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Crash: Iran Aseman AT72 near Semirom on Feb 18th 2018, impacted terrain

By Simon Hradecky, created Sunday, Feb 18th 2018 08:22Z, last updated Monday, Mar 12th 2018 01:34Z

An Iran Aseman Airlines Avions de Transport Regional ATR-72-212, registration EP-ATS performing flight EP-3704 from Tehran Mehrabad to Yasuj (Iran) with 60 passengers and 6 crew, disappeared from radar near the Dena Mountain at about 09:30L (06:00Z). The aircraft was found on Feb 20th 2018 at position N30.8229 E51.6143 at an elevation of approximately 4000 meters/13120 feet. There were no survivors.

Emergency services reported fog and snowfall in the crash area hamper rescue efforts and make it impossible to land helicopters at the crash site. Rescuers are on their way to the crash site by foot.

On Feb 21st 2018 rescue and recovery personnel reached the crash site, first bodies have been recovered.

The airline confirmed the aircraft (initially reporting ATR-72-212A registration EP-ATX built in year 2000, later identifying ATR-72-212 registration EP-ATS built in 1993) has crashed in southern Iran due to "atmospheric conditions" while enroute to Yasuj with 60 passengers and 6 crew (all names were published on the airline's website). The aircraft had departed Mehrabad Airport at 08:00L (04:30Z), contact was lost about 50 minutes later. After the aircraft disappeared, helicopters were dispatched and sighted the aircraft in terrain accessible only by helicopters. Rescue forces are being dispatched on site. The airline subsequently reported no survivors were found at the crash site. The airline added, that the captain involved in the accident flight was experienced stating he had experienced the failure of the #2 engine on his aircraft and had been able to safely land the aircraft in Yasuj in 2014.

Iran's News Agency Fars identified the crashed aircraft as EP-ATS (built in 1993) based on "some source". According to Mode-S data the EP-ATS was flying about 160nm north of Semirom at 05:15Z. Iran's News Agency IRNA however reported EP-ATX based on the statement of the airline, but subsequently changed to EP-ATS.

On Feb 19th 2018 local officials reported the wreckage has been located in the range of Dangazloo (Position of village: N30.8687 E51.6483) and Noqol (Position of village: N30.8672 E51.6531), located about 11nm northnortheast of Yasuj.

Subsequently on Feb 19th 2018 the CAO (Iran's Civil Aviation Authority) denied that report stating the exact location of the wreckage has still not been determined, the last radar contact was 14nm from Yasuj. Helicopters have been dispatched again following weather improvement.

On Feb 20th 2018 Iran's Revolutionary Guards reported helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles have sighted the wreckage 30 meters below the peak of the mountains south of Noqol (Editorial note: airway W144 leading to Yasuj passes over Nogol and Yasuj NDB, according to Google Earth the highest peak below W144 in that area rises up to about 4040 meters/13250 feet at position N30.7946 E51.6355, another peak rising up to 3900 meters/12800 feet is at position N30.8034 E51.6184, both about 7nm northeast of the aerodrome. The instrument approach chart (see below) lists the higher eastern peak at 13,984 feet/4263 meters and the other western peak at 13,819 feet/4213 meters).

On Feb 20th 2018 The Aviation Herald received verified information, that the flight had been enroute at FL210. At 05:52Z the aircraft was cleared to descend from FL210 to FL170 while tracking airway W144. At 05:53Z the aircraft was cleared to join the NDB instrument approach procedure overhead the NDB Yasuj, the crew reported 25nm from the aerodrome at 05:55Z and at 05:59z 14nm from the aerodrome. At 06:00Z the crew correctly read back QNH 1021 reported by ATC, this was the last communication from the aircraft. When tower called the aircraft at 06:04Z there was no reply anymore.

The French BEA joined the investigation led by Iran's CAO and dispatched three investigators and technical advisors to the crash site.

The Dena Mountain features more than 40 peaks above 4000 meters, the highest peak rises up to 4409 meters (14,460 feet).

The aerodrome of Yasuj is surrounded by high mountains. The AIP Iran do not publish any Standard Arrival Route, only Instrument Approach Procedures 1 (Cat A/B including ATR-72) and 2 (Cat C/D) are published together with the aerodrome chart. The IAC marks the MSA 25nm north of the aerodrome at 15,500 feet MSL.

