

TRADE UPDATE 2018

Sub-Saharan Africa in Focus

Paul Holtom and Irene Pavesi



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Credits

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
Barometer	Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer
CAR	Central African Republic
DICON	Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria
DLS	Denel Land Systems (South Africa)
DPMP	Denel Pretoria Metal Pressings (South Africa)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
EUC	End-user certificate
MACC	Manufacture d'armes et de cartouches du Congo
MANPADS	Man-portable air defence system(s)
ML	(Common) Military List
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NGN	Nigerian naira
NISAT	Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers
PoA	Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
PSC	Private security company
RDM	Rheinmetall Denel Munition (South Africa)
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade (launcher)
SEE	South Eastern Europe
SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN Comtrade	United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
UNOCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
UN Register	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
USD	United States dollar

Key findings

- According to UN Comtrade, the international small arms trade was worth at least USD 5.7 billion in 2015, a 7 per cent decrease compared to 2014. Small arms ammunition remains the largest category of this trade, with exports worth USD 2.3 billion in 2015.
- In 2015 the top exporters of small arms (those with annual exports worth at least USD 100 million), in descending order, were the United States, Italy, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, Austria, the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Belgium, Switzerland, France, Croatia, and Israel.
- In 2015 the top importers of small arms (those with annual imports worth at least USD 100 million), in descending order, were the United States, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Indonesia, Australia, Germany, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and France.
- The 2018 edition of the Barometer identifies, in descending order, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Serbia as the most transparent exporters for 2015. The least transparent exporters for 2015 are, in ascending order, Iran, North Korea, the UAE (all with scores of zero), Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
- ATT initial and annual reports, together with PoA reports, shed new light on the national transfer control systems and reporting practices of several major arms exporters. Yet the average score for the 2018 Barometer is 12.35 out of a possible 25 points—less than half of the possible maximum score.
- The Small Arms Survey identified that at least 15 sub-Saharan African states industrially produce small arms and/or ammunition.
- While it is difficult to determine the largest sub-Saharan African exporters and importers of small arms, South Africa was the largest exporter—and one of the largest importers—of small arms in the region during 2013–15, according to ATT annual reports, UN Comtrade data, national arms export reports, and submissions to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UN Register). UN Comtrade indicates that Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Namibia, and Niger were the other largest arms importers during this period, while other open sources indicate considerable small arms deliveries to Angola, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda.
- The largest transparent small arms exporters to sub-Saharan Africa for 2013–15 appear to be Bulgaria, Serbia, France, Spain, and Italy, in descending order of importance. Exporters such as China, the Russian Federation, and Turkey, which record low scores for transparency in the 2018 Barometer, have delivered small arms to the region in this period in quantities that would suggest that they are also important sources of supply.



Traditionally there is a low level of openness regarding sub-Saharan African small arms production and transfers, which hampers efforts to determine the sources of supply and volume of small arms flows.”

Introduction

Introduction

Although sub-Saharan Africa accounts for less than 5 per cent of the estimated value of the international small arms trade, it suffers disproportionately from the negative impacts of small arms and ammunition flows on peace, security, stability, and development. Traditionally there is a low level of openness regarding sub-Saharan African small arms production and transfers, which hampers efforts to determine the sources of supply and volume of small arms flows. Yet, with 22 sub-Saharan African states parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) as of the end of December 2017, and with this number likely to increase further in coming years, it is anticipated that the ATT's requirement for states parties to report on their small arms imports and exports will enable significantly better mapping than official data has allowed to date of the scale of this trade as it pertains to sub-Saharan African states, including sources of supply, and the extent of export and re-export activities.

The 2018 edition of the Trade Update begins by updating global small arms trade and transparency figures, before focusing on the main countries driving the demand for and supply of legal (government-authorized) small arms flows in sub-Saharan Africa, including domestic industrial production of small arms and ammunition.

More specifically, the 2018 Trade Update addresses the following key questions:

- Who were the top and major exporters and importers throughout the world in 2015?
- Who are the most and least transparent top and major exporters of small arms?
- Has the ATT increased the transparency of international small arms transfers?
- Which sub-Saharan African states have small arms and ammunition production capabilities?
- Who are the largest exporters of small arms and ammunition in sub-Saharan Africa?
- Who are the largest importers of small arms and ammunition in sub-Saharan Africa?
- Who are the largest exporters of small arms and ammunition to countries in sub-Saharan Africa?

The 2018 edition of the Trade Update comprises three main sections. The first lists the top and major exporters and importers of small arms in 2015 throughout the world, using data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) (see Box 1). Section II presents the 2018 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer (Barometer), which for the first time draws on ATT initial and annual reports. The third section identifies industrial production of small arms and ammunition in sub-Saharan Africa and seeks to determine the most important exporters and importers of small arms in—as well as the largest exporters of small arms to—the region. ●

Box 1 UN Comtrade data

The figures for the international small arms trade in Sections I and II of this report are based on an analysis of customs data that states contribute voluntarily to UN Comtrade. While UN Comtrade captures much international commercial activity, it does not capture all small arms transfers, because many states do not report them to UN Comtrade, or do so only partially. If both an exporter and importer of a specific transaction do not report any details of a transfer to UN Comtrade, the activity will not be reflected in the estimates of the global small arms trade contained in Sections I and II of this report. Moreover, transfers of some light weapons, light weapons ammunition, and accessories for small arms and light weapons are not discernible from transfers of other items recorded in the same categories, and therefore are not covered in this analysis. As a result, this Trade Update is skewed towards documenting more transparent countries and certain categories of items, and most certainly underestimates the total value and extent of the global trade in small arms.

To compensate for non-reporting and to help resolve discrepancies between exporter and importer data, the analysis uses the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) Reliability Index (Marsh, 2005).

This index assigns a 'reliability score' for each data point, which, in turn, determines whether data provided to UN Comtrade by the exporter or importer is used when their figures diverge.

The analysis of the documented trade in 2015 reflects data entered in the UN Comtrade database as of 24 November 2017. This is in line with established practice, whereby the Small Arms Survey and NISAT give countries almost two full calendar years in which to make and revise their respective UN Comtrade submissions.



“ . . . top and major exporters, as defined by the Small Arms Survey, account for almost 98 per cent of the global authorized small arms trade (as documented by UN Comtrade).”

I. Authorized transfers

This section presents data on and analysis of authorized small arms transfers that occurred in 2015 and discusses trends over the period 2013–15. It uses the financial value of small arms¹ imports and exports reported by states to UN Comtrade, as compiled by NISAT (NISAT, n.d.).² According to this data, top and major exporters, as defined by the Small Arms Survey (see Box 2), account for almost 98 per cent of the global authorized small arms trade (as documented by UN Comtrade). UN Comtrade data for these states indicates that the financial value of the

Box 2 Defining top and major small arms exporters and importers

The Small Arms Survey identifies top and major exporters and importers by assessing the financial value of their annual documented small arms exports and imports, based on UN Comtrade data, as elaborated by NISAT (Marsh, 2005). Top exporters and importers are those trading at least USD 100 million worth of small arms and light weapons, including their parts, accessories, and ammunition, in a calendar year (see Table 1). Major exporters and importers are those trading at least USD 10 million worth of small arms and light weapons, including their parts, accessories, and ammunition, in a calendar year. For the purposes of this analysis, top and major exporters and importers are classified according to a tier system (see Table 1).

Table 1 Tier classification of top and major exporters and importers of small arms

Category of exporter or importer		Value traded (USD)
Top	Tier 1	≥500 million
	Tier 2	100 million–499 million
Major	Tier 3	50 million–99 million
	Tier 4	10 million–49 million



USD 100 million+

Top exporters and importers

States that traded at least USD 100million worth of small arms in one calendar year.



USD 10million+

Major exporters and importers

States that traded at least USD 10million worth of small arms in one calendar year.

small arms trade in 2015 was worth at least USD 5.7 billion. This figure represents a 7 per cent decrease compared to 2014, a year that marked a record high for the global small arms trade in the period since 2001, when the Small Arms Survey began collecting trade data.

Top and major exporters in 2015

In 2015, 36 states exported at least USD 10 million worth of small arms and light weapons, including their parts, accessories, and ammunition (see Table 2). The 14 top exporters—with small arms exports worth equal to or above USD 100 million—accounted for 78 per cent of the global trade captured by UN Comtrade (see Table 3). The United States, Italy, and Brazil remain the three largest exporters, and together their small arms exports were worth USD 2.2 billion: the United States exported small arms worth USD 1.1 billion, Italy USD 582 million, and Brazil USD 559 million. The value of exports for these three states in 2015 is USD 198 million lower than in 2014, accounting for almost half of the overall decline in the global trade between these years. While the value of exports for Italy and the United States dropped below their export values for 2013, the value of Brazil's exports in 2015 is lower than for 2014, but remains above the level for 2013 (see Table 3).

Notable changes in the composition of the top exporters in 2015 compared to 2014 include France's export of USD 103 million worth of small arms in 2015, making it a top small arms exporter for only the second time since 2001.³ In contrast, Japan and Spain dropped out of the category of top exporters. Japan, a large exporter of sporting and hunting firearms, recorded a USD 9 million drop in exports between 2014 and 2015. The value of Spain's small arms ammunition exports in 2015—at USD 67 million—is the lowest registered for the country since 2006.

Table 2 Top and major small arms exporters, as reported to UN Comtrade, 2015

Category		Value (USD)	Exporters (listed in descending order of value exported)
Top exporters	Tier 1	≥500 million	United States, Italy, Brazil
	Tier 2	100–499 million	Germany, South Korea, Austria, Russian Federation, Czech Republic, Turkey, Belgium, Switzerland, France, Croatia, Israel
Major exporters	Tier 3	50–99 million	China, Japan, Finland, Spain, Canada, United Kingdom, Norway, Mexico, Serbia, Slovakia
	Tier 4	10–49 million	Sweden, India, Taiwan, Bulgaria, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Philippines, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, UAE, Cyprus

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Table 3 Top small arms exporters, as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2013–15

Exporter	2013	2014	2015	Total value of exports, 2013–15	Share of global exports, 2013–15
United States	1,093	1,135	1,075	3,303	19%
Italy	644	689	582	1,915	11%
Brazil	387	591	559	1,537	9%
Germany	557	475	408	1,440	8%
South Korea	296	349	368	1,013	6%
Austria	345	315	302	962	5%
Turkey	231	224	184	639	4%
Russian Federation	205	210	212	627	4%
Czech Republic	171	189	202	562	3%
Belgium	141	154	153	448	3%
Croatia	139	141	101	381	2%
Israel	145	122	100	367	2%
Switzerland	107	106	107	320	2%
France	94	93	103	290	2%
Other countries	1,322	1,329	1,254	3,905	20%

Source: NISAT (n.d.)


This Trade Update identifies 22 major exporters in 2015 (Table 2, tiers 3–4), accounting for USD 1 billion worth of small arms. All 22 were also major exporters in 2014, while six major exporters in 2014 recorded exports below USD 10 million in 2015. In alphabetical order, the latter countries are:

- Argentina (exports decreased from USD 10 million to USD 8 million);
- Denmark (USD 14 million to USD 8 million);
- Netherlands (USD 14 million to USD 3 million);
- Romania (USD 10 million to USD 8 million);
- Singapore (USD 21 million to USD 7 million); and
- South Africa (USD 33 million to USD 7 million).

Among the small arms-related categories identified by UN Comtrade, ammunition remains the largest, with exports worth over USD 2 billion per year between 2013 and 2015 (see Figure 1). The value of ammunition exports increased by 13 per cent, from USD 2.0 billion in 2013 to USD 2.3 billion in 2015. In 2015 the ammunition category accounted for 41 per cent of the documented small arms trade. The main exporters of small arms ammunition in 2015 were, in descending order, the United States (accounting for 23 per cent of small arms ammunition exports), South Korea (14 per cent), the Russian Federation (9 per cent), and Germany (8 per cent). The main recipients were the United States (accounting for 31 per cent of all small arms ammunition imports), followed by Canada (6 per cent), and Iraq (5 per cent). Ammunition is the only small arms-related category identified by UN Comtrade that has recorded year-on-year growth during 2013–15 (see Figure 1).

The value of military firearms exports recorded the largest increase for a small arms category in UN Comtrade between 2013 and 2015, from USD 475 million in 2013 to USD 637 million in 2015. In 2015 the United States accounted for 33 per cent of global military firearm exports, with 31 per cent of these exports delivered to Saudi Arabia, followed by South Korea (11 per cent) and the Central African Republic (CAR) (7 per cent).

Figure 1 Financial values of global small arms and ammunition exports (USD million), by category, 2013–15



Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Comparing top and major exporters in 2013, 2014, and 2015

From 2014 to 2015, the number of top and major exporters changed from 42 to 36.



Top exporters in 2015



14 The top 14 exporters accounted for USD 4.5bn of the global small arms trade in 2015.

France
France was identified as a top exporter for only the second time since 2001.

3 The top 3 exporters accounted for USD 2.2 billion of the global small arms trade in 2015.

- United States → **USD 1.1 billion**
- Italy → **USD 582 million**
- Brazil → **USD 559 million**


USD 2.2 billion

Major exporters in 2015



- States with USD 50-99 million worth of exports: China, Japan, Finland, Spain, Canada, United Kingdom, Norway, Mexico, Serbia, Slovakia.
- States with USD 10-49 million worth of exports: Sweden, India, Taiwan, Bulgaria, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Philippines, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, UAE, Cyprus.

Financial value of global small arms exports, 2013-15



Brazil accounted for 15 per cent of worldwide military firearm exports, with Indonesia their principal recipient. In the same period the value of exports of pistols and revolvers decreased by almost a quarter, from USD 1 billion to USD 766 million. The decline was mainly due to lower levels of deliveries by the top three exporters: Austria, the United States, and Germany. Between 2013 and 2015 Austria's exports of pistols and revolvers to the United States dropped by USD 24 million, while US exports to the Philippines and Thailand reduced in value by USD 22 million and USD 10 million, respectively. In the same period Saudi Arabia became the main destination of US exports of pistols and revolvers, receiving USD 26 million worth of such weapons during 2013–15.

Table A1 in Annexe 1 to this Trade Update contains information on the total value of exports, types of small arms exported, and main trading partners for each top and major exporter.

