6. *Russian Federation*

(a) *Past trends*

At a total fertility rate of 2.51 children per woman, fertility in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic in 1950-1955 was only slightly higher than the average fertility in Western Europe and Northern Europe. Its life expectancy at birth of 67.3 years in 1950-1955 was similar to the average for Western Europe. Fertility stayed above replacement levels until 1965, but dropped to 1.50 children per woman in the Russian Federation in 1990-1995 and to 1.35 in 1995-2000. Mortality levels have stagnated, or increased over much of the period since 1965, especially among adult males. As a result, the 1995-2000 life expectancy at birth of 66.6 years was lower than the 1950-1955 level. Nevertheless, the proportion of the population aged 65 years or older increased from 6 per cent in 1950 to 12 per cent in 1995. The share of the population aged 15 to 64 years also increased slightly, from 65 per cent in 1950 to 67 per cent in 1995. The potential support ratio, which was 10 persons aged 15-64 years for each person aged 65 or older in 1950, declined to 6 in 1995.

(b) *Scenario I*

This scenario, which is the medium variant of the United Nations *1998 Revision*, assumes that 7.4 million net migrants would enter the Russian Federation between 1995 and 2050: 2.0 million from 1995 to 2000, 4.1 million from 2000 to 2025 and 1.4 million from 2025 to 2050. As a result of low fertility, the population of the Russian Federation is projected to decline from 148.1 million in 1995 to 121.3 million in 2050. By 2050, 6 per cent of the total population would be post-1995 migrants or their descendants (the results of the 1998 United Nations projections are shown in the annex tables). The population aged 15-64 would increase slightly, from 99.2 million in 1995 to 103.0 million in 2010, and then decline to 73.6 million by 2050. One quarter of the population of the Russian Federation in 2050 would be aged 65 years or older. Owing to the unevenness of the age structure, the potential support ratio would decrease from its level of 6 in 1995 to 5.0 in 2005 and increase again after 2005 to 6 in 2010. After 2010, the potential support ratio would decline by more than half, to 2 by 2050.

(c) *Scenario II*

Scenario II uses the fertility and mortality assumptions of the medium variant of the United Nations *1998 Revision*, but assumes zero migration after 1995. Under these conditions, the population of the Russian Federation would decline faster than in Scenario I. There will be 114.2 million people in 2050, 7.1 million fewer than in Scenario I. The number of persons aged 15-64 is also projected to start declining 5 years earlier than under Scenario I, from 100.5 million in 2000 to 69.2 million in 2050. However, the share of the total population above age 65 would still be about 25 per cent in 2050, and the potential support ratio would be 2 in that year.

(d) *Scenario III*

Scenario III holds the population of Russia constant at its 1995 size of 148.1 million, preventing it from declining further. In order to do so, 25 million net migrants would be needed between 2000 and 2050, an average of 500,000 immigrants per year. By 2050, out of a total population of 148.1 million, 33.9 million, or 23 per cent, would be post-1995 immigrants or their descendants. By 2050 the potential support ratio would be 3.

(e) *Scenario IV*

Scenario IV keeps the size of the population aged 15-64 constant at its maximum of 100.5 million, reached in 2000. To attain this, a total of 36 million net migrants would be needed from 2000 to 2050. The average net migration would need to be 91,000 per year between 2000 and 2010, and 871,000 per year between 2010 and 2050. This scenario would result in a total population of 158 million in 2050, of which 43.8 million, or 28 per cent, would consist of post-1995 immigrants or their descendants. The potential support ratio in 2050 would be 3.

(f) *Scenario V*

Scenario V does not allow the potential support ratio to decrease below the value of 3.0. In order to achieve this, no immigrants would be needed until 2035, and 26.6 million immigrants would be needed between 2035 and 2050, an average of 1.8 million per year during that period. By 2050, out of a total population of 143 million, 29 million, or 20 per cent, would be post-1995 immigrants or their descendants.

(g) *Scenario VI*

This scenario keeps the potential support ratio at its 1995 value of 5.62. A total of 253 million net immigrants would be needed between 2000 and 2050, an overall average of 5.1 million per year. However, the average annual net migration required to maintain this ratio varies considerably over time, as two relatively small cohorts—those born between 1940 and 1945 and those born between 1965 and 1970—pass through their economically active years and into the 65 years or older group. In the period 2005-2010, the sharp decline in the number of persons aged 65 or older would require the emigration of some 3.6 million persons per year to keep the potential support ratio constant. Immigration would then resume after 2010. Under this scenario, by 2050, a total of 308 million persons, or 73 per cent of Russia's projected population of 422 million, would be post-1995 immigrants or their descendants.

