

Legitimizing Insurgency: Social Norms and Social Networks as Instruments in Recruitment by Organizations of Political Violence

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Abstract

This paper conceptualizes the evolution of the legitimacy of political violence. Utilizing a theoretical framework that operationalizes the use of social norms and social networks in optimizing recruitment by organizations of political violence, the paper deconstructs the legitimation process into two phases: the nascent stage where an initial cadre creates a foundation of legitimizing aims and a subsequent stage where this foundation is instrumental to the recruitment strategies and tactics of the organization. This theoretical framework is tested through an application to the case study of EOKA, the Greek Cypriot insurgent organization that engaged in an armed struggle against British colonial forces with the aim to unite Cyprus with Greece in the 1950s. The evidence from the case study is drawn from a new database based on interviews conducted with ranked officers and recruiters of the organization and a survey questionnaire of the members of the organization.

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Introduction

The theoretical framework presented here examines the role of social norms and social networks on the organization of political violence. The framework represents a challenge to traditional accounts of collective action, where the prescribed solution is the provision of selective incentives in order to overcome the free-rider problem of collective action. The framework hypothesizes that the use of social norms and social networks can serve as a complementary mechanism that minimizes the need for selective incentive provision. The framework synthesizes elements from different bodies of literature that speak to the issue of political violence: the literatures on social movements, networks, and norms are integrated with concepts from the economic literature on asymmetric information. As a result, the framework advances a new understanding of the recruitment processes of violent political organizations through the formulation of a deductive argument and testable hypotheses.

A common way to explain the conceptual puzzle of participation in organized political violence is to characterize it as a collective action problem where potential contributors have a personal incentive to free-ride on the contributions of others. Jessica Stern (2003, 3) illustrates the concept with the following example: “When Jewish extremists attempt to lay a cornerstone for the Third Temple they hope to build, all like-minded messianic Jews (and messianic Christians) benefit. Only the participants pay: When they ascend the Temple Mount, they incur risks to their person, their livelihood, freedom, and families. Given this, the extremist should be asking himself: Why bother participating? Why not let others do the work and take the risks?” It is hard to argue with such eloquent logic; yet, there are many related issues that remain unexplained. If all Jews, both extremists and moderates alike, recognize the logic (a debatable point in itself), then why does *anyone* bear the risk? Or, if at some point no one was willing to do so, who were those first risk-takers, how were they able to attract more like-minded individuals to their cause, and why did they not fail at the outset, presumably when at their most vulnerable? Most fundamentally, is it the case that *all* forms of political violence can be explained by this theoretical device? In other words, is there no variation in the severity of collective action problems that may arise in the attempts of non-state actors to organize political violence?

The traditional response to such questions has been that collective action problems are alleviated by the provision of personal selective incentives to individual participants in addition to the collective incentive, which by itself is insufficient to encourage participation. Yet the provision of any type of targeted selective incentives at the nascent stage of organization logically presupposes the existence of prior organizational capacity. In other words, if resources are being distributed, then the mechanisms for their distribution and the decision-making processes that resulted in them have already taken place. This necessitates the existence of the

very organization structure whose formation we aim to explain. If this structure is assumed, then the theoretical puzzle is transformed from group formation to recruitment by an organization at its nascent stages. But such an organization can be expected to be relatively vulnerable at this stage of its development. For example, there could be other organizations competing for control of the same resources and aiming to attract the same participation. Even in the absence of such competition, a comparison can be made between the organization at its nascent and its ideal form in terms of size and resource accumulation: in both cases, it could be reasonably assumed that the ideal form would be larger and control more resources than the nascent form. Therefore, this should be the stage where such organizations would want to distribute as few resources as possible in order to facilitate recruitment.

The study of recruitment is a necessary component of understanding the processes that shape the organization of political violence, as well as its conduct. No matter what the preferences of organizations that engage in political violence are, they need to achieve a sufficient membership base that would give them the capacity to attempt to reach their objectives. It is a necessary precondition for action and its accomplishment cannot simply continue to be assumed, as it has been by much of the literature.

Theoretical framework

A general statement of the collective action problem

The canonical formulation of the collective action problem (Olson 1965) holds that groups that aim to provide public goods, which are both non-excludable and jointly supplied, should be unlikely to form solely on the basis of providing the goods. *Infeasibility of exclusion* means that under normal circumstances no member of the group can be prevented from enjoying the good once it is provided. *Jointness of supply* means that the contribution of each individual member is of such small proportion to the capacity of the entire group that no member can unilaterally provide the good, thus necessitating the participation of the majority of possible contributors.

As Olson (1965, 2) famously states: “[U]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.*” Thus, if the probability of successful provision is low then individuals are better off not contributing at all since their contribution is unlikely to sufficiently affect the likelihood of successful provision. Therefore, a decision by an individual to contribute would be individually irrational since he would incur some cost for no benefit. On the other hand, if the probability of successful provision is high as a result of high participation, then an individual is better off free-riding and receiving the collective benefit while others bear the cost of

contribution. In this case, any individual's decision to participate would be individually irrational since it would entail a higher cost for no additional gain.

The dominant strategy of this strategic interaction, which Ostrom (2000, 137) refers to as "the zero-contribution thesis" is equivalent to the mutual defection equilibrium of the famous matrix-form game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, where rational, self-interested individuals forsake the potential mutual gains from cooperation due to the strategic structure of their interaction, which always makes it better for both to defect. The solution that is implied in the above quote from Olson (either coercion, in which case membership is involuntary, or some other special device) has persisted. Olson (1965, 51) states that in the absence of coercion, only a separate and selective incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way as a way to separate those who contribute from those who do not. Moreover, Olson specifies that these incentives could be either positive or negative for the targeted members, inducing contribution either by making it more beneficial or by making abstention more costly. Much of the work that has followed Olson's paradigm, especially in political science, has focused on the analysis of the forms that these selective incentives can take.

I identify two fundamental problems with this approach. The first is that the probability of successful group formation is not treated as a continuum; rather, all analytical emphasis is placed at the extremes where non-participation is certain. This suggests that the propensity of each potential member to participate is placed at neither probability extreme but somewhere in between. In fact, the very possibility of selective incentive provision necessitates a non-zero probability of success; if not, then who is providing the incentives given that everyone is defecting? Conversely, that probability cannot be equal to one since the group should not be willing to expend resources on selective incentives that would not yield a higher probability of successful provision anyway. Therefore, the probability of successful provision must necessarily lie between the two extremes.

