

GM May Abandon Air Bags

General Motors, which once said it could install air bags as standard equipment on all its 1975 model cars, won't even offer them as optional equipment on 1978 model cars.

Status Report learned of GM's decision just four weeks before the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration was to hold a public meeting to hear comments on passive restraints.

A Washington representative for GM confirmed that his company has made executive decisions for 1977 and 1978 model cars that make no provision for air bags — even as optional equipment. Although the plans were “not irretrievable,” he conceded to *Status Report* that the giant auto maker's decision “puts a hell of a dent” in any possibility of a federal requirement for passive restraints in 1977 or 1978 model cars.

Meanwhile, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has asked NHTSA to seek comments from auto makers, after-market equipment manufacturers and others on passive restraint retrofit.

(In 1970, at NHTSA's first public meeting on passive restraints, GM said that “the air cushion shows promise and should be scheduled for production vehicles.” As an alternative to the agency's plan to require passive restraints on 1973 models, the auto maker offered a voluntary plan under which, it said, “approximately one million 1974 model General Motors cars could be equipped with the air cushion In the fall of 1974 the air cushion would be made standard equipment on all 1975 General Motors passenger cars, most light trucks (under 6,000 lbs. GVW) and certain multipurpose passenger vehicles.”)

In the current decision to abandon air bags, the GM representative said the need to conserve space and weight in order to improve fuel economy played an important role.

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Citing sales of less than 6,000 during the two years that GM has offered air bags as optional equipment on some of its most expensive models, he said the demand for air bag equipped cars over the last two years has been "so slim" that "it doesn't make sense" to continue offering them.

He was especially critical of congressional leaders and consumer advocates who have pushed for a federal air bag requirement but have not, he said, bought optionally equipped air bag cars for their own use. GM offers air bags only on full-sized Buicks, Cadillacs and Oldsmobiles. He also claimed that air bags are not, in GM's view, "cost-effective."

DELOREAN DISAGREES

John Z. DeLorean, a former GM vice president, has expressed disagreement with GM's position on the cost-effectiveness issue. In a recent press release, DeLorean said, "Federal studies as well as a number of other studies clearly reveal that air bags are several times more cost-effective than seat belt systems at present usage rates." He promised to release the details of an air bag study that his consulting firm has conducted. The study was commissioned by Allstate Insurance Co. and will be presented at NHTSA's public meeting in May.

THREE-OPTION EXTENSION

NHTSA has proposed a one year extension of its current rule that allows auto makers three options for providing occupant crash protection.

The current occupant crash protection standard is due to terminate with the end of the 1975 model year. Extension of the rule would allow auto makers to continue – at least through the 1976 model year – to provide crash protection with one of three options: belts with a buzzer and light, passive restraints, or a combination of passive restraints and belts.

Actually, NHTSA made a similar proposal in March, 1974. However, that proposal also would have mandated passive restraints for 1977 model cars. (See *Status Report*, Vol. 9, No. 6, March 26, 1974.) The agency has scheduled a five-day public meeting in May to air comments on passive restraints, after which it will decide when – if at all – passive restraints will become mandatory. (See *Status Report*, Vol. 10, No. 7, March 31, 1975.)

NHTSA has asked for comments on extension of the three-option proposal before close of business May 12, 1975.

RETROFIT

William Haddon, Jr., M.D., president of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, has told NHTSA in a letter that the agency's failure to include passive restraint retrofit among subjects for discussion at its May 19 public meeting is a "serious" omission in its rulemaking exercise.

Haddon noted that NHTSA required safety belt anchorages in some vehicles prior to requiring belts in those vehicles. He said a requirement to accommodate passive restraint retrofit "would be directly analogous."

He said that the agency ought to consider whether auto makers "should be required in their design to accommodate the retrofitting of passive restraint systems as options available to consumers wishing to purchase the protection of such systems." The agency should use its public meeting, scheduled to start May 19, to explore the issue since auto makers are already making design decisions for 1976, 1977 and later model year cars, Haddon said.

“The failure . . . to address questions of retrofit is especially disturbing since the subject has been under active consideration within the Department of Transportation, as a matter of record, since 1968,” he said. In 1968 during a meeting with DOT officials, representatives of General Motors and Eaton, Yale and Towne, an air bag manufacturer, indicated that they had already considered the possibility of retrofitting air bags.

