

# RAMPART JOURNAL

OF INDIVIDUALIST THOUGHT

<b>The Wisdom of "Hindsight" by <i>Read Bain</i> .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>On the Importance of Revisionism for Our Time by <i>Murray N. Rothbard</i> .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Revisionism: A Key to Peace by <i>Harry Elmer Barnes</i> .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Rising Germanophobia: The Chief Obstacle to Current World War II Revisionism by <i>Michael F. Connors</i> .....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Revisionism and the Cold War, 1946-1966: Some Comments on Its Origins and Consequences by <i>James J. Martin</i> .....</b>	<b>91</b>

## Departments:

<b>On the Other Hand by <i>Robert LeFevre</i> .....</b>	<b>114</b>
---	------------

Vol. II, No. 1

SPRING, 1966

# RAMPART JOURNAL of Individualist Thought

Editor ..... Ruth Dazey

Director of Publications ..... J. Dohn Lewis

Published by Pine Tree Press for

RAMPART COLLEGE

Box 158

Larkspur, Colorado 80118

President ..... William J. Froh

Dean ..... Robert LeFevre

## Board of Academic Advisers

Robert L. Cunningham, Ph.D.

University of San Francisco  
San Francisco, California

Arthur A. Ekirch, Ph.D.

State University of New York  
Albany, New York

Georg Frostenson, Ph.D.

Sollentuna, Sweden

J. P. Hamilius, Jr., Ph.D.

College of Esch-sur-Alzette  
Luxembourg

F. A. Harper, Ph.D.

Institute for Humane Studies  
Stanford, California

F. A. von Hayek, Ph.D.

University of Freiburg  
Freiburg, Germany

W. H. Hutt, B.Com.

University of Virginia  
Charlottesville, Virginia

Arthur Kemp, Ph.D.

Claremont Men's College  
Claremont, California

Bruno Leoni, Ph.D.

University of Pavia  
Turin, Italy

James J. Martin, Ph.D.

Rampart College Graduate School  
Larkspur, Colorado

Ludwig von Mises, Ph.D.

New York University  
New York, New York

Toshio Murata, M.B.A.

Kanto Gakuin University  
Yokohama, Japan

Wm. A. Paton, Ph.D.

University of Michigan  
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Sylvester Petro, LL.M.

New York University  
New York, New York

Hans F. Sennholz, Ph.D.

Grove City College  
Grove City, Pennsylvania

Louis M. Spadaro, Ph.D.

Fordham University  
New York, New York

V. Orval Watts, Ph.D.

Northwood Institute  
Midland, Michigan

---

The RAMPART JOURNAL of Individualist Thought is published quarterly (March, June, September and December) by Rampart College. Second class postage paid at Boulder, Colorado.

Regular subscriptions are \$7.50 per year (four issues). Student rates of \$5.00 per year are available to full-time students. Single copies are \$2.00. (Quantity rates available on request.)

All manuscripts submitted for publication will receive prompt and careful attention from the editorial staff. No responsibility can be assumed for returning manuscripts unless the sender encloses a self-addressed, stamped envelope.

Please address all inquiries to the RAMPART JOURNAL, Box 158, Larkspur, Colorado 80118.

The RAMPART JOURNAL  
is a platform for rational statement  
and sound scholarship  
in the field of individualist thought.

Conflicting opinions, positions, and conclusions presented in the pages of the RAMPART JOURNAL are those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the college, its board, its editor, or publisher.

New manuscripts are welcomed by the editor.

## Revisionist Issue

The Spring, 1966 issue of the RAMPART JOURNAL of Individualist Thought is devoted to revisionism. The assistance of Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes in the compilation of this material is gratefully acknowledged. Current world conditions point up the value of revisionism. As Dr. Barnes has commented, revisionism is "an honest search for historical truth and the discrediting of misleading myths that may be a barrier to peace and goodwill among nations."

Reprints of articles are available for quantity orders. Write for information, specifying the article.

RAMPART JOURNAL    BOX 158    Larkspur, Colorado 80118



# The Wisdom of “Hindsight”

by Read Bain

Professor emeritus of sociology at Miami University in Ohio, Dr. Read Bain has been a strong supporter of revisionist attitudes in sociology, history, and international relations. He was editor of the *American Sociological Review* (1937-1941) and is the author and editor of numerous books, notably *Fields and Methods of Sociology*; *Critiques of Research in Social Science* (three volumes); and *Marriage and the Family* (contributor).

Dr. Bain earned his Ph.D. degree at the University of Michigan in 1926, and received an LL.D. from Willamette University in 1941.

Valid historical judgments must be based on competent historical research. This is possible only after historical events have occurred. All “history” written at the time it is “being made” tends to be special pleading—and much that is written thereafter has the same character.

In this sense, all history is “revisionistic.” Sound judgments depend upon the perspective of time, the impartial analysis of all documentary and other evidence, and the events that follow from the policies, actions, and events that are the data of history. The present historical interpretations of the Civil War and World War I are good examples—and the story is far from complete in both cases.

World War II is no exception. It will take historians many years to arrive at a fairly objective account and evaluation of what happened from 1930 to 1960, as it did for the period 1830-1860—even if we escape a post-1960 holocaust far more destructive to the world than the 1861-1865 tragedy was to the United States.

Therefore, it is highly important that the “revisionist historians” of World War II be given every opportunity to find out what actually went on in the “minds” of the leaders in all countries and what plans and decisions actually were made, and if possible, why they were made. This requires access to all documents and other evidence, adequate financing, and uncensored publication. Full knowledge of all relevant facts is necessary for an impartial and objective analysis and evaluation. Competent historians and social scientists

are our best bets for such a task; politicians, publicists, preachers, and "patriots" are the worst. The early completion of such a research program may make the difference between "peace" and catastrophe in the next generation.

Such research will inevitably destroy much mythical and wishful thinking born in the passion of the moment from the ignorance and self-interest of actors and publicists in high places. Valid historical and social science research is the difference between "propaganda" and science. It will be charged that the findings of such research is "hindsight" rather than wisdom, but all "wisdom" is the result of proper analysis and evaluation of previous events. The "lessons of experience" may lead to wiser action in subsequent similar situations.

"Hindsight" now indicates that our interests would have been better served if we had permitted Germany and Russia to "bleed each other white" in World War II. Whichever power-structure survived would have been so weakened by the struggle that it could have been no serious menace to "the free world" for many years. Certainly our position would have been no worse than it is at present—convinced as we are that our erstwhile deadly Nazi enemies, Germany and Japan, must be rearmed (and democratized) to help us withstand the menace of the colossus we ourselves did so much to create. We are now a garrison state in a garrison world—and the secret vaults of the garrisons are filled with weapons whose destructive power is beyond human imagination.

If this is a sound judgment now, in the light of "hindsight," it is certain that serious errors of policy and action produced the situation in which we find ourselves. These errors should be studied and assessed in order to train ourselves for more realistic judgments in the future. The wisdom of "hindsight" may save us from disaster in confronting the dangers of the present and the near-future that is so relentlessly rushing upon us.

Therefore, revisionist studies of prewar, wartime, and post-World War II history should be prosecuted with all possible intensity and dispatch. This is one of the most important tasks to which students of collective behavior can address themselves. Such studies should be widely circulated and should be read by all. If democratic societies are to survive, their peoples must rapidly acquire sufficient social intelligence to recognize and face facts, analyze them realistically, and act accordingly. If thought-control is evil in totalitarian states, it is doubly dangerous and doubly damnable in democracies.



# On The Importance of Revisionism For Our Time

by Murray N. Rothbard

Dr. Rothbard received his doctorate in economics from Columbia University. A consulting economist and historian, his published works include: *What Has Government Done to Our Money?* (1964), *America's Great Depression* (1963), *Man, Economy and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles* (two volumes, 1962), *The Panic of 1819: Reactions and Policies* (1962). He has contributed numerous articles to such publications as the *American Economic Review*; *American Political Science Review*; *Journal of the History of Ideas*; *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, and the RAMPART JOURNAL of *Individualist Thought*. He is currently an editor of the tri-annual journal, *Left and Right*.

Revisionism as applied to World War II and its origins (as also for previous wars) has the general function of bringing historical truth to an American and a world public that had been drugged by wartime lies and propaganda. This, in itself, is a virtue. But *some* truths of history, of course, may be largely of antiquarian interest, with little relevance to present-day concerns. This is not true of World War II revisionism, which has much critical significance for today's world.

The *least* of the lessons that revisionism can teach has already been thoroughly learned: that Germany and Japan are not uniquely "aggressor nations," doomed from birth to menace the peace of the world. The larger lessons have, unfortunately, yet to be learned. The United States is again being subjected to that "complex of fear and vaunting" (in the brilliant phrase of Garet Garrett's) which drove us, and the Western world, into two other disastrous wars in our century. Once again, the American public is being subjected to a nearly unanimous barrage of war propaganda and war hysteria, so that only the most searching and rational can keep their heads. Once again, we find that there has emerged upon the scene an Enemy, a Bad Guy, with the same old Bad Guy characteristics that

we have heard of before; a diabolic, monolithic Enemy, which, generations ago in some "sacred texts," decided (for reasons that remain obscure) that it was "out to conquer the world."

Since then, the Enemy, darkly, secretly, diabolically, has "plotted," conspiratorially, to conquer the world, building up a vast and mighty and overwhelming military machine, and also constructing a mighty international and "subversive" "fifth column," which functions as an army of mere puppets, agents of the Enemy's central headquarters, ready to commit espionage, sabotage, or any other act of "undermining" other states. The Enemy, then, is "monolithic," ruled solely and strictly from the top, by a few master rulers, and is dominated always by the single purpose of world conquest. The model to keep in mind is Dr. Fu Manchu, here trotted forward as an international bogeyman.

The Enemy, then, says the war propaganda, is guided by but one purpose: conquest of the world. He never suffers from such human emotions as fear—fear that *we* might attack *him*—or belief that he is acting in defense, or out of self-respect and the desire to save face before himself as well as before others. Neither does he possess such human qualities as reason.

No, there is only one other emotion that can sway him: superior force will compel him to "back down." This is because, even though a Fu Manchu, he is also like the Bad Guy in the movie Western: he will cower before the Good Guy if the Good Guy is strong, armed to the teeth, resolute of purpose, etc. Hence, the complex of fear and vaunting: fear of the supposedly implacable and permanent plotting of the Enemy; vaunting of the enormous military might of America and its meddling throughout the world, to "contain," "roll back," etc., the Enemy, or to "liberate" the "oppressed nations."

Now revisionism teaches us that this entire myth, so prevalent then and even now about Hitler, and about the Japanese, is a tissue of fallacies from beginning to end. Every plank in this nightmare evidence is either completely untrue or not entirely the truth. If people should learn this intellectual fraud about Hitler's Germany, then they will begin to ask questions, and searching questions, about the current World War III version of the same myth. Nothing would stop the current headlong flight to war faster, or more surely cause people to begin to reason about foreign affairs once again, after a long orgy of emotion and cliché.

For the same myth is now based on the same old fallacies. And this is seen by the increasing use that the Cold Warriors have been

making of the "Munich myth": the continually repeated charge that it was the "appeasement" of the "aggressor" at Munich that "fed" his "aggression" (again, the Fu Manchu, or Wild Beast, comparison), and that caused the "aggressor," drunk with his conquests, to launch World War II. This Munich myth has been used as one of the leading arguments against any sort of rational negotiations with the Communist nations, and the stigmatizing of even the most harmless search for agreement as "appeasement." It is for this reason that A. J. P. Taylor's magnificent *Origins of the Second World War* received probably its most distorted and frenetic review in the pages of *National Review*.

It is about time that Americans learn: that Bad Guys (Nazis or Communists) may not necessarily want or desire war, or be out to "conquer" the world (their hope for "conquest" may be strictly ideological and not military at all); that Bad Guys may also fear the possibility of *our* use of our enormous military might and aggressive posture to *attack* them; that both the Bad Guys and Good Guys may have common interests which make negotiation possible (e.g., that neither wants to be annihilated by nuclear weapons); that *no* organization is a "monolith," and that "agents" are often simply ideological allies who can and do split with their supposed "masters"; and that, finally, we may learn the most profound lesson of all: that the domestic policy of a government is often no index whatever to its foreign policy.

We are still, in the last analysis, suffering from the delusion of Woodrow Wilson: that "democracies" *ipso facto* will never embark on war, and that "dictatorships" are always prone to engage in war. Much as we may and do abhor the domestic programs of most dictators (and certainly of the Nazis and Communists), this has no necessary relation to their foreign policies: indeed, many dictatorships have been passive and static in history, and, contrariwise, many democracies have led in promoting and waging war. Revisionism may, once and for all, be able to destroy this Wilsonian myth.

There is only one real difference between the capacity of a democracy and a dictatorship to wage war: democracies invariably engage much more widely in deceptive war propaganda, to whip up and persuade the public. Democracies that wage war need to produce much more propaganda to whip up their citizens, and at the same time to camouflage their policies much more intensely in hypocritical moral cant to fool the voters. The lack of need for this

on the part of dictatorships often makes their policies *seem* superficially to be more warlike, and this is one of the reasons why they have had a "bad press" in this century. The task of revisionism has been to penetrate beneath these superficialities and appearances to the stark realities underneath—realities which show, certainly in this century, the U.S., Great Britain, and France—the three great "democracies"—to be worse than any other three countries in fomenting and waging aggressive war. Realization of this truth would be of incalculable importance on the current scene.

Conservatives should not need to be reminded of the flimsiness of the "democratic" myth; we are familiar now with the concept of "totalitarian democracy," of the frequent propensity of the masses to tyrannize over minorities. If conservatives can see this truth in domestic affairs, why not in foreign?

There are many other, more specific but also important, lessons that revisionism can teach us. The Cold War, as well as World Wars I and II, has been launched by the Western democracies so as to meddle in the affairs of Eastern Europe. The great power-fact about Eastern Europe is that the smaller nations there are fated to be under the dominance, friendly or otherwise, of Germany and/or Russia.

In World War I, the U.S. and Britain went to war partly to help Russia expand into the part of Eastern Europe then dominated by Austria-Hungary and Germany. This act of meddling on our part, at the cost of untold lives, both West and East, and of an enormous increase in militarism, statism, and socialism at home, led to a situation in Eastern Europe which brought the U.S. and Britain into World War II, to keep *Germany* from dominating Eastern Europe.

As soon as World War II was over (with its enormous consequent increase in statism, militarism, and socialism in the U.S.), the U.S. and Britain felt they had to launch a Cold War to oust Russia from the dominance over Eastern Europe which it had obtained as a natural consequence of the joint defeat of Germany. How much longer is the United States to play with the fate of the American people, or even the human race itself, for the sake of imposing a solution of our own liking on Eastern Europe? And if we should wage a holocaust to "destroy communism," and there should (doubtfully) be any Americans remaining, how distinguishable from communism will the American system, in reality, be?

There have been two major facets to the Cold War: trying to establish U.S. and British hegemony over Eastern Europe, and

attempting to suppress nationalist revolutions that would take undeveloped countries outside of the Western imperialist orbit. Here again, revisionism of World War II has important lessons to teach us today. For in World War I, England, backed by the United States, went to war against Germany to try to hobble an important commercial competitor which had started late in the imperialist game. Before World Wars I and II, Britain and France tried to preserve their imperialist domination as against the "have-not" nations Germany and Japan that came late in the imperialist race. And now, after World War II, the United States has assumed the imperialist sceptre from the weakened hands of Britain and France. Revisionism thus provides us with the insight that America has now become the world colossus of imperialism, propping up puppet and client states all over the undeveloped areas of the world, and fiercely attempting to suppress nationalist revolutions that would take these countries out of the American imperial orbit.

As Garet Garrett also said: "We have crossed the boundary that lies between republic and empire." Communism having allied itself with the immensely popular movements of national liberation against imperialism, the United States, in the hypocritical name of "freedom," is now engaged in the logical conclusion of its Cold War policy: attempting to exterminate a whole nation in Viet Nam to make very sure that *they* are rather dead than Red—and to preserve American imperial rule.

All these lessons revisionism has to teach us. For revisionism, in the final analysis, is based on truth and rationality. Truth and rationality are always the first victims in any war frenzy; and they are, therefore, once again an extremely rare commodity on today's "market." Revisionism brings to the artificial frenzy of daily events and day-to-day propaganda, the cool but in the last analysis glorious light of historical truth. Such truth is almost desperately needed in today's world.

# Revisionism: A Key To Peace

by Harry Elmer Barnes

Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes is internationally recognized as a pioneer revisionist historian.

Of his work on the First World War, as a whole, the English scholar, George Peabody Gooch, wrote: "No other American scholar has done so much to familiarize his countrymen with the new evidence and to compel them to revise their wartime judgments in the light of this new material."

Dr. Barnes has inspired, edited, or promoted most of the important books which have appeared on World War II revisionism in the United States, and some by European authors. The book, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (1953), which he edited, and to which he contributed, was hailed by Raymond Moley as the "most solid of books recently published on our foreign policy."

Dr. Barnes received his Ph.D. degree from Columbia University, and has taught history and historical sociology at Syracuse University, Barnard College, Columbia University, Clark University, Smith College, Amherst College, Temple University, the University of Colorado, the University of Indiana, and Washington State University.

Among his historical writings are: *The History of Western Civilization* (2 vols., 1935), and *An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World* (1937). His chief works in the field of diplomatic history and international relations are *The Genesis of the World War* (1926); *In Quest of Truth and Justice* (1928); and *World Politics in Modern Civilization* (1930).

## I. Revisionism in Historical Writing

During the last forty years, revisionism has become a controversial term. To so-called revisionists, it implies an honest search for historical truth and the discrediting of misleading myths that may be a barrier to peace and goodwill among nations. In the minds of anti-revisionists, the term often savors of mendacity, deviousness, malice, vindictiveness, and an unholy desire to smear the saviors of mankind. Actually, revisionism means nothing more or less than

the effort to revise the historical record in the light of a more complete collection of historical facts, a more calm political atmosphere, and a more objective attitude.

In its origins, revisionism dates from the beginnings of historical writing in ancient oriental times in the historical books of the Bible. These were written and repeatedly revised over many centuries and it required about a century of study by expert biblical scholars in modern times to separate, however imperfectly, the original text from subsequent revisions. In the European tradition, historical writing starts with the Greeks, and the first true historian here was Hecataeus of Miletus (b. 500 B.C.), who is known chiefly as a revisionist of traditional Greek tales about Hellenic origins. As he put it: "What I write here is the account which I considered to be true: for the stories of the Greeks are numerous, and in my opinion ridiculous." The greatest scholar among Greek historians, Polybius, in his searching revisionist criticism of the use of sources by the Greek antiquarian, Timaeus, was the first to lay down the fundamental principles of critical historical research and scholarship.

In the period of the Renaissance and humanism, Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457) exposed the forged "Donation of Constantine," which was a cornerstone of the papal claim to secular power, and he later called attention to the unreliable methods of Livy in dealing with early Roman history. Much of the historical writing during the Reformation and counter-Reformation was revisionist in nature, although often more heated than scholarly. In the cooperative work known as the *Magdeburg Centuries*, the Protestant historians attacked the accepted historical documents and dogmas of the Catholic church, and this was answered with equal revisionist vigor by Cardinal Baronius in his *Ecclesiastical Annals*. Revisionism has played a prominent role in historical writing from this time to the latest discussions of the causes of the Second World War.

Revisionism has been most frequently and effectively applied to correcting the historical record relative to wars because truth is always the first war casualty, the emotional disturbances and distortions in historical writing are greatest in wartime, and both the need and the material for correcting historical myths are most evident and profuse in connection with wars.

Revisionism was applied to the American Revolution many years ago. Beginning with the writings of men like George Louis Beer, and completed by the monumental work of Lawrence H. Gipson, it was shown that the British commercial policy toward the colonies

was not as harsh and lawless as it had been portrayed by George Bancroft and others among the early ultrapatriotic historians. Others demonstrated that the British measures imposed on the colonies after the close of the French and Indian War were in general accord with the British constitutional system. Finally, Clarence W. Alvord made it clear that Britain was more concerned with the destiny of the area west of the Alleghenies than it was with such eastern coastwise disturbances as those connected with the Stamp Act, the Boston Massacre, and the Boston Tea Party.

The War of 1812 was similarly subjected to revisionist correction. Henry Adams revealed that Timothy Pickering and the extreme anti-war Federalists played a decisive role by indirectly encouraging the British to continue their oppressive commercial policies and their seizure of sailors on American ships that aided the American "warhawks" in leading this country into war. They misrepresented Jefferson's commercial and naval policies to an almost treasonable extent. More recently, Irving Brant, in his notable biography of Madison, has argued that Madison was not actually pushed into war against his personal convictions by Clay, Calhoun, and the "warhawks," but made the decision for war on the basis of his own beliefs.

The Mexican War has been effectively treated by revisionists. For a long time, historians who sought to correct the wartime passions of 1846 criticized Polk and the war group as rather conscienceless warmongers, impelled by political ambition, who pounced without justification upon a helpless little country. Then, in 1919, along came Justin H. Smith, who, in his *The War With Mexico*, showed that there had been plenty of arrogance, defiance, and provocation on the part of Santa Ana and the Mexicans.

While the term revisionism has been little used in connection with the writings on this period, the causes of the Civil War (War between the States) have produced even more extensive revisionist research and restatement than the causes of either World War. This was made clear in the remarkable summary of revisionist interpretations of the coming of the Civil War by Professor Howard K. Beale in 1946, set forth in chapter iii of the monograph edited by Merle E. Curti, *Theory and Practice in Historical Study*. The outcome of these scholarly efforts demonstrated that the Civil War, like General Bradley's description of the Korean War, was "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time." Hotheads on both sides brought on the war, while judicious restraint might



easily have averted the catastrophe. Charles W. Ramsdell has suggested the interesting view that Lincoln actually executed a "Pearl Harbor" by inciting the South to strike the first blow through his reinforcement of Fort Sumter, thus anticipating Roosevelt's activities in all but forcing the Japanese to launch the Pacific War on December 7, 1941.

Professor William A. Dunning and his seminar students at Columbia University rigorously applied revisionism to the aftermath of the Civil War and the vindictive reconstruction measures piloted through Congress by Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens. Their verdict was approved and popularized in Claude Bowers' book on *The Tragic Era*. Beginning in the 1930's a reaction set in against the revisionism by Dunning and his students. Today, under the leadership of historians such as Kenneth M. Stampp and T. Harry Williams, this reaction brands the interpretation of reconstruction by the Dunning school as a "myth." According to this revision of Dunning's revisionism, the northern radical Republicans, led by Stevens and Sumner, and the Negro leaders in the South were patriotic defenders of democracy and racial justice.

Revisionist historians soon tackled the propaganda concerning the Spanish-American War which had been fomented by Hearst and Pulitzer and showed how McKinley, with the Spanish concessions to his demands in his pocket, concealed the Spanish capitulation from Congress and demanded war. Further research has revealed that there is no conclusive evidence whatever that the Spanish sank the battleship "Maine," and has shown that Theodore Roosevelt quite illegally started the war by an unauthorized order to Admiral Dewey to attack the Spanish fleet at Manila while Secretary Long was out of his office. The best revisionist presentation of the Spanish-American War was provided by Walter Millis in his *The Martial Spirit* (1931). Julius H. Pratt and others have exposed the irresponsible warmongering of the "warhawks" of 1898, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Albert J. Beveridge, and indicated the primary responsibility of Admiral Mahan for the expansionist philosophy upon which this rise of American imperialism was based.

Hence, long before the Austrian archduke was assassinated by Serbian plotters on June 28, 1914, revisionism had an impressive history and had been brought to bear on all the important wars in which the United States had been engaged. Applied abroad to the Franco-Prussian War, it clearly proved that the initiative lay with

France rather than Bismarck and the Prussians. But it was the First World War which brought the term revisionism into general use.

## II. Revisionism and the First World War

It is usually held that revisionism in connection with the First World War began a few years after the armistice of November, 1918, but Harry Paxton Howard has done well to point out that it started *during* the war: "Actually, in the literal sense of the word, the biggest job of *revising* history was done during the First World War when our 'histories' were completely revised to show that Germany had always been our enemy, that Germany had started the war in 1914, that Germany had even started the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, and that in the Revolutionary War we had not really been fighting the British but the Hessians—not to mention such things as the Germans cutting the hands off Belgian babies, instead of the Belgians cutting off the hands of Congolese. This was a real revision of our histories which has distorted the American mind for over fifty years."

By 1914, the new methods of communication, mass journalism, and greater mastery of propaganda techniques enabled the combatants to whip up popular opinion and mass hatred as never before in the history of warfare. Jonathan French Scott's *Five Weeks* revealed how the European press stirred up violent hatreds in July, 1914. The intensity of feeling in the United States has been recalled in an impressive manner in H. C. Peterson's *Opponents of War, 1917-1918*. As C. Hartley Grattan, the present writer, and others, have pointed out, the historians scrambled on the propaganda bandwagon with great alacrity and vehemence after April, 1917. It was almost universally believed that Germany was entirely responsible not only for the outbreak of war in 1914 but also for American entry in April, 1917. Anyone who publicly doubted this popular dogma was in danger of the tar bucket or worse. Eugene Debs was imprisoned by Wilson, who had proclaimed the war to be one to make the world safe for democracy. Debs' crime was a statement that the war had a primarily economic basis, precisely what Wilson himself declared in a speech on September 5, 1919.

There is no space here to go into the scope and nature of revisionist studies on the causes of the First World War. We can only illustrate the situation by citing a few of the outstanding myths

and indicating the manner in which they were disposed of by revisionists.

The most damaging allegation brought against Germany was the charge that the kaiser called together a crown council of the leading German government officials, ambassadors, and financiers on July 5, 1914, revealed to them that he was about to throw Europe into war, and told them to get ready for the conflict. The financiers demanded two weeks' delay so as to be able to call in loans and sell securities. The kaiser acceded to this demand, and left the next day on a well-publicized vacation cruise. This was designed to lull England, France, and Russia into a false sense of security while Germany and Austria-Hungary secretly got ready to leap upon an unprepared and unsuspecting Europe. The first complete statement of these apparently damaging assertions appeared in *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, which was ghost-written by a leading American journalist, Burton J. Hendrick.

Professor Sidney B. Fay, the leading American revisionist dealing with the outbreak of war in 1914, proved from the available documents in 1920 that this crown council legend was a complete myth. Some of the persons alleged to have been at the council meeting were not in Berlin at the time. The kaiser's actual attitude on July 5th was completely at variance with that portrayed in the legend, and there was no such financial action as was implied. But it was a long time before it was revealed how Mr. Morgenthau got this story. It was known that he was an honorable man, and not even the most severe critics of the myth charged that he had deliberately concocted and disseminated a lie of such proportions and profound implications.

Many years later, Paul Schwarz, who was the personal secretary to the German ambassador in Constantinople, Baron Hans von Wangenheim, revealed the facts. Von Wangenheim had a mistress in Berlin and, in the early days of the crisis of 1914, she demanded that he return at once to Berlin to settle some critical matters with her. He complied and, to conceal from his wife the real reason for his making the trip, he told her that the kaiser had suddenly summoned him to Berlin. On his return, he told his wife about the fanciful crown council that he had dreamed up. Shortly after this, with his wife by his side, von Wangenheim met Morgenthau, then the American ambassador at Constantinople, at a diplomatic reception. Morgenthau had heard about von Wangenheim's trip to Berlin

and inquired of him as to what had happened. Under the circumstances, von Wangenheim was under pressure to repeat the myth he had told his wife. To what extent liquor may have stimulated his imagination or lessened his restraint, and how much Morgenthau and Hendrick elaborated on what von Wangenheim actually told Morgenthau, are not known and probably never will be.

This fantastic tale, created out of whole cloth, both indicates the need for revisionism and demonstrates how momentous and tragic events may hang on the most palpable fabrications. Since Morgenthau's book did not appear until 1918, the recency and sensational nature of his tale about the fictitious crown council had a great influence upon Allied propaganda against Germany at the end of the war. It was used in Lloyd George's campaign of 1918 advocating the hanging of the kaiser and exploited by the more vindictive makers of the Treaty of Versailles. It is quite possible that, otherwise, the latter would never have been able to write the fateful war-guilt clause into the treaty. Since historians are agreed that it was the Treaty of Versailles which prepared the way for the Second World War, the harebrained von Wangenheim alibi of July, 1914, may have had some direct relation to the sacrifice of millions of lives and astronomical expenditures of money in the wars since 1939, with the possibility that the ultimate consequences may be the extermination of much of the human race through nuclear warfare.