On Oct 26th 2017 the airline had posted a photo of EP-ATS reporting that the aircraft will be restored to flying condition by qualified maintenance engineers after being out of service for seven years.

On Feb 22nd 2018 Iran's Civil Aviation Authority (CAO) reported Iran Aseman Airlines temporarily stopped operating their ATR aircraft until further notice in order to permit a comprehensive study of the causes of the crash and thus ensure safety of flights.

On Feb 23rd 2018 Iran's CAO released first information in Persian stating, that the minimum altitude along airway W144, that the aircraft was tracking on, was 17,000 feet MSL, in an emergency situation the aircraft could have descended to the minimum safe altitude of 15,500 feet spanning north of the aerodrome and around the crash site. A lot of investment had gone into Yasuj Airport, besides an NDB a DVOR/DME navigational aid has been installed at the airport as well as runway lighting permitting night operations. The aircraft carried 59 adults and one child as passengers and 6 crew (two pilots, two flight attendants, two security officers). Communication with the aircraft was lost about 85 minutes after departure from Tehran Mehrabad. Attempts to locate the aircraft via its ELT were unsuccessful. According to ATC recordings the aircraft reported overhead OBTUX waypoint on airway W144 at 09:20L (05:50Z), was cleared to descend to FL170 at 09:22L (05:52Z), was handed off to and reported on Yasuj Tower at 09:23L (05:53Z) and cleared to join the approach procedure overhead Yasuj, the aircraft descended through FL186 at 09:25L (05:55Z) and exited radar coverage due to mountaineous terrain, the crew reported being 25nm from Yasuj at 09:25L and reported 14nm DME from Yasuj at 09:29L, at 09:30L (06:00Z) the crew acknowledged the QNH transmitted by tower, at 09:32L (06:02Z) there was a transmission as if the microphone of a radio was keyed, however, no actual transmission occurred. When tower called at 09:34L (06:04Z) the aircraft did not reply anymore. The crew did not indicate any emergency or abnormal situation on board (e.g. turbulence). The aircraft was supposed to continue at FL170 until overflying the NDB, then descend to 15,000 feet and join the instrument approach procedure. The CAO reported the weather at Yasuj were very different to the reported Metars: Ambient temperature at Yasuj was between 0 and -2 degrees C (not 13 degrees C as indicated in the METARs), there were clouds between 3500 and 4500 feet with thunderstorms and overcast cloud at 9000 feet. QNH was 1021 hPa. Accident investigators are on site to recover the black boxes (FDR and CVR). The captain (62, ATPL, 17,400 hours total, 15,000 hours on type) was flight instructor within the airline. The first officer (36) had accumulated 1,846 hours total and 96 hours on type.

On Mar 3rd 2018 Iran's CAO reported that two pieces of wreckage recovered by mountain climbers according to training provided likely are the black boxes of the aircraft. Until the pieces are handed over to the specialists of the accident investigation team it is not possible to officially verify the black boxes though.

On Mar 5th 2018 Iran's CAO and the accident investigation team confirmed the pieces recovered on Mar 3rd 2018 were indeed both blackboxes, flight data and cockpit voice recorders, of EP-ATS. On Mar 6th 2018 the CAO added, that the recorders will be read out and analysed in France due to some technical issues.

On Mar 8th 2018 the CAO reported the recorders have been successfully read out in France, the data have been handed to Iran's Accident Investigation Team who will now analyse the data and prepare a report due to in due time.

On Mar 11th 2018 Iran's AIB released their preliminary report in Persian reporting that according to FDR and CVR the aircraft had been handed over to Yasuj Tower, the autopilot was set to 15,000 feet. Descending through 15,600 feet the crew activated the anti-ice systems. The aircraft levelled off at 15,000 feet on autopilot, the crew set the QNH to 1021 and maintained 15000 feet for about one minute. Then the engines were reduced to idle, the speed reduced to 200 KIAS with the angle of attack increasing, the engines get slightly accelerated. The speed continued to decrease and reached 129 KIAS (minimum maneouvering speed 132 KIAS), the pitch reaches 15 degrees nose up, the engines accelerate to 67% torque. The altitude target is set to 14,000 feet and the aircraft begins to descend at about 600fpm. The speed further reduces to 117 KIAS, a stall warning activates, the crew disengages the autopilot, the aircraft rolls 20 degrees to the left, the pitch reduces to about 9 degrees nose down. Descending through 14200 feet at 137 KIAS the autopilot gets re-engaged, the aircraft rolls right by 12 degrees, the pitch increases to 5 degrees nose down. A GPWS warning "TERRAIN AHEAD! PULL UP!" activates, the autopilot is disengaged, the GPWS warning continues for 12 seconds until impact.

