Kevin -

Not an analysis at all, really. I was trying to point out that at the tactical level (not grand tactical) there are a number of parallels and that applying consistent standards would require that either the commanding general was credited with the victory in both cases or that neither should be. Certainly Moreau would be credited with a defeat had he lost!

As for the grand tactical level, Napoleon clearly is Moreau's superior IMO, having a much better grasp of the big picture, and there I think we're in complete agreement. Moreau seems to have been a difficult subordinate, but most of the old revolutionary generals who were accustomed to having a free hand to direct their own operations with only loose guidelines from paris would have been tough to manage. Were the roles reversed, I would expect Napoleon to be a difficult subordinate to manage. In fact, I recall Napoleon getting orders from Paris directing him to detach a portion of his command to Kellerman in 1796. He pitched a fit, and refused to do it. In 1800 we have Paris directing Moreau to detach a large portion of his command to another general and he is similarly reluctant. For that I see a general focused on his own limited front and not viewing the big picture - also a good bit of distrust of centralized direction which wouldn't be surprising considering the experience of the preceding decade.

From my reading of the situation, Moreau viewed his army as being essential for the defence of France (note focus on defence, not the destruction of the enemy army). He felt that risking it by placing it on the rear of the enemy (and the enemy therefore on his own rear) as Napoleon wanted him to do constituted an unacceptable risk that would leave the frontiers of France exposed and undefended in the event of failure. It's not an unreasonable fear, but it definitely highlights the difference in style between Moreau and Bonaparte. The one is cautious and methodical, the other goes for big risk/big gain. We're definitely in agreement on the differences in approach as well. Although in all fairness to Moreau, I'm not sure that Napoleon's methods were as clearly "correct" in the context of early 1800 as they seem to us. We have quite a few more case studies that prove Napoleon's grand tactical methods to be extremely effective. In spring 1800 the Napoleonic maneuver on the rear had not been attempted on so large a scale yet, so I'm hesitant to regard Moreau's caution as being "overcautious."

Had Moreau lost at Hohenlinden, he would have fallen back on his LOC. No great disaster there. Worst case (in the event his army is completely mauled) he falls back to the line of the Rhine as in 1796 or 1799. Not likely the Austrians could have pierced the Rhine line with the forces they had, although they might have been able to make a grab for Zurich again. However, had Moreau maneuvered aroudn the rear of the Austrians as Napoleon had originally intended and then lost, the results would have been far more dire. Moreau wants to minimize risk, Napoleon wants to maximize potential gain. Fundamental difference in priority.

Regards,

Robert Goetz