Another item which was used to inflame opinion against the Germans was their invasion of Belgium. The Allied propaganda presented this as the main reason for the entry of England into the war and the final proof of the charge that the Germans had no regard for international law or the rights of small nations. Revisionist scholars proved that the British and French had for some time been considering the invasion of Belgium in the event of a European war, and that English officers had traveled over Belgium carefully surveying the terrain against this contingency. Further, the Germans offered to respect the neutrality of Belgium in return for British neutrality in the war. Finally, John Burns, one of the two members of the British cabinet who resigned when Britain made the decision for war in 1914, told me personally in the summer of 1927 that the cabinet decision for war had definitely been made before a word had been said about the Belgian issue. The following year, the *Memorandum on Resignation* of the famed John Morley, the other cabinet member who resigned in 1914 as a protest

against the war policy, fully confirmed Burns' account of the matter. The facts brought forth by Burns, Morley, and others as to the myth that England decided to go to war because of the German invasion of Belgium are confirmed by the latest British book on 1914, George M. Thomson's *Twelve Days* (1964), written to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War. Thomson makes it clear that the most ardent, determined and ubiquitous British warmonger in 1914 was Winston Churchill, then first lord of the admiralty.

A third leading allegation which produced violent feelings against the Germans in the First World War was the charge that they had committed unique and brutal atrocities against civilians, especially in Belgium—mutilating children, women, and the helpless, generally. They were said to have utilized the bodies of dead German and Allied soldiers to make fertilizers and soap, and otherwise to have behaved like degraded beasts. The distinguished British publicist Lord James Bryce was induced to lend his name to the authentication of these atrocity reports. After the war, a large number of books riddled these atrocity tales, notably Sir Arthur Ponsonby's *Falsehood in Wartime*, and J. M. Read's *Atrocity Propaganda*. When Bryce was queried on this matter by the brilliant English lawyer and publicist Irene Cooper Willis, he only shrugged his shoulders and said: "You know how things go in wartime!" The First World War was no picnic but no honest and informed scholar today believes that any considerable part of the alleged atrocities actually took place, or that the Germans were any more guilty of atrocious conduct than other participants in the war.

Scholars and publicists who had been condemned to silence during the war soon sought to clear their consciences and set the record straight after the close of hostilities. Indeed, Francis Neilson anticipated many basic revisionist conclusions in his *How Diplomats Make War*, which was published in 1915 and may be regarded as the first important revisionist book on the causes of the First World War. Lord Loreburn's *How the War Came*, a scathing indictment of the English diplomats of 1914, came out at the same time that the Treaty of Versailles was drafted.

Only the briefest summary can be given here of the revisionist conclusions relative to the entry of the United States into the First World War. There had been a notable shift in the American attitude toward Germany between 1870 and 1915. At the former date, we were more friendly toward Germany than toward any other

European state, but even before war broke out in 1914 we were more hostile in our attitude toward Germany than toward any other main European country. This transformation was due in part to trade rivalries and clashes in imperialistic ventures, but even more to the fact that American news and comments concerning Germany in the decade before 1914 came primarily through the notoriously anti-German Harmsworth (Northcliffe) papers.

Woodrow Wilson, unlike Franklin D. Roosevelt, was a man who preferred peace to war. Even though Wilson's cultural sympathies with respect to foreign countries were overwhelmingly pro-British, he quite sincerely called for a neutral attitude on the part of this country and did maintain neutrality for some time after the outbreak of war. There is no doubt, in the light of the latest evidence, that he wished to mediate between the warring powers and bring the bloody conflict to an end. A conversation he had with a famous American editor, Frank I. Cobb of the *New York World*, the night before he delivered his war message on April 7, 1917, shows that even then he had much hesitation about bringing the country into war. But there were just too many persons, forces, and factors favorable to war for him to control.

Colonel House, Secretary Lansing, and Ambassador Page in London, undermined Wilson's peace efforts even to the point of sheer betrayal and insubordination. Grotesque exaggerations of alleged German atrocities in the Bryce report and elsewhere made most Americans believe that the Germans were a brutal and ruthless people. This propaganda was extended to the religious realm in the bellicose sermons of Newell Dwight Hillis and others who proclaimed the conflict to be a "holy war." Bankers who had made large loans to Britain and France encouraged American entry, as did businessmen who envisaged the large profits in producing war materiel. The sinking of the "Lusitania," which now appears to have been accomplished with the connivance of Churchill and the British authorities, helped to spur American indignation over alleged German ruthlessness. Lansing and Page made it all but impossible to keep England restrained to the international law of war, while it was insisted that Germany be held to "strict accountability." When Wilson, as Professor Link has recently revealed, made a sincere effort to mediate in Europe and bring peace right after his re-election in 1916, Lansing treacherously betrayed him by urging the Allies to insist on terms that the Germans could not accept unless they were willing to admit defeat. The Germans were left with no

alternative except unrestricted submarine warfare, which became the final rationalized justification for the decision to put the United States into the war. When the inevitable results of this policy eventuated in the Treaty of Versailles, Lansing became one of the chief critics of the situation which he had probably done more than any other American to bring about. To a very considerable extent, the war was Lansing's war rather than Wilson's.

The first American scholar thoroughly to challenge the wartime propaganda was Professor Sidney B. Fay of Smith College, who brought out a series of three striking articles in the *American Historical Review*, beginning in July, 1920. These first aroused my interest in the facts. During the war, I had accepted the anti-German propaganda; indeed, had unwittingly written some of it. While I wrote some reviews and short articles dealing with the actual causes of the First World War between 1921 and 1924, I first got thoroughly involved in the revisionist struggle when Herbert Croly of the *New Republic* induced me in March, 1924, to review at length the book of Professor Charles Downer Hazen, *Europe Since 1815*. This aroused so much controversy that George W. Ochs-Oakes, editor of the *New York Times Current History Magazine*, urged me to set forth a summary of revisionist conclusions at the time in the issue of May, 1924. This really launched the revisionist battle on the public level in the United States.

Very soon even the largest publishing houses and the best periodicals eagerly sought revisionist material for publication. Professor Fay's *Origins of the World War*, J. S. Ewart's *Roots and Causes of the Wars*, my *Genesis of the World War*, and Frederick Bausman's *Let France Explain* were the leading revisionist books on 1914 by American authors published in the United States. American revisionists found allies in Europe: Georges Demartial, Alfred Fabre-Luce, and others, in France; Friedrich Stieve, Max Montgelas, Alfred von Wegerer, Hermann Lutz, and others, in Germany; and G. P. Gooch, Raymond Beazley, and G. Lowes Dickinson, in England. Turning from the causes of war in Europe in 1914, other scholars, notably Charles C. Tansill, Walter Millis, C. Hartley Grattan, and John K. Turner told the truth about the entry of the United States into the war. Mauritz Hallgren produced the definitive indictment of American interventionist diplomacy from Wilson to Roosevelt in his *A Tragic Fallacy*.

At the outset, American revisionist writing was somewhat precarious. Professor Fay was not in peril, personally, for he wrote

in a scholarly journal which the public missed or ignored. But when I began to deal with the subject in media read by at least the upper intellectual level of the "men on the street," it was a different matter. I recall giving a lecture in Trenton, New Jersey, in the early days of revisionism and being threatened bodily by fanatics who were present. They were cowed and discouraged by the chairman of the evening, who happened to be a much respected former governor of New Jersey. Even in the autumn of 1924, a rather scholarly audience in Amherst, Massachusetts, became somewhat agitated and was only calmed down when Ray Stannard Baker expressed general agreement with my remarks.

Gradually, the temper of the country changed, but at first it was caused more by resentment against our former allies than by the impact of revisionist writings. It was the "Uncle Shylock" talk of 1924-27 which turned the trick. This indication of implied Allied ingratitude for American aid in the war made the public willing to read and accept the truth relative to the causes, conduct, merits, and results of the First World War. Moreover, with the passage of time, the intense emotions of wartime had an opportunity to cool off. By the mid-1930's, when Walter Millis's *Road to War* appeared, it was welcomed by a great mass of American readers and was one of the most successful books of the decade. Revisionism had finally won out.

Interestingly enough, as a phase of the violent anti-revisionism after 1945, there has set in a determined effort on the part of some historians and journalists to discredit the revisionist scholarship of 1920-1939 and return to the myths of 1914-1920. This has even taken place in West Germany in such examples as the fantastic writings of Fritz Fischer of Hamburg, who claims to have found evidence that the German leaders in 1914 had dreams of gains and annexations in the event of a German victory. This may well be true, but it was also the case with the leaders on both sides. Fischer writes as though he had never heard of the secret treaties of the Allies. This trend to by-pass World War I revisionism is devastatingly challenged and refuted by the eminent expert on World War I revisionism Hermann Lutz, in his book on *German-French Unity* (1957), which takes account of recent materials in the field.

As we have already explained briefly, the historical scholarship that sought to produce the truth relative to the causes of the First World War came to be known as revisionism. The Treaty of Versailles had been directly based on the thesis of the unique and



sole German-Austrian responsibility for the coming of the war in 1914. By the mid-1920's, scholars had established the fact that Russia, France, and Serbia were more responsible than Germany and Austria. Hence, from the standpoint of both political logic and factual material, the treaty should have been revised in accordance with the newly revealed truth. Nothing of the sort took place, and in 1933 Hitler appeared on the scene to carry out the revision of Versailles on a unilateral basis, with the result that another and more devastating world war broke out in 1939.

Since revisionism, whatever its services to the cause of historical truth, failed to avert the Second World War, many have regarded the effort to seek the truth about the responsibility for war as futile in any practical sense. But any such conclusion is not convincing. Had not the general political and economic situation in Europe, from 1920 onward, been such as overwhelmingly to encourage emotions and restrain reason, there is every probability that the revisionist verdict on 1914 would have led to changes in the Versailles *diktat* that might have preserved peace. In the United States, less disturbed by emotional cross-currents, revisionism exerted an impressive influence which worked for peace. It was partly responsible for increasing the restraint imposed on France at the time of the Ruhr invasion, for the mitigation of the harsh reparations program, for the Nye investigation of the armament industry and its nefarious ramifications, and for our neutrality legislation.

The fact that, despite many months of the most vigorous and irresponsible propaganda for our intervention in the Second World War, over eighty per cent of the American people were in favor of refraining from intervention on the very eve of Pearl Harbor proves that the impact of revisionism on the American public mind had been deep, abiding, and salutary. If President Roosevelt had not been able to incite the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor, the revisionist campaign of the late 1920's might have saved the United States from the tragedies of 1941-1945 and the calamities which have already grown out of our intervention in the Second World War, to say nothing of the more appalling disasters that may still lie ahead of us.

### III. Revisionism and the Second World War

#### 1. *Greater Hatreds and More Ruthless Propaganda*

Long before the Second World War broke out at the beginning

of September, 1939, it was evident that, when it came, it would present an even more dramatic and formidable revisionist problem at its close than did the First World War. The stage was all set for a much greater volume and variety of distorting hatreds than in the years before 1914, and the capacity to whip up passion and disseminate myths had notably increased in the interval. Many technical advances in journalism, larger newspaper staffs, especially of foreign "experts," and greater emphasis on foreign affairs, all made it certain that the press would play a far more effective role in swaying the masses than in 1914-19. Indeed, even in 1914, as Jonathan F. Scott and Oron J. Hale have made clear, the press was perhaps as potent a cause of the war as the folly of the heads of states and their diplomats. It was bound to exert an even more powerful and malevolent influence in 1939 and thereafter.

The techniques of propaganda had been enormously improved and were well-nigh completely removed from any moral restraint. The propagandists in 1939 and thereafter had at their disposal not only what had been learned relative to lying to the public during the First World War but also the impressive advances made in the techniques of public deceit for both civilian and military purposes after 1918. A leading English intelligence officer, Sidney Rogerson, even wrote a book, published in 1938, *Propaganda in the Next War*, in which he told his fellow-Englishmen how to handle Americans in the case of a Second World War, warning them that they could not just use over again the methods which Sir Gilbert Parker and others had so successfully employed from 1914-1918 to beguile the American public. He suggested new myths and strategy which would be needed.

These new methods were worked out and applied after war broke out in 1939. They were not of the genteel and persuasive type followed by Sir Gilbert Parker but were of a ruthless and irresponsible nature which should have made Rogerson gasp with astonishment, and were carried on not only with the connivance but the active assistance of prominent American officials such as J. Edgar Hoover and Colonel "Wild Bill" Donovan. They were directed by Sir William Stephenson, "the quiet Canadian," and are described in a book under this title by H. Montgomery Hyde. It was literally an invasion of the United States by a British fifth column. Had Stephenson and his associates been Germans, they would have been summarily seized and presumably imprisoned if not shot. When some American citizens showed rather extreme zeal in opposing

American entry into the war, they were arrested and subjected to a sedition trial which was probably the most serious challenge to liberty since the alien and sedition laws at the end of the eighteenth century. The Orwellian nature of the postwar situation was underlined by the fact that the man who was formally responsible for the trial was later made the national president of the American Civil Liberties Committee. When Parker's methods of 1914-1918 were revealed, they produced a considerable wave of criticism, even revulsion, in many American circles. But when Hyde's book was published in England and soon issued in an American edition as *Room 3603*, there was not even a ripple of criticism. It passed virtually unnoticed save for occasional commendation.

There was a far greater backlog of bitter hatreds for the propagandists to play upon by 1939. However much the kaiser was lampooned and reviled during the war, he had been rather highly regarded before July, 1914. In 1913, at the time of the 25th anniversary of his accession to the throne, such leading Americans as Theodore Roosevelt, Nicholas Murray Butler, and former President Taft praised the kaiser lavishly. Butler contended that if he had been born in the United States he would have been put in the White House without the formality of an election, and Taft stated that the kaiser had been the greatest single force for peace in the whole world during his entire reign.

There were no such sentiments of affection and admiration held in reserve for Hitler and Mussolini in 1939. Butler had, indeed, called Mussolini the greatest statesman of the twentieth century. Churchill had declared that if he had been an Italian he would have been "wholeheartedly with Mussolini from start to finish." While these statements by Butler and Churchill were made in the late 1920's, Churchill referred to Mussolini in 1935 as "so great a man and so wise a leader." About the same time, he was paying comparable compliments to Hitler, but he promptly forgot about these tributes when war broke out in 1939. British propaganda against Il Duce during the Ethiopian foray had put an end to most American admiration of him. The hatred built up against Hitler in the democracies by 1939 already exceeded that massed against any other public figure in modern history. American and British conservatives hated Stalin and the Communists, and they were later linked with Germany and Hitler after the Russo-German pact of August, 1939. This hatred of the Russians was fanned to a whiter flame when they invaded eastern Poland in the autumn of 1939 and

Finland during the following winter. Racial differences and the color bogey made it easy to hate the Japanese and, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the real facts about which were not to be known until after the war, the hatred of the Japanese went so far that even leading American naval officers like Admiral William F. Halsey could refer to the Japanese as literally subhuman anthropoids.

Against this background it was obvious that hatreds could thrive "without stint or limit," to use Mr. Wilson's phrase, and that lies could arise and luxuriate with abandon and without any effort to check on the facts, if there were any. Every leading country set up its official agency to carry on public deception for the duration and supported it lavishly with almost unlimited funds. It was more than evident that it would be a formidable task for revisionism to wrestle with the war propaganda once hostilities had ended.

## 2. *Historical Writing on the Second World War*

After the First World War, the Russians took the first important steps in launching revisionism. The Communists wished to discredit the tsarist regime and saddle it with responsibility for the First World War, so they published the voluminous documents containing the secret Franco-Russian agreements from 1892 to 1914. These, together with supplementary French materials, did prove that France, Russia, and Serbia were mainly responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914. The publication of the Russian documents was soon followed by the appearance of those of Germany and Austria, and in due time the British, French, and Italians offered considerable access to their archives. I have already indicated that many important revisionist books appeared in European countries.

Following the Second World War, the overwhelming majority of revisionist writings have been produced in the United States. There was no tsar for the Russians to blame in 1945. Stalin desired to preserve intact the legend that his "collective security" formula, which Litvinov sold to the popular front nations and to liberals generally, proved his desire for peace and that he had been surprised and betrayed by the German attack on June 22, 1941. England was watching her empire disintegrate, and the British leaders were aware of the primary responsibility of Britain for the outbreak of war in 1939; hence, every effort was made to discourage revisionist writing in England. Chamberlain and Halifax were presented as being determined appeasers to the bitter end in early September, 1939. Only A. J. P. Taylor produced a forthright book on the

causes of the Second World War. France was torn with hatreds even worse than those of the French Revolution, and about 100,000 Frenchmen were butchered either directly or quasi-legally during the "liberation." Only the famous journalist Sisley Huddleston, an expatriate Englishman resident in France, the distinguished publicist Alfred Fabre-Luce, the able journalist Maurice Bardèche, the implacable Jacques Benoist-Mechin, and the courageous French historian and geographer Paul Rassinier produced anything that savored of revisionism in France.

Germany and Italy, under the heels of conquerors for years, were in no position to launch revisionist studies. Even when Germany was freed, the hatred of Hitler which had survived the war and political pressure, especially from the United States and Israel, discouraged revisionist work. For some years, only Hans Grimm and Ernst von Salomon produced anything resembling revisionism in Germany, and their works were not devoted primarily to diplomatic history. During the 1950's, however, West German publicists and historians gained some new courage and determination, in part due to encouragement from the revisionist books by non-Germans, mainly Americans, which were translated and published in Germany. In the late 1950's and in the early 1960's a number of worthy German revisionist books made their appearance.

The more important German revisionist works are the interpretation of political leadership in the Western world between the two world wars by Edmund Marhefka, a delegate to the Versailles conference and one of the first to repudiate sole German responsibility for the Second World War; Udo Walendy's able statement concerning the need for a truthful account of recent world history and responsibility for the Second World War; Willi Glasebock's extended and well-documented attack upon the thesis of the Allies and the Bonn government that Germany was solely responsible for the Second World War; the comprehensive two-volume work of Friedrich Lenz, *Never Again Munich*, which is far the best contribution of a Germanic writer to the revisionist study of the causes of the Second World War, and is worthy to rank with the books of Stieve, Montgelas, Von Wegerer, and Lutz in the revisionist literature on the First World War; Erich Kern's account of how the Versailles Treaty and European diplomacy after 1920 led to the rise of Hitler and national socialism; Helmut Sundermann's works on the Anglo-American encouragement of the Second World War, the nature of the Third Reich, and the background and results of

the Potsdam conference; C. J. Burckhardt's presentation of the Danzig question as preliminary to the outbreak of war in 1939; Philipp Fabry's analysis of the Stalin-Hitler Pact of August, 1939, and Heinrich Hartle's extended study of German and Allied responsibility for the Second World War, including a searching analysis of the Nuremberg trials. A good summary of German revisionist writing on the Second World War has been provided by Walther Reitenhart. Two substantial German journals publishing revisionist materials have been firmly launched: *Nation Europa*, edited by Arthur Ehrhardt, and *Deutschen Hochschullehrer-Zeitung*, edited by Herbert Grabert.

In Italy, the eminent scholar and diplomatic historian Luigi Villari wrote an able book on the foreign policy of Mussolini which is one of the substantial products of revisionism on the Second World War, but he had to get his book published in the United States. The same was true of his book on the "liberation" of Italy after 1943.

In the United States, revisionism got off to an early start and flourished relatively, so far as the production of substantial books was concerned, despite the fact that not one large commercial publisher in the United States has published an important revisionist book since Pearl Harbor, and revisionist literature has been made available mainly by some two small courageous publishers. This relative profusion of revisionist volumes was, however, far surpassed by the almost insuperable obstacles that were met in trying to make such literature known to the public and read by it. In other words, an unprecedented volume of revisionist books was accompanied by an even more formidable "historical blackout" that has thus far been able to conceal most of the revisionist material from the reading public.

The reasons for the relatively greater productivity of revisionism in the United States for a decade after 1945 are not difficult to discover. There had been over four years of debate about the European and world situation between President Roosevelt's Chicago bridge speech in October, 1937, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Most of the men who produced revisionist books after 1945 had taken part in this great debate, had gathered materials on the issues, and were well aware of the realities and of the misinformation spread by the interventionists. They were eager to come forth with books to sustain their position as soon as the end of hostilities made this possible. Pearl Harbor had silenced them only for the duration. Further, the United States

had been untouched by the ravages of war, it was in good economic condition at V-J Day, and it had not lost any colonial possessions. Four years of vigorous debate before Pearl Harbor and nearly four years of passionate lying and hating after that date had at least slightly restrained the American capacity for hatred for the time being, as compared with the existing situation in Europe and Asia. While not at all comparable to the situation after 1918, there was at least a slight and brief breathing spell until hatreds were revived when Truman launched the Cold War in March, 1947.

We have space to mention only some outstanding revisionist products in the United States dealing with the Second World War. John T. Flynn's *As We Go Marching* was published in 1944, his pioneer brochures on Pearl Harbor in 1944 and 1945, and his *The Roosevelt Myth* in 1948. George Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor* appeared in 1947; Charles Austin Beard's two volumes on Roosevelt's foreign policy were brought out in 1946 and 1948; and Helen Mears' *Mirror for Americans: Japan* came out in 1948. William Henry Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade* was published in 1950; Frederic R. Sanborn's *Design for War* came off the presses in 1951; Charles C. Tansill's *Back Door to War* made its appearance in 1952; the symposium, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, which I edited and which presents the best anthology of revisionist conclusions on the Second World War, came out in the summer of 1953; and Richard N. Current's *Secretary Stimson* was published in 1954. Admiral R. A. Theobald's *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* also appeared in 1954; René A. Wormser's *The Myth of the Good and Bad Nations* and Francis Neilson's *The Churchill Legend* came out in this same year; Admiral H. E. Kimmel's *Admiral Kimmel's Story* was published in 1955; Bryton Barron's *Inside the State Department* was brought out in 1956; George N. Crocker's *Roosevelt's Road to Russia* was issued in 1959; Anne Armstrong's *Unconditional Surrender* appeared in 1961; William L. Neumann's *America Encounters Japan* was published in 1963; and James J. Martin's massive two-volume work *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941* appeared in 1965.

In addition to these books by American revisionists, there was an impressive list of volumes by Europeans who sought to escape the even more stringent historical blackout at home and secure respectable publication and publicity in the United States. Such were, Hermann Lutz's *Franco-German Unity*; Sisley Huddleston's books on *Popular Diplomacy and War* and *France: the Tragic Years*; the

trenchant criticisms of the war-crimes trials by Lord Hankey and Montgomery Beligion; the remarkable book of F. J. P. Veale, *Advance to Barbarism*, which criticized both the barbarous saturation bombing of civilians and the war-crimes trials; Russell Grenfell's devastating exposure of Germanophobia in his *Unconditional Hatred*; Emrys Hughes' brilliant biographical study of Winston Churchill; Charles Bewley's substantial and authoritative biography of Hermann Goering; and Dr. Villari's volumes on Mussolini's foreign policy and the Allied liberation of Italy.

There were a number of other American books on the periphery of literal revisionism, of which Freda Utley's *High Cost of Vengeance*, dealing with the Allied folly and barbarism in Germany after V-E Day, and Nicholas Balabkins' *Germany Under Direct Controls*, treating the application of the revised Morgenthau Plan to postwar Germany, are representative and among the more notable. Along with them might be mentioned such books as Andy Rooney and Bud Hutton's *Conqueror's Peace*; Marshall Knappen's *And Call It Peace*; Milton Mayer's *They Thought They Were Free*; Harold Zink's *American Military Government in Germany*; and John T. Snell's *Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma Over Germany*.

It has been maintained by some commentators friendly with revisionism that what is really needed today are more and better revisionist books. But the preceding information makes it clear that there has been no dearth of good books presenting the revisionist case relative to the Second World War, except for the responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1939. But this gap was filled by A. J. P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War*, which appeared in 1961. As will be made clear later on, the problem has not been one of a lack of adequate and reliable books but the almost insuperable difficulties in getting these books presented effectively to the scholarly and intelligent general public.

### 3. *Some Leading Revelations of Revisionism Bearing on the Second World War*

Not only have there been many more formidable revisionist volumes published in the United States since 1945 than in the comparable period after 1918, but the facts revealed by this recent revisionist research have been far more sensational than those produced by revisionist scholars after the First World War.

From 1937 onward, Stalin had worked as hard for a war of



attrition and mutual destruction between the capitalistic Nazi, fascist, and democratic countries as Sazonov and Izvolski did in 1914 to start a Franco-Russian-English war against Germany and Austria.

Hitler, far from precipitately launching an aggressive war against Poland on the heels of brutal and unreasonable demands, made a greater effort to avert war during the August, 1939, crisis than the kaiser did during the crisis of July, 1914. And Hitler's demands on Poland were the most reasonable ones he made on any foreign country during his whole regime. They were far more conciliatory than Stresemann and the Weimar republic would even consider. Poland was far more unreasonable and intransigent in 1938-39 than Serbia had been in 1914. Hitler became involved in war more because of inability to cope with the devious diplomacy of Halifax than because of bellicose intent. He allowed himself to be trapped into occupying Prague by the British indications that there would not be any serious objections to this move. Then the British sprang Halifax's trap by alleging that Hitler's occupation of Prague was a ruthless violation of his promises at Munich and an indication that he aimed at world conquest. This clever but devious move, combined with a false charge by Virgil Tilea, the Rumanian minister in London, that Germany had just sent an ultimatum to Rumania, was used to justify Chamberlain's hasty and precipitate guarantee to Poland at the end of March, 1939, which Halifax and Chamberlain realized almost inevitably meant a new European war. Hitler failed to defeat this stratagem by sitting tight and consolidating his new position, resources and strength. His proposals to Poland were just and moderate but it was not necessary to enter a second British trap by military action against Poland. Like Berchtold in 1914, Hitler failed to read the British mind in respect to foreign policy.

Mussolini sought to dissuade Hitler from going to war in 1939, and made repeated efforts to summon peace conferences after the war began. Far from wantonly sticking "a dagger in the back of France" in June, 1940, he was virtually forced into the war by unneutral acts of economic strangulation on the part of Britain. France was loath to go to war in 1939, and only extreme pressure by the British foreign office prodded Bonnet and Daladier into reluctantly acceding to the bellicose British policy on September 2-3, 1939.

Whereas, in 1914, British responsibility for the First World War

was chiefly that of weakness and duplicity on the part of Sir Edward Grey—more a negative than a positive responsibility—the British were almost solely responsible in any direct sense for the outbreak of both the German-Polish and the European wars in early September, 1939. Lord Halifax, the British foreign minister, who really directed British foreign policy from March to September, 1939, and Sir Howard Kennard, the British ambassador in Warsaw, were as responsible for the European war of 1939 as Sazonov, Izvolski, and Poincaré were for that of 1914. Chamberlain's speech before parliament on the night of September 2, 1939, was as mendacious a misrepresentation of the German position as had been Sir Edward Grey's address to parliament on August 3, 1914.

The plain fact is that Britain had decided upon war by March, 1939, for the purpose of preserving the balance of power on the continent of Europe, which had been the fundamental item in British foreign policy since the days of Cardinal Wolsey in the sixteenth century. Hitler's unexpected success in revising the Treaty of Versailles and the equally sensational success of Goering in rebuilding the German economy had made Germany so strong that the British leaders believed that the balance of power was in mortal danger. Churchill put the matter in a nutshell when, only about a year after Churchill had paid Hitler what Francis Neilson described as the most glowing tribute ever given by a prominent Englishman to the head of a foreign State, he told General Robert E. Wood in November, 1936, that "Germany is getting too strong and we must smash her." Churchill's views were warmly seconded by his outstanding American friend and intimate, Bernard Baruch, who remarked to General George C. Marshall in 1938: "We are going to lick that fellow Hitler. He isn't going to get away with it." Even after his talk with General Wood, Churchill publicly stated that if England ever got into the same sorry situation as Germany had found itself in 1933 he hoped that England would find her Hitler to solve the problems England faced.

The anti-revisionists have especially attacked the Munich conference and agreement as one of the most evil episodes in human history, notably in recent years when the facts might compel a more reasonable attitude toward Hitler's conduct a year later. The actual nature of this historic event is realistically described by A. J. P. Taylor, who has produced the only thorough and reliable treatment of the causes of the Second World War in the English language: "The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, which

had worked precisely to this end; not a triumph for Hitler, who had started with no such clear intention. . . . It was a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life; a triumph for those who had preached equal justice among peoples; a triumph for those who had courageously denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles."

President Roosevelt had a major responsibility, both direct and indirect, for the outbreak of war in Europe. He began to exert pressure on France to stand up to Hitler as early as the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in March, 1936, months before he was making his strongly isolationist speeches in the campaign of 1936. This pressure on France, and also England, continued right down to the coming of the war in September, 1939. It gained volume and momentum after the quarantine speech of October, 1937. As the crisis approached between Munich and the outbreak of war, Roosevelt pressed the Poles to stand firm against any demands by Germany, and urged the English and French to back up the Poles unflinchingly. From captured Polish and French archives, the Germans collected no less than five volumes of material consisting almost exclusively of Roosevelt's bellicose pressure on European countries, mainly France and Poland. The Allies later seized them. Only a small portion has ever been published, most notably some seized by the Germans in Poland in 1939 and published as the *German White Paper*. It is possible that the material covering Roosevelt's pressure on England might amount to more than five volumes. There is grave doubt that England would have gone to war in September, 1939, had it not been for Roosevelt's encouragement and his assurances that, in the event of war, the United States would enter on the side of Britain just as soon as he could swing American public opinion around to support intervention. Yet, when the crisis became acute after August 23, 1939, Roosevelt sent several messages *for the record* urging that war be avoided through negotiations.

