NATO Mess dinner - Piracy evening - 11 Feb 2011‫‏‬ From piracy to global cooperation – A Portuguese Tale Nuno Lemos Pires1 Portuguese arrived in Macau around 1535. Portuguese traders obtained the rights to anchor ships in Macau's harbors and to carry out trading activities, though not the right to stay onshore. Around 1552–1553, they obtained temporary permission to erect storage sheds onshore, in order to dry out goods drenched by sea water and from 1557, the Portuguese established a permanent settlement by paying China an annual rent. The trade in the area, from India do Japan, and as far as Timor developed over the next decades and, at the same time, so did the threat with local Pirates in the region. During the Napoleonic Wars, there were some developments that led for further cooperation among Portugal and China that finally, in 1887, a Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed, under which China ceded the right of "perpetual occupation and government of Macau by Portugal". Let us recall the events which took place at the beginning of the XIX century when Portuguese and British troops were fighting against France in all parts of the world: In India, the Portuguese Viceroy had authority over the Governors of Mozambique, Macau and Timor. As had happened in Madeira, where British “reinforcements” had landed in 1801 and 1807, from 1808 forward some of our maritime‫ ‏‬fortresses‫ ‏‬were‫ ‏‬occupied‫ ‏‬by‫ ‏‬British‫ ‏‬Naval‫ ‏‬forces‫ ‏‬due‫ ‏‬to‫“ ‏‬possible French‫ ‏‬attacks‫ ‏‬using‫ ‏‬those‫ ‏‬locations”. The British Governor, Marquis of Wellesley‫(‏‬Arthur‫‏‬Wellesley‟s‫ –‏‬future duke of Wellington - Brother) had indeed 1 Lt. Col. PRT Army, currently assigned as Professor of Military History and International Relations at the Portuguese Military Academy in Lisbon, Portugal. He holds a BA in Human Resources Management, a degree in Military Science, a postgraduate degree in Military History, War College Diploma, and is currently a PhD candidate on History, Defence and International Relations at the ISCTE/ Lisbon´s University Institute. He has commanded at the Platoon, Company, and Battalion levels. He has also served as a Military History Professor at the Portuguese War College, as an Intelligence Officer in the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Spain, and as the Military Assistant to the Commander of NATO Joint Command Lisbon. During his military assignments he has participated in numerous overseas missions to include deployments to Mozambique, Angola, Pakistan, Ethiopia and most recently as Chief of Staff for the Portuguese Operational Mentor & Liaison Team in Kabul, Afghanistan (ISAF). He has published two books and has cooperated in dozens of books and projects, related to Military History and Strategy, written in Portuguese, Spanish and English. Additionally, LTC Lemos Pires has published many articles in academic magazines and given lectures in Portugal, Germany, Bulgaria and Spain. He is the Military Museum of Lisbon’s Secretary of the Fiscal Board, Revista Militar´s Permanent Associate, Larousse encyclopaedia’s academic reviser for military issues, Fronteira Palace Battle Room’s (Sala das Batalhas) Associate Researcher, Portuguese Commission for Military History Scientific Board’s member, Foro para el Estudio de la Historia Militar de España’s member and the Portuguese Military member for British Peninsular War 200. 1 been alerted to the French threat in that region, specifically against Goa and Bombay2. On 25 May 1808, an Anglo-Portuguese convention was signed between ViceroyCount of Sarzedas and General Governor Lord Minto and finally, in 1814, the last British soldiers left Goa. A Portuguese Goan Regiment detachment was deployed in Macao and, as in India and Madeira; British presence was noted in 1801, 1802 and 1807. In 1802, a British convoy was sent to Macao to “protect‫ ‏‬Portugal‫ ‏‬against‫ ‏‬a‫‏‬ French‫‏‬attack”.3 Due to the local Portuguese governor‟s refusal they were sent back. The Chinese government stated than that, in case of a French attack, the Portuguese should only get help from China. But in 1808, India‟s‫ ‏‬British‫‏‬ Governor‫ ‏‬sent‫ ‏‬Admiral‟s‫ ‏‬Drury‟s‫ ‏‬Fleet‫ ‏‬to‫ ‏‬Macao.