

## *Edward IV, the earl of Warwick and the Yorkist Claim to the Throne*

### *Abstract*

This note and document discusses a grant made by Edward IV to Richard Neville, earl of Warwick, in March 1463. The content of the document, which provides valuable detail on the relationship between Edward and Warwick during their exile in Calais in 1459–60, is explained and amplified. Particular attention is paid to one striking phrase that may cast new light on the dynastic politics of the period. A possible interpretation is advanced, supported by additional relevant primary material, and its implications considered in terms of the broader historiographical debate concerning the motives of the Yorkist party at this stage of the civil war.

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ON 15 MARCH 1463 Edward IV made a substantial grant to Richard Neville, earl of Warwick, of £3,580, to be drawn from the revenues of the duchy of Lancaster.<sup>1</sup> This important act of royal patronage has received little attention from historians. Somerville, in his definitive study of the duchy of Lancaster in the late medieval period, accorded it a couple of lines and elsewhere it has passed without comment.<sup>2</sup> Yet this large cash repayment is of considerable significance. The grant, which is printed below, was enrolled under the duchy warrants from a royal signet letter that no longer survives. Its language and tone are highly personal and throw fresh light on the relationship between Edward and Warwick, and possibly also the Yorkist claim to the throne.

In his grant, Edward recalled his gratitude to Warwick for the help given in the fateful period between November 1459 and June 1460, when the house of York had been threatened with extinction. After the rout of Richard duke of York's forces at Ludford on 12–13 October 1459, Edward had separated from his father. York and his second son, Edmund earl of Rutland, had travelled to Ireland; Warwick, Salisbury and Edward eventually reached Calais. In early December a hostile parliament assembled at Coventry passed acts of attainder against all the fleeing lords and began to dismember York's

<sup>1</sup> Public Record Office, DL 37/32/79: a full transcript is printed below. I am grateful to Professors Michael Hicks and Tony Pollard and to Miss Margaret Condon for advice given during the preparation of this piece.

<sup>2</sup> R. Somerville, *History of the Duchy of Lancaster* (2 vols., 1953–70), i. 233.

estates. Further military action was now inevitable. Edward chose in his grant to pay special tribute to Warwick's fleet, which had dispersed a Lancastrian force at Sandwich in January 1460 and in the king's eyes had been responsible for protecting Calais.

Edward next expressed his high regard for one particular act of service, the 'jeopardies costly and grete viage' to Ireland to meet with his father. In order to effect this, Warwick had been forced to borrow heavily, and was now 'gretly endaungered by chevisaunce': probably being threatened with legal action to recover the sum owed.<sup>3</sup> In his letter to the receiver-general of the duchy of Lancaster the king stressed the importance of this voyage. On 30 November 1460 Warwick had already been assigned £2,500 from the revenues of the duchy. This was to cover his wages whilst he had been retained for 'keeping of the sea' between 1458 and 1460.<sup>4</sup> The additional sum of £3,580, 'the grete intollerables and excessive charges' referred to in the warrant, was beyond the remit of the original indenture. It had been necessary for Warwick to recruit additional men and ships, so that when he sailed from Calais to Waterford in March 1460 it was with a fully equipped war fleet.<sup>5</sup> The debt incurred in the process was Warwick's legal responsibility, and Edward now saw it as a moral obligation that he fully meet the costs involved. The repayment, which was also to be drawn from the duchy of Lancaster, thus had to be properly authorized. However Edward, in his warrant, chose to do rather more than that. He gave an intimate and highly personal tribute, remembering the news that Warwick brought back to him in early June 1460 as 'oure grettest joye and consolacion erthly'. Why did Warwick's voyage mean so much to him?

The general context is worth establishing. It remains unclear whether it was accident or design that led Edward eventually to reach Calais at the beginning of November 1459. Most recent accounts simply note that the separation from his father occurred.<sup>6</sup> Contemporary chroniclers were divided

<sup>3</sup> It is not clear who made this large loan. The merchants of the Calais Staple are the most likely candidates. According to an account of these events in *The Brut*, the Yorkist lords had at this stage 'borrowed moche gode of the Staple' (*The Brut, or the Chronicles of England*, ed. F. W. Brie (Early English Text Soc., cxxxi, cxxxvi, 1906–8), ii. 528). After the Lancastrians had repudiated the company's dues, worth over £30,000, in Oct. 1459 they had every reason to support Warwick (G. L. Harriss, 'The struggle for Calais: an aspect of the rivalry between Lancaster and York', *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, lxxv (1960), 51).

