masudi, Abkhazians and Circassians, who were related to the Jikks (Ubykhs), came to the Caucasus from other lands. On this basis, Agusti Alemany sums up that the various ethnic groups living in the Caucasian mountains “came from Aru and are the descendants of Amur bin Tubal bin Yafith bin Nuh: Lesgis, Alans, Khazars, Abkhazians, Avars, and Circassians.”⁴

² See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, op. cit.

³ *Kartlis tskhovreba* (History of Georgia), ed.-in-chief R. Metreveli, Artanuji, Tbilisi, 2008, p. 82.

⁴ A. Aleman, *Alany v drevnikh i srednevekovykh pismennykh istochnikakh*, Menedzher, Moscow, 2003, p. 351 (see also: A. Aleman, *Sources on the Alans: A Critical Compilation*, Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2000).

The various processes and cataclysms that occurred in the world and particularly in the Eurasian expanse and Middle East had a strong impact on the processes going on in the Caucasus. The amalgamation of ethnicities led to the emergence of new ethnic groups, some ancient peoples disappeared; it is enough to recall the Caucasian Albanians.

Before analyzing the ethnic changes, let us take a look at the situation in the present-day Northern and Southern Caucasus as a whole (if we abide by the division of the Caucasus into Northern and Southern still customary today and not by the division that is more in keeping with reality mentioned above).

The Adyghe, Circassians, Kabardins, Abazins, Abkhazians, Chechens, and Ingush speak in languages that belong to the Caucasian linguistic family (previously called Iberian-Caucasian). The Daghestani ethnic groups (Avars, Akhvaks, Andians, Baghulals, Botlikhs, Godoberins, Karatins, Tindals, Chamalals, Didois, Kapuchins, Khvarshins, Ginukhs, Gunzibs, Archins, Dargins, Kaitags, Kubachins, Laks, Lezghians, Aguls, Rutuls, Tabasarans, and Tsakhurs) also speak in the languages of that same family, as well as the Khinalugs, Gryzes, Bzhedugi, who live in the Shakhdag mountains of Azerbaijan, Udins of Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the Georgians.

The Ossetians, whose ancestors (the Alans) settled in the Caucasus in the relatively recent historical past, should be mentioned among the Iranian-speaking ethnic groups. As for the Tats and Talysh, they are the oldest residents of the Caucasus.

Turkic-speaking people settled in the Northern and Southern Caucasus at different times throughout history. The Azeris are the indigenous residents of the Southern Caucasus, while the Kumyks, Nogais, Balkars, and Karachays populate the North.

Armenians are Indo-Europeans by origin.

Mountain and Georgian Jews have lived in the Caucasus from time immemorial.

The Caucasus is the home of all the above-mentioned ethnic groups.⁵

Moreover, nationalities live in the Caucasus that are non-Caucasian by origin: Russians, Ukrainians, Kurds, Assyrians, Greeks, Tatars, and others. Strange as it may seem, Russians are the largest ethnic group in the Caucasus today (12 million); they mainly live in the Northern Caucasus—by 1989 their numbers had reached 11,233,700 people,⁶ which constituted two thirds of the entire population.

The above ethno-demographic picture has formed in the Caucasus over the past two centuries.

Changes in the Ethnic Situation in the Caucasus at Different Times in History

We mentioned the Jikks (Adyghe ethnic group) above, who migrated to the Caucasus (to the Black Sea region) from the Sarmatian valleys at the beginning of the new era. At that time, migration processes also affected other ethnic groups of the Northern Caucasus: the nomadic tribes of the Iranian-speaking Scythians, Sarmatians, and Alans encroached upon the extensive territory of Eurasia. Throughout the entire early Middle Ages, tribes of Alans and Khazars predominated in the valleys of

⁵ See: N.G. Volkova, *Emonimy i plemennye nazvaniia Severnogo Kavkaza*, Moscow, 1973; N.G. Volkova, *Etnicheskiy sostav naseleniia Severnogo Kavkaza v XVIII-nachale XX veka*, Moscow, 1974; R. Topchishvili, *The Ethnography of the Caucasian Peoples: Ethnic History, Ethnic Culture*, Tbilisi, 2007 (in Georgian).

⁶ See: V.S. Belozеров, *Etnicheskaia karta Severnogo Kavkaza*, OGI, Moscow, 2005, p. 13.

the Northern Caucasus. Iranian-speaking Alans came from the East—from Central Asia and from the territory of present-day Kazakhstan.⁷

The invasion of the Turkic-speaking Huns, who began their conquests from the territory of present-day Mongolia and formed a new conglomerate after merging with other ethnic groups, had a significant impact on the ethnic and demographic situation in the Caucasus.

While moving west through Eurasia, the Huns met resistance from the Alans in the Volga and Azov Sea regions. Some of the Alans, whom the Huns pressed back into the foothills of the Caucasus, took up a settled way of life; this is now the ancient ancestors of the Ossetians first became Caucasians. However, they also began to push out the indigenous tribes that populated the piedmont plains of the Caucasus. So the Nakh-Daghestani ethnic groups that resided there were forced to move to the mountains. At that time, a significant part of the population was assimilated by the Alans.

At the same time, Turkic-speaking tribes of Huns (Savirs) settled in the territory of present-day Balkaria; while an ethnic group of Kumyks formed in Daghestan.

The Khazars are also considered descendants of the Huns. The Khazar kingdom covered an extensive territory: its northern border passed along the northern coast of the Caspian Sea, while in the west it stretched to the Crimean Peninsula (including its eastern part).

The Khazar kingdom, which bordered with the Alans in the north, was destroyed by Kievan Rus in the 960s. But this did not mean that the Turkic ethnic groups disappeared from the valleys of the Northern Caucasus. It should be emphasized that the collapse of the Khazar state prompted the migration of different tribes (particularly Turkic) from east to west. Until a certain period of time, the Khazars essentially closed the corridor connecting Asia to Europe.

Thus, as the chroniclers of the 11th century rightly noted, the Khazars, just like the Huns, were a nationality from the distant past.⁸

The Huns, and then the Khazars, also left their mark in the Southern Caucasus. In 392-396, large Hun tribes infiltrated the Southern Caucasus and Southwest Asia. But neither the small number of Huns left in the territory of Caucasian Albania, nor the Khazars who arrived in the 7th century were able to change the ethnic situation that existed there: the first and the second were soon assimilated.

The Alans, “who reside in the magnificent grass steppes between the Kuban and the Don,”⁹ created a state formation that maintained close relations with the Georgian kingdom in the 11th-12th centuries.

Juansher’s *History* testifies to the fact that during the time of King Vakhtang Gorgasali (the 5th century), the Alans (Ossetians), who tried to push out the Georgians (from the Southern Caucasus) and other ethnic groups (from the mountains of the Northern Caucasus), were the main political force in the Caucasus. The Georgian chronicler mentioned allies of the Ossetians—the Khazars, meaning one of the tribal alliances of the Huns.

The Alans, Huns, and Khazars controlled the plains of the Northern Caucasus; the chroniclers first took note of them in the early Middle Ages, while mountain ethnic groups were rarely mentioned in the historical sources of that period.

Moreover, the ethnonym “Alans” often also referred to the local tribes living in the mountains and foothills of the Caucasus. The present-day Nakh-Daghestani and Abkhazian-Adyghe ethnic groups, which often mixed with each other, are considered the indigenous ethnic groups of the Northern Caucasus. Others were evidently assimilated by the Alan-Ossetians and Turkic-speaking Kipchaks (Cuman) who settled there later.

⁷ See: R. Topchishvili, *Area of the First Settlement of the Ancestors of the Ossetian-Alans*, TGU Publishers, Tbilisi, 2008 (in Georgian); idem, *Osetiny v Gruzii*, Universal, Tbilisi, 2009, pp. 171-216.

⁸ See: A.V. Gadlo, *Eticheskaja istoria Severnogo Kavkaza IV-X vv.*, Leningrad, 1979, p. 20.

⁹ L.H. Gumilev, *Otkrytie Khazarii*, Ayris-press, Moscow, 2003, p. 263.

The Savirs resided close to the Caucasian mountains. But, as we know, they also lived in the mountains—particularly in the territory of present-day Balkaria and West Ossetia (Digoria), which is confirmed by ethnographic studies.

- First, the mountain-dwellers of western Georgia (the Svans) call the Balkars (and sometimes the Ossetians too) “Saviars.”
- Second, traces of the Savirs are obvious in the toponymy of Digoria: the Ossetians call the Digorian Gorge “Savari-kom,”¹⁰ which means “gorge of the Savirs.”

As Arabian historian of the 10th century Ibn Ruste writes, it was at least a ten-day walk from Daryal to the borders of the Alan domains.¹¹

Another Arabian author, al-Masudi, mentions that the Daryal fortress was under the jurisdiction of the Georgian, and not the Alan, ruler.¹²

According to the Syrian chronicles (second half of the 6th century), the plains of the Northern Caucasus were populated by thirteen different ethnicities who resided in tents and mainly lived on the meat of domestic cattle, wild animals killed during hunting, and fish. This source also mentions the Alans among them.¹³

The Serir kingdom (in the territory of Daghestan) was also situated in the Caucasus during the existence of the Alan state formation, the indigenous population of which was the Avars.

A new stage in the ethnic history of the Caucasian peoples began with the invasion of the Mongols: their incursions prompted the migration of various Turkic-speaking and Iranian-speaking ethnic groups living in the expanses of Eurasia. The Mongols destroyed the political alliances of Alan-Ossetians and Kipchaks.¹⁴

As a result, the Ossetian steppe-dwellers ultimately moved to the mountains of the Central Caucasus and became mountain-dwellers, while some of the Kipchaks took refuge in the mountains of the Western Caucasus. Present-day ethnicities—the Balkars and Karachays—formed from the amalgamation between the Kipchaks and the local population.

After the Mongolian rule, the western part of the territory, where the Alans settled, was occupied by Kabardins who controlled the situation in the Caucasus until the Russians arrived. Turkic-speaking Nogais, who came from a mixture of representatives of the Europeanoid and Mongoloid races, predominated in the northern regions.

The fact that the Alan-Ossetians became mountain-dwellers had a significant effect on the ethnic situation in the Southern Caucasus and, particularly, in Georgia.

The Ossetians, the number of whom grew as a result of the high birth rate, strove to return to the valleys of the Northern Caucasus, to the land of their ancestors, but the Kabardins who had settled in their place would not allow them to do this. The Ossetians found a solution by occupying the time-honored historical-geographical regions of Georgia—Dvaleti and Shida Kartli. Based on numerous historical sources, it has been established that *migration of the Ossetians to Dvaleti occurred in the 16th century, and to the foothills of Shida Kartli no earlier than the mid-17th century.*¹⁵

The Mongol invasion changed the ethnic situation in the Southern Caucasus, but such changes also occurred there earlier. For example, in the early Middle Ages, a Christian Albanian ethnic group existed in the territory of present-day Azerbaijan (historical Caucasian Albania) that had its own

¹⁰ See: A.Dz. Tsagaeva, *Toponimiia Severnoi Osetii*, Ordzhonikidze, 1971, Part 1, pp. 148, 188.

¹¹ See: A. Aleman, op.cit., p. 347.

¹² See: Ibidem.

¹³ See: A.V. Gadlo, op.cit., pp. 100-101.

¹⁴ See: Yu.D. Anchabadze, N.G. Volkova, *Etnicheskaia istoria Severnogo Kavkaza XVI-XIX vv.*, Moscow, 1993.

¹⁵ See: R. Topchishvili, *Migration of the Ossetians to Georgia and the Ethnic History of Shida Kartli*, Tbilisi, 1997 (in Georgian); idem, *Osetiny v Gruzii*, pp. 7-16, 104-107.

written language. It has completely disappeared; now the Udins are considered to be its only ethnic successors. In the physical sense, the Albanians did not regenerate, but became a Turkic-speaking people—today's Azeris.

In the 7th-8th centuries, Turkic-speaking Khazars moved to Albania (12,000 people); in 1025—40,000 families of Oghuz Turks; and in 1070, Seljuk Turks appeared there (at the time of Alp Arslan's conquest).

Nevertheless, according to scientists, the physical descendants of the ancient Albanians, and not of the Turkic peoples, predominate numerically among today's Azeris.

Great changes took place in the Caucasus with the arrival of the Russians. According to the results of the last population census conducted during the Soviet era, their numbers amounted to 12 million people, whereas two centuries before they did not exist there at all.

The ongoing struggle of the Russian Empire to conquer the Caucasus led to a large part of the indigenous population leaving their homeland and moving to the Ottoman Empire. The once large ethnicities of Adyghe origin (700-750,000 people) found themselves in the minority.

Other North Caucasian ethnic groups also left their historical homeland. Among the muhajirun (emigrants) were many Abkhazians and Georgian Muslims. Eight thousand people moved to the Ottoman Empire from Ajaria (a historical-ethnographic territory of Georgia); there was also mass migration of Georgian Muslims from Samtskhe-Javakheti. The settlement area of Ossetians and Armenians who were loyal to the Russians extended into the liberated territories.

Ossetians settled in the Caucasian valley, on a small section of land of their ancestors. In the 19th-beginning of the 20th centuries, Armenians occupied the vast territories of the Northern and Southern Caucasus. The czarist government moved them from the Ottoman Empire to Georgia and Azerbaijan.

In addition to Armenians, other ethnic groups also moved to Georgia—in particular, Greeks. They settled in Trialeti and called themselves Urum; their native language was Turkish and they confessed Christianity.

The Russian Empire tried to change the ethnic situation in all the regions of the Caucasus. The people of Adyghe origin who remained in the mountains of the Northern Caucasus were moved to the valleys where they found themselves in the midst of many Russian population settlements.

This policy was successfully continued in the Soviet period as well. Evidence of this is the migration of the North Caucasian mountain-dwellers (Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, and Karachays) to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The same lot befell the residents of Georgia—the Meskhetian Turks and Hemshinli (Armenian Muslims). At the same time, the Russian Empire did everything it could to settle the various ethnic groups of non-Caucasian origin in the Northern Caucasus; primarily Russians. It is worth noting that during the Soviet period they comprised the absolute majority of the population of the autonomous formations of the Northern Caucasus.

For example, whereas in 1867, the number of Chechens in Chechnia amounted to 31.7% and Russians to 30.1%, in 1874 their ratio was already 29.9% and 28.8%, respectively.¹⁶

In short, the arrival of the Russians radically changed the ethnic map of the Northern and the Southern Caucasus. What is more, there was unprecedented migration of Armenians, Germans, Greeks, and other nationalities to these regions. Colonization of the Northern Caucasus also had an impact on where the nomadic peoples—Nogais, Turkmen, and Kalmyks—settled.

The Black Sea region, Abkhazia in particular, has always been a target of the Russian authorities' special attention; there was mass migration of Russians to that region. But the climatic factor interfered with this policy—mortality among the migrants was very high. For example, in 1809-1811, 7,315 migrants died in the Black Sea region of the Northern Caucasus, and in 1818, as the result of an epidemic, their numbers decreased by almost half. So in 1870-1890, there was mass settlement of

¹⁶ See: V.S. Belozerov, *Emicheskaja karta Severnogo Kavkaza*, OGI, Moscow, 2005, p. 23.

Armenians on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, in the districts of Tuapse, Sochi, Adler, Anapa, Novorossiysk, and Maikop. This process also took place in 1915-1916.

It is also worth mentioning the role of the large states situated to the south of the Caucasus. From this point of view, the Arabian conquerors had a strong impact on the ethnic situation (particularly in the Eastern Caucasus). The spread of Islam accelerated the ethnic changes there.

In southwest Georgia, the Ottoman Empire changed the ethnic situation. There is a document from 1595 that presents the results of a population census carried out in the Gurjistan vilayet; it describes the historical-ethnographic districts of Georgia—Samtskhe, Javakheti, Kola, Artaani, Erusheti, and Tao Oltisi (Shavsheti, Klarjeti, and a large part of Tao were not included)—and indicated several hundred settlements. There were 102 settlements in Javakheti alone. The Ottoman entirely ravaged Tori (now the Borzhomi region). Inculcation of Islam entailed de-ethnization and Turkization of the Georgians.¹⁷

Iran had a negative influence on the ethnic situation in Georgia during the late Middle Ages. The indigenous Georgian population was forced to leave its land, which became settled with Turkmen tribes. As a result of this, an emergency situation developed in several regions of Eastern Georgia. Eastern Kakhetia (now a region of Saingilo), Gagma Mkhari (the left-hand bank of the River Alazani), Shida (Inner) Kakhetia, and Ertso-Tianeti became essentially deserted. Kartli and Trialeti found themselves on the brink of a demographic disaster.

Some of the population of the province of Fereydan (the territory of present-day Iran) consists of the descendants of Georgians exiled by Shah Abbas in the 17th century. At the same time, Turkmen tribes migrated to Kakheti and Kvemo Kartli; they also migrated at a later time. The frequent inroads of the North Caucasian mountain-dwellers, known in eastern Georgia as “lekianoba” (“Lezghian dominance,” “Lezghian incursions”) and “tkvis skidva” (“the sale of prisoners”) also had a significant effect on the ethnic situation in Georgia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union had a great impact on the ethnic and demographic situation in the Caucasus. The ethnic conflicts that flared up there under the instigation of the Russians prompted migration of the population. It is enough to remember the consequences of the war in Chechnia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Shida Kartli (the Tskhinvali region); Chechens, Armenians (from Azerbaijan), Azeris (from Armenia and from the territory of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenian armed forces), and Georgians migrated from the conflict zones; they essentially became refugees. Unfortunately, some of the Ossetians also left Georgia. Ethnic Greeks have practically disappeared from the Tsalk region.

Moreover, a large part of the indigenous population have left Georgia, particularly young people. The emigration of Georgians to Western countries has been instigated by economic difficulties.

C o n c l u s i o n

So beginning from ancient times, the Caucasus has constantly undergone ethno-demographic changes. The events occurring in the Eurasian expanse and in Southwest Asia had an effect on the ethnic situation of the region. Over many centuries, a multitude of ethnic groups now disappeared, now settled there.

Conquering of the Caucasus by the Russian Empire forced many indigenous Caucasian ethnic groups to leave the land of their ancestors.

¹⁷ See: R. Topchishvili, *Kuda delos gruzinskoe naselenie Javakheti*, Tbilisi, 2000.

The ethnic diversity in this region arose as a result of Russia's targeted policy; nevertheless, peace reigned for a certain time in the territory of the Caucasus it conquered. For example, relative peace and favorable conditions were created in the 19th-20th centuries conducive to the development of the Caucasian ethnic groups.

Russia always had its bastion there in the form of the region's "privileged nationalities" (the Armenians and Ossetians), on whom it counted and who to a certain extent helped to realize its imperial strivings.

GEOHISTORY**Jamil HASANLI***D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor at Baku State University
(Baku, Azerbaijan).***HOW THE CAUCASIAN BUREAU OF
THE C.C. R.C.P. (B.) DISCUSSED
THE KARABAKH ISSUE IN 1920-1923****A b s t r a c t**

The author presents the wide panorama of political intrigues around Nagorno-Karabakh which began in the early 1920s when the Bolsheviks occupied the Transcaucasus and slowed down when an autonomous republic was established in the mountainous part of the contested area. The Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) set up in April 1920 repeatedly returned to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. A vast range of hitherto unpublished historical sources

and the author's analysis of the course of events prove that under the Musavat government (1918-1920), the entire territory of Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan. It was in April 1920, when the Bolsheviks came to power in the Transcaucasus, that it became a target of unjustified Armenian claims.

Soviet Russia was actively involved in what was going on in Nagorno-Karabakh between 1920 and 1923 when the autonomous republic was set up.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The political destiny of Karabakh was largely shaped by what happened in the 1920s in the Caucasus.

The policy of Soviet Russia, which occupied the Caucasus, turned Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia into seats of potential conflicts. In the first months of the region's Sovietization,

Moscow and its representatives in the Caucasus recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an inalienable part of Azerbaijan. In the spring of 1921, however, the Bolsheviks decided to find a plausible pretext to transfer it to Armenia. With no plausible pretexts at hand, they armed themselves with the formula "autonomy first, then mobilization of the local Armenians"; in July 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) was set up as part of the Azerbaijan S.S.R.

Sovietization of Armenia. The Karabakh Issue is Back on the Agenda

As soon as Soviet power was established in Armenia on 29 November, 1920, the Communists returned the Karabakh issue to the political agenda.

It should be said that the Armenians were prepared to exploit the slogans of proletarian solidarity to realize their narrow selfish interests. On 30 November, 1920, Chairman of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee (Az.R.C.) Nariman Narimanov and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Mirza Huseynov congratulated the Armenian Revolutionary Committee in a telegram. The telegram, however, did not entirely correspond to the decision adopted by the joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.

Nariman Narimanov's speech at the grand meeting of the Baku Soviet on the occasion of establishing Soviet power in Armenia and the Declaration he read on 1 December, 1920 also contained certain contradictions.

The Declaration said: "Soviet Azerbaijan, which intends to appease the fraternal Armenian working people fighting the Dashnaks who have spilled and are spilling the innocent blood of our best Communist comrades in Armenia and Zangezur, declares that from this time on territorial issues will never cause bloodshed between two peoples who have been neighbors for centuries; the territories of the Zangezur and Nakhchivan uyezds are an inalienable part of Soviet Armenia. The toiling peasants of Nagorno-Karabakh are granted the right to complete self-determination; all military actions in Zangezur are being suspended, while the troops of Soviet Azerbaijan are being pulled out."¹

On 4 November, 1920, after discussing the Russian-Armenian treaty, the meeting of the Politburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) attended by Stalin and Orjonikidze decided that "the suggestion that Nakhchivan and Zangezur should be transferred to Armenia is disadvantageous both politically and strategically."

On 30 November, 1920, however, the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) passed a decision on the transfer of Zangezur to Armenia (the Nakhchivan issue was not discussed). Several days later, on 2 December, Envoy Plenipotentiary of the R.S.F.S.R. in Armenia Boris Legran pointed out that Soviet Russia had recognized only the transfer of Zangezur (out of the three territories mentioned above) as legal.²

The Declaration Narimanov read on 1 December mentioned Nakhchivan in addition to Zangezur.

The text which appeared in the Baku newspapers had been falsified by Orjonikidze. On 1 December, he informed Legran and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. Georgy Chicherin of the following in a ciphered telegram: "Azerbaijan has already responded and transferred Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Armenia."³ On 2 December, in another tel-

¹ *Kommunist*, 2 December, 1920.

² See: Radiogram of B. Legran to G. Orjonikidze. 02.12.1920, Russian State Archives of Social-Political History (hereinafter RGASPI), rec. gr. 85, inv. 14, f. 33, sheet 16 (all archival documents are in Russian unless otherwise stated).

³ G. Orjonikidze's ciphered telegram to Legran and Chicherin. 01.12.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 14, f. 33, sheet 12.

egram, he informed Lenin and Stalin of the following: “Yesterday Azerbaijan announced that Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and Nagorno-Karabakh were transferred to Soviet Armenia.”⁴ Two days later, the “good news” appeared in *Pravda*.⁵

Was Grigory (Sergo) Orjonikidze misinformed, or was it a lie?

When Soviet power was established in Dilijan, G. Orjonikidze discussed the issues mentioned in the Declaration of the government of Azerbaijan with Amayak Nazaretyan by direct telephone line and said in particular that “today, the Soviet gathered for its gala meeting in Baku where Narimanov read the Declaration of the government of Azerbaijan, which pointed out that there were no longer borders between Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan. From this day on, the territory of the Zangezur and Nakhchivan uyezds has become an inalienable part of Soviet Armenia. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have been granted the right to self-determination. The riches of Azerbaijan—oil and kerosene—have become the riches of both republics.” Overjoyed, A. Nazaretyan exclaimed, “We shall start shouting in the press: Bravo, Azeris!”⁶

This means that the Declaration of the Chairman of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee of 1 December, 1920 was “slightly” changed by the Bolsheviks. Two Baku newspapers (*Kommunist* on 2 December, 1920 and *Bakinsky rabochy* on 3 December, 1920) wrote about the “right to self-determination” granted to the toiling peasants of Nagorno-Karabakh, while on 7 December, 1920 the Armenian *Kommunist* informed readers that “Nagorno-Karabakh has been recognized as part of the Armenian Socialist Republic.”

The flagrant falsifications enraged Nariman Narimanov. In June 1921, he instructed People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Mirza Huseynov, who was in Tiflis, to inform the Caucasian Bureau that “since they refer to my Declaration, I must say that it states the following: Nagorno-Karabakh has been granted the right to free self-determination.”⁷

Did anyone in Armenia see the real text of the Declaration? We know that the text signed by Narimanov and Huseynov was telegraphed to the Armenian Revolutionary Committee. After reading the document, Askanaz Mravyan (a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee) informed Armenian representative in Moscow Saak Ter-Gabrielyan that Azerbaijan had announced that Zangezur and Nakhchivan had been united [with Armenia] and that a referendum would take place in Nagorno-Karabakh.⁸

The collection of documents *Velikaya Oktyabrskaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsia i pobeda Sovetskoy vlasti v Armenii* (The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Victory of Soviet Power in Armenia) published in 1957 in Erevan contained the original text of the Declaration kept in the Central State Archives of Armenia.⁹

Since the mid-1980s, Armenian authors have been using the “doctored” text; this is true of those who were involved in putting together the documentary collection of 1957.¹⁰

Nagorny Karabakh: istoricheskaya spravka (Nagorno-Karabakh: Historical Information) for example, compiled by the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R., relied on the “edited” text

⁴ G. Orjonikidze’s letter to V. Lenin and I. Stalin, 02.12.1920. RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 14, f. 33, sheet 20.

⁵ *Pravda*, 4 December, 1920.

⁶ Conversation between A.M. Nazaretyan and G.K. Orjonikidze by direct telephone line. 01.12.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 14, f. 37, sheet 1.

