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The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy

Joseph V. Montville

Dean Rusk, who served under both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson as secretary of state, was fond of reminding audiences that the American eagle depicted on the great seal of the United States held arrows in one claw and an olive branch in the other. The arrows, he said, represented America's willingness to use force to deter aggression that threatened our liberty. But the olive branch symbolized our desire as a nation to seek peaceful solutions to international conflicts.

Today, age-old concepts of deterrence are being called into question since implementation of the threat of retaliation in the nuclear era means there would be no liberty left to defend or, as President Reagan put it, "A nuclear war can never be won." Yet, there is little evidence that governments and political movements around the world have changed much in their concepts of deterrence and defense or the use of violence for political ends. Einstein once wrote to Freud, "The splitting of the atom has changed everything except our way of thinking [and, he might have added, behavior] and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe. . . . We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive."

For several years a number of scholars, diplomats, and thoughtful laymen around the world have been grappling with the problem of traditional human defensive thinking, including the use of violence. Almost ten years ago teachers and professionals from the United States, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America gathered together to form the International Society of Political Psychology; their intention was to determine how the science of human behavior could shed light on ways to save the species from the combined consequences of its technological brilliance and its traditional ways of violent conflict. The society has focused its attention on the emerging field of political conflict and works to discover nonviolent, constructive, and, eventually, mutually

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satisfactory solutions to even very complex and long-standing ethnic and sectarian disputes.

To return to the American eagle, the arrows today do not seem as reassuring as they once did; more than a few thinkers are therefore taking a new look at the olive branch. Peace has always been hard to define. It has a passive quality about it, as in "the absence of war." But, according to the concepts of conflict resolution, peace is seen, not as a passive state but as a continuous process: peace making or peace building. Anyone who has worked on the disputes in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, South Africa, or the U.S.–Soviet relationship can attest, however, that peace building is difficult and discouraging work. Even if political leaders wanted to work full time at nonviolent diplomatic resolution of conflicts—and many do not seem to want to—for psychological reasons their constituents would by-and-large limit their ability to do so. Political leaders are seen above all as the stewards of people's defense. First and foremost they must be warrior-defenders. Today they may ride in helicopters and armored limousines rather than on horseback, but if they die in office they are borne to their graves on a caisson, followed by a riderless horse. The symbolism is ancient, but still powerful.

The institutions of state, diplomacy, the military, and intelligence are engaged for the most part in deterrence and defense. The idea of full-time peace building or conflict resolution has not yet been recognized as a potentially constructive component of national defense that is worthy of a major commitment of national resources.

This chapter elaborates on a theory of conflict resolution–track two diplomacy that would fit into the tool kit of statecraft and diplomacy in the nuclear age. The activities that are involved are familiar, but political leaders have rarely recognized the potential of track two diplomacy, which engages individuals and organizations from outside the government in the complex task of conflict resolution. If and when governments do recognize this potential, a new manner of thinking may well have succeeded in getting underway.

What Is Track Two Diplomacy?

Track two diplomacy is an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict. It must be understood that track two diplomacy is in no way a substitute for official, formal, "track one" government-to-government or leader-to-leader relationships. Rather, track two activity is designed to assist official leaders by compensating for the constraints imposed upon them by the psychologically understandable need for leaders to be—or at least to be seen to be—strong, wary, and indomitable in the face of the

enemy. If there is great tension in a political conflict, a leader who takes risks for peace without his constituents being prepared for it could lose his political base or, as has happened in more than just a few cases around the world, his life.

Track two diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance, to manage conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of the public view and without the requirements of formal negotiation or bargaining for advantage. Track two diplomacy seeks political formulas or scenarios that might satisfy the basic security and esteem needs of the parties to a particular dispute. On its more general level, it seeks to promote an environment in a political community, through the education of public opinion, that would make it safer for political leaders to take risks for peace.

Three Distinct Processes

Track two diplomacy involves perhaps three interdependent processes. The first process consists of small, facilitated problem-solving workshops or seminars that bring together the leaders of conflicting groups or nations (or their representatives) for the purpose of: (1) developing workable personal relationships in a microcosm; (2) understanding the dimensions of the conflict from the perspective of the adversary; and (3) at some point, developing joint strategies for dealing with the conflict as a shared problem, the solution of which requires reciprocal and cooperative efforts.[1]

The second process is to influence public opinion. Here the task is a psychological one that consists of reducing the sense of victimhood of the parties and rehumanizing the image of the adversary. If successful, this process will gradually bring about a climate of opinion within a community or nation that makes it safe for political leaders to take positive steps—perhaps those that were worked out in the small workshops—toward resolving the conflict.