Boobytrap Funding – Two Sides Of The Coin

After more than one and one-half years, states have obligated – contracted to be spent – only eight per cent, or just under \$100 million, of the almost \$1.3 billion available to them for the three year highway hazard removal program established by the Congress in the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1973.

According to the most recent Federal Highway Administration figures, the states reached that level of obligation as of February 28. FHWA estimates that by the end of fiscal 1975, the states will have obligated 27 per cent – \$347 million – of the total amount available to them for the six highway safety construction programs established in the act.

The Department of Transportation, in its report to the Congress on fiscal 1974 implementation of the highway safety improvement programs, said that the states’ progress had been “encouraging.” DOT cautioned, however, that “it is premature to judge the effectiveness of the projects undertaken because of their small number and early stages of implementation.” Nevertheless, “The states are active in these programs,” DOT said.

In what it termed a “Counter-Report,” the Center for Auto Safety has accused FHWA of “listless implementation” of its hazard removal program and attacked the “dismal progress” states have made in roadside hazard removal.

According to the center, “FHWA set the tone of slow implementation of the 1973 safety improvement programs” by issuing only “interim instructions” to the states four months after apportioning the first of the funds. FHWA didn’t issue final guidelines until the second year of the program, the center said.

These delays, the center said, acted as “a clear signal to the states that the federal agency would not seek the vigorous implementation of these programs.”

Furthermore, the center charged that the states’ lack of progress is due, in part, to the “misleading and ambiguous” nature of the late instructions they received. As an example, the center said that FHWA has never made clear to the states the distinction between the high hazard location program, which calls for correction of stretches of highway with established histories of crashes, and the roadside obstacle elimination program, a means for removing known *types* of hazards, not merely specific objects that have been involved in crashes in the past.

This confusion, the center says, dates back to FHWA’s initial directive of December, 1973, telling states that they could request obstacle removal funds for roadside hazards “identified by the state’s accident experience,” thereby implying that the two programs established by the Congress are virtually identical.

Nor, the center said, has FHWA provided “proper instructions for ensuring that the preliminary steps of safety projects – inventories of hazards, prioritization [sic] methods, and scheduling of projects – are founded on valid procedures which ensure the cost/effectiveness of the projects.”

Center To Chart Hazard Efforts

The Center for Auto Safety has initiated a system of rating states on their progress — or lack of it — in carrying out four highway safety improvement programs established under the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1973. (See story, page 3.)

Each month the center will identify states that “are lagging badly” in implementing the programs and report those findings to newspapers and government officials around the country. These programs “deserve far more publicity than they have so far received,” the center said in a recent press release.

Included in the center’s monthly package for “newspaper editors, legislators, and governor’s highway safety representatives” in these states, will be a chart showing the amount of money available to the state and the amount it has spent.

“The center hopes thereby to encourage interest in these programs at the state and local levels,” the press release said.

Information regarding the monthly reports is available from Art Delibert, Center for Auto Safety, 1223 Dupont Circle Building, Washington, D.C. 20036. Tel: 202/659-1126.

The center also scored FHWA’s failure to meet deadlines set in the 1973 act. (See *Status Report*, Vol. 9, No. 17, Sept. 27, 1974.)

To correct what the center calls FHWA’s “consistent tendency to look on the bright side of things” the “Counter-Report” included its own analyses of the states’ progress in implementing highway safety construction programs established by the 1973 act. Among its findings, as of January 31:

- Twenty three states had no programs under the 1973 act for the elimination of roadside obstacles. Out of a possible \$98 million, only \$10 million was obligated. The center claimed there were no programs at all in FHWA’s administrative region six, which includes Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas;

- Of 52 states (including Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia), 17 had not commenced rail-highway crossings programs, and out of \$97 million available, only \$12 million had been obligated — 44 per cent of that by two states;

- Only six states accounted for 60 per cent of the \$25 million obligated for projects to identify high hazard locations. This was out of \$122 million available;

- \$14 million, out of an available \$150 million had been obligated by 29 states (out of 55 including Guam, the Virgin Islands and Samoa) for the safer roads demonstration programs. Two thirds of the projects underway were concentrated in just seven states, the center said.