⁷ *K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy avtonomnoy oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoj SSR. Dokumenty i materialy*, Baku, 1989, p. 89.

⁸ From a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee (A. Mravyan) to representative of Soviet Armenia Ter-Gabrielyan. 04.01.1921, Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (hereinafter AVP RF), rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, folder 232, f. 53001, sheet 14.

⁹ See: *Velikaya Oktyabrskaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsia i pobeda Sovetskoy vlasti v Armenii*, Erevan, 1957, pp. 437-438.

¹⁰ See: *Nagorny Karabakh: istoricheskaya spravka*, Erevan, 1988, pp. 28-29.

published by the *Kommunist* newspaper on 7 December, 1920 rather than on the original text available from the 1957 collection of documents. The Armenians have developed the habit of using falsified historical documents.

Nariman Narimanov: “Azerbaijan Went as far as Renouncing its Territory in Favor of Armenia When This Should Not Have Been Done for Political Reasons”

The Armenians interpreted Narimanov’s Declaration as the transfer of the Zangezur and Nakhchivan uyezds; this played into the hands of those forces in Bolshevik Russia that did not want Azerbaijan to preserve its territorial integrity.

In 1923, in a letter to Lenin, Nariman Narimanov admitted that this had been a mistake by saying: “Azerbaijan went as far as renouncing its territory in favor of Armenia when this should not have been done for political reasons.”¹¹

The Russian-Armenian military-political treaty signed on 2 December, 1920 registered the Zangezur Uezd as part of Armenia¹²; according to the latest population census, however, the Muslims outnumbered the Armenians: 123,095 and 99,257, respectively.¹³

On 24 December, as soon as part of Zangezur had been transferred to Armenia, Commissar Extraordinary of Karabakh and Zangezur Sh. Makhmudbekov sent a report to Narimanov (on Narimanov’s instructions, a copy was sent to Orjonikidze), in which he wrote in particular that “the representatives of four units of lower Zangezur came to me to resolutely announce that they wanted to remain under Azerbaijan Soviet power. If their desire is ignored, they would like to know where they could move.”¹⁴

In another of his dispatches sent to N. Narimanov and G. Sultanov on 30 December, 1920, Sh. Makhmudbekov described the situation in Zangezur as critical because of the constant threat of a Dashnak attack. He wrote that if the Center, absolutely convinced that the situation was under control, would remove its troops from the vast territory, which covered hundreds of versts, it should allow the locals to mobilize their own forces to protect Karabakh and Zangezur and concluded that “this is possible and necessary.”¹⁵

On 15 February, 1921, Sh. Makhmudbekov supplemented his report of 24 December with two pages of information addressed to Narimanov, Sultanov, and Karaev: threatened with pogroms, the Muslim population of Karabakh and Zangezur needed Baku’s help to protect themselves against the emboldened Dashnaks. He warned that the Dashnaks, “who cannot so far press on to Kurdistan, have stirred up a revolt in the 2nd Varandian part of the Shusha Uezd to merge with the 1st Khankendi part and isolate Nagorno-Karabakh from the valley.”

¹¹ N. Narimanov’s letter to V. Lenin. 09.01.1922, RGASPI, rec. gr. 5, inv. 1, f. 1220, sheet 1.

¹² See: I. Musa, *Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan*, Part II, Baku, 2010, p. 143 (in Azeri).

¹³ The Territories Disputed by the Transcaucasian Republics. 01.03.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 5, inv. 1, f. 2296, sheet 4.

¹⁴ Sh. Makhmudbekov’s Report to N. Narimanov. Copies to G. Sultanov and A. Karaev. 24.12. 1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 13, f. 177, sheets 2-3.

¹⁵ Sh. Makhmudbekov’s Report to N. Narimanov. Copy to G. Sultanov. 30.12.1920, State Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic (hereinafter GA AR), rec. gr. 27, inv. 4, f. 17, sheet 60.

To protect the Muslim population of Karabakh and Zangezur, the commissar extraordinary suggested that Khosrov bek Sultanov (the brother of Sultan bek Sultanov), former Governor-General of Karabakh and Zangezur, well known as defender of the Azeris (arrested at the urgent request of the Armenians), be released from prison.

Sh. Makhmudbekov added a few hand-written lines, stating the following: "If Khosrov Sultanov is released, I personally shall vouch for his loyalty and fidelity and assume responsibility for his acts."¹⁶ On 28 February, the business manager of the Council of Peoples' Commissars transferred the report to G. Orjonikidze.

Why did Narimanov suggest in his Declaration that Zangezur and Nakhchivan be transferred to Armenia?

The idea belonged to the Politburo of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). Back on 4 November, 1920, during his trip to the Caucasus, Stalin attended a joint meeting of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) and the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.), which listened to Legran's report on the situation in Armenia and passed a decision. Point "b" of the document, which related to the discussed treaty between Russia and Armenia, said the following: "To inform, at the same time, that the Politburo insists that the point on the transfer of Nakhichevan and Zangezur (suggested by Moscow.—*J.H.*) is not advantageous either politically or strategically and can only be carried out in an emergency." Point "d" instructed Narimanov to substantiate the Politburo's opinion about Nakhchivan and Zangezur.¹⁷

This meant that there was no Karabakh problem at all initially, which was why it was not discussed.

On 20 November, 1920, a diplomatic mission of Soviet Russia arrived in Erivan to monitor the talks between Turkey and Armenia underway in Gumri and to sort out Armenia's territorial claims to Azerbaijan and Georgia. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin was informed that "today, the continued existence of the Armenian people depends not so much on military force as on diplomacy. We should abandon party romanticism and arm ourselves with grim realism."

The diplomatic mission deemed it necessary to remind the people's commissar that "when talking to the Turks in Batumi (at the peace conference held in Batumi in May-June 1918.—*J.H.*), Kachaznuni and Khatisyan agreed to transfer Karabakh to Azerbaijan."¹⁸

The First Decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.): "Strictly Confidential"

On 3 June, 1921, members of the Caucasian Bureau, G. Orjonikidze, F. Makharadze, N. Narimanov, A. Myasnikov (Martuni), I. Orakhelashvili, A. Nazaretyan, and Yu. Figatner, candidate for bureau member, Secretary of the C.C. of the Azerbaijan C.P. G. Kaminsky, and member of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Georgia, Sh. Eliava, attended a plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.).

¹⁶ Addition to Sh. Makhmudbekov's Report to N. Narimanov of 24 December. Copies to G. Sultanov and A. Karayev. 24.12.1920, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 13, f. 71, sheets 1-1rev.

¹⁷ Protocol No. 4 of the joint meeting of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) and Caucasian Bureau. 04.11.1920, Archives of Political Documents at the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (hereinafter APD UDP AR), rec. gr. 1, inv. 1, f. 22, sheet 20.

¹⁸ The Diplomatic Representatives of Soviet Russia in Erivan to People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin. November 1920, GA AR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 38, sheet 15.

Its evening sitting was expected to discuss three questions:

- (1) the Azerbaijani issue;
- (2) the issue of Zangezur;
- (3) the nomads.

Protocol No. 6 deals with the decisions on the first and third points; the second was discussed separately in the Addendum to the Protocol,¹⁹ which started all the trouble.

- First, as distinct from Protocol No. 6, the decision on Zangezur, which consisted of 7 points, was marked as “strictly confidential.”
- Second, of the seven points only six dealt with Zangezur, while Point 5 said: “The declaration of the Armenian government should mention that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Armenia.”²⁰

This meant that Armenia was “strictly confidentially” instructed to issue a government declaration saying that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Armenia. The Caucasian Bureau, however, was not empowered to pass decisions of this sort.

This was not all. On 2 May, 1921, a C.C. plenary session discussed organizational issues related to the Caucasian Bureau. It was decided to set up a Presidium of three members (G. Orjonikidze, F. Makharadze, and Yu. Figatner)²¹ to operate between the plenums. This put the Caucasian Bureau into the hands of a very narrow circle, without a single representative of Azerbaijan among them.

On 12 June, the Council of People’s Commissars (CPC) of Armenia issued a decree which said: “Proceeding from the declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and from the agreement between the socialist republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is declared that from this time on Nagorno-Karabakh has become an inalienable part of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia.”²² The same day, A. Myasnikov and M. Karabekyan signed the document; three days later, on 15 June, it was discussed by the C.C. C.P. of Armenia, which passed the following decision: “The decree on the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh and Soviet Armenia should be published.”

The same sitting discussed the fifth point of its agenda on dispatching a representative to Karabakh; it was decided “to send Comrade Mravyan together with Pirumov, Akop Ionisyan, Ter-Simonyan, and a group of other comrades to Karabakh;”²³ the government issued a corresponding decree, which the Armenian Revolutionary Committee published a week later, on 19 June. Askazas Mravyan was appointed *chargé d’affaires* extraordinaire in Nagorno-Karabakh.²⁴

The next day, the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia passed a decision On Strengthening Clandestine Activity in Zangezur with New Officials²⁵ to add weight to the decision of the Armenian

¹⁹ Protocol No. 6 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 03.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 76rev.

²⁰ Addendum to Protocol No. 6 of the Evening Sitting of the Plenary Session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 03.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 77.

²¹ Protocol No. 2 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 02.05.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 57.

²² *Bakinsky rabochy*, 22 June, 1921,

²³ Protocol No. 8 of the meeting of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia. 15.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 105, sheet 11rev.

²⁴ Askanaz Arutyunovich Mravyan was born in 1886 in Ganja; in 1906, graduated from a theological seminary in Erivan; in 1905, began cooperating with the Gnchak Party; upon Sovietization of Armenia, filled various high posts in the Foreign Ministry of Soviet Armenia; edited the *Khorurdain Aystan* newspaper (see: A.A. Mravyan’s Autobiography, 1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 8, f. 4020, sheet 13).

²⁵ Protocol No. 9 of a meeting of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia. 20.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 105, sheet 12rev.

Revolutionary Committee and to fortify Armenia's position in Zangezur to become firmly entrenched in Karabakh. On 28 June, Chairman of the Economic Council of Armenia Sarkis Lukashin (Srapionyan) and Commissar of Justice A. Karinyan were sent to Zangezur.

On 28 June, the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia appointed P. Makintsyan as envoy extraordinary in Zangezur who, since May 1921, had filled the post of the minister of the interior of Armenia. Commissar of Post and Telegraph Drastamat Ter-Simonyan, who received the post of Chairman of the Zangezur Revolutionary Committee, was instructed to promptly occupy Gerus. The C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia and I. Dovlatov were requested to send more assistants to Mravyan.²⁶

The Muslim population of Zangezur was obviously discontented, which forced the emissaries to return to Erivan. On 7 August, the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia condemned P. Makintsyan and D. Ter-Simonyan for leaving Zangezur without permission. Soon after that, the latter was sent to Zangezur for two months as an envoy of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia and the Council of People's Commissars.²⁷

As distinct from the Decree of the CPC of Armenia of 12 June, the Declaration of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee did not mention the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia; this was not discussed by the republics either. It seems that the authors of the Decree were inspired by the "strictly confidential" decision on the Zangezur issue which the Caucasian Bureau had passed on 3 June (the 3 June decision of the Caucasian Bureau did not mention the decree of 12 June for some reason).

I have already written that despite the classified nature of its decision, the Caucasian Bureau was not empowered to pass decisions of this kind.

The First Attempt to Join Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia

In fact, the first step in this direction was made in the spring of 1921 when the government came up with a document of six points entitled *The Basic Premises on Uniting Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia*. It said that the mountainous part was separated from Lower Karabakh by a low mountain range.

Convinced that this mountain range should be joined to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenians argued that, first, this zone was allegedly used by the Armenians and, second, there were strips of arable land.

The Armenian government drew up a document which said that Nagorno-Karabakh (including the village communities of Talysh, Maragaly, Kasapet, Kabarek, Boyakhmedli, Khanabad, Gulabli, Engikend, Kagardin, and Qajar) should become part of Armenia. The authors had to admit that certain Muslim communities (Boyakhmedli, Gulabli, Qajar, and others) would remain part of Nagorno-Karabakh because certain Armenian areas would remain in the valley.

Art 5 of the document is especially interesting. It reads: "The transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Republic of Armenia should be naturally accompanied by the transfer of so-called Kurdistan, a narrow mountainous strip between Karabakh and Zangezur. Its very specific location and the nationalist sentiments of its population, however, might cause certain problems. The following should be

²⁶ Protocol No. 11 of a meeting of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia. 27.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 105, sheet 17rev.

²⁷ Protocol of a meeting of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia. 07.08. 1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 105, sheet 18.

done to neutralize possible complications: this area is situated higher than the northern Shusha-Gerusi road and consists of six village communities with a total population of 27 thousand. This area can be transformed into a canton governed by the Republic of Armenia or, as a last resort, placed under Azerbaijan's protectorate. Kurdistan might demand the Malybeyli community along with the town of Shusha. This cannot be done for the following reasons:

- "1. The Malybeyli village is the only one with a settled population; it is practically non-existent: the people moved to the valley when Soviet power was established. Other villages are populated by nomads who settled on their land in the valley in the past few years.
- "2. This community (Malybeyli.—*J.H.*) wedged between Varanda and Khachyn cannot form a unit. These two parts of the Shusha Uezd will remain divided, which means that no single administrative unit can be set up.
- "3. This applies to the city of Shusha surrounded by the lands of the Shushikend community and the Armenian village of Gaybalikend. Historically, the area of the city of Shusha is part of the lands of the Shushikend community.
- "4. Kurdistan is connected to the valley by the road going through Khankendi."²⁸

The sixth, concluding, article of the document states the true intentions of the Armenian government in clear terms: "The Kaladarasi and Jamilli communities with their predominantly Armenian population are found to the south of Kurdistan in the Akkara valley. This strip with a road offers the only connection between Zangezur and Nagorno-Karabakh as a future single administrative unit with a single administration. Without this, there is no sense in joining Nagorno-Karabakh to the Republic of Armenia."²⁹

In May 1921, the Armenian government, guided by the above and never bothering about the legal arguments, unilaterally decided to join Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The plenary session of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia held on 23 May, 1921 appointed A. Ionisyan as envoy of Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. He was summoned from Baku to Tiflis by a telegram to receive instructions from A. Bekzadyan.³⁰

The same plenum discussed the revolutionary committee of the Alexandropol Uezd; D. Ter-Simonyan was appointed as commissar of the Daralagez Uezd. After listening to D. Pirumov, who informed the plenum about the statement of the Zangezur commission, the meeting ruled the following: "The note to Azerbaijan should be postponed until the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is clarified at the next plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the R.C.P. (B.)."³¹

In May, Armenia obviously took practical measures to join Nagorno-Karabakh and overcome Azerbaijan's resistance. The so-called recommendations of the Caucasian Bureau and the decision of 3 June served the same purpose.

The Armenians were informed of the upcoming discussion of the problem at the June plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.), the decisions of which might have supplied the Armenians' illegitimate actions with legal foundations.

In May 1921, the leaders of Azerbaijan carried out several organizational measures to forestall possible decisions on Karabakh. Armenak Karakozov, who from May 1920 to January 1921 filled a high post in the extraordinary commissariat of Zangezur and Karabakh, returned to Azerbaijan after serving for about twelve months in the Economic Council of Armenia. On 3 May, 1921, he was ap-

²⁸ The Basic Premises on Uniting Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia. 1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 137, sheet 7-7rev.

²⁹ Ibid., sheet 7rev.

³⁰ Protocol No. 4 of a meeting of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia. 23.05. 1921. RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 105, sheet 5rev.

³¹ Ibidem.

pointed as commissar extraordinary of Karabakh and Zangezur by a decree of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee.³²

A couple of weeks later, on 15 May, the Az.R.C. repealed its mandate of 3 May and moved Karakozov to the post of deputy commissar extraordinary of the Karabakh District. The same decree appointed N. Buniyatov as temporary commissar extraordinary of the Karabakh District.³³

This reshuffling evidently happened because the Az.R.C. was reluctant to send A. Karakozov, particularly when vested with “extraordinary and unlimited powers,” to Karabakh, especially after Armenia declared this region “its inalienable part.” This reluctance was underpinned by N. Narimanov’s claim that Karakozov had “one foot in Armenia and the other in Azerbaijan,” thus casting aspersions on his loyalty.

Later Sergey Kirov (who in 1921 was placed at the head of the party organization of Azerbaijan) insisted on Karakozov’s appointment as a senior official in Karabakh. On 5 February, 1922, the joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan passed the following decision: “To send Comrade Karakozov to Karabakh. Comrade Karakozov will receive the instructions related to his duties from the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.”

The decision of the joint meeting consisted of two parts; the second pointed out that Karakozov was delegated as a “representative of the Az.R.C. and the Armenian Revolutionary Committee and the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.).”³⁴ Obviously, the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) appointed Karakozov as a representative of both sides.

Sergo Orjonikidze: “The Karabakh Issue is a Matter of Honor for All the Soviet Republics and Should Be Resolved Once and For All”

Protocol No. 6 of the plenum of the Caucasian Bureau clearly indicates that Nariman Narimanov was also present: point 1 of the agenda was related to his opponents. Sarkis [Sarkisov] was promptly fired, while the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) was suggested that, without disrupting the smooth functioning of the Baku Committee, G. Jabiev, R. Akhundov, S. Agamirov, O. Shatunovskaya, and G. Lordkipanidze be moved to new posts.³⁵

Nariman Narimanov, who remained the only member at the 3 June sitting, preferred not to comment on the decision of the Caucasian Bureau. He decided to continue fighting with the help of republican structures. On the other hand, the secret decision of the Caucasian Bureau on the Zangezur issue signed by Yu. Figatner and stamped by the Caucasian Bureau was sent to all the Bureau members, including N. Narimanov in Baku.³⁶

The absence of Azerbaijan’s prompt response and protest against the illegal inclusion of the article relating to Karabakh encouraged the Armenians to intensify their claims on Karabakh and start moving in this direction.

³² Registry of outgoing papers of Az.R.C. for 1921, GA AR, rec. gr. 410, inv. 2, f. 14, sheet 14.

³³ Ibid., sheet 7.

³⁴ Protocol of a meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 05.02.1922, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 71, f. 123, sheet 26.

³⁵ Protocol No. 6 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 03.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 76.

³⁶ See: Addendum to protocol No. 6. Strictly confidential. 03.06.1921, GA AR, rec. gr. 410, inv. 1, f. 98, sheet 5.

What caused the hasty and legally untenable actions designed to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia? What was behind Armenia's actions and the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) in May-June 1921?

The answer is simple. On 15 June, the commission on border problems among the Transcaucasian republics was to meet in Tbilisi. On 2 May, 1921, the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau set up a commission of representatives of the three republics headed by Sergey Kirov to delimitate the administrative borders.³⁷

On the eve of the Tiflis meeting, the Caucasian Bureau (by its decision of 3 June) and the Armenian government (by a decree of 12 June) wanted to confront Azerbaijan with the accomplished transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.

On 26 June, the CPC of Azerbaijan discussed A. Karaev's report about his trip to Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan and decided that the Armenian claims to Nagorno-Karabakh should be studied and summarized in a detailed report to the Council. A group of three (Shakhtakhtinsky, Vezirov, and Aliev) was set up to cope with the task. It was decided to suspend the powers the Armenian government had extended to Mravyan until the group had completed its report and to inform G. Orjonikidze, Chairman of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee A. Myasnikov, Navy Commissar of Azerbaijan A. Karaev, and A. Mravyan of this decision.³⁸

On 27 June, Narimanov, in fulfillment of the decision, informed G. Orjonikidze and A. Myasnikov by telegraph that the CPC of Azerbaijan had unanimously deemed the unilateral decision on Nagorno-Karabakh passed by the Armenian Revolutionary Committee without discussion at the CPC of Armenia and the arrival of A. Mravyan in Nagorno-Karabakh as envoy extraordinary of Armenia to be an unprecedented political and tactical mistake. It was also requested that Mravyan be immediately recalled.³⁹

Four days after Kirov had been elected First Secretary of C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan it was urgently requested to urgently deliver Karaev's report to the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan no later than 03:00 p.m. of 29 July.⁴⁰

Business Manager of the CPC of Azerbaijan A. Shirvani replied that in the absence of a verbatim report, it was impossible to reconstruct what Karaev had said at the meeting.⁴¹

On 27 June, a joint sitting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan discussed the problem of borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia and dismissed the Nagorno-Karabakh issue raised by A. Bekzadyan as untenable in view of the region's obvious economic bias toward Azerbaijan. Likewise, it was administratively and economically untenable to divide the localities with Armenian and Azeri populations between the two republics. On the basis of Narimanov's declaration, involving Armenian and Muslim villagers in wide-scale Soviet construction was suggested as the only answer. It was also suggested that all discussions be discontinued until relevant information had arrived from Tiflis. Even before the sitting adjourned, A. Shirvani, instructed by Narimanov, informed Huseynov in Tiflis of this decision.⁴²

His message said in part: "The Council of People's Commissars has agreed with the decision. Comrade Narimanov asked me to inform you that the question must be resolved in this way, other-

³⁷ Protocol No. 2 of the sitting of the Caucasian Bureau of C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 02.05.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 57.

³⁸ Protocol of a sitting of the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan. 26.06.1921, GA AR, rec. gr. 411, inv. 1, f. 12, sheet 1.

³⁹ Telegram of N. Narimanov to G. Orjonikidze and A. Myasnikov (copies to A. Mravyan and A. Karaev). 28.06.1921. RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 13, f. 98, sheet 1; N. Narimanov, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Baku, 1989, pp. 523-524.

⁴⁰ The C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to the Faction of the CPC of Azerbaijan S.S.R. 28.07.1921, GA AR, rec. gr. 411, inv. 1, f. 12, sheet 3.

⁴¹ A. Shirvani to the C.C. C.P. of Azerbaijan. 04.08.1921, GA AR, rec. gr. 411, inv. 1, f. 12, sheet 1.

⁴² Protocol No. 20 of the sitting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 27.06.1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 1231, sheet 64.

wise the Council will divest itself of all of its responsibilities, since if this is the way Soviet Armenia wishes to make a good impression on the Dashnaks and the non-party masses, we should bear in mind that by the same token we will be reviving anti-Soviet groups in Azerbaijan similar to the Dashnaks.”

At this point Narimanov took the receiver and said to Huseynov: “Tell them that this is the unanimous opinion of Politburo and Orgburo. My declaration, to which they refer, merely said, ‘Nagorno-Karabakh is being granted the right to free self-determination.’”

Huseynov, in turn, promised to personally supply the details of the Tiflis process and deemed it necessary to warn that “our decision will be coolly received.” He reminded Narimanov of the talk that had taken place the day before, saying: “Yesterday I spoke to Comrade Sergo, who minced no words: the Karabakh issue is a matter of honor for all the Soviet republics and should be resolved once and for all. These were his exact words, which I quoted to you yesterday.”

Narimanov said: “Today we sent you a telegram, with copies to Sergo, Myasnikov, and Karaev, to inform you that Comrade Mravyan has been recalled from Karabakh.”

Mirza Huseynov deemed it necessary to point out that the situation was far from simple and that a way out should be sought for and found. He said: “I think we should first discuss in detail why, on the one hand, the CPC of Armenia is making one declaration and sending its commissar extraordinary to Karabakh, without informing us so to speak, although our Armenian comrades insist that this is being done with our knowledge and consent. While on the other hand, we are sending them a telegram that essentially annuls their decisions. I am at a loss. I think that the question should be discussed more than once—there is no other solution. Right now I shall consult with Sergo and contact you once more before my departure.”

Narimanov asked Huseynov to tell Orjonikidze that “if he familiarizes himself with the material we have at our disposal, he will also object to all of this. You will bring all the documents with you to Tiflis and then it will become clear that our Armenian comrades are only thinking about the territory and are not concerned about the wellbeing of the poorest Armenian and Muslim groups or about strengthening the revolution.”⁴³

The question is who allowed the Armenians to speak in the name of the Azeri leaders? Mirza Huseynov, who said that “this is being done with our knowledge and consent,” hinted at Narimanov’s failure to speak out at the meeting of the Caucasian Bureau on 3 June. His passivity negatively affected the course of the discussion of the Karabakh issue. Later, however it turned out that it had been Orjonikidze and Kirov who gave the Armenians this permission. Having concentrated real power in the Caucasus, they were looking for ways to transfer Karabakh to Armenia. It was they who handed Narimanov the telegram on 26 June with Bekzadyan’s idea about dividing Karabakh on national-ethnic grounds. The telegram read: “If you want to know our opinion, it is the following: to smooth out the friction and establish genuinely friendly relations when dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, we should be guided by the principle that none of the Armenian villages should be united with Azerbaijan, just as none of the Muslim villages should become part of Armenia.”⁴⁴

The same day, 27 June, Huseynov, on Narimanov’s instructions, moved the issue to the Caucasian Bureau, which ruled the following: “An extraordinary plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) must be convened immediately. The following telegram should be sent to comrades Narimanov and Myasnikov: ‘The Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) suggests that when you receive this you must immediately depart to attend the extraordinary plenum of the Caucasian Bureau to discuss delimitation of the republics. There are six members of the Caucasian

⁴³ Conversation of A.G. Shirvani and N. Narimanov by direct phone line with M.D. Huseynov. 27.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 215, sheet 14.

⁴⁴ Telegram of G. Orjonikidze and S. Kirov to N. Narimanov. 26.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 18, f. 229, sheets 1-2.