In the problem-solving workshops it is quite possible, even common, for leaders to develop a vastly expanded understanding of a conflict and of the psychological tasks to be mastered before it can be resolved. It is also possible for leaders to undergo a personal transformation in which their sense of and approach to the enemy becomes humanized. But these leaders are compelled to reenter the political environment of their constituents, who have not had the benefit of a firsthand opportunity to gain insights from the workshop

1. See Joseph V. Montville and William P. Davidson, "Foreign Policy According to Freud," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1981–82, pp. 145–157. Also, Herbert C. Kelman, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution," in *Unofficial Diplomats*, ed. Maureen R. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

experience. Unless the overall political environment comes to reflect (to some extent) the enhanced knowledge gained by leaders, the latter are very likely to confront strong resistance when they try to take action based on their new insights.

Cooperative economic development, the third process, may not be essential to conflict resolution but it provides incentives, institutional support, and continuity to the political and psychological processes. For groups and nations in conflict, cooperative economic activities offer the prospect of growth, the enhancement of individual well-being, and a measure of stability for families and communities who have suffered significant personal loss and endured chronic instability.

An agenda of psychological tasks in conflict resolution is implicit in the foregoing outline of processes in track two diplomacy. Explaining these tasks is not within the purview of this essay, but it can be noted that they include the presentation of historic grievances by all parties, an acceptance of responsibility for hurts afflicted, and mourning for losses that were sustained.[2] In the following explication of the three-tiered track two diplomacy process, these tasks will be explained more fully.

The Problem-solving Workshop

The most complex and sensitive activity in track two diplomacy is dealing with leaders or their representatives in small, problem-solving workshops. Over the last fifteen years or so, a significant number of these workshops have been held on the Northern Ireland, Arab–Israeli, Cypriot, Sri-Lankan, Falkland/Malvinas, and internal Lebanon conflicts, among others. Professors Herbert C. Kelman of Harvard, John Burton of Kent (United Kingdom) and George Mason Universities, Edward Azar of the University of Maryland, and Stephen P. Cohen, formerly of the City University of New York, are some of the leading theorists and practitioners of the conflict-resolution or problem-solving workshop. A group of psychiatrists affiliated with the American Psychiatric Association organized six workshops from 1980 through 1984 that brought together Israelis, Egyptians, and Palestinians. I was a consultant to this group and a facilitator in five of the six meetings. The most efficient and productive way to organize and run facilitated workshops is a matter of ongoing research, and it is still not definitive how the positive results of a workshop can be used to resolve a real conflict.[3]

Usually a workshop is held at a neutral site, most often a third country, away from workaday interruptions. Representatives of adversary groups and

2. See *Political Psychology*, June 1985, a special issue entitled "A Notebook on the Psychology of the U.S.–Soviet Relationship," edited by Joseph V. Montville.

3. See John W. Burton, "Procedures for Facilitated International Conflict Resolution," forthcoming.

the third-party or facilitator groups reside there together, usually in a hotel or a resort, for a period of three to five days. Participants meet in plenary sessions and sometimes break up into small working groups. They take their meals together and go as a group to preplanned recreational events—tours, concerts, plays, and special dinners at noteworthy sites. One successful formula has two days of meetings followed by a third day of special recreational events, followed by two final days of meetings and a ceremonial farewell dinner. Throughout the workshop ample time is available for delegations to caucus and for individuals to meet one-on-one. Significant conversations take place among participants as they sit together on buses or boats or simply stroll around a tourist site.

It is not possible to evaluate in this essay the collective results of all the workshops held to date, but there are a number of examples of the kinds of conceptual breakthroughs that are possible. In his discussion in this volume, John Burton mentions the achievements of a workshop sponsored by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management of the University of Maryland in 1984 in which representatives of the major Lebanese religious factions agreed to twenty-two "principles to govern a future Lebanese state."