The AIB continued that there was no technical malfunction of the aircraft, the engines operated in accordance to pilot inputs, all aircraft systems supplied the crew with valid data. Due to the cloud cover the crew remained unaware of the mountains ahead until 2 seconds before impact and rolled the aircraft sharply left in order to avoid the terrain.

The AIB stated that the crew should have maintained 17,000 feet in accordance with the flight plan, however, descended the aircraft to 15,000 feet followed by a target altitude of 14,000 feet on the autopilot contrary to flight rules. In addition, while the crew was permitted to conduct the flight with the weather data available at the time of departure, the latest weather information provided by Yasuj Tower indicating clouds up to 15,000 feet prohibited the approach to Yasuj according to company procedures due to cloud cover present at the aerodrome, the crew should have diverted to Shiraz or Isfahan planned as alternate aerodromes. Pilot discussions according to the CVR confirm the presence of cloud up to 15,000 feet confirming the accuracy of the weather report by Yasuj Tower. Although the aerodrome was still more than 10km away the crew appeared to be confident the area would be in visual meteorologic conditions. The AIB warns that all of this is first interpretation of first investigation results and is not to be taken as cause of the accident.


Metars Yasuj:
OISY 180630Z 14006KT 9999 FEW035CB SCT040 OVC090 15/M02 Q1021=
OISY 180600Z 13004KT 9999 FEW035CB SCT040 OVC090 13/M00 Q1021=
OISY 180530Z 09004KT 9999 FEW035CB SCT040 OVC090 14/M01 Q1022=
OISY 180500Z 00000KT 9999 SCT040 OVC090 11/M00 Q1021=
OISY 180430Z 08006KT 9999 SCT040 SCT090 10/M01 Q1021=
OISY 180400Z 14006KT 9999 FEW040 BKN090 06/00 Q1022=
OISY 180300Z 00000KT 9999 FEW040 BKN090 06/M00 Q1022=
OISY 180200Z 16004KT 9999 FEW040 SCT090 07/M00 Q1022=
OISY 180100Z 10004KT 9999 FEW040 SCT090 06/00 Q1022=

Wreckage found on Feb 20th 2018 (Photos: APA/Mohammed Khademosheikh/Mizan News Agency):
Wreckage found on Feb 20th 2018 (Photo: APA/Mohammed Khademosheikh/Mizan News Agency)

Wreckage found on Feb 20th 2018 (Photo: APA/Mohammed Khademosheikh/Mizan News Agency)

Infrared Satellite SEVIRI IODC Image Feb 18th 2018 06:00Z (Graphics: AVH/Meteosat):
Infrared Satellite SEVIRI IODC Image Feb 18th 2018 06:00Z (Graphics: AVH/Meteosat)

Map view overhead Noqol at 7000 meters/FL230 looking towards crash site and Yazuj (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):
Map view overhead Noqol at 7000 meters/FL230 looking towards crash site and Yazuj (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth)

Detail Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):
Detail Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth)

Area Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):
Area Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth)

Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):
Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth)

Excerpt of Enroute Chart around Yasuj (Graphics: AIP Iran):
Excerpt of Enroute Chart around Yasuj (Graphics: AIP Iran)

Instrument Approach Chart 1 Yasuj (Graphics: AIP Iran):
Instrument Approach Chart Yasuj (Graphics: AIP Iran)



Reader Comments: (the comments posted below do not reflect the view of The Aviation Herald but represent the view of the various posters)


By fariborz on Saturday, Apr 7th 2018 09:38Z

@Captain Crunch :
Our discourse here was to try and figure out why experienced pilots had the power back so low.

hi, may be they want to commence descent for app in a wrong position , to reach the aerodrome traffic altitude (due high altitude of IAF in relation of field elevation.



@ Tony La Ros
By Captain Crunch on Tuesday, Mar 20th 2018 11:57Z

Congratulations private pilot Tony! You've cracked the case!

