

# **Political Participation of Minorities: A Comparison of the Greek-Orthodox Minority of Istanbul and Turkish/Muslim Minority of Western Thrace**

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Burcu Çulhaoğlu  
burcu@su.sabanciuniv.edu  
Istanbul Bilgi University, The Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences,  
Political Science Program

## **Abstract**

Minority rights are often not implemented without political representation of minorities themselves. For the Greek minority and Turkish minority case, it is indicated that their ethnic identity and political participation strategies are determined by the Greece-Turkey relations, which affect the implementation (negative or positive) of the reciprocity principle, which as a fact limit or enlarge the social, economical, civil and political rights of the minorities within the framework of legal structures and binding international agreements. Until now, several researches on the political behavior of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace and on the political participation of non-Muslim minority of Turkey (very few on Greek minority) had been conducted. Moreover, in the comparison of these two communities, social, cultural and religious rights have been discussed more intensively rather than how reciprocity influenced their political rights and political participation strategies. However, a comparative study, which observes the political participation, political behavior and strategies of these two groups regarding the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and with the light of reciprocity, has not been conducted. This work aims to fulfill this gap by analyzing the political participation strategies of Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace and Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul. The main purpose is to understand how the ethnic identity of these groups and their political participation is affected by the political structure of the society they are living in, by the legal structure, the official discourses and practices, international politics, bilateral relations and international conjuncture.

In this regard, the main targeted groups are the Turkish/Muslim minority in Greece (in the provinces of Xanthi/ İskeçe; Komotini / Gümülçine and Rhodopi/ Rodop- Dedeağaç) and the Greek minority/Roums in Istanbul. In this research, their political participation strategies since the Lausanne Treaty will be examined, however the main focus will be on the period after 1980, when both countries led to democratic consolidation, and had rapprochement with the European Union. The asymmetry between these two countries on the experience of Europeanization in the field of minority rights will be crucial for examining whether the level of democracy in one country, the agreements it is obliged to or the concept of 'reciprocity' are the significant determinant for the conditions of respective minorities. The paper finds out that more than EU membership, direct and effective political participation of these minorities would break the hegemony of rule of reciprocity and bilateral relations on their freedom to enjoy their minority rights. However, political participation of these minority groups has been perceived as a threat to the national security, and tried to be controlled and limited by the host-state whereas highly mobilized by the kin-state.

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Political participation of minorities is crucial not only for maintaining the implementation of the minority rights, but also for the functioning of stable democracy as well. However, it is observed that the political participation of the minority community has not been the primary focus of minority rights as much as linguistic, religious and educational rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantee the right to all citizens to participate in the political life of the country<sup>1</sup>. The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) also only contains a rather general clause regarding political participation in Article 15: “the Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them.” However, similar to the definition of minority and minority rights, political representation of the minorities lacks a minority-specific dimension, ignoring the ‘politics of difference’ that alienate the social identities of minority groups. On the other hand, compared to economical, cultural and social rights of the minorities, their right to political participation seems to be less likely limited by the states, due to the fact that political participation constructs the foundation of citizenship rights which all the citizens of the countries enjoy equally. Moreover, while larger minorities found their primary voice through minority parties, smaller minorities more frequently express their concerns when it comes to minority-specific interests through institutions for cultural autonomy, minority associations, or local-level political activism.

If we analyze the case of Greek-Orthodox minority community of Istanbul and Turkish-Muslim minority in Greece, it is seen that the implementation, and protection of the minorities’ economical and cultural rights has not been guaranteed mainly by their political participation, but through the ‘principle of reciprocity’ which has been settled by the Lausanne Treaty of 1924 between Turkey and Greece. Even though Muslim minority in Greece is the larger minority groups, which has been concentrated in Western Thrace, cannot be represented by a minority party or independent candidates due to 3% national threshold,

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<sup>1</sup> Florian Bieber, “Introduction: Minority Participation and Political Parties”, in *Political Parties and Minority Participation*, (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, 2008), pp.5-31.

and they can only participate into Greek Parliament through majority parties. Parliamentary political participation of the Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul is totally left impossible since 1964, as the number of this community has been diminished to around 3000. Despite these facts, both of these communities have managed to have a voice on their cultural and economical rights through the channel of ‘reciprocity’.

As a recent example, on 13<sup>th</sup> of December, the interview in which the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomeos said twice on the high-profile US television newsmagazine 60 Minutes that he feels “crucified” in Turkey due to repressive measures applied to the Greek minority, is broadcasted in Turkey. The patriarch also blasted the continued closure of the Halki seminary. “It’s a pity and a shame. It’s a crime to keep such a school closed and unused for no reason”.<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister George Papandreou also expressed his support in a telephone call to Bartholomeos on December 21. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s reaction was particularly sharp: “I want to believe that these words were said inadvertently. The crucifixion metaphor was especially unfortunate. In our history and traditions, there was never a crucifixion, nor will there be”. On the other hand, the Turkish authorities pointed out the Greek-Orthodox Theological school of Halki (Heybeliada) can be opened, however the Greek government should also bring similar measures on the religious rights of the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace, especially ‘the right to elect their own religious leader/ mufti’. The attitude of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, the support from Greek government and the reaction of Turkish authorities remarking the rights of the Turkish minority of Western Thrace in exchange for the improvement of the rights of the Greek minority in Turkey brought the question of “reciprocity” again into the agenda.

In general, the policies of both countries against their minorities’ position in the society they live in indicate that in both Greece and Turkey, the social, economic, civil and political rights of their minorities are perceived as “a threat to their national security” rather than “an understanding for justice and equality”<sup>3</sup>. “Politics of fear”<sup>4</sup>, which suggests to ‘grating power of governing by using fears’ is continued to be utilized in both countries. The fact that the minorities were not totally Turkified or Greekified, in the eyes of the public and the government fostered the perception that they were ‘less trustable’. Minorities are not

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<sup>2</sup> Bartholomeos: “I feel like crucified”. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/patrik-ten--font-color-red-bomba--font-aciklamalar/siyaset/sondakikaarsiv/20.01.2010/1175352/default.htm?ver=43>, 18/12/2009

<sup>3</sup> Will Kymlica, *Multicultural Citizenship*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995)

<sup>4</sup> Jack Bratich, *Foucault, Cultural Studies, and Governmentality*, (State University of New York Press, 2003)

considered proper citizens of the country in which they live in, but as appendices of a neighboring state. What is impressive is that due to the reciprocity principle, which has been affected mostly by the Greek-Turkish relations, the minorities also follow an inconsistent stance towards the Greek Political Parties, and Turkish Political Parties, by favoring in a certain electoral contest one party, and in the sequential its opponent<sup>5</sup>. For instance, the salient feature for the post-1946 is that Turkey's relations with its neighbors affected the position of its minorities. The immigrations of the Greek-Orthodox (Roums) of Turkey to Greece coincide with the periods when there is a direct Turkish-Greek conflict and when Cyprus conflict occupies the agenda<sup>6</sup>.

This causality suggests that the political behavior of the Greek minority in Istanbul and Turkish minority of Western Thrace is shaped by the political, social, economic conditions they are living in rather than their own ethnic identity. With this regard, I will utilize Frederik Barth's approach, which claims that "ethnic identities are not primordial and they are socially constructed through the competition of the groups for the distribution of resources"<sup>7</sup>. Hence the political participation strategies of the minorities will be shaped not according to their intrinsic ethnic features, but through their interaction with the other groups, where the social structure, relations with outside, type of production and gender are determining factors. Barth's theory on ethnic groups suggests that the ethnic identities of the groups, which came from the same ethnic origin but interacted with different social groups display different qualifications. For the minorities, this interaction can be categorized as process of recognition, unrecognition and/or misrecognition of a certain group by surrounding groups<sup>8</sup>. Thus a social

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<sup>5</sup> Until 1961, non-Muslim minorities were represented in the Turkish Parliament. Among 23 minority deputies (Roums, Armenian, Jewish), 8 of them were Roums namely: Nikola Taptas; Mihal Kayaoğlu; Nikola Fakaçelli; Vasil Konos; Ahliya Moshos; Alexandros Hacopulos; Hristaki Yoannidis and Kaludi Laskari.

Given in Appendix B: List of Non-Muslim minority deputies in Turkish Parliament.

For the Turkish-Muslim mirotiy deputies in the Greek Parliament, except the junta period of 1967-1974 and 1993 elections, Turkish minority has been represented in the Greek Parliament since 1920s ranging from 1-3 deputies.

Given in Appendix C: List of Turkish-Muslim Minority Deputies in the Greek Parliament since 1920s.