<sup>4</sup> P.R.O., DL 37/29/35.

<sup>5</sup> The Lancastrian government had made the destruction of Warwick's fleet a military priority, and were even prepared to negotiate for French help to achieve this aim. A letter of 24 Feb. 1460 from Pierre de Brézé to Charles VII referred to his communication with Margaret of Anjou via the intermediary, Doucereau, and added 'Elle m'a mande aussi que je mette toute la peine que je pourrai a gagner le navire du comte de Warwick' (G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII* (6 vols., Paris, 1881–91), vi. 288). Warwick's war fleet proved more than a match for the naval force under the duke of Exeter, which attempted to intercept him on his return from Ireland in May 1460. Exeter's failure to engage was probably because Warwick's force was too strong for him (C. F. Richmond, 'English naval power in the 15th century', *History*, lii (1967), 8).

<sup>6</sup> A. Goodman, *The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society, 1452–97* (1981), p. 31; B. Wolffe, *Henry VI* (1981), p. 319; J. Gillingham, *The Wars of the Roses* (1981), p. 105.

on the question. The sequence of events in Waurin suggests that Warwick, Salisbury and Edward were also intending to sail to Ireland, but their ship was forced by unfavourable winds on to the north Devon coast. They then made their way overland to the English Channel, where they were able to take ship to Jersey and then Calais.<sup>7</sup> But a continuation of *The Brut* has York intentionally 'levyng his eldest son' with Warwick and Salisbury before his own flight to Ireland, and then describes how the two earls, with Edward in their keeping, deliberately set out southwards, to Devonshire, in order to find shipping. Help from the Dinham family enabled them to reach first Guernsey and ultimately Calais.<sup>8</sup> *The Brut* account gives the impression that York, Warwick and Salisbury chose to part company, in an emergency council meeting at Ludford on the night of 12 October, and that York, who fled to Ireland with his second son, Edmund earl of Rutland, and left his two youngest sons with his wife Cecily Neville, deliberately separated his male offspring. This possibility finds support in Edward's own version of events in the preamble of the grant. The 'grete viage' is recalled in terms of Warwick's loyalty to both Edward and his father. There is no suggestion that the young earl of March was ever to hazard the journey. Instead Edward's 'abode within oure towne of Caleys', protected by Warwick's ships, had led to an increasing 'plentith of ese' for himself and for York in Ireland, suggesting that his safe-keeping there was part of the original plan. If ensuring the succession to the house of York was of such importance to them both, dynastic considerations may have already been influencing their strategy.

Once Edward had arrived in Calais on 2 November 1459, the seventeen-year-old, in Charles Ross's words, 'shook off the tutelage of his father and emerged as an independent political figure in his own right'.<sup>9</sup> The wording of the grant reminds us that he was now playing a full part in counsel and decision-making. Warwick's great journey, 'specially for the tendre zele, love and effeccion that he bare unto oure persone', may have come about, in part at least, through his prompting, and on the earl's return he had been fully briefed as to its outcome. Later in June 1460 Edward added his own name, as earl of March, to those of Warwick and Salisbury in the manifesto drawn up by the Yorkist lords as they prepared to embark for England.<sup>10</sup> Now that Edward was on the throne, the utmost priority was being given to meeting Warwick's debt, providing him a secure source of assignment, and guaranteeing a full repayment within two years. The urgency of these measures shows how important the voyage to Ireland was to the new king, and suggests that the powerful relationship between Edward and Warwick had been forged at this time of particular crisis.

Edward, after two years of his reign had passed, still placed a considerable

<sup>7</sup> *Recueil des Croniques et Anchiennes Istories de la Grant Bretaine par Jehan de Waurin*, ed. W. and E. L. C. P. Hardy (5 vols., Rolls Ser., 1864–91), v. 277.

<sup>8</sup> *The Brut*, ii. 527.

<sup>9</sup> C. Ross, *Edward IV* (1974), p. 21.