‫ ‏‬Before‫ ‏‬allowing‫ ‏‬him to land, cautiously, the Portuguese Governor forced him to sign a convention. Later, 21 September 1808, 1.182 British troops landed and occupied 2 forts in Macao. However, following strong pressure from China, the British left Macao in 19 December and never came back4. In fact, the local threat there was not the French but the Pirates led by Quan-Apon-Chai that since 1807 was operating in the area. What was needed was cooperation against pirates, not against French and, China did not want, at that time, the interference of Great-Britain so, the best help British Armed Forces could do was to leave the area and trust the Portuguese ally‟s capacity to endure the fighting against local piracy. Knowing when to stay, like in the Iberian Peninsula where brave British soldiers fought side by side with the Portuguese from 1808 in Vimeiro/ Portugal to 1814 in Toulouse/France, and when to leave is a demonstration of a true alliance and GB understood than that was better to leave Macao. Was Quan-Apon-Chai‫ ‏‬a‫ ‏‬pirate?‫ ‏‬A‫ ‏‬corsair?‫ ‏‬In‫ ‏‬1785‫ ‏‬two‫ ‏‬Chinese‫ ‏‬noblemen‟s,‫‏‬ Quan-Apon-Chai and Ajuo Chai rebelled again the Chinese Emperor and seek refuge in the “Thieves Island” (or the Wanshan Archipelago)5 where many people joined them. China‟s‫ ‏‬government‫ ‏‬called‫ ‏‬them‫ ‏‬Pirates,‫ ‏‬they‫ ‏‬called‫‏‬ themselves liberators, and some could call them corsairs6... 2 PEREIRA, 2005, p. 64 and also Bessa IN in BARATA and TEIXEIRA, 2003, p. 307 “knowing Sultan Tipu’s plans in conjunction with the brave and energetic French soldier Dupliex (…) Stuart agreed being urgent Goa’s defense (…) urgency grew with the news of Napoleon’s victories in Europe. Goa, besides being an excellent operation base, was the perfect location to allow the passage of troops from Egypt towards Malabar or directly to Europe”. 3 Pereira, 2009, p. 249 4 See complete description of the events: Bessa in BARATA and TEIXEIRA, 2003, p. 315 5 The Wanshan Archipelago (which means Myriad Islands Archipelago), sometimes referred to as the Ladrões Islands (from the Portuguese - Thieves Islands), is a 104-island archipelago that is part of Zhuhai Municipality in Guangdong Province. 6 “piracy as a phenomenon of political opposition or lawlessness” BENTON, 2009, P. 701 2 The‫ ‏‬piracy‫ ‏‬activity‫ ‏‬grew‫ ‏‬in‫ ‏‬the‫ ‏‬next‫ ‏‬years‫ ‏‬and‫ ‏‬in‫ ‏‬1807‫ ‏‬Chai‟s‫ ‏‬pirates‫ ‏‬were‫ ‏‬a‫‏‬ threat against China‟s‫ ‏‬mainland and Macao. The local Chinese province‟s governor‫“ ‏‬vice-Roy”‫ ‏‬prepared‫ ‏‬an‫ ‏‬80‫“ ‏‬war‫ ‏‬junks7”‫ ‏‬fleet against the pirates but didn‟t‫ ‏‬get‫ ‏‬any‫ ‏‬result.‫ ‏‬Chai‟s “troops”‫ ‏‬occupied River‫ ‏‬Tiger‟s‫ ‏‬mouth‫ ‏‬and‫‏‬ controlled all neighboring commerce channels. Chai was now in control of all the islands and part of the mainland and had more than 600 taos, junks (and thousands of lorchas8) divided into two separate fleets. The threat spread from‫ ‏‬sea‫ ‏‬to‫ ‏‬land‫ ‏‬and‫ ‏‬Chai‟s‫ ‏‬influence‫ ‏‬reached some of the major provinces: Quang-Tong, Quang-Si, Fokien and Chinchen; his action went as far as the centre of China where governmental troops were often defeated against‫‏‬Chai‟s‫“‏‬pirates”. In 1807 some Portuguese ships were also attacked near Macao and in 1808, the new Portuguese governor, Captain-General José Lucas de Alvarenga, decided to take action: he appointed a fleet commander and with 3 new ships they went to sea on February 1809 and had the first battle,‫‏‬against‫‏‬200‫‏‬Chai‟s‫‏‬ ships, on 15 that same month, and won. The‫ ‏‬news‫ ‏‬of‫ ‏‬Chai‟s‫ ‏‬first‫ ‏‬defeat‫ ‏‬leads Chinese government to seek further cooperation with Portuguese authorities. A protocol was signed in November 1809 and a combined fleet was formed with 6 Portuguese ships and 60 Chinese junks with 18.000 troops. Chai fought major battles against the Portuguese fleet, on 29 November, 11 December, 4 and 21 January, but lost all of them and in February 1810 Chai capitulated to the Portuguese Captain-General and as a result, later on the 21st February, Quan-Apon-Chai accepted China‟s Emperor‟s authority and integrated his fleet into the Imperial Chinese Fleet. At 20 April 1810, Chai‫ ‏‬fleet‟s‫ ‏‬formal surrender to Portuguese and Chinese authorities took place: 280 ships, 2.000 artillery guns and 30.000 troops. Later Chai was reintegrated as Chief Admiral of the Chinese Fleet. From that moment on, China and Portugal strengthen the relations and cooperation grew and developed. Piracy led to confrontation but also to cooperation, and from cooperation, increased and enlarged relations grew among Portuguese and Chinese, Portugal and Great Britain. By the international pressure done by China the British had to leave the Portuguese Fortresses in Macao trusting that his oldest ally would take care of the problem, and they did. Fighting piracy also lead to regional security, peace and stability. 