

THE CYPRUS QUESTION IN THE MAKING
AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION TOWARDS
THE CYPRUS QUESTION (1960-1974)

A Master's Thesis

by

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ANKARA

September 2008

To my grandfathers
Osman OYMAK and Mehmet Akif ASLAN,

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The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

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ABSTRACT

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In this study, the Soviet attitude towards the Cyprus Question between the years 1960-1974 will be analyzed within the framework of Cold War. In this context, the reasons of the emergence and development of the Cyprus Question was explicated. The differences between Stalin's foreign policy during the post-Second World War and that of post-Stalin period regarding the Third World countries in the Middle-East will be emphasized. In this connection, increasing influence of the Soviet Union in these countries will be explained with reference to certain related treaties. In addition, the developing relations between Cyprus and the Soviet Union which commenced with the independence of Cyprus in 1960 and further flourished as a result of intersecting interests of Makarios and Soviet Union will be explained.

Together with these developed relations, the impact of the Soviet Union on the Cyprus Question until 1974 will be examined.

Key words: Cyprus Question, Soviet Foreign Policy, Greece, Turkey

ÖZET

KIBRIS SORUNUNUN OLUŞUMU

ve

SOVYETLER BİRLİĞİ'NİN KIBRIS SORUNUNA YAKLAŞIMI

(1960-1974)

Aslan, Mustafa Çağatay

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Bu çalışmada Sovyetler Birliği'nin 1960 ile 1974 yılları arasında Kıbrıs Sorunu'na yönelik yaklaşımı Soğuk Savaş konjonktürü içerisinde ele alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Kıbrıs Sorunu'nun oluşumu ve sorunun zaman içerisinde derinleşmesinin nedenlerine değinilmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Stalin dönemi ile Stalin sonrası dönemde Sovyetler Birliği'nin Orta Doğu'daki Üçüncü Dünya Ülkeleri'ne yönelik izlediği dış politika arasındaki farklılıklar incelenmiştir. Bu cümleden, 1955 yılı ve sonrasında Sovyetler Birliği'nin bazı üçüncü dünya ülkeleri ile yaptığı anlaşmalar ele alınarak, Sovyetler Birliği'nin bu ülkelerde artan nüfuzu irdelenmiştir. Bunların yanında, 1960'da Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin bağımsızlığı ile iki devlet

arasında başlayan ve Sovyetler Birliđi ile Makarios'un örtüşen çıkarları sonucunda daha da gelişen ilişkiler ele alınmıştır. Gelişen ilişkilerle birlikte, 1960-1974 yılları arasında Sovyetler Birliđi'nin Kıbrıs Sorunu'na etkisi incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs Sorunu, Sovyet Dış Politikası, Yunanistan, Türkiye

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The root of the Cyprus question was the aim of the Greek Cypriots for *Enosis*.¹ This aim stemmed from Hellenic nationalism. The main aim of Hellenic nationalism idea was the incorporation of all Greeks in a common state. In this connection, the Greek Cypriots desired union with their motherland, Greece.² The Greek Cypriots did not have the opportunity to realize their aims when they were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The coming of the British administration after the leasing of the island from the Ottomans entailed an opportunity for the Greek Cypriots to achieve *Enosis*. However, the Greek Cypriots were not able to accomplish *Enosis* and, at the beginning of the twentieth century, they ironically considered the British administrative practices on the island as the main reason for this failure. It is, therefore, a necessary to investigate the British intentions on Cyprus

¹ Enosis: The union of Cyprus with Greece.

² During the times of the Grekk independence struggle in 1821, the Greek Cypriots also revolted against the Ottoman administration but this rebellion was strictly suppressed by the Othooman Empire/ For more details on the process of this revolt please see: (George Hill, *The History of Cyprus Vol. 4* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 100, 141.

when it leased the island from the Ottomans. Understanding of the logic of the British practices on the island requires the emphasizing on deliberations in London about the acquisition of the island. The first part of the first chapter was concerns this topic.

The British practices, supposedly, made the Cyprus question an insoluble one. The Greek Cypriots claimed that these practices impeded the embrace of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. They also added that this lack of relationship also prevented a solution to the Cyprus dispute. With the aim of investigating of not only the accuracy of this allegation but also other factors for the lack of a solution to the question, the political annals of the island from 1878 to 1950 will be examined in the second part of the first chapter under the title of “The Making of Cyprus Problem”.

At the beginning of 1950s, the Greek Cypriots dramatically intensified their efforts to reach *Enosis*. As part of these efforts, they chimed in the Greek government. The Greek government wanted to find a solution to Cyprus question in favor of *Enosis* through bilateral negotiations with Britain. However, Britain never accepted the bilateral negotiations with the Greek government on Cyprus. However, the negotiations on Cyprus were, for the first time, initiated in London Conference in 1955 the participants in which were Britain, Greece, Turkey, and representatives of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. This conference was the first step which paved the way for the independence of Cyprus on 16 August 1960. The process between 1955 and 1960 will be examined in the last part of the first chapter.

Understanding of the Soviet attitudes towards the Cyprus question requires the emphasis on the evolution in Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World countries at the post-Stalin terms. In 1955 and onwards, Soviet interests in the Third

World countries dramatically increased. However, the Soviet Union made a few commitments in 1950s regarding the Cyprus dispute. The main factor for this was that the island was ruled by the British administration until 1960. In the second chapter of this study, the logic change in Soviet Foreign policy after the death of Joseph Stalin and the attitudes of the Soviet Union regarding Cyprus question during the 1950s will be examined.

Although the independence of Cyprus was declared on 16 August 1960 on the basis of Zurich and London Agreements of 1959, this was, unfortunately, not a permanent solution to the question. As a matter of fact, the first crack was seen in 1962 when President Makarios visited Turkey and sought a confirmation by Turkish government for constitutional amendments in order to provide the working of state mechanism more effectively. These amendments were vetoed by Turkey, one of the guarantors for the independence of Cyprus. After this, the Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish Cypriots. This was the first stage of crisis, which was witnessed in the Cyprus Republic. From 1960 to 1974 there were three crisis on the island, in 1964, in 1967, and in 1974, respectively. These crisis forced Makarios to cooperate with the communist world. Makarios' good terms with the communist world led to the dissatisfaction of pro-*Enosis* circles –both on the island and in Greece- and of the West towards Makarios. This dissatisfaction resulted in fractures among Greek Cypriots. This disagreement was the most important factor which draw the island July 1974 coup d'état. This coup forced the Turkish government to take a decision for military intervention as a guarantor of the independence of Cyprus. The growing relations of the President Makarios with the communist world, the growing Soviet influence on the political life of the island and the Soviet statements on the said crisis will be analyzed in the last chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE MAKING OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION

2.1 The Coming of British Administration to Cyprus

In the second half of the nineteenth century one of the most frequently discussed matters in Great Britain was how the Empire could secure its communication with its colonies. This was regarded as a matter of urgency for the welfare of British interests. Most believed this could be achieved only by securing trade routes between the Empire and its colonies.³ In addition to this opinion, four other important reasons also caused Great Britain to increase its presence in the Mediterranean towards the end of the nineteenth century.

The first reason was the opening of Suez Canal in 1869. This event was a turning point for Britain in comprehending the necessity of increasing its influence in Eastern Mediterranean. Providing the shortest commercial route to East, the Suez

³ Samuel White Baker, Arminius Vambery, "Russia and England: Batumi and Cyprus" *Forthnightly Review*, No. 40:237, (1886, October), p. 372.

Canal was vital for British interests. In fact, Britain purchased shares of the Suez Canal in 1875.⁴ This investment also indicates the significance of the Suez Canal for Great Britain. Moreover, the route to India through the Suez Canal was the shortest and so it was indispensable for military purposes, that is, for the transportation of troops to India in case of emergency.⁵

The second important reason, as perceived by the British Empire, was the rise of the Russian threat which first emerged in the Crimean War and later at the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1870, Russia announced that it would no longer obey the principles of neutrality regarding the Black Sea which had been determined by the Treaty of Paris in 1856.⁶ Furthermore, the Russian infiltration of Central Asia was gradually becoming a menacing situation for Britain and the latter's doubts concerning Russian intentions in the region increased accordingly. In 1876, the Russian Empire constructed a railway to Merv, 240 miles (ca. 387 km) from Herat, the key to India.⁷ In addition, Russia also occupied the port of Batumi on August, 1878 and which ceased to be a free port in 1886. This was significant because Batumi was regarded as an important strategic base for a possible attack to Constantinople.

Relations among the powers of Europe were another reason forcing the Great Britain to amplify its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Italy and the Austria-Hungarian Empire were allies of Great Britain whereas France was trying to repair its damages resulting from its

⁴ Michael Willis, *Gladstone and Disraeli: Principles and Policies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 7.

⁵ Baker, Vambéry, p. 373.

⁶ Donald W. Mitchell, *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power* p. 185 .

⁷ Vambéry, Baker, p. 377.

defeat by Prussia in 1870.⁸ On the other hand, Germany's main concern was the protection of its newly unified structure by focusing on internal unrest.

The fourth factor was Great Britain's attitude towards the Ottoman suppression of the Serbian and Bulgarian revolts of 1875 and 1876. The Russian victory on the Ottoman Empire in 1877-78 wars made it impossible to defend the integrity of Ottoman territories in the Balkans both morally and materially.⁹ Moreover, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, believed that Russian Empire would not settle for occupation of Kars. For Salisbury, the intention of the Russians was, as in the case of the Balkans, the agitation of Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire against the Sublime Porte. Nevertheless, the Russian threat had to be eliminated to secure Great Britain's interests. To accomplish this, Salisbury suggested that a treaty of alliance between Britain and the Ottoman Empire should be signed to defend Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire against Russia infiltration.¹⁰

All four of these factors led the British Empire to strengthen its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In spite of possessing Gibraltar and Malta, these alone were not sufficient for Great Britain to secure its trade route to India through the Suez Canal and to hinder the possible infiltration of Russian influence to the Ottoman Asian provinces¹¹. Therefore, it was necessary for Great Britain to establish itself in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was, however, a difficult task to find a suitable place to serve as a base in the Eastern Mediterranean and there were many discussions of this issue in the cabinet.

⁸ Kenneth Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 123.

⁹ Bernard Porter, *Britain, Europe and the World 1850-1986*, (London, Boston: Allen & Wollen, 1987), p. 39.

¹⁰ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, *Henry Layard'ın İstanbul Elçiliği*, (Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi Basım Evi, 1968) p. 77.

¹¹ Vambery, Baker, p. 374.

In the meantime, due to economic problems, the Sublime Porte sent a dispatch to Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador in London, to inquire the possibility of borrowing a loan from British Empire. Upon hearing this request, Disraeli dispatched a letter to Henry Layard, the British ambassador in Constantinople, indicating that financial assistance could be rendered as soon as the Ottoman Empire consented to sell a territory to Britain in conformity with British interests.¹² At the same time with Musurus Pasha's unequivocal declaration of the Ottoman loan credit to Great Britain, the cabinet nominated Colonel Home to draw up a report on which location in the Eastern Mediterranean was most suitable. When Home completed his report, he established with three important criteria. First, the British Empire should occupy a place of which public would not rebel owing to the transfer of its administration from the Sublime Porte to Great Britain. Moreover, the wealth of the place in terms of raw materials should be useful to Great Britain. Secondly, with respect to its military value, troops in the region should be easily transferrable to the battlefield in the case of an attack by Russian armies on the Ottoman Asian provinces. Lastly, for economic reasons, that place should be usable by British producers as a depository to facilitate their trade in Middle East.¹³

In the light of Home's criteria, Cyprus appeared to be the most suitable place for British occupation. Indeed, there were limited choices for the British in the region. One was Crete, but the Cretan insurrection had been suppressed nearly a decade earlier in 1869, and a new change of administration might have encouraged the insurrection once again. The second possibility was Egypt. The occupation of Egypt might have caused deterioration in the relations between Great Britain and

¹² Kurat, *Henry Layard'ın İstanbul Elçiliği*, p. 78.

¹³ *ibid*, pp. 82,83.

France.¹⁴ Malta was not sufficient due to its remoteness from any immediate military intervention against a Russian attack on Ottoman lands in Asia.

Finally, Prime Minister Disraeli ordered Henry Layard to begin negotiations with Sublime Porte over Cyprus. At the conclusion of these negotiations, the Ottoman Empire and the Great Britain agreed to sign a secret treaty foreseeing the leasing of the island to Britain and the transfer of its administration from the Ottoman Empire to Britain. In return, Great Britain guaranteed military and economic support to the Ottoman Empire in case of an attack by Russia. Thus, on 10 July 1878, a British man of war, *HMS Salamis*, delivered an edict to the governor of Cyprus, Besim Pasha. The edict specified that the island's administration was to be temporarily ceded to British officials.¹⁵

The British manner towards the island directly affected not only the fate of the Cyprus, but also the attitudes of its population both to the outer world and to each other in the years to follow. It is therefore necessary to consider the deliberations in Great Britain over the acquisition of the island and the perceptions and reactions of the island's peoples to their new ruler at the beginning of its administration.

The acquisition of Cyprus was not an entirely new project for the British Empire. In 1814, a Scottish official of the East India Company, J.M. Kinneir supposed that if Cyprus was taken by the British forces, then the Empire would be the unquestioned sovereign of the Mediterranean.¹⁶ Additionally, in 1847 in his novel *Tancred*, Disraeli also supported Kinneir's ideas regarding Cyprus.¹⁷ There was,

¹⁴ Indeed, the Great Britain occupied Egypt in 1881. To prevent possible uneasiness relations between France and Great Britain, the latter declared that it would remain blind to French ambitions over Tunisia. Some historians regarded that event as one of the important factors for the beginning of 'Scramble for Africa' process from onward years. (see: Michael Wills, pp. 7,8.

¹⁵ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "1878 Kıbrıs Konvansiyonu ve Enosis Kıvılcımları", *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dün /Bugün/ Yarın*, Sayı 89, (Haziran, 2004), p. 74.

¹⁶ Kurat, *Henry Layard...*, p. 76.

¹⁷ Harold Temperley, "Disraeli and Cyprus", *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 46, No. 182 (April, 1931), p. 274.

however, some opposition to this idea. Discussions on the subject stemmed from different understandings of foreign policy by leading British political figures. The nature of these discussions can be understood by considering their different opinions.

First, it is important to examine Disraeli's ideas of foreign policy. He was in favor of increasing the prestige of Great Britain in the world politics. In his view, the only way to gain such prestige was to shift from policy of isolation to one of intervention in world affairs.¹⁸ Therefore he advocated that the Empire should not be quiescent against the Russian threat. It was necessary, therefore, to hinder Russian infiltration into Asian territories of the Ottoman Empire. In one of his addresses in 1876, Disraeli stated that if the Russians possessed Constantinople, which Disraeli regarded as a key to India by, this might result in losing India.¹⁹ Disraeli regarded the Ottoman Empire as a buffer zone between Great Britain and Russia. To demonstrate this, it is sufficient to consider his words in another speech to House of Lords in 1879:

“...We wished to maintain Turkey as an independent political State. It is very easy to talk of the Ottoman power being at the point of extinction. But when you come practically to examine the question there is no living statesman who has ever offered or propounded to any practical solutions to the difficulties which would occur if the Ottoman Empire were to fall to pieces.....”²⁰

Another significant personality in Parliament, William Gladstone, sharply criticized Disraeli's ideas and labeled them as 'Beaconsfieldism' which he understood to be the evil of British imperial interests.²¹ Indeed, Gladstone desired the preservation of peace throughout Europe and was in favor of following a non-aggressive foreign policy. Instead of adopting a unilateral foreign policy, he

¹⁸ Porter, p. 38.

¹⁹ Willis, p. 90

²⁰ *ibid*, p. 90.