<sup>10</sup> C. L. Scofield, *The Life and Reign of Edward IV* (2 vols., 1923), i. 66.

emphasis on the information Warwick brought to him from Ireland. The force of the king's remembrance, 'oure grettest joye and consolacion erthly', is striking. Such a phrase, with its stress on 'erthly', normally signified the most important action or moment in one's mortal life. An example is provided by the letter William de la Pole, duke of Suffolk, wrote to his son and heir in April 1450. Suffolk advised him that loyalty to the king should be his guiding tenet, and gave that principle full emphasis by placing it 'above alle erthely thyng'.<sup>11</sup> The overwhelming significance to Margaret Hungerford of her chantry and almshouse, as she made provision for her death in 1471, was made clear through her instructions: they were the things 'I most charge and desyre of thyngis erthly'.<sup>12</sup> The wording of Edward's grant provides a straightforward, literal explanation. Warwick had brought back news of the 'certainte' of York's 'welfare and suerete' in Ireland: it was the report of his father's safety that had moved the king so profoundly.

However this line of interpretation presents its own problems. Cora Scofield long ago established that communication between York in Ireland and the earls in Calais had been taking place well before Warwick's voyage in March 1460.<sup>13</sup> It could be argued that the sending of messages was time-consuming and dangerous and that Edward was still being troubled by fears over his father's welfare. Two pieces of evidence work strongly against such a hypothesis. The first is a letter written by William of Worcester from London in January 1460, which makes it clear that the security of York's position in Ireland was already common knowledge. Worcester wrote that 'the Duke of York ys at Debylyn, strengthened with hys Erles and homagers'. He was referring to how the duke had been fully accepted by the Anglo-Irish nobility, despite the attainder passed in the Coventry parliament and the Lancastrian attempt to replace him in office. He then added significantly 'as ye shall see by a bille', suggesting that information on York's success was being circulated and used for propaganda purposes.<sup>14</sup> It is hard to imagine Calais being out of contact with London and Edward and Warwick being unaware of this. Equally telling is the information provided in a Waterford Chronicle on the manner of Warwick's arrival in Ireland. This source describes how Warwick and York sailed into Waterford harbour together on 16 March 1460 and gives the combined strength of their fleet as twenty-six ships.<sup>15</sup> It is a far cry from Warwick sailing to Ireland to seek accurate information on York's safety and welfare: they had been able to co-ordinate their plans effectively enough for York to meet with Warwick off the Irish coast and escort him into Waterford. Taking this into account, the likelihood is that Edward and Warwick had a reasonably accurate idea of York's position before the voyage to Ireland.

<sup>11</sup> *The Paston Letters, 1422-1509*, ed J. Gairdner (6 vols., 1904), ii. 142.

<sup>12</sup> M. A. Hicks, 'The piety of Margaret, Lady Hungerford', *Jour. Eccles. Hist.*, xxxviii (1987), 35.

<sup>13</sup> Scofield, i 59.

<sup>14</sup> *Paston Letters*, i. 203.

<sup>15</sup> Lambeth Palace Library, MS. 632 fo. 255.

If so, a formulaic rather than a literal understanding of this part of the grant is to be preferred. The phrase describing the purpose of the visit, to see York's 'state, welfare and undoubted suerete', could be used in a sense denoting a general service as well as a specific task. Such indeed was Somerville's own view, the grant being made as he saw it 'for the assistance given in Ireland to the king's father, the duke of York'.<sup>16</sup> But what particular assistance was Edward then recalling with such conviction?

In this reading, Edward's 'greatest joye and consolacion erthly' is more likely to be linked to the actual outcome of the two months of discussions between York and Warwick. One substantial matter we can be reasonably certain of is the decision to mount a joint invasion. Contemporary chroniclers were well aware that the immediate purpose of their meeting was to discuss how best they could return to England. According to *The Brut*, Warwick 'bi the avise' of the Calais lords, took many of his ships and sailed to York in Ireland for the purpose of resolving 'how thei shold entre in-to England ageyn'.<sup>17</sup> Waurin provides the only detail on what the two men actually talked about, saying it was agreed that York should assemble an army in Ireland and land in the north of the country, Warwick and the others the south, possibly Kent.<sup>18</sup> Despite this account's factual inaccuracies (mistakenly placing York's wife Cecily Neville and younger sons George and Richard at Waterford), document evidence indicates that it is at least broadly plausible.