Bureau in Tiflis; if you fail to arrive, their decision will be considered final, therefore we insist that you go there at once.”⁴⁵

On 28 June, the CPC met once more under N. Narimanov’s chairmanship. Myasnikov’s Declaration, which proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh part of the Armenian S.S.R., was declined; the meeting discussed the possibility of recalling Mravyan, extraordinary representative of Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. The meeting registered that “in view of Comrade Narimanov’s planned trip to Tiflis, where the question will be discussed by the Caucasian Bureau, the decision of the Politburo and Orgburo of 27 June, 1921 on this issue should be taken as the basis.”⁴⁶

The intensified Armenian claims to the mountainous part of Karabakh forced Chairman of the Shusha Uezd Executive Committee B. Bunyatov to send Narimanov and People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs G. Sultanov a report on the Situation in the Shusha Uezd, in which he wrote: “The Armenian population (of Nagorno-Karabakh.—*J.H.*) showed no intention of separating themselves from the Az.S.S.R. because, first, the people know that if they are cut off from the valley they will perish, second, that they will get nothing from impoverished and starving Zangezur except for circulars, and, third, that as part of the Az.S.S.R. they will speak with a strong voice and with the hope that their demands will be promptly satisfied; this will never happen in the Armenian S.S.R.... What the Armenians are saying about being stepchildren in the Az.S.S.R. is explained by the tactless and inappropriate behavior of some of the officials.”⁴⁷

Why Are the Armenians Falsifying the Well-known Documents of the Caucasian Bureau Relating to Nagorno-Karabakh and Implicating Stalin?

The famous sitting of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) of 27 June, 1921 never considered the historical and ethnographic aspects; the decision was based on Karabakh’s economic pull toward Azerbaijan.

On 4 July, however, at another plenum of the Caucasian Bureau attended by Stalin, Kirov (future head of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan) and Orjonikidze (the republic’s curator) voted for the following resolution: “To include Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian S.S.R. and limit the plebiscite to the mountainous part.”⁴⁸

The plenary session was attended by member of the C.C. R.C.P. Stalin and members of the Caucasian Bureau Orjonikidze, Makharadze, Narimanov, Myasnikov, Kirov, Nazaretyan, Orakhelashvili, and Figatner. The discussion revealed two opposite opinions.

The participants were invited to vote for the following:

- (a) Karabakh should remain part of Azerbaijan (Narimanov, Makharadze, and Nazaretyan voted “for”; Orjonikidze, Myasnikov, Kirov and Figatner, “against”;

⁴⁵ Protocol No. 5 of a sitting of the Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 27.06.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 2, sheet 73.

⁴⁶ Protocol of a meeting of the CPC of Azerbaijan. 28.06.1921, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 9, sheet 10.

⁴⁷ Report of Chairman of the Shusha Uezd B. Bunyatov to N. Narimanov and G. Sultanov, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 169, f. 249/II, sheets 31-32.

⁴⁸ Protocol No. 11 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 04.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 118.

- (b) The plebiscite should be carried out throughout the entire territory of Karabakh among the Armenians and Muslims (Narimanov and Makharadze voted “for”).
- (c) The mountainous part of Karabakh should be joined to Armenia (Orjonikidze, Myasnikov, Figatner, and Kirov voted “for”).
- (d) The plebiscite should be carried out only in Upper Karabakh, that is, among the Armenians (Orjonikidze, Myasnikov, Figatner, Kirov, and Nazaretyan voted “for”).⁴⁹

The protocol contains a note: Comrade Orakhelashvili was absent when the vote on Karabakh was taken. This was a much more honest position than that of future Secretary of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Kirov and Orjonikidze, who repeatedly demanded in his telegrams to Lenin and Chicherin that both the valley and the mountainous part of Karabakh be left in Azerbaijan. They voted “for” on the two last points.

The adopted decision violated Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

This made people wonder why Orjonikidze and Kirov, who several months earlier “could not imagine Azerbaijan without Karabakh,” changed their minds in June 1921 and voted against Azerbaijan at the 4 July sitting of the Caucasian Bureau. Were they guided by the Center’s secret instructions?

Here is an explanation: the Moscow Treaty of 16 March, 1921 between Soviet Russia and Turkey (with a point which preserved Nakhchivan within Azerbaijan) turned Nagorno-Karabakh into a target of secret and then open discussions at the Caucasian Bureau in June-July 1921 and triggered attempts to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia by force.

The decision of the Caucasian Bureau of 4 July was frequently falsified and misinterpreted; Academician T. Kocharli has written the following on this score: “The Armenian authors performed a ‘minor’ operation by replacing the verb ‘include’ with the verb ‘leave in’.”⁵⁰

Nariman Narimanov stated resolutely that “because the Karabakh issue is so important to Azerbaijan, I believe it necessary to transfer the final decision on it to the C.C. R.C.P.”⁵¹ It was thanks to his protest that the meeting arrived at the following decision: “Since the Karabakh issue has caused serious disagreements, the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) believes it advisable to transfer the final decision to the C.C. R.C.P. (B.).”⁵²

This meant that the same sitting discussed the Karabakh issue as Point 5 of the agenda; the decision passed by a majority vote after Narimanov’s statement (Point 6) annulled the previous results.

This issue was never discussed in the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) because, first, Orjonikidze had renounced his previous erroneous position and, relying on Nazaretyan, demanded that the decisions of the previous plenary session on Karabakh be revised.⁵³

On 5 July, the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau adopted the following decisions on Point 2 of the agenda in view of N. Narimanov’s firm position and G. Orjonikidze’s retreat from his previous stand:

- (1) proceeding from the need to maintain national peace between the Muslims and the Armenians, the economic ties between Upper and Lower Karabakh, and its constant contacts with Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh should be left within the Azerbaijan S.S.R. with broad regional autonomy and its administrative center in the town of Shusha, which belongs to the autonomous region;

⁴⁹ Ibidem.

⁵⁰ T. Kocharli, *Karabakh: Lies and Truth*, Baku, 1998, p. 172 (in Azeri).

⁵¹ Protocol No. 11 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 04.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 114.

⁵² Ibidem.

⁵³ Protocol No. 12 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 05.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 112.

- (2) the C.C. of Azerbaijan should be instructed to identify the boundaries of the autonomous region and present the results to the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) for approval;
- (3) the Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. should be instructed to talk to the C.C. of Armenia and the C.C. of Azerbaijan about a candidate for the post of commissar extraordinary of Nagorno-Karabakh;
- (4) the C.C. of Azerbaijan should be instructed to identify the volume of rights of the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh and present the result to the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. for approval.⁵⁴

When commenting on the repeal of the first “fair decision” on the Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian side referred to Stalin’s unexpected arrival in Tiflis, who had allegedly pulled the strings for the Azeris in his usual manner.

Why do the Armenian historians who falsify the historical documents of the Caucasian Bureau implicate Stalin in the “transfer” (their favorite term) of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan? Because the crimes perpetrated under Stalin give the Armenians a chance to present themselves as victims of the totalitarian regime and create the semblance of “fairness restored.”

The Armenian authors and politicians who ascribe the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan to Stalin’s decision are courting the world public for approval since “it has become fashionable to heap the guilt for all misfortunes on Stalin.”⁵⁵

In his publication of 1989, Doctor of Philosophy Grant Episkoposyan of Moscow State University, for example, never hesitated to distort the facts and describe Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Armenia transferred to Azerbaijan on Stalin’s instructions.⁵⁶

Prof. A. Karsetsi, who did not bother to look into the protocols of the Caucasian Bureau, wrote in his book *Konflikty mezhdu narodami i puti ikh preodoleniya. K probleme Nagornogo Karabakha* (Conflicts between Peoples and Ways to Settle Them. On the Problem of Nagorno-Karabakh), where he claimed to present the latest findings, that “Stalin arrived from Nalchik, where he had been on leave at the time, and supported Narimanov’s demands, contrary to what he had written earlier in his article ‘Da zdravstvuyet Sovetskaya Armeniya!’ (Long Live Soviet Armenia!), which appeared in *Pravda* on 4 December, 1920. His opinion, alas, proved to be decisive; Nagorno-Karabakh was transferred to Azerbaijan.”⁵⁷

Another publication issued by the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R. (*Nagorny Karabakh: istoricheskaya spravka*) likewise heaps the blame on Stalin: “The decision of 5 July, 1921 was imposed by Joseph Stalin.”⁵⁸ It should be said that the book is a result of the joint efforts of prominent Armenian historians who know why Nagorno-Karabakh was transferred to Azerbaijan.

Protocols No. 11 (the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of 4 July) and No. 12 (the 5 July session) provide an absolutely clear picture. Stalin, who was present at both sessions, said nothing about Karabakh. Protocol No. 8 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) of 2 and 3 July is kept together with the protocols of 4 and 5 July in the same record group. Any impartial researcher will discover Stalin’s name at the top of the list of those present at these plenums.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Protocol No. 12 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 05.07.1921.

⁵⁵ Ig. Aliev, *Nagorno-Karabakh: Istoria. Fakty. Sobytia*, Baku, 1989, p. 84.

⁵⁶ See: G. Episkoposyan, “Stalin i armyansky vopros,” *Kommunist*, 22 January, 1989.

⁵⁷ A. Karsetsi, *Konflikty mezhdu narodami i puti ikh preodoleniya. K probleme Nagornogo Karabakha*, Ayastan, Erevan, 1990, p. 31.

⁵⁸ *Nagorny Karabakh: istoricheskaya spravka*, p. 33.

⁵⁹ See: Protocol No. 8 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 02-03.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheets 87-88; Protocol No. 8 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) with representatives of local party organizations and trade unions. 02-03.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 18, f. 59, sheets 12, 14.

It was Addendum to Protocol No. 8 that registered “the fact of the appearance of nationalist ‘Communist’ groups in the Communist organizations of the Transcaucasus, which were fairly strong in Georgia and Armenia and weak (in terms of their numbers and quality) in Azerbaijan.”⁶⁰

The results of the discussion of the Zangezur (3 June, 1921) and Nagorno-Karabakh (4-5 July) issues were caused by a wave of Communist nationalism in Armenia raised by the fact that the Moscow Treaty (March 1921) between Soviet Russia and Turkey had registered the status of the Nakhchivan region.

On 15 April, 1921, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Armenia A. Bekzadyan (who headed the Armenian delegation at the Moscow talks) sent a long letter of protest to Chicherin in which he accused Soviet Russia of failing to protect the interests of the Armenians. The letter said: “The Armenian delegation finds it very important to point out that the Turkish delegation at the conference acted as a protector and defender of the Muslim population of the Transcaucasus and of the interests of Soviet Azerbaijan in particular.”⁶¹

People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs A. Bekzadyan was concerned about the fact that Turkey had managed to retain Nakhchivan, a border point of great importance for its safety in the east, within Azerbaijan.⁶² He deemed it necessary to stress that “the conference’s decision on the Nakhchivan and Sharuro-Daralagez issues deprived Armenia of the possibility of administering Zangezur, which belongs to it, in a normal way.”⁶³

Georgy Chicherin wrote a letter to Saak Ter-Gabrielyan, who represented the Soviet government of Armenia, informing him of the above, by saying that he was amazed by Bekzadyan’s attempt to justify what the Armenian delegation had been doing at the Moscow conference and push the guilt onto the Russian delegation.

He wrote that the Armenians with whom he had been communicating were well-aware of the conference’s main aim and had never complained of its decisions.⁶⁴

Chicherin sent a more or less similar telegram to Boris Legran in Tiflis, which said: “I strongly object to the way Bekzadyan is trying, first, to heap the guilt on the Russian delegation and, second, to purge the Armenian delegation of accusations in front of readers or listeners, of whom I know nothing, by distorting the facts and suppressing information of which the Armenian delegation was well aware.”⁶⁵

The Armenians resorted to blackmail of this sort to be able to take advantage of an opportune moment (in the context of the closed discussions of the Moscow Treaty) to appropriate Karabakh and pull the Center to their side. The Armenian leaders obviously wanted Karabakh as a compensation of sorts.

The Nagorno-Karabakh issue was discussed once more on 5 July at the insistence of Orjonikidze and Nazaretyan; some of the Armenian authors, however, wrote (for obvious reasons) that it was Narimanov, not Nazaretyan, who together with Orjonikidze put the question back on the agenda.⁶⁶

In their joint article, which appeared in Moscow, V. Zakharov and S. Sarkisyan revived the erroneous statement that Nagorno-Karabakh had not been transferred to Azerbaijan until 5 July.⁶⁷

⁶⁰ Protocol No. 8 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) with representatives of local party organizations and trade unions. 02-03.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 18, f. 59, sheet 14.

⁶¹ A. Bekzadyan’s letter to G. Chicherin. 15.04.1921, AVP RF, rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, folder 232, f. 53001, sheets 58-59.

⁶² Ibid., sheet 59.

⁶³ Ibid., sheet 62.

⁶⁴ G. Chicherin’s letter to Ter-Gabrielyan. 21.04.1921, AVP RF, rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, folder 232, f. 53001, sheet 63.

⁶⁵ G. Chicherin’s telegram to B. Legran. 22.04.1921, AVP RF, rec. gr. 04, inv. 39, folder 232, f. 53001, sheet 65.

⁶⁶ G. Melik-Shakhnazarov, “Politizatsia istorii kak istochnik napryazheniya mezhnatsionalnykh otnosheniy,” in: *Mayendorfskaya deklaratsia 2 noyabrya 2008 goda i situatsiya vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha*, Collection of articles, Moscow, 2008, p. 311.

⁶⁷ V.A. Zakharov, S.T. Sarkisyan, “Azerbaidzhano-karabakhskiy konflikt: istoki i sovremennost,” in: *Mayendorfskaya deklaratsia 2 noyabrya 2008 goda i situatsiya vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha*, p. 221.

It is a well-known fact, however, that Stalin had been in Tiflis since the end of June, therefore his surprise arrival on 5 July is nothing but a later invention. He came to Georgia to replace more or less independent Philip Makharadze, who had quarreled with Orjonikidze, with more pliable Budu Mdivani.

Alexander Myasnikov: “It was as though Agaronyan, Topchibashev, and Chkhenkeli had Attended the Latest Plenum of the Caucasian Bureau”

In mid-August 1921, when talking on the phone to Orjonikidze, Alexander Myasnikov said that treatment of the Karabakh issue in Armenia had become more or less loyal.⁶⁸

On the whole, during the first months of Sovietization, the Armenians still expected Soviet Azerbaijan to fulfill their demands.

In January 1922, at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Armenia, when asked why Nagorno-Karabakh had not been joined to Armenia, Myasnikov answered: “It was as though Agaronyan, Topchibashev, and Chkhenkeli had attended the latest plenum of the Caucasian Bureau. Azerbaijan said that if Armenia demanded Karabakh, it would not supply it with kerosene.”⁶⁹

The Caucasian Bureau was informed about the meetings of the Orgburo and Politburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) held in July 1921, the heated debates over the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, and the disagreements between the Bolsheviks of Azerbaijan and the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia.⁷⁰

On 19 July, 1921, after discussing the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July and N. Narimanov’s trip to Tiflis, the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan ruled that “Nagorno-Karabakh remains an inalienable part of Soviet Azerbaijan with the right to internal self-administration within the Soviet Constitution with the regional Executive Committee as its governing body.”⁷¹

In his report, Narimanov spoke about the administrative borders between Azerbaijan and its Transcaucasian neighbors; he also pointed out that “in view of the considerable working-class element in Shusha, the question of a Shusha City Executive Committee (in addition to the regional Executive Committee) is on the agenda. The C.C. of the C.P. of Azerbaijan should do the same in relation to the party organizations in Nagorno-Karabakh: in addition to the regional party committee, a city party committee should be set up. The relations between the regional and city Executive Committees and the Party Committees should be the same as in Baku (that is, between the Baku Party Committee and the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.).”⁷²

On 20 July, the day after the meeting of the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan and after hearing what Aligeidar Karaev had to say about the situation in Karabakh, the Politburo and Orgburo of

⁶⁸ A. Myasnikov’s talk with G. Orjonikidze by direct telephone line. August 1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 18, f. 177, sheet 4.

⁶⁹ Materials of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Armenia. 26-29.01.1922, RGASPI, rec. gr. 1, inv. 1, f. 232, sheets 22-23.

⁷⁰ Information about the protocols of the C.C. C.P. of Azerbaijan for July 1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 90, sheet 173rev.

⁷¹ Protocol of a sitting of the CEC of Azerbaijan. 19.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 31, sheet 122.

⁷² N. Narimanov, op. cit., pp. 533-534.

the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) decided to set up a commission of representatives of the people's commissariats of internal affairs, justice, and foreign affairs to draft a constitution of the autonomous region. An excerpt from the decision was sent to S. Chvanov (People's Commissariat for Justice), Suleymanov (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), and Andreev (People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs). S. Adigezalov temporarily preserved his post of secretary of the Shusha Uezd Committee of the Communist Party.⁷³

Despite the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) of 5 July, all sorts of Armenian organizations remained involved in destructive actions against Azerbaijan. On 23 July, A. Karaev deemed it necessary to telegraph Narimanov and Huseynov from Shusha to inform them that "Comrade Ter-Simonyan, envoy extraordinary of Soviet Armenia, has issued an order in the Azeri, Russian, and Armenian languages, in which he informed in Gorisa that the mountainous part of Karabakh had been joined to Soviet Armenia. On the other hand, this provocation was accompanied by Ter-Simonyan appointing Musaev (Ojaggulu Musaev.—*J.H.*) as envoy plenipotentiary to Kurdistan. This complicated the political situation in Shusha; now it is gradually returning to normal. Ter-Simonyan wants to unite the Kubatli Uezd Executive Committee with Zangezur at all costs. Musaev disbanded the local executive committees in the Minkend area and replaced them with revolutionary committees. We should put an end to this bacchanalia and take resolute measures against Ter-Simonyan."⁷⁴

The document contains Narimanov's resolution "To the Caucasian Bureau. Send a telegram with a request to take measures." On 8 August, the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) expelled O. Musaev from the Communist Party for exceeding his authority and interfering with party and Soviet work in Kurdistan.⁷⁵

The decisions of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July began to be implemented in the first days of August. On 1 August, 1921, an extraordinary Congress of the Soviets of the 2nd Part of the Shusha Uezd was held in the village of Kendhurt. L. Mirzoyan, who was invited to represent the Council of People's Commissars, delivered a report in which he proved that economically, spiritually, politically, and ethnically Karabakh was closely connected with Baku as the center of Azerbaijan. He described the decision of the Caucasian Bureau to set up an administrative unit subordinated directly to Baku in the mountainous part of Karabakh as absolutely correct⁷⁶ and promised that with the establishment of an autonomy all the problems would be resolved.⁷⁷

Upon his return, Mirzoyan supplied a detailed report in which he wrote, in particular, that the Karabakh issue had been created (and fanned) by top party and Soviet officials, on the one hand, and by the Armenian nationalist-minded intelligentsia, on the other.⁷⁸

In their joint report on the Situation in Karabakh delivered on 8 August, 1921 at a joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), L. Mirzoyan and A. Karaev confirmed this opinion. The report, which dealt mainly with party work in Karabakh, served as the basis for a new Shusha Uezd Party Committee consisting of S. Adygezalov, Makhmudbekov, Danelyants, Ataev, Safarov, Avakyan, and A. Kambarov; A. Karaev was appointed as temporary envoy extraordinary to Karabakh.⁷⁹

⁷³ Protocol No. 22 of the meeting of the Political and Organizational Bureau of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Azerbaijan. 20.07.1921. APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 2, f. 18, sheet 94; RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 92, sheet 51.

⁷⁴ A. Karaev's telegram from Shusha to Chairman of the CPC of Azerbaijan N. Narimanov. Copy to M.D. Huseynov. 23.07. 1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 3, f. 104, sheet 209.

⁷⁵ Protocol No. 27 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. 08.08.1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 2, f. 18, sheet 114rev.

⁷⁶ Protocol of the extraordinary Congress of the Soviets of the 2nd Part of the Shusha Uezd. 01.08.1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 2, f. 18, sheets 120-120rev.

⁷⁷ See: *Pravda o Nagornom Karabakhe*, Stepanakert, 1989, p. 31.

⁷⁸ Report by L. Mirzoyan at the C.C. Az.C.P. (Copy to the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.)) about his trip to the mountainous part of Karabakh. 03.08.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 95, sheet 3rev.

⁷⁹ Protocol No. 27 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. 08.08.1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 2, f. 18, sheets 114-114rev.

After 5 July, it was rumored that the Armenians had been evicted from Karabakh to Armenia (L. Mirzoyan mentioned in his report that the rumors were started by nationalist-minded Armenians); gradually this "information" reached the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.)

It should be said that all those who were displeased with the decisions of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July acted through Kirov (when he was elected First Secretary of the C.C. of the Community Party of Azerbaijan).

In August 1921, Secretary of the Caucasian Bureau Figatner wrote to Kirov that allegedly after the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July to keep Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan, "many Armenian villages were moved from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia."⁸⁰ After receiving this information, Kirov immediately asked Karaev and Mirzoyan (who were in Karabakh) to clarify it.⁸¹

Numerous facts, however, spoke of the opposite: A. Karakozov informed the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) that nearly all the Muslims of the Jevanshir Uezd had moved away.⁸²

The national composition of the Caucasian Bureau points to the source of the provocative information and destructive actions: in the early 1920s, out of the total number of 80 members 12 were Georgians, 28 were Armenians, 25 were Russians, 13 belonged to other nationalities, and 2 were Azeris.⁸³

Joseph Stalin: "They Say That Fonstein, a Native of Karabakh, Represents it in the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan"

On 26 September, 1921, the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) discussed the so-called Karabakh File. It was decided to ask the Caucasian Bureau to review the Nagorno-Karabakh Issue once more and to postpone its autonomy.

Narimanov and Buniatzade, on the other hand, were convinced that Nagorno-Karabakh should immediately be granted its autonomy.

A commission (Karaev, Efendiev, Stukalov, and Mirzoyan) was set up to collect the materials related to the Karabakh File; it was expected to depart for Karabakh immediately after the session of the CEC of Azerbaijan. The commission was entrusted with the task of supervising party and Soviet work in the region.⁸⁴

On 6 October, the Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) discussed the issue once more (without Narimanov) to obtain results as promptly as possible and instructed all the members of the commission (with the exception of Stukalov) to leave for Karabakh no later than 9 October. The Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan instructed People's Commissar for Finances Tagiev to give the commission 1 billion rubles for 4 uezds of Karabakh; People's Commissar for Internal Affairs Bagirov was instructed to appoint responsible persons to escort the commission; People's Commissar for

⁸⁰ Information supplied by Secretary of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.) Figatner to Kirov. August 1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 129, f. 107, sheet 58.

⁸¹ S. Kirov's inquiry to A. Karaev and L. Mirzoyan. August 1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 129, f. 107, sheet 58.

⁸² A. Karakozov's telegram to the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 19.06.1920, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 1, f. 126, sheet 11.

⁸³ Secret report of the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee of the R.C.P. 16.08.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 85, f. 340, sheet 248.

⁸⁴ Protocol No. 30 of a meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. 29.09.1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 2, f. 18, sheet 158rev.

Military and Naval Affairs G. Karaev had to supply 500 sets of uniforms for the Karabakh militia and 3 kg of quinine.⁸⁵

On 21 October, after studying the situation in Karabakh, the commission, along with the Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), gathered the executives, both Azeris and Armenians, for a conference in Shusha, Javanshir, Gubadli, and Karyagino which, after listening to A. Karaev's report and arguing for many hours, decided that Nagorno-Karabakh should become an autonomous region.⁸⁶

On 24 October, the Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) discussed the commission's report about its trip to Karabakh and the conference documents and instructed the State Political Administration of Azerbaijan to try harder to fight gangsters in Karabakh and find, in the shortest time possible, 1.5 billion rubles for four uyezds to build Soviet and party work there from scratch. The People's Commissariat for Land was instructed to dispatch commissions to Karabakh empowered to deal with land disputes.

A. Babaev replaced Sh. Makhmudbekov as Chairman of the Shusha Uezd Executive Committee, which can be described as the first step toward normalization in Karabakh.

A commission of officials of the People's Commissariats for Land, the Navy, and Internal Affairs was set up to delimitate the borders of the autonomous part of Karabakh.⁸⁷ Strange as it may seem, this happened three days after the conference attended by the members of the Orgburo and a large number of Karabakh executives had ruled that an autonomous status for Nagorno-Karabakh was inexpedient.

The decision of the Caucasian Bureau on an autonomous status for the mountainous part of Karabakh forced the Center to closely follow the relevant developments. In a letter to Sergey Kirov, First Secretary of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), dated 22 May, 1922, Stalin wrote the following with a great deal of sarcasm: "They say that Fonstein, a native of Karabakh, represents it in the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan."⁸⁸

In his letter dated 18 June, Kirov explained to Stalin that he had been deluded and listed both the members (Akhmedov, Arzanyan, Alekperov, Mamedkhanov, Mirzabekyants, and Ildrym) and candidate members (Hajibeyli, Avetisov, Khanbudagov, and Gajiev) who represented Karabakh at the CEC. In the same letter, he informed Stalin that Mirzabekyan had been transferred to the post of commissar in the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan.⁸⁹

At the same time, the Center was playing into the hands of the Armenians; it tried to prevent subordination of the party organization of Karabakh to the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. On 1 August, 1922, however, Kirov and Matyushin, who headed the organizational department of C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), telegraphed to Moscow: "The territory of Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, while its party organization is part of the Az.C.P."⁹⁰

Personnel Policy in Karabakh: More Armenians are Brought In

Kirov and Orjonikidze broke the lull which followed the decision of 5 July, 1921. They initiated a meeting of the Presidium of the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee (TCTC) of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.)

⁸⁵ Protocol of a meeting of the Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P., 06.10.1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 125, sheet 9.

⁸⁶ Protocol of a sitting of a joint conference of the executives of Karabakh (Shusha, Javanshir, Gubadli, and Karyagino) and members of the Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), 21.10.1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 2, f. 74, sheets 23-23rev.

⁸⁷ Protocol No. 20 of the meeting of the Orgburo of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), 24.10. 1921, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 2, f. 15, sheets 15 rev.-16.