7 Chinese flat bottom ship with a high poop and battened sails 8 kind of light vessel having the hull built on a European model, and the rigging like that of a Chinese junk 3 Now back to 2011, looking at the future, we could argue that because‫‏‬of‫“‏‬new”‫‏‬ Piracy new forms of cooperation could be found. Taking into consideration the lessons learned from this Old Portuguese tale, and in a non-academic, more as a wishful thinking method, please allow me to offer some thoughts for discussion: 1. Corsairs, mercenaries and Pirates – again a difficult distinction in our days; who is a corsair? Who are the soldiers/sailormen and who are the mercenaries9? Who is the Pirate and who supports who10? As in the old times, Pirates can bring money into countries and regions and feel some degree of protection from some kind of authorities; 2. Pirates and global threats – where there is trade you can find pirates, a common threat for the entire world, meaning the need to get global action against them; it forces cooperation among international organizations, enterprises and countries, by giving rise to a challenge that provides for increased forms of cooperation11; 3. Pirates and a new global order12 – Because of Pirates we all need new laws, new doctrines and new organizations, could it mean a new world order? 4. Counter-insurgency at sea – Small ships against heavily, powerful ships, it is not war among the people but it is an asymmetric threat13 in international waters, what can we learn from land do sea and from sea to land14? 9 “Military outsourcing is making headlines, but it didn't begin in Iraq. Private contractors played a key role in winning American independence (…) during the Revolution, US Congress, unable to launch an effective navy of its own, licensed approximately 1,700 privately owned warships to roam the ocean in quest of British prizes” PATTON, 2008, p.31 10 “As long as there have been pirates, there have also been active and passive co-conspirators in their misdeeds who have succeeded in hiding them, nurturing them, financing them and encouraging them” PUCHALA, 2005, p. 10 11 “Pirates are the central characters in a story about the mutual influence of Atlantic legal politics and Mughal-European relations (…)uncomplicated role of oceans as forces of global integration in the early modern world” BENTON, 2009, P. 701 12 “One lesson to be drawn from the history of piracy is that a more diverse set of political and social actors structured global legal interactions (…)Inter-imperial rivalries encompassed a global politics in which the legal strategies of other polities mattered and in which patterns of legal interaction were shaped by both the policies of states and the strategies of a wide variety of legal agents, including pirates” BENTON, 2009, P. 723-724 13 “pirates usually have been demonstrated masters at what would today be called ‘asymmetric warfare’. Their assaults maximize their advantages by exploiting their victims’ vulnerabilities” PUCHALA, 2005, p. 10 14 “Most piracy incidents worldwide take place near fragile or failed states, where there are weak state structures and ungoverned territories. These areas include Somalia, Nigeria, the Indian subcontinent and areas in the south China sea ” WILJK, 2010, p. 40 4  5. Pirates15 and the Sea - For too long now, countries like Portugal and UK forgot how important the sea really is. Political speeches talk about the priority of exploring sea opportunities but so little has been done; cooperating against pirates may lead to increased cooperation and to better make use of the sea, because, we are nations from and for the sea, and should become more so, more sea-nations, in the future. “For many reasons,‫ ‏‬then,‫ ‏‬the‫ ‏‬successive‫„ ‏‬wars‫ ‏‬on‫ ‏‬piracy‟‫ ‏‬might‫ ‏‬have‫ ‏‬been‫‏‬ fought more effectively and expeditiously had governments been able to agree that a common menace superseded their political differences”16 15 “piracy throve historically on dissension and rivalry among states” PUCHALA, 2005, p. 20 16 PUCHALA, 2005, p. 20 5  BIBLIOGRAPHY BARATA, Themudo e TEIXEIRA, Nuno Severiano, NOVA HISTÓRIA MILITAR DE PORTUGAL, Lisboa, Círculo de Leitores, 2003; BENTON, Laura – LEGAL SPACES OF EMPIRE LEGAL SPACES OF EMPIRE: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism, (2009), New York University Press FERREIRA, Margarida Nóbrega, PIRACY IN THE XXI CENTURY, Lisboa, ISCTE, 2010; PATTON, Robert H - PIRATES OF THE REVOLUTION, American History, June 2008; PEREIRA, José Rodrigues, CAMPANHAS NAVAIS, VOL I & II, Lisboa, Tribuna, 2005; PEREIRA, José Rodrigues, GRANDES BATALHAS NAVAIS PORTUGUESAS, Lisboa, Esfera dos Livros, 2009 PUCHALA, Donald, J - OF PIRATES AND TERRORISTS: What Experience and History Teach, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.26, No.1, pp.1–24, April 2005 WIJK, Rob , ANDERSON, David M. and HAINES, Steven, Forum: THE NEW PIRACY: THREE CONTEXTS, Survival, 52: 1, 39 — 54, 2010 6