Rifat Bali, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlık Milletvekilleri*, Minority Deputies during the Republican Period, *Toplumsal Tarih*, vol. 186, June 2009; Vemund Aarbakke, "Concept of reciprocity and its significance for the political organization of the Muslim minority in Greece", in *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities law, religion and politics*, (ed.) by Samim Akgönül., (Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008); Nikolakopoulos Elias, "Politics of power and election behavior of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace 1923-1955", (*Center of AsiaMinor Studies*, 8, 1990- 1991), pp. 182.

<sup>6</sup> Alexis Alexandridis, *Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), p.316 The migration flows happened on the periods 1922-29, 1955-59, 1964-67 and 1972-75.

<sup>7</sup> Frederik Barth, *Etnik Gruplar ve Sınırları: kültürel farklılığın toplumsal organizasyonu*, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Culture Differenece, (Istanbul Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2001).

<sup>8</sup> Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

group is usually inclined to form and articulate its identity as a response to stereotypes and general perspectives produced by “others”. Moreover, according to the institutional channeling theory<sup>9</sup> legal and political institutions both shape and limit the minorities’ choice of possibilities, and institutional forces such as citizenship laws, the actions of authorities determine what forms minority mobilization takes, more than any intrinsically ethnic particularities or socio-professional status, along which lines minority mobilization occurs.

For the Greek minority and Turkish minority case, it is indicated that their ethnic identity and political participation<sup>10</sup> strategies are determined by the Greece-Turkey relations, which affect the implementation (negative or positive) of the reciprocity principle, which as a fact limit or enlarge the social, economical, civil and political rights of the minorities within the framework of legal structures and binding international agreements. Until now, several researches on the political behavior of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace and on the political participation of non-Muslim minority of Turkey (not specifically Greek minority) had been conducted in reference to a certain period of time (mainly after 1974 for Greece and after 1980 for Turkey, or inter-war period, during the junta years of both states, and influence of European Union on political rights of the minorities). Moreover, in the comparison of these two communities, social, cultural and religious rights have been discussed more intensively rather than the political rights dimension of reciprocity. However, a comparative study, which observes the political participation, political behavior and strategies of these two groups regarding the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and with the light of reciprocity, has not been conducted. This work aims to fulfill this gap in the literature.

Defending the thesis that improvement and implementation of the political participation of these communities would break the hegemony of ‘the rule of reciprocity’ and bilateral relations on the protection of their minority rights, this study aims to search the dynamics that influence the political participation of Muslim minority of Western Thrace (in the provinces of Xanthi/ İskeçe; Komotini / Gümülcine and Rhodopi/ Rodop- Dedeğaç) and Greek-

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<sup>9</sup> Patrik Ireland, “Reaping what they saw: institutions and immigrant political participation in Western Europe”, in *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics: comparative European perspectives*, edited by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

<sup>10</sup> The forms of political participation can be categorized as “canvassing or campaigning in elections; active membership of a political party or a pressure group; political demonstrations; various forms of civil disobedience; membership of government advisory committees or consumer’s councils for publicly owned industries; client involvement in the implementation of social policies; and various forms of community actions”. Anthony H. Birch, *Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*, (New York: Routledge, 1993). p. 105.

Orthodox minority of Turkey, to understand whether it is the internal political system of the states they are living in, the socio-economical features of these communities, the rule of reciprocity, bilateral or international factors that affect and shape the political participation of these minority groups. For this purpose, the study will conduct a comparative work between the political participation of Greek-Orthodox minority and Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece since the implementation of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 by giving the main focus after 1980s when both Greece and Turkey have been led to a more consolidated democracy and had rapprochement with the European Union (1983 the transition from military rule to democracy for Turkey and 1981 accession of Greece to the EU). The asymmetry between current and post- EU membership criteria led Greece and Turkey to diverse experiences of Europeanization in the field of minority rights. This difference between these two countries will be crucial in examining whether the level of democracy of one country, the agreements it is obliged to or the concept of 'reciprocity' will be the significant determinant for shaping the conditions of respective minorities.

With this regard, the thesis mainly tests:

- 1) If ethnic identities of respective minorities are shaped by structural constraints, rather than intrinsic variables. How they define themselves, and how they are perceived by the society they are living in.
- 2) If political participation of Greek-Orthodox and Turkish-Muslim minority is influenced, restricted or supported as a result of the reciprocity principle.
- 3) If the difference of political participation strategies among Turkish and Greek minority emerges due to their numerical differences, although they are granted with similar social, economical, political and civil rights, and recognized as the citizens of the countries they are living in, due to the Lausanne Treaty and the reciprocity principle.
- 4) If the relations between Greece and Turkey influence the political participation strategies of these communities.
- 5) If international conjecture, mainly the accession process of Turkey to EU influences the political participation of these communities.
- 6) If the European integration process for Greece, and eventually for Turkey, and the signing of a series of international legal instruments by both countries concerning human and minority rights, may serve to disconnect the minority issue from bilateral dimension and put it under multilateral supervision, which would relieve

these minorities of the burden of negative reciprocity and de-legitimize it once and for all.

### **Principle of Reciprocity**

As the primary factor that influences the conditions of the Greek-Orthodox and Turkish-Muslim minority, it is needed to explain: What is reciprocity and how does it function on Greek-Turkish relations regarding the policies toward their respective minorities?

Reciprocity is a universal concept in international law and in international relations that encourages the parties to adhere to a contractual agreement. It is also binding, as it allows the possibility of sanctions under the international law. Within the framework of reciprocal treatment of the minorities in Greece and Turkey, the policies have been based on the Lausanne Treaty (24 July 1923). In Lausanne summit<sup>11</sup>, it was launched for the first time a brand new, brutal practice, the compulsory populations exchange<sup>12</sup>. After the end of the Greco-Turkish war, Greek orthodox were forced to leave Turkey, as well as Muslims who had been living in Greece were required to do the same. Two cases, for some reasons,<sup>13</sup> were exempted from this

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<sup>11</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 51.

With the constitution of the League of Nations in 28<sup>th</sup> April 1919, it was the first time that the protection of minorities was put on an international system and therefore the League of Nations undertook to respond to that commitment, to the principle of self-determination and self-governance and to the international commitment to minority rights. Although there was not a comprehensive convention, which defined the rights of minorities that should be allocated to minority groups, the “minority treaties” which were signed between the allied powers and each new or newly-enlarged nation states included articles and clauses about the protection of minorities. The main features were the absence of bilateralism and inter-state negotiations about the minorities, the explicit obligation of the kin-state not to involve, but to proceed in a procedure to denounce the state which violated the rights of the minority affiliated, and the centralization of the settlement of the problem, under the aegis of the services, competent departments and Minority Office of the League of Nations. In the framework of the Lausanne Treaty, which was under the League system, Greece and Turkey undertook significant obligations.

<sup>12</sup> According to its provisions all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory and all Greek nationals of Muslim religion established on Greek territory, were forced to be exchanged. Following it, approximately 1,1 million Orthodox Greeks fled Turkey and became refugees in Greece, and 400.000 Muslims left Greece. This was the first time this method was adopted, the compulsory exchange of large ethnic groups as a means to separate nationally intermingle people in order to solve the problem.

Dimitris Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Population and its Impact on Greece*, (London: Hurst and Company, 1962) pp. 52.

<sup>13</sup> Initially, the Turkish deputies wanted the Greeks of Istanbul to be included in the compulsory exchange. After pressure put from the British Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon, the Greeks of Istanbul were excluded, as according to him, this population was of vital significance for the city, its commerce and industry, and without it Istanbul would be in danger losing its wealth and trade. Furthermore, Venizelos opposed strongly as well regarding the Greeks of Istanbul on the ground that Greece could not absorb more refugees, after the arrival of Greek refugees from Anatolia. Moreover, the Greeks of Istanbul represented a large number of urban population, which the Greek state could not receive, since the urban centers were about to overflow from the mass arrival of refugees. Most important reason was to remain the Patriarchy and its community in Istanbul. Despite Turkey’s initial objections, finally Greeks of Istanbul and the two small islands were exempted. This concession on behalf of the Turkish side, they achieved also to exclude the Muslim minority of Western Thrace as well. There was an issue raised by the Turkish delegate on the proportionality of the two non-exchangeable groups and thus 110.000

condition: The Muslim minority of Western Thrace, and Greek-Orthodox community in Istanbul, Gökçeada (Imros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) were allowed to stay. Lausanne Treaty brought guarantees and positive dimensions for the minorities<sup>14</sup>. The Greek and Turkish Government's obligations to guarantee the rights of the Turkish and Greek community respectively stems from a number of treaties and agreements. According to Articles 37-45 of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Greek and the Turkish governments are obliged to protect the respective minorities in their territories. They agreed to provide equality before the law, protection of life and liberty, free use of any language, free exercise of religion, the right to establish and control their own institutions and schools, the right to give instruction in their own languages, freedom of movement and all other rights enjoyed by the majority. To be more precise, all these guarantees were mentioned (in Articles 37-44)<sup>15</sup> in respect to the Greek minority in Istanbul and the last one (Article 45)<sup>16</sup> shortly but equally bindingly stated that the same rights were recognized by Greece in relation to its Muslim minority.