²¹ *ibid*, p. 7.

preferred to act within the Concert of Europe.²² Congruent with his thoughts on foreign policy Gladstone was strictly opposed to the acquisition of Cyprus and he criticized the overemphasis on trade routes to India because of the possibility of driving a wedge between the European powers.²³ Furthermore, Gladstone viewed the Cyprus Convention of 1878, as an ‘insane covenant’ and repeated his criticisms on the acquisition of Cyprus when he came to power in 1880, saying that the island provided no benefits to Great Britain in terms of either military or political interest.²⁴

There was also conflict between two other important British statesman, Lord Derby and Lord Salisbury, the successive Foreign Secretaries in Disraeli’s cabinet. Derby was averse to Disraeli’s ambitions. In one of his meetings with Salisbury, he complained about Disraeli’s interventionist policy, claiming that this policy might result in a general war in Europe. He especially criticized Disraeli’s attempt to acquire Cyprus in return for undertaking a secret commitment to the defense of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, Derby believed that Cyprus was not useful. Instead, he thought it would cause more trouble to the Empire.²⁵ On the other hand, Derby’s suspicions were aroused by the rise of Russia as a threat, especially after the San Stefano Treaty in 1878 as a result of which some of his opinions changed, but he still opposed the acquisition of Cyprus. He believed that the alliance between Great Britain and Austrian-Hungary would be enough to hinder the emergence of the Russian Empire as the sole power in the Balkans. Even if this cooperation did not deter Russia and it became determined to take further steps, Derby believed Great

²² John F. Beeler, *British Naval Policy in the Gladstone and Disraeli Era 1866-1880*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 14.

²³ Willis p. 7.

²⁴ John Reddaway, *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection*, p. 9.

²⁵ Bernard Porter, p. 40.

Britain take an interest in Crete or Egypt instead of Cyprus both to secure routes to India and to deter Russia.²⁶

On the other hand, Salisbury envisioned that British foreign policy should be practiced for the protection of British territories, British properties, and British lives.²⁷ Additionally, as previously mentioned, Salisbury believed that Russia would take further steps after 1878 to increase its ascendancy not only in the Balkans but also in Eastern Anatolia, so would create an imminent crisis for British interests in these regions. To avoid this possibility, Salisbury believed Great Britain should increase its influence in these regions, especially with the assistance of merchants, travelers, soldiers, and on the like. Salisbury thought that developing British influence with this method would entail the right of access to these regions and he that “once getting right of access, in a few years it would be resulted in a conquest without even drawing a sword”.²⁸ Like Disraeli, Salisbury regarded the occupation of Cyprus as necessary for the protection of British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, he considered the island as one of links in the chain which had to be secured from Gibraltar to India. In Salisbury’s opinion, a base on Cyprus would facilitate a counter-attack on any Russian advance on Constantinople or Eastern Anatolia.²⁹ Therefore, he advocated for the Cyprus Convention of 1878 and justified it as necessary for securing the British interests in the region. Salisbury was also convinced of the idea of making reforms to strengthen the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire and, according to the same logic, he thought that Cyprus might be an example for other provinces of the region under Ottoman rule.³⁰

²⁶ Kenneth Bourne, p. 133.

²⁷ David Gillard, ‘Lord Salisbury’ in *British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy*, ed. by Keith M. Wilson, (London: Croom Helm Press, 1987), p. 123.

²⁸ *ibid*, p. 132.

²⁹ Kenneth Bourne, p. 135.

³⁰ *ibid*, p. 136.

It is tried to shed light on the diversity of opinion with respect to the acquisition of Cyprus by Great Britain by considering the different views of important British statesmen. However, considering the issue of acquisition on the individual level may be misleading in understanding the main rationale for Britain's acquisition of the island. Therefore it is, necessary to focus on the general British approach towards the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Digestion of general British manner towards Ottomans during this period requires emphasizing on the British policy during the times of Crimean war. As in the later case of the 1877-78 wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain had decided to support the Ottomans against Russians during the Crimean War. This policy was mainly formulated by Lord Palmerston, the Home Secretary, then and later became Prime Minister during the years 1855-1858 and 1859-1865.³¹ Actually, the British policy towards Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 was the recurrence of that of the Crimean War years. To be sure, Great Britain followed this policy to pursue its own interests on the Eastern question and to protect them against the Russian threat. Indeed, the Queen expressed the traditional policy of Great Britain in her own words. In one of her speeches she supported Disraeli and on the acquisition of Cyprus by saying that: "High and low are delighted, except Mr. Gladstone who is frantic".³² Additionally, in another speech on 19 April 1877, she explained that "It [the acquisition of Cyprus] is not the question of upholding Turkey; it is the question of Russian and British supremacy in the world".³³ Furthermore, although Gladstone was not a pro-war statesman, he ordered the

³¹ Willis, p. 78.

³² Reddaway, p. 9.

³³ P.J. Polo, 'Lord Derby', in *British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War*, ed. Keith M. Wilson, (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 111.

bombing of Alexandria and the occupation of Egypt in 1882.³⁴ Like Cyprus, Egypt was also a link in the chain securing the route from Gibraltar to India and occupied in accordance with British interests despite Gladstone's inclinations.

Whatever the extent of deliberation in Britain, at last, the Empire took over the administration of the island. Britain played a key role in determining the fate of the island in the following years. As previously mentioned, the first reaction of the people of Cyprus to their new masters and the practices of British administration needs to be examined to understand the British role in the making of the Cyprus problem.

2.2. The Making of the Cyprus Problem

On 12 July 1878, the British flag was run up at Nicosia and ten days after the first saluting of the British flag, the first High Commissioner of the island, Sir Garnet Wolseley, arrived at Larnaca.³⁵ The arrival of British administration on the island was interpreted by the Greek population of the island as the first step toward the union of the island with Greece. Actually, the Greeks had a good cause to expect this, because after fifty years of administration the Britain had ceded the Ionian Islands taken from Napoleon in 1814 to Greece in 1864. The Greeks, therefore, believed that Cyprus would also be ceded by the British Empire. At the welcoming ceremony for Wolseley, the Bishop of Kition,³⁶ Kyprionos, specified that the Greek

³⁴ John. F. Beeler, , p.15.

³⁵ Tandell, p. 92.

³⁶ Kition is the historical name of Larnaca which on the southern coast of the island.

population confided in British administration for its assistance in the realization of *Enosis*.³⁷ On the other hand, with few exceptions, there was no serious opposition against British administration among the Turkish Cypriots.

The first administrative innovation implemented by Great Britain was the formulation of a constitution. This did not satisfy the Greek population, however, and expressed their reactions to this constitution in 1879 and 1881.³⁸ Due to these reactions, in 1882, Gladstone, who had come to power in 1880, ordered the modification of the first constitution. The constitution of 1882 was regarded as the most liberal and democratic among those of other British colonies. The constitution established two Councils. The first was the Legislative Council. This consisted of 18 members and the distribution of the number of members was determined according to the ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the population as a whole. Consequently, nine members were elected among the Greek population, and three members from the Turks. The other six members were officials assigned by Britain. The High Commissioner presided over the Legislative Council and possessed the all-important right of veto.³⁹ The second institution established by the constitution was an Executive Council. It consisted of three members, of whom two were Greek and one was a Turk. There was a hierarchical relationship between these two councils, the Legislative Council being superior to the Executive Council. Any decision regarding the island had to be approved by the Legislative Council. On the other hand, Executive Council's only role was to make recommendations to the High Commissioner. But the High Commissioner was not bound by these recommendations.⁴⁰

³⁷ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, '1878 Kıbrıs Konvansiyonu ve Enosis Kuvvımları', p. 75.

³⁸ Ahmet Gazioğlu, *İngiliz İdaresinde Kıbrıs (1878-1960)* (İstanbul: Ekin Basımevi, 1960) p. 47.

³⁹ Reddaway, p. 19.

⁴⁰ *ibid*, p. 21.

Although the constitution was one of the most liberal among those of other British colonies, it did not meet the demands of Greek population. With the formation of an alliance between the British members and Turkish members, the Greek majority in the Legislative Council could be counterbalanced and due to the fact that the deciding vote was in the hands of High Commissioner, such an alliance could counteract the will of the Greek councilors ten to nine. Thus it was not possible for Greeks to pass a bill through the Legislative Council on their own initiative. In 1887-88 the Greeks staged demonstrations to demand the withdrawal of veto power from the High Commissioner. The British authorities ignored these demonstrations and no amendments were made in the articles of constitution related to the Legislative Council.⁴¹

The most important reaction on the part of the Greek population to the formation of the Legislative Council came in 1912. Winston Churchill, as the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, had occasion to visit Cyprus in 1911, at which time the Greek population transmitted their demands for *Enosis* to Churchill. However he unequivocally rejected the demands of Greeks and stated that the British Administration had to respect the sensitivities of both communities on the island. Therefore, the British administration could not allow the Greek population to achieve *Enosis* by ignoring the feelings of the Turkish Cypriots. Following this response, in April 1912 Greeks once again organized demonstrations in major cities such as Nicosia, Larnaca, and Limassol. The British had no difficulty in suppressing the demonstrations in Nicosia and Larnaca. Nevertheless, the riots in Limassol could scarcely be under controlled and police attacked the demonstrators resulting in some deaths. In the aftermath the Greek members of the Legislative Council resigned.⁴²

⁴¹ Gazioğlu, p. 52.

⁴² *ibid*, pp. 54-56.

From 1878 to 1912 the Greek population's demands for *Enosis* were delivered to British officials many times, all of which were rejected. Interestingly, the British never stated that British rule in the island was temporary and that the *de jure* sovereign of the island was the Sultan.

The beginning of the First World War in 1914 was a turning point for the history of the Cyprus. Upon the Ottoman entry into the war on the side of Germany, the British Empire unilaterally declared the annexation of the island.⁴³ This annexation entailed no amendments in the constitution in the way acceding to Greek demands. However in 1915 Cyprus was offered to Greece in return for joining the war on the side of Entente powers.⁴⁴ The British government asked Greece to reinforce the Entente powers in Serbia in return for Cyprus. The Prime Minister of Greece, Alexander Zaimis, stated that Greek support to Entente Powers in Serbia would be ineffective and would destroy Greece. Instead of sending troops to Serbia, Greek government's intention was to deploy its troops in Asia Minor. The Greek government, therefore, rejected this offer. Although the Prime Minister, Zaimis, was criticized for the rejecting of the offer, the main author of this refusal was Constantine.⁴⁵ Although Greece voiced its demand for *Enosis* at the Versailles negotiations, Britain rejected Greeks' request in 1919 and the island remained in the possession of Britain.⁴⁶

The Greek Cypriots persisted in their demands for amendments in the Legislative Council, Having been rejected time and again by the British, the Greek

⁴³ As it is known the unilateral annexation of the island was recognized by Ankara Government on July 1923 with signing of Lausanne Treaty.

⁴⁴ George Hill, p. 426.

⁴⁵ For more detailed information on the process of the offer of Cyprus to Greece please see: C.M. Woodhouse, "The Offer of Cyprus: October 1915" in *Greece and Great Britain During World War I* (Thessaloniki: Institute For Balkan Studies, 1985) pp. 77-97.

⁴⁶ William Mallinson, *A Modern History of Cyprus* (New York: I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2005),p.11.

members once again withdrew from Legislative Council in December 1920, but this did not bring about a concrete solution to the Greek demands.⁴⁷

In 1921, a census was held on the island. According to this census, the population of the Cyprus was 310,709. Apart from small groups of Armenians and Latin, Greek Cypriots formed the bulk of the population while Turkish Cypriots comprised one-fifth of the total.⁴⁸ This was a hopeful indication for Greek Cypriots on the issue of making amendments to the constitution for the re-allocation of membership in the Legislative Council. Greek Cypriots made a new offer to the British officials to amend in the constitution in 1922. They requested that the number of Greek members in the Legislative Council had to be increased from nine to twelve in accordance with the result of last census. This request was once again rejected by the British in 1923, who claimed that such an amendment would be possible only if the number of British officials on Legislative Council was increased from six to nine. The British admitted that it would otherwise create great concern for the Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, the defeat of the Greek armies in Anatolia by the Turkish forces in 1922 led to the scaling down of the Greek Cypriots demands for *Enosis* for a time.⁴⁹

In 1925, the British declared Cyprus to be a Crown Colony. In addition to this a constitutional amendment was put into force and the number of Greek members was raised to twelve, while the number of British officials was correspondingly increased to nine. Although the number of the Turkish Cypriots on the council remained the same, the increased number of British officials provided the

⁴⁷ George Hill, p. 425.

⁴⁸ Tindall, p. 94.

⁴⁹ George Hill, p. 426, 427.

counterbalancing of the Greek Cypriots in the Council, despite the fact that they were the majority on the island.⁵⁰

With the encouragement of Communist Party in Greece, established in 1924, Nicholas Othon Yiavopolos initiated a communist movement on Cyprus in 1925, which proved to be a critical year for the political history of the island. He established a worker's union and this became the basis of the first communist party of Cyprus, *Kommonistikon Komma Kyprou* (KKK). However, towards the end of 1925 Yiavopolos was found guilty for violating public order on the island and was exiled to Greece. His successor was Kostas Skeleas whose leadership lasted for a short time. Haralambos Vatiliotis returned to the island in 1925 from Moscow to become the leader of the party and Skeleas became his deputy.⁵¹ The first communist party was not be effective in shaping policy on the island. The primary reason for this failure was the enormous significance of the church on Cyprus.⁵² Still, the endeavors of KKK continued until 1933 and in 1931 it played important role in the outbreak riots on the island.

As already mentioned, the constitutional amendment of 1925 did not satisfy the demands of Greek Cypriots. Additionally from 1925 till 1931, the British officials ignored the applications of Greek Cypriots to Britain. In 1931, the Governor submitted a proposal to the Legislative Council to impose a supplementary tax of five percent on official salaries over a hundred pounds.⁵³ The Legislative Council voted on the proposal and it was refused by thirteen to eleven votes. This vote was remarkable in the history of Cyprus because for the first time a Turkish member of

⁵⁰ Reddaway, p. 21.

⁵¹ Fethi Tevetoglu, *Kıbrıs ve Komünizm* (Ankara: Yazar, 1968), pp.66-68.

⁵² Thomas W. Adams, Alvin J. Cortell, *Kıbrıs'ta Komünizm* (Ankara: Türkiye Ticaret Odaları, Sanayi Odaları, ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği Matbaası, 1967), p. 6.

⁵³ The title of the High Commissioner was renamed as Governor after the declaration of the island as a Crown Colony in 1925.

the Legislative Council made an alliance with the Greek members. This Turkish member, therefore, was labeled as the ‘Thirteenth Greek’. Although the Legislative Council did not approve the proposal, the Governor enforced it by an order in council. This governor’s attitude was the straw that broke the camel’s back for the Greek Cypriots. Upon bypassing the decision of the Legislative Council, the Bishop of Kition⁵⁴, unilaterally declared the *Enosis* on October.⁵⁵ To be sure, this declaration was not recognized by Britain. This British manner resulted in the outbreak of riots in the island on 21 October 1931. British officials took strict measures to suppress the riot.

One of the short-term effects of the 1931 riots was the abolishment of the Legislative Council by the Letters Patent of 12 December 1931. At this time the function of the Legislative Council was granted to the Governor.⁵⁶ In a certain sense the Executive Council⁵⁷ replaced the Legislative Council,⁵⁸ but its decisions were advisory and the Governor did not have to obey its recommendations. The second short-term consequence was the banning of the Communist Party and the deportation its leaders, Haralambos Vatiliotis and Kostas Skeleas. Two bishops held responsible for the outbreak of riots were also exiled.⁵⁹ In 1933, the Criminal Law of the island was restructured and the new law empowered government authorities to ban the communist formations. On the following day the Communist Party was banned and seven agencies related to the Communist party were declared illegal.⁶⁰ Until the independence of the island in 1960, Cyprus was mainly ruled by decree. Although the British officials supposedly endeavored to consider the sensitivities of the

⁵⁴ Kition is the historical name of Larnaca which on the southern coast of the island.

⁵⁵ Mallinson, p. 11.

⁵⁶ George Hill, pp. 431,432.

⁵⁷ The Executive Council consisted of five members after 1925 constitutional amendments. Four of five members were the Greek Cypriots and the rese was Turkish Cypriots.

⁵⁸ Reddaway, p. 21.

⁵⁹ Mallinson, p. 11.

⁶⁰ Tevetoğlu, p. 71.