Top and major importers in 2015

In 2015, 61 countries—two fewer than the previous year—qualified as top and major importers of small arms because they recorded at least USD 10 million worth of imports (see Table 4). The nine top importers—importing at least USD 100 million worth of small arms in 2015—accounted for 63 per cent of the global small arms trade. The five largest importers in 2015 were also the largest importers for the period 2013–15 (see Table 5): the United States, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Indonesia. As discussed

Table 4 Top and major small arms importers, as reported to UN Comtrade, 2015

Category		Value (USD)	Importers (listed in descending order of value imported)
Top importers	Tier 1	≥500 million	United States
	Tier 2	100–499 million	Canada, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Indonesia, Australia, Germany, UAE, France
Major importers	Tier 3	50–99 million	United Kingdom, Mexico, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Israel, Thailand, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, Austria
	Tier 4	10–49 million	Poland, Switzerland, South Africa, Slovakia, Brazil, Sweden, Denmark, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation, Japan, Oman, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Pakistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Estonia, Finland, Namibia, Niger, Argentina, Egypt, Kuwait, Malaysia, Paraguay, Colombia, Ukraine, Qatar, Chile, Bulgaria, Peru, Malawi, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Luxembourg, China, Singapore


Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Table 5 Top small arms importers, as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2013–15

Importer	2013	2014	2015	Total value of imports, 2013–15	Share of global imports, 2013–15
United States	2,489	2,214	2,041	6,744	38%
Canada	344	364	303	1,011	6%
Saudi Arabia	161	209	285	655	4%
Indonesia	81	331	173	585	3%
Germany	209	198	166	573	3%
Australia	140	156	172	468	3%
France	136	125	126	387	2%
UAE	168	75	134	377	2%
Iraq	10	139	207	356	2%
Other countries	2,182	2,348	2,162	6,692	37%

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Figure 2 Comparison of the trend in small arms imports recorded by UN Comtrade and US federal licence applications, 2001–15 (index: 2001 = 100)



Sources: ATF (2017); NISAT (n.d.)

below, among the top importers, Iraq, the UAE, and Indonesia recorded the most significant changes in the value of their imports during 2013–15.

UN Comtrade data indicates that US small arms imports continued the downward trend identified by the previous Trade Update (Holtom and Pavesi, 2017, pp. 22, 28). The financial value of US imports dropped from USD 2.5 billion in 2013 to USD 2.0 billion in 2015 (See Table 5). This decline mirrors the decrease in the number of firearms licence applications processed by the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives⁴ in the same period (see Figure 2), suggesting an overall reduction in US civilian demand after a significant increase during 2011–13. Despite this decline the United States accounted for 35 per cent of the value of global small arms imports in 2015, and for 38 per cent of global small arms imports during 2013–15.

In 2013 Iraq recorded small arms imports worth just over USD 10 million, but became a top importer in 2014, and the fourth largest importer in 2015. South Korea was the source of 73 per cent of total recorded Iraqi imports in 2015, exporting USD 80 million worth of small arms ammunition, USD 47 million of light weapons, and USD 24 million of military firearms to Iraq that year. The dramatic increase in the value of small arms delivered to Iraq is clearly related to the equipping of Iraqi government forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga to deal with the non-state armed group Islamic State (SIPRI, 2015; AI, 2015; Mc Evoy and Hideg, 2017).⁵

The value of UAE small arms imports dropped from USD 168 million to USD 75 million between 2013 and 2014, but increased to USD 134 million in 2015. Fifty-one per cent of the UAE's imports in 2015 came from the United States, followed by Brazil (18 per cent), and South Korea (13 per cent). During this period the UAE appeared to be one of the largest importers of major conventional weapons and small arms (SIPRI, n.d.; Holtom and Pavesi, 2017), the likely result of its participation in the Saudi-led military coalition that supports government forces in Yemen's civil war. UAE small arms imports and those of Saudi Arabia have occurred against a backdrop of documented violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by all parties to the Yemeni conflict (AI, 2018a; HRW, 2015; UNSC, 2018a), as well as recorded cases of the diversion, including unauthorized re-export, of small arms and ammunition in the Middle East and North Africa involving one or the other country (Holtom, Pavesi, and Rigual, 2014; Holtom and Pavesi, 2017).

The value of imports to Indonesia fluctuated between USD 81 million in 2013, USD 331 million in 2014, and USD 173 million in 2015, yet it was the largest importer in the Asia and Pacific region for the 2013–15 period. Brazil was the largest documented exporter of small arms to Indonesia in 2014 (the source of 83 per cent of Indonesia's imports) and 2015 (59 per cent), supplying USD 196 million worth of military firearms in 2014 and USD 99 million in 2015.


In 2015 the 52 major importers (Table 4, tiers 3–4) accounted for just over a third of the global small arms trade. Bangladesh registered the largest increase in the value

of small arms imports between 2014 and 2015, from USD 4 million to USD 67 million. In 2015 Bangladesh imported USD 50 million worth of small arms ammunition from the Russian Federation and USD 5 million of the same items from China. In 2015 Namibia and Niger became major importers for the first time since the Small Arms Survey began to document the value of the small arms trade (see Section III). China qualified as a major importer for the second time since 2001, with small arms imports worth USD 10 million in 2015. Italy (21 per cent) and Germany (21 per cent) were the main exporters to China in 2015. Six states that were major importers in 2014 dropped out of this category in 2015 when their small arms imports dropped below USD 10 million in value. In alphabetical order they are:

- Afghanistan (whose imports decreased from USD 13 million to USD 6 million);
- Algeria (USD 12 million to USD 3 million);
- Botswana (USD 10 million to USD 2 million);
- Greece (USD 11 million to USD 6 million);
- Guatemala (USD 10 million to USD 9 million); and
- Morocco (USD 13 million to USD 6 million).

Figure 3 presents regional patterns in the small arms trade between 2001 and 2015, based on UN Comtrade data. After peaking in 2013, the 2014–15 drop in the value of US small arms imports strongly affected both global and regional (the Americas) trends. Since 2014 the Asia and Pacific region has accounted for the second largest share of small arms imports, displacing European imports in this regard for the first time since


Figure 3 Regional trends in small arms imports, as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–15




Note: All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.

Comparing top and major importers in 2013, 2014, and 2015

From 2014 to 2015, the number of top and major importers changed from 63 to 61.




Top importers in 2015



United States	→ USD 2billion
Canada	→ USD 303million
Saudi Arabia	→ USD 285million
Iraq	→ USD 207million
Indonesia	→ USD 173million
Australia	→ USD 172million
Germany	→ USD 166million
UAE	→ USD 134million
France	→ USD 126million

Iraq
Iraq recorded imports worth USD 10mn in 2013, USD 139mn in 2014, and was the 4th largest importer in 2015 with imports worth USD 207mn.


Major importers in 2015



Namibia and Niger qualified as major importers for the first time since the Small Arms Survey began documenting the value of the small arms trade, with imports worth USD 22.6mn and USD 22mn, respectively.

Financial value of small arms imports by region, as reported to UN Comtrade, 2015

The Americas: USD 2.6bn
Asia & the Pacific: USD 1.7bn
Europe: USD 1.2bn
Africa: USD 294mn



2002. In 2015 the value of imports in the Asia and Pacific region was USD 1.7 billion and USD 1.2 billion in Europe. The number of major small arms importers in Africa increased from 2 in 2012 to 7 in 2014, then dropped to 6 in 2015. Overall, the value of small arms imported by African states increased from USD 138 million in 2012 to USD 294 million in 2015. Section III discusses this increase in greater detail. ●



The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer presents an annual assessment of reporting on small arms trade activities by 49 countries that exported at least USD 10 million worth of small arms and light weapons . . . during any calendar year from 2001 to 2015.”

II. The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer⁶

The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer presents an annual assessment of reporting on small arms trade activities by 49 countries that exported at least USD 10 million worth of small arms and light weapons, including their parts, accessories, and ammunition, during any calendar year from 2001 to 2015. The score for each major exporter is based on an evaluation of information on its transfer control system and small arms exports made publicly available via national and multilateral reporting instruments. The Barometer uses an established set of standardized scoring guidelines to assess 42 criteria across seven transparency parameters: timeliness, access and consistency, clarity, comprehensiveness, deliveries, licences granted, and licences refused (for more information, see Annexe 2). The Barometer does not verify the accuracy of the information that countries provide.


For the first time the Barometer assesses ATT and UN Small Arms Programme of Action (PoA) reports to determine small arms exporters' levels of transparency. These sources provide new information for the Barometer on national transfer control systems, while ATT annual reports on arms exports reveal new data compared to national arms export reports; UN Comtrade data, as elaborated by NISAT (see Marsh, 2005); and the UN Register. This edition of the Barometer identifies which countries are the most and least transparent major exporters of small arms, based on reporting on their arms trade activities in 2015. It also assesses the impact of ATT reports on the transparency of international transfers of small arms.

Transparency Barometer review and revised scoring

When a new transparency mechanism becomes available or exporters provide new types of information on their small arms transfers, it is integrated into the Barometer's assessment and the scoring guidelines are revised, if necessary. The first editions of the Barometer assessed national reporting practices on the basis of available national arms export reports, submissions to the UN Register, and contributions to UN Comtrade. In 2009 the Small Arms Survey revised the Barometer assessment process and scoring guidelines after the introduction of the European Union (EU) Annual Report on Arms Exports (Lazarevic, 2010).⁷ In 2016 the methodology was revised a second time in order to:

1. address the time-lag between the submission of data to the multilateral reporting instruments that the Barometer uses and the public availability of this data; and
2. include in the assessment the South-eastern Europe Regional Report on Arms Exports, which is coordinated, compiled, and disseminated by the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) (Pavesi, 2016).

The 2018 Transparency Barometer Small Arms Survey



The submission in 2016 of the first ATT annual reports, which include small arms exports that took place in 2015, led to a third revision of the scoring guidelines for the 2018 Barometer. This revision ensures consistency in the assessment practices for all instruments. In light of these changes, direct comparisons should therefore not be made with previous editions. Annexe 2 contains a detailed overview of the revised scoring guidelines.


The 2018 Barometer reviews information gathered from the following sources for 49 major exporters:


- national arms export reports, including submissions to regional reports;⁸
- ATT initial and annual reports;
- national reports on the implementation of the UN PoA and International Tracing Instrument;
- the UN Register; and
- UN Comtrade.⁹

Including ATT and PoA reports in the Transparency Barometer

The ATT seeks to promote transparency in the international arms trade (UNGA, 2013, art. 1). Within one year of becoming a party to the treaty, states parties are legally obliged to submit an initial report on the measures undertaken to implement the treaty and to communicate updates on new measures (UNGA, 2013, art. 13.1). Further, states parties shall report annually, by 31 May, on their conventional arms

Map 1 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2018, based on 2015 trade





Box 3 The contribution of ATT initial and annual reports to Transparency Barometer scores


This box provides a summary of the way in which ATT initial and annual reports can contribute to a country's score in six of the Barometer's seven parameters (see Annexe 2, Table A4).¹⁰ The timely and consistent submission of ATT initial and annual reports enables a country to score up to 17.75 out of a possible 25 points in the Barometer (see Figure 4). In comparison, the maximum number of points that can be awarded through reporting comprehensively to the UN Register and UN Comtrade is 13.25 and 10.25 points, respectively.¹¹ It should be noted, however, that the final score for each criterion is derived from the highest number of points awarded in terms of any of the sources under review.

- **Timeliness** (ATT reports can score 1.50 out of 1.50 available points): ATT states parties receive full points for submitting an ATT annual report on authorizations or actual exports—and imports—of small arms that took place during the previous calendar year, if this report is made publicly available by the ATT Secretariat within 13 months of the year under observation. For example, if the report on exports that took place during the 2015 calendar year is made publicly available between January 2016 and January 2017.

Figure 4 Attainable Transparency Barometer points for ATT reporting, by parameter

- Transparency Barometer points attainable by ATT initial and annual reports
- Maximum points available

Parameters



- **Access and consistency** (1.50 out of 2.00 available points, starting from 2020):¹² Points are awarded for ‘access’ if an ATT state party gives permission for its initial and annual ATT reports to be made publicly available on the ATT Secretariat website. An ATT state party can gain points for consistency after its ATT reports have been submitted and made publicly available for three years in a row.
- **Clarity** (3.75 out of 5.00 available points): ATT states parties receive points if their initial report and subsequent updates include information on laws, regulations, administrative procedures, and multilateral commitments to control exports, and if they regulate and report on the transit or transshipment and brokering of small arms. Points are also awarded for publicly available ATT annual reports that contain information on small arms export licences granted or deliveries.
- **Comprehensiveness** (3.00 out of 6.5 available points, based on the ATT annual report template): If publicly available ATT annual reports contain information on small arms exports disaggregated by subcategory, quantity, value, and importer, then points are awarded. Points are also awarded for additional information, such as indicating the type of end user. The ATT annual report template neither requests nor invites information on transit, transshipment, re-export, or brokering transactions, nor on licence refusals for any types of international transfers. Therefore, points are not normally awarded for these areas. Such information can, however, be voluntarily included in ATT annual reports, increasing Barometer scores for this parameter above the 3.00 points indicated above.
- **Deliveries** (4.00 out of 4.00 available points): An ATT state party can receive full points if its annual report contains information on deliveries of small arms in a calendar year that indicates recipient state, specific end user, type, quantity, and value.
- **Licences granted** (4.00 out of 4.00 available points): Full points are awarded if an ATT annual report contains information on licences granted for small arms exports in a calendar year that indicates recipient state, specific end user, type, quantity, and value.

imports and exports during the previous calendar year (UNGA, 2013, art. 13.3). To mitigate the additional reporting burden and address reporting fatigue, Article 13.3 notes that states parties can use the same information in their UN Register submissions and ATT annual reports. The previous Small Arms Survey Trade Update noted the differences and similarities between the ATT annual report template¹³ and the UN Register standardized reporting form (Holtom and Pavesi, 2017, pp. 48–49).

Twenty-eight of the 49 countries under review for the 2018 Barometer submitted an ATT annual report in 2016, which covered arms trade activities that occurred in 2015, and an initial report during 2015–16 (see Table 7).¹⁴ Therefore, all ATT states parties under review have submitted an initial and annual report to the ATT Secretariat, even if not all of these states did so before the respective reporting deadlines. Not all of

these reports have been made publicly available (see Table 6). Box 3 describes how comprehensive ATT initial and annual reports can produce high scores for small arms trade transparency in the Barometer.

For the first time this edition of the Barometer also includes reports submitted by UN member states on measures to implement the PoA, which are made publicly available by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA, n.d.).¹⁵ UN member states are encouraged to report biennially on the implementation of the UN PoA, including on laws, regulations, and administrative procedures to control and regulate international small arms transfers. With the inclusion of the ATT initial reports and PoA reports, for the first time the Barometer takes into account sources that do not contain statistical data on arms exports. These sources can provide points for ‘clarity’ with regard to national transfer control systems, including brokering; measures undertaken to reduce small arms diversion; and existing international and regional commitments.