Compared to the constitution of the League of Nations in 28<sup>th</sup> April 1919, where the main features were the absence of bilateralism and inter-state negotiations about the minorities, the

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Greeks were allowed to stay in Turkey and a respective number of Muslims to stay in Greece. Those who were entitled to remain in the areas exempted from the population exchange were recognised in the French treaty text as *établis*. As we notice, there was a strong interstate bargaining for the number and the status of the two groups. Alexis, Alexandris, *Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1983).

<sup>14</sup> The minorities in both sides are determined regarding their religion, not ethnicity. In Turkey only non-Muslims: Greek-Orthodox, Armenians and Jews are considered as minorities, while Alevis and Kurds, and also other non-Muslim groups are exempt from this recognition. In Greece, similarly only Muslims are recognized as minorities and granted the rights from Lausanne Treaty. Macedonians who are orthodox, and Albanians who are Orthodox or Muslims are exempted from this recognition. Greece and Turkey attempted to exercise different policies: Greece was led to consider the minority as religious (except for the early 1930s and the 1950s) over-estimating Pomaks and Gypsies, while Turkey considered the whole minority as one and only nationally Turkish. Meanwhile, Turkey refers to the minority group as Roums instead of Greek, and naming an organization including "Greek" is forbidden. Renée Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean: An appraisal of the 1923 compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey*, (New York : Berghahn Books, 2004).

<sup>15</sup> Section III of the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) Concerning Protection of Minorities. Given in Appendix A. In these articles it is explicitly mentioned that The Muslims of Western Thrace in order to be treated as equal citizens of the Greek state were granted civil, political and cultural rights. Equality before the law is guaranteed and discrimination on the ground of ethnic characteristics is prohibited. With the respect to the political rights, apart from the fact that the convention implicates full exercise of political rights of the members of minority, as the Christians, there is no reference that political equality requires territorial autonomy or quotas for the representation of the minority group in the parliament. Distinct rights did not involve maintenance of the group as a distinct body with its own legislative and executive powers. As regards the cultural rights, according to the provisions of the convention, Greece was obliged to secure and maintain rights of the Muslim minority linked to their language, education and religion. In particular the Greek state undertakes the responsibility that in areas where a large number of the minority is established the group receives an equitable share of the funds in order to be able to maintain its own religious, social and educational institutions. The non-Muslims (Roums, Armenians, Jews) in Turkey will enjoy the same rights granted to the Muslim minority of Greece.

<sup>16</sup> "The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory".



explicit obligation of the kin-state not to involve, but to proceed in a procedure to denounce the state which violated the rights of the minority affiliated, although in theory aimed the equal and just practice and protection of minority rights, Lausanne Treaty positioned these two countries as the monitoring kin-states that would indirectly intervene in the internal affairs of the other country through mobilizing or manipulating their kin-minority groups living in the other state. It was obvious that these articles will be challenged or misused by Turkey and Greece within time according to internal, international and bilateral dimensions, as the Treaty of Lausanne ignored five main features of Greek-Turkish relations:

- 1) These two nations established their nation-states through the wars they made against each other: 1821 War of Independence for Greece (Greek Rebellion in Turkish literature) against the Ottoman Empire, and 1919-1922 War of Independence for Turks against the Greek occupation (Asia Minor Catastrophe in Greek literature).
- 2) Bad memories of the War of Independence and the population exchange was very new, there was distrust between the two nations created by their living history. The enforced population exchange was a tool for the process of homogenizing of the nations, and also interpreted as the indication for “these two communities cannot live together”.
- 3) Especially in Turkey, minorities were perceived and labeled as the allies of the occupying forces (Roums-Greece; Armenians- Russia and France) and separatist activities (Jews and Armenians).
- 4) Both Greece and Turkey (but especially Turkey) was at the stage of creating nation-states with more homogeneous citizens under the discourse of “one language-one goal- one culture”.<sup>17</sup> Hence, minorities became the main target for this nationalizing policy.
- 5) There were unsettled issues such as the conditions of the islands in Aegean, the rule of Cyprus and War compensations.

As a result, very soon after the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the violations of the articles concerning the ‘Protection of Minorities’ started. For Turkey’s side, which was passing

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<sup>17</sup> Every nationalism has a perception of ‘other’. According to Ayşe Kadioğlu, Turkish national identity has three types of ‘other’, which has been excluded time to time, or sometimes tried to be assimilated to Turkish identity. These are non-Muslims within the empire; non-Turkish Muslims and lastly its own past. Ayşe Kadioğlu, Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Üç Ötekisi, The three “Others” of Turkish National Identity, Radikal 2, 23 October 2005.

through nationalization and de-Ottomanization process, the articles 37-45, guaranteed the continuity of a similar order of ‘community’ and ‘millet’ that the minorities were granted under the Ottoman Empire rule. Due to these articles, minorities of Turkey also expected that they will continue the ‘millet’ order (also as equal citizens) where they could maintain their cultural identities; however very soon, under the single-party regime of the Early Republican period, they understood that these rights will be abused in practice under Turkey’s “one language- one goal- one culture” motto which aimed to melt the whole ethnic communities under its Turkification policy<sup>18</sup>. On this issue, the biggest deterrence had been the 42<sup>nd</sup> article of Lausanne Treaty<sup>19</sup>, which enables the minority communities to exercise their religious rights according to their own religious practices (private laws, such as religious church weddings instead of official municipality marriages). The Civil Law of 1926 displayed that Turkey would not accept such an exercise of private laws. The minorities announced that (in surface by their own will, but in reality due to the warnings of the political institutions) they resign from their rights determined by the article 42<sup>20</sup>. Turkification policy during the early Republican period showed itself in economical field as well, by the implementation of numerical quota for the employment of the minorities. In 1923, all the companies are forced to employ Muslim officers in order to reduce the percentage of the non-Muslim officers, which was about 90% before 1923<sup>21</sup>. This was an open violation of 37<sup>th</sup> and 39<sup>th</sup> articles of the Lausanne Treaty.

Moreover, the concept of reciprocity was misconstrued and, eventually, misused by the respective governments. Very soon the Greek government has put the misusing of the reciprocity rule into practice as “any Turkish measure taken against the homogeneia (the minority of Greek descent) in Turkey, after being verified beyond any doubt, has to be faced by counter-measures, excluding any retaliation without having consulted with the Ministry for

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<sup>18</sup> Rıfat N. Bali, “Cumhuriyet Döneminin Azınlıklar Politikası”, “Minority Policy of the Republican Period”, *Birikim*, vol. 115, November 1998, pp.80-90.

<sup>19</sup> Appendix A: Treaty of Lausanne, Protection of Minorities.

<sup>20</sup> For the Turkification policies, look at Ayhan Aktar “Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında uygulanan “Türkleştirme politikaları” (Turkification policies implemented during the Early Republican Period), *Tarih ve Toplum* December 1996 vol. 156 s.4-18. This policy was implemented especially toward the Jewish minority, they had taken Turkish names and surnames, and their integration to the Turkish culture had been repeated in every occasion.

<sup>21</sup> Alexis Alexandridis, *The greek minority of İstanbul and Greek-Turkish relations 1918-1974* (Center for Asia Minor Studies Atina 1983), s.109-111

For Turkish National Economy look at Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de ekonomi ve toplum (1908-1950) Milli İktisat MilliBurjuvazi, Economy and Society in Turkey (1908-1950) National Economy National Bourgeoise*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995.

Foreign Affairs”.<sup>22</sup> However, as a positive side, reciprocity also deters the states to apply more severe measures toward their minorities, considering their kin-member on the other side. The concern of Turkey regarding the minority of Thrace is perceived to be more limited compared to the concern of Greece regarding the minority of Istanbul. Hence, the Greek side understood that there were no possibilities to make gains in favor of the Greek minority in Turkey by applying repressive measures in Thrace<sup>23</sup>.