⁸⁸ Stalin's letter about the situation in the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and the representative of Karabakh in the CEC of Azerbaijan. 22.05.1922, RGASPI, rec. gr. 558, inv. 11, f. 746, sheet 1.

⁸⁹ S. Kirov's confidential letter to Stalin. 18.06.1922, RGASPI, rec. gr. 558, inv. 11, f. 746, sheet 2.

⁹⁰ Telegram sent by Kirov and Matyushin to the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 01.08.1922, RGASPI, rec. gr. 80, inv. 25, f. 2, sheet 1.

held on 27 October, 1922, at which the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), acting upon instructions, implemented the Caucasian Bureau's decision of 5 July. The same meeting appointed Armenak Karakozov as chairman of the Executive Committee of Karabakh; another important post in Karabakh went to S. Shadunts, whom Armenia placed at the disposal of the C.C. Az.C.P.⁹¹

Three days later the leaders of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, in execution of the decision of the Presidium of the TCTC, discussed the question of the Autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh and set up a commission chaired by Agamalyoglu, with Karakozov and Sviridov as members.⁹²

In November 1922, on the instructions of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Mirzoyan and Karaev were sent to Shusha to organize a conference of chairmen of village Soviets and secretaries of party organizations of the mountainous part of Karabakh.

After three days of discussions, the conference ruled that Nagorno-Karabakh should remain part of Azerbaijan.⁹³

On 14 December, 1922, the TCTC brushed aside all the objections to setting up a committee on Nagorno-Karabakh; the next day, the Communist faction of the CEC of Azerbaijan and the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) discussed the TCTC decision on Karabakh. A central commission was set up with Kirov, Mirzabekyants, and Karakozov as members; the same sitting set up a committee of 7 members with Karakozov as chairman.

The committee consisted of chairmen of the executive committees of the Shusha, Jebraïl, and Javanshir uezds; Karakozov and the Secretariat suggested three more members (Shadunts, Tavakalyan, and Parzyan) to be approved by the Presidium.⁹⁴

The Presidium instructed the CEC and the CPC to publish, within the next seven days, a decree on setting up a commission on Nagorno-Karabakh and a committee with the right to communicate independently with the Center.⁹⁵ On 17 December, the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) set up a committee on Nagorno-Karabakh, with Mamedkhanov, Agazade, Tavakalyan, Parzyan, and Shadunts as members.

The TCTC was requested to free Papazyan from his duties as secretary of the CPC of Armenia and Fanakolyants from his duties as secretary of the Zangezur Uezd Committee to enable them to assume their new duties as members of the committee on Nagorno-Karabakh. M. Bagirov was instructed to urgently approve the committee's candidates with the CPC; Karakozov was asked to urgently present his estimates of future expenditures to the evening session of the Council. Strange as it may seem, the same evening, Karakozov was given a two-week leave of absence to visit Erivan.⁹⁶

On the whole, in the fall of 1922, the Armenians who filled high posts in Karabakh began intensifying their contacts with Armenia. On the other hand, in the early 1920s, certain Armenians who fought openly or behind the scenes to detach Karabakh from Azerbaijan were invited, one after another, to move first to Baku and then to high posts in Karabakh.

In the first days of 1923, Sergey Kirov, Secretary of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.), asked TCTC head Myasnikov to ask the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia to send Tavakelyan and Manutsyan to Baku so that they could promptly join Karakozov in Shusha.⁹⁷

⁹¹ See: *K istorii obrazovania Nagorno-Karabakhskoy avtonomnoy oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoï SSR. Dokumenty i materialy*, p. 127.

⁹² Decision of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 30.10. 1922, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 129, sheet 40.

⁹³ See: *Pravda o Nagornom Karabakhe*, p. 32.

⁹⁴ Decision of CEC and CPC of Azerbaijan "On Nagorno-Karabakh." December 1922, GA AR, rec. gr. 411, inv. 1, f. 48, sheet 201.

⁹⁵ Protocol No. 56 of the joint sitting of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) and the Communist faction in the CEC of Azerbaijan. 15.12.1922, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 58, sheets 175-175rev.

⁹⁶ Protocol No. 57 of the meeting of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 17.12. 1922, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 169, f. 249/II, sheet 28.

⁹⁷ S. Kirov's telegram to the TCTC of the C.C. R.C.P. and A. Myasnikov. 1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 85, f. 316, sheet 155.

On 23 January, 1923, Kirov, this time with Karakozov, asked A. Ionisyan, Secretary of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia, to send Tavakelyan, Akopyan, Aydynyan, Vartanyan, Akhtynsky, and Manutsyan to Karabakh.⁹⁸ A week later, Kirov sent a similar telegram to Myasnikov accompanied with the following words: "Without more people, it is impossible to organize proper work in Karabakh."⁹⁹

It should be said that, in May 1921, Armenia appointed Akop Ionisyan as its representative in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The list was obviously compiled by Ionisyan and Karakozov during his two weeks in Erivan.

This meant that from the very first days of 1923 the trend toward greater reliance on the party and Soviet officials from Armenia who, one after another, received high posts in Karabakh became obvious; this tipped the balance in favor of the Armenians.

After a while, the Armenians entrenched themselves in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Decision of the CEC of Azerbaijan: "An Autonomous Karabakh Region Should Be Set Up in Upper Karabakh with its Center in Khankendi"

On 20 May, 1923, the Karabakh Committee the TCTC set up late in 1922 was ready with its Draft for Settlement of the Karabakh Issue. On 20 June, the draft was transferred to the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) for further discussion. The authors wrote that the mountainous and valley parts of Karabakh were two economically mutually complementary parts and that the Armenian bias of Nagorno-Karabakh was caused by the absence of qualified Turkic specialists able to achieve better results.

The draft went on to say that "the Center, which concentrates the largest and best part of its people on the oil front, mainly in Baku and its environs, created a vast shortage of Muslim forces. For three years, there was not a single hint at more or less consistent efforts in administration, education, the use of land, transport, cooperation, trade, etc., since the larger part of Karabakh is geographically completely isolated from the Center; the interests and rights of the minority should be observed," which meant that Karabakh needed administrative reforms.¹⁰⁰

The meeting was chaired by Sergey Kirov; Inozemtsev served as its secretary; it was attended by Khanbudagov, Karaev, Mirzoyan, Bagirov, Vareykis, Chagin, Konyushkin, Gasymov, Rakhmanov, Mashkevich, and others. After discussing the issue in detail, the meeting passed the following decision:

- (a) Karabakh, both its mountainous and valley parts, should become a single administrative unit;
- (b) a commission chaired by Karaev, with Bagirov, Dovletov, Mirzoyan, and Khanbudagov, as its members should study (within three days) the question in the minutest detail and present a draft decision to the Presidium of the C.C. for approval;

⁹⁸ Telegram of S. Kirov and A. Karakozov to A. Ionisyan, Secretary of the C.C. C.P. of Armenia. 22.01.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 85, f. 316, sheet 155.

⁹⁹ S. Kirov's telegram to the TCTC of the C.C. R.C.P. and A. Myasnikov. 30.01.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 85, f. 316, sheet 153.

¹⁰⁰ How to Deal with the Karabakh Issue Project. 20.05.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 132, sheets 113-114.

- (c) A. Karakozov and Kh. Shadunts should attend the meeting of the TCTC to discuss the Karabakh issue;
- (d) E. Khanbudagov's separate opinion should be registered in the protocol.¹⁰¹

The document went on to say that "the Karabakh problem should be ultimately resolved by implementing the decisions of the May (1920) Decree of the CPC of Azerbaijan on making Nagorno-Karabakh an administrative unit in its own right. No other solution can meet the demands of the national minority of Karabakh. If this problem is resolved in any other way, we will be doomed to discuss it again and again."¹⁰² At this time, the decision of the 9th Congress of the Armenian peasants dated 29 April, 1920 was sent to Moscow where the Armenian delegation holding secret talks about the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia was supposed to pass it on to the Russian government. The document, however, was ignored.

Careful examination of the relevant documents revealed that the CPC of Azerbaijan did not issue this decree in May 1920; if issued at all, it might have been dated May 1921 when, on 23 May, the plenum of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia appointed A. Ionisyan as Armenian representative in Nagorno-Karabakh. This "misunderstanding" should have triggered a negative response from Azerbaijan, which never happened, while the issue was discussed (strictly confidentially) on 3 June by the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau. This explains why the May 1921 decree on Karabakh is not listed among the other decrees of the CPC of Azerbaijan.

The decision of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) of 20 June to unite the mountainous and valley parts into a single administrative unit was approved in June 1923 by a TCTC plenary session. On 1 July, 1923, a meeting of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) suggested that the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh, with its center in Khankendi, should be registered in a decree saying that all issues on Nagorno-Karabakh, including border matters, would be dealt with by a special commission. There were plans to set up an executive committee, which required a revolutionary committee of five members headed by Karakozov and a regional party committee of 5 headed by Manutsyan.

The border issues were entrusted to a commission headed by A. Karaev, with Karakozov, Sviridov, Ildrym, and Buniatzade serving as its members, which was expected to present its suggestions to the C.C. Presidium within seven days.¹⁰³

On 4 July, the CEC Presidium confirmed the commission's suggestions. The first paragraph of the document said: "The autonomous Karabakh region should be set up in Upper Karabakh with its center in Khankendi."¹⁰⁴

On 7 July, 1923, the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan crowned three years of preparatory work with a decree on setting up the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The decree signed by Deputy Chairman of the CEC of Azerbaijan M. Gasyimov and CEC Secretary M. Khanbudagov¹⁰⁵ said in particular that "the workers' and

¹⁰¹ Protocol No. 20 of the meeting of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 20.06.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 132, sheet 110.

¹⁰² E. Khanbudagov's special opinion on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. 20.06.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 132, sheet 115.

¹⁰³ Protocol No. 20 of the meeting of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. 01.07.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 132, sheet 145rev.

¹⁰⁴ Extract from Protocol No. 14 of the meeting of the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan. 04.07.1923. APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 129, sheet 38.

¹⁰⁵ The authors of *Karabakh: Real History. Facts. Documents* Ya. Makhmudov and K. Shukurov translated into many languages confused Makhmud Faraj ogly Khanbudagov (1898-1937), who between August 1922 and December 1923 was Secretary of the CEC of Azerbaijan, and Eyyub Shirin oglu Khanbudagov (1893-1937), who in 1922-1924 was Secretary of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B). They wrote that the Decree on Setting up the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh had been signed by E.Sh. Khanbudagov (should be Makhmud Khanbudagov) (see: Ya. Makhmudov, K. Shukurov, *Karabakh: Real History. Facts. Documents*, Baku, 2005, p. 64, in Azeri). In December 1923, Makhmud Khanbudagov was sent to Moscow to study at the Moscow Socialist Academy. In 1926, after completing the course, he returned to

peasant revolution and Soviet power see it as their task to eliminate all forms of national oppression and inequality and replace national enmity and hatred with international solidarity of the working people and fraternal cooperation of peoples in a single state union. To fulfill this task, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Azerbaijan rules that ‘an autonomous region should be established in the Armenian part of Nagorno-Karabakh as a component of the A.S.S.R. with its center in the Khankendi settlement.’”¹⁰⁶

Bashir Buniyatov: “All the Muslims of Karabakh See Me as a Traitor”

Two weeks later, a joint meeting of the Presidium of CEC and CPC of Azerbaijan endorsed the names of those who would work in the revolutionary committee: Karakozov (Chairman); Buniyatov, Kostonyan, Kafiev (Kafiyani), and Chalyan.¹⁰⁷ Karakozov, Buniyatov, Chalyan, Vareykis, and Manutsyan were entrusted with the task of drafting a Statute for the NKAR; Karakozov was instructed to organize the work and complete it in seven days.¹⁰⁸

Buniyatov was the only Azeri among the five members of the newly established revolutionary committee; his contribution could be described as mainly formal. In January 1923, he was appointed as chairman of the Shusha Uezd Executive Committee. Several months later, in September, being keenly aware of the ambiguity of his position, he asked Kirov to rescue him from moral death by relieving him from his post when the situation in the region improved, which would make his continued services unnecessary. “All the Muslims of Karabakh see me as a traitor,” he wrote.¹⁰⁹

The urban population of Shusha was dead set against autonomy for the mountainous part of Karabakh; early in 1923, after Buniyatov’s address at a meeting of the people of Shusha, they sent a delegation to Baku to inform the Center that the autonomy of Karabakh should be radically revised. S. Kirov panicked and demanded “urgent explanations” from Karakozov and Buniyatov.¹¹⁰

The Agdam, Jebrazil, and Kurdistan uyezds were set up in the territories beyond the borders of the new autonomous region.¹¹¹

The idea of a “Kurdish autonomy” bordering on the NKAR was born in the border commission on the day the decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan was published.¹¹² On 16 July, the meeting of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) abandoned the idea and set up a Kurdistan Uezd instead; on 21 July, this was approved by the CEC and CPC of Azerbaijan.¹¹³

Baku where he filled different posts. In 1936, he was arrested as an active counterrevolutionary and Trotskyite (see: Personal file of Makhmud Khanbudagov, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 8, f. 5593, sheet 1; Information supplied by Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the T.S.F.S.R. Stepanov to TCTC Secretary L. Beria. 10.09.1936, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 16, inv. 1, f. 5666, sheet 1).

¹⁰⁶ Decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan On Setting up the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh. 07.07.1923, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 73, sheet 135.

¹⁰⁷ Protocol No. 15 of a joint sitting of the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan and the CPC 21.07.1923, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 67, sheet 63.

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁹ B. Buniyatov’s letter to S. Kirov. September 1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 123, sheet 163.

¹¹⁰ S. Kirov’s telegram to A. Karakozov and B. Buniyatov. 1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 85, f. 329, sheet 42.

¹¹¹ Document “On the History of Setting up the Autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh,” APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 169, f. 249/I, sheet 41.

¹¹² Protocol of a meeting of the commission for delimitating autonomous Karabakh and Kurdistan. 07.07.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 132, sheet 170.

¹¹³ Decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan on setting up the Kurdistan Uezd. 21.07.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 125, f. 303, sheet 33.

The population census of 1937 (the first one to be conducted in the Soviet Union, the results of which were annulled for political reasons) revealed that there were 10,878 Kurds in Azerbaijan and 22,313 Kurds in Armenia.¹¹⁴

How Khankendi Became the Center of the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh

A careful examination of the decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan will reveal a discrepancy between it and the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July. The decision said that broad autonomy was granted to the region, with its administrative center in Shusha.¹¹⁵ The decree, on the other hand, said that “an autonomous region should be established in the Armenian part of Nagorno-Karabakh as a component of the A.S.S.R. with its center in the Khankendi settlement.”¹¹⁶

Why did this happen? On 7 July, the day the CEC Decree was published, Shusha did not belong to the region. Two weeks later, however, on 21 July, 1923, the joint meeting of the Presidium of the CEC and CPC of Azerbaijan, after listening to D. Buniatzade’s report on the Karabakh issue, passed a decision of eight points which said in particular that:

“(a) the plundered Russian villages of the Skobelev Society should be included in the territory of autonomous Karabakh;

“(b) the city of Shusha should be included in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region.”¹¹⁷

On the other hand, Shusha was the only city in the territory of the newly formed autonomous region with a predominantly Azeri population. This explains why the Armenians preferred the Khankendi settlement as the regional center (in the past its population had been predominantly Muslim, whereas by the time the NKAR was set up, it was registered as a small Turkic settlement). The Armenians obviously feared that the Azeri population of Shusha would establish its control over the power structures.

The settlement status of a very small village was prompted by the far-reaching plans to transform it into a “capital.”

In July 1920, the idea of turning Khankendi into a regional center began gaining momentum to develop, by the fall of 1922, into practical measures. The Armenian (mainly Dashnak) committee of Nagorno-Karabakh set up back in April 1920 was transformed, with ease, into an uezd committee of the Communist Party of Armenia.¹¹⁸

On 11 July, its chairman, S. Ambartsumyan, and one of the officials informed the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan that they were carrying out party work separately from their Muslim comrades (because they knew next to nothing about how to work in the Muslim milieu). They pointed out in the same report that “the confusion in the party threatens to destroy all the organizational efforts in Karabakh. We need a center in Khankendi that will geographically and economically join all the districts of Karabakh.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ See: *Vsesoyuznaya perepis naselenia 1937 goda: obshchie itogi. sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, Moscow, 2007, pp. 107-108.

¹¹⁵ Protocol No. 12 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P. (B.). 05.07.1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 64, inv. 1, f. 1, sheet 122.

¹¹⁶ Decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan On Setting up the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh. 07.07.1923, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 73, sheet 135.

¹¹⁷ Protocol No. 15 of a joint sitting of the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan and the Council of People’s Commissars of the A.S.S.R. 21.07.1923, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 67, sheet 63.

¹¹⁸ See: Report of A. Atatev in the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 31.10. 1920. APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 1, f. 81, sheet 35rev.

¹¹⁹ Report of members of the Karabakh Uezd Committee in the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 11.07.1920. APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 1, f. 126, sheet 20.

During the first months of Soviet power, all sorts of Armenian organizations had obviously selected Khankendi as the regional center. In December 1922, the Communist faction of the CEC and C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) approved the members of the Karabakh Committee which was entrusted, among other things, with the task of opening a school and a hospital in Khankendi.¹²⁰

This makes us wonder what the Azeri population of Shusha thought about this?

On 9 August, 1923, the CEC of Azerbaijan received a letter written by empowered representatives of the population of Shusha R. Aliev, I. Musaev, B. Sarabi, and G. Shamshiev on behalf of the people of Shusha. It said that “for many years (over a century), Karabakh and all the other parts of Czarist Russia suffered under the yoke of Russian militarism” and protested against the newly established NKAR and the inclusion of the city of Shusha and the nearest Muslim villages in it.

The authors asked the authorities to take into account that “the population of the city of Shusha and the nearest Muslim villages ... believes it expedient to let it be known that they are closely connected in this respect and economically with the population of the newly founded Kurdistan Uezd. They empowered us to ask for the city and the nearest villages to be joined to this uezd. On the strength of the above and being convinced that the Soviet government will never ignore the interests of the local people and will always satisfy their justified requests, we ask you to satisfy the requests of the people of Shusha and the nearest villages and join them to the Kurdistan Uezd.”

The empowered representatives concluded the letter with the following: “If for state or other considerations it is impossible to satisfy our request, we ask you to preserve the city of Shusha as the center of Nagorno-Karabakh and not to transfer the center to Khankendi.”¹²¹

As soon as the Armenian leaders of the autonomous region learned about the letter, they telegraphed Sergey Kirov to dismiss it as a provocation. Secretary of the Shusha Uezd Executive Committee S. Manutsyan wrote that it proved beyond a doubt that the traders were merely concerned about losing their profits if Shusha stopped being the uezd center.¹²²

The people in Shusha refused to succumb to the pressure of the Armenian leaders and went on with their attempts to move out of the autonomous region. On 4 January, 1924, plenipotentiary representatives of the Shusha population M. Mirbagirov and A. Guliev sent a telegram to the Congress of the Soviets of the Transcaucasus (copies were sent to Kirov, Bagirov, and Orjonikidze) to demand, on behalf of the multi-thousand population of Shusha, that the city be made part of the Kurdistan Uezd.¹²³

On 17 April, 1924, under pressure from the Azeri population of the city, the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) instructed the Karabakh Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to set up an administrative unit based on Shusha and the nearest Turkic villages.¹²⁴

Mir Jafar Bagirov's Memo (1923)

The last, fifth, point of the decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan on setting up the NKAR suggested that a mixed commission of representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh, Lower Karabakh, Kurdistan, and the central government of the A.S.S.R. should be set up to draft a Statute for the region, transfer the

¹²⁰ Protocol No. 56 of a joint sitting of the Communist faction of the CEC of Azerbaijan and the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. 15.12.1922, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 58, sheet 175rev.

¹²¹ Statement of the plenipotentiary representatives of the city of Shusha R. Aliev, I. Musaev, B. Sarabi and G. Shamshiev at the CEC of Azerbaijan. 09.08.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 85, f. 329, sheets 38-39.

¹²² S. Manutsyan's telegram to S. Kirov. 03.08.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 85, f. 329, sheet 3.

¹²³ Telegram of M. Mirbagirov and A. Guliev to the Congress of the Soviets of the Transcaucasus. Copies to S. Kirov, M.J. Bagirov and G. Orjonikidze. 04.01.1924. RGASPI, rec. gr. 85, inv. 24, f. 728, sheet 1.

¹²⁴ Extract from a protocol of the sitting of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 17.04.1924, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 174, f. 136, sheet 41.

administrative units to the autonomous region, and draw its borders. The job should be completed before 15 August.¹²⁵

On 14 July, 1923, the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) discussed the need to draft a Statute to provide legal substantiation of the creation of the NKAR; it set up a commission consisting of A. Karakozov, Ch. Ildrym, M. Khanbudagov, M. Chalyan, and S. Manutsyan with D. Buniatzade as its chairman (because A. Karaev could not take part in the commission).

The commission had to work hard to be able to present the draft Statute in the shortest time possible to the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) for approval.¹²⁶

On 23 July, the Presidium discussed the issue once more and made several insignificant amendments to the draft Statute. The Committee for Nagorno-Karabakh was liquidated and its property was transferred to the Revolutionary Committee of the autonomous region.¹²⁷

Late in July, the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan issued 8 thousand chervontsy (10-ruble banknotes in use in the Soviet Union in 1922-1947), 5 thousand poods (a pood—Russian measure of weight = 16.38 kg) of kerosene, building materials, and 10 thousand arshins (an arshin—Russian unit of length = 28 inches) of cloth totaling 15 thousand gold rubles to the NKAR.¹²⁸

Late in July 1923, the Statute commission gathered for a more extensive sitting to discuss the Statute based on the 1923 Statute of the gubernia executive committees.

An autonomous region was set up for the local Armenians but it was decided to include the numerous Turkic villages of Karabakh in it. The majority (with three members abstaining) voted to include Shusha and the Khonashen village in Lower Karabakh.

Karakozov insisted that both the city and the village should remain within Upper Karabakh; his opinion, supported by the Commission chairman, outweighed the votes of six highly placed Azeri officials. The meeting agreed on the form of administration and the administrative division of Lower Karabakh and Kurdistan.¹²⁹

A year later, on 5 June, 1924, the commission which delimited the Agdam Uezd and the NKAR decided that the Khonashen lands and, in particular, the village of Kuropatkino should remain within the NKAR, according to the decision of the CEC of Azerbaijan of 6 August 1923; in 1924 the Avshars were allowed to bring in the harvest from their land.¹³⁰

On 20 August, the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) and, on 5 September, the C.C. Secretariat dispatched E. Khanbudagov, I. Dovlatov, and M.J. Bagirov to Karabakh to study the situation, talk to the people, and sort out the conflict between the Muslim village of Kolany and the Armenian settlement of Sarov.

On 8 October, the Presidium discussed the results and ruled that:

1. The People's Commissariat for Land should be instructed to supply Nagorno-Karabakh with free timber.
2. The Council of People's Deputies should be instructed to discuss the possibility of increasing the grain quota for Nagorno-Karabakh in the form of debt; speed up financing of the electric power project in Khankendi; and extend urgent help to the starving population of Nagorno-Karabakh.

¹²⁵ Decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan On Setting up the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. 07.07.1923, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 73, sheet 136.

¹²⁶ Protocol No. 26 of a meeting of the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan. 14.07.1923. APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 132, sheet 157.

¹²⁷ Protocol No. 27 of a meeting of the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan. 23.07.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 132, sheet 173.

¹²⁸ *Bakinsky rabochy*, 30 July, 1923.

¹²⁹ Protocol No. 1 of a meeting of the Commission for drafting a Statute for the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. July 1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 169, f. 249/I, psheet 63-65.

¹³⁰ Protocol of a meeting of the Commission set up to clarify the border issues between the Agdam Uezd and NKAR. 05.06.1924, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 137, sheet 59.

3. Karakozov and the People's Commissariat for Land should be instructed to look into the use of land.
4. The People's Commissariat for Health should be instructed to open a medical post in Khan-kendi (not at the expense of the Agdam and Terter medical posts).
5. The Karabakh Regional Committee and the Regional Revolutionary Committee should be instructed to study the borders of the Kurdistan Uezd in the vicinity of Kaladarasi to include the Kurdish villages in the Kurdistan Uezd.¹³¹

It should be said that information relating to Point Five of the decision could be found in the extensive memo supplied by Bagirov, which summed up the results of his mission and said, in particular, that the population of Shusha (numbering 10 thousand) wanted to join the Kurdistan Uezd.

Bagirov believed that Shusha (with its Muslim population) should be united with the Kurdistan Uezd to become its center and that it was wrong to make the city part of Nagorno-Karabakh. In his report he noted: "There are several Muslim villages (Khalfali, Zaristy, Musulmanlar, and several others with a total population of up to 8 thousand) in the vicinity of Khan-Kendi, Shusha, and Abdalar. It is much easier to manage them from Abdalar than from Khan-Kendi because there are small Karadarasi settlements with about 1,150 Armenians along with the Muslim villages. For some reason, however, the entire area was joined to Khan-Kendi."¹³²

Bagirov (one of those entrusted with sorting out the conflict between Kolany and Sarov) wrote that, during the confusion in the Jevanshir Uezd, the Muslims of Kolany captured the Armenian village of Sarov on instructions from the Center. Later they abandoned the captured territory and returned to their villages. The Sarov Armenians, wrote Bagirov, should have pulled out of the land captured from the Kolany Muslims. He went on to say that "because of the criminal attitude of some of our officials to the matter, instead of retreating to their village, some of the Sarov people remained on the Kolany's land, while others moved to Sarov. This means that 5 thousand Kolany people have nowhere to go. I should say that the Kolany people are the most troublesome in Karabakh; so far they remain silent because they expect a fair decision from the government."¹³³

Bagirov also touched upon more serious matters by saying: "From time immemorial, Muslims from the village of Khojali, the residents of Muganli, etc. have been coexisting with Armenians along the road between Agdam and Karyagino in the Khanabad area. During the massacre, these villages, both Armenian and Muslim, were plundered, while the villagers scattered. Recently, they returned only to discover that an ugly mistake had been made. Under the new delimitation of land, a Muslim cemetery was transferred to the Armenians; today Armenians from faraway regions who have nothing to do with these places work on the land of Muslims who are still waiting for a final settlement."¹³⁴

Nariman Narimanov: "Under Mirzoyan's Strong Pressure Nagorno-Karabakh was Made an Autonomous Region"

The decision of the CEC of Azerbaijan of 7 July did not alleviate the mass discontent. In November 1924, the final draft of the Statute for the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, a product

¹³¹ Protocol No. 40 of a meeting of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 08.10. 1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 169, f. 291/I, sheet 51.