Drop the nose and splat your brains on the rocks at full power. Keep in mind you're below the GRID MORA altitude, so you don't know where the 14,000 peak is and you're at 14,200, descending. If you had another answer what would it be?

I think to stay alive:

Push slightly on the nose
Flaps 15
MCT Thrust
- EGPS alert -
Do a 180 degree Chandell away from radar returns (since you probably can't climb much at 137kts in an ice covered ATR.

Our discourse here was to try and figure out why experienced pilots had the power back so low.







By Tony La Ros on Tuesday, Mar 20th 2018 01:14Z

ATR mountain crash

I could puke reading these childish ‘expert comments.
I am a retired aero engineer and pilot. First lesson in a C150,stall this thing and recover with nose down and full power.When did these armchair geeks learn this.


@Anonymous
By Magnar Nordal on Friday, Mar 16th 2018 09:22Z

The preliminary report surprises me. Anti-ice is on, so min speed is 157, not 132. Use of de-icing is not mentioned.

Stick pusher activation is not mentioned. Uncommanded roll is a sign of aerodynamic stall. This can happen even when the wing is free of ice. I have no idea if the ADs you mentioned have any influence.

Correct stall recovery in ATR is:
1. Push the yoke forward.
2. Flaps 15.
3. Add power as required, in this case should they have set MCT (max continuous thrust).


@ Magnar Nordal
By (anonymous) on Friday, Mar 16th 2018 03:03Z

Thanks Magnar for the great stick pusher activation info. I'm not sure that the stick pusher played any part, since they were in a 600fpm descent at stall warning, but it's possible. T-tails are kinda funky. I wonder if this thing had the stick pusher AD that changed the activation attitude with ice on?

The 20 degree surprise roll at disconnect sounds kinda like the dreaded aileron hinge ice causing autopilot to hard-over the aileron trim prior to disc, if this thing didn't have the 18 boot AD's (if those even do any good.) What do you think?

What's the likely stall recovery technique?

Push on yoke
& lower flaps?

No Max Pwr?

Thanks much,

Cpt Crunch





@Captain Crunch
By Magnar Nordal on Thursday, Mar 15th 2018 01:26Z

ATR has stick pusher. On this model, with flaps 0, is stick shaker activated at 11.6 degrees AOA and stick pusher activated at 13.5 degrees AOA. When anti-ice is activated is the threshold reduced to 8 degrees and 10.6 degrees respectively (icing mode).

According to the preliminary report was anti-ice activated when the aircraft descended through 15.600 feet. This sets the stall warning system to icing mode. The airspeed indicator has two bugs for minimum speeds: A white bug indicates minimum speed in normal conditions. According to the report was it 132, which corresponds with a weight of 20 tons. A red bug indicates minimum speed for icing conditions, which is 157 knots in icing conditions.



No A/T
By Skydriver on Wednesday, Mar 14th 2018 07:52Z

@Joao Patricio
Thanks for clarifying such a basic point!
So crew was used to handling the throttles under AP, next question : what distracted them from gesting aircraft energy?


A/T
By Joao Patricio on Tuesday, Mar 13th 2018 23:11Z

I read many comments about auto pilot and the pilots not using the auto throttle... heads up: the atr does not have auto throttle.


Manual thrust?
By Skydriver on Tuesday, Mar 13th 2018 10:08Z

Is it an option the plane was flown using autopilot but manual thrust?
This might be the beginning of everythings as this would require permanent situation awarness on speed/thrust. This kind of monitoring while under AP is quite demanding. That’s why most FCOMs or SOPs will direct the crew to use A/T while using AP.



Preliminary Report
By Gozlemci on Tuesday, Mar 13th 2018 06:28Z

Thanks Simon, very good performance !


Stick Pusher?
By Captain Crunch on Tuesday, Mar 13th 2018 00:54Z

Some T-tail aircraft have "Stick Pushers" because at high AOA, the main wing can block out the tail, and you can't recover from a stall promptly, since no elevators.

For example, sadistic B-727 simgods would pull the stick shaker breaker and if you got above 13 degrees deck angle (holding altitude) the bird would lose over 4000 feet in the stall, since you were blocking the T-Tail with the main wing. Nothing you did would decrease AOA promptly.

So the later BAe-146 T-tail had a stick pusher which would activate at stall to prevent blocking the tail with main wing wash.