In short, in both of these states, reciprocity had been interpreted as a legitimate basis for retaliation against its own citizens for policies of another sovereign state. Reciprocity, when applied to the situation of minorities in Greece and Turkey, cannot be treated by both governments as means of reprisal, but instead should be source of responsibility towards the respective minority that resides in each country and constitutes part of the society. On the other hand, it is observed that the minorities also internalized this concept, demand its stricter and wider implementation from time to time through the discourses<sup>24</sup> such as “they have more than we have” and “we should have the same rights as they have”. Also, the same kind of thinking is widespread among the majority in both nations. “Our people are more valuable and deserve more than the others”. As a result, reciprocity is applied on the worst forms as the denial of rights, oppression and human suffering. Meanwhile, the Patriarch himself has joined those complaining about the ‘reciprocity’ principle and said “they’ve used us as a ‘trump card’ in Turkish-Greek affairs, especially after the Lausanne Treaty...if Greece ill-treated Muslims in Western Thrace, why blame a few thousand Greeks here? The same is true for the Turks of

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<sup>22</sup> Konstantinos Tsitselikis, “Reciprocity as a regulatory pattern for the treatment of the Turkish/Muslim minority of Greece”, in *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities law, religion and politics*, (ed.) by Samim Akgönül., (Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008)

<sup>23</sup> Some examples for the positive application of reciprocity: When just after the Lausanne Treaty, the Greek side break the principle by confiscating houses of the Muslims in order to facilitate the Greek refugees, the Turkish side has accused Greek government and informed the Mixed Commission on the reason that the implementation of the provisions of the treaty regarding minorities’ property. Again, when Venizelos enacted the Land reform to distribute the lands in Western Thrace, the Turks put a lot of pressure and they finally managed to avoid the law to be applied in the Muslims areas in Western Thrace. It was clear that the Greek government had fear that the Turks might retaliate against the Greek populations in Istanbul. However due to indirect and bureaucratic ways that Greece utilized since the Lausanne Treaty the percentage of Muslim minority in Western Thrace has dropped from 84% to 35% today. Oran, Baskın, *Yunanistan’ın Lozan ihlalleri*, Lausanne Violations by Greece, (Ankara : Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüdler Milli Komitesi, 1999)The re-opening of minority school in Gökçeada/İmvrös and Bozcaada/ Tenedos (early 1950s) and establishment of the minority high schools in Komotini in 1953 and in Xanthi in 1965 may be also considered as positive measures in the framework of applied reciprocity. Bruce Clark, *İki Kere Yabancı: Kitlemel İnsan İhracı Modern Türkiye’yi ve Yunanistan’ı Nasıl Biçimlendirdi?*, *Twice a Stranger*, (Istanbul Bilgi Yayınları, 2008)

<sup>24</sup> Dimontenis Yağcıoğlu, “The internalization of reciprocity by many members of Greek-Orthodox and Turkish-Muslim minorities: how can it be explained? Some initial reflections”, *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities law, religion and politics*, (ed.) by Samim Akgönül., (Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008)

Western Thrace”<sup>25</sup>.

### **Reciprocity in the framework of Greek-Turkish Relations**

However, although reciprocity in this framework is morally wrong, legally illegitimate and harmful to minorities’ interests, in practice since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, it has been applied, and continues to be applied. The most salient point in terms of the integration of these minorities with the majority of group, and their freedom to exercise of their civil, economic, political and social, and religious rights is highly related to the relations between Turkey and Greece. When Greek- Turkish relationships were seriously deteriorated, this has been reflected to the Muslim minority on Western Thrace and Greek-Orthodox community of Turkey, as concerns the policy of the Greek and Turkish governments towards the minority population. Though minority issues also form part of the debate, discussed and criticized publicly, the arguments are often limited to a comparative narrative of repressive acts, aiming to demonstrate the faults and sins of the ‘other’ side<sup>26</sup>. Depending on the Greek-Turkish relations, there have been elements of continuity and change in the implementation and development of minority policies in Greece and Turkey.

In Greece, Muslim minority is internationally recognized compared to the Macedonian minority, and their rights are legally protected<sup>27</sup>. On the other hand, as aforementioned reciprocity inextricably linked with the fate of Greek Orthodox population of İstanbul and its outskirts, and the islands of Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada). As fluctuations of Greek-Turkish relations influence the fate of these minority communities, any wrong move towards these minorities would most likely jeopardize the delicate post-Lausanne relationship between Greece and Turkey.

In 10<sup>th</sup> June 1930, with the initiatives of Venizelos, the first rapprochement between Greece and Turkey occurred, when the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Greek Ambassador in Ankara signed the “Ankara Convention”, the Convention settled all the

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<sup>25</sup> Tsitselikis, Reciprocity, p. 98.

<sup>26</sup> London School of Economics; Hellenic Observatory Annual Symposium; Paper presentation, by Georgios Niarchos “Continuity & Change in the minority policies of Greece & Turkey”.  
[www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/Niarchos.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/Niarchos.pdf)

<sup>27</sup> Muslims who have settled outside Thrace are not covered by the Lausanne minority regime and therefore, lack places of worship or religious ministers for their weddings and funerals. The recently approved bill for the construction of a mosque and an Islamic cultural centre in the wider Athens area, aims to cure some of these problems, but it is unlikely to satisfy the needs of the Muslim community of Athens.

property issues which were pending after the populations' exchange. Turkey and Greece accepted not to participate in any economic or political alliance that would be against the interests of the other. Until the signature of the series of agreements of friendship, the Greek government favoured the "conservatives" of the minority, stressing on the religious and not the national characteristic of the minority. Unlike after the agreements, the "Reformists" were favoured in the expense of the "conservatives" by the Greek government, which interfered in the sphere of autonomy of the minority. The leader of the anti- Kemalist "group of the 150", Mustafa Sabri left Thrace and he went to Egypt<sup>28</sup>. In return, the Greek side requested from Turkey the removal of Papa Efthim from Istanbul. Moreover, although today the government of Greece justifies its refusal to accept the Turkish identity of the minority on the Treaty of Lausanne, which only mentions a "Muslim minority" by pointing out the fact that "Turkish" refers to state identification, rather than to an ethnicity, during the friendship years until 1950s (before 6-7 September Events of 1955), it should be noted that the chief administrator of Thrace orders municipalities to change all signs from "Muslim minority" to "Turkish minority"<sup>29</sup>. Which signifies the fact that despite claims that the Treaty of Lausanne only allows reference to a "Muslim minority," official Greek state policy has fluctuated regarding the identity of the minority and appears largely to be a function of Greco-Turkish relations<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>28</sup> The reforms that Kemal Atatürk introduced in the modern Turkish republic, which change completely the Islamic image of the country and formed a clear secular. State, were not welcomed by the conservative part of the minority society of the Western Thrace, a region where religion played a key role. The religion defined their lifestyle, and based on that they had been organized. The Conservatives or the "Old Muslims" (*Muhafazakâr*) were not determined to adopt the changes which were taking place in their motherland and that led to a conflict with the champions of "Kemalism", the "Kemalists" or the "Reformists" (*İnkılapçı*), who were trying to transfer the newly established state model in Greek Thrace. The conservatives were strictly opposed to the reforms that were already adopted to Turkey, many of which were related to fields they controlled. They didn't want to abolish the religious education, as well as they were against the use of Latin alphabet, or the Swiss Civil code, the new position of the Muslim woman and the abolition of the traditional clothing and the Islamic Law Şeriat. These reforms also included state control of the religious foundations, in which they played a dominant role. They also enjoyed the support of the Greek administration, had obvious interests that the minority not be recognized as national, but religious, thereby strengthening the Conservatives. The Lausanne regime gave them the chance to maintain their traditional character, as there was a stipulation in the Treaty about the protection of religious particularities. Baskın Oran, *Yunan-Türk ilişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu, The Problem of Western Thrace in Greek-Turkish Relations*, (Ankara Bilgi Yayınları, 1991).

<sup>29</sup> Baskın Oran links this good intention of Greece to its Cyprus policy, to display the international and Turkish community that Turks of Cyprus will live in peace and prosperity under the rule of Greece if it unites with Greece, as the Turkish/Muslim minority of Western Thrace does.

<sup>30</sup> Turkey and Greece, although they have not make war against each other since the 1920s and they have been involved in the common alliance (NATO) since 1952, are two countries that do not manage to establish good neighboring. As the former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs declare "among the obstacles that prevent not only the solution but even the discussion of the 'real' problems is the distrust between the two nations created by their living history". Moreover, both Turkey and Greece constructed their nation-state identity as a result of their struggle they made against each other and the process of their mutual interaction. Since 1974, Greek-Turkish relations have been frustrated mainly by two sets of issues: Cyprus and Aegean. After 1999 Helsinki Summit, it can be said that Turkey-EU relations had become the forth party in Greek-Turkish relations. Şükrü Sina Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri, 1821-1993 (Turkish-Greek Relations in Historical Context, 1821-1993)*, (Ankara: Ümit, 1993), p.10.