In its “Counter-Report” the center is also critical of FHWA’s primary recommendation that the Congress combine all highway safety improvement programs “into a single program” in order to give the

states more power in deciding how money should be spent. Such a change, the center said, "would encourage the states' tendency to neglect certain kinds of safety work in favor of more conventional construction work and would help to camouflage that neglect," a center staff member said.

The following table, from figures compiled by the center, shows what is available to each state for the current fiscal year for four of the six highway safety construction programs established by the 1973 act that the center says would be most vulnerable to such a consolidation. The programs are for identification of high hazard locations, the elimination of roadside obstacles, the pavement marking demonstration program and the safer roads demonstration program. Amounts obligated are as of February 28.

In addition to the amounts shown in the first column, states have a total of almost \$129 million left unspent from their FY 1974 apportionments. As of December 11, FHWA apportioned another \$325 million to them for FY 1976. Funds can be spent as soon as they are apportioned and remain available for two years from the end of the fiscal year for which they are apportioned.

Hazard Removal Funding: Apportionments vs. Obligations

STATE	FHWA FY 1975 APPORTIONMENT	AMOUNT OBLIGATED BY STATE	PER CENT OBLIGATED
Alabama	\$ 6,775,115	\$ 1,966,000	29
Alaska	1,351,723	164,000	12
Arizona	2,915,616	722,000	25
Arkansas	3,719,788	370,000	10
California	23,769,534	3,171,000	13
Colorado	4,043,272	280,000	7
Connecticut	3,404,659	415,000	12
Delaware	1,485,642	231,000	16
Florida	9,786,003	1,962,000	20
Georgia	8,027,725	1,066,000	13
Hawaii	1,366,361	63,000	5
Idaho	2,231,151	128,000	6
Illinois	13,908,272	1,159,000	8
Indiana	8,107,492	256,000	3
Iowa	5,676,589	797,000	14
Kansas	5,266,947	538,000	10
Kentucky	5,838,593	36,000	1
Louisiana	5,492,251	1,031,000	19
Maine	2,085,685	985,000	47
Maryland	4,986,298	10,000	0
Massachusetts	5,944,300	1,769,000	30
Michigan	11,830,457	3,401,000	29
Minnesota	7,055,951	1,727,000	24
Mississippi	4,261,467	759,000	18
Missouri	8,257,156	1,229,000	15
Montana	2,326,310	384,000	17
Nebraska	3,474,979	1,294,000	37
Nevada	1,534,607	164,000	11
New Hampshire	1,671,466	222,000	13
New Jersey	7,631,598	94,000	1
New Mexico	2,259,125	56,000	2
New York	20,766,662	1,088,000	5
North Carolina	8,996,473	2,546,000	28
North Dakota	2,445,510	475,000	19

(Cont'd on page 8)

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Correct Park Hazards, Safety Chief Says

The chief of the National Capital Parks Safety Division has recommended that the Interior Department “eliminate or make changes” to hazardous areas of the park system’s roads – including the heavily traveled George Washington, Baltimore-Washington, Rock Creek and Suitland Parkways in the Washington, D.C. area.

National Capital Park Service Safety Chief Clifford Chadderton’s recommendation was triggered, he said, by review of *The Law and Roadside Hazards*, a recently published book sponsored by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, detailing strategies for citizens and organizations to harness federal, state and local laws in order to eliminate roadside hazards. (See *Status Report*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Jan. 10, 1975.)

The book, he pointed out, follows “the trend of courts in making more and larger awards against the local, county, state and federal agencies” responsible for building hazardous roads.

A post, an open culvert and a decorative rock wall await motorists who misjudge this Rock Creek Parkway curve.



Status Report

In a 1972 “Critical Review of Parkway Roadside Design,” the Center for Auto Safety commented on the “chaotic state” of the National Capital Parks’ roadside safety efforts. At that time, the center reported Chadderton as saying that “every month the three areas of highest accident frequency are identified by the Park Police” but, he added, “there is no requirement that any of these hazardous areas be corrected.”

Chadderton recently told *Status Report* that the Park Service keeps *no* specific information on high hazard locations along the roads in his agency’s jurisdiction.

Cutting this tree closer to the ground would have removed the hazard that stands only feet from the parkway.