Confirmation of the invasion plan is found in the testimony of the master of the *Julian*, one of the ships impressed by Warwick on his way to Ireland. He recounted how the earl had ordered his craft to be detained there because it was needed to help conduct the duke of York's men to England.<sup>19</sup> Also many of the articles of the manifesto of June 1460, which prepared the ground for the landing in the south-east, seem to have been drawn up whilst the two lords were in Dublin.<sup>20</sup> But what was the invasion supposed to achieve for the Yorkists? If we take the Calais manifesto at face value, it was a restoration of their landed estates and rightful influence within the counsel of the realm. They insisted that they intended no harm to the person or title of Henry VI. The failures of the government were criticized, but blamed on evil and grasping councillors, who had planned the attainders of the Coventry parliament to enrich themselves. York's renunciation of his allegiance to the Lancastrian king on his landing near Chester on 8 September was, in this scenario, never a part of the earlier discussions, and his attempt to claim the throne in Westminster Hall on 10 October a complete surprise even to his closest supporters.

If Edward was only seeking the restoration of the duchy of York in June

<sup>16</sup> Somerville, i. 233.

<sup>17</sup> *The Brut*, ii. 528–9.

<sup>18</sup> *Waurin*, v. 286–7.

<sup>19</sup> P.R.O., C 1/27/383.

<sup>20</sup> P. A. Johnson, *Duke Richard of York, 1411–60* (Oxford, 1988), p. 201.

1460, it is hard to imagine him making much of the news of this plan, brought back from Ireland by Warwick, once he had become king. At the time of his grant to the earl, in March 1463, he had a *de jure* claim to the throne, that rested on the same concept of legitimate inheritance, as heir of Lionel of Clarence, that his father had asserted in October 1460. Henry VI was regarded as an usurper, a king 'in deed and not by right', whilst Richard duke of York was posthumously recognized as 'king in right of the realm of England'.<sup>21</sup> Edward would now have avoided recalling any profession of loyalty to the deposed Lancastrian king. He revered his father's achievement, and felt it important to honour the promises made by York on his return to England in 1460, in the brief period when the duke believed that he would be acclaimed king of England. In a writ of 16 January 1463, appointing William Stanley of Hooton sheriff of Cheshire, Edward took pains to recite how his father had retained Stanley for life on 16 September 1460 and had then offered him the reversion of the shrievalty, whenever he could grant it.<sup>22</sup> York had bestowed on Stanley the reversion of an office in the royal gift, in a clear demonstration of his own dynastic ambitions. Edward IV was choosing, through the wording of his appointment, to recognize the validity of his father's actions.

There is another possibility: the news that moved Edward so deeply could have involved, alongside an invasion, a decision to advocate his father's claim to the throne. From the moment Richard duke of York landed near Chester his documents and indentures were drawn up without reference to the regnal year, indicating that he was now resolved to seize the crown himself. In K. B. McFarlane's words it was a decision 'as unexpected as it was unwelcome' for his principal allies.<sup>23</sup> Charles Ross was equally emphatic, saying of the Calais earls that it 'had never been part of their plans to depose Henry VI'. This had been a spur-of-the-moment decision by York, who 'sometime before returning to England, and apparently without informing his friends . . . had decided to lay claim to the throne in his own right'.<sup>24</sup> Such a view was derived from the account of the contemporary Burgundian chronicler Waurin, which took pains to stress that Warwick had no prior knowledge of York's ambitions. Ross noted that Waurin's version of events was confirmed by the commentaries of Pope Pius II, which drew upon information provided by the legate Coppini, and also reported that Warwick had opposed York's attempt to depose the Lancastrian king.<sup>25</sup> If this was

<sup>21</sup> *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, v. 462–4.

<sup>22</sup> P.R.O., CHES 2/135, m. 3.

<sup>23</sup> K. B. McFarlane, 'The Wars of the Roses', *Proc. British Acad.*, 1 (1964), 93. The indenture between York and Thomas Holcot, drawn up at Gloucester on 2 Oct. 1460, is now printed in full in *Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War, 1278–1476*, ed. M. Jones and S. Walker (*Camden Miscellany XXXII* (Camden 5th ser., iii, 1994), pp. 164–5). McFarlane took the text of York's grant at Chester on 13 Sept. 1460 from the copy on the patent roll of Edward IV. The original survives and is now filed under P.R.O., C 266/82/31 (which I owe to Professor Hicks).