¹³² Memo on the State of Affairs in Karabakh of member of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.) M.J. Bagirov to the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 134, sheets 7-8.

¹³³ Ibid., sheet 7rev.

¹³⁴ Ibid., sheet 8rev.

of prolonged discussions edited by Bagirov, Aliev, and Karakozov, was transferred to the 4th session of the plenary session of CEC of Azerbaijan (second convocation).

CEC Secretary M. Khanbudagov summed up the draft; it was decided to offer it to the CEC Presidium for further consideration.

The same month, the Statute was published in the press. Article One confirmed that “the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region is part of the Azerbaijan S.S.R.,” Article Two said that “clerical work shall be conducted in the native language;” and Article Three ruled that “the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region shall be proportionally represented in the republican structures of Azerbaijan.”¹³⁵

The Statute ruled that government and public institutions and organizations should use Armenian when dealing with the Armenians and the Turkic (Azeri) language when dealing with the Turkic minority.¹³⁶ The Azeris found themselves a national minority in their own country.

In July 1923, 169 villages of the Shusha, Jevanshir, and Gubadli uyezds were included in the NKAR at the commission’s suggestion; the text published on 26 November, 1924 enumerated 198 settlements.¹³⁷

The autonomy received 115 villages of 16 village communities in the Shusha Uezd, along with the city and Khankendi; 52 villages of 6 village communities of the Jevanshir Uezd; 30 villages of 3 village communities of the Karyagino Uezd; and the Galaderesi village community of the Gubadli Uezd.¹³⁸

In 1923, the NKAR covered a territory of 4,160.5 sq. km; ten years later it was 4,431.7 sq. km.¹³⁹

At no time were the Armenians satisfied with the concessions of the Azerbaijan S.S.R.

Karakozov wrote to Kirov that the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat for Justice had established a Supreme Court for Nakhchivan, while there was no similar court in Nagorno-Karabakh despite a corresponding decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan, and described this omission as politically untenable. On the other hand, according to its Constitution, Karabakh as an autonomous region did not differ from Nakhchivan, which meant that the decisions relating to it should equally apply to Karabakh.¹⁴⁰

On 1 August, 1923, the smaller Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan recommended that the Presidium treat Pirijan as the center of the Kurdistan Uezd and the city of Agdam as the center of the Agdam Uezd, while the center of the Jebraill Uezd should be moved from Karyagino to Jebraill.¹⁴¹

On 6 August, the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan approved the administrative-territorial division of the Agdam Uezd with its center in Agdam, the Jebraill Uezd with its center in Jebraill, and the Kurdistan Uezd with its center in Pirijan.¹⁴²

On 18 September, 1923, the Regional Party Committee of Karabakh met under the chairmanship of Manutsyan (Ter-Zakharov served as the secretary) to discuss renaming the city of Khankendi. After a short discussion it was decided “to change the name of the city of Khankendi to Stepanakert

¹³⁵ The Statute of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. 1924, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 137, sheet 98.

¹³⁶ The Statute of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. 1924, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 1733, sheet 12rev.

¹³⁷ For more information see: A. Pashaev, *Tracing down Undisclosed Information*, Baku, 2001, p. 342 (in Azeri).

¹³⁸ The decision of the CEC of Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. 1924, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 169, f. 249/II, sheets 33-34.

¹³⁹ See: *Or Mayendorfa do Astany. Printsipialnye aspekty armyano-azerbaidzhanskogo nagono-karabakhskogo konflikta*, Moscow, 2010, p. 42.

¹⁴⁰ A. Karakozov’s letter to S. Kirov. 1925, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 142, sheet 100.

¹⁴¹ Protocol of a sitting of the smaller Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan. 01.08.1923, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 2, f. 3082, sheet 47.

¹⁴² Order of the CEC of Soviets of Azerbaijan. 06.08.1923, GA AR, rec. gr. 379, inv. 3, f. 89, sheets 1-1rev.

in commemoration of Stepan Shahumyan and 26 commissars."¹⁴³ The same day, the CEC of Azerbaijan approved the decision.

The leaders of Azerbaijan tried to present the name as "Stepan kend," and this is how it was written for some time in official documents, but the Armenians finally insisted on the official form of "Stepanakert."¹⁴⁴

The leaders of Azerbaijan launched an extensive propaganda campaign in favor of the Karabakh autonomy and did not spare any efforts explaining the developments to the local people.

This is how the struggle over the territorial affiliation of Nagorno-Karabakh which began in the first years of Soviet power in the Transcaucasus ended. In May 1924, at the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Sergey Kirov, who headed Azerbaijan, said the following about the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh: "Settlement, even if not final at least considerable, of the so-called Karabakh issue can be described as the most important and the most impressive achievement in this field. This question belongs to those relating to the Transcaucasian Federation."¹⁴⁵

On 27 May, 1924, Nariman Narimanov wrote the following to Stalin: "Under Mirzoyan's strong pressure, Nagorno-Karabakh was made an autonomous region. I was not able to accomplish this, not because I was against the autonomy, but because the Armenian peasants themselves did not want this. Meanwhile, Mirzoyan, assisted by the Dashnak teachers, tilled the soil and pushed the decision through the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee."¹⁴⁶

He knew that the trouble for Azerbaijan did not stop there; he predicted that the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh was the beginning of a future tragedy.

C o n c l u s i o n

To quote Narimanov, the tragedy that began with granting autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh was rooted in trusting outsiders.

In 1923, "a delayed action bomb with a clock-operated mechanism" was set to snap into action as soon as Soviet Russia pulled out of the Caucasus.

Grigory Orjonikidze's idea formulated in July 1920 of "autonomy for Karabakh and organization of the Armenian population" has passed the test of time to become Russia's lever of control in the region after the Soviet Union disappeared from the world map.

¹⁴³ *K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy avtonomnoy oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoj SSR. Dokumenty i materialy*, pp. 187-188.

¹⁴⁴ For more on renaming Khankendi Stepan kend, see: Protocol No. 40 of a meeting of the Presidium of the C.C. Az.C.P. (B.). 08.10.1923, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 74, f. 134, sheet 3; APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 169, f. 249/I, sheet 69.

¹⁴⁵ From S.M. Kirov's report at the 6th Congress of the Az.C.P. (B.). 05.05.1924, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 169, f. 249/II, sheet 4.

¹⁴⁶ N. Narimanov, *K istorii nashey revolyutsii v okrainakh (Pismo I.V. Stalinu)*, Baku, 1992, p. 59.

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SOME ASPECTS OF GEORGIAN HISTORY IN THE LIGHT OF ARMENIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

A b s t r a c t

This article takes a look at and substantiates the complete invalidity of the views of Armenian scientists (historiographers) on certain aspects of Georgian

history. In particular, it shows the absolute unacceptability of Armenia's claims to Lower Kartli and Javakheti—time-honored ancient Georgian territories.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Unfortunately, over the past few years, this kind of Armenia's approach has become an increasingly aggressive and stable tradition. It began with Moses of Chorene (the 5th century)—the father of Armenian historiography. This historian does not consider the Georgians to be the indigenous people of the Caucasus at all. According to him, "the northern territory on the other side of the Caucasian mountains," which is occupied by the "great and powerful tribe" of Gugars, is situated in Armenia. And this Armenian tribe is subordinated to the Armenian king. Since the "great and powerful tribe," as it turns out, actually lives on the southern boundaries of the East Georgian kingdom (Lower Kartli and Upper Javakheti), it stands to reason that this territory belongs to Armenia.

This is what Moses of Chorene believed, and his viewpoint is still fully shared by contemporary Armenian historiographers. And as a result, all textbooks, encyclopedias, and historical maps published both in Armenia and in those countries where there is an influential Armenian lobby present the southern half of the republic of Georgia and its oldest historical provinces of Kvemo (Lower) Kartli and Javakheti as the territory of so-called Great Armenia.

General Background

It is a well-known fact that in the Middle Ages confessional affiliation and ethnic identity sometimes intermingled, intercepting each other. For example, the term "Kartvelian people" (Georgians)

in the Caucasus referred not only to ethnic Georgians, but sometimes to Orthodox people of non-Georgian origin, just as “Somekhi” (Armenians) could, in addition to ethnic Armenians, mean any person of the Armenian faith, and so on. After making a fetish, so to speak, out of this “formula,” contemporary Armenian historians (professors V. Arutiunova-Fidanian and P. Muradian particularly “excelled” here), wherever the ethnonym “Georgian” (“Iver” in Byzantine and “Vratsi” in Armenian) is found in the ancient Armenian and Byzantine sources, particularly if it applies to well-known people, arbitrarily use it only in the confessional respect to refer to “Orthodox Armenians.” So all the famous political and cultural figures, such as David Curopalates (the 10th century)—initiator of the unification of feudal Georgia (whom, incidentally, Sharafkhan Bidlisi, a well-known Muslim historian of the 16th century, directly calls a Georgian); famous Georgian commander John Tornik Chordvaneli (Chorchaneli)—founder of the Holy Monastery of Iviron on Mount Athos in Greece (980); Grigol Bakurianisdze—the Grand Domestic of Byzantium, church warden of Petritsoni (Bachkovo) Monastery in Bulgaria (1083), and so on, turned out to be Armenians for the simple reason that the Armenian historians who were their contemporaries called them “Vrats Curopalates,” that is, “Georgian Curopalates” or “vratsi azgav,” that is, “of Georgian origin,” while the ethnonym “Georgian” in all these cases (even when the ethnic affiliation “of Georgian origin” is emphasized) should be understood in the confessional respect.

The absurdity of this “concept” is obvious, while authoritative Georgian sources are usually ignored. Meanwhile, Grand Domestic Grigol Bakurianisdze states in the Petritsoni Typicon written in Georgian and Greek, referring to himself: “We Georgians are a valiant people raised as warriors and, being laymen, have always been used to the hard life.” Can we really doubt that in this context the ethnonym “Georgians” (“Ivers” in the Greek text) was used in precisely the ethnic and not the confessional sense? This phrase alone, not to mention all the other arguments, unequivocally settles the question of the ethnic affiliation of the Grand Domestic for the open-minded person.

When we read articles by contemporary Armenian historians, the impression is created that Georgians, as such, did not exist at all. Only the common Armenians and the uncommon Armenians of Chalcedon, who for some reason were called “Georgians,” that is, “Ivers” (in Greek) and “Vratsik” (in Armenian), actually existed.

Indeed, classic political scientist (as he calls himself) A. Migranian came up with this “constructive” thought, undoubtedly on the basis of contemporary Armenian historiography. In one of his interviews, calling the entirely natural reaction of the Georgian public to Russia’s annexation of primordial Georgian land—Abkhazia and Shida (Inner) Kartli—cannibalism, he wrote in *Izvestia* (on 16 October, 2006): “For all specialists more or less well-versed in questions of the Transcaucasus, it is obvious that such an ethnicity as the Georgians, as incidentally such a state as Georgia, did not exist in history before this territory became, first, part of the Russian Empire and then of the Soviet Union”!! In the same article, A. Migranian notes: “Gratitude, as a virtue, is found very rarely either in human relations or in relations between ethnicities. We do not have to look far for an example. I, an Armenian (!—*D.M.*), am very well aware of this.

“At one time, the Armenians delegated the younger branch of their princely and later royal family to Georgia to become the ruling dynasty of the Bagratuni. The Armenian princes and commanders extended the borders of the medieval Georgian state. The Armenians built the capital of Georgia and to this day all the more or less significant architectural monuments are a result of the patronage of the Armenian merchants and industrialists who lived and worked in Tiflis (!—*D.M.*).

“Mesrop Mashtots, the creator of the Armenian alphabet, also created an alphabet for the fraternal (!—*D.M.*) Georgian people. But never has any Georgian cultural or political figure ever mentioned, even in the interests of historical justice, the contribution of the neighboring people to the culture, science, and architecture of the Georgian state. So ingratitude is a characteristic trait both of individuals and of entire nations.”

Indeed! Admittedly, the author of this raving tirade contradicts himself, without noticing it, by admitting that the Georgians and the Georgian state appear to have actually existed! But it is not entirely clear why these charitable Armenians did not labor for their own benefit, but for the “fraternal Georgian people,” creating an alien culture, science, a capital city, and a state; especially since they lost their own statehood in the 11th century for almost an entire millennium!

Kvemo (Lower) Kartli

Relating how Arsacid King Valarshak (Vagharshak in Armenian) set up the Armenian kingdom, Moses of Chorene says: “Gushar, from the sons of Sharai, inherited the Dark Mountain, that is, Kangark and half (of the country) of the Javakhs, Kokhb, Tsob, and Dzor as far as the fortress of Khnarakert. But Vagharshak gave the Ashotsk possessions and Tashir domains to the descendants of Gushar Khaykid.”¹

It has long been established that Gushar is the eponym for Gugark. There is evidently a spelling mistake in the text and “perhaps Gowjar, now Gujareti, is more correct.”² I also uphold this viewpoint, with the only difference that I think that the original source should have said not Gujar, but simply Gugar, instead of Gushar.³

Keeping in mind the location of the “gawars” (regions) of Gugark listed by the Armenian historian, it is worth noting, with respect to the reliability of this reference, that the territory described (with the exception of “half (of the country) of the Javakhs”) corresponds to two ancient, according to the *Kartlis tskhovreba*, provinces of the Iberian (Kartlian) kingdom: Gachiani and Gardabani, that is, of the historical region of Georgia—Kvemo (Lower) Kartli.⁴

But it should be kept in mind that even within the above-designated boundaries, Gugark seems to be the result of a long historical process. For one statement by Faustus of Byzantium (the 5th century) points in no uncertain terms to the fact that Gugark, Kokhb, and Dzor are different regions.⁵ Nor, evidently, did Khnarakert, Tashir, Ashotsk, and “half (of the country) of the Javakhs” initially belong to the territory of Gugark and using this name to describe them ensued from the time-honored political development of the mentioned province. In all likelihood the main nucleus of Gugark was Kangark, and possibly Tsob (Tsobopor), that is, the basin of the River Debeda-Chay, not including the River Kamenka.

In addition to everything else, this is indicated, first, by the geographical location of this gorge and its upper reaches (that is, Kangark) at the very southern edge of Gugark, on the border with Armenia. It stands to reason that this is why the Armenians could call all the rest of the territory lying further north Gugark⁶; second, this is also indicated by the fact that it was here, at the sources of the Debeda-Chay, that Gogarani,⁷ the ancient Georgian toponymic relict of this province was preserved, the name of the village that has now been renamed Gugark!

According to *Ashkharatsuyts* (a medieval geography of Armenia written in the 7th century), the boundaries of Gugark stretched further and, in addition to the above-mentioned provinces of South

¹ Moses of Chorene, *Istoria Armenii*, New translation by N. Emin, Moscow, 1893, p. 58; *Movsesi xorenaiwoy PatmowĖiwn hayoĖ*, [1910], p. 108.

² N. Adonts, *Armenia v epokhu Iustiniana*, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 424.

³ See: D.L. Muskhelishvili, *Iz istoricheskoi geografii Vostochnoi Gruzii*, Tbilisi, 1982, p. 6.

⁴ See: *Kartlis tskhovreba* (History of Georgia), Tbilisi, 2008, p. 16.

⁵ See: *Fawstosi BiwzandaĖwoy PatmowĖiwn hayoĖ*, [1913], p. 242; *Istoria Armenii Favstosa Buzanda*, Erevan, 1953, p. 123.

⁶ See: D.L. Muskhelishvili, op. cit., pp. 8, 9.

⁷ See: *Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoiu arkhograficheskoiu komissiei*, Vol. I, Tiflis, 1866, p. 402.

Iberia, Gugark also included Trialeti and almost the entire southwestern part of historical Georgia: Javakheti, Artaani, and Klarjeti.⁸

How can this be explained?

The thing is that, as we know, in order to protect the northern borders of the kingdom from military invasions, the Armenians created a so-called *bdeshkhstvo* (margraviate) in the territory of Gugark. Popular opinion had it that this *bdeshkhstvo* was established by Tigran the Great in the 1st century BC.⁹ The extended boundaries of Gugark, which *Ashkharatsuyts* testifies to, are evidently a consequence of the subsequent development of the political processes. It would be natural to presume that as Armenia expanded territorially to the north, the conquered lands were added to the domains of the Gugark *bdeshkh* and, in so doing, extended the boundaries of Gugark.

As we already know, Moses of Chorene considers the eponym of Gugark-Gushar to be Khaykid, that is, a descendant of Khayk, the eponym of the Armenians. Consequently, for him, Gugark was initially an Armenian province. Gugark is also mentioned in *Ashkharatsuyts* as a time-honored Armenian region, although it is also emphasized that by the time this book was written, that is, by the 7th century, this territory belonged to the Iberian (Kartlian) kingdom.¹⁰

The same viewpoint also prevails in contemporary Armenian historiography.

In order to clarify how legitimate this idea is, the first thing we need to know is who the Gugars, the indigenous population of Gugark, were and to which ethnic group they belonged according to the same Armenian sources.

Let us turn to one of the earliest Armenian sources, to Faustus of Byzantium (the 5th century). He writes: "Maskut King Sanesan, extremely angry, was filled with hate for his tribesman, Armenian King Khosrow, and gathered all of his troops—Huns, Pokhs, Tavasars, Khechmatakhs, Izhmakhs, Gats, Gluars, Gugars, Shichbs, Chilbs, Balasich, and Egersvans, as well as an uncountable number of other diverse nomadic tribes, all the numerous troops he commanded. He crossed his border, the great River Kura, and invaded the Armenian country."¹¹ According to the context, we are talking here about different Caucasian tribes, and it is entirely obvious that the historian does not consider the Gugars to be an Armenian tribe.

More specific data about the question we are interested in can be found in Moses of Chorene himself. For example, when talking about Gushar Khaykid's inheritance, as mentioned above, the historian goes on directly to say: "Rule of the northern country situated on the other side of the Caucasian mountains (Valarshak.—*D.M.*) is entrusted to a great and powerful tribe; its patriarch is conferred the title of *bdeshkh* of the Gugars."¹² It is obvious that this "great and powerful tribe" was not of Armenian origin, and since it lived to the north of Armenia "on the other side of the Caucasian mountains," it would be most logical to presume (particularly since Moses of Chorene began talking about the origin of the Alvans prior to this) that the historian implies Georgians here. And since the patriarch of this tribe was called "bdeshkh of the Gugars," it should be recognized that Gugars were indeed Georgians. The fact that Moses of Chorene means Georgians, in particular, Eastern Georgians, when referring to the "great and powerful tribe of Gugars," is confirmed by the text that follows: "Rule of the northern country situated on the other side of the Caucasian mountains is entrusted to a great and powerful tribe; its patriarch is conferred the title of *bdeshkh* of the Gugars, who came from

⁸ See: J. Saint-Martin, *Mémoires historiques et géographique sur l'Arménie*, Vol. I, Paris, 1818, p. 366; *Armenian Geography of the 7th century A.D. (attributed to Moses of Chorene)*, Text and translation published by K.P. Patkanov, St. Petersburg, 1877, p. 20; *Géographie de Moïse de Corène d'après Ptolémée*, Texte arménien traduit en français par le p. Arsène Soukry Mékhitariste, Venise, 1881, p. 34.

⁹ See: J. Marquart, *Ērānshahr nach der geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenaçi*, Berlin, 1901, p. 95.

¹⁰ See: *Géographie de Moïse de Corène d'après Ptolémée*, pp. 34, 35.

¹¹ *Fawstosi Biwzandaĭwoy PatmowĒiwn hayoĭ*, [1913, p. 242; *Istoria Armenii Favstosa Buzanda*, p. 123.

¹² Moses of Chorene, op. cit., p. 59; *Movsesi xorenaĭwoy PatmowĒiwn hayoĭ*, p. 108.

a descendant of Mikhrdat, the satrap of Darekh, brought by Alexander and appointed as ruler over the Iberian captives.”¹³

So it is entirely clear that the “descendant of the ruler of the Iberians,” whom we already know as *bdeshkh*, is the “patriarch of the great and powerful tribe of Gugars,” that is, the Gugars are identical to the Iberians, or to be more precise, are one of the East Georgian (Kartlian) tribes which the Georgians called “Gogarani:” the correct grammatical form of the plural of the nominative case is retained, as already mentioned, in the name of the village in the Pambak Gorge.

This interpretation of Moses of Chorene’s point of view is also confirmed by the fact that a little further on he mentioned a “certain Mikhrdat, the great Iberian *bdeshkh*, who descended from Mikhrdat, the satrap of Darekh, and was appointed by Alexander over the Iberian captives, as mentioned above,”¹⁴ who supposedly lived under Armenian King Artaxias (2nd century BC). So Moses of Chorene equated the great noble of the Armenian kings, “*bdeshkh* of the Gugars,” with the “great *bdeshkh* of the Iberians;” consequently, the Gugars are Iberians! This is why Moses of Chorene’s “*bdeshkh* of the Gugars Ashush”¹⁵ is called “*bdeshkh* of the Iberians” in Ghazar Parpetsi (5th century), Movses Kaghankatvatsi (7th century), and Stepanos Orbelian (13th century).¹⁶

Hovhannes Draskhanakertsi (the 10th century) presents extremely significant evidence to confirm these facts. For example, in his *History of Armenia*, he deliberately lists “our (i.e. Armenians’.—*D.M.*) neighbors: Greeks, Egers, Gugars, and Utiyts.”¹⁷ There can be no doubt that here the Gugars imply the Iberians or Eastern Georgians, just as the Egers imply the Megreles, or to be more precise, Western Georgians in general, and the Utiyts mean the Alvans.

Another fact presented by Hovhannes Draskhanakertsi is just as important, when he mentions the “great Corepiscopa [Chorbishop] who ruled over the part of Gugark situated next to the Alan gates.”¹⁸ This refers to the principality of Kakheti, and so, as we see, not only Kartli but also Kakheti and the Darial Gorge are called Gugark.¹⁹

So why did Moses of Chorene, and the whole of contemporary Armenian historiography that followed him, think that Gugark/Gogarani was an Armenian province? Perhaps the author of *Ashkharatsuyts* is right in saying that although Gugark/Gogarani belonged to the Iberian (Kartlian) state during his time, it resulted from the Iberians (Kartlians) seizing Armenian land?

Moses of Chorene is definitely biased. Indeed, first, he knows that “the great and mighty tribe of Gugars” living in “the northern country on the other side of the Caucasian mountains” is not Armenian. Nevertheless, contradicting himself, he thinks Gushar, the eponym of this tribe, is Khaykid, that is, Armenian. Moreover, from his rather garbled recitation, we know that “the descendant of the ruler of the Iberians” is “the patriarch of the great and powerful tribe of Gugars,” while the “*bdeshkh* of the Gugars” (he is also “the patriarch of the great and powerful tribe of Gugars”) and the “great *bdeshkh* of the Iberians” both descended from the “ruler of the Iberians.” The impression is created that Moses of Chorene is deliberately not revealing everything. But according to the context, perhaps even against his will, it is entirely obvious that the “Gugars” and “Iberians” are identical ethnic concepts, although the historian does not mention this directly anywhere.

As for *Ashkharatsuyts*, it should be noted that the information in this book that interests us is to a certain extent correct. The thing is that whereas its final edition dates to the turn of the 6th and

¹³ Moses of Chorene, op. cit., p. 59; *Movsesi xorenaiwoy PatmowÊiwn hayoĭ*, p. 108.

¹⁴ Moses of Chorene, op. cit., p. 64; *Movsesi xorenaiwoy PatmowÊiwn hayoĭ*, p. 117.

¹⁵ Moses of Chorene, op. cit., p. 201; *Movsesi xorenaiwoy PatmowÊiwn hayoĭ*, p. 356.

¹⁶ See: *Uazaray Farpeiwoy PatmowÊiwn hayoĭ*, Tfuiz, 1904, p. 52; *Movsesi Kauankatowaiwoy PatmowÊiwn Auowanĭ Aĭxarhi*, B. 1913, p. 132; *PatmowÊiwn nahangin Sisakan arareal Stefanosi Orbelean Arqepiskoposi Siwneaĭ*, B. 1911, p. 60.

¹⁷ I. Draskhanakertsi, *Istoria Armenii*, Translation from the Old Armenian, introductory article and comments by M.O. Darbinian-Melikian, Erevan, 1986, p. 140.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

¹⁹ See: D.L. Muskhelishvili, op. cit., pp. 13-15.

7th centuries, older sources were doubtlessly used when describing the Transcaucasian countries.²⁰ In particular, I think that the description of the territorial structure of Iberia presented in the source corresponds to the situation in the second half of the 4th and first half of the 5th centuries.²¹ This was the time when Gugark/Gogarani ultimately joined Iberia, which was noted by the author of *Ashkharatsuyts*. He of course knew that Gugark/Gogarani used to belong to Armenia as a large administrative formation and so, when describing his country, he also included this district in it. *Ashkharatsuyts* is the oldest book about geography and we should not expect its author to take us on excursions into history. It is possible (under the influence of Moses of Chorene?) that he sincerely believed that Gugark/Gogarani was Armenian land.