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According to a second National Park Service official there is now “no budget at all” for roadside hazard removal. Action resulting from Chadderton’s recommendation would, he said, “be the beginning of such a program.”

Costs for relatively minor and sporadic improvements such as the removal of trees, are absorbed by the Interior Department. Funds for “substantial improvements would have to be budgeted by the Congress,” he said.

Chadderton’s memo cited areas along park roads needing attenuating devices and breakaway post bases and other areas where trees “within a few feet of the roadbed along the parkway should be removed.”

“In planning for new facilities, we should design to eliminate roadside hazards,” Chadderton recommended in his memo.



A headlight rim, the glass it once surrounded and a grille emblem rest at the base of a tree – testimony to a hazard standing inches from heavily traveled Rock Creek Parkway.

The reflective panel that identifies this bridge rail as a hazard bears marks that punctuate its warning.



(Cont'd from page 5)

Ohio	15,153,789	4,609,000	30
Oklahoma	5,182,779	0	0
Oregon	4,456,188	777,000	17
Pennsylvania	15,775,814	9,046,000	57
Rhode Island	1,317,716	235,000	18
South Carolina	5,576,966	431,000	8
South Dakota	2,473,089	507,000	21
Tennessee	6,860,959	89,000	1
Texas	19,143,300	0	0
Utah	2,125,066	628,000	30
Vermont	1,508,845	91,000	6
Virginia	7,242,902	1,884,000	26
Washington	5,908,207	206,000	3
West Virginia	2,827,845	189,000	7
Wisconsin	9,123,384	0	0
Wyoming	1,635,413	365,000	22
District of Columbia	1,235,000	172,000	14
Puerto Rico	2,570,398	178,000	7

———— DOT Officials Alerted To 'Critical' Books ————

The Director of the Federal Highway Administration's Office of Highway Safety has alerted Department of Transportation officials to "two new books, both critical of federal and state highway safety programs."

FHWA's Safety Director James L. Foley, Jr., commenting on *The Law and Roadside Hazards*, sponsored by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, and *The Yellow Book Road*, written by the Center for Auto Safety, warned, "These books are not an idle exercise, but the authors mean business, since they don't believe that safety improvements are progressing at an acceptable rate."

In the April issue of *National Traffic Safety Newsletter*, a DOT employee publication, Foley characterized *The Law and Roadside Hazards* as "a handbook on how to sue federal, state and local jurisdictions for losses caused by a vehicle straying off the highway and crashing into a roadside hazard." (See *Status Report*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Jan. 10, 1975.) He said that the center's *Yellow Book Road* "charges that FHWA and the states have failed to implement an effective roadside safety program." (See *Status Report*, Vol. 9, No. 23, Dec. 26, 1974.)

Vetter Named To NHTSA Post

Fred Vetter, Jr., a former governor's representative and highway safety coordinator in Delaware, has been named Associate Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Traffic Safety Programs.

Vetter succeeds Willard Howell who retired.

A retired Air Force General, Vetter has a background in economics, aeronautical engineering and crime reduction, according to NHTSA's *National Traffic Safety Newsletter*. He attended the University of Wisconsin and has a BA in languages and a MBA in economics, both from George Washington University.

DOT Implements 55 MPH Limit

In response to a mandate by the Congress (Public Law 93-643), the Department of Transportation has proposed a rule to permanently set the nation's maximum speed limit at 55 miles per hour.

According to the proposed regulation published in the March 6 *Federal Register*, states would be required to certify that they have imposed and are enforcing a speed limit no greater than 55 miles per hour in order to obtain approval for federal-aid highway construction projects. The current speed limit rule, established as a temporary measure by the Congress, expires June 30.

To certify its compliance, a state would have to supply the Federal Highway Administration with:

- A copy of the 55 mile per hour law;
- An opinion of the state's legal counsel that the law is valid;
- A statement that appropriate speed limit signs are posted;
- The governor's certification that the law is enforced;
- Copies of regulations or administrative orders relating to its enforcement;
- Information relating to enforcement, including the extent of highways posted at 55 miles per hour and the number of citations and warnings issued by the state for speed violation over 55 miles per hour for each month of the year preceding certification;
- Information relating to motorists' observance of the speed limit.