The second – and much more significant in practical terms – problem is that the provision of selective incentives necessitates some pre-existing level of group cohesion. In this respect, it is somewhat peculiar that the logical consequent of this framework is to argue that under no circumstances will individuals be better off participating in the absence of selective incentives. If those who provide the selective incentives to future recruits were also the recipients of selective incentives themselves, the problem is simply pushed to a higher order with the fear of leading to an infinite regress. The possibility that they were coerced begs the same question: if they were, then by whom? If they were not the recipients of either selective incentives or victims of coercion, then how did the group form to begin with? To present the problem in Olson's terms, how can it be that a latent group has the organizational capacity to

induce participation in either of these two ways? Conversely, if the group is not latent but active, then theories of collective action can only explain recruitment but not group formation.

As a logical consequent, recruitment by a small, entrepreneurial group at its nascent stage then becomes the crucial determinant of successful provision. The question remains whether targeted selective incentive provision is a sufficient condition to overcome the free-rider problem. More importantly, is it a sufficient condition in the application of this framework to phenomena of organized political violence? These questions are addressed in the following section.

The collective action problem of organized political violence

For contribution to be individually rational in situations where the conditions of infeasibility of exclusion and jointness of supply hold, the value of selective incentives needs to at least equal the cost of contribution. However, in the reformulation of the framework for cases of organized political violence, there are two separate costs of contribution for which each potential participant would need to account: the cost of entry and the potential (and highly variable) cost of participation. The first of the two is analogous to the cost as expressed in the general statement of the problem presented in the previous section. The second is not captured by that framework since the emphasis is on contribution as the determinant of successful provision.

Yet insofar as the organization of political violence may be characterized as a collective action problem, the intended outcome is not achieved merely through successful organization. Achieving the objective of politically oriented action is one possible outcome of a conflict process and it is by no means assured. It is still crucial to consider the risk that accompanies participation since it ought to be part of the decision-making mechanism for each participant. As a result, all other things being equal, the reformulated expected total cost is higher than that in the original formulation. As in the previous case, the value of selective incentives needs to at least equal the expected total cost; therefore, it may be concluded that the value of selective incentives necessary to induce contribution will be higher in any situation where participation carries some associated risk for the individual. It follows that the higher the perception of risk, the less willing any individual will be to contribute and the higher will be the value of selective incentives that will be necessary in order to offset the difference. The solution that is suggested by this reformulation seems fairly simple: when aspiring organizations plan to engage in behavior that is risky for their participants, they simply provide more selective incentives. This suggestion, albeit logical, is problematic for a number of reasons that are outlined below.

In the general form of the collective action problem the recruitment strategy is maximum inclusion. Olson argues that “when there is organized or coordinated effort in an

inclusive group, as many as can be persuaded to help will be included in that effort” (1965, 40). This statement seems intuitively plausible, so would an organization of political violence be expected to simply maximize recruitment? After all, group size ought to have a direct effect on the expected probability of success. The inclusion of the risk factor differentiates that strategy. At any given point in time, an organization controls a specific amount of resources which may or may not afford the organization the capacity to reach its recruitment goals through the necessary provision of selective incentives. If its existing capacity is sufficient for its goals, then this provision may be all that is necessary. However, an organization looking to establish itself at a nascent stage can be expected to be relatively small in size and in control of relatively scarce resources. Assuming that those resources are finite in the short run, then the task with which an organization is faced can be characterized as a series of resource allocations over time. The recruitment of one additional participant requires some portion of those resources which exacerbates the resource drain imposed by elevated selective incentive requirements, making the organization less likely to satisfy its recruitment demands through the sole provision of those incentives. This in turn suggests that such an organization would be even less likely to follow a strategy of maximum inclusion. It is, therefore, possible to face the seemingly paradoxical situation where supply exceeds demand and the organization is faced with the problem of finding the right individuals to participate.

The problem can be characterized as an informational asymmetry of fitness: individuals may hold private information about their ability to participate effectively. They may misrepresent that ability or they may even have mistaken beliefs about their own fitness. This condition may lead to adverse selection for the organization whereby the lack of credible information on the projected future performance of each participant makes bad choices just as likely to occur as good ones. Moreover, participants who engage in the provision of violence and perform poorly by being captured, wounded, or killed can have a variety of detrimental effects on the organization: if captured they could provide confidential information to the opposition or relinquish weaponry, if wounded, they will represent an additional and unanticipated resource burden, if killed the resources expended on preparing them for battle are wasted and they will not be available for future contribution.

Thus, the problems of asymmetric information and resource scarcity exhibit feedback characteristics that exacerbate the overarching problem of collective action. In light of this observation, provision of selective incentives seems like a very costly mechanism for overcoming the collective action problem. By and large, political scientists have not paid sufficient attention to the role of information in collective action frameworks. The work done by economists to provide solutions in this area is outlined in the following section.

Models of asymmetric information

The modern literature on the economics of information has been largely framed by the seminal work of Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz. The field is rooted in the assumptions that information is intrinsically valuable as a determinant of market outcomes, and that sharing and acquiring information is inherently costly. Broadly defined, a market failure of asymmetric information is any situation where one party to a transaction holds private information that directly affects the outcome of the transaction. Depending on the nature of the information, the incentive structure for either party may be affected positively or negatively.

Akerlof's (1970) seminal article on the used car market defines the problem of adverse selection. In that case the asymmetry exists between the seller and the buyer of a used car with the former holding private information over whether the car in question is a "lemon" (meaning defective in some way that is not readily identifiable). The existence of both good cars and "lemons" on the market and buyers' inability to distinguish between the two can have market-wide repercussions. If there were two separate markets for good and bad cars then two separate price points would be set with the price for good ones being obviously the higher of the two. But since there is only one market and buyers cannot be certain of the quality of any particular car then a Pareto suboptimal price will be set that tends to undervalue good cars and overvalue "lemons".

The Spence and the Rothschild-Stiglitz models provide self-selection mechanisms through which market agents can credibly reveal private information thereby alleviating the effects of adverse selection. Spence's (1973; 1974) approach relies on high quality agents differentiating themselves from low quality agents through the use of costly signaling. For the signal to be credible it must be sufficiently costly that low quality agents would be either unable or unwilling to undertake the cost. Spence uses education as the signal that potential employees send to potential employers. The Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model approaches the problem from the side of uninformed agents by analyzing what they can do to improve the outcome through the inducement of self-selection by the agents who hold private information.