In regard to American entry into the European war, the case against President Roosevelt is far more serious than that against Woodrow Wilson with respect to the First World War. Wilson remained neutral for some time after 1914, and Professor Arthur S. Link has recently revealed that after his re-election in 1916 Wilson made a serious and honest effort to mediate between the contending European powers and suggest reasonable terms of peace. But these efforts were frustrated by the treachery of Secretary of State

Robert Lansing, and came to naught. Roosevelt had abandoned all semblance of neutrality, even before war broke out in 1939, and moved as speedily as was safe and feasible in the face of an anti-interventionist American public to involve this country in the European conflict.

The statement of Clare Boothe Luce that Roosevelt lied the United States into war was one of the most restrained understatements of the wartime period. While he was publicly insisting that he favored peace and was assuring American fathers and mothers that their sons would not be sent into any foreign wars, he was actually engaged in secret intrigue with Winston Churchill planning how the United States might rapidly be brought into the war in behalf of Britain and France. Beginning even before war broke out in Europe, Roosevelt and Hull began an unbroken series of acts and policies hostile to Japan until they were finally able to provoke the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor.

On July 26, 1939, Hull informed the Japanese that the American commercial treaty with Japan would be abrogated in six months, and in December, 1939, a moral embargo was invoked against the shipment of vital raw materials to Japan. In 1940, Roosevelt put through the first peacetime draft in our history, arranged the "destroyer deal" which legally put the country at war, and appointed the two leading Republican interventionists, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, as secretary of war and secretary of the navy, respectively. This was done to give an ostensible bipartisan cast to his drive for war. Stimson immediately began to work for a stiffer embargo policy against Japan. Early in 1940, at the suggestion of the British and against the advice of the chief of naval operations and the commander-in-chief of the Pacific fleet, the fleet was sent to Pearl Harbor, where the ships were bottled up like sitting ducks as a target in the event of a Japanese attack. Joint staff conferences with the British began in December, 1940, and continued until April, 1941, one outcome of which was Roosevelt's promise that the United States would make war on Japan if Japanese forces went beyond an arbitrary line in the South Pacific, even though the Japanese did not attack the American flag or forces. Admiral Stark then informed his commanders that it was only a question of time and place in regard to American entry into the war. This agreement with the English was a direct betrayal of Roosevelt's campaign promises and of the Democratic platform of 1940 which pledged no war unless attacked.

All during 1941, until the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, Roosevelt kept assuring the American public, which was still overwhelmingly against intervention, that all his actions were "short of war," but throughout this year he also performed one deed after another that made American entry into the war more certain and more imminent. In January, 1941, he sent Harry Hopkins to London to assure Churchill that the United States was in the war with Britain to a victorious end. Beginning in May, stringent economic and financial pressure was launched against Japan which American civil and military leaders recognized would mean certain war since they involved the economic strangulation of Japan and offered her no alternative except war or collapse. Philippine exports to Japan were banned by executive order on May 29, 1941, and on July 26, 1941, all Japanese assets in the United States were frozen and all American trade with Japan brought to a summary end. The Lend-Lease Act was put through in March, 1941, and was immediately followed by the convoying of ships taking supplies to Britain, hoping that the convoying vessels would be fired on by the Germans or Italians, thus giving Roosevelt his impatiently awaited opportunity to enter the conflict directly.

When these countries failed to rise to the bait and provide a *casus belli* in the Atlantic, Roosevelt met with Churchill in Newfoundland on August 9th and formulated a program to force Japan to attack the United States and thus enable the latter to enter the war through the Japanese "back door." Beginning as early as January, 1941, Roosevelt rejected the repeated and substantial Japanese overtures for peaceful arrangements, although he was urged to give them careful consideration by Joseph C. Grew, the American ambassador in Tokyo. Against the advice of General Marshall and Admiral Stark, he brushed aside the proposal of a *modus vivendi* and approved Secretary Hull's sending an ultimatum to Japan on November 26th which Hull admitted meant the end of diplomacy and the coming of war in a matter of days.

The Japanese peace overtures were remarkable, almost urgent. Japan twice offered to get out of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis in return for peaceful arrangements with the United States. In January, 1941, the Japanese suggested willingness to retire from their drive into China and southeast Asia as the price of peace with the United States. In March, the Japanese ambassador in Washington began some forty fruitless conferences with Hull to secure a peaceful settlement with the United States. In August, Prince Konoye,

the Japanese prime minister, made the astonishing concession of agreeing to meet Roosevelt at any designated place to work out some method of preserving peace between the two countries. He agreed to accept in advance, as the basis for negotiations, the four fundamental principles laid down by Hull in April, 1941, as an adequate basis for the settlement of Japanese-American relations. Even after this amazing proposal was curtly turned down, the Japanese made remarkable overtures for peace in November, 1941, and sent Saburo Kurusu, well known as a friend of the United States and an expert on Japanese-American relations, to Washington to assist the Japanese ambassador in the negotiations. Even when the Japanese fleet started for Pearl Harbor it had orders to turn back if the United States indicated any evidence of willingness substantially to modify Hull's ultimatum. While Hull denounced the Japanese reply to his ultimatum on December 7th in very explosive and colorful language, it was actually a very moderate and reasonably accurate summary of Japanese-American relations, considering the source and the conditions of the moment.

It had been assumed in American naval strategy that, in the event of a Japanese attack on the United States, they would start out with a surprise attack on an American fleet if it were based in the Pacific. American naval maneuvers had shown that it would be feasible to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor launched as close as one hundred miles away. This was one reason why Admiral Richardson opposed bottling up the fleet at Pearl Harbor. In 1941, this danger would appear to have been largely overlooked. Not even a Purple decoding machine was sent to Pearl Harbor although three were sent to London. There was such an overpowering mass of evidence that the Japanese would attack, if at all, at the Philippines or in the South Pacific that Pearl Harbor was disregarded. No warnings of imminent war were sent to the commanders there, and what were later represented as warnings by defenders of Roosevelt actually made General Short and Admiral Kimmel feel all the more certain that there would be no attack on Pearl Harbor.

Roosevelt waited impatiently for the attack in the Far East. He felt that he had to have a Japanese attack to meet the assurances of the 1940 Democratic platform and to avoid having to live up to his agreement in April, 1941, to go to war if the Japanese moved too far south, even though they did not attack the American forces. It was for this reason that Roosevelt brushed aside Stimson's proposal that American planes based in the Philippines attack a

Japanese task force moving south and thus start the war. As a stratagem to induce the urgent and indispensable Japanese attack, on December first Roosevelt ordered that three small ships be fitted out in the Philippines, flying the American flag, and be sent out in the path of Japanese task forces to draw the Japanese fire. The first one sent out was the "Isabel," the private yacht of Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of the American fleet in the Far East. The Japanese recognized it and refused to be trapped into firing on it. Before the next one in order could be prepared to move, news came of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Recently divulged information reveals the fact that by December 3rd, Roosevelt was beginning to despair of a Japanese attack and was telling Secretary Henry Morgenthau that he and Churchill would apparently have to decide where and when the United States and Britain would launch their attack on Japan.

By the next morning—the 4th—Roosevelt obtained the welcome news, apparently from the British, that the Japanese were not only going to attack but would make their attack on Pearl Harbor. He did not, as was thought by revisionists for some years, directly or openly order Washington officials not to send any warnings to General Short and Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. He was too devious and adroit for that. Instead, he only revealed this information to General Marshall and gave an order that all information sent to Pearl Harbor had to be cleared with Marshall. When, about 1:30 on the afternoon of the 6th, the Japanese pilot message forecast the arrival of the Japanese reply to Hull's ultimatum and probable war in a matter of hours, Roosevelt ordered Marshall to disappear until it would be too late effectively to warn Short and Kimmel. This he did, and, according to official testimony, did not get to his office on the 7th until an hour and a half before the time set for the delivery of the Japanese reply to Hull in person and for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Marshall did not even make effective use of the brief time available. He leisurely formulated an ambiguous and inadequate warning, and sent it casually by a slow method. It was not delivered to Short until hours after the Japanese planes had returned to their carriers and the pride of the Pacific battleship fleet had been sunk or disabled.

It would have been a far more mortal disaster had it not been for the fact that the commander of the Japanese task force, Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, was a hesitant and timorous person who had not favored the attack plan, but had to be placed in command because

of seniority rules in the Japanese navy. A bold and resolute commander could have easily returned the next day, destroyed what remained of the navy and, far more important, the machine shops and supply depots, which would have set the United States back at least a year in prosecuting the war in the Pacific. Indeed, the Hawaiian Islands could have been occupied and an American victory indefinitely postponed. In retrospect, the greatest American luck in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack was Admiral Nagumo.

In one of his most stupid moves, and from an assumed strict sense of honor, Hitler, as a member of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, declared war on the United States and this enabled Roosevelt to move at once into the European field. A feigned sense of shock over a sneak attack and condolences to the United States for its Pearl Harbor losses sent by Hitler would have created infinite embarrassment and problems for Roosevelt and Churchill, but such adroitness would have required a Halifax, Churchill, Roosevelt, or Stalin. Perhaps in estimating Roosevelt's greatest stroke of luck in getting his war, along with a united country, Hitler would have to be ranked next to Nagumo.

#### 4. *Some Leading Reasons for the Historical Blackout in Relation to Revisionism and the Second World War*

Despite this voluminous revisionist literature which has appeared since 1945 and its sensational content, there is still virtually no public knowledge of revisionist facts over twenty years after V-J Day. The "man on the street" is just as prone to accept Roosevelt's "day of infamy" legend today as he was on December 8, 1941. A member of the state historical department of a leading eastern state recently wrote me that he had never heard of any revisionist movement relative to the Second World War until he read my article in the Spring, 1958, issue of *Modern Age*. By 1928, most literate Americans had a passable knowledge of the facts about the coming of war in 1914 and the American entry in 1917. What are the reasons for the strange contrast in the progress of realistic knowledge after 1918 and after 1945? Since we have already indicated the factors that have all but paralyzed revisionism in Europe since 1945, our examination of the reasons for the blockage of knowledge will be limited to the United States and the so-called historical blackout.

A main reason why revisionism has made little headway since



1945 in attracting public attention in the United States is that the country never really had time to cool off after the war. We have pointed out above that while the emotional situation was not as acute here after 1945 as in Europe and Japan, it was far more tense than it was in the United States in the 1920's. Even as early as the congressional campaign and election of 1918, there was a rift in the wartime political monolith. By the campaign of 1920, disillusionment with the war had set in and a trend toward isolation from European quarrels had begun to assert itself. The United States refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles or to enter the League of Nations. There was a cooling off period for about twenty years after 1918. As late as 1941, the overwhelming majority of the American people wished to remain aloof from the European war, and Roosevelt had great difficulty in forcing through a peacetime draft law and in getting any repeal of the neutrality legislation.

Nothing like this happened following 1945. By March, 1946, Winston Churchill was proclaiming the Cold War in his speech at Fulton, Missouri, delivered with the benediction of President Truman, and a year later Truman actually launched the Cold War. This led, in 1950, to the outbreak of a hot war in Korea. The Orwellian technique of basing political tenure and bogus economic prosperity on cold and phony warfare had taken over by 1950, to enjoy an indefinite domination over the public mind and political policy. A hot war spontaneously provides plenty of genuine, even if dangerous and misguided, emotion, but a cold war has to be built up almost entirely by propaganda and mythology and sustained on synthetic excitement which is provided by planned propaganda.

The tortures of "1984," as administered by the "Ministry of Love," have not as yet proved necessary in the United States. The American public proved more susceptible to simple brainwashing through propaganda than Orwell could imagine, although he was himself a veteran propagandist on the BBC. Orwellian doublethinking enabled the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations to formulate and enforce mutually contradictory policies, and the "crimestop" technique of the Orwellian semantic system prevents the public, and many of its leaders, from thinking through any sound program or rational solution. A national policy of perpetual war for perpetual peace does not appear unreasonable or illogical to the American public or its political leaders although it is plainly identical with the cornerstone of the Orwellian system to the effect that "war is peace," and vice versa. Thus far, the propaganda

carried on by our "Ministry of Truth," with the almost unanimous aid of our press and other agencies of communication, has been sufficient to maintain popular support of the Cold War and our alleged devotion to defending the "free nations" from the menace of communism, the "free nations" apparently including even overt totalitarian regimes if friendly to the United States.

It is obvious that such a brainwashed public is not likely to concern itself seriously with facts and writings that are designed to discredit warfare and furnish a solid basis for substantial peace. It would be about like expecting desert sheiks to concentrate on books devoted to water polo or outboard motorboat racing. The public mind has become all but impenetrable on such matters. In the mid-1920's, for the Allies to deride Uncle Sam as "Uncle Shylock" relative to a paltry twelve billion dollars of war debts made Americans so angry that they were willing to listen to revisionist conclusions. By the mid-1950's, even such flagrantly offensive and ungrateful gestures as "Yanks Go Home," after the United States had poured tens of thousands of lives and over sixty-five billion dollars of foreign aid into lands across the sea, did not even register here. The Washington administrations demanded larger foreign aid appropriations and the public appeared to approve. Congressmen like John Taber, who for years had sought to kill as many appropriations as possible which were devoted to the effort to create a better life here at home, proclaimed that foreign aid was so important that it transcended all considerations of restraint, thrift, and economy which they had so long demanded of appropriations to be used within our own borders. Revisionist views were totally ignored in public policy.

Another explanation of the antipathy or indifference of the public to revisionism since 1945 is to be found in the sharply contrasting intellectual atmosphere of the 1920's and of the period since 1945. Conditions in the 1920's and early 1930's were the most conducive to independent and fearless thought of any decade in modern American history. This was the period of Mencken and Nathan, of the height of the popularity of H. G. Wells. It was an era when James Harvey Robinson's *Mind in the Making* could become a best seller, and Thorstein Veblen was one of the most respected American economists. After 1945, we ran into a period of intellectual conformity perhaps unsurpassed since the supreme power and unity of the Catholic church at the height of the Middle Ages. Between the pressures exerted by the military aspects of the Orwellian cold-

war system and those which were equally powerful in the civilian or commercial world, intellectual individuality and independence all but disappeared.

In this era of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, "The Organization Man," "The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit," the "Hidden Persuaders," and "Madison Avenue," even the average American college graduate became little more inclined to independent thinking than was a Catholic peasant during the papacy of Innocent III. As Irving Howell pointed out in the *Atlantic* of November, 1965, American higher education conformed to the Orwellian cold-war system about as conveniently as the Pentagon or American business. When, in the mid-1960's, a small minority of students began to show signs of restlessness, this caused widespread surprise and alarm, and public leaders like Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut suggested procedure which would have won them kudos from Hitler.

Another reason for the unprecedented resistance to revisionism after the Second World War is the fact that most liberals and radicals, who became the shocktroops and spearhead of revisionism in the 1920's, have since 1945 been overwhelmingly among the chief opponents of any acceptance of revisionist facts and conclusions. They were the leaders of the war party in Britain, France, and the United States for months or years before 1939 and 1941, and they have never recanted. Although most of the prominent liberals heartily supported Wilson's war after 1917, they were completely disillusioned by the "peace" treaty and led the revisionist parade after 1919. Especially notable were Herbert Croly and his editorial associates on the *New Republic*. They recanted, but plenty. Oswald Garrison Villard and most of his associates on the *Nation* did not need to recant, for they had never supported American intervention in 1917 with any enthusiasm.

A leading reason why the liberals and radicals have been unable to revise their prewar views and attitudes is that their hatred of Hitler and Mussolini has been just too great to permit them to accept any facts, however well established, that might to any degree diminish the guilt with which these men were charged from 1939 onward—or from 1935, for that matter. The American liberals introduced the dangerous doctrine that we must do battle with any foreign country whose political ideology and practices do not accord with liberal beliefs and prejudices. This opens the door to perpetual war—a state of "permanent war," as *Time* expressed it, since we shall never run out of foreign nations whose public

opinions and operations do not charm American liberals or any other powerful war-minded groups in the country. In such a case, "facts can be damned." There was no comparable prewar liberal hatred of Stalin to have to live down despite the brutal and scandalous Soviet trials of the mid-1930's. The hatred of Hitler has been especially bitter among some minority groups that were notably enthusiastic about the revisionism that followed the First World War.

Indeed, the hesitancy in setting down any historical facts that might present the diplomacy of Hitler and Mussolini in any more favorable light than that of wartime appears to have extended to many revisionists of today, even to those of a conservative temperament. After the First World War, most of the American revisionist historical writing was on the European background of August, 1914. There were only four important and explicitly revisionist books written on the American entry into the war—those by Tansill, Grattan, Millis and J. K. Turner—while there were a dozen or more on the European situation published in Europe and the United States. The first definitive book on American entry, Tansill's *America Goes to War*, did not appear until 1938, ten years after Fay's *Origins of the World War*.

After the Second World War, the revisionist books written by American authors have dealt chiefly with American entry into the war. There has not been a revisionist book or an extended and thorough revisionist article which sets forth the truth about 1939 that has been written by an American author and published here. The nearest approach is the able and informed treatment of the European background in Tansill's classic *Back Door to War*, but this book is devoted primarily to the American entry into the war. Either aversion to even the slightest mitigation of the wartime indictment of Hitler and Mussolini, or fear of the results, appears to have prevented most revisionists in both the United States and Europe from having systematically tackled the crisis of 1939 in over twenty-five years after the events. A. J. P. Taylor's above-mentioned *Origins of the Second World War*, by an English historian, was the first to do so, and it has not stimulated others to emulate this precedent since 1961.

The anti-interventionist groups of 1937 and thereafter, like America First, were primarily conservative and for the most part welcomed the early revisionist publications. But they soon fell in line with the Cold War because of the business advantages in industry,

trade, and finance which an extravagant armament program and foreign aid provided. Thereafter, they feared or refused to give any open support, financial or otherwise, to a scholarly movement which undermined the cold-war assumptions as thoroughly as it did the interventionist mythology of 1939-1941. Hence, revisionism since 1947 has not only been unpopular or ignored but also poverty-stricken. On the other hand, the rich foundations have given lavish aid to the writing of anti-revisionist books. About \$150,000 was given to aid the publication of the Langer and Gleason volumes, the most impressive effort to whitewash the diplomatic record of Roosevelt and Churchill, and Roberta Wohlstetter was generously subsidized to produce her book on Pearl Harbor which attempted to blur out the revisionist conclusions relative to the Japanese attack and the failure to warn the Pearl Harbor commanders.

Other factors have led to the almost incredible obstruction of revisionism since 1945. The excessive "security" policies and measures which have been adopted under the cold-war system have greatly increased fear and timidity on the part of public officials, scholars, and the general public. Since revisionism implicitly and logically challenged the whole fabric of American public policy, especially foreign policy, after Pearl Harbor, it has been precarious to espouse it. It has become hazardous to work for peace except through war. The press and all other agencies of communications, naturally, prefer the emotion-provoking frame of reference of a Cold War to the prosaic scholarship of revisionism. In the 1920's, the press was congenial to revisionism because it buttressed our prevailing public policies relative to reparations, war debts, isolationism, disarmament, neutrality and the like. Today, revisionism challenges the honesty, intelligence, and integrity of our basic foreign policies by its devastating revelation of the disastrous results of our martial world-meddling since 1937, while our communications agencies, for the most part, applaud and warmly support our militant interventionist foreign policy.

##### 5. *Outstanding Publication and Promotional Difficulties with Respect to Revisionism and the Second World War*

Especially important is the difficulty in having revisionist books published under auspices likely to arouse extensive public interest and in getting them presented to the reading public honestly and effectively. There have only been two publishers, and these relatively small ones, which have consistently published revisionist

books: the Henry Regnery Company in Chicago; and the Devin-Adair Company in New York City. Only six other small publishers have produced a revisionist book—one book only in each of these cases save for the Yale University Press, which brought out both of Beard's volumes because the director was a close friend and great admirer of Beard, and the Rutgers University Press. University presses have found it precarious to indulge in revisionist publication; W. T. Couch, the able head of the University of Chicago Press, was dismissed primarily because he published so peripheral a revisionist volume as A. Frank Reel's admirable book, *The Case of General Yamashita*. The Rutgers University Press has shown the greatest courage in this matter by publishing Richard N. Current's *Secretary Stimson*, Anne Armstrong's *Unconditional Surrender*, and Nicholas Balabkins' *Germany Under Direct Controls*.

Not one large commercial publisher in the United States has brought out a single substantial and literal revisionist book since Pearl Harbor.\* This stands out in sharp contrast to the attitude of publishers toward revisionist volumes in the 1920's and the 1930's. The largest publishers were then very eager to get such books. Professor Fay's classic work was published by the Macmillan Company, and the monumental two-volume work of John S. Ewart by Doran. Alfred Knopf published my *Genesis* and a veritable library of revisionist books in the 1920's, but in 1953 he refused even to consider so mild and restrained a revisionist book as Professor Current's scholarly study of the public career of Secretary Henry L. Stimson.

There are a number of obvious reasons why the large publishers shy away from revisionist books today. In the first place, they are American citizens and, for reasons already discussed, like most of their fellow Americans, they dislike giving up their prewar and wartime convictions, emotions, hatreds, and prejudices; most of them just do not like revisionists and revisionism. Further, knowing that revisionism is publicly unpopular, they realize that revisionist books are not likely to sell well; hence, revisionist publication is relatively poor business. Moreover, those publishers who may privately espouse revisionism and would like to see some revisionist books published, even if they had to do it with slight profit or even a small loss, just cannot consider a revisionist book on its own merits or by itself alone. They have to take into account its possible

---

\*The nearest approach was the publication of the prison memoirs of Shigenori Togo, the wartime foreign minister of Japan, *The Cause of Japan*, by Simon and Schuster, in September, 1956.

reaction on the general publishing trade and the book-buying public. The loss that they could sustain through merely publishing a revisionist volume might be nothing as compared to what they would lose by the unfortunate impression such publication might make or from the retaliation which might follow.

They are especially alarmed at the possible retaliation at the hands of the various book clubs, since all the powerful ones are tightly controlled by those groups and interests most hostile to revisionism today. William Henry Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade* is the one revisionist treatment of the Second World War which is admirably suited for popular sale and reading. It is precisely comparable to Walter Millis' *Road to War* on our entry into the First World War. The Millis book was a Book-of-the-Month-Club selection and sold by the hundreds of thousands. The head of one of the largest publishing houses in the world knew and liked Chamberlin, admired his book, and personally would have liked to publish it. But he held, quite understandably, that he did not feel that he could do so in the light of his responsibilities to his stockholders. As he put it, if he published the Chamberlin book, his company probably would not get another Book-of-the-Month-Club adoption in a decade. The Chamberlin book was published by Henry Regnery.

A comparison of its fate with that of the Millis *Road to War* is instructive. Macy's in New York City ordered fifty copies of the Chamberlin book and returned forty as "unsold." If it could have been handled on its merits, surely five or six thousand copies would have been sold. A year after the date of publication, there was still not a copy of the book in the New York Public Library or any of its branches. Revisionist books are virtually boycotted, so far as sales to the general run of public libraries are concerned. The woman who is said to exert a greater influence upon book orders by libraries than any other person in the United States is vehemently anti-revisionist. So far as possible she sees to it that revisionist books are either ignored or smeared in her advice to librarians seeking guidance as to purchases. She also possesses considerable influence on purchases by book stores.

Even when revisionist books get into stores, clerks frequently refuse to display them and, in some cases, even lie about their availability. In the book department of America's outstanding store, a woman sought to purchase a copy of what was then the most widely read revisionist book. The clerk told her decisively that the supply

was exhausted and no copies were available. The customer suspected that she was lying and was able to get the head of the store, who happened to have revisionist sympathies, to make an investigation. It was found that over fifty copies were hidden under the counter and that the clerk had known that this was the case. The head of the store was so outraged that he ordered the book department to make a special display of the hitherto concealed book.

The leading magazines are just as reluctant to publish revisionist articles as the large commercial publishers are to publish any revisionist books. This also stands out in complete contrast to the situation in the 1920's, when the editors of the better periodicals were eager to get authoritative articles by leading revisionists. All of the many articles I wrote on revisionism in the 1920's and early 1930's were solicited by the editors. So far as I know, this was true of other revisionist writers. But not a substantial revisionist article has been printed in a popular and powerful American periodical since Pearl Harbor. At the same time, American periodicals are open to all manner of anti-revisionist contributions, and in recent years have published a great mass of the most virulent Germanophobia which is probably the chief obstacle to scholarly revisionism today. When American Germanophobes are not regarded as adequate to the task, they seek out European vitriol-vendors like Hugh Trevor-Roper. The reasons for editorial allergy to revisionist articles are the same as those that affect the heads of the large commercial publishing houses relative to revisionist books.

Incredible as it may seem, not only publishers but even printers have sought to suppress revisionist material. When I presented a restrained brochure, based on extensive research and designed to set forth the basic facts about the military and political career of Marshal Pétain, to a printing firm in New York City, the printers refused to put the material into type unless it was approved by the censorship department of one of the most powerful and vehemently anti-revisionist minority groups in the country. Whereupon, I took the copy to a leading upstate New York printing firm which was not accessible to this form of pressure. The episode reminded one of the pre-publication censorship which existed back in the days of Copernicus. There have also been attempts to suppress even the most factual revisionist material. A leading minority anti-revisionist organization sought to prevent further distribution of *A Select Bibliography of Revisionist Books* that I had prepared with the aid of several able revisionist historians. The publisher was something



less than sympathetic with this effort, and the would-be censor retreated in some dismay.

The handicaps imposed on revisionist books are not limited to the difficulties of publication and distribution. When these books are published, they have usually been ignored, obscured or smeared. They have rarely been given decent notice or honest reviews, even if the opinion of the reviewer might be unfavorable. As one of the leading blackout organizations has advised its agents, it is preferable to ignore a book entirely if one wishes to assure killing its distribution and influence. Even a viciously unfair review will at least call attention to the volume and may arouse some curiosity and interest. To ignore it completely will do more than anything else to consign it to oblivion. Under the editorship of Guy Stanton Ford, it was the announced policy of the *American Historical Review* not to review "controversial" volumes but, upon careful examination, it turned out that "controversial" meant "revisionist." Highly controversial anti-revisionist books in the field were given a good position and reviews as long as those usually accorded to other books of comparable importance.

When revisionist books are actually listed and reviewed, they are usually given an obscure position, often being put in the book notes. This was the case with Dr. Luigi Villari's book on *Italian Foreign Policy Under Mussolini*. Although it was a book of major importance in diplomatic history—the only authoritative volume which had appeared on the subject—and the author was the most distinguished living authority in the field, the book was consigned to the book note section of the *American Historical Review*, and outrageously smeared. It should be pointed out, in fairness, however, that for a time after Dr. Boyd C. Shafer succeeded Dr. Ford as editor, revisionist books were given a somewhat more decent treatment in the *American Historical Review*. Space limitations do not permit me to cite here in detail the fate of the leading revisionist books at the hands of scholarly periodicals, and the book review sections of leading periodicals and newspapers. Most of them have their permanent cabal of anti-revisionist and Germanophobic reviewers. I have gone into this matter at length in the first chapter of *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*.

The essence of the situation is that no matter how many revisionist books are produced, how high their quality, or how sensational their revelations, they will have no effect on the American public until this public learns of the existence, nature, and im-

portance of revisionist literature. That they have not been able to do so as yet is obvious, and the obstacles that have thus far proved effective have not been reduced to any noticeable extent. Indeed, a more malicious and misleading obstacle has arisen in the tidal wave of Germanophobia with which our journalism and all other communication agencies have been drenched since the time of the Eichmann trial in 1961, a matter to which Professor Connors devotes some trenchant pages later on.

#### 6. *Official Aspects of the Historical Blackout*

Thus far, I have dealt mainly with private or non-official efforts to obscure the truth relative to the causes and results of the Second World War. The official censorship has been as unrelenting and in many ways more shocking. Those who publish official documents do not have to be restrained by considerations of profit and loss. More than a decade ago, Charles Austin Beard blasted the procedure of the State Department in its tendency to permit historians favorable to the official foreign policy to use the public documents rather freely, while denying such access to anybody suspected of revisionist sympathies. This led to some momentary relaxation of censorship, and it was fortunate that Professor Tansill was able to carry on much of his research at this time. But soon the censorship, restrictions, and favoritism returned full force. As an example of the continuing favoritism it is interesting to note that in preparing their books on the career of the late President Kennedy, Theodore C. Sorensen and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., were given access to top secret documents such as the Vienna conference transcript which outsiders are not likely to see until after 1984.

The Republicans promised drastic reform of this abuse when they came into power in 1953, but they failed to implement these assurances and, under Secretary Dulles, the scandal grew to far greater proportions than under Democratic auspices. The same historical adviser, Dr. G. Bernard Noble, was continued in the service and actually promoted to be director of the historical division of the State Department. He was a Democrat, a Rhodes scholar, and known to be one of the most frenzied advocates of our intervention in the Second World War among all American social scientists and an implacable enemy of revisionism.