Cypriots in their actions, the administration of the island was undemocratic and authoritarian.⁶¹

After the dissolution of the Legislative Council, the Executive Council remained as the sole institution in the administration of the island. However, it was very difficult for Greek Cypriots to serve on the Executive Council. The Greek members were attacked by pro-*Enosis* Greeks as ‘Sir Traitors’ or as ‘imperialist lackeys’ by the Communists.⁶² In 1934 a leading figure on the Executive Council, A. Triantaphyllides, who was also a former member of the Legislative Council, was assassinated due to his advocacy of cooperation with the British officials.⁶³

Between 1934 and 1939 there were also endeavors in London to support the aims pro-*Enosis* Cypriots. In 1937, a ‘Committee for Cyprus’ was established in London by overt supporters of *Enosis*. Moreover, in the summer of 1937, a commission was established to convince the Colonial Office to withdraw from the island and to allow the unification with Greece. As in previous years, however, the Colonial Office once again emphatically rejected the suggestion of the commission. The Committee for Cyprus prepared a constitutional draft and presented it to the Colonial Office as its new constitution, revoked after 1931 riots. However these efforts were not successful.⁶⁴ Some groups in London also bolstered the Communist movement on Cyprus. In June 1937, a document captured by police officers on Cyprus revealed that, the Communist activities on the island was being espoused by the British Communist Party Center, not just by Moscow⁶⁵ Although communist activities were forbidden in 1933 with banning of Communist Party, the party’s operations had shifted underground. To be sure, after 1931 the communist efforts

⁶¹ Reddaway, p. 21.

⁶² Reddaway, p. 25.

⁶³ George Hill, p. 432.

⁶⁴ *ibid*, p. 433.

⁶⁵ Tevetoglu, p. 72.

were not as intensive as they had been before 1931. These underground efforts were led by two brothers, named Ploutis Loizou Savvides, generally known as Ploutis Servas, and Hristos Savvides.⁶⁶

The beginning of the Second World War entailed drastic changes for the political history of Cyprus. After the British declaration of war on Germany, approximately 37,000 Cypriots – one-third of this figure representing Turkish Cypriots- were conscripted into the army. After the defeat of Germany, the Greek Cypriots once again expressed their hopes for *Enosis*. They believed that the Cypriot contribution in the course of Second World War would convince the Britain to make some concessions towards *Enosis*. In fact, in 1941, the Greek Foreign Minister asked his British opposite number to cede the island to Greece in return for Greek support given to Britain in the war. This request, however, was rejected.⁶⁷ On the other hand, the real resistance in Greece against Germany was formed by communists rather than nationalists. The latter preferred to cooperate with the Nazi occupation.⁶⁸ This resulted in the growth of communist power in Greece which would soon lead to civil war. The rising power of communists in Greece unavoidably reflected in Cyprus. In 1941, the banned Communist Party of Cyprus was reestablished under the name of AKEL (*Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou*) and the purposes of its program were “the support of war, the satisfaction of the immediate and pressing economic demands of the people, the granting of political and civil freedom in the island, and the abrogation of decrees of the ‘dictatorship’”. Consequently, AKEL gained support in the municipal elections of 1943 which were held for the first time since the 1931

⁶⁶ *ibid*, p. 71.

⁶⁷ Mallinson, pp. 11,12.

⁶⁸For detailed information on the Greek communist’s affairs during the Second World War, please see: Haris Vlavianos, *Greece, 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War* (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, 1992).

riots.⁶⁹ This success was one of the perplexing statements in the British Foreign Secretary's rejection of his counterpart in Greece. The former argued that both in Greece and in Cyprus communism was making great strides and the cession of the island to Greece would result in the victory of communists in Greek civil war.⁷⁰

Not surprisingly, the Church was uneasy about the rise of communism in Cyprus. With the aim eliminating the communist threat, the Church encouraged the establishment of a right-wing political party which would to be overtly supported by the Church. Consequently, the Nationalist Party was established in 1947.⁷¹ The end of civil war in Greece and the establishment of Nationalist Party caused a sharp political division among Greek Cypriots. This division was manifested in the celebration of Greek Independence Day on 25 March 1948. The two parties organized their own celebrations separately in which the Nationalist Party was the hard-line supporter of *Enosis*, and the Communist Party offered to cooperate with Greek guerrilla movement.⁷² By 1949, the defeat of Communism and the banning of any communist activities in Greece helped the Nationalist Party to increase its influence on the island and led to a reduction in the AKEL votes relative to the 1943 municipal elections. In Cyprus the threat of communism seemed to have been averted by 1949. In the municipal elections of 1949, the pro-*Enosis* Nationalist Party received sixty percent of the votes. Still, AKEL retained the offices of mayors in Limassol, Larnaca, and Famagusta.⁷³

The aspirations of Greek Cypriots for *Enosis* since the leasing of the island to Britain in 1878 and the communists' efforts to import communism caused a great deal of anxiety among the Turkish Cypriots, especially in terms of their security on

⁶⁹ George Hill, p. 436.

⁷⁰ Mallinson, pp. 18,19.

⁷¹ T.W. Adams, Alvin J. Cortell, p. 7.

⁷² George Hill, p. 436.

⁷³ T.W. Adams, Alvin J. Cortell, p. 7.

the island. As previously mentioned, the anxiety of the Turkish Cypriots was manipulated by British officials as an pretext for their resistance to demands for *Enosis*. As a result of this anxiety, in 1943 the Turkish Cypriots established the Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlıklar Kurumu (The Turkish Minority Institution of Cyprus) with the aim of preventing *Enosis*. Moreover, since 1940 the Turkish Cypriots lobbied in Turkey to attract its attention to the situation of the Turkish Cypriots.⁷⁴

It is clear that since 1878, the main ethnic group on the island, Greeks, for the most part followed the policy of *Enosis*. As a reaction to this, the other significant ethnic group, the Turkish Cypriots, formed an alliance with the British to block the Greek majority. The alliances constructed in the Legislative Council between the British and the Turkish Cypriots are the most straightforward examples of British and Turkish Cypriot cooperation. The Greeks generally blamed Britain and alleged that due to the unfair distribution of the number of members in the Legislative Council, the Turkish Cypriots could hinder the Greek aims but, on the other hand, this situation also prevented the merging of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots regarded this policy as a classic imperial ‘divide and rule’ policy, deliberately followed by the British administration to prevent the development of a sense of solidarity.⁷⁵ This accusation, however, seems to be exaggerated. Although the alliances of the British officials and the Turkish Cypriot members in the Legislative Council might have been one of the factors averting the development of solidarity among the island’s peoples, it should be kept in mind that the roots of the absence of political cordiality goes back to the years before than the British occupation. After all, one can trace the roots of the *Enosis* movement

⁷⁴ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Doğmamış Bir Devletin Tarihi: Birleşik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2005), p. 34.

⁷⁵ Reddaway, p. 20.

nourished by the Hellenic nationalist ideas to the beginning of the nineteenth century.⁷⁶

More importantly, the political history of Cyprus prevented the emergence of modernization which could have been a factor in linking the island's different inhabitants. The lack of a process of modernization on Cyprus resulted in the strengthening of ethnic self-consciousness. This situation can be clearly seen, for example, during the War of 1919-1922 between the Greeks and the Turks in Anatolia. At the end of the war, while the Turkish Cypriots were celebrating Turkey's victory over Greece, the Greek Cypriots were in despair.⁷⁷ From this perspective the lack of modernization and the unimpeded growth of nationalist feelings not only led to the emergence of the Cyprus question, but also deepened the roots of the problem. As at 1950 the Cyprus problem was becoming an issue which would make the NATO countries uncomfortable within the context of the Cold War.

2.3. Efforts for the Internationalization of Cyprus Problem and Road to Independence

In November 1949, the Greek Orthodox Church decided to hold a referendum to prove the determination of the peoples of Cyprus for *Enosis*.⁷⁸ The result of this referendum, which was not recognized by the British government, indicated that the

⁷⁶ Nicholas Sambanis, 'Ancient Affections: Standing in the Way of Resolutions in Cyprus?', *SAIS Review*, [n.s.]:14, 2, (1994, Summer / Fall), p. 131.

⁷⁷ Kızılyürek, pp. 29,30.

⁷⁸ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963), p. 18.

95 % of the voters were in favor of *Enosis*.⁷⁹ After the referendum, the Greeks claimed that this rate demonstrated, apart from the Greeks themselves, there were others who supported the idea of *Enosis*. This claim, however, could have been accurate if only the turnout of the referendum was near a hundred percent. There was, however, no clear documents explaining the real turnout rate of the referendum. It would be, therefore, an illogical conclusion that, some of the Turkish Cypriots were advocates of *Enosis*, just by considering the result of this referendum. At the time, the Turkish government regarded the referendum meaningless and unnecessary attempt of Greek Cypriots and stressed that it was contradictory to the international law, since it ignored the rest of the people of the island.⁸⁰ The Turkish government's approach to that issue revealed a parallelism to that of the British government in terms of labeling the referendum as an unofficial one. Therefore, there was no reason for the parties of the Cyprus Question to recognize or to obey the putative result of the referendum. Furthermore, the British and Turkish officials even tended to deny the existence of a Cyprus problem, no matter how dreadfully the Greek Cypriots dreadfully endeavored to promulgate it. For instance, Fuad Köprülü, then, the foreign minister of Turkey, explained that Turkey had not evaluated the situation in Cyprus as a dispute.⁸¹

Towards the end of 1950, a priest of Kitium, Mihail Hristodulu Muskosthe was elected by the Greek Cypriots as the Archbishop with the name Makarios III. At the ceremony organized for the sake of his inauguration he declared that,

⁷⁹ Ü. Haluk Bayülken, "Cyprus Question and the United Nations", *Foreign Policy* (Vol. 4, Feb. 1975) p.5.

⁸⁰ Armaoğlu, p. 23.

⁸¹ Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler (1945-1960) in *Türk Dış Politikası* ed. Baskın Oran. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, Kasım 2004) p. 598.

“I take the Holy Oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waver from our policy of uniting Cyprus to Mother Greece.”⁸²

After Makarios’ oath, another explanation came from Greece, which is important for the process of Cyprus question. In February 1951, the Greek Prime Minister, Sofokles Venizelos, officially explained that the unification of the Cyprus to Greece was a necessity.⁸³

The most outstanding event of 1952 for the fate of the Cyprus question was the election of Marshal Alexandros Papagos as the Prime Minister of Greece replacing Venizelos. Papagos was one of the fervently pro-*Enosis* politicians in Greece, and in his election plank, he declared that he would take the Cyprus question to the agenda of the United Nations.⁸⁴ His promise, however, was not an easy one to keep, as the internationalization of the question required logical pretexts. Furthermore, especially under the conditions of the Cold War, a direct application to the UN without any plausible pretext would lead to resentment of the Western Bloc. The United States, naturally, was also against the carrying of the question to the UN. First of all, if the question was to be discussed in the UN, then Soviet Union would have a chance to meddle in the affairs of the island thanks to its seat in the Security Council. Besides, it may lead to a conflict within NATO. It is usually argued that Washington mainly supported the British government on the issue and encouraged them to solve the problem among the three parties (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom) of the question. Therefore, Papagos decided to negotiate on the Cyprus question with the Foreign Secretary of British government, Anthony Eden. Papagos had a chance to talk with him in September 1953. Eden commented to him that there

⁸² Michael Stephen, *The Cyprus Question*, (London: Northgate Publications, 2001) p. 17.

⁸³ Armaoğlu, p. 25.

⁸⁴ Melek Firat, “Yunanistan’ls Iliskiler (1945-1960)”, p. 597.

was no Cyprus Question in the agenda of the British Foreign Policy and Her Majesty's Government did not have any intention to leave the island.⁸⁵

On the other hand, Greece insisted that the question should be solved either by an international mediation or by mutual negotiations between Greece and the United Kingdom. The denial of considering Cyprus as a conflict by Turkey, created the impression that Turkey did not want to be a party to the question. In this connection, the Greek Government might have postponed to apply to the United Nations for the solution of the problem in early 1950s. Nevertheless, the first blow to the possibility for the beginning of bilateral negotiations between Greece and Britain occurred when Papagos and Eden met in London in 1953. More destructive blow came with the declaration of Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs. In his address to the House of Commons in July 1954, he mentioned that some colonial lands could not be abandoned by Britain because of their strategic importance. Therefore, the peoples of these lands should not have expected to be independent. It was quite clear that Hopkinson was talking about Cyprus since with the Suez Treaty, signed almost at the same time with the speech of Hopkinson, the withdrawal of the British forces from Egypt was became ascertained.⁸⁶ Furthermore, it was also decided by the British government that the British forces in Egypt were going to be transferred to Cyprus and this transfer of forces was performed in October 1955.⁸⁷

As mentioned above, Greece had tried to make a bilateral deal with the British government over the Cyprus question. All of its efforts, however, proved

⁸⁵ Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement between 1954 and 1996" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (August, 1998), Bölükbaşı, p. 413.

⁸⁶ Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler (1945-1960)", p. 597.

⁸⁷ Stephen G. Xydis, "Toward "Toil and Moil" in Cyprus" *The Middle East Journal* Vol. 20 No. 1, (Winter, 1966), p. 12-13.

fruitless. The Greek government then decided to carry the question to the agenda of the UN.⁸⁸ Consequently, the Greek government declared in 23 March 1954 that it would make an official application to UN.⁸⁹ On 24 September 1954, at the UN General Assembly, the official application of Greece was polled, to decide whether it should be put on the agenda of the General Assembly or not. The application was accepted to put on the agenda by 30 to 19 with 11 abstentions.⁹⁰ This decision led to the Turkish resentment and it was highly criticized in the country. The Turkish representative in the UN, Selim Sarper, suggested that, according to the UN Charter, UN does not have right to intervene in the domestic affairs of states and Cyprus was a British colony⁹¹. In other words, Cyprus was the internal problem of Britain. In this connection the Turkish government believed that the application was going to be rejected in the meeting of the General Assembly in December of the same year.⁹² This explanation indicates that at the time Turkey still disinclined to see the Cyprus Problem as an international issue. On 14 December 1954, the UN Assembly gathered. At the beginning of its session, Leslie Know Munro, delegate of New Zealand in the UN, presented a new proposal not to negotiate the Cyprus Question in the Assembly. In accordance with the procedure of the UN, the proposal was polled and the result was different from that of September. This time the draft of New

⁸⁸ Bayülken, p. 13.

⁸⁹ Armaoğlu, p. 51.

⁹⁰ *ibid*, p. 75.

⁹¹ It is important to note that, Selim Sarper professed to Rauf Denктаş in the following years, upon the Greek application to the UN, the Turkish government sent cryptos to him which told that Turkey was one of the parties of the question. Sarper explained that he did not know what he would say regarding Cyprus in the UN committee. Sarper's driver, a Turkish Cypriot, whose name was Osman, suggested to him that he could tell any details to Sarper about Cyprus. Thanks to his driver's briefing Sarper was managed to defend Turkish interests in the UN committee. (Interview with Rauf Denктаş, Nicosia, 18 August 2008.)

⁹² Bölükbaşı, p. 414.

Zeland was accepted by 28 to 15 with 16 abstentions.⁹³ Thus, the Cyprus Question was not discussed in the UN in 1954.

In September of 1955, Greece once again applied to the UN to bring the Question to the agenda of the UN. The application was polled in the General Committee after the representatives of Turkey, United Kingdom and Greece had been listened. The General Committee decided by 7 to 4 and 4 abstentions to recommend the General Assembly not to put the Question in its agenda and the recommendation was confirmed in the UN Assembly by 28 votes to 22 with 10 abstentions.⁹⁴ It is important to remind that in May 1955, Britain decided to organize a conference in London to discuss the future of the island with the governments of Greece and Turkey.⁹⁵ This attempt of the British government might have led to the refusal of Greek application both in General Committee and General Assembly in September 1955.

By 1955, the British policy towards Cyprus question began to display important changes. One of the factors for this alteration in the British policy on Cyprus was The United States' pressure on British government. The USA regarded Cyprus question as an important problem, and insisted that the conflicts should have been worked out by negotiations among the British, Turkish and Greek governments. It was obvious that the USA worried that the problem was reaching a deadlock, which might have resulted in the splitting of the two NATO members, Turkey and Greece.⁹⁶ This potential splitting would be a serious blow to the NATO policies against the communist threat. The USA, therefore, encouraged the British

⁹³ Armaoğlu, p. 82.

⁹⁴ Bayülken, p. 7.

⁹⁵ Micheal Arthur Riccioli, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1945 and Anglo-Turkish Relations* (Paris: Sorbonne University Press, 1977) p. 43.

⁹⁶ James H. Wolfe, "United States Policy and The Cyprus Conflict" in *The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of the United Nations*, ed. Kjell Skjelsbaek (The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, November, 1988), p. 44.

government for the convening of a conference with the participation of the three parties, Britain, Greece and Turkey. Other factor was the ascending violence on the island which was mainly organized by a group called as *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* (EOKA)⁹⁷. Last factor for this policy changing was the abrasive presence of communism on the island, as represented by AKEL.