The problem of asymmetric information has been all but ignored by the political science literature on the organization of violence. Weinstein (2005; 2007) models the process as an organizational task of hiring by characterizing combatants as "job applicants". Similarly to the Spence model, individuals undertake contractual commitment as a promise to illustrate their quality over time. High-quality individuals are more likely to make the commitment than opportunistic low-quality individuals who are bluffing since they are more likely to perform successfully. Moreover, as payoffs from participation are deferred to the future - by which time the level of quality is revealed through actual performance of combat-related tasks - the rewards of bluffing are minimized.

Alternative theoretical framework

Organizations of political violence do not operate in a vacuum; they are products of the sociopolitical environment within which they operate. They can utilize the existing social norms and social networks of their environment in order to optimize recruitment by alleviating the inherent problems of asymmetric information. Social norms and social networks can serve as mechanisms that reveal information about individual recruits. Thus, they can help alleviate problems of asymmetric information as well as guide distributional decision-making processes. Moreover, a social network can help minimize free-riding by enforcing contribution through existing social norms.

Sociological literature on collective action

The analysis of collective behavior (of which the analysis of *violent* collective behavior is a subset) has been a mainstay of sociological scholarship since the structural-functionalist school of thought that was preeminent in the 1960s. According to this paradigm, shifts in social transformations (especially at abrupt intervals of sweeping changes) resulted in a by-product of collective action. Social movements were therefore seen as pathologies, or as crises/challenges to the existing social framework due to the inability of social institutions to mitigate social discord. In addition, psychologically grounded theories in this tradition portrayed collective behavior as the result of feelings of deprivation and/or marginalization on the part of individuals guiding their decision-making process to participate. There is an obvious conceptual link between general structural theories of collective behavior and early theories of protest and revolution as a direct result of grievance accumulation such as the work of Ted Gurr (1970; 2000). The latter relied on the concept of shared grievances leading to the formulation of a shared ideological core and then to collective behavior in the form of sociopolitical movements that aim to address those grievances. Moreover, the recent debate over the causal mechanisms of civil war onset as a dichotomy of greed or grievance can be framed as the theoretical consequent of the same foundations.

In contrast to such structural approaches, there are a number of approaches that can be broadly categorized under the analytical umbrella of assuming rationality, purposeful action, and organizational capacity on the part of social movements. One major theoretical strand in this tradition is the resource-mobilization paradigm, emphasizing the presence of opportunities for collective behavior and the organizational capability to mobilize (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

Literature on social networks

Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl (1988) examine the link between the strength of a pre-existing social network and the ability of an organization to overcome collective action free-riding problems. They find that the higher the density of pre-existing social ties the better the

prospects for undertaking collective action. Moreover, they also find that the centralization of network ties always has a positive effect on collective action and that the costs associated with organization are proportional to group heterogeneity; as the organization draws from a more homogeneous pool, it can identify and selectively recruit individuals with a higher probability of overall contribution.

Gould (1993) re-iterates the primacy of the centralization of network ties on organizational strength and successful collective action but also focuses on the structural positions of individual contributors on the overall level of contribution. He concludes that individual contribution is routed through norms, efficacy concerns, and social structures. McAdam and Paulsen (1993) provide a framework for recruitment on the basis of four fundamental conditions that are largely similar to concepts outlined above. They argue that successful recruitment requires a specific recruitment attempt, a linkage between the prospective recruits identity and participation (ideological and/or goal-oriented), a support network that can sustain and reinforce that specific linkage, and the absence of countervailing linkages to other salient identities.

The idea of placing particular attention to the formulation and intricacies of selective incentives and disincentives is nothing new. Oliver (1980) makes the argument that positive and negative incentives are analytically dissimilar because the relationship between individual cost and group size is variable. She concludes that “negative incentives are *essential* for ensuring unanimous cooperation in costly collective action” (1980, 1373). Snow et al. highlight “the importance of social networks as a conduit for the spread of social movements” (1980, 790). They find that the probability of recruitment is largely determined by preexisting interpersonal ties between existing group members and prospective recruits and the existence or absence of competing networks. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) identify the four fundamental aspects of mobilization as: *mobilization potential*, or the subset of people who could be mobilized within a society that stands to gain by achievement of the movements goals, *recruitment networks* that reach individuals within that subset, *motivation to participate* at the individual level as a function of perceived costs and benefits associated with participation, and the *barriers to participation*.

McAdam (1983, 735) emphasizes the need for shifting emphasis away from the analysis of origins and causes of insurgency (typically rendered static by the analytical tools employed) towards a more dynamic approach that highlights movement development and decline. Klandermans (1984) draws attention to a fundamental feature of the social dilemma faced by potential contributors to a collective benefit; that at the specific moment of making the decision to participate, each participant has expectations about the likely actions of every other potential participant (and uses those expectations to formulate their own cost-benefit analysis and estimate their own utility from participation) but is ultimately uncertain about the

actual overall level of participation. Thus, Klandermans reformulates the collective action problem as a coordination dilemma; individuals will be more willing to participate if they expect others will do likewise. Thus, membership in a preexisting social network that facilitates the dissemination of information, thereby converging expected outcomes and actual ones, increases the likelihood of successful mobilization with both the collective and the selective incentives from cooperation held constant. Conversely, Oliver (1984) analyzes a framework where there are diminishing marginal returns from contribution to a collective good (a property which is inversely proportional to the overall size of the participation population; for example, participation in neighborhood collective goods) such that initial contributions make a marked and easily perceivable difference and subsequent contributions have increasingly less significant impact. She argues that in such cases, “rational individuals take account of the likelihood that the collective good will be provided through the efforts of others, and they are less likely to contribute the more they believe others will” (1984, 609).

McAdam (1986) makes the crucial distinction between participation in low- and high-risk activism. Furthermore, he emphasizes the importance of pre-existing supportive networks and the prominent role of ideological inclination among group members as well as prior history of activism.

Snow et al. (1986, 464) argue that frame alignment - defined as the linkage between the “interpretive orientations” of individuals and Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) “such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goal and ideology are congruent and complementary” - is a necessary precondition for participation. Therefore, success in mobilization requires the utilization of preexisting linkages, the alteration of such linkages to suit an emergent political identity, the generation of new linkages, or a combination of the above.

Literature on social norms

The theoretical literature on social norms as explanatory variables for collective action lies at the nexus of various research areas. It includes work done by theoretical economists, game theorists, evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, sociologists as well as political scientists. Comparatively speaking, political science represents the least of the bulk of this work. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004, 185) two of the leading figures in this research area define social norms as “standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs [about] how individual group members ought to behave in a given situation” and, of course, that definition presupposes that failure to act in accordance with the norm is subject to punishment. In terms of overcoming the collective action problem, social norms are considered essential because in the absence of some norm that deviates from what is known as rational egoism in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game the dominant strategy will always be that of mutual defection. In other words,

for players to have an incentive to deviate from the dominant strategy there must be an overriding principle to which they adhere such as ‘you should not free-ride and take advantage of your fellow members.’ While strict adherence to such deontological principles would be sufficient to shift the outcome from the equilibrium of mutual defection to mutual cooperation, it is rarely the case that social norms are obeyed solely due to their moral force.