In May, 1953, the State Department promised that all records of the international conferences during the Second World War

would be ready for publication within a year and that all other documents on the period since 1930 would be speedily published.

Nothing was done until the spring of 1955, when the documents on the Yalta conference were finally published. It was evident, and soon proved, that these had been garbled and censored in flagrant fashion. Two able members of the historical staff of the department, Dr. Bryton Barron and Dr. Donald Dozer, protested against this suppression and distortion of documents. Noble forced Barron into premature retirement without pay and discharged Dozer. The latter was reinstated by the Civil Service Commission, but Noble was able to get him discharged again—and this time permanently. Barron had been assigned to compile the material bearing on the Yalta conference, and Dozer that on the Cairo-Teheran conferences. When the Teheran documents were published, Dozer examined them carefully and found that they had been as badly manhandled by selection and distortion as the Yalta documents had been.

In the meantime, some thirty-seven volumes dealing with our foreign policy since 1939 were collected and made ready for publication. But nothing was sent to the printer and, in the spring of 1958, the State Department blandly announced that it did not propose to publish any of these volumes in the predictable future. It gave as the reason the assertion that publication might possibly offend some persons among our NATO allies. To give this amazing procedure some semblance of historical authority, a hand-picked committee was appointed in 1957 to advise the department on publication. The personnel of the committee, which did not contain one revisionist historian, assured that the right advice would be turned in. The chairman was none other than Professor Dexter Perkins, admittedly a jolly and affable historical politician, but also one of the half-dozen outstanding and unremitting opponents of revisionist scholarship in this country. The committee dutifully reported that publication of any of the thirty-seven volumes would not be politically expedient. After the inauguration of President Kennedy, increased interest and activity ensued and by the end of 1964 some eighteen volumes had been published covering the years 1940 through 1943, thus still leaving a twenty-year gap. Not all the blame can be assigned to the State Department since some congressmen have resisted paying over the necessary funds.

When Dr. Barron appeared before a senatorial committee to protest against the censorship and delays, he was allowed only eleven

minutes to testify, although witnesses supporting the official censorship were allowed ample time. As one of the abler editorial writers in the country commented, quite correctly: "Such a record of concealment and duplicity is unparalleled. Its only counterpart is the 'memory hole' in George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, where an authoritarian regime of the future was depicted as disposing of all documents and facts that failed to fit into the current party line." All this is hardly consistent with the assumed role of the United States as the leader of the "free nations" or with our bitter condemnation of the Russians for censoring their official documents.

When the documents on the Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam conferences were published, Professor Norman Graebner of the University of Illinois declared in the July, 1962, issue of the *American Historical Review* that "the editors have eliminated nothing of significance from the official record. Their care and thoughtfulness in preparing these publications are apparent everywhere." And in the same issue of this scholarly periodical it was announced that the advisory committee representing the American Historical Association, Dexter Perkins, Fred H. Harrington, and Richard W. Leopold, "expressed its deep appreciation of the scholarly work and achievements of the chief of the historical division, Bernard Noble."

There are, of course, some vital official documents dealing with the onset of the Second World War that our government has never dreamed of publishing at any time and are so full of dynamite that not even historians engaged in whitewashing the official record are allowed to make any practical use of them. Such are the so-called "Kent Documents," namely, the nearly 2,000 secret messages illegally exchanged in the American code between Churchill and Roosevelt from September, 1939, onward. Churchill himself has frankly told us that these documents contain most of the really vital facts about the collaboration between him and Roosevelt in their joint efforts to bring the United States into the war. Their explosive content can well be discerned from the fact that when the most impressive historical effort to whitewash the Roosevelt-Churchill record was about to be undertaken, Churchill threatened the principal author with a court suit if he made use of these "Kent Documents."

The origin, nature, and implications of the Kent Documents are best described in pages 310-320 of Richard J. Whalen's biography of Joseph P. Kennedy, *The Founding Father* (1964); and in an article on that subject by Whalen in the magazine *Diplomat*, November, 1965. In his article, "The Strange Case of Tyler Kent," Whalen

states that Langer and Gleason did not even know of the existence of the Kent Documents until Churchill mentioned them in his post-war memoirs. He based this statement on a letter just received from Langer which said: "Until Churchill spoke of these messages, there was no reason to even suspect that they existed."

This is obviously preposterous. Even an alert reader of the newspapers and magazines of the first half of the 1940's could hardly have failed to have seen references to the existence of the Kent Documents and their general nature. It is not likely that Langer, with his special interest in diplomatic history and his high position in the Office of Strategic Services, would have been more ignorant than the average literate "man in the street." Moreover, it was a former student of Langer who informed me that Langer told him that Churchill had threatened him with a court suit if he made use of the Kent Documents. Without raising the issue of the relative veracity of Langer and his student and protégé, one can safely say that Langer's statement that he did not know of the existence of the Kent Documents until he read about them in the Churchill memoirs passes the limit of credibility. I discussed this with a leading professor of modern European history since the Whalen article appeared. He said that surely by 1944 he had a considerable dossier on the Kent case collected from published accounts. He doubted if his experience was unusual. John Howland Snow's *The Case of Tyler Kent*, the best treatment of the case prior to that by Whalen, appeared in 1946. Churchill's *The Gathering Storm* was not published until 1949, and *Their Finest Hour* not until 1950.

One interesting by-product of Whalen's researches was the discovery that Stalin surely had the Kent Documents in his possession during the wartime conferences. Stalin may very well have used their knowledge of this fact to blackmail Roosevelt and Churchill into making extensive concessions to Russia, especially at Teheran and Yalta, and possibly to pressure Truman into certifying them at Potsdam. Whalen states that such a thesis is "far-fetched." Actually, the American intelligence experts whom I induced to help Whalen on this matter of the codes of 1940-1941 made it clear that the intelligence personnel of any of the main European countries could read, and probably were reading, the Gray code in which the Kent Documents were sent, so far as they *were* in code. Moreover, a leading American businessman told me personally in the spring of 1946 that in 1945 he had purchased a microfilm of the Kent Documents from Russian sources and had sent it to Truman.

It may be granted that it is only a possibility that Stalin used these documents for the purpose of diplomatic blackmail, but he surely had them if he wished to use them for this purpose. He may not have needed to do so anyway, because when Russia had driven the Germans out of eastern Europe, Churchill and Roosevelt faced the bald fact that they would probably have to write off this area or start World War III.

The suppression of documents relative to responsibility for the Second World War extends, of course, far beyond all Anglo-American activities and relations. When the Communists and Socialists in Russia, Germany, and Austria published their archives following 1918 in order to discredit the old imperial regimes, this forced the British and French ultimately to follow suit to a limited extent. Eventually, scholars had most of the documentary material at their disposal. But neither the British nor the French published all of their documents. It was interesting to find Bernadotte Schmitt, perhaps the outstanding Anglomaniac among American historians, heading a list of international scholars protesting in the *London Times* of September 18, 1965, against the British failure to open all of their archives bearing on the First World War over fifty years after 1914.

Nothing like this publication of documents after 1918 was possible after the Second World War. The victorious Allied powers, chiefly Britain and the United States, captured the German and Italian archives, except for some of the more vital Italian materials which the Italian Communists destroyed, with Allied connivance and encouragement, when they captured and murdered Mussolini. Hence, West Germany and Italy could not have published all their documents after 1945, even if they wished to do so, for they did not possess them. The Bonn government has now received the substance of the captured German documents, and many of those taken from Italy have been returned. The United States has kept a full microfilm copy of all returned documents.

The Germans and Italians cannot be expected to publish much that is likely to modify the wartime indictment of Hitler and Mussolini. One of the main obstacles to the development and acceptance of revisionism in regard to the Second World War is the curious but bitter opposition of the Bonn government in West Germany to revisionist publications on the causes of the Second World War that would place Germany in a better light by bringing out the truth on 1939. This attitude stands in marked contrast with the situation under the Weimar republic in the 1920's when the govern-

ment officials took the lead in publishing the documents on the background of the First World War, warmly and directly encouraged revisionist writings, sometimes subsidizing them, and went out of their way to honor foreign scholars who came to Germany to lecture on the subject.

The publication of forthright revisionist material on the Second World War by West Germans was made a public crime although this order was not always rigorously enforced. The Bonn regime has its coterie of court historians who denounce revisionism as heatedly as those in Britain, France, or the United States. When the Bonn government recently regained possession of the German documents which the Allies had seized, these were censored to a considerable extent and restrictions placed on their use, much as had been done previously in the case of the American archives. A scholarly friend of mine recently had to check on a document in the archives in Arlington, Virginia, for a German friend who found it too difficult to get at it in Bonn. This strange situation has been brought on by the fear that the facts about the causes of war in 1939 may encourage a revival of pro-Hitler sentiment in Germany, and because of American pressure on West Germany relative to World War II reparations.

The postwar Italian government has also been hostile to revisionist publications, although some Italian authors have defied government displeasure, notably Dr. Luigi Villari and Messrs. Tomaro, Anfuso, and D'Aroma, but Villari had to get his important books published in the United States and the other authors mentioned above deal chiefly with internal Italian affairs. Indeed, Dr. Villari wrote me that, much as he would like to do so, he would have great difficulty in getting an Italian translation of my 1958 *Liberation* article published in Italy. There has not, however, been any such avalanche of vilification of Mussolini in Italy as there has been of Hitler in Germany. In fact, there has recently been some indication of a revived Italian appreciation of the benefits that Mussolini's achievements brought to Italy.

Although the Russians have not published any such revolutionary revisionist material as was the case after the First World War, they have made some start in publishing the Russian documents. In 1957, they published a two-volume collection of the correspondence of Stalin with Roosevelt and Churchill during the war. In 1961, they published a collection of documents on the Teheran conference, limited to the discussions between Stalin, Roosevelt, and

Churchill. In 1965, they published documents on the Yalta conference and promised to follow with those on the Potsdam conference. A preliminary checking of the Russian documents published thus far indicates that the translations are accurate and the documents, so far as published, are reliable.

The main import of official censorship is that the striking revisionist verdict relative to responsibility for the Second World War is probably less drastic than it will be if and when all the documents are available. If the documents now suppressed would lessen the already severe indictment of the Allied wartime leaders, elementary logic and strategy support the assumption that they would have been published long before the present moment in order to modify or eliminate the severe judgments already set forth in existing revisionist volumes.

One paradox should be noted relative to the status and results of revisionism after the two World Wars. After the First World War, the revisionist verdict as to the responsibility for the war was very generally accepted by scholars and intelligent public leaders, but little was done about it in the way of revising the European postwar system that had been based on the lies and propaganda of wartime. If the logical steps had been taken to revise the postwar treaties while the Weimar republic was in existence, it is unlikely that Hitler would ever have risen to power in Germany, that there would have been any Second World War, or that any Cold War would have come on its heels. After the Second World War, while the facts brought forth by revisionism as to the responsibility for the war have been ignored, indeed, are virtually unknown to the publics among the victorious Allies, there has been an almost complete revision of American public policy toward our former enemies. Both West Germany and, to a lesser extent, Japan have been almost forcibly rearmed and given extensive material aid so that they can now function as allies against our former ally, Soviet Russia. One can imagine the outcry if, say, in 1925, we had insisted that Germany and Austria must rearm to the hilt and we had expressed our determination to enable them to do so.

Any such situation as has taken place since 1945 can only be possible in an era of Orwellian double-thinking and "crimestop." We spent about 400 billion dollars to destroy the military power of Germany and Japan and, after its destruction, we have poured in more billions to restore their military facilities. If it were conceivable that we could fight a third world war without exterminating



all the participants, we might envisage a situation where, after destroying Russian power, we proceeded to give her billions to rebuild her fighting forces to defend us against China and India.

One lesson that revisionism might teach us is that we should learn from its publications attitudes and facts which could protect us against repeated folly and tragedy. The eminent philosopher, John Dewey, told a friend of mine that if he had not been so wrong in his attitude toward the First World War (as exemplified by his *German Philosophy and Politics*), he might have succumbed to the propaganda that led us into the Second World War. But publics appear to profit less by experience than pragmatic philosophers. They seem to vindicate Hegel's classic observation that the only lesson that history teaches us is that we learn nothing from history. In an age of hydrogen bombs, intercontinental guided missiles, terrifyingly lethal chemical and bacterial warfare, and pushbutton military technology, we shall have to do better than the publics of Hegel's time if we are to have any prospect of survival or of attaining such a degree of peace, security, and well-being as would justify survival. But the American public can hardly learn any lesson from revisionism if it does not even know that it exists, to say nothing of its content and implications.

Unless and until we can break through the historical blackout, now supported even by public policy, and enable the peoples of the world to know the facts concerning international relations during the last four decades, including the South Viet Nam War, there can be no real hope for the peace, security, and prosperity which the present triumphs of science and technology could make possible.

#### **IV. Historical and Educational Losses Due to the Historical Blackout, and the Significance of A. J. P. Taylor's "Origins of the Second World War"**

##### *1. A Lost Generation in Historical Writing and Teaching*

Those who are now coming to maturity are greatly handicapped in regard to historical information and realism as compared to my own generation. As has been noted, the 1920's and early 1930's were an era of iconoclasm and debunking, well symbolized by Mencken and Nathan and the *American Mercury*. It was difficult in those days to maintain an intellectual blackout anywhere, even in the realm of historical writing. My first ardent attack on any form of historical blackout appeared in the first number of the *Mercury*

at Mencken's suggestion, even insistence. The iconoclastic trend in history took the form of what has come to be known as revisionism, which was devoted to wiping out the vestiges of the wartime propaganda of the previous decade.

The generation which was born or has been educated since 1936 or thereabouts is, historically speaking, a lost generation—a group of youthful Rip van Winkles. By 1937, the majority of American liberal intellectuals were adopting the internationalist ideology of the popular front based on the "collective security" formula which Litvinov had so successfully propagated at Geneva. Nearly all liberals, and a surprising number of conservatives, jumped on the interventionist and anti-German bandwagon then being chartered and steered by President Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins. The majority of American historians belonged to the liberal camp and became ardent interventionists.

From this time onward, most history teaching and writing in this country, in dealing with recent world events, increasingly took on the form of a fanciful, and in part unconsciously malicious fairy-tale. It presented the pattern of the late 1930's and the 1940's as a planetary crusading arena in which a triumvirate of St. Georges—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin—were bravely united in a holy war to slay the Nazi dragon. Even before Hitler had shot himself in a Berlin bunker, Roosevelt and Churchill had begun to suspect that perhaps their erstwhile Soviet fellow crusader for freedom, justice, and peace was more of a menace to utopia than the Nazi "madman." In due time, even Stalin's successor in the Kremlin came to be regarded as a threat to the "free world," although he had removed Stalin from the Kremlin display window and buried him like any ordinary mortal.

In the 1920's and early 1930's, the evidence of the mistakes which the United States had made in its first crusade in Europe under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson was frankly brought forth and displayed before the American educational world and reading public. Not so with the far greater blunders of our second global crusade. The disagreeable facts were consigned to the Orwellian "memory hole," and the few books which sought to present the salutary truth were, as has been indicated above, either ignored or unfairly derided. The generation which grew up during this ill-fated crusading era has been thoroughly brainwashed in regard to the historical basis of world affairs and the role of the United States therein. It

has passed little if any beyond the intellectual and informational confines of President Roosevelt's colorful but misleading "day of infamy" rhetoric. Richard J. Whalen well summarized the situation in the *National Review* of April 20, 1965: "The tidal wave of disillusionment that swept through the West after World War I brought a flood of scholarly and popular books debunking the official history of the war. Revisionism became an integral part of the dominant liberalism of the period. But the younger journalists and historians who revolted against their elders following World War I have in the years since the last war succeeded brilliantly in forestalling a like revolt against themselves. And so we have missed the debunking generation."

It has long since been observed that historical truth is the first casualty of a war. American historiography, in dealing with world affairs, was sadly ailing before September, 1939, and was mortally ill by Pearl Harbor, in December, 1941. The majority of historians ardently supported intervention in the European maelstrom. A surprisingly large group accepted posts involved in the war effort and propaganda, some of them of much prominence and responsibility. Hence, they had a powerful vested interest in preserving and defending the dragon-killing legend.

Most historians were ardently inflamed by the emotions engendered by the wartime propaganda. Many of them, no doubt, were honestly convinced of the soundness of this interventionist and crusading propaganda. Those few who had kept their heads and really knew the score were wise enough to keep their counsel to themselves in order to hold their posts and have some assurance of promotion. Whatever the reasons for the debacle, it is certain that historical standards and products affected by recent world events have declined to a lower level, so far as integrity and objectivity are concerned, than at any period since the close of the counter-Reformation. For anything comparable in this country one would have to look back to the political tracts of the period of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that those historians who today accept, aid, and abet, and promote the extreme Germanophobia of recent years are no more accurate in their approach to national socialist Germany than Orosius was in his description and appraisal of pre-Christian pagan culture.

In the 1920's there was a strong reaction against the military

obsession with intervention in foreign quarrels. For more than a decade, a trend towards peace, isolation, and anti-militarism ensued. Historical writing and teaching rather generally adjusted to this climate of intellectual opinion. Revisionism sprang up and, by and large, had won the battle against the bitter-enders of the previous decade by the end of the 1920's. Leading revisionist historians, such as Sidney Bradshaw Fay and Charles Callan Tansill, were lavishly praised by members of their craft. The journalistic culmination of revisionist spirit and lore, Walter Millis' *Road to War*, became one of the outstanding best sellers of the 1930's.

There was, as has been pointed out earlier, no such extensive cooling-off period or escape from militant emotions after V-J Day in 1945. Along with the perpetuation of propaganda in the guise of history came a powerful effort to prevent those who had some real regard for historical truth from getting their facts and thoughts before the American public. This project has come, as we have seen, to be known as the "historical blackout." It involved a comprehensive effort since the outbreak of the Second World War to suppress the truth relative to the causes and merits of the great conflict that began in 1939 and the manner in which the United States entered it. This has consisted in ignoring or suppressing facts that ran counter to the wartime propaganda when writing books on these subjects, and in suppressing, ignoring, or seeking to discredit those books which have taken account of such facts.

It has often been asserted that this historical blackout is today a sinister and deliberate plot to obstruct the truth and degrade history. This is undoubtedly the truth with respect to the program and activities of some minority groups and ideological organizations which have a special vested interest in perpetuating the wartime mythology. But, for the most part, it has become more the unconscious product of three decades of indoctrination and brainwashing that grew out of interventionist and wartime propaganda. Even most professional historians who began their teaching career after 1937 have automatically come to accept as truth the distortions of prewar and wartime interventionism. The current blackout is as much an inevitable and automatic reaction to brainwashing as a perverse conspiracy. But this does not make it any less difficult to resist or overcome. As Taylor has pointed out, the conviction of these historians that they are writing unbiased history is all too often self-deception: "The academic historians of the West may

assert their scholarly independence even when they are engaged by a government department; but they are as much 'engaged' as though they wore the handsome uniforms designed for German professors by Dr. Goebbels."

This situation following the Second World War is, thus, a complete reversal of what happened after the First World War when revisionism carried the day in the historical forum within a decade after the armistice of November 11, 1918. Even some of the outstanding leaders of revisionism after the First World War, such as Sidney B. Fay and William L. Langer, abandoned World War I revisionism, succumbed to the historical blackout, and gave warm support to the dragon-slaying fantasy. In only a little over a year and a half after the armistice of 1918 Fay had blasted for all time the myth of the unique guilt of a Hohenzollern gorilla, as the kaiser had been portrayed during the conflict. Within a decade after the close of the war, a veritable library of revisionist books had been produced on responsibility for the calamity of 1914.

Despite the fact that the documentary material to support revisionism after the Second World War is more profuse, cogent, and convincing than after 1918, as of today not a single volume by an American scholar devoted exclusively to the causes of the Second World War has been published in the United States—some twenty-six years after the outbreak of the war and twenty years after its close.

To be sure, one book related to the field was published, *Back Door to War*, by Charles Callan Tansill, long dean of American diplomatic historians. It has about as much material on responsibility for 1939 as Professor Taylor's *Origins of the Second World War*, is more thoroughly documented, and arrives at much the same conclusions as Taylor. But the Tansill book was designed primarily to indicate by impressive documentation how, as Clare Boothe Luce expressed it, President Roosevelt had lied the United States into war from 1937 to 1941. Hence, there was much more interest in what Tansill had to say about the antecedents of Pearl Harbor than in his treatment of the responsibility for the European war in 1939, and Tansill's extensive and valuable material on the latter subject was generally slighted. There have been a number of important and distinguished books by American writers which have supplemented Tansill's account of American entry into the Second World War but for the most part they have been ignored

or smeared, and the dragon-slaying fiction still remains almost immaculate and impregnable.

Professor Tansill's book, *America Goes to War*, which was published in 1938, and is far and away the best account of American entry into war in 1917, was declared by Dr. Henry Steele Commager to be "the most valuable contribution to the history of the prewar years in our literature and one of the most notable achievements of historical scholarship of this generation." His *Back Door to War* is an equally learned, scholarly, and erudite account of our entry into the Second World War, but orthodox historians have been inclined to dismiss it as merely superficial and biased counter-propaganda. Even Charles Austin Beard, dean of American historians and political scientists, was ruthlessly smeared for presuming to protect Clio's chastity by two of the best books he ever wrote.

William Henry Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade*, the only substantial but popular account of our entry into the Second World War, was highly comparable to Millis' *Road to War* on our intervention in 1917. But, whereas Millis' book sold a quarter of a million copies, a year after the Chamberlin book was published there was, as we noted above, not one copy listed in the New York Public Library or in any of its many branches.

It need not be alleged that all those who operate book clubs and book services deliberately aim to pervert or frustrate historical truth relative to world affairs. Some of them presumably regard themselves as supporting historical truth. They just do not know what it is. They are emotionally congenial to the wartime legends, and most historians they know seem to agree with them. Both have been brainwashed for a generation.

The essence of what has preceded is that the generation which has gained its historical knowledge and perspectives since the late 1930's has been deprived, cheated, and handicapped by the distortion and suppression of historical facts relative to world affairs. This is especially unfortunate because of the transcendent role of world relations and policies in the everyday life, interests, decisions, and destiny of the American citizens of today. The handicap is true even if a person has been a history major in college. Indeed, it is likely that he will have been more victimized by historical errors as a result of more copious and intensive indoctrination with historical fiction than one who has specialized in literature, art, or music.

2. A. J. P. Taylor's "*The Origins of the Second World War*":  
*A New Epoch in Revisionist Historiography*

The importance of Professor Taylor's highly controversial volume lies in the fact that it could prove unusually potent in blasting through the historical blackout. Through a fortunate combination of circumstances, the book has shaken up Britain more than any other historical work in the field of world affairs since the writings of E. D. Morel over forty years ago. It was hoped that the American edition could do as well in producing a flash of light which would penetrate the historical blackout of a generation's duration. For the lost generation, historically speaking, the great value of the Taylor book is that it could be the logical starting-point for them in recovering the all-important lost pages of history, out of which they have been cheated by brainwashing and the historical blackout.

Professor Taylor's book is the first to be published in any language which is exclusively devoted to the task of debunking the dragon-slaying travesty which has colored and distorted historical perspective for over a quarter of a century.

It is probable that no living historian could be more appropriate as an effective and convincing author of such a book. In the first place, he is an English scholar. Due to Rhodes scholarships and other related items which promote Anglophilism in the United States, there is a special aura attaching to English historians, their scholarship, and their implied words of wisdom. This gives Taylor and his book special prestige in this country. Then, he is easily the best known and most popular of contemporary British historians. Further, he is the author of a number of substantial historical works dealing with contemporary history and diplomatic relations, most of them devoted in part at least to recent German history. In other words, he is a specialist in the field covered by his book under consideration here, which is not the case with his bitter critics such as A. L. Rowse and Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, the former a specialist in Tudor history and poetry and the latter in Stuart ecclesiastical history and, also, poetry.

In all of his previous books, Taylor had invariably shown a rather strong antipathy to German politics and leaders. Hence, he could not logically be suspected of any pro-German sympathies or any desire to clear Hitler or any other German politician of political errors or public crimes which could be supported by reliable docu-

mentation. Finally, he has been closely associated with British left-wing activities, the Labor Party, disarmament, and other attitudes and policies which make it quite impossible for him to be imagined as having any sympathy with totalitarianism of any sort, least of all with that of national socialist Germany in the 1930's. Clement Attlee and the Laborites were, if anything, more vehement in their hatred of Hitler and so-called appeasement than the Tories who were in power in Britain in 1938-1939.

Hence, it would be difficult to conceive of any historian who could give greater assurance that his criticisms of the dragon-slaying hypothesis are no more than those which historical accuracy and reliable documentation make necessary. They are a product of historical integrity and professional courage, probably more of the latter than has been displayed by any other historian of our generation. It is interesting to note that since his book on the causes of the Second World War has appeared, a number of critical reviewers have accused Taylor of being a publicity-seeking vendor of sensationalism who must not be taken seriously as a historian. But these same critics are usually the very ones who had previously applauded his profound scholarship when his books reflected a strong hostility to Germany and its policies.

After these preliminary observations, which are indispensable for judging the importance and validity of Professor Taylor's work, we can now get down to the outstanding conclusions which are expressed in the book.

The vital core of the volume is the contention that Hitler did not wish a war, either local, European, or world, from March, 1933, right down into September, 1939. His only fundamental aim in foreign policy was to revise the unfair and unjust Treaty of Versailles, and to do this by peaceful methods.

This is a most remarkable and unusual contention, however well defended in the book. Hitherto, even those who have sympathized heartily with the justice and need of revising the Versailles Treaty have, nevertheless, usually maintained that, even if Hitler's revisionist program was justified in its general objectives, he carried it out in a reprehensibly brusque, provocative, and challenging manner, gladly or casually risking war in each and every move he made to achieve the revision of the Versailles system. In other words, even if his goal was justifiable, his methods of seeking to obtain it were unpardonably violent, deceitful, and inciting.

Professor Taylor repudiates and refutes the interpretation as



thoroughly as he does the charge that Hitler wished to provoke war at any time. He holds that Hitler was unusually cautious and unprovocative in every outstanding step he took to undermine Versailles. He let others create situations favorable to achieving his ends and then exploited them in a non-belligose manner.

One thing is certain, even if one takes a most hostile attitude towards Hitler and Professor Taylor's thesis. This is that the Allies had some thirteen years in which to revise the Treaty of Versailles in a voluntary and peaceful manner. But they did nothing about it, although one of the main ostensible functions of the League of Nations was stated to be carrying forward a peaceable revision of Versailles. Professor Sidney B. Fay had proved by 1920 that the war-guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles, proclaiming that Germany and her allies were solely responsible for the First World War, had no valid historical foundation whatever.

Professor Fay and the rest of us revisionists of the 1920's hoped that since the facts we brought forth had completely undermined the war-guilt clause, this would lead to the revision of the treaty in political fact. But it did not, and the failure to do so accounts for the rise of Hitler and all the many results for good or evil which ensued.

After he came into power, Hitler waited patiently for some years for the Allies to make some practical move to revise the Versailles system before he occupied the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. Even on the heels of this action he publicly proposed on March 31, 1936, what Francis Neilson has called "the most comprehensive non-aggression pact ever to be drawn up." But the Allies made no cooperative response whatever; they totally ignored it. They accused him of bluffing but refused to call his bluff, if it was such.

Hitler had barely attained power when, on May 17, 1933, he proposed the most sweeping disarmament plan set forth by any country between the two World Wars, but neither Britain nor France took any formal notice whatever of it. Even after he had introduced conscription in March, 1935, in response to the expansion of military conscription in France, Hitler declared that "the German government is ready to take an active part in all efforts which may lead to a practical limitation of armaments." This proposal received no more response from Britain, France, or the United States than that of May, 1933. Hence, if Hitler was to revise Versailles at all, it had become completely evident by March, 1936, that it must be by unilateral action.

We should always keep in mind Taylor's fundamental assumption about Hitler, to the effect that he was not a fanatical and belligerent psychopath—a veritable madman intent upon war—but a shrewd and rational statesman, notably in his handling of foreign affairs.

It will hardly be necessary for any sane person to emphasize the fact that Professor Taylor does not seek to present Hitler as any combination of Little Lord Fauntleroy, George Washington at the cherry tree, Clara Barton, and Jane Addams. He could be as devious, shrewd, inconsistent, self-contradictory, cruel, and brutal as the leaders among his enemies, although he did balk at saturation bombing of civilians until he was compelled by Britain to do so in retaliation. The main point here is that, unlike Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, he did not wish to have a war break out in 1939.

It is very important to indicate briefly the significance of the book by Professor Taylor for citizens of the United States. So far as revisionist scholarship is concerned, this is greatly strengthened and its basic contentions are confirmed. It should now be easier to treat the causes of the Second World War realistically and honestly without being accused of mental defect or moral depravity.

