

**IN EACH OTHER'S ARMS:
FRANCE AND THE ST. LAWRENCE MISSION VILLAGES
IN WAR AND PEACE, 1630-1730.**

by

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University of Toronto

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Abstract

Beginning in the late 1630s, a diversity of Algonquian and Iroquoian peoples established under the auspices of Jesuit and, later, Sulpician missionaries a string of village communities in the St. Lawrence Valley. A diversity of peoples, whom the French lumped under the rubrics of “Algonquins”, “Montagnais”, “Hurons”, “Iroquois”, “Abenakis” and “Loups”, migrated to these villages in the hope of bettering their lives in trying times. This dissertation retraces the formation and the early development of these communities, exploring the entangled influence of armed conflict, diplomacy, kinship, and leadership on migration, community-building, and identity formation.

The historiography of the St. Lawrence Valley – the French colonial heartland in North America – has tended to relegate these Aboriginal communities to the margins. Moreover, those scholars who have considered the formation of mission villages have tended to emphasize missionary initiative. Here, these villages are reimagined as a joint creation, the result of intersecting French and Aboriginal desires, needs, and priorities.

The significance of these villages as sites of refuge becomes readily apparent, the trajectories of individual communities corresponding with the escalation of conflict or with

its tense aftermath. What also becomes clear is that the course of war and peace through the region cannot be accounted solely by the relations of the French and Iroquois, or of the French and British crowns. Paying close attentions to the nuanced personal and collective identities of the residents of the mission villages and their neighbours allows us to gain a better understanding of the geopolitics of the northeastern woodlands during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1755, four Mohawk delegates traveled to the mission village of Kahnawake, or Sault Saint-Louis as the French knew it, on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River opposite Montreal. Speaking on behalf of the Six Nations Confederacy to which they belonged and on behalf of the British, they invited their Christian Iroquois brothers to remain neutral in the intercolonial war that was then under way. Kahnawake representatives respectfully responded that this would not be possible: “the French and we are one blood, and where they are to die we must die also. We are linked together in each other’s arms and where the French go we must go also.”¹

This concise expression of solidarity, in equal measure revealing and misleading, could very well have been heard in other times or elsewhere in the St. Lawrence Valley. Beginning in the late 1630s, a diversity of Algonquian and Iroquoian peoples established under the auspices of Jesuit and later Sulpician missionaries a string of village communities in the heartland of the French-Canadian colony. Their number and location varied over the years. By the end of the French Regime in 1760, there existed eight such mission villages of variable importance – from Wendake (Lorette), Arsikantegouk (Saint-François), Wowenak (Bécancour), Pointe-du-Lac, Kahnawake (Sault Saint-Louis), Kanehsatake (Lac des Deux-Montagnes), Akwesasne (Saint-Régis), to Oswegatchie (La Présentation) – inhabited by a total of some three to four thousand “*sauvages domiciliés*”, meaning “resident” or “settled” Natives.

With the exception of the Montagnais and Algonquins, who already occupied the St. Lawrence Valley when French settlers established themselves there in the early seventeenth

¹Minutes of 21 August 1755, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), RG 10, 1822: 86-87.

century, none of the peoples who came to reside in the mission villages were indigenous to the area. Although Hurons, Iroquois, Abenakis, and others had varying degrees of familiarity with the St. Lawrence Valley, where some of their ancestors had lived and which they visited periodically to hunt, fight, and trade, they were in other respects newcomers like the French. In grappling with this historical space, and recognizing that Richard White's *Middle Ground* has become an inescapable point of reference in Early American studies, scholars have revealed the mission villages to have been sites of encounter, negotiation, adaptation, and vibrant cultural hybridization of a type that has generally been portrayed as a hallmark of the imperial periphery in the continent's interior. Allan Greer has accordingly described the St. Lawrence Valley as "the Indians' Middle Ground", while Jan Grabowski has adopted the spatial metaphor of the "Common Ground" to depict it.²

As Grabowski and Greer have stressed, however, the St. Lawrence Valley did differ from the *Pays d'en Haut* in fundamental ways. By the final third of the seventeenth century, the French represented a large demographic majority in the area, and their institutions were solidly entrenched in a way that mirrored Aboriginal predominance in the interior. The story of the formation and development of the mission villages throughout the French Regime jars with the expected narrative of contact in Early America: here, indigenous populations were not simply withdrawing before an advancing colonial frontier, but rather drawing near to European settlement and carving out a place for themselves in its immediate vicinity; as time advanced most of these mission villages did not decline, they grew in importance. Yet while the *domiciliés* mixed with their *habitant* neighbours, they did not merge. Following an initial period of official

² Jan Grabowski, "The Common Ground: Settled Natives and French in Montréal, 1667-1760" (Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Montréal, 1993); Allan Greer, *Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 99. Cf. Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

and ecclesiastical optimism and efforts towards the assimilation of this Aboriginal population, clear boundaries took form between the two groups: few of either ever learned to speak the language of the other, and cross-cultural marital unions were rare. The inhabitants of each mission village developed distinct identities and managed their internal and external affairs with considerable independence.

The words uttered at Kahnawake in 1755 offer us a glimpse into the complex relationships which linked the *domiciliés* to neighbouring populations, both friends and foes. These words invite us, however, to explore these relationships more fully, and to probe the ways in which the mission villages came to function as key political, social, cultural, and religious units. In an effort to shed a new light on the matter, this dissertation considers the link between armed conflict and the formation and development of these villages. War has long been recognized as a fundamental process of historical change, and few populations have escaped this violent reality: war played a critical role in shaping the mission villages of the St. Lawrence Valley, and they in turn shaped in critical ways the course of war in the region. Moving beyond this obvious fact, this dissertation explores the entanglement of armed conflict, diplomacy, kinship, leadership, migration, community-building, and identity formation.

The rhetorical motifs and imagery evoked at the beginning of this introduction point the way. Blood was at times spilled, and at times mingled. Bodies, individual and political, were destroyed and remade. In this context, conflict reveals itself to have been an integrative, incorporative process. Even as it tore populations apart and from their lands, it brought people together spatially, politically, culturally, and conceptually. Arms were linked in friendship and harmony, according to one of the standard metaphors in Iroquoian diplomacy. Conversely, peoples were also “taken by the arm”: invited, coaxed, or compelled to relocate. Conflict

challenged, reconfigured, and created personal and collective identities and solidarities, this often in unexpected ways. While the Iroquoian reference to arms referred unambiguously to human limbs, it is difficult to resist the temptation of playing upon the double meaning of the word in the English language to highlight the centrality of warfare to the relationship between the *domiciliés* and their neighbours.

Ideally, this topic should be studied across the entire period of the French Regime, from the 1630s to 1760, even beyond, into the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth. However, the practical constraints of a doctoral dissertation make it necessary to confine attention to the first hundred years of the mission villages, from the 1630s to the 1730s. It covers the formation of communities at Kamiskouaouangachit (Sillery), Kentake-Kahnawake (La Prairie, Sault-Saint-Louis), Kanehsatake (La Montagne, Sault-au-Récollet), Msakkikkan and Arsikantegouk (or Odanak, Saint-François), and Wowenak (or Wôlinak, Bécancour). The formation of Iroquois mission villages at Oswegatchie (La Présentation), and Akwesasne (Saint-Régis) in the late 1640s and 1650s, are not covered. To keep this dissertation at a manageable length, a portion of a chapter drafted to examine the formation of a comparably modest Algonquian mission at Île aux Tourtes in the first decade of the eighteenth century, and a chapter covering the *domiciliés*' relations with the Foxes and Chickasaws of the continent's interior between the 1710s and 1740s, have not been included.³

³ For a detailed study of the mission at Île aux Tourtes (or Tourtes), see Léon Robichaud and Alan M. Stewart, "Île aux Tourtes: Mission, fort et poste de traite, 1704-1727", report presented to the Société archéologique et historique de l'île aux Tourtes, October 2000. A web version is available at <http://sahit.multimania.com> (still active as of January 2011). An early iteration of my inquiry into the links between the *domiciliés*, the Foxes, and Chickasaws was presented under the title "Casse-tête and Calumet: St. Lawrence 'Domiciliés' and Colonial Wars in the North American Interior", at the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture in Boston, 7 June 2008.

In Each Other's Arms draws and elaborates upon a rich but fractured historiography. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Catholic missionaries assigned to what had by then been institutionalized as reserves under the Indian Act developed a keen interest in local history, which in many case led them to compile notes on the subject and to publish brief articles or longer monographs. While they sought to gain a greater understanding of the populations to whom they ministered, these avocational scholars were above all captivated by their own predecessors. The Jesuit and Sulpician missionaries of the French Regime were depicted as heroic figures, dedicated and tireless, who could do little wrong. The Aboriginal residents of the missions tended on the other hand to be outlined as the recipients of their teachings, occasionally fickle and seditious, but on the whole faithful new Christians.⁴

In the late 1970s, these accounts which often verged on the hagiographic gave way to more academic analyses written from an ethnohistorical perspective. Building on earlier local histories, some scholars placed mission villages squarely at the center of their analysis. Gordon Day's pioneering work at Odanak during the 1960s and 1970s, and his quest to explain what he described as its "complex peopling", culminated with the publication of *The Identity of the Saint Francis Indians* (1981). Around the same time appeared James Ronda's article-length study of the Jesuit "experiment" at converting and civilizing the Montagnais through the establishment of a first mission village at Sillery (1979), and David Blanchard's survey of Kahnawake's history

⁴ On the Wendat mission, see Lionel Lindsay, *Notre-Dame de la Jeune-Lorette en la Nouvelle France : étude historique* (Montreal: Revue canadienne, 1900). For the Abenaki missions, see Joseph-Anselme Maurault, *Histoire des Abénaquis depuis 1605 jusqu'à nos jours* (Quebec: 1866); Thomas M. Charland, *Histoire de Saint-François-du-Lac* (Ottawa: Collège Dominicain, 1942); Thomas M. Charland, *Histoire des Abenakis d'Odanak (1675-1937)* (Montreal: Éditions du Lévrier, 1964). On Kahnawake, see Nicolas-Victor Burtin, "Histoire des Iroquois du Saut Saint-Louis avec Documents et pièces justificatives", two manuscript volumes completed in 1881, Saint-François-Xavier parish archives, Kahnawake, Quebec; J.-G. Forbes, "Saint-François-Xavier de Caughnawaga", *Bulletin des recherches historiques*, hereafter *BRH*, 5 (1899), pp. 131-36; Edward James Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga* (Montreal: Messenger Press, 1922). Henri Béchard, the Vice Postulator of Kateri Tekakwitha, wrote *The Original Caughnawaga Indians* (Montreal: International Publishers' Representatives, 1976) in the same vein. The notable exception to this ecclesiastical-avocational scholarship is G.F.G. Stanley's "The First Indian 'Reserves' in Canada", *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*, hereafter *RHAF*, 4, 2 (September 1950), pp. 178-210.

(1980). Although they have remained unpublished, David Blanchard's dissertation on the same subject, Louise Tremblay's masters' thesis on the early Sulpician missions, including that of Kanehsatake and Île aux Toutres (1981), and Gretchen Green's dissertation on Kahnawake during the French Regime (1991), have all proven extremely influential.⁵ Through the 1990s, the context of the troubles at Oka and of litigation, negotiation, and advocacy surrounding the rights of the bands descended from the *domicilié* communities spurred further research and publication by Québécois and Canadian academic and public historians, most notably on Kahnawake, Kanehsatake, and Lorette.⁶

In parallel, the mission villages and their inhabitants have featured in studies centred elsewhere, on the peoples from which they had detached themselves and with whom they retained intimate links. Bruce Trigger thus included an overview of the Huron migration and settlement in the vicinity of Quebec as a long epilogue to his pioneering *Children of Aataentsic*

⁵ Gordon M. Day, *The Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, Canadian Ethnology Service Paper no. 71, National Museum Of Man Mercury Series (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1981); James P. Ronda, "The Sillery Experiment: A Jesuit-Indian Village in New France, 1637-1663", *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, 3, 1 (1979), pp. 1-18; David Scott Blanchard, *Kahnawake: A Historical Sketch* (Kahnawake, Quebec: Kanien'kehaka Raotiteohkwa Press, 1980); Blanchard, "Patterns of tradition and change; the re-creation of Iroquois culture at Kahnawake" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1982); Blanchard, "... To the Other Side of the Sky: Catholicism at Kahnawake, 1667-1700", *Anthropologica*, New Series, 24, 1 (1982), pp. 77-102; Louise Tremblay, "La politique missionnaire des Sulpiciens (1668-1735)" (M.A. thesis, Université de Montréal, 1981); Gretchen L. Green, "A New People in an Age of War: The Kahnawake Iroquois, 1667-1760" (Ph.D. dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1991).

⁶ Denys Delâge, "Les Iroquois chrétiens des 'réductions', 1667-1770. I. Migration et rapports avec les Français," *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, hereafter *RAQ*, 21, 1-2 (1991), pp. 59-70; Delâge, "Les Iroquois chrétiens des réductions, 1667-1770. II. Rapports avec la Ligue iroquoise, les Britanniques et les autres nations autochtones", *RAQ* 21, 3 (1991), pp. 39- 50; Delâge, "Les Hurons de Lorette dans leur contexte historique en 1760", in Denis Vaugeois ed., *Les Hurons de Lorette* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996), pp. 97-132; Marcel Trudel, "Les Hurons et Murray en 1760: Un traité qui n'est qu'un laissez-passer" in *ibid.*, pp. 133-59; Cornelius Jaenen, "Rapport historique sur la nation huronne-wendat", in *ibid.*, pp. 160-253; Alain Beaulieu, "Les Hurons de Lorette, le 'traité Murray' et la liberté de commerce", in *ibid.*, 255-92; Vaugeois, *La fin des alliances franco-indiennes: enquête sur un saut-conduit de 1760 devenu un traité en 1990* (Montreal: Boreal, 1995). Of interest are also the following reports, copies of which can be found in the Departmental Library of Indian and Northern Affairs in Ottawa: D. Peter MacLeod, "The Huron of Lorette and the Murray treaty of 1760" (unpublished, 1990); Donald E. Graves, "The Huron of Lorette, the general Murray Treaty of 1760, the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Ghent: Historical Analysis and Opinion, Volume I" (unpublished, 1990); Helen Stone, "Assessment of Murray Treaty: Report by C. Jaenen, jointly for the Huron-Wendat Nation and the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and Discussion on Legal-Historical issues and Sources for their Clarification; Interim Report" (unpublished, 1995); Helen Stone, "Report on the Murray Treaty of 1760 Affecting the Huron-Wendat of Jeune Lorette, Quebec" (unpublished, 1995).

(1976). Daniel Richter in his significant *Ordeal of the Longhouse* (1991) and, more recently, Jon Parmenter in his dissertation and monograph, *Edge of the Woods* (1999, 2010), have similarly discussed the formation and development of Kentake/Kahnawkae and Kanehsatake in the context of wider studies of the Iroquois. P.-André Sévigny (1976) and Colin Calloway (1990) did something similar in their studies of the Abenakis, as did Alain Beaulieu in his study of the early encounter between Montagnais, Algonquins, and Frenchmen.⁷ Comparatively few scholars have tried to tackle the *domiciliés* as a whole. The two notable exceptions are Marc Jetten's concise survey of the missions' history up to 1701, and Denys Delâge and Jean-Pierre Sawaya's numerous publications on the so-called Confederacy of the Seven Fires, which are most useful with respect to the transition from the French to the British Regime.⁸

Several points emerge from these studies which form a basis for this dissertation. Naturally, the mission villages have been portrayed as a major site of religious and cultural encounter between Aborigines and Europeans. Early ethnohistorical efforts to understand the missionary project as an attempt to effect massive culture change through the introduction of social and cultural values and institutions, and to measure its impact on the inhabitants of the mission villages, emphasized failure. Ronda's case study, which dwelled on the previously

⁷ Bruce G. Trigger, *The Children of Aataentsic, A History of the Huron People to 1660* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976); P.-André Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis: Habitat et migrations (17e et 18e siècles)*, Cahiers d'histoire des Jésuites 3 (Montreal: Bellarmin, Montreal, 1976); Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: the Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

Jon Parmenter, "At the Woods' Edge: Iroquois Foreign Relations, 1727-1768" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1999); Parmenter, *The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534-1701* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010).

⁸ Marc Jetten, *Enclaves amérindiennes: les "réductions" du Canada, 1637-1701* (Sillery, Quebec: Septentrion, 1994); Jean-Pierre Sawaya "Les Sept-Nations du Canada: traditions d'alliance dans le Nord-Est, XVIIIe-XIXe siècles" (M.A. thesis, Université Laval, 1994); *La Fédération des Sept-Feux de la vallée du Saint-Laurent: XVIIe-XIXe siècle* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1998); "Les Sept-Nations du Canada et les Britanniques, 1759-1774: alliance et dépendance" (Ph.D. dissertation, Université Laval, 2001); *Alliance et dépendance. Comment la couronne britannique a obtenu la collaboration des Indiens de la vallée du Saint-Laurent entre 1760 et 1774* (Sillery: Septentrion, 2002). Denys Delâge and Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Les Traités des Sept-Feux avec les Britanniques: droits et pièges d'un héritage colonial au Québec* (Sillery: Septentrion, 2001); Sawaya and Delâge, "Les origines de la Fédération des Sept-Feux", *RAQ*, 31 (2001), 43-54.

unexamined oppressive facets of the missionary project among the Montagnais in the 1640s, concluded that the mission of Sillery failed because it was something that “demanded cultural suicide”.⁹ About the same time, David Blanchard reached the conclusion that Kentake/Kahnawake was emphatically not “a theocracy under the domination and control of the Jesuits”. Observing that Iroquois culture and spiritual beliefs persisted there, he argued that most of the migrants came for economic and political motives, engaging with the missionary teachings only to the extent necessary to achieve peaceful coexistence with the Jesuits, and only insofar as new practices such as fasting and self-mortification could be adopted to achieve traditional aims such as dream visions. Catholic practice was in this perspective a “thin veneer calculated to enable traditional belief and practice and the pursuit of more secular interests”.¹⁰

Scholarship has continued to emphasize the diversity and complexity of motivations for relocation. Significant was the desire or need to draw on the material assistance offered by the missionaries and colonial officials, to seek opportunities to secure new goods through trade, and to exploit expansive hunting and fishing territories. The mission villages also offered a safe haven from conflict, as is most obvious in the case of the Hurons and Abenakis, as well as internal tensions, as in the case of the Iroquois. Yet most authors have not been as inclined as Ronda or Blanchard to minimize the effects of missionary work. James Axtell’s reading of missionary contexts throughout colonial North America indicates that conversions were sincere, deep, and widespread.¹¹

⁹ Ronda, “The Sillery Experiment”, p. 15.

¹⁰ Blanchard, “Patterns of tradition and change”, esp. pp. 134-178 (quote from p. 137). See also Blanchard, “... To the Other Side of the Sky”, pp. 77-102.

¹¹ James Axtell, “Were Indian Conversions Bona Fide?”, in Axtell, *After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

In the St. Lawrence Valley, as in many other contact zones, relocation and habitation in a mission community offered an opportunity to gain access to the spiritual power wielded and promoted by the missionaries, and to seek in the lifestyle which they promoted an antidote to the debilitating effect of alcohol abuse. Drawing from a rich literature on religious encounters throughout New France and the Early Modern world, the most recent work on the mission villages has problematized the meaning of Aboriginal Christianity and made a persuasive case for a syncretic understanding of religion. Allan Greer's study of Catherine Tekakwitha demonstrates most usefully how a variety of selective appropriations led to a synthesis of Aboriginal and Christian beliefs into unique forms of Catholicism at Kahnawake in the late seventeenth century.¹² The same process occurred in the other mission villages.

However significant the *domiciliés*' appropriation of Christian practices, beliefs, and identities, or of their political and military alignment with the French, all of the scholars who have examined their communities have stressed the extent to which these remained *Aboriginal* communities. Through the end of the French Regime and well after it, they maintained traditional kinship structures, languages, a distinctive material culture, and longstanding seasonal subsistence patterns that hinged on the combination of horticultural activity with hunting and fishing expeditions which kept most away from their villages for most of the fall and winter. There have been disagreements as to the degree of political autonomy of these Aboriginal communities, however, and the precise nature of their relationship to the French monarch and his officials. Most convincing have been those who have maintained the view that the inhabitants of the missions, as David Blanchard and Gretchen Green argued in their studies of Kahnawake,

¹² Greer, *Mohawk Saint*; Greer, "Conversion and Identity: Iroquois Christianity in Seventeenth- Century New France," in Kenneth Mills and Anthony Grafton, eds., *Conversions: Old Worlds and New* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2003), pp. 175-198.

were “not mere puppets of the French” and that “power was more widely shared than past interpretations have shown”.¹³ The context of advocacy, negotiation, and litigation concerning Aboriginal rights polarized scholarly interpretations in the early 1990s. Denys Delâge and Jan Grabowski strengthened the case that although the *domiciliés* were subjected to pressures from colonial officials, they received privileges and exemptions, notably in relation to the justice system, on account of their considerable economic and military significance. Attempts at arguing that this was not the case have been unconvincing, although the picture that emerges from the literature is one where geopolitical power and autonomy was not distributed equally between all mission villages: from the end of the seventeenth century onwards, the importance of Kahnawake was considerably greater than that of Lorette, given the disparity in their size, location, and links to indigenous and colonial populations beyond the St. Lawrence Valley.¹⁴

The few authors who have looked most closely at the *domiciliés*’ involvement in intercolonial wars have similarly demonstrated their independence from the French and their ability to pursue their own political and military objectives. In his study of the Christian Iroquois’ involvement in the Seven Years’ War, Peter Macleod’s explained how the Aboriginal and the French conducted “parallel warfare”, whereby each group held to its particular practices and aspirations. In parallel to an imperial war, the warriors of the missions waged a war for personal goals: taking prisoners, scalps, and loot. “Since goals frequently conflicted,” writes Macleod, “the war was as notable for cultural conflict with the French as for military

¹³ Green, “A New People”, p. v-viii.

¹⁴ Delâge, “Les Iroquois chrétiens des ‘réductions’, 1667-1770. I”; Grabowski, “The Common Ground”. The essays published by Delâge, Jaenen, Trudel, and Beaulieu in Vaugeois, ed., *Les Hurons de Lorette*, provide a good sense of the polarization of views on the status of the Wendats. The unpublished reports cited *infra* do the same with respect to the people of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake.

engagements with the British.”¹⁵ Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney’s microhistorical exploration of the Deerfield Raid of 1704 followed the same line, revealing how the warriors who took part in the expedition did so as a result of individual and collective calculations that hinged on their own cultural, economic, and political interests. The French needed the assistance of their indigenous allies, but they could not dictate the terms of their participation.¹⁶

The nature of the relationship between the inhabitants of the mission villages and the populations from which they had detached themselves, and the degree of overlap or conflict between their respective identities, is yet another subject of scholarly divergences. Most of the authors who have considered the Iroquois and Abenakis have acknowledged the great porosity of the mission communities. The flow of people to the missions was far from unidirectional, as men and women shuttled to traditional homelands to visit family and friends, to find partners, to trade, and take part in diplomatic and military activities. The case of the Iroquois has proven difficult to interpret, however, on account of evidence that the relations between the inhabitants of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake on the one hand, and those of the League’s traditional homelands on the other, were often tense and occasionally violent. While most Iroquoianists who have considered the matter have explained these tensions as an extension of factionalism between groups that they have variously described as “Christians” and “Traditionalists”, or “Pro-French” and “Pro-English” parties, or otherwise “Francophiles”, “Anglophiles”, and “Neutralists”, some have instead placed the emphasis on the fundamental unity of the Iroquois through time and space. Coming from this perspective, they have tended to minimize the

¹⁵ D. Peter Macleod, *The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years War*, Canadian War Museum Historical Publication 29 (Toronto and Ottawa: Dundurn Press and Canadian War Museum, 1996). Though touching only indirectly on the inhabitants of the mission villages, Ian K. Steele’s *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the “Massacre”* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) offers similar insights.

¹⁶ Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, *Captors and Captives: The 1704 French and Indian Raid on Deerfield* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003). An earlier inspiring foray into the Deerfield raid was John Demos, *The Unredeemed Captive: A Family Story from Early America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

evidence of hostility between the Iroquois of the St. Lawrence Valley and of the League.¹⁷

Among other things, this dissertation supports the view that neither the existence of intimate links between the two groups nor the changing nature of their membership prevented the emergence and persistence of discrete categories and cultural, social, and political differences.¹⁸

Investigations into the so-called Confederacy of the Seven Fires or Seven Nation as an expression of the *domiciliés*' internal and external linkages have been disappointing. Research into the matter was an outgrowth of the judicial scrutiny of treaties concluded at the fall of New France in 1760: the treaty concluded at Oswegatchie was reportedly negotiated with representatives of "nine Severall Nations and Tribes of Indians Inhabiting the Country about Montreal" and that concluded at Kahnawake with those of "Eight nations of Canada", regrettably unspecified.¹⁹ References to "Seven Fires" or "Seven Nations" appear with increasing frequency in subsequent British Indian Department documents. Through the 1990s, Denys Delâge and especially Jean-Pierre Sawaya argued that the inhabitants of the missions were politically united in a *confédération* or *fédération* between about 1660 and 1860. Though critics were quick to point to the lack of evidence supporting the existence of such an organization before the mid-

¹⁷ Compare Green, "A New People", and Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, with Blanchard, "Patterns of Tradition and Change", esp. pp. 134-178, and Parmenter, *Edge of the Woods*.

¹⁸ My understanding of communal identities and boundaries is informed by a reading of Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969); Gerald Suttles, *The Social Construction of Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); Anthony P. Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (London: Tavistock, 1985); Joane Nagel, "The Political Construction of Ethnicity", in Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel, ed., *Competitive Ethnic Relations* (Academic Press, 1986), pp. 93-112; E. Frazer, *The Problem of Communitarian Politics. Unity and conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

¹⁹ Alain Beaulieu, "Les garanties d'un traité disparu : le traité d'Oswegatchie, 30 août 1760", *Revue juridique Thémis*, 34 (2000), pp. 369-408; Journal of Jelles Fonda, in the Miscellaneous Manuscripts of the New York Historical Society, New York, published in James Sullivan et al., eds., *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, hereafter *PSWJ* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1921-1965), 13: 163-166.

seventeenth-century, the notion of the “Seven Nations” came into fashion as a means of conceptualizing collectively the inhabitants of the mission villages.²⁰

After a decade of investigation, Sawaya and Delâge corrected their initial position: the formation and institutionalization of the Seven Nations as a political organization, it is now clear, was a direct consequence of the Conquest. Borrowing the notions of *direct* and *indirect* rule from scholars working on the British empire in Asia, they now argued that whereas the French had interposed themselves between their allies and negotiated with each group on an individual basis, the British had instead preferred to elevate one nation above the others and to use it as broker between the Crown and the others. In the St. Lawrence Valley this meant giving preeminence to the Kahnawakes, whose friendship the British had been cultivating since the turn of the century, and fostering the formation of a more formalized confederacy, with the familiar Six Nations Confederacy offering, though not a true model, at least a label.²¹ It is unfortunate

²⁰ For early allusions to the Seven Nations and scholarship on its activity during the late eighteenth century, see Georges Boiteau, “Les chasseurs hurons de Lorette” (M.A. thesis, Université Laval, 1954), p. 29; David S. Blanchard, *Seven Generations: A History of Kanienkehaka* (Kahnawake: Kahnawake Survival School, 1980), pp. 275-282, and “The Seven Nations of Canada: An Alliance and a Treaty”, *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, 7 (1983), pp. 3-23; Lawrence Ostola, “The Seven Nations of Canada and the American Revolution 1774-1783” (M.A. thesis, Université de Montréal, 1989); Delâge, “Les Iroquois chrétiens des réductions, 1667-1770, II”, pp. 46-9; Calloway, *The Western Abenakis*, pp. 194-195, and *The American Revolution in Indian country: crisis and diversity in Native American communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 26-84.

Sawaya’s “Les Sept-Nations du Canada: traditions d’alliance dans le Nord-Est, XVIIIe-XIXe siècles” (M.A. thesis, Université Laval, 1994) was revised and published as *La Fédération des Sept Feux de la vallée du Saint-Laurent: XVIIe-XIXe siècle* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1998). Delâge’s submission to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, prepared in collaboration with Sawaya, Marc Jetten and Régent Sioui, “Les Sept Feux, les alliances et les traités autochtones du Québec dans l’histoire” (Ottawa, 1996), went on to be published in digital format by Delâge and Sawaya as “Les Sept-Feux et les traités avec les Britanniques” in *Pour Sept Générations* (Ottawa: Libraxus, 1997), and revised and published in book form as *Les Traités des Sept-Feux avec les Britanniques: droits et pièges d’un héritage colonial au Québec* (Sillery: Septentrion, 2001). For other’s scholars misgivings regarding these interpretations, see John A. Dickinson’s review of Sawaya’s *La fédération des Sept Feux* in *American Historical Review*, 105 (2000), pp. 202-203, and Normand Clermont’s review in *RHAF*, 52 (1999), pp. 590-591.

²¹ It was not long after the publication of *La Fédération des Sept Feux* before Sawaya attempted to work out some of the ambiguities. See his article with Alain Beaulieu, “Qui sont les Sept Nations du Canada? Quelques observations sur une appellation ambiguë”, *RAQ* 27 (1997), 43-51. For the revised interpretation, see Sawaya and Delâge, “Les origines de la Fédération des Sept-Feux”, *RAQ*, 31 (2001), 43-54, and *Les Traités des Sept-Feux*; Sawaya, “Les Sept-Nations du Canada et les Britanniques, 1759-1774: alliance et dépendance” (Ph.D. dissertation, Université Laval, 2001); Sawaya, *Alliance et dépendance. Comment la couronne britannique a obtenu la collaboration des Indiens de la vallée du Saint-Laurent entre 1760 et 1774* (Sillery: Septentrion, 2002).

that a number of popular and academic authors have unwittingly continued to use the term “Seven Nations” as a dubious shorthand to designate the inhabitants of the mission villages through the French Regime.²²

The timeline of mission formation in the St. Lawrence Valley makes it possible for this dissertation to cleave to a rough chronological order. Its first chapter, entitled “Fear is the Forerunner of Faith”, examines the Montagnais and Anishnabeg search for refuge during the 1630s and 1640s. Whereas scholars who have considered the formation of the earliest mission villages during these years have tended to emphasise missionary initiative, here they are reimagined as a joint creation, the result of intersecting French and Aboriginal desires, needs, and priorities. Though there is no question that a combination of disease, famine, brandy, and war explain the establishment of a community at Kamiskouaouangachit, as Sillery was known by its inhabitants, here the reader’s attention is drawn to the impact of defensive considerations. The trajectories of that and other missions corresponded neatly with the intensification of the Iroquois offensive and the decline of the Algonquians of the St. Lawrence as a military power. Examining the context of the escalating conflict, and paying close attention to abortive developments at Trois-Rivières and on the Island of Montreal during these years, this first chapter attempts to shed new light on the contingencies of village formation.

²² See for example: Cornelius J. Jaenen, “Christian *réductions* in New France”, in Gerald Hallowell, *The Oxford Companion to Canadian History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 130; Marge Bruchac, “Abenaki Connections to 1704: The Watso and Sadoques Families and Deerfield”, in Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, eds., *Captive Histories: Captivity Narratives, French Relations and Native Stories of the 1704 Deerfield Raid* (University of Massachusetts Press 2005), p. 271; Claudio Salvucci’s preface to a recent edition of Claude Chauchetière’s *Annual Narrative of the Mission of the Sault* (Bristol, Pennsylvania: Evolution Publishing, 2005), p. v; Michael Johnson, *Tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003), p. 7; Ruth Sheppard, *Empires Collide: The French and Indian War 1754-63* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006) p. 53.

Rather than portraying the resettlement of Wendats near Quebec as the epilogue to the destruction of Huronia, or as a meagre prologue to the more recent history of the Wendats who continue to inhabit Lorette-Wendake, the following chapter places that mission's early history during the 1650s and 1660s at the center of the analysis. In trying to gain a clearer understanding of the subject, "With their Consent or by Force" examines how over six hundred individuals sought safety in the St. Lawrence Valley, founding what colonial observers called a "Huron Colony" and making a place for themselves at the heart of the Franco-Aboriginal political sphere. The refugee community was subjected to considerable pressures, as Iroquois warriors and ambassadors in turn negotiated with, cajoled, and threatened them in an effort to effect their relocation. Exploring Wendat-Iroquois relations during this period reveals the extent to which force and persuasion were part and parcel of a broader socio-cultural pattern of incorporation.

For the refugee community, an opportunity for regeneration came with the Franco-Iroquois peace settlement of 1667. After this date, large numbers of visitors and migrants streamed towards the St. Lawrence Valley and its mission villages. Picking up on the theme of warfare as an integrative process, the third chapter, entitled "Flesh Reborn", probes the limits of integration and the fusion of diverse Iroquoian social fragments in these villages from this time to 1680. Through the return of Hurons from Iroquoia, a distinct Huron community would persist near Quebec. For many Hurons and other "New Iroquois", however, the process of assimilation begun in the villages of Iroquoia would be completed in new missions of the Montreal region. By paying close attention to patterns of settlement during this period, this chapter offers new insights on the formation communities at Kentake/Kahnawake and Kanehsatake.

By the early 1680s, the inhabitants of these two communities had developed a vibrant religious and political identity distinct from that of the Five Nations from whom they had detached themselves. Chapter three, “Fathers, Brothers, and Sons”, centers on the falling out and reconciliation of the Christian and League Iroquois and again shows how patterns of kinship and migration played a significant role in shaping patterns of war and peace-making. Through the 1680s, the inhabitants of the missions sided with the French in their campaigns against the distant and faintly-related Senecas. With the outbreak of European war in 1689, they were drawn into a war against their close relatives among the Mohawks, Oneidas, and Onondagas. The contours of the military and diplomatic activity that ensued corresponded closely to longstanding incorporative patterns of war. Out of it, the Christian Iroquois, and particularly the people of Kahnawake, emerged as a power to be reckoned with: while scholars have deemed the Great Peace of 1701 to have been a triumph for either the French or the Five Nations, here it emerges as a triumph of that mission’s diplomacy.

The people of Huronia were not alone in seeking refuge from a war-torn homeland in the St. Lawrence Valley, and the Iroquois were not alone in emerging as crucial military allies of the French. Returning back in time a little and shifting to another sector, “No Other Friends or Brothers than Those Who Pray like Us” chronicles how hundreds of displaced Algonquians from what is today northern New England sought temporary or long-term refuge in the colony, both within and without the mission villages, during the period spanning from 1675 to 1713. Here again, evangelization, migration, and military mobilization were mutually reinforcing processes in the formation and transformation of nominally “Abenaki” mission villages. In tracing the formation of these communities, this chapter follows the growing importance of the Wabanakis

and their mission villages in the eyes of colonial officials and of their aboriginal neighbours. By the turn of the century, they too had emerged as key players in the geopolitics of the region.

The final chapter of this dissertation brings the reader into the 1720s and explores the shifting relationship of the *domiciliés* with colonial powers and among themselves. As its title suggests, “Trade and Peace We Take to Be One Thing” shows how the satisfaction of material needs and the cultivation of long-term social relationships were inseparable in how the inhabitants of the mission village, like other Aboriginal populations, understood and managed their external affairs. No less than kinship and religion, exchange in the form not only of trade but also gift-giving shaped the solidarities that shaped the patterns of war in the region. After exploring how important exchange was to the unity of the *domiciliés* and the French, this chapter goes on to reveal how it was also exchange that brought the *domiciliés* closer to their would-be Anglo-American enemies. Through the War of Spanish Succession and the years that followed the Peace of Utrecht, these relationships developed in ways that undermined the French Crown’s efforts to direct their allies’ military undertakings and to restrict their diplomatic and commercial activity.

The story of the mission villages and their inhabitants must be reconstructed from primary source material put to paper by their French, English, and Dutch contemporaries. *In Each Other’s Arms* rests above all on a fresh and focused reading of sources familiar to specialists, such as the *Jesuit Relations* and the array of official correspondence and papers produced by colonial officials, complemented whenever possible by less familiar ones. Adopting an ethnohistorical stance and reexamining these records and the complex cross-cultural

encounters that they document makes it possible to follow the processes and activities that shaped the mission communities and characterized their relations to other groups. Appraising and comparing observations emanating from different colonies, and from different individuals and interest groups within a colony, provides remarkable opportunities to arrive at a fuller understanding of murky events. Conference and council minutes, transcriptions of judicial and quasi-judicial examinations, or of informal conversations, allow Aboriginal voices to shine through and grant us precious insights into individual and communal perspectives.²³

In researching and writing this dissertation, I have paid particularly close attention to expressions of personal and collective identity. While the insufficiency of the record makes it impossible to produce biographical scholarship that comes anywhere close to what has been written about Catherine Tekakwitha, the most famous resident of Kahnawake (or of all the mission villages, for that matter), it is possible to catch glimpses of other life trajectories. Attentiveness to the personal names that appear in scattered sources, and a willingness to make sense of their garbled and variable orthography, has two benefits. Firstly, it gives us a better sense of how the leadership and networks of individuals influenced the formation, development, and political orientation of the mission villages. Secondly, individuals named in the sources can serve as tracers which make it possible to detect the activity and relations of wider groups and networks that are otherwise gestured to only vaguely in the sources.

²³ On the sources, methods, challenges, and rewards of ethnohistory, see Gilles Havard, *Empire et métissage : Indiens et Français dans le Pays d'en Haut, 1660-1715* (Quebec: Septentrion and Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), pp. 21-30; Denys Delâge, "Les premières nations : approches et orientations", *RHAF* 53, 4 (2000), pp. 521-527; Donald L. Fixico, ed., *Rethinking American Indian History* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997); Shepard Krech III, "The State of Ethnohistory", *Annual Review of Anthropology* 20 (1991), pp. 345-375; James Axtell, "Ethnohistory: An Historian's Viewpoint", *Ethnohistory* 26 (1979), pp. 1-13; Robert M. Carmack, "Ethnohistory: A Review of Its Development, Definition, Methods, and Aims", *Annual Review of Anthropology* 1 (1972), pp. 227-246. For a good guide to ethnohistorical methodologies, see Russell J. Barber and Frances F. Berdan, *The Emperor's Mirror: Understanding Cultures through Primary Sources* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998).

Anglo-American colonists referred to the inhabitants of the mission villages collectively and vaguely, as “Canada Indians”, “Canadian Indians”, “French Indians”, “Praying Indians”, or “French Praying Indians”. Like the French, who themselves spoke of “*nos Sauvages*”, the English spoke of the “French and *their* Indians”. Though the French also commonly spoke of “*Sauvages chrétiens*”, in the final decades of the seventeenth century the multiplication of missions and converts in the interior gave rise to a more precise designation, that of “*Sauvages domiciliés*”. The adjective, translated most simply as “domiciled”, or otherwise “resident” or “settled”, had until then been occasionally used in reference to the Frenchmen who had established their residence in the colony, i.e. “*Français domiciliés*”. Afterwards it became a convenient way to distinguish the Aboriginal populations which had established a fixed residence in the heartland of the colony from the more distant French-allied or nominally Christian peoples.²⁴

Retrieving the names which the inhabitants of the missions used to describe and distinguish themselves is much more problematic. Period dictionaries and ethnohistorical upstreaming makes it possible to translate most colonial ethnic labels in a way that brings us closer to the historical actors. The silences and ambiguities of the sources have nonetheless led me to resist the recent scholarly trend of adopting Haudenosaunee to designate the Iroquois. While the notions of Haudenosaunee (or Rotinonhsionni in Mohawk, “People of the Longhouse”, i.e. members of the Confederacy) and Onkwehón:we (“Real Men”, i.e. ethnic Iroquois) would become conflated in the nineteenth century, my research suggests that the distinction was crucial during the period under examination. Still, as the French contemporaries

²⁴ In the final decades of the French Regime the term “domicilié” was on occasion applied to describe groups in the interior, such as the Illinois or Tamarois. See for example Jean-Paul Mercier to Beauharnois (?), 27 May 1741, C11A 75: 214-214v.

confused the issue by translating both designations as “Iroquois”, I have found it safer to retain this more familiar label.

On account of ambiguity in the original sources, neither have I retranslated the term “Algonquin” as Anishnabeg (in fact, owing to the fluid boundary between certain Innu/Montagnais and Anishnabeg/Algonquin populations during the early seventeenth century, I have also found it useful to coin the neologism “St. Lawrence Algonquians” for occasional use). In light of all of this, I have found it preferable to retain colonial labels: Montagnais (rather than Innu), Huron (rather than Wendat), and Abenaki (rather than Wabanaki).

Whereas ethno-cultural labels have given me cause to hesitate, I have been bolder with respect to community names. While the inhabitants of the mission villages remained Iroquois (Onkwehón:we), Huron (Wendat), Abenaki (Wabanaki), and so forth, they significantly acquired collective identities as inhabitants of specific mission villages. Beyond familiar toponyms such as Kahnawake and Kanehsatake, readers will find that I have chosen to refer to Kamiskouaouangachit, instead of Sillery, and Arsikantegouk, instead of Odanak (this modern name dating only back to the nineteenth century). In my attempt to come as close as possible to seventeenth and eighteenth century senses of self and place, I have however resisted the temptation of referring to Lorette as Wendake, as that name does not appear in period records. When in doubt, I have found it safer to cleave to the terms used in the documents.

CHAPTER 1
FEAR IS THE FORERUNNER OF FAITH:
Village Formation among the St. Lawrence Algonquians, 1632-1650.

On May 24th, 1633, a delegation of Algonquins from the vicinity of Trois-Rivières led by a chief named Capitanal met with Samuel de Champlain. The latter had landed in the colony only two days earlier, following a four-year absence imposed by the occupation of the embryonic French colony by the Kirke brothers, English privateers. Suspecting that these Algonquins' intention was to journey on to Tadoussac to trade with several English vessels anchored there, Champlain did his best to dissuade them from doing anything of the sort. Addressing Capitanal through his interpreter, he argued amongst other things "that the French had always loved and defended them, that he had assisted them in person in their wars" and recalled how, eighteen years earlier, he had fought alongside his interlocutor's father. Intent on establishing an outpost upriver in Algonquin territory, at a site dubbed Trois-Rivières, at the juncture of the St. Lawrence and St. Maurice Rivers, Champlain made a case for it by stating that he had returned because "they [Capitanal's people] had expressed a wish that a French settlement should be made in their country, to defend them against the incursions of their enemies". Capitanal, responding with disarming humility and exceeding flattery, denied that he or his people had asked for such a settlement. He nonetheless welcomed Champlain to build one, and provided clear instructions as to how he should go about it.²⁵

"You will make, to begin with a house like this, to live in," Capitanal said, designating a small space with his hand, "that is to say, you will make a fortress. Then you will make another

²⁵ Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, hereafter *JRAD* (Cleveland: Burrows Bros. Co., 1896-1901) 5: 202-210. On Capitanal (Kepitanal, Kepitenat, Kapitenach), whose name may be derived from a word for "captain" in a Basque pidgin, see Thomas Grassman, "Capitanal" in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, hereafter *DCB* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966-2005) 1: 163-164; Lucien Campeau ed., *Monumenta Novae Franciae*, hereafter *MNF* (Rome, Quebec and Montreal: Monumenta Hist Soc Iesu, Presses de l'Université Laval, and Bellarmin, 1967-2003) 2: 70; Claude Hubert and Rémi Savard, *Algonquins de Trois-Rivières: l'oral au secours de l'écrit, 1600-2005* (Montreal: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 2006), p. 22-23.

house like that,” designating a large space, “and then we shall no longer be dogs who sleep outside, we shall go into that house”. The author of the *Relation* observed that by the latter, the speaker in fact meant a *bourg fermé*, that is, an enclosed village. “You will sow wheat. We shall do as you do, and we shall no longer go to seek our living in the woods;” he went on, “we shall no longer be wanderers and vagabonds.” Responding to Champlain’s claim that the Jesuits would happily live among them and minister to them, the Algonquin declared that “This good fortune will be for our children; we, who are already old, shall die ignorant. This blessing will not come as soon as we should like to have it.”²⁶

On one level, Capitanal was pandering to Champlain and the Jesuits who had made their ambitions plain. French policies regarding Aboriginal populations had been officially portrayed in terms of religious aims from the earliest encounters in the St. Lawrence Valley, but it was only now, with the chartering of the proprietary Compagnie des Cent-Associés in 1627 and the serious effort at a colonial settlement undertaken after 1632, that Christianization became a genuine concern and matter of cooperation between civil and religious authorities. On another level, however, Capitanal and others were genuinely engaging with new possibilities afforded by the return of the newcomers whom they called *Mistigoches*, meaning “men who travel in wooden vessels” or “who work in wood”.²⁷ For beyond the intensification of missionary efforts, this was

²⁶ *JRAD* 5: 202-210. Cf. Innu oral traditions as recorded in the 20th century, in Sylvie Vincent, “Les sources orales innues. La fondation de Québec et ses conséquences”, in Yves Chrétien, Denys Delâge, Sylvie Vincent, *Au croisement de nos destins : quand Uepishtikueiau devint Québec* (Montreal: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 2009), pp. 59-68.

²⁷ The name (*Mistigoches*, *Ouemichtigouchiou*, etc.), given as a result of their initial contacts, stuck well through the French Regime. See Samuel de Champlain, *The Works of Samuel de Champlain*, ed. H. P. Biggar (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922-1935), 2: 121; *MNF* 2: 421; Gabriel Sagard, *Le Grand Voyage du pays des Hurons*, ed. Réal Ouellet and Jack Warwick (Montreal: Bibliothèque québécoise, 1990), p. 148; Antoine Silvy, *Dictionnaire montagnais-français*, ed. Lorenzo Angers, David E. Cooter and Gerard E. McNulty (Montreal: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1974), p. 104; Pierre Laure, *Apparat français-montagnais*, ed. David Cooter (Sillery: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1988), p. 419; Vincent, “Les sources orales innues”, p. 5. The term also spread westward among Algonquian-speaking peoples, as evidenced by Diane Daviault, *L’Algonquin au XVII^e siècle: une édition critique, analysée et commentée de la grammaire algonquine du Père Louis Nicolas* (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1994), pp. 198.

a period marked by the intensification of the Iroquois offensive against their longstanding enemies, including the Algonquin and Montagnais inhabitants of the St. Lawrence Valley. In this context, courting the Mistigoches' friendship, tapping into the new sources of technological and spiritual power made available by them, and coalescing in fortified villages near colonial settlements, all offered means of ensuring the security and wellbeing of loved ones.²⁸

The Jesuits who arrived at Quebec beginning in 1632, fully intending to make a much more serious effort at evangelizing the indigenous populations than their predecessors had mustered, ran against the bulwark of Algonquian nomadism. Arriving with solidly entrenched notions that a settled, agricultural way of life was the essence of civilization and the breeding ground of Christianity, they encountered a bevy of practical difficulties while trying their hand at “flying missions” among the Montagnais: the dispersal of bands during the hunting season encouraged backsliding; there were far too few missionaries to accompany each family band during this great scattering; having to keep up with one of these bands through the winter entailed considerable physical and mental hardships. These challenges only reinforced the Jesuits' conviction as to the merits of the sedentary way of life. Projecting their evangelical hopes onto more distant nations, primarily the Hurons, whose semi-sedentary, horticultural lifestyle suggested greater potential for conversion, they nevertheless continued to entertain an ambition for the “reduction”, or settlement, of Algonquian bands closer to the heart of the colony. In this respect, missionary efforts in South America, and in particular the Jesuits' ongoing *reducción* of the Guaraní in Paraguay, offered a source of inspiration and a beacon of

²⁸ The relationship during the previous decade and a half, as a result of colonial officials' efforts to impose a commercial monopoly and a measure of political control on the Algonquians, had on the contrary been punctuated by violence as Alain Beaulieu recently emphasised in “‘L'on n'a point d'ennemis plus grands que ces sauvages': L'alliance franco-innue revisitée (1603-1653)”, *RHAF* 61, 3-4 (2008), pp. 367-385.

hope.²⁹

The relative success of missionary efforts corresponded neatly with the decline of the St. Lawrence Algonquians as a military power. As Paul Le Jeune, head of the Jesuit mission in Canada put it, “fear is the forerunner of faith in these barbarous minds”. He might as well have written that fear was the forerunner of settlement. Writing in 1639, in reference to the institutionalization that year of a first mission village of St. Joseph at Sillery a few leagues upriver from Quebec, Le Jeune observed that “calamities attract the Natives”.³⁰ Whereas other scholars who have looked at the history of Franco-Algonquian relations and the development of mission villages during these years have, with excellent reasons, emphasised religious change and pointed to the combination of disease, famine, brandy, and warfare in explaining the development of these communities, in this chapter the emphasis is placed more squarely on the latter element. The establishment of a mission at Kamiskouaouangachit – as its inhabitants knew Sillery, and as it will be called here – must not be seen merely as the product of a missionary initiative, but rather as a joint creation, the intersection of Aboriginal and French desires, needs, and priorities. It was, most significantly for our purposes here, a manifestation of the leadership of charismatic headmen who sought, in difficult times, innovative way to ensure the survival and perenity of their family bands and wider networks. There, a population coalesced that acquired a distinctive collective identity as Christians and close collaborators of the French. Examining the context of intensifying warfare and paying close attention to abortive developments at Trois-Rivières and on the Island of Montreal during these years sheds light on the contingencies of

²⁹ The scholarship on the early missionary program is abundant. In particular, see Dominique Deslandres, *Croire et faire croire : Les missions françaises au XVII^e siècle* (Paris, Fayard, 2003); Emma Anderson, *The Betrayal of Faith: The Tragic Journey of a Colonial Native Convert* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Alain Beaulieu, *Convertir les fils de Caïn : Jésuites et Amérindiens nomades en Nouvelle-France, 1632-1642* (Québec: Nuit blanche, 1990); Marc Jetten, *Enclaves amérindiennes : les “réductions” du Canada, 1637-1701* (Sillery, Quebec: Septentrion, 1994), pp. 15-62.

³⁰ *JRAD* 11: 88; *JRAD* 16: 110; *JRAD* 24: 254; *JRAD* 25: 110.

village formation through the St. Lawrence.

In attempting to explain to the European readers of the *Relations* the population which had fixed itself at the nascent mission village of Sillery-Kamiskouaouangachit in 1643, the Jesuit Barthélémy Vimont wrote that they were “two sorts of persons: one Montagnais, the other Algonquins. The Montagnais are those who reside nearer Kebec, and are thus called on account of our high mountains. The Algonquins are further upriver.” He observed an additional distinction among the later: “some are of the Island, and from various places, extending toward the Hurons”, in reference to the Kichesipirinis, Weskarinis, Onontchataronons, and other Ottawa River Algonquins; “the others are neighbours of the Montagnais, and as if mingled with them.” The two broad Algonquian groupings would subsequently be described as (upper) “Algonquins supérieurs” and (lower) “Algonquins inférieurs”.³¹ Unlike the St. Lawrence Iroquoians that Cartier had encountered through the area a century before, and who had since dispersed as a result of warfare compounded by climactic change and disruptive epidemics, but also unlike contemporary Iroquoian and Algonquian populations to the south and west, the Algonquian inhabitants of the early seventeenth century St. Lawrence Valley were a villageless population. Their social organization was instead centred on highly mobile, atomistic, exogamous, bilineal family bands, who ranged widely through the year to hunt, fish, and gather their subsistence. This was a way of life well adapted to the poor soil and short growing season of the boreal shield, where horticulture could not provide a reliable source of food. It was a way of life that imposed restrictions on group size and a great mobility, but that did not preclude the existence of broader links between families, bands and neighbouring groups who spoke closely related

³¹ *JRAD* 23: 302-304. See also *JRAD* 54: 126. Scholars have generally failed to acknowledge the fluidity of the categories “Algonquin” and “Montagnais” in the early 17th century. Hubert and Savard are among the few to do so, in *Algonquins de Trois-Rivières*, p. 23.

Algonquian dialects.³²

Several related bands of Montagnais and Algonquins periodically returned to the vicinity of the French settlement at Quebec, as they had done since well before the establishing of a colonial presence there. In the summertime, the narrowing of the St. Lawrence River – Uepishtikueiau in Innu or Gepeg in Mi'kmaq, both of which meant “narrowing of the water” – became an important fishing site accommodating large numbers. Here, the bark of birch trees also attained a thickness particularly desirable for the crafting of canoes, as Innu oral tradition reveals. A handful of family bands also occasionally returned to the area during the winter to hunt large game and, increasingly, to seek a rapprochement with the newcomers and draw on their trade and material assistance. During the winter that preceded the Kirke brothers' intrusion, the presence of bands led by the Montagnais “captain” Chomina, his brother Negabamat, as well as a man named Manitougache, whom the French had nicknamed “La Nasse” (The Hoop Net) in what must have been a nod to the importance of fishing in the area.³³

In an early experimentation with sedentarization undertaken shortly before the Kirke

³² For an overview of the location and political history of Algonquin groups, see Maurice Ratelle, “Location of the Algonquins from 1534 to 1650” in Daniel Clément, *The Algonquins* (Gatineau: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1996), pp. 41-68; Roland Viau, “Les dieux de la Terre: Histoire des Algonquins de l’Outaouais 1600-1650” in M. Côté and G.L. Lessard, eds., *Traces du passé. Images du présent. Anthropologie amérindienne du Moyen-nord québécois* (Rouyn-Noranda: Cégep-Éditeur, 1993), pp. 109-132; André Cellard, “Kichesippi: The Great River of the Algonquins (1600-1650)” in Chad Gaffield, ed., *History of the Outaouais* (Quebec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1997), pp. 67-84. On Algonquian lifeways and worldviews, see Alain Beaulieu, *Convertir les fils de Caïn : Jésuites et amérindiens nomades en Nouvelle-France, 1632-1642* (Quebec: Nuit Blanche, 1990), pp. 21-36; Anderson, *The Betrayal of Faith*, pp. 11-62; Rémi Savard, *L’Algonquin Tessouat et la fondation de Montréal* (Montreal: Éditions de l’Hexagone, 1996), pp. 20-25; José Mailhot, *Au Pays des Innus : les gens de Sheshatshit* (Montreal: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1993), pp. 123-153; Jacques Leroux, “Cosmologie, mythologie et récit historique dans la tradition orale des Algonquins de Kitcisakik” (Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Montréal, 2003), pp. 20-106. For the most up to date overview of the scholarship on the St. Lawrence Iroquoians, see Roland Tremblay, ed., *The Saint Lawrence Iroquoians. Corn People* (Montréal: Éditions de l’Homme, 2006).

³³ Gabriel Sagard, *Histoire du Canada et voyages que les Frères Mineurs Recollects y ont faits pour la conversion des Infidèles* (Paris: 1636 [Paris: Tross, 1866]), 4: 884-885, 892; Champlain, *Works* 6: 42. Negabamat, who would go on to acquire considerable importance, is here called Neogabinat and Onageabemat. For evidence of other family bands establishing seasonal encampments near the French, see Champlain, *Works*, 6: 50; Chrestien Le Clerq, *Premier établissement de la foy dans la Nouvelle France* (Paris: Amable Auroy, 1691), 1: 261, 286; *JRAD* 4: 194; Sagard, *Histoire du Canada*, 2: 532-542; 3: 543, 636. On the occupation of the Quebec region, see Chrétien, Delâge, and Vincent, *Au croisement de nos destins*, esp. pp. 49-53.

brothers' arrival, the Jesuits had offered Manitougache a cleared plot of land near the Quebec *habitation* and encouraged his dabbling with agriculture. Soon after the Jesuits' return in the summer of 1632, he had made a display of goodwill by declaring his intention to rebuild his cabin nearby. It was a sense of pressing danger, however, that in November of that year brought him and his band back to encamp near the Jesuits' newly built residence. His initial claim was that he they had cut their hunt short because two or three families had been "devoured by large unknown animals, which they believed were Devils", and which had been spotted downriver in the vicinity of Cap Tourmente and Tadoussac. The basis for these fears became clear in the following days, when Manitougache once again appeared with his family before the Jesuits. He now reported that a large number of *Iroquois* had been spotted near Quebec, and that this was causing great alarm among his people.³⁴

Wishing to put his loved ones in a safe place, Manitougache asked the missionaries "if his wife and children could not come and lodge with us." Sacerdotal scruples alas made for a less than welcoming reception. Indeed, the Jesuits responded that while the boys "would be very welcome", the women and girls would not be allowed to stay. Even in France women were prohibited from spending the night in Jesuit residences, they explained, adding quite rudely that "just as soon as we could close our doors" they "would not again be opened" to Manitougache's female relatives. As an alternative, the missionaries suggested that he and his family might find strength in numbers by joining one of the Montagnais encampments in the area, promising that some *harquebusiers* would be sent there to protect them. Complying, Manitougache was welcomed by an unnamed "Captain of the Savages" who invited him to reside in his cabin "until

³⁴ On this episode, see *JRAD* 5: 106. For evidence of Manitougatche's (Manitougache, Manitoucharche, Manitouchatche) relations with the French see Champlain, *Works*, 6: 49-66; *JRAD* 5: 56, 92-94, 102-106, 110, 120-122, 162; *JRAD* 6: 118-124. See also Anderson, *Betrayal of Faith*, pp. 128, 147-157; and the entry by Thomas Grassman in *DCB* 1: 487-488.

the fright should have passed away”. Yet as soon as he had placed his followers in safety, Manitousgache returned to the house of the Jesuits, displaying his desire to establish a relationship based on reciprocity and making a show of his willingness to participate in their mutual defense against the Iroquois. “[I]f he had to die,” he declared to the missionaries, “he wanted to die near us”. A week later he set out to erect a cabin with boards and nails, in an effort to emulate the newcomers’ building style, nearby the missionary residence.³⁵

The idea of a Franco-Algonquian defensive partnership against the Iroquois was not a new one. At the Tadoussac *tabagie* or feast of 1603, François Gravé du Pont and Samuel de Champlain had extended on behalf of his king Henri IV an offer of diplomatic and military assistance to the Montagnais-Algonquin-Maliseet coalition, to help them make peace with or otherwise defeat their enemy the “Killer People”. From the perspective of the Montagnais and Algonquins, the incorporation of the French newcomers into their preexisting alliance network, which stretched into the interior to the Hurons and beyond, was an opportunity to secure a privileged access to trade goods and assistance against a longstanding enemy. From the perspective of Gravé du Pont and Champlain, entry into this alliance advanced both the Crown’s ambition of forming a permanent colony and the monopolist’s desire to expand the fur trade and exclude rival traders from it.³⁶ In 1609, 1610, and again in 1615, Champlain demonstrated his commitment to the alliance by joining his new Montagnais, Algonquin, and Huron allies in campaigns against the Mohawks and Onondagas. His attention to the defensive facet of this military and commercial alliance, which had soon thereafter slipped as a result of Algonquian-Iroquois accommodations and Franco-Algonquian tensions, would grow again as the necessities

³⁵ *JRAD* 5: 106. For another case of French houses being judged improper for women, see *JRAD* 7: 288-290.

³⁶ Champlain, *Works*, 1: 98-101. Such an offer of military assistance had a precedent in the alliances contracted by the French with Timucuan chiefs in Florida during the 1560s. See Marcel Trudel, *Histoire de la Nouvelle-France 1: Les vaines tentatives, 1524-1603* (Montreal: Fides, 1963), pp. 202-208; Jerald T. Milanich, *The Timucua* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 82-88.

of colonization dictated after 1632.³⁷ Returning to Quebec that year, the French received reports of periodic clashes upriver pitting Algonquins and Montagnais against Mohawks. Though no Iroquois warriors materialized in the region of Quebec during the winter that followed Manitougache's alarm, the persistent threat of enemy raids meant that defensive cooperation was on everyone's mind, as evidenced by the exchange between Champlain and Capitanal in May of 1633.³⁸

The Jesuits' pastoral predisposition to view the Algonquians as lambs for the slaughter, in desperate need of salvation both spiritual and temporal, goes a long way towards explaining why the *Relations* of the 1630s and 1640s make a great deal of "the fear that the Algonquins [and Montagnais, for that matter] have of their enemies, the Iroquois".³⁹ The pervasiveness of terror, not unlike the perils of nomadism, was a recurrent trope: upon rumors that enemy warriors were prowling in the vicinity, the Montagnais all "trembled with fear"; the news of men killed or captured in war, even of a single loss, "frightened" them tremendously. Even victories, which might otherwise have been cause for rejoicing, brought panicked apprehension: the killing, on one occasion, of a prominent Iroquois man and the vengeful reciprocation that was expected made "these poor wretches live in fear".⁴⁰

Beyond the colonial bias there was nonetheless a degree of truth, for family bands who spent much of the year dispersed in search of game did present an attractive target for hostile war

³⁷ See Alain Beaulieu, "La paix de 1624 : les enjeux géopolitiques du premier traité franco-iroquois" in Alain Beaulieu, ed., *Guerre et paix en Nouvelle-France* (Sainte-Foy: Éditions GID, 2003), pp. 56-88; Bruce G. Trigger, "The Mohawk-Mahican War (1624-28): The Establishment of a Pattern", *Canadian Historical Review*, hereafter *CHR*, 52,3 (Sept. 1971), pp. 276-286; William A. Starna and José Antônio Brandão, "From the Mohawk-Mahican War to the Beaver Wars: Questioning the Pattern", *Ethnohistory*, 51,4 (2004), pp. 725-750.

³⁸ *JRAD* 5: 202-210. No clash with the Iroquois was recorded between mid-May 1632, when some Algonquins and Montagnais raided Mohawk Country, and June of 1633, when Iroquois surprised some Frenchmen near Trois-Rivières. See *JRAD* 5: 20, 26-28, 44, 48, 213-215, 251; *JRAD* 6: 4; *JRAD* 5: 20-28, 44-48, 92, 212-214, 250; *JRAD* 21: 20.

³⁹ *JRAD* 5: 192.

⁴⁰ *JRAD* 5: 54, 92, 106, 132; *JRAD* 12: 142; *JRAD* 20: 260; François Dollier de Casson, *Histoire du Montréal*, ed. Marcel Trudel and Marie Baboyant (Montreal: Hurtubise HMH, 1992), p. 86.

parties. Although a band's ranging within great wooded expanses provided it with a measure of security, its small size and prolonged isolation from related and allied groups meant that if caught up by determined enemy warriors it was in no state to defend itself. In this context, attentiveness to the slightest signs of a possible enemy presence in the area – suspicious tracks, vague reports circulated, or dreams and shamanic visions – was a key to survival. Even as they delighted in dismissively pointing out that the Montagnais and Algonquins were inclined to exaggeration and quick to give “a thousand false alarms”, and that dreams and visions of lurking Iroquois war parties most often “passed away in smoke”, the Jesuits were glad for the fact that fear seemed to incline these vulnerable populations to value the newcomers as allies and spiritual guides.⁴¹

It is perhaps of some significance that while the Montagnais Manitougache dabbled in the construction of a cabin in the French style to place his immediate family in security, interest in the establishment of an actual village was first voiced by Algonquins whose territories lay further upriver. The documentary record reveals that Algonquins had somewhat more cultural experience with village life and semisedentary horticulture than the Montagnais. The Kitchesipirini of the upper Ottawa River, in particular, were not only known to obtain corn and meal from the Hurons on a regular basis but also to themselves practice a simple type of swidden horticulture. Upon asking during his exploration of the river why they remained in such a barren location, while the Montreal Island region was much more favourable from this perspective, Champlain had been told that “they were forced to do so, in order to be safe, and that the roughness of the region served as a bulwark against their enemies”. His Kitchesipirini interlocutors had then intimated that should the French build an outpost at the rapids along

⁴¹ Idem.

Montreal Island's south shore, "they would leave their abode to come and live near us, feeling assured that their enemies would do them no harm while we were with them."⁴²

What is more, in expressing interest in village formation and horticulture, men such as Capitaneau or the unnamed Kichesipirini were exploring a course with precedent in his own people's not-too-distant history. When the French established an outpost of their own at Trois-Rivières in 1634, the "the ends of [...] blackened stakes" could still be seen, "remains of a good palisade, which formerly surrounded a village" destroyed by the Iroquois, near which there were cleared fields where corn had apparently been cultivated.⁴³ The Kichesipirinis and other Algonquin nations who inhabited the Ottawa River Valley for their part claimed that they had "in earlier times cleared the land, and had a settlement" near Mont-Royal that they had been forced to abandon "as they were too often molested by their enemies".⁴⁴ These memories were the fruit of the incorporation among the bands from which they descended of refugees or captives from the St. Lawrence Iroquoians of the previous century. The intergenerational recollection of village life and productive horticulture was in some cases concrete: "My grandfather," explained one elderly man when touring the Island of Montreal with a Jesuit, "tilled the soil on this spot. Maize grew very well on it, for the sun is very strong there." Taking in his hands some earth, he added: "See the richness of the soil; it is excellent." It was nevertheless apparent to the French that, notwithstanding the evidence of limited horticulture by the Kichesipirinis, the Algonquins had "lost the habit".⁴⁵

⁴² Champlain, *Works*, 2: 280-281.

⁴³ *JRAD* 8: 26-28.

⁴⁴ *JRAD* 12: 132; *JRAD* 22: 214-216; *JRAD* 29: 146.

⁴⁵ *JRAD* 22: 214-216. On the connection between the Algonquins and St. Lawrence Iroquoians, see James F. Pendergast, "The Ottawa River Algonquin Bands in a St. Lawrence Iroquoian Context", *Canadian Journal of Archaeology* 23, 1-2 (1999), pp. 63-136. While it does not map neatly, William Balée's notion of "agricultural regression", developed to describe the transition from horticulture to foraging in the forest lowlands of South America, speaks to this process. See William Balée, *Footprints of the Forest: Ka'apor Ethnobotany—the Historical Ecology of Plant Utilization by an Amazonian People* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 214-215;

For the time being, the Island of Montreal remained a dangerously exposed frontier at the juncture of Algonquian and Iroquois hunting territories. With the construction of a French outpost at Trois-Rivières in 1634, and the establishment of another Jesuit residence there, named La Conception, the missionaries hoped that an indigenous community would naturally coalesce. The juncture of the St. Lawrence and St. Maurice rivers was a site which the Algonquians (including not only Algonquins and Montagnais, but also Attikameks from the upper St. Maurice River and others) seemed to “like [...] better” than Quebec, meaning that they stopped there more often, for longer periods, and in greater numbers. But though the missionaries posted at La Conception accordingly began to instruct and baptize more people than those at Quebec, and though they announced their readiness to have a patch of land cleared, sowed with maize, and cultivated by hired hands for the first family which could be persuaded to give up its nomadic lifestyle, no one seemed willing to take up the offer just yet. The unexpected death of Capitaneau in the fall of 1634 may also explain why the project came to naught. Significantly, he was buried near the settlement of Trois-Rivières, according to his wishes, and Champlain “had a little enclosure placed around his grave, to distinguish it”.⁴⁶ Equally significant, however, if not more, was the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Algonquins and their Mohawk foes that same fall.⁴⁷ Finding strength in numbers and in alliance, by coalescing into an enclosed village in the shadow of a colonial settlement, was an endeavor that lost much of its appeal in peacetime.

and “Mode of production and ethnobotanical vocabulary: A controlled comparison of the Guajá and Ka’apor of Eastern Amazonian Brazil” in Ted L. Gragson, Ben G. Blount (eds.), *Ethnoecology: Knowledge, Resources, and Rights* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), pp. 24-40.

⁴⁶ JRAD 8: 154-158; JRAD 9: 6.

⁴⁷ Bruce G. Trigger, *The Children of Aataentsic, A History of the Huron People to 1660* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), pp. 485-498; Savard, *L'Algonquin Tessouat*, 90-95.

To understand the nature of the pressure which the Algonquians of the St. Lawrence began to face from the Iroquois in the 1640s, and to appreciate the appeal of courting the French alliance and establishing fortified villages near colonial settlements, it is necessary to look into the meaning and conduct of war among the indigenous populations of the Northeastern Woodlands. As scholars like Rémi Savard and Peter Cook have pointed out, Algonquians and Iroquoians of the Northeastern Woodlands shared certain cultural patterns. Modern ethnography, and its underlying evolutionary typologies, has tended to have a distorting effect on our understanding of the past by presenting some features and patterns as quintessentially Iroquois or, somewhat more broadly, Iroquoian.⁴⁸

Among Algonquians and Iroquoians alike, war was an integral and cyclic part of life. Its deepest roots could be found in a given society's will to survive and prosper in its environment: to maintain group unity and autonomy, to protect and improve material circumstances in changing conditions. But though the need to secure access to limited resources and maintain freedom of movement along trade routes tended to translate into hostile intergroup relations, the parties involved did not tend to think about violent conflict in this way. Instead, it was the real or imagined transgressions of outsiders – ranging from the killing, wounding, or capture of a relative, to suspicions of sorcery, thievery or trespassing, and to a variety of breaches of protocol and public insults – that unavoidably provided the proximate causes of war. Where intergroup relations were characterized by a high degree of mutual understanding, positive reciprocity and intermarriage, minor affronts might be tolerated; more serious grievances could be resolved peacefully, through symbolic and material compensations. Where there existed a long history of

⁴⁸ Savard, *L'Algonquin Tessouat*, pp. 90-91, 100-101; Cook, "Vivre comme frères", pp. 144-148.

strained relations, of mutual contempt, suspicion, or fear, communities easily tipped into a cycle of violence.⁴⁹

The non-coercive structures of Algonquian and Iroquoian societies, coupled with the dynamic relation that existed between personal autonomy and collective responsibility, made for particularly volatile intergroup relations. Individual warriors could raid without the sanction of their chiefs and elders, who had no power beyond persuasion to prevent those who nursed vengeful feelings or who thirsted for the prestige that feats of arms imparted from taking violent action. As such, there existed two, interrelated and often blurred, levels of intergroup aggression: one characterized by the sporadic, back-and-forth raids of small war parties; the other, by the involvement of entire communities, often of a broader network of allies, and by the fielding of large armies. Large-scale mobilization was preceded by long periods of public discussion and argument, during which speakers tried to achieve consensus by molding perceptions and invoking common values, in a way that focused negative opinion on the enemy,

⁴⁹ My description is derived from a broad familiarity with the primary sources in conjunction with a reading of the eclectic anthropological literature on warfare in non-state societies, and of ethnohistorical studies focused on the specificities of war in the Northeastern Woodlands. See Jonathan Haas, ed., *The Anthropology of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Pierre Clastres, *Archeology of Violence* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1994); Clastres, "Malheur du guerrier sauvage", *Libre 2* (1977), pp. 69-109; Carol Ember and Melvin Ember, "Resource unpredictability, mistrust, and war: A cross-cultural study", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (1992), pp. 242-262; R. Brian Ferguson, *Yanomami Warfare: A Political History* (Santa Fe: School of American Research, 1995); Renato Rosaldo, "Grief and a Headhunter's Rage" in Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe I. Bourgois, eds. *Violence in war and peace: An Anthology* (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004). For an overview of warfare in the Northeastern Woodlands, see Havard, *Empire et métissage*, pp. 145-166. For warfare among the Northern Iroquoians, see Daniel K. Richter's seminal article, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience", *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Series, vol. 40 (1983), 528-559; and *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: the Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), ch. 3. See also Roland Viau, *Enfants du néant et mangeur d'âmes. Guerre, culture et société en Iroquoisie ancienne* (Montreal: Boréal, 1997); and José Antônio Brandão, *Your Fyre Shall Burn No More: Iroquois Policy toward New France and Its Native Allies to 1701* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), chs. 3-4; Craig Scott Keener, "An Ethnohistoric Perspective on Iroquois Warfare during the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century (A.D. 1649-1701)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1998), chs. 3-8. For warfare in the Abenaki – and by extension the Northeastern Algonquian – context, see Alvin H. Morrison, "Dawnland Dog-Feast: Wabanaki Warfare, c. 1600-1760" in William Cowan, ed., *Papers of the Twenty-First Algonquian Conference* (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1990), pp. 258-278; Alice N. Nash, "The Abiding Frontier: Family, Gender, and Religion in Wabanaki History, 1600-1763" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1997), pp. 97-147, 264-306.

assigned blame on them for recent transgressions and recalled more distant ones, making war a moral duty for community members.⁵⁰

Kinship structures, beyond serving as the basic organizing principle of daily life and a context for biological and social reproduction, provided the bases for the cooperative effort required to carry out war. Although the speakers at war councils, like warriors, were invariably male, Algonquian and Iroquoian women played an important role in the waging of war and the cultivation of peace. Women could instigate a raid by urging their men on, challenging their honour and requesting that they prove their masculinity by protecting their dependants or by humiliating the enemy. Beyond that, divergent means of reckoning kinship and subsistence patterns translated into differences in how war was conducted. Among Iroquoians, the concentration of population in village communities as well as the cross-cutting ties of matrilinearity and matrilocality facilitated more extensive cooperation among men, making possible the mobilization of larger forces and long-distance warfare more feasible.⁵¹ Iroquoian women, moreover, as clan leaders and horticultural labourers, played a more decisive role in the making of war and peace than their Algonquian counterparts. Though Iroquois or Huron warriors could set out with hostile intent on their own initiative, it was the prerogative of clan matrons to request action in response to the death of a clan member. Conversely, when they judged a given warlike project to be foolhardy or otherwise detrimental to the community,

⁵⁰ See Richter's, "War and Culture", pp. 528-559; and *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, ch. 3; Viau, *Enfants du néant*; Brandão, *Your Fyre Shall Burn No More*, chs. 3-4; Keener, "An Ethnohistoric Perspective", chs. 3-8. On captivity in particular, see also William A Starna and Ralph Watkins, "Northern Iroquoian Slavery", *Ethnohistory*, 38, 1 (1991), pp. 33-53.

⁵¹ R. Brian Ferguson, "Explaining War" in Haas, ed., *The Anthropology of War*, p. 36-38.

women could hinder the activity of warriors by restricting their access to the supplies of corn meal required to carry out any campaign.⁵²

Despite the rhetoric of killing which permeated speeches and stories, wars in the Aboriginal northeast were fundamentally wars of capture. A warrior's greatest prize was to bring back a living enemy. Whatever scalps could be brought back were valued as war trophies, tangible proof of military accomplishment. It was, however, of only secondary value, as a stand-in for human beings.⁵³ Insofar as they could be used to mediate intergroup relations, captives had considerable value: a captive might be sent back as envoy to convey a message, designed to appease the enemy or to humiliate him; be released as a sign of goodwill and an invitation to peace; be offered as a diplomatic gift to draw a third party into the war; or be retained as hostage. Captives, equally significantly, provided a means of dealing with the emotional distress of death. Torture, often leading up to an execution, was very often the culmination of the war party's effort. It was an occasion that allowed noncombatants – the elderly, children, adolescent men, and most significantly women – to partake in the defeat and humiliation of their foes. An entire society was given the opportunity to demonstrate its superiority over its enemies and signal its ferocity to potential enemies. Individuals who had lost a loved one to the enemy were meanwhile afforded the opportunity of purging their grief. The tormenting of captives, observed Joseph-François Lafitau, was “a thing which each one does with more or less fury according as he is more or less aroused by the losses caused him by the war”.⁵⁴

⁵² On the role of Iroquoian women, see besides the sources listed above Kathryn McGee, ““They Are the Life of the Nation”: Women and War in Traditional Nadouek Society”, *Canadian Journal of Native Studies*, 28,1 (2008), pp. 119-138.

⁵³ James Axtell and William Sturtevant, “The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping?”, *William and Mary Quarterly*, hereafter *WMQ*, 37, 3 (1980), pp. 451-472; Viau, *Enfants du néant*, pp. 110-118; Georg Friederici, *Skalpieren und Ähnliche Kriegsgebräuche in Amerika* (Braunschweig, 1906).

⁵⁴ Joseph-François Lafitau, *Customs of the American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1977), 2: 152.

Captives who represented less of a threat, notably women and children, would most often be allowed to live and given the opportunity to incorporate within their captors' community. Here again, the range of possibilities reflected the distinctive social organizations and subsistence patterns of Algonquians and Iroquoians. For Montagnais, Algonquins, and northern Abenakis peoples, whose basic social unit was the highly mobile, atomistic, patrilineal family band, and whose reliance on hunting required a great deal of flexibility and meant that they periodically lived on the edge of starvation, captives represented something of a liability. These societies accordingly tended to be selective about who they kept alive and sought to assimilate. More often than not, captive adults appear to have been treated as slaves, liminal individuals who had no basis for claiming reciprocal obligations, whom no one would avenge. If the captives' labour proved unsatisfactory, he or she could be killed by his or her master without fear of repercussion. But captives might otherwise be well treated. Those who demonstrated a willingness to reject their former lives and identities and to develop affective ties to their captors would be incorporated into the group as kin through either marriage or adoption as the child or sibling of a household head.⁵⁵

For Iroquoians, warfare was a distinctly incorporative endeavor. Horticultural abundance made it less of a luxury to keep captives alive, and semi-sedentary village life was a more conducive context for their management and assimilation. Matrilineal clans structured the experience of captivity. As noted earlier, it was a clan matron's prerogative to request action when a member of her clan had been killed by outsiders. It was therefore to the grieving matrilineages that captives were distributed, and up to them to determine their fate through internal consultation. A captive who seemed an improper candidate for adoption would be tortured to death, or alternatively maintained in a precarious state of slavery. A captive who

⁵⁵ Morrison, "Dawnland Dog-Feast"; Nash, "Abiding Frontier", pp. 264-306

showed more promise would be adopted as a new member of the lineage and given the opportunity to adapt and assimilate to his new family's society, replacing symbolically and literally a dead relative.⁵⁶ To the extent that, from a functionalist perspective, intergroup conflict provided northern Iroquoian societies with a means of dealing with death on both a psychological and demographic level, ethnohistorians after Daniel Richter have labeled this broad pattern of behaviour and belief the "mourning war complex".⁵⁷

Among Iroquoians, both ritual execution and adoption served an emotional need to alleviate grief and demonstrated a will to incorporate outsiders into the community. Iroquois and Hurons, even as they tormented a captive to the point of death, would address the victim using kinship terms such as "uncle" or "nephew". The cannibalism with which such executions culminated offered an opportunity to absorb the enemy's spiritual power, in an extension of cultural values associated with the incorporation of others (the Iroquois' Algonquian neighbours to the east and north, it will noted, did not practice cannibalism and feared their enemy all the more for it). The rhetoric that surrounded the attack and destruction of enemy nations was meanwhile replete with metaphors of incorporation through mutilation and consumption. Among the usual figures of speech for making war or peace among the Iroquois was the setting up or breaking of the war kettle, the vessel in which captives were cooked. To destroy an enemy settlement was to "eat a village". The expression *we-hait-wat-sha*, used by the Onondagas in relation to their seventeenth-century captives, as recalled by one nineteenth century informant of the ethnologist Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, meant "a body cut into parts and scattered around. In

⁵⁶ Richter, "War and Culture" and *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, ch. 3; Viau, *Enfants du néant*; Starna and Watkins, "Northern Iroquoian Slavery".

⁵⁷ Richter, "War and Culture".

this manner, they figuratively scattered their prisoners, and sunk and destroyed their nationality, and built up their own.”⁵⁸

The establishment of European colonial settlements and the increasing frequency of contact with the newcomers in the early seventeenth century brought about a decisive shift in the balance of power between the Iroquois and their neighbours. The new wave of wars were fought in part to improve material circumstances with the manufactured goods introduced to the region by the Europeans, by securing access to hunting territories, trading routes and posts; trade goods and tradable pelts offered new forms of plunder, a new material reward for war.⁵⁹ But the impact of the waves of disruptive and traumatic epidemics was arguably greater still. Following the first well documented epidemic in the Northeast in 1634, three other major ones followed in 1636,

⁵⁸ On Iroquoian cannibalism, see Richter, “War and Culture”; Viau, *Enfants du néant*, pp. 179-183; Peggy Reeves Sanday, *Divine Hunger: Cannibalism as a Cultural System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 125-50; John W. Traphagan, “Embodiment, Ritual Incorporation, and Cannibalism among the Iroquoians after 1300 C.E.” *Journal of Ritual Studies* 22, 2 (2008), pp.1-12; Marie-Laure Pilette, “S’allier en combattant et combattre pour s’allier ou les deux paramètres du cannibalisme mythique et social des Iroquois des seizième et dix-septième siècles” (Ph.D. dissertation, Université Laval, 1991); Yvan Simonis, “Le cannibalisme des Iroquois. Comportement social, environnements, structures de l’esprit”, *Anthropologie et Sociétés* 1, 2 (1977), pp. 107-122. For the metaphorical language, see *JRAD* 27:229; *JRAD* 40: 169; *JRAD* 41: 53; Jacques Bruyas, *Radical words of the Mohawk language with their derivatives* (New York: Cramoisy Press, 1862), p. 45; Henry R. Schoolcraft, *Notes on the Iroquois; or Contributions to the Statistics, Aboriginal History, Antiquities and General Ethnology of Western New York* (New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1846), p. 29.

⁵⁹ There is contention on this point. The argument that the wars of the Iroquois were motivated by economic considerations, the fur trade and their desire to act as middle men, was first put forth by George Hunt. Daniel Richter and Roland Viau, while stressing the primacy of cultural motives, did not reject the notion that Iroquois warfare was in part motivated by the new economic context of the fur trade. Others have gone further and argued that very little evidence exists to support the economic explanation as a factor: Matthew Dennis (who argues that the Iroquois waged war entirely for defensive reasons), José Brandão (who emphasizes the will to make and adopt captives) and Craig Keener (who emphasizes vengeance and prestige). See George T. Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940); Richter, “War and Culture” and *Ordeal of the Longhouse; Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 50, 64, 66; Viau, *Enfants du néant*, esp. pp. 17-43; Dennis, *Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Brandão, *Your Fyre*; Craig S. Keener, “An ethnohistoric perspective on Iroquois warfare during the second half of the seventeenth century (A.D. 1649-1701)” (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1998).

1637, and 1639, decimating the indigenous populations of the region.⁶⁰ For Iroquoian peoples, pressures to incorporate outsiders in keeping with mourning war patterns acquired a new importance as a means of making up for these unprecedented population losses.⁶¹

The Five Nations of the Iroquois League, in particular, became an increasingly menacing foe to their neighbours through the 1630s and 1640s. In this context of intensified warfare they had a marked advantage over the Algonquians of the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Valleys, insofar as the Iroquois' well established horticultural village communities, as well as their matrilineal mode of reckoning kinship, facilitated the mobilization of larger military forces and made long distance warfare more feasible. The Iroquois had another notable advantage, this one over both their Algonquian and Iroquoian neighbours, for they began to acquire firearms from the Dutch in 1637; it would be some time before the French began to furnish their own trading partners with the same.⁶² This initial advantage was multiplied over time, as victories raised Iroquois

⁶⁰ Recent archaeological studies of Northern Iroquoian populations indicate that these did not suffer dramatic losses from sudden "virgin soil" epidemics through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Documentary evidence suggests that the first epidemic in the Northeast occurred in New England in 1616-1618, but did not spread far; another outbreak in New England occurred in 1633. Both archaeological and documentary evidence suggest that the first major epidemic to strike Iroquoian populations and their neighbours in the interior occurred in 1634-1635. In 1639, smallpox spread from Quebec to the Innu, Algonquians, and from there to the Iroquoians of the interior. See Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lanphear, "European Contact and Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First Epidemics", *Ethnohistory* 35, 1 (1988), pp. 15-33; Dean R. Snow, "Mohawk Demography and the Effects of Exogenous Epidemics on American Indian Populations", *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology* 15, 2 (1996), pp. 163-169, 174. On the notion of the "virgin soil" epidemic, compare Alfred W. Crosby, "Virgin Soil Epidemics as a Factor in the Aboriginal Depopulation in America", *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 33, 2 (1976), pp. 289-99; and David E. Jones, "Virgin Soils Revisited", *William and Mary Quarterly* 3d ser., 60, 4 (2003), pp. 703-4.

⁶¹ For evidence of the correlation between epidemics and increased raiding, see Brandão, *Your Fires*.

⁶² Though scholars have debated the effectiveness of muskets compared to bows, the former provided two signal advantages: penetrating power and shock value. See Thomas S. Abler, "Beavers and Muskets: Iroquois Military Fortunes in the Face of European Colonization" in R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, *War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1992), pp. 151-174; and "European Technology and the Art of War in Iroquoia" in D. C. Tkaczuk and B. C. Vivian, eds., *Cultures in Conflict: Current Archaeological Perspectives* (Calgary: University of Calgary Archaeological Association, 1989), pp. 273-82; Craig S. Keener, "An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Iroquois Assault Tactics Used against Fortified Settlements of the Northeast in the Seventeenth Century", *Ethnohistory* 46, 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 777-807; Roger Carpenter, "Making War More Lethal: Iroquois vs. Huron in the Great Lakes Region, 1609-1650", *Michigan Historical Review* 27, 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 33-51. Cf. Brian James Given, *A Most Pernicious Thing: Gun Trading and Native Warfare in the Early Contact Period* (Carleton University Press: Ottawa, 1994); and "The Iroquois Wars and Native Firearms", *Canadian Ethnology Society Papers from the Sixth Annual Congress, 1979*, National Museum of Man Mercury Series Canadian Ethnology Service Paper, 78 (1981), pp. 84-94.

confidence and demoralized their opponents, and as the taking of captives strengthened the ones while weakening the others.

The Algonquin-Mohawk peace of 1634 was consequently short-lived. Bands of Weskarini and Kichesiprini Algonquins from the Ottawa River, and others from Trois-Rivières clashed sporadically with Iroquois warriors from the summer of 1635 onwards.⁶³ The idea of forming villages, palisaded and in close proximity to French settlements, regained currency in this context. On April 27th, 1637, a Montagnais man named Makheabichtichiou with another unnamed headman from Tadoussac asked to speak with Governor Montmagny at Quebec. Makheabichtichiou, who though not the headman of his nation “played the captain” to a band of Montagnais and Algonquins owing to his skill as a warrior and an orator, had spent the winter encamped with his followers near the Jesuit residence. The request for a meeting no doubt was the result of councils held between the band that had wintered near Quebec and those that had come in after the winter hunt; just a few days earlier, another Montagnais captain from Tadoussac had passed through on his way to meet up with Algonquins around Trois-Rivières and together raid Mohawk Country.⁶⁴ The possibility of settlement, it is likely, had been discussed.

Makheabichtichiou opened the conversation with the governor by declaring that they had learned from their deceased leader – presumably Capitaneau – that some years ago Champlain “had promised to help them enclose a village at the Three Rivers, to clear the land, and to build some houses”. They “had often thought about it”, he explained, and now part of them had at last resolved “to locate there, and to live in peace with the French”. He went on to give some context: “We have two powerful enemies who are destroying us. One is ignorance of God,

⁶³ *JRAD* 3: 23, 59; *JRAD* 9: 65, 227, 235-237, 251-255; *JRAD* 10: 75-77; *JRAD* 12: 153-159, 181-183; *JRAD* 13: 83.

⁶⁴ *JRAD* 12: 160-166. On Makeabichtichiou (Makheabichtichiou, Makhatewebichtichi, Makhate8ebichtichit, Makeabichtichiban, Makheubichtigiou), see *JRAD* 11: 110-112, 148-182, 224, 238-240, 244, 250-266; *JRAD* 12: 14-16, 20, 30, 140, 160-164, 148-150, 172, 178; *JRAD* 14: 130-132, 264, 274; *JRAD* 20: 208-210; *JRAD* 21: 67; Thomas Grassman, “Makheabichtichiou”, DCB 1: 481-482.

which is killing our souls. The other is the Iroquois, who are slaughtering our bodies. They force us to be wanderers. We are like seeds which are sown in diverse places, or rather like grains of dust scattered by the wind: some are buried in one place, some in another.” Pointing out that game had become scarce in the vicinity, he went on to plead that “Unless we reap something from the earth, we are going to ruin.” He asked for assistance in this settlement, in keeping with the promise made by Champlain.⁶⁵

Father Le Jeune reminded the two Montagnais that assistance was entirely dependent on their willingness to become sedentary and have their children instructed in the Christian faith. Informed that a seminary would be built for that purpose at Trois-Rivières, but that in the meantime they should leave their children at Quebec, the Montagnais proved reluctant. While Makheabichtichiou took the opportunity to publicly declare his “wish to believe in God”, he hinted that his people were not all of the same mind. Many indeed resented the Jesuits’ efforts to regulate their lifestyle; some, far from believing that the French were valuable allies, had come to believe that those who united with them only died. To all this, Makheabichtichiou countered that “we ourselves are being ruined, that no more harm could happen to us than is happening every day, for we are dying every moment.” Though such reluctance was again voiced when the two men returned to their people to report on their meeting, the “old men all decided that they ought to begin to clear the land and avail themselves of the help of the French”, but that they should first await the arrival of one of their absent chiefs.⁶⁶

The return in late April and early May of Montagnais and Algonquin warriors who had

⁶⁵ *JRAD* 12: 160-166.

⁶⁶ *JRAD* 12: 160-166. The chief in question was Tchimiouiriniou (Thimeouiriniou, Tchimaouirineou, Tchimiouirineau, Tchimawirini), who bore the hereditary surname of Batiscan (Batisquan, Baptiscan), see *JRAD* 6: 128-132; Benjamin Sulte “Le Nom ‘Batiscan’”, *Bulletin des recherches historiques* 5, 9 (September 1899), pp. 274-275; Elsie McLeod Jury, “Batiscan”, *DCB* 1: 80. Unlike his predecessor of the same name, he does not feature prominently in the record beyond this passing mention.

left for Mohawk Country around the time of Makheabichtichiou's meeting caused great alarm. They had been flatly defeated, and their respective captains had been killed. Survivors straggled back, in great contrast with the orderly return of warriors during the previous year's expedition, with reports that the enemy was fast approaching.⁶⁷ Apprehension of the Iroquois caused a "panic" to spread among the Algonquins and others then assembled at Trois-Rivières. On the 14th of May, they "begged that their wives and children might be taken into the [French] fort, to be in a place of safety." The French, in an effort to further the settlement project, merely replied that if they returned on the following morning some stakes would be loaned to them "with which to enclose a sort of village under the shelter of the fort." At the crack of dawn the next day they all showed up to carry off the stakes; within a matter of hours of hurried work they had prepared a site and now "found themselves barricaded".⁶⁸

In the apprehensive weeks that followed, the Algonquins of Trois-Rivières strengthened their defenses by erecting a second palisade, distant about a foot and a half from the first one, intending to fill in the space with branches and mud. "It seems that they wish to fortify themselves for good", reported an enthusiastic Father Jacques Buteux to his superior. Once the alarm had passed, however, it became apparent that only two families were taking steps to clear land for cultivation near Trois-Rivières: that of a "Montagnais Captain" by the name of Etinechkawat and that of another man named Nenaskoumat, the latter of whom had already sown more than half an arpent and now declared that next year he would "make a great field [...] if he can get some help". Buteux gladly gave the pair a present of some corn, which they planted, and promised them "every assistance, in proportion to our limited means".⁶⁹

⁶⁷ *JRAD* 12: 152-160.

⁶⁸ *JRAD* 12: 168-170.

⁶⁹ *JRAD* 12: 172-174. On Jean-Baptiste Etinechkawat (Etinechkaëuat, Etinechkaëuant Etinechkaouat, Etinechkavat, Etinechka8at, Erinechkwat, Etineska8at, Etineschka8at), see *JRAD* 12: 172, 180; *JRAD* 16: 134-146; *JRAD* 18: 96,

These expressions of renewed interest in village formation came at just the right time. In the summer of 1637, Le Jeune's calls for financial assistance from across the Atlantic were answered by Noël Brulart de Sillery, who offered funds for the missionaries' enterprise of conversion and sedentarization.⁷⁰ The observation that the Algonquins, Montagnais, and Attikamegues "like the Three Rivers better than Quebec, [...] stop there more often, and in greater numbers", and that there existed what appeared to be an embryonic settlement there, made it the most obvious choice of site where a mission settlement might be further encouraged. Yet the Jesuits feared that the mingling of neophytes with the droves of unconverted who passed through the area would not be conducive to the development of a Christian community. As the westernmost colonial outpost, moreover, Trois-Rivières was too exposed to Iroquois harassment.⁷¹ Le Jeune instead opted to establish the mission community on a sandy bay at the foot of the cliff of Cap Diamand, about a league and a half upstream from Quebec. This was a site favoured by the Montagnais and Algonquins, who visited it on a seasonal basis to exploit its abundant fisheries, and who fittingly knew it as Kamiskouaouangachit, which has in recent times been interpreted to mean "place where we come to fish", "where we spear salmon" or "eel point", but which may more likely be a reference to the site's reddish sand.⁷²

170, 180; *JRAD* 21: 70; *JRAD* 22: 132; *JRAD* 23: 308, 316; *JRAD* 24: 36, 66; *JRAD* 25: 134-136, 152-158; *JRAD* 27: 102, 234, 238; *JRAD* 28: 214; *JRAD* 30: 164; *JRAD* 31: 236; *JRAD* 32: 90; *JRAD* 35: 46; *JRAD* 37: 100; *JRAD* 38: 50; Léo-Paul Hébert, ed., *Le registre de Sillery (1638-1690)* (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1994) pp. 94, 100-101, 103-104, 106, 115, 121, 126, 132, 136; Lucien Campeau, *Catastrophe démographique sur les Grands Lacs – Les premiers habitants du Québec*, Cahiers d'histoire des Jésuites 7 (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1986), pp. 107-108, 114, 116-117. On François-Xavier Nenaskoumat (Nenask8mat, Ne nak8mat), who appears to have also borne the surname "François Boulé", see *JRAD* 12: 172; *JRAD* 14: 134-146; *JRAD* 16: 64, 78-82, 84, 96; *JRAD* 18: 178; *JRAD* 28: 172, 276, 316; *JRAD* 29: 80-82; Hébert, *Le registre de Sillery*, p. 93.

⁷⁰ *JRAD* 14: 204. For a chronicle of the mission's funding, see Jetten, *Enclaves amérindiennes*, pp. 56-61; Beaulieu, *Convertir les enfants de Caïn*, p. 139.

⁷¹ *JRAD* 9: 50-52 (retranslated); *JRAD* 6: 148-152; *JRAD* 8: 26-28.

⁷² Negabamat, in a dictated letter to Le Jeune, refers to "Ka-Miskouaouangachit, which you call St. Joseph". *JRAD* 38: 64. It appears as "ka mik8a8agachik" and "Ka Mikuaugachit" in Fathers Fabvre and Laure's dictionaries. Both of these men indicated that it is a reference to "sable rouge". See Bonaventure Fabvre, *Racines montagnaises*

While the Jesuits would never acknowledge as much in their published *Relations*, they noted in subsequent memorandums arising from contestations over the exploitation of these aquatic resources that “the design and expectation of this fishing has been the only, or at least the principal reason why these poor Natives have chosen the land at Sillery to establish a residence and accustom themselves to stay there”. They had “not been willing to accept any other place to cultivate, though more advantageous for grain, with the sole design that the Sillery cove was most advantageous for the eel fisheries, which forced [us] to make their church and houses on this site which are there to fix them even more”. In the context of intensifying warfare, eels which smoked and dried could provide sustenance through the winter were a precious resource. These fisheries were “more necessary to them now than ever because of the great dangers involved in going far to seek their subsistence owing to the frequent hostilities of the Iroquois”.⁷³ Thus Le Jeune made arrangements to secure title to this land and began the construction of a small house, a new *résidence* to be named after St. Joseph, in July of 1637.⁷⁴

In having a second small house built there during the following winter, the Jesuits intended to offer it to Etinechkawat, whom they had destined “to be the foundation and base of the reduction of Saint Joseph”. An unimpressive orator according to his contemporaries,

compilées à Tadoussac avant 1695 par le père Bonaventure Fabvre, jésuite, ed. Lorenzo Angers and Gérard E. McNulty (Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1970), p. 152; Laure, *Apparat français-montagnais*, p. 702. Cf. Régent G. Sioui, “Projet d'inventaire toponymique huron-wendat; rapport de recherche soumis à la Commission de toponymie du Québec” (Wendake, 1989). The name has mistakenly transcribed as “Kamiskda d'Angachit” or “Kamskda d'Angachit”, with “8's” being mistaken for “d's”. Cf. *Pièces et documents relatifs à la Tenure Seigneuriale* (Quebec: E.R. Fréchette, 1852), pp. 50-51. For a brief overview of the fisheries on this site, see Adrien Pouliot, “La pêche dans l'anse de Sillery au XVIIe siècle”, *La Charcotte - le bulletin de la société d'histoire de Sillery*, 3, 2 (1989).

⁷³ “Mémoire touchant la Pêche de l'Anguille à la Pointe à Puiseaux, près Québec, dressé par les RR. PP. Jésuites en faveur des Sauvages chrétiens de Sillery”, 1651, Archives du Conseil de la Nation huronne-wendat, cote G-1-91, document 1479, cited in Joëlle Gardette, “Le procesus de revendication huron pour le recouvrement de la seigneurie de Sillery, 1651-1934” (Ph.D. dissertation, Université Laval, 2008), 2 : 25-27; Jean de Quen, “Requête d'opposition à la prise de possession de la pêcherie d'anguilles”, c. October 1650, *MNF* 7: 681-682.

⁷⁴ *JRAD* 14: 204-216; Hébert, ed., *Le registre de Sillery*, p. 92. The mission's subsequent insertion into the seigneurial system would cause problems which will not be covered here. See Michel Lavoie, *C'est ma seigneurie que je réclame: La lutte des Hurons de Lorette pour la seigneurie de Sillery, 1650-1900* (Montreal: Boréal, 2010), pp. 19-69.

Etinechkawat was nevertheless held in high esteem and exerted considerable moral authority as “a Captain by descent” and as “a man of good sense, and courageous”. There was good reason to hope that his conversion and settlement would bring about that of a much larger Montagnais and Algonquin population. But though Etinechkawat had showed a tentative interest in clearing a field at Trois-Rivières in the spring of 1637, he nevertheless persisted in disappointing the missionaries by resisting conversion and relocation. As he later explained to Le Jeune, “I was afraid my people would look upon me as a Frenchman, hence I did not wish to give up the customs of my nation to embrace those of yours”.⁷⁵

Another man, named Negabamat, was at this juncture quicker to appreciate the opportunity presented by the missionaries. Variouslly described in the sources as a “Montagnais” or an “Algonquin”, suggesting that he was linked to both groups, he and his late brother Chomina had been known to conduct their winter hunt in the vicinity of Quebec in the years before the Kirke brothers’ intermission. In more recent years, though, he had orbited around Trois-Rivières. In the spring of 1638 he brought with him his friend Nenaskoumat, and their respective families, amounting to some twenty persons, to Kamiskouaouangachit to take up residence in the house that had been prepared with Etinechkawat in mind. “We have some influence among those of our nation”, Negabamat declared to Le Jeune, suggesting that he and Nanaskoumat would in time attract many more. Sure enough, the pair quickly emerged as the “two chief pillars” of the nascent mission community, drawing during the summer many other families which clustered around the Jesuit residence.⁷⁶

The emergence of community leaders at Kamiskouaouangachit was in keeping with Algonquian traditions. Among the Montagnais and Algonquins, leadership derived from a

⁷⁵ JRAD 16: 134-146.

⁷⁶ JRAD 14: 204-216; JRAD 27: 276. See also Hébert, ed., *Le registre de Sillery*, p. 92.

combination of achievement, heredity, and election. There existed “two kinds of captains”, as one Jesuit explained it: “those by right of birth”, prominent chiefs whose nomination rested on genealogical considerations and who were ritually installed for life; and “those by election”, task-oriented leaders who emerged for more limited diplomatic, commercial, or military purposes.⁷⁷ Etinechkawat was clearly of the former type; Negabamat may very well have begun as one of the latter, though his adoption of the name Tekouerimat, noted for the first time in 1639 and passed on to a series of male relatives after his death, suggests that he may have transitioned from one category to the other.⁷⁸ Only with the consent of the group was either type of leader selected and followed. Leaders were expected to give generously, to motivate others to reach consensus and follow a given course of action through example and persuasive oratory, to display proficiency in hunting and in warfare, as well as a capacity to ensure the wellbeing of their followers through their knowledge of the land and their relationships with its human and nonhuman occupants. By tapping into Christian beliefs and rituals as new sources of spiritual power, and by cultivating an alliance with the French, neophyte leaders were innovating within well-established structures.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ *JRAD* 16: 134.

⁷⁸ The name Tekwerimat (Tecouerimat, Takwirimath, Tecouermiat, Tecouërimat, Tekwerimatch, Tekwirimaeth, Teykorimat, Thekwarimat) was applied to a succession of four headmen at Sillery: Noël Negambat (died in 1666), Theodore (died in 1669), Charles Negaskouat alias Nita8abistinagan (died in 1675), and Michel (confirmed 1682, died in 1685). Charles’s son Louis was baptised in 1674. See *JRAD* 52: 61-69, 223-227; *JRAD* 53: 61; *JRAD* 60: 251; *JRAD* 62: 33, 53; P.F. de Crespieul (Léo-Paul Hébert, ed.), *Pretiosa Mors Quorundam Algonquinniorum et Montanensium = Mort précieuse de certains Algonquins et Montagnais : éloge des Montagnais par François de Crespieul* (Joliette: L. P. Hébert, 2006); Léo-Paul Hébert, ed., *Le registre de Sillery (1638-1690)* (Sainte-Foye : Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1994) p. 31-32, 78, 104, 223, 248-249, 288, 293; Jacques Bigot, *Relation de ce qui s'est passé de plus remarquable dans la Mission Abnaquise de Saint Joseph de Sillery, et de Saint Francois de Sales, l'année 1685* (New York: Presse Cramoisy de Jean-Marie Shea, 1858), p. 13-15; Burial of Michel Terourimah [sic], 23 January 1685, Programme de recherches en démographie historique, Université de Montréal, Répertoire des actes d'état civil, 1621-1799, (<http://www.genealogie.umontreal.ca>), Record #30553. On the Tekouerimat “dynasty”, see also Sylvie Savoie and Jean Tanguay, “Le nœud de l'ancienne amitié: La présence abénaquise sur la rive nord du Saint-Laurent aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles”, *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, hereafter *RAQ* 33, 2 (2003), p. 40; Lucien Campeau, *Catastrophe démographique*, pp. 114-117, 127-128.

⁷⁹ See Pierre Clastres (quoting Robert Lowie) in *Society Against the State*, p. 21; Toby Morantz, “Northern Algonquian Concepts of Status and Leadership Reviewed: A Case Study of the Eighteenth-Century Trading Captain System”, *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 19, 4 (1982), pp. 482-501; Edward S. Rogers, “Band

Within a year of its founding, the “Bourgade encommencée” or incipient village was temporarily evacuated at the missionaries’ insistence to prevent its ruin by a smallpox epidemic.⁸⁰ While one of its first pillars, Nenaskoumat, did not survive long after his baptism in December of 1638, the scare had the effect of increasing the appeal of the missionaries’ teachings and strengthening the neophyte community’s leaders. That other pillar, Negabamat alias Tekouerimat, who in baptism took on the third name of Noël in honour of his community’s benefactor Noël Brulart de Sillery and in a confirmation of his personal importance, persisted. When he too was ill and seemed to be nearing death, he demonstrated his investment in the community by identifying his eventual successors, declaring to the missionaries that “When I am dead,” a given family, regrettably unidentified in the record, “will take my place.”⁸¹ In fact, the spread of that year’s sickness within Etinechkawat’s family convinced him also to finally convert and relocate with his own followers at Kamiskouaouangachit.⁸² The terror of disease, like the terror of the Iroquois, could be a forerunner of faith and settlement.

The outstanding majority of the newcomers were reproducing a traditional seasonal subsistence pattern, encamping at and around Kamiskouaouangachit during the warm months to fish, with few if any intending to remain there year-round.⁸³ The arrival of more distant visitors interested in settling there on a more somewhat more permanent basis, notably some Kichesipirinis from the Ottawa Valley, prompted the leaders to formalize the bases of the community and to reinforce their claims to authority during the summer of 1641.⁸⁴ Without consulting the missionaries, Etinechkawat, Tekouerimat, and the Algonquin Étienne Pigarouik

Organization Among the Indian of Eastern Subarctic. Canada” in David Damas, ed., *Contributions to Anthropology: Band Societies, Proceedings of the Conference on Band Organization, Ottawa, August 30 to September 2, 1965* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1969), pp. 21-50.

⁸⁰ *JRAD* 16: 100-110; *JRAD* 18: 95-107.

⁸¹ *JRAD* 16: 100-110.

⁸² *JRAD* 16: 136-146.

⁸³ Beaulieu, *Convertir les enfants de Caïn*, pp. 134-135.

⁸⁴ On the arrival of Kichesipirinis, see *JRAD* 18: 92.

convened other bands in the region to “offer them strong inducements to believe. If anyone showed himself an open enemy to the faith, they resolved to drive him away from the village that they are beginning.” During the council, the three men spoke in turn, with Etinechkawat speaking last. “I believe that the only means of restoring your nation,” he urged the visitors, “which is going to destruction, is for you all to assemble and to believe in God.” The handful of men who voiced their objections to these pressures included Makheabichtichiou, the renowned warrior and orator who just three years earlier had himself expressed the desire to embrace Christianity and settle down near Quebec; he was now marginalized on account of his determined polygamy. Having failed to produce a consensus during the meeting, Etinechkawat, Tekouerimat, and Pigarouik asked the missionaries to act in secret with the governor so that he might “prompt them to appoint some captains to lead them in their small affairs”. The governor accordingly convened the principal men of the mission and advised them that they should elect chiefs.⁸⁵

Etinechkawat’s name was not put up for election, for “being a Captain by descent, every one gave him the first rank”. The Christian men whose names had been put up, certainly including Tekouerimat and plausibly Pigarouik, won a sweeping victory which was ratified by the community in the missionaries’ absence. Besides the three captains elected to lead the community in collaboration with Etinechkawat, the assembly selected three other persons unnamed in the record: a “Captain of prayers” who would be responsible for communicating the missionary teachings to the rest of the community, and two others who would “keep the young men to their duty”. During the council, those assembled “confirmed the resolution they had made to cultivate the land” with the governor’s assistance.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ *JRAD* 18: 98-100. On Étienne Pigarouich, see Elsie McLeod Jury, “Étienne Pigarouich” in *DCB* 1: 548-549.

⁸⁶ *JRAD* 18: 100-106.

The link between leadership, kinship, political alliance, and conversion was a strong one. In their effort to communicate the meaning of their religion to their audience, missionaries employed indigenous terms for “leader” to designate the Christian God. In prayers composed by Le Jeune in the 1630s, he used the word “utkimau” (or utchimau, oukhiman, oukhimame), meaning “captain”, as the term of address for the divinity.⁸⁷ The conceptualization of God not merely as a leader, but as a father, beyond expressing his divine primacy, pointed to the bonds of kinship which united all Christians. “Is it not true”, asked Le Jeune, rhetorically, to a Montagnais leader before the mission’s establishment, “that you cherish those of thy own nation more than [you cherish] the Algonquins who are your allies? Monsieur the Governor does the same. All those who believe in God are of his nation; he holds and loves them as such.”⁸⁸ Aboriginal conceptions of the new religion consequently built upon traditional senses of identity based on kinship. For individuals uprooted from different kin groups and nations as a result of the waves of epidemics and warfare of the late 1630s and 1640s, the new Christian beliefs and behaviours offered a basis for the construction of new support networks and a vocabulary for the expression of feelings of unity, solidarity, and alliance.⁸⁹

The settlement of Kamiskouaouangachit appears to have been surrounded by a palisade before December 1642, as the Latin reference to the “*oppidum Sancti Josephi vulgo Sillery*” in the sacramental registers suggests.⁹⁰ That year, the presence of some thirty-five to forty neophyte families was noted at Kamiskouaouangachit, in addition to an unspecified number of

⁸⁷ *JRAD* 7 : 152-154.

⁸⁸ *JRAD* 11: 240-242.

⁸⁹ *JRAD* 25: 264; *JRAD* 27: 156; Cook, “Vivre comme frères”, pp. 476-484; Kenneth M. Morrison, “Baptism and Alliance: The Symbolic Mediations of Religious Syncretism,” *Ethnohistory*, 37, 4 (1990), pp. 416-437; John Steckley, “The Warrior and the Lineage: Jesuit Use of Iroquoian Images to Communicate Christianity”, *Ethnohistory* 39, 4 (1992), pp. 478-509; Greer, “Conversion and Identity”, pp. 182-183; and *Mohawk Saint*, pp. 51-53.

⁹⁰ Hébert, ed., *Registre de Sillery*, p. 128.

unconverted ones. The following year, the mission was said to be nearing 150 inhabitants; by 1645, it numbered 167.⁹¹ In parallel, Trois-Rivières remained a pole of attraction for the Algonquians of the St. Lawrence. Following a show of force in the region by Governor Montmagny at the head of a well-armed flotilla in 1639, in response to Iroquois movements, the bands that orbited around the area held a series of councils during which they “decided to embrace the Christian faith and to dwell near the French”. They erected “good and long cabins”, giving an impression of permanence, close to the town. By the following year, it was observed that while a group of “Montagnais” was encamped near the residence of the Jesuits, another group of “Algonquins” had their own encampment across a hill near the town’s recently built hospital. In 1641, hoping to formalize the bases of this community and regularize its relationship to the French, the Jesuits reinvented their residence of La Conception into a mission village akin to that of Saint-Joseph at Sillery.⁹² The existence of a dynamic community at Kamiskouaouangachit seems to have discouraged the coalescence of a comparable entity at Trois-Rivières, however, by drawing away the most motivated neophytes. The height of eighty neophytes, observed at La Conception during first years, was never again matched.⁹³

Like Trois-Rivières for the Algonquins, Tadoussac remained a major pole of attraction for the Montagnais. In their relations with their relatives, friends and acquaintances there, the people of Kamiskouaouangachit quickly took on the role of enthusiastic promoters of their new faith and of their new community. As soon as the mission’s residents had planted their fields in the spring of 1640, their leaders informed the missionaries that they were going to Tadoussac to trade with the people of the Saguenay and to invite the “Captain of Tadoussac” and his people to embrace the faith and, reportedly, to resettle near them. So as to make their invitation more

⁹¹ *JRAD* 23: 302-318.

⁹² *JRAD* 16: 50; *JRAD* 23: 304. See also *JRAD* 15: 230.

⁹³ Jetten, *Enclaves amérindiennes*, p. 38.

persuasive, they amassed a large quantity of wampum to which the missionaries contributed. If the people of Tadoussac reacted positively to their invitation, they expected that they would go on to invite more distant nations to do the same. “In order,” they declared, “that we may all have only one God, and one way of doing things.”⁹⁴ Though the people of Kamiskouaouangachit may very well have hoped to convince others to reside among them, given the pressures that this would have put on the local resources it seems more plausible that their intention was to put their community forward as a diplomatic and ritual center. The hereditary chief of the Montagnais of Tadoussac, Neapmat alias Etouet, responded by requesting that a priest be sent to them, as a result of which Le Jeune carried out the first baptisms there in 1641.⁹⁵ In an effort to encourage resettlement, the Hospitalières donated some houses at the Kamiskouaouangachit for the express purpose of housing the Montagnais of Tadoussac.⁹⁶ While it is not clear whether or not this measure prompted the relocation of any of the latter, it is apparent that in the decade that followed they came to recognize the mission’s residents’ privileged access to the French and to the Christian God. During the winter of 1647-1648, in a move that illustrated the bonds between the two communities, Etouet “gave the district most abounding in game” in his parts to Tekouerimat.⁹⁷

The St. Lawrence Valley Algonquians’ network of allies stretched far to the west and south. Arriving in the early years of the century, the French had witnessed firsthand the longstanding alignment of the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Hurons against their common foe, the Iroquois. The French settlement at Quebec furthered the bonds of friendship and alliance

⁹⁴ *JRAD* 18: 110; *JRAD* 20: 188; *JRAD* 26: 128-132.

⁹⁵ *JRAD* 21: 82; Hébert, ed., *Registre de Sillery*, p. 37. On George Neapmat alias Etouet (Etouait, Estwet, Etwet), see *JRAD* 26: 156-158, 162; *JRAD* 28: 204; *JRAD* 30: 180; *JRAD* 32: 267-270; Campeau, *Catastrophe démographique*, p. 119. On his predecessor, see *JRAD* 12: 18; *JRAD* 18: 190.

⁹⁶ “Concession par les Religieuses de l’Hôtel-Dieu aux Sauvages de Tadoussac”, 12 July 1642, ANQ-Q, ZQ123, Fonds Seigneurie de Sillery, 1637-1952.

⁹⁷ *JRAD* 32: 270.

between these groups, as an increasing number of Hurons canoed down the Ottawa River and the St. Lawrence to trade.⁹⁸ For Hurons interested in strengthening their ties to the French and neophytes, Kamiskouaouangachit became in the 1640s an obvious site of instruction and fraternization. A Huron presence was observed in the mission's registers as early as June 1641, when Vimont baptised Charles Tsondatso from the village of Ossossane (a likely Attignawantan), with Governor Montmagny serving as godfather. Two Hurons from Skanontaenrat (Tahontaenrats, it is likely), who spent the following winter at the mission, were baptised there in the following spring. A handful of others were baptised that year and the next, including one identified as being from the Attignehongneac village of Taenhatentaron and another from the Attignawangan village of Arente. Though the Jesuits, for want of means to support them, were not as yet inclined to encourage these visitors to remain at the mission for good, they hoped to form a cadre of young Huron men who could assist their missionary endeavours in Huronia.⁹⁹

This strengthening of ties had an undeniable strategic dimension. Charles Tsondatso became the first Huron to possess a gun, given to him by Montmagny upon his baptism with the explicit advice that he could use it to protect himself against the Iroquois. The Governor proclaimed on this occasion his willingness to extend his protection to those Hurons who were willing to declare themselves Christians, implying thereby that he would not be extending it to non-Christians. The captain of the "Christians of Saint-Joseph", possibly Jean-Baptiste Etinechkaouat, though perhaps Tekouerimat given that the former was not known as an orator, made a declaration of his own to the newly baptised Tsondatso: "You cannot imagine the joy of our hearts in seeing that you have adopted our belief, and have chosen this little church in which

⁹⁸ Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, pp. 610-617.

⁹⁹ Hébert, ed., *Le registre de Sillery*, p. 38, 112; *JRAD* 22: 135-153; *JRAD* 24: 102-120; *JRAD* 25: 243; Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, pp. 614-615.

to be made our brother. [...] we have henceforth but one Father, who is God, and but one common Mother, which is the Church; [...] your friends are their [our] friends, and that your enemies are their [our] enemies.” As Montmagny had given the convert an arquebus, the people of Kamiskouaouangachit presented him with powder to use with it.¹⁰⁰

The Montagnais and Algonquins of the St. Lawrence also cultivated a relationship with the Algonquians who inhabited the lands to the south and east, most notably with the Abenakis of the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers, in what the French called Acadia. Algonquians all, they shared a similar set of beliefs and customs, social structures and subsistence patterns; they spoke languages that, though not mutually intelligible, were sufficiently related that individuals from one group could achieve with relative ease some degree of understanding of the other’s tongue. The range of their hunting grounds overlapped in the woodlands of the south shore of the St. Lawrence, and it was not uncommon for bands from the two regions to hunt together and intermarry. It is likely that these interactions became more frequent as hunting patterns shifted to accommodate trade with the Europeans on the Atlantic coast, with Abenakis ranging increasingly far to the north in search of coveted beaver pelts. The St. Lawrence Algonquians, finally, were united with the peoples of Acadia by a common enmity towards the Iroquois. Periodically, small groups of men from the Kennebec came down the Chaudière River and the St. Lawrence towards the vicinity of Trois-Rivières “to help their allies in their wars”¹⁰¹

Passages and occasional intermarriages with the peoples who orbited around Kamiskouaouangachit allowed the Jesuits to hope that their mission would in no time be

¹⁰⁰ *JRAD* 20: 214-220; Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, p. 633.

¹⁰¹ For evidence of these early links between the St. Lawrence Valley and Abenaki country, see Champlain, *Works* 1: 103, 109, 298, 320; 5: 313-316; 6: 43-45; *JRAD* 12: 187-189 (quote); *JRAD* 20: 117; *JRAD* 28: 215, 229; *JRAD* 29: 67-69. Also Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, pp. 64-66; and Savoie and Tanguay, “Le nœud de l'ancienne amitié”, pp. 30-32.

“inhabited by Abnaquiois”.¹⁰² For the leading neophytes there, religion joined trade goods as part of a new symbolic vocabulary by which intertribal relations could be negotiated. The murder of Makheabichtichiou, who had left the mission community for Abenaki country as a result of his opposition to the enforcement of Christian monogamy, paradoxically contributed to the strengthening of bonds between this distant population and the neophytes. When two Abenaki ambassadors came to Kamiskouaouangachit to make amends for the murder committed by one of their inebriated countrymen, Etinechkawat and Tekouerimat intervened as mediators to mollify the angry relatives of the deceased who lived at Trois-Rivières. At the same time, they took the opportunity to renew the peace between their people and the visitors’. One of the principal neophytes, plausibly Tekouerimat, stated the conditions under which this peace might be further strengthened: “If you wish to bind our two nations by a perfect friendship, it is necessary that we should all believe the same: have yourself baptized, and cause your people to do likewise; that bond will be stronger than any gifts. We pray to God, and know no other friends or brothers than those who pray like us.”¹⁰³

The complaints of the Capuchin missionaries in Acadia, who worried about the effects that Jesuit competition might have on their own endeavors, coupled with the misgivings of Governor Montmagny, who saw Abenaki visitors as commercial interlopers who would drain valuable furs away from the St. Lawrence Valley, proved to be a major hindrance to the rapprochement. Still, a handful of Montagnais, Algonquin, and Abenaki leaders, notably Tekouerimat, persisted in their efforts to cultivate an alliance between their peoples by visiting

¹⁰² *JRAD* 21: 117.

¹⁰³ *JRAD* 21: 67-71; *JRAD* 25: 117-119, 153.

each other's villages through the 1640s and early 1650s.¹⁰⁴ In the context of the Iroquois' intensifying offensive, making friends and brothers was of vital importance.

The fluidity of movement of Algonquian populations and the significance of leadership and war among the contingencies of village formation are well illustrated by the case of the Tessouat, the principal Kichesipirini chief, and his people. While this figure has attracted scholarly attention, his story has not been placed in parallel and in relation with that of mission-village formation.¹⁰⁵ At least two groups of Kichesipirinis had been attracted to Kamiskouaouangachit after its institutionalisation as a mission: some thirty persons who arrived in the spring of 1640, and an unknown number who arrived in the fall of 1641. Tessouat, the hereditary "Captain of the Island" (i.e. Allumette Island, on the Ottawa River) and chief of the Kichesipirinis, was the most prominent figure in that second group. Among Frenchmen and Aborigines alike he had acquired a reputation as an arrogant and mean-spirited troublemaker, in no small part because he and his predecessors had restricted passage up the Ottawa River and access to Huronia. Now he and his followers had come to explore the possibility of wintering at the mission where some of their relatives had been spending time. They were well received by the neophytes, in keeping with indigenous traditions of hospitality, yet it was not long before Tessouat began to pick at the community's foundations.¹⁰⁶

Though he proclaimed that he and his people desired to "bring about a closer union"

¹⁰⁴ JRAD 23: 283; JRAD 24: 59-65, 159-161, 183-185; JRAD 25: 117-121, 153, 177-179; JRAD 28: 203-205, 215; JRAD 29: 67-71; JRAD 30: 179-180, 183, 195; JRAD 31: 183-207; JRAD 36: 83-89, 129; JRAD 37: 261; Gabriel Druillettes, *Journal of an embassy from Canada to the United Colonies of New England, in 1650*, ed. John Gilmary Shea (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1857); Druillettes, "Rapport du R.P. Druillettes" in *Le Canada Français* 20 (June-August 1933), pp. 941-949. On Druillettes, see Lucien Campeau's entry in *DCB* 1: 281-282. On missionary competition, see Luca Codignola, "Competing Networks: Roman Catholic Ecclesiastics in French North America, 1610-1658" *Canadian Historical Review* 80, 4 (1999), pp. 539-84.

¹⁰⁵ On Tessouat, see Rémi Savard's thorough *L'Algonquin Tessouat et la fondation de Montréal* (Montreal: Éditions de l'Hexagone, 1996).

¹⁰⁶ JRAD 18: 92; JRAD 20: 154-56, 164-166.

between themselves and the Christians of Kamiskouaouangachit, and agreed that it was fitting “that they should all live together”, Tessouat made a case for settling somewhere far from Quebec.¹⁰⁷ This was a signal challenge to the leadership of Etinechkawat and Tekouerimat. Finding that it failed to find much appeal among the followers of the two men, who were similarly invested in the embryonic mission village, Tessouat and his people fell back on Trois-Rivières for the winter. When in the spring of 1642 these Kichespirinis relayed a new invitation to the people of Kamiskouaouangachit, this time to accompany them in an expedition against the Iroquois, some of neophyte warriors accepted. Yet Tessouat’s people were officially rebuffed by Etinechkawat who, responding on behalf of his community as a whole, declared that “Your argument is not properly stated; you have inverted your words. You say ‘Let us go to the war, and then we will be baptized’. Reverse your language, and say ‘Let us be baptized, and then let us all go together to the war.’”¹⁰⁸

Now orbiting around Trois-Rivières and the residence of La Conception, Tessouat and his nephew Oumastikouei (The Toad) confirmed their reputation as troublemakers, in constant conflict not only with the local missionaries but also with Pieskaret, another Kichesipirini who had by this time emerged at the leader of the local Christian community.¹⁰⁹ The foundation of Ville-Marie (later to be known as Montreal) that year provided Tessouat with an opportunity to consolidate his dwindling sphere of influence. The Island of Montreal, which occupied a key position within the world of the Algonquins of the Ottawa River, was closer than Kamiskouaouangachit to what Tessouat and his followers had in mind as a proper village site. As noted above, the Kichesipirinis believed that they had “in earlier times cleared the land, and had a settlement near this mountain [Mont-Royal]” which they had been forced to abandon “as

¹⁰⁷ *JRAD* 20: 154-56, 164-166.

¹⁰⁸ *JRAD* 20: 164-166.

¹⁰⁹ *JRAD* 20: 290; *JRAD* 24: 190; Elsie McLeod Jury, “Simon Pieskaret”, *DCB* 1: 547-548.

they were too often molested by their enemies”. The Onontchataronons’ ancestors were similarly said to have inhabited the island in former times. Algonquins still referred to the Island of Montreal as “the Island where there was a village”. Some of the elderly recalled that their grandparents’ generation had grown corn here and had been passed down a knowledge of the spots on the island where the good exposure to sunlight and rich soil that had made horticulture most viable.¹¹⁰

Discovering all of this, the Jesuit missionaries did not hesitate to urge them to “return to their country”, informing them of the plans of the French to send people to succor them and promising to give them assistance to build their houses and till the soil.¹¹¹ The missionaries’ ambition was comforted by Algonquins who passed through the region to exploit its abundant game or on their way to war, and who, in keeping with what Champlain’s Kichersipirini interlocutors had intimated several decades earlier, suggested that “they would have settled there, long ago and in great number, if they had had there, as at present, a place of refuge against the Iroquois”.¹¹² There was no doubt in the mind of the Jesuits, nor of the devout secular administrators of Ville-Marie who hoped to recreate through evangelization the purity of the primitive church, that the island and its vicinity would in time be home to a diversity of “Algonquins, as much those of the Island as of the Petite Nation, the Onontchataronons, and many others who are in those quarters, some Hurons, and even also some Iroquois”.¹¹³ But it seemed likely that there would never be a large number “until either the Iroquois are subjugated, or we make peace with them”, as the latter caused for the time being “too much terror” to the

¹¹⁰ *JRAD* 12: 132. See also *JRAD* 22: 214-216. *JRAD* 29: 146

¹¹¹ *JRAD* 22: 214-216.

¹¹² *JRAD* 24: 230; Champlain, *Works*, 2: 280-281.

¹¹³ *JRAD* 21: 116.

potential neophytes and villagers.¹¹⁴

Ville-Marie quickly became a site of occasional refuge for the Algonquin family bands that came and went through the region, as well as a convenient rallying point for war parties on their way to or from Mohawk Country. Towards the end of February 1643, Tessouat's nephew, Oumastikouei, arrived at Ville-Marie after having spent part of the winter along the Richelieu River. The Jesuits François du Perron and Joseph-Antoine Poncet, who had wintered at the new outpost, found him more receptive to missionary entreaties than he had shown himself in recent years. He displayed "a special liking for that place" and, upon promises that a field of his own choosing would be given to him and that two French field hands would be placed at his disposal for a year, declared his interest in receiving religious instruction and settling down. Arriving from Trois-Rivières shortly thereafter and informed of the liberal terms that had been offered to his nephew, Tessouat in turn promised to settle there with his people and finally embrace the faith – threatening that if he was not welcomed here he would go to Huron Country, where missionaries would surely instruct him as he pleased. Thrilled at the prospect of converting and sedentarizing a prominent leader who had until then seemed so opposed to their work, the Jesuits hastily instructed him, baptized him, and solemnized his marriage. That Tessouat received after the latter ceremony a "fine arquebus" from Maisonneuve, "with the articles necessary for its use", is a reminder of the military stakes of conversion.¹¹⁵

In March of 1643, within weeks of Tessouat's baptism, a dozen warriors showed up at Ville-Marie to report the death of Pieskaret, who had led them on the warpath, and eight other men who included some of Tessouat's relatives, in a skirmish against the Iroquois. No doubt preoccupied with their immediate security, these warriors too stated their desire to settle near the

¹¹⁴ *JRAD* 22: 214-216.

¹¹⁵ Dollier de Casson, *Histoire*, pp. 86-87; *JRAD* 24: 214-220, 230-240, 256; Savard, *L'Algonquin Tessouat*, pp. 40-60.

French town and asked for baptism. Yet Montreal's great vulnerability and consequent inadequacy as a pole of attraction and as a potential site of settlement was soon made apparent when Tessouat and Pieskaret – for reports of the latter's death had been premature – both informed Maisonneuve that their people had now resolved to spend the summer at Trois-Rivières with other bands, to mourn together the loss of their men, deliberate on the course of action, and seek assistance against the common enemy.¹¹⁶ Tessouat, notwithstanding his expressions of interest at Ville-Marie in the spring, was still at Trois-Rivières in mid-December; the next year, his presence was noted at Quebec.¹¹⁷ As long as the Montreal region remained an exposed frontier in the war against the Iroquois, the formation of a semipermanent Algonquian mission community there would be impossible.

An exchange which occurred on May 18th of 1645, when Pieskaret brought two Mohawk captives to “Monsieur the Governor and to the Christian Savages, his friends”, at Kamiskouaouangachit, is revealing of the distinctive status and identity of the young community. For one thing, Etinechkawat greeted the arriving canoes by proclaiming that the prisoners would not be mistreated: “You know well that we now proceed in a different fashion than we formerly did. We have overturned all our old customs. That is why we receive you quietly, without harming the prisoners, without striking or injuring them in any way.” For another, during the discussions that ensued, Pieskaret highlighted the extent to which the neophyte community had aligned its interests with those of the French: “It is to you that I address my words,” Pieskaret began, “you who are but one and the same thing, you who have but one secret, you who whisper into each other's ears. It is to the Captain of the French, and to you who in the past three years

¹¹⁶ *JRAD* 24: 252, 258-260.

¹¹⁷ *JRAD* 25: 258-264; Savard, *L'Algonquin Tessouat*, p. 161.

have become French, – to you, Negabamat; to you, Etinechkaouat – to whom I address my voice; you are but one council. Listen to me.”¹¹⁸ Significant differences of course persisted between the French and the Algonquian residents of Kamiskouaouangachit which would have made clear to all that the two had not lost their distinctive identities. Nevertheless, Pieskaret’s language points to the extent to which the community which had coalesced around the mission village under the leadership of Negabamat alias Tekouerimat and Etinechkaouat was recognized by other Algonquians as distinct and intimately aligned with the French. It is also an indication that the neophytes of La Conception had failed to coalesce in this way.

In an attempt to open a dialogue with the Mohawks, with the aim of freeing the flow of pelts towards the colony, Montmagny allowed the two captives a measure of freedom. Shortly thereafter, he released a third captive who had been taken the previous year so that he might carry an offer of “universal peace” to the enemy.¹¹⁹ The Mohawks, who were around this time on tense terms with their Dutch neighbours and trading partners, responded positively to the overture by sending an embassy to Trois-Rivières. Algonquins, Montagnais, Attikamegues, and Hurons were present during the peace conference. Before the official Franco-Mohawk proceedings began on July 12th, the Algonquins and Montagnais invited the Iroquois visitors “to their feasts, and they gradually accustomed themselves to converse together.” During the closing council which occurred two days later, following Montmagny’s remarks, Pieskaret and Tekouerimat in turn addressed the Mohawks, offering pelts and elk skins to condole the deaths of the enemies killed in battle and to allay the grief of their relatives and friends. Tekouerimat declared on that occasion that “as he and his people at Sillery had the same heart as their elder brother Monsieur the Governor, they offered but one present with his.” At the conference

¹¹⁸ *JRAD* 27: 238-244.

¹¹⁹ *JRAD* 26: 60; *JRAD* 27: 238-244.

convened at Trois-Rivières for the ratification of the peace agreement that September, the “principal captains of three or four Algonquin nations” (of whom only the Kitchesiprini and Ononchataronnon were specifically named in the published account) who had been absent at the earlier meeting confirmed the peace.¹²⁰

Though it seemed that the French were willing to stand as mediators and guarantors of a universal peace, the public proceedings were paralleled by secret negotiations towards a more limited accord. During his stay at Trois-Rivières in July, the Mohawk ambassador had two private meetings with Montmagny during which he revealed that his people had in fact no intention to make peace with the Algonquins. Offering a substantial present to the governor, he advised him that “if he desired peace for both himself and the Hurons, he should abandon the Algonquins without shelter.” Reportedly, the governor initially refused to abandon his allies and to accept the present. But during the second meeting he qualified his objections, declaring “that there were two kinds of Algonquins: one like ourselves, recognized as Christians; the other, unlike us. Without the former, it is certain, we do not make a peace; as for the latter, they themselves are the masters of their own actions, nor are they united with us like the others.”¹²¹ The broader context suggests that by *Christians* the governor actually meant *settled*, excluding those who like Tessouat (and perhaps also Pieskaret) who had accepted baptism but failed to redefine themselves as Christians and fully align their interests with those of the French. Unbeknownst to them, the governor was willing to let some of his allies hang.

That fall the Algonquians of the St. Lawrence received cause to think that the peace would be short-lived. A hunting band composed of Algonquins and Montagnais from Kamiskouaouangachit was attacked: three persons from the community were killed, and three

¹²⁰ JRAD 27: 246-305.

¹²¹ JRAD 28: 148-150.

others were wounded (including a son of the late François-Xavier Nenaskoumat, that early pillar of the mission community, whose wound proved fatal). Though the Mohawks were initially suspected, the survivors revealed that the attackers spoke a different tongue. It was eventually learned that they were Sokokis, Western Abenaki-speaking inhabitants of the upper Connecticut Valley: during the winter that followed, these presented the scalps of the victims to the Mohawks in a bid to reignite the war.¹²² In January, the peace was further jeopardized when the St. Lawrence Algonquians were shocked to find out from a visiting Huron that the Mohawks were plotting to leave them out of the peace; the French were forced to deny the rumour that the governor had agreed to this. Angered, the residents of Kamiskouaouangachit considered striking first by falling upon the Mohawk hostages whom Montmagny was about to release. Upon hearing that they were planning to “play an evil trick” on those men during their return, the governor thought best to delay the latter’s departure.¹²³

It was most likely for fear of enemy raiders, that towards the beginning of April the approximately twenty-two persons who had stayed behind at the mission while the rest of their people had gone out hunting decided to abandon their cabins and encamp closer to Quebec. Only when the rest of the community returned from the hunt, shortly after Easter, did this group feel comfortable returning home.¹²⁴ Still, the Mohawks persisted in their outward signs of goodwill. During a third Franco-Mohawk conference held at Trois-Rivières on May 7th, the visiting ambassador offered condolence presents to the relatives and friend of the persons killed the previous fall and assured them that “they had had no knowledge of it until after the act was done, and that all the captains of the country had condemned this outrage.” The people of Kamiskouaouangachit’s reaction to the ambassador’s assurances that the Algonquians would not

¹²² *JRAD* 28: 276; *JRAD* 29: 82-84.

¹²³ *JRAD* 28: 148-152. The Algonquians are called “Aticha8ata” in the account of the Huron report.

¹²⁴ *JRAD* 28: 168.

be excluded from the peace was not recorded. Tessouat was for his part vocal, proclaiming that that though he remained exceedingly distrustful of the Mohawks, neither he nor his followers would be the ones to first breach the peace, and reminding the governor that “he should not walk all alone in safety within the roads which he had levelled and broken, but that this happiness should also be common to the Algonquins and to the Hurons”.¹²⁵

As the peace was short-lived, the French willingness to exclude unconverted Algonquins from their negotiations would not be tested. The Mohawks had not succeeded in convincing the other nations of the League to accept the conditions of this universal peace, and the killing in October of 1645 of Isaac Jogues, the Jesuit who was attempting to extend the mission field to Mohawk Country, destroyed what remained of French goodwill.¹²⁶ Tessouat and his Kitchesipirini followers, who had yet again displayed an intention of wintering near Ville-Marie and plant corn there in the spring, were persuaded by the rumours of Mohawk disingenuousness to instead remain in the vicinity of Trois-Rivières. The Ononchataronnon leader Tawiskaron and the Matoueskarini leader Makatewanakisitch, who had similarly intended to settle at Montreal, held out a little longer. The Onontchataronons’ resolve to “recover [...] as their country” the Island of Montreal which their “ancestors [had] formerly inhabited”, did not prevent them from spending an anxious season.¹²⁷ Even in the vicinity of Trois-Rivières and downriver as far as Quebec, the threat of enemy raids was becoming palpable. In the early days of March 1646, Mohawk war parties ambushed several Algonquin bands in the vicinity of Trois-Rivières, killing among others Pieskaret and Tawiskaron. That April, Tekouerimat and Etinechkawat returned to

¹²⁵ *JRAD* 28: 290-302.

¹²⁶ *JRAD* 22: 268-284.

¹²⁷ *JRAD* 29: 144-154. Little is known about this Jean Tawiskaron (Tawizkaron, Ta8ichkaron), whose name bears a strong resemblance to that of Tawiskara, the evil twin in Iroquoian mythology. In 1646 he was said to be “Captain of the Onontchataronons” (Iroquet). His band was ambushed by the Iroquois during the winter of 1647: he was killed, and only five members of his band were said to have escaped. See *JRAD* 29: 144; *JRAD* 30: 234-244. Even less is known about “Makate8anakisitch, Captain of the Mata8chkairini8ek” (Mataoueskarinis), who appears nowhere else in the *Relations*.

Kamiskouaouangachit from their hunt earlier than expected, having been pressed by “the fear of the Iroquois”.¹²⁸

The year 1647 marked the beginning of a decade-and-a-half-long Iroquois offensive against the inhabitants – French, Algonquian, and soon Huron – of the St. Lawrence Valley. This had serious ramifications for the people of Kamiskouaouangachit, who took part in defensive operations with their allies, rebuilt their village’s palisade, and prompted Montmagny to construct a stone fort there.¹²⁹ The state of war heightened the already considerable fluidity of movement. Father Lalemant, writing in 1648, accordingly made no effort to distinguish the neophytes of Kamiskouaouangachit from those of Trois-Rivières in one passage, explaining that “their enemies pursue them so closely that, like frightened pigeons, they fly to the first and safest dovecote that they find.”¹³⁰ Passing through Kamiskouaouangachit once again in what must have been an effort to find refuge and coordinate a broader Algonquian response to the threat posed by the enemy, Tessouat was exhorted by Tekouerimat, as on many occasions before, to embrace the faith. “I will have no one near me who does not firmly believe in God”, he warned.¹³¹

Only in 1649 was work on the stone enclosure projected two years earlier actually begun, and only in 1651 did the mission finally find itself with a “good and strong wall, which is flanked at the four corners and can withstand the assaults of the Iroquois”. As a result, people apparently regrouped themselves at Kamiskouaouangachit “all the more willingly”.

¹²⁸ *JRAD* 30: 160, 230-244; Guy Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation, Ursuline (1599-1672): Correspondance* (Solemes : Abbaye Saint-Pierre, 1971), pp. 325-327; Dollier de Casson, *Histoire*, p. 107; *JRAD* 30: 154.

¹²⁹ *JRAD* 30: 172; *JRAD* 31: 170-180, 192-194. See also *JRAD* 30: 283-288; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, pp. 330-331.

¹³⁰ *JRAD* 32: 238.

¹³¹ *JRAD* 33: 52-54.

Tekouerimat, who remained at the head of the community in Etinechkawat's old age, gave these newcomers "clearly to understand that the walls which had been built there were not for the purpose of sheltering vice, but of preventing it from entering."¹³² In a parallel effort to bolster the defenses of the St. Lawrence's inhabitants, Tekouerimat and the Jesuit Gabriel Druillettes travelled up the Chaudière and down the Kennebec to ask both the Abenaki residents of the region and, less successfully, the authorities of northern New England for "assistance against the Iroquois". The pair at the same time undertook efforts to broaden the alliance from the familiar Eastern Abenakis of the Kennebec to the more distant and less familiar Western Abenakis, including the Sokokis.¹³³

Tekouerimat at the same time begged for assistance from the French. "[W]e see ourselves dying and being exterminated every day", he lamented in a letter he dictated in 1651 for his good friend Father Le Jeune, who had gone back to France. "The Iroquois are weak, but you are strong; the Iroquois are few in number, but you are very numerous. If you wish to destroy our enemy utterly, you will do it, and give us life once more." In a subsequent letter he was equally insistent: "Make haste to come, and to bring us many sword-bearers, in order to drive away the Iroquois from our heads. We shall soon be departed souls; do not wait until we are in the grave before coming to see us. [...] Speak to the great Captain of France, and tell him that the Dutch of these coasts are causing our destruction, by furnishing firearms in abundance, and at a low price, to the Iroquois, our enemies. Tell him to give aid to those who are baptized. That is all I have to say."¹³⁴

Tekouerimat's apparent despair reflected a new state of affairs. The phase during which

¹³² *JRAD* 34: 62; *JRAD* 36: 192-194. Three years earlier, the neophytes of La Conception had similarly decided to limit the access of the fort at Trois-Rivières to Christians and catechumens. See *JRAD* 35: 236.

¹³³ *JRAD* 36: 101-105, 129, 139-141; *JRAD* 38: 173-175; *JRAD* 40: 195-209; Druillettes, *Journal of an embassy*; "Rapport du R.P. Druillettes".

¹³⁴ *JRAD* 37: 76-78; *JRAD* 38: 64-66

Algonquians regrouped themselves “all the more willingly” at Kamiskouaouangachit, because of its heavily fortified state, did not last long. It was to the ravages of epidemic diseases and brandy that French commentators and historians after them would attribute the fact that the mission’s Montagnais and increasingly assimilated – “Montagnicised” – Algonquin inhabitants largely abandoned it in favour of Tadoussac, the Saguenay River, and Lac Saint-Jean from the early 1650s through the 1660s.¹³⁵ The intensification of the Iroquois offensive, however, represented a much more disruptive force. Much of the appeal of village coalescence near French settlement lay in the security that it afforded. Quebec, the heart of the French colony, was sufficiently distant from Iroquoia and well buffered by Trois-Rivières so as to remain protected through the intermittent warfare of the 1640s. As the Iroquois demonstrated their ability to strike with impunity at the colony’s heart through the 1650s, the mission village and its vicinity began to lose its initial appeal.

Agricultural work – which the missions’ Algonquian inhabitants practiced on a small scale and with little enthusiasm to begin with – took on an increasingly precarious dimension, as field workers made attractive targets to enemy marauders. Fishing, hunting, and foraging in the vicinity also became dangerous occupations. A 1650 memorandum indicates that because over the last “year or two that their Iroquois enemies have become more fearsome, and that they feared more their incursions”, the Christians had not dared to set up fishing encampments at the nearby Pointe à Puiseaux, a short distance downstream from the mission, as they had done in years past. Contestations over the fishing rights formerly enjoyed at other points along the shore, pitting the neophytes against the new Governor, Louis d’Ailleboust de Coulonge, and his

¹³⁵ *JRAD* 60: 131; *JRAD* 62: 259-261; Saint-Vallier, *Estat présent de l’Église et de la colonie française dans la Nouvelle-France* (Quebec: Augustin Côté et Cie., 1856), p. 68. See also Campeau, *Catastrophe démographique sur les Grands Lacs*, p. 117; Jetten, *Enclaves amérindiennes*, p. 61; Ronda, “The Sillery Experiment”, p. 15.

employees, only compounded these difficulties.¹³⁶ The fact that Etouet, the Captain of Tadoussac, “gave the district most abounding in game” in his parts to Tekouerimat during the winter of 1647-1648 points not only to the strong ties between the two men and their followers but perhaps also to the people of Kamiskouaouangachit’s need to gain access to more distant, safer hunting grounds.¹³⁷ The arrival of hundreds of Huron refugees in the Quebec region beginning in the summer of 1650, another consequence of the Iroquois offensive and the focus of the next chapter, further contributed to the mission’s decline. For one thing, it is likely that the arrival of these newcomers, the pressures on the region’s environment, and the shifting of missionary resources to the new missions contributed to edging out Kamiskouaouangachit’s first inhabitants. For another, the arrival of the Hurons, whom the Iroquois were intent on incorporating through diplomacy or violence, ensured that the enemy’s interest and presence in the region remained high.

In the end, the relationship between fear, faith, and village formation had been a far more complicated and contradictory one than the missionaries had at first perceived. Just as the threat of Iroquois depredations could encourage coalescence, it could as easily discourage it. By 1655, the Jesuits observed that the Iroquois were “incessantly prowling about this village”, bent on “the destruction of the Christian Algonquins and Hurons, whose shattered remnant we preserved in the fort of Sillery”.¹³⁸ A fire, which destroyed the Jesuits’ residence, church, and most of the houses in June of the following year was a disaster from which the already battered community does not appear to have recovered. Beginning in 1660, as the Algonquin and Montagnais inhabitants of Kamiskouaouangachit withdrew, the missionaries began to cede lands surrounding

¹³⁶ Ragueneau, “Mémoire du P. Paul Ragueneau sur la pêche de l’anguille”, October 1650, in *MNF* 7: 685. See also Jean de Quen, “Requête d’opposition à la prise de possession de la pêcherie d’anguilles”, c. October 1650, *MNF* 7: 682.

¹³⁷ *JRAD* 32: 270.

¹³⁸ *JRAD* 42: 262-266.

the old mission to colonists.¹³⁹ Though the Montagnais and Algonquins who withdrew from Kamiskouaouangachit continued to retain an attachment to Christianity and to the French, and to retain the site as a ritual and occasional diplomatic centre, they ceased to exist as “Christians of St. Joseph”.

¹³⁹ *JRAD* 43: 48-50; Ronda, “The Sillery Experiment”, pp. 8-9; Jetten, *Enclaves amérindiennes*, p. 61.

CHAPTER 2
WITH THEIR CONSENT OR BY FORCE:
Establishing a Huron Colony in the St. Lawrence Valley, 1650-1666.

“The design of the Iroquois, as far as I can see,” observed the Jesuit missionary Isaac Jogues in June of 1643, “is to take, if they can, all the Hurons and, having put to death the most considerable ones and a good part of the others, to make of them but one people and only one land”.¹ There was considerable truth to this, though a more careful look reveals a process shaped by more than captures and executions. Iroquois warriors and ambassadors in turn negotiated with, cajoled, and threatened their opponents, interweaving generous pledges of unity and renewal with reminders that noncompliance would be met with ruthless violence. As a subsequent French commentator put it, “They exert their industry to engage the other nation to give themselves up to them; they send them gifts and the most skilled people of their nation to harangue them, and to let them know that if they do not give themselves up they will not be able to avoid destruction [...]; yet on the contrary, if they were willing to surrender and disperse in their longhouses, they would become the masters of the other men [...]”²

Scholarly emphasis on Iroquoian mourning *wars* and the experience of captivity has tended to obscure the extent to which force and persuasion were part and parcel of a broader socio-cultural pattern of incorporation.³ The motif of using speech rather than violence to eliminate and integrate outsiders featured prominently in the traditional accounts of the Iroquois

¹ JRAD 24: 297.

² Antoine-Denis Raudot, *Relation par lettres de l'Amérique septentrionale, années 1709 et 1710*, ed. Camille de Rochemonteix (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1904), p. 184. See also, for example, JRAD 36: 183-185; JRAD 43: 187-189.

³ See for example Richter, “War and Culture” and *The Ordeal of the Longhouse*; Viau, *Enfants du néant*; Brandão, *Your Fyre Shall Burn No More*, etc. For studies that draw more attention to the relationship of peace and war, see Dennis, *Cultivating a Landscape of Peace*; Jon Parmenter, *The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534-1701* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010).

League's founding: in times immemorial, the Great Peacemaker Deganawida had used words to transform Hiawatha from a cannibal warrior to a messenger of peace; later, the pair had gone on to use reason to straighten the twisted mind and body of the tyrannical Tadodaho, converting him to the ways of peace.⁴ The rhetoric used by Iroquois diplomats and warriors through the 1640s and 1650s was similarly conciliatory. As one Mohawk deputy explained to a gathering of Hurons in an attempt to incite their resettlement: "Fear not, I no longer look upon you as an enemy, but as my relative. You shall be cherished in my country, which shall also be yours." On another occasion, an Onondaga explained to a Huron assembly that his country "would be to them a promised land".⁵

Picking up on the previous chapter's discussion of incorporative warfare, this chapter examines two parallel processes: the Iroquois efforts to incorporate the Hurons, and the latter's search for a "promised land" from the late 1650s to the mid 1660s. Weakened through the 1630s and 1640s by devastating epidemics and by the ensuing disruption of subsistence activities, and further destabilized by divisions created by the parallel dissemination of Christianity by missionaries and proselytes, the Attignawantan, Attigeneenongnahac, Arendarhonon, Tahontaenrat, and Ataronchronon who together made up the Huron Confederacy were poorly equipped to repulse Iroquois incursions. Gaining in intensity through the 1640s, Iroquois campaigns culminated in an all-out offensive against the Huron homeland between 1649 and 1651. One by one, its villages fell to the invaders.⁶ As Iroquois military supremacy grew

⁴ For the Deganawidah epic and the combing of Tadodaho, see William Beauchamp, *Iroquois Folk Lore, Gathered from the Six Nations of New York* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Dehler Press, 1922), pp. 66-68. On the centrality of themes of peace in Iroquois myths and rituals, see Dennis, *Cultivating a Landscape of Peace*.

⁵ *JRAD* 43: 186-188; *JRAD* 45: 60.

⁶ The most satisfactory general account of the Huron dispersal is that given by Bruce Trigger, though for him and many other scholars of the Hurons the period after 1650 represents little more than a cursory epilogue to the history of Huronia. See Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, chs 8-11; Conrad Heidenreich, *Huronia: A History and Geography of the Huron Indians, 1600-1650*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), pp. 264-277.

increasingly indisputable, a mounting number of Hurons gave serious thought, in the words of two of their captains, “throwing themselves into the arms of the enemy”.⁷

Meanwhile, over six hundred individuals sought safety in the St. Lawrence Valley, founding there what colonial observers called a “Huron Colony” and making a place for themselves at the heart of the Franco-Aboriginal political sphere. It was not long, however, before these refugees discovered that the Mohawks and Onondagas were persistent in their efforts to “remove them [...] either with their consent or by force”⁸ During the decade that followed, the Huron community which had made its home on Île d’Orléans and then in the town of Quebec saw its population shrink: a fraction was killed, many were bound and carried away, but most with resignation reached the conclusion that colonial officials and missionaries were incapable of offering the protection and opportunities for regeneration that they so desperately needed. For the outstanding majority of the refugees from Huronia, migration to the St. Lawrence Valley had merely delayed a seemingly inevitable exodus to Iroquoia. Still, those who cast their lot with the French in the hopes of retaining an identity distinct from that of their former enemy would in time see themselves vindicated and their foe humbled.

The tendency among colonial chroniclers and contemporary historians to generalize about “the Hurons” and “the Iroquois” (or “the Five Nations”) has obscured the extent to which Iroquoian war was a fundamentally local matter, and the ways in which patterns of incorporation were shaped by narrow solidarities. As implied in the previous chapter’s discussion of mobilization, the basic social, political, and cultural unit was the community or village. It was at that level, and secondarily at the level of the nation – a cluster of adjacent villages, normally –

⁷ *JRAD* 35: 192.

⁸ *JRAD* 43: 200.

that leadership manifested itself and that political and military support could be mustered. To be sure, clans did foster solidarity across national boundaries, in a way that facilitated the concerted action of warriors from different nations, and confederacy-wide councils provided mechanisms for maintaining internal peace as well as a forum in which broader support could be mustered. As Paul Le Jeune observed, the Iroquois consequently had a tendency to “lend a hand to one another in their wars”.⁹ The same could have been said of the Hurons. Notwithstanding, both the Iroquois League and Huron Confederacy of the mid-seventeenth century remained loosely knit formations which lacked the means of elaborating and carrying out a unified foreign policy.¹⁰ As this chapter and the fourth demonstrate, effectively concerted military or diplomatic action involving more than a few constituent nations was the exception rather than the norm throughout this period.

Divergences were readily apparent in the Iroquois offensive. The thrust of the 1640s against the Hurons was spearheaded by the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas; it was not until the fall of 1646 that the Mohawks and Oneidas, who had until then had focused their own energies towards the St. Lawrence Valley and beyond the Hudson River, joined in the offensive against the Huron homeland. By late 1647 tensions were surfacing between the Onondagas, who with Caygua and Oneida support were willing to make peace with the enemy, and the Mohawks, who with Seneca support were set against it. During the winter that followed, a group of Mohawks scuttled the possibility of accommodation by ambushing a Huron embassy on its way to Onondaga country. Through 1648 and 1649, the Onondagas, Cayugas, and Oneidas persisted in seeking peace, whereas the Mohawks and Senecas carried out a massive and critical assault on

⁹ *JRAD* 21: 20.

¹⁰ William N. Fenton, “Locality as a Basic Factor in the Development of Iroquois Social Structure”, in William N. Fenton, ed., *Symposium on Local Diversity in Iroquois Culture* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1951), pp. 35-54.

Huronian. It was only towards the end of 1649, with the total defeat of the Huron Confederacy in sight, that the Onondagas returned to the fray. Competition between the League's western and eastern nations over the privilege of incorporating the survivors would persist for a decade at least.¹¹

In the same way, the paths of the constituent nations of the Huron Confederacy – the Attignawantan (People of the Bear), Attigeenongnahac (People of the Cord), Arendarhonon (People of the Rock), Tahontaenrat (People of the Deer), and Ataronchronon (People of the Marshes, who may or may not have been recognized as a distinct constitutive nation) – diverged and converged under pressure from the Iroquois. In 1647, while the Attignawantan were willing to put up armed resistance and for that purpose sought the alliance of the Susquehannocks of what is now southern New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, it was the Arendarhonon under the leadership of their principal headman Jean-Baptiste Atironta who entered into peace negotiations with the Onondagas.¹² It may be that the Attignawantan, as the oldest and largest segment of the Huron Confederacy, of which until recently they had represented a full half and whose political affairs they still tended to dominate, were more confident in their ability to match arms with the enemy. The fact that the Arendarhonon had a smaller population and that they occupied the exposed eastern frontier of Huronia, towards Lake Simcoe, may meanwhile explain why they felt less confident in their ability to sustain a drawn-out conflict and more inclined to parley.¹³

¹¹ For the most detailed account of the offensive against Huronia, see Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, pp. 725-788.

¹² *JRAD* 33: 70-184; François Dollier de Casson, and Marcel Trudel and Marie Baboyant, eds., *Histoire du Montreal* (Ville La Salle, Quebec: Hurtubise, 1992), pp. 112-113; Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, pp. 725-788.

¹³ While most authors speak like myself of a "Huron Confederacy", it should be noted that John Steckley has argued that this term may not accurately describe the nature of the alliance which united the Huron people. He points out that unlike the Iroquois, the Hurons do not appear to have had a founding myth for their association; their alliance may accordingly have been in an emerging or still unfinished state during the first half of the seventeenth century. On the Huron Confederacy and the respective importance of its constituent nations, see Trigger, *Children of*

The next wave of Mohawk and Seneca attacks in 1647 left no doubt that the Arendarhonon were especially vulnerable. Before the year was over they were compelled to abandon their villages and seek refuge in other Huron communities, primarily those of the Attigneenongnahac, the second oldest and second most important nation of the confederacy. The following year, though, the Attigneenongnahac villages were in turn beset by Mohawk and Seneca warriors. In 1649, the Attigneenongnahac villages that had held out were overrun, as were those of the Ataronchronon. The Jesuit mission of Sainte-Marie on the Wye River was also assaulted, forcing the droves who had sought refuge there to seek it elsewhere.¹⁴

Through these years, recognizing that resistance had become unfeasible and that to accept the enemy's invitations was the surest way to survive, men, women, and children crossed over by the thousands, individually or in groups of various sizes. The mix of reluctance, calculation, and impulsivity that factored into the decision varied from one person to the next. In most cases, crossing over was a half-hearted, desperate act of self-preservation; an ultimate resort to avoid certain death on the battlefield or at the stake. No doubt many thought of it as a temporary solution, insofar as they may have hoped to make an escape as soon as favourable circumstances presented themselves, or expected that within a few years their hosts would allow them to leave on their own terms. But all were not so reluctant. Indeed, there were among the "enemy" an ever growing number of friends and relatives. Already before the campaigns of the 1640s, as a result of earlier conflicts and peacetime encounters, individuals of Huron origin could be found residing among the Iroquois and vice versa.¹⁵

Aataentsic, pp. 30, 54-59, 156-163, 730-744, 789; Heidenreich, *Huron*, pp. 75-90, 264-277, 300-302; Steckley, *Words of the Huron*, pp. 23-46.

¹⁴ Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, pp. 742-756.

¹⁵ See for example *JRAD* 34`24-34, 140-142.

For Hurons staunchly opposed to the growing influence of Jesuit missionaries after 1634 and to their countrymen's appropriation of the newcomer's religion, relocation to Iroquoia offered a means of holding on to a traditional way of life and the stability that they associated with it. Many of the Hurons in Iroquoia whom colonial chroniclers were quick to label "captives" can more accurately be thought of as "refugees". Among their new hosts they proclaimed that it was the Christian faith and prayer which "had attracted all sorts of misfortunes on their nation, which had infected it with contagious diseases, which had made their hunting and fishing less productive, than when they lived following their ancient customs."¹⁶ The ever growing presence of Hurons in Iroquoia, ranging from eager refugees to reluctant captives, had a snowballing effect. As the two captains cited in the chapter's opening explained it to their missionaries in the spring of 1650, many of their people had among the Iroquois "a great number of relatives who wish for them, and counsel them to make their escape as soon as possible from a desolated country if they do not wish to perish beneath its ruins".¹⁷

¹⁶ Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, p. 323.

¹⁷ *JRAD* 35: 193. Along the same lines, a Mohawk orator argued to a group of Hurons in 1653 that they would find in their villages "their kinsfolk who had been formerly carried away captive, and who bore their absence only with regret and inconsolable sadness. He said they were waiting for them with love, and would receive them with joy." *JRAD* 41: 47. Beyond the ties of immediate biological kinship, it is possible that the broader spiritual kinship of clan structures also played a role in the social integration of these voluntary migrants: Huron men and women belonging to the Turtle, Wolf, Bear, Beaver, Deer and Hawk clans may have recognized a special affinity to the Iroquois who belonged to the clans of the same name, and vice versa. I have found no evidence of this, however. On Huron clans, see Steckley, *Words of the Huron*, pp. 47-67; and "Clans and Phratries of the Hurons", *Ontario Archaeology* 37 (1982), pp. 29-34; Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, p. 102. On Iroquoian clans more broadly, see Elizabeth Tooker, "Northern Iroquoian Sociopolitical Organization", *American Anthropologist*, 72, 1 (1970): 92-94; "Clans and Moieties in North America", *Current Anthropology*, 12, 3 (June 1971): 357-376.

Huron and Iroquois Clans						
Clan	Huron	Seneca	Cayuga	Onondaga	Oneida	Mohawk
Bear	X	X	X	X	X	X
Deer	X	X	X	X	X	X
Turtle	X	X	X	X	X	X
Beaver	X	X	X	X		
Wolf	X	X	X	X		

Most dramatically, the Tahontaenrats and a large number of Arendarhonon, after failing to find safety among the Neutrals, would give themselves over freely to the Senecas and collectively resettle among them in 1651. Describing the results of this migration, the missionary Paul Ragueneau noted that these Hurons “now live as peacefully” with the Senecas “as if they had never been at war.” Instead of joining preexisting communities these migrants formed a satellite village apart from those of the Senecas where they lived, according to Paul Le Jeune, “satisfied to be united with them in good feeling and friendship.”¹⁸ One of the advantages of collective, voluntary resettlement, thus, was the possibility of retaining a distinctive cultural identity, and no doubt a measure of political autonomy. Perhaps these Huron migrants hoped, in time, to be formally recognized and integrated within the Iroquois League on equal footing with its other five constituent nations.

While many Huron men and women were choosing to “to throw themselves into the arms of the enemy” individually or in groups during the assault on their desolated homeland, others were intent on avoiding incorporation among the Iroquois. Some scattered in small groups in the forests north of Lake Huron or west towards Lake Michigan and Superior, while others sought

Hawk	X	X	X	X		
Fox	X					
Loon/Sturgeon	X					
Snipe		X	X			
Heron		X				
Eel			X	X		
Ball				X		
Sources: Steckley, <i>Words of the Huron</i> , pp. 47-67; Tooker, “Clans and Moieties in North America”, pp. 357-376.						

¹⁸ The village established among the Senecas, known to the French as Saint-Michel after the name of the former mission to the Tahontaenrat, was almost certainly that of Gandougarae. *JRAD* 36: 143, 179; *JRAD* 44: 21; *JRAD* 45: 243; *JRAD* 57: 193. See also Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, pp. 789-792.

refuge in vain among neighbouring Iroquoian groups, the Petuns, Neutrals, and Eries. A few even contemplated finding refuge among their distant Susquehannock allies.¹⁹ A significant number of those who had embraced the newcomers' faith and alliance for their part resolved to cast their lot with the French, relocating first within Huronia, and eventually to the St. Lawrence Valley and the vicinity of Quebec.

For a people to seek temporary or permanent refuge in the arms of a friendly nation, even a distant one, was not an uncommon occurrence in the Great Lakes region, or for that matter throughout Aboriginal North America. It represented an extension of the notions of hospitality and of the mutual obligations that undergirded alliance, friendship, and trade. Missionaries had witnessed the prevalence of this firsthand:

“It is customary among these peoples, even with the unbelievers, that, when a nation seeks refuge in any foreign country, those who receive them immediately distribute them over different households, where they not only give them lodging, but also the necessities of life [...]. I have very often seen this hospitality practiced among the Hurons: as many times as we have seen nations devastated, or villages destroyed, or some fugitive people, seven or eight hundred persons would find, as soon as they arrived, benevolent hosts, who stretched out to them their arms, and assisted them with joy, who would even divide among them a share in lands already sown, in order that they might be able to live, although in a foreign country, as in their motherland.”²⁰

For these former hosts to displaced populations, the tables had turned.

Neither was the idea of resettlement in the St. Lawrence Valley entirely new. Through the 1630s and 1640s, several Hurons spent time there, having come to trade, take part in military operations, or receive religious instruction. They commonly remained for several months at a time at Quebec and Sillery, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal, particularly when the onset of winter

¹⁹ *JRAD* 34: 222; *JRAD* 35: 192; Trigger, *Children of Aataenstic*, pp. 776-779, 783, 789-797.

²⁰ *JRAD* 35: 206-208. Here I have translated “Patrie” as “motherland”.

or enemy blockades delayed their return journey.²¹ As early as 1637, the Jesuits dreamed that the handful of Huron seminarians at Quebec would form the core of a permanent community there, and that within a few years “there would be here a village of Christian Hurons, who would help in no slight degree to bring their compatriots to the faith, through commerce with each other”. It was hoped that their sedentary way of life would incite the nomadic Montagnais and Algonquins to settle down and adopt a more disciplined lifestyle.²² After the founding of Ville-Marie on the island of Montreal in 1642, some Hurons, like the Ottawa River Algonquins, showed an interest in resettling there as long as the French were willing and able to provide them with assistance against their Iroquois enemy.²³

The Iroquois invasion of Huronia pressed the issue. In early 1649, the Huron refugees assembled at the fortified but increasingly vulnerable mission of Sainte-Marie dispatched one of their captains – the Christian Arendarhonon chief Jean-Baptiste Atironta, it is almost certain – to Quebec to see if the French might give their assent to their resettlement there and to ask for material assistance to undertake the move.²⁴ As they awaited a response, most of the community fell back with its missionaries to the nearby island of Gahoendoe or Saint-Joseph (today Christian Island), where other Hurons had already taken refuge and where more soon flocked. The hastily fortified mission of Sainte-Marie (II) at Gahonedoe was reported to enclose over a hundred cabins; Ragueneau, overestimating by perhaps a few thousands, claimed that its crowded population reached between 6000 and 8000 persons. After enduring a winter of great

²¹ See for example *JRAD* 30: 164, 172; *JRAD* 32: 160-162; *JRAD* 34: 62; Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, p. 284-287; Trigger, *Children of Aataenstic*, p. 797.

²² *JRAD* 12: 78-80. That said, Étienne Girault de Villeneuve's claim, in his 1762 historical notes on the Hurons, that “a considerable number of Hurons [...] had been settled at Sillery” since its beginning is unsubstantiated in period records. See *JRAD* 70: 207.

²³ *JRAD* 30: 220. See also Champlain, *Works*, 3: 171-172.

²⁴ *JRAD* 34: 222; *JRAD* 35: 39, 202; Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, p. 390.

famine and unrelenting enemy depredations, the majority intended to scatter in the forest, among distant nations, or cross over to the enemy. Some leaders, however, fearing that “The greater number will meet their death where they hope to find life”, and wishing to maintain a measure of social cohesion among their people, were intent on preventing this dispersion.²⁵

In May or June 1650, before Atironta had even returned with an answer, the refugees of Gahonedoe convened a major council to discuss the situation as a result of which two of the eldest captains, said to represent about 600 persons, approached Father Ragueneau. “My brother, take courage” the unnamed men pleaded. “You alone can bestow upon us life, if you will strike a daring blow. Choose a place where you may be able to reassemble us, and prevent this dispersion. Cast your eyes toward Quebec, and transport thither the remnants of this ruined nation. Do not wait until famine and war have slain the last of us. [...] If thou listen to our wishes, we will build a Church under shelter of the fort at Quebec. There, our faith will not die out; and the examples of the Algonquins and of the French will hold us to our duty. Their charity will alleviate, in part, our miseries”.²⁶

Whether or not it was an accurate reflection of the speakers’ religious conviction, the request was couched in terms that were bound to appeal to the Jesuit missionaries at Gahoendoe. After much consultation and prayer for divine guidance, the latter concluded that “God had spoken to us by the lips of these Captains”, and that the time had come to undertake a speedy retreat towards the St. Lawrence Valley. Approximately 300 Hurons, described as “almost all [...] Christians”, thus left in the company of their missionaries on June 10th, 1650. Betraying

²⁵ *JRAD* 35: 182-194. Regarding the Huron refuge to Gahoendoe, see *JRAD* 34: 202-224; *JRAD* 35: 85-87. For Ragueneau’s estimate of the population, *JRAD* 35: 87. See also Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, pp. 770-788.

²⁶ *JRAD* 35: 192-194.

some doubt that this hasty journey into the unknown was the wisest course of action, the other 300 who had also expressed an interest promised to follow after the harvest.²⁷

Passing through the Montreal region and contemplating its advantages, this first group of refugees gave some thought to establishing themselves there but decided against it owing to its exposure to the enemy.²⁸ They reached Quebec after a seven-week journey, on July 28th. About a third was taken in by the Augustines, the Ursulines, and their benefactor Marie-Madeleine de la Peltrie, as well as three or four other prominent townspeople. The others established encampments close to the Hôtel-Dieu or on the Jesuit estates of Beauport and Sillery.²⁹

In all likelihood the Algonquians of Kamiskouaouangachit held a council to welcome the newcomers, whom they recognized as “their Ancestors’ allies” and who had become brothers in the Christian faith. “Since I was baptized,” explained one captain on another occasion, “it seems to me that I have gained a great many relatives. When I enter the Frenchmen's Church; I am told that the French are my relatives. When I see a baptized Huron, I look upon him as my relative”.³⁰ It is nevertheless apparent that the Algonquians, Hurons, and French allies and relatives decided against an attempt to integrate the two very different communities. The governor, the missionaries, and the Hurons themselves instead set their sights on the southwestern point of the as yet sparsely cleared or populated Île d’Orléans, in the St. Lawrence River two leagues east of Quebec. In the final week of March, 1651, the Hurons who had been scattered throughout the region gathered at the concession which the missionaries had secured

²⁷ *JRAD* 35: 182-198, 208-214; *JRAD* 36: 58.

²⁸ *JRAD* 35: 208-214.

²⁹ *JRAD* 35: 39, 208-214; *JRAD* 36: 44, 54, 58; Albert Jamet, ed., *Annales de l’Hôtel-Dieu de Québec*, (1939), pp. 73-74. The latter chronicle appears to confuse the Hurons who wintered there in 1649-1650 and those who arrived in the spring of 1650.

³⁰ For Tekouerimat’s description of the Hurons as his “Ancestors’ allies”, see *JRAD* 40: 208. For the description of Hurons as relatives, see *JRAD* 37: 148.

there for that purpose. A few months later they were joined by the 300 who had remained behind at Gahoendoe, who after fleeing north to Manitoulin Island had resolved to join their countrymen at Quebec.³¹

The refugee community that the French took to referring to as the “Huron Colony” quickly appropriated the site. They spent the spring and summer clearing fields and erecting cabins, and, though rumours of an impending enemy campaign that fall brought them to seek greater safety by encamping in front of Quebec’s parish church, they soon returned to the island. They claimed, according to one missionary, “to have found there their second country”.³² It is likely that they understood this latest relocation as a traumatic continuity, rather than a clean break, within their social and cultural experience – an oddly fitting one, given that the literal meaning of their name, Wendat, was “Islanders”. By taking to calling this latest home “the Island of Saint Mary”, they emphasized the link between it and the defunct Christian mission in their homeland.³³ It is not impossible that the Iroquoian practice of matrilocality also influenced this name choice, with the Virgin Mary standing in as mother to the new Christian community.

As the Petuns, Neturals, and Eries in turn fell to the Iroquois onslaught, a number of Hurons who had initially sought refuge among them reoriented their own sights towards the

³¹ On the Hurons settlement at Île d’Orléans, see *JRAD* 36: 116; *JRAD* 70: 207; Léonard Garreau (?), responding “au nom de tuteur des pauvres Sauvages Hurons”, to Sieur de Beaulieu and Éléonore de Grandmaison, 1652 (?), ANQ-Q, P1000, S3, file 814, 1960-01-004/44; Pierre-Joseph-Marie Chaumonot, *Un missionnaire des Hurons : Autobiographie du Père Chaumonot de la Compagnie de Jésus et son complément*, ed. Félix Martin (Paris: H. Oudin, 1885), pp. 109-110; Nicolas Perrot, *Moeurs, coutumes et religion des Sauvages de l’Amérique septentrionale*, ed. Pierre Berthiaume (Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2004), p. 330; Marcel Trudel, *Le Terrier du Saint-Laurent en 1663* (Ottawa: Éditions de l’Université d’Ottawa, 1973), map 11 and pp. 80-82; Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, pp. 782-788.

³² Idem. For references to the “colony”, see *JRAD* 35: 214; *JRAD* 36: 202.

³³ For references to the “Island of Saint-Mary”, see *JRAD* 36: 202; Chaumonot, *Un missionnaire des Hurons*, pp. 109-110; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, pp. 465-466. The first of these sources seems to indicate that the name was an indigenous innovation, rather than a missionary one.

French colony. They continued to trickle to the St. Lawrence Valley, some settling on Île d'Orléans, others instead remaining for a time in the vicinity of Trois-Rivières and Montreal to hunt and fish. By 1653, the total number of these refugees was generously estimated to be between 500 and 600 individuals, and this at a time when the French population of the Laurentian colony numbered approximately 1500.³⁴ This was a heterogeneous population, which contained elements from each of the constituent nations of the now defunct Confederacy, although given the tendency of French chroniclers to lump "Hurons" together the representation of each is uncertain. It is likely that the Attignawantan predominated, as they had been the most numerous nation of the Confederacy and the one which included the largest number of Christian converts; the Attigeneongnahac and Arendarhonon were also well represented, even if most of the Arendahronon had apparently joined the Senecas at the same time as the Tohontaenrats.³⁵

Maintaining the integrity of this refugee community proved something of a challenge. Although a wooden palisade, of dimensions comparable to the fort abandoned on Gahoendoe, was built near their cabins at Île d'Orléans to serve as a fallback position, the men and women who continued to travel up and down the St. Lawrence Valley to hunt, fish, and liaise with friends and relatives, remained a privileged target of Iroquois assaults and overtures.³⁶ Among the Five Nations the ambition to incorporate the Hurons was as strong as ever. The persistence of a Huron community interfered with the smooth assimilation of captives and reluctant migrants already living in Iroquoia, insofar as it represented the hope of freedom and an invitation to

³⁴ For evidence of additional arrivals, see for example *JRAD* 36: 144. For the estimate of the Huron population, see *JRAD* 41: 138. The estimate of 1500 for the French population at this time is Marcel Trudel's. See *Histoire de la Nouvelle-France 3 - 2, La seigneurie des Cent-Associés : La Société* (Montreal: Fides, 1983), p. 92. In May 1651 messengers arrived to Trois-Rivières who reported that some of the Tahontaenrat and Arendarhonon who had been living with the Neutrals were coming to join those who had taken refuge in the St. Lawrence Valley. There is no evidence, however, that they ever arrived. *JRAD* 36: 179; Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, p. 791.

³⁵ See *supra*.

³⁶ See for example *JRAD* 36: 118-122, 132-134, 188-190; *JRAD* 37: 104-110.

escape. In addition, the St. Lawrence refugees' willingness to migrate and capacity to adapt to their colonial hosts and new surroundings may have given the impression that they would as easily adapt to Iroquoia.

The Mohawks, in particular, sent raiding parties to the St. Lawrence with increasing frequency from 1650 to 1653, striking against Algonquians, Hurons, and Frenchmen alike. Their encounters with Hurons could be cordial, for the refugees were invariably interested in receiving news of their relatives in Iroquoia and might yet be persuaded to join them. These war parties in fact often included a small number of adoptees, whom French chroniclers described as "Hurons, turned Iroquois" or "Renegade and Iroquoiscized Hurons".³⁷ But Iroquois or even Iroquoiscized warriors were not always in a mood to discuss. During these three years a minimum of forty Hurons were captured or killed in the region, most of them in the vicinity of Montreal and Trois-Rivières, representing between five and ten percent of the men and women who had taken refuge among the French. Even though some of these captives managed a subsequent escape, this constituted a substantial and demoralizing population loss.³⁸ The Huron refugees responded in kind when possible, tormenting and killing the enemies who occasionally fell in their hands – their precarious position, coupled with the fact that their defensive operations only netted male captives, meant that adopting enemies was unfeasible at this juncture.³⁹

In the summer and fall of 1653, the Onondagas and Mohawks each initiated a decisive rapprochement with the French and the Hurons. Towards the end of June, sixty Onondagas approached Montreal and exchanged gifts with the officials there. Then, in July, a group of

³⁷ *JRAD* 36: 142, 188; *JRAD* 38: 550; *JRAD* 40: 120; Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, p. 621. For an earlier example, see *JRAD* 33: 118; *JRAD* 34: 24-34.

³⁸ *JRAD* 35: 58; *JRAD* 36: 132-134, 148; *JRAD* 37: 94-96, 100, 104, 110, 114-116; *JRAD* 38: 48, 52, 168-170, 176-178; Trigger, *Children of Aataentisc*, pp. 805-6.

³⁹ For the activity of Huron warriors, see for example *JRAD* 38: 52; *JRAD* 40: 96.

Oneidas brought a wampum belt of their own to Montreal, hoping to be party to the Onondagas' peace – and warning, at the same time, that a force of 600 Mohawks had set out for Trois-Rivières with hostile intentions. Whatever the intentions of these Mohawks may have been, in late August they too began informal parleys through the intermediary of several Hurons, as a result of which the Mohawk headman Teharihogen formalized a truce.⁴⁰

Travelling to Quebec in the first week of September, an Onondaga delegation accompanied by a few Mohawks, met with Governor Lauson, the Algonquians of Kamiskouaouangachit, and the Hurons in their village on Île d'Orléans. During the meeting that followed the Onondaga ambassador pointed out "that a careful distinction must be made between nation and nation; that the Onnontaëronnons [Onondaga] were not faithless, like the Anniehronnon [Mohawk] Iroquois, who cherish, deep in their breast, their rancor and bitterness of heart, while their tongues are uttering fair words." During a second meeting the Mohawks again made pledges of goodwill, Tekouerimat, principal chief of Kamiskouaouangachit, spoke out to reproach them for their past treacheries, and advised them that if they were truly interested in peace they ought to send back the women whom they were holding in captivity so that they might come back to dwell in "the country of the Algonquins". The unnamed Huron captain who spoke last was more conciliatory than either the Onondaga or the Algonquin, however. Turning to Tekouerimat, he declared that "the old disputes must now be forgotten" and that the Algonquins should not abuse the blessings of Heaven in such a time of triumph. During the first week of November, a more substantial Mohawk delegation arrived at Quebec to ratify the peace with Lauson.⁴¹

⁴⁰ *JRAD* 38: 172-174, 178-180; *JRAD* 40: 88-92, 112-116, 164-190.

⁴¹ *JRAD* 38: 194; *JRAD* 40: 164-168, 182-190, 196.

Historians who have looked into this period have tended to focus on the Franco-Iroquois relation, and to identify the desire of trading with the French as the major Iroquois motivation for entering into peace negotiations at this juncture. There was, however, a parallel and equally – if not *more* – crucial stake at play.⁴² Unbeknownst to colonial officials and missionaries, Mohawk and Onondaga ambassadors each in turn approached the Hurons in the fall of 1653, with wampum belts and gifts, in a renewed effort to induce their resettlement. How the Mohawks went about this is best documented. During the night that followed the conclusion of the peace accord in early November, Teharihogen visited the Hurons in secret and “told them plainly that the purpose of his journey was to sever their connection” with the French, “and to transfer their Huron colony to his own country”. The negotiations with Lauson, he further revealed, “was only meant to conceal their game” and to give his delegation “more means of speaking with us [the Hurons] without suspicion, and of conducting this whole affair smoothly and effectively.” The Huron leaders responded to the Mohawks, as they did to the Onondagas, with wampum and gifts of their own which the recipients interpreted as tokens of their willingness to comply.⁴³

A few days after the departure of the Mohawk ambassadors in November, the senior captains of the Hurons (among whom Jacques Oachonk and Louis Taieronk may have numbered) revealed to the missionaries and governor what had occurred. Displaying the wampum belts “of rare beauty” that the Mohawks had offered in secret, they explained that they

⁴² Some scholars have thus explained the Mohawk-Onondaga tensions during the 1650s merely as a competition for the primacy in diplomatic relations and trade with New France. Lucien Campeau, *Gannentaha : première mission iroquoise, 1653-1665* (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1983), pp. 19-25; Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire : the covenant chain confederation of Indian tribes with English colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster treaty of 1744* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1984), p. 104-109. Others have acknowledged the Huron stake without examining it closely. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 108-109; Dennis, *Cultivating a Landscape of Peace*, pp. 233. Jon Parmenter’s emphasis on the importance of the Huron stake comes closest to my own, though I do not find his broader argument that the Mohawk-Onondaga competition reflected a “debate between competing constructions of the League’s spatial relations with Native and non-Native neighbours” to be convincing. *Edge of the Woods*, pp. 82-114.

⁴³ *JRAD* 38: 198; *JRAD* 41: 44-48.

were presents “from the depths of hell, from a demon who spoke to us in the awful stillness of a dark night – a demon who inspires us with fear, since he loves only darkness and dreads the light.” The captains explained that his people “dared not reject these presents [...] for that would have been to break with them and refuse the peace, which we must try to keep, since we are powerless to carry on war.” Still, they could not help but harbour great misgivings about the Mohawks’ true intentions: “Perhaps, too, they are treating with the French in sincerity, and, while pretending to wish to deceive you [the French], really wish to deceive us [the Hurons], after removing us from under your protection; for he who commits one treachery is capable of committing more than one.” The captains, in revealing this and inviting the advice of the officials and missionaries, declared that they were “resolved to live and die” with them.⁴⁴

The contradictory nature of the pledges made to the Onondagas, Mohawks, and French points to two things. Obviously, the Huron community’s leading figures – the colonial accounts allude only of male headmen, but we must presume that women also exercised a leadership in this matter – and segments were not of a single mind when it came to the question of “living and dying” with the French. Regrettably, the habitual anonymity of the Huron “captains” who crop up in period sources makes it impossible to develop more than a sketchy understanding of the internal politics of the refugee community. We know only that the man who had responded to Mohawk presents with three of his own, giving an apparent indication of his people’s willingness to resettle among them, was Atsena or Le Plat (The Dish), the principal chief of the Attignawantan.⁴⁵ In time, it would become clear that the Attignawantan, Attigeenongnahac, and Arendarhonon disagreed as to the safest, most promising course of action in these trying times.

⁴⁴ *JRAD* 41: 44-48.

⁴⁵ *JRAD* 41: 18. On Atsena (also Atsina, Atsenha, Atchenha) or le Plat, see also *JRAD* 43: 29, 41, 193.

But, above all, the contradictory pledges made until this time and subsequently should be interpreted as an indication that the Hurons were in no hurry to migrate to Iroquoia, and that while a minority was in favour of migration to Mohawk or Onondaga Country, the majority was against it. In late January of 1654, an Onondaga delegation headed by a certain Tsiraenie proceeded to Île d'Orléans to make arrangements for their relocation. In lieu of consensus, ruse would have to do. Meeting in private with a handful of leaders, he proposed that come spring they should bring their people to the Montreal region, asserting that they were interested in resettling there. A band of four or five hundred Onondaga would be waiting for them, to escort them to Onondaga country. Huron headmen reacted differently to this scheme. Three or four of them, reportedly, were ready to go along with it. Tsiraenie advised them to keep this secret even from their wives. It is tempting to interpret this not just as a suggestion that the women were expected to reveal the scheme to others, but as a tantalizing indication that they were more committed to their community's independence from the Iroquois. As heads of households in a matrilineal society, they arguably had more to lose than their men from their people's incorporation into foreign clans and lineages. In any case, some of the men approached by Tsiraenie hesitated. One of them revealed the nature of the discussions to the missionaries, who then found the opportunity to confront the other elders about it. Chiding the latter for having kept these discussions secret, Governor Lauson nevertheless adopted a stance of laissez-faire and stated that he had no objection to their project "since he did not intend to keep his nephews, the Hurons, in captivity." He only advised that they postpone it for two years.⁴⁶

During the public council that followed, the Huron leaders protested to the Onondaga ambassador that "their message had been altered" as their intention had strictly been to "place a

⁴⁶ *JRAD* 41: 20-22, 50-64.

mat” in his country to ensure that their captive relatives living there would not come to harm should hostilities ever resume. Faced with Onondaga insistence, however, they intimated that they were now inclined to go through with the resettlement – as long as they could postpone it for a year, and as long the Onondagas began by welcoming the Jesuits among them in the meantime. “[W]herever our Fathers should decide to go,” the headmen made it known, “the [Huron] colony would follow them.” The governor supported this with presents of his own, exhorting the Onondagas to give a cordial reception to the Hurons, begging them not to pressure those families which were not yet ready to make the journey or otherwise disinclined to undertake it. The Hurons should be allowed freedom to go where they wished, he asserted, “even though some should feel disposed to seek the country of the Anniehronnon Iroquois [Mohawks], and others Sonnontwanne [Senecas]; and even though still others should long for their former country, or choose to continue their abode with the French.”⁴⁷

Judging by their actions and words, the consensus among the Huron refugee community was that the best course of action was to delay the consequential decision of having to accept either Onondaga or Mohawk invitations. It was surely a desire to escape mounting pressures that most of the Hurons who had until then orbited around Trois-Rivières (and who appear to have included Atsena and thus perhaps a core of Attignawantans) removed to the village on Île d’Orléans in April 1654.⁴⁸ This was, on its face, an indication that for the time being at least

⁴⁷ Idem.

⁴⁸ *JRAD* 70: 205-207. Within weeks of Teharihogen’s embassy the year before, a Mohawk delegation visiting Fort Orange had requested that officials there write to their counterparts in Canada to advise that if ever the Mohawks “again got involved in war with the French savages, that the French should keep out of it”. A.J.F. Van Laer, ed., *Minutes of the Court of Fort Orange and Beverwyck, 1652-1656*, (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1920), 1: 90-92. In the summer of 1654, a Mohawk party reportedly led by the Flemish Bastard attacked a Franco-Huron delegation, which included Simon Le Moyne and several Hurons, on its way to Onondaga. Several Hurons were killed, and the remainder captured. An outraged Onondaga member of the escort told the Mohawk assailants: “I declare war on you.” Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, pp. 550-551.

they indeed preferred “to continue their abode with the French”, as Lauson had put it. Picking up on the declaration that the Hurons would be more inclined to relocate among them if they first welcomed a Jesuit mission there, the Onondagas began to ask insistently for an outcome that would see them together in Onondaga Country. In September of 1655, an Onondaga embassy came to confirm their peace with the French, the Algonquins, and the Hurons. The link between the extension of the mission field and the relocation of the mission community was manifest as the chief ambassador reiterated their invitation for the French “to build a new Sainte-Marie, like that whose prosperity we formerly witnessed in the heart of the Huron country”.⁴⁹

On this occasion, the Onondaga orator departed from what had until then been the dominant kinship metaphor of Franco-Aboriginal brotherhood. He described Lauson as both someone who had “cherished the Algonquins and Hurons in his bosom, with all the love of a mother holding her child in her arms”, and who “had sustained life in all the Nations that became your allies and took refuge in your arms”, as well as someone who “now extended to the Iroquois also a father’s care and love”. The Onondaga offered a gift to the governor to symbolically strengthen his arms, urging him to “Clasp them more firmly” and “not tire of embracing them; let them live within your bosom, for you are the father of the country.”⁵⁰ The mixed parental metaphors, like the apparently contradictory call for the governor to release and hold on to his children, suggest an inadequate missionary rendering of the Onondaga speaker’s words and meaning. Given the context, and the fact that the speaker belonged to a matrilineal and matrilocal society, it is plausible that this amounted to a case for the Hurons’ resettlement: while Onontio had acted as a mother to them, he was now becoming their father, that is, allowing them to go reside elsewhere. By urging at the same time that Onontio “clasp them more firmly” and

⁴⁹ *JRAD* 42: 48-58.

⁵⁰ *JRAD* 42: 52-56.

“let them live within [his] bosom”, it seems most plausible that the speaker was asking that he prevent the Hurons from moving to Mohawk Country in the interval.⁵¹

The case for migration was further strengthened by the speech of a “Huron Captain, formerly a captive of the Iroquois [e.g. Onondagas], and now a Captain among them” who had accompanied the embassy. “My brothers”, said this unnamed adoptee, addressing the Hurons in the audience, “I have not changed my soul, despite my change of country; nor has my blood become Iroquois, although I dwell among them. My heart is all Huron, as well as my tongue. I would keep silence, were there any deceit in these negotiations for Peace. Our proposals are honest; embrace them without distrust.” What the Hurons thought of this is not clear. For their part, the Jesuits reached the conclusion that the benefits of founding a mission in Onondaga country – the double opportunity to convert and pacify – outweighed the heavy risks involved for themselves or their flock. From this perspective, the careful injection of their Huron neophytes among the heathen Iroquois would radically advance the spread of Christianity.⁵² Thus it was that, during an embassy to Onondaga in November of that year, Father Pierre-Joseph-Marie Chaumonot assured the local elders that the “Huron question” had been resolved.⁵³

Subsequent events would reveal this to be far from the truth. The conflicting promises made to the Mohawks and Onondagas, or what one missionary commentator described as the

⁵¹ Idem. The earliest recorded formulation of the idea that some of Onontio’s allies were his children, rather than his brothers, occurred in September 1645 when a French embassy in Mohawk country was asked to thank him for restoring the good sense of his Algonquin children. In the fall of 1656, Father Le Moyne referred to the Hurons as the children of Onontio. And the following year, Mohawk delegates who sought the governor’s sanction to carry away the Hurons adopted the same metaphor: “Onontio, ouvre tes bras & laisse aller tes enfants de ton sein.” *JRAD* 43: 46, 188-190, 202-204, 212. On the metaphors and their shift, see Cook, *Vivre comme frères*, pp. 488-490.

⁵² *JRAD* 42: 53, 57-59; *JRAD* 43: 127-133; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, pp. 544-545; Campeau, *Gannentaha*, p. 21; Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, pp. 808-809.

⁵³ *JRAD* 42: 92. There is nevertheless no evidence to go as far as Laflèche does in suggesting that the Hurons were forced by the missionaries to entertain diplomatic relations with the Onondagas. Cf. *Les saints martyrs canadiens. 5. Le martyre de la nation huronne et sa défaite avec Dollard des Ormeaux*, (Laval, Quebec: Éditions du Singulier, 1995), p. 165.

“imprudence of the Huron in giving himself to two masters”, had grave repercussions.⁵⁴

Diplomatically outmaneuvered by the Onondaga, the Mohawks sent a force of three hundred warriors to the St. Lawrence Valley in April 1656 with the intention of resorting to violence if necessary to compel the Hurons to come and live among them, rather than anywhere else. At Trois-Rivières, the regional governor Pierre Boucher attempted with presents to dissuade the warriors from pursuing downriver. Their captains countered with wampum belts of their own, reiterating the solidity of their alliance with the French and promising to return home as long as Onontio was willing to “close the doors of his houses and of his forts against the Onnontageronnon [Onondaga], who wishes to be my enemy”.⁵⁵ If the Mohawks had any intention of returning home, however, these evaporated with the concurrent arrival of an Onondaga ambassador. Aware that this latest development would further irritate the Mohawks, and eager to appease the latter after the recent torture and killing of a Mohawk marauder at Île d’Orléans, Father Simon Le Moyne rushed to meet the advancing army at Trois-Rivières. Following his intervention, the Mohawk force dispersed in search of wild game, allowing the French to believe that a crisis had been averted.⁵⁶

On May 17th, the Onondaga ambassadors and a small number of Senecas who had come with them set out from Quebec back towards Onondaga with of a large contingent of missionaries, lay brothers, and soldiers, who intended to establish a mission settlement on the shores of Lake Gannentaha (Onondaga Lake), as well as a few Hurons.⁵⁷ The presence of the latter – emissaries or migrants – hints at the fact that the migration of the Île d’Orléans

⁵⁴ *JRAD* 43: 78.

⁵⁵ *JRAD* 43: 108-110.

⁵⁶ *JRAD* 43: 108-112. The Onondaga ambassador was Jean-Baptiste Ochionagueras, said to have “embraced the faith two years before” and whose “heart had become quite French”.

⁵⁷ *JRAD* 43: 134; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 582-583. See also Campeau, *Gannentaha*, pp. 19-25.

community continued to be an underlying stake. The departure of this convoy amounted to an evident diplomatic victory of the Onondagas, who by welcoming missionaries were fulfilling the condition set out by the Hurons two years earlier, and promised to usher their massive resettlement. Yet this convoy had travelled no further than ten to twelve leagues from Quebec that its tail was ambushed by the Mohawk force, which had secretly reassembled. Gaining the upper hand with no difficulty, they mistreated the Onondagas and bound the Hurons. After some discussions, the Mohawk assailants relented and freed their captives for “fear of becoming involved in a war” with the Onondagas, explaining unconvincingly that they thought the canoes carried only Hurons – with whom they explained that they were still at war.⁵⁸

News of this skirmish does not appear to have reached French officials at Quebec, nor the Hurons at Île d’Orléans, where the Mohawk force converged three days later. Landing before dawn on May 20th, the raiders scattered in ambush near the fields and caught the villagers by surprise as they went out to till their fields in the morning. While some of the Hurons managed to find refuge in the mission’s fort, a large number was seized and forced to embark in the waiting canoes. The *Relation* for that year reported that 71 persons were captured and killed; Marie de l’Incarnation’s account reported that 85 were captured and six killed outright.⁵⁹

In an effort to maintain the Franco-Mohawk peace, the raiders were careful not to harm the few colonists of the area during the attack. By noon the raiders departed and paddled past Quebec in broad daylight, forcing their captives to sing, mocking both their Huron victims and the French who passively stood by as their allies were carried away. The scene elicited the pity

⁵⁸ JRAD 43: 134-136; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 583-584. This episode bears striking resemblance to the attack of Le Moyne’s embassy in the summer of 1654. See *Marie de l’Incarnation*, pp. 550-551.

⁵⁹ JRAD 43: 105-107, 113-123; Perrot, *Moeurs, coutumes et religion des Sauvages*, pp. 343-345; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 584. Guy Laflèche makes the strong case that an embarrassed Paul Le Jeune delayed the publication of the account of the attack in the *Relation* for 1656 to avoid concluding it on a demoralizing note, and decided to publish it only in the following year in a purposefully confusing and misleading way. Laflèche, *Les saints martyrs canadiens*, 5: 11, 18, 137-139.

of the townspeople, who were further appalled to find out that Governor de Lauson categorically refused to intervene for fear that it would jeopardize the peace which the colonists enjoyed, or that it might otherwise endanger the safety of the missionaries who had just left for Iroquoia. When the raiders and their captives reached the vicinity of Trois-Rivières, a Jesuit stationed there could do no more than visit the camp to console the unfortunate captives.⁶⁰

That, following Marie de l'Incarnation's numbers, only six persons were killed during the raid of May 17th reminds us that the Mohawks' intention was not so much the destruction of the Huron community, as the incorporation of its members. The captives included "a large number of young women who were the flower of that [Huron] colony." But they also included men like Jacques Oachonk, the prefect of the Huron Congrégation de Notre-Dame (a lay confraternity) and according to the missionaries "the most fervent of all our Christians", as well as Joachim Ondakont, one of the community's most celebrated and skilled warriors. In Mohawk country, the captors granted their lives to all of the captives except six of the "principal Christians" – in other words the leaders who had been the fiercest opponents of relocation, among whom was Oachonk – whom they promptly put to death. Just a handful of the captives found a way to escape and rejoin their community, including a severely mutilated Ondakont.⁶¹ At Quebec he and the others joined the remnants of the community which soon after the raid had abandoned its home on Île d'Orléans. Some families appear to have gone to live temporarily at Sillery, but most found refuge in a fortified encampment laid out for them in the upper town of Quebec

⁶⁰ Idem.

⁶¹ *JRAD* 42: 32; *JRAD* 43: 142; Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, p. 584. On Jacques Oachonk, who was tortured and killed in Iroquoia in early June, see *JRAD* 41: 166-175; and Campeau's biographical sketch in *Monumenta Novae Franciae* 8, *Au bord de la ruine (1651-1656)* (hereafter *MNF* 8), (Rome and Montreal: Institutum Hist. Soc. Iesu and Éditions Bellarmin, 1996), p. 985. On Joachim Ondakont, who had the good fortune of escaping his captors around that time, see *JRAD* 43: 118-122, 142-144; and Campeau's biographical sketch in *MNF* 8: 986.

between Fort Saint-Louis and the parish church. This ultimate refuge, nestled at the very heart of the colony, quickly became known as the “Fort des Hurons”.⁶²

Seeing that so many of their loved ones had been taken by force and no doubt fearing, with good reason, that the same would unavoidably happen to them, the Hurons remaining among the French sued for peace with the Mohawks. In the fall of 1656, they concluded with them an accord which hinged on the refugee community’s resettlement in Mohawk country in the following spring.⁶³ The Onondagas responded to this unwelcome development with a show of force of their own, breaking with the cordial diplomatic approach that had distinguished them from the Mohawks in recent years. In the first days of May 1657, some fifty to a hundred Onondaga warriors arrived in the vicinity of Quebec, threatening war against the Hurons and harassing French colonists. During a first council, in the presence of representatives of the Hurons, Algonquins, Montagnais, and French, as well as of a few Mohawk deputies, the Onondagas excused themselves “for having come for the Hurons, their brothers, with arms in their hands”. They had been compelled to it, they claimed, by the discovery that under Mohawk influence the Hurons had reneged on their earlier promises to join them. All parties present reiterated their willingness to maintain peace and harmony, and the issue of the Hurons’ migration was further discussed in a series of private councils.⁶⁴

On May 15th, the Onondagas returned home in the company of three Huron envoys who must have intended to discuss the issue further. Meanwhile, though, a body of about a hundred

⁶² *JRAD* 43: 35; *JRAD* 45: 115, 245; *JRAD* 47 : 248; *JRAD* 53: 121; *JRAD* 70: 207. While they remained at Quebec, the Hurons continued to cultivate fields on the Île d’Orléans, as well as on the south shore, opposite Quebec. The suggestion that the Hurons abandoned their fields as a result of the relocation, and instead turned to hunting and fishing, accordingly lacks in substance. Compare *JRAD* 47: 261, with Jetten, *Enclaves amérindiennes*, p. 64.

⁶³ *JRAD* 42: 261; *JRAD* 43: 187. On 26 December, the three Huron emissaries were back with five Mohawk ambassadors.

⁶⁴ *JRAD* 43: 34-42.

Mohawk warriors had entered the St. Lawrence Valley to make sure that the Hurons complied with their promise of the previous fall. Intercepting the three Huron ambassadors in the vicinity of Trois-Rivières and Montreal, they dissuaded them from proceeding on to Onondaga as planned.⁶⁵ Reaching Quebec on May 28th, a delegation of twenty to thirty Mohawks headed by the celebrated Teharihogen met with the Hurons in council. “Four years ago,” he declared, in reference to the discussions of 1652, “you begged me to take you by the arm, to raise you and bring you to my country. You did sometimes withdraw it when I wished to comply with your request; that is why I struck you on the head with my hatchet. Withdraw it no more, for I tell you in earnest to get up. It is time for you to come.” He asked the new interim governor Charles de Lauson de Charny to let the Hurons go and to allow Father Simon Le Moyne to accompany them to Mohawk country. During the nightlong internal consultations that ensued, divisions within the refugee community – divisions which would have been apparent to all at the time, but which were not alluded to in the records until this time – manifested themselves. While the Attignawantan agreed to join the Mohawks, the Arendarhonon reaffirmed their pledge to join the Onondagas, and the Attigneenongnahac opted to remain at Quebec.⁶⁶

In reporting the events of the summer of 1657, the *Relation* allows us to catch a rare and final glimpse of the relations between the constituent nations that had made up the former Huron Confederacy. Rare, because after the invasion of Huronia colonial chroniclers had ceased to refer to the national segments, favoring instead the convenient national label of “Huron”; final, because no mention whatsoever would be made of these national segments in colonial writings after 1657. Even as it betrays a lack of ethnographic interest on the part of the chroniclers of the

⁶⁵ *JRAD* 43: 44. On 1 April, two Mohawks had already arrived at Quebec from Montreal with presents for the Hurons. *JRAD* 43: 33.

⁶⁶ *JRAD* 43: 45-47, 187, 191. On Thearihogen/Tekarihoken, see Bruce G. Trigger, “Tekarihoken”, *DCB* 2: 624-625.

times, this change in terminology surely reflected a very real process of cultural and political convergence that occurred in the St. Lawrence Valley during the 1650s and 1660s. While the sources do not hint at how the Huron refugees defined themselves in this period, it is doubtless that under the pressures of invasion and forced migration, the distinct cultures and identities of the refugees who shared a common fate gradually merged. The cultivation of a common Christian identity among the Huron refugees contributed to this process of convergence, as surely did the tendency of missionaries and officials to think of and approach them as “Hurons” rather than Attignawantan, Arendarhonon, or Attigneenongnahac.

In the summer of 1657, on the other hand, these cultural and political cleavages still mattered. There are tantalizing hints that these cleavages were not new, and that they in fact rested on a consistent pattern of goodwill and enmity. A decade earlier, in 1647, as noted earlier in this chapter, it was the Arendarhonon who had attempted peace negotiations with the Onondagas, while the Attignawantan had been strongly opposed to such a peace.⁶⁷ In the fall of 1653, it was the Attignawantan leader Atsena who had responded with gifts to Mohawk invitations. Likewise, it was to the Arendarhonon that the Onondagas had directed their secret wampum belts in May of 1657.⁶⁸ Presumably the refugees’ leaning were influenced by the presence of a critical mass of Attignawantan captives and migrants living among the Mohawks, and conversely of Arendarhonons living among the Onondagas.

An element of explanation for the Attigneenongnahac desire to remain with the French can also be teased from the activities of their most prominent leader, Étienne Annaotaha. In the previous decade, he had emerged as one of the staunchest and most flamboyant opponents of the Iroquois. Already recognized as “the most esteemed in the country for his courage and his

⁶⁷ See *JRAD* 33: 116-126.

⁶⁸ *JRAD* 41: 18; *JRAD* 43: 40.

exploits over the enemy” in 1649, the following year he was captured but managed a prompt escape. At Gahoendoe Island, after the departure of the first Huron contingent for the St. Lawrence Valley, he brought about the death of thirty Onondaga ambassadors by cunning – or treachery, from the Onondaga perspective. In July 1652, in the vicinity of Trois-Rivières, he similarly seized a Mohawk ambassador who was soon thereafter put to death. Both the Onondagas and Mohawks thus had good reasons to wish ill of Annaotaha; the French, at any rate, believed that the Iroquois’ desire to avenge these acts had been a cause of their hostility in recent years.⁶⁹ Without doubt, Annaotaha’s Attigdeenongnahac relatives and friends were party to his exploits; his actions most likely reflected a suspicion, hatred even, of the Iroquois that was more pronounced among them than among other segments of the Huron population. Recent developments had done little to ease tensions. On May 12th 1657, less than two weeks before the momentous council, an Onondaga man had killed a nephew of Annaotaha a league south of Quebec. Though the head of the Onondaga delegation had dissociated himself from the act and done his best to atone for the killing with customary presents, it takes no stretch of the imagination to think that this was of little consolation.⁷⁰ Annaotaha and his close relatives and followers thus had strong personal reasons to resent both the Onondagas and the Mohawks, and to fear that in spite of assurances to the contrary his reception among either nation would be tricky at the best, fatal at the worse.

For their part, French officials and missionaries were torn between, on the one hand, the desire to maintain a fragile Franco-Iroquois peace and to make missionary inroads among the Five Nations, and on the other the fear that recent displays of Iroquois hostility augured poorly

⁶⁹ *JRAD* 34: 128; *JRAD* 36: 180-188; *JRAD* 37: 108. On the Iroquois’ desire to avenge themselves for these actions, see *JRAD* 41: 56. There is a caveat here: although Annaotaha’s national affiliation is not stated in the sources, there is strong circumstantial evidence that he was Attigdeenongnahac. For biographical sketches, see *Untold Tales, Three 17th Century Huron*, (Toronto: J. Steckley, 1992); Elsie McLeod Jury, “Annaotaha”, *DCB* 1: 64-65.

⁷⁰ *JRAD* 43: 42.

for the safety of the Hurons. The Jesuits' willingness – eagerness, perhaps – to permit the relocation of the refugees among the Onondagas, where they might spiritually reinforce the embryonic mission of Sainte-Marie-de-Gannentaha, was matched by their great distrust of the Mohawks. Reiterating the position of diplomatic laissez-faire adopted by his father in 1654, Lauson de Charny chose to wash his hands of the affair, declaring that “Onontio loves the Hurons. They are no longer children in swaddling-clothes, but are old enough to be out of tutelage. They can go where they wish, without being hindered in any way by Onontio. He opens his arms to let them go.” Lauson could hope that a compromise according to which the Arenderhonon would relocate among the Onondagas and the Attignawantan among Mohawks would satisfy everyone, and ease the tensions that were endangering the fragile Franco-Iroquois peace. Still, he sought to delay the migration by denying the Mohawks the boats that they had requested to transport the Hurons, and beseeching the latter to wait until they had had a chance to meet the next governor before departing.⁷¹

Even the Attignawantan knew very well that, notwithstanding Mohawk assurances of goodwill, there was much risk involved in yielding to pressures after a decade of defiance. When their headman Atsena announced his people's decision to Teharihogen, it was with heavy heart: “I am at your service. I cast myself, with my eyes shut, into your canoe, without knowing what I am doing. But, whatever may betide, I am resolved to die. Even if you should break my head as soon as we are out of range of the cannon here, it matters not; I am quite resolved.”⁷² Attignawantan reluctance to proceed with this resettlement became clear on the expected day of departure, June 2nd, at which time only fourteen women and children embarked for Mohawk

⁷¹ *JRAD* 43: 190-194.

⁷² *JRAD* 43: 192.

country.⁷³ It took the intervention of a second Mohawk delegation in early August of that year, once again backed by a strong military force of about a hundred warriors, to put a stop to these delaying tactics. On August 21st, “some” Hurons left Quebec in the company of Mohawks, followed five days later by an equally unspecified group of Hurons accompanied by Father Le Moyne.⁷⁴ Whether these represented the last of the Attignawantan at Quebec, or merely another handful of families, is not known.⁷⁵

The Arenderhonon who had resolved to join the Onondaga, by this point numbering a little over fifty, of which four fifths were women and children, for their part left Quebec on June 16th. From Montreal they travelled westward with Father Ragueneau and a few other Frenchmen, escorted by about thirty Onondagas and fifteen Senecas. Though it was the likelihood of encountering a large force of Mohawks intent on laying claim to these Arenderhonon that caused the most apprehension, harm soon came from an unexpected direction. On the way up the St. Lawrence, within days of having left Montreal, one of the migrants was killed for uncertain reasons by an Onondaga captain of the escort; the incident snowballed into a melee during which all the men were killed and the women and children were seized. Heavily outnumbered and devoid of authority, the French members of the party were unable to intervene. When Ragueneau attempted to calm tempers and secure concessions in

⁷³ JRAD 43: 49. Guy Laflèche instead argues that this should be interpreted as the departure of a few families that would have included fourteen women and children, ergo some thirty to forty Hurons in all, and points out that the calculation of 5-6 days after the council of 30 May should give 5-6 June, not the stated 2 June. Given the colonial chroniclers’ habit of stating the number of warriors in a group, rather than the number of women and children, this interpretation is unconvincing. Cf. Laflèche, *Les martyrs canadiens*, 5: 172.

⁷⁴ JRAD 43: 53-55; JRAD 44 : 189.

⁷⁵ Oral tradition recorded among the Wyandots of Anderson, Ontario, before 1870, confusingly had it that part of the Bear Nation – Attignawantan – “returned” to its traditional country from Quebec around 1650. See P.C. Dooyentate, *Origin and Traditional History of the Wyandotts* (Toronto: Hunter, Rose, and Co., 1870), pp. 4-7.

favour of the survivors, the Onondaga captain defiantly retorted that by releasing the Hurons the French had empowered him to treat them as he pleased.⁷⁶

In early September, another group of Onondagas who had spent the summer between Montreal and Quebec, and who had apparently not yet been informed of the massacre, presented new belts and strings of wampum to the Hurons remaining there in a continued effort to persuade them to join them in their country, “giving them a thousand assurances that they would be very welcome”. The Hurons showed some inclination to comply, but convinced the Onondagas to postpone the journey until the following spring. News of the massacre, which reached Quebec in the early days of October, unsurprisingly spelled the end of the resettlement project.⁷⁷ Though the Onondaga elders promptly conveyed their assurances that they had nothing to do with the unfortunate event and that they did not approve of the behavior of their young men, it is doubtful that the Hurons who remained at Quebec found these words reassuring.⁷⁸ According to one count, as a result of recent outmigration they now numbered approximately 130.⁷⁹ It seems safe to assume that they were primarily Attigneenongnahac.

The massacre of the Arendarhonon, coupled with parallel reports that Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawk bands were now prowling between Trois-Rivières and Quebec intent on doing mischief to Hurons, Algonquins, and Frenchmen alike, and the reappointment of Louis d’Ailleboust as interim governor ushered a shift in colonial policy. In concert with the principal

⁷⁶ JRAD 43: 50; JRAD 44: 72-76, 154; Pierre-Esprit Radisson, *The Explorations of Pierre Esprit Radisson: From the Original Manuscript in the Bodleian Library and the British Museum*, Arthur T. Adams ed. (Minneapolis, Minn.: Ross & Haines, Inc., 1961), pp. 50-57, 70; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 605. The *Relation* mentions the killing of all eight of the Huron men, while *Marie de l’Incarnation* speaks of the killing of thirteen adults and children, and the capture of forty.

⁷⁷ JRAD 43: 57-59; JRAD 44: 187-189.

⁷⁸ JRAD 43: 61; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 605.

⁷⁹ For the estimate of the population, see Ragueneau’s letter to Goswin Nickel, 20 August 1658, in *MNF* 9: 190.

colonists, d'Ailleboust resolved that the hostilities and robberies of the Iroquois would be tolerated no more. During a council with his Huron and Algonquin allies on October 24th, 1657, he declared that they would henceforth be free to conduct offensive or defensive operations as they pleased. While the French would defend their allies if they were attacked near the colonial settlements, he nevertheless requested that they avoid initiating hostilities in their vicinity. The French, he warned, would not be the first to strike or break the peace.⁸⁰

The Algonquins had not waited for colonial invitation to respond to Iroquois aggression, sending a war party of their own to the Richelieu River in the days preceding the council. The Hurons were somewhat slower to respond, perhaps fearing what might happen to their numerous relatives in Iroquoia, but plausibly also discouraged by the Jesuits who surely worried of what this would mean for the mission at Gannentaha. The news of that mission's abandonment amidst fears that it would soon be attacked by the Mohawks, and the arrival of its fleeing personnel in the first days of April 1658, no doubt played its part in triggering the departure from Quebec on June 15th of a first war party made up of twenty-three Huron warriors in three canoes.⁸¹

With the intensification of Iroquois military operations in the St. Lawrence Valley, the forceful diplomatic overtures that had characterized the period from 1653 to 1657 came to halt. While the Iroquois continued to entertain sporadic diplomatic relations with the French in the years that followed, these now tended to revolve around the liberation of Iroquois prisoners held

⁸⁰ JRAD 44: 191-193.

⁸¹ JRAD 44: 99. Trigger's speculation on this matter (that the Hurons of Quebec had been restrained by the French from carrying out hostilities, including by depriving them of firearms, and that the Hurons would have accordingly been resentful) is unconvincing. Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, p. 816. The military capacity of the Hurons was indeed diminished compared to that of their Algonquin allies. During his welcome reception in early August of 1659, the new governor, Pierre de Voyer d'Argenson, gave a clear indication of the new French willingness to encourage war by distributing arms to the two groups, metaphorically wiping away the tears shed for the death of their peoples and restoring their voice so that they might exhort their young men to battle. The nature of the presents given to the Algonquins (powder, lead, swords, guns) and to the Hurons (swords, iron arrowheads, and hatchets) can be read as an indication of the divergence in military capacity. Not necessarily, however, as an indication that the Hurons were being deprived of firearms. JRAD 44: 103-105.

by the latter.⁸² While evidence of Mohawk-Onondaga competition over the incorporation of the remnant of the refugee community disappears after 1658, there is no doubt that the Iroquois continued to entertain for a time a hope of drawing it by force, as suggested by the rumour which reached the ears of Marie de l'Incarnation in 1659 to the effect that a large Iroquois army was amassing to "carry away our new Christians, and as I believe, as many Frenchmen as they can".⁸³

Huron warriors, in the company of Algonquins and Frenchmen, took part in defensive operations in June and August 1659.⁸⁴ Then, in April of the following year, Étienne Annaotaha mobilized the largest Huron war party in a decade, numbering forty men in all. As one of them, Ignace Tsaouenhohoui, would later explain, they were motivated by "the desire to repress the furor of the Iroquois, to prevent him from carrying away the rest of our women and children, for fear that by carrying them away they make them lose the Faith, and after paradise" (though contrary to this statement after the fact, the religious dimension was likely not a major consideration: the fear of seeing loved ones carried away and a community further dislocated would have been motivating enough in itself).⁸⁵ The forty Huron warriors who left Quebec with Annaotaha were joined on the way by four Algonquins from Trois-Rivières, then near Montreal by seventeen Frenchmen led by Adam Dollard des Ormeaux. While French-Canadian

⁸² For the Franco-Iroquois diplomacy during this period, see for example *JRAD* 44: 110, 120; *JRAD* 45: 84-86, 100; *JRAD* 46: 224.

⁸³ Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, p. 614.

⁸⁴ *JRAD* 45: 95-97, 107. The Mohawks, meanwhile, complained at Fort Orange that when they were out hunting "they are attacked by the French savages, among whom are always concealed parties of Frenchmen". A.J.F. Van Laer, ed., *Minutes of the Court of Fort Orange and Beverwyck, 1657-1660* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1923), 2: 218. Given the summer timings recorded in the *Journal* of the Jesuits, John A. Dickinson's claim that Huron war parties tended to leave Quebec towards the end of winter appears baseless. Cf. Dickinson, "Annaotaha et Dollard vus de l'autre côté de la palissade", *RHAF*, 35, 2 (1981), p. 166.

⁸⁵ For Ignace Tsaouenhohoui's quote, see Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, p. 624. Here he is mistakenly called *Eustache* Tha8onhoh8i.

historiography long emphasized the latter's leadership in this adventure, it is much more likely that the older and more experienced war chief Annaotaha acted as the party's leader.⁸⁶

The expedition would prove disastrous for the Hurons of Quebec. At the foot of the Long-Sault rapids on the Ottawa River, along which they had expected to surprise small enemy bands, the Franco-Aboriginal party was beset by a force of some 200 to 300 western Iroquois warriors, primarily Onondagas but including some Senecas and perhaps also Cayugas. The greatly outnumbered Hurons and Frenchmen took refuge in a makeshift fort only to find the besiegers reinforced within a few days by an additional 500 Mohawks, Onondagas, and Oneidas. On Annaotaha's prompting, a "Huronised" Oneida from his party – that is, an adoptive Huron of Oneida origin – went out with two of the leading Hurons to obtain "some good terms". Unsurprisingly, given the Iroquois' incorporative efforts and successes over the preceding decade and a half, the enemy force itself included a number of "Iroquoiscised" Hurons. During the tense truce that followed the parley, a number of these summoned their compatriots in the defenders' camp to abandon the uneven fight. Most of the Huron defenders, twenty four or thirty men, chose to defect as a result.⁸⁷

Annaotaha was among the few who remained with the French and Algonquins. His longstanding opposition to the Iroquois may have wavered, but his impressive and controversial

⁸⁶ *JRAD* 45: 244-260; Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, pp. 622-624. John A. Dickinson was the first to make a case for Annaotaha's leadership in "Annaotaha et Dollard". For another good analysis of the Aboriginal participation in the campaign of the Long-Sault, see John Steckley, *Untold Tales*, ch. 3; and Patrice Groulx, *Pièges de la mémoire: Dollard des Ormeaux, les Amérindiens et nous* (Hull: Vents d'Ouest, 1998). Also of some use is Guy Laflèche, *Les saints martyrs canadiens*, 5: 187-260.

⁸⁷ Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, pp. 622-624; *JRAD* 45: 255. Trigger figured that "Given the experience of repeated French betrayal that the Huron refugees had at Quebec, it is hardly surprising that most of them felt under no obligation to fight to the death, especially when other Huron offered them a plausible alternative. The abandonment of Dollard was a response to many years of similar treatment by the French." Trigger, *Children of Aataentsic*, p. 817. In fact, the massive Huron defection was not a resentful response to poor colonial treatment, but the typical Aboriginal response to such situations. While fighting to the death might be praised and admired in the early modern European way of war, such self sacrifice did not have the same gloss in the small scale societies of North America, where the value of warriors' lives generally surpassed any strategic gain. As Dickinson argued, this action was perfectly "rational". "Annaotaha et Dollard", p. 168.

war record made it likely that he would not be spared torture and death even in the case of voluntary surrender.⁸⁸ After a siege of seven to ten days the Onondagas and Mohawks stormed the makeshift fort, killing Annaotaha in the process. The five French captives were tortured to death, as were some of the captured Hurons and Algonquin; conversely, although the men who had voluntarily defected were at first treated like captives, most were eventually spared. Of the forty Huron warriors, the *Relation* reports that only seven were burnt, a number that may actually refer to both those killed in battle and the few who were put to death afterwards.⁸⁹ After the destruction of Huronia a decade before, and the assault on Île d'Orléans four years earlier, the loss of some forty men was a terrible blow to the Huron community at Quebec. If one commentator described them as “the flower of all those of importance that remained here with us”, another spoke even more dramatically of “the forty *remaining* Hurons”.⁹⁰

The community remained vulnerable. Their assemblage of bark houses nestled at the heart of the colonial capital was well protected, but venturing out for necessary subsistence activities continued to involve considerable risks. During fall of 1662, the Iroquois captured another five Hurons who were harvesting fields that they had retained on Île d'Orléans and on the Lauson shore, just across the river from Quebec.⁹¹ In May of the following year, officials at Montreal had the imprudence of lodging four Mohawk would-be deputies with a small band of Hurons who had established a hunting camp on that island. Surprising their hosts after an evening of good cheer, the guests killed three of them and captured another three. The enraged relatives of the victims retaliated a few weeks later, rather indiscriminately, by killing an

⁸⁸ See *supra*. The defectors included Annaotaha's nephew, La Mouche (The Fly), whom John Steckley suggests may have been none other than Joachim Ondakont. Steckley, *Untold Tales*.

⁸⁹ *JRAD* 46: 22-56, 120; Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, p. 624-626. On casualties, see Guy Laflèche, *Les saints martyrs canadiens*, 5: 381.

⁹⁰ *JRAD* 45: 156, 244 (emphasis mine). See also *MNF* 9: 426.

⁹¹ *JRAD* 47: 291.

Onondaga visitor to town.⁹² The murders of May 1663 became the last documented Iroquois attack against a group consisting solely of Hurons in the St. Lawrence Valley. By the fall of 1663, in fact, both the French and their allies began enjoying a lull in the enemy offensive, less a result of a successful defensive operations than of the fact that the Five Nations were now distracted by other wars.⁹³

It is difficult to fathom the extent to which the experience of the Hurons of Quebec was shaped by personal and collective loss and bewilderment in the decade and a half that followed their departure from their ancestral homeland. That the refugee community sought and found a good measure of solace in Christian beliefs and practices should not surprise. The Attignawantan, Arendarhonon, and Attigeneongnahac who had chosen to seek their safety with the French, after all, were on the whole those who had most enthusiastically embraced and appropriated the new faith. During the difficult years that followed, missionary teachings offered ready meaning to traumatic experiences and a dynamic basis for the construction of new social bonds and support networks. Most significantly perhaps, they offered ways of channeling grief at a time when traditional beliefs and practices were proving poorly adapted to the new context. The Hurons of Quebec's ever diminishing warrior effectiveness, indeed, made it unfeasible to carry out traditional mourning mechanisms that hinged on the possibility of capturing or killing enemies. By contrast, the stoic resignation in the face of adversity that was advocated by the missionaries, and the belief that death in fact represented a transition to a better life and an opportunity to be reunited with loved ones, offered ways of channeling grief that were more

⁹² *JRAD* 48: 85-93.

⁹³ Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, p. 705; *JRAD* 48: 75-83; *JRAD* 49: 136-148; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 98-102; Parmenter, *Edge of the Woods*, pp. 114-116.

practicable at this juncture. One missionary proudly observed that for the shattered community which mourned the loss of Annaotaha and his men in 1660, “prayer took the place of lamentation”.⁹⁴

Lamentation, in reality, featured prominently in the rhetoric of Huron leaders. In condoling the Ursulines’ loss of their convent by fire in 1651, Louis Taiaeronk described his nation as “devoured and gnawed to the very bones, by war and famine” and of “carcasses [...] able to stand only because you support them”. In the welcome addresses that they gave upon the arrival of Bishop François de Laval in 1659 and of Lieutenant General Alexandre de Prouville de Tracy in 1665, they similarly emphasized social collapse and dependency. No imagery could more strikingly communicate what had happened to their people than that of the tortured, cannibalized, and decomposing victim of the Iroquois, the human body being here equated with the political and social body. Addressing Laval, an unnamed speaker described his people as “fragments of a once flourishing nation”, “remnant of living carrion”, “the skeleton of a great people, from which the Iroquois has gnawed off all the flesh, and which he is striving to suck out to the very marrow.” Five years later, the elder who welcomed Tracy similarly declared that he spoke on behalf of “the wreck of a great country, and the pitiful remnant of a whole world”, now “mere carcasses, only the bones of which have been left by the Iroquois, who have devoured the flesh after broiling it on their scaffolds” and after passing it “through the boiling cauldrons”.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ *JRAD* 46: 61-63. Trigger suggests “that the marked piety that later characterized this group, and which was not evident in the preceding decade, dates from this time.” *Children of Aataentsic*, p. 817.

⁹⁵ *JRAD* 36: 214; *JRAD* 45: 38-40; *JRAD* 49: 226-234. The “sauvages”, presumably the Hurons, similarly welcomed governor Voyer d’Argenson on August 1st 1658. While the speeches were not recorded, d’Argenson indicates that they gave two gifts, “one to express the joy of my arrival and the other to let me know the hope that they had conceived that I would deliver them from their sorrows and that I would not abandon them.” He responded by confirming it and organized a feast. See *MNF* 9: 218. The images of a nation “devoured and gnawed to the very bones, by war and famine” and of “carcasses [...] able to stand only because you support them” were also evoked

The sense of loss was very real, and the appraisal of diminished political and military capacity was very lucid. Yet beyond expressing Huron grief, such plaintive performances were intended to produce grief in an audience and stir the French from their lethargy. The orator who welcomed Laval clarified the stakes: “[I]f you would have a Christian people,” he declared, “the infidel must be destroyed”. “[I]f you can obtain from France armed forces to humble the Iroquois”, it would be possible by destroying even just two or three of their villages to open a path to vast lands and many nations who yearned only for “the light of the Faith”. This line of argument was not only well chosen insofar as it made the most of the audience’s sensibilities and priorities: at a time when the Christians of Kamiskouaouangachit were distancing themselves from the mission village, it made a claim for the Hurons of Quebec’s centrality in the Christian alliance. “On our life depends that of countless peoples; but our life depends on the death of the Iroquois”, concluded the speaker, drawing a parallel between the life of the soul and the body. “[G]ive life to your poor children”.⁹⁶

Louis XIV’s takeover of the colony in 1663 and the arrival two years later of Tracy, the king’s newly appointed Lieutenant General in America, and 1300 soldiers thus promised to breathe new life into the refugee community. “Courage, O desolate people!” proclaimed an unnamed Huron elder, as if speaking to his people, during his welcome address to Tracy in the final week of June 1665, “Your bones are about to be knit together with muscles and tendons, your flesh is to be born again, your strength will be restored to you, and you shall live as you didst live of old.” Once again, after having expressed loss and a sense of social collapse, the elder made a case for the continued strategic value of his people. However diminished and

by Louis Taiaeronk when he consoled the Ursulines after the destruction by fire of their convent in 1651. See *JRAD* 36: 214.

⁹⁶ *JRAD* 45: 38-42.

battered, the Hurons of Quebec retained a crucial expertise in the domain of warfare; though they could not contribute very many warriors to a forthcoming campaign, they could offer indispensable advice to the officers and soldiers who lacked a crucial experience in indigenous ways of war. Marching against the Iroquois, he tried to get the point across, was not something that could be done lightly.⁹⁷

Mixing symbolic language with practical considerations, he offered war paint with which Tracy might inspire fear among his enemies. Turning to the soldiers, he advised them to load their muskets so well that, upon reaching the enemy's country, the noise made by their discharge would not only spread panic among the Iroquois, but would resound as far as Quebec. "His meaning", as the Jesuits who acted as linguistic and cultural interpreters during this council understood, "was that the Iroquois, Savages although they were, were not so contemptible as to render it unnecessary to provide good arms and equipment for their conquest." Along similar lines, the speaker raised concerns about the soldiers' uniforms which, though they corresponded to the height of European military fashion, appeared dangerously inappropriate for the task at hand. He warned that the Iroquois, who fought entirely naked so as to minimize the impediments to their fast running in dense forests, would represent an elusive target. "When you have defeated him, you will not have captured him – especially as you are embarrassed with clothing ill-adapted for running through thickets and underbrush". He said this as he offered a girdle – perhaps an actual girdle, though more likely a wampum belt designed to get the point across – which might hold up the long skirts of their coats.⁹⁸ Beyond practical sartorial advice, the speaker was drawing attention to capture as the fundamental objective of Iroquoian warfare.

⁹⁷ JRAD 49: 224-230.

⁹⁸ JRAD 49: 224-230. On the men, dress, and campaigning of the Carignan-Salières Regiment, see *The Good Regiment, The Carignan Salières Regiment in Canada, 1665-1668* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press).

On that note, the elder's final and most important point was that "the element of greatest strength" among the enemy consisted of captives of Huron, Algonquin, French, and various other origins, who he claimed made up almost two thirds of their numbers, and who were compelled to bear arms by their captors. The surest means of defeating the Iroquois was to turn this strength into a weakness. It would not be very difficult, he declared, to entice these captives away "from the service of those cruel masters, for whom they had only fear and hatred in their hearts, and not love." It would suffice for the army to announce to the enemy, as it neared their villages, that they could either hand over their captives or suffer the consequences. "If they delivered them up, they themselves would be defenseless; if they refused, we could compel them by force, while the captives would voluntarily take our side, seeing that their own safety lay with us." Thus it would be possible to "defeat that haughty Iroquois without striking a blow".⁹⁹

The Algonquins, who had been out hunting at the time of Tracy's arrival, reassembled at Quebec some weeks thereafter to welcome him, with Tekouerimat as their representative, and similarly exhort him to act in concert with them to ensure "the destruction of the Iroquois and the publication of the Gospel."¹⁰⁰ Preparations for the campaign soon got under way. The Mohawks' reluctance to take part in the peace negotiations spearheaded by the Onondagas in the fall of 1665 and pursued through the following year, coupled with Tracy's confident intransigence, determined the colonial authorities to take action. Although he had tactfully listened to the Huron recommendations during his ceremonial welcome, the Lieutenant General and his staff proceeded to disregard them altogether. The Hurons of Quebec were surely astonished to learn that their allies intended to carry out their expedition in winter, given that the

⁹⁹ *JRAD* 49: 230-234.

¹⁰⁰ *JRAD* 49: 234-236.

commanders and men had spent less than six months in the colony and were woefully ignorant of what this season entailed. It would have been worrying to see that Tracy, Governor Daniel Rémy de Courcelles, and Intendant Jean Talon, had not taken the precaution to furnish the men with the necessary equipment – crucial snowshoes, axes and blankets – or sufficient provisions for that matter.¹⁰¹

The Hurons of Quebec may have voiced their objections to this ill-conceived enterprise. Though colonial authorities had expected that both the Hurons and Algonquins would be persuaded to take part in the expedition, by the time the campaign got under way in January of 1666 it appears that only some thirty of the latter were expected to take part.¹⁰² In actuality, Courcelles' decision not to wait for these Algonquins at the agreed upon meeting point meant that not a single allied warrior accompanied the 500 to 600 soldiers and militiamen who proceeded along the Richelieu, Lake Champlain, and Hudson Rivers, during what according to contemporaries turned out to be harshest and longest winter in thirty years. Instead of reaching the country of the Mohawks, as expected, the army after a harrowing journey stumbled upon the Dutch outpost of Schenectady, where Courcelles decided that to return home was now the wisest course of action. In what was to be the first in a long line of complaints that would stretch until the very end of the French Regime, voiced by colonial officers distressed by the apparent unreliability of their indigenous allies, Courcelles tried to pass the blame for his expedition's dismal failure onto the Algonquins. Others, such as Lieutenant René Gaultier de Varennes,

¹⁰¹ *JRAD* 50: 126-130; Salière, "Mémoire des choses qui se sont passées en Canada..." in Régis Roy and Gérard Malchelosse, *Le Régiment de Carignan : son organisation et son expédition au Canada (1665-1668)* (Montreal: Ducharme, 1925), pp. 54-55. On the persistent peace overtures of the western Iroquois in 1665 and 1666, see *JRAD* 49: 176-178; *NYCD* 3: 126-127; Salières, "Mémoires", pp. 62-63; Trudel, *HNF* 4 : *La seigneurie de la Compagnie des Indes occidentales*, pp. 191-192.

¹⁰² Talon to Colbert, 27 April 1665, C11A 2: 127-128v.

instead pointed out that “if they had not encountered the Algonquins during their return they would not have brought back a single soldier; they would all have died of hunger”.¹⁰³

Eighty to a hundred warriors, mainly Algonquins given that Huron men were in short supply, did join Captain Pierre de Sorel when in the final days of July he responded to Mohawk raids by leading up the Richelieu an impromptu force of two hundred soldiers and militiamen. Presumably, the French had been more careful this time in eliciting the assistance of their allies; the fact that this was a summertime operation surely made it a more inspiring undertaking. Sorel nevertheless found another way of frustrating his allies. When, within days of reaching the enemy villages, his small army was approached by an embassy directed by Canaqueese, the Mohawk leader known as the Flemish Bastard, Sorel decided to order an about-face to escort the ambassadors to Quebec. Believing that these enemies should have been handed over to them, the allied warriors were “offended”.¹⁰⁴

Anticipating Mohawk duplicity, Tracy, Courcelles, and Talon ignored Canaqueese’s conciliatory overtures and resolved to launch a third campaign.¹⁰⁵ The authorities’ perspective had changed since the last winter. They reached the conclusion that fall would be the best time to carry out the campaign, and they were careful to amass the required supplies. For a time they worried that their allies might not agree to take part in the operations, as they had been vexed during the previous one. But, as Talon remarked in a letter to the Minister of Marine, they

¹⁰³ JRAD 50: 130-148, 168, 180-186; René-Louis Chartier de Lotbinière, “Sur le voyage de monsieur de Courcelles” in Jeanne d’Arc Lortie, ed., *Les textes poétiques du Canada français, 1606-1867* (Montreal: Fides, 1987), 1 : 53-63; Salières, “Mémoire” in Roy and Malchelosse, *Le Régiment de Carignan*, pp. 54-58; Trudel, *HNF 4 : La seigneurie de la Compagnie des Indes occidentales*, p. 180-189.

¹⁰⁴ NYCD 3: 131, 134; JRAD 50: 138, 192, 196; Salières, “Mémoires”, pp. 62-63; Perrot, *Moeurs, coutumes et religion*, p. 354.

¹⁰⁵ JRAD 50: 138-140, 198-200.

concluded that it would surely be possible to secure their participation “by means of arguments and by presents”.¹⁰⁶

At 1300 men, including a hundred Algonquin and Hurons, Tracy’s army in October of 1666 was the largest ever fielded up to that point in the northeast. The indigenous allies played a critical role as guides, hunters, and porters. On several occasions they took on the thankless task of carrying their inept French allies on their backs through the most difficult passages between Lake Champlain to the Mohawk Valley. At one point, even, Tracy was himself saved from drowning by a “strong and brave” Huron brother-in-arms. When, after three Mohawk villages had been sacked, Courcelle hesitated to move on to the final and largest one, it was an Algonquin woman (an indication that the accompanying “warriors” were not only men) who had spent part of her youth in captivity among the Mohawks before returning to her homeland, who, seizing a pistol in one hand and the commander in the other, urged him on. “Come,” she said, “I will lead you straight to it.”¹⁰⁷

While the French and their Aboriginal allies had hoped to surprise the Mohawks, and had expected to meet with some resistance, they found all four villages forewarned and abandoned. Only a few old men, women, and children were discovered in that furthest and largest of the Mohawk villages, Tionontoguen. The army spent a few days destroying the fields and food stores, laying waste and setting fire to magnificently decorated longhouses, and plundering tools, kettles, “and rest of their riches”. Having intoned a *Te Deum*, planted crosses bearing the arms

¹⁰⁶ “Mémoire de Talon à Tracy et Courcelle pour montrer qu’il est actuellement plus avantageux de faire la guerre aux Agniers que de conclure la paix avec eux”, 1 September 1666, COL C11A 2: 207-213v. This appears to be the earliest iteration of what would become the standard colonial policy in the last decades of the century. See also Talon to Colbert, 27 April 1665, C11A 2: 127-128v. On the preparation of the expedition, see Talon to Tracy and Courcelles, 1 September 1666, C11A 2: 207-213v.

¹⁰⁷ JRAD 50: 140; Salières, “Mémoires”, p. 64; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, pp. 772, 774; Trudel, *HNF 4 : La seigneurie de la Compagnie des Indes occidentales*, p. 195-202.

of France, and solemnly taken possession of Mohawk country in the name of Louis XIV on October 11th, the army began its journey home.¹⁰⁸

The sources do not hint at how the Hurons, or the Algonquins for that matter, reacted to the sacking of the Mohawk villages. It must have seemed like a much belated vindication of the decision to side with the French and their God. The Hurons who had sought safety the heart of the French colony a decade and a half earlier, indeed, had found very little of it. Their number had been whittled down, with their consent and by force, from a height of approximately six hundred to less than a hundred. After so many years on the defensive, and two expeditions characterized by ineptitude and failure, the Franco-Aboriginal alliance had finally struck a signal blow against its longtime foe. Having seen their own villages sacked a many years earlier, the Hurons must have been glad for the opportunity to reciprocate at last.

Yet in light of the expectations that their elder had voiced the previous year, it is quite possible that the Hurons were disappointed, demoralized even, by the outcome of the campaign. “When you have defeated him, you will not have captured him”, had warned the elder. Evaluated from a perspective where captive-taking was the primary objective of war, the sacking of the enemy villages in the fall of 1667 had been a dismal failure. Even more worrisome may have been the fact that none of the “captives” of Huron, Algonquin, and French origin had found or taken the opportunity to leave their “cruel masters” during the enemy’s withdrawal. The Hurons of Quebec’s longing to see their bones knit together with muscles and tendons, and their flesh be born again would not be fulfilled so soon. An opportunity for regeneration would nonetheless come with the Franco-Iroquois peace settlement of 1667, after which large numbers

¹⁰⁸ *JRAD* 50: 142-144, 202-204; *NYCD* 3: 135; Talon to Louis XIV, 11 November 1666, C11A 2 : 214-215; Salières, “Mémoires”, p. 64; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 773-776.

of Hurons and other “New Iroquois” would start streaming towards the St. Lawrence Valley and its mission villages.

CHAPTER 3
FLESH REBORN:
New and Old Iroquois in the St. Lawrence Valley, 1667-1680.

The military and diplomatic success of Five Nations warriors through the 1640s and 1650s had allowed their villages to maintain relatively high population levels in spite of the mortality rate brought about by warfare and epidemics. The claim made by the Huron elder who welcomed Lieutenant General Tracy, that foreigners represented more than two-thirds of the population of Iroquoia, reflects other contemporary estimates. By 1657, Le Jeune observed that the villages of the Senecas “contain more foreigners than natives of that country”. Certain communities contained more than others. Most dramatically, the village of Gandougarae was said to be composed entirely of Hurons, namely those who had resettled en masse from the missions of Saint-Michel (the name of the former mission to the Tahontaenrats) and Saint-Jean-