Destined to stay with the USA

There is no causal link between profile and influence. Because of international media coverage of the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and the second Gulf War, John Howard has become the best known prime minister in Australian history - outstripping Bob Hawke, Paul Keating and Malcolm Fraser.

Yet, as a former Labor leader, Kim Beazley, has argued, Australia was never so influential as in 1918, because of the key role played by the Australian military in the Allied victories of World War I.

Australian special forces were involved in key battles in Afghanistan and Iraq, the air force was engaged in combat in the latter conflict and the navy took on significant responsibilities in the Persian Gulf during, between and after both Gulf wars. However, Australia's essential contribution was to provide important public support for its traditional allies, the United States and Britain.

Sure, ADF personnel in and around Iraq are making a contribution to peace enforcement. It's just that their very presence is important in itself, in a diplomatic sense. That's why any decision to withdraw the ADF from Iraq, in the absence of the agreement of Australia's allies and the incoming Iraqi government, would have an impact well beyond the number of forces involved.

Whether or not most Australians agree with the Howard Government's decision to support the coalition of the willing (the US, Britain, Poland, Australia and others) in Iraq, this commitment was consistent with 100 years of Australian foreign policy. Meaning that successive governments, conservative and social democratic, have given military support (of a substantial, medium or modest size) to our traditional allies when they have been engaged in military conflict in an area of interest to Australia - namely, Europe, the Middle East/North Africa or East Asia.

From the mid 1950s to the late 1960s, most federal elections were fought on foreign policy issues. All were won by the Coalition. It is sometimes overlooked today that, when Gough Whitlam won office in December 1972, all Australian combat troops had already been withdrawn from Vietnam. Consequently, in fact if not in law, conscription for service in Vietnam had also ended. Whitlam's winning agenda in 1972 focused on social issues - health, sewerage, urban development.

It is difficult to determine precisely what Mark Latham has in mind for Australian forces in and around Iraq. But in Parliament on Thursday he referred three times to a Labor "commitment that would have our troops back by Christmas".

During this address, the Opposition Leader made numerous references to what he termed "the defence of Australia". He defined ALP policy as follows: "always the defence of Australia first and foremost, not expeditionary forces".

It is not clear what impact, if any, such a policy would have for ADF peace-enforcement forces in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, or the ADF personnel on peacekeeping duties in Africa and the Middle East.

It is no easy task determining foreign policy when Labor is in opposition. After all, senior figures in the parliamentary party include the Victorian-based deputy whip, Michael Danby (who would be broadly sympathetic with the policy of a George Bush or a John Kerry administration), and the Perth-based ALP national president, Carmen Lawrence (who would probably prefer a leftist like Noam Chomsky in the White House).

Some Labor supporters identify a "defence of Australia" doctrine with Australia's wartime prime minister, John Curtin, who withdrew Australian forces from the northern hemisphere to the Pacific theatre to take on the real threat of Japanese militarism. This overlooks the fact that Curtin supported expeditionary forces and courageously insisted that the ALP should junk its traditional opposition to conscription for overseas service to make it possible for all members of the ADF to fight away from Australia in the south-west Pacific.

At the time, such Labor MPs as Arthur Calwell and Eddie Ward opposed Curtin's policy of limited conscription for certain operations by expeditionary forces. As David Day documents in John Curtin: A Life (HarperCollins, 1999), the likes of Calwell and Ward engaged in "virulent abuse" of their leader. But Curtin prevailed.

The prospect of a foreign policy election poses potential problems for the Coalition and Labor:
 Surveys by the Morgan Poll and the Pew Research Centre in mid-2003 indicated that 63 per cent of Australians hold favourable attitudes to the US (Morgan) and that 83 per cent of Australians trust in the US to come to Australia's defence (Pew).

 In spite of the generally positive attitude of Australians towards the US, as measured before March 11, George Bush is not that popular in Australasia or Western Europe - unlike his father and Bill Clinton. Moreover, the contributions in Australia by the US ambassador, Tom Schieffer (a Texan friend of the Texan Bush), do not help. He should understand that it is not the role of the US ambassador to interfere in the domestic political debate.

 The Australian-American alliance works best when it is seen as of mutual benefit to both nations. References to Australia as a "deputy sheriff" to the US (a comment which John Howard did not make), or to the Prime Minister as a US-endorsed "man of steel" (a statement which Bush did utter) do not help the cause of the alliance. They give an unnecessary, and unwarranted, image of fawning.

 A foreign policy election also poses potential problems for Labor, especially in security-sensitive Queensland and Western Australia, where the ALP needs to gain and retain seats respectively.

 Most Australians probably know, after Bali and all that, that the threat to security today is not as it was at the time of the Pacific war. Militant Islam regards Westerners as infidels and acknowledges no territorial boundaries. In this context, the defence of Australians requires the ability to project power and to attain and share intelligence. Here Australia's links with the US and Britain are vital.

 A nine-country survey by the Pew Research Centre this month demonstrated a growing mistrust of the US in European and Muslim nations. As a US ally, Australia should note this finding. Yet, despite what some critics of the Howard Government allege, the Australian-American alliance causes few problems in the East Asian region. After all, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore have their own alliances with the US. And the relationship between the US and both China and Vietnam is as good as it has been in two decades or more.

It is impossible to predict what might be the potential outcome of an election fought on foreign policy issues in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Bali and Madrid, and the continuing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It could be a media opportunity of historical dimensions. But not one consistent with Australia's national interest. Profile and influence are not necessarily interchangeable.

gerardhenderson@thesydneyinstitute.com.au