The awe and reverence with which English historians are customarily regarded by the American historical guild should make it the more difficult and embarrassing for the latter to laugh off Professor Taylor's confirmation of the basic tenets of American revisionist historical scholarship. The frenetic reviews of the book have already revealed the schizoid reaction of American anti-revisionists—a sort of intellectual "twist" dance.

The Taylor book underlines the wisdom and soundness of American anti-interventionism which had been supported by revisionist historical writings in this country. The interventionists based their policy on the fantastic assumption, actually voiced by such able historians as Samuel Flagg Bemis, earlier a mild revisionist, top commentators like Walter Lippmann, and superb journalists of the type of Walter Millis, that the United States was in mortal danger of infiltration and attack by Nazi Germany in 1940.

The flipflopping and inconsistency of much of this interpretation is well illustrated by Millis who, in a book entitled *Viewed Without Alarm: Europe Today*, published as late as 1937, had attacked warmongers and alarmists, commended British "appeasement" of Hitler, and looked forward sympathetically to future German unification of Central Europe: "If the Nazis can create a growing economic and social system in Central Europe, it will be—however unpleasant

for the lesser nations it swallows—not a menace but a market and a stabilizing force for the rest of the world” (p. 53). It may be observed that this envisaged German expansion beyond anything Hitler had attained at the time war broke out in September, 1939.

Professor Taylor’s book emphasizes the grotesque fallacy of this alarmist contention relative to the national socialist program of world conquest. Hitler did not even wish to attack England or France, to say nothing of proceeding westward across the Atlantic. Nor was it necessary for the United States to enter the war to protect Britain or France. Hitler sought peace on very generous terms after the Polish war and again after the fall of France, and the British collapse at Dunkirk.

In the light of the facts brought forward by Professor Taylor, which are not at all new to American revisionist historians and had previously been well stated by Tansill, Beard, and others, President Roosevelt’s allegation that Hitler planned to invade the United States by way of Dakar, Rio de Janeiro, and Panama—his notorious timetable for the Nazi occupation of Iowa—is shown to be as fantastic and untenable as his statement that he was “surprised” by the Japanese attack in December, 1941.

Professor Taylor’s book should serve as a warning that a third world war will not be prevented by an avalanche of stale and exaggerated Germanophobia, or by merely mouthing arrogant platitudes and benign homilies about the virtues and superiorities of democracy and the “free world,” as was the habit of Cordell Hull. These semantic gestures must be supplemented and implemented by all the wisdom, precaution, foresight, and statecraft that can be drawn from the disastrous experience with two world wars and their ominous aftermaths. Failing this, we are not likely to have another opportunity.

We are not likely to succeed so long as we resolutely reject searching self-examination but continue to seek a scapegoat on whom we may lay the blame for all international tragedies. The effort to make a scapegoat out of the kaiser and Germany after the First World War produced the Versailles Treaty and, in time, the Second World War. The same process was continued on a more fantastic scale after the Second World War, and it has already led us to the brink of nuclear war several times. Professor Taylor has made clear the folly in seeking to make Hitler’s foreign policy the cause of all the miseries and anguish of the world since 1939—or even 1933.

We can get no valid comfort from the illusion that nuclear warfare will be withheld in the Third World War, as poison gas was in the second. As F. J. P. Veale pointed out so well in his *Advance to Barbarism*, the Nuremberg trials took care of that. These showed that the rule in the future will be that defeated leaders, military and civilian, will be executed. Hence, no leader in wartime will spare any available and effective horrors which may avert defeat. Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery got this point when he stated in Paris in June, 1948: "The Nuremberg trials have made the waging of unsuccessful war a crime: the generals on the defeated side are tried and then hanged." He should have added chiefs of state, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and even secretaries of welfare.

While it is easy to demonstrate that the Second World War and American entry into it constituted one of the outstanding public calamities in human history, and perhaps the last—surely, the next to the last—of such magnitude, the question is always asked as to what *should* have been done. There is no space here to write a treatise on world history or to combine prophesy with hindsight. But a reasonable answer can be suggested.

Britain should not have started the Second World War. The British leaders knew that Hitler was no threat to them. Next to assuring German strength, he was mainly interested in bolstering the British empire. As Liddell Hart and others have shown, even after Dunkirk he offered to put the German *Wehrmacht* and *Luftwaffe* at the service of Britain if she would make peace.

Germany and Russia had made a pact in August, 1939, and both were interested in turning east and south. If they remained friendly, they could have developed and civilized these great untamed areas and would have reduced their interests in the West. If they quarreled and fought, they would thereby have reduced the two great totalitarian systems to impotence through military attrition. Once the war started and Germany had invaded Russia, Britain and the United States should have remained aloof and allowed these totalitarian rivals to bleed themselves white and thereby end their menace to the Western world.

The wisdom of such procedure was recognized by public leaders in both major political parties, such as ex-President Herbert Hoover, Senator Robert A. Taft, and Senator Harry S. Truman. Had their advice been heeded, communism would not now dominate a vast

portion of the planet or have over a billion adherents. Nor would we be faced with a war of nuclear extermination.

But the combined power of Roosevelt's lust for the glamor of a war presidency, the Communist line about "collective security," so successfully propounded by Litvinov at Geneva and adopted by American liberals as the ideological basis of their interventionism, and Churchill's gargantuan vanity and vast enjoyment of his prestige as wartime leader, was far too great to be overcome by either factual information or political logic. The dolorous results of the folly of American intervention and Roosevelt's concessions to Stalinite communism still dominate the material on world affairs in every daily newspaper and every political journal of our time.

The schizoid confusion and consternation of American anti-revisionist historians when facing the contentions and conclusions of the Taylor book were well illustrated by their reviews in leading historical journals, of which the *American Historical Review* holds first place. Among these historians, one of the most distinguished and aggressive is Professor Raymond J. Sontag of the eminent University of California in Berkeley, California. Professor Sontag reviewed the Taylor book in the July, 1962, issue of the *American Historical Review*. He had been a frank revisionist with respect to the First World War, and had written to me pleasantly, even flatteringly, concerning my *Genesis of the World War*. It was well known, however, that he had undergone a great change in attitude in approaching the background of 1939 but few could have been prepared for his review of the Taylor book. It was a superficial smear from beginning to end and made no attempt whatever to indicate the nature, significance, and contributions of the book as the first revisionist treatment of the causes of the Second World War to appear in any language. There was no real excuse for such an exhibition because Sontag had been one of the principal supervisors and editors of the documents on 1939 seized from the Germans at the end of the war.

Sontag attacked Taylor vigorously for condensing slightly some of the cited documentary material although this did not seem to have made any real difference in Taylor's interpretation of the essentials of his case. He then proceeded to offer some largely irrelevant and casuistic criticism of details, such as Taylor's not regarding Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and other early statements as valid evidence of his plans in 1938-1939. All this could be overlooked,

even though much better use could have been made of the space thus taken up by giving readers of the review some slight idea of the character, originality, merits, and contributions of the book. What cannot be regarded so complacently is that Sontag then completely misrepresented the basic thesis of Taylor's book by contending that Taylor treats British policy after the German demand for the return of Danzig on March 21, 1939, as "foolish, blindly foolish" and responsible for dragging Europe into the tragedy of war.

The fact is that Taylor declares several times that no country wanted war in 1939 and that it was the product of blunders by all. The main weakness and defect of the Taylor book is actually his palpable failure adequately to reveal the responsibility of Britain for the onset of the war. In a brochure on Taylor's book, entitled "Blasting the Historical Blackout," I devoted some twenty-one pages to a careful analysis of the content and contentions of the volume. I found it necessary to devote no less than eight of these pages to a summary of the evidence indicating that Taylor actually absolved Britain of any direct or major responsibility for the onset of war during the critical period from the end of March to early September, 1939. Apparently, Sontag regards it as highly reprehensible to juggle the text of a few documents, even if this does not materially affect the author's narrative or generalizations, but quite permissible, even commendable, to juggle a whole book and totally misrepresent its main argument and conclusions.

The confusion and contradictions involved in the efforts of anti-interventionist historians in facing up to a realistic treatment of the facts about responsibility for the Second World War were further revealed in an article that Professor Sontag wrote in the *Review of Politics*, October, 1963, on this subject. The main contention of this article was that determining the responsibility for the coming of war in 1939 is so complicated and difficult that the problem is not likely to be settled in a definitive manner for many years to come. This is a defensible assertion. Yet, he also concludes that the responsibility of Hitler and the Germans for 1939 is so obvious that its demonstration does not require serious historical investigation.

## V. Revisionism and Peace

A chief reason why any friend of peace should be warmly interested in the revisionist verdict on the responsibility for the

Second World War and American entry into the conflict is that it destroys the fatal illusion that the only danger of war after the Treaty of Versailles lay in the aggressive nature of the German people and their leaders, and that destroying them would surely usher in a glorious era of brotherly love, in which swords would literally be beaten into plowshares.

As Russell Grenfell did well to point out in his vigorous and courageous book, *Unconditional Hatred*, it is doubtful if ever before in history "have so many aggressions been crowded into so short a time as have taken place in the years since the defeat of Germany and Japan." Mankind has never been able to hate humanity into peace but, under the present conditions of military technology, nations can, and possibly will, hate each other into extinction.

Mention of Captain Grenfell suggests that far the most important point relative to the Second World War and the "peace" which followed has been very generally overlooked, even by most revisionists including myself. Yet, it is absolutely indispensable to drawing the main lesson for any constructive pacifism in the future, if there is to be any future. Grenfell criticized Churchill for trying to act like a "Whitehall Napoleon" rather than a sagacious "Downing Street statesman." This was a shrewd observation, but General Albert C. Wedemeyer has correctly contended that even this characterization of Churchill's conduct of the war is actually too kindly a judgment, for "he waged war more like an Indian chieftain from the Arizona territory intent upon obtaining the largest possible number of enemy scalps."\* He goes on to say with equal accuracy: "Our own leaders were just as vehement in proclaiming that the slaughter of the enemy was a primary aim of the war."

This matter is of fundamental importance for pacifism and the cause of peace because it bears so very directly upon the widespread complaint that, while the Allies "won the war, they lost the peace." This is usually coupled with the assertion that the peace was lost chiefly because of the "unconditional surrender" policy and related actions and attitudes which ignored the inevitable results of concentration on sheer butchery and hollow military triumph, and

---

\*Editor's note: This phrase indicates a need for revisionist study. There is considerable in the way of evidence to suggest that North American aborigines were not the blood-thirsty savages so many novelists, newspaper writers, and historical propagandists have made them. The victors of all military adventures are presumed "good" and the vanquished are invariably scoundrels whose elimination or enslavement occurred in the triumph of virtue.

forgot the need of planning for a better and more peaceful world after the victory was won, as had been stated in the Atlantic Charter of August, 1941. Nobody has more frequently repeated this actually superficial view of the situation than myself.

The plain and blunt fact is that, in the Second World War, the Allies had no *peace* to lose from the very moment that the conflict started. The British entered the war to "smash Germany" and to destroy Hitler and the Nazis. Roosevelt and the Americans adopted the identical program at once, merely adding the smashing of Japan. Stalin was compelled to take it over because he had been attacked by Germany, whatever the merits of the struggle between the two countries. All three countries were thus committed to a global "scalping party." There were no actual *peace* aims or program. All the aims were *war* aims. The purpose of the war was to kill Germans, Japanese, and Italians. Stalin added to this the acquisition of territory and peoples that would act as a protective buffer against any powerful Germany of the future and also, he hoped, assure Russian hegemony in the Old World.

To be successful the "scalping party" literally required "unconditional surrender," even if it had never been specifically announced by Roosevelt at Casablanca. Indeed, the British had adopted this policy from the very outbreak of the war on September 3, 1939. The Atlantic Charter was dead before the ink was dry on the proceedings at Newfoundland. It had no role in a scalping party. In fact, Churchill knew it was doomed before he met Roosevelt there, for it ran counter to the British reasons for starting the war and Stalin had already demanded the spoils of victory from Britain before he had been willing to discuss any basic strategy for winning the victory. The Allies won just exactly what they fought for—and *all* they fought for: an astronomical number of enemy scalps and incredible physical destruction of enemy property and homes, together with great territorial and population acquisitions for Russia. They lost nothing whatever for which they had actually planned and fought. It is a travesty to condemn them for losing the *peace*—something they never really had in mind. They can, of course, be condemned for having little or nothing except butchery and destruction (save in the case of Stalin) on their minds.

Pacifists who overlook these fundamental facts ignore the most important lesson to be drawn from the Second World War and one that has to be faced even more urgently today. These facts demonstrate for all time the complete political and moral bankruptcy of



the Second World War, and it would have been just as savage and futile if the concentration had been on killing Britishers, Frenchmen, Russians, or Americans. In the Cold War of today, we face even greater public idiocy and potential calamity. In the Second World War, it was only a matter of killing Germans, Japanese, and Italians; today, we are confronted with the prospect of killing everybody on the planet with no basic plans or motives other than a "massive surprise attack," to be followed by the mopping up of survivors through a "massive retaliation."

The origins and motives of the Cold War were as sordid and ethically bankrupt as those of the Second World War: Stalin's determination to hold his illicit gains, the British effort to regain their balance-of-power position which they had lost in the war that was designed by Halifax and the British war group to preserve it, and the effort of Truman and Clark Clifford to pull the Democratic political prospects out of the sub-basement of opinion ratings in late February, 1947. There was evidently the same collaboration between Truman and the British in 1946-47 as there had been between Roosevelt and the British between 1938 and 1941. The Republican bipartisan support of the Cold War, engineered by Arthur Vandenberg and his cohorts, was no less selfish and sordid.

The world was soon consigned to the operational framework of the Orwellian pattern of linking up bogus economic prosperity and political tenure with cold and phony warfare, from which the only relief may well be devastating nuclear warfare, set off by design or accident, and in either case surely killing off more in the first hours than were killed in the whole Second World War. In the meantime we linger along, continuing the series of lesser tactical or revolutionary "hot wars" in Korea, South Viet Nam, the Congo, and elsewhere, which are so needed to stoke the fires of our military state capitalistic economy. Indeed, in *Time* of September 25, 1965, it was suggested in a lengthy and factual editorial that we might as well get adjusted to this situation of worldwide non-nuclear war as permanent until the final nuclear overkill comes along. In its issue of December 6, 1965, *U.S. News & World Report* amply documented this dolorous conclusion of *Time* in a comprehensive article entitled, "The World in a Mess," and indicated that there are a dozen or more places where the United States could as logically be intervening as in South Viet Nam and that such opportunities will not be lacking so long as this trend and policy dominates our global attitude.

## VI. The New Strategy in Maintaining the Historical Blackout on the Second World War: The Blurout and the Smotherout

The preceding review of the methods employed in producing a blackout relative to the causes of the Second World War and the American entry into the fray in December, 1941, could make it appear that the results should have satisfied the proponents of the program to keep the facts from the conventional academic world and the American public. But this did not suffice. The facts might be kept from general knowledge but it became increasingly apparent that the factual material piled up by the revisionist scholars might not remain permanently suppressed. Some method must be found to minimize or destroy the relevance of these facts themselves.

The first device or technique which was employed to produce this result was what has been called by revisionist scholars the "historical blurout." This method was most notably exemplified by the book of Dr. Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, published in 1962. Little attempt was made in this book to deny or refute the basic facts established by revisionist writers from Morgenstern until the present time. Instead, a great number of distracting, secondary, or irrelevant items were brought in with respect to the critical matters in the hope that these would obscure or blur out the recognition or import of the really vital facts or conclusions established by revisionist scholars. This sufficed to satisfy many of the traditional blackout contingent. Samuel Eliot Morison declared Dr. Wohlstetter's book to be "the best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor," and it was reviewed in a similar lyrical vein in most of the historical journals and the book review sections of leading newspapers.

Nevertheless, the blurout technique did not satisfy the more farsighted and determined members of the blackout cult. Too many revisionist contentions were admitted and shrewd revisionists could penetrate the blurring stratagem. Moreover, it was not so well adapted to handling the responsibility for the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 which is, after all, the most crucial aspect of revisionism in relation to the Second World War. Some method had to be devised to make it appear that even though revisionists might demonstrate that Hitler was not solely responsible for the Second World War, that the responsibility of Britain was greater, and that Roosevelt deliberately forced Japan into a situation that made Japanese military resistance to economic strangulation inevit-

able, these major contentions of revisionism are of subordinate significance, if not actually irrelevant. To produce this result, the blurout technique was expanded or really supplanted by what can best be described as the "historical smotherout." This is rapidly becoming the technique of those directing the strategy of combating revisionism and it promises to be far more effective than the historical blackout in suppressing revisionist efforts to establish and disseminate the truth relative to responsibility for the Second World War and American entry into the conflict.

The feasibility and effectiveness of this new strategy appears to have been suggested by the Eichmann trial of 1961. This demonstrated the apparently intense and insatiable appetite of American readers for anything which emphasized national socialist savagery, an opportunity which our communications agencies exploited to the uttermost. This morbid interest was prolonged and stimulated by the Frankfurt-Auschwitz trial, which was so planned as to drag on for an entire year, after which the West Germans were pressured into lifting their statute of limitations on war crimes, thus making it possible to continue such trials indefinitely.

The smotherout strategy, which has supplanted the previous procedure that dominated the efforts to counteract revisionism for a decade and a half after the end of hostilities, has now shifted attention from primary concern with responsibility for the beginning of the war and for American entry, to establishing the basic assumption that what really matters is what took place *after* hostilities were started. The fundamental aim has now become to emphasize the allegation that Hitler and the national socialist leaders were such vile, debased, brutal, and bloodthirsty gangsters that Great Britain had an overwhelming moral obligation to plan a war to exterminate them, and that the United States was compelled to enter this conflict to aid and abet this British crusade because of a moral imperative that could not be evaded to engage in a campaign of political, social, and cultural sanitation.

To implement and reinforce this new smotherout strategy, American journalism, radio, motion pictures, and television have been flooded with profuse and persistent alleged examples and "proofs" of national socialist turpitude and Hitler's personal diabolism, far exceeding anything known in wartime and ever increasing in frequency, volume, and venom. Lest the public become "fed up" and bored by the repetition, the material handed out has to be made more unceasing, exaggerated, and inflammatory. Scholarly revision-

ist materials are smothered beneath a flood of sensational horror literature. Even the literate public only gets into contact with scattered and minor bits of substantial revisionist material at considerable intervals. But not a day goes by without one or more sensational articles appearing in the daily papers about the national socialist savagery which required Britain to start the war and the United States to enter it, the weekly and monthly journals never miss their quota of this passionate prose, the radio has it on the air daily, expensive moving pictures are devoted to the theme, not a week passes by without several inciting television programs revolving about this intensified propaganda, and lurid books pour forth at frequent intervals.

It was difficult enough for revisionist writers to make headway against the older historical blackout in the form of the silent treatment, grossly distorted reviews, incessant smearing and the like, but revisionism is now becoming smothered and obliterated by this new technique of diversionary sensationalism. It cannot be resisted or countered by accurate diplomatic history, which is now implied to be no more than "piddling" irrelevance, savoring of a lack of moral sensitivity. To expect the public to listen to sober revisionist scholarship in the face of the current avalanche of violent vituperation against prewar and wartime Germany is like imagining a housewife whose home is on fire and the flames threatening her small children, being eager or even willing to open her door to a Fuller Brush salesman and listen intently to his sales talk. If an anti-revisionist or non-revisionist scholar is approached with the assertion that it is no longer possible to maintain the sole guilt of Germany in 1939 or the notion that Roosevelt entered the war reluctantly in December, 1941, and was surprised and shocked by the Japanese attack, the response is increasingly becoming: "So what? Look at what those sub-human Nazis did after the war got started, no matter who started it!"

This diversion of the debate over the revisionist approach to the Second World War from the area of historical documentation and discussion to frenetic and irresponsible emotional journalism, whether in print, on the air, or in films, has now become the Hindenburg Line of the existing resistance to revisionism. It may well be the last redoubt of the defenders of historical fiction and mendacity but it also appears all but inevitable that it may be relatively impregnable and permanent, not because of its validity but on account of the fact that any attempt to launch an attack based on fact and

logic will be fiercely, ruthlessly, and speedily smothered and discounted. Those most eager to perpetuate the historical blackout operating under this new pattern and strategy already have a tight control, directly or indirectly, over all the means of communication. This control may not be shaken off short of some now completely unforeseen and revolutionary political alignment of the world, or of such a universal and drastic development of totalitarianism and intolerance as to elevate Hitler, even among the opponents of this trend, into much the same role and status that Thomas Jefferson has long enjoyed among American liberals, a by no means impossible prospect.

That the strategists of the new model blackout or smotherout are confident of indefinite control of communication agencies is apparent from the fact that the current massive and virulent Germanophobia is far easier to refute than the documentary opposition to revisionism. Even if one were to accept the most extreme and exaggerated indictment of Hitler and the national socialists for their activities after 1939 made by anybody fit to remain outside a mental hospital, it is almost alarmingly easy to demonstrate that the atrocities of the Allies in the same period were more numerous as to victims and were carried out for the most part by methods more brutal and painful than alleged extermination in gas ovens.

To look for a moment at the Communist atrocities, between three and four million German expellees lost their lives through overt butchery, lethal brutality, and starvation during the process. The Yugoslav publicist, Mihajlo Mihajlov, examining Russian sources in 1964, revealed that at least twelve millions passed through Stalin's concentration camps, with untold mortality and suffering, to say nothing of the great number of Russian refugees deported from Germany to Russia for slaughter or enslavement at the close of hostilities.

The infamous Lindemann plan for saturation bombing of German civilians which was quickly adopted by Churchill and the British, matches for moral depravity and inhuman cruelty anything alleged against Hitler and the German concentration camps. If the current Germanophobia is based on the assertion that Hitler and his entourage ordered the extermination of six million Jews, there is no doubt that the Morgenthau plan for postwar Germany envisaged the starvation of twenty to thirty million Germans in transforming Germany into a pastoral country. This plan was enthusiastically adopted by Roosevelt, and Churchill was bribed into supporting it.

No action seriously alleged against Hitler and his subordinates surpasses for casual and needless brutality the incendiary bombings of Tokyo and Hamburg or the destruction of Dresden.

All other indefensible breaches of a humane code by either Hitler or the Allies were outdistanced by the atom bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than six months after the Japanese had virtually sued for peace on the same terms that were accepted on V-J Day after the atom bombings, which the noted British military authority General J. F. C. Fuller denounced as gratuitous savagery unmatched since the days of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. We now know that those responsible for ordering the atom bombings, especially Secretary of War Stimson, were fully aware that the Japanese were desperately eager to surrender and that the bombings were not necessary to bring immediate peace. The documents now available prove that the bombings were ordered and were approved by Stimson as technological exhibitionism and were carried out primarily to impress and intimidate the Russians.

The neo-blackout or smotherout strategists would not dare to invite a disastrous showdown and the exposure of their methods and contentions if they did not feel certain that they can indefinitely smother the presentation of the material which would so easily refute their mendacity. Any revisionist protests or corrections in relation to the recent blatant and irresponsible Germanophobia are met by charges of anti-Semitism or an intention to "rehabilitate" Hitler, despite the fact that there has not been one anti-Semite or Hitler sympathizer among all the American revisionist historians. Indeed, most of them have been at least moderate Judophiles and severe critics of Hitler and national socialism.

Further evidence that the custodians of the new pattern of smotherout strategy feel confident of retaining indefinite control of publishing and communication agencies, and that the latter will continue their eagerness to serve their present masters, is to be discerned in the apparently utter indifference to a possibly drastic backlash, if and when the blackout and smotherout are ultimately demolished and the truth is made available, which would rapidly be the case if revisionists ever gained even decent access to our publishing and communication facilities. Being for the most part literate persons, the hierarchy of the new smotherout dispensation must surely recall the revulsion which followed the revelation by Abrams, Lasswell, Mock and Larson, Peterson, Ponsonby, and Read of the hoax perpetrated by the Bryce report on alleged German

atrocities during the First World War. But the Bryce report and wartime propaganda of that era were only a trifling deviation from veracity as compared with much of the current Germanophobia.

Perhaps the leaders of the new smotherout strategy also reckon on the very possible loss of any capacity for moral revulsion or self-respect on the part of the American public. The fact that books like *The Quiet Canadian* and *Black Boomerang* could pass almost unnoticed may provide impressive evidence supporting this view. It required the books of outsiders like Arthur Ponsonby, J. M. Read, and others to expose the falsity of the Bryce report and comparable propaganda literature. Today, the masters of propaganda and mendacity in the Second World War proudly confess their malign achievements and boast of them. Whatever slight attention has been paid to their arrogance and audacity has mainly partaken of praise rather than public shame, indignation, and denunciation.

Professor Michael Connors will deal more thoroughly with the rise and implications of the current Germanophobia for the revisionist movement; hence, little more need be said about it here. The relevant fact is that opposition to revisionism in relation to the Second World War has been transformed in recent years from historical study and discussion into a loaded public propaganda enterprise. It has passed from the investigation and interpretation of documents and other traditional historical evidence into a frenzied concentration of publicity on extermination archeology, comparative biology, clinical pathology, and genocidal ethics, with no immediate prospect of exposure and disgrace for the smotherout fraud, because only one side has access to the publicity.

It is inevitable that a comparable change must be made in the pattern of revisionist procedure relative to the Second World War. It is no longer remotely possible to make effective headway in public, or even scholarly, debate. If the public could not be made aware of revisionist materials and induced to read them in the 1950's, there is surely little or no prospect of making headway in honest factual debate today in the face of the literal tornado of hostile and sensational bilge presented daily by our communication agencies.

Aside from the need of a few more comprehensive books to supplement that of Professor Taylor on the causes and responsibility for the Second World War, and perhaps a comprehensive book on Pearl Harbor to bring together the new evidence as to the responsibility of Roosevelt, Stimson, and Hull for the Japanese attack, thus supplementing Morgenstern's *tour de force* by the latest knowledge

which confirms his main conclusions, the historical and factual battle of revisionism has been won. But the extensive revisionist literature on which this has been based and that which will be presented later on must be regarded for the time being as existing mainly for the record, prior to the time when historical facts can reach the public, unimpeded by censorship, mendacity, favoritism, and fraud. If this time never comes, the failure will be accompanied by far worse calamities to civilization and the human race than ignorance of the responsibility for the Second World War and American entry into it, even though these latter two events may constitute the main original basis for the abysmal calamities which can await us, including nuclear extermination. They have surely been chiefly responsible for most of the global disasters and demoralization which have arisen since 1939.

Future historical revisionist writing in the current intellectual temper and publicity scene must therefore be regarded as chiefly for the record, and we already have a monumental and impressive achievement for this new revisionist program: Professor James J. Martin's *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941*, which portrays the most stupendous betrayal of humane ideology and public morality in contemporary times. Others will follow.\*

---

\*Note. My prediction that anti-revisionism will in the future combine the smear technique of the earlier historical blackout with the Germanophobia of the new smotherout is strikingly confirmed by the review of Professor Martin's book by Professor Robert H. Ferrell of the University of Indiana in the *American Historical Review*, January, 1966, pp. 728-730.

Ferrell smears the Martin book by describing it as a "scholarly disaster," offering no evidence for this except for indicating that he found the material unpleasant reading. He then amply provides the Germanophobia of the smotherout by describing the national socialist regime as the "most amoral government since the statistically clouded times of Genghis Khan."

The review further illustrates Professor Martin's contention that the "respectable" and traditional American historians of today are making the test of desirable prose not whether it is true but whether it makes pleasant reading to these historians and their brainwashed public.



# Rising Germanophobia: The Chief Obstacle to Current World War II Revisionism

by Michael F. Connors

Assistant professor of history at Gwynedd-Mercy College, Gwynedd Valley, Pennsylvania, Michael F. Connors is a frequent contributor of articles to *Social Justice Review*. He is the author of a monograph, "The Development of Germanophobia." Professor Connors earned his master of arts degree in history at the University of Pennsylvania. He is now working for his Ph.D.

## **I. The Germanophobic Interpretation of Germany and Germans**

It is widely conceded in theory today that the kind of thinking which presents any ethnic or national group in terms of a crude, unflattering, and inaccurate caricature is unfortunate and misleading, at best, and something rather more sinister at worst. Conversely, acceptance of other groups or countries on the basis of merit without reference to racial or national background is regarded as one of the distinguishing marks of the truly educated man.

One of the most widely publicized reasons offered in explanation of our vehement opposition to the regime of the late Adolf Hitler was its severe policy directed at Jews and other enemies of the regime. It is conveniently overlooked that there were over 3,000,000 Jews in Poland as compared to 500,000 in Germany, and that they were on the whole treated worse than the Jews were in peacetime national socialist Germany. By some curious irony, moreover, many of the same Americans who were so quick to attack the reprehensible national socialist racial doctrines have been among the worst offenders in spreading abroad an equally fantastic myth of unique German wickedness.