A second example of the type of creative thinking a workshop can produce came in a meeting of Egyptians and Israelis. Participants included former cabinet ministers, military and intelligence officers, psychiatrists, academics, and diplomats. One Israeli participant, an academic and political moderate, offered in the following statement a concept that might break the deadlock over competing Israeli and Palestinian claims to historical rights to Palestine:

> There has been an endless and fruitless discussion between Israelis and Palestinians on historical rights. I don't want to go into a debate whether historical rights do exist in a law or in reality or in politics, but I would like to adopt a term, which I found in a very good article by an Israeli author who proves rather successfully that the term "historical rights" is really meaningless. He suggested to replace it with a term which I think we can use usefully, namely the "right of distress." The author said that if we came and established a state, it is mainly on the basic human right of distress. A human group in distress was asking to have the right to establish a state for itself, and there were all kinds of reasons why it should be established on that specific land. I suggest that we might adopt this same standard also concerning the Palestinians, that is to say if analyzing it backwards one of the big errors on the Arab side was a refusal to recognize in the Jews the right of distress.
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> Here was a group in distress, in a sense seeking refuge away from Europe where six million Jews were murdered. We wanted to get away to a place that was meaningful to us. So, there was a right of distress that was denied. This was followed by violence, and now, I think I agree with you, we are denying the right of distress of the Palestinians. They are in distress. I think those two things should be compared with each other.

> I think that there are also two other rights in conflict. There is what the Palestinians call the right of return, and their demand to the rights of return, and the Israeli fear that the rights of return will be unlimited. Similarly, there is a Jewish or Israeli fear that the rights of return will be unlimited.

For the Arab participants in the workshop, this statement was taken as recognition by at least one Israeli that Palestinians, like Jews, have been victimized by history. The recognition of historic grievances and hurts is a critically necessary early step in any psychologically sensitive conflict-resolution process. Another interesting and creative aspect of the above statement is the implicit recognition of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Three other conflict situations have benefited from track two workshops in recent years. In Washington, D.C., Argentine and British parliamentarians have worked on a hypothetical resolution to the Falklands/Malvinas dispute; and Greek and Turkish Cypriot graduate students and young professionals have conducted workshops at Harvard University. Indeed, Professor Philip Stewart of Ohio State University, who has been rapporteur for numerous unofficial meetings of Soviet and American representatives in the Dartmouth Conference series, has reported that in April 1974, Soviet participants believed that their government was "close to a positive decision on joining the major international economic institutions (the general Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank)." The end of détente precluded this development.

Critics could justifiably point out that there is no evidence that conflict-resolution workshops would work for the principal political leaders themselves—perhaps because they are too tough or even impervious to the humanizing process. It is indeed difficult to see how some top leaders who might have been responsible for acts of murderous repression, could undergo a personal transformation in a problem-solving workshop. In some cases where a track two approach seems desirable, it might be more promising to use an unofficial but highly respected and knowledgeable individual to try to evoke the conceptual creativity of the workshop through a series of noncommittal, exploratory, even philosophical discussions with a top leader. This process could very well take up a long period of time with minimal perceptible results. Yet, under the right circumstances, the link could prove to be useful and constructive.

One way of employing the problem-solving workshop that might help top leaders, even though they are not expected to be "creative" or involved in the process themselves, has been suggested by two psychiatrists—Vamık Volkan and Demetrios Julius of the Center for Psycho-Political Studies at the University of Virginia. In a proposal dealing with the Cyprus dispute, Volkan—a Turkish Cypriot American—and Julius—a Greek American born in Athens—would conduct a series of facilitated problem-solving workshops that would

bring Greek and Turkish Cypriots together by professional function. Politicians, lawyers, civil servants, educators, journalists, academics, and businessmen and women, among others, would share the insights gained in the workshops with colleagues in their own respective professional spheres and there design programs to expand cooperation in ways appropriate to each profession. One possibility is a series of jointly produced human interest television programs in English for Turks on the Greeks and vice versa.

Influencing Public Opinion

A principal, if not the principal, role for nongovernmental action is to shape the overall political environment so that leaders might be encouraged to take positive steps toward resolving a conflict. In almost all the cases that I know of, private citizens have taken the initiative, and the governments involved have subsequently concurred. In one case well known to U.S. officials responsible for relations with the Soviet Union, the Esalen Institute of Big Sur, California, has sponsored a U.S.–Soviet exchange program since 1979. Among other achievements, this program led to joint agreements with the Soviet Ministry of Health and the State publishing house; hosted visits by academics, writers and scientists; organized meetings of Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts; and even arranged a live satellite exchange of rock concerts between Moscow and San Bernadino. As a result of the November 1985 summit meeting between President Reagan and Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev, the United States has established a new office in the U.S. Information Agency in Washington to coordinate private sector exchanges between the two countries. The Esalen program is credited by some for having helped keep the faith in people-to-people contact in the period prior to the 1985 summit. And those U.S. government personnel who are now responsible for coordinating U.S.–Soviet exchanges have briefed themselves on the Esalen initiatives in citizen diplomacy, as well as on others.