<sup>24</sup> Ross, p. 28.

<sup>25</sup> C. Head, 'Pius II and the Wars of the Roses', *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae*, viii (1970), 160.

indeed the case, York's adoption of the style and manner of a legitimate monarch in September and October 1460 can only be seen, to use the phrase of his most recent biographer, as 'an act of supreme stupidity'.<sup>26</sup>

However cracks have begun to appear in the historical consensus. Professor Ralph Griffiths has raised a number of questions about the accepted version of events, that the agreed intention of York and Warwick at the time of their meeting in Ireland was to confront Henry VI in order to secure the dismissal of his advisers. Earlier attempts along these lines in 1452 and 1455 had not been conspicuously successful and by 1460 Margaret of Anjou's implacable opposition also had to be faced. To judge by the speed with which Warwick, Salisbury and Edward marched northwards at the beginning of July 1460 they did not flinch from a violent confrontation with the king's forces, and the possibility of the capture or even death of Henry VI and his family. It was natural that the Calais manifesto should confine itself to an attack on the king's disreputable ministers for it was too risky openly to advocate the deposition of an anointed king. Those chroniclers, Waurin included, who eulogized Warwick, would not wish to portray him as a traitor and regicide. Griffiths speculates that 'York's regal demeanour in the weeks after his own landing and his determination to march towards the throne sprang from the meeting with Warwick the previous March'.<sup>27</sup> York's isolation when he arrived at Westminster to claim the crown is explained in more pragmatic terms, that Warwick had been unable to secure enough support within the peerage or the church for dethroning a captive king and chose to negotiate a compromise. It is seen as a distinct possibility that 'Henry's deposition was discussed in Ireland, that dethronement was judged the best outcome of the Yorkist invasion, and that Warwick gave his support to this course of action'.<sup>28</sup>

Dr. Paul Johnson has looked more critically at some of the contemporary accounts of Warwick's behaviour. Waurin described a four-day meeting between York and Warwick at Shrewsbury in late September 1460, with the disclaimer that the earl still had no knowledge of any claim on the throne.<sup>29</sup> Johnson points out that if York had renounced his allegiance at Chester by 13 September (as most historians accept) and was retaining in his own right without any reference to the king, his intentions were hardly likely to be a well-kept secret and Warwick almost certainly knew what was going on. He draws attention to the fact that Pius II could refer to an earlier conversation between Warwick and the legate Coppini, in March 1460, before the voyage to Ireland, in which the earl asserted that the duke of York should be on the throne. The pope believed, no doubt on the authority of Coppini, that York's claim had come about through the boldness of Warwick. Johnson also

<sup>26</sup> Johnson, p. 212.

<sup>27</sup> This challenging discussion is found in R. A. Griffiths, *The Reign of King Henry VI* (1981), pp. 855–7, and the quotation is from p. 856.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 857.

<sup>29</sup> *Waurin*, v. 310.

suggests that it was Warwick's failure to find sufficient support for the plan when he entered London ahead of York in early October that caused him to back away from advocating Henry VI's deposition.<sup>30</sup>

The argument can be taken further through a consideration of the international situation. The Milanese ambassador wrote to Francesco Sforza from the papal court in May 1460 reporting a belief that Warwick was aiming to see Henry VI deposed. Before his voyage to Ireland the earl had told Coppini bluntly that York 'would now be on the throne if there were any regard for justice', though he had also spoken of the possibility of using a captive Henry as a figurehead in governing the kingdom.<sup>31</sup> But the rumours take on greater significance in the light of Whethamstede's report that before his return to England York obtained from Pius II absolution from all his oaths of loyalty to Henry VI.<sup>32</sup> When news of the battle of Northampton reached Bruges at the end of June 1460 it was also believed that Warwick intended to depose Henry, though here it was thought that he would be replaced by the earl of March. Again the Burgundians were likely to have been reasonably informed. They had opened discussions with Warwick within days of his arrival in Calais, Philip the Good sending the seigneur de Lannoy to meet with the earl as early as 5 November 1459.<sup>33</sup> The dauphin Louis, sheltering at the Burgundian court, was also interested in Warwick's intentions, and after his return to England kept in regular contact with the earl through his standard-bearer, the seigneur de la Barde, who was to fight for the Yorkists with a small contingent at the battle of Towton.<sup>34</sup> However intriguing these reports are, they yet remain highly circumstantial. But in one case it is possible to go substantially further.