In 1951, Colonel Grivas and Socrates Loizidis had come up with an idea that, the political pressure for *Enosis* should be conducted by an armed struggle on the island. Since 1948, Colonel Grivas had been studying this idea and finally he met with Makarios in July 1951 to discuss the possibility of an armed struggle. This meeting was an important step to persuade Makarios, who have some hesitations to initiate an armed struggle on the island.⁹⁸ The founding document of the EOKA stated that the main purpose of the organization was to attract the attention of the international politics and to force the UN or British government to accept *Enosis*.⁹⁹ For the reinforcement of the organization in terms of arms, there were three main shipments from Athens to Cyprus in 1954. The first two shipments were sent on 2 March 1954 and on 2 August 1954, respectively. The last one was on 10 November 1954. General Grivas also arrived on the island with this shipment. As soon as he arrived, he was engaged in the distribution of arms, and in training small groups for the upcoming armed struggle.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, the armed struggle of the EOKA was initiated on 1 April 1955, and at the same day, the leaflets were also distributed throughout the island to announce the aims of EOKA. In the leaflets, it was specified that EOKA initiated its armed struggle to end the British ascendancy in Cyprus.¹⁰¹ Later on, the EOKA had intensified its attacks. For example, on 21 June 1955, in the

⁹⁷ National Organization of Cypriot Fighters

⁹⁸ Xydis, p. 5.

⁹⁹ *ibid*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid*, pp. 10-15.

¹⁰¹ Zenon Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict Identity and Statehood*, (Wakefield, 1976), p. 31.

Turkish part of Nicosia 14 Turkish Cypriots were killed.¹⁰² EOKA killed 196 people in the island until November 1956.¹⁰³ EOKA's armed struggle was terminated by General Grivas when Zurich and London negotiations paved the way for the independence of Cyprus.

The other important factor for the alteration of the British policy towards Cyprus was the threatening presence of the communists on the island. The presence of communism supposedly was also one of the factors for the British and Turkish governments not to be on the side of *Enosis*. Turks believed that, in the case of a communist rule, on the island, the Turkish Cypriots, whose majority had never become sympathetic to the communist system, would be deprived of their rights. Furthermore, the British and the Turkish governments suggested that if *Enosis* was exercised, it might result in the re-emergence of the civil war in Greece, since the Greek Prime Minister Papagos was going to eliminate the communists on the island.

AKEL increased its significance in the political life of Cyprus during and after the Second World War.¹⁰⁴ Of the leading members of AKEL were trained in Moscow. AKEL was the other legalized political party in the two-party system of Cyprus, besides the Nationalist Party. Although AKEL could not repeat its success in 1946 municipal elections, it was still an important actor in the struggle of *Enosis* during the first half of the 1950s. It supported *Enosis* movements, by staging strikes and provoking unrest in the island.¹⁰⁵ Apart from these efforts, AKEL also tried to establish diplomatic contacts to win adherents in international arena. AKEL

¹⁰² Riccoli, p. 45

¹⁰³ Bayülken, p. 8.

¹⁰⁴ Roy P. Fairfield, "Cyprus: Revolution and Resolution" *The Middle East Journal* Vol. 13, No. 3, (Summer, 1959), p. 241.

¹⁰⁵ Thomas W. Adams, Alvin J. Cottrell *Cyprus between East and West*, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 30.

sent its own delegation to some of the capitals of Europe and to Moscow to espouse *Enosis*.¹⁰⁶

Actually, it was difficult to understand why AKEL supported the movement of *Enosis* in the first half of the 1950s, while any communist organizations had been banned in Greece because of civil war in the country between 1946 and 1949. If *Enosis* was performed, AKEL, as a communist party, would be automatically excluded from politics. The General Secretary of AKEL Ezekias Papaioannou dispelled the curiosity of people who were trying to understand AKEL's purpose by supporting *Enosis*. In one of his speeches, he said,

The Struggle of the People of Cyprus for national rehabilitation must be viewed in relation to their struggle of the Greek people for peace and national independence, not separately. It is part and parcel of the same struggle. Governments come and go but the Greek people are always there. When the people in Greece and Cyprus have achieved their national freedom, they will then be able to decide for themselves the type of regime they wish to live under.¹⁰⁷

Papaioannou's speech unequivocally exposed that the communists of the island had two main goals. Their short-term aim was to get rid of the British existence on the island by supporting *Enosis*, and their long-term goal was to initiate a regime change in Greece. From this perspective, Turkish and British suspicion regarding the presence of communism on the island was dramatically accurate.

On the other hand, by 1955 and onwards, there was a shift in AKEL's policy towards *Enosis*. The first reason for this policy change was the founding of EOKA. As it was mentioned, EOKA was presided over by General Grivas who was an anti-communist. Despite the fact that both EOKA and AKEL separately engaged in efforts for the realization of *Enosis*, they had never been in good terms. Although their short-term aims were the same, i.e. The union of the island with Greece,

¹⁰⁶ Thomas W. Adams *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus*, (Stanford, California: California University, Hoover Institution Press), p. 40.

¹⁰⁷ *ibid*, p. 42.

AKEL's long-term purpose impeded the cooperation between AKEL and EOKA. To prove this antagonism, it is enough to specify that EOKA had never admitted even one communist as a member in the EOKA since its foundation. Moreover, it was also averred that the original name of EOKA was "National Liberation Front of Cyprus". This name, however, was not admitted because of its redolence of communist led national liberation fronts. Therefore, EOKA was adopted as the title of the organization.¹⁰⁸ Besides EOKA's manner, AKEL's Central Committee took a decision on 14 April 1955 to condemn the armed struggle initiated on 1 April 1955 by EOKA. Later, in 1957, EOKA labeled the communists as traitors and in 1958 it published a "black book" which was mainly about communists' destructive efforts for the realization of *Enosis*.¹⁰⁹ Second reason for the changing policy of AKEL was its banning by British administration in 1955. The justifications for this decision were that AKEL was promoting unrest and caused sedition within the island. The ban entailed the detention of 135 leading AKEL members, including the General Secretary Papaioannou. Moreover, any publications related to communism were also banned. The banning of AKEL led the losing of the legal status of the party and it had to maintain its struggle in underground. Unavoidably, AKEL also relatively lost its popularity among Cypriots. This stepped down the role of the party on the fate of the island.¹¹⁰ The banning law on AKEL had been abolished in 1959 and party relatively regained its popularity after the declaration of independence of Cyprus in 1960.

Consequently, due to the aforementioned factors stemming from the US pressures, EOKA's armed struggle and the presence of communism on the island led to changes in the British policy towards Cyprus question. The British administration

¹⁰⁸ Xydis, p. 19.

¹⁰⁹ Tevetoglu, p. 32.

¹¹⁰ Adams, *AKEL: Communist....*, pp. 48,49.

decided to convene a conference with the participation of the United Kingdom, Turkey, Greece, as well as the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, with the aim of the discussion of the question. The conference was gathered on 29 August 1955. It is important to note that, with this conference, Turkey for the first time officially became a part of the Cyprus Question.¹¹¹ Actually, before the conference, the Greek ambassador in London, Mostras, anticipated that, the British government was going to implicate the Turkish government to the process. According to him, the British government established good terms with Turkey. Thus, the Greek resentment, which might have been occurred because of the Turkish inclusion to the question, would not be a problem for Britain.¹¹² Moreover it was suggested that London appreciated Turkey's participation very much, because by doing so, Turkey not only reduced Britain own responsibility which might stem from its withdrawal from the island, but also the British government was able to balance Athens' diplomatic pressures for bilateral negotiations on the question.¹¹³

Conference had lasted for 10 days and an agreement among participants could not be reached. The conference was dispersed due to the notorious "6 – 7 September events" in Turkey. These events were the result of provocation in which a bomb had been thrown by a Turkish agent to the maternity home of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Thessaloniki. Hereupon a huge mob in Istanbul and in Izmir destroyed the properties of Greek minorities to an enormous scale.¹¹⁴ Although the London Conference brought nothing in terms of solution to the problem, it exposed that the issue was to be resolved among five parties of the question; Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Turkish

¹¹¹ Riccoli, p. 43.

¹¹² Xydis, p. 11

¹¹³ Dominic Lieven, *Empire The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 359.

¹¹⁴ For detailed information on 6-7 September events of 1955 see Dilek Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2006)

Cypriots, and the Greek Cypriots come to an understanding. This was also the exclusion of the UN from the question at least for that period. After the London Conference, British government submitted different plans, in terms of solving the problem, to the parties of the question. The titles of these plans were the Radcliffe Proposal, the Foot Plan and Macmillan Plan and they were presented in December 1956, in December 1957 and in June 1958, respectively. Among these proposals, although Turkey accepted only the last one, Greece accepted none of them.¹¹⁵ These plans, therefore, contributed nothing for the solution of the problem.

Turkey's acceptance of the MacMillan plan was a foregone conclusion. On 16 November 1956, Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, convoked Professor Nihat Erim to prepare a report on Cyprus Question. In his first meeting with Erim, the Prime Minister gave essential information about the understanding of the Turkish Foreign Policy on possible solutions of the Question. According to this, Turkey's first preference was the preserving of status quo in the island. In other words, Turkey did not support the withdrawal of the British from the island. The second preference was that, if Britain decided to leave the island, the administration of the island should be given to Turkey. The third acceptable solution was the equal partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. Besides, these two countries should leave some territories for the usage of British Bases. The fourth solution was that if the self-determination right would be applied on the island, the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey should be strictly protected. The last and most undesirable solution by Turkey was that Britain's cession of the island to Greece.¹¹⁶ Among these preferences only the third one seemed plausible. The first two plans likely were not going to be accepted by Greece and while Turkey would not confirm the last two

¹¹⁵ Bolükbaşı, p. 14.

¹¹⁶ *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Prime Ministry Archives of Republic of Turkey, hereafter stated as BCA), Fon No: 030 01, Place No: 38-277-1*

solutions. Therefore, the Macmillan Plan was the best one which was parallel with the third option and that is the reason why Turkey supported it. Moreover, Menderes explained the frame of partition policy in his speech at Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). This policy was also supported by the leader of opposition party of the country at the time, İsmet İnönü.¹¹⁷

Although the partition policy had been adopted by Turkish political parties, defending of this policy did not find support in the international community. The 1950s witnessed the decolonization of many European states. In such a period, when many states declared their independence, supporting of partition policy was not supported by other countries. Understanding of the inapplicability of the partition policy, the efforts of parties were in the direction of giving independence to Cyprus. The first step in that direction was taken by Turkey. As a result of Turkey's invitation, Turkey and Greece bilaterally discussed the future of the island. These meetings between these two states also paved the way for the organization of Zurich Conference.¹¹⁸ Zurich Conference was held between 5 and 11 February in 1959. The participants of this conference were Turkey and Greece. The Prime Minister of both countries came to an agreement on internal and international status of future's independent Cyprus.¹¹⁹

After Zurich Conference, other important step was taken in London on 19 February 1959. London Agreement, of which essence articles were determined in Zurich, was signed with a ceremony. Thus, Zurich and London Agreements formed the basis of the emergence of Cyprus as an independent state in international politics by 16 August 1960. This independent status of Cyprus opened its borders to the

¹¹⁷ Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler (1946-1960)", p. 604.

¹¹⁸ Riccioli, p. 48.

¹¹⁹ Nasuh Uslu, *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003* (New York: Nova Science Publisher, 2003) p. 11.

Eastern Bloc and gave an opportunity that bloc to make use of the question in its struggle with the Western Bloc.

CHAPTER III

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS CYPRUS 1950'S

3.1. Soviet Foreign Policy towards Third World from 1945 to 1970

Comprehension of the Soviet attitude towards Cyprus question requires a brief evaluation of the general Soviet attitude towards the Third World countries from 1945 to 1970. This period was remarkable in the course of Soviet Foreign Policy. From 1945 to 1953, under the strict rule of Stalin, the USSR did not give much attention to the Third World countries. After Stalin's death, however, Soviet approach towards the Third World countries changed dramatically. While during the former period Soviet popularity almost nonexistent in these countries, the latter period witnessed a great deal of development of Soviet popularity among the Third World countries.

The Second World War resulted in the weakening of British and French powers and the defeat of Japan. This gave rise to the revolutionary movements in the colonial

countries who sought to get rid of their masters.¹²⁰ These revolutionary movements might have been important tools for the USSR in its struggle with the Western world. Stalin, however, preferred to ignore or to underestimate the potential role of the Third World countries for the struggle against the capitalist world. There were five major factors for this policy of indifference.

First, in the early post-war years, Stalin was mainly engaged in the economic reconstruction of the USSR and consolidating the Soviet influence in its satellites at the Eastern Europe. and in others, like China and North Korea.¹²¹ The second, the USSR essentially abstained from nuclear superiority during the initial post-war years. Moreover Stalin did not want to pursue an active policy in the Third World because of their potential for being *casus belli* between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc.¹²² The third factor was that, Stalin did not believe the idea that increasing the Soviet influence in the Third World countries would aggrandize the Soviet popularity in international politics.¹²³ The fourth and the most important factor was that, the Soviet foreign policy was based on the so-called “two camps theory” which was paraphrased by Andrei Zhdanov’s, the Secretary of Central Committee. The theory was the whole picture of the idea that “he who is not with us, against us.”¹²⁴ In other words, Stalin supposed that only communist states were the allies of the USSR, while others, regardless of their difference among each other, were regarded as non-communists, thus, enemies of the Soviet people. The last factor, but not the least, was that the main aim of the Soviet domestic policy, the creation of the “New Soviet Man”, impeded the

¹²⁰ Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 375.

¹²¹ Stephen T. Hosmer, Thomas W. Walfe *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Countries* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 3.

¹²² David J. Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin* (Philadelphia, Chicago, New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1961), p. 12.

¹²³ Rubinstein, p. 376.

¹²⁴ Erik P. Hoffmann, Frederic J. Fleron Jr. *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago, Alding Publishing Company, 1977), p. 394.

interaction of the Soviet Union with the Third World countries. The “New Soviet Man.” could be described as “an ultra modern, supranational secular carrier of working class consciousness.”¹²⁵ As in the logic of “two camps” theory, a “New Soviet Man” could be a friend only with another “New Soviet Man”. In the eyes of Stalin, except for the Soviet Man, every people have common characteristics regardless of their differences. All of them were enemies of the New Soviet Man and they were parts of conspiracies, produced by West, aiming at destroying the communist system in the Soviet Union.¹²⁶

Being predicated on the afore-mentioned factors, Soviet economic and military aid were not directed to the Third World countries because Stalin believed that such aid would not be helpful in strengthening socialism in the World. Instead they might have resulted in the emergence of counter revolutionary movements against the communist system.¹²⁷ Stalin regarded the leaders of the Third World movements of decolonization, such as Gandhi and Nehru, as puppets of the capitalist system. Therefore he always avoided cooperating with those leaders.¹²⁸ In this connection, for Stalin, economic and military aid to these people connoted the strengthening of anti-communist movements. Indeed, during Stalin’s tenure, the Soviet military and economic aid was only sent to the Eastern European satellites of the USSR, to North Korea and to communist China.¹²⁹

All these factors resulted in the absence of the Soviet influence in the Third World countries. In other words, the Soviet Union could not make use of the Third World countries during Stalin’s term to get an advantage over the Western world. After his death, Stalin was criticized by his successors, because of his policy towards the Third World countries. Critics generally claimed that Stalin could not see the potential

¹²⁵ Ted Hoff, “Moscow’s Foreign Policy, 1945-2000: identities, institutions and interests” in *The Cambridge History of Russia* Ed. Ronald Grigor Suny, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 663.

¹²⁶ *ibid*, p. 668.

¹²⁷ Hoffman, Fleron, p. 393,394.

¹²⁸ Hosmer, Wolfe, p.4.

¹²⁹ *ibid*.

role of the “national bourgeoisie” in the Third World countries in the struggle of communism against the capitalist system.¹³⁰

After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Foreign policy towards the Third World countries was reviewed and this was resulted in the shifting of Soviet’s attitude towards the Third World countries. In this connection, new Soviet Foreign policy strove to make use of the Third World countries in their struggle against “the imperialist West.” After all, the USSR followed more constructive policies towards these countries with the aim of relaxation in their mutual relations. On the other hand at the Bandung Conference, in Indonesia, in 1955, most of the participants were newly independent countries, declared that they would be on the side of neither the Western blocs nor Soviet bloc; instead, they would be a new pillar in the international politics as a non-aligned countries.¹³¹ Almost a year later, at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Khrushchev approved the shifting in the Soviet foreign policy by saying that the Soviet Union would be on good terms with the non-aligned countries as of now.¹³² It was obvious that the main aim of the Soviet foreign policy was to increase the Soviet influence in the Third World Countries or, at least, to keep these countries aloof from Western influence. Within the frame of this new understanding, by 1955, the Soviet Union began to make economic and military aid to these countries.¹³³ The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was, therefore, the official declaration of the new Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World countries. Khrushchev’s explanations at the Congress also gave more flexibility to the Soviet diplomacy and indicated that the Soviet Union was not going to follow the foreign policy

¹³⁰ *ibid.*

¹³¹ Hoff, p. 681.