As a consequence of this Germanophobic myth, the very word German conjures up in all too many minds an uncomfortable image

of robot-like, goose-stepping legions of glassy-eyed storm troopers set in motion by the harshly barked commands of an Erich von Stroheim-type "Prussian" officer. Furthermore, "militarism," "aggressiveness," and a marked preference for "authoritarianism" over democracy have for over three decades been well-nigh universally regarded as "typically German" national traits.

Germanophobia in the 1930's and 1940's had for the "educated" classes in the West an appeal which could never have been affirmed for such concepts as "white supremacy" or anti-Semitism. Nor, indeed, has this situation really changed appreciably today. It is precisely this academic and intellectual respectability of the notion of unique German wickedness, based on specious racial and historical arguments, that has made of it such a dangerous fallacy.

## II. American Opinion of Germany and Germans in the Nineteenth Century

This dark image of a sinister, aggressive, predatory, and militarily regimented Germany only became prevalent in the present century. The famed English historian Frederic William Maitland (1850-1906) has described the once characteristic attitude toward the Germans: ". . . it was usual and plausible to paint the German as an unpractical, dreamy, sentimental being, looking out with mild blue eyes into a cloud of music and metaphysics and tobacco smoke."<sup>1</sup>

The French writer Madame de Staël (1766-1817) romantically portrayed for the Napoleonic world of the early nineteenth century a Germany utterly unlike the grotesque image later drawn by Allied propagandists during two World Wars. Madame de Staël's Germans were a nation of "poets and thinkers," a race of kindly, impractical, other-worldly dreamers without national prejudices and, strangely, in the light of later propaganda, "disinclined to war."<sup>2</sup>

In America, too, a similarly warm view of things German predominated. It is difficult to exaggerate the constructive impact of German institutions and learning upon American life and the cordiality of the reception accorded them in the century or so from Frederick the Great to Bismarck. The story of this golden age of German-American relations has been ably chronicled by a very

<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Manfred Messerschmidt, *Deutschland in Englischer Sicht: Die Wandlungen des Deutschlandbildes in der Englischen Geschichtsschreibung* (Dusseldorf: Michael Triltsch Verlag, 1955), p. 51.

<sup>2</sup>George P. Gooch, *Germany* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 88.

thorough and gifted American scholar, Henry M. Adams, in his indispensable volume, *Prussian-American Relations, 1775-1871*.<sup>3</sup> In the cultural and intellectual spheres, as in the political realm, the relationship was one of immense mutual profit.

The Prussian system of higher education and the cultural flowering which characterized Prussia in the era of regeneration following upon the Napoleonic wars all left a distinct impression upon America. The list of American scholars and writers—George Tichnor, Edward Everett, Joseph Cogswell, George Bancroft, John Lothrop Motley, Henry E. Dwight, Washington Irving, Henry W. Longfellow, and James F. Cooper, to mention only some—who went to Prussia to secure inspiration for their life's work is a most impressive one. By most Americans, "whether seen in their newly united nation or in this country, the Germans were generally regarded as methodical and energetic people," indeed as "models of progress," while "in their devotion to music, education, science, and technology they aroused the admiration and emulation of Americans."<sup>4</sup>

It is evident then that the Germans in the nineteenth century ranked extremely high in the esteem of their European and American neighbors. Two unrelated historic factors seemed to conspire at the time to give widespread currency to views of this sort. First, there were the truly remarkable achievements of Germans in every sphere of cultural, intellectual, and scientific creativity. It could hardly have seemed amiss to speak of a nation of *Dichter und Denker* when one thought of the contributions to literature of Goethe and Schiller, the historical works of Niebuhr, von Ranke, and Mommsen, the philosophical studies of Kant and Hegel, the great scientific achievements of Alexander von Humboldt, Bunsen, von Liebig, Helmholtz, and Röntgen, and the varied musical achievements of Beethoven, Brahms, Schumann, the Strausses, and Wagner.

The second factor which seemed to support this amiable and admiring attitude toward the Germans was their military and political weakness before their achievement of national unification in 1871. One cannot imagine a more extreme contrast than that between Madame de Staël's Germans and the stereotyped image of monocled, burr-headed, heel-clicking, mindless robots which Holly-

<sup>3</sup>Cleveland: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1960.

<sup>4</sup>Henry Cord Meyer, *Five Images of Germany: Half a Century of American Views on German History* (Washington, D.C.: The American Historical Association, 1960), p. 3.

wood and the yellow press have done so much to popularize in the 1930's and thereafter.

Possibly even more difficult to grasp, for those whose thinking has been shaped by the propaganda of recent years, is the fact that throughout the nineteenth century France rather than Germany was cast in the role of international bully and villain.<sup>5</sup> Had not Louis XIV and Bonaparte repeatedly made a battleground of Europe? Could anyone forget that French arms had rolled at high tide across the entire continent of Europe, threatening to engulf even the vast empire of the Russian tsars? Or could anyone forget that it had required the combined resources of Austria, Britain, Russia, and Prussia, assisted by the fortuitous intervention of nature in the form of a severe Russian winter, to shatter the might of the Corsican conqueror?

Much has been made in anti-German propaganda of the allegation that France has been invaded by Germany on three occasions in contemporary times, while overlooking the approximately thirty invasions of German territory by French forces during modern history. An examination of the relative warlike activities of European nations by the eminent American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, surely no sympathizer with Germany, in his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, placed Germany at the bottom of the list in the percentage of years engaged in warfare. From 1200 to 1925 "Germany had the smallest and Spain the largest percentage of years with wars."<sup>6</sup> In his monumental *A Study of War*, the eminent historian and political scientist Quincy Wright, in covering the period from 1480 to 1940, found that the percentage of participation of the main European nations in wars during this period was the following: England, 28; France, 26; Spain, 23; Russia, 22; Austria, 19; Turkey, 15; Poland, 11; Sweden, 9; Italy, 9; Netherlands, 8; Germany (including Prussia), 8; and Denmark, 7.<sup>7</sup> This should put at rest the myth that Germany has been the seat of military ardor and plotting throughout the course of modern history.

<sup>5</sup>It should be noted that the old and persistent conviction that Franco-American relations were undeviatingly friendly throughout the nineteenth century is quite at odds with the facts. For a recent scholarly study which reveals the full extent of Franco-American estrangement during these years see Henry Blumenthal, *A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830-1871* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959).

<sup>6</sup>Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York: American Book Company, Vols. I-III, 1937; Vol. IV, 1941), III, p. 352.

<sup>7</sup>Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942, p. 221.

### III. The Rise of Germanophobia

The thoroughgoing alteration of Anglo-American and French thinking about Germany in the twentieth century is one of the most curious and fascinating transformations in the whole course of intellectual history. As Professor Herbert Butterfield of Cambridge has pointed out, the hitherto nearly unrestrained admiration for Germany was now replaced by "a common opinion that Germany had been the aggressor and enemy of freedom throughout all the ages. . ."<sup>8</sup>

Anglo-German estrangement in the years before World War I was compounded in varying parts of naval rivalry and industrial and commercial competition. British publicists and historians, ever sensitive to the wishes of the foreign office, soon began to reflect this new state of affairs. American opinion was not far behind that of Britain, and with good reason for American writers and journals were mainly dependent upon British sources, especially the Germanophobic Harmsworth press, for information about European and particularly German affairs.

But it remained for entente propagandists of the 1914-1918 period to give birth to the truly pathological Germanophobia which has long since become so integral a part of Western thinking processes. Horrendous tales of fiendish German atrocities in Belgium and France, when combined with a universal conviction of "sole German guilt" for the war's origin, added up to a fixation of special German savagery. The products of Lord Bryce and Arnold J. Toynbee rank high in this effort. That the calm, sober researches of postwar Anglo-American "revisionist" scholars made a total shambles of the entente propaganda structure did not, however, prevent the rise after 1933 of a new and even more violent outpouring of Germanophobic sentiment in the West.

### IV. The Intensification of Germanophobia during and after the Second World War

With the onset of World War II, in Britain as in the United States, the literature of Germanophobia reached flood-tide proportions. One may gather something of the spirit of this literature from the variant "solutions" it proposed for what it liked to call

<sup>8</sup>Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), pp. 162-163.

the "German problem." Among these were suggested population transfers, territorial dismemberment, and even, in one case, "eugenic sterilization" of 48,000,000 Germans of procreative age.<sup>9</sup> Nor were these merely the rantings of lunatic fringe fanatics. Earnest A. Hooton, an eminent Harvard anthropologist and Rhodes scholar, even suggested forced labor service by German soldiers throughout Europe after the war, with the dual purpose of simultaneously reducing the German birth rate and encouraging their cohabitation with non-German females to mix the supposedly more virulent German genes with the milder ones of other Europeans.<sup>10</sup> Anglo-American and French historians eagerly rushed into print with the most specious Germanophobic writings designed to prove that Hitler was the inevitable product of sinister forces long operative in German history, while an entire school of Sunday supplement writers, following the curious volume of Richard Brickner, sought to explain the "German problem" in terms of the jargon of psychiatry.<sup>11</sup> Hence, the German people were found to be the victims of collective schizophrenia or paranoia, depending upon the preference of the writer concerned, and implying the desirability of enslaving the Germans or exterminating them as suggested by T. N. Kaufman.

Between 1945 and 1960 there was a slight lessening of interest in Germany. Nevertheless, books and articles about Germany were still fairly plentiful. But to the shame of honest historiography there was only a very limited corrective literature to counter the tendentious interpretations of previous years. In reference to Germany these years saw a continuing "historical blackout," to borrow the apt phrase of Harry Elmer Barnes. Typical of postwar attempts by Western historians to perpetuate the Germanophobic myth was Hans Kohn's article, "Rethinking Recent German History."<sup>12</sup> Kohn resuscitated all the stock villains of German history who had long been so dear to the hearts of melodramatic anti-German writers: Bismarck as the supposed embodiment of Machiavellian power politics; the wicked Prussian and German ruling classes; that nebu-

<sup>9</sup>Theodore N. Kaufman, *Germany Must Perish* (Newark: Argyle Press, 1941).

<sup>10</sup>John L. Snell, *Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma Over Germany* (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1959), pp. 8-9.

<sup>11</sup>See, e.g., A.J.P. Taylor's *The Course of German History* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1946); Edmond Vermeil's *Germany's Three Reichs: Their History and Culture* (London: Andrew Dakers Limited, 1945); William Montgomery McGovern's *From Luther to Hitler* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941); and Richard Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943).

<sup>12</sup>*The Review of Politics*, July, 1952, pp. 325-345.

lous demon, German intellectual development, and all the rest of the tiresome litany. Kohn even attacked those who "attempt to show that the pernicious trends in modern German history were common to European civilization as a whole," citing as an example the charge that Gobineau's racism influenced Wagner, though it is an undeniable fact. It is not surprising that he should find that the national socialist "deviation from the main lines of European development . . . started long before Hitler."

A widely read college-level text in the popular and inexpensive Anvil series published by Van Nostrand gathers between its covers most of the threadbare clichés and superstitions ever penned by Germanophobic writers.<sup>13</sup> Its author, Louis L. Snyder, an ardent revisionist on World War I, is virtually obsessed with his favorite delusions of intellectual history. To read his account one might imagine that pre-national socialist Germany had some kind of monopoly on racism, anti-Semitism, and "irrationalism." Snyder has also managed to get himself regarded as an authority on Germany and books on Germany. He is, perhaps, the most prolific reviewer of books which appear on Germany, even in scholarly journals and in magazines of much popular prestige such as the *Saturday Review*. These reviews may well have accomplished more in the way of denigrating Germany and the Germans than his books. Another historian who is hard on the heels of Snyder and an ardent and ubiquitous anti-German reviewer is Gordon A. Craig of Stanford University.

One of the most persistent of the Germanophobic writers in the postwar period, and one with no apparent scholarly credentials, has been T. H. Tetens, whose fantastic volume, *Germany Plots with the Kremlin*,<sup>14</sup> gives a feverish account of an alleged diabolical scheme by German "geopolitical master minds" operating out of Madrid and Bonn to sell out the West to Moscow.

Undoubtedly the most successfully publicized and widely read book dealing with national socialist Germany to appear in America in the decade and a half following the end of the war was William L. Shirer's *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*.<sup>15</sup> Despite its

<sup>13</sup>Louis L. Snyder, *Basic History of Modern Germany* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957).

<sup>14</sup>New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1953.

<sup>15</sup>New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Shirer followed this up with a shorter, watered-down version for elementary school children entitled *The Rise and Fall of Adolf Hitler* (New York: Random House, 1961) which has been described as "Shirer for tiny tots."

ingratiating style and the rave reviews of eager journalistic enthusiasts, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, embodying as it does many of the worst features of wartime Germanophobia, contributes very little to an honest understanding of German history during the period with which it is concerned. Again and again the reader is sharply reminded of Shirer's bias not merely against the national socialists but against the entire German people. As early as page five, for example, he writes that "the German people" were "a natural instrument which he [Hitler] was able to shape to his own sinister ends." Further on, the reader learns that "Nazism and the Third Reich . . . were but a logical continuation of German history" while Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Hitler left a common stamp upon the German people in the form of a "lust for power and domination, a passion for unbridled militarism, a contempt for democracy and individual freedom and a longing for . . . authoritarianism." Needless to say, Shirer ignores the role of Allied statesmen and of the Draconian Versailles peace in producing the rise of Hitler. It is not surprising then that he should neglect or disparage revisionist scholarship in relation to World War II.

England did not lag behind the United States in producing Germanophobic literature. The leaders were Robert Gilbert (Lord) Vansittart, Edward Frederick Langley (Lord Russell of Liverpool), and Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, Regius professor of modern history at Oxford, and an authority on the seventeenth century history of religious affairs and poetry. Of these, Vansittart was far the most effective, due to his high post in the British government. Vansittart began his attack on Germany as the unique warmonger and the main disturber of peace throughout European history by his *Black Record*, published in 1941. This was devastatingly demolished by the famous British naval historian Captain Russell Grenfell in his *Unconditional Hatred* (1953). Vansittart continued on this theme at greater length in *Lessons of My Life* (1943). He ended his anti-German crusade with a book on how to treat the Germans after World War II so as to insure their destruction as the chronic disturber of the peace of the world. More vehement than the writings of Vansittart as a jeremiad against the Germans were those of Lord Russell of Liverpool, whose first important work was *The Scourge of the Swastika* (1954). He returned to the fray after the Eichmann trial in *The Record* (1963), a slashing anti-German attack on Eichmann and his superiors. Professor Trevor-Roper has been the leading academic assailant of Hitler and the Germans, mainly through



semi-official editorial work in such books as *The Last Days of Hitler* (1947), *Hitler's Table Talk* (1953), *The Testament of Adolf Hitler* (1959), and *Hitler's Secret Conversations* (1961). He was a leading critic of Taylor's *Origins of the Second World War* but was badly worsted by Taylor in a London television debate about the book on the BBC on July 9, 1961.

Perhaps the most influential British attack on Hitler and national socialism was the book, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, by the Oxford professor and historian, Alan Bullock. First published in 1952, it went through many editions and appeared in an expanded and revised version in 1960. It abandoned the extreme polemic exposition of Vansittart and Lord Russell but its conclusions as to Hitler's dictatorship were essentially the same. Owing to its academic language and ostensible restraint, it exerted its great influence because it became the most widely used textbook, especially in the United States, on Hitler and national socialism, thus doing for the academic world what Vansittart and Lord Russell had done for the general reading public. Its bias and errors were laid bare by Francis Neilson in a lengthy review published in the *American Journal of Sociology and Economics*, July, 1958.

The newer and more virulent wave of postwar Germanophobia was stimulated by the seizure of Adolph Eichmann in Argentina in 1960 and his trial in 1961. For example, the above-mentioned T. H. Tetens made another contribution to the vast literature of Germanophobia with his *The New Germany and the Old Nazis*<sup>16</sup> which found the Bonn foreign office to be dominated by a reactivated "Ribbentrop Group." To Tetens, contemporary West Germany seemed but a discreetly veiled replica of the Third Reich and prominent Germans including Ludwig Erhard (then finance minister) were but unregenerate national socialists. A bit more restrained than the wild rhetorical sallies of Tetens were the assaults of Professor Snyder, who is also, as we have seen, a veteran of the literary war against Germany.<sup>17</sup> Conveniently disregarding the matter of the war-guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles as a factor in the rise of Hitler, he predictably blamed everything on "the very nature of German culture" and pontificated that "in Germany the people followed even an evil genius like Hitler simply because they were trained to follow the leader—no matter what he did." The routine

<sup>16</sup>New York: Random House, 1961.

<sup>17</sup>*Hitler and Nazism* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1961).

preoccupation with probing the allegedly morbid German intellectual history with a view to finding there an all-sufficing explanation of everything that went wrong in the world after 1933, thereby precluding any serious discussion of World War II revisionist literature, has proceeded unceasingly.<sup>18</sup>

As just intimated above, the most blatantly offensive and exaggerated anti-German literature, much of it in the paperback field and dealing in painfully clinical but totally onesided detail, with gruesome tales of wartime German physical atrocities, followed in the aftermath of the Eichmann case.<sup>19</sup>

This demonstrated the morbid and almost fanatical interest of the American reading public in an endless recital of horror stories revealing alleged German atrocities. The press and all our other communication agencies made the most of it and have not ceased to this day. The more reasonable Jewish accounts of Eichmann and his trial, such as Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, were vigorously attacked by other Jewish writers such as Jacob Robinson in his *And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight*. The opportunity for sensational publicity based on gruesome tales of German atrocities was revived by the Frankfurt trial of war criminals in 1964, which concentrated mainly on the horrors allegedly committed at Auschwitz. To provide more opportunity for publicity, this was strung out for an entire year by spacing the meetings of the court. Then, in 1965, the West Germans were pressured into setting aside their statute of limitations on war-crimes trials so that they can go on indefinitely, and further reports of savagery are frequently recounted to the American public by the press and other communication agencies.

This writer quite frankly regrets having to deal at all with this thoroughly distasteful body of literature designed to convey in an

<sup>18</sup>See, e.g., Fritz Stern's *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961).

<sup>19</sup>Limitations of space preclude mention of every volume of this kind but a representative selection might include the following: John Donovan, *Eichmann: Man of Slaughter* (New York: Avon Books, 1960); Comer Clarke, *Eichmann: The Man and His Crimes* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1960); H. A. Zeiger (ed.), *The Case Against Adolf Eichmann* (New York: Signet Books, 1960); Louis Hagen, *The Mark of the Swastika* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1965); Robert Neumann and Helga Koppel, *The Pictorial History of the Third Reich* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1962); Quentin Reynolds, *Minister of Death* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1961); Lord Russell of Liverpool, *The Record* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1963); and Jacob Robinson, *And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight* (New York: Macmillan, 1965).

explosively sensational and irresponsible manner the impression that national socialist war crimes were of unique magnitude and depravity. Unfortunately, however, the sheer bulk of this literature with its tiresome repetition of the same Germanophobic theme makes it impossible for one to ignore it. Publishers are by no means the only offenders in this matter for television and the movies have, if anything, outdone them in the campaign to vilify Germany. In addition to such newer products as *Judgment at Nuremberg*, the worst of the old propaganda films from the 1930's and 1940's are being rerun with monotonous regularity.<sup>20</sup> Soviet sympathizers are obviously not displeased with this continuing Germanophobic publicity bath which serves as a moral rationale for preventing the German reunification and nuclear arming of West Germany. This subject and related matters were dealt with at some length in my article, "Current Germanophobia: The Transmission Belt of Communist Propaganda," in the *Social Justice Review* for December, 1962.

#### V. German and Allied Atrocities: A Morbid Balance-Sheet

Professor Harry Elmer Barnes once observed that the question of World War II atrocities is rather a dangerous one for *either* side to concern itself unduly. Even though some genuinely impartial tribunal (which by definition excludes both the Nuremberg process and the trial of Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem) should one day find that the national socialist war crimes were fully as brutal and extensive as has been alleged in the most extreme of the recent charges, it could still be cogently argued that they were at least equaled and possibly surpassed by those of Germany's enemies.

There is, to begin with, the matter of Allied saturation bombing of civilian populations. Contrary to popular opinion, not the Germans but the British initiated the barbaric practice of unrestricted bombing of civilian areas. The unbelieving reader need only consult the testimony of the informed and responsible *British* officials, J. M. Spaight and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, for proof of this charge.<sup>21</sup> The decision (the "splendid decision," as former Principal Secretary of the Air Ministry Spaight terms it) was first activated on May 11, 1940, while the German air attack on Britain did not begin as protective retaliation until July of that year. This "splen-

<sup>20</sup>See the incisive comments of Professor Russell Kirk on the recent deluge of Germanophobic television fare in the *Atlanta Times* of March 9, 1965.

<sup>21</sup>J. M. Spaight, *Bombing Vindicated* (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1944); and Sir Arthur Harris, *Bomber Offensive* (London: Collins, 1947).

did" British decision, which cost millions of lives including those of Britons, had an even more grisly development for, according to Sir Charles Snow, who had charge of selecting scientific personnel for war research in Britain at the time, F. A. Lindemann, a cabinet member and confidant of Churchill, produced early in 1942 a remarkable cabinet paper dealing with the bombing of Germany:

"It described in quantitative terms, the effect on Germany of a British bombing offensive in the next eighteen months (approximately March, 1942-September, 1943). The paper laid down a strategic policy. The bombing must be directed essentially against German working-class houses. Middle-class houses have too much space round them and so are bound to waste bombs . . ."22

One may wonder if it was the "cultivated humanitarianism" inherent in this decision to minimize the bombing of strategic targets and to assure the death of more working-class Germans per bomb which entitled the Allies, and in particular the British, to sit in moral judgment on German leaders at Nuremberg in 1945-1946. The property damage from all of this staggers the human imagination even in retrospect. In major cities like Berlin, Cologne, and Hamburg it ranged from forty to seventy per cent of all housing units while in smaller cities such as Düren, Bocholt, and Paderborn it averaged better than ninety per cent of all prewar housing units.<sup>23</sup> The utterly needless bombing of Dresden, approved by Churchill, destroying one of the most beautiful cities in the world which had no strategic military significance and produced a death toll in excess of either of the atomic bombings of Japanese cities, was perhaps the most brutal and senseless atrocity connected with World War II.

It has now been definitely proved that those who persuaded President Truman to order the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were well aware that it was not needed to make the Japanese surrender, which they had been trying to do for some seven

<sup>22</sup>C. P. Snow, *Science and Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 48.

<sup>23</sup>Neil P. Hurley, "Germany's New Urban Profile," *America*, May 9, 1959, p. 306. Fuller studies of the Allied aerial assault on Germany are Hans Rumpf's *The Bombing of Germany* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964); and Martin Caidin, *The Night Hamburg Died* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1960). Perhaps the most savage single Allied "war crime" was the bombing of the beautiful city of Dresden, "the most senseless act of mass murder committed in the whole course of World War II," as R.H.S. Crossman described it in his article, "Apocalypse at Dresden," in *Esquire*, November, 1963, p. 149. See also David Irving's *The Destruction of Dresden* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963).

months on the same terms that were accepted on VJ-Day. The bombings were executed to impress the Russians with the magnitude and superiority of our new military technology. Aside from the death and destruction that these bombings produced, they introduced a new era in devastation which may well end in the extermination of much of the human race.

Any balancing of the books of history in this matter of World War II atrocities must take into account the mass expulsion in 1945 of nearly 14,000,000 Eastern Germans from their ancestral homelands by the Czechs, Poles, and Soviets with the tacit connivance of the Western Allies. Surely this was a "war crime" by any standard. Moreover, it takes on distinctly macabre overtones when we examine the discrepancy between the number of those expelled and those who actually reached West Germany alive. Outright murder, physical assault, starvation, exposure, and disease were the causes of this mortality which took the lives of nearly four million victims of mass brutality.

Can anyone doubt that the "Morgenthau Plan" which envisaged the destruction of the Ruhr mines, the pastoralization of a primarily industrial Germany, and the political dismemberment of Germany was a moral "war crime"? Had this genocidal plan been carried out rigorously, from twenty to thirty millions of Germans would have died of starvation. Though never implemented to the letter, its spirit so permeated the occupational planning for Germany under the early "levels of industry" plans that for a long time after the war had ended, Germans were deliberately kept on a diet comparable to that enjoyed by the inmates of Auschwitz until the German forces were disorganized.

Who can doubt the criminal nature of the Soviet butchery of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn forest in 1940? What is to be said of the forcible return of some millions of Russian military and civilian anti-Communist refugees by the Western Allies to the tender mercies of the men in the Kremlin after the war? Tens of thousands were summarily shot, and millions went to a condition worse than death in the Soviet labor camps in Siberia and elsewhere. A Yugoslav publicist, Mihajlov, examining the Russian records in Moscow in 1964, discovered that Stalin maintained twice as many concentration camps as the Germans are said to have set up. It would require considerable restraint to doubt that the mortality in them was as great as has been reported in the German camps.

How is one to explain the conduct of our "noble" Soviet allies, as we then liked to call them, who distinguished themselves by brutalizing the women of conquered lands?<sup>24</sup> Could the enthusiastic response of the Soviet soldiery to the incitements of Ilya Ehrenburg to seize the women of Germany as the spoils of victory, which resulted in the rape of half the women of Berlin alone, lend substance to the pretensions of moral dignity assumed by the prosecuting powers at Nuremberg?

Were the German camps for Allied prisoners of war really worse than those we established for captured German military personnel? According to the report of Judge Edward L. van Roden, an eminent American jurist who headed an official commission of inquiry into the matter, our investigators, burning with a zeal for justice, applied revolting physical torture methods to extort "war crime" confessions from hapless German prisoners of war.

Dare we omit any mention of the enforced transfer in 1942 of Japanese inhabitants of our own Pacific coastal region to concentration camps in the interior of the country?

It would seem safe to conclude then that a final summation or balance sheet of German war crimes honestly verified will most assuredly be counterbalanced by the equally sordid record of Germany's self-righteous enemies. Surely the dawning of that day will symbolize the return of sanity to the study and writing of recent history.

## VI. The Historical Smotherout and the Attempted Stultification of Revisionism

The unending reiteration of the theme of unique German savagery in the waging of World War II has not been without consequences for historical research and writing. Most importantly, it has served to preclude, through intimidation or lack of interest, the normal development of scholarly inquiry into the causes of World War II. As a faculty colleague of this writer expressed it: "What difference does it make as to who started the Second World War? Whatever

<sup>24</sup>There is ample documentation to substantiate charges of mass Soviet violations of German women and girls. See A. J. App, *Ravishing the Women of Conquered Europe* (Philadelphia: Boniface Press, 1960); Johannes Kaps (ed.), *The Tragedy of Silesia: 1945-46* (Munich: Christ Unterwegs, 1952-53); Wilhelm K. Turnwald (ed.), *Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans* (Munich: Munich University Press, 1953); and Theodor Schieder, *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern-Central Europe* (Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1960-61).

responsibility may be laid at the door of Allied leaders for the coming of World War II by even the most careful and meticulous research is overshadowed and made simply irrelevant by what the Germans did during the war to Jews and others."

This attitude reflects what Dr. Barnes, in his preceding material, has called the "historical smotherout," which has extended if not supplanted the traditional historical blackout with which revisionist historians have had to deal in the past, or it may be regarded as a new and more frustrating technique of applying the blackout to revisionist historical writing. It is true that Germanophobia stimulated, reinforced, and protected those who have operated the historical blackout in their efforts to withstand and defeat revisionist historical writing by disparaging its activities and achievements. But, for the most part, the historical blackout consisted in the attempt directly to discredit revisionist books and their conclusions. There was no doubt expressed as to the importance of revisionist conclusions if they could be established beyond reasonable doubt, but the anti-revisionists contended that this was impossible and used the historical blackout to obscure any demonstration that they were not correct in their attitude.

The historical smotherout may still employ some of the methods of the earlier historical blackout but if so, this is wholly secondary to the newer strategy and techniques which are based primarily on exploiting the increasing volume and irresponsible use of Germanophobia. Political motivation is far more apparent and potent. Germanophobia is powerfully stimulated and supplied from Communist sources as well as from the West, and one of the main sources is Warsaw. It is designed to postpone or prevent any stable peace settlement, especially the unification of Germany. The direct appeal is made to the public rather than to scholars, and reliance is placed primarily on voluminous and unscrupulous use of publicity through all agencies of communication.

The historical smotherout also introduced a marked change of emphasis as to the importance of war responsibility. Whereas the historical blackout had admitted that this was of great scholarly and public significance, the smotherout rests on the assumption that it is relatively unimportant and can be virtually ignored when it is at all advantageous to do so. What is of vital significance is not what happened prior to the outbreak of war but the operations of the combatants after hostilities had broken out, with emphasis almost wholly given over to the morbid and brutal operations of

the Germans. In other words, revisionist achievements in regard to the coming of war in 1939 and American entry in 1941 are to be nullified rather than refuted. Even if revisionists could prove the primary responsibility of Halifax and the British for beginning the conflict in 1939, this would be of no practical import, nor would any provocative policy on the part of Roosevelt in regard to Japan be of any vital significance, even if this interpretation could be upheld by the documentary evidence.