In June 1460 there were rumours that York had engaged in an alliance with the king of Scotland, who was to assist him by invading England from the north.<sup>35</sup> These reports can be linked to an important letter sent by James II to Charles VII of France. James related 'the great and serious quarrel there is between the king of England on the one side, and the duke of York, the earl of Salisbury, and others with them, on the other', a quarrel that concerned no less than 'the insignia and crown of England'. In view of the gravity of this dispute it seemed an appropriate time to reopen the war on the border, for 'if we now let this opportunity slip away, it is not to be hoped that such a one will ever be presented to us again'. James added that York

<sup>30</sup> Johnson, pp. 205, 211–13, 216.

<sup>31</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Milan, 1385–1618*, p. 22; Head, p. 152.

<sup>32</sup> *Registra Quorundam Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albani*, ed. H. T. Riley (2 vols., Rolls Ser., 1872–3), i. 383–4.

<sup>33</sup> Archives Départementales du Nord, B2040 fo. 155v; *Cal. S.P. Milan 1385–1618*, p. 27.

<sup>34</sup> P.R.O., *48th Annual Rept.* (1887), app., pp. 444, 447; J. Calmette and G. Périnelle, *Louis XI et l'Angleterre* (Paris, 1930), pp. 3–4. The will of Edmund Mulso, drawn up at Calais on 1 May 1458, shows the dauphin had already made overtures to the Yorkists. Mulso left to Warwick 'my double harnois complete that I had of gift of the dolphin of Fraunce' (P.R.O., PROB 11/4 fo. 191 (PCC 24 & 25 Stokton)).

<sup>35</sup> *Cal. S.P. Milan 1385–1618*, p. 27.



had already sent him 'honourable ambassadors and letters' appealing for his assistance and that he had resolved to support him in the matter, and asked that Charles also consider his cause. The letter was written at Edinburgh on 28 June, but no year was given. The antiquary Stevenson, who published a full transcript of the document, placed it in 1456 and most authorities have been content to follow his dating.<sup>36</sup> But his justification does not stand up well to scrutiny. Stevenson must have been influenced by the juxtaposition of a Scottish attack on Roxburgh and the recent ending of the second protectorate. But there is no evidence of any quarrel involving Henry VI, York and Salisbury as early as June 1456. All had remained as councillors and in May York was given command of the army to resist the Scottish invasion, a task he accomplished with considerable vigour.<sup>37</sup>

The evidence for the alternative date of 1460, a year in which James began a full-scale siege of Roxburgh, is compelling. The seriousness of the quarrel between York and Salisbury and the Lancastrian regime is evident enough. Crucially, the impart of James's letter is confirmed by a number of document sources. The first is a letter of the comte de Foix written to Louis XI on 6 August 1461, shortly after the death of his father. Louis was preparing to end his exile and return to France, and the count was concerned to give him news of the French court and also recent events in the English civil war. He related how 'le duc d'York fit faire ouverture au Roi votredit pere, par le moyen de ceux d'Ecosse et autres, qu'il lui plut lui donner faveur et aide en sa querelle a l'encontre du Roi Henry'. The matter had been discussed in the French council but the decision had gone against supporting York's claim.<sup>38</sup> Secondly, an entry on the Scottish exchequer roll confirms that an agent of the duke of York, a master John Kingscot, was in Edinburgh in June 1460.<sup>39</sup> Finally the Scottish emissary Archibald Whitelaw, in a speech given to Richard III in September 1484, remarked how some twenty-five years earlier he had been sent by James II to conclude a binding treaty with Richard's father in Ireland.<sup>40</sup>

If a redating of this letter is accepted, and the evidence for it is very strong,

<sup>36</sup> *Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry VI*, ed. J. Stevenson (2 vols. in 3, Rolls Ser., 1861-4), i. 323-6. I have followed the translation given in J. H. Flemming, *England under the Lancastrians* (1921), pp. 133-4.

<sup>37</sup> Note the comments of Wolffe, p. 301: 'Until the middle of August 1456 there was no sudden change in the direction of affairs of state. York's loss of the protectorate did not mean dismissal for himself or his principal associates, Salisbury and Warwick.'