One of the most ambitious and comprehensive nongovernmental initiatives in track two diplomacy has been Co-operation North, which was founded by Dr. Brendan O'Regan, the former head of the Irish Tourist Board. Established in 1979, Co-operation North (incorporated as Cooperation Ireland in the United States), describes its origins and philosophy this way:

> The lack of communication and understanding between people in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland has bred deep mistrust and suspicion and has surely contributed to the violence of the last sixteen years in both parts of Ireland.

In the late 1970s a group of leaders in business, academic life, the trade unions, the professional bodies and voluntary organizations in Ireland came

together with the shared conviction that it was not enough simply to bemoan the situation. It was crucial to take action, to build mutual respect and understanding through practical cooperation in the economic, social and cultural spheres with no political strings attached.

Co-operation North concentrates on business, youth and educational activities. In 1984, some fifteen thousand people and almost two thousand organizations and companies were involved, directly or indirectly, in its activities. One program, called School-Links, is aimed at linking schools and colleges in the North and the Republic; it has already brought together over ten percent of all secondary schools in the island. Another program that promotes cooperation in industry and commerce has sponsored research on information technology and small business development.

The dilemma of an organization like Co-operation North is that its impact is limited by its small budget. While many businesses donate funds—and the British and Irish governments as well as the European Community contribute—very few people have come to see that track two activities like Co-operation North and similar organizations can play, not just a useful, but a critical role in diplomacy. If track two is deemed important, then the program budget for organizations like it should be increased tenfold. There is little doubt in my mind that this was the main reason Dr. Brendan O'Regan took the nongovernmental initiative to establish the Irish Peace Institute, an organization co-anchored firmly in both the north and the south. In that way the work of Co-operation North and its sister organizations in Ireland North and South and in other countries as well, can persuade public and private donors to give the lifesaving financial support that is needed to make their critical contribution to the success of track two diplomacy.

In another example, a particular citizen initiative is showing enormous potential for helping to build an environment for eventual Arab–Israeli peace. In 1972 Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs of Israeli citizenship founded the village of *Neve Shalom* (Hebrew)/ *Wahat al-Salaam* (Arabic), meaning Oasis of Peace, on a hill situated halfway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. This village offers concrete expression to its founders' determination to prove that Arabs and Jews can live together on the basis of mutual respect.

Since 1980, well over eight thousand people, including two thousand adults in mixed groups from the Arab and Jewish communities, have attended the village's programs. The Neve Shalom School for Peace runs programs for children, teenagers, and adults. In a structured environment, a trained professional staff leads workshops in minority/majority relations and coexistence. Three of these four-day workshops are held each month. Selected graduates are given more intensive training when they demonstrate leadership skills in Arab–Jewish relations in their communities. Again, like almost all track two initiatives, Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salaam is constantly scratching for funds. Its success—considering the modest level on which it operates—has been phenomenal. Its trainers have even taught their methods in Catholic–Protestant youth programs in Northern Ireland.

This courageous group of Arabs and Jews is not alone. Another visionary, an alumnus of the American Psychiatric Association's conflict-resolution workshops, has organized an effort to teach Jewish schoolchildren Arab history and culture, to promote the growth of mutually respectful Arab–Jewish relations as a response to the alarming rise in Israeli youth support for extremist anti-Arab ideologues. Under the leadership of Alouph Harevan, the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute has developed "To Live Together," a curriculum in civic education on Arab–Jewish relations for the eleventh and twelfth grades. A version of this curriculum has been prepared for informal education, including simulations and games for use in teacher training. The institute is also preparing elementary and secondary-level collections of short stories in Hebrew by Arab writers. Furthermore, a curriculum on Arab–Israeli relations as a pluralistic experience is being proposed to replace the existing curriculum for secondary schools on the Arab–Israeli "conflict." There are several similar programs and hundreds of Israeli teachers awaiting training but, again, funding has been very hard to come by. The Israeli Education Ministry, even though it has officially endorsed the Van Leer program, has provided little funding and, with rare exceptions, Harevan has not been able to raise funds in the American Jewish community. The U.S. Agency for International Development gave the Van Leer project a one-time $150,000 grant under its human rights program.[4]

Why is it so difficult for voluntary groups such as Co-operation North, Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salaam, and the Van Leer project to raise funds for work that seems obviously useful? One of the main objectives of conflict resolution workshops is to develop respectful and "rehumanized" relationships among adversaries. This, of course, is the goal of the broader "public opinion" programs also. But the very fact that this has to be a basic goal in a conflict situation helps explain why support for peace-making programs, especially in centers of political and financial power, is difficult to obtain.