¹³² Rubinstein, p. 382.

¹³³ Hoffman, Fleron, p. 394.

The first aim of the Soviet Union, by 1955 and onwards, in the Middle East was the total elimination of the British influence in the region. The second aim, in the case of the accomplishment of the first, was to prevent the entry of a third power into the Middle East.¹³⁴ In order to realize these aims, the Soviet Union began to set up good terms with most of the countries in the region by 1955. Among these countries, the first military aid agreement was signed between the USSR and Egypt in 1955. In this connection, the Soviet Union permitted the selling of Czech arms to Egypt.¹³⁵ In early 1956, Syria received military aid from the Soviet Union. In 1958, after the overthrowing of pro-West monarchy by a coup d'état led by General Abdul Kasim, the Soviet Union supported Iraq, militarily.¹³⁶

On the other hand, it is important to mention that the economic aid to the Third World countries by the USSR were suspended between the years 1961 and 1963 owing to the economic problems within the Soviet Union. During this era, Soviet officials preferred to concentrate on the economic issues at the domestic level, instead of ongoing in providing economic aid to the Third World countries. The following year, however, witnessed the recommence of aid both to the countries above and also to new countries.¹³⁷ One of these new countries was Turkey. The development of good terms between the Soviet Union and Turkey will be analyzed in the following chapter. Still, it will be suffice to say that Turkey had a significant difference from other countries which were getting Soviet economic and military aid. First of all, it has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover Turkey had also been considered as one of the most devoted members of NATO and a loyal ally of the USA.

¹³⁴ Dallin, p. 385.

¹³⁵ Hoff, p. 681.

¹³⁶ Hosmer, Wolfe, p. 11-16.

¹³⁷ The main factor for the re-start of economic aids was the economic difficulties of the early years of 1960s. It was argued by Soviet authorities the Soviet Union could maintain its economic aids with the aim of getting economic benefits for its domestic markets. To do so, classic bartering method was used. In other words, for instance, in return for military aids, Soviet Union imported textile or food products to meet its internal demands rather than producing them.

The main purposes of the post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World countries can be summarized under four headings. The first one was keeping the Third World countries aloof from Western bloc and preventing the establishment of foreign military bases in their territories. The second one was blocking the Western influence in their economics. The third one was the promoting of the influence of local communist parties and pro-communist labor unions. (To this effect perform, Moscow recommended the local communist parties to cooperate with the stronger nationalist parties or groups when it needed be.)¹³⁸ Finally, the last aim was to make agrarian reforms with the aim of increasing consciousness of proletariats.¹³⁹

When the situation of international politics in the early 1970s is reviewed, it is difficult to evaluate whether Soviets could achieve these objectives or not. But certainly, thanks to its progressive interests in the Third World, which was reflected as political, military and economic aids to these countries, the Soviet Union could get an opportunity to ascend its penetration in these countries, when compared to the pre-1955 years. According to a Foreign and Commonwealth Office report in 1970, the Somalian ambassador in Sudan commented that the Egyptians found themselves in a dilemma owing to the Soviet aid to this country because Egypt was becoming entirely dependent to the USSR in terms of military, politics, and economics.¹⁴⁰

One of the international issues in which the influence of the Soviet Union was to be felt was the Cyprus problem. Although the Soviet Union seemed to be relatively disinterested in the Cyprus problem throughout 1950s, its concern on the question should be examined with the beginning of 1960s. It is possible to come up with two

¹³⁸ Hosmer-Wolfe, p. 21.

¹³⁹ Roger E. Kanet, "The Recent Soviet Reassessment of Developments in the Third World", in *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* Ed. Erik P. Hofmann, Frederic J. Fleron Jr., (Chicago, Alding Publishing Company, 1977), p. 399.

¹⁴⁰ The National Archives of UK (TNA): Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 17/1005, (stated hereafter as TNA: FCO), p. 8.

reasons for the emergence of the Soviet interest on the question. The first was the cession of the island by Britain and the declaration of independence of Cyprus with the signing of Zurich and London Agreements. The second reason was the rapprochement of the USSR and Turkey. Improving relations of Turkey with the USSR forced the latter also to get more interested in the question. Still, it is necessary to mention the Soviet attitude towards the Cyprus question throughout 1950s, briefly.

3.2. Soviet Attitude toward Cyprus Question throughout 1950s

As it was mentioned before, Soviet foreign policy until 1953 was based on “two camps” theory. According to Stalinist hardline, anybody who was not a satellite or unconditional supporter of the Soviet position was regarded as the enemy of Soviet Union. Thus, Cyprus, as a Crown Colony of the United Kingdom, was also considered as an enemy. This understanding prevented the Soviet Union to be interested in the Cyprus question.

The only possible link of the Soviet Union with Cyprus could be the Communist Party of Cyprus, AKEL. An AKEL delegation traveled to the USSR in 1950 with the aim of getting support for *Enosis* in the international arena from the Soviet Union. At that time, however, AKEL could not achieve its goal partly due to Soviet indifference to the Cyprus problem.¹⁴¹ On the other hand, receiving Soviet support was important for the Greek Cypriots. It is claimed that in October 1952, Makarios admitted that if the Soviet Union had supported them in their case for *Enosis*, they would not be displeased.

¹⁴¹ Adams, *AKEL: Communist.....*, p. 40.

Makarios accepted that their main goal was to get rid of the British yoke and to do so any means were acceptable to him.¹⁴²

As it was mentioned, AKEL was the only link between Cyprus and the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet foreign policy was changing in a positive way towards the Third World countries after the death of Stalin, there was no change in the policy of the Soviet Union towards the island. The main factor for this was that the island was still under the rule of Britain. The second factor was the ban on AKEL by the British administration which was the sole connection of the Soviet Union with the island in 1955. AKEL, after the ban, embarked on underground activities, but it lost some of whatever popular support it previously had. Consequently, the Soviet Union also gave up its support for AKEL. It is important to note that, at the beginning of 1950 although the Soviet Union it was indifferent to the Cyprus problem, by 1952, it supported *Enosis* movement of AKEL. After the changing of the logic in the Soviet foreign policy, Soviet officials encouraged the local communist parties to cooperate with nationalist powers who were engaged in an anti-colonial struggle efforts. In the case of EOKA, however, the situation was different. The brain team of EOKA was formed by the leading and fervent anti-communists like Grivas. As it was mentioned, EOKA, from the beginning, did not admit the communists into the organization. Therefore from Soviet perspectives, it was not easy to encourage AKEL to give a hand to EOKA. After the ban on AKEL, the Soviet Union gave up backing *Enosis* and this also resulted in changing the policy of the USSR towards Cyprus. Thus, the Soviet Union was in favor of “liberation” of the Cypriots from their “foreign oppress”, which was represented not only by Britain, but also by Greece and Turkey.¹⁴³ Although the Soviet Union maintained to support AKEL

¹⁴² *ibid*, 41.

¹⁴³ Adams, Cottrell, *Cyprus Between ...*, p. 31.

in the struggle of the independence from the “foreign masters”, both of them were ineffective during the years of ban on AKEL, from 1955 to 1959.¹⁴⁴

It is important to specify that the Soviet charge d'affaires in Turkey, Voronin, make a scathing criticism to Turkish foreign policy because of the latter's manner towards the Cyprus question in 1955. He unequivocally claimed that Turkish foreign policy was erroneous as it followed the demands of the USA. He averred that Turkey should not have relied on the USA; instead, it should have been in concert with the USSR for the solution of Cyprus problem, for its own good. Interestingly, he explained that the USSR would make Cyprus its own base against NATO and Baghdad Pact. He claimed, therefore, Turkey should have cooperated with the USSR.¹⁴⁵ Voronin's explanation were completely conflicted with USSR's 'sincere' demands for the liberation of Cypriots. While the Soviet Union wished to find a peaceful solution to the problem, Voronin claimed that the island would be turned into a Soviet base in the near future. Actually, Voronin's explanation should be evaluated together with Papaioannou's speech, mentioned in the previous chapter. Both of their speeches indicated that communists in Cyprus and Moscow might have had a long-term target which was formed by two stages. At first stage, *Enosis* would be implemented and at the second stage efforts would be intensified for a regime change in Greece. If this change had been achieved, Greece might have be a part of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet approach towards the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959 was pessimistic. Agreements were regarded as 'so-called agreements' by the USSR, and it was argued that they entailed nothing in terms of the solution of the Cyprus problem. Instead, these agreements approved the establishment of the Greek, Turkish and British condominium over the island, by neglecting the will of Cypriots. They argued that as

¹⁴⁴ *ibid*, p. 32.

¹⁴⁵ BCA, Fon no. 030 01, Yer No. 37 226 7.

a result of these agreements, the island would turn into a military base of NATO.¹⁴⁶ Although the Soviets criticized these agreements, with the independence of Cyprus, the relations between the Cyprus Republic and the USSR were improved. These improving relations and their effects on the Cyprus problem will be examined in the following chapter.

¹⁴⁶ Cited in Adams, *AKEL: Communist....*, p.58.

CHAPTER IV

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS CYPRUS DISPUTE FROM 1960 TO 1974

4.1. Aftermath of Zurich and London Agreements

Zurich and London Agreements included four main parts. These are the draft for a constitution for Cyprus Republic; a treaty of guarantee between Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey; a treaty of alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey; a treaty of establishment between Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey; respectively. As the agreements had foreseen, Cyprus became an independent state by 16 August 1960. After the declaration of independence, election was immediately held in conformity with the related articles of the agreements. As a result of election, while

Makarios was elected as the president of Cyprus and Fazil Kucuk became his vice.¹⁴⁷ However, mainly owing to the ethnic discrepancies between the two main communities of the island, the full implementation of the agreements could not be performed.

Under the stimulus of the Helen nationalism, Greek Cypriots considered themselves simply as a part of the greater Greek nation. Nevertheless, the Zurich and London Agreements forced them to live side by side with the Turkish Cypriots. AKEL, for instance, criticized Makarios in March 1959 for giving approval to the Agreements. AKEL argued that these agreements made *Enosis* impossible. It was also opposed to the recognition of military intervention right to Britain, Turkey, and Greece to island within the frame of treaty of guarantee. Makarios who signed the Agreements on behalf of the Greek Cypriots, ironically, stated that the Agreements had just created a state but not a nation.¹⁴⁸ He avowed that he signed the Agreements due to pressure of the NATO, and he had never given up his ultimate goal, *Enosis*.¹⁴⁹ On the other hand, one of leading actors of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktaş, retrospectively alleged that Makarios was engaged in destruction of Turkish Cypriot's equal political rights, stemmed from the Agreements. Furthermore, he accused Makarios for making preparation for an armed struggle to realize his goal.¹⁵⁰ Denktaş also did not believe the idea that Cyprus Republic would survive. Therefore, he suggested that the Turkish Cypriots should adopt the idea of partition of the island (*taksim*).¹⁵¹ It was claimed that Makarios did not intend to admit the Turkish

¹⁴⁷ Dominick J. Coyle, *Minorities in Revolt: Political Violence in Ireland, Italy and Cyprus* (East Brunswick, London, Toronto: Associated University Press, 1983) pp. 179, 182.

¹⁴⁸ Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kısacasında Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2005) pp. 103-107.

¹⁴⁹ *ibid*, p. 182.

¹⁵⁰ Rauf Denktas, *Karkot Deresi* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, Kasım 2005), p. 135.

¹⁵¹ Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kısacasında...*, p. 267.

Cypriots as the co-founder of the Republic since he insisted on that they are the minority of the island.¹⁵²

The Zurich and London Agreements liberated Greek Cypriots from their master and, for the first time, they became the main rulers of the island. Greek Cypriots wanted to make use of this position to realize *Enosis*. However, the Agreements had put *Enosis* out of the way. They, therefore, had to be abolished and a new regulation must be put into force in favor of Greek Cypriots. “The Akritas Plan” was tailored to fulfill of this requirement. This plan was formed by Makarios, the minister of interior, Yorgacis, and the Chairman of the House of Representatives of the island, Klerides. In accordance with this plan, the opposition of the Turkish Cypriots for *Enosis* would be removed or they would be turned into ineffective subject of the island.¹⁵³ With the aim of falling the effects of the Turkish Cypriots on the island Makarios visited Turkey in November 1962. He complained to Turkish officials about the system of the Agreements. He argued that the system was not suitable to put necessary laws for “the common good” into force. He, therefore, suggested that a package of constitutional amendments was necessary to dispel the blocking of the system. The Prime Minister of Turkey, İsmet İnönü, rejected Makarios’ offer and the latter returned to the island empty handed.¹⁵⁴ In spite of being rejected, Makarios insisted on the constitutional amendments, he believed, were essential for the maintenance of the state system effectively. Indeed the complications of the system reflected to the communities of the island from the beginning of 1963. On 30 January 1963, during the parliamentary debates of the House of Commons, a member of parliament, Mr. Bottomley, asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, about the situation of British

¹⁵² Coyle, p. 183.

¹⁵³ Sadi Somucuoglu, *Kıbrıs'ta Sirtaki* (Ankara: Umit Matbaacılık Ltd. Sti. , Kasım 2002) pp. 58, 60.

¹⁵⁴ İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, *Çağlayangil'in Anıları* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2007), pp. 334, 335.

troops in the island. In response, Mr. Sandys admitted that the tension between the communities in Cyprus had been growing and he was afraid that this might be resulted in the resurrection of the past unrest on the island.¹⁵⁵ In fact, these constitutional amendments would eliminate whatever political power the Turkish Cypriots had and would turn them into a mere minority rather co-founders of the Republic. This was why Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots were strictly opposed to these amendments. When Makarios gave a memorandum to Ankara, Athens and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Fazıl Küçük, about these amendments on 30 November 1963, not surprisingly the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriots rejected them. The Turkish government declared to Makarios on 16 December 1963 that it was not in favor of constitutional agreements. This refusal of the offer caused the acceleration of the tension between two communities and a chain of violent events took place by 22 December 1963. These events confirmed the inapplicability of the Zurich and London Agreements and paved way for the outbreak of the 1964 Crisis.

4.2. 1964 Crisis and its Aftermath

The series of events which would create 1964 crisis were initiated in the night of 21-22 December 1963. At first, three Turkish Cypriots were killed in Nicosia. Upon this, the Turkish Cypriots gathered in the centre of Nicosia and protested the murders. By the time, Makarios unilaterally declared that the Treaty of Guarantee

¹⁵⁵ House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates (Oral Answers)* Vol. 689 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), p. 518.

would be no longer in force.¹⁵⁶ By doing this, Makarios probably wanted to impede a possible military intervention by Turkish troops. A day later, the leaders of the two communities, Makarios and Küçük, gave out a notice to stop fighting between the two communities of the island. However, on 24 December 1963 clashes continued and barricades were constructed between the Turkish and Greek villages.¹⁵⁷ Upon the maintenance of the clashes, the Turkish government decided to enforce its conventional right stemming from the Treaty of Guarantee and three Turkish jets hedgehopped over the island to warn the Cypriots. This event alerted the big powers whether Turkey would enlarge its military intervention or not.¹⁵⁸ By the way, Makarios complained of the Turkish government to the UN because of its meddling in the internal affairs of the island and its violation of the airspace of Cyprus.

The Soviet Union was clearly against to a possible Turkish invasion of the island. The Soviet ambassador in Cyprus, Pavel Zermoshin, visited Makarios on 1 January 1964. Zermoshin ensured Makarios that latter's complaint would be espoused by the Soviet representative in the UN Security Council.¹⁵⁹

When the Turkish government halted its military intervention, the resurrection of Cyprus Republic became almost impossible. The leaders of the Turkish Cypriots believed that the government of Cyprus lost its legitimacy and the island should be partitioned between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. By January 1964, all Turkish officials in the Cyprus government resigned and the Turkish Cypriots, living in the south part of the island, moved to the north side. On the other hand, Rauf Denktaş explained that the Turkish Cypriots did not deliberately resign from their

¹⁵⁶ "Kıbrıs'ta Kanlı Çatışmalar" *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 22 December 1963), p.1.