ATT states parties are obliged to report on exports and imports of all eight categories of conventional arms covered by the ATT. They are encouraged to report using 11 subcategories for small arms and light weapons and two subcategories for ‘other’ small arms and light weapons (ATT Secretariat, 2017, p. 11). States can indicate whether information has been withheld due to ‘national security or commercial confidentiality concerns’. For example, Bulgaria’s first ATT annual report contains information for ten subcategories of small arms and light weapon exports, but also indicates that information had been withheld. Therefore, it is possible that Bulgaria has not provided a complete account of its small arms exports in its first ATT annual report (ATT Secretariat, 2018b). Conversely, Argentina’s first report contains information only for exports of small arms in the subcategory ‘pistols and revolvers’, but indicates that no information was withheld. These two data points help to determine if a country’s report is incomplete (ATT Secretariat, 2018b). This is not so easy to determine for the other multilateral reporting instruments under review. Therefore, comprehensive ATT annual reports can contribute points for the Barometer’s parameters on ‘comprehensiveness’, ‘deliveries’, and ‘licences granted’ (see Box 3).

ATT annual reports shed new light on reporting practices by transparent exporters. For example, previous editions of the Barometer assumed that Germany’s UN Register submission contained data on small arms deliveries, unless otherwise specified. Germany’s submission to the UN Register on its 2010 activities indicated that data pertained to licences granted for commercial international transfers (UNGA, 2011, p. 96), but subsequent submissions did not provide such an indication. Previously it was assumed that Germany reports on deliveries, and points were awarded accordingly. However, Germany’s ATT annual report reveals that its small arms export data refers to licences issued, not deliveries. The data contained in the ATT report matches the data in the UN Register submission. Therefore, Germany is not awarded points for data on deliveries in this edition of the Barometer.

Table 6 Major small arms exporters that submitted ATT and PoA reports, 2014–16

Exporter	Arms Trade Treaty		Programme of Action	
	Initial report	Annual report for 2015	2014 report	2016 report
Argentina	✓	✓	✓	✓
Australia	✓	✓	✓	✓
Austria	✓	✓	✓	
Belgium	✓	✓	✓	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	✓	✓		✓
Brazil			✓	✓
Bulgaria	✓	✓	✓	✓
Canada ^a				✓
China			✓	✓
Croatia	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cyprus ^b	✓ ^a		✓	
Czech Republic	✓	✓	✓	✓
Denmark	✓	✓	✓	
Finland	✓	✓		✓
France	✓	✓	✓	✓
Germany	✓	✓	✓	✓
Hungary	✓	✓	✓	✓
India			✓	✓
Iran			✓	✓
Israel				
Italy	✓	✓	✓	✓
Japan	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mexico	✓	✓	✓	
Netherlands	✓	✓		✓
North Korea				
Norway	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pakistan			✓	✓

Exporter	Arms Trade Treaty		Programme of Action	
	Initial report	Annual report for 2015	2014 report	2016 report
Peru ^c	✓			✓
Philippines				✓
Poland	✓	✓	✓	✓
Portugal	✓	✓	✓	✓
Romania	✓	✓	✓	✓
Russian Federation			✓	✓
Saudi Arabia				✓
Serbia	✓	✓	✓	✓
Singapore			✓	✓
Slovakia	✓	✓ ⁺		✓
South Africa	✓	✓ [†]	✓	
South Korea ^d			✓	
Spain	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sweden	✓	✓	✓	✓
Switzerland	✓	✓	✓	✓
Taiwan				
Thailand ^e				✓
Turkey				✓
UAE				
Ukraine			✓	✓
United Kingdom	✓	✓	✓	✓
United States			✓	✓

Notes:

Grey background: not an ATT state party, as of 26 January 2018.

⁺ Annual or initial report submitted with preference that the report is not made publicly available.

[†] Small arms export data not included in the annual report.

^a Canada submitted a PoA report in 2015.

^b First annual report due by 31 May 2018 (ATT Secretariat, 2018a).

^c First annual report due by 31 May 2018 (ATT Secretariat, 2018a).

^d Initial report due by 25 February 2018; first annual report due by 31 May 2019 (ATT Secretariat, 2018a).

^e Thailand submitted a PoA report in 2015.

The 2018 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer

The 2018 Barometer identifies Switzerland as the most transparent small arms exporter based on information provided on its small arms trade activities conducted in 2015 (with a score of 21.75 points out of a possible 25), followed by the Netherlands (20.00 points), the United Kingdom (20.00 points), Italy (19.50 points), and Serbia (19.00 points). All five countries published a national report; submitted an ATT annual report, ATT initial report, and PoA report; and provided data to UN Comtrade. These sources contain information on the national transfer control system and small arms exports that took place in 2015.

Switzerland is the only major exporter that releases a dedicated national report on small arms exports, with information on export authorizations (including denials), and deliveries, transit, and brokering of small arms (Switzerland, n.d.). Switzerland submitted its first ATT annual report in May 2016, despite not being obliged to do so until 31 May 2017 (ATT Secretariat, 2018a). To increase its score further Switzerland needs to report on temporary exports¹⁶ and re-exports, and provide details on the end users of arms deliveries.

The Netherlands releases detailed monthly reports on arms export, transit, and brokering licences. These reports include descriptions of items, including small arms, and distinguish between permanent and temporary exports, which gives the Netherlands one of the highest scores for comprehensiveness (Netherlands, 2016). The Netherlands could increase its Barometer score if it included the following information in its reports: the number of items subject to licences or delivered, the intended end users, and details of the quantity and value of small arms when an export licence is refused.

The United Kingdom makes data available on export licences issued and refused through quarterly reports and the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website (UK DIT, n.d.; UK, n.d.), which provides an online tool for creating reports on different types of export licences disaggregated by UK national control list category and destination. The quarterly reports include information on licences issued and refused; the value, quantity, and description of the exported items; and, for some items, the end user or end use. The UK national report, ATT annual report, and UN Register submission contain information on exports of shotguns, which are categorized as 'rifles and carbines' in the ATT annual report and UN Register submission. The United Kingdom's score could be increased if it provided information on its deliveries of small arms.

Italy has not reported to the UN Register since 2009, but information it provided on its small arms exports in its national report, UN Comtrade submission, and ATT report made it one of the most transparent major exporters for 2015. Italy's first ATT annual report reveals the quantity of small arms authorized for export, broken down by sub-category and importing state. Italy's national report on arms export licences for 2015 indicates that no small arms export licence applications had been refused (Italy, 2016,

Table 7 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2018, covering major exporter activities in 2015*

Exporter	Total points	National report **/ regional report ***	UN Comtrade**	UN Register**	ATT/PoA		
					ATT annual report	ATT initial report*	PoA [^]
Switzerland	21.75	X	X	X	X	X	X
Netherlands	20.00	X/EU	X	X	X	X	X
United Kingdom	20.00	X/EU	X	X	X	X	X
Italy	19.50	X/EU	X	o	X	X	X
Serbia	19.00	X/SEE	X	X	X	X	X
Germany	18.50	X/EU	X	X	X	X	X
Romania	18.00	X/EU	o	X(14)	X	X	X
Belgium ^a	17.75	X/EU	X	X	X	X	o
Spain	17.50	X/EU	X	X	X	X	X
France	17.25	X/EU	X	X(14)	X	X	X
Poland	17.25	X/EU	X	X	X	X	X
Sweden	17.25	X/EU	X	X(14)	X	X	X
Portugal	16.50	X/EU	X	X	X	X	X
Austria	16.00	EU	X	X	X	X	o
United States ^b	15.75	X	X	X	o	o	X
Czech Republic	15.25	X/EU	X	X	X	X	X
Norway	15.25	X	X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia	15.25	X/EU	X	X	X*	X	X
Hungary	15.00	X/EU	X	X	X	X	X
Finland	14.50	X/EU	X	X	X	X	X
Canada	13.50	X	X	X	o	o	X
Denmark	13.50	X/EU	X	o	X	X	o
Croatia	13.25	X/EU	X	o	X	X	X
Bulgaria	13.00	X/EU	o	X	X	X	X

Total timeliness (1.50 max.)	Total access and consistency (2.00 max.)	Total clarity (5.00 max.)	Total comprehensiveness (6.50 max.)	Total deliveries (4.00 max.)	Total licences granted (4.00 max.)	Total licences refused (2.00 max.)
1.50	1.50	4.50	5.25	3.00	4.00	2.00
1.50	2.00	4.50	6.00	3.00	2.00	1.00
1.50	2.00	4.50	5.00	3.50	2.50	1.00
1.50	1.50	3.50	5.50	3.00	2.50	2.00
1.50	1.50	3.50	5.50	3.50	2.50	1.00
1.50	2.00	4.25	3.75	2.50	3.00	1.50
1.50	1.50	3.50	5.75	2.50	3.00	0.25
1.50	2.00	3.75	4.00	2.50	2.00	2.00
1.50	1.50	3.50	4.00	3.50	2.50	1.00
1.50	2.00	4.00	4.75	3.00	1.50	0.50
1.50	1.50	3.75	4.00	3.00	1.50	2.00
1.50	1.50	4.75	5.25	2.50	1.50	0.25
1.50	1.50	3.25	5.00	3.50	1.50	0.25
1.50	1.50	2.75	4.50	3.50	2.00	0.25
1.50	1.75	3.50	4.00	3.00	2.00	0.00
1.50	1.50	2.75	4.75	3.00	1.50	0.25
1.50	1.50	3.75	4.75	3.00	0.00	0.75
1.50	1.50	3.25	4.50	3.00	1.50	0.00
1.50	1.50	3.00	4.25	3.00	1.50	0.25
1.50	1.50	2.75	3.75	3.00	2.00	0.00
1.50	1.50	2.50	4.00	4.00	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.50	2.75	3.75	2.50	1.50	0.00
1.50	1.50	3.00	3.25	2.50	1.50	0.00
1.50	1.50	2.75	2.25	2.50	1.50	1.00

Exporter	Total points	National report ** / regional report ***	UN Comtrade**	UN Register**	ATT/PoA		
					ATT annual report	ATT initial report*	PoA^
Australia	12.50	X	X	o	X	X	X
Japan	12.00	o	X	X	X	X	X
Mexico	11.75	o	X	X	X	X	o
South Korea ^c	11.75	X	X	o	o	X ^t	X
South Africa ^d	11.50	X	o	o	X	X	o
Argentina	11.00	o	X	o	X	X	X
Cyprus	11.00	o	X	X	o	X ^t	o
Bosnia and Herzegovina	10.25	SEE	o	X	X	X	X
India	10.25	o	X	X	o	o	X
Thailand	10.25	o	X	o	o	o	X
Taiwan ^e	10.00	X	o	o	o	o	o
Turkey ^f	9.75	X	X	o	o	o	X
Peru	9.50	o	X	o	X	X	X
Russian Federation	9.50	o	X	X	o	o	X
Singapore	9.25	o	X	X	o	o	X
Ukraine	9.25	X	o	X	o	o	X
Philippines	9.00	o	X	o	o	o	X
Brazil	8.75	o	X	X	o	o	X
China	8.25	o	X	X(14)	o	o	X
Pakistan	7.75	o	X	o	o	o	X
Israel	0.75	o	o	X	o	o	o
Saudi Arabia	0.50	o	o	o	o	o	X
Iran	0.00	o	o	o	o	o	o
North Korea	0.00	o	o	o	o	o	o
UAE	0.00	o	o	o	o	o	o

Total timeliness (1.50 max.)	Total access and consistency (2.00 max.)	Total clarity (5.00 max.)	Total comprehensiveness (6.50 max.)	Total deliveries (4.00 max.)	Total licences granted (4.00 max.)	Total licences refused (2.00 max.)
1.50	1.00	2.75	3.25	3.00	1.00	0.00
1.50	1.50	2.25	3.75	3.00	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.50	2.50	3.75	2.50	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.00	2.50	3.25	2.50	1.00	0.00
1.50	1.50	2.25	3.25	0.00	3.00	0.00
1.50	1.00	2.50	3.00	3.00	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.00	2.50	3.50	2.50	0.00	0.00
1.50	0.50	2.25	2.00	2.50	1.50	0.00
1.50	0.50	2.50	3.25	2.50	0.00	0.00
1.50	0.50	2.00	3.25	3.00	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.50	1.50	2.50	3.00	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.00	2.50	2.25	2.50	0.00	0.00
1.50	0.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.00	1.75	2.00	3.00	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.50	1.75	2.50	2.00	0.00	0.00
1.50	0.50	2.25	2.25	2.50	0.00	0.00
1.50	1.00	1.75	2.00	2.50	0.00	0.00
1.50	0.50	1.50	1.75	3.00	0.00	0.00
1.50	0.50	1.75	2.00	2.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.25	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: The online version of the Transparency Barometer incorporates corrections that may affect country scores and rankings. For this reason, the online version rather than the printed one should be considered definitive. See Small Arms Survey (n.d.).

- * Major exporters are countries that export—or are believed to export—at least USD 10 million worth of small arms, light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammunition in a given year. The 2018 Barometer includes any country that qualified as a major exporter at least once during the 2001–15 calendar years; it assesses arms trade activities for 2015.
- ** X indicates that a report was issued or submitted by the cut-off date—that is, 13 months after the year in which the trade activities took place. X(year) indicates that, because a report was not issued or submitted by the cut-off date, the country was evaluated on the basis of its most recent submission, which covered activities for the year reported in brackets.
- *** The Barometer assesses information provided in the following regional reporting instruments: (1) the EU's *Seventeenth Annual Report* (CoEU, 2016), which reflects exports of military equipment carried out by EU member states in 2015 and appears as 'EU' in the Barometer; and (2) the regional report compiled by SEESAC (SEESAC, 2017), which covers data on transfers completed in 2014 by exporters from South-eastern and Eastern Europe and appears as 'SEE' in the Barometer. The SEESAC Regional Report for arms transfers in 2015 was not available when the 2018 Barometer was finalized.
- ♦ The annual ATT report was submitted to the ATT Secretariat, but the country requested that the report not be made publicly available.
- † The initial ATT report was submitted to the ATT Secretariat, but the country requested that the report not be made publicly available.
- ♦ X indicates that an initial ATT report was submitted during 2015–17.
- ▲ X indicates that a PoA national report was submitted during 2014–16.

Scoring system

The scoring system for the 2018 Barometer allows exporters to earn up to 25 points on the basis of 42 criteria in 7 parameters: timeliness; access and consistency; clarity; comprehensiveness; and the level of detail provided on actual deliveries, licences granted, and licences refused. For detailed scoring guidelines, see Table A4 in Annexe 2.

Explanatory notes

The 2018 Barometer assesses national arms export reports that were made publicly available between 1 January 2015 and 31 January 2017. It also reflects information submitted by states to regional reporting mechanisms that were published after 31 January 2017 and before the Barometer was finalized (31 May 2018)—although the submission of this data does not receive points for timeliness.

The 2018 Barometer takes into account national submissions to the UN Register from 1 January 2015 to 31 January 2017, as well as information submitted to UN Comtrade on 2015 exports up to and including 24 November 2016.

The fact that the Barometer is based on multiple reporting mechanisms—international, regional, and national—works to the advantage of exporters that submit data to all of these mechanisms. While Barometer scores acknowledge the provision of information to any of the reporting instruments, the same information is not credited twice.