We think that everything said above contradicts this. Indeed, if the indigenous residents of this province, the Gugars/Gogarians, were Georgians, which Armenian sources unequivocally show, it stands to reason that their land should have also initially belonged to the Iberian kingdom.

Are there any arguments in favor of such a presupposition? Yes, there are.

We find the earliest mention of Gugark/Gogarani in Strabo, who knew this province as Gogarene (compare with the Georgian “Gogarani”!). This well-known place in his *Geography* (XI, 14, 5) reads: the Armenians, who had become stronger by the beginning of the 2nd century BC, in particular King Artaxias deprived “the Iberians of the foot of the Paryaderes, the Chorzene, and Gogarene, which is on the other side of the Cyrus,” that is, Kura. Consequently, as the geographer clearly indicates, Gogarene/Gogarani was an Iberian region that was conquered by the Armenians, whereby its territory was defined as lying to the southeast of the River Kura. This location entirely coincides with the one Moses of Chorene suggests for Gugark. And here we must also recall, with respect to the evidence of the Greek geographer, the statement by the Armenian historian about the “great bdeskhk of the Iberians,” to whom “Artaxias entrusted rule of the northern mountains and Pontic Sea.”²² This full semantic and chronological coincidence only confirms the reality of the situation.

Consequently, according to Strabo’s graphic evidence, which is confirmed by Moses of Chorene, Gogarene/Gogarani was an Iberian (Kartlian) region conquered by the Armenians, whereby its territory (Gogarene/Gogarani) was defined as lying to the southeast of the River Kura.

This was the Armenians’ first expansion toward Iberia (Kartli).²³

For several centuries, this region was a bone of contention between neighbors. During the political collisions, immigration of the Armenians also apparently took place. In the second half of the 4th century, Gugark/Gogarani ultimately became part of the Iberian (Kartlian) kingdom.²⁴

It was this political fate that seems to have given Moses of Chorene and some other Armenian sources (*Ashkharatsuyts* and *Gakhnamak*, etc.) reason to regard Gugark/Gogarani as an Armenian province.

Unfortunately, this trend continues in contemporary Armenian historiography.

It was Gugark/Gogarani, that is, the province of Kvemo (Lower) Kartli, that also remained an inviolable part of the Georgian state after the Arabs conquered Eastern Georgia in the mid-7th century. Later, when the comprehensive development of feudal relations caused the early feudal Iberian (Kartlian) state to disintegrate at the end of the 8th century into separate feudal principalities, Gugark/Gogarani remained within the Tbilisi Arab Emirate that broke away from the Caliphate.²⁵

²⁰ S.T. Eremyan, *Hayastan = =st «A}xarha}oy}i»-i*, Erevan, 1963, p. 14ff.

²¹ D. Muskhelishvili, *Main Questions of Georgia’s Historical Geography*, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1977, Chapter 2, Para. 6 (in Georgian).

²² Moses of Chorene, op. cit., p. 64; *Movsesi xorena}woy Patmow}eiwn hayo}i*, p. 117.

²³ See: I. Javakhishvili, *Granitsy Gruzii v istoricheskom i sovremennom rassmotrenii*, Transl. from the Georgian by E. Khoshtaria-Brosse, Tbilisi, 1919, p. 33.

²⁴ See: D.L. Muskhelishvili, *Iz istoricheskoi geografii Vostochnoi Gruzii*, pp. 10-13.

²⁵ See: D. Muskhelishvili, *Main Questions of Georgia’s Historical Geography*, Vol. II, Tbilisi, 1980, Chapter 1, Para. 2-4 (in Georgian).

By the end of the 9th century, Ashot Barepasht, founder of the Armenian kingdom of the Bagratunis, captured the southern provinces of Gugark/Gogarani.²⁶ This was the Armenians' second expansion toward Eastern Georgia.²⁷ According to the extremely exaggerated statement by Armenian historian of the 13th century Vardan the Great, Ashot appears to have conquered the whole of Iberia, Albania, and the entire Caucasus. However, Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi, a contemporary of Smbat Tiezerakal (890-914) and Ashot Erkat (914-928), the son and grandson of Ashot Barepasht, indicates that they ruled the town of Samshvilde (Shamshulde), a major center of the southern part of Kvemo Kartli. In particular, the historian says: "King Ashot (son of King Smbat) set off, went to the Gugark country, and reached a large fortress, which in Iberian was called Shamshulde, that is, Three Arrows, for the people who lived around the fortress were subordinate to his father."²⁸ It is interesting to note that the old Georgian town of Samshvilde (the impressive ruins of which have survived to this day), which, according to Georgian sources, is the center of one of the eristavs (provinces) of the Kartlian kingdom, is also mentioned in *Ashkharatsuyts* as precisely a "Georgian town."²⁹

Further it should be emphasized that Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi, as can be seen from the context, does not think the "country of Gugark," where Ashot Erkat went and where "tribes" live (in the context, the Armenian word "zazgs" would be more correctly translated as "tribes," "people," and not "ethnicities")³⁰ that are subordinate to the Armenian kings, is Armenian. But since the name of the fortress of the country, according to him, is Georgian, there can be no doubt that he believes the "tribes who live around the fortress" to be Georgians, and the "country of Gugark" itself to be part of Georgia (Kartli). And despite the fact that the etymology offered by the medieval Armenian historian is not entirely precise ("Samshvilde" in Georgian does not mean Three Arrows, or to be more precise, Three Bows, but "the place where bows are made"), he is, of course, much more objective, believing, like the author of *Ashkharatsuyts*, that the town is Georgian, than the contemporary Armenian translator of his *History of Armenia*, who translates «i lezow Vraĭ» in the Armenian text as "in the Iberian language" (?!), and not simply "in Georgian;" and regards the town of Samshvilde as an Armenian fortress.³¹

So this passage from an authoritative source without a doubt explains the ethnic essence of the "country of Gugark." This is precisely why, when Ashot Barepasht, the ruler of Armenia, conquered the southern provinces of Gugark/Gogarani at the end of the 9th century, he assumed the title "ishkhan of the ishkhans of the Armenians and Georgians,"³² that is, "prince of princes in Armenia and Georgia."³³ This political situation also continued later when the so-called Lore-Tashir, or Tashir-Dzoraget, "Armenian kingdom" of the Kyurikids,³⁴ subordinate to the Ani kingdom, was created in this territory at the end of the 10th century, right up to the mid-11th century.³⁵ Indeed, after his reign, the title of Ashot Barepasht was passed on to his successors, the kings of the Ani state, who, for example, Gagik I Shahenshah (990-1020, suzerain of the Kyurikids, and his son Smbat (1020-1041), were called "kings of the Armenians and Georgians."³⁶

This title was due to the fact that the Armenian kings, Ashot I Barepasht in particular, who was also ishkhan of the ishkhans of the Armenians, as well as his son Smbat I Tiezerakal, according to

²⁶ See: *Stefanosĭ Tarĭneĭwoy Asoukan PatmowĖiwn Tiezerakan*, 1885, p. 117.

²⁷ See: I. Javakhishvili, op. cit., p. 37.

²⁸ I. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 202.

²⁹ J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., p. 358; *Armenian Geography of the 7th century A.D. (attributed to Moses of Chorene)*, p. 17.

³⁰ I. Draskhanakertskiy, *History of Armenia*, Transl. with comments and index by I. Abuladze, Tbilisi, 1937, p. 56 (in Georgian).

³¹ I. Draskhanakerttsi, op. cit., p. 345.

³² *Stefanosĭ Tarĭneĭwoy Asoukan PatmowĖiwn Tiezerakan*, p. 158.

³³ *Vseobshchaia istoria Stepanosa Taronskogo Asokhika po prozvaniuu*, Moscow, 1864, p. 107.

³⁴ *Mecin Vardany Bar>rberdeĭwoy PatmowĖiwn Tiezerakan*. M., 1861, p. 129.

³⁵ See: *Stefanosĭ Tarĭneĭwoy Asoukan PatmowĖiwn Tiezerakan*, pp. 256, 279; *Vseobshchaia istoria Stepanosa Taronskogo Asokhika po prozvaniuu*, pp. 108, 203; *Kartlis tskhovreba*, pp. 154, 159.

³⁶ K. Kostaneanĭ, *Vimakan taregir*, S.-Peterbowrg, 1913, pp. 13, 20; D. Muskhelishvili, *Agjakala—krepost Gagi. Sbornik po istoricheskoi geografii Gruzii*, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1960, p. 133.

Armenian historians Vardan the Great, Hovhannes Draskhanakerttsi, and Pseudo-Shapukh Bagratuni,³⁷ conquered the Georgian lands, particularly a large part of Gugark/Gogarani.

At the end of the 10th century, as already mentioned, the so-called Lore-Tashir or Tashir-Dzoraget kingdom arose on this land with its center in the town of Samshvilde. The northern border of the kingdom, which separated it from the Tbilisi emirate, passed along the River Algeti.³⁸

Armenian historiography unequivocally considers the above-mentioned kingdom to be Armenian. But this is not so. The ruling dynasty was of course Armenian, but the territory and indigenous population, as we already know, was Georgian. Let us listen to what Stephanos of Taron has to say about this: “King David, son of Gurgen (founder of the Tashir-Dzoraget kingdom.—*D.M.*) and his brother Smbat ruled [at that time] the countries of Tashir and the Iberian lowland, having the extensive fortress of Shamshulde [Samshvilde] as their place of residence; soon he also took possession of the town of Dmanik” (the well-known Georgian town of Dmanisi.—*D.M.*).³⁹

Keeping in mind all we know about Gugark/Gogarani, this evidence from the Armenian historian essentially does not tell us anything new and only confirms that the Tashir-Dzoraget kingdom that arose in the territory of Gugark/Gogarani with its center in Samshvilde and the town of Dmanisi and “countries of the Iberian lowlands” were a Georgian kingdom, in terms of territory and the indigenous population, headed by an Armenian dynasty.

And, finally, the fact that medieval, in contrast to contemporary, Armenian historiography is more objective is unequivocally confirmed by a statement by Armenian historian of the 13th century, author of *Chronographic History*, Mkhitar Ayrivanetsi, who around 981 wrote: “At that time the kingdom of Bagratuni began to rule over the Georgians, for Gurgen ruled in Georgia and his brother Smbat in Armenia.”⁴⁰ This presumes the emergence of the Tashir-Dzoraget kingdom, and Mkhitar Ayrivanetsi’s words best sum up all that was said above about Gugark/Gogarani and its indigenous population: there can be no doubt that the Gugark/Gogarani country was initially a province of the Iberian (Kartlian) kingdom, and the Gugars/Gogarians were an East Georgian, or to be more precise, Kartlian tribe.

However, the term “Somkhiti” (the Georgian name for Armenia.—*D.M.*) was retained in the historical geography (of Georgia.—*D.M.*) in memory of the time the Armenians ruled in this region. This name (for this territory.—*D.M.*) was entirely unknown in the olden days and was not encountered until the beginning of the 10th century.⁴¹ Contemporary Armenian historiography, however, ignoring the authoritative evidence of the Armenian medieval historians and essentially relying only on the biased statement of Moses of Chorene and inappropriate interpretation of *Ashkharatsuyts*, to this day stubbornly adheres to the unsubstantiated opinion that the ancient Georgian province, which in the Georgian sources is called “Gachi-ani” and corresponds to medieval “Kvemo (Lower) Kartli”, has always belonged to Armenia...

Javakheti

A similar trend was also revealed with respect to another ancient Georgian province—Javakheti. In contemporary Armenian historiography, this region is also considered to be “primordially Armenian,” and its indigenous population, the Javakhs, to be Armenians.

³⁷ See: *PatmowĒiwn {aphoy Bagratownwoy}*, 1921, p. 65.

³⁸ See: *Kartlis tskhovreba*, p. 154; D. Muskhelishvili, *Main Questions of Georgia’s Historical Geography*, Vol. II, Tbilisi, 1980, p. 211.

³⁹ See: *Stefanos Tar;neĒwoy Asoukan PatmowĒiwn Tiezerakan*, p. 256; *Vseobshchaia istoria Stepanosa Taronsko-go Asokhika po prozvaniiu*, p. 184.

⁴⁰ M. Ayrivanetsi, *Chronographic History*, Transl. from the ancient Armenian, preface, comments, and index by L.S. Davlianidze-Tatishvili, Tbilisi, 1990, p. 74 (in Georgian).

⁴¹ I. Javakhishvili, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

In fact, we know that the Armenian source of the 7th century, *Ashkharatsuyts*, when listing the “gawars” of Gugark, also mentions “Javakhk” among them (the Armenian name for Javakheti), and in the extensive edition of the source—“Upper Javakhk.”⁴² But we already know that, first, the region of Gugark/Gogarani itself (and all of its indigenous population) was primordialially Georgian; and second, how the text of this source should be adequately interpreted (see above).

What do other ancient Armenian sources tell us?

For example, Armenian scientist of the 10th century Ukhtanes talks about the family tree of Kyrion, the Catholicos of Georgia. The literal translation of this text is as follows: Kyrion “came from the Georgians in terms of country and lineage, from the region of the Javakhs.”⁴³ There can be no doubt that Ukhtanes believed Javakheti to be part of Georgia (Iberia), and the Javakhs to be Georgians. Z. Aleksidze examines the viewpoint of this historian and the enlightened Armenian society of the 10th century on the problem that interests us in depth.⁴⁴

When relating about his ancestors, the representatives of the once illustrious Georgian feudal family of Orbeli, 13th century historian, Armenianized Georgian Stepanos Orbelian, states that they received many estates from the rulers of Kartli (Georgia), including the fortress of Orbeti, “settled in the borough of Orbeti and, after a long time, were called Orbuls, that is, Orbets, after the name of this fortress, since this tribe (that is, Georgians.—*D.M.*) had the custom of naming its princes after the place they lived, for example, Eristavs from (the region) Ereti, Javakhurs from Javakheti, Kakhetian from Kakheti ... and many more.”⁴⁵

Despite the fact that not all of Stepanos Orbelian’s etymology is correct, the assertion that many of the Georgian princely names came from their estates (which is extremely legitimate in a developed feudal society) is entirely correct. However, I am interested in something else: it is of course clear from the context that, for this Armenian historian too, Javakheti (and he uses precisely the Georgian form of the name of the region) and its population (to designate which he again uses the ancient Georgian term “javakhurni”—in Armenian “javakhurkn”) are a Georgian region and Georgian tribe.

And another passage from Stepanos Orbelian’s *History* reads: in 1178, the Georgian noble, amir-spasalar (commander-in-chief of the Georgian troops) Ivane Orbeli, rose up against King George III and “all the heads (of feudal families.—*D.M.*) and the Georgian nobility were unanimous with Ivane and all set off together and came to see him at the estate (called) Darbazi: the eristavs of Kartli ... and Javakhs: Kakha and his sons, and Great Gamrekeli and Jakeli Memna” and others.⁴⁶ This reference shows again that Javakhs (in the Armenian text, the Georgian form “javakhurni” > “javakhurkn”), whom the historian lists by name (Kakha Toreli and his sons, Great Gamrekeli Toreli and Memna Jakeli), are Georgians, Georgian nobles...

Such is the opinion of Armenian historians, who were the contemporaries, or almost the contemporaries, of the events and people about which they wrote...

Unfortunately, contemporary Armenian historians do not take this into account and do not only consider Javakheti a province of Armenia, but also identify the Javakhs, the indigenous population of the region, with Armenians, including the ancient Georgian (Meskhetian) feudal family of Jakeli, while the documents show when and on whose initiative mass settlement by Armenians of this ancient Georgian territory took place: in 1830, on the initiative of the Russian vicegerent in the Caucasus, Ivan Paskevich, up to 30,000 Armenians from Turkey were settled in the Akhaltsikhe (Meskheti) and mainly in the Akhalkalaki (Javakheti) districts.⁴⁷

⁴² See: *Géographie de Moïse de Corène d’après Ptolémée*, p. 34.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴⁴ See: Z. Aleksidze, “Javakheti and Gugareti in the Geopolitical Consciousness of Ancient Armenian Historians,” in: *Ukhtanes*, Collection, Mravaltavi, Tbilisi, 2005 (in Georgian).

⁴⁵ *PatmowĖiwn nahangin Sisakan arareal Stefanosi Orbelean Arqepiskoposi Siwneaĭ*, B., 1911, p. 371.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

⁴⁷ See: Z. Ivanenko, *Grazhdanskoe upravlenie Zakavkaz’em*, Tiflis, 1873, pp. 265, 266; I. Javakhishvili, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

C o n c l u s i o n

To sum up the above, ancient Gugark/Gogarene should be situated in the basin of the Debeda-Chay River. The ancient Georgian name of this province was “Gogarani,” which has been retained on the upper reaches of the river in the name of the village that has now been renamed “Gugark.”

The indigenous population of the region, the Gugars/Gogarans, was an East Georgian, or to be more precise Kartlian, tribe. I. Marquart⁴⁸ and H. Hübschmann⁴⁹ were also of the same opinion.

Javakheti is also an ancient Georgian province, while the indigenous population of the region, the “javakhurni,” according to the information of the ancient Armenian sources, was one of the East Georgian tribes.

⁴⁸ See: I. Marquart, *Ērānshahr nach oter Geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenaçi*, Berlin, 1901 (22:116).

⁴⁹ See: H. Hübschmann, *Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen*, Strassburg, 1904 (9:276).

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TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AZERBAIJAN AT THE TURKISH-RUSSIAN TALKS OF 1921 (*The Moscow and Kars Conferences*)

A b s t r a c t

The author draws on the documents, | *Moscow and Kars conferences to discuss published and unpublished, of the | Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.*

B y W a y o f I n t r o d u c t i o n ¹

On 5 May, 1920, at its first meeting, the government formed two days earlier by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) decided that instead of waiting for Moscow to answer the

¹ The context and pre-history of the events described in this article are given in the work by V. Gafarov, “Russian-Turkish Rapprochement and Azerbaijan’s Independence (1919-1921),” *The Caucasus & Globalization*, Vol. 4, Issue 1-2, 2010, which also contains more detailed information about some persons mentioned in the present publication.—*Ed.*

letter Mustafa Kemal had dispatched on 26 April, it would start official negotiations with the government of the R.S.F.S.R. The delegation consisted of Foreign Minister Bekir-Sami Kunduh-bek and Minister of Economics Yusuf Kemal Tengirshbek; later they were joined by Osman-bek from Lazistan, who knew Russian.²

Meanwhile, on 5 and 6 May, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, who commanded the Eastern Army, sent Mustafa Kemal two telegrams from Erzurum to express his concern about the delay: "The Armenians are agitated; there is information that they too dispatched a delegation to seek collusion with the Bolsheviks. We should act immediately; every day missed could bring great losses."³

The Talks Begin (July–August 1920)

On 11 May, 1920, the Turkish delegation left Ankara; in Erzurum it acquired two more members, Dr. İbrahim Tali (Öngeren) and Seyfi-bek (Dusgeren), military experts recommended by Karabekir Pasha.⁴

Since the foreign minister refused to travel by sea, the delegation moved toward Maku (via Bayazid and Nakhchivan); it turned out, however, that the land route was unsafe. The delegates had to return to set out once more on 11 July, 1920. This time they traveled by sea and arrived in Moscow on 19 July.⁵

Several Turkish officials, however, arrived much earlier: Halil Pasha and Dr. Fuad Sabit-bek arrived on 16 May; Enver Pasha and İttihad members Jamal Pasha, Dr. Bahattin Şakir, and Badri-bek came from Germany on 27 May; late in May Tegmen İbrahim-bek delivered Kemal's letter of 26 April.

The İttihad group headed by Halil Pasha had already spoken to the Soviet officials and even reached an agreement on financial and military aid.

On 3 June, İbrahim-bek returned to Anatolia with a letter from Georgi Chicherin.⁶

The talks began on 13 August; the Turks who had arrived on 19 July, 1920 were unofficially received by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. Lev Karakhan twice on 24 July. Soviet Russia was biding for time: it needed to sort out its relations with Armenia.

On 19 July, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin informed Erivan that Anatolia had begun mobilization and that peace involving all the sides was Armenia's only chance. Soviet Russia, in turn, pledged to join the peace treaty.

On 31 July, 1920, Boris Legran, who represented Soviet Russia in the Caucasus, met A. Jamalyan and A. Babalyan, who represented the Dashnak government, in Tbilisi⁷; on 10 August the Russian-Armenian treaty was signed, which left Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan under temporary Soviet administration. The Gumri-Shakhtakhti-Julfa railway could be used by Armenia (not for military purposes).⁸ Russia promised to negotiate territorial concessions with the Turks.

The official talks between Soviet Russia and Turkey began on 13 August in Moscow. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin tried to dispel the Turks' concern over the Russian-Arme-

² See: Yu.K. Tengirshbek, *Guarding the Motherland*, Bahar Publishers, Istanbul, 1967, pp. 145-146 (in Turkish).

³ K. Karabekir, *Our War for Independence*, Vol. II, Yapy kredi Publishers, Istanbul, pp. 786-790 (In Turkish).

⁴ See: Yu.K. Tengirshbek, op. cit., p. 148.

⁵ See: Ibid., p. 151.

⁶ See: S. Yerasimos, *Turkish-Soviet Relations. From the October Coup to "National Resistance,"* Gezem Publishers, Istanbul, 1979, pp. 152-155 (in Turkish).

⁷ See: Ibid., p. 166.

⁸ The Archives of the Defense Ministry of the Turkish Republic (ATASE), A. 1/4282, K. 588, D. 118-36, F. 6-3.

nian treaty, which they heard about on 13 August, the day the talks began. The Soviet official claimed that the transfer of Van and Bitlis to Armenia would promote Turkish interests in the future. He added that Halil Pasha and Jamal Pasha had already agreed.⁹

The Turks retorted that by acting in this way Russia was no better than any other colonialist state and that Halil Pasha and Jamal Pasha had not been empowered to talk on behalf of Turkey.¹⁰

The first day was wasted because of Georgi Chicherin's unacceptable claims.

The next day, the delegation met with Lenin, who confirmed that signing the treaty with the Armenians had been a necessity dictated by the circumstances, but went on to admit that "it was a mistake we will try to correct. If we fail to do so, you will have to correct it."¹¹ The leader of Soviet Russia assured the Turks that Sovietization of Armenia and Georgia in the near future would settle all the problems.¹²

On 17 August, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs appointed A. Sabanin and E. Adamov to discuss the basic principles of a treaty with Turkey. The preliminary stage, between 17 and 24 August, produced a draft of eight articles, but Chicherin's position on transfer of the Anatolian lands to the Armenians proved to be a stumbling block. The talks were suspended.

Having secured financial and military aid, the Turkish delegation returned to Anatolia.¹³

Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan at the Moscow Conference

In the fall of 1920, Turkey launched military action against Armenia; in December 1920, the sides signed the Gumri (Alexandropol) Treaty. Russia was worried.

On the other hand, Moscow knew that Turkey could find new allies in the West: the land transfer issue had to be dropped. Polikarp Mdivani, who represented Russia, explained that the "land transfer issue was raised by mistake," because of misinterpreted collisions.¹⁴ In a note sent to Ankara, Georgi Chicherin refrained from using the term "Turkish Armenia;" he merely confirmed Moscow's intention to continue the talks and sign a treaty.¹⁵

On 22 December, 1920, the TBMM government informed Moscow by telegram that it approved the Soviet suggestions and supplied a list of Turkish delegates.¹⁶

The Turks suggested Baku as a venue; Chicherin, who said that the leaders of the R.S.F.S.R. could not leave for Baku, insisted on Moscow as the place for the talks and promised stable communication with Ankara via Armenia and Novorossiysk.¹⁷

The failed first stage of the Moscow talks caused a lot of worry in Ankara: Turkey badly needed a treaty with Russia and stable relations with it. To speed up the process, Ali Fuat Cebesoy was appointed Ambassador to Russia on 21 November, 1920.¹⁸

⁹ See: Yu.K. Tengirshok, op. cit., p. 167.

¹⁰ See: Ibid., pp. 167-168.

¹¹ TBMM, Protocols of Secret Meetings, Vol. I, Part II, Ankara, 1985, p. 166 (in Turkish).

¹² See: A.F. Cebesoy, *Moscow Reminiscences (21/11/1921-2/6/1922)*, Vatan Publishers, Istanbul, 1955, pp. 72-73 (in Turkish).

¹³ See: Yu.K. Tengirshok, op. cit., pp. 178-181.

¹⁴ I.E. Atnur, *Nakhchivan: From the Ottoman to Soviet Rule (1918-1921)*, TTK Publishers, Ankara, 2001, p. 438 (in Turkish).

¹⁵ See: *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR*, Vol. III, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1959, pp. 391-392.

¹⁶ See: Ibid., p. 436.

¹⁷ See: Ibid., pp. 391-392.

¹⁸ See: A.F. Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

On 14 December, the Turkish delegation left Ankara.¹⁹ It included Minister of Economics Yusuf Kemal, delegation head, Minister of Education Riza Nur, and military representative Saffet (Arykan)-bek.²⁰ On 7 January, 1921, they reached Kars; on 15 January (after some delay), they joined Cebesoy and his embassy (Cebesoy had arrived in Kars on 16 December). On 18 February, the Turkish delegation reached Moscow.

The same day, the Turks met Chicherin and Karakhan for unofficial talks; passions flew high. On 22 February, the Turks turned to Stalin for support²¹ and were encouraged: the prospects looked brighter than before.

The official talks began four days later, on 26 February. Soviet Russia was represented by Georgi Chicherin and Jelal Korkmasov (the Turks insisted that Armenian Karakhan be excluded).