¹⁵⁷ Aydoğan Önel, "Kıbrıs'ta Çatışmalar Bir İç Savaş Halini Alıyor" *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 24 December 1963), p. 1.

¹⁵⁸ Coyle 184.

¹⁵⁹ "Ruslar Makarios'u Destekliyor", *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 2 January 1964), p.1.

offices. He claimed that the Greek Cypriots forced the Turkish Cypriots to leave their offices.¹⁶⁰ Whatever the reason for the resignation of the Turkish Cypriots, Cyprus government was entirely obtained in the hands of Greek Cypriots. In other words, this was the *de facto* partition of the island.¹⁶¹ Upon these events, a fivefold conference was gathered in London on 16 January 1964 with the participation of London, Ankara, Athens, and the leaders of the Cypriot communities, Makarios and Küçük.¹⁶² However, the conference brought nothing for the solution of the problem and it was dissolved on 21 January 1964. The dissolution of the conference confirmed the accuracy of Küçük's explanation "The Cyprus Republic is dead"¹⁶³

After the dissolution of the London Conference, Makarios engaged himself to strengthen the Greek Cypriots Army against to a possible Turkish intervention. With this purpose, the Minister of Interior of Cyprus, Yorgacis, met with the Soviet ambassador, Zermoshin on 30 January 1964. They mainly negotiated on Cyprus dispute. It was alleged that, at the meeting, the Minister asked for Soviet military aid to Cyprus for the equipment of army and police forces.¹⁶⁴ Thus, Makarios' first contact with the Soviet Union after the independence of Cyprus was established. By the way, the USA, London, Greece and Turkey were negotiating to bring tranquility to the island. To do so, the sending of a NATO Peace Keeping Force was envisaged. The Soviet Union was strictly against this idea. To express his annoyance, Khrushchev sent a message to Ankara and London. In his message to Ankara, he specified that the meaning of sending of NATO Peace Keeping Force to the island was tantamount to the invasion of the island by NATO powers. It would be an overt

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Rauf Denктаş.

¹⁶¹ Aydoğan Önel, "Kıbrıs Bölünüyor", *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 3 January 1964), p. 1.

¹⁶² Çağlayangil, p. 335.

¹⁶³ Coyle, p. 185.

¹⁶⁴ Nuyan Yiğit, "Makarios Ruslardan Silah İstedi", *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 31 January 1964) p, 1.

violation of the territorial integrity and independence of the island. He underlined that the Soviet Union would not keep silent in the case of launching NATO troops to Cyprus.¹⁶⁵ Khrushchev sent a longer message to the British government and it was discussed in the House of Commons on 13 February 1964. In the message Khrushchev accused of Turkey, Britain and the USA to agitate the Turkish Cypriots against Cyprus government. He claimed that the NATO powers were the primarily responsible for the existence disorder on the island and he blamed NATO for making use of this unrest as an excuse to meddle the internal affair of the island and to turn it into a NATO base. He uttered that both Turkish and Greek Cypriots were capable of solving their internal problems themselves; they did not need any foreign intervention to solve their problems. Khrushchev advised that the NATO powers had to leave the island to its owners. He noted that the Cyprus problem could not be solved beyond the will of Cypriots. He also declared that the Soviet Union could not be indifferent to the Cyprus dispute not only because of its responsibility for protection of international peace, but also its geographical proximity to the island. Khrushchev, therefore, insisted that the Soviet government would not permit the dispatch of NATO powers to the island and his government condemned any kind of actions to do this. Instead of the NATO powers, Khrushchev suggested that an international intervention to be exercised at the level of the UN and a UN peace keeping force should be sent to the island for the assurance of tranquility.¹⁶⁶ As a matter of fact the Soviet Union overtly ensured that it would prop Makarios, if he applied to the UN for the transfer of Cyprus dispute to the Security Council. In fact, Makarios initiated preparation to arrange a letter of memorandum to the UN on 12

¹⁶⁵ “Kabine Yeni Teklif ile Rus Notasını İnceledi”, *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 9 February 1964), p. 1.

¹⁶⁶ House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates (Written Answers) Vol. 689* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1964), pp. 108, 110.

February 1964.¹⁶⁷ Two days later, the Soviet Union gave a guaranty to Makarios essentially on two matters. First, the Soviet Union would not allow the landing of Turkish troops on the island. Second, it would defend and espouse Makarios' thesis in the Security Council.¹⁶⁸ In fact, in the discussion of the Security Council, the Soviet representative, Nikolai Fedorenko, argued that the 1964 Crisis was caused by the illegal Turkish military intervention stemming from 'the so-called Agreements' of 1959. He criticized the NATO members for their efforts to turn the island into a NATO base. He finally added that the Soviet Union felt attracted to Makarios and his government who 'heroically defended' the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus Republic.¹⁶⁹ At the end of the deliberations in the Security Council the launching of the United Nations Peace Keeping Forces for Cyprus (UNPFCYP) was accepted and it embarked on its duty on 5 March 1964.

It was obvious that the NATO powers were in favor of launching a NATO Peace Keeping Force to the island. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations of the United Kingdom, Duncan Sandys, in his statement on Cyprus dispute in the House of Commons on 17 February 1964, declared that the governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey were in favor of landing NATO troops on the island, particularly on two grounds. First NATO forces had a chance to arrive the island immediately. Second, the termination of inter-communal conflict in the island was essential for the interests of NATO members.¹⁷⁰ However, NATO members were not able to impose their plan on Makarios, especially because he was backed by the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, the Soviet aid to Makarios was

¹⁶⁷ Kemal Kınacı, "Makarios BM'ye Müracaat Ediyor", *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 12 February 1964), pp.1,7.

¹⁶⁸ "Sovyetler Makarios'a Garanti Verdi", *Hürriyet Gazetesi*, (İstanbul: 14 February 1964), p. 1.

¹⁶⁹ "Rus Temsilci Türkiye ile İngiltere'yi İtham Etti", *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 21 February 1964), pp. 1,7.

¹⁷⁰ House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates (Oral Answers) Vol. 689* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), pp, 840, 843.

maintained in the course of the 1964 crisis. With the aim of initiating the flights between Soviet Union and Cyprus, the negotiations of the Soviet and Cypriot officials started by on 25 February 1964. It was also claimed by the Turkish press, these flights facilitated the sending of Soviet military personal and equipments to the island.¹⁷¹ A day later, it was declared that a treaty of arms trade between the Soviet Union and Cyprus was also signed.¹⁷² As a matter of fact, on 9 March 1964, it was reported that Greek Cypriots attacked to the Turkish Cypriots with Soviet weapons, which was discovered after capturing of two Soviet-made shells used by the Greeks against the Turks in Paphos.¹⁷³

To be sure, the main factor, which led Makarios to collaborate with Soviet Union, was to balance the pressure of NATO powers on him. It is hard to assume that Makarios ever wanted to make the island Moscow's puppet. Makarios' main purpose was to impede the landing of Turkish or NATO troops on the island. He was convinced that if he allowed the landing of these forces, the island would be turned into a NATO base and thus would lost its independence. Of course, the Soviet Union was staunchly against the "NATOisation" of the island. Its objective was to turn Cyprus into one of the non-aligned countries which had good terms with the Soviet Union. Thanks to the Soviet support, Makarios achieved to keep the UN in and NATO out.¹⁷⁴

The Soviet Union also could make the propaganda of its interests in the island with the help of AKEL. Indeed, the main international determinant of AKEL's

¹⁷¹ Kemal Kınacı, "Rusya Kıbrıs Arasında Uçak Seferleri Başlıyor", *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 25 February 1964), pp. 1,7.

¹⁷² Kemal Kınacı, "Rumlar Ruslarla Silah Anlaşması Yaptılar", *Hürriyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 26 February 1964) pp. 1,7.

¹⁷³ Kemal Kınacı, "Rumlar Rus Silahları ile Türklere Hücum Ediyorlar" *Hürriyet Gazetesi*, (İstanbul: 9 March 1964), pp. 1,7.

¹⁷⁴ Mallinson, p. 44.

foreign policy was Moscow. In other words, the party's main goal was to satisfy Moscow's demands and to follow a Moscow oriented foreign policy. AKEL had never deviated from the Soviet perceptions on Cyprus problem, except in 1965, when the Soviet officials declared that a federal system in the island could be also conceivable as a solution of the Cyprus dispute.¹⁷⁵ As a result of this witting opposition of AKEL to federal system, the Soviet Union omitted Cyprus in its slogan of the anniversary of October Revolution in 1966.¹⁷⁶ This was a severe reprimand for AKEL, and the officials of the party came to understand that they had no chance of conflicting with Moscow.¹⁷⁷ It has been alleged that this rigid dependency of AKEL to Moscow stemmed from its being financed by the latter. Although this financial aid had been denied by the General Secretary of the Party, Papaioannou, for the maintenance of the capital flow, AKEL had to be in conformity with Moscow's line on Cyprus dispute. In fact, the party became a fierce advocate of Soviet policy on Cyprus. The party's propaganda was mainly committed to the expulsion of British bases from the island and to the prevention of NATO's infringement to the island.¹⁷⁸

The rising Soviet influence on the island alarmed the USA and other anti-communist circles. Thus, General Grivas accused Makarios of being responsible from the growing of communism in Cyprus in January 1964.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, General Grivas returned to the island in June 1964. When a journalist asked a question to İnönü, during his visit to Washington, about Grivas' arrival in the island the Prime Minister responded that it was too early to comment on this. It was obvious that İnönü avoided giving a definite statement on Grivas' arrival. However, the arrival of

¹⁷⁵ Erim, p. 439.

¹⁷⁶ Adams, *The Communist Party...*, p. 183.

¹⁷⁷ As a matter of fact, besides the communist party of Luxembourg, AKEL was the only communist party which did not condemn the Soviet intervention to Czechoslovakia in 1968.

¹⁷⁸ Adams, *The Communist Party...*, p. 184.

¹⁷⁹ "Grivas Makarios'u Suçladı", *Hürriyet Gazetesi*, (İstanbul: 26 January 1964), pp. 1,7.

Grivas was known by the USA and the Americans told İnönü that, Grivas had arrived in the island to fight against with communism on the island.¹⁸⁰ Within the framework of the Geneva Conference¹⁸¹ the USA proposed a plan, namely, the Acheson Plan.¹⁸² The plan was presented to participants twice. At first, the plan was rejected by all parties. Then, a modified plan was presented. Although the Turkish government seemed to accept this plan, especially due to Makarios' insistence Athens refused it. Being conscious of the advantages stemming from being a president of an independent country, Makarios had a tendency for keeping the independent status of the island rather than supporting *Enosis*.¹⁸³ This would also lead to a disagreement among the Greek Cypriots in the following years, who would be divided as the "pro-Enosis" and "pro-independence" factions. The second factor for Makarios' refusal of the plan was the Soviet support for him. This encouraged Makarios to pursue a pro-independence policy against to NATO powers. In fact the Turkish daily, *Cumhuriyet*, exposed the articles of an agreement between the Soviet Union and Cyprus on 21 October 1964. Although the exact signing date of the agreement was untold, in accordance with the agreement, Makarios ensured to prevent the landing of NATO troops on the island and to be persistent on the independence of the island in return for Soviet support to Cyprus. The articles of the agreement would also be kept secret from the NATO countries.¹⁸⁴ In fact after the dissolution of Geneva conference, in September 1964, Makarios made an agreement with Soviet Union to buy anti-aircraft

¹⁸⁰ Nihat Erim, *Bildiğim, Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs* (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık, 1976), p. 334.

¹⁸¹ The Geneva meetings were initiated with the participation of the Greek, Turkish and British governments and also the UN mediator Tuomioja. In the course of conference, the USA proposed the Acheson Plan, but it was not accepted in the conference. Thus the conference brought nothing in terms of the solution of the problem, it was dissolved on 31 August 1964.

¹⁸² For detailed information on Acheson Plan please see: Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler (1960-1980)" in *Türk Dış Politikası* ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, Kasım 2004), pp. 727 – 729.

¹⁸³ Melek Fırat, p. 728.

¹⁸⁴ "Makarios Sovyet Rusya'ya Teminat Verdi" *Cumhuriyet* (İstanbul: 21 October 1964), p. 1.

missiles. In the 1964 crisis Makarios was convinced that in the case of a Turkish air attack to the island, Greece would not be able to assist Greek Cypriots. This conviction of Makarios led him to sign the arms trade agreement with Soviet Union.¹⁸⁵ Actually, the Acheson plan was prepared to prevent the growing danger of communism and to hinder the penetration of the Soviets to the island.¹⁸⁶ In other words, it required the indirect inspection of the island by the NATO powers. In the case of the acceptance of the plan, it would hinder a possible splitting of NATO's southern flank. As a matter of fact, this was the primary factor for the USA to be engaged in Cyprus dispute. This can be also understood from a conversation between a US diplomat and Denktaş. She informed Denktaş that the main factor for the US government for engaging itself to Cyprus dispute was the existence of the possibility for the cracking of NATO's southern flank. She added that if there were no such a danger, the USA would not be interested in the clashes of the two communities with each other in the island.¹⁸⁷

In the process of the 1964 crisis the Soviet policy towards Cyprus was based on two objectives. One of these purposes was, through backing Makarios, the keeping the island away from being a NATO base. By the end of 1964, the Soviet Union was seemed successful in realizing its first objective. The second objective was, by making use of Greek and Turkish annoyance towards NATO, to develop good terms with these states.¹⁸⁸ Owing to coup d'état in Greece by a junta in 1967, the Soviet Union could not be successful to develop good terms with this country. However, this was not the case for Turkey.

¹⁸⁵ Andreas G. Papandreu, *Democracy at the Gunpoint* (New York: Doubleday&Company,1970), p. 140.

¹⁸⁶ Coyle, p. 186.

¹⁸⁷ Denktaş, p, 153.

¹⁸⁸ Melek Firat, p. 729.

Throughout the 1964 crisis, the policy of the USA was not in conformity with the Turkish policy towards the island. Although the UNPFCYP landed to the island on 5 March 1964, it was not so effective in halting the clashes between the two communities and the clashes continued until the summer of 1964. Thereupon, the Turkish government, once again, decided to undertake a military intervention on the island. However, this time the Turkish government faced up to American opposition. The Turkish Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü had received the ‘infamous’ letter of President Lyndon Johnson. In the letter, the US declared that it would not permit the use of NATO arms in any military intervention to Cyprus. Furthermore, the US covertly threaten the Turkish government by saying that it would not assist Turkey in case of a Soviet attack to this country during a clash in Cyprus.¹⁸⁹ This message forced the Turkish government to suspend its decision for military intervention on the island. On the other hand, when made public, Johnson’s letter unavoidably created a strong negative public opinion towards the USA, for the first time in the history of Turkish-American relations.¹⁹⁰ Thus, the Cyprus question indirectly impelled the Turkish officials to diversify their alternatives in their country’s foreign policy.¹⁹¹ However, it seemed difficult for the Turks to accomplish this since there was no opportunity for Turks to break the ice with the Soviet Union. During the summer of 1964, clashes among Cypriots continued and consequently, the Turkish government, once again, decided to send sorties over the island on 9 August 1964. The following day, the island was bombarded by the Turkish aircrafts. This action annoyed Khrushchev. After the bombardment, he sent a message to İnönü and warned the Turkish government to halt operations immediately. Khrushchev argued

¹⁸⁹ Çağrı Erhan, “ ABD ve NATO ile İlişkiler” in *Türk Dış Politikası* Cilt. 1, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, Kasım 2004) pp. 688, 689.

¹⁹⁰ Erim, p. 303.

¹⁹¹ Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917 – 1973* (New York, Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 691.

that no state had right to intervene in the internal affairs of another state. On 10 August 1964, Turkey terminated its air strikes after Makarios halted Greek Cypriots' harassment of the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁹² However, the failure of the Geneva Conference in August 1964 indicated that it would not be possible to find a solution for the Cyprus dispute within the framework of NATO. Makarios' persistence wearied the NATO powers and a solution to the problem was left to the initiative of the UN. This atmosphere provided an opportunity for the Turkish government to diversify its foreign policy. In the mean time, the Soviet Union also wanted to develop its relations with Turkey. The intersecting interests of these two states began a new phase in their relations.