State-specific notes

- ^a In addition to the national report issued by the Belgian federal government, each Belgian region (Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia) reports separately on its arms exports.
- ^b For the purposes of the Barometer, the US national report refers to the State Department report issued pursuant to Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act on direct commercial sales, as well as the report on foreign military sales, which is prepared by the US Department of Defense (US DoD, 2017; US DoS, 2016). For the first time the 2018 Barometer assesses information on foreign trade provided via USA Trade Online (US CB, n.d.).

- ^c The Transparency Barometer 2018 assesses South Korea's national arms export report for the first time, although according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on national reports on arms exports, this report is the second edition (SIPRI, n.d.). The national report is produced by the Defence Acquisition Program Administration and provides information on export authorizations.
- ^d In the evaluation of South Africa's national report the term 'conveyance' is interpreted to mean transit in accordance with the definition provided in the National Conventional Arms Control Act (South Africa, 2002, art. 1(vii)).
- ^e Data on Taiwan was retrieved from the Directorate General of the Customs Administration of Taiwan's Ministry of Finance (Taiwan, n.d.).
- ^f SIPRI's database on national reports on arms exports indicates that the Defence Industry Manufacturers Association publishes an annual report on Turkey's arms exports (SIPRI, n.d.). The Barometer does not consider this report in assessing the country's transparency because it is not produced by a government agency, and thus is not representative of national reporting practices.

p. 715). Italy, however, does not disclose intended end users for export licences nor provide disaggregated information on small arms brokering activities. Data on re-exports and transit is partial, because destinations are not listed. Addressing these issues would further boost Italy's score.

Serbia reports to all of the multilateral instruments used by the Barometer and makes information available on the national transfer control system and data on authorizations and deliveries. It also publishes a national report on arms exports and contributes to the South-eastern Europe Regional Report on Arms Exports (Serbia, 2016; SEESAC, 2017). Both the national and regional reports only become available two years after the year of activity, which is reflected in a lower score for timeliness. Serbia could increase its score by revealing information on temporary exports and the reasons for export licence refusals.

According to the 2018 Barometer, the least transparent major exporters were Iran, North Korea, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. North Korea and the UAE did not report to any of the transparency mechanisms considered for the Barometer, and therefore scored zero points. Iran and Saudi Arabia submitted PoA reports in 2016. Saudi Arabia's PoA report contained information on its national transfer control system, but Iran's PoA report did not contain any information relevant to Barometer criteria. Consequently, Iran did not score any points for clarity and scored zero points overall. Israel could only be assessed by using its UN Register submission, which indicated that the country did not export any mortars or man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). The report did not include information on small arms.

On average, the exporters reviewed for the 2018 Barometer scored 12.35 points out of 25 available points. Twenty-five out of the 49 exporters under review achieved a score above this average, while three exporters scored zero points. Therefore, the 2018 Barometer has an average score that is less than half of the maximum points that can be awarded, and just over half of the assessed states recorded scores above this. ●



One of the challenges of determining if industrial production is under way in sub-Saharan African states is that information on whether producers are active or dormant can be contradictory.”

III. Sub-Saharan African small arms production, exports, and imports

This section uses data released by states complemented by other open-source information to provide an overview of the production of small arms in sub-Saharan Africa and identify the largest sub-Saharan African small arms exporters and importers, as well as the largest exporters to the region, for 2013–15.¹⁷ It consists of four subsections. The first identifies 15 sub-Saharan African states in which industrial production of small arms, light weapons, or ammunition takes place. The second subsection analyses UN Comtrade data to determine the largest sub-Saharan

Table 8 Known small arms and/or ammunition producers in sub-Saharan Africa, 2018

Country	Producer	Small arms	Ammunition
Angola	Companhia de Pólvoras e Explosivos de Angola		X
Cameroon*	Cartoucherie de Garoua		X
Chad	Unknown		[X]
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Société Africaine d'Explosifs (AFRIDEX)	[X]	X
Congo, Republic of the	Manufacture d'armes et de cartouches du Congo (MACC)		X
Ethiopia*	Metals and Engineering Corporation	[X]	X
Kenya*	Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation	[X]	X
Madagascar	Usine militaire de Moramanga		X
Mali	Cartoucherie du Mali		X
Namibia	Windhoeker Maschinenfabrik		X
Nigeria*	Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON)	X	X
South Africa*	Denel; Milkor; Diplopoint; KZN Ammunition; Frontier Bullets; Peregrine Bullets	X	X
Tanzania*	Mzinga Corporation	X	X
Uganda*	Luwero Industries Limited	[X]	X
Zimbabwe*	Zimbabwe Defence Industries	X	X


Note: The use of square brackets ('[X]') indicates that the information is unconfirmed/uncertain.

* Previously identified as a small arms producer by the Small Arms Survey.

Sources: AU and Small Arms Survey (2018); Berger (2015, p. 45); GRIP (2018); Mack (2018); Nkala (2016); Small Arms Survey (2001, pp. 6–57; 2002, pp. 8–61; 2003, pp. 8–55); UNSC (2014, paras. 166–70; 2015d, para. 214 and Annex 1.11; 2017b, para. 92; 2017c, para. 161; 2017e, para. 249)²⁰

Known small arms and/or ammunition producers in sub-Saharan Africa, 2018


- Small arms production
- Ammunition production
- ? Information unconfirmed/uncertain
- * Previously identified as a small arms producer by the Small Arms Survey



Largest sub-Saharan African small arms exporters, according to UN Comtrade, 2013–15*

Exporter	Total value
South Africa	USD 62.3mn
Côte d'Ivoire	USD 11.4mn
Namibia	USD 3.4mn
CAR	USD 3.0mn
Kenya	USD 1.4mn


*Note: All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.



Largest sub-Saharan African small arms importers, according to regional/national arms exports reports and UN Comtrade, 2013–15*

Importer	Highest value
South Africa	USD 126.1mn
Cameroon	USD 52.3mn
Côte d'Ivoire	USD 52.0mn
Malawi	USD 38.3mn
Namibia	USD 32.2mn

*Note: All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.



African small arms exporters during 2013–15. These subsections focus on South African production and exports, with the second providing examples of unauthorized re-exports from Uganda to South Sudan during 2013–17. The third subsection seeks to identify the largest sub-Saharan African importers of small arms, with the fourth focusing on the largest exporters of small arms to the region. The study does not cover—at least directly—either small arms craft production or illicit small arms transfers.¹⁸ Readers should also note that the figures presented in this section on the volume and value of sub-Saharan African small arms production, exports, and imports are skewed by the reporting of the most transparent producers, importers, and exporters.

Sub-Saharan African industrial production of small arms

The Small Arms Survey identified small arms producers in ten sub-Saharan African states at the turn of the 21st century, concluding that industrial production is limited in scale and largely dependent on input from non-African suppliers (Berman, 2007; Small Arms Survey, 2001; 2002; 2003). The research conducted for this year's Trade Update, drawing on open-source research, commissioned background papers, and a questionnaire completed by 21 sub-Saharan African states, indicates that by and large these conclusions still hold for the 15 sub-Saharan African states in which industrial production of small arms and/or ammunition has been identified (see Table 8). Several more states appear to have the capacity for industrial production of small arms and/or ammunition than those identified in Table 8, and some others are reportedly seeking to establish new production facilities. Several producers manufacture small arms and ammunition for domestic and regional markets for civilian users. Unfortunately, some of these items are diverted into the illicit trade (see Box 4).

Box 4 Diversion of sub-Saharan African-produced hunting ammunition

Several of the states listed in Table 8 produce 12-gauge cartridge shotgun ammunition for domestic and export civilian markets. Yet such ammunition, typically used for hunting, has also reached non-governmental armed forces and criminal groups in the region. For example, although MACC does not have clients in CAR and the DRC, since 2014 MACC-produced hunting ammunition has been found in significant quantities in the hands of non-governmental forces in both states.²¹ Twelve-gauge shotgun cartridges produced by Cartoucherie du Mali are also present in markets in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea. It appears that at least some of these cartridges have found their way into neighbouring states illegally (Agence ivoirienne de presse, 2016; Côte d'Ivoire, 2017).

This study confirms production in eight states previously identified by the Small Arms Survey as small arms producers (Small Arms Survey, 2003, p. 12), and identifies ammunition producers for government and civilian end users in seven more states. One of the challenges of determining if industrial production is under way in sub-Saharan African states is that information on whether producers are active or dormant can be contradictory. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Namibia informed the Small Arms Survey that industrial production of small arms, their parts, or ammunition does not take place in their state (AU and Small Arms Survey, 2018). Yet independent sources point to ammunition producers in all three states (see Table 8). In other cases production facilities appear to be present, but are operating at limited capacity or are dormant. For example, Cartoucherie de Garoua in Cameroon and Usine militaire de Moramanga in Madagascar face problems sourcing materials for production (GRIP, 2018), while Manufacture des munitions de chasse in CAR reportedly ceased production in 2015 (UNSC, 2015d, Annex 1.11). There is also uncertainty regarding ongoing industrial production in Burkina Faso and Guinea.¹⁹ For these reasons the information on small arms and/or ammunition producers provided in Table 8 is likely to be incomplete.

Belgian, Chinese, and German companies have supported the development of small arms production capabilities in sub-Saharan Africa, with licensed production arrangements concluded in Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe from the 1960s onwards (Anders and Weidacher, 2006, pp. 55–57; Small Arms Survey, 2002, pp. 43–48). Sub-Saharan African states have also turned to other suppliers for production equipment, technical assistance, and licensed production arrangements. North Korea has contributed to production capabilities in the DRC, Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda (Berger, 2015, p. 45; Holtom and Pavesi, 2017, p. 69). Spain's MAXAM CPEA has a joint venture with the Companhia de Pólvoras e Explosivos de Angola to produce ammunition for hunting and sporting purposes (Mack, 2018). Nigeria's 2017 federal budget allocated NGN 364 million (USD 1 million) for DICON to produce Beryl M762 rifles under licence from the Polish Armaments Group (DefenceWeb, 2018; Fabryka Broni Łucznik, 2018). Cameroon has discussed cooperation with Turkey to establish an arms and ammunition production factory (Ndangue, 2016). South Sudan has been seeking external support to establish a small arms ammunition production facility in Juba since 2015 (UNSC, 2016b, para. 28; 2017a, paras. 119–21). In other words, not only do sub-Saharan African states continue to seek external assistance to establish small arms/ammunition production facilities, but the range of potential partners is expanding.

Sub-Saharan African small arms exporters

South Africa is the only sub-Saharan African state to consistently fall within the top or major small arms exporter categories during 2001–15. ATT annual reports and UN

Register submissions list South Africa as the only sub-Saharan African exporter of small arms during 2013–15. It is also the only sub-Saharan African state to release information on its arms exports for parliamentary and public scrutiny (see Box 5). Table 10 shows the value of small arms exports for the five largest sub-Saharan African exporters, as recorded in UN Comtrade for 2013–15. Table 11 shows the largest importers for the five largest exporters (South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Namibia, CAR, and Kenya). With the exception of South Africa, the values are negligible compared to top and major small arms exporters worldwide. Moreover, as explained below, it is highly likely that some of the recorded exports from sub-Saharan Africa actually involve the return of small arms and ammunition to countries that have participated in peacekeeping missions in the

Box 5 South African small arms production and exports

South Africa’s small arms and ammunition industry is the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, producing a wide range of small arms and ammunition for government and civilian markets. Denel Land Systems (DLS) is the largest South African small arms producer, manufacturing M4 and M6 60 mm mortars, M8 81 mm mortars, mini-SS light machine guns, SS77 general-purpose machine guns, NTW 20 x 82 anti-materiel weapons, and 40 mm automatic grenade launchers (DLS, n.d.). Milkor has reportedly produced more than 70,000 40 mm grenade launchers that have been delivered to more than 50 countries (Martin, 2013a). Denel Pretoria Metal Pressings (DPMP) is the main small arms ammunition producer, while Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM) produces and exports ammunition for 60 mm and 81 mm mortar launchers and 40 mm infantry weapons (Rheinmetall Defence, n.d.). Smaller ammunition producers include Diplopoint, KZN Ammunition, Frontier Bullets, and Peregrine Bullets, which largely cater for civilian markets (Martin, 2017).

South African producers work with overseas companies to develop, produce, and market their products. For example, DLS shares technology and production lines with the Swiss producer Brugger & Thomet, while DPMP has partnered with the Norwegian/Finnish company NAMMO to produce 12.7 mm multi-purpose ammunition, and Germany’s Rheinmetall GmbH is the majority partner in RDM (DLS, 2016; Martin, 2013b).

Denel’s annual report contains information on total revenues and export values for DLS, DPMP, and RDM, but does not indicate the value of small arms production or small arms exports. South African arms export reports show that the South African authorities authorized the export of large quantities of small arms to Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East during 2013–14 (see Table 9).²² The value of authorized South African small arms exports has increased significantly in recent years from USD 11.4 million in 2013 to USD 30.1 million in 2016 (South Africa, 2014; 2017). The South African Parliament has, however, expressed concern about some of the destinations for South African arms exports, citing in this regard ‘human rights abuse [sic] as well as regional instability’ (South Africa, 2016).²³

Table 9 Largest recipients of South African small arms, according to value of export authorizations (USD million), 2013–14

Importing country	Value of exports (USD million), 2013–14	Categories
UAE	7.8	Ammunition, bombs and rockets, heavy weapons
Pakistan	5.9	Ammunition, heavy weapons
Jordan	4.9	Ammunition, heavy weapons, light weapons
United Kingdom	4.4	Ammunition
Chad	2.8	Ammunition

Notes:

All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.

The 'heavy weapons' category covers 40 mm grenade launchers, while 'light weapons' covers rifles, assault rifles, sub-machine guns/machine pistols, and machine guns.

Sources: South Africa (2014; 2015)

region. Yet sub-Saharan African states can and do export small arms, in some cases re-exporting small arms or ammunition in violation of end-user assurances relating to the original importation of such items—as the case of Ugandan re-exports of small arms to South Sudan demonstrates (see below).

Table 10 Largest sub-Saharan African small arms exporters, as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2013–15

Exporter	2013	2014	2015	Total
South Africa	21.9	33.5	6.9	62.3
Côte d'Ivoire	0.6	5.7	5.1	11.4
Namibia	2.4	0.7	0.3	3.4
CAR	–	–	3.0	3.0
Kenya	1.1	0.0	0.3	1.4

Note: All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Table 11 Main importers for the five largest sub-Saharan African small arms exporters, as reported to UN Comtrade, 2013–15

Exporter	Largest importer	2 nd largest importer	3 rd largest importer
South Africa	Canada (63%)	United States (15%)	Thailand (3%)
Côte d'Ivoire	Jordan (35%)	Burkina Faso (29%)	Mali (14%)
Namibia	Botswana (44%)	South Africa (33%)	Zambia (15%)
CAR	Chad (100%)	–	–
Kenya	Ghana (61%)	Sierra Leone (18%)	Serbia (9%)

Note: The percentages in brackets indicate the share of the exporting state's exports accounted for by the importing state.