Doesn't this T-Tail ATR have a stick pusher that activates at stall warning? Is that why the stall recovery procedure doesn't have "max power" in there? At high AOA, full power would pitch nose higher, blank the elevators and put you in a deep stall???
This is just guesswork on my part. As Simon says, this ATR never should have started this bad weather approach: DIVERT!




Good posts by everybody
By Captain Crunch on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 23:55Z

Over reliance on automation & Fear of hand flying are suspect to me with the few shards of info we have. The weather was cold and IMC layers with thunderstorms over the field. In bad icing, the NTSB said that turboprops should be hand flown to detect icing effects (that ATR autopilots blindly trim against - me.) This was highlighted by Dr. Earl Weener's NTSB slide presentation Feb 1, 2011.

I'd like to know if the Aseman FDR records power level angles.

This maybe, is a pretty old bird: Vintage 1993? What kind of FDR did it have?

We need to know the Power lever angle 1 (2)
PLA1(2). A 2016 article says:
"The PLA positions are given as seen by the HMU. In this reference, the
reference Ground Idle (GI) position is 20°, Flight Idle (FI) position is 35° and
the notch position (if applicable) is 75°.


Key point: speed
By (anonymous) on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 21:05Z

Many people focusing on stall recovery.
Reading from preliminary report key point is : why did the aircraft flew level flight under autopilot at 15 000ft with power almost idle slowing down below manoeuvering speed before any action was taken.

Then of course they were too low to regain energy, they did not see where the peaks and the valleys were and probably the altimeter setting/temperature correction was not correct... But first do not approach stall conditions in level flight!


Peculiar sequence of events
By Dave Cornutt on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 21:04Z

It almost seems like they thought they had reached a waypoint and were initiating descent for approach, even though it does not appear that they were anywhere near the destination. I hope they weren't descending in an attempt to get below the deck and scud-run in that terrain.



Aseman ATR Accident
By Aghdaie on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 18:11Z

If TDU Terrain Display Unit has been operatinng,they would have noticed the picks and would have sufficient time to avoid the impact.
Engins power did not increase during stall or before impact according to the report or may be it's missing.


Aseman ATR Accident
By Aghdaie on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 18:11Z

If TDU Terrain Display Unit has been operatinng,they would have noticed the picks and would have sufficient time to avoid the impact.
Engins power did not increase during stall or before impact according to the report or may be it's missing.


How it flies.
By Helmut on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 15:43Z

So there they were at 15000 ft at 200 kts in a/p ALTHLD. The idea seems then to slow the aircraft down and so throttles are pulled back. The AOA increases to maintain the selected ALT as the airspeed decays. Selecting a new alt of 14000 feet then sees the descent being conducted in VS or AS hold modes resulting in a 600 ft/min descent. In AS Hold, the AOA would automatically start to reduce but in VS hold, the AOA would be substantially unaltered. Hence the crew would continue to open the throttles to arrest the decaying airspeed. With such a high AOA the efficiency of pitch compensation to increase the airspeed whilst in VS Hold would be counter productive. So then the aircraft arrives at 14200 feet with a high AOA and low forward airspeed. I am thnking that the roll from the autopilot may be related to it being engaged in HDG hold and possibly this diversion put them into conflict with the terrain below the MSA. Stay tuned for further analysis I guess.


pitot tubes
By mahdi on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 13:53Z

pitot tubes have proven to be a major cause for ice related incidents or even accidents
i hope they will finally undergo every hint here- and they got more than enough hints to suspect icing


Corrections to earlier post
By Captain Crunch on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 13:52Z

Correction, The autopilot-disconnect step I posted is part of the SEVERE icing procedure of the ATR Cold Weather Ops Bulleten.

It says go to 100% MCT, not full power as I said, before.

The stall recovery procedure however says:

"If an unusual roll response or uncommanded roll control movement is observed.
This is standard ATR stall symptoms which require stall recovery by:
Pushing firmly on the control wheel
Setting flaps 15°
Both actions reduce the angle of attack.

This was date March, 2011. Operator procedures take precedence, it says.




alt meter
By (anonymous) on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 13:05Z

Strongly suspicious if their alt meter was giving correct readings.