It is seen that after cold-war, minority is perceived as diverse, Muslim in general (Turks, Pomaks, Gypsies), but definitely not Turkish. Hence, Greece refers the minority as Muslim but treats a Turkish one<sup>31</sup>.

Among enormous examples I would like to give some applications of negative reciprocity between Greece and Turkey considering the Turkish and Greek minorities in their territory. The closure of minority schools on Gökçeada/Imvros and Bozcaada/Tenedos (1964), the Greek-Orthodox seminary on Halki/Heybeliada (1971), the closure of schools for the Muslims of Rodos and Kos/Istanköy (1971) as links in a chain reaction to mutually repressive measures. Similarly, the Cyprus events of 1954 (claim for union with Greece raised by the Greek-Cypriots), which caused the related pogrom against Greeks in Istanbul (6-7 September 1955), the unilateral denouncement by President Makarios of the constituent treaty of Cyprus, the military involvement of Turkey, the atrocities committed against Turkish-Cypriots by Greeks in Cyprus (1964) and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974) constitute the milestones which shaped Greek and Turkish policies towards their minorities: the collateral victims of the Cyprus crisis<sup>32</sup>. Although, as a reaction to the massive expulsion and immigration of the Greek minority (1955 and 1964)<sup>33</sup>, Greek authorities did not take symmetric direct counter-measures against the minority of Thrace, this was regarded as an attempt to show the international community that Greece was to be relied on keeping control over the Cyprus question (that any non-Greek population would be secure under Greek administration). However, later Greece also enforced the article 19 of the 1955 Citizenship Law, which had been used arbitrarily to deprive ethnic Turks (and other non-ethnic Greeks) of their citizenship<sup>34</sup>. Through the implementation of Article 19 of Civil Law, 60,000 citizens were expelled from Greek citizenship, and 50,000 of them were Muslim.

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Mustafa Aydın, "Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities", *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, edited by Mustafa Aydın, Kostas Ifantis, (London And New York: Routledge, 2004), p.27-32. Thanos M. Veremis, *Greeks and Turks in War and Peace*, (Athens News, 2007), p.180.

<sup>31</sup> Umut Özkırımlı and Spyros A. Sofos, *Tormented by history: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, (New York : Columbia University Press, 2008)

<sup>32</sup> Tsitselikis, p. 97

<sup>33</sup> In order to force Greece to take an action about the Cyprus Events, Turkey abandoned the bilateral agreement of 1930 between Greece and Turkey, which permits Greek citizens to work in Turkey. In 1964 Turkey announced that it would not extend the residence permit for the Greek citizens, which led to mass emigration of Greeks (8600 people) and drop in the number of Greek minority of Turkey.

<sup>34</sup> Baskın Oran, *Yunanistan'ın Lozan ihlalleri, Lausanne Violations of Greece*, (Ankara : Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüdler Milli Komitesi, 1999).

These events changed the balance between the population of minorities in the Western Thrace and Turkey which was determined by the Lausanne Treaty, such that today approximately 3000 Greek-Orthodox minority had left in Turkey compared to 86,000 Turkish-Muslim minority of Greece. Similarly, while in the early 1970s there were 2,622 Greeks on Gökçeada/Imbros, in 1985 there were 496 and today less than 300. Bozcaada/Tenedos had 1,400 Greeks in the early 1970s, 150 in the 1980s and around 50 today. Nevertheless as authorities noticed, considering the 3% birthrate of Western Thrace Turks, around 380,000 member of the minority group had been emigrated from Greece to Turkey<sup>35</sup>. This difference in the number of populations also affected and mainly removed the rule of reciprocity for the Turkish minority of Greece as left the Greek authorities free on their Western Thrace policies. This dramatic reduction in the number of Roums limited and deterred their political participation which is crucial for the protection of their minority rights and left it totally at the hands of Greek and international interests. As a result, the debate on minority rights had shifted from the implementation of property and educational rights of the Greek-Orthodox minority to maintaining of the Patriarch at Istanbul.

### **Electoral Systems and Party Systems of Greece and Turkey**

As the thesis of the paper asserts, the political behavior of the Greek minority in Istanbul and Turkish minority of Western Thrace is shaped by the political, social, economic conditions they are living in rather than their own ethnic identity. Therefore, it is salient to understand the functioning of the political system in Greece and Turkey, in order to analyze the political participation of the minority communities.

The electoral system of the states, determines the political behavior of the voters. A similar link can be discussed between the electoral system and the political participation of the minorities. The First-Past-the-Post electoral system has the feature of excluding dispersed minorities from representation. But it favors territorially concentrated groups. In Southeastern

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<sup>35</sup> According to Niarchos, socio-economical difference between the Greek-Orthodox minority and Turkish-Muslim minority also plays a significant role on their ability to immigrate, such that “the Greek-Orthodox, a generally urban, bourgeois and wealthy population that was politically and socially mobilized, did not manage to ‘survive’, but departed in a relatively small period of time. On the other hand, the Muslim minority in Greece managed to preserve its numerical strength, despite its low level of urbanization and social mobility. Perhaps, the fact that the latter was an agricultural community, attached to the land, from which it gained its living, largely contributed to its reluctance to abandon its roots”, Georgios Niarchos, *Between Ethnicity, Religion and Politics Foreign Policy and the Treatment of Minorities in Greece and Turkey, 1923-1974*, unpublished PhD Thesis, LSE.

Europe, and also in Greece and Turkey, countries opted for proportional representation (PR), however in combination with relatively high thresholds might actually be a greater disadvantage to minorities than majoritarian systems when these are geographically concentrated. Thresholds were not established to prevent minority participation, but rather to avoid excessive fragmentation of the Parliament. As a result of PR electoral system with high national thresholds, only the parties of the largest minority would be able to secure parliamentary representation, and only if they were to run on a single ticket. Coalitions among several smaller minority groups to overcome the threshold have been rare.

Turkish and Greek political systems display similar features, beside common social, economic and civil rights of the minorities in both sides. The electoral systems of these countries, which determine the allocation of the seats in the national assemblies and hence the behavior of the political parties, are also significant in understanding the role of the political parties. Both Turkey and Greece adopted proportional representative (PR) electoral systems. Turkey is applying PR electoral system since 1961 (after the 1960 military coup), and Greece had adopted complex system of "reinforced" proportional representation, which has been modified several times since the restoration of democracy in 1974, following seven years of military dictatorship. In both Greece<sup>36</sup> and Turkey<sup>37</sup>, we witnessed the rise of patron-client relations and populist policies after the adoption of the PR system (mainly 1974-1990 period for Greece; and since 1960 for Turkey). Moreover, although they are in PR electoral system, which is supposed to be more fair and representative compared to plurality electoral system, in both countries a significant national threshold is enforced, in order to deter the political participation of their minority out-of the party system. Greece applies 3% national threshold, which means an independent candidate, or a party should receive 200.000 numbers of votes, which is impossible for Muslim minority, which is around 100.000. Hence, the candidates' position on the party ticket was fixed in these elections and could not be influenced by votes' mark of preference. In practice this meant that PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and

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<sup>36</sup> Christos Lyrintzis, "PASOK in Power: From 'Change' to Disenchantment", in *Greece 1981-89 The Populist Decade*, (ed.) by Richard Clogg, (The Macmillan Press, 1993).

<sup>37</sup> DP's (Democrat Party) emergence changes the political patronage, due to now elected representatives become as direct personal (extremely accessible and act according to personal demand), and the voters have the power of direct bargaining with the candidates and parties. Sabri Sayari, "The Changing Party System", in S.Sayari and Y. Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, 2002. Sabri Sayari, "Political Patronage in Turkey", in E. Gellner and J Waterbury (eds.) *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, (Duckwph, 1997). According to Sayari, "political patronage" refers to a particular form of reciprocal exchange whereby individual patrons and/or political parties seek to mobilize the support of their followers in return for assistance and various brokerage services.



ND (New Democracy) would divide the three mandates in each of the Ksanthi (İskeçe) and Rodopi prefecture between them, with the largest party taking 2 and the smaller 1. When the minority candidates were first set up in 3rd place on each party ticket this means in practice their exclusion<sup>38</sup>. Turkey's 10% national threshold is adapted as a precaution to its Kurdish minority, not against the non-Muslim minorities who are around approximately 100.000 in total<sup>39</sup>.