Although FHWA says it "will conduct its own program to monitor vehicle speeds," it has no provision in the proposed regulation to verify a state's claim of compliance.

The proposal would allow measures — such as those already put before some state legislatures — reducing current speeding penalties to token fines as long as the violation is below the earlier speed limit and removing the punishment of penalty points for such offenses.

There is a "great deal of timidity" at the prospect of infringing on what the states consider to be a matter of sovereignty by forbidding such measures, an FHWA official said, adding, "The Congress would have to have given it specific authority" for DOT to dictate minimum requirements for speeding penalties.

DOT also hesitates to establish a minimum requirement for enforcement. Under the permanent regulation, DOT "would not specify an acceptable level of enforcement or a minimum level of speed observance" necessary for a state's certification, the *Federal Register* notice said. Instead, states are to strive for a "reasonable goal" of speed law observance. DOT suggested in the notice that a 90 per cent level of compliance by 1977 would be acceptable.

A 1974 DOT study, *Highway Vehicle Speeds 1973-1974*, observed in 23 states that 47 per cent of motorists exceeded the 55 mile per hour speed limit in free flowing traffic. This, DOT said, "testifies to the willingness of the American public to respond to a national need."

The proposed regulation would also require that states go through a similar certification procedure to show compliance with federal vehicle weight and size limitations.

Scandinavian Laws' Effectiveness 'Unproven'

The widespread belief in the deterrent effect of Swedish and Norwegian laws on drinking and driving is not supported by the available evidence, according to a new study.

"The impression that there is strong and convincing evidence to believe that the Scandinavian laws have deterred drinking and driving . . . may be fairly characterized as 'the Scandinavian myth,'" the study said.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety sponsored and supported the fact finding by a University of Denver professor, H. Laurence Ross, a specialist in the field of drinking and driving legislation. He has conducted two comprehensive analyses of the British law and also studied other alcohol-related countermeasures, such as the unsuccessful Chicago "crackdown on drunk drivers." (See *Status Report*, Vol. 9, No. 5, March 5, 1974.)

Both the Norwegian and Swedish laws, passed in 1936 and 1941 respectively, are generally regarded as strict because of their use of imprisonment as a routine penalty.

Punishment for violating the law is imprisonment together with loss of the driver's license. This penalty is particularly severe in light of the general criminal systems of those countries. It is usually justified by claims of the deterrent effect of the law.

ANALYSIS FAILED TO SHOW EFFECT

Ross analyzed before-and-after data on fatal motor vehicle crashes in Norway and Sweden to discover whether the assumed deterrent effect of the law was real. The data "yield no evidence for effectiveness" of the legislation, Ross said.

There were no significant changes in the number or rate of fatal motor vehicle crashes associated with the introduction of the laws or with later changes that lowered the blood alcohol concentration that constituted the offense, he found.

Ross said that the deterrent effect of the law is not questioned in Norway. According to one expert criminologist there, "People assume deterrence and do not require scientific demonstration of it." However, the legislation has been questioned in Sweden, because of concern over the propriety of prison sentences.

Ross questioned the following arguments commonly offered in support of the deterrent effect of the Swedish law:

- *The rate of drinking-driving violations has remained constant in spite of a "broadening of the definition of the offense and increased police supervision of highways, together with a general increase in the use of alcohol."* Ross pointed out that whether the conviction rate for drunk driving is high or low is not in itself proof of the deterrent effect of the law. "It is not constancy, but rather change in the rate in conjunction with change in the law, that could provide unambiguous evidence of legal effects."

- *Alcohol is less often found in the blood of fatally injured drivers in Sweden than in other countries.* There are insufficient studies in which all drivers involved in fatal crashes were tested for alcohol, Ross said. Also, factors such as types of road users and differences in weather and darkness could result in more fatalities for reasons other than alcohol, he said.

- *The law receives strong support in public opinion polls.* Ross pointed out that such responses may be viewed as proper and expected, and in any event attitudes and behavior may diverge widely. Even if the attitudes are accepted at face value, he said, "it is not demonstrated that the source of the favorable attitudes is the law. To the contrary, it may be this attitude, springing from another source, which produced the political climate that enabled passage of the distinctive Scandinavian laws"

- *Those convicted of drinking and driving include large proportions of people with histories of alcohol problems and of general criminality. Supporters of the deterrence hypothesis argue that this reveals an absence of "normal" drinkers in the drunk driving population and that these "normals" were deterred.* Ross attacked the logic of this conclusion and also argued that the high blood alcohol concentrations noted in Sweden among those convicted of drinking and driving "reflect in part the limitations of the abilities of police patrol in detecting drivers with low blood alcohol concentration."