Hmm, WTF?
By Captain Crunch on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 13:01Z

The general March 2011 ATR icing procedure says:

"FIRMLY HOLD CONTROL WHEEL AND DISENGAGE AP
The AP may mask tactile cues that indicate adverse changes in handling characteristics. Full aileron trim may
be required so if the AP does not disengage automatically because of the unusual trim requirement, when
disengaged manually expect strong control column forces to avoid an aircraft upset"

It also says the deice system can't keep up with severe icing. Says go Full power and add ten knots since the stall may happen before the warning. (I'm paraphrazing since I can't provide a link.)

1. Did this airframe have the 18 AD's completed on the boots?
2. Was it in severe icing?
3. Why did they keep putting it on autopilot during stall recovery????? No Max Power?


"Final report"?...
By Viator on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 10:26Z

If that document is a Preliminart Report, why the cover page is marked "Accident Investigation Final Report"?...


any thoughts by others? (Part Two)
By Anonymous 97 on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 09:40Z

4. See no mention of ANY throttle inputs in response to stall warning. Curious. Don't want to pitch up too high, but an ATR at FL150 is no thoroughbred. Perhaps viewed as being a GA -- and thus not an option for some reason?

5. Did they realize where were, terrainwise? Or off course just a little, think they still had some room below? Otherwise, seems a bit aggressive scudrunning.

6. After stall warning, report often is phrased in passive voice again, regarding pitch. Unclear if changes were a response to pilot inputs, AP inputs, gravity - or letting plane regain equilibrium. Or perhaps not yet clear.

7. Cockpit gradient - 96 hours on type vs 15k. Decision to proceed, confidence will soon reach VFR conditions. Not usually from, nor challenged, by low hour FO (though with no transcript, voice inflections, can't rule out a little display of bravado by either - or not wanting to apppear weak.)


any thoughts by others? (Part One)
By Anonymous 97 on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 09:23Z

Prelim report (as translated/summarized here) at times phrased in passive voice that can make harder to follow, eg, ("engines were reduced to idle, the speed reduced . . . with the angle of attack increasing.")

1. I infer flight crew actively reduced engines to idle. Didn't happen on own. AP didn't. Unlike Asiana 214, not passively expecting an AT to maintain suitable airspeed. No hypothetical "ice on airframe" reduced the engines to idle. (Can reduce airspeed more than anticipated, but so far that bell is not ringing here.)

2. Infer AP responded by increasing AoA to maintain altitude - but also coming ever closer to stall. Very little room remained to trade height to regain speed. Not first time.

3. Perhaps both sets Mark Ones watching for opening in clouds. Neither closely watching airspeed. CRM?? Respective duties distributed, adhered to?


SOPs
By Av8tor on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 09:16Z

Plan your flight and Fly your plan. Stick to SOPs. Aviate, Navigate, then communicate.
Stad story.



By Paul on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 08:56Z

"The aircraft levelled off at 15,000 feet on autopilot, the crew set the QNH to 1021 and maintained 15000 feet for about one minute. Then the engines were reduced to idle"


How can the engines be reduced to idle when they were flying on auto-pilot?


Stall
By CM on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 06:59Z

Interesting decision to re-engage the autopilot following a stall. Not necessarily a turning point in the sequence of events but might provide leads for aircraft management techniques. I'm assuming the torque didn't increase from 67% from that point on? I believe around low 70's is normal cruise power for those altitudes in that aircraft. Certainly reads like there was a major breakdown in situational awareness in the flight deck.


ice
By mahdii on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 06:47Z

i cannot believe that under the given circumstances and even woth a stall and the given scenario ice is not even considered a factor in this accident

if engine operation were normal and the crew was just leveling of we can only guess that ice stalled the plane and slowed it down-
its not even a month after the crash and we already see reports blaming the pilot instead of making the relation to the weather at the crash site a factor

hope that they will solve it competely in order
to prevent these accidnts from happening in iran again- atrd are not made for an approach in such a high altitude especially not in icing consitions


GPWS
By JM on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 06:24Z

Ignoring a GPWS for 12 seconds is puzzling. Language barrier? Startle effect? Poor training?


ELT
By Peter Lewis on Monday, Mar 12th 2018 02:20Z

The band lasted a lot longer than these do in a crash. The majority of fixed units use a basic bnc connector to the fixed antenna. Looking at those pictures, that's not going to make it.

Ejectable/deployable flight data recorders are the way to go for sure, but that's not going to happen retroactively. MH370 proves that if you think it will.

A direct coupled unit, like the TAMDAR meteorological devices, would be a way better design.


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