## **Political Participation of the Minorities**

### **A- Participation of the Greek-Orthodox Community in Turkey**

Non-Muslim minorities had participated effectively in Turkish political system until 1961, before the number of Greek-Orthodox community had decreased drastically. Until 1946 the transition to the multiparty system, they had been represented in the Turkish Parliament as independent candidates. It is observed that the minority community had preferred Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti- DP) rather than Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- RPP). It is seen that only Greek-Orthodox minority group had been elected from RPP. The reason of preference for the minority group favoring DP can be due to the repressive measures of RPP. For example, as a result of the repressive measures of the RPP during the Early Republican period (1923-1945), in the 1930 municipality elections, the minorities supported the opponent party, Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Partisi- FRP) and FRP managed to mobilize the minority and immigrant (mostly exchangees) electorates as well<sup>40</sup>. Similarly, in the 14 May 1950 national elections, they voted for DP in majority, and played an important role for DP to come to the power, and each of the minority groups were represented in the Parliament<sup>41</sup>. The 6-7 September Events of 1955 damaged the good relation and trust between the minorities in Turkey and the political parties. During the 6-7 September Events

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<sup>38</sup> Vemund Aarbakke, "Concept of reciprocity and its significance for the political organization of the Muslim minority in Greece", in *Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities law, religion and politics*, (ed.) by Samim Akgönül., (İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), p. 130.

<sup>39</sup> Baskın Oran, *Türkiye'de azınlıklar: kavramlar, Lozan, İç mevzuat, içtihat, uygulama*, (İstanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2004). In his study it is noted around 1500 Greek-Orthodox lives in Turkey, which is given as 3000 in other sources. Around 60,000 Armenians, and 25,000 Jews are living in Turkey. The number of other non-Muslims such as Catholics, Protestants, and Syrian Orthodox (Süryani) are not given.

<sup>40</sup> Rifat N.Bali "1930 yılı Belediye seçimleri ve Serbest Fırka'nın azınlık adayları", "The 1930 Municipality Elections and the minority candidates of the Free Party", *Tarih ve Toplum*, vol. 167, November 1997, pp. 25-34 Cemil Koçak, *Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, The Incumbent Party and Free Republican Party with documents*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2006). Cem Emrence, *99 Günlük Muhalefet: Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, Opposition of 99 Days: Free Republican Party, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları 2006)

<sup>41</sup> İstanbul deputies (Resource: TBMM Albümü 1920-1991), Rifat Bali, Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlık Milletvekilleri, Minority Deputies in the Republican Period, *Toplumsal Tarih*, Sayı 186, Haziran 2009. Given in Appendix B.

of 1955, as a deputy from the incumbent party-DP- Aleksandros Hacopulos can be noted as the most effective Greek-Orthodox politician who expressed the concerns of his community<sup>42</sup>. Generally, Turkey's relations with its neighbors affected the position of its minorities. The last term a non-Muslim minority deputy had been elected to the Turkish Parliament is in 20<sup>th</sup> Term (8 January 1996-18 April 1999), Cefi Jozef Kamhi, a Jewish deputy from Istanbul. Candidacy of Kamhi who is a well-known businessman can be read also as 'window showing', where as a non-Muslim politician who would not express the difficulties the minorities experienced in the past, he would contribute to the positive presentation of Turkey abroad and would attract votes from a specific electorate group.

On the other hand, since 1961, non-Muslim minority groups, and especially Greek-Orthodox community had been deprived of political representation in the Turkish Parliament. Whether this is a deliberate choose of the minority groups or the major effective political parties is an issue, which must be questioned. Examining political participation from the point of view of democratic stability, one can note that minorities run the risk of being excluded from the political system without special protective measures. Especially in countries with mobilized ethnic nationalism, majorities have been unlikely to vote for parties or candidates of other nations or ethnic groups. Conventional institutions of democracies without minorities are insufficient to allow for a stable democracy system in diverse societies. It is in the interest of state and stability to provide for political inclusion of minorities to avoid the consequences of exclusion. Generally it is seen that, political participation of minorities has been largely channeled through minority parties. On the other hand, parliamentary representation, though symbolically important, has often not been the most significant form of minority inclusion, as the impact of minority members in the Parliament has been marginal.

To sum up, as smaller minorities more frequently articulate their concerns when it comes to minority-specific interests through institutions for cultural autonomy, minority associations, or local-level political activism, the same political participation strategy is feasible for the Greek-Orthodox minorities of Turkey. They donot have the sufficient number to form their own minority party, not even to elect an independent candidate, and the candidates from Greek-Orthodox ethnic origin are not preferred and nominated by the major effective Turkish parties. Therefore, the rule of reciprocity, effective policy of Greece and the intervention of

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<sup>42</sup> Alexis, *Greek Minority of Istanbul*, p. 289.

the international actors such as European Union play the significant role in protecting and monitoring their minority rights. The community is gathered around the Patriarch who is a powerful religious and political actor in expressing the conditions of the community to the internal and foreign public. Greek-Orthodox foundations and associations also enable the community to act collectively<sup>43</sup>. As every community needs to represent their political interests, the political participation strategy of Greek-Orthodox community has been shaped by the legal, social and economical conditions of Turkey. For instance, when the law for foundations was implemented by the Turkish government in 1936 (to prove the legacy of the foundations by showing the deeds), the community sought help from Greece to enforce the ‘rule of reciprocity’.

As mentioned, another key feature of the development of minority parties has been the European Union. Although the EU lacks a coherent minority right policy, it has strengthened the European legal framework, above all the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, by insisting on its ratification by accession states. However, in regard to the representation of minority parties in the political system, the EU has not taken a clear position. Hence, the Greek-Orthodox minority still faces difficulties in recognizing the title-deeds of its foundations, the communities and the Patriarchate lack of a legal status, new teaching materials and teachers trained abroad encounter problems in obtaining approval and most students have few prospects to remain in Turkey to study and work. The Halki/Heybeliada Theological Seminary has also attracted the interest of the EU, as an outstanding human rights violation that Turkey is required to cure. On the other hand, as given in the previous example, Turkey requires the improvement in the conditions of the Muslim minority in Greece, in return to open the Theological Seminary in Halki/Heybeliada. As a result, both Muslim and Greek-Orthodox communities have been worse-off because of the negative application of the reciprocity rule.

### **B- Participation of the Turkish-Muslim Community in Greece**

Greece is noted nowadays as one of the most homogeneous European countries. Compared to Turkey, Greece’s deeper incorporation into the process of European integration, the implementation of liberal European norms regarding human rights, have influenced the

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<sup>43</sup> More detailed study on the political participation strategy of the Greek-Orthodox community will be conducted during the thesis work through interview, literature review and archive research.

conduct of minority policy in recent years. Considering the political participation of Muslim minority to Greek politics, it is observed that since 1920s, in every Greek election the Turkish community had given forth at least one deputy as the community is highly concentrated in Western Thrace region, and in order to pull the votes of Turkish minority, Greek parties nominate Turkish deputy candidates in their lists<sup>44</sup>. Moreover, political parties or candidates of larger Turkish-Muslim minority have been a relatively stable fixture in highly volatile Greek political party systems. It is even seen that as the case of Mūderris Hafız Ali Galip, who had been elected to the Greek Parliament from Komotini/Gümülcine district for 6 terms, this consistency can also be understood as the reflection of the cleavages between majority and minority.

On the other hand, despite the geographically concentrated power of the community, Greece's integration to EU and its more homogeneous feature (which supposed to decrease security concerns of the state), rights of Western Thrace Turkish minority has been violated by the Greek state due to the enforcement of the 'rule of reciprocity', and fluctuations on the bilateral relation between Greece and Turkey. The main political struggle of the minority has been to be recognized as Turkish, rather than being referred as Muslim which the Greek state prefers by misusing the Lausanne Treaty<sup>45</sup>. The second problem is the nationalization of the lands belonging to the Turkish-Muslim minority who earn its living through animal husbandry and agriculture. Third problem can be given as the illegal deportation from Greek citizenship due to the enforcement of Article 19, where around 50,000 minority members lost their citizenship. The fourth one is their demand on controlling their own education materials, and the last one is to earn their right to elect their own religious leader, which has been assured by the Lausanne Treaty.

These rights and demands have been expressed through Turkish foundations, associations and mainly by the Turkish state, as well as in the Greek Parliament by the Turkish-Muslim minority deputies. However, effectiveness of the minority deputies can be questioned. In

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<sup>44</sup> Given in Appendix C.

<sup>45</sup> Several associations has been closed due the fact that they used the word 'Turk'. Even money has been offered in exchange for removing the word 'Turk' from the labels. The reflection of Cyprus Events is such that after the establishment of Turkish Republic of South Cyprus in 1983, Greek authorities removed these labels for security concerns such as to avoid a Muslim-Christian conflict. Baskin Oran, *The Problem of Western Thrace in Greek-Turkish Relations*, (Ankara Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991), p. 167.

