

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe



On board his flagship the Iron Duke

Britain's "Future Nelson" - The Man and his Work

What was it in Sir John's personality that marked him out for his great command? How came it that Lord Fisher, months before war was declared, could speak of him to the writer of these lines as "the future Nelson"?

His selection has not been due to any external dominance of character. Indeed, the ordinary man - noting only the Commander-in-Chief's downward look, quick upward glance, and clear outward gaze - would not discern in him a man who was pre-destined for the greatest responsibility and command which any man could bear. There have been chiefs who have won their way by some dominant force, and have strengthened their position and command by some stern or forbidding expression of character. That is not Jellicoe's way. So far as his great position depends upon personality - apart from the expression of personality in love for the service, and sleepless zeal in mastering its mysteries and in gaining confidence in every step that has led to command – his authority comes from a quality of calm persuasiveness, which makes him beloved and trusted by men in every rank and rating of the Service. His hold upon them is as Nelson's hold was on the officers and men of the Fleet in his time. His officers are hid colleagues as well as his comrades. The Admiral is an assiduous worker, and is never so happy as when he can work some good for officers and men in the Service. The men on the lower deck idolize him. They know that if anything is to be done it will be done well by Sir John Jellicoe. No Admiral ever had a better staff. It delighted him to say, of the recent battle, in which it was not given to him, owing to inexorable conditions of geography and atmosphere, to play a decisive part, that the "glorious traditions handed down to us by generations" of gallant seamen were most worthily upheld".

Speed and the Gun

Sir John Jellicoe is pre-eminently a gunnery officer, and has always had faith in the power and effect of the big gun. His broadsides and salvoes have not been fired in the Press. He has contributed a great deal to the advancement of scientific gunnery. He believes, with the modern gunnery officers, that to get in the first blow may go half-way to win the battle. He would say with Mulvaney, "I'm not for fightin' ivery gint for the pure joy of fightin', but when you do, punch him first and punch him frequent".

The Admiral is also a great believer in speed. The gun may hit, but it must first get within range and speed means the power of "getting there". He is also a wary and far-seeing strategist. There is nothing of impetuosity or hot-headedness about him. He would say with Nelson, "Do not imagine I am one of those hot-brained people who fight at an immense disadvantage without an adequate object", but the object disclosed and recognised he would strike, taking every risk of consequences. He is likewise a great tactician, as he has proved by his success in manoeuvres, and it has been made known that when at last in the recent battle he came up with the German Fleet, he handled his fleet so magnificently that the Germans were dismayed and incontinently fled. We have heard of the "Nelson touch", and the historian may yet speak of the "Jellicoe touch", likewise.

His Knowledge of the Enemy

The truth is that Sir John Jellicoe has lived to the full the life of the naval Service. He was one of the survivors of the ill-fated "Victoria", being then a young officer, when she went down with that famous seaman, Sir George Tryon, in the terrible collision with the "Camperdown". He has risked his life that the lives of others might be saved. He was severely wounded in the Boxer Expedition with the International Force, and in these and later times, has been well liked by our present enemies.

He knows the German Navy very well, and is personally acquainted with some of its chiefs, so that he can estimate their character and certainly he would be the last man to under-estimate a courageous and efficient adversary. Not only does Jellicoe know all about the Navy afloat. He knows its organisation and administration ashore. As

Third Sea Lord and Controller, he did a giant's work at the Admiralty, urging the spending of money where it could properly be spent, and doing an immense deal to vivify all the work of the dockyards and private yard's, and his opinion went a long way in the design of many of the ships which now serve with his flag. He was Second Sea Lord at a time of the utmost importance for all that concerns the state and advancement of officers and men, and particularly of promotion from the lower deck.

Sir John Jellicoe is a great believer in the maxim "Mens sana in corpore sano". His constant thought in the war has been of the health of the Fleet, and never has there been a fleet so healthy as his. He is himself the embodiment of fitness. He has been equally good in the flannels and between the goalposts, and indeed in every kind of game and sport, which he has also encouraged in all his commands.



No 1 Mess, HMS Shark



Engineers and Stokers and Ratings, HMS Queen Mary



Engineers and Stokers HMS Shark



Officers of HMS Indefatigable



Marines of HMS Queen Mary

Admiral Sir David Beatty

The Spirit of Sea Power Incarnate



Admiral Beatty (2nd right) and the Tsar (centre) on the Lion

Admiral Sir David Beatty was, on that famous 31st May, the spirit of Britain incarnate, the spirit of the greatest of Nelson's captains revived, of Troubridge and Saumarez, of Collingwood, and "the gallant, good Rion", and many another of the glorious seamen "who made Britain's fame" a hundred years ago.

"He was on the topmost bridge all the while directing operations", says one who was in the great fight of May 31. "They say that he gloried in the fight and was as eager, as active, and as delighted as a schoolboy in a victorious football match." That little pen picture of one of the most brilliant of Britain's seamen may be accepted as accurate, for it agrees entirely with all that is known of the man who, in one of his brief spells ashore, made a speech in which he said, "More than a year ago we started this war in the Navy with a whoop of joy", and then went on to complain that since then because the German had refused to come out in any

strength, they had done nothing but "barge about in the North Sea".

For the Third Time

The greatest naval battle in history up to this present writing was Sir David Beatty's third and greatest fight with the Germans. His first was the fight in the Bight of Heligoland on August 27th, 1914, when the Germans lost five vessels, while none of the British ships was seriously damaged. His second victory was in the Battle of the Dogger Bank on January 24th, 1915, when his battle-cruiser squadron sank the *Blucher* and severely damaged two other powerful cruisers, part of a German Squadron which slunk back to the shelter of the Kiel Canal after a futile raid on the East Coast.

Throughout the whole of his career Admiral Beatty has been a maker of records, and it is hard to avoid the belief that he is about the luckiest man in the world. That would be a mistake, however;, for it is not luck, but sheer hard work and conspicuous merit that have brought Sir David Beatty so many of the plums of his profession.

From Strength to Strength

Born on January 17th, 1871 - so that he is now only 45 and in the prime of life -David Beatty has been marked out by his own qualities for the highest postions, almost, it might be said, since the day he entered the Navy as a cadet, an apprentice to the grim sea service of Britain. His father was Captain D L Beatty, of Bowdale, County Wexford, a member of one of those Irish sporting families that do so little for themselves and Ireland if they remain there, and so often come to distinction in the greater world outside.

It was in 1884 that young Beatty entered the Navy, and six years later he was promoted to sub-lieutenant, and in 1892 to the rank of lieutenant. In 1900, Lieutenent Beatty was in command of the *Barfleur*, when the Boxer troubles broke out, and did a gallant action in attempting to capture two Chinese guns. This brought him a captaincy - although it nearly ended his life - at the early age of 29 years. Thus he became the youngest captain in the Royal Navy, and passed over the heads of 200 officers, just as when he was advanced to commander, he passed over the heads of nearly 400 officers who were his seniors.

An Admiral of Youth

In 1910, Beatty was a Rear-Admiral at the age of 39, and the only parallels to his rapid promotions are to be found in the naval records of the 18th century, when Rodney became a flag officer at 31, Keppel at 37, and Nelson at 38.

Beatty's first laurels were won during the Nile Expedition to the Soudan in 1906, when he was employed under the late Lord Kitchener, then Sir Herbert, in getting the gunboats over the cataracts, an arduous task which he performed with complete success. A little later, in the same affair, British gunboats were bombarding the Dervish stronghold at Hafir. Commander Colville, the officer in charge, was wounded. The command of the flotilla thereupon devolved upon Beatty, who fought his little ships with such gallantry and skill that he received a mention in despatches and was awarded the DSO.

These are only some of the outstanding incidents in Sir David Beatty's stirring and strenuous career.


Multum in Parvo (Much in Little)

Like Nelson, he is physically small and slight, although he is not battle scarred in a way that is visible to the eye. He is well-made, conveying an unmistakable sense of strength and energy.

And it is not only a sense of strength and energy that radiates from Sir David Beatty's personality. He conveys also a feeling of confidence. When, immediately after the battle off the Jutland Bank, and before the first feeling of unjustifiable depression had worn off, a sailor was asked if the men of the Fleet still had confidence in the Admiral, his instant reply was, "Confidence in David? Why, we'd go to hell for David". That answer, and the use of the familiar Christian name, show unmistakably how the Fleet regards the youthful Admiral.

How Britannia Rules the Waves

Broadside of 12-in. guns, firing. Destruction at 15,000 yards.



HMS Magnificent showing its 12-in. guns trained on the broadside

The Battle of the Jutland Bank

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's Despatch

The Full Official Report issued by the Press Bureau, July 6, 1916

The Secretary of the Admiralty communicates the following letter, which has been addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

Admiralty, 4th July, 1916.

Sir,

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have considered your reports on the action off the Jutland Bank between the Grand Fleet under your command and the German High Sea Fleet, on the 31st May, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and those of the various Flag Officers and Commanding Officers of the Grand Fleet.

Their Lordships congratulate the officers, seamen, and Marines of the Grand Fleet, on this, the first the first Fleet action which has occurred since the outbreak of war, as a result of which the enemy, severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The events of the 31st of May and 1st June gave ample proof of the gallantry and devotion which characterised all who took part in the battle. The ships of every class were handled with skill and determination, their steaming under battle conditions afforded a splendid testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the engineering staff, while individual initiative and tactical subordination were equally conspicuous.

The results of the action prove that the officers and men of the Grand Fleet have known both how to study the new problems with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to account. The expectations of the country were high; they have been well justified.

My Lords desire me to convey to you their full approval of your proceedings on this occasion.

I am. Sir, your obedient Servant,

(Signed) W Graham Greene.

Admiralty, 6th July, 1916.

The following Despatch has been received from Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, GCB, CCVO, Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, reporting the action in the North Sea on 31st May, 1916.

Iron Duke, 24th June, 1916.

Sir,

Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31st May, 1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.

The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued by me.

In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31st May, the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas, supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th and 12th Flotillas.

The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by our advanced force during the first hour after commencing their action with the enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact.

The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beattv, KCB, MVO, DSO, and admirablv supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, MVO, fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner that was in keeping with the best traditions of the service.

The following extracts from the report of Sir David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene.

"At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from *Galatea* (Commodore Edwyn S Alexander-Sinclair, MVO, ADC, indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base.

"At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the eastward and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p.m.

Their force consisted of five battle-cruisers. After the first report of the enemy, the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for orders, spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light-cruisers at long range. In the meantime, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed, and was able to take station ahead of the battle-cruisers by the time we turned to ESE, the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light Cruiser Squadrons was excellent, and of great value.

"From a report from *Galatea* at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable, and not merely an isolated unit of light cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered *Engadine* (Lieutenant-Commander C G Robinson) to send up a seaplane and scout to NNE. This order was carried out very quickly and by 3.8 p.m. a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant F J Rutland RN, as pilot, and Assistant-Paymaster G S Trewin, RN, as observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in *Engadine* about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light-cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 ft. within 3,000 yards of them, the light-cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.

"At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots, and formed line of battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to ESE, slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing NNW, 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind SE. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

"At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was SSE, the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 vards.

"At 4.8 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to slacken. The destroyer *Landrail* (Lieutenant-Commander Francis E H G Hobart), of 9th Flotilla, who was on our port beam, trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of *Lydiard* (Commander Malcolm L Goldsmith) and *Landrail* undoubtedly preserved the battle-cruisers from closer submarine attack. *Nottingham* (Captain Charles H Miller) also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.

"Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, *Nestor* (Commander the Hon Edward B S Bingham), *Nomad* (Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield), *Nicator* (Lieutenant Jack E A Mocatta), *Narborough* (Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett), *Pelican* (Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A Beattie), *Petard* (Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C O Thomson), *Obdurate* (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H H Sams), *Nerissa* (Lieutenant-Commander Montague C B Legge), with *Moorsom* (Commander John C Hodgson), and *Morris* (Lieutenant-Commander Edward S Graham), of 10th Flotilla, *Turbulent* (Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart), and *Termagant* (Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P Blake), of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m., simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy destroyers. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner, and with great determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light-cruiser and fifteen destroyers, a fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle-cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers was rendered less effective, owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was, therefore, unfavourable for torpedo attack.