When opening the conference, under the rotating chairmanship of Chicherin and Kemal, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs said that they had gathered together in order to sign a treaty of friendship, the main provisions of which had been agreed upon the previous year.²²

Another Turkish delegation headed by Bekir Sami-bek was talking to the British in London. According to the European press, British Premier Lloyd George promised Turkey the Transcaucasus, along with the oilfields of Baku, if Turkey moved against Soviet Russia.²³

In Moscow, Chicherin, who referred to the London talks as "anti-Soviet," wanted to know: "Does Sami-bek in London represent Ankara or Istanbul?"²⁴

The London talks produced no positive results; the British leaks to the press were intended to undermine the Moscow talks.

The Russian side insisted that Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia be represented: the Kremlin wanted to have a firm grip on the foreign policy of the Transcaucasian republics in order to set them against Turkey. The Turks declined the suggestion on the grounds that they were not empowered to talk to them.

On 26 February, 1921, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Azerbaijan in Moscow Behboud Shakhhtakhtinsky telegraphed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. M. Huseynov: "...The Turks do not want Azerbaijan and Armenia at the conference. They argue that they have no contradictions with Azerbaijan and that they will sign another treaty with it. They do not want the Armenians because they consider the Gumri Treaty valid and have no intention of denouncing it. Russia, on the other hand, is dead set against a treaty with us (Turkey.—V.G.) and wants an Azeri and then an Armenian representative at the conference. I am against Azerbaijan's involvement for the simple reason that I have nothing to say there. We should not quarrel with the Turks over trifles. I enjoy a certain amount of clout with them; there are all sorts of combinations to be realized in Anatolia. If I go against the Turks at the conference on issues unrelated to Azerbaijan, I might lose a lot. Russia is talking about friendship and brotherhood, not an alliance."²⁵

In fact, the most controversial issues which cropped up in Moscow were related to Azerbaijan (with the exception of the Batumi question): the Nakhchivan question and the Independence of Azerbaijan.

The Turks attached great importance to the former because at that time Nakhchivan was playing an important role in the contacts between Azerbaijan and Turkey and was an intermediary be-

¹⁹ See: Yu.K. Tengirshbek, op. cit., pp. 198-199.

²⁰ See: Ibid., p. 199.

²¹ See: S. Sonyel, *The War of Turkish Liberation and Foreign Policies*, Vol. II, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 1986, pp. 52-53 (in Turkish).

²² See: Ibid., p. 54.

²³ See: *Istoria vneshney politiki SSSR, 1917-1985*, in two volumes, Vol. 1, 1917-1945, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 144.

²⁴ *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR*, Vol. III, pp. 589-590.

²⁵ Archives of Political Documents at the Administration of the President of the Azerbaijan republic (APD UDP AR), rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheet 2.

tween Moscow and Ankara (Nakhchivan was involved in many other strategic and geopolitical issues). Turkey acquired Nakhchivan under the Treaty of Batum of 4 June, 1918 and regarded it as its property.

On 13 December, before the delegation set off for Moscow, its head Yusuf Kemal asked Mustafa Kemal: "What should I do if the Russians insist on retrieving Nakhchivan?" The answer was: "Nakhchivan is the gate to Turkey. Bear this in mind and don't spare efforts."²⁶

On 10, 12, and 14 March, 1921 in Moscow, the talks on the Nakhchivan question became fierce: the Turks wanted to remain in control, while the Russians were resolutely against this.

The Turks turned to Stalin once more; Behboud Shakhtakhtinsky was also present. When Stalin asked his opinion, the Azeri envoy answered: "Nakhchivan should remain an independent state under Russia's protectorate."²⁷

On 10 March, 1921, the Turkish delegates put their trump card on the table. They argued that since the population of the contested area had invited Turkish troops, this meant that it was under the protectorate of Turkey.²⁸ The Gumri Treaty spoke of the same.²⁹ The Russian side refused to accept this argument.

The Turks suggested that Nakhchivan remain an independent state under the joint protectorate of Turkey and Azerbaijan³⁰; Russia, likewise, refused to accept this.

There was another attempt to achieve a consensus: Turkey was prepared to transfer protectorate to Azerbaijan on the condition that it pledged not to transfer it to third states.³¹

The Russian side agreed to discuss Nakhchivan autonomy under the protectorate of Azerbaijan and its borders with certain reservations:

- First, they refused to regard Turkey's suggestion as a concession because the Treaty of Alexandropol had been never adopted, which meant that the invitation the population had extended to the Turkish armed forces had no legal power and could not, therefore, be regarded as a foundation for protectorate.
- Second, since Azerbaijan was unofficially involved in the talks, it could not assume responsibilities of any sort.
- Finally, the Russian formula, "consistent contacts between the Nakhchivan Region and Azerbaijan and autonomy under the protectorate of Azerbaijan," was supplemented with the Turkish reservation, "Azerbaijan should not transfer protectorate to any third state;" delimitation of borders of the Nakhchivan Magal was entrusted to military experts.³²

On 12 March, the talks on the border between the Nakhchivan area and Armenia developed into fierce debates. The Russians insisted that since at no time had Azerbaijan been a patron of any part of the Erivan Uezd, the border, as drawn by experts, went beyond all reasonable limits.

It was said that the Soviet republics were closely interconnected and that, therefore, the border issue was of secondary importance; the borders of the Sharur-Daralagyaz District should be based on the ethnic principle.

The Turkish position was the opposite; the Turks argued that:

- (a) the bloodshed which made introduction of Turkish troops inevitable started in Nakhchivan;

²⁶ M. Kemal, "Nakhchivan, the Gates of Turkey," *Collection on the History of the Turkish Peace*, No. 64, April 1992, pp. 5-6 (in Turkish).

²⁷ Yu.K. Tengirshok, op. cit., p. 222; K. Karabekir, op. cit., p. 1062.

²⁸ See: APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheets 41-46.

²⁹ See: State Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic (GAAR), rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 55, sheet 86.

³⁰ See: Yu.K. Tengirshok, op. cit., p. 222.

³¹ See: APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheets 41-46.

³² See: I. Musaev, *Politicheskoe polozhenie v azerbaidzhanskikh regionakh Nakhchivan i Zangezur i politika zarubezhnykh gosudarstv (1917-1921)*, Baku University Press, Baku, 1996, pp. 302-303.

(b) the majority of the area's local population was Muslim, therefore Azerbaijan should become the patron of the contested territory.³³

In disregard of the Turks' firm stand, the Russians were determined to transfer control over Nakhchivan to Armenia some time in the future.

They believed that the border between Nakhchivan and Armenia would be drawn on the strength of direct talks between the two states and any territorial concessions made before that would not be regarded as violations of Azeri protectorate.

The Turkish diplomats, who proceeded from Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and security of the eastern borders of their own state, insisted on an immediate decision; they excluded the possibility of future talks with Armenia.

The talks went on for a long time, until finally it was decided, on Turkey's suggestion, to transfer the Sharur-Daralagyaz District to Nakhchivan and draw the border along the Kemurlu Dagh (6930)³⁴ and Saray-Bulak (8071) mountains in the contested part of the Erivan Uezd (the new border began at Ararat Station); these questions were referred to the mixed conciliatory commission consisting of representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey.³⁵

On 14 March, 1921, the conference finally agreed on the status of Nakhchivan.³⁶

This meant that the Turkish diplomats managed to save part of Nakhchivan for Azerbaijan (with the provision that it would not be transferred to third states).

On 18 March, 1921, Russia and Turkey signed the Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood; the Turkish side wanted the date changed to 16 March (the anniversary of the occupation of Istanbul).

The Russians agreed, since the Turk's proposal went along with Russia's desire to normalize relations with Britain (this was the day the two countries had signed a trade agreement).

The date of the Treaty of Moscow was changed from 18 to 16 March on the sides' mutual consent.³⁷

The document was signed by Chicherin and Korkmasov on the Russian side and by Yusuf Kemal, Nur, and Cebesoy on the Turkish.³⁸

Art III of the Treaty of Moscow (which consisted of 16 articles and 3 Annexes), which was related to the Nakhchivan issue, said: "The contracting sides agree that the Nakhchivan Region within the borders specified by Annex I (B) to the present treaty becomes an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan, providing that it not be transferred to any third state.

"A commission composed of delegates of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia will readjust the border of the Nakhchivan territory as being wedged between the Arax talveg in the east and the line of Mt. Dagna (3829), Veli Dagh (4121), Mt. Bgarsik (6587), and Mt. Kemurlu Dagh (6930) in the west, starting at Mt. Kemurlu Dagh (6930) and crossing the Saray-Bulak mountain (8071) to Ararat Station. It will end at the convergence of the Kara-Su and the Arax."³⁹

Appendix I (B) to the Treaty described the Nakhchivan borders in the following way: "The Ararat Station, Mt. Saray-Bulak (8071), Mt. Kemurlu Dagh (6839 or 6930); from there to the elevations of 3080, Sayat Dagh (7868), the village of Kurt Kulag (Kyurt Kulak), Mt. Gamessur Dagh

³³ See: APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheets 48-54.

³⁴ The numbers under which the points appeared on the map.

³⁵ See: APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheets 41-46.

³⁶ See: APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheet 59.

³⁷ See: Yu.K. Tengirshbek, op. cit., p. 230.

³⁸ See: GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 66, sheets 19-22; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 67, sheets 1-4; APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheets 93-95; *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR*, Vol. III, pp. 597-604; Yu.K. Tengirshbek, op. cit., pp. 293-299.

³⁹ GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 58, sheets 143, 146; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 66, p. 19a; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 67, p. 1a; APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheets 93-94; Archives of the Ottoman Government (BOA), HR. SYS, D. 2309, G. 1.

(8160), the elevation of 8022, Kuki Dagh (10282), and the eastern administrative border of the former district of Nakhchivan.”⁴⁰

Turkey and Russia guaranteed that the Government of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. would not transfer Nakhchivan to Armenia.

Upon his return to Ankara, Yusuf Kemal said to Mustafa Kemal: “Esteemed Pasha! We did our best on the Nakhchivan issue;” to which Mustafa Kemal answered: “Yusuf Kemal-bek! Our gates protect us, this is most important.”⁴¹

On 16 April, 1921, the Turkish troops left Nakhchivan; on 20 July, the R.S.F.S.R. Central Executive Committee (CEC) ratified the Treaty of Moscow; the next day the Grand National Assembly of Turkey did the same. On 22 September, the sides exchanged ratification instruments in Kars.⁴²

Attempt to Sign a Turkish-Azeri Treaty

In Moscow, the sides discussed the attempt of the TMBB government to sign a treaty with Azerbaijan. True to the principles of “socialist centralism,” Russia did not want Turkey to sign treaties with the Transcaucasian republics; the Turks hoped at least to preserve the independence of Sovietized Azerbaijan.

The Turkish diplomats forced the Russian side to accept the possibility of a treaty between Azerbaijan (as a sovereign republic) and Turkey. Later, however, Russia made this absolutely impossible.

The Turkish side, which wanted a separate treaty with Azerbaijan, objected to its involvement in the Moscow talks; the Turks intended to show Russia that they treated Azerbaijan as a sovereign state.

The Turkish draft contained the following points:

1. Pooling the efforts of the two states to liberate the East and fight imperialism;
2. In the event of a treaty between Turkey and Entente, the former pledged to dispatch armed units to Azerbaijan, which pledged to finance the emissaries.
3. Azerbaijan pledged to support the national-liberation struggle in the East, but a Soviet government could be set up in Azerbaijan if the nation wanted it.
4. Azerbaijan could not enter treaties with Entente without Turkey’s approval.
5. Turkey pledged to help Azerbaijan in the event of an Entente attack.
6. Azerbaijan pledged to supply Turkey with oil and oil products while it was involved in revolutionary activities in the East.

On 1 April, 1921, the Turkish delegation left Moscow for Baku, taking 4 million gold rubles supplied by the Soviet government with it. When it reached Baku on 8 April, it tried to persuade the government of Azerbaijan S.S.R. to sign a separate treaty. The Azeri leaders, who were no more than Moscow puppets, refused to sign the treaty.⁴³ On 9 April, 1921, Georgi Chicherin warned the

⁴⁰ GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 66, p. 22; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 67, p. 4.

⁴¹ M. Kemal, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴² See: *Dokumenty vneshey politiki SSSR*, Vol. III, p. 604; K. Karabekir, op. cit., p. 1110.

⁴³ See: TBMM, Protocols of Secret Meetings, p. 231.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Huseynov not to engage in any talks with the Turkish delegation; the same telegram invited the Azeri representatives to come to Tiflis to present a united front, together with Armenia, to the Turks at a general conference to be held in the city.⁴⁴

Chicherin sent the draft of a treaty to Tiflis that the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics were to sign with Turkey; he deemed it necessary to warn that the Turks would try to engage Baku, Erivan, and Tiflis in separate talks and instructed the three republics to be prepared to act together in Tiflis.⁴⁵

No separate treaty was signed: the allegedly independent Soviet government of Azerbaijan went along with Moscow on the issue of a "single treaty between the Transcaucasian republics and Turkey."

On 19 April, 1921, the Turkish delegation met Mirza Huseynov and Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate Behboud Shakhtakhtinsky for the last time; it was agreed to hold a joint conference of the Transcaucasian republics and Turkey in Kars.⁴⁶

On 19 April, 1921, the day the Turkish delegation left Baku, Mirza Huseynov informed Chicherin of the following: "Shakhtakhtinsky and I spoke to the Turks and insisted on a joint conference of the Transcaucasian republics and Turkey. Although displeased, the Turks agreed, on the condition that each of the republics sign the treaty individually. We announced that we accepted this. The Turks wanted Kars as the venue; if the other republics (Armenia and Georgia) agree, Azerbaijan will not object."⁴⁷

The Kars Conference

Azerbaijan wanted Baku or Tiflis as the venue of the conference; the Turks wanted Kars.⁴⁸

Azerbaijan and Turkey agreed on Kars⁴⁹: on 3 July, 1921, however, Yusuf Kemal informed Mirza Huseynov by telegram that his new duties as Foreign Minister of the TBMM government did not allow him to go to Kars. He suggested Ankara⁵⁰; the Soviet side declined this.⁵¹

It should be said that Envoy Plenipotentiary of the R.S.F.S.R. in the Transcaucasus Boris Legran was worried about even the small amount of independence Azerbaijan had displayed. In his telegram of 22 June, 1921 addressed to M. Huseynov and N. Narimanov, he wrote: "You should not act on your own. You should discuss everything with the republics. I insist that in the future you should not act without informing the envoy plenipotentiary of the R.S.F.S.R."⁵²

After exchanging diplomatic correspondence, Ankara, Baku, Moscow, Tiflis, and Erivan⁵³ fixed the place (Kars) and date of the future conference: 26 September, 1921.

⁴⁴ See: APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 15, p. 139.

⁴⁵ See: Ibidem.

⁴⁶ See: Ibid., sheet 227.

⁴⁷ APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheet 199.

⁴⁸ See: APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheet 199; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 2, f. 27, sheet 163.

⁴⁹ See: TBMM, Protocols of Secret Meetings, p. 229.

⁵⁰ See: GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 49, sheet 8; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 66, sheet 28.

⁵¹ See: *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR*, Vol. IV, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1960, pp. 227-228.

⁵² APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheet 47.

⁵³ See: GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 49, sheets 7-8; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 66, sheet 29; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 133, sheets 13, 19-22, 30, 32; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 27, sheet 163; APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheet 199.

On 22 September, 1921, in Kars, the Turkish and Russian delegations exchanged the ratification instruments of the Treaty of Moscow of 16 March, 1921.⁵⁴

The conference was opened on 26 September, 1921 at 19.00. Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate Behboud Shakhtakhtinsky represented Azerbaijan; Georgia was represented by Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs Shalva Eliava and Commissar for Foreign Affairs and Finances Alexander Svanidze; Armenia, by Commissar for Foreign Affairs Askanas Mravyan and Commissar for Internal Affairs Poghos Makinisyen. Yakov Ganetsky, Envoy Plenipotentiary of the R.S.F.S.R. to Latvia, acted as an intermediary.⁵⁵

According to Kâzim Karabekir Pasha, the Bolshevik delegation numbered 150 members (officials and auxiliary staff).⁵⁶

The Turkish delegation was headed by Kâzim Karabekir Pasha, TBMM member and Commander of the Eastern Front; it also included TBMM Burdur deputy Veli-bek, M. Shevket-bek, who represented Turkey in Azerbaijan, and Mukhtar-bek, chief engineer of the railway construction project in Eastern Anatolia.⁵⁷

On 17 September, 1921, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the TBMM government Yusuf Kemal sent the Turkish representatives his "briefing" with respect to entering the treaties with each of the Transcaucasian republics.

The draft treaty with Azerbaijan envisaged the following:

- (1) The treaty should be written in clear terms in Turkish⁵⁸; its Preamble should contain statements that confirm the brotherhood between both nations.
- (2) Their relations with other states should proceed from both Azerbaijan and Turkey rejecting all treaties and international acts imposed on them by force.
- (3) The Azeri side should pledge not to transfer its patronage over Nakhchivan to any other state.
- (4) The treaty should contain an article relating to the Turkish emigrants in Azerbaijan and the Azeri emigrants in Turkey (the Turkish government should acquire the right to grant Turkish citizenship to any Azeri emigrants who ask for it).
- (5) Turkey should receive a share of the profits from the Baku oilfields.
- (6) Education in Azerbaijan should be free (to preserve national schools to prevent Russification).
- (7) The article related to Batum (in the treaty with Georgia) should not appear in the treaty with Azerbaijan, or the article related to Nakhchivan in the treaty with Georgia, etc.⁵⁹

It should be said that in Kars the delegations of the Transcaucasian republics and Soviet Russia acted as representatives of a single state.

On the whole, the atmosphere was tense; the sides could not arrive at a common decision about the treaty (a single treaty or separate treaties with each republic). The Turks insisted on separate treaties, while Russia and the "independent states" could not accept this.

The talks reached boiling point when Karabekir Pasha refuted everything Ganetsky had to say with weighty arguments and continued insisting on separate treaties.⁶⁰

⁵⁴ See: *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR*, Vol. III, p. 604; K. Karabekir, op. cit.

⁵⁵ See: GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 81, sheets 136-141; APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 10, f. 16, sheet 84.

⁵⁶ See: K. Karabekir, op. cit. p. 1112.

⁵⁷ See: GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 81, sheets 136-141; K. Karabekir, op. cit., p. 1111.

⁵⁸ It was recommended to use French, the diplomatic language of the time, in the treaties with the other Transcaucasian republics, to avoid misunderstandings.

⁵⁹ See: K. Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 1112-1116.

⁶⁰ See: GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 81, sheet 5; K. Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 1125-1126.

On 30 September, at the fourth sitting, Kâzim Karabekir Pasha suggested that the treaty consist of two parts: one of them should deal with the relations with all the Transcaucasian republics, while the other should envisage the trade and border issues with each of the republics separately. This, too, was rejected.⁶¹

Behboud Shakhtakhtinsky ended the debates by saying that the Transcaucasian republics had been de facto united economically, politically, and militarily and that a single treaty suited their interests and those of Turkey from the point of view of political expediency.

He concluded his contribution with: "In the name of the Azerbaijan Republic, I suggest that the treaty be united with no separate sections dealing with the republics."⁶² This settled the issue: the Turks agreed on a single treaty.⁶³

In Kars, the Turkish and Soviet sides voiced their suggestions.

The Turks regarded most of what the Soviet side wanted (permission for Georgia to carry out archeological digs in Eastern Anatolia; transfer of the salt industry in Kulp and the ruins of Ani to Armenia; permission for Armenia to use of the railway via Gumri; aid to the starving population of Erivan, etc.) to be interference in their domestic affairs and rejected it. Some of the proposals (supplies of railway equipment and foodstuffs to Armenia) were accepted.⁶⁴

The Turks, in turn, tried to settle certain problems: they wanted Turkish citizens to be returned their requisitioned commodities and receive immunity for their personal belongings; Turkey also wanted a share of the profits from the Baku oil fields and the right to use the Batum port.

It should be said that the treaty afforded Turkey access to the port of Batum, but nothing was said about a share in oil profits. Shakhtakhtinsky declared that Turkey would receive aid, but Azerbaijan was not ready to shoulder any official responsibilities.⁶⁵

The Kars conference paid special attention to the Nakhchivan issue; the Turkish delegation supplied its draft based on the Treaty of Moscow.

The memorandum the Transcaucasian republics submitted to the Turkish government suggested that "an autonomous Nakhchivan Soviet Republic within the Azerbaijan Republic with slightly changed borders in favor of Armenia" be discussed along with other issues.

Even before the conference, the Azeri and Armenian diplomats met in Tiflis where they reached an agreement on the issue. In Kars, they merely tried to clothe their agreement in legal garbs.

The Turkish delegates were informed that the Nakhchivan issue could be resolved without Ankara, while a mixed commission (with Turkish representatives) would be unwelcome in the Transcaucasus.

On 13 October, 1921, the long discussions and debates between Turkey, on the one side, and Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia (with Russia in the background), on the other, was crowned with the Treaty of Kars, which consisted of 20 articles and three Annexes. The text, with few exceptions, was identical to the Treaty of Moscow of 16 March, 1921.⁶⁶

Art V of the Treaty of Kars said: "The Turkish Government and the Soviet Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan are agreed that the region of Nakhchivan, within the limits specified by Annex III to the present Treaty, constitutes an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan."⁶⁷

⁶¹ See: GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 81, sheet 21.

⁶² GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 81, sheet 30.

⁶³ See: Ibidem.

⁶⁴ See: K. Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 1119-1120, 1121-1122.

⁶⁵ See: K. Karabekir, op. cit., p. 1120.

⁶⁶ See: GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 5, sheets 136-141; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 69, sheets 9-19; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 123, sheets 122-125; APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheets 110-115; *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR*, Vol. IV, pp. 420-429; K. Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 1128-1132.

⁶⁷ GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 5, sheets 136-141; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 69, sheets 9-19; GAAR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 1, f. 123, sheets 122-125; APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 609, inv. 1, f. 94, sheets 110-115; *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR*, Vol. IV, pp. 420-429; K. Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 1128-1132.

Art V did not comprise the provision of the Treaty of Moscow which said that Azerbaijan should never transfer the right of protectorate to third states.

Annex III "Territory of Nakhchivan" said: "The village of Ourmia, from there by straight line to Azerdaian Station (leaving it to the SSRA), then by straight line to Mt. Dash-Burun west (3142), the watershed of Mt. Dash-Burun east (4108), crosses the river Kyahaanam-Darassi to the south of the inscription 'Rodne' (Boulakh) (South), follows the watershed of Mt. Bgarsik (6607) or (6587), and from there passes along the administrative border of the former districts of Erivan and Sharur, Daralagyaz, through the elevation of 6629 to Mt. Kemurlu Dagh (6839 or 6930); from there to the elevations of 3080, Sayat Dagh (7868), the village of Kurt Kulag (Kyurt Kulak), Mt. Gamessur Dagh (8160), the elevation of 8022, Kuki Dagh (10282), and the eastern administrative border of the former district of Nakhchivan."

Russia's political ambitions made ratification a long process: the Transcaucasian republics (instigated by Russia) insisted that the treaty signed by Turkey, on the one side, and the Azerbaijan S.S.R., Armenian S.S.R., and Georgian S.S.R., on the other, be ratified in the name of a union of Transcaucasian states (which did not exist at that time).

Turkey stood its ground, which led to Soviet Russia suffering defeat: on 17 March, 1922, the TMBB ratified the Treaty of Kars.

On 3 March, 1922, the CEC of Azerbaijan ratified the Treaty, to be followed by Armenia (20 March) and Georgia (14 June). The ratification instruments were exchanged on 11 September, 1922 in Erivan; the Treaty came into force on the same day.

I n L i e u o f a C o n c l u s i o n

Under the Treaty of Kars, which had no expiry date, Armenia recognized Nakhchivan as part of the territory of Azerbaijan.

The Third Congress of the Party Organizations of the Nakhchivan Area held on 23 February, 1923 described Nakhchivan joining the Azerbaijan S.S.R. as an important prerequisite for the region's economic, political, and cultural progress.

Four days later, the Third All-Nakhchivan Congress of the Soviets, which opened on 27 February, 1923, discussed the question of the Nakhchivan S.S.R. joining Azerbaijan as an autonomous republic. The Congress adopted a Declaration which recognized the necessity of Nakhchivan joining Azerbaijan as its inalienable part.

On 8 January, 1924, the Transcaucasian CEC, after discussing the earlier decision of the CEC of Azerbaijan, ruled that the Nakhchivan area "should be declared the autonomous Nakhchivan S.S.R. within the Azerbaijan S.S.R."

On 9 February, 1924, the CEC of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. issued a decree which transformed the autonomous area of Nakhchivan into the Nakhchivan A.S.S.R. with its own legislative and executive structures; the autonomy was administrative, not political.

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THE CAUCASUS IN THE 15TH CENTURY (600th Anniversary of the Azeri Kara Koyunlu State)

A b s t r a c t

The author traces the process that was crowned by the formation of the Kara Koyunlu state (1410-1468) in Southern Azerbaijan 600 years ago. He looks at various aspects of the foreign policy

pursued by Padishah Kara Yusuf and his two sons (Kara Iskender and Jahan Shah) and their relations with the Timurids, Jelairids, Shirvanshahs, and Ak Koyunlu.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The 15th century marked a turning point in the long history of Azerbaijan; it shook off the foreign yoke of the Timurids, while the state of the Shirvanshahs (known as a long-living state which spanned 1,000 years between the 6th and 16th century) continued flourishing.

Kara Koyunlu and Ak Koyunlu, two tribal confederations which replaced one another and played an important role in the history of the Muslim East (of which Azerbaijan was a part), appeared in the 15th century. At the same time, the Safavids, the sheikhs of Ardabil, fortified their position to play a key role in setting up the vast Azeri Safavid Empire (1501-1736).