Greek Parliament where to be the incumbent party a party needs at least 151 seats of 300<sup>46</sup>, votes and deputies of the minority community which has given forth to at least one deputy since 1920s, seems crucial, that giving bargaining power to the minority.

Inhanlı Events of March 1982 when properties, mosques, homes and associations belonging to minority had been destroyed by Greeks, this led the way to Sadık Ahmet's leadership, who also organized the mass march of 1988 which took the attention of the international associations (especially Turks in Europe) to their conditions. Increasing trend of identity politics of 1990s, also contributed to construct an ethnic identity consciousness among the Turkish minority. When between 1989-1990 election period, Turkish-Muslim minorities managed to elect independent candidates for the three sequential elections, and the raising leader Sadık Ahmet established his minority party called Friendship-Equality-Peace Party (Dostluk, Eşitlik, Barış Partisi-DEB), Greek government immediately introduced 3% national electoral threshold before the 10 October 1993 elections, in order to avoid political participation of the minority group independent from Greek control. Moreover, the leader of DEB and independent deputy Dr. Sadık Ahmet has been tried and jailed, as he was accused of through using the word 'Turk' destroying the civil peace by openly and indirectly leading the citizens to violence and creating a division within the society. Whereas, by the Turkish minority community, his rival and another independent deputy Ahmet Faikoğlu had been accused of having secret connections with Greeks. To protest the implementation of 3% threshold, Muslim minority voted for independent candidates again, and as a result 10 October 1993 elections had been the only election that Turkish-Muslim minority has not been represented in Greek Parliament. Since then in every elections, Turkish minority groups lead campaigns as 'Turk's vote is for Turk' in order to give forth to deputies as many as possible, where Greek parties introduce different Turkish-origin candidates in order to divide but also gain the Turkish votes. Therefore, political effectiveness of the minorities has been limited and controlled due to the Greek political system, where minority group cannot be represented neither by their own minority party nor by independent candidates, and needed to be involved in the Greek parties if they want to be represented in the Parliament.

Interest of Turkey on Greek elections and mobilizing the Turkish-Muslim minority in Western Thrace cannot be dismissed. During 1989-1990 period, Turkey was also supporting

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<sup>46</sup> As the case for Karamanlis' New Democracy Party for the term 16 September 2007-4 October 2009.

independent candidates. On the other hand, as Vermund asserts, independent candidates were independent of Greek parties but more dependent on Turkey<sup>47</sup>. In 22 September 1996 elections, minorities managed to elect three candidates, but from three different Greek parties. It is noted that Turkey pooled the minority vote for their favored candidates to PASOK in Rhodopi and to ND in İskeçe/Ksanthi. General look to party preferences of the Turkish-Muslim minority in Western Thrace suggests that there is not a strong party-affiliation for the Greek parties. It is seen that usually, in Komotini/Gümülcine the votes are given to PASOK and in Rhodopi (İskeçe/Ksanthi) district ND is preferred. The reason behind this division can be to elect the highest number of minority deputies. However, the question whether these votes are given for the party preferences or for the candidates is important to understand the political behavior of this minority group and needed to be examined in more detail. For the last two electoral period, it is seen that from both Komotini/Gümülcine and Ksanthi/İskeçe Turkish-Muslim minority choosed their preference favoring PASOK, probably due to the economic crisis and their long for more liberal right. Hence, this question is also important as it indicates that Turks in Greece donot vote regarding their intrinsic ethnic behavior, but in accordance with the dynamics of Greek political system.

Another actor that influences the political participation of the Turkish-Muslim minority is the Orthodox Church in Greece, which usually interferes to Greek politics, as much as Turkish army interferes to Turkish politics. Orthodox Church perceives the demands of the minority as a latent jihad. And Muslim minority is still widely perceived as an alien body within Greece and its elected representatives are often regarded with suspicion<sup>48</sup>. This is why, when Gülbeyaz Karahasan nominated by PASOK for the superprefecture of Kavala, Drama and Xanthi in May 2006, Metropolitan and Archbishop in Greece interferes to politics and opposed this nomination. She was asked to express that she is Greek in public.

### **Conclusion**

Since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, both Greek and Turkish authorities regarding their minorities have misused the rule of reciprocity. The process created a vicious circle where fluctuations in Greek-Turkish relations influences the application of rule of reciprocity, and where this implementation limits or improves minorities' political participation which is

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid.p. 136.

<sup>48</sup> Özkırmı, Tormented by History, p.159

crucial for them to protect and monitor their social, economical, cultural and political rights in order to enjoy freely. Violation of minority rights is always ‘commercially’ popular; therefore more eager to be efficiently promoted abroad, as human suffering always provokes stronger sentiments of disapproval, than other political misconducts. The paper displayed that minority rights were always invoked in times of tension or in cases when the two countries were facing international criticism for their own conduct of human rights. Hence, improvement of their political participation is very salient to break this vicious circle and position their right to enjoy their minority rights, which are given by the Lausanne Treaty beyond the restriction of the ‘rule of reciprocity’. With this regard, implementation of quota system for both Turkish-Muslim minority and Greek-Orthodox minority in Greek and Turkish electoral systems respectively can be discussed as a solution to break this chain and to normalize Greek-Turkish relations regarding their minorities. Until now, it has been seen that minorities determine their political behavior according to the enforcement of the rule of reciprocity, and Greek-Turkish relations. The quota system would also help the minorities to express their concerns and display their political preferences in a more relaxed atmosphere. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s call on his visit to Athens to Greek-Orthodox Turkish citizens who left Turkey in the period following 6-7 September Events and currently live in Greece that they can return back to Turkey<sup>49</sup>, if realized would increase the number of Greek-Orthodox minority in Turkey around 80,000, and would ease their political participation.

The will and ability of Greece and Turkey to effectively undertake the above process will determine whether they will successfully deal with their future challenges over their minority policies and bilateral relationship. As aforementioned, the minority issue has remained right or wrongs a matter of politics, affected by bilateral relations and most often seen through a national security perspective. Within this context, the minority issue has been a matter of secondary importance within the whole spectre of Greco-Turkish differences. The big interests at stake, namely Cyprus and the Aegean, kept it at a minor level of interest and gave it a rather politically exchangeable character<sup>50</sup>. However, both sides seem to agree during this period that when relations were improving, minorities were off the agenda and a permanent resolution of their main differences would keep them out there.

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<sup>49</sup> Erdoğan’s visit to Athens, 17 May 2010, <http://www.stargazete.com/politika/genel-baskan-baska-yerdeydi-haber-262674.htm>. On his demands for Turkish-Muslim minority: <http://www.news.az/articles/15575>.

<sup>50</sup> Niarchos, *Between Ethnicity, Religion and Politics Foreign Policy and the Treatment of Minorities in Greece and Turkey, 1923-1974*, unpublished PhD Thesis.

With this regard, another question emerges is: if the European integration process for Greece, and eventually for Turkey, and the signing of a series of international legal instruments by both countries concerning human and minority rights, may serve to disconnect the minority issue from bilateral dimension and put it under multilateral supervision, which is believed to relieve these minorities of the burden of negative reciprocity and de-legitimize it once and for all? Although as the criteria of accession for the candidate and member countries, European Union put democratization and respect to human and minority rights, there is not a certain criteria or article on the political participation of the minority groups. Looking at Greek policy towards its Turkish-Muslim minority suggest that reciprocity rule and bilateral relations with Turkey play a more effective role than the enforcements of EU. On the other hand, Turkey's accession process to EU would improve Turkey's policy toward its non-Muslim and Muslim minorities, and would help and encourage both Turkey and Greece to deal with their high political issues such as Aegean and Cyprus conflict. Putting these issues out of the agenda would deter negative implementation of rule of reciprocity for these minority groups.



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## **APPENDIX A: TREATY of LAUSANNE (24 July 1923)**

### **PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.**

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#### **ARTICLE 37.**

Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them.

#### **ARTICLE 38.**

The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.

#### **ARTICLE 39.**

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.

All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.

#### **ARTICLE 40.**

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

#### ARTICLE 41 .

As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned.

#### ARTICLE 42 .

The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.

#### ARTICLE 43 .

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act with constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.

This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order.

#### ARTICLE 44 .

Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

#### ARTICLE 45 .

The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.