"*Nestor, Nomad*, and *Nicator*, gallantly led by Commander the Hon Edward B S Pingham of *Nestor*, pressed home their attack on the batlle-cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament. *Nomad* was badly hit, and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently *Nestor* and *Nicator* altered course to the SE, and in a short time, the opposing battle-cruisers having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for torpedo attack fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, *Nestor* was badly hit and swung to starboard, *Nicator* altering course inside her to avoid collision, and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. *Nicator* made good her escape, and subsequently rejoined the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. *Nestor* remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. *Moorsom* also carried out an attack on the enemy's battle fleet.

"Petard, Nerissa, Turbulent, and Termagant also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. Petard reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's line, while Nerissa states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander Bingham and other Officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry.

"From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle-cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ship, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outline of the ships very indistinct.

"At 4.38 p.m. Southampton (Commodore William E Goodenough, MVO, ADC) reported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted SE. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Battle Fleet. The enemy battle-cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. *Southampton*, with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy Battle Fleet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. *Southampton's* reports were most

valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle-cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, in Barham (Captain Arthur W Craig), this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

"At 4.57 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy Battle Fleet. *Fearless* (Captain (D) Charles D Roper), with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla, joined the battle-cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. *Champion* (Captain (D) James U Farie), with 13th Flotilla, took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.

"The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 p.m. Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation, and was corroborated by Princess Royal (Captain Walter H Cowan, MVO, DSO), and Tiger (Captain Henry B Pelly, MVO). Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. Onslow (Lieutenant Commander John C Tovey) and Moresby (Lieutenant Commander Roger V Allison), who had been detached to assist *Engadine* with the seaplane, rejoined the battle-cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of Lion (Captain Alfred E M Chatfield, CVO). At 5.10 p.m. Moresby, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at a ship in their line. Moresby then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined Champion. In corroboration of this, Fearless reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m. and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam.

"At 5.35 p.m. our course was NNE, and the estimated position of the Battle Fleet was N 16 W, so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his light-cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron.

"Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Battle Fleet, bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east, and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to you that the enemy battle-cruisers bore south-east. At that time only three of the enemy battle-cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the 'Koenig' class.

"At about 6.5 p.m. *Onslow*, being on the engaged bow of *Lion*, sighted an enemy light-cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack

with torpedoes. *Onslow* at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. *Onslow* then closed the enemy battle-cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at low speed. Being informed that he still had had three torpedoes, he closed with the light-cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them and must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage then caused *Onslow* to stop.

"At 7.15 p.m. *Defender* (Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R Palmer), whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, while on the disengaged side of the battle-cruisers, by a shell which damaged her foremost boiler, closed *Onslow* and took her in tow. Shells were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1 p.m., 1st June, when *Onslow* was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J C Tovey, of *Onslow*, and Lieutenant-Commander L R Palmer, of *Defender*, for special recognition. *Onslow* was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron as follows — 'Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again, and made straight for the *Derfflinger* to attack her.' "

Proceedings of Battle Fleet and Third Battle Cruiser Squadron

On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted, the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying cruiser and destroyer force, proceeded at full speed on a SE by S course to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the older battleships were severely tested. Great credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner in which they, as always, responded to the call, the

The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral the Hon. Horace L A Hood, CB, MVO, DSO, which was in advance of the Battle Fleet, was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At 5.30 p.m. this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear Admiral Hood sent the *Chester* (Captain Robert N Lawson) to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light cruisers at about 5.45 p.m. The engagement lasted for about 20 minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy odds, and, although the ship suffered considerably in casualties, her fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 p.m. she rejoined the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron.

The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward, and at 6.10 p.m. sighted our battle-cruisers, the squadron taking station ahead of the *Lion* at 6.21 p.m. in accordance with the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Fleet. He reports, "I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried

out magnificently, Rear Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the ESE in support of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made a report to you of the bearing and distance of the enemy battle fleet.

"By 6.50 p.m. the battle-cruisers were clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about NNW 3 miles, and I ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite superiority over them. From the report of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle-cruisers and battle-ships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle-cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron was also engaging battleships. The report of Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.

"From the report of Rear-Admiral T D W Napier, MVO, the Third Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 p.m. attacked with the torpedo. *Falmouth* (Captain John D Edwards) and *Yarmouth* (Captain Thomas D Pratt) both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle-cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. *Indomitable* (Captain Francis W Kennedy) reports that about this time one of the Derffiinger class fell out of the enemy's line."

Meanwhile, at 5.45 p.m., the report of guns had become audible to me, and at 5.55 p.m. flashes were visible from ahead, round to the starboard beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished, and the position of the enemy's battle fleet could not be determined. The difference in estimated position by "reckoning" between *Iron Duke* (Captain Frederic C Dreyer, CB) and *Lion*, which was inevitable under the circumstances, added to the uncertainty of the general situation.

Shortly after 5.55 p.m. some of the cruisers ahead, under Rear Admirals Herbert L Heath, MVO, and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt, MVO, were seen to be in action, and reports received show that *Defence*, flagship (Captain Stanley V Ellis), and *Warrior* (Captain Vincent B Molteno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light-cruiser at this time. She was subsequently observed to sink.

At 6 p.m. *Canterbury* (Captain Percy M R Royds), which ship was in company with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, had engaged enemy light-cruisers which were firing heavily on the torpedo-boat destroyer *Shark* (Commander Loftus W Jones),

Acasta (Lieutenant Commander John O Barron), and *Christopher* (Lieutenant Commander Fairfax M Kerr). As a result of this engagement the *Shark* was sunk.

At 6 p.m. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle-cruisers, were sighted by Marlborough bearing before the starboard beam of the battle fleet.

At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Fleet reported to me the position of the enemy battle-cruisers, and at 6.14 p.m. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.

At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle-cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.

I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir David Beatty's report, and during deployment the fleets became engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle-cruisers ahead of the battle fleet.

The divisions of the battle fleet were led by:

The Commander-in-Chief Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, KCB, KCMG Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B. Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt, KCB, CVO, CMG Rear-Admiral Alexander L Duff, CB Rear-Admiral Arthur C Leveson, CB Rear-Admiral Ernest F A Gaunt, CMG

At 6.16 p.m. *Defence* and *Warrior* were observed passing down between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy fire. *Defence* disappeared, and *Warrior* passed to the rear disabled.

It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement with the enemy's light-cruisers and in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy ships, owing to the mist until he found himself in close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when *Black Prince* (Captain Thomas P Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk, but a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 p.m.

The First Battle Squadron became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening fire at 6.17 p.m. on a battleship of the *Kaiser* class. The other Battle Squadrons, which had previously been firing at an enemy light-cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on battle ships of the *Koenig* class.

At 6.6 p.m. the Rear Admiral Commanding Fifth Battle Squadron, then in company with the battle-cruisers, had sighted the starboard wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of *Barham*, and the first intention of Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manoeuvre which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy battle fleet. An

accident to *Warspite's* steering gear caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy's line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Edward M Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation.

Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight to twelve.

The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from 6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m. at ranges between 9,000 yards and 12,000 yards, during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from SE by E to W in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and the alterations of course had the effect of bringing the British fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line, but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.

At 6.55 p.m., *Iron Duke* passed the wreck of *Invincible* (Captain Arthur L Cay), with *Badger* (Commander C A Fremantle) standing by.

During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battlecruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line and at least one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.

The Battle Cruisers in the Van

Sir David Beatty reports, "At 7.6 p.m. I received a signal from you that the course of the Fleet was south. Subsequently signals were received up to 8.46 p.m. showing that the course of the Battle Fleet was to the south-westward.

Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to SW by S to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle-cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the *Koenig* class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. and increased speed to 22 knots, At 7.32 p.m. my course was SW speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing NW by W. Again, after a very short time, the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire, while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy's line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.

"At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy's line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support. We soon located two battle-cruisers and battleships, and were heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by *Lion*, and turned away eight points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. *Princess Royal* set fire to a three-funnelled battleship, *New Zealand* (Captain John F E Green) and *Indomitable* report that the third ship, which

they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, and *Falmouth* reported they were last seen at 8.38 steaming to the westward.

"At 8.40 p.m. all our battle-cruisers felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel.

"I continued on a south-westerly course with my light cruisers spread until 9.24 p.m. Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that the enemy was to the north westward, and that we had established ourselves well between him and his base. *Minotaur* {Captain Arthur C S H D'Aeth) was at this time bearing north 5 miles, and I asked her the position of the leading battle squadron of the Battle Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last seen bearing NNE. I kept you informed of my position, course, and speed, also of the bearing of the enemy.

"In view of the gathering darkness, and the fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to dose the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours, I therefore concluded that we should be carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to you that I had done so."

Details of Battle-Fleet Action

As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a "following" or "chasing" fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired, but only one took effect (on *Marlborough*), and even in this case the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. The enemy's efforts to keep out of effective gun range were aided by the weather conditions which were ideal for the purpose, Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.

The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, came into action at 6.17 p.m. with the enemy's Third Battle Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe punishment, both to the battleships and to the battlecruisers and light-cruisers, which were also engaged. The fire of *Marlborough* (Captain George P Ross) was particularly rapid and effevtive. This ship commenced at 6.17 p.m, by firing seven salvoes at a ship of the *Kaiser* class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard, but reopened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser, and at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the *Koenig* class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron.

The range decreased during the course of the action 9,000 yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy's return fire than the remainder of the battle fleet, with the exception of the Fifth Battle Squadron. Colossus (Captain Alfred D P R

Pound) was hit but was not seriously damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.

In the Fourth Battle Squadron - in which squadron my flagship *Iron Duke* was placed – Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee leading one of the divisions - the enemy engaged was the squadron consisting of *Koenig* and *Kaiser* class and some of the battle-cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light-cruisers. The mist rendered range-raking a difficult matter, but the fire of the squadron was effective. *Iron Duke* having previously fired at a light-cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battleship of the *Koenig* class at a range of 12,000 yards, The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo, and only ceased when the target ship turned away. The rapidity with which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organisation of the flagship so ably commanded by my Flag Captain, Captain Frederic C Dreyer.

The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed at enemy battlecruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.

The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the *Kaiser* or *Koenig* classes between 6.30 and 7.20 p.m. and fired also at an enemy battle-cruiser which had dropped back apparently severely damaged.

During the action between the battle fleets the Second Cruiser Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L Heath, MVO, with the addition of *Duke of Edinburgh* (Captain Henry Blackett) of the First Cruiser Squadron, occupied a position at the van, and acted as a connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle-cruiser fleet. This squadron although it carried out useful work, did not have an opportunity of coming into action.

The attached cruisers *Boadicea* (Captain Louis C S Woollcombe, MVO), *Active* (Captain Percy Withers), *Blanche* (Captain John M Casement), and *Bellona* (Captain Arthur B S Dutton) carried out their duties as repeating ships with remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.

The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 p,m. and again at 8.18 p.m., when they supported the Eleventh flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore James R P Hawksley, MVO, to attack. On each occasion the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Ie Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The *Calliope* (Commodore Ie Mesurier) was hit several times, but did not sustain serious damage, although, I regret to say, she had several casualties. The light-cruisers attacked the enemy's battleships with torpedoes at this time, and an explosion on board a ship of the *Kaiser* class was seen at 8.40 p.m.

During these destroyer attacks four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light-cruisers, and destroyers.

After the arrival of the British Battle Fleet the enemy's tactics were of a nature generally to avoid further action, in which they were favoured by the conditions of visibility.