At present, Ross said, "several thousand people annually, many with serious personal problems, waste their time in jail in honor of a plausible but fundamentally unsupported hypothesis." Ross supported proposals for changes in the law that "offer a possibility for testing the [deterrence] hypothesis."

The Scandinavian Myth: The Effectiveness of Drinking-and-Driving Legislation in Sweden and Norway by H. Laurence Ross will be published in *The Journal of Legal Studies*, June, 1975. Prepublication copies are available by writing to: "Scandinavian Myth," Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Watergate Six Hundred, Washington, D.C. 20037.

NHTSA Publishes Consumer Data

More than halfway through the current model year, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has finally released its consumer information booklets comparing braking, passing and tire performance of 1975 model passenger cars.

An NHTSA official told *Status Report* that the delay in making the booklets available to the public was due to late introduction of a "substantial number" of foreign models — manufacturers are not required to provide the braking and other information to NHTSA until 30 days prior to the model's introduction — and the manufacturers' shifting of equipment from standard to optional, thus changing the performance of the vehicle.

Another NHTSA official said that the agency is evaluating, and may possibly change, its consumer information program. Last year, only 2,200 copies of the booklet on braking performance — the most popular volume — were sold, the official said. He said NHTSA would "welcome" any suggestions from the public on how to improve its consumer information program.

Copies of the booklets can be obtained from: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Titles and prices of the books are: *Brakes — A Comparison of Braking Performance of 1975 Passenger Cars and Motorcycles* (\$1.10); *Acceleration and Passing — A Comparison of 1975 Passenger Cars and Motorcycles* (\$1.35) and *Tires — A Comparison of Tire Reserve Load for 1975 Passenger Cars* (\$1.20).

Clarification

In a recent story on the new Secretary of Transportation, *Status Report* (Vol. 10, No. 7, March 31, 1975) cited National Health Survey data on highway injuries. The data cited were for 1972; figures for 1973 show that there were almost four million highway injuries that year.

Upgrading Of Steering Assembly Rule Planned

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has acknowledged that it is aware of deficiencies in the federal safety standard requiring energy absorbing steering assemblies (FMVSS 203) and plans to correct them in future amendments to the standard.

NHTSA's acknowledgement was in response to an inquiry by Sen. Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) concerning a study of the real world performance of energy absorbing steering assemblies. That study, conducted at the University of Birmingham, England, reported that the current standard encourages the use of designs that perform poorly in crashes. It urged that the standard be upgraded. (See *Status Report*, Vol. 9, No. 15, Aug. 16, 1974.)

(Energy absorbing steering assemblies are designed to absorb, in a controlled compression, the force of a driver's impact with the steering assembly, so as to prevent or reduce injuries by limiting the forces exerted on the driver's chest. Energy absorbing steering assemblies were first introduced on some 1967 model U.S. cars. The federal safety standard requiring such devices went into effect Jan. 1, 1968. It has been estimated that some 300,000 U.S. drivers died needlessly on spear-like steering assemblies before energy absorbing devices were used.)

In February, NHTSA Administrator James Gregory told Hartke that his agency agreed that the current standard does "not completely simulate the real-life accident environment." To remedy some of the current deficiencies in the standard, NHTSA is considering requiring a "larger padded hub [on the steering wheel] to spread the impact load over a larger area of the chest," and requiring that the energy absorbing steering assembly align with the chest of the driver under impact, Gregory said.

Gregory told Hartke that NHTSA anticipated issuing new rulemaking on the standard "within the next few months." An NHTSA official told *Status Report* that the agency considers revision of the standard a "matter of priority," but has not settled on the specifics of the proposal. The official claimed that because of the amount of time the agency devoted to reconsideration of the bumper standard (FMVSS 215) and issuance of the proposed school bus standards mandated by the Congress, the agency has "slipped the schedule on some other things."

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the highway
loss reduction

STATUS REPORT

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