## APPENDIX B: List of Non-Muslim Minority Deputies in Turkish Parliament since 1935

Name and Surname of the Deputy	Ethnicity	Political Party	Term
Berç Türker (Keresteci)	Armenian	Independent	1 March 1935-5 August 1946 V-VI-VII Term
Nikola Taptas	Greek-Orthodox	Independent	1 March 1935- 8 March 1943 V and VI Term
Abravaya Marmaralı	Jewish	Independent	1 March 1935-8 March 1943 V and VI Term
Mihal Kayaoğlu	Greek-Orthodox	Independent	8 March 1943-5 August 1946 VIII Term
İstamat Zihni Özdamar	Turkish-Orthodox	Independent	1 March 1935-5 August 1946 V-VI-VII Term
Avram Galanti Bodrumlu	Jewish	Independent	8 March 1943-5 August 1946 VIII Term
Nikola Fakaçelli	Greek-Orthodox	CHP	5 August 1946-22 May 1950 VIII Term
Vasil Konos	Greek-Orthodox	CHP	VIII Term, resigned before participating to the Parliament.
Salamon Adato	Jewish	DP	5 August 1946-3 April 1954 VIII and IX Term
Ahilya Moshos	Greek-Orthodox	DP	22 May 1950-14 May 1954 IX Term
Andre Vahram Bayar	Armenian	DP	22 May 1950-14 May 1954 IX Term
Aleksandros Hacopulos	Greek-Orthodox	DP	22 May 1950-27 May 1960 IX-X-XI Term
Zakar Tarver	Armenian	DP	14 May 1954-27 May 1960 X and XI Term
Hanri Soryano	Jewish	DP	14 May 1954-1 November 1957 X Term
Yusuf Salman	Jewish	DP	1 November 1957-27 May 1960 XI Term
İzak Altabev	Jewish	DP	1 November 1957-27 May 1960 XI Term
Hristaki Ioannidis	Greek-Orthodox	DP	1 November 1957-27 May 1960 XI Term
Mıgırdiç Şellefyan	Armenian	DP	1 November 1957-27 May 1960 XI Term
Erol Dilek	Jewish	Founding Parliament, Representative of State President	6 January-25 October 1961
Hermine Agavni Kalustyan	Armenian	Founding Parliament, Representative of State President	6 January-25 October 1961
Kaludi Laskari	Greek-Orthodox	Founding Parliament, Representative of State President	6 January-25 October 1961
Berç Şahak Turan	Armenian	Member of the Republican Senate	15 October 1961-7 June 1964
Cefi Jozef Kamhi	Jewish	DYP then DTP	8 January 1996-18 April 1999 XX Term

The table is taken from the article: Bali, Rifat N., Cumhuriyet Döneminde Azınlık Milletvekilleri, Toplumsal Tarih, Vol. 186, June 2009.

CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (People's Republican Party/RPP)

DP: Demokrat Party (Democratic Party/DP)

DYP: Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party/TPP)

DTP: Demokrat Türkiye Partisi (Democratic Turkey Party/DTP)

## APPENDIX C: List of Muslim Minority Deputies in Greek Parliament since 1920s<sup>51</sup>

### 1 NOVEMBER 1920:

- 1-Müderriş Hafız Ali Galip Gümölcine/Komotini
- 2-Müderriş Hafız Salih Efendi
- 3-Arifzâde Arif Bey
- 4-Hasan Abdürrahimođlu İskeçe/Ksanthi

### 16 DECEMBER 1923:

- 1-Mustafa Ađa Gümölcine/Komotini
- 2-Eminbeyzâde Hasan Bey Dimetoka/Didymotheiko
- 3-Müderriş Hoca Mestan Efendi İskeçe/Ksanthi

### 7 NOVEMBER 1926:

- 1-Müderriş Hafız Ali Galip Gümölcine/Komotini
- 2-Mustafa Ađa
- 3-Şükrü Mahmutođlu İskeçe/Ksanthi
- 4-Haşimbeyzâde Fehmi Bey

### 19 AUGUST 1928:

- 1-Müderriş Hafız Ali Galip Gümölcine/Komotini
- 2-Cezayirli Muhtar Ali Rıza
- 3-Niyazi Mumcu İskeçe/Ksanthi
- 4-Halil Karaçanlı

### 25 SEPTEMBER 1932:

- 1-Müderriş Hafız Ali Galip Gümölcine/Komotini
- 2-Mustafa Ađa
- 3-Hatip Yusuf
- 4-Hasan Abdürrahimođlu İskeçe/Ksanthi

### 5 MARCH 1933:

- 1-Müderriş Hafız Galip Gümölcine/Komotini
- 2-Mustafa Ađa
- 3-İbrahim Demir Serdarzâde İskeçe/Ksanthi
- 4-Hasan Abdürrahimođlu

### 9 JUNE 1935:

- 1-Hatip Yusuf Gümölcine/Komotini
- 2-Mehmet Mustafaođlu
- 3-Niyazi Mumcu İskeçe/Ksanthi
- 4-Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi

### 26 JANUARY 1936:

- 1-Müderriş Hafız Ali Galip Gümölcine/Komotini
- 2-Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi İskeçe/Ksanthi

### 31 MARCH 1946:

- 1-Osman Üstüner Gümölcine/Komotini

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<sup>51</sup> Taken from <http://www.westtrakien.com/haberler/b.trakyada1920denbuyanamilletvekiliseilent.html>. The minority deputies of 2007 and 2009 elections are added by the author.



2-Faik Engin  
3-Hüseyin Zeybek İskeçe/Ksanthi  
3- Osman Nuri Fettâhoğlu

**5 MARCH 1950:**

1-Fehmi Otmanlı Gümülcine/Komotini  
2-Osman Üstüner  
3-Osman Nuri Fettâhoğlu İskeçe/Ksanthi

**9 SEPTEMBER 1951:**

1-Osman Üstüner Gümülcine/Komotini  
2-Os. Nuri Fettâhoğlu İskeçe/Ksanthi  
3-Hamdi Hüseyin Fehmi

**16 NOVEMBER 1952:**

1-Yusuf Hasanoğlu (Molla) Gümülcine/Komotini  
2-Hasan Hatipoğlu  
3-Os. N. Fettâhoğlu İskeçe/Ksanthi

**19 FEBRUARY 1956:**

1-Osman Üstüner Gümülcine/Komotini  
2-Yusuf Hasanoğlu  
3-Os. N. Fettâhoğlu İskeçe/Ksanthi

**11 MAY 1958:**

1-Osman Üstüner Gümülcine/Komotini  
2-Yusuf Hasanoğlu  
3-Os. N. Fettâhoğlu İskeçe/Ksanthi

**29 OCTOBER 1961:**

1-Yusuf Hasan oğlu Gümülcine/Komotini  
2-Hasan Hatip oğlu  
3-Os. N. Fettâh oğlu İskeçe/Ksanthi

**1 NOVEMBER 1963:**

1-Yusuf Hasan oğlu Gümülcine/Komotini  
2-Hasan Hatip oğlu  
3-Os. N. Fettâh oğlu İskeçe/Ksanthi

**16 FEBRUARY 1964:**

1-Hasan hatip oğlu Gümülcine/Komotini  
2-Yusuf Hasan oğlu

**17 NOVEMBER 1974:**

1-Yaşar Mehme toğlu Gümülcine/Komotini  
2-Sebahattin Galip

**20 NOVEMBER 1977:**

1-Hasan İmamoğlu Gümülcine/Komotini (Ethniki Parataksi)  
2-Orhan Hacıbram İskeçe/Ksanthi (PASOK)  
3-Celâl Zeybek (ND)

**18 OCTOBER 1981:**

1- Yaşar Mehmet oğlu Gümülcine/Komotini (ND)  
2-Ahmet Mehmet (PASOK)

**2 JUNE 1985:**

- 1-Mehmet Müftü oğlu Gümülcine/Komotini (ND)
- 2-Ahmet Faik oğlu İskeçe (PASOK)

**2 JUNE 1989:**

- 1-Sadık Ahmet Gümülcine/Komotini (Independent)

**5 NOVEMBER 1989:**

- 1- İsmail Molla Gümülcine /Komotini (Independent)

**8 APRIL 1990:**

- 1-Sadık Ahmet Gümülcine/Komotini (Independent)
- 2-Ahmet Faikoğlu İskeçe/Ksanthi (Independent)

**10 OCTOBER 1993:**

-

**22 SEPTEMBER 1996:**

- 1-Galip Galip Gümülcine/Komotini (PASOK)
- 2-Mustafa Mustafa (Synospismos)
- 3-Birol Akifoğu İskeçe/Ksanthi (ND)

**9 APRIL 2000:**

- 1-Galip Galip Gümülcine/Komotini (PASOK)
- 2-Ahmet Mehmet (ND)

**7 MARCH 2004:**

- 1-İlhan Ahmet (ND)

**16 SEPTEMBER 2007:**

- 1-Çetin Mandacı (PASOK)
- 2-Ahmet Hacıosman (PASOK)

**4 OCTOBER 2009:**

- 1- Çetin Mandacı (PASOK)
- 2- Ahmet Hacıosman (PASOK)