Night Dispositions

At 9 p.m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night, with a view to its safety from such attacks, whilst providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manoeuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack, and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy's heavy ships.

Night Attacks by Flotillas

During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore Hawkesley and Captains Charles J Wintour and Anselan J B Stirling, delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy losses.

It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth Flotilla occurred, including that of *Tipperary*, with the gallant leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken, and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.

Two torpedoes were seen to take effect on enemy vessels as the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from *Spitfire* (Lieutenant Commander Clarence W E Trelawny) and the other from either *Ardent* (Lieutenant Commander Arthur Marsden), *Ambuscade* (Lieutenant Commander Gordon A Coles), or *Garland* (Lieutenant Commander Reginald S Goff).

The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan J B Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, which consisted of six large vessels, besides light-cruisers, and comprised vessels of the *Kaiser* class, was taken by surprise. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and third ships in the line. Those fired at the third ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack made twenty minutes later by *Maenad* (Commander John P Champion), on the five vessels still remaining, resulted in the fourth ship in the line being also hit.

The destroyers were under a heavy fire, from the light-cruisers on reaching the rear of the line, but the *Onslaught* (Lieutenant Commander Arthur G. Onslow, DSC), was the only vessel which received any material injuries. In the *Onslaught* Sub-Lieutenant Harry W A Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G Arnot, RNR, the

only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out of action and reached her home port.

During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, *Castor* (Commodore James R P Hawksley) leading the flotilla, engaged and sank an enemy torpedo boat destroyer at point-blank range.

Sir David Beatty reports:

"The Thirteenth flotilla, under the command of Captain James U Farie, in *Champion*, took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At 0.30 a.m. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to *Petard* and *Turbulent*, switched on searchlights and opened a heavy fire, which disabled *Turbulent*. At 3.30 a.m. *Champion* was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. *Moresby* reports four ships of *Deutschland* class sighted at 2.35 a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by *Moresby* and *Obdurate*.

"*Fearless* and the 1st Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during the earlier part of the 1st May. At 6.10 p.m., when joining the Battle Fleet, *Fearless* was unable to follow the battle cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station at the rear of the line. She sighted during the night a battleship of the *Kaiser* class steaming fast and entirely alone. She was not able to engage her, but believes she was attacked by destroyers further astern. A heavy explosion was observed astern not long after."

There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas; they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of them.

Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for about 15 minutes at 10.20 p.m. with a squadron comprising one enemy cruiser and four light-cruisers, during which period *Southampton* and *Dublin* (Captain Albert C Scott) suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired. The return fire of the squadron appeared to be very effective.

Abdiel, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out her duties with the success which has always characterised her work.

Proceedings on June 1

At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet, being then to the southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in search of enemy vessels and for the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag from *Marlborough* to *Revenge*, as the former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed of the squadron. *Marlborough* was detached by my direction to a base, successfully driving off an enemy submarine attack en route. The visibility early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin until 9 a.m. The British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near the line of approach to German ports until 11 a.m. on 1st June, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft. The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been known to the enemy, as at 4 a.m. the Fleet engaged a Zeppelin for about five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of the British Fleet.

The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the destroyers *Ardent* (Lieutenant Commander Arthur Marsden), *Fortune* (Lieutenant Commander Frank G Terry), and *Tipperary* (Captain (D) Charles J Wintour), were picked up, and the *Sparrowhawk* (Lieutenant Commander Sydney Hopkins), which had been in collision and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15 p.m., it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser squadron was detached to search for *Warrior*, which vessel had been abandoned whilst in tow of *Engadine* on her way to the base owing to bad weather setting in and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light-cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she foundered.

Sir David Beatty reports in regard to the *Engadine*:

"The work of *Engadine* appears to have been most praiseworthy throughout, and of great value. Lieutenant Commander C G Robinson deserves great credit for the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he handled his ship. He actually towed *Warrior* for 75 miles between 8.40 p.m., 31st May, and 7.15 a.m., 1st June, and was instrumental in saving the lives of her ship's company."

I fully endorse his remarks.

The Fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30 p.m. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.

Losses

The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took place and the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination of the evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk, it is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.


I deeply regret to report the loss of HM ships *Queen Mary, Indefatigable, Invincible, Defence, Black Prince, Warrior,* and of HM TBDs *Tipperary, Ardent, Fortune, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Nestor, Nomad,* and *Turbulent,* and still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear Admiral the Hon Horace Hood, Captain Charles F Sowerby, Captain Cecil L Prowse, Captain Arthur L Cay, Captain Thomas P Bonham, Captain Charles J Wintour, and Captain Stanley V Ellis, and those who perished with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led officers and men who were equally gallant, and whose death is mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.

The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him. We particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German light-cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after deployment, under a heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun left in action.



HMS Queen Mary

A huge cloud of smoke rose when HMS Queen Mary exploded 38 minutes into the battle of Jutland after being struck by a salvo from the German battlecruiser SS Derflinger. Queen Mary blew up after being hit by two 12-inch shells on 'A' and 'B' turret and their respective magazines were detonated. In all, 1,266 men lost their lives.



HMS Invincible

The bow and stern of HMS Invincible sticking out of the water as the battle cruiser sinks during the battle of Jutland after she was hit five times by shells from the German battle cruisers Derrflinger and Lutzow, the last hit blowing the roof off "Q" turret and setting fire to the cordite propellant, the flash soon spread to the magazine and Invincible was ripped in two by the explosion. There were only three survivors with those killed including Rear-Admiral the Hon Horace Hood. The photograph was taken from HMS Benbow and shows the destroyer HMS Badger moving in to rescue survivors.

The Personnel of the Fleet

The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld - whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light-cruisers, or destroyers - the same admirable spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.

I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me.

Details of the work of the various ships during action have now been given. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude to action is the work of the engineroom department, and that during action the officers and men of that department perform their most important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review. Several ships attained speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and several instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of injured ships.

The artisan ratings also carried out much valuable work during and after the action; they could not have done better.

The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing critical operations, and with their staff seriously

depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude.

It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the Battle Cruiser Fleet (the units of which were less heavily armoured than their opponents), the Fifth Battle Squadron, the First Cruiser Squadron, Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, and the Flotillas. This was inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas mentioned as well as the individual vessels composing them were handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons of the Battle Fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the manner in which all the vessels were handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous throughout the day.

I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand Fleet), Vice Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear Admiral Alexander L Duff, Rear Admiral Arthur C Leveson, and Rear Admiral Ernest F A Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the Battle Fleet. They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney's squadron, owing to Its position, was able to see more of the enemy Battle Fleet than the other battle squadrons, and under a leader who has rendered me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear of the Battle Fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.

Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight, he appreciated the situations at once on sighting first the enemy's lighter forces, then his battle-cruisers, and finally his battle fleet. I can fully sympathise with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manoeuvred, and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest value.

Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded him by Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, the magnificent manner in which Rear Admiral the Hon Horace Hood brought his squadron into action, the able support afforded him by Rear Admiral William C Pakenham and Rear Admiral Osmond de B Brock, and the good work performed by the Light Cruiser Squadron under the command respectively of Rear Admiral Trevylyan D W Napier, Commodore William E Goodenough, and Commodore Edwyn S Alexander-Sinclair. He states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and used their forces to the best possible effect.

I most fully endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff:

"I desire to record and bring to your notice the great assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag Commander, the Hon. Reginald A R Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy's discomfiture; my Secretary, Frank T Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant Commander Ralph F Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manoeuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire."

I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant work of my Chief of the Staff. Vice Admiral Sir Charles Madden, KCB. Throughout a period of 21 months of war his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his long experience in fleet, special gift for organisation, and his capacity for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet Action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist and his judgment was never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.

My special thanks are due to Commodore Lionel Halsey, CMG, the Captain of the Fleet, who also assists me in the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation is largely due the rapidity with which the Fleet was fuelled and replenished with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance to me during the action.

Commander Charles M Forbes, my Flag Commander and Commander Roger M Bellairs, of my Staff, plotted the movements of the two fleets with rapidity and accuracy as the reports were received; Commander the Hon Matthew R Best, MVO, of my staff, acted as observer aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. These officers carried out their duties with much efficiency during the action.

The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander Alexander R W Woods, assisted by the other signal officers, and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. The signal departments in all ships deserve great credit for their work. My Flag Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was also of much service to me throughout the action.

The high state of efficiency of the W/T arrangements of the fleet, and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and after the action, is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out by Commander Richard L Nicholson. His services have been invaluable throughout the war.

A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all ships.

My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H Share, CB, and Victor H T Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the action. Their records have been of much assistance.

To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E Leggett, I am indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout the operations.

In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the attention of their Lordships the names of officers and men all of whom did not come under my personal observations, but who had the opportunity of specially distinguishing themselves.

I am, Sir, Your Obedient Servant,

J R Jellicoe, Admiral Commander in Chief

Enclosure

List of enemy vessels put out of action, 31st May – 1st June, 1916

Battleships or Battle-Cruisers

2 Battleships - Dreadnought type

1 Battleship - Deutschland type (Seen to sink)

1 Battle-cruiser (Sunk - *Lutzow* admitted by Germans)

1 Battleship - Dreadnought type.

1 Battle-cruiser (Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port)

Light Cruisers

5 Light cruisers (Seen to sink; one of them had the appearance of being a larger type, and might have been a battleship)

Torpedo-Boat Destroyers

6 Torpedo-boat Destroyers (Seen to sink) 3 Torpedo-boat Destroyers (Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port)

Submarines

1 Submarine (Sunk)

Note – all times are given in Greenwich Mean Time.

The portions of Admiral Beatty's report to Sir John Jellicoe which are not quoted by the latter in the above despatch are given in full below.

North Sea Heroes Who Gave Their Lives for Victory

(Only officers were recorded here. Details of all casualties are appended below.)

HMS Queen Mary

Captain Cecil Irby Prowse served during the Egyptian war, 1882, and was awarded the Egyptian medal and the Khedive's Bronze Star. He became first lieutenant of HMS *Racoon*, and in 1895 was awarded the General Africa medal. He was also present at the bombardment and capture of the Sultan of Zanzibar's palace in August, 1896.

Commander Robert Harman Llewelyn, aged 31, only surviving son of Sir Robert Llewelyn, served in HMS *Ramillies*, flagship of Lord Charles Beresford, in the Mediterranean. He served in HMS *Hindustan* in 1911 and in HMS *St Vincent* in 1912 as gunnery lieutenant.



Commander Sir Charles Rodney Blane was killed by a shell explosion before the vessel sank.

Succeeded his uncle as fourth baronet in 1911.

He was awarded the Italian Order of St Maurice and St Lazarus for services at the time of the Messina earthquake.

His two younger brothers were both in the Army and have both lost their lives in the war.



Commander Harry L L Pennell, served in the British Antarctic Expedition, 1910-1913, and was specially promoted to commander in June, 1913.



Lieutenant John Malby Bergin Hanly, was wounded early in the war, but recovered sufficiently to attend his brother's wedding as best man in 1915. He died on 31 May 1916 and is remembered on Portsmouth Naval Memorial.



Engineer Lieutenant Commander John Matthew Murray when at the RN College was instructor to the Prince of Wales.

Major Gerald C Rooney served with the expeditionary forces in China during the war, acting as Adjutant to the Royal Marines Battalion in August, 1900, and receiving a medal.

Lieutenant Commander Ralph Lyall Clayton, was born in London in 1885.

He was the son of Admiral Francis Starkie Clayton and Edith Margaret Clayton, of Wyelands, Ross-on-Wye.

He died on 31 May 1916, age 31, and is remembered on Portsmouth Naval Memorial.



Lieutenant Victor Alexander Ewart, who was promoted to that rank at the end of August, 1913, was through his mother a nephew of Lord Ancaster.

He was only 23 years of age.

Sub-Lieutenant Algernon M Percy, RNR, was the son of Lord Algernon Percy, and nephew of the Duke of Northumberland.

Acting Sub-Lieutenant Neville Seymour, aged 20, excelled in sport, and possessed numerous cups and other prizes.

Fleet Surgeon E E Lobb served in HMS *Thrush* in the Delagoa Bay blockade and in the Gambia River Expedition in 1901. He received the General African medal, with Aro clasp.

Midshipman Denis Gerald Ambrose Goddard, although only 18 years of age, had seen service in the Persian Gulf, the Suez Canal, and the Dardanelles.

Midshipman Thomas Mostyn Field, only son of Admiral Sir Mostyn and Lady Field, was appointed to HMS *Queen Mary* in January last.

HMS Invincible



Rear Admiral the Hon Horace Lambert Alexander Hood, CB, MVO, DSO, third son of the fourth Viscount Hood and brother of the present peer, attained flag rank in May, 1913.

He served with great distinction in the Sudan operations, and has been Naval Attache in Washington; in command of the Royal Naval College, Osborne; Naval Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty. In October and November, 1914, he was in command of the monitors and other vessels which bombarded the German works on the Belgian coast.



Captain Arthur Lindesay Cay, formerly in command of HMS *Achilles*, entered the Navy as a cadet in 1882.

He took four firsts for his promotion to lieutenant in 1891, and attained the rank of captain in 1907.



Commander Richard H D Townsend was appointed to the *Invincible* at the beginning of the war.

He became flag-lieutenant in the Home Fleet in 1907.

He took part in the defeat of the German squadron off the Falklands.



Commander Lionel Henry Shore, navigating officer, was the second son of Commander the Hon Henry Noel Shore, and a nephew of Lord Teignmouth.

He served in China in 1920 as aide-de-camp to the late Admiral (then Commander) Cradock, and was mentioned in despatches.

Lieutenant Charles D Fisher, RNVR, the Oxford tutor, brother of Mr H A L Fisher, of Sheffield University, was a great cricketer. He served with the RAMC in France during the early part of the war, then obtained a commission in the RNVR.

Lieutenant Commander Edward Smyth Osbourne served in the following ships: *Cambrian, Lee* and Arab, tb No 1, in command, *Diana, Lord Nelson*, and *Vivid*. He took part in the battle of the Bight of Heligoland in August, 1914, and in the battle of the Falkland Isles on November 9, 1914.

Lieutenant Commander John Cyril F Borrett, youngest son of Major General H G Borrett, CB, was 33 years old. He was appointed to the *Invincible* in August, 1914.

Lieutenant Thomas Frederick Stewart Fleming, aged 22, served in the *Indefatigable* in 1911-13, afterwards in the *Flying Fish*, *Vigilant*, *Brisk* and *Active*.

HMS Indefatigable

Captain Charles F Sowerby was from 1908 to 1912 Naval Attache at Washington. He attained the rank of captain in 1905.

Commander Henry Ernest Digby Hugh Willoughby, nephew of Lord Middleton, was flag-lieutenant to Admiral Sir Hugo Pearson, and subsequently to Admiral Sir Wilmot Fawkes. His youngest brother. Captain Godfrey Willoughby, of the 9th Rifle Brigade, fell in Flanders on August 9, 1915.



Lieutenant Commander John Skinner Wilson, died on 31 May 1916.

He is remembered on Plymouth Naval Memorial.



Engineer Commander Hubert Joseph Clegg, was the son of Stephen Robert Clegg, and Jane Clegg, of Portsmouth, and was married to Clara Elizabeth Clegg.

He died on 31 May 1916, age 45, and is remembered on Plymouth Naval Memorial.

Surgeon Alexander Morison, killed on board the *Indefatigable*, was one of Scotland's foremost footballers. He played for Watson's College for six years, and is the sixth member of this team who has fallen in the country's service.



Lieutenant Claude de Mentville Lucas, aged 23, was the youngest son of the late Lieutenant Colonel Lucas, of Dunchidrock House, Exeter.

He became a lieutenant in July 1915.

Lieutenant Henry George Stobart Laing, aged 25, was grandson of Sir James Laing, of Etal Manor, Northumberland, and Sunderland, the eminent shipbuilder. He passed out of Dartmouth as Chief Cadet, receiving the King's Gold Medal and Dirk, presented by the Admiralty.

Chaplain and Naval Instructor the Reverend Guy Abbott Browning, educated at Dulwich College, he was a Scholar of St John's College, Cambridge, and a Wrangler in 1900.



HMS Defence

Rear Admiral Sir Robert Keith Arbuthnot, Bt, CB, MVO, eldest son of Sir William Wedderburn Arbuthnot, third baronet, served in the Naval Intelligence Department.

He was severely injured in a serious gun accident on board HMS *Royal Sovereign* off Platea in November, 1901. In 1909 he was appointed captain of HMS *Lord Nelson* and flag captain to Rear Admiral C J Briggs.

Sir Robert was a well-known motor-cyclist, and had a record unequalled among amateurs.



Lieutenant Roderick Charles Alister Gow was the youngest son of the Headmaster of Westminster.



Chaplain The Reverend Wallace Mackenzie le Patourel, MA, was the son of Messurier and Elizabeth le Patourel, of Guernsey. He was married to Eva Beatrix le Patourel, of High Chimneys, Hurst, Berks. He died on 31 May 1916, age 51. He is remembered on Plymouth Naval Memorial.

Commander Arthur E Silvertop, was specially promoted to lieutenant for services in the Philippine Islands in February, 1889. He was appointed commander of the *Vernon* for wireless duties in 1911.

Engineer Commander Edward Meeson, DSO, was 38. In the *Laurel* he took his part at the battle of Heligoland Bight so satisfactorily that he was promoted to commander and was made a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order. He was present at the sinking of the Blucher and at the evacuation of both Anzac and Cape Helles.

Lieutenant Commander the Hon Hugh C R Fielding, RN, second son of the Earl and Countess of Denbigh, had been torpedo officer of the *Defence* for three-and-ahalf years, and for the last few months had been first lieutenant. He was awarded several prizes and distinctions.

Lieutenant C H Abercrombie was famous both as a cricketer and as a Rugby football player. A splendid forward, he played for Scotland against England and Ireland in 1910, and against Wales and France in 1911.

HMS Black Prince

Captain Thomas H P Bonham, RN, became staff officer of the *Vernon*, the torpedo schoolship, in 1901. He commanded a Minelayer Squadron from 1912 to 1914, in February of which year he was appointed Inspecting Captain of Minesweeping Vessels.



Engineer Commander George Edward Allan Crichton, died on 31 May 1916.

He is remembered on Portsmouth Naval Memorial.



Lieutenant Robert Irvine Faulkner, was the son of Dr Charles Irvine Faulkner and Alice Faulkner, of 26 Earls Road, Tunbridge Wells, Kent.

He died on 31 May 1916, age 28, and is remembered on Portsmouth Naval Memorial.

Commander John Beauchamp Waterlow, DSO, grandson of the late Sir Sydney Waterlow, Bt, was three times mentioned in despatches for services rendered in connection with the landing of troops at Gallipoli. He received the DSO for minesweeping operations in the Dardanelles.

Lieutenant Robert C Chichester, third son of the late Rear Admiral Sir Edward Chichester, Bt, CB, and brother of Sir Edward Chichester, served in HMS *Indefatigable* and torpedo-boat destroyers.

HMS Shark



Commander Loftus W Jones, who, with one leg shot away, served his last gun to the end, was the second son of Admiral Loftus Jones and great-nephew of Admiral Sir Lewis Jones.

He served with distinction in the fight in the Bight of Heligoland on August 28, 1914.

Two of his brothers are in the Navy.

HMS Tipperary



Captain Charles John Wintour was appointed in command of a division of destroyers in July, 1906, and had served with them ever since.

He was leading the flotilla in the *Tipperary* when she was sunk on May 31.

HMS Nestor



Commander the Hon E B S Bingham was the third son of Lord Clanmorris.

As second lieutenant he took part in Admiral Sturdee's action off the Falkland Isles in December, 1914.

HMS Turbulent



Lieutenant Commander Dudley Stuart, was born at Bromley, Kent in 1884.

He was the second son of Commander Dudley C Stuart, RN, and Amy Stuart, of Mountford, Isle of Bute.

He died on 1 June 1916, age 32.

He is remembered on Portsmouth Naval Memorial.

HMS Chester




Chaplain The Reverend Cyril Ambrose Walton, MA, was the son of Thomas Isaak Walton, and Barbara Walton, of Ickleford Rectory, Herts.

He was married to May Walton, of The School House, Old Town, Clapham, London.

He died on 31 May 1916, age 39, and is remembered on Chatham Naval Memorial.

HMS Nomad



Below are extracts from a cheerful letter, written from a German naval hospital on 8 June.

Whitfield gives a lively account of the ship's last hours. He concludes by taking issue with his captors' version of events.



'They would have me believe that nearly our whole Navy has gone, and they don't like me one bit when I tell them I don't believe them'.

Our misfortune lay in getting a shell from one of their Light Cruisers clean through a Main Steam pipe, killing instantly the Engineer officer and I think a leading stoker. At the same time from two boilers came the report that they could not get water.

We then shut off burners from the Upper Deck, engaging the enemy meanwhile. The ship finally stopped, though steam continued to pour from the Engine Room. With the snip stopped bad luck had it that the only gun that would bear was the after one, and that couldn't be fought owing to the steam from the ER obliterating everything. Several of our destroyers passed close, but I did not signal to them for assistance as I saw they were all wanted and busy.

I then noticed that we had started to list to Port considerably, and so I thought that rather than let the torpedoes go down with the Ship, and before the list became too bad, I would give them a run for their money, and fired all four at the enemy's battle-ships who were on the Starboard beam. I think they were of the Kaiser class, and if any were hit at about 3.0 p.m. GMT I put a claim in.

Having no one within our gun range, we set to work putting small fires out etc., and I also prepared for being towed, in case a friendly destroyer came along. Just about this time the 1st High Sea Fleet spotted us, and started a "Battle Practice" at us with 6" or bigger guns. Salvo after salvo shook us, and wounded a few. The Ship sinking fast, I gave the order to abandon her and pull clear, and about 3 minutes after, she went down vertically by the stern.

Three German Torpedo Boats picked us up.

It was grand practice for them, but murder for us, and so exasperating as we could not hit back. The officers and crew behaved splendidly, and while waiting for "the end", or my order to abandon they might have been having their usual forenoon stand easy, to look at them.

I cannot find out the names or numbers of our casualties because all my officers and men except the wounded have gone to some prison camp. The following I am sure of:

Killed

Engineering Lieutenant Commander W Benoy Able Seaman W Read Able Seaman J Wiles Stoker or Leading Stoker ?

Wounded

Myself Engine Room Artificer Wallin Petty Officer Able Seaman R Amey Able Seaman J Walker

With my usual luck, I met three different salvoes and am wounded as follows.

Upper and lower lips torn to pieces (since sown together). Three teeth removed. shrapnel hole through the throat - each hole about the size of a 4/- piece. Splinter hole in the right forearm And right ear cut. Shot or splinter hole in the right chest. Left hand burned - now fit for duty.

This is just a rough description of the last of the Nomad, and I nearly cried as she went down.

I am longing to hear our losses - they would have me believe that nearly our whole Navy has gone, and they don't like me one bit when I tell them I don't believe them. I expect to be here 3 or 4 weeks yet.

Hoping you and the flotilla are all going strong and asking you to excuse this handwriting, paper etc.

Yours sincerely

Paul Whitfield

Unknown Ship



Commander Chiosuke Shimomura

Appendix to Sir John Jellicoe's Report

The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons were almost continuously in touch with the battle cruisers, one or both squadrons being usually ahead. In this position they were of great value. They very effectively protected the head of our line from torpedo

attack by light cruisers or destroyers, and were prompt in helping to regain touch when the enemy's line was temporarily lost sight of. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was at the rear of our battle line during the night, and at 9 p.m. assisted to repel a destroyer attack on the 5th Battle Squadron. They were also heavily engaged at 10.20 p.m. with five enemy cruisers or light cruisers, *Southampton* and *Dublin* (Captain Albert C Scott) suffering severe casualties during an action lasting about 15 minutes. *Birmingham* (Captain Arthur A M Duff), at 11.30 p.m., sighted two or more heavy ships steering South. A report of this was received by me at 11.40 p.m. as steering WSW. They were thought at the time to be battle cruisers, but it is since considered that they were probably battleships.

* * * *

It is impossible to give a definite statement of the losses inflicted on the enemy. The visibility was for the most part low and fluctuating, and caution forbade me to close the range too much with my inferior force.

A review of all the reports which I have received leads me to conclude that the enemy's losses were considerably greater than those which we had sustained, in spite of their superiority, and included battleships, battle cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers.

This is eloquent testimony to the very high standard of gunnery and torpedo efficiency of His Majesty's Ships. The control and drill remained undisturbed throughout, in many cases despite heavy damage to material and personnel. Our superiority over the enemy in this respect was very marked, their efficiency becoming rapidly reduced under punishment, while ours was maintained throughout.

As was to be expected, the behaviour of the ships' companies under the terrible conditions of a modern sea battle was magnificent without exception. The strain on their morale was a severe test of discipline and training. Officers and men were imbued with one thought, the desire to defeat the enemy. The fortitude of the wounded was admirable.



A report from the Commanding Officer of *Chester* gives a splendid instance of devotion to duty. Boy (1st class) John Travers Cornwall, of *Chester*, was mortally wounded early in the action.

He nevertheless remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded all round him.

His age was under 16 years.

I regret that he has since died, but I recommend his case for special recognition in justice to his memory, and as an acknowledgment of the high example set by him.

In such a conflict as raged continuously for five hours it was inevitable that we should suffer severe losses. It was necessary to maintain touch with greatly superior forces in fluctuating visibility, often very low. We lost *Invincible*, *Indefatigable* and *Queen Mary*, from which ships there were few survivors. The casualties in other ships were heavy, and I wish to express my deepest regret at the loss of so many gallant comrades, officers and men. They died gloriously.

Exceptional skill was displayed by the Medical Officers of the Fleet. They performed operations and tended the wounded under conditions of extreme difficulty. In some cases their staff was seriously depleted by casualties, and the inevitable lack of such essentials as adequate light, hot water, &c. in ships damaged by shell fire tried their skill, resource and physical endurance to the utmost.

As usual, the Engine Room Departments of all ships displayed the highest qualities of technical skill, discipline and endurance. High speed is a primary factor in the tactics of the squadrons under my command, and the Engine Room Departments never fail.

I have already made mention of the brilliant support afforded me by Rear Admiral H Evan-Thomas, MVO, and the 5th Battle Squadron, and of the magnificent manner in which Rear Admiral Hon H L A Hood, CB, MVO, DSO, brought his squadron into action. I desire to record my great regret at his loss, which is a national misfortune. I would now bring to your notice the able support rendered to me by Rear Admiral W C Pakenham, CB, and Rear Admiral O de B Brock, CB. In the course of my report I have expressed my appreciation of the good work performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively of Rear Admiral T D W Napier, MVO, Commodore W E Goodenough, MVO, and Commodore E S Alexander-Sinclair, MVO. On every occasion these officers anticipated my wishes, and used their forces to the best possible effect.

I desire also to bring to your notice the skill with which their respective ships were handled by the Commanding Officers. With such Flag Officers, Commodores and Captains to support me my task was lightened.

The destroyers of the 1st and 13th Flotillas were handled by their respective Commanding Officers with skill, dash, and courage. I desire to record my very great regret at the loss of Captains C F Sowerby (*Indefatigable*), C I Prowse (*Queen Mary*), and A L Cay (*Invincible*), all officers of the highest attainments, who can be ill spared at this time of stress.

I wish to endorse the report of the Rear Admiral Commanding the 5th Battle Squadron as to the ability displayed by the Commanding Officers of his squadron.

In conclusion, I desire to record and bring to your notice the great assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain R W Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag Commander, Hon R A R Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy's discomfiture; my Secretary, F T Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly

before me; my Flag Lieutenant, Commander R F Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under the most difficult circumstances, despite the fact that his signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these Officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manoeuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire.

In accordance with your wishes, I am forwarding in a separate letter a full list of Officers and Men whom I wish to recommend to your notice.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

David Beatty,

Vice Admiral. The Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet.

Sir John Jellicoe on the Battle

By John Leyland, author of *The Royal Navy: Its Influence in English (sic) History and the Growth of Empire.* Editor of Brassey's *Naval Annual.*

The despatch addressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet to the Admiralty, describing the great naval engagement in May off the Jutland Bank, is a document of many merits. It is simple and direct, setting forth the circumstances in the manner of the sea, and telling the story with a clarity and dignity which will enable those who read it with care and insight to understand the general development of the action. Nothing is exaggerated and nothing extenuated. Possibly the tale is but half told, but the enemy will glean nothing to his advantage from what Sir John Jellicoe has said, and that was, of course, a right and reasonable object in the writing and publishing of the despatch. The Commander-in-Chief is full of admiration for the gallant services of his officers and men of every rank and rating. He pays a noble tribute to those who laid down their lives for their country in the battle, he speaks of the fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination and correct strategic insight of Sir David Beatty, and of other flag officers he speaks in high terms also. He denies neither gallantry nor skill to the enemy. He claims no glorious victory, but, on the other hand, he is .satisfied that the adversary has suffered very heavily in the battle.

The best thing one can do here is to endeavour to discover the leading features of the battle, both strategically and tactically. We are presented, in the first place, with a division of the Fleet, which, however, a "competent authority" whose views have been promulgated, has been careful to point out was apparent and not real. We may regard it as a strategic division of forces of which the object was to bring the enemy to action in circumstances advantageous to ourselves, and, as the same "authority" remarks, the risk run would be measured mainly by the skill with which Admiral Beatty could entice the enemy northward without himself being overwhelmed by superior force.

Following the Best Traditions

Nothing unsatisfactory can be concluded from a mere division of naval forces, unless it can be shown that some disaster or misfortune has followed. St Vincent divided his forces off Cadiz, when he sent Nelson into the Mediterranean and gave us the victory of the Nile. Cornwallis divided his fleet off Brest, with results that enabled Calder to encounter Villeneuve on July 22, 1805, in an action which was not, unfortunately, as conclusive as the nation hoped it would be. Because Howe did not attack d'Estaign when the latter arrived in great force off Sandy Hook in July, 1778, we must not say that Sir David Beatty ought not to have attacked Admiral Hipper in the Jutland Bank battle. We have Sir John Jellicoe's word for it that the course pursued was unavoidable, as "had our battle-cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward, the main fleets of the enemy would never have been in contact". On the other hand, the official chart certainly shows that the Germans turned northward again at about 4.52 p.m., when their battle-fleet was coming up from the South-East, and stood on a northerly course until about 6 p.m. But here we must leave the subject of the division and co-operation of the Fleet. Obviously this aspect of the action cannot be treated with advantage in this place.

The action was brought about by the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, which directed one of those periodical sweeps through the North Sea, which have been a part of general policy, and Sir David Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet, supported by the Fifth Battle Squadron (Rear Admiral H Evan-Thomas), which consisted of four 24knot Queen Elizabeths, was the advanced or observation force. It is worthy of remark that the German Admiralty report transmitted to the Associated Press of America, states that the High Sea Fleet, consisting of three battle squadrons, with five battle-cruisers, a large number of small cruisers, and several destroyer flotillas, was cruising off the Skagerak "with the purpose, as on earlier occasions, of offering battle to the British Fleet." David Beatty says that the opposing battle squadrons commenced action at a range of 18,500 yards at 3.48 p.m., "opening fire practically simultaneously". We may therefore say with certainty that there was no reluctance to engage on either side. Perhaps both were "spoiling for a fight". We may well believe, however, that the Germans did not wish to feel the full weight of Sir John Jellicoe's blow. Probably their "enterprise towards the North" was made with the object of encountering Sir David Beatty alone. The latter was unfortunately unaware of the approach of the enemy's battle fleet until his own light cruiser, the Southampton, signalled their approach. No patrolling vessel or independent flotilla appears to have sighted them, or the Vice Admiral would not have been left uninformed.

HMS Queen Mary's Fate

The battle took the form of a parallel action, as in the old wars, that is to say that the main battle-cruiser fleets were each in single line ahead, engaging one another. The Fifth Battle Squadron did not come into action until 20 minutes after the battle was engaged, opening fire at 20,000 yards. At the beginning of the battle the German fire seems to have been very accurate, but our fire soon dominated it, and the enemy's fire grew weaker and less accurate. It appears to have been within the first six minutes of the battle that the *Queen Mary* was blown up and torn asunder by a thunderous explosion, which sent that magnificent battle-cruiser instantly to the bottom. Upon the causes of this disaster the despatch throws no light, nor upon the

precise phase of the operations in which it occurred. Sir John Jeliicoe is content to give a list of the ships lost.

Now developed a very gallant enterprise in the battle, in which eight destroyers of the 15th Flotilla, with some others, were ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes. This happened at 4.15 p.m., and the enemy's destroyers seem to have had a similar enterprise in hand. Sir David Beatty's despatch recounts the gallant story, which, as he says, indicated the spirit pervading his Majesty's Navy, the action being worthy of its highest traditions. Some of these destroyers came under the heavy fire of the enemy's big ships at close quarters. The use of destroyers for attacking fleets in daylight seems to be a new feature of naval warfare. So far as the writer's knowledge goes. It has not been practised in manoeuvres. The intrepid character of our young officers is beyond all praise, though unfortunately Sir David Beatty is unable to say definitely that their attack was effective the real chance of the destroyers came when the night fell.

Even while the destroyers were attacking the battle-cruisers' fight grew in intensity. The direction was still to the southward, the two fleets parallel, and the four *Queen Elizabeths* of the Fifth Battle Squadron were pouring at long range a destructive fire on the rear of the enemy's battle-cruiser line.

The first great phase of the action ended at 4.42 p.m. when the German Rattle Fleet was sighted ahead. It had been a double phase - the first fight of the battle-cruisers and the brilliant destroyer attack, followed by the entry of battleships into action. But, when the main body of the German High Sea Fleet was discerned approaching at high speed from the south-east, Sir David Realty turned his Fleet 16 points, reversing his course, and his four battleships came up astern. Admiral Hipper conformed to his new disposition, also altering course 16 points. It is worthy of remark that in this movement the two Fleets turned outward from one another, thus temporarily increasing the range, which is in accordance with tactical wisdom, because ships may become "straddled" - that is, come end-on to the enemy - with guns unable to bear as they are on the turn, the operation may therefore become rather critical.

We now see the opposing Fleets still opposing one another - in parallel lines, but with the course directed to the north-west. Sir David Beatty was leading on the Germans towards our own Grand Fleet. The fresh elements in the battle were the accession of new forces. The main body of the German Fleet was coming up at high speed to get into action astern of the battle-cruisers, and possibly Admiral Hipper did not use his best speed in order that he might assist in this operation. Sir John Jellicoe's Battle Fleet was coming down from the north at the highest possible speed. A decisive phase of the battle was approaching. The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under command of that splendid officer Rear Admiral the Hon Horace Hood, which had been with the flag, was sent on ahead.

Meantime, Sir David Beatty was standing on a north-westward course at high speed, and evidently getting ahead of the Germans. Visibility was not good for us, and the range was reduced, but, though our ships were silhouetted against a clear western sky, the enemy received very severe punishment, as the despatch records. The position of the Germans was now becoming dangerous. The .Admiral was getting ahead of them, and at about 5.30 p.m. he altered course to the east of north, the Germans edging away to the east also. Sir David Beatty was endeavouring to "cross their T" - that is, to steam eastward across the head of their line. They had evidently suffered very heavily, and in order to escape disaster the three German battle-cruisers which were still visible turned in a wide sweep from east to south. The eastward turn was made at about 6 o'clock, and an hour later the enemy was in flight. He had gone too far north for safety. Much damage had been received by both sides, but the advantage was all with us. Admiral Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had taken station ahead of Sir David Beatty and was in action with the enemy at the short range of 8,000 yards. Hood, whose action was "worthy of his great naval ancestors", fought magnificently, and it was very sad that he was lost to us in the sinking of the *Invincible*.

Now we may turn to the direct intervention of Sir John Jellicoe, who handled his Fleet in a most masterly manner. The sounds of the battle were audible to him as he approached, and flashes became visible just before 6 o'clock ahead of him. At this time the Battle Cruiser Squadrons were going eastward across his front. But the situation was very difficult, because for some time the actual position of the enemy could not be known, and our own battle-cruisers were between the Grand Fleet and the Germans. There was a danger of friends being mistaken for enemies in the misty weather, but at about 6.15 the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet was made out, and at the same time Sir Robert Arbuthnot's Cruiser Squadron, fighting most gallantly, came unwittingly near the German big ships, and that brave officer and several of his ships were lost in a magnificent struggle.

The First Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet, commanded by Sir Cecil Burney, opened fire at 6.17 against the enemy's battleships, which by this time were within range, and the *Marlborough*, his flagship, did great execution, even when she had been hit by a torpedo, and had a considerable list. Her fire was "particularly rapid and effective". The enemy seems now to have been in some disarray, and his object was not to engage but to escape. Sir John Jellicoe's south-westward sweep was a splendid operation which brought, first on the enemy's bow and then on his quarter, overwhelming force to bear. Constantly the Germans turned away, seeking shelter behind smoke screens, the ranges being from 9,000 to 12,000 yards; and so the action continued until 8.20 p.m. The Fourth Battle Squadron, in which was Sir John Jellicoe's flagship, the *Iron Duke*, did most effective work, beginning her hits on a ship of the *Koenig* class at the second salvo. This demonstrated splendid gunnery organisation.

Although the Grand Fleet remained in proximity to the scene of battle and on the line of German retirement until 11 a.m. on June 1, the Commander-in-Chief was compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned to port.

Makers of Our Modern Navy

What the Empire Owes to Lord Fisher

Come, tumble up, Lord Nelson, the British Fleet's a looming! Come, show a leg, Lord Nelson, the guns they are a booming! 'Tis a longish line of battle - such as we did never see; An' 'tis not the same old round-shot as was fired by you and me!

- Dudley Clark

This country owes a great deal to the men who gave us the modern Fleet - the all big gun Fleet of the Dreadnoughts, Bellerophons, St Vincents, Neptunes, Orions, King George Vs, Iron Dukes, Queen Elizabeths, and Royal Sovereigns. Marvellous has been the transformation effected since the Dreadnought was laid down. She was the proudest ship of her day, the embodiment of speed and power, and she is famous still, because every subsequent and more powerful ship has carried further the principle which the Dreadnought represented.

The Grand Fleet is a magnificently equipped and perfectly poised instrument of war, complete in every class of ship, vessel and auxiliary and repair ship, owing its character and readiness to the vast reform which Lord Fisher drove through, and to an organisation which those who came after him carried further under the tutelage of experience and events. The great principle, which found us ready in August, 1914, and readier still on May 31st, 1916, was that every ship in the fighting line should always be ready for sea. Everything that was useless was cut off. A battleship not strong enough to take her place in the line of battle was useless. So with the requirements in other classes of ships.

This was the kind of economy that has given us our present strength. Crews locked up in old ships on distant stations were released and used in the new ships. The Fleet had been distributed according to the traditions of the Napoleonic wars, but strength gradually grew, and the front was changed from the Channel to the North Sea. The old Fleet Reserves were done away with, and ships not in full commission were provided with nucleus crews, consisting of specialist officers and higher trained expert ratings of the men. An immense deal is due to the officers of these ships who, in difficult circumstances, kept everything in readiness for mobilisation. No longer were ships in the charge of "care and maintenance parties" ready to break down whenever they went to sea. Hand in hand with all this went on the gradual reorganisation of the Fleet in Squadrons and Fleets, developing the great system which is embodied fully in the Grand Fleet. Battleships were given repairing facilities on board, repair ships accompanied the Fleet, new bases grew up on the East Coast, and have now almost reached maturity. Submarines began to be built also, and the mine-trawling fleet was called into existence.

The Dreadnoughts constituted the strength of these organisations, and they it was that struck the mighty hammer blows. No modern battleships before the Dreadnought ever carried more than four of the biggest guns. The Lord Nelson and Agamemnon foreshadowed the advance by mounting in addition ten 9.2 in. guns, but the Dreadnought was the first of all big gun ships. This was her outstanding feature -

her great gun-power, combined with high speed, and a relatively small displacement, and not her great size and cost. Speed was required to enable ships of this class to reach the scene of action, as when Sir John Jellicoe came down and dismayed the German Fleet. Our Dreadnoughts are magnificent vessels of enormous gun-power - 13-in., I3.5-in., and 15-in. in successive classes, and of high sea speed, the Queen Elizabeths being good for 24 knots. The supreme courage with which Lord Fisher adopted the turbine in the original Dreadnought, giving lighter weights and greater space for internal construction, was a great factor in this development which gave us such advantage in the Jutland Battle.

All honour then to Lord Fisher, First Sea Lord from October, 1904, to January, 1910, the far-sighted maker of the modern Fleet, where high courage and indomitable will and power were manifested in this vast re-organisation, and in much more. "Instant readiness for war" had been his watchword. After him came Sir Arthur Wilson, the great tactician and embodiment of the "silent Navy". Sir Francis Bridgeman and Prince Louis of Battenberg, who was First Sea Lord when the mobilisation took place for the war, and then again came Lord Fisher, in October, 1914, full of fresh ideas, imparting new vigour to everything he touched, and unrelenting in his pursuit of the things that make for victory in war. Sir Henry Jackson now holds his place.



Reading from left to right the above makers of our modern Navy, in succession to Lord Fisher, are Admiral Sir A K Wilson, First Sea Lord, 1909-11; Admiral Sir F Bridgeman-Bridgeman, First Sea Lord, 1911-12; Admiral HRH Prince Louis of Battenberg, First Sea Lord, 1912-14; Right Hon Winston Churchill, First Sea Lord, 1911-15; Admiral Sir Henry Bradwardine Jackson, First Sea Lord since 1915; Right Hon A J Balfour, First Lord since 1915.

A Brilliant British Victory

Sir David Beatty's Consummate Skill

By Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, GCB

The British Grand Fleet put to sea on one of its periodical "sweeping" cruises; the German High Sea Fleet also put to sea; the two forces met, and a battle ensued. All this is quite plain, and leaves no room for doubt or controversy. If we study the reports we shall see that doubt can only arise or controversy be reasonable when details are concerned.

Examination of the proceedings, on May 31 last, will lead up to an appreciation of the facts. The first fact that discloses itself is that our Fleet was so distributed that, if the enemy were to put to sea, he would be surely fallen in with, and would be enticed into joining battle. Had our whole force been kept together it would have been reasonable to expect that the enemy would shun an engagement with so powerful a fleet, and that no battle would have taken place.


Why the Fleets separated

Sir David Beatty was far enough from Sir John Jellicoe's main body to encourage the enemy in the belief that he might be attacked on terms favourable to our opponents; and yet Sir David was not so far away from that main body that he could not by skilful manoeuvring draw the hostile fleet to the spot where it was desirable to get it; in fact, into the arms of Sir John Jellicoe. This could only be done by fighting; by bringing on an action which, when once started, the enemy could not venture to break off except at a great disadvantage to himself.

Excellent Tactics

Much has been said, and most deservedly, of Sir David Beatty's splendid gallantry in hastening to fight his enemy as soon as he sighted him. The procedure deserves even higher praise. It was a tactical movement of singular excellence. It repeated the method of Nelson, viz., not letting an enemy, once sighted, get away without a battle. Sir David had to fight in a particular way, so that the enemy might reduce and not increase the distance between him and Sir John Jellicoe's battleships. That he did this admits of no dispute. It gave the note on which the whole battle was fought. Had the weather been perfectly clear and the light good, it would have been highly commendable; in the shifting and varying mists of the North Sea it was strikingly, almost wonderfully, skilful.

An obvious desideratum on our side was to interpose our force between the enemy's and his bases. This must have been as well known to the enemy as it was to our own people; and it hardly admits of doubt that he tried to prevent it. He did not succeed in preventing it. Sir John Jellicoe grasped the situation at once, and got, so to speak, on the enemy's inner side.



Innumerable Small Battles

Firing Broadsides

Owing to the misty weather, which hid the enemy's movements, this operation was extremely difficult, and its successful execution should bring lasting credit to the Commander-in-Chief. It rendered it possible for the engagement to become general; the battleships of the Grand Fleet being in action for rather more than two hours. There were also innumerable other actions going on. Our light cruisers and destroyers fought with gallantry that might be called reckless had it not been governed by sound tactical conceptions and a knowledge of what was best to be done. Where all showed such dazzling courage it is not easy to particularise; but every true British heart will be stirred by the memory of the devoted gallantry of the officers and men of our destroyers. In both Sir David Beatty's command and the Main Fleet the superiority of the British gunnery was reported, and seems to have been established by the results. The reports speak in the highest terms of the admirable efficiency of the engineer officers and the engine-room complements. Here, as at the Falkland Islands, they did all that men could do.

Unquestionable British Victory

The enemy, favoured by the imperfect visibility of a misty evening, and then by darkness, was able - though after heavy losses - to get back in a battered condition to his ports. Our losses also were heavy, and we have to lament many brilliant and gallant officers and men. No great victory over a well-equipped and determined enemy can be won without considerable losses. Our recent losses appeared exceptionally great, because ships were sunk and whole crews perished with them This is a result of the armament and naval material of the day, and of the fact that navies have not had long experience of their use. In the great naval conflicts of the seventeenth century - in the infancy of the then naval material - battles were not thought indecisive or victories denied because ships had been lost on either side. The battle of May 31st, 1916, was one of the greatest and also one of the most decisive ever fought. Tactically and strategically we won a victory finer than many of those of which we have long been justly proud.


Submarines and Destroyers

Their Part in the Epic of Jutland

What part did the submarine play in the battle of May 31st? This question is more easily asked than answered. We may say with certainty that on our side the submarine was not employed at all, unless it may have been in what we may call the fringes of the battle. That the Germans had some submarines at work we know, because at least one of them was destroyed by being rammed.

Undersea Attacks

Submarines had assisted in previous engagements, having put in an appearance both at the Heligoland Bight, August 28th, 1914, and the Dogger Bank, January 24th, 1915. One correspondent said of the recent battle that there appeared to be "a lot of German submarines, and they seemed to be very busy, but my impression is that a good many of them were done for by our ships running over them". That the *Marlborough* was injured by a torpedo we know.



Bold Submariners

The word "Fear" is not in the vocabulary of submarine officers and men. What they will dare in passing through mine-fields and in other perilous situations is enough to take the breath of the ordinary man. Our submarine officers have developed extraordinary skill, and we cannot deny the same to the enemy.

It must be admitted that it is not always easy to discover the true cause of the loss of each individual ship. The *Queen Mary* blew up with appalling suddenness, and the disaster has been ascribed by various witnesses to the action of the guns, and of submarines, mines, and Zeppelins and seaplanes dropping bombs. Similar doubt appears to exist in regard to the sinking of the *Invincible* and other ships, and even where statements are made with confidence, except in regard to damage caused by shells, some doubt may still remain.

Super Submarines

The Germans have unquestionably intended to use submarines in Fleet actions. They hoped that the submarine might enable them to pick off some of our ships and so reduce the large balance against them. The Americans have built two experimental submarines, intended to have a surface speed of 25 knots, and to accompany the fleet at sea, and the Germans have been working with the same idea; but 25 knots is not enough to enable submarines to keep up with modern fleets in action. We have heard of super-submarines of 2,000 tons and more, with high

surface and submerged speed, and carrying large supplies of torpedoes, besides having armoured conning-towers and upper works, and being specially strengthened against the effect of ramming. Whether such boats were in action we do not know. It is, perhaps, doubtful. Apparently they are intended to be to the ordinary submarine what the Fokker was to the ordinary aeroplane - immensely superior for special short range work.

Destroyers

Some time since, we were assured by Mr Churchill that the days of the destroyer were numbered, and that new submarines and light cruisers would take over all or most of their duties. These forecasts have not been justified, for the big destroyer is more valuable than ever she was, and probably some of the destruction attributed to the submarine may actually have been due to the destroyer.

We had several flotillas of destroyers at work. One was composed of the newer "N" class, including the *Nomad* and *Nestor*, and the other of the "K" class, with the *Tipperary* as leader, and including the *Acasta*, *Ardent*, *Fortune*, *Porpoise*, *Shark* and *Sparrowhawk*. Our destroyers were at close grips with the enemy, both parrying blows aimed at the big ships and striking blows themselves.

Thrilling Adventures of the Shark

The brilliant skill and proficiency of their young officers and the indomitable pluck of their men were admirable, and when they had, it is said, prevented the German destroyers from getting their torpedoes "home" in the flanks of British ships, they drove down on the enemy's line and covered themselves with renown. The plucky dash of the *Shark* will live in history. She raced down between two lines of German destroyers, discharging torpedoes right and left at close range, sinking a couple of enemy destroyers, and then herself being sunk. Destroyers of this class are magnificent vessels of nearly 1,000 tons and over 30 knots, with engines of over 24,000 horsepower, and each carries three 4in. guns.

The submarine has not all these advantages, destructive as she can prove herself. Engines of 2,500 horsepower compare ill with the 25,000 horsepower of modern destroyers. Twenty-five knots on the surface, requiring, perhaps, 12,000 horsepower, is a speed probably not yet reached - 20 knots may be a maximum and the utmost submerged speed may be about 16 knots. They do not carry such large torpedoes as the destroyer, and their guns are much less powerful. Being built for submerged duties their guns have not the same command as those of destroyers.

In Praise of our Seamen

By one who knows them well

The men who fought so nobly for the Empire in the great battle at sea were as good men as Britain ever bore. On that tremendous day, amid the thunders of the battle, when Death was on the wing and speeding unseen through the deeps, not one of them quailed, and the sense of failure was not in the heart of any among them. As was said of some of the youngest, they "never turned a hair". They were staunch and true as in the greatest days of the Navy of wood and hemp and canvas. They excelled, indeed, any of their foregoers in the business of the sea, for never was there battle comparable to that of the eventful 31st of May.

Jellicoe's Praise

Sir John Jellicoe has never lost an opportunity of paying tribute to the magnificent qualities of his seamen. They are models of all that seamen should be, and the country they have so well defended will never cease to be grateful for their services nor suffer to be forgotten the deeds of the thousands among them who died in Britain's cause. This was not the first battle in which they had engaged. Had they not been lighting ever since the War began? Some there were who had fought in the Heligoland Bight, some at the Dogger Bank, others at the Falkland Isles, and some in the Dardanelles, but all save the youngest in their company had fought through two winters in the icy grip of the North Sea, in the tremendous tumult of the waves and in the pitiless blast of the storm. No man who has not been with them can tell what that service has been.

If we render justice here to these splendid seamen we still in thought and meaning exclude none of their fellowship, whether the men have served on deck or in the gun positions or in the engine-room, in big ships or little, in fleets or flotillas, in the actual battle or in mine-sweepers or patrol vessels, or in any other class or description of craft which has been doing the business of Britain at sea. They are men of whom the country cannot be too proud, nor can it value them too much.

A Naval Inferno

No inferno has ever even suggested the horrors of a modern battle at sea. "It was hell", said many. "Think of forty thunderstorms rolled into one", said one brave fellow, in a vain attempt to enable others to visualize his own experiences. White-hot masses of steel hurtling through the air, to work destruction wherever they hit or fell, deadly hails of shrapnel, clouds of smoke and flame and dust and steam, the deafening crash and clatter of it all, the shell or torpedo that found some vital spot and sent a thousand men to instant doom - these were the features of a fight that no man can describe.

But with splendid resolution and as coolly and calmly and accurately as if in exercises of peace the seamen-gunners worked their guns. When ships were mortally hit the men went on unflinchingly and dauntlessly still serving their guns. "Everything went just as if we had been at target practice", said one officer. The torpedo-men were as ready and efficient as in any evolution of peace.

An Exhilarating Fight

There was spirit and exhilaration in the sight and fury of the combat, but there were men who never saw the battle. They were the noble fellows, the black squad, who served in the engine-room, and worked like Titans to get every ounce of pressure out of the engines. Think what it was to be in the engine-room of the big ships of the Grand Fleet, when every moment brought wireless news of the conflict in which Beatty was engaged, and the men in the bowels of the ships knew that everything depended upon them to reach the scene of battle in time. These grand fellows laboured unceasingly to keep their ships going at topmost speed, in heat and grime, and never was the engine-room work of the Fleet so magnificently efficient as in this tremendous time. Of these men, numbers of whom perished in the sunken ships, we cannot think too highly.

Hearts of Oak Throughout

What is said here applies to every rank and rating in the Service. The qualities of officers are well known - qualities of high training in every specialisation and duty and of leadership and command. Of these nothing more shall be said in this article, save that the Navy was never better officered than now, and that the captains are a "band of brothers" such as were the pride and the strength of Nelson. The warrant and petty officers of the Fleet in the battle were, and still are, a body of men of superlative character.

Some of the warmest work was in the destroyers, in the night of May 31st and the early dawn of June 1st, when the German Fleet was hastening homeward. As the enemy's ships became visible the boats forged ahead to the attack and came to close quarters. The stories of some of them have been related. One officer thus described his experiences.

Bang - off went one of our torpedoes, and round we turned and gave them two more, and then they saw us, and we had a 'merry hell' for a bit. However, we stuck it, and watched, and then to our joy from one of their ships leaped a huge flame higher than her masts - a terrific explosion, and red-hot fragments leaped sky-high, and after that no sign of her at all.

Such were the situations in which the bluejackets and men of the engine-room complements of the destroyer flotillas worked in the battle.

Long shall the tale be told of the heroism of that day. It shall shine brilliantly in the company of the brightest events in Naval History.

To Beatty's Boys

Were ye Gods, or mere boys. In your chariots of grey. On the storm-trodden way. With your thunderbolt toys And the earth-rending noise Of your play?

As ye drove in swift might Down the battle-wrecked line. Ye were surely divine For a day and a night. In Olympian fight On the brine. As Immortals ye strove At the gun and the wheel, From the tops to the keel. With the plaudits of Jove When your thunderbolts drove Through the steel.

With our grief ocean-deep. And our praise heaven-high. For your messmates who lie In their glorious sleep. We can smile as we weep Our good-bye.

How the Jubilant cheers. That were quenched on their lips As they sank with their ships. Ever ring in our ears! How their glory appears Through eclipse!

- Arthur Waghorne


How the Kaiser Created the German Navy

The Story of a Single Handed Feat of Statecraft

It was truly a magnificent array of ships - the whole High Sea Fleet save, perhaps, some of the older vessels - that steamed out on the 31st of May under Admiral Reinhold von Scheer and his colleague Admiral Hipper, the latter of whom we met before in the Dogger Bank affair.

How comes it, we may well ask, that the greatest military power on earth aspired also to equal dominion with us at sea? It came from the swift growth of Germany's Weltpolitik. From the leaping prosperity which was hers after the humbling of France in 1870 sprang great dreams of world-expansion and the idea that Germany's future lay on the water.

In the old Emperor William's time Germans did not know what their Navy was for. The men of the present Emperor set about to teach them. The Navy law of 1895 was followed by that of 1900. In the year 1890 the German Empire possessed but a few small coast defence battleships. By 1913 her naval tonnage had mounted to 630,000 tons, including Dreadnoughts, both battleships and battle-cruisers, great flotillas of destroyers, and the building of the powerful long-range submarines, which were to be Germany's "trump card" against an island foe acknowledged to be immeasurably hei superior at sea, was beginning. How was this miraculous growth of a great navy brought about? How was a purely military people induced to take interest in a mighty Navy when their only coast line was a hundred miles or so of mud-banks and unapproachable shoals?



Wilhelm the Fleet Maker

The outstanding fact is that they caught their fervour from the visions of their Emperor. But the Emperor was not enough. There would have been no German Navy, as we know it to-day, but for his chosen instrument, Alfred von Tirpitz. From the fertile brain of the future Grand Admiral came a torrent of literature and inspiration of the press which taught the Germans at length what their Navy was to be built lor. Through storm and shine the Kaiser stood by Von Tirpitz. "I will not let them take my Tirpitz from me", he once exclaimed. The Emperor Wilhelm strove also with extraordinary zeal to educate his people in sea-power and all it implied for "Deutschtum". They were none too keen at first, those stolid Germans, fighting shy of colonial dreams and considering an Army of ten million men quite enough to sustain their prestige in the face of an envious world.

But the "All-Highest" set many an agency at work to cure this condition of *Reichsvertrossenheit*, or "fed-upness" with Empire. The German Navy League was founded and von Tirpitz and Admiral von Koester, Chief of the League, proclaimed the new note. "Our future upon the seas!" Also was once said "The Trident must be our fist!" These classic sayings of the Emperor had a pretty obvious meaning, which was further underlined and exposed in the famous " Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe".

A Record Navy Bill

The "Indiscreet Chancellor" harped continually on the fact that the War-Lord wanted his new navy for "offensive purposes"! According to Hohenlohe, the German Staff were thoroughly hostile to Britain as far back as 1890, and Von Tirpitz ten years later brought in his famous Navy Bill with a demand for £200,000,000.

"Germany must have", it was declared, in the famous preamble of the .Act, "a fleet of such strength that a war, *even against the mightiest Naval Power*, would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power". We saw in 1914 how far this calculation went astray. Gradually the federated States were kindled with the vision of a Greater Germany overseas. They must expand, and whosoever got in their way would suffer.

.Already they had vast colonies in East and South-west .Africa. In South America they practised "pacific penetration" so skilfully that immense Brazil was alarmed for her southern provinces of Rio Grande, Santa Catalina and Parana. These magnificent highlands and other regions in the "Empty Continent" were soon marked in red on Berlin maps as "Our Colonies"!

Where the Shoe Pinched

Clearly a great Navy was necessary to protect these and the immense commerce which was growing. It was pointed out that geographically Germany was unfortunately situated. "The whole of our sea-traffic", explained Dr Gerhart Schoott, Director of the Hamburg Naval Observatorv, "has to come out of the small triangle, Ems-Heligoland-Sylt, and 95 per cent, of it goes through the Straits of Dover, which are completely impassable if both shores are hostile. Then in the Mediterranean everything is subject to the rulers of Gibraltar, who control the whole international trade to India, Eastern Asia, East Africa, and Australia. Only at the Dardanelles does British power cease."

So there lay the enemy, and therein lay a crying need for the Fleet. All parties in the Reichstag, including the Socialists, were in time won over. Frankfurt bankers, Westphalian ironmasters and the agrarian interests - all were gradually convinced. Herr Ballin, the shipping Titan of Hamburg, was also enlisted as an apostle of the Kaiser's new naval creed, though he never expected his ships to be captured or interned.

Statecraft's Biggest Scoop

It was the Kaiser who chose all the instruments of his propaganda. "I am leading you on to days of glory" was a typical flourish to his people by the self-styled "Admiral of the Atlantic". Germany's voice must be "authoritative as that of the Roman Empire". And so on, from the Kruger telegram to the Agadir incident in 1911. "Without the consent of Germany nothing must happen in any part of the world." Always the Master's voice, with Von Tirpitz as his mouthpiece in the Reichstag, and Von Koester telling the tale to the common people.

The Vulkan Works at Stettin and Hamburg, the Weser at Bremen, Tecklenborg's at Geestemuende, the Schichau Yards at Elbing and Danzig, Howaldt's, Krupp's, Blohm and Voss's - the whole Empire was now roaring with Thor-hammer clang. We see the result in Dreadnoughts of the *Kaiser* class, in battle-cruisers like the *Hindenburg* and so on, down to submarines of great size, and a petrol range which (the Germans boast) would take them to New York Harbour and home again.

True, the enemy has copied our designs in battleships of each succeeding type, but it were idle to deny that in personnel and material the German navy is a miracle of efficiency and power brought into being at the ruler's bidding, and that during his own reign. There is little space in which to deal with the more dramatic stages, such as the acquisition of Heligoland (our most disastrous blunder), the construction of the Kiel Canal, linking the two seas, and the long and subtle war of wits between Von Tirpitz and Sir John, now Lord, Fisher.

The Fisher-Tirpitz Due


This last episode is stranger than any tale. How, after years of fevered labour and fabulous outlay, the Canal was dug, and then Fisher sprang the Dreadnought type upon the world. By this stroke the Kiel Canal was for years rendered useless for the big ships which were coming. In a flash all nations realised that the new all big-gun monster was the ship of ships. But the Canal was too narrow and too shallow to receive the naval revolution.

Germany saw what had happened, but she set to work with unabated energy to reconstruct her strategic waterway. The sixty-mile stretch became once more a vast workshop, with 1,400 labourers in night and day toil. The reconstruction took over 5 years and cost the Fatherland another £12,000,000. But it was done. And meanwhile the world watched the long race for armaments between Germany and ourselves. We saw our Ministers proposing a mutual halt in the beggar-my-neighbour game. Of course Germany scouted the idea - which never was a practical one - as she scouted the notion of "disarmament" at each conference at The Hague.

In Berlin, Bill after Bill was quietly laid before the Reichstag, backed by the Emperor's plea that "our supreme duty is to strengthen Germany's position". Editors were warned "on patriotic grounds" to refrain from all comment upon Naval budgets, that doubled and trebled and quadrupled to keep pace with preparations. At Court naval officers were favoured ostentatiously, Admiral Prince Henry of Prussia, the Kaiser's brother, leading the way. Chemists, designers of naval ordnance, torpedo specialists - and of course Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin - were all employed in the accomplishment of the task.

A Miracle in Steel


What was the result? The second greatest Navy in the world, worth nearly £400,000,000, and quite admirably manned. And to think that in Queen Victoria's day German warships were almost as scarce as Swiss Admirals, and were mostly built in Britain! Living men remember the time when Germany had no Navy at all, and Prince Adalbert of Prussia published a tentative pamphlet which he styled "A Memorandum concerning the Establishment of a German Navy".



Seyditz badly damaged on 1 June and later sank

What are the odds in Britain's favour in this tremendous matter of sea - power, upon which the fate of our Empire depends? They can only be stated approximately, for the building on both sides has long been wrapped in the fog of war. At the same time German experts like Captain Persius and Count Reventlow warn their people to have no illusions about their chances.

"There is no denying", says the fiery Reventlow, "that Britain is to-day - in spite of her losses - actually stronger at sea than when war broke out." Briefly put, the odds in our favour to-day are in Dreadnought and battle cruisers 70 to 42, in other cruisers 111 to 42, in destroyers and torpedo craft 252 to 178, and in submarines 80 to 30. These figures take no account at all of France's fine Navy, nor Italy's, nor Russia's.



British Superiority

Kaiserin was sunk

In every single type we out-gun the German, just as our Lord Nelsons and King Edwards out-gun the nine *Deutschlands* and *Braunschweigs*. Both sides have acquired ships building for other nations. Thus we took two Dreadnoughts ordered by Turkey; and the *Almirante Latorre*, laid down by Chile (with ten 14in. guns), became the battleship *Canada* of our fleet.

Similarly the Vulkan Company adapted to German uses the Greek *Salamis* which was building at Hamburg, we having first secured her 14in. guns, which were being supplied from America. It takes well over two years to build a capital ship of these types, and Britain's resources - private as well as State - are overwhelmingly superior to our enemy's, even if we add the product of Austrian yards to his output. Our six *Queen Elizabeths* are a matchless homogeneous squadron, oil-driven, of railroad speed, with stupendous wire-wound guns that throw a high explosive shell of 1,950 lb. a distance of twelve miles.

Britain's Balance of Power

But to get full measure of our gun-power as compared with the flower of the German Navy, I select the pick of the Dreadnoughts on both sides, and arrive at the following table.


	British	German
15-in. guns	80	16
14-in. guns	10	3
13.5-in. guns	162	-

In the 12-in. weapon my selected squadrons are pretty evenly matched, and the Germans have 86 11-in. guns - a type we do not carry at all. I have no hesitation in saying that if "The Day" had not degenerated into a cautiously chosen "Afternoon", our enormous preponderance of 13.5 guns would, in Jellicoe's phrase to his friend, have "finished the business".

Authorities like "Brassey" and "Jane" point out the hopelessness of Germany's naval "bid", no matter what her industrial activities (and they have been great) since the war began. For ours have meanwhile been vastly greater, and to our stupendous armada one must add the entire navies of two other first-class Powers.

"Can it be expected", Von Tirpitz (the "Eternal") put to his American interviewer, "that our Fleet - which is only about one-third the size of Britain's - will seize an opportunity unfavourable in the military sense and challenge Jellicoe for mastery of the seas?" Not a bit of it. But there were to be excursions and alarms, torpedo havoc delivered with new "round-the-world" submarines; pounces by fast squadrons, with Zeppelin eyes in the sky to see that Jellicoe was nowhere near. And here and there wily decoys luring our ships into nests of newly-laid mines. But a forthright challenge - No!

The "Mushroom" Fleet



Westfallen - believed to have been sunk

What do our peerless sailors think of the formidable "mushroom" fleet they faced the other day? They give it all due praise, and then make one fatal reservation. "These

Germans lack the true sea spirit." Our men regretted that grand steel targets worthy of their 15-in. guns and glorious traditions were kept from them by Berlin politics and cautious strategy. "The Day" - or rather the "Afternoon" - has come and gone. What is the result? Perhaps it is best expressed by a foreign expert - the veteran Admiral Canevaro, a former Italian Minister of Marine, whose opinion carries weight the world over. "Britain's domination of the sea has been confirmed." And this domination, which was won three hundred years ago and ever since maintained, is for the Allies an enormous factor in the final victory.

Advertisements

The following advertisements of the period were included in this publication.



The Ficulas Co., Graham St., London



Admiral Jellicoe's "SWAN" Pen

"Admiral Jellicoe signed his name with my 'Swan' fountain pen which he highly praised; and indeed it writes very smoothly and easily. Before taking leave I told the Admiral he would be affording me great joy if he would consent to accept this pen from me as a memento.

"So when I have occasion to read about the exploits of the Grand Fleet I shall imagine that the orders and reports of the Admiral were signed with my pen."

> The above was written by M. Nabobou, a Russian Journalist who vesiled the British Flost recently, and is reproduced from the "Times" Existing Support.





Standard Pattern "Swans," with slip-on caps, from 10/6 upwards. Safety Pattern "Swans," with screw-on caps, from 12.6 upwards.

SOLD BY STATIONERS AND JEWELLERS EVERYWHERE. Illustrated Catalogue Post Free on request

MABIE, TODD & Co., Ltd., 79-80, High Holborn, London, W.C. 38. Cheagnide, E. C., 91a& 204, Regent St., W., London, 3, Exchange St., Manchester, 37, Ave. del Opera, Paris. London Factory-319-329, Weston St., S. E. Associate House-Mabie, Todd & Co., Inc., New York and Chicago.







PS

A happy, healthy babyhood is much-but a babyhood that shall develop to sound, vigorous maturity, that is more.

Thousands of mothers have found in Nestlé's Milk the secret of baby's well-being : they have also found, as the years have sped by, that Nestle's Milk has built equally well for the future. . . . What finer proof of the truth of this than that thousands of the splendid fighting men on whom our Empire now depends owe much of their strength and vigour to the Nestle's Milk upon which they were reared in babyhood.

A MAGNIFICENT BOOK FREE

Send us a postcard (mentioning "The Naval Battle Souvenir") and we will send you free, by return post, a copy of Nesth's Baby Book for 1916, just issued-one of the most strikingly "conclusive" volumes ever published on behalf of any infants' food.



"When been a set thin and always rey-ing. Now thanks to Nestle's Milk, he is very strong, braithy and contented." Mrs. O., Wostanie, S.E.





entirely from high on Sectio's Milk, If music a man of Aim." Mon.H., Birmingham.

Stilk, trief

Other foo W., Hollashy.



"For an Nextle's almost from birth, and is a picture of health and contentinent." Mrs. G., Harrow

in.



"Britain's Best Babies"

Particulars f the Competition.

196,550 habits competed, The Constitution research on Not-Web, WZ, and closed on March 406, 1953. Enginesi, Ireinat, which and and Woite were separated into one dimension. Ever failure were closed from math dimension as the best in that area.

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palate-it nourishes you at the same time.

Mackintosh's Toffee de Luxe The Toffee with the high food value. Toffee de Luxe for our Soldiers and Sailors de Luxe. Send them some to-day. John Mackintosh, Ltd., The Toffee Mills, Halifax.



EACH packet of B.D.V. Silk-Picture Cigarettes,

10 for 4d., contains one of a series of Flags, Regimental Badges, Territorial Crests, or Naval Crests, beautifully printed in Colours on Silk, suitable for working into Needlework Designs, for which valuable Cash Prizes are presented each month.

OVER £4,000 HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO DATE. Full particulars from Godfrey Phillips, Ltd., London, E.

20 for 72d.

25 for 91d.

50 for 1/7

Each packet contains a large Silk Portrait, Standard, or Flag. Each packet contains a beautiful Velveteen Oriental Rug, 4‡in. by 3‡in. Each bos contains a Silk Coloured Portrait, Flag or Picture, 6in. by 4in

Special Prices for Soldiers with the Expeditionary Forces.



The Finest Naval Picture inspired by the War.

Royal Academy, 1916.

Silent Might

Painted by Bernard F. Gribble.

PHOTOGRAVURE 159 Gracious Dermission of 1015 Majesty the Rung.

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Raphael Tuck & Sons, Ltd., pointerer to Char Mainter the Nore & Cacon. Raphael House, Moorfields, City, London.



Wood Milnes are British !

 $\begin{array}{l} From lower Adap, H_{11}, he're oud, fyw Physions, \\ Weith, Mee, H, and Ghanne mand Jorch, draw, Teel and Harp, \\ Then 'H's ensure 'Provide an partial, \\ This 'Heg' on and body for another, \\ From thega to bad Weith Whitese Kond Har meredag. \end{array}$

Every walker ought to wear 'Wood-Milnes' in war time, for reasons of Economy, for Comfort, and for Health. 'Wood-Milnes' in particular, because 'Wood-Milnes' give best and longest service, because made from a better quality of rubber than all the rest.

To prove how 'Wood-Milnes' save fadigue, try a day's hard walking without them, then a day's hard walking with them. To prove how they save repairs, wear a pair of boots without 'Wood-Milnes,' then on alternate days a like pair with 'Wood-Milnes'--see which pair wants mending first !



¹ Wood-Milnes,¹ are made in many shapes and sizes, and there is NO INCREASE IN PRICE. Every genuine pair is stamped with the name 'Wood-Milne."