This new phase began with the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Cemal Erkin, to Moscow on 31 October 1964. This was followed by a visit of a Soviet delegation to Ankara on 4 January 1965. The chief of the delegation, Podgorny, explained that on the Cyprus question, the Soviet Union conceived a federal system as one of the formulas for ending the Cyprus dispute.¹⁹³ As already mentioned, this alteration in the Soviet policy on Cyprus disturbed the Communist Party of Cyprus, AKEL. On the other hand, Soviet support for a federal solution was not certified by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the United Kingdom. According to a FCO document Podgorny stated in his address to both houses of Turkish Parliament that, Podgorny said that the Soviet Union supported a solution on the basis of the protection of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the island with the assurance of the rights of both communities on the island. The FCO admitted that Podgorny never implied a federal solution, at least according to the press reports. However, FCO document admitted that it was not clear whether Podgorny implied a federal solution in his other

¹⁹² "Hava Hucumunu Şartlı Olarak Durdurduk" *Cumhuriyet*, (İstanbul: 11 August 1964), p. 1.

¹⁹³ Erel Tellal, "SSCB ile İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası* ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2004) p. 776.

speeches not reported by the press.¹⁹⁴ Podgorny's visit was followed by that of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, on 17 May 1965. At that time, the Turkish Prime Minister, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, also went to Moscow on 9 August 1965. This senior-level visit witnessed the signing of cultural cooperation agreements and the decision to accelerate economic cooperation between the two countries.¹⁹⁵ Within the framework of economic cooperation, the Soviet Union loaned 168 million dollars to Turkey and provided an additional 15 million dollars to finance the construction of the Arpaçayı dam. During Ürgüplü's visit, there were also negotiations between the two countries for the establishment of a steel mill, a tractor factory, and an oil refinery.¹⁹⁶ Relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union improved in the following years. For the first time a Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, visited Turkey on 20 December 1966 and this was followed by the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, on 19 September 1967.¹⁹⁷ In 1967 a Soviet–Turkish inter-governmental economic agreement was signed as well. This agreement accelerated the degree of cooperation between the two countries. In an interview published in *Izvestiia* on 4 January 1972, Semion Skachkov, then the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, confirmed that since 1967 there had been extensive economic and technological cooperation between the two countries. In the same interview he added that in return for Soviet economic aid to Turkey, the latter provided some required goods such as cotton, tobacco, bauxites, and citrus fruit.¹⁹⁸ The FCO also reported that, “Russia pledged to Turkey in aid 366 million dollars since 1967.”¹⁹⁹ On 15 March 1972, a supplemental agreement to the 1967 economic agreement was signed

¹⁹⁴ TNA: FCO, 9 – 1366, p. 1.

¹⁹⁵ Erel Tellal, pp. 776-777.

¹⁹⁶ Marshall I. Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), p. 153.

¹⁹⁷ Erel Tellal, p. 778.

¹⁹⁸ TNA: FCO 9 / 1611 p. 1.

¹⁹⁹ TNA: FCO 9/1611, p. 12.

in Ankara by Foreign Trade Secretary General, Şeref Durugönül and Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry Departmental Director, Kuznetsov, which allowed a 80 million dollars credit to Turkey.²⁰⁰ These developing relations would require the Soviet government to pursue a different policy towards Cyprus in the 1967 crisis than that of 1964.

The 1964 crisis had many consequences. First, it impelled the Soviet government to be engaged in the Cyprus dispute. For the first time the Soviet government and Makarios established diplomatic relations. While the former's purposes were the protection of the island from NATO penetration and a manipulating the threat of a possible split in NATO's southern flank, the Soviet aimed at counterbalancing the NATO pressure and maintaining the independent status of the island. A second consequence was the deterioration of relations between Turkey and the USA. This created an opportunity for the Soviet Union and Turkey to reinvigorate their relations which had been frozen since the end of the World War II. The third and most remarkable result of the 1964 Crisis was the *de facto* partition of the island. As it was mentioned above, the Turkish officials resigned from their offices and the Turkish Cypriots began to gather in the north side of the island living in the pockets of somewhat fortified enclaves. On the other hand, Denктаş stated that the Turkish Cypriots did not deliberately resign from their office. He claimed that, the Greek Cypriots forced another to resign.²⁰¹ Whatever the reason for the resignation of the Turkish Cypriots, the government of Cyprus fell entirely into the hands of the Greek Cypriots. Indeed, in their enclaves the Turkish Cypriots established the institutions which were basic requirements of their own state. However, the Greek Cypriots did not recognize this formation. Moreover, Ankara did not ask any state to recognize the Turkish side as a state, simply because the Turkish government knew that such an offer

²⁰⁰ TNA: FCO 9/1611, p. 12c.

²⁰¹ Interview with Rauf Denктаş.

would be refused by others. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot government was recognized as the ‘official’ government of Cyprus.²⁰² Therefore, this *de facto* partition was not in favor of the Turkish Cypriots. Unfortunately, this partition made the Cyprus problem more indissoluble and might have prevented the possible reconciliation of two communities with each other. Clashes sporadically continued between these official and unofficial states on the island. These clashes paved the way for the outbreak of the 1967 crisis on the island.²⁰³

4.3. 1967 Crisis and its Aftermath

The sporadic clashes endangered the order in Cyprus until April 1967. On 8 April 1967, Greek Cypriots attacked a Turkish village, named Mari, and eleven Turkish Cypriots were wounded. The expansion of this clash was impeded by the UNPFCYP.²⁰⁴ By this time, the Greek government was abolished by a military coup and a military junta came to power on 21 April 1967. The new Greek government was staunchly pro-*Enosis* and they believed that *Enosis* should be realized as soon as possible. With the coming of the junta into power in Greece, the fighting on the island intensified. To support the *Enosis* movement, the Greek government began to send its military forces to the island. On 13 November 1967 Rauf Denktaş protested the landing of Greek soldiers on the island and claimed that Greek government was attempting *Enosis* in terms of military. Upon this, he suggested that, the Turks should

²⁰² Zenon Stavrinides, p. 56.

²⁰³ *ibid*, p. 57.

²⁰⁴ “Kıbrıs’ta Rumlar Bir Türk Köyüne Hücum Ettiler” *Milliyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 9 April 1967), p. 1.

determine a new Cyprus policy in favor of the partition of the island.²⁰⁵ Two days later, the pro-*Enosis* Greek Cypriots under the command of General Grivas invaded two Turkish villages, namely Boğaziçi and Geçitkale.²⁰⁶ This was the beginning of the 1967 Crisis. The invasion of these villages resulted in the death of 29 Turkish Cypriots. This was clearly a breach of the constitution and the Turkish government decided to exercise a military intervention to the island. This decision deterred Grivas' forces and they withdrew from Boğaziçi and Geçitkale.²⁰⁷

The United States opposed a military intervention fearing that it would turn into a war between Greece and Turkey. This might have resulted in splitting the southern flank of NATO. In order to eliminate this possibility, the USA nominated Cyrus Vance as a special mediator. As a result of his shuttle diplomacy between Ankara, Athens and Nicosia, he managed to prevent the outbreak of a war between Greece and Turkey. The 1967 crisis ended with the acceptance of the Turkish demands by the Greek government. According to an agreement between Ankara and Athens, Greek soldiers were withdrawn from the island. The Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Cypriots, General Grivas should also leave the island.²⁰⁸ Interestingly, Washington's reaction to the Turkish intention for a military intervention was not as fierce as during the 1964 crisis. This might have been the result of the discontent among Turks towards the US after 1964 and Turkey's developing relations with Soviet Union especially after the October 1964. Besides these factors, there were others for the US government to follow a modest policy towards Turkey in 1967. The first factor was Makarios' rejection of the Acheson Plan, which anticipated the landing of NATO troops on the island with the aim of impeding the growth of

²⁰⁵ "Denktaş: Enosis Fiilen Olmustur" *Milliyet Gazetesi* (İstanbul: 14 November 1967), pp. 1,7.

²⁰⁶ "Kıbrıs'ta İki Türk Köyü İşgal Edildi" *Milliyet Gazetesi*, (İstanbul: 16 November 1967), p. 1.

²⁰⁷ "Grivas Kuvvetleri Çekildi" *Milliyet Gazetesi*, (İstanbul: 17 November 1967), p. 1.

²⁰⁸ Çağlayangil, pp. 353-360.

communist movements. The second was Makarios' split with the Greek junta because of their different opinions on *Enosis* policy. The third was the increasing cooperation between Cyprus and the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, although Soviet officials criticized Ankara for its decision for military intervention, saying that the parties of the Cyprus dispute should have avoided any actions that might have been resulted in the acceleration of tension on the island, the Soviet Union sat on the fence during the 1967 Crisis.²⁰⁹ The first factor for this even-handed Soviet policy was that the Greek Cypriots attacks, which impelled the Turks to take a decision for the exercise of a military intervention, were planned and commanded by the military government in Athens. The second factor was the developing relations between Turkey and Soviet Union after October 1964 and these proceeding relations deterred the latter from opposing Turkish military intervention strongly.

The end of the 1967 crisis in favor of Turkish government engendered the emergence of two different opinions on reaching *Enosis* among Greek Cypriots. The first was that the Greek Cypriots should overrule the Turkish Cypriot resistance by a sudden military attack. Overcoming the Turkish resistance would facilitate the declaration of *Enosis*. On the other hand, the second opinion anticipated that the Turkish Cypriot resistance could only be overcome by a long-term strategy. According to this long-term plan, Turkish Cypriots should be subjected to economic and political pressures. This strategy of deterrence would provide the opportunity for the declaration of *Enosis*. While the ex-EOKA members advocated the former, President Makarios was in favor of the latter. Moreover, because of this

²⁰⁹ Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy, Brezhnev Years* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 59.

disagreement, there were rumors of the overthrow of Makarios from presidency by a military coup supported by the junta, although the Greek foreign minister denied them.²¹⁰

Makarios believed that a sudden Greek military attack by the Greeks would have to confront a Turkish military intervention as in the 1967 crisis. He argued that for the time being, Greeks were not capable of coping with a possible Turkish military attack.²¹¹ Moreover, he advocated that more states in the UN should support Greek Cypriots' struggle for *Enosis*. This was the primary motive for Makarios' foreign policy of Cyprus. His foreign policy, especially since 1967, had been based on being a non-aligned country and having friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Following this policy would entail a secure position for Cyprus among the non-aligned countries and in the UN. In addition, after 1967 Makarios, supposedly, gave up the policy of *Enosis*. Indeed, in 1971 he admitted that, although *Enosis* was his superior purpose, it was not feasible in the existent conditions of international politics.²¹² He believed that as long as the threat of Turkish military intervention was in force, it would not be possible to put *Enosis* into the practice.

Makarios was criticized by the Greek junta for his ambition for being president of an independent country. The main factor for Makarios' persistence on presidency was that he was becoming aware of the advantages stemming from the presidency. Moreover, the Communist Party of Cyprus, AKEL, and the trade unions under the direct control of the party were opposed to *Enosis* since 1967. Furthermore, trade was dramatically in the hands of Greek Cypriots on the island. The capital

²¹⁰ House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates (Oral Answers) Vol. 751* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967), p. 964.

²¹¹ Somuncuoğlu, p. 78.

²¹² TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 20.

circulation of the market was in favor of them. The expenditures of the UNPFCYP and Turkey's economic aid to the Turkish Cypriots were transferred to the Greek Cypriots' cash. In other words, there were vital economic benefits to be derived from the independence for island's artisan class. All these factors forced Makarios to pursue an independent policy against the Greek government. This brought about the deterioration in relations between Greek government and Cyprus dramatically.²¹³ These deteriorating relations induced Makarios to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Thus he could not only balance Athens pressure, but also provide a wide scope for his foreign policy.²¹⁴

Makarios' foreign policy of Cyprus also improved the relations of Cyprus with the rest of the communist world. On 11 January 1968, the Cypriot Council of Ministers decided to make an airline agreement with Czechoslovakia and flights between two countries were initiated on 2 April 1968.²¹⁵ On February 2, trade unions in Czechoslovakia labeled the Turkish threats for the invasion of Cyprus as a NATO conspiracy.²¹⁶ 15 March 1968 witnessed the signing of trade agreements between Cyprus and East Germany. At the end of the same month, the Soviet Union and Cyprus signed a five-year trade and payment agreement. This agreement required the exchange of goods valued at more than 12 million pounds. The improving relations with communist world was also reflected in the cultural sphere. The Soviet ambassador, Tolubeyev, promulgated that two hundred Cypriots came to the USSR to study at various universities.²¹⁷ Cyprus also hosted to international communist formations. About 50 members of the World Peace Council (WPC) gathered in

²¹³ Kemal Karpat, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975) pp. 192, 193.

²¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 194.

²¹⁵ Adams, *The Communist Party...*, pp. 223, 226.

²¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 223.

²¹⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 225, 226, 230.

Nicosia on 5 June 1968, including the USA, the USSR, France, Canada and India. Three days later, the WPC Council issued a memorandum on the Cyprus question and declared that the Council was in favor of protecting the independent status of the island and was opposed to any initiatives to bring the island under NATO control.²¹⁸ Developing relations with communist world provided military equipments to Cyprus. Although the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, Smirnov, denied this ²¹⁹ on 27 June 1968, the Turkish press revealed that the Soviet Union had sent arms to Cyprus out of Egypt since 1964.²²⁰

By the beginning of 1971 the Soviet Union increased its overt support to Makarios against the NATO powers. According to an article published in *Pravda* on 16 February 1971, the Soviet Union criticized Britain for opening of its bases at Akrotiri to the USA. The article claimed that the US would use these bases to provide the delivering of its aircrafts to Jordan out of Cyprus. According to the Soviet officials, this confirmed the intention of the USA to make use of Cyprus as its station in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, military bases had also been used for the transferring of Phantoms to Israel. The Soviet Union once again stated that it would always be opposed the island becoming a NATO base. On the other hand, President Makarios stated that the turning of Cyprus into a NATO base would not be beneficial for its national interests. He also added that the Cyprus' entrance to NATO was unthinkable. In addition to Makarios, the communist Party, AKEL, also believed that Cyprus had to remove any foreign bases on its territory.

The Soviet Union accused the USA of trying to induce the communities of the island against each other. The Soviet Union believed that NATO supported the

²¹⁸ *ibid*, p. 229.

²¹⁹ "Sovyet Büyükelçisi Kıbrıs'a Silah Yardımı Haberini Yalanladı" *Milliyet Gazetesi*, (İstanbul: 29 June 1967), p. 1.

²²⁰ "Rusya Kıbrıs'a Silah Satıyor" *Milliyet Gazetesi*, (İstanbul: 27 June 1967), p. 1.

underground activities in Cyprus for a military coup against Makarios. The Soviet Union implied it would back Makarios against a military coup by saying that the USSR was in favor of a non-aligned Cyprus and saw this requirement as a necessity for the stabilization of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.²²¹ In an article, published in *Pravda* on 2 July 1971, Nikolai Bragin claimed that the Greek junta aimed at overcoming Makarios' government and in collaboration with the EOKA-B to accomplish this.²²²

In July 1971, Makarios paid a visit to Moscow. In his assessment of the visit, he stated that the Soviet Union supported an independent Cyprus. However, he was anxious about the developing relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union after 1965. Makarios thought that the relations of Cyprus might have been secondary for the USSR to its relations with Turkey. Therefore, he was concerned that the Soviet Union entertained a federal solution for Cyprus.²²³ However, this was not the reality. Indeed, by 1971 the essential Soviet objectives regarding the Cyprus question could be grouped under four main headings. First, the Soviet Union aimed at impeding the NATO presence on Cyprus. Parallel with the first, the second goal was the protection of the independence of the island. To do so, the Soviet Union in practice backed President Makarios. The third Soviet aim was to avoid annoying Ankara to maintain good relations with Turkey. Last but not least, the Soviet Union pursued any opportunities to divide NATO's southern flank so as to obtain an advantage in its struggle against the 'Imperialist Western World'. All these aims exposed that the Soviet attitude towards Turkey and Cyprus had to be balanced. Because, on the one hand, extreme support to Cyprus might have led to Turkey's anger, on the other, proceeding relations between Turkey and Soviet Union might have increased

²²¹ TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 3.

²²² TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 9.

²²³ TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 9b.