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

One indicator for the limited scale of exports is that very few sub-Saharan African small arms-producing companies are present at international arms and security fairs, including those that take place in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa is a notable exception, because it hosts the biennial Africa Aerospace and Defence Exhibition and its small arms producers are also present at arms fairs in other parts of Africa and further afield. Other examples include Zimbabwe Defence Industries, a small arms producer that promoted its wares at the Africa Aerospace and Defence Exhibition 2016 (Africa Aerospace & Defence, 2016). BNTI Tactical Limited, a Nigerian-owned and US-based company that manufactures small arms for US and African customers, became 'the first Nigerian-owned company to exhibit at the SHOT Show' small arms fair in the United States in 2017 (Burgess, 2017). Yet available data does not show significant small arms exports from Nigeria and Zimbabwe.

Exports, or the return of peacekeepers' military equipment?

The ATT and UN Register exclude from their definitions of 'international arms transfer' situations where states deliver arms to military contingents that countries have deployed abroad, for example as part of a multilateral peacekeeping mission. UN Comtrade, however, includes information on such movements of small arms, without indicating that the arms are destined for a peacekeeping mission or are returning from such a mission. Several of the entries in UN Comtrade that list sub-Saharan

African states as exporters appear to relate to such cases. For example, UN Comtrade recorded USD 49 million worth of small arms exported from Zambia to CAR in 2015, which would make Zambia the second largest sub-Saharan African exporter for 2013–15. Communication with the Zambian Ministry of Defence (MoD) revealed, however, that the transfer related to the supply of equipment for the Zambian contingent in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.²⁴ For this reason this report does not identify Zambia as a major small arms exporter.

UN Comtrade data for Côte d'Ivoire includes exports to Jordan (worth USD 4 million) and Bangladesh (worth USD 1 million), most of which are probably repatriated small arms used by Jordanian and Bangladeshi troops during their participation in the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) during 2013–15. The reduction in the number of military personnel that these states contributed to UNOCI in fact correlates closely with the reported export of small arms from Côte d'Ivoire to Bangladesh and Jordan. Jordan reduced its military contingent in UNOCI from 1,074 troops in 2013 to 18 in 2015, while the number of Bangladeshi troops dropped from 2,182 to 1,433 (UNSC, 2013b, Annex III; 2015c, Annex). Other 'exports' from sub-Saharan African states could reflect similar movements of small arms.


Unauthorized re-exports

Even if sub-Saharan African states—with the exception of South Africa—are not major small arms producers and exporters, in some cases they have re-exported small arms and ammunition that they previously imported from another state. In some cases such re-exports breach a commitment made to the state that originally exported the small arms to obtain its express permission before delivery to another end user. This subsection considers two types of such 'unauthorized re-exports'. The first consists of cases in which the importing state re-exports small arms almost immediately after receiving the shipment—for example, it unloads the consignment from the vessel that delivers it before sending it by aircraft to another state without the authorization of the original exporting state. The second type relates to the re-export of small arms and ammunition that have been in the national stockpile of the re-exporting state for several years, or even decades (Holtom, Pavesi, and Rigual, 2014, pp. 117–28).


It is believed that Kenya and Uganda have both re-exported arms and ammunition to the Government of South Sudan without the express permission of the original exporting state, with the '*Faina* episode' of 2008 perhaps the most well-known example of this. In September 2008 pirates seized the *Faina* cargo ship, which was transporting arms and ammunition from Ukraine to Kenya, but which were in fact intended for subsequent delivery to South Sudan—an example of the first type of 'unauthorized re-export' cited above (Lewis, 2009, pp. 39–44).

Figure 5 Two types of unauthorized re-export


Unauthorized re-export type 1




Conventional arms are exported from state A and arrive by ship in state B.



The government of state B unloads the conventional arms from the ship and issues a delivery verification certificate for state A.



The government of state B then **intentionally diverts** the conventional arms shipment to state C by plane.



Unauthorized re-export type 2



Almost twenty years after importing conventional arms, the armed forces of state B decide that the previously imported conventional arms are now “surplus”.



Therefore, the armed forces transfer the conventional arms to the national police force in state B.



Due to the passage of time it is perhaps an **honest mistake** that the government of state B forgot to inform and seek authorization from the competent authority of state A to transfer ownership of the imported conventional arms, in accordance with the assurance given in the EUC issued by the government of state B to state A.



Source: Small Arms Survey (2018b)

The Panel of Experts on South Sudan accused Uganda of re-exporting small arms and ammunition to the Government of South Sudan in 2013–15 in cases that illustrate both types of unauthorized re-export (UNSC, 2016a, para. 80). The Panel of Experts reported in November 2016 that Bulgaria delivered a shipment of 4,000 rifles and small arms ammunition to the Ugandan MoD in July 2014 that was re-exported to South Sudan shortly after its arrival in Uganda (UNSC, 2016c, para. 53). The Panel of Experts expressed similar concerns over another case in 2017, following the Bulgarian authorities' issuance in June 2017 of another export licence for small arms and ammunition destined for the Ugandan MoD (UNSC, 2017d, para. 54). The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that an authentic end-user certificate (EUC) had been provided in support of the export licence application and that the Ugandan MoD had made a commitment not to retransfer the items without Bulgaria's consent (Bivol.bg, 2017). The shipment of small arms and ammunition in connection with this licence, comprising 31 tons of weapons (including Kalashnikov rifles) and 12 tons of ammunition, arrived in Uganda from Bulgaria on 29 August 2017 (Bivol.bg, 2017; UNSC, 2017d, para. 54). The Panel of Experts on South Sudan reported, however, that 'sources claim the weapons were destined for onward shipment to Juba' (UNSC, 2017d, para. 54). These reports of Uganda's unauthorized re-export of small arms occurring shortly after their delivery to the country are of note since, as indicated in the following subsections, Uganda was a significant small arms importer during 2013–15.

Uganda has also supplied arms and ammunition to the Government of South Sudan from its own national stockpile, in line with the second type of unauthorized re-export. Israeli-produced Galil 'micro assault rifles' originally delivered to the Ugandan MoD in 2007 were subsequently re-exported to South Sudan in 2014 without Israel's permission, notwithstanding the EUC Uganda gave Israel that required it to seek Israel's permission before retransferring the rifles (UNSC, 2016a, para. 81; 2016c, para. 51). These cases of unauthorized re-export were uncovered as the result of investigations by an expert team focused on arms deliveries to South Sudan. Comparable investigations conducted in other contexts are needed in order to determine the extent of the problem of unauthorized arms re-exports in sub-Saharan Africa.

Identifying the largest small arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa

It is difficult to determine the largest small arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa using open-source materials. Official data provided by importing and exporting states reveals only parts of the puzzle, and it is not always clear which pieces are missing. For example, 33 of the 46 sub-Saharan African states reviewed for this section made customs data on small arms imports available via UN Comtrade for at least one of the years 2013–15, while only 22 did so for all three years. Yet, when cross-referenced with other

Table 12 Trend in small arms imports by sub-Saharan African countries, as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2006–15

2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
84.2	125.1	80.6	87.5	86.2	173.0	85.2	110.3	145.6	257.3

Note: All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

sources of information on international small arms transfers, it is evident that UN Comtrade data reveals only part of the picture of authorized small arms flows to sub-Saharan African states. Although none of the 46 sub-Saharan African states submitted information on international small arms transfers to the UN Register for the years 2013–15, five sub-Saharan African countries submitted an annual report to the ATT Secretariat on imports and exports for the 2015 calendar year.²⁵ In order to try to determine the largest small arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa, this subsection utilizes information released by transparent exporters via multilateral reporting instruments (ATT annual reports and UN Register submissions), UN Comtrade, and national arms export reports. Most of these sources contain data on exports of small arms, related equipment, and ammunition ‘made or modified to military specifications’ (OSCE, 2012), although it is not always clear if security forces are the intended recipients of these items.²⁶ Taking account of such limitations, this subsection seeks to identify the largest sub-Saharan African small arms importers by comparing open-source information with estimates of military, law enforcement, and civilian firearms holdings.

UN Comtrade recorded sub-Saharan African countries’ small arms imports worth USD 257 million in 2015, the highest value of imports for the period 2001–15. The previous highest level occurred in 2011, when sub-Saharan African countries imported USD 173 million worth of small arms. The value of sub-Saharan African small arms imports increased by 49 per cent between 2011 and 2015 (see Table 12). As a result, although UN Comtrade data indicates that sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 4.7 per cent of the global value of small arms imports in 2015, this represents the highest share for the region since 2001.

The upwards trend is also reflected in the increase in the number of sub-Saharan African states that imported at least USD 10 million worth of small arms in a single calendar year during 2013–15 (see Section I). In 2013 South Africa was the only sub-Saharan African state to record such a level of small arms imports. During 2014 and 2015 four other sub-Saharan African states also recorded small arms imports worth USD 10 million or more in at least one of these years (see Table 13). Nevertheless, the value of small arms imports fluctuated significantly during 2013–15 for four of the five largest sub-Saharan African importers, with South Africa an exception. In most of these cases a single exporter accounted for more than half of the value of the imports (see Table 14).

Table 13 Largest sub-Saharan African small arms importers, as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2013–15

Importing country	2013	2014	2015	Total, 2013–15
South Africa	38.0	43.9	44.2	126.1
Côte d'Ivoire	9.4	16.1	26.5	52.0
Malawi	3.0	22.7	12.6	38.3
Namibia	5.4	4.2	22.6	32.2
Niger	–	4.1	22.0	26.1

Note: All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Table 14 Main exporters for the five largest sub-Saharan African small arms importers, as reported to UN Comtrade, 2013–15

Importing country	Largest source	2 nd largest source	3 rd largest source
South Africa	United States (31%)	Italy (15%)	Czech Republic (10%)
Côte d'Ivoire	France (96%)	Unspecified (2%)	Mauritania (1%)
Malawi	UAE (56%)	Hong Kong (29%)	South Korea (13%)
Namibia	Russian Federation (54%)	United States (10%)	Germany (7%)
Niger	France (77%)	China (17%)	Switzerland (3%)

Note: The percentages in brackets indicate the exporting state's share of the importing state's imports.

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

UN Comtrade data on imports to the region does not correspond to available data on the number of active troops or firearms holdings in sub-Saharan African countries. South Africa is the only one of the five states UN Comtrade identifies as significant importers that has a large armed force and a high level of civilian firearm holdings in sub-Saharan Africa (see Tables 15–16). Côte d'Ivoire is among the ten states estimated to have the largest number of civilian-held firearms in sub-Saharan Africa, but the number of registered firearms in the country is very low, at 2,500. Namibia has the second highest known number of registered firearms in the region (200,000), while Malawi has 12,500 (estimated 47,000 total), and Niger 2,000 (estimated 117,000 total). These figures do not point to significant demand for small arms and ammunition in these four states in comparison to the other states listed in Tables 15 and 16.

Table 15 Largest armed forces in sub-Saharan Africa, in descending order, and estimates for military and law enforcement firearms holdings, 2018

Country	Number of active troops (reserve and/or paramilitary)	Estimate of military firearms holdings	Estimate of law enforcement firearms holdings	Estimate for total government firearms holdings
Eritrea	201,750 (120,000 reserve)	668,550	12,000	680,550
South Sudan	185,000	351,500	42,000	393,500
Ethiopia	138,000	525,600	79,000	604,600
DRC	134,250	161,000	46,000	207,000
Nigeria	118,000 (82,000 paramilitary)	224,200	362,400	586,600
Angola	107,000 (10,000 paramilitary)	203,300	60,000	263,300
South Africa	66,350 (15,050 reserve)	350,636	250,481	601,117
Uganda	45,000 (10,000 reserve; 1,400 paramilitary)	116,660	54,000	170,660
Rwanda	33,000 (2,000 paramilitary)	66,500	14,000	80,500
Chad	30,350 (9,500 paramilitary)	25,020	34,000	59,020

Sources: IISS (2018); Small Arms Survey (2018a)

Table 16 Largest civilian firearms holdings in sub-Saharan Africa, 2018

Country	Estimated civilian firearms holdings	Number of registered firearms
Nigeria	6,154,000	n/a
South Africa	5,351,000	3,000,000
Angola	2,982,000	n/a
Ghana	2,280,000	1,236,128
Mozambique	1,337,000	7,000
South Sudan	1,255,000	n/a
Somalia	1,145,000	n/a
Côte d'Ivoire	1,049,000	2,500
Kenya	750,000	8,136
Cameroon	510,000	n/a

Source: Small Arms Survey (2018a)

A better match between demand, as reflected in Tables 15 and 16, and small arms imports can be found in the national and regional arms export reports of EU member states and South-eastern European states, as well as in these states' submissions to the UN Register and ATT Secretariat (see Table 17). These sources corroborate UN Comtrade data with regard to South Africa's status as one of the largest small arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa, but indicate that Angola, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda are important destinations for small arms and ammunition 'made or modified to military specifications', as defined in categories ML1 and ML3 of the EU Common Military List (ML) (see Table 18).

Table 17 Deliveries of small arms to Angola, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda, according to information contained in ATT annual reports and UN Register submissions, 2013–16

Importer	Small arms	Light weapons
Angola	577 pistols and revolvers; 157 rifles and carbines; 2,500 sub-machine guns; 12,500 assault rifles; 2,000 light machine guns	20 heavy machine guns; 3,500 under-barrel and grenade launchers
Cameroon	1 pistol or revolver; 26 rifles and carbines; 8,900 assault rifles; 19 light machine guns	431 heavy machine guns; 468 under-barrel and grenade launchers; 30 20 mm anti-aircraft guns

Importer	Small arms	Light weapons
Kenya	215 pistols and revolvers; 46 rifles and carbines; 9 sub-machine guns; 10,719 assault rifles; 2 light machine guns	1 under-barrel and grenade launcher; 6 anti-tank guns
Nigeria	2,340 pistols and revolvers; 30 sub-machine guns; 12,947 assault rifles; 2,655 light machine guns	64 heavy machine guns; 363 under-barrel and grenade launchers; 20 recoilless rifles; 33 mortars under 100 mm
South Africa	14,637 pistols and revolvers; 3,278 rifles and carbines; 15 sub-machine guns; 314 assault rifles; 75 light machine guns	2 heavy machine guns; 293 under-barrel and grenade launchers; 5 anti-tank missiles and launchers; an undisclosed number of 84 mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles and AT-4 anti-armour weapons
Uganda	200 pistols and revolvers; 50 rifles and carbines; 250 sub-machine guns; 20,173 assault rifles; 600 light machine guns	70 heavy machine guns; 12 anti-tank missiles and launchers; 50 82 mm mortars

Sources: ATT Secretariat (2018b); UNODA (n.d.); UNROCA (n.d.)