The study of human psychology, especially the psychoanalytic tradition, reveals that the existence of a clear, unambiguous, "all bad" enemy plays an important stabilizing function for many people. Just as there are some people "we love to hate," there are among all races, colors, and creeds some people who need to know who the enemy is almost as a way of distinguishing between good and evil. When peace makers come onto the scene they inevitably act in a way that blurs the evil image of the enemy. In fact, that is what rehumanization seeks to do. "Letting go" of an enemy can be very hard

4. This situation might improve. On August 10, 1986, the *New York Times Magazine* published a very supportive article on Neve Shalom and the Van Leer program entitled "Arabs and Jews in Israel," by David K. Shipler, former New York Times Jerusalem bureau chief.

to do unless there is a carefully coordinated strategy designed to deal with the emotional as well as the cognitive tasks of conflict resolution.[5]

Cooperative Economic Development

The third process in track two diplomacy—cooperative economic development—probably depends on and is a result of the success of the first two processes. The first two may need to be well under way before significant economic cooperation is possible, especially in conflicts where ethnic and sectarian enmity is intense and widespread.

For example, the Institute for Middle East Peace and Development at the City University of New York has, as its name implies, committed itself to promote and study the role of economic development as an incentive for overcoming regional hostilities. The institute staff has surveyed executives of large Israeli firms about their attitudes on doing business in Egypt. Similar research has been planned for Egypt. In another initiative the institute organized the Business Group for Middle East Peace and Development, made up of some thirty highly motivated Jewish and Arab–American business leaders. Among the projects mentioned for possible investment in the West Bank were a cement plant, a quarry, a juice factory, and a pharmaceutical plant. However, these explorations in Arab–Jewish development cooperation were reportedly stymied by a combination of intense opposition by Israel's right wing, local Palestinian skepticism, and Jordanian silence.

Another joint development venture—the Middle East Regional Cooperation Program, in which the U.S. government funds collaborative research by Egyptian and Israeli scientists—has been a significant, if unpublicized, success, in spite of the damaging political fallout from Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Using only $5 million per year (one-tenth of one percent of the annual $5 billion in U.S. aid to Egypt and Israel), this program has achieved breakthroughs in each of its major projects in agriculture and infectious diseases. Scientists from the two countries crossbred fish to produce a type that grows to market size at an accelerated speed. They also worked together to defeat an outbreak of mosquito-borne Rift Valley fever, which had killed several thousand people and three million heads of cattle in 1982, and they drove the disease from the region. A joint agriculture project produced a new breed of goat that yields increased quantities of milk and meat and survives in a very dry climate.

In addition to the concrete results of scientific collaboration, about one thousand scientists from both countries have developed professional and personal relationships in a political atmosphere described at best as a "cold

5. See Vamık D. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach," *Political Psychology*, June 1985, pp. 219–48.

peace." However, this activity, as important as it is, can probably best be seen as symbolic of the potential fruits of regional development cooperation when and if the political climate between Israel, Egypt, the Palestinians, and the neighboring Arab states improves. The activity cannot itself be said to be driving political processes in a positive direction.

A more promising example of cooperative development potentially leading or perhaps paralleling political reconciliation is the public support of the Protestant Unionist parties in Northern Ireland for a joint project with the Republic of Ireland. Co-operation North has been successfully promoting economic cooperation research among Protestant and Catholic businessmen for several years. No doubt the long experience of living and working together—though painfully difficult at times—makes collaboration in Ireland north and south easier than between Israelis and Arabs. The record of cooperative development as an engine of conflict resolution may be spotty, but there is a strong logic to the idea that tangible economic incentives for groups and nations in conflict must be helpful. However, a good case can be made that psychological barriers to peacemaking must first be breached before the day-to-day collaboration work can get significantly off the ground.