It is obvious that this new smotherout technique, based on a flood of publicity revolving about unique German turpitude, makes it almost impossible for revisionist scholars to make any progress whatever in affecting public opinion, no matter how much or how important the material may be that they keep turning up. If they could not have any significant influence in the 1950's, when the small library of impressive revisionist books was appearing and Germanophobia was far less overpowering than that since 1960, there is surely little prospect for revisionist influence now that the historical smotherout, based on irresponsible Germanophobia, has become thoroughly established and has monopolized public attention and opinion.

There is little that can be done to confront this brazen enterprise of writing history backward beyond quietly continuing to pile up revisionist discoveries and synthesis against the time when Germanophobia cannot nullify the effect of revisionist studies and publications. (It almost sounded like an attempt at political black humor on the part of President Johnson when he offered the Germans a partnership with the United States in the future probing of outer space, just before Christmas of 1965, at a time when the systematic defamation of the Germans was still in full swing in American books, magazines, and newspapers, and on American radio, moving pictures, and television.) There is little prospect that such nullification will really cease until there are drastic political realignments that compel American policy to assume new positions antagonistic to Germanophobia and impel our communication agencies to reflect this changed attitude. This time may be far off. In the meantime, as Dr. Barnes has suggested, revisionist scholars can only work conscientiously for the historical record, hoping that it may ultimately be accorded both scholarly approval and public respect.



# Revisionism and the Cold War, 1946-1966:

## Some Comments on Its Origins and Consequences

by James J. Martin

Dr. James J. Martin, chairman of the department of history of Rampart College Graduate School, for a number of years has scanned domestic and foreign affairs with an astute revisionist eye. Historian Harry Elmer Barnes has described Martin's most recent work, *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941*, as "surely the most impressive contribution to history and public affairs produced in this generation."

From 1959-1965 Dr. Martin taught history and economics at Deep Springs College, California, where enrollment is exclusively for hand-picked, top-rated students. He taught at the University of Michigan (where in 1949 he earned his degree of doctor of philosophy in history) from 1946-1950; from 1950-1957 at Northern Illinois University.

His book, *Men Against the State* (1953 and 1957), provides invaluable source material on thinkers who have challenged the role of the State.

Realistically, all wars have been for economic reasons. To make them politically and socially palatable, ideological issues have always been invoked. Any possible future war will, undoubtedly, conform to historical precedent.

—Office of Naval Intelligence, *United States Imports of Strategic Materials—1938* [official document prepared for the United States Navy Department], quoted in *Congressional Record—Senate*, Vol. 93, part 3, April 15, 1947, p. 3387.

The end of something is always the beginning of something else, and the Cold War is no exception. It was a logical extension of the politics of the Second World War, the political consequences of which were obvious to a multitude of commentators of all kinds in

this country in the more than two years that preceded American involvement. These observers, most of whom opposed active participation, were hardly rewarded with acclaim for their perspicacity in this time or later, however. Frequently denounced as shadowy friends of the enemies of England and Stalinist Russia, their day was to be delayed to the closing hours of hostilities and after. Then even the most dense enthusiast of war for the obliteration of Germany and Japan became aware that the only likely forces capable of filling the vacuum thus created in Europe and Asia would be Stalinist Russia and a China in grave danger of becoming a Communist state itself. This was so obvious a case that no time was required to provide proper perspective; many contemporaries quickly recognized and commented on this great but mindless triumph. Probably the most succinct was that of the Labor Party M. P. Richard H. S. Crossman. "The Second World War," observed Crossman in March, 1946, "by the total elimination of Germany, destroyed the European balance of power."<sup>1</sup> But the problem involved many other things besides this, even though two decades and scores of billions of dollars have been devoted to restoring it.

The Second World War undoubtedly shaped the politico-economic face of the world for a long time. The world politics of twenty years has rested squarely on its consequences, and promises to do so for many more years to come. The presumption is that in the age of national states, conflicts of interest among them bring about wars. Though these are not inevitable, collisions occur when all other efforts at resolving their rivalries have failed or have been avoided or neglected. Once under way, these wars bring about greater or lesser alterations of the economic and social fabric of the world, and the greater the war, the more profound the alterations. As the greatest war of all time, World War Two also produced an upheaval of unprecedented proportions, dwarfing the settlements of any war all the way back to antiquity.

"Battle doesn't determine who is right. Only who is left," Peter Bowman observed in his book, *Beach Red*.<sup>2</sup> It is another form of stating Spinoza's declaration that wars are not conflicts between right and wrong, but between right and right, as well as intimating

<sup>1</sup>Crossman, "A Strategy for Britain," *New Republic* (March 18, 1946), pp. 371-374. Crossman was a former assistant editor of the London *New Statesman and Nation*, and deputy director of psychological warfare, first in North Africa and then in France with SHAEF. He has been a formidable politician in England over the last twenty years.

<sup>2</sup>New York: Random House, 1946.

the immense part played by chance circumstances and pure luck in determining the outcome of combat. It is a foregone conclusion that the winners resolve in their favor the interest conflicts with the losers, but in the desire for a better "peace" than prevailed before hostilities, they ideally seek solutions which will not incubate hate and revenge sentiments, nor lay the foundations for the reopening of the struggle. Thus, the citizenry may once more resume the multitude of pursuits which characterize a complex community, in an atmosphere of improved tranquility and reasonableness.

One can conclude without reservations that such an objective was not paramount in the eyes of the Anglo-American leaders in this war, despite the rodomontade of the Atlantic Charter and the foggy, evanescent dream propaganda of the "United Nations." It was quite obvious from the context of these military morale nutrients for the civilian sector that their beauteous comforts and consolations were not to extend to the opposition, if and when defeated (*vide* the Casablanca "unconditional surrender" doctrine); they were simply designs and devices to aid in the restoration of a status quo rudely shaken by these upstart enemies. Unfortunately, the Anglo-American leadership team never found a formula to incorporate their chance ally of the unpredictable fortunes of war, Stalinist Russia. Though they tried to bind the Communists with the paper twine of vague pronouncements at various times during hostilities, it was evident to almost all who cared to see that World War Two was at least three separate wars, and trying to ride them all to a common conclusion was in the same class with trying to ride the same number of wild horses home into a single stall. The consequences of the pointless military victory achieved were too powerful to confine within the feeble "peace" policies devised near its conclusion.

It would have been grand if Roosevelt and Churchill had been able to enlist Soviet manpower and war material in bringing about the wreck of Germany and its version of a united Europe run by Germans, without Stalin seeking anything for his regime in the natural outcome, the division of the swag of victory.<sup>3</sup> A review of

<sup>3</sup>John Foster Dulles, participating in the first diplomatic caterwauls following the end of the war, started the preparation of the visionaries for a return to reality with his philosophical observation, "Fellowship based on a war coalition usually disintegrates after the enemy's defeat." Dulles, "The General Assembly," *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1945), pp. 2-11(2). It is regrettable Dulles and others equally prestigious did not begin making such incisive remarks during the last two years of the war, instead of issuing long streams of soothing, narcotic visions of coming everlasting amity with Stalinist Russia.

the oratory of Roosevelt and Churchill in particular describing the world that was expected to take shape out of this planetary bath in hot metal and blood is excessively depressing today. Down through the Yalta conference, a bare three months before the end of the European phase of the fighting, there is a persistent theme of visionary promise of a permanent plateau of eternal peace, the "broad, sunlit uplands" cliché so dear to Churchill. Its usual implication was the expectation of frank and wholehearted cooperation in such a project from Stalin, and the assumption was that no dismal and base quarrel over such things as land, markets, oil, marine lanes, world air traffic, and scores of other important material considerations and facts of life would be permitted to interfere with the attainment of this latest in a line of pet schemes for establishing immediate and perpetual peace, mirages such as had followed every big war in the previous 400 years.

What did these eminent men really think at the time about such possibilities? It is tiresome and unrewarding work to fight through the opportunistic and self-serving *ex post facto* memoirs of "statesmen," looking for an answer to this question, in this instance as well as in others. One must fall back on the dictum that public men must be judged by their public actions, and in Churchill's case in particular it is impossible to erase from the record a succession of mawkishly adulatory tributes to Stalin, as well as a generally favorable reaction to a postwar settlement in most of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe in conformity with Soviet demands. His encomium to Stalin after his return to London from Yalta is particularly distressing, read today, and his multitude of "conservative" adulators prefer to wipe from the record Churchill's Stalinophile period, in their urgent necessity to retain at least one towering figure in which they can vest their faith and verbal reflexes. (Churchill as the leader of a vast national socialist "war effort" tailored to British and not German *mores* is another incident such numerous folk must forget; it is indeed instructive to note how they have rigorously avoided coming to grips with such books as Francis Neilson's *The Churchill Legend* and Emrys Hughes's *Winston Churchill, British Bulldog*. "Liberals" have had to be depended upon to attack such efforts at balancing the picture.)

Furthermore, the Churchill-Roosevelt leadership must have been sufficiently cognizant of history to know the essentially preposterous nature of any eternal peace scheme; one can be reasonably sure that they at least understood the essence of Disraeli's proposition

that "finality is not the language of politics."<sup>4</sup> Therefore, it was deception on a scale almost beyond measurement to oversell so prodigiously the world-peace-forevermore campaign, particularly from the gathering of the Dumbarton Oaks conference down through the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations by the United States Senate.

It is customary to note, increasingly in the period since the French Revolution, the expertness with which the wartime lies and preposterous promises of the winners are mitigated or erased, if not completely forgotten by those to whom they were made. One calls to mind the dignified phrasing of the famous British politician, Lord Alfred Milner (1854-1925), of this lamentable business: "In the heat and flurry of a resort to arms, and under the natural impulse to justify so extreme a measure, much is promised which, even if intended, it is afterward found impossible to perform; and such non-performance is, within reasonable limits, readily condoned by the public opinion of mankind."<sup>5</sup>

One may conclude that an immense amount of self-delusion was indulged in also by many of the key figures engaged in this grandiose adventure, but one of them certainly was not Stalin. "Every time treaties are made concerning the realignment of forces for a new war, these treaties are called treaties of peace," the Soviet leader declared twenty years earlier. "Treaties are signed defining the elements of a future war, and always the signing of these treaties is accompanied with a lot of claptrap about peace."<sup>6</sup> From the record, it appears that both the Russian and Anglo-American leaders were engaged in a complex double game against their own publics and each other.

---

<sup>4</sup>It took some while before a sophisticated propaganda appeared which was able to present, albeit in a rather specious way, the reasons why the expansionism of Germany under Hitler and of the Soviet under Stalin were of the same order. Even Dulles had not come to this conclusion in the fall of 1945. "There are always people who would like to make change in the world illegal," was the way he referred obliquely to early postwar complaints about the Reds in Europe. Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup>This citation from Lord Milner's speeches has been publicized a number of times. Amusingly enough, it was repeated at the height of World War II by Professor Lindsay Rogers in his review of Wendell Willkie's hyperbolic *One World*, in which he detected the same kind of florid, impossible pie-in-the-sky Lord Milner was referring to, while at the same time attempting to save Willkie from subsequent scorn and his readers from the pangs of disillusion. *Saturday Review of Literature*, April 17, 1943, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup>Speech before Fourteenth Congress All-Union Communist Party, December, 1925.

In truth, action had already begun which gave the lie to these incredible maneuvers. While seeking to plant in circles of public opinion the conviction that a genially cordial entente with Stalin to supervise a warless world had been gathering in San Francisco in April, 1945, the first stages of a shooting war with Stalin were already months under way at that moment.

Though it is commonplace to date the official beginning of the Cold War with Churchill's famous "iron curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri in March, 1946, it began in actuality with the British efforts at preventing the Communists from overrunning Greece in November, 1944, at a moment when these two contenders were in warm agreement on other objectives. It is just another commentary on the political expediency of Churchill to see him in the forefront of the movement to elevate the Yugoslav Communist Tito to the position of a combination of Robin Hood and William Tell, at the very same moment he was committing British soldiers to frustrate Tito's Greek Red neighbors from extending communism just beyond Yugoslav borders. One must conclude that Churchill did not object to seeing a dozen European lands go Communist under regimes subservient to Moscow, but he felt that for Greece to go, too, was excessive, as well as being a direct threat to British interests in the Mediterranean. A Communist regime breathing upon the Suez Canal and Near East oil apparently was too gruesome an apparition to imagine, though it was hardly in the imaginary stage in late 1944.

So, while the mass media and the politicians brayed of the new era of changeless, heavenly peace which was to be erected upon the mountainous rubble of Europe and Asia, the almost-ended war meshed quite effortlessly into another, as a new collision of interests emerged from the liquidation of the previous one. The world was on the verge of the next stage in what Charles A. Beard was to describe as "perpetual war for perpetual peace."

It undoubtedly was unnecessary for Churchill to announce to the world in March, 1946, that an "iron curtain" had descended across Europe from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic. Hundreds of publicists saw it coming down for more than two years preceding, and only a paltry handful emitted any alarming noises about it. Some of them had even used the term "iron curtain" well in advance of Churchill (for one example, among several, see Herbert L. Matthews, "What Russia Really Wants," *Collier's* [November 24, 1945], p. 74), as had the German propaganda ministry before the war ended, though this had been dismissed when

first broadcast as a crude anti-Bolshevik canard, seeking to undermine "the sincere unity of the Western Allies and their gallant democratic partner in the East." One will search long and diligently in the newspaper and periodical literature of Britain and America from late 1943 to late 1945 to find serious criticisms of this descending "curtain." Most of the more influential saw it happening, and pronounced it good. (See, for example, the long series of approving columns by Raymond Moley on this subject during the period mentioned above, in *Newsweek*.)

The lame and ludicrous aspect of the whole affair is the late ex post facto discovery that it was a mind-rending catastrophe. What triggered this delayed recognition of reality is still obscure. Was it the final realization by the denser part of the community that Stalin was hardly going to allow Anglo-Franco-American interests to regain political and economic influence in the vast area of Central and Eastern Europe wrung from the Germans? David Lawrence's *U.S. News* soberly predicted such consequences to its businessman readers all during the last eighteen months of the war. Surely, it was not the superficial expressions of moral horror over the extension of communism; too much had been said by the Reds' late allies in the West to the contrary while the fighting was going on, to make this excuse or explanation stick. Of great interest, from the point of view of propaganda, was the spectacle of Churchill returning to his much earlier description of Red Russia as "an enigma inside a riddle wrapped in a mystery," one of his most famous outbursts of colorful corn which his idolators repeatedly mistook for profundity. This clashed discordantly with his diagnoses of Stalin and Soviet ambitions in the last two years of the war, during which times he radiated clear understanding. This vault backward made him appear to be a gulled dupe, but, knowing something of Churchill's tastes and predilections, it cannot be utterly ruled out that he savored the opportunity to continue a state of affairs in which he took great delight and flourished while feigning political innocence and puzzlement; a *Newsweek* portrait thirteen years earlier had borne the title, "Churchill Revels in War and Loves a Political Rumpus."<sup>7</sup>

Churchill, in seeking to make a joint Anglo-American undertaking out of the world confrontation of communism, was indirectly telling the world that, though he had announced at the Lord Mayor's banquet in London in November, 1942, that he had not become His

---

<sup>7</sup>*Newsweek* (April 1, 1933), pp. 16-17.

Majesty's first minister in order to supervise the liquidation of the British Empire, in March, 1946, it was a physical impossibility to prevent it without American help. John Maynard Keynes, just before his death this same year, put it far more honestly and bluntly by declaring, "We have become a poor nation and must cut our foreign policy accordingly." Crossman put it somewhat differently but even more darkly in the same year: "Britain ended the Second World War as France ended the First—a victor, but a victor who could never afford to fight again."<sup>8</sup> The declaration by Clement Attlee, Churchill's successor as prime minister in 1945, that Britain did not "fight to victory in the war only to be defeated by economics," was a shallow-pated slogan on a par with Senator Homer Ferguson's incredible dictum that war should be "above politics." The superiority of Keynes and Crossman to Attlee in judgment and acumen has been verified by the experience of over twenty years; no politicians have bailed out the English from the economic shambles the Second World War made out of Great Britain and the Empire.

Nor did teamwork with America either save the Empire or halt the advance of communism. It is one of the ironies of the maturation of the Cold War imperative into the "containment" policy, the latter so persuasively described by George Kennan in the semi-official organ of Anglo-American interventionism, *Foreign Affairs*, in the summer of 1947, that shortly after, the vast stretches of China swiftly went Maoist. In between these events Hungary and Czechoslovakia similarly underwent Communist revolutions.

Whatever the technical difficulties, the momentum of the Cold War can be seen to gain perceptibly with Churchill's turgid appeal before a Westminster College audience, barely a year after he had returned to London from Yalta to extol Stalin, his "great and good friend," and hail his probity. As far as political somersaults were concerned, in a career full of them, this was undoubtedly Churchill's "finest hour." The prompt and savage dressing-down he received from Stalin shortly after Fulton was all that was needed to close out the strange and strained opportunistic partnership which had fought to victory in World War Two, though who or what really won has been the topic of extended controversy these last twenty years. "To triumph in a struggle at the cost of one's fundamental

---

<sup>8</sup>Crossman, *op. cit.*



values is the height of vulgarity—and futility,” Sidney Hook has observed.<sup>9</sup>

What the long, impressively destructive, and alarmingly bloody war just concluded had done to the winners was only partially being realized at this moment, though well-understood by a few onlookers. As Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn put it in a long essay on the significance of the war published just about at the time of the Fulton speech, “Democratic efficiency in wartime is often nothing other than the ability to turn swiftly totalitarian and drop, in the fraction of a second, constitutional liberties”; a moral problem of great magnitude had resulted from fighting Hitlerite totalitarianism with identical methods, resulting in what he bluntly described as “the failure of the moral objectives of the Western Powers.”<sup>10</sup>

Undoubtedly the herd enthusiasms which helped propel the dynamism of the recently-concluded war had not entirely cooled when Churchill issued his stirring call to mount for battle again in March, 1946. Since many were not inclined to consider the modest British campaign against the Communists in Greece as the first frontier of this new struggle, and with much of the aftermath of the old war not yet reconciled, there was a sluggish response to Fulton. The more ardent Stalinophiles in America and England were utterly appalled and revolted, and this sentiment vaulted across conventional political lines. Reluctance to enlist was seen from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other, from Senator Robert A. Taft and former Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy to William Z. Foster, but, as in the case of the Second World War, emotions and sentiments favorable to belligerence did not respect political lines either, and were seen to crop up in all camps. A “left”-“right” coalition favorable to a “halt the spread of communism” policy was only a few months in the making, after a shaky start. Conservative politicians, members of the business world, and prominent church dignitaries soon found themselves cheek-by-jowl with ex-Communists, Trotskyites, Menshevik Social

<sup>9</sup>Hook, “The Future of Socialism,” *Partisan Review* (January-February, 1947), pp. 22-36. The dismayed account in *Time* (March 25, 1946, p. 26) of Stalin’s attack, in which he denounced Churchill as “as bad as Hitler,” is a pathetic masterpiece. At that moment *Time* led all other publicity organs in the Anglo-Saxon world in seeking to elevate Churchill to the status of the *Schwanenritter* of the twentieth century.

<sup>10</sup>Kuehnelt-Leddihn, “Europe After World War II,” *Catholic World* (February, 1946), pp. 403-409.

Democrats, Socialists, and contingents of the well-left-of-center totalitarian liberals, who had devised and produced most of the rationale behind American participation in the global bloodbath of 1941-1945. And once again this new projected combat was clothed in high moral idealism and eloquent talk, while at that very moment such protagonists labored shoulder-deep in the debris of the shattered and betrayed moral and ethical promises and commitments made so breezily and brazenly before and during the hostilities.

As the approach of World War Two found its propaganda support in extended statements, so did the Cold War. A new literature suggesting an even more profound planetary grapple appeared on the scene in a manner which almost suggested timing with Churchill's "noble address." It presented the citizenry with a more painful prospect, however. Many years had been spent convincing the community that Hitler and the Japanese represented evil of a sort exceeding Beelzebub in his worst garb. But the new propaganda called for a sudden about-face on one with whom great efforts toward "waging peace" presumably were going on simultaneously, and one who enjoyed an immense bank account of good will, thanks to the diligent sympathetic propaganda of 1941-1945.

The amazing thing is that the *renversement* took place as soon as it did, and with so little psychic damage to those who performed the flip-flop. It suggests that a massive underground survived throughout the war, particularly in America, which allowed the administration's pro-Soviet wartime propaganda appeals to go in one ear and out the other, and which never accepted the tale of partnership with Stalinist Russia. In England, where testament to fervent Soviet admiration was undoubtedly more genuine, the Cold War appeal gained ground far more slowly than in the United States, despite Churchill's sponsorship. Churchill's erstwhile wartime Labor Party collaborators in the war against Germany and Japan were his fiercest critics when he directed a phase of the war against the Communists. The Labor M. P. Aneurin Bevan (later minister of health and housing in the British government in 1945) called Churchill "a wholesaler of disaster" in December, 1944 for his Greek anti-Communist policy (Quentin Reynolds, "Rebel in the House," *Collier's* [December 29, 1945], p. 36), but one may wonder at Bevan's lack of courage and/or candor in failing to assess Churchill along similar lines in the five years before that.

A ponderous volume can be prepared on the early pro-Cold War literary propaganda alone. Some of the most widely read were

ghost-written works by recent defectors to the "West" from the Soviet Union, mainly former military and political functionaries. But there were two particularly significant works which contributed to thinking of the showdown with the Communists on the level of global strategy, William C. Bullitt's *The Great Globe Itself* (New York: Scribner, 1946), and James Burnham's *The Struggle for the World* (New York: Day, 1947). These might have supplied most of the propaganda fuel for the Cold War by themselves, had no other works along such lines ever appeared.

The response to them cut across all lines of thought in the country, and long analyses appeared, with illustrative material calculated to maximize hysteria, many of them redressing the "Hitler-is-trying-to-conquer-the-world" pronouncements in the accouterments called for by casting Stalin and the Russians in this role now. Their influence in one form or another is with us to this day. Bullitt, a prestigious diplomat during the Roosevelt era, had a well-known pedigree as an anti-Soviet strategist; his book contained the first dress rehearsal of the rationale of "containment." It was eclipsed by that of Burnham, whose background as a Marxist scholar and Trotskyite proponent disclosed no notable previous anti-Soviet works. Burnham's *Struggle* was published and reviewed the same month President Harry S. Truman announced his government's decision to take up the British "burden" of supporting the Greek and Turkish governments (March, 1947).

Despite owing a very heavy intellectual debt to Arnold J. Toynbee and his "challenge and response" theory, Burnham's book gained wide readership and was one of the first bridges thrown across to the American left and liberal-left to aid in mobilizing them in substantial numbers in behalf of the latest political offensive. It also had an important part to play in the sharp division of left-liberal politics, since many of the latter were most remiss about abandoning their decades of championing the post-1917 dispensation in Russia.

An example may be seen in the whooping enthusiasm for the Burnham thesis of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in his review for *The Nation* (April 5, 1947, pp. 385, 398-399), though Schlesinger shuddered a bit at the thought of Burnham as secretary of state. The editor, Freda Kirchwey, was so distressed by the eager belligerence of the reviewer that she wrote a special editorial chiding him for his excessive zeal. What the Cold War did to liberal-New Deal politics, especially after their crushing defeat in the November,

1946 congressional elections, followed by the creation of the Americans for Democratic Action, the public repudiation of American Communists, and a sharply stepped-up support for Cold War policies, especially as represented in the tactical extensions known as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan of March-June, 1947, is another story. But writers such as Burnham and converts such as Schlesinger helped direct a path over the barrier consisting of the pro-Soviet good will efforts of the war years, into the anti-Soviet Cold War camp. There they joined many other groups and elements similarly disposed, an uneasy coalition, supported by its fractions for a widely differing number of reasons. The falling-out among them in the years of the Korean War helped demonstrate the substance of Senator Arthur Vandenberg's observation, in another context, that "unshared idealism is a menace."<sup>11</sup>

There is no need to review the mountain of published and broadcast abuse of Communist Russia and its leaders in the period following Fulton. There had always been an irreducible minimum of this form of attack all during the period of maximum cordiality, ranging from the spirited polemics of the Rev. James M. Gillis in the *Catholic World* and the occasional ill-tempered growls in the Hearst, McCormick, and Patterson press, to the assemblage of ex-Reds, former Soviet well-wishers, and disaffected Mensheviks who were published in the *American Mercury* during the editorship of Eugene Lyons, or in the Social Democrat weekly *New Leader*. Now its steeply increased output reflected the change in policy, and found its way into every journal of any importance in the land. Undoubtedly a large part of it was true, but much of it sounded hollow, and unconvincing. It was just too much to expect the intelligent and

---

<sup>11</sup>*Time* (February 3, 1947), p. 19. Some idea may be gleaned as to how the Churchill-Truman Cold War-"containment" policies scrambled American ideologies by perusing Walter Lippmann's little book, *The Cold War* (New York: Harper, 1947), and the slightly larger one by the former member of the House of Representatives (R., N.Y.), Hamilton Fish, *The Red Plotters* (New York: Domestic and Foreign Affairs, 1947). Lippmann, whose somersaults on questions of American foreign politics have established him as this country's most formidable journalistic acrobat in the twentieth century, was one of the most incandescent newspaper warriors urging this country to become a belligerent between 1939-1941. In this book, however, he attacked "containment" of Communist Russia bitterly and considered it "neither practical nor wise." Fish, one of the half-dozen best known opponents of American involvement in World War Two, though a fierce anti-Communist, attacked Truman's aid to Greece and Turkey "containment" program as "dollar imperialism." Even more incredible combinations than this may be found among the early supporters of these policies.

the critical to believe that the murderous, untrustworthy, knavish, and scurrilous propensities of the Communists were such recent discoveries; what was one to do with the millions of ardent words to the contrary spoken, many of them by the same people, in the five years prior to the Cold War? One might even agree that all the denigration and accusations were true, but at the same time it should have been admitted that those who had insisted on this all the time and had never abandoned these views deserved belated honor and vindication.

But this was rarely the case. For the most part, two separate airtight compartments were constructed; one to hold the fulsome comments on Soviet communism and its ineffable leadership during the Second World War, when these latter and the Anglo-American counterparts were pictured in grinning embraces during the alcoholic sprees which occurred at their much-publicized wartime strategy meetings, the other to contain the alleged high intelligence of the immediate postwar months, when the boundless rascality of the Reds presumably was first discovered by their chastened late "allies" and admirers. A vast majority gradually accepted this schizoid picture, affording impressive support to the comment by Sir Norman Angell, Nobel Peace Prize recipient in 1933. "Little consideration seems to have been given," wrote Sir Norman in the spring of 1946, "to the truth that men, particularly in political matters, are not guided by the facts but by their opinions about the facts."<sup>12</sup> It was the job of the regiment of turnabout publicists to provide them with these opinions.

The most peculiar aspect of the early years of the Cold War is the sharp separation between Russian and Chinese communism. "Thirteen European capitals are in the power sphere of the U.S.S.R.," wrote Kuehnnelt-Leddihn in February, 1946, and the obvious message of the Churchill call to the world was one of resistance to further spread of this "power sphere," and, if possible, its harnessing and subsequent reduction in scope. But the idea seemed to be that Communist success in China was most unlikely, if at all possible, and no political faction in the world enjoyed a better press in America in particular than Chinese communism at the moment the nation was being urged to get its back up against the Russian brand. The 1945-1947 period was the time of the maximum output of fawning fairy-tales of the Maoists as "agrarian re-

---

<sup>12</sup>Angell, "Leftism in the Atomic Age," *Nation* (May 11, 1946), p. 564.

formers." A score of outraged fulminations in book form were published in the United States by authors who raked the Chinese Nationalists for not entering into a "coalition" with the Chinese Reds, and American policy makers for not pressuring such a course upon Chiang Kai-shek. (The most influential undoubtedly was *Thunder Out of China* [New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946] by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby.)

The Cold War was not extended to the Chinese Communists until they had successfully swept into power a few years after Churchill had peered at the world and found only Russia a menace to "Western civilization." Shortly thereafter, they replaced Russia as the principal antagonist. President Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins University, in defining "statesmanship" in *Foreign Affairs* early in 1946, put down as its first characteristic, "looking ahead."<sup>13</sup> By this criterion, the Anglo-American leaders possessed an alarmingly small amount of this quality. In fact, a good imagination is needed to give them credit for any at all.