(h) *Additional considerations*

Between 1990 and 1995 international migration had a major impact on population growth in the Russian Federation. An estimated 1.8 million persons migrated into Russia in this period, an average of 360,000 per year. While this volume of migration is comparable to the average levels required under scenarios I and III, it is much lower than the 871,000 persons that would be needed annually between 2010 and 2050 under scenario IV. It is also important to note that a large proportion of recent immigration into the Russian Federation has been the result of the resettling of ethnic Russians who came from the other republics of the former Soviet Union. Figure 19 shows, for scenarios I, II, III and IV, the population of the Russian Federation in 2050, indicating the share that is made up of post-1995 migrants and their descendants.

The number of immigrants required in scenario VI is immensely larger than past experience, more than 13 times the level recorded in 1990-1995.

In the absence of migration, the figures show that it would be necessary to raise the upper limit of the working-age in the Russian Federation to 66.8 years to obtain a potential support ratio of 3.0 in 2050. This would have to increase to about 73 years in order to obtain in 2050 the same potential support ratio observed in 1995, which was 5.6 persons of working-age per each older person past working-age. Increasing the activity rates of the population, if it were possible, would only be a partial palliative to the decline in the support ratio due to ageing. If the activity rates of all men and women aged 25 to 64 increased to 100 per cent by 2050, this would make up for only 30 per cent of the loss in the active support ratio resulting from the ageing of the population.

Scenario	I	II	III	IV	V	VI *
Period	Medium variant	Medium variant with zero migration	Constant total population	Constant age group 15-64	Ratio 15-64/65+ not less than 3.0	Constant ratio 15-64/65 years or older
A. Average annual number of migrants (thousands)						
1995-2000	394	0	611	0	0	*746*
2000-2025	163	0	445	638	0	*3 481*
2025-2050	55	0	551	792	1 064	*6 654*
2000-2050	109	0	498	715	532	*5 068*
1995-2050	135	0	508	650	484	*4 675*
B. Total number of migrants (thousands)						
1995-2000	1 970	0	3 056	0	0	*3 731*
2000-2025	4 084	0	11 120	15 951	0	*87 021*
2025-2050	1 364	0	13 776	19 805	26 604	*166 358*
2000-2050	5 448	0	24 896	35 756	26 604	*253 379*
1995-2050	7 417	0	27 952	35 756	26 604	*257 110*
C. Total population (thousands)						
1950	102 192	-	-	-	-	-
1975	134 233	-	-	-	-	-
1995	148 097	-	-	-	-	-
2000	146 934	144 960	148 097	144 960	144 960	*148 790*
2025	137 933	131 824	148 097	149 479	131 824	*231 075*
2050	121 256	114 248	148 097	158 049	143 093	*422 094*
D. Age group 0-14 (thousands)						
1950	29 542	-	-	-	-	-
1975	31 280	-	-	-	-	-
1995	31 232	-	-	-	-	-
2000	26 679	26 244	27 040	26 244	26 244	*27 216*
2025	20 923	19 905	23 285	24 131	19 905	*43 641*
2050	17 372	16 298	22 719	25 011	23 613	*80 051*
E. Age group 15-64 (thousands)						
1950	66 328	-	-	-	-	-
1975	91 069	-	-	-	-	-
1995	99 200	-	-	-	-	-
2000	101 862	100 467	102 703	100 467	100 467	*103 197*
2025	92 021	87 764	99 805	100 467	87 764	*159 103*
2050	73 569	69 199	92 540	100 467	89 610	*290 343*
F. Age group 65+ (thousands)						
1950	6 322	-	-	-	-	-
1975	11 883	-	-	-	-	-
1995	17 664	-	-	-	-	-
2000	18 393	18 249	18 353	18 249	18 249	*18 376*
2025	24 989	24 156	25 006	24 881	24 156	*28 331*
2050	30 315	28 750	32 837	32 571	29 870	*51 701*
G. Potential support ratio 15-64/65+						
1950	10.49	-	-	-	-	-
1975	7.66	-	-	-	-	-
1995	5.62	-	-	-	-	-
2000	5.54	5.51	5.60	5.51	5.51	*5.62*
2025	3.68	3.63	3.99	4.04	3.63	*5.62*
2050	2.43	2.41	2.82	3.08	3.00	*5.62*

* Scenario VI is considered to be demographically unrealistic.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

**Figure 18. Age-sex structures by scenario for 2000, 2025 and 2050**
(*Population in millions*)

Medium variant   Constant total population

Age

2000

2025

2050

Population without migration after 1995   Migrants plus descendants

Figure 18 (continued)

Constant
age group 15-64

Constant ratio
15-64/65 years or older

Age

2000

2025

2050

**Figure 19. Population of the Russian Federation in 2050, indicating those who are
post-1995 migrants and their descendants, by scenario**