The European Community—Track Two Diplomacy Success

In recent history there have been overwhelmingly successful examples of track two diplomacy: Franco–German rapprochement following World War II, the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and, ultimately, the European Community. The old, bitter conflict between the French and the Germans appears to have been resolved by humanizing relations among adversary leaders, enhancing public opinion for peace making, and building cooperative economic development schemes that institutionalized the revolutionary new peaceful relationships between the countries involved.

The brief sketch that follows can only hint at the potential richness of a full-scale study of the development of the European Community as one of the greatest successes of track two diplomacy in human history. Although rivers of blood have been spilled over the centuries in Europe in ethnic and sectarian violence, today the idea of war between Germany and France seems bizarre. We take the peace of Western Europe and the Economic Community for granted almost as though this condition always existed.

In looking at Franco–German rapprochement as an example of successful track two diplomacy, it is not immediately obvious when and where the problem-solving workshop phase took place. I submit that this process took place from 1946 on, mainly in the neutral site of Caux, Switzerland, at the

annual summer assemblies of Moral Re-Armament. The facilitator was no group of psychiatrists or social scientists but rather an extraordinary American, a Lutheran minister named Frank Buchman, who had founded the Oxford Group in England in the 1920s that later became known as Moral Re-Armament.

Buchman's psychologically sound Christian practice of appealing to the work- and love-based spiritual potential of human beings of all faiths and political identities drew an impressive number of American, European, African, and Asian leaders to the Caux conference center. Among the five thousand visitors from some fifty countries in the summer of 1947 were the president of Switzerland and the wartime commander of the Swiss army, the prime ministers of Denmark and Indonesia, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, the Smith–Mundt Committee of the U.S. Congress, and twenty-six members of the Italian parliament. With the express consent of General Lucius Clay, commander in the American zone of occupied Germany, and Lord Francis A. Pakenham, the British commander, some one hundred and fifty Germans were also permitted to travel to Caux. These included several state minister–presidents, industrialists, trade union leaders, and journalists.

Perhaps the signature event in terms of psychological breakthroughs in the Franco–German conflict occurred at Caux in the summer of 1947. A heroine of the French resistance and a confirmed hater of the Germans was converted and became a repentant and inspired builder of reconciliation in Europe.

Mme Irene Laure was secretary–general of the national organization of socialist women in France, and she had recently been a member of parliament for Marseilles. Her son had been tortured by the Gestapo. Like many of the French at Caux, she would leave the room each time a German rose to speak. Challenged by Buchman on what kind of unity she envisaged for Europe, Mme Laure went through a painful struggle with her emotions. After two days alone in her room she emerged and asked to speak at a plenary meeting. She said, "I have so hated Germany that I wanted to see her erased from the map of Europe. But I have seen that my hatred is wrong. I wish to ask the forgiveness of all the Germans present."

According to Garth Lean, Buchman's biographer, Mme Laure's apology had an electric effect on the Germans.[6] She later took her message to Germany, addressing two hundred meetings in eleven weeks, including ten of the eleven state parliaments.

The emotional impact of a French victim of Nazi barbarism asking forgiveness for her hatred of Germans was utterly disarming to otherwise highly guilt-ridden and defensive Germans. The experience gave the Germans who heard Mme Laure—many of whom were political leaders—a stake in

6. *Frank Buchman: A Life* (London: Constable, 1985).

striving for a sense of European community and acceptance that they believed history had denied them and that Hitler and his regime had almost ruled out forever.

The names and numbers of French, German, and other European leaders who went to Caux from 1946 on show that the opportunity for both intellectual and spiritual interaction among former enemies was grasped enthusiastically, and its influence, while hard to quantify, seems to have been great. No less a witness than Konrad Adenauer wrote in 1951, "In recent months we have seen the conclusion, after some difficult negotiations, of important international agreements. Moral Re-Armament has played an invisible but effective part in bridging differences of opinion between negotiating parties." Robert Schuman, French foreign minister and negotiator with Adenauer of the Coal and Steel Plan, even wrote a foreword to a collection of Buchman's speeches.

There is also a truly impressive record of private initiatives in the second step of the track two process—creating an environment of support for conflict resolution in concerned populations at large.[7] An army of Moral Re-Armament representatives toured France and Germany with dramatic presentations that reaffirmed traditional Western moral values in the face of vigorous Communist competition for ascendancy in the German and French labor movements. But well beyond the Moral Re-Armament effort, leading intellectuals in the two countries worked assiduously to build a sense of common purpose. Franco–German conferences brought together distinguished politicians, professors, and journalists like Theodore Hess, Heinrich Luke, Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, Robert Schuman, Christian Pineau, Rene Pleven, Francois Mitterrand, Bertrand de Jouvenal, Alfred Grosser, and Andre Fontaine.