Table 18 Largest sub-Saharan African importers of small arms according to different data sources (USD million), 2013–15

Largest importer by value of licences issued for exports of ML1 and ML3 equipment to sub-Saharan Africa by EU and SEE states	Largest importer by value of deliveries of ML1 and ML3 equipment to sub-Saharan Africa by EU and SEE states	Largest importer by value according to UN Comtrade	Highest value for small arms deliveries as reported in regional/national reports and UN Comtrade
South Africa, 235.0	Cameroon, 52.3	South Africa, 126.1	South Africa, 126.1
Nigeria, 158.3	South Africa, 29.7	Côte d'Ivoire, 52.0	Cameroon, 52.3
Uganda, 66.9	Nigeria, 18.0	Malawi, 38.3	Côte d'Ivoire, 52.0
Cameroon, 62.3	Angola, 14.9	Namibia, 32.2	Malawi, 38.3
Angola, 48.9	Kenya, 12.8	Niger, 26.1	Namibia, 32.2

Notes: All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.

Data derived from EU Annual Arms Export Reports for the years 2013–15 and SEESAC Annual Arms Export Reports for the years 2013–15. All EU member states submit information on the value of their export licences, but not all do so on the value of deliveries.

Sources: CoEU (2015; 2016; 2017); SEESAC (2015; 2017; 2018); NISAT (n.d.)

The use of this data to corroborate UN Comtrade data is subject to several caveats. Firstly, it does not necessarily include the category of ‘firearms’ covered by UN Comtrade. Secondly, several of the largest small arms exporters in the EU, in particular France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, do not make data publicly available on the value of deliveries of small arms and ammunition falling within the ML1 or ML3 categories. It is also worth noting that China, the Russian Federation, and the United States are important suppliers of military equipment for the armed forces of Angola, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda according to SIPRI—trade that is not reflected in Table 18 (SIPRI, 2018). In sum, while UN Comtrade data indicates that the largest importers of small arms in sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15 were South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Namibia, and Niger, other sources put Angola, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda in this category.

Box 6 Deliveries of small arms and ammunition to Cameroon: risks of diversion and misuse

As noted elsewhere in the text, Cameroon appears to have been one of the largest importers of small arms in sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15 (see Tables 17 and 18). According to data made available by EU and SEESAC states, Serbia accounted for 96 per cent of the value of deliveries of small arms ‘made or modified to military specifications’ to Cameroon during this period, including a considerable quantity of assault rifles, heavy machine guns, and grenade launchers (see Table 17). In addition, Spain delivered USD 5.5 million worth of shotguns and 12-gauge shotgun ammunition to the country during 2013–15 (Spain, 2014; 2015; 2016). Small arms and ammunition supplied to Cameroon in 2013–17 have attracted attention due to the risk of diversion to non-state armed groups in neighbouring states and the potential for misuse by Cameroonian security forces.

During 2014–15 the UN Panel of Experts on CAR found evidence of anti-Balaka groups in CAR using hunting ammunition acquired from sources in Cameroon in acts of violence (UNSC, 2014, paras. 166–70; 2015d, para. 208). Given the arms embargo on CAR and the trafficking of hunting ammunition from Cameroon to CAR, restrictions were imposed on the sale of hunting ammunition in eastern Cameroon; however, the trafficking of hunting ammunition between Cameroon and CAR continued (UNSC, 2017e, paras. 251–52). Examinations of some of the 12-gauge shotgun ammunition seized in CAR reveal Spain as the country of manufacture (Conflict Armament Research, 2015, pp. 23–24), indicating that exports of Spanish hunting ammunition to companies in Cameroon had been diverted to unauthorized users in CAR.

More recently, Amnesty International has accused Cameroon’s security forces of committing human rights violations in anglophone Cameroon during 2016–18 (AI, 2018b, pp. 18–29). In a particular episode Serbian-supplied Zastava M21 rifles were found in the hands of individuals suspected of participating in extra-judicial executions carried out by the Cameroonian armed forces (AI, 2018c).

Identifying the largest exporters of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa

As noted in the previous section, a number of importing states in sub-Saharan Africa do not release information to the public on small arms import authorizations or deliveries. Transparent exporters can help to address this shortcoming, although they cannot provide a complete picture of authorized arms flows to the region. The first part of this section reviews official information released by transparent exporters, defined as small arms exporters that scored 12.5 points or more in the Transparency Barometer: primarily EU member states and South-eastern European states. The second part of the section examines open-source material for several less transparent small arms exporters—that is, exporters that scored fewer than 12.5 points in the Transparency Barometer—which are often considered important sources of supply for sub-Saharan African states or which appear to be growing in importance based on open-source information. Using these two methods, this section seeks to identify many of the largest exporters of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15.

The largest transparent exporters

This subsection compares data contained in various official sources to determine the flow of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa from transparent exporters. The subsection compares UN Comtrade data with information released by European exporters through national and regional arms export reports for the years 2013–15. It also highlights differences in reported values between authorizations and deliveries of small arms, as well as between exports of small arms ‘made or modified to military specifications’, as defined in national and regional arms export reports, and the firearms category used in UN Comtrade. The summary contained in Table 21 highlights points of convergence in the data, but also points to a lack of information on European countries’ actual deliveries, as opposed to reported export authorizations for such items. Although there is a significant discrepancy between the value of issued licences and deliveries, it should be noted that in practice not all the licences that a country issues are used.

Table 19 lists the five largest exporters of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa for 2013–15 according to UN Comtrade: France (which accounted for 18 per cent of small arms exports to the region), the United States (15 per cent), Spain (7 per cent), Italy (6 per cent), and Turkey (5 per cent). The three largest exporters for 2013–15 all recorded their highest value for exports to sub-Saharan Africa in 2015. The value of French exports to sub-Saharan Africa increased by 171 per cent between 2014 and 2015, while the figure was 96 per cent for the United States and 16 per cent for Spain. Table 20 shows that for three of the top five exporters, one importer accounted for more than half of the value of their exports to sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15. Mali accounted for just under

Table 19 Largest exporters to sub-Saharan Africa, as reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2013–15

Exporting country	2013	2014	2015	Total
France	12.3	17.9	48.4	78.6
United States	13.6	18.2	35.7	67.5
Spain	8.3	11.5	13.3	33.1
Italy	10.1	6.6	8.0	24.7
Turkey	5.7	8.6	9.4	23.7

Note: All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

Table 20 Main importers for the five largest exporters to sub-Saharan Africa, as reported to UN Comtrade, 2013–15

Exporter	Largest importer	2 nd largest importer	3 rd largest importer
France	Côte d'Ivoire (63%)	Niger (26%)	Cameroon (3%)
United States	South Africa (58%)	CAR (23%)	Ghana (5%)
Spain	Ghana (33%)	Cameroon (16%)	South Africa (12%)
Italy	South Africa (73%)	Ghana (8%)	Cameroon (8%)
Turkey	Mali (49%)	South Africa (16%)	Burkina Faso (10%)

Note: The percentages in brackets indicate the share of the exporting state's exports to sub-Saharan Africa accounted for by the importing state.

Source: NISAT (n.d.)

half of the value of Turkey's exports to the region, while Ghana accounted for a third of Spain's exports.

There is reason to believe that these values do not cover all of the small arms exports to the region, both for these exporters and for other important small arms exporters. For example, Spain is one of the few European exporters to release data on authorizations and deliveries of civilian firearms and small arms 'designed or modified to military specification' in its national arms export report. According to reports for the period 2013–15, Spain authorized the export of USD 60.0 million worth of firearms and ammunition and recorded the delivery of USD 33.6 million worth of such items during this period. The value for civilian small arms exports in Spain's national report corresponds

Table 21 Largest transparent exporters of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa (USD million), 2013–15

Largest exporter by value of <i>licences issued for ML1 and ML3 equipment to sub-Saharan Africa by EU and SEE states</i>	Largest exporter by value of <i>deliveries of ML1 and ML3 equipment to sub-Saharan Africa by EU and SEE states</i>	Largest exporter by value according to UN Comtrade	Highest value for small arms deliveries as reported in regional/national reports and UN Comtrade
United Kingdom,* 249.4	Bulgaria, 85.4	France, 78.6	Bulgaria, 85.4
Bulgaria, 218.7	Serbia, 84.5	Spain, 33.1	Serbia, 84.5
France,* 127.4	Austria, 12.2	Italy,* 24.7	France,* 78.6
Serbia, 121.5	Poland, 9.5	Czech Republic, 16.4	Spain, 33.1
Slovakia, 44.0	Czech Republic, 6.5	Germany,* 14.5	Italy,* 24.7

Note: All values are expressed in constant 2015 US dollars.

* Indicates that the state does not provide data on the value of deliveries of items covered by EU Military List categories ML1 and ML3 in national or regional arms export reports.

Sources: CoEU (2014; 2015; 2016); SEESAC (2015; 2017; 2018); NISAT (n.d.)

closely with the value in UN Comtrade, but appears to exclude the delivery of almost USD 3 million worth of small arms classified as ML1 and ML3 that are documented in Spain’s national report and the EU Annual Report on Arms Exports (Spain 2014; 2015; 2016). This means that, even for broadly transparent exporters, it is often difficult to fully account for deliveries of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 21 presents a comparison of UN Comtrade data and information contained in national and regional arms export reports for the states that have recorded the highest value for authorizations and/or deliveries of items covered by categories ML1 and ML3 of the EU Common Military List during 2013–15. One of the main challenges with such a comparison is that four of the largest European small arms exporters—France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom—do not report on the value of their deliveries of small arms ‘made or modified to military specifications’ in national or regional arms export reports. Of these four states, UK national reports indicate that a significant portion of the authorizations for small arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa are intended for private security companies (PSCs) involved in anti-piracy operations; yet the UK Parliament’s Committees on Arms Export Controls have prompted the UK government to reveal that actual deliveries of small arms for such operations are well below the value and volume authorized for export (see Box 7).

National and regional arms export reports indicate that Bulgaria and Serbia delivered items falling within EU Military List categories ML1 and ML3 well in excess of the value

Box 7 UK small arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa for anti-piracy operations

The United Kingdom's ATT and UN Register reports document authorizations to export 4,879 pistols and revolvers, 26,398 rifles and carbines (including shotguns), 63 sub-machine guns, 43,805 assault rifles, 60 light machine guns, 11 heavy machine guns, and 31 under-barrel and grenade launchers to sub-Saharan African states during 2013–16 (ATT Secretariat, 2018b; UNODA, n.d.; UNROCA, n.d.). These data sources do not indicate if these items were all delivered to sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of concerns expressed by the UK Parliament's Committees on Arms Export Controls over the UK government's authorization of the transfer of 181,708 items to Eastern Africa for use by maritime PSCs during April 2012–September 2013 (UK, 2014, para. 382), the United Kingdom's quarterly reports on arms export authorizations now identify whether arms, ammunition, and other military equipment are destined for anti-piracy operations. Eighty-three per cent of pistols and revolvers, 89 per cent of rifles and carbines, 84.5 per cent of assault rifles, and 94 per cent of light machine guns authorized for export to Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Tanzania during 2013–16 were in fact destined for anti-piracy operations. It has therefore been possible to determine that the majority of small arms authorized for export to seven Eastern African states were authorized for anti-piracy operations, and not for use by security forces or civilians in these states.

of their exports to sub-Saharan Africa that were recorded in UN Comtrade—in fact surpassing the values recorded by the largest exporters to the region in UN Comtrade. Bulgaria reported the delivery of USD 85.4 million worth of small arms 'made or modified to military specifications' to sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15, with Uganda accounting for 26 per cent of these deliveries, followed by South Africa (17 per cent) and Angola (13 per cent). In contrast, UN Comtrade recorded exports from Bulgaria to sub-Saharan Africa worth only USD 35,142. There is a similar large discrepancy in the value of Serbia's deliveries, which reported USD 84.5 million worth of deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15, but for which UN Comtrade recorded deliveries worth a mere USD 5.8 million. Cameroon was the main recipient of Serbian exports to the region, accounting for 58 per cent of Serbian deliveries (see Box 6), followed by Kenya (11 per cent) and Angola (10 per cent). Based on this information, the largest transparent European exporters to sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15 appear to be Bulgaria, Serbia, France, Spain, and Italy.

Less transparent major exporters

Most of the less transparent major exporters—those with Transparency Barometer scores below 12.5 points—recorded comparatively low levels of exports to sub-Saharan Africa

for 2013–15. Yet there is evidence that some of these countries are important sources of supply for sub-Saharan Africa. For example, small-arms-producing and -exporting companies located in China, Israel, the Russian Federation, and Turkey are well represented at arms fairs in Africa, while heads of state and defence and trade ministers promote arms exports when they visit the region or host African government delegations in their countries.

Turkey, a less transparent exporter as measured by the Transparency Barometer, is seeking to increase the value of its arms exports and has identified sub-Saharan Africa as a target market (Shinn, 2015, p. 10). UN Comtrade indicates that Turkey was one of the five largest suppliers of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15, although the country's UN Register submissions for 2013 and 2016 contain limited information on small arms deliveries to the region, mentioning only five states:

- 2,355 semi-automatic pistols to Burkina Faso;
- 51 semi-automatic pistols and 10,700 assault rifles to Kenya;
- 51 sub-machine guns and 291 assault rifles to Senegal;
- 2,690 pistols and one 40 mm automatic grenade launcher to South Africa; and
- 30 semi-automatic pistols to Zambia.

The deliveries to Burkina Faso and South Africa correlate with the UN Comtrade data presented in Table 20. The fact that Turkey did not submit UN Register reports for 2014 and 2015 makes it difficult to corroborate UN Comtrade data for these years, which recorded small arms exports from Turkey to Mali worth USD 8.9 million in 2014–15. Turkey has also prioritized security sector reform assistance for Somalia, and in 2017 delivered 450 MPT-76 assault rifles for the Somali security forces (*Daily Sabah Defense*, 2017). In the same year a shipment of 25,000 Turkish-made alarm guns, primarily Ekol Tuna alarm pistols, was seized in Somalia at the port of Kismayo (Florquin and King, 2018, p. 29). These reports tend to indicate that the limited quantities of small arms exports from Turkey to the region that are recorded in official sources do not reflect the full scale of Turkish small arms and ammunition deliveries.