The most consistent approach towards understanding human cooperation through social norms is through the norm of conditional cooperation. Conditionality specifically refers to the maxim of ‘cooperate if others cooperate, defect if others defect.’ In other words, the heuristic algorithm at work is to reciprocate the behavior of others regardless of whether it is positive or negative. Early efforts that focused on this norm emphasized either kinship (Hamilton 1964) or reciprocity (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1971). However, as Boyd and Richerson (1988) illustrate, these mechanisms are insufficient to maintain cooperation as group membership rises beyond small groups. Consequently, many new approaches have been introduced in the attempt to explain specifically human sociality, since cooperation in this sphere occurs in very large numbers among largely unrelated individuals. Nowak and Sigmund (1993) argue that a strategy of ‘Win-Stay, Lose-Shift’ outperforms ‘Tit-for-Tat’ in the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma Game. The strategy entails that those who do badly are able to observe those who do better and adopt their strategies accordingly over time. This development has led to the consideration of mechanisms of social learning that facilitate the adoption of common and successful behaviors.

The two most common themes in this research area are the concepts of payoff-biased (Bowles 2004) or, relatedly, prestige-biased transmission (Henrich and Gil-White 2001) and conformist transmission (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 1998). The first two are roughly analogous to the social rule of “copy those that you observe to be successful” (hence the emphasis on higher payoffs and prestige) and the latter to “copy what the majority does.”¹⁸ The most significant difference between the two is that while conformity may be regarded as a public good in itself (where individuals have an incentive to free-ride), the pursuit of higher payoffs and/or prestige may lead to within-group competition due to scarcity. This is especially true in the case of prestige which may be considered as a positional good, hence the more one possesses within a finite population, the less everyone else may possess in relation to that individual. Thus, cooperation in such cases is not evolutionary stable (Henrich and Boyd 2001, 81).

Two solutions to the problem of evolutionary instability in culturally transmitted social norms have dominated recent scholarship: costly signaling and punishment. Both concepts are based on the idea that mechanisms that are individually costly can be mutually or collectively beneficial (Bowles, Choi, and Hopfensitz 2003). According to Gintis, Smith, and Bowles (2001, 103) costly signaling constitutes an honest signal of the member’s quality, and therefore results

in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. The quality that is being revealed can be either cooperative or competitive; in other words, a member may reveal information about his fitness as a partner or as a competitor. Either way, revealing information ought to decrease transaction costs that would otherwise be incurred through experimentation in both the selection mechanism and the selection itself. The authors assert that the collective benefit of the mechanism is powerful enough that it can overcome the collective action problem even without repetition or other associative attributes such as the relative extent of kinship. They show that non-cooperation becomes a sub-optimal strategy when signaling benefits are incorporated into the interaction.

This modeling process accurately captures the dynamics involved in group membership for the pursuit of political goals through the use of organized violence (and the authors seem to agree since they propose group raiding or defense as possible applications). In fact, *performance in warfare* is the public good provided by active participants as a way of proving their worth. Interestingly enough, the provision of this good is central to the provision of the higher-order public goods game in which the group aims at achieving its political goals which in itself is the primary collective action problem. There are some striking similarities between this framework and the theoretical models of overcoming adverse selection problems due to asymmetric information presented above. High Quality Signalers should have lower marginal costs of signaling, since they should be better at performing the provision of the public good once asked to do so. Therefore, bluffing is discouraged by coupling performance to reputation. Costly signaling provides an evolutionary stable equilibrium when: high-quality individuals are neither too common (which would render the mechanism of little consequence) nor too rare (which would render the mechanism cost ineffective), and the cost of signaling is sufficiently marginally lower for high-quality individuals than for low-quality individuals.

The second major category of solutions is the punishment of defection through selectively targeted sanctions. There is considerable experimental evidence (Fehr and Gächter 2000; 2002; Yamagishi 1986; 1988) suggesting that the credible threat of third-party sanctions has a considerable effect on eliminating defection. However, the literature on sanctions has spawned an interesting offshoot in trying to explain the motives behind sanctions. Briefly, the argument is that the credibility of the threat of sanctions is a public goods problem in itself, in the sense that if the threat is credible no punisher has the incentive to actually contribute to its provision. This, therefore, leads to a second-order social dilemma where punishment of non-punishers is needed in order to secure the punishment of defectors. Naturally, this leads to an *n*th-order similar problem leading to an infinite regress whereby higher levels of monitoring of lower orders are always required. Two solutions to the problem are: 1) that a combination of payoff-biased and conformist transmission stabilizes punishment at some specific *n*th-order

depending on the parameters of the interaction (Henrich and Boyd 2001); and 2) that sanctions are non-selfish in the strict sense of self-interest.

Norms, networks, and information

The most significant shortcoming of traditional accounts of collective action is inefficiency; they do not distinguish between potential participants, therefore not allowing for the potential to differentiate in terms of quality and thus concluding that selective incentives are both necessary and singular as a requirement for successful cooperation. Information can fundamentally alter the internal dynamic of the interaction by allowing for this differentiation. Models of asymmetric information address this problem in an attempt to reduce inefficiency and optimize recruitment into collective groups. The usage of social network analysis in sociology of movements and organizations provides social-based applications of these mechanisms. Models of social norm transmission employ a similar rationale in explaining formation, propagation and monitoring standards of behavior that make cooperation mutually beneficial. This section applies this theoretical progression to a framework intended for specific application to recruitment by organizations of political violence.

Theoretical conceptualizations of group-level cooperation are generally abstract and not necessarily manifested in real life applications. Norms as exhibited in human society must necessarily overcome the problem of large numbers where transmission of the norms may not be monitored in strict and absolute terms but in vague general terms, for example as long-standing traditions rather than explicit standards of behavior. The most important consideration for this framework is whether rules of conduct constrain behavior in significant and observable long-term patterns. After all, the focus of this study is not the emergence of such norms, their specificity, or the rationale for their choice over other competing norms. Rather, the focus is on their effect on the ability of societal sub-groups to organize themselves and recruit other members of their society to engage in behavior that is beneficial to the sub-group. Thus, the parameter of measurement is the instrumental usage of pre-existing social norms by organizations of political violence. The extent to which such organizations will be able to use the norms to facilitate recruitment is largely beyond their control, since the specific nature of the norms is the result of long-term societal evolutionary processes and unlikely to be transformable in the short-run. However, in the short-run they may very well be malleable in specific ways that organizations can utilize to reframe long-standing patterns of behavior to their own ends.