In 1948, a group of journalists, writers, politicians, and teachers put together an organization called the French Committee for Exchanges with the New Germany. The purpose of the new organization was to promote debates and group visits. Also, in 1948, German intellectual, political, and industrial leaders founded a German–French unit in all areas of intellectual and public life. A Franco–German task force of historians undertook one of the most critically important psychological tasks in conflict resolution—reviewing and reinterpreting the most disputed points of French and German history from 1789 to 1933. The purpose was to purge textbooks of tendentious, nationalistic, and intellectually dishonest biases so that the youth of both countries could work from a base of historical truth, warts and all. The importance of searching history for the deeply rooted and often obscure sources of ethnic and sectarian conflict cannot be overemphasized.

7. See F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945–1963* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1965).

The organizing genius who deserves credit for initiating the third process of the track two strategy—cooperative development—was Frenchman Jean Monnet, architect of the European Coal and Steel Community known as the Schuman Plan.[8] Monnet's purpose was to put an end to the combative economic sovereignties whose prewar zero-sum wins and losses caused the economic and social breakdowns that led inexorably to breakdowns in national security, and eventually to war. As Schuman put it in a letter to Adenauer on May 9, 1950:

> The elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany, and a pooling of resources and production, will make war between the two countries not merely unthinkable but actually impossible.

Monnet gave advice then that can be interpreted now as elements of a philosophy of track two diplomacy:

> There is no problem which can be dealt with in bits. You have to try to put all the elements together. You must make up your mind as to what is in common in the interests of the people concerned, and bring them to the point of seeing it. The majority are men of goodwill, but they only see things from their own point of view. You must get them together round a table and get them talking of that same thing at the same time.

Monnet, as a French government official, combined the best track two instincts with track one diplomacy. His gift to European conflict resolution was the scheme to remove the coal and steel resources of the Ruhr from the potential war-making control of either a sovereign France or Germany. He believed that the institutionalization of peace was critical to its endurance. He said, "Experience begins over again with every man. Institutions alone become wiser; they accumulate the general experience and from their experience and this wisdom come the rules which, once men have accepted them, change gradually not their nature, but their behavior." Of course, the massive capital transfers for reconstruction of the Marshall Plan were a key resource for institution building and development, and they contributed greatly to the success of European conflict resolution.

Resolution Versus Settlement

It could easily be said that the French and the Germans were able to come to an understanding only after Germany had been soundly defeated in a

8. See R. C. Mowatt, *Creating the European Community* (London: Blandford Press, 1973) and Kenaston Twitchell, *Regeneration in the Ruhr* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981).

long, bloody, and destructive war. Surely such a situation makes conflict resolution an easy task! Furthermore, some would say that this case shows that war is justifiable as an instrument of positive political change. However, I believe that such a view is wrong. There is a major difference between settlement of a conflict and resolution of a conflict. Settlements represent the victory of power over weakness. The post–World War I Versailles Treaty was a "settlement." It did not deal with the systemic economic, social, and psychological roots of Franco–German and European conflict in general. In fact, it actually set Europe on a steady course toward the rise of Hitler and World War II. The post–World War II agreements, on the other hand, amounted to a process of actual resolution of the conflict.

It may well be that one side or another in any or all current group or national conflicts will have to be beaten militarily before a resolution can be promoted. And it may be that only "settlements" will follow the combat. But perhaps the establishment of peace institutions in Ireland, Canada, and the United States and the proliferation of peace and conflict-resolution studies in universities around the world indicate that the concept of resolution without a war may be winning over the idea of settlement after a war. The "unwinnable" nature of nuclear war may have something to do with this trend. In any case, it is now clearly essential that the task of developing both theory and practice in conflict resolution be pursued with urgency. The threat of nuclear war resulting from uncontrolled regional conflict, superpower misstep, or accident is serious. In addition, putting aside the threat of nuclear disaster, there seems to be a growing public rejection of the idea that innocent men, women, and children should have to die because leaders cannot think beyond violence. It is hoped that the accounts in this volume of track two diplomatic efforts will contribute to a better understanding of the potential of conflict resolution.