According to UN Comtrade, the Russian Federation delivered USD 17.5 million worth of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15, mostly, it appears, to Namibia, which reported the import of USD 16.7 million worth of small arms from the Russian Federation in 2015. Open sources, however, indicate that the Russian Federation has concluded contracts with and completed deliveries of small arms and ammunition to a number of other sub-Saharan African states during this period. For example, in February 2013 it delivered 3,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 300 machine guns, and ammunition to Mali (Rostec, 2013a). This delivery is not reflected in UN Comtrade data. Rosoboronexport has indicated that some of its biggest gains in arms exports during this period were with Ghana and Tanzania (AFP, 2013). News reports published in 2016 and 2017 indicated that both

states were interested in purchasing Russian Federation small arms (Sputnik International, 2017; *Moscow Times*, 2016). Further, a USD 1 billion arms deal concluded with Angola in 2013 included small arms and ammunition that are also not mentioned in UN Comtrade and multilateral arms transfer reporting (Rostec, 2013b). Finally, in December 2017 it was revealed that the Russian Federation sought to deliver small arms and ammunition to CAR (see Box 8). Russian Federation small arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa remain opaque, but there are several indications that the country remains an important supplier for several sub-Saharan African states and is of interest to others.

China does not feature in UN Comtrade as an important exporter of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15, even though Chinese-produced small arms and ammunition are visible throughout the region (Bromley, Duchâtel, and Holtom, 2013, p. 41). Chinese arms exporting companies, such as Norinco and Poly Technologies, often supply small arms as part of broader commercial deals and arrangements between sub-Saharan African states and Chinese companies (Bromley, Duchâtel, and Holtom, 2013, p. 42). There are also strong connections between sub-Saharan African defence ministries, armed forces, and Beijing-based defence attachés and their Chinese counterparts. China has also donated small arms and ammunition to several sub-Saharan African states during the past decade.

The first ATT annual reports made publicly available by sub-Saharan African states provide a glimpse of China's small arms deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa for 2015–16. Liberia reported the import of 560 rifles from China in 2015, with Sierra Leone importing 235 CF98 pistols, 1,000 'AK47' assault rifles, and 1,050 Type 97 light machine guns from the country in 2016 (ATT Secretariat, 2018b). These deliveries are not reflected in UN Comtrade data. Neither is Norinco's delivery to South Sudan in July 2014 of almost USD 21 million worth of small arms and ammunition, including:

- 100 HJ-73D anti-tank guided missile-launching and guidance systems, including batteries and spare parts, and 1,200 rounds of the missile;
- 9,574 Type 56 automatic rifles, 2,394 under-barrel 40 mm grenade launchers, and 20 million rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition;
- 319 Type 80 general-purpose machine guns and 2 million rounds of 7.62 x 54 mm ammunition;
- 660 NP-42 pistols delivered with 2 million rounds of 9 x 19 mm ammunition; and
- 40,000 rounds of Type 69 high-explosive anti-tank rockets (UNSC, 2015b, paras. 70–74).

The Chinese government authorized this delivery as part of a contract arranged before the outbreak of hostilities in South Sudan, subsequently suspending further arms exports to the country. The Panel of Experts on South Sudan noted in 2018 that 'large quantities of weapons and ammunition found in South Sudan . . . are linked to Chinese

manufacturers' (UNSC, 2018b, p. 126, para. 79). It is unclear if these arms and ammunition were delivered directly to South Sudan or were re-exported from South Sudan's neighbours (see above). As with the Russian Federation, these examples of Chinese small arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa, which are significant in and of themselves, are likely to capture only part of the broader pattern of small arms transfers that are largely invisible in official sources.

It is equally difficult to discern the small arms trading relationship with sub-Saharan Africa of several other less transparent major small arms exporters. North Korean contributions to small arms industries in the region are noted above, but information on weapons deliveries remains limited. Ukrainian submissions to the UN Register for 2013–16 indicate a significant drop in the quantity of small arms delivered to sub-Saharan Africa in comparison to 2009–12 (Holtom, 2011). During 2013–16 the largest delivery of small arms was 10,000 sub-machine guns to Ethiopia in 2013, followed by 1,000 light machine guns and 150 heavy machine guns to South Sudan in 2014 and 2016 (Ukraine, 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017). By comparison, 3,000 rifles and carbines, 20,500 sub-machine guns, and 46,798 assault rifles were delivered to sub-Saharan Africa during 2009–12. Neither the volume nor value of ammunition supplied from Ukraine to the region is documented in UN Comtrade or in Ukraine's national arms export reports.

UN Comtrade indicates that Brazil exported USD 3 million worth of small arms to South Africa during 2013–15, a small fraction of its global exports. It emerged in 2016 that one of Brazil's largest small arms producers, Taurus, was authorized to ship 8,000 handguns as part of a USD 2 million deal purportedly intended for Djibouti's MoD in 2013 that was in fact diverted to Yemen by the arms broker Fares Mohammed Hassan Mana'a (UNSC, 2018a, pp. 137–42). The Taurus weapons were shipped in July 2015, three months after Mana'a was specifically listed as being subject to the UN arms embargo imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 2216 of 14 April 2015. The EUC for this deal contained a request for 80,000 pistols for the Djibouti MoD, despite the fact that Djibouti's armed forces consist of 16,000 active personnel and 9,500 reserves. The overall volume of Brazilian small arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa is not known, and it is unclear if there are other cases similar to this one.

Israel is known to have supplied small arms, such as Galil and Tavor assault rifles, Negev light machine guns, and Uzi sub-machine guns, to at least 12 sub-Saharan African states (Egozi, 2018), although it is thought that Israeli-produced small arms are only acquired in small quantities for elite presidential guards or special forces (Wezeman, 2011, p. 5). Since 2013 members of the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), civil society, and academia have called for greater transparency in and oversight of Israeli arms exports, with particular emphasis on preventing arms transfers to countries that violate human rights, citing the examples of Burundi and South Sudan (Cohen, 2015). These calls have not yet yielded more information on the value or recipients of Israel's small arms exports, but in 2016 Israel's Defense Export Controls Agency responded to 'significant suspicions of

Box 8 Small arms exports to CAR: shining a light on less transparent exporters

As of 31 December 2017 four sub-Saharan African states were subject to UN arms embargoes: CAR, the DRC, Eritrea, and Somalia. Government forces in CAR, the DRC, and Somalia can, however, import small arms and ammunition if the relevant sanctions committee is notified and/or approves the delivery.²⁷ The supply of small arms and ammunition to the CAR security forces, for example, requires approval by the sanctions committee prior to any delivery (UNSC, 2013a, para. 54e). During 2017–18 the Russian Federation and China both sought authorization to deliver small arms and ammunition to CAR, and in both cases France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, as members of the sanctions committee, initially refused the applications.

In December 2017 a Russian Federation application for an exemption from the arms embargo on CAR to supply 900 pistols; 5,200 assault rifles; 140 sniper rifles; 840 Kalashnikov machine guns; 270 RPGs; 20 anti-aircraft guns; and millions of rounds of ammunition, hand grenades, and mortars was made public after France and the United States blocked the application (AFP, 2017a). France raised concerns over the storage of the arms and ammunition, while the United States requested the serial numbers of the weapons to be supplied. The Russian Federation subsequently gave assurances that there would be enhanced security for storage, and the exemption was authorized in December 2017, with deliveries scheduled for December 2017, February 2018, and April 2018 (AFP, 2017b).

In June 2018 France, the United States, and the United Kingdom sought ‘justifications’ for a Chinese application to donate military equipment to CAR forces that included 50 pistols, 6 sniper rifles, 10 sub-machine guns with silencers, 30 machine guns, 4 anti-aircraft guns, 8 grenade launchers, 500 anti-tank grenades, and 725,000 rounds of ammunition (AFP, 2018). The United States questioned the delivery of anti-aircraft weaponry, while the United Kingdom expressed security concerns over the fact that the shipment would travel through Cameroon without an escort. The arms embargo regime on CAR has thus provided considerable detail on proposed small arms deals by less transparent states, China and the Russian Federation, that would probably not have come to light otherwise. The Russian Federation case also highlights some of the measures that can be taken to mitigate diversion risks before authorizing the export of small arms.

violations of human rights’ by requiring Israeli exporters to apply for marketing licences for the promotion of sales of arms and defence services to Burundi (Opall-Rome, 2016). Israel has also reportedly put in place a ban on weapons sales to the parties to the conflict in South Sudan (Ravid, 2016). ●



According to UN Comtrade data, the financial value of the small arms trade in 2015 was at least USD 5.7 billion, a 7 per cent decrease compared to 2014, which saw a record high for the global small arms trade since 2001.”

IV. Conclusion

According to UN Comtrade data, the financial value of the small arms trade in 2015 was at least USD 5.7 billion, a 7 per cent decrease compared to 2014, which saw a record high for the global small arms trade since 2001, the starting point for the Survey's collection of trade data. The value of the exports of the three largest exporters—the United States, Brazil, and Italy—declined between 2014 and 2015. As with the overall upwards trajectory for the value of the international small arms trade to 2014, the decline between 2014 and 2015 largely mirrors the decline in the value of imports by the United States, which were down from USD 2.5 billion in 2013 to USD 2 billion in 2015. This decline also corresponds with other sources of information that show a reduction in civilian demand in the United States since the significant increase during 2011–13. Two countries in the Middle East are among the five largest importers of small arms during 2013–15—Saudi Arabia and Iraq—both of which were parties to conflict during this period, in Yemen and against the non-state group Islamic State, respectively. Overall, between 2014 and 2015 the value of small arms deliveries to countries in the Asia and Pacific and African regions increased, while decreasing for the Americas and Europe.

The 2018 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer marks a break with previous editions of the Barometer due to revisions to the scoring system resulting from the availability of the first ATT initial and annual reports. The 2018 Barometer should therefore be considered as the beginning of a new time series for transparency scores and as a possible baseline for future assessments of transparency in the small arms trade. Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Serbia are the most transparent exporters in this edition of the Barometer, while Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, North Korea, and the UAE are the least transparent countries, with Iran, North Korea, and the UAE each scoring zero points.

The addition of PoA reports to the sources assessed by the Barometer revealed information on transfer control systems that allowed points to be awarded to 15 countries, including exporters that are not ATT states parties. The inclusion of ATT initial reports and annual reports on arms exports and imports made an especially important contribution to the scores of more than half of the assessed countries in the 2018 Transparency Barometer. These sources of information increase the amount of public information on transfer control measures and on authorizations and actual small arms exports. Twenty-three of the 25 countries that received at least half of the available Barometer points are in fact ATT states parties, indicating that, overall, ATT states parties are the most transparent major exporters. Nevertheless, five ATT states parties that submitted initial and annual reports still recorded below average scores, and no ATT state party received full Barometer points. There is, in other words, still much more that ATT states parties can do to help fulfil the purpose of the ATT and promote transparency in the international small arms trade.

This edition of the Trade Update identifies 15 sub-Saharan African states that have small arms and/or ammunition industrial production capabilities. With the exception of South

Africa, industrial-scale production is confined to a small number of producers that remain dependent on external suppliers of production equipment, designs, components, and know-how; their focus remains on acquiring production capabilities to meet domestic—and sometimes, as it turns out, regional—demand. Of particular concern in this regard is hunting ammunition produced in sub-Saharan Africa, which appears to move around the region and is trafficked into conflict-affected settings, contributing to armed violence and instability.

Available evidence indicates that South Africa is the only major exporter of small arms in sub-Saharan Africa; the recorded value of small arms exports by other sub-Saharan African states is very small when compared to countries outside the region. Furthermore, of those states that appear to be the largest small arms exporters in sub-Saharan Africa, it is possible that their ‘recorded exports’ are not exports at all, but the return of small arms and ammunition used by troops involved in UN peacekeeping and stabilization missions in sub-Saharan Africa.

At the same time, this study has highlighted cases in which sub-Saharan African states have delivered small arms and ammunition to other African states without authorization to do so from the original exporting state. There are two types of such ‘unauthorized re-exports’: (1) small arms that are re-exported to another state shortly after delivery to the authorized end-user state, and (2) small arms that have been imported and held in the national stockpile for years, but which are then delivered to another state. These transfers can also fuel instability and conflict in the region.

It is difficult to determine the largest importers of small arms in sub-Saharan Africa for 2013–15; the same is true when attempting to identify the largest exporters to the region during this period. Official data contained in UN Comtrade, the UN Register, ATT annual reports on arms exports and imports, and national and regional arms export reports provide only a partial picture of authorized arms flows to sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15, although they do consistently point to South Africa as one of the largest small arms importers in the region. A combination of data sources indicate that Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, and Namibia imported high values of small arms during this period, while significant quantities of ‘small arms made or modified to military specifications’ were also delivered to Angola, Nigeria, and Uganda.

In terms of the largest small arms exporters to sub-Saharan Africa, the study distinguished exporters that receive at least 12.5 points in the Transparency Barometer, on the one hand, and fewer than 12.5 points, on the other. Several of these—mostly European—‘transparent’ countries do not release data on small arms deliveries. Therefore, while France and the United Kingdom issued export licences for ‘small arms made or modified to military specifications’ worth almost USD 130 million and USD 250 million, respectively, for sub-Saharan Africa during 2013–15, their arms export reports do not include information on deliveries of such items. Available data on deliveries of small arms to sub-Saharan Africa indicates Bulgaria, Serbia, France, Spain, and Italy as the largest exporters, with the United States as a notable non-European major exporter to the region.

Of those states that score fewer than 12.5 points in the Transparency Barometer, UN Comtrade data indicates that Turkey was an important small arms exporter to sub-Saharan Africa. Other open-source information points to China and the Russian Federation as important sources of supply. By and large, the small arms trading relationship with sub-Saharan Africa remains obscure for several major small arms exporters. High-profile scandals or investigations into arms transactions involving entities subject to UN arms embargoes nevertheless shine some light on the export activities of some of these exporters. It is hoped that, as more African states become ATT states parties, their annual reports on arms exports and imports can help to elucidate the patterns of authorized arms flows to the region. Among other things, this would help identify those arms flows posing acute risks of diversion—including unauthorized re-export—or misuse. ●

Annexes

Annexe 1

Table A1 Major exporters' annual authorized small arms exports worth at least USD 10 million, 2015 [available at <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2018-Tables-A1-A2.pdf>]

Table A2 Major importers' annual authorized small arms imports worth at least USD 10 million, 2015 [available at <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2018-Tables-A1-A2.pdf>]

Table A3 Regional breakdown of countries and territories

Region	Subregion	Country or territory
Africa	Eastern Africa	Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
	Middle Africa	Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe
	Northern Africa	Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia
	Southern Africa	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland
	Western Africa	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
Americas	Caribbean	Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos
	Central America	Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama
	Northern America	Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, United States
	South America	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guyana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela

Region	Subregion	Country or territory
Asia and the Pacific	Central Asia	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
	Eastern Asia	China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan
	Oceania	Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk Island, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna
	South-eastern Asia	Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam
	Southern Asia	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
	Western Asia	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Europe	Eastern Europe	Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine
	Northern Europe	Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom
	Southern Europe	Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
	Western Europe	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland

Annexe 2. Revised Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer scoring guidelines

The assessment of ATT initial and annual reports for the Barometer led to the third revision of the standardized scoring guidelines (see Table A4). The revision of the scoring guidelines harmonizes the assessment of information across sources and reflects lessons learned over 15 years of analysing reporting practices.