In the latter half of the same century, Azerbaijan and the Russian state invigorated their contacts and trade along the Volga and across the Caspian. At that time, Kazan became a place of annual trade fairs which attracted Russian and Eastern merchants. Shamakhy, Baku, Ganja, Tabriz, Ardabil, and Maraga traded with the Russian state on a large scale.

In 1465, Shirvanshah Farrukh Yassar (1462-1500) sent his ambassador, Hasan bek, to the Grand Prince of Muscovy Ivan III (1462-1505) with lavish gifts and suggestions about how to better organize trade between the two states.¹ In 1466, after successfully completing his talks,² he returned to Shirvan along with caravans of Moscow and Tver merchants, among whom was Afanasi Nikitin, a merchant from Tver who later gained prominence as a traveler. He reached Derbend, Shamakhy, Baku, Tabriz, and other cities and described his impressions about Shirvan, Iran, and India in his famous *Khozhdenie za tri moria* (Travels beyond Three Seas).

¹ See: *Zapiski Vostochnogo otdelenia Imperatorskogo russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva*, Vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1898, pp. 30-32.

² See: V.V. Bartold, *Mesto prikaspiyskikh oblastey v istorii musulmanskogo mira*, Baku, 1926, p. 100.

The same year, Russia reciprocated with an embassy headed by Vassiliy Panin. The two states did not stop at an exchange of embassies; in 1475, an ambassador of Ivan III, whom Contarini called Marco Rosso, talked to Uzun Khan in Tabriz; in 1499, Shahabaddin, the Shirvanshah's ambassador, went to Moscow where he negotiated a treaty of "friendship and consent."

Liberated from the Mongolian and Timurid yoke, the country entered a period of unprecedented development of the Azeri culture and sciences: the ever-increasing number of poets started writing in their native language; in the 15th century they gained wide popularity in the Middle East.

Imadeddin Nasimi (1369-1417), a great poet born in Shamakhy, enriched Azeri literature with new artistic forms and images. He was one of the first to use the living Azeri language to write ghazals; one of the first humanists, he was accused of free thinking and tortured to death as a heretic in 1417.

Shah Kasim Enver (1356-1434), who used the pseudonym Kasimi, was another outstanding poet. Padishah Jahan Shah of Kara Koyunlu is known for his diwan of poetry in Azeri; his nom de plume was Haqiqi. *Hatai Tabrizi's* "Yusuf and Zulaikha" and *Hagiri's* "Layla and Majnun" were very popular throughout the region.

The 15th century gave the world two more great men: *Shah Ismail I* (1501-1524,) founder of the Azerbaijan Safavid state, who was born on 17 July, 1487, and Muhammad Fuzûlî (1494-1556), one of the luminaries of world poetry.

In the 15th century, Azeri scientists wrote numerous works on mathematics, astronomy, and geography that were avidly read by their colleagues in other countries. *Seyyid Yahya Bakuvi* (1410-1462) wrote several philosophical treatises under the title of *Sharki-gulshani-raz* (Commentaries on the Galaxy of Mysteries), as well as numerous works on history and astronomy. *Abdurrashid ibn-Saleh Bakuvi*, another prominent savant of the 15th century, left a rich legacy of scholarly works on geography, history, and other sciences.

Music reached its peak in the 15th century: songs of Azeri musicians became part of the world's musical legacy. *Abd al-Qadir Maraghi* (1353-1435) had many mugams, songs, and dance music to his name which were widely popular throughout the Middle East. He was a gifted theoretician who laid the foundations of Azeri folk music.

In the 15th century, Azeri architecture reached unprecedented heights, a breathtaking example of which—the Shirvanshahs' Palace—can be seen in Baku. The tomb of Sheik Safi-ad-din in Ardabil is another outstanding monument of 15th-century Azeri architecture. In 1465, the famous Blue Mosque (Goy Masjid), the walls and the dome of which were inlaid with sky-blue marble and tiles, was built in Tabriz, the capital of Kara Koyunlu. The magnificent palace complex of Hasht Behesht (Eight Paradises) in Tabriz, complete with a palace, libraries, a mosque, a hospital for 1,000 patients, a hippodrome, and a park, dates to the Ak Koyunlu period. Tabriz boasts of the well-known Mosque of Hasan Padishah, the Geyseriyye covered market, and the Nasriyye and Maksudiyye madrasahs. Azeri architects added numerous magnificent buildings to the architectural treasures of Iran, Asia Minor, and Central Asia.

The Kara Koyunlu Azeri State Begins

In the 12th-13th centuries, nomadic tribes, which later united into the Kara Koyunlu tribal confederation,³ moved from Central Asia westwards, to Iran, Azerbaijan, and Asia Minor. They were

³ The tribal standard had a black ram (Kara Koyun) on it.

Oghuz Turks, including the tribes of *Baharlu*, *Saadlu*, *Karamanlu*, *Alpaut*, *Jagirlu*, *Duharlu*, *Hajilu*, and *Agacheri*; the tribes of Baharlu and Saadlu were the leaders.

In the 14th century, the tribes of the confederation roamed Western Anatolia; in the 1370s, they settled in Arzinjan and Sivas (Northern Kurdistan). As soon as the Kara Koyunlu confederation gained strength, it began threatening their neighbors.

In the last quarter of the 14th century, the confederation had to fight on two fronts—against Ak Koyunlu⁴ and the founder of the strongest empire in Central Asia Emir Timur (1370-1405). Kara Koyunlu joined forces with the state of the *Jelairids* (1341-1431)⁵ in the south of Azerbaijan; they were too weak to stand up to Timur and his army. In 1392, the Kara Koyunlu tribal confederation was routed, while its leader, Kara Yusuf,⁶ had to flee the country.

Egyptian Captivity

In the summer of 1394, Kara Yusuf of Kara Koyunlu and Sultan Ahmed Jelairid (who ruled at intervals between 1382 and 1410), in an effort to take revenge, suffered a crushing defeat outside Baghdad at the hands of Timur's generals and sought refuge in Egypt with Mamluk Sultan Barquq (1382-1399).

The sultan, who feared Emir Timur and his expansionist policies, refused to deport the refugees; when he died, his son Faraj (1399-1412), reluctant to quarrel with the formidable conqueror, locked Kara Yusuf and Sultan Ahmed in a fortress. In Egyptian captivity, the two prisoners agreed to divide the spheres of influence, if and when they regained their freedom. Under this agreement, Sultan Ahmed acquired Baghdad, while Kara Yusuf of Kara Koyunlu received Southern Azerbaijan along with Tabriz.

In 1405, as soon as the news about Timur's death reached Egypt, the sultan freed his prisoners, who started gathering troops to realize their plans. While Sultan Ahmed was unable to rally any large number of soldiers under his banners, Kara Yusuf gathered together a fairly large army of volunteers of the Kara Koyunlu tribes, as well as units of the Kurdish emirs of Kurdistan, Asia Minor, and Southern Azerbaijan attracted to him because of his alliance with the ruler of Hilat, Mush, and Hunus Meliq Shams ad-Din, whom he won over to his side by giving him his daughter's hand in marriage. This argument proved strong enough for the Kurdish nomadic lords.

In June 1406, after capturing Baghdad, Kara Yusuf and Sultan Ahmed moved to Tabriz, where Shirvanshah Ibrahim I (1382-1417) had ruled since May 1406.

The National-Liberation Movement in Azerbaijan

The countries and regions of Timur's empire, although consolidated by the iron willpower of the great leader, had little in common economically, which explains why they immediately broke

⁴ The tribal standard of Ak Koyunlu featured a white ram (Ak Koyun).

⁵ In September 1359, Sheik Uveis Jelairid (1356-1374) attacked Azerbaijan and captured Tabriz. Azerbaijan became part of the state of Jelairids, with the capital in Tabriz.

⁶ Kara (black) is a symbol of beauty in Oriental poetry. Other potentates of the same epoch were also called kara (Kara Mahmud, Kara Yusuf, Kara Iskender, Kara Yülük Osman, and others).

away from each other after Timur's death early in 1405. Squabbles among the Timurids, the sons and grandsons of Timur, developed into bloody wars, which weakened their grip on Azerbaijan. The time had come to shake off the foreign yoke and unite the country into one state. Inspired by the idea of liberation, people all over Azerbaijan rose bearing arms against the Timurids in Tabriz, Maraga, Karabakh, and elsewhere.

Realizing that the time was ripe, Shirvanshah Ibrahim I took up arms to unify the country under his power. He used the riots to capture Ganja and a large part of Karabakh; many of the influential Azeri feudal lords (such as the ruler of Sheki, Seyyid Ahmed, Emir Yar Ahmed of the Karamandy tribe in Karabakh, and ruler of Ardabil Emir Bistam Jagir of the Jagirlu tribe) joined him. Georgia rebelled at the same time, while King Georgy VII (1393-1407),⁷ according to historian Mirkhond, "sent his ambassadors to express his obedience and subordination to Ibrahim."⁸ Later, in the summer of the same year, in a battle on the River Kura, they routed Omar Mirza, Timur's grandson.

In the spring of 1406, Tabriz, the largest trade and handicraft center of the time, rose against Abu Bakr, one of the Timurids; the insurgents turned to Shirvanshah Ibrahim I, who, in May, crossed the Arax and entered Tabriz.

The new ruler extended his power to a larger part of Azerbaijan; it looked as if his plan to unify the territory into a single Azeri state could be realized. Joining Tabriz to this state could have been another step in the same direction, but the Shirvanshah was unable to secure a firm footing in this important town: in June 1406, he received news that Sultan Ahmed Jelairid was returning to Southern Azerbaijan. At an obvious disadvantage, Ibrahim I decided to retreat from Tabriz, which was immediately occupied by the much stronger forces of Sultan Ahmed.

Soon, however, his extortionate taxes and cruelty forced the people to open the gates to Sultan Ahmed's enemy, Abu Bakr and his troops, which approached the city just in time.⁹

The Kara Koyunlu State Appears

This began a long period of struggle over Azerbaijan between the Timurids and Kara Yusuf. In October 1406, he routed Abu Bakr and forced him to flee, but the struggle was not over. On 21 April, 1408, in the village of Sardrud not far from Tabriz, the enemies met for another and, as it turned out, very important battle. Kara Yusuf reigned victorious despite the 20 thousand-strong army Sultan Shah Rukh dispatched to his brother Miran Shah. The Timurids were utterly defeated, Miran Shah was killed. This was the end of the Timurids' dominance in Azerbaijan.

Kara Yusuf's impressive victory shifted all real power to Kara Koyunlu; the new ruler placed his military garrisons in almost all the cities of Southern Azerbaijan. This victory allowed Sultan Ahmed Jelairid to return to Tabriz. The alliance, however, did not survive the much stronger position of one of the partners. The squabble between Sultan Ahmed and Kara Yusuf ended in a bloody battle. Sultan Ahmed, who knew in 1410 that his former ally Kara Yusuf was distracted by his struggle against Kara Yülük Osman (1394-1434), head of the Ak Koyunlu tribal confederation, attacked Kara Yusuf in Tabriz and captured the city. Not quite sure of his success, Sultan Ahmed Jelairid turned to Shirvanshah Ibrahim I for support, who agreed to help him as the

⁷ Son of Bagrat V (1360-1393).

⁸ I.P. Petrushevskiy, "Gosudarstva Azerbaidzhana v XV v.," in: *Sbornik statey po istorii Azerbaidzhana*, Issue I, Baku, 1949, p. 154.

⁹ See: *Ibid.*, p. 157.

less dangerous of the two adversaries. He dispatched a small unit under Prince Kayumars, which arrived too late.

After learning about the Tabriz developments, Kara Yusuf hastened to Southern Azerbaijan and reached Tabriz earlier than Prince Kayumars. On 30 August, 1410, the former allies met on the battle field at Shanbi Hazan not far from Tabriz. Completely routed, Sultan Ahmed fled only to be later caught and brought to Kara Yusuf's camp where he had to abdicate in favor of the Kara Koyunlu dynasty. This sealed his fate: on 31 August, 1410, Sultan Ahmed was strangled and his dead body was tied to a cross.¹⁰ This spelled the end of the Jelairid dynasty in Azerbaijan; in 1412, Kara Yusuf captured Baghdad.

This was how the new state of **Kara Koyunlu (1410-1468)** headed by the **Barani** dynasty of the **Baharlu** tribe was founded. It included part of the Azeri land to the south of the Kura, Armenia, Kurdistan, part of Georgia, Iraq, and Western Iran. Tabriz, an ancient Azeri city, became the capital of the new state. Kara Yusuf personally ruled Southern Azerbaijan, while his sons received bit and pieces in other parts of the fairly large state.

Padishah Kara Yusuf

Kara Yusuf (1410-1420) was an outstanding person. Historian Illarion Petrushevskiy wrote about him: "He was a born leader of nomads who knew all their customs and habits; he knew how to force them to obey him. None of the nomadic leaders had equally well-armed or well-fed troops; none knew better how to look after horses. His soldiers were well-known as excellent riders and excellent archers. He was firm and persistent, and he knew how to bridle his passions."¹¹ Though illiterate, Kara Yusuf was an active and ambitious person and an excellent military commander.

The State of Kara Koyunlu and Shirvan

The Shirvan units under Prince Kayumars reached Tabriz when Sultan Ahmed and his troops had already been defeated. Unaware of the recent developments, the prince settled down for the night only to be suddenly attacked by Kara Yusuf; the Shirvan units were surrounded and routed; the prince was taken prisoner.

Shirvanshah Ibrahim I offered a lot of money to get his son back, but Kara Yusuf let the prince go without a ransom: instead the prince carried a letter with him in which Kara Yusuf demanded that Shirvanshah recognize him as the supreme ruler.

Ibrahim's suspicions, which had been aroused by the easy terms on which the prince was released and the effortlessness with which he had been captured, sealed the prince's fate: suspected of high treason, he was executed.

Kara Yusuf, meanwhile, tried to consolidate his power throughout the entire territory of Azerbaijan; he sent an ambassador to Shirvan with the same demand: the Shirvanshah should accept him as

¹⁰ See: I.P. Petrushevskiy, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

¹¹ *Ibidem.*

his ruler. Ibrahim I, naturally, stuck to his independence, for which he had paid dearly. He had no choice but to start readying for a final battle with his very dangerous opponent. He had Seyyid Ahmed of Sheki and King of Kakhetia Konstantin I (1407-1412)¹² on his side. The formidable alliance forced Kara Yusuf to wage war late in 1412.

The battle took place in the month of shaban, 815 AH, that is, between 6 November and 4 December, 1412,¹³ on the shores of the Kura. Kara Yusuf's army outnumbered that of the Shirvanshah and his allies; they were all surrounded and taken prisoner. Kara Yusuf captured the Shirvanshah, his seven sons, the retinue, the Georgian king, and his many princes and aznaurs.¹⁴

They were all brought in front of the mejlis (assembly) of military nobles of Kara Yusuf; the Georgian king and his 300 aznaurs were executed without much ado; rank-and-file Shirvan soldiers were set free without ransom, while the Shirvan nobles, the Shirvanshah among them, were clamped in irons and sent to prison. After routing and plundering the Shirvan cities and villages, Kara Yusuf stole about one million head of cattle.¹⁵

In Tabriz, after talking to the Shirvanshah, Kara Yusuf agreed to set the prisoners free for a huge ransom of 1,200 gold Iraq tumans.¹⁶ This was not all; the victor demanded that Shirvanshah Ibrahim I part with all the treasures that had been accumulated since the time of Yazdegerd, son of Shahriar, in the treasure troves of his ancestors.¹⁷ On top of this, the Shirvanshah became the vassal of Kara Yusuf.

Ibrahim I had no choice but to accept the conditions in exchange for his freedom. According to historian Mirkhond, all the gold and silver vessels, as well as the precious stones that the family had inherited from the Sassanian King Yazdegerd II (438-457), were delivered to Kara Yusuf. This, however, was not enough to pay the ransom.

Things took a different turn: the heads of the merchant and handicraft communities in Tabriz came to the diwan of Kara Yusuf to ask him to accept the ransom in goods. At that time, even wealthy merchants did not always have ready money at hand, while wholesale trade was based on barter. Kara Koyunlu accepted goods totaling 1,200 tumans; later Shirvanshah Ibrahim I repaid the debt.¹⁸

Kara Yusuf greeted the ransomed Shirvanshah with great honors; he seated him next to himself at the feast and poured his wine for him himself.

The Shirvanshah had no choice but to recognize Kara Yusuf as his patron in exchange for continued rule of his domains "from the border of Sheki to Derbend." The dependence was purely token; Ibrahim I still ruled his vast state. In the spring of 1413, he and other former prisoners returned home, while the troops of Kara Yusuf left Shirvan.

Ibrahim I died in 1417; his son Halilullah I (1417-1462) ascended the throne. A strong and skilful ruler, he continued the policy of his father; under him the state gradually regained its strength. Halilullah I refused to remain a vassal of the Kara Koyunlu padishahs. So the Shirvanshah established friendly relations with one of the Timurids, namely, Sultan Shah Rukh (1409-1447) who ruled Central Asia and almost the whole of Iran. Sultan Shah Rukh, the most formidable of Kara Yusuf's opponents, took advantage of the opportunity to weaken Kara Koyunlu and split it.

¹² Son of Bagrat V, brother of Georgy VII (1393-1407).

¹³ Some of the authors date the battle to the winter of 1413 (see: V.M. Sysoev, *Kratkiy ocherk istorii Azerbaidzhana (Severnogo)*, Baku, 1926, p. 80).

¹⁴ See: Sara hanum Ashurbeyli, *The State of Shirvanshahs*, Baku, 2006, pp. 212-213 (in Azeri).

¹⁵ I. Petrushevskiy wrote that Kara Yusuf stole 1 million head of cattle from Shirvan (see: I.P. Petrushevskiy, op. cit., p. 161). S. Ashurbeyli cites the same figure (see: Sara hanum Ashurbeyli, op. cit., p. 213). According to D. Ibragimov, the conquerors stole over 100 thousand head of cattle (see: D. Ibrahimov, *Feodalnye gosudarstva na territorii Azerbaidzhana XV veka*, Baku, 1962, p. 29).

¹⁶ According to V. Sysoev, the Shirvanshah should have been paid 12,000 gold tumans (see: V.M. Sysoev, op. cit., p. 80).

¹⁷ See: Ibidem.

¹⁸ See: Mirkhond, *Rouzat-as-safa*, lithograph, Vol. VI, Bombay, 1261 AH, pp. 295-296.

In 1418, Sultan Shah Rukh, at the head a huge army, moved from Herat to Azerbaijan, where he was defeated. His second march on Azerbaijan was also a disaster. On 17 November, 1420, Kara Yusuf suddenly died at the age of 65. He was buried in Arjish on the shores of Lake Van, next to his ancestors.

Padishah Kara Iskender

The war continued. In May 1421, Kara Iskender, son of Kara Yusuf (1420-1429, 1431-1435), resumed military action against Sultan Shah Rukh and his ally Shirvanshah Halilullah I. On 1 August, 1421, the sides met for a decisive battle in the Alashkert valley at Derbend. This time, the sultan defeated and scattered the army of Kara Iskender; however in the fall of 1421, the sultan pulled his forces out of Azerbaijan.

Padishah Kara Iskender used this opportunity to gather another army and consolidate his position in Tabriz; many of the Azeri emirs accepted him as their leader, which meant that his state survived the military calamities and was restored; Shirvan and Sheki, however, remained independent.

Kara Iskender, an intrepid warrior, did not have the military talents of his father. Three times (in 1427, 1430, and 1434), he tried to conquer Shirvan and failed.¹⁹ In 1427, he miscalculated and started a war on two fronts: he attacked Shirvan in an effort to subjugate the Shirvanshah and started a war against Sultan Shah Rukh.

In May 1429, Shah Rukh led his 100 thousand-strong army against Kara Iskender; the Shirvan troops of Halilullah I sided with the sultan. Kara Iskender was defeated at Salmas; the victor captured Tabriz, the capital of Kara Koyunlu. Sultan Shah Rukh preserved the state under Abu Seyyid (1429-1431), one of Kara Yusuf's sons, who accepted his vassalage and received, in return, a deed granting him the right to rule Southern Azerbaijan, Karabakh, and part of Asia Minor.

The sons of Kara Yusuf were still fighting for power. In 1430, when Timurid's troops had been pulled out, Padishah Kara Iskender showed up in Azerbaijan; in 1431, after murdering Abu Seyyid in a bloody fratricide, he recaptured the throne.

His rule was dotted with feudal riots and internecine squabbles; the economy was failing, while the Padishah plundered Azerbaijan and spent his time feasting.

In an effort to conquer Shirvan in 1434, Kara Iskender once more invaded Northern Azerbaijan, where his army remained for a year, plundering the land and felling orchards and mulberry trees, the linchpin of the country's wealth. The capital, Shamakhy, was ruined; people died in great numbers; the devastation was unrivaled since the Mongol inroads. Shirvanshah Halilullah I continued fighting; he turned to Sultan Shah Rukh for help and maintained relations with him across the Caspian.

In 1435, Sultan Shah Rukh returned to Azerbaijan with an army. Defeated by the Timurid and Shirvan troops, Padishah Kara Iskender fled to Asia Minor. In the fall of 1435, Sultan Shah Rukh led his troops into Tabriz. Power in Kara Koyunlu was transferred to Jahan Shah (1435-1467), another son of Kara Yusuf, who recognized his dependence on Sultan Shah Rukh. In the spring of 1436, the Sultan gave Jahan Shah a deed that granted him the right to rule Southern Azerbaijan.

The fate of Kara Iskender was a sad one; after failing to recapture power with the help of Ottoman Sultan Murad II (1421-1444) and Mamluks of Egypt, he was routed by his brother Jahan Shah and incarcerated in the Alinja fortress, where one night he was stabbed to death in his sleep by his own son. His severed head was sent to Jahan Shah, who organized a lavish burial for his brother-enemy and built a magnificent mausoleum over his grave in Tabriz.

¹⁹ See: D. Ibrahimov, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

Padishah Jahan Shah. The Kara Koyunlu State Becomes Stronger

It was under Padishah Jahan Shah, son of Kara Yusuf, that the state reached the peak of its glory. Unlike his predecessors, he was a well-educated man with an exquisite taste for art. Under the pseudonym Haqiqi, he wrote a diwan of poetry; it was during his rule that Tabriz acquired several outstanding architectural monuments, the best of which was the Blue Mosque (Goy Masjid).

Very much aware of the foreign policy context of the time, Jahan Shah of Kara Koyunlu did not abuse his vassal dependence on the Timurids until the death of Sultan Shah Rukh in 1447. For the same reason, he left the Shirvanshah, an ally of the Timurids, alone. In the 1440s, however, he repeatedly marched on Georgia in alliance with ruler of Ardabil, Sheik Ibrahim Safavid, known as Sheik Shah (1427-1447).

The internecine wars which followed the death of Sultan Shah Rukh gave Jahan Shah a chance to expand his domains in the east and the south. Several times he marched against the Timurids who ruled in Iran. In 1453, he conquered Western Iran; four years later, in 1457, he defeated Timurid General Ibrahim Mirza at Jurjan and entered Horasan; in June 1458, his troops occupied Herat, the capital of the Timurid sultans.

While he was fighting Abu Seyyid Timurid, his own nomadic feudal lords mutinied under the command of his sons Hasan Ali (in Azerbaijan) and Pirbudag (in Baghdad). In January 1459, Jahan Shah had to accept a truce with Sultan Abu Seyyid and, after extracting a huge ransom from the Timurids, retreated.

It took him a long time to sort out the riots of the nomads; late in 1459, he finally restored law and order in his domains; he suppressed the riot of Hasan Ali in Azerbaijan and imprisoned him. After settling scores, he resolved the problem with his other son, Pirbudag, who was captured and executed.

His domains stretched from the Persian Gulf in the south to the Kura River in the north; his state comprised the larger part of Armenia and Persian and Arabian Iraq.

In the west, where Jahan Shah was tied down in a permanent war against the Ak Koyunlu tribal confederation (which had been and remained the worst threat to Kara Koyunlu's continued existence), he was not as lucky. In the 1450s, he lost the larger part of Kurdistan and part of Asia Minor.

B y W a y o f a C o n c l u s i o n : Kara Koyunlu Routed

Ak Koyunlu, a confederation of nomadic tribes, was an old enemy of the Kara Koyunlu nomads. They lived to the west of the Kara Koyunlu territory and maintained close ties with the Empire of Trebizond; the confederation was headed by oymak Bayanduri, which means that practically all leaders belonged to this oymak.

Uzun Hasan (1468-1478), who skillfully exploited the squabbles among those who contended for the Kara Koyunlu throne, the popular riots, and other internal disturbances in the rival state, achieved a final victory.

In May 1467, the old rivals met for a decisive battle in the Muş Valley in Asia Minor. Jahan Shah was defeated and beat a retreat, leaving behind the dead bodies of his soldiers; in November 1467, the Ak Koyunlu troops, which were persistently chasing the enemy, launched a surprise night attack on the village of Chubugjur in Southern Azerbaijan. Taken unawares, the Kara Koyunlu troops put up practically no resistance. This was a complete rout which cost Jahan Shah his life.

His death intensified the squabbles among the contenders for the throne; in an effort to take revenge on Ak Koyunlu, the Kara Koyunlu emirs freed Hasan Ali (1467-1468) from the Maku fortress and put him on the throne. Uzun Hasan, however, easily defeated what remained of the Kara Koyunlu army led by Hasan Ali in Maranda and occupied Southern Azerbaijan and Karabakh without much trouble. A large part of the Kara Koyunlu tribes joined the Ak Koyunlu tribal confederation.

This was how the history of Kara Koyunlu ended: Ak Koyunlu replaced it in Azerbaijan with the same capital in Tabriz. The Ak Koyunlu state included Armenia, Eastern Anatolia, Arabian Iraq, and almost the whole of Iran. Its power in Southern Azerbaijan and Karabakh lasted from 1468 to 1501.