The Cold War era may be interpreted in various ways. That it is and has been the backbone of world politics and the central political fact for the past twenty years is not in question. What it means is another matter. Actually, it has been two affairs, not one, and the most inflammatory of the two was the latest to emerge and mature. However, both struggles take turns in dominating the attention of the planet. Undoubtedly Churchill did not consider the Far East a very important problem to handle when he came forth with his proposal for a joint Anglo-American endeavor which in essence amounted to a commitment to shore up a new global status quo to replace the disintegration of 1945. In many ways this status quo has long emerged in Europe, challenged and tested by probing ventures periodically but essentially unchanged from the

---

<sup>13</sup>Bowman, "Strategy of Territorial Decisions," *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1946), p. 193. Dr. Bowman, an eminent geographer, and frequently publicized in the last fifteen months of the war as President Roosevelt's more regularly consulted adviser on such subjects, does not seem to fare very well in this department, either, in view of the furious fulminations that swept the land after the war ended, upon revelation of the territorial settlements made prior to Roosevelt's demise. The penchant for dividing countries in half is the most curious tendency observed at the end of World War II. It seems to have created enough possibilities for future wars to keep the United States engaged for many decades to come, as well as the two already involved in since 1945. These arbitrary hackings have reminded some observers of the Biblical story of Solomon and the disputed baby, except that in these latter-day cases the objects of contention were severed between the contestants with dispatch.

times the Red Army established Soviet control over the lands still referred to as "behind the iron curtain." Where the continuous threat to the status quo exists is from the area least considered a locus of disturbance in 1946. For more than fifteen years it has been the site of the only serious bloody contests aiming at such results; yet, discounting the demise of the Anglo-Franco-Dutch colonialism, even here the frontiers between the contesting Cold War sides have changed little from those prevailing after the triumph of Chinese communism in 1949.

Looked at from the point of view of geopolitics, the "free world," long led by the U.S.A., ever since the catastrophic debility of Britain became an admitted fact early in 1947, has occupied a foothold on the continent of Europe, and a handhold on the fringe lands of the periphery of Asia. These precarious perches remain to this day hardly more than American beachheads. But vast expenditures of wealth have been laid out to maintain these places, and a continuous public relations has been utilized to explain why they are maintained. There is little evidence to support the view that any substantial part of the American people favor withdrawal from these positions. And there is even less evidence that either the Russian or Chinese Communist regimes are likely to make any significant alterations in theirs. The idea of either side rolling the other back is now confined to fantasy, despite the occasional spate of colorful talk. It appears that both sides, particularly in the Western sector, have gotten adjusted to this condition. This brings up another aspect of the matter.

To what degree have the Cold War antagonists come to depend upon the continuance of this conflict as an integral part of their domestic politics? Few care to investigate this subject, but the economic and political significance to all concerned is immense. Are any of the major states implicated in the Cold War interested in seeing it end, or ready to move on to an alternative should it end? Undoubtedly this will be the beginning of another gigantic wheeling action of world politics, if it ever occurs. But as long as disequilibrium prevails in Asia, and Americans and Communists struggle to work out an Oriental status quo equivalent to that which seems relatively tranquil in Europe, there is little need to be concerned about what might follow the Cold War; there will be no significant concessions made, despite all the talk of the necessity of "negotiation." The interest conflicts of the major national states seem unlikely to diminish in intensity or scope, even should there

develop a world-wide "Yankee and Communist Both Go Home" campaign. One is left to wonder whether the division of the world and the ensuing status quo occurring during the last twenty years is to become semi-permanent, lit up occasionally by limited "hot" wars, a sort of "perpetual endemic local war to make attractive by comparison a state of fitful, halting peace," to paraphrase and elaborate upon the famous Beardian formula.

It is conventional, of course, when dealing with the Cold War in the polemical sense to blame it all on the Communists. This in turn has inspired a variety of revisionism which places the onus particularly on the United States, in view of the vastly greater proportion of American arms, personnel, and material commitments involved, especially since 1950. Churchill's part and the original British emergency which played so heavy a role at the start have almost been forgotten, as has the knockout military victory of 1945 which brought about the concentration of power and which in turn set up the confrontation that persists to this day.

An additional factor has been added to the other ingredients which go to make up the complex called the Cold War: the prodigious escalation in armaments, especially in their quality. Efforts to improve these will not stop, and here we have the most unstable aspect of the matter, if one has concluded that a largely quiet world condition has emerged from the Cold War, and that the area of conflict has now moved to other than that of the military. Therein lies the only real possibility of a future breakthrough and an essay in seeking preponderant "victory," for which we have been told many times there is no substitute. In either case, a perpetuation of the Cold War for the purpose of enjoying its limited consolations resulting from relative status quo circumstances, or a massive effort on one side or the other to win saturation victory, the prospect for freedom is obviously very dismal. Each side may go on describing the other as sinister, unprincipled rogues indefinitely, and its leaders in turn insisting that only they sincerely desire "peace." And endless, wearisome mutual accusations of "aggression" fly back and forth; the use of this exclamation becomes more reckless and indiscriminate than ever before. Yale's famous professor of international law, Edwin M. Borchard, referred to the word in 1933 as "essentially a dishonest and mischievous term calculated to mislead the unwary and the uninformed";<sup>14</sup> "Aggression is a concept

<sup>14</sup>Borchard, "The Wrong Road to Peace," *New Republic* (June 28, 1933), pp. 171-174.



without any precise agreed content,"<sup>15</sup> declared John Foster Dulles in 1945; a committee of the League of Nations spent the interwar years trying to define the word without success; the U.N. has spent the same amount of time trying to do so too, and with no more success. But its employment seems to increase in direct ratio to the number of years spent in futile efforts to define it.

But few concern themselves with the consequences of the Cold War in extension for additional decades as a force converting the contesting sides into psychical and philosophical similarities. When one has "gone Communist" in the struggle against communism, when the outcome of the power struggle has been to convert the contestants each into vast totalitarian national socialist combines, the time may arrive when once more it will be pertinent to ask the question, "What price victory?"

---

Revisionist scholarship, with respect to the aftermath of both the World Wars of this century, had much the same object. In brief, it sought to balance the propaganda accounts of the coming of these conflicts, by demonstrating through emphasis on the part left off the record by all the belligerents, the mixed nature of the problem and the universal fact of responsibility on the part of victors and defeated alike. Revisionism also sought to stress the absence of any real success and the mutual impoverishment which totalitarian industrial war had brought to all involved, as a corrective to the more elementary nationalistic propaganda which tried to conceal the essentially pyrrhic consequences upon the nominal "winners." It had the additional objective of revealing the leaders of all the warring States as men in various states and stages of emotional and mental turmoil, compounded by misinformation and conflicting goals, all of which helped bring on the struggle which scarred them all, rather than accepting the wartime propaganda which divided these men into categories of devils and angels.

Revisionism, in short, was engaged in setting the record straight,

---

<sup>15</sup>Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Dulles credited British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden with uttering these words at the San Francisco U.N. conference in April of 1945, but Dulles had said the same thing, in more blunt fashion, in a number of magazine articles between 1935 and 1938, and he had gone into detail on this subject in his book, *War, Peace and Change* (New York: Harper, 1939). It was quite dismaying to many with good memories to witness Dulles in the 1950's using precisely the same political terminology he had deployed in the 1930's and 1940's. (See also this writer's booklet, *Meditations Upon the Early Wisdom of John Foster Dulles* (Mercer Island, Washington, 1958.)

regardless of the resulting impact upon all concerned, and ground no ax in behalf of any special interest. It had to labor under such a charge, however, because anything said in extenuation of the vanquished invariably drew such accusations from "victorious" interests. Coming on the scene after the successful had already written the first version, revisionists undertook their work with such a hazard as one of the expectable risks of their literary occupation.

Revisionists after both wars produced a formidable bibliography, but the circumstances under which this production took place and its effect in both cases were remarkably dissimilar. Conditions in the world following the First World War encouraged revisionism. The evolution of the League of Nations into a Franco-British mutual insurance company, the creation of a Europe with Germany and Soviet Russia standing on its fringes as pariahs, the withdrawal of the United States to the Western Hemisphere, despite its participation in many international gatherings between the Washington conference of 1921 and the London conference of 1933, and the existence of a vast political free-for-all in Asia, all help to account for this. Such efforts as were made to promote international peace were unilateral, and no State took upon itself the job of enforcing its will over vast areas under the name of "keeping the peace," other than the European colonial powers. On top of this, many intimate disclosures of immense consequences were made by politicians and governments which provided much material for revisionist studies. No wartime regimes survived intact anywhere, a political fact of striking significance as well; few if any efforts were made to suppress embarrassing revisionist narratives which cast serious reflections upon individuals and wartime governments with cheerful equanimity. Defenders of the orthodox and official stories there were aplenty, of course, but they enjoyed no monopoly anywhere; actually, between 1920 and about 1937, official accounts which tended to shore up the wartime propaganda were under steady discount. Mass circulation media devoted generous space to revisionism and the revisionist outlook, the result being that even national policy was influenced by it, at least in part. Even the frequent international conferences which dealt with such subjects as war debts, disarmament, reparations, conflicts of interest, and proposals for peace reflected to a degree the influence of the impartiality of revisionism.

The breakdown of international sanity and the coming of a longer, bigger, and much more destructive war is a story which is outside

the scope of this analysis. The main concern is with what this latter war and its continuance in another form had to do with twisting the nature of revisionism and choking its influence. The Second World War never really ended; twenty years after the cessation of gunfire, its principal issues had not been settled to the satisfaction of anyone. But the most significant difference between this war aftermath and that of the First World War was the almost immediate outbreak of a planetary political war among the parties which had fought to "victory," a war with occasional martial phases which never were allowed to escape local confinement. This struggle of maneuver and world strategy has long been known as the Cold War, and it has been the central political fact in international affairs for two decades.

With the winners of the Second World War divided into the two camps comprising the Cold War antagonists, a political situation confronted revisionism utterly unlike that which followed the struggle which ended in 1918. Despite their seeming mutual hostility, there was no interest on either side in having the origins of the war questioned and any kind of detached history coming out of such investigation. The foundation of the Cold War was the mutual propagandas of the now-divided winners of the previous cataclysm. In the "free world" and "iron curtain" sectors everywhere, a variety of synthetic political "revolutions" were carried out swiftly after hostilities were suspended in 1945. The overthrown regimes were exterminated physically, either by outright execution programs, or through the fantastic "war crimes trials" morality pageants. Then the victors rapidly assembled local regimes amenable to occupation by their conquerors, and a massive new propaganda came into existence in both areas to describe these new puppet states as the fruit of "liberation."

In view of this, it was absolutely essential that nothing be done to undermine these new ersatz political organizations, and this meant that the forces which were responsible for their existence were not to be seriously discommoded by historical research, especially if this research undermined the total depravity doctrine of the overthrown forces as was maintained with scrupulous agreement by the now quarreling "victors." Therefore, revisionism enjoyed a maximum lack of welcome everywhere. It undermined the entire fabric of postwar politics.

In essence, though seemingly a profound conflict, the Cold War really functioned as a structure to make effective a new status quo

replacing that which was wrecked in the second World War. This was and is the reality underneath the rival propagandas. Despite the many years of frightful threats, menacing gestures, and belligerent talk, there is still no solid, convincing evidence that either side seriously wishes to see a fundamental showdown to demolish this now-twenty-year-old status quo.

But the Cold War has been a wonderful weapon to use against one's own public. Both sides have been able to cite the opposition in trembling tones as reason and excuse for increasingly massive political interference in all manner of areas from economic life to the field of movement and expression on the part of their citizenry. New taxes for immense military construction are made palatable by suggesting the horrendous consequences of failing to keep up with similar enemy expansion. A host of other forms of genteel blackmail are made possible by this division of the political world into two staggering collections of power; but one of the undeclared objectives surely is the suppression of unilateral action on the part of subordinate constituents on both sides. One has only to notice the resentment on the part of the rival leaderships when one of their stable shows signs of vacating the corral.

Americans have been particularly vulnerable to a Cold War propaganda which has maintained that it has been an effective device for "containing" communism. Nobody knows whether this means the expansionist ambitions of Soviet Russia or collectivism as a way of life. There is evidence that in neither case has there been any remarkable achievement, least of all in the case of the latter. The United States has been as effective in exporting collectivism with its massive government aid programs as one might expect of its collectivist enemies operating unhampered. Going socialist to avoid going communist has been advanced to the position of an imperative. Its equivalent has been described as the avoidance of murder by committing suicide via self-dosage with periodic limited amounts of poison.

Revisionism has not only been blunted by the political dispensation of the world-saturation Cold War but also by the effect of this war upon its own people. A respectable fraction of revisionists has been distracted into support of the Cold War, and thus has lost the initiative which their discipline involves in remaining detached and insisting on straightening the record, regardless of its effect. Emotional commitment to the goals of one side or another of the Cold War seriously weakens the impact of the work of any revision-

ist, and makes it that much more difficult to fight through the thick screens of evasions and half-truths which are prominent in the output of the Cold War rivals. One ends up seduced into accepting their version of world history this last quarter of a century; on this the Cold War antagonists have little to quarrel about.

The existence of a limited hot war in the Far East does not undermine this analysis. There the lines of the status quo have not settled, and no one can predict when this will occur. As in Europe, where the United States is still engaged in a maneuver with Soviet Russia seeking to reach a satisfactory boundary between their respective German satellite enclaves, a similar operation goes on with Red China attempting to set limits to that country's operable confines. It is preposterous to support for a moment the notion that these immense power conglomerations seriously seek to undertake each other's demise. The overriding consideration facing all three constituents of the Cold War is the suppression by the most efficient and effective means of any force or tendency which endangers the relatively stable status quo, whether these involve the ambitions and efforts of Germans, Poles, Yugoslavs, French, Japanese, Chinese Nationalists, Israeli, Arabs, Africans, Pakistani, or Hindustani. The rather formalistic, cut-and-dried fulminations of the Russians, Red Chinese, and Americans take place in a very sedate and predictable environment. One sees to the core of the problem, however, whenever someone not of this precious club of three begins to muddy the international political stream. The near hysteria that promptly breaks out among them and in the United Nations soapbox center is all one needs to observe. Immediately they begin scurrying about, with at least two showing signs of advanced prostration at the prospect of the status quo being ruptured by violence which has not been condoned by the Cold Warriors. While agents of the U.S. and Red China murder each other in the swamps of Southeast Asia, or while agents of the U.S. and Soviet Russia pot each other on the beaches and approaches of Cuba or in downtown San Domingo, they all find time to cluck disapprovingly of similar homicidal festivities in Kashmir or in various places in Africa or the Gaza Strip or the Israel-Syria frontier by purely local forces. The Cold Warriors demand a monopoly of violence, that "peace" may not be "endangered." Nothing has done more to emphasize this than the famous July 14, 1965 letter of the late U. S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson. Stevenson not only frankly outlined the status quo quest thesis, but went on to describe its

final achievement, East and West, as the jumping-off point for subsequent teamwork between the two adversaries toward the realization of the many-millennia mirage-dream, the World State.\*

The Cold War has done more to hobble revisionism than all other influences and forces combined.\*\* It is for this reason that revisionism, if it is to have any significance henceforth, must not only become involved more deeply in investigations of how the world went to war again in 1939-1941 and what really went on during that war, but also devote increasing attention to the Cold War and illuminate its spurious and artificial origins and dimensions.

---

\*Stevenson's recommended policies: "The first is to establish a tacitly agreed frontier between the Communist and non-Communist areas of influence on the understanding that neither power system will use force to change the status quo. . . . The second is to move from this position of precarious stability toward agreed international procedures for settling differences, toward the building of an international juridical and policing system, and toward a whole variety of policies designed to turn our small, vulnerable planet into a genuine economic and social community." Stevenson went even further in comparing the degree of status quo between the "free world" and the Russians and Chinese: "The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 may have convinced the Russian leaders that interventions . . . beyond the tacit frontier of the two worlds are in fact too costly and dangerous. We have no such line with the Chinese." (Quotations from Stevenson letter as published in *National Observer*, December 20, 1965, p. 2.)

\*\*One will concede the immense importance of Germanophobic influences in the book, magazine, newspaper, stage, radio, moving picture, and television industries, but they relate to just part of the total picture. Obviously, they help shore up Russian, Polish, and Czech Communist politics and make support for any proper settlement of German territorial and property claims and national reunification of Germany extremely unlikely. But the influences of Germanophobia have little or nothing to do with the Asiatic phase of the Cold War, certainly the vastly more important sector of this phenomenon for over fifteen years, where tens of thousands of Americans have died and billions of American dollars have been wasted trying to repair the colossal folly of wrecking Japan as a factor in Asian affairs, in behalf of a European colonialism that went down anyway. The cover-up for this Far Eastern fiasco since before the Korean War has involved far more extensive though different repressions of revisionism, because of the more dynamic nature of the situation.

Also, more investigation is needed into another aspect of mass-communications Germanophobia, which is overwhelmingly based on atrocity themes. To what extent is this a response by the producers to an extensive market provided by sadists and psychopaths, criminal and otherwise, who have almost no understanding of nor interest in the historical aspects, but who gobble up the substance of such literature and spectacles, for utterly different but obvious reasons?

### SPECIAL NOTE

Due to space limitations, it has not been possible to include a suitable bibliography as an appendix to this issue of the RAMPART JOURNAL devoted exclusively to the subject of historical revisionism. For those who wish to explore the literature of revisionism, which is substantial, it is recommended that they consult the informative and well-classified SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REVISIONIST BOOKS, the only compendium of its kind available today, published by the Oxnard, California *Press Courier*. For your convenience, copies of this indispensable compilation may be obtained from Pine Tree Press, Box 158, Larkspur, Colorado 80118, at fifty cents each copy.

## On the Other Hand

Those who believe in human liberty do not favor coercion. The autarchist favors self-control and self-government, and will not admit to any justification for imposed violence. The Stoics championed the value of the individual and saw no reason to excuse the State for its belligerent behavior.

One of the major difficulties experienced by revisionist scholars has been the accusation that they support one brand of coercion over another. Most revisionists contend that this is not so; that their purpose is solely to set the record straight and to put the truth into focus. But the accusation is inescapable, especially when the highly publicized version of any historical event is shown to be in error on the basis of additional evidence which may have been suppressed or distorted during war or other political excess.

A case in point is the revisionist approach to World War II. In highlighting guilty actions leading to war, and the complicity and duplicity of men in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, revisionists have made Hitler and the Axis powers appear more innocent than the popular view holds them to be. Thus it has been said of revisionists that they are apologists for Hitler, pro-Nazi, and actually appear to justify the war.

Another frequent accusation is that revisionists overstate their case. It is said that they make extreme statements which cannot be supported. But most of us are sensitive with respect to any conclusion we hold. A statement which runs counter to our own view, especially when that view is also popularly held, is going to appear to be "extreme" even though it is supported by irrefutable evidence, sound logic, and a clear and cogent exposition.

Still another criticism that is sometimes expressed by those who think of themselves as "purists" in the libertarian (classical-liberal) tradition, is that revisionists as well as anti-revisionists rely almost entirely upon government documents and newspaper reports, even while protesting their "slanting" and lack of objectivity, and the unreliability of these sources. Indeed, this can be a burden that is generally laid at the feet of any historian, past or present. The view



of the historian is nearly always a view from capitol hill. It tends to overlook economic data or to use economic problems as historical "justification" for war, embargoes, tariffs, and other economic restraints.

It is a maxim, long employed among scholars who honestly do try to understand complex historical evidence, that no man and no nation is ever wholly wrong or right. The "other side" always commits the act of aggression, and the most palpably outrageous conduct is invariably justified as "necessary" and "mandatory" on the grounds of defense.

It is at this juncture, however, that revisionist scholarship becomes paramount. When there is no longer any "other" side; when historians and propagandists find agreement so that history is finalized into a kind of racial or national obsession, then revisionism emerges like a phoenix.

As the contributors to this issue of the RAMPART JOURNAL make abundantly clear, revisionism is a most necessary attitude in an examination of both history and current events. All of us are revisionists to some degree. Indeed, all educational efforts as well as all propaganda efforts are charted more or less in the direction of changing attitudes and changing procedures. We learn. As we learn and apply what we have learned, our attitudes change. One of the weaknesses of contemporary educational methods is the tendency to suppose that after so many years of study, so many books absorbed, so many learned men consulted, a person is *educated*. The term is used with finality. He is an *educated* man.

But revisionism does not finalize. It seeks the truth constantly. It is always ready to listen to new evidence, to reweigh the old. This willingness as well as the ability to re-examine is mandatory when political and military forces dominate the scene and color human behavior with generous coatings of whitewash and lamp-black.

The paramount idiosyncrasy of this immediate moment is to characterize America and its political and military adherents as "the free world"; and to label all opponents as "socialists," "communists," or "imperialists." What is needed is the recognition that every war is justified by its perpetrators on the grounds of "freedom" and that each act of political intervention, whether performed for military or economic purposes, is an actual abrogation of liberty and supports the downgrading of individualism, human dignity, and the chances of meaningful survival.

Traditionally, the world was divided by a series of vertical

barriers erected around nations and called "national boundaries." Karl Marx sought to bring a revision in thinking by drawing a horizontal line and insisting that the world was actually divided between its classes, the "haves" and the "have-nots" (the bourgeoisie and proletariat). He sought a world movement in which the "workers of the world" would unite against their "oppressors" and "exploiters," the hated capitalists.

The reaction against this attempt at revision, especially among conservatives, has been to re-emphasize the national boundaries and to wage wars across them for economic reasons benignly cloaked in humanitarian terms calculated to elevate human sacrifice to the status of ultimate nobility. The military configurations and the geographic revisions emerging from this effort have done more to advance Marxist economics than the First, Second, and Third Internationales combined.

Historical revisionism is a necessary procedure if we are ever to arrive at an age of liberty, peace, and reason. It must be seen that property is rightfully owned by persons, not States; that "collective security" really means individual insecurity; that the ultimate enemy is neither the worker nor the capitalist, nor the neighbor of some other political or racial geographic area. The line of demarcation must be revised and redrawn, not between worker and capitalist, as Marx would have it; nor between States, as so many suppose; but between those whose arena of activity is voluntary, confined to productive and market-place procedures, and those whose arena of activity is the political and military, and whose modus operandi is involuntary, based on compulsion, coercion, starvation, and death. In this respect, all governments and all military forces are suspect. The world is not divided between those nations which are free and those which are not. The world is divided between those persons who seek to mind their own business and those who intend to mind the business of others by forceful interventions of every kind and description.

Politically speaking, this nation is in the midst of a major revision. The so-called "conservative movement" tested its numerical strength in November of 1964 and emerged with a Texas brand on its quivering flank.

Revisionism in the political hustings can be clearly outlined since F. D. Roosevelt appeared on the scene. Prior to 1933, one heard little about any "conservative movement." The term, conservative, was employed to signify an attitude, a point of reference which

might relate to politics but equally might relate to science, religion, business, home life, or moral outlook. Mr. Roosevelt's appearance as the major political figure of his time had an enormous effect upon the thinking of millions of Americans. Some were prone to accept him as the leader without a peer. Others were prone to oppose him and to recognize in his policies a turning away from the traditional stance of America as it related to citizens vis-a-vis their government.

It was at this juncture that the terms "conservative" and "liberal" took on other meanings than those classically employed. It was no longer sufficient to say of a person that he was a Republican or a Democrat. These party labels began to slip into a hyphenated position. There were conservative-Republicans and conservative-Democrats. There were liberal-Republicans and liberal-Democrats. It became more important to know whether a person was a conservative or a liberal than to know what political party secured his allegiance.

The conservative position in the 1930's became the position of opposition to Roosevelt and his policies. Roosevelt began to prepare for war. The conservatives opposed and branded his actions as interventionist, extravagant, and outright un-American. They took the traditional stand of Americans, that this nation should mind its own business, stay out of European or Asiatic conflicts, and certainly stay out of war. Roosevelt instituted Social Security and the NRA; a host of governmental bureaus bloomed from the executive department of the government. Conservatives opposed, pointing out that this was enlarging the government, reducing the dignity and the importance of individuals, taxing everyone in a manner never before imagined. Roosevelt instituted huge programs of relief and public welfare, and the conservatives branded these moves as socialistic, costly, and unnecessary.

Thus, by the beginning of the 1940's the lines were drawn. The conservative view was in favor of peace, individualism, lower taxes, smaller government, independence, and self-reliance, and it contained a great love of the Constitution. The cry of the conservative was that we should "get back to the Constitution."

The liberals, who rallied to Mr. Roosevelt's banner, proclaimed a new "deal" in which government would play an ever larger role, taxes would rise, governmental services would increase, and America would intervene in all international affairs and assume a position of "world leadership."

Liberals branded conservatives as "isolationists," "reactionaries," "Cro-Magnon men," "diehards," and "me-too-ers." Conservatives branded liberals as "socialists," "interventionists," "war-makers," "social experimenters," "crooks," "thieves," and "opportunists." The conservative cry of "Back to the Constitution" was met by the liberals with their cry of "Forward to more social legislation and a brave new world."

Into this conservative-liberal standoff was introduced a new note: the threat of communism. Scholars, examining the Rooseveltian policies, discovered a strange parallel between the New Deal philosophy and the policies expounded by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and a host of socialist and pro-Communist writers. Could this parallel be circumstantial, inadvertent, a simple matter of political expediency?

Investigators turned up evidence that Russian spies, working in and out of various governmental offices, had stolen secrets, obtained restricted data, sometimes gotten hold of scarce and even rare material.

Russia was a Communist country.

Suddenly the whole thing seemed to fit together. It was a conspiracy, either of deliberate cooperation or one in which our own government people were the dupes of clever foreign operatives.

By the beginning of the 1950's the term "communist" had been incontrovertibly linked with Russia. A "communist" was presumed to be a Russian agent, a man working for the military takeover of this country by a foreign power. The conservatives became "patriots," those who sought to defend their nation from subversion at home or from military aggression abroad.

The attention of the American conservative shifted in emphasis. He became primarily concerned with foreign affairs. Russia was the new danger. It was no longer a matter of the rise of government and the displacement of individual rights, the erosion of property rights, the increase of taxes. Instead, the conservative emphasis became known as anti-communism. And with this shift came a strange metamorphosis to the conservative objective. For where it had served originally as the champion of peace, it now began to urge the line of "stand fast," "no compromise," "war if necessary." And where it had originally championed the idea of smaller government, it began to clamor for larger bureaus to hunt down Communists. It called for expansion of the police powers, sought laws to arrest persons of non-conservative persuasion on the grounds

that they were "traitors," and clamored for costly "investigations," all of which took more in the form of tax money.

Suddenly, it was not against high taxes per se, but was only against those taxes which were not to be used in anti-Communist effort. All at once the government became the most important thing in the mind of the conservative. The government must be made strong. It must spend billions in missile and weapon research. It must develop "strong men."

Gradually, the theory arose that the way to prevent a war with Russia was to start one. Russia was the head of the Communist conspiracy. Russia was secretly planning for a military take-over of the world. The best defense was aggression.

Where conservatives had joined ranks in opposing the military draft of Roosevelt and in criticizing the draft of President Woodrow Wilson, they now joined hands in branding anyone who refused to be drafted as a "dupe" or an outright "red." Those who had opposed Roosevelt's brand of interventionism now began to favor outright assistance to foreign countries which would oppose Russia. "Foreign aid," that biggest of all boondoggles, was seen to be a constructive thing if it went to "non-Communist" countries.

A supreme court justice who had consistently upheld the position of the government as it opposed the rights of individuals became the subject of praise if the individual on trial was suspected or proved to be a Communist.

Still, within the framework of the "conservative movement" lived persons who objected to high taxes and the further advance of government. But the vigor of their opposition was blunted by their own cries to "make government strong." This is the present status of the conservative movement. It is rent by conflicting philosophies. Most still favor lowered taxes. But at the same time they clamor for more power in the hands of government, more strict interpretation of law, more investigations, more crackdowns on those who disagree.

What we now see within the framework of conservatism is a new alliance between former liberals and latter-day conservatives. The liberal of the 30's wanted larger government, principally in the area of social legislation, welfare, and human experiment. The latter-day conservatives also want larger government, but they now want it in the police area of armies, navies, air forces, and rocketry. They also want more trials, more rigid domestic policing.

But both the former liberal and the latter-day conservative desire

larger government. And the end result of this combination is a bigger tax program, more spending on education (for defense), establishment of new bureaus (for patriotic reasons), and great emphasis upon national union. The latter-day conservative, while still critical of the "welfare state" of the former liberal, lends his support to the formation of a military or a "police state" where things will be controlled at the top by a "strong man."

Meanwhile, another strange shift is occurring. For while some of the former liberals are intrigued by this turn of events and are now jumping on the bandwagon of "anti-communism," other liberals, in the nineteenth century tradition of liberalism, are beginning to wonder about human liberty in the great sense, and are shifting over to oppose war-making, the draft, foreign intervention, and even high taxes. Thus, it appears that the liberal camp, as well as the conservative camp, is splitting. The traditional liberal of prior years is now aligning himself with the conservative of the 1930's.

Perhaps, at this crucial juncture, intellectual revisionism is as necessary as the study of historical or political revisions. Never before has the need for a moral imperative been more urgent. Instead of some new double standard of human behavior ("the good guys versus the bad guys"), it may be possible to detect the true autarchic nature of man and to establish a line of demarcation, not between economic theories or geographic territories, but between human actions that are intrinsically constructive and those human actions which are inescapably evil.