<sup>38</sup> The text of this important letter is given in C. Pineau-Duclos, *Recueil des Pièces pour servir à l'Histoire de Louis XI* (La Haye, 1747), pp. 247-8. It is discussed in C. Macrae, 'Scotland and the Wars of the Roses' (unpublished University of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1939), pp. 461-70, where the case for the alternative date of 28 June 1460 is first argued.

<sup>39</sup> *Exchequer Rolls of Scotland*, viii. 33.

<sup>40</sup> A full translation of Whitelaw's address is given by David Shotter in *The North of England in the Age of Richard III*, ed. A. J. Pollard (1996), pp. 193-9. The reference is found on p. 194: 'It is twenty-five years since I performed an ambassador's role to your illustrious father in Ireland, when a settlement was established and concluded, and confirmed by his seal and signature for himself, his heirs and successors; I brought it back for my illustrious King and Prince [James II], who was still alive then but has now ended his life of sacred memory.'

the following political context emerges. Within a matter of days of Warwick leaving Ireland, York was appealing to James II in a quarrel with Henry VI that was now said to involve the crown of England itself. The Scottish king believed that Salisbury and the others supported York on this issue. If this was correct, it is at least possible that the Calais lords had discussed the idea of York advancing his own claim to the crown in March 1460 and decided that Warwick should sail to Ireland to encourage the duke to do this. When Edward spoke of his 'grettest joye and consolacion erthly' he may then have been remembering the moment his father first advocated his right to the kingdom through legitimate inheritance, and thus the birth of the Yorkist dynasty.

This striking phrase can be no more than suggestive. The longer-term strategy agreed between York and Warwick in Ireland remains frustratingly obscure, and much was probably kept strictly secret at the time. Later Yorkist commentators were unlikely to elaborate on the matter, when the Lancastrians could be blamed for the civil war of 1460–61 because of their faithless breach of the Act of Accord and their treacherous slaying of York at Wakefield. The dramatic events that led to Edward IV's accession have to be viewed through a distorted lens, given the tainted nature of much of the surviving evidence. But Edward's grant to Warwick in the spring of 1463 reminds us that an alternative scenario exists, and deserves our careful consideration.

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*Public Record Office, DL 37/32/79*<sup>41</sup>

Edward etc. To our recevour generall of oure duchie of Lancaster for the tyme beyng, gretynge. For asmoche as we havynge tendre respect to the plentith of ese and suerte that grewe, nat onely unto us in the tyme of oure abode within oure towne of Caleys, absent oute of this oure realme, but also to the noble and famous prince of worthi memory oure right honorable ffader, whom God rest, beyng in like manner absent oute of the same in oure lande of Irlande, by the navyer of oure right dere and entirely bilovede cousin Richard erle of Warrewyk and by the power thereof. Callyng also unto oure herty remembrance the grete intollerables and excessive charges that oure saide cousyn bare and toke upon hym by the saide navyer in the saide tyme, specially for the tendre zele, love and effeccion that he bare unto oure persone and suerte and to oure saide honorable ffader and the jeopardies costly and grete viage that it liked hym to take from oure saide towne into oure saide lande to viset him there and see the state, welfare and undoubted suerte of the same oure honorable ffader and ayeinwarde from thens to oure saide towne to us with the certainte of the same welfare and suerte. Whiche was oure grettest joye and consolacion erthly. By the whiche charges oure saide cousyn, as we wele understande, for certaine and as

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reason necessary concludeth is gretly endaungered by chevisaunce of grete somes of good to him intollerable withoute our grace to him be shewede. We therfor takyng the premise, in nygh affection of oure mynde and gode grace, have graunted and graunte by thees presentes unto oure saide cousyn by way of rewarde towardes the repayment of the saide somes of money the some of MMMDiiij<sup>xx</sup> li sterlinges, to be had and perceived of the revenues of oure duchie of Lancaster by the handes of the recevour generall of the same for the tyme beyng in two yeres from the feste of Seint Michell tharchangell [29 Sept.] last passed by even porcions. Wherfor we wol and charge you that ye paye unto oure saide cousyn the saide some of MMMDiiij<sup>xx</sup> li of the revenues aforsaide. Of the whiche some we woll that by thees oure lettres ye have due allowance from tyme to tyme in youre accomptes therof to us made. Yeven etc. at Westminster the xv day of Marche the yere etc. thirde [15 March 1463].

per litteram sub signeto