Makarios' anxiety. The latter possibility might have resulted in an alteration of Makarios' policy towards NATO and such a change would not be in favor of Soviet goals on Cyprus. In other words, Makarios might have permitted the NATO countries to intervene in the internal affairs of the island. Nevertheless, the prevention of landing NATO troops on the island was the most vital Soviet interest. Indeed, the British officials, supposedly, claimed that if the Soviet Union had to choose between Turkey and Cyprus, its preference would be Cyprus. It was, therefore, clear that there was a limit for the Soviet Union on its developing relations with Turkey. This situation forced the Soviet Union to support for Makarios against a Greek conspiracy to overthrow him.²²⁴ In fact, if Makarios was overthrown and a pro-*Enosis* president came to power, this might have left the Soviet Union hopeless to protect its vital interests regarding Cyprus.

Makarios' policy of developing relations with Moscow to protect the independence of the island worried the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots thought that Makarios would turn the island into a "Cuba of Mediterranean". It was also uttered by the Cypriot General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Veniamin, in the case of a Turkish invasion, the Soviet Union would offer immediate naval intervention against the Turks. The opening of Cyprus ports to Soviet ships had been also discussed for this purpose in 1971. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots witnessed the visit of a Soviet ship to Paphos and they averred that the ship was unloaded in a suspicious manner. In other words, the Turkish Cypriots implied that the ship might have been loaded with Soviet weapons.²²⁵ Four days later after this claim, it was stated in *Pravda*, that the Greek Cypriots considered the existence of the Soviet fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean as an assurance of their territorial

²²⁴ TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 10.

²²⁵ TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 11.

integrity and their independence. To be sure, this explanation was not given by a Soviet authority but it was allowed to be published in *Pravda*.²²⁶ It is important to mention that Makarios denied the allegations about the opening of Cyprus ports to Soviet ships. In his interview with Robert Southgate of Independent Television News (ITN) on 22 September 1971, in response to a question, “Would you allow Soviet ships to use Cyprus ports?” Makarios said that “if such a question arose, I would consider it, having in mind primarily the interests of Cyprus”.²²⁷

By 1971, the threat of communism on the island increased the anxiety of the NATO countries. Indeed, in the election of 1971, AKEL received 30 % of the total votes. AKEL’s achievement in the election and the progress of the communist movements on the island was a signal of AKEL’s possible victory in the next election. If AKEL was going to win the next election, the island might pass into the hands of Moscow. At a NATO meeting held in Lisbon in May 1971, Makarios was criticized for his ignoring the communist threat on the island. The US also decided that some measures had to be taken against Makarios. In fact, if the Turkish government had taken action to do this, it might have stirred the Soviet Union. As recalled, the Soviet Union declared that if Turkey attacked the island, the Soviet Union would confront the Turks. There was, therefore, only one way to overthrow Makarios and that was through the resurrection of EOKA on the island. This required the returning of General Grivas to the island. Grivas landed on the island in 28 August 1971 and he immediately embarked on the establishment of new version of EOKA, known as EOKA-B.²²⁸

²²⁶ TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 12.

²²⁷ TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 19.

²²⁸ Brendan O’Malley, Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999) pp. 134, 135.

On 6 October 1971, in an article in Pravda, titled “Clouds over Cyprus”, the Soviet Union criticized the return of Grivas to Cyprus. The reasons of his return, supposedly, were not only to provoke an inter-communal conflict, but also to fight against Makarios’ government. Upon Grivas return, Makarios warned that a civil war in Cyprus might occur.²²⁹

Makarios’ good terms with the Eastern Bloc made him increasingly suspect on the eyes of the USA. The President of the USA, Richard Nixon, backed the Greek junta which engaged in Makarios’ elimination.²³⁰ The anxiety of the Greek junta about Makarios was that the latter would turn the island into “Mediterranean Cuba”. By 1969, both the USA and the Greek junta came to understand that there would be no progress in terms of solving the Cyprus question in favor of the NATO as long as Makarios was in power.²³¹ In AKEL’s publication, Haravghi, it was claimed that at the NATO summit in Rome, the USA, Britain, Greece and Turkey agreed on a new plan for Cyprus, which anticipated joining the island to NATO. If Makarios insisted on being rejecting the plan, he would be overthrown.²³² In fact, the first attempt to eliminate Makarios came on 8 March 1970 while he was being taken to a memorial service at a monastery. His helicopter was shot down but Makarios walked away.²³³ This clearly proved the break up of two camps among Greek Cypriots. Makarios, who was convinced that pro-*Enosis* circles would eliminate him, established a Tactical Police Reserve against the pro-*Enosis* circles and received respectable amount of arms from Czechoslovakia for the equipping of this new agency.²³⁴

²²⁹ TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 21.

²³⁰ O’Malley, Craig, p. 132.

²³¹ *ibid*, p. 133.

²³² TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 2b.

²³³ O’Malley, Craig, p. 133.

²³⁴ *ibid*, p. 136.

The EOKA-B attacks on Makarios' government intensified during March and April 1973. The most remarkable one of these occurred when a bomb was thrown into the house of the Minister of Interior of Cyprus, George Ioannides. Moreover, on 8 April 1973 there were thirty-two expulsions in Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca.²³⁵ At the end of June 1973, forty pro-*Enosis* people were arrested and charged with attempting to overthrow the government. With the aim of retaliation on 27 July 1973 a police station in Limassol was bombed and the Minister of Justice, Hristos Vakis, was kidnapped.²³⁶ On 7 October 1973, Makarios was exposed to a mined aggression. However, this assassination attempt to Makarios also resulted in failure.²³⁷

On 27 January 1974, General Grivas, the leader of the EOKA-B, died. Shortly afterwards, President Makarios granted an amnesty for the detained EOKA-B members. The announcement of the amnesty was welcomed by the Soviet Union as evidence of the strong will of the government to end terrorist activities on the island. In concert with the Soviet Union, AKEL also backed Makarios' decision. The party stated that this amnesty was the manifestation of Makarios' good will to reduce the tension on the island.²³⁸ Indeed, it was expected that the announcement of the amnesty for detained members of EOKA would led to a drop off in violence on the island. However, the local leaders of EOKA-B declared in March 1974 that they were not going to make use of the amnesty. On the contrary, they would enter into a new phase of terror and violence on the island for carrying out the goal of *Enosis*.²³⁹

The refusal of amnesty by EOKA-B aggravated the Soviet Union. In a meeting on 18 March 1974, Semyonov, the Soviet *charge d'affaires* in London, inferred to the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Relations

²³⁵ *ibid*, p. 138.

²³⁶ *ibid*.

²³⁷ *ibid*, p. 139.

²³⁸ TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 2.

²³⁹ TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 20.

that Makarios' government was making resolute efforts to normalize the tension on the island, to consolidate the independence of the island, and to find a solution to the Cyprus problem in conformity with the interests of both communities of the island. Semyonov claimed that although Makarios was attempting to normalize the situation, NATO and pro-*Enosis* circles were provoking the inhabitants of the island to hamper the Makarios' government efforts.²⁴⁰ On the other hand, the Turkish government did not agree with Semyonov. On 26 March 1974 the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, argued that the Soviet comments were based on false intelligence. Güneş stated that President Makarios did not intend to preserve the independence of Cyprus. His main goal was the realization of *Enosis*. Güneş also suggested that Soviet Union should have supported the Turkish Cypriots if it was in favor of independence.²⁴¹

In the meantime, among Makarios' supporters there was a growing concern about the possibility of a *coup d'état*. On 30 March 1974, in an article, published in *Izvestiia* titled "Dangerous Plan For Cyprus", it was stated that illegal organizations on the island were stocking arms and they would use for a coup d'état.²⁴² On 5 April 1974, the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Veniamin, and the British ambassador in Nicosia, D.M. Day, discussed the former's visit to Moscow on 21 March 1974. Veniamin told to the ambassador that, according to the Soviet intelligence services both in Nicosia, and Athens, the Greek government directly supported the EOKA-B. He stated that, all this evidence dramatically exposed the accuracy of allegations of a military coup against Makarios.²⁴³

These allegations led to Makarios to send a letter to the Greek Prime Minister, Adamantios Androustopoulos, at the beginning of the July 1974. Makarios

²⁴⁰ TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 3.

²⁴¹ TNA: FCO, 9 1945, p. 6.

²⁴² TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 21b.

²⁴³ TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 27.

criticized the Greek government for its provoking unrest on the island by backing the EOKA-B both financially and militarily.²⁴⁴ By the way, the Soviet government was sure that the Greek junta, with the support of the USA, would attempt a military coup in the near future. Therefore, on 12 June 1974, the Soviet Union recommended AKEL that it should support the inter-communal negotiations, and cooperate with the Turkish Cypriots to preserve the independence. In the 15th Congress of AKEL, the party also took the same line as Moscow. The party criticized EOKA-B and declared that Cyprus would not be turned into a NATO military base.²⁴⁵ The Greek junta made an attempt on the state on 15 July 1974 which seemed to be successful at first. Makarios had to leave the island for London and the government passed to a puppet government of the Greek junta under the leadership of General Nikos Sampson.

The first reaction of the Soviet Union indicated that it was disconcerted by the coup. On 16 July 1974, at his meeting with the British Prime Minister, the Soviet ambassador in London, N.M. Lunkov, stated that the Greek government was behind the coup. He added that the Greek government was mainly responsible for what had happened on the island.²⁴⁶

The 15 July *coup d'état* led to the establishment of a puppet government directed by the Greek junta. This impelled the Turkish government to initiate a military intervention. The Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, labeled this military intervention as “the Peace Operation”. He claimed that the Turkish government launched a military intervention in order to restore not only the independence of Cyprus, but also the rights of all Cypriots and to protect the territorial integrity of the island.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁴ Stavrinides, p. 85.

²⁴⁵ TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 29.

²⁴⁶ TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 32.

²⁴⁷ Stavrinides, p. 86.

By July 1974, the main objective of the Soviet Union was the maintenance of the Makarios' government and preserving the independence of Cyprus. This was the essential factor why the Soviet government did not condemn the Turkish military intervention on 20 July 1974. Soviet officials believed that the Turkish intervention would result in overthrowing of the Sampson government and provided an opportunity to restore Makarios' government on the island. In addition, the Soviet Union did not intend for a military intervention on the island. By 2 August 1974, a Soviet naval vessel was anchored at a discrete distance from Cyprus.²⁴⁸

After the Turkish military intervention, a conference was gathered in Geneva with the participation of the British, Greece,²⁴⁹ Turkey, and representatives of the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. However, this conference ended in failure and the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, ordered a second military intervention. This intervention differed from its predecessor. The Turkish Prime Minister explained that the aim of the operation was "to end the long sufferings of the Turkish Cypriots and to enable them to live freely in their own soil".²⁵⁰ This meant the partition of the island rather than the protection of its territorial integrity.

The Soviet government's statement on second Turkish military intervention to Cyprus was published in Soviet Central Press on 23 August 1974. This time the Soviet government condemned this military operation and perceived it to be a part of the plan which was prompted by the 'bellicose' NATO circles to turn the island into a NATO base. The Soviet government alleged that the Turkish military intervention made the Cyprus question more complex and suggested that an international

²⁴⁸ TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 43.

²⁴⁹ As a result of the Turkish military intervention, on 24 July 1974, the Greek junta had to hand over the power to a civilian government whose Prime Minister was Konstantinos Karamanlis.

²⁵⁰ Stavrinides, p. 86.

government should be put in place under the auspice of the UN.²⁵¹ According to the Soviet proposal the negotiations would concern on three basic articles: the protection of the independence and the territorial integrity of the island, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the island, and the seeking of new guarantees for the independence of Cyprus.²⁵² However, this proposal was never negotiated because the Turkish government did not accept it. Instead, the Turkish government was in favor of bilateral negotiations with Greece. The Turkish government believed that the inclusion of other states in the negotiation process would impede the solution of the Cyprus dispute.²⁵³

The Soviet Union's proposal to find a solution to the Cyprus question was not accepted. Instead, by December 1974, the bilateral negotiations between the Turkish and Greek governments initiated. In the same month, Makarios also returned to the island and he grounded a general amnesty for anyone who joined the 15 July *coup d'état*. He also tried to cooperate with the Turkish Cypriots. However, his efforts were not sufficient to heal the wounds of the Turkish Cypriots which had resulted from their past experiences and a practical solution to the Cyprus question could not be found.

²⁵¹ TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 70a.

²⁵² TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 89.

²⁵³ TNA: FCO, 9-1945, p. 84.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Russia indirectly had affected the fate of Cyprus twice since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. At first, the Russian expansionism during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was the main factor for the British Empire to settle on Cyprus. Under the veil of supporting the Ottoman Empire against Russian threat, the British Empire “leased” Cyprus from the Ottomans after Russo-Turkish Wars of 1877-78. In accordance with the articles of Cyprus Convention of 1878, Cyprus was leased to the British Empire until the Russian threat to Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire was managed to abolish. However, in reality, the British intention was the permanent settlement on the island, not temporarily. The deliberation between the leading figures of the British politics in 1870’s on the acquisition of Cyprus and the British administrative policy in Cyprus in the following years clearly revealed this.

The root of the Cyprus problem was the idea of *Enosis* which was produced by Hellenic nationalism in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. However, the

British administrative practices strengthened the roots of the problem and made it an insoluble one. The British practices not only impeded the growth of fraternity between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also reasoned the lack of modernization process and the growth of extreme nationalism on the island. The different approaches of the two main communities on the Turkish Independence War of 1919 - 1922 was the most remarkable example of this extreme nationalism which was the main factor for the lack of modernization.

The ending of the Second World War entailed the decolonization period. Although the imperialist powers withdrew from their colonies one by one, this was not the case for Cyprus. Cyprus was one of the strategically important territories for the Western Bloc in their struggle against communism. Furthermore, the British withdrawal from Egypt after the Suez Crisis increased this strategic importance. Thus, once again, Russia indirectly affected the fate of the island, but this time under the cloak of communist threat. In fact, the British administration enforced strict regulations to prevent the emergence of communism on the island. The only communist formation, AKEL, which would act as a spokesman of the Soviet Union in 1960's in Cyprus, was also banned in 1955 until 1959.

The Greece application to the UN for the solution of the Cyprus problem in 1954 and the foundation of the EOKA a year later to support Greek thesis with violent actions deepened the Cyprus problem. These Greek efforts led to the Turkish annoyance. Of course, this was a danger for the possibility of a split in the NATO's southern flank.

Although Britain had no intention to withdraw from Cyprus in 1950's, the annoyance between Turkey and Greece forced Britain to gather a conference in London in 1955. In fact, the United States was also uncomfortable owing to the

Cyprus problem because of its potential to create a split in NATO's southern flank. This impelled the US to recommend the British government to find a solution to the problem. This process, initiated with the London Conference in 1955, ended with the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959, which made Cyprus an independent state as at 16 August 1960.

The Zurich and London Agreements created only a toy-republic. As a matter of fact, from 1960 to 1974 there were main three crises on the island between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. However, the independent status of Cyprus opened its borders for the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet Union, as a result of its logical change towards the Third World Countries after the death of Stalin, became increasingly interested in Cyprus as at 1960. The main target of the Soviet policy was to prevent the re-settling of NATO powers on the island and made Cyprus a non-aligned country having friendly relations with the Soviet Union. To accomplish this, at first, in 1964 and onwards, the Soviet Union aimed at the internationalization of the Cyprus problem through carrying it to the UN. Thus, the Soviet Union achieved to impede the solving of the Cyprus dispute within the framework of NATO. In fact, thanks to its support to the President Makarios, the Soviet Union provided the landing of the United Nation Peace Operation Forces in 5 March 1964 on the island, instead of the NATO troops.

As a second step to realize its aim regarding Cyprus, the Soviet Union endeavored to keep Cyprus as an independent state. This also led to the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the President Makarios who wanted to hinder the NATO intervention in Cyprus' internal affairs and to balance the Greek military junta pressures for the declaration of *Enosis* as soon as possible after the 1967 crisis.

Although the intersecting interests of the Soviet Union and Makarios developed Cyprus relations with the communist world, this strategy made Makarios as a *persona non grata* in the eyes of the West Bloc countries. Nevertheless, mainly thanks to the Soviet support, Makarios managed to keep his position until the coup d'état in 15 July 1974.

In fact, within the context of the Cold War, the essential political aim of the two blocs was to reduce or to vanish another's influence in the Third World Countries. This was also the case for Cyprus. The Soviet Union followed policies to decrease or to abolish the influence of NATO on the island and, if possible, to exclude NATO from the solution process of the Cyprus problem. The process, from 1960 to 1974, indicated that the Soviet Union seemed to be successful to accomplish its aims regarding Cyprus.

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