The Barometer’s previous scoring system assumed that the top and major exporters under review export a wide variety of small arms. Analysis of information contained in UN Register and UN Comtrade submissions shows that countries can export USD 10 million worth of small arms in a single calendar year due to exports of one subcategory of small arms for one destination, or be important exporters for a limited number of small arms subcategories. For example, in 2013 Peru recorded exports of USD 10 million worth of small arms in UN Comtrade, but the export of small arms ammunition to the United States accounted for USD 9 million worth of this total.²⁸

In recognition of the fact that major exporters do not appear to export items in every small arms subcategory, there have been two amendments to the Barometer’s scoring guidelines with regards to subcategories of small arms in UN Register submissions:

1. Previously, when a state submitted background information on the international transfer of small arms to the UN Register using the standardized reporting form, it was considered an omission if one or more subcategories of small arms and light weapons did not contain information on exports. It is now acknowledged that major exporters do not export every subcategory of small arms every year, and that a UN Register submission can legitimately contain exports for some subcategories, but not for all of them. Therefore, the new scoring guidelines interpret blank fields in subcategories in a submitted report as ‘nothing to report’, and such reports are awarded full points for each relevant criterion if exports for only one or several subcategories are recorded. This adjustment ensures consistency with the approach used for assessing other criteria—that is, only the information provided is assessed and assumptions are not made that a state has deliberately omitted information if a subcategory does not contain information on exports. This practice also applies to ATT annual reports, albeit with a slight adjustment, because ATT states parties are requested to indicate if information has been withheld from the report for ‘commercial confidentiality’ or ‘national security’ reasons. If an ATT annual report indicates that information has been withheld on such grounds, full points are not awarded.
2. Previously, full points were only awarded for the provision of information on the quantity and importing country for at least seven of the 13 UN Register subcategories of small arms contained in the UN Register standardized reporting form. The new scoring guidelines drop this requirement and award full points if information

on at least one subcategory of small arms is reported, but information on the quantity and importing country must still be provided for all of the subcategories for which exports are indicated. As above, this is to ensure consistency in the application of the Barometer's methodology. This practice also applies to ATT annual reports, with the proviso that a state does not indicate that it has withheld information for 'commercial confidentiality' or 'national security' reasons.

Other changes are based on emerging practice identified as a result of analysis of national transfer control processes described in ATT and PoA reports:

- Criterion 3.5.1 (national transfer control system) and criterion 3.5.2 (brokering control) were merged into a single criterion (3.5.1), because measures to regulate arms brokers and brokering should be part of the national transfer control system. The new scoring guidelines award full points for a detailed explanation of the national transfer control system using the 'voluntary information' sections of ATT initial reports and PoA reports. Partial points are awarded for indicating that measures are in place—that is, by ticking boxes in the reporting templates for the ATT and PoA reports—and for listing relevant legislation and regulations.
- Criterion 3.7 (licences granted) is an addition to the scoring guidelines for the Barometer assessment because the provision of information on licences granted and licences refused should not be assessed in a single criterion. Therefore, criterion 3.7 now awards full points when data is provided on export authorizations disaggregated by small arms subcategory or type. Partial points are awarded if information is provided by Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List or EU Common Military List category.²⁹
- Finally, new criterion 3.8 (brokering authorizations) shifts the focus of assessment from information on individual arms brokers to brokering licences. This change is due to the fact that no major exporter provides details of registered arms brokers in its national reports or for multilateral reporting mechanisms, but it is an emerging practice to provide information on licences issued for brokering activities. Information is provided on the country of origin and destination, the small arms being transferred, their value or quantity, and in some cases licences refused. In addition to the availability of such information, the licensing of brokering transactions provides for case-by-case assessment and greater scrutiny than the registration of brokers alone. A two-stage process of registration to be a broker and licensing for each transaction is an encouraged practice. Therefore, points are now awarded in recognition of the availability of information and emerging practice.

Table A4 Overview of revisions to the Barometer scoring guidelines

Parameter (max. points)	Criteria (points)*	National report (NR)/ regional report (RR)			ATT/PoA**			UN Register	UN Comtrade
		NR	RR	RR	ATT annual report	ATT initial report	PoA		
Timeliness (1.50)	1.1 Did the exporter submit data in 2015 or 2016? (0.5)	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
	1.2 Did the exporter submit data in 2016? (0.5)	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓
	1.3 Did the exporter submit data in 2016 that concerned activities in 2015 or 2016? (0.5)	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓
Access and consistency (2.00)	2.1 Did the exporter make its national report available online free of charge? (0.5)	✓			✓			✓	✓
	2.2 Did the exporter provide interim information —such as biannual or quarterly reports—in addi- tion to a consolidated annual report? (0.5)	✓							
	2.3 Did the exporter use the same tool to report on activities in 2013, 2014, and 2015? (0.5)	✓			✓			✓	✓
	2.4 Did the exporter use a single additional tool to report on activities in 2013, 2014, and 2015? (0.5)	✓			✓			✓	✓
Clarity (5.00)	3.1 Did the exporter distinguish between government- and private industry-supplied transactions? (1/0.5)	✓			✓			✓	

3.2 Did the exporter distinguish small arms and light weapons from other types of conventional weapons? (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3.3 Did the exporter distinguish small arms and light weapons ammunition from ammunition for other types of conventional weapons? (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3.4 Did the exporter provide information on temporary exports? Examples would include transfers to trade shows that must be returned, transfers to troops participating in peace operations, and materiel sent to be repaired and returned. (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3.5 Did the exporter provide information on its small arms-related laws, regulations, and administrative procedures, as well as its multilateral commitments?																			
3.5.1 Did the country provide information on its transfer control system, including brokering control, to any reporting mechanism? (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3.5.2 Did the exporter provide information on the measures it uses to prevent and detect the diversion of international small arms and light weapons transfers? (0.25)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
3.5.3 Did the exporter provide information on its subregional, regional, and international commitments relating to the control of international small arms and light weapons transfers, including brokering? (0.25)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Parameter (max. points)	Criteria (points)*	National report (NR)/ regional report (RR)		ATT/PoA**			UN Register	UN Comtrade
		NR	RR	ATT annual report	ATT initial report	PoA		
Comprehensiveness (6.50)	3.6 Did the exporter provide information on deliveries? (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
	3.7 Did the exporter provide information on licences granted? (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓	✓			✓	
	3.8 Did the exporter provide information on small arms brokering authorizations? (0.5)	✓		✓			✓	
	4.1 Did the exporter provide information on its exports of guided light weapons, such as MANPADS and anti-tank guided weapons? (0.5/0.25)	✓		✓			✓	✓
	4.2 Did the exporter provide information on its exports of unguided light weapons apart from heavy machine guns and anti-materiel rifles— that is, rocket launchers such as RPGs and anti-tank weapons, grenade launchers, mortars, and recoilless rifles and guns? (0.5/0.25)	✓		✓			✓	✓
	4.3 Did the exporter provide information on exports of sporting and hunting guns or rifles? (0.5/0.25)	✓		✓			✓	✓
	4.4 Did the exporter provide information on exports of pistols and revolvers? (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓

4.5 Did the exporter provide information on exports of military firearms—automatic rifles; light, medium, and heavy machine guns; sub-machine guns; anti-materiel rifles; and military shotguns—apart from pistols and revolvers? (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
4.6 Did the exporter provide information on exports of ammunition of 12.7 mm calibre and below, as well as shotgun shells? (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓						✓
4.7 Did the exporter provide information on exports of ammunition larger than 12.7 mm calibre that is used in light weapons? Single-use light weapons systems that contain both the launcher and the projectile are treated as light weapons in either 4.1 or 4.2, above, and are not considered as ‘ammunition’ here. (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓						✓
4.8 Did the exporter provide information on exports of parts and accessories for small arms and light weapons? (0.5/0.25)	✓	✓						✓
4.9 Did the exporter provide information on ‘intangible transfers’ concerning small arms and light weapons, their ammunition, or their parts and accessories? Intangible transfers include the provision of technical plants, blueprints, know-how, schematics, and software for the production of small arms, light weapons, their ammunition, or their parts and accessories. (0.5/0.25)	✓							

Parameter (max. points)	Criteria (points)*	National report (NR)/ regional report (RR)			ATT/PoA**			UN Register	UN Comtrade
		NR	RR	ATT annual report	ATT initial report	PoA			
Deliveries (4.00)	4.10 Did the exporter provide information on permanent re-exports of small arms and light weapons, and/or their ammunition, not including temporary exports covered in 3.4? (0.5/0.25)	✓		✓			✓		
	4.11 Did the exporter identify the origin and destination of permanent re-exports of small arms and light weapons and/or their ammunition? (0.5/0.25)	✓		✓			✓		
	4.12 Did the exporter provide information on transit or transhipment of small arms and light weapons, and/or their ammunition? (0.5/0.25)	✓		✓			✓		
	4.13 Did the exporter identify the origin and destination of the transit or transhipment of small arms and light weapons and/or their ammunition? (0.5/0.25)	✓		✓			✓		
	5.1 Did the exporter provide information on delivery recipients? (1/0.5)	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	
	5.2 Did the exporter provide information on the state of import AND specific end user—such as riot control police, air force, museum, or private dealer? (1/0.5)	✓	✓	✓			✓		
	5.3 Did the exporter provide information on the state of import AND the types AND quantities of weapons and/or ammunition delivered? (1/0.5)	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	

Notes:

- * For some criteria only full points are awarded, while for others both partial and full points can be awarded, depending on the comprehensiveness of the information provided by the exporters. In the latter case, two possible scores are given, for example (1/0.5).
- ** New source for the 2018 Transparency Barometer.
- Grey background: not applicable.
- Orange background: changes in interpretation of nil reports.
- Green background: drop of threshold for number of categories reported.
- Yellow background: changes based on revision of best practices.
- ✓ Voluntary information.
- ✓ Not scored in the 2018 Transparency Barometer, but will be taken into account in subsequent editions of the Barometer.

Endnotes

- 1 The UN Comtrade commodity categories used in the analysis of the small arms trade are the following: 930120, 930190, 930200, 930320, 930330, 930510, 930520, 930521, 930529, 930621, and 930630. This list includes new categories included in the latest version of the Harmonized Classification System.
- 2 NISAT considers both countries' self-reported exports and mirror data (imports reported by destination countries) to generate a single value for each transaction; see Marsh (2005).
- 3 In 2009 France became a top exporter for the first time with USD 162 million worth of small arms exports (Grzybowski, Marsh, and Schroeder, 2012, p. 273).
- 4 More commonly known as the ATF.
- 5 Several major exporters of small arms recorded authorizations and/or deliveries of small arms to the Kurdish Peshmerga as small arms transfers to Iraq in national arms export reports and ATT annual reports, as well as in submissions to the UN Register.
- 6 An earlier version of this section was published as a separate publication in August 2018 (Holtom and Pavesi, 2018).
- 7 EU Annual Report on Arms Exports according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP Defining Common Rules Governing the Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment (CoEU, 2008).
- 8 For the purposes of the Barometer, national arms export reports also include national submissions (1) by EU member states to the EU Annual Report on Arms Exports (CoEU, 2016), and (2) by South-eastern European states for the regional report compiled by SEESAC (SEESAC, 2017).
- 9 The Transparency Barometer assesses UN Comtrade data as elaborated by NISAT (see Marsh, 2005).
- 10 The ATT annual report template neither requests nor invites information on the seventh parameter—licences refused. Therefore, scoring for this parameter continues to rely solely on information included in national reports on arms exports (Lazarevic, 2010; Pavesi, 2016).
- 11 The maximum number of points that can be awarded through the submission of information for a regional report is 8.5 points, and 1.0 points for a PoA report.
- 12 The maximum number of points that can be gained by ATT annual reports under the consistency parameter in this edition of the Transparency Barometer is 0.5 out of 1.0 available points, because the maximum score is given when states report three years in a row. Therefore, ATT states parties that have submitted a 2015 report will only be able to achieve full points for consistency for ATT reporting in the 2020 Barometer.

- 13 The ATT does not provide a template for the annual report. The current reporting template was developed by an informal working group and recommended for use by states parties at the Third Conference of States Parties to the ATT.
- 14 Of the 49 countries assessed for the 2018 Transparency Barometer, 27 were ATT states parties that were obliged to submit their first annual report to the ATT Secretariat on trade activities that took place during the 2015 calendar year. All 27 ATT states parties provided such a report during the 2016 calendar year.
- 15 See Holtom and Ben Hamo Yeger (2018) for a recent assessment of the implementation of the PoA using information provided by UN member states in their 2012–17 PoA reports.
- 16 Temporary exports cover small arms that are exported for a limited period of time and then imported back into the country of original export. This occurs, for example, when national armed forces take arms on a temporary peacekeeping assignment, when arms are exported for repair or to be displayed in films or expositions, or when individuals take their firearms on a hunting expedition in a foreign country.
- 17 Sub-Saharan Africa is defined for the purposes of this section as African countries covered by the UN Statistical Department definition for Eastern, Middle, Southern, and Western Africa. It does not include those countries listed in the Northern Africa subregion. See Annexe 1, Table A3.
- 18 The following sub-Saharan African states have indicated that craft production of small arms takes place on their territory: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania (AU and Small Arms Survey, 2018; UNODA, n.d.).
- 19 Background research could not confirm industrial production in Burkina Faso since 2006, and Guinea informed the Small Arms Survey that there was no industrial production of small arms, parts, components, or ammunition on its territory (AU and Small Arms Survey, 2018; GRIP, 2018).
- 20 Email correspondence with Rob Perkins, Conflict Armament Research, 28 June 2018.
- 21 Berghezan (2015); UNSC (2014, paras. 166–70; 2015a, para. 221 and Annex 71; 2015d, para. 214; 2017e, para. 249).
- 22 As of November 2018, the South African national arms export report for 2015 was not publicly available.
- 23 South Africa's National Conventional Arms Control Committee is required to report regularly to Parliament's Joint Committee on Defence on the country's arms exports.
- 24 Email correspondence with Zambian MoD, 15 May 2018.
- 25 Seven sub-Saharan African states were obliged to submit an ATT annual export/import report by 31 May 2016. Four of these states reported on their conventional arms exports and imports occurring in 2015—Liberia, Mali, Senegal, and South Africa. South Africa's report, however, did not include information on its small arms exports or imports. In addition, Sierra Leone submitted an ATT annual report, even though it was not obliged to do so (ATT Secretariat, 2018b).
- 26 For example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Wassenaar Arrangement information exchange guidance define small arms and light weapons as 'man-portable weapons made or modified to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war' (OSCE, 2012; Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996; 2012, Appendix 3).
- 27 Comparable systems were also part of the sanctions regimes for Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia.
- 28 Email correspondence with NISAT, 8 March 2016.
- 29 Categories 1–4 of the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and EU Common Military List cover small arms, light weapons, ammunition, and their parts and accessories (CoEU, 2018; Wassenaar Arrangement, 2017).

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