Both solutions (costly signaling and punishment) provided by the social norms literature to the problem of evolutionary instability equilibria of what are essentially large-scale public goods games should be directly observable in practical applications of the theoretical framework. As already stated, the theoretical concepts of costly signaling in social norm

transmission and asymmetric information models bear remarkable conceptual resemblance. Their application to theories of organized political violence is relatively straightforward.

In the theoretical framework that I propose, recruits are the signalers who signal their quality as fighters to the organization. The organization would like to expend as few resources as possible on finding the recruits since those resources will be better utilized by limiting their expenditure to those who become active combatants. In addition, since monitoring is costly, it should be the case that the organization will try to minimize the cost of monitoring both recruits and active combatants. If the organization can accomplish this by using information already available within the social network, then it can lower both its recruiting costs and its operational costs. At the same time, the level of cohesion of the social network has an effect on the probability that low quality recruits will bluff; the more cohesive the social network, the lower the probability of dishonest signaling since more information is available on each potential recruit. As already stated, since the tasks that recruits will be asked to perform as members are combat-related, it is very difficult to assess them based on past performance even with a social network to provide information. Except for the case of recurrence of war, most combatants will not have participated in these tasks, especially since most of the targeted recruits are likely to be young males. Thus, the degree to which long-standing traditions of social norms that exhibit combat-related characteristics affects the availability of information to organizations that is directly applicable to successful recruitment.

Moreover, the degree to which monitoring of how such norms function in a specific sociopolitical environment can be utilized by organizations for the purposes of recruitment – and also operational monitoring and evaluation of performance - is largely dependent upon the specific structural characteristic of the social network. The structure of the network can account for variation along the following parameters: the dissemination of information, the efficiency in coordination among its members, the adaptation of strategies and tactics over time, the harmonization of expectations of members vis-a-vis the actions of all other members.

Observable parameters/hypotheses

The analysis presented above yields the following hypotheses that can be tested through application to specific case studies.

Hypothesis 1: Broad social norms of expected behavior make both the organization and conduct of political violence less costly.

The extent to which rules of conduct permeate the sociopolitical environment within which organizations of political violence operate may favor both recruitment and operation by: facilitating monitoring and enforcement, discouraging defection from participation, and

discouraging deviation from expected behavior within society at large, even beyond those actively involved in the organization.

Hypothesis 2: Traditions that favor characteristics of combat-related behavior make the organization of political violence less costly.

More specifically, social norms that constrain behavior in ways that are easily transferable to combat favor organizations of political violence in a variety of ways: they reveal fitness information of individuals, reduce transaction costs, discourage bluffing, and minimize resource expenditure.

Hypothesis 3: The structure of the social network affects both of the above.

The structure of the social network defines the way in which these mechanisms work in a specific sociopolitical environment. The strength of social ties, closeness of network subgroups, and the relationship between the structure of the network and the structure of the organization are significant determinants of its ability to constrain the behavior of both its potential and active participants.

Legitimacy and Political Violence in Context

There are various ways in which legitimacy may be conceptualized within the context of a sociopolitical environment where political violence is utilized either by state or by non-state actors that are, usually but not necessarily, oppositional to the state. In fact, as della Porta (2013, 6) notes, the empirical assessment of legitimacy presents inherent difficulties. In the most obvious sense, the legitimacy in question may be that of the state, and the absence of which may be the impetus for the use of political violence. For example, Tilly (2003, 27) makes legitimacy the distinguishing criterion between force and violence, thereby rendering all violence as inherently illegitimate. However, he points out that the boundary between legitimate force and illegitimate violence is difficult to demarcate, and can be described as a continuum along two separate axes: with respect to legitimacy of the use of force in and of itself, as well as with respect to the magnitude of force employed, either by state or non-state actors. This framework is compatible with the classical Weberian definition of the state as the organized institutions of a community that successfully hold a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory; thereby, political violence exercised by organizations other than the state or sanctioned by the state is in direct opposition to legitimacy. As a result, all conflictual collective action can in turn be characterized as a denial of and a challenge to the legitimacy of the state (della Porta and Diani 2006, 36).

If then, social movements use repertoires of persuasion and coercion of questionable legitimacy (Wilson 1973, 227), then it must be a different assessment of legitimacy than the one occupied by the state; in other words, the differentiation between legitimate force and illegitimate violence cannot capture the entirety of the locus of legitimacy within the scope of the usage of organized political violence. Such a broader conceptualization of the legitimacy of political violence must involve social agents other than the state (or any other entity that controls territory as the colonial power in the case that we examine) and its opposition. Della Porta and LaFree (2012) more specifically characterize the link between legitimacy and the processes of radicalization and de-radicalization as a relationship between actors and audiences. This relationship is pivotal to the recruitment patterns of organizations that aim to utilize violence for political means given that the audience that confers legitimacy also represents the pool of potential recruits. Therefore, what need to be examined are the ways in which actions by such organization affect their future prospects for recruitment and the determinants of that probability, as well as the extent to which these considerations become a factor in their decision-making calculus. In other words, are such organizations aware that their actions affect their future level of legitimacy and do they take that into account? As della Porta and LaFree (2012, 6) put it: “radicalization is also traced to the level of the actors’ perceptions and attitudes, with scholars using the concept of interpretative frames and examining the role of violence-legitimizing narratives.”

Lounsbury (2005, 92) observes the shift away from the centrality of legitimacy for organizations towards a focus on institutional variation and change; from the routinization of practices and behaviors (Suchman 1995) to a conflation of legitimacy with economic and social factors of organizational cohesion and structure. This shift has been intensified by a reconceptualization of rationality as a culturally-embedded construction (Clemens 2002). Other approaches conceptualize legitimacy as a means rather than an end: Creed, Scully and Austin (2002) and Scully and Creed (2005) treat legitimacy as a symbolic resource, a tool for action that can yield outcomes from the activities of social movements and organizations. Such approaches focus on the use of discourse by social agents in order to achieve legitimacy both in terms of affecting change in the social identities as well as activities.

For the purposes of this framework, the interaction of legitimacy as a variable in the successful recruitment of participants can be operationalized in two ways. At the nascent stage where an initial cadre creates the foundation of legitimizing aims of the organization, “long-term survival is favored by the presence of motives for and methods of action which are already legitimated” (della Porta and Diani 2006, 146). At a subsequent stage, this foundation is instrumental to the recruitment strategies and tactics of the organization. This differentiation does not entail that the referent objects of the legitimizing discourse are changed; rather, the goals of the organization with respect to the usage of the legitimization methods change as the

need to ensure the survival and sustainability of the organization may be transformed in accordance with the rest of the variables at work. Thus, the legitimizing tools generally tend to conform to the embeddedness of social norms to the sociopolitical environment of the organization; as della Porta and Diani (2006, 85) put it: “in the absence of references to one’s own history and to the particular nature of one’s roots, an appeal to something new risks seeming inconsistent and, in the end, lacking in legitimacy.”

Application of the Framework to a Case Study of the EOKA Organization

Introduction to the case study

EOKA (Greek acronym for National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was an anti-colonial organization of Greek Cypriots that operated between 1955 and 1959. EOKA fought against the British rule of the island and for self-determination with the ultimate goal of uniting the island with Greece, a concept known as *enosis* (Greek for union). *Enosis* was a concept deeply embedded in the conscience of Greek Cypriots. The *Megali Idea* (Greek for “Great Idea”) of a greater unified Greek nation was an unfulfilled aspiration of all those seeking to revive the past greatness of Hellenic culture. Cyprus had been under British administration since 1878 and formally annexed by the British Empire in 1923 through the Treaty of Lausanne. The first major incident that clearly demonstrated the Greek Cypriots’ increasing agitation occurred in October 1931. The recently formed organization ‘National Radicalist Union’ openly declared its goal of *enosis* and led an organized riot that resulted in the burning of the colonial Government House in the capital city of Nicosia. In this, as in all other subsequent incidents, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus was actively involved and often led the anti-colonial initiatives. The next major event was the plebiscite that was held in January 1950. Every Cypriot over the age of eighteen was called to demand or oppose unification with the motherland. The result was a resounding ‘yes’: 96% of those who voted favored *enosis*. Naturally, the Turkish Cypriot minority declined to participate. The result was utterly rejected by the British who held that self-determination would “never apply to Cyprus” as British Minister for the Colonies Hopkinson famously declared in July 1954. Hopkinson’s “never” had a crystallizing effect on many Greek Cypriots who decided that an armed struggle would be the only way to achieve their aim of *enosis*.

These events were the prelude to the 1st of April 1955, when multiple synchronized explosions marked the beginning of EOKA’s armed struggle for *enosis* and an intense guerrilla campaign against the British administration. The organization was led by two prominent figures: on the military front by Lieutenant-Colonel George Grivas, who went by the nom de guerre Digenis (a mythical figure of Cypriot folklore from the Byzantine era) and on the political front by the Archbishop of Cyprus, Makarios III. In October 1955, Field Marshal John

Harding, chief of the British imperial general staff, was sent to the island as Governor of Cyprus. He immediately began negotiating with Makarios on bringing an end to the hostilities, but when the talks broke down he declared a state of emergency and enacted draconian measures hoping to deter EOKA sympathizers.

In January 1956, after renewed negotiations broke down again, Makarios was deported to the Seychelles in the hope that a politically-headless EOKA would cave into pressure. Instead, violence intensified as Grivas assumed total control of the organization. In April 1957 Makarios was allowed to move to Athens, where he was received with a hero's welcome. Meanwhile, the armed struggle continued amidst Constitutional proposals by the British administration directed towards the Greek and Turkish governments. Cypriot opinion and sentiment (both on the Greek and Turkish side) were not considered, either in these proposals or in the negotiations that ensued. The Turkish Cypriot side was vehemently opposed to *enosis*. They feared that union with Greece would relegate them to the status of a foreign minority and simply replace the British yoke with a Greek one. In comparison to such a predicament, British rule was preferable. Throughout 1958, as the negotiations were taking shape, intercommunal violence among the Greek and Turkish Cypriots began to take place.

After a succession of compromises and the increased involvement of both Greece and Turkey, the aforementioned negotiations were concluded in February 1959 in Zurich and provided for the creation of an independent Republic of Cyprus. The Cypriot flag was raised on top of the House of Representatives on the morning of August 16, 1960. The reception that it received, along with everything for which it stood, was at best mixed and reluctant. The Greek Cypriots largely believed that the EOKA struggle had not achieved its intended aim: union with Greece. After independence, Grivas moved to Athens where he was regarded as a national hero. There he made a brief, and largely unsuccessful, attempt at launching a political career. In August 1964, he returned to Cyprus to assume the leadership of the recently-established Greek Cypriot National Guard as a result of intensifying intercommunal violence among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. By that time, Turkish Cypriots had withdrawn into guarded enclaves effectively separating the two communities on the island completely.

In November 1967 Grivas was banished from Cyprus for the second time following a serious outbreak of violence in the vicinity of one of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. With him left the Greek contingent of 7,000 that had been clandestinely stationed during his command of the National Guard.

Grivas returned to the island secretly in 1971 and established EOKA-B, a guerrilla organization that consisted largely of nationalist extremists, including many members of the original EOKA who still believed in the original cause of *enosis*. EOKA-B played a huge role in the ensuing events on Cyprus, even though at the time many believed that it would quietly fade into a largely insignificant contraband troupe, following the death of General Grivas in

January 1974. Under the initiative of the military junta of Greece, which had been in power since April 1967, EOKA-B made an attempt against President Makarios' life on the 15th of July 1974. He narrowly escaped and subsequently fled to London. EOKA-B assumed power and installed Nikos Sampson – a journalist and known national extremist who had been actively involved in both EOKA organizations – as the new President. In response to the coup, Turkey exercised its right of intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee, and invaded Cyprus on the 20th of July 1974. As a result, the Sampson government fell and the Greek junta followed shortly afterwards. The result of the intervention was the uprooting of roughly half of the population of Cyprus – from both communities – and the death of almost half of all the Greek Cypriot soldiers who resisted the invading army (approximately 6,000). The military occupation of 37% of the island by Turkey continues to this day.

Research design

The primary objective of this project is to test the validity of the theoretical model of recruitment by organizations of political violence through application to the case study of the Greek Cypriot organization EOKA. The research project will result in the construction of a new database derived from survey questionnaires and in-depth interviews with ex-combatants. The findings of the project will also fill a lacuna in the study of this particular case. Even though many aspects of EOKA have been examined, there is no in-depth political scientific study of the organization's formation and evolution, especially with an emphasis on recruitment. A particular aim of this project is to provide not only a theoretical explanation, but also empirical data on the organizational aspects of the case study. In what ways did the pool of participants, recruitment patterns, and the conduct of political violence emerge and change over time? To provide answers to these questions, the project will rely on data collected through survey questionnaires and in-depth personal interviews with members of the organization. This approach represents innovation in the study of this particular organization, since no equivalent account exists in the relevant literature. There are several historical and political accounts but none of a purely scholarly nature that rely on original data and use the innovative methodological tools that this project introduces.

Sampling methodology and data collection

From a methodological standpoint, the case study employs a mixed-methods approach that consists of quantitative, qualitative, and formal theoretical analysis. The qualitative analysis includes content, process tracing and discourse analysis of data gathered from 40 in-depth personal interviews. The quantitative analysis consists of social network analysis through the use of visualization and modeling software, and statistical descriptive analysis through the use of statistical packages. The quantitative analysis relies on data that will be collected through

the use of survey questionnaires. Based on the population size – as a result of a preliminary contact with the EOKA veterans’ associations – and the nature of the analysis that will be undertaken, a sample size of 250 participants is necessary for a statistically significant result. Based on the research design, the sampling method is not random but purposive and stratified. The stratifications includes gender and geographical spread, as well as level of participation in the organization including rank. Age is also desirable as a variable but due to the nature of the specific case study and the chronological timeline of investigation, all potential participants are of relatively similar and advanced age. Moreover, due to the nature of the population to be examined (social network structure, hidden population, contact-based recruitment, sensitive subject-matter and conditions of anonymity), the correct sampling method is that of respondent-driven snowball sampling. This method entails that a sample starts small and builds on the trust and connections of existing participants for attracting increasing participation.

Research Findings

This section presents the results of both the qualitative and the quantitative parts of the data collection process. The qualitative data were collected through in-depth interviews with high-ranking officials of the organization EOKA while the quantitative data were collected through survey questionnaires with other participants. The case selection process followed snowball respondent-driven methodology and was accomplished in collaboration with the established organizations of ex-combatants who contributed through the endorsement of the project as well as active communication with potential participants, including the usage of their premises for conducting the interviews in specific cases.

Qualitative Results

The project’s theoretical framework evaluates outcomes in relation to specific Observational Hypotheses. Namely, these are that nascent organizations that expose their recruits to the threat of violence for political aims ought to: be highly selective in recruitment, be reluctant to invest scarce resources in new recruits, actively seek potential participants who strongly exhibit shared norms and to seek information on those participants from the social network (or sub-networks) in which they are embedded. The open-ended nature of the interviews facilitated the collection of data on these hypotheses but also provided a slew of other potential observations with respect to the usage of kinship networks in recruitment, the administration of loyalty tests and initiation rites, the application of ranking assignments in the establishment of a more formal hierarchy, as well as many other implications that are derived from the relevant literature. In addition, the case selection for the interviews was steered not only towards capturing the attitudes and behavior of ranked officials within the organization

but also based on the fact that the majority of these individuals additionally acted as recruiters for the organization; therefore, the structural progression of the organization can be captured both chronologically and organizationally through an analysis of their experiences and actions within the organization.

The data show remarkable consistency with respect to the Observational Hypotheses and the general conclusion is that they tend to overwhelmingly provide empirical support for the hypotheses. Most especially, this is evident in the case of the organization's selectivity at its nascent stage, an assertion that is strongly supported by the interviewees and will be compared later on with the results derived from the quantitative part of the data collection process. Especially in the cases of individuals who acted as recruiters at the inception of the organization, the predominant characterization was indeed of an institutionalized reluctance to expand uncontrollably. The same attitude was of prime concern with respect to guerrilla warfare where the organization – especially in a controlled hierarchical sense – appeared much more reluctant than individual combatants to recruit individuals for guerrilla operations, primarily due to concerns of cost, operational complexity and lack of capacity as well as the potential for jeopardizing secrecy and keeping operations clandestine. This final observation is closely linked to the perception that finding and training suitable recruits represents a scarce resource in and of itself, especially given the small population size. Therefore, the case study proves that it is indeed possible – as is the assertion generated from the theoretical framework of the project – for the organization to be in a position to turn recruits away rather than seek them out as a result of parameters exogenous to the recruitment process itself.

Another major observation derived from the qualitative data is the general lack of utilization of family ties or usage of familial/kinship norms in the case of EOKA. This finding runs counter to the prevalent perception of the organization, mainly due to specific highly publicized cases of siblings being involved in the armed struggle, even more so in cases of individuals who lost their lives as a result of their participation. This counter-intuitive outcome is largely based – as in the case of the logic presented above – on the emphasis on secrecy and the ability of operatives to continue leading their normal lives without the involvement of their families either through active participation or even by putting them in danger without their knowledge of operations.

Beyond the Operational Hypotheses, the project's theoretical framework focuses primarily on the consideration and juxtaposition – and in some ways the combination – of two alternative approaches to the study of recruitment for the purposes of political violence by organized groups: that the adoption and utilization of broad social norms of expected behavior and the adoption of social network structures make both the organization and the conduct of such

groups less costly. These mechanisms work by three combined parameters that will be explored later on. At this stage, evidence for the two approaches – usage of social norms and social networks – are presented individually.

In the area of the adoption of social norm, content analysis reveals some very prominent recurrent themes and focal points. Generally speaking, the analysis of the interviews produces a dominant discursive paradigm in the sense that the same sentiments, attitudes, and experiences are identified, even in the usage of specific key terms – such as “being reared as Greeks” used almost invariably among interviewees. In addition, the common usage of national identifiers such as the usage of the Greek flag and its penalization by the colonial government and the prohibition of singing of the national anthem as formative experiences among EOKA participants illustrate not only an agreement of what the dominant discursive paradigm is at a general (and collective) level, but also a shared confirmation of individual components of the paradigm that can be characterized as inducements for behavior.

Causal explanations of this phenomenon are not easy to ascertain, even though the extensive repetition of the same or similar aspects of different accounts seems to strongly suggest a confirmation that the adoption of social norms was pivotal to the recruitment process and the acculturation of the organization. Yet, caveats abound, not least among them the temporal lag between the events taking place and their recollection, the age of the participants and the inherent biases and potential unreliability of the remembrance of past events. Even more importantly, though, there is the possibility that a dominant discursive paradigm was not the result of the recruitment process at the time, but of a long-term process of defining – and constantly redefining – pivotal events after they occur, not only by the participants themselves, but also by society more broadly in attempting to come to terms with its own past.

In the area of the adoption of the social network, the qualitative data center around a number of key clusters such as the emphasis on secrecy, privacy and dependability. In order for these traits to be ensured, the account focuses on the provision of fitness information as a result of the emphasis of the theoretical framework. Briefly restated, the overarching argument of the theoretical framework is that organizations will always try to decrease the need for selective incentive provision and their success in doing so depends on solving the three compounded problems of collective action (in other words free-riding), resource allocation, and asymmetric information. All three solutions are facilitated through the provision of otherwise private information through the embedded social network. Each problem is addressed individually below with reference to the evidence provided by the qualitative data.

With respect to the collective action problem and the phenomenon of free-riding, some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the data. A common assertion in the relevant literature is that organizations at their nascent stage are likely to face an acute recruitment problem due to their vulnerability at that stage of their development and a generally perceived lack of legitimacy within the broader social network, especially in cases of direct opposition to dominant governmental structures. Therefore, such groups are expected to perform progressively better in terms of attracting recruitment as their level of legitimacy rises and they present a viable threat to the government. The evidence from the case study of EOKA seems to run counter to this logic. The qualitative data seem to strongly suggest that the organization faced the reverse problem of being successful in attracting recruitment from the very early stages of its inception. Early recruiters of the organization spoke of the necessity of imposing barriers to entry in the face of mounting volunteerism from the broader social network of Greek Cypriots. In many cases, individuals spoke of having to deny their involvement with the organization in response to a pervasive enthusiasm among volunteers which could present a problem to the organization in terms of revealing existing structures and opening up a clandestine process too much, thus bringing the existing hierarchy into jeopardy. As a result, the discourse presented by the qualitative data is one of hesitation by the organization, not only in terms of entry but also in terms of promotion. This hesitation is especially true with respect to the guerrilla aspect of the organization as mentioned above. This may be explained as a result of the element of youth and the potential for adventure and the conduct of great deeds in the course of the armed struggle, as well as the allure of the guerrilla lifestyle. This aspect became increasingly prevalent as key individuals within the organization gained notoriety within the broader social network and presented models for younger participants. High-ranking officials – especially Regional Leaders who were tasked with administering the organizational capacities of their areas – spoke of having to dampen the expectations of youths who wanted to “take to the mountains” and lead the guerrilla lifestyle. A third observation in this area – one that again runs counter to the conventional logic within the relevant literature – has to do with the aspect of opportunism in the recruitment patterns of organizations of political violence. The argument presented in this case is that opportunistic participants ought to be expected to jump on the bandwagon early in order to maximize their benefits from participation. The evidence derived from the interviews suggests that the nature of the social network, especially through its segmentation at the village level, provided sufficient information in terms of fitness that the problem was largely obviated.

In the case of the problem of resource allocation – especially at the nascent stages of recruitment – the evidence seems to be largely supportive of the arguments presented both in the relevant literature and the theoretical framework. The characterization of the progression of

the recruitment patterns is of the acuteness of scarcity at the inception of EOKA. As a result, there was a lack of selective incentive provision, not only by choice but also borne out of necessity. Given the hierarchy's realization that selective incentive provision was not an option in order to attract the best recruits, alternative approaches were necessary, thus the provision of credible information about individual fitness was of paramount importance and could only be accomplished through mining the social network.

The parameters of this provision also inform the account of informational asymmetry. Interviewees emphasized the utility of youth groups – such as the religious organization OXEN – in defining the pool of potential participants and placing particular attention to locating like-minded individuals. The accomplishment of this goal necessitated the convergence of a number of roles for key recruiters such as religious and/or community leaders, much more so than kinship networks, reinforcing the conclusion drawn above in the case of the dominant discursive paradigm.

Future research

The most obvious area for future research is for further work to be conducted on the single case study of EOKA that further applies the most significant approaches from the theoretical literature. More specifically, the intended approach is to test quantitative theoretical models of recruitment; in this respect, the groundwork has already been completed towards that end, since the quantitative data collected are amenable to this approach. Beyond the single case study, however, comparative methodological approaches can be employed in order to test for various competing hypotheses, as analyzed above in the quantitative data section. In addition, especially given that the question is raised on a number of occasions by the findings of this analysis, a comparative approach would facilitate testing for scale effects across various cases. For example, a new research design could be built on the question: how significant is network extent in relation to the sociopolitical environment? Such research questions have thus far been neglected in the current theoretical literature.

Conclusion

Future applications of the theoretical framework must incorporate original data, integrating first-hand accounts from individual participants with secondary literature. It is difficult to envision a large-*N* study that is based on original data purely on practical grounds; therefore, single case or small-*N* studies must be conducted using similar methodological procedures so that comparative conclusions may be drawn from the usage of the framework.

The acquisition and use of original data will also allow analytical refinement and the potential use of additional methodological tools, such as formal social network analysis. Network theory applications are becoming increasingly popular in political science, especially

in areas of conflict studies with applications such as transnational terrorist network analysis. A similar application to the organization of political violence can be used to examine the exact nature of the relationship between its own structure and the social structure from which it emerges. The comparison of the two network structures can utilize concepts such as centrality measures in order to establish the relationship between the hierarchical nature of the two, as well as communication patterns both within the organization and across the two networks. This approach could also examine how the relationship between the two networks develops through the duration of a conflict. One limitation to this approach is that while it may prove very useful for analyzing the social network component of the framework, it may not provide as much insight into the interaction between social networks and social norms. Therefore, this tool would be more beneficial if used in conjunction with other tools.

An important theoretical consideration is the determination of the exact relationship between the two main variables. In other words, it is not clear whether the effects of social norms have a more significant influence on the effects of social networks, or vice versa. Given that there are feedback characteristics between the two mechanisms, the determination of that relationship will also provide insight into the nature of the causal relationship between the mechanisms and the probability of successful recruitment.

A multi-level approach that includes examination of the macro (broad characterization of individual conflict cases), the meso (the organization as the unit of analysis, as in this study), and the micro (individual participation) level may be achieved by starting at the lowest level with the use of original data and aggregating results upwards. In other words, rather than starting at the top with generalized conceptions of conflict causation, it may be preferable to examine data at the individual level for possible patterns of interaction that are - for all intents and purposes - invisible at the higher strata of inquiry.

The case study of EOKA amasses a database of original data at the individual level to test whether the above patterns emerge from the data. The pilot phase that has already been completed indicates that there is a wealth of data that can be collected using this methodological approach. The full scale phase of the research project will yield broader patterns that can be used to draw conclusions about EOKA as the unit of analysis, but also to potentially exhibit within case variation among different regions. Ultimately, the existence of comparable data in other case studies may allow for comparative analyses of different organizations, not only in terms of recruitment but also in terms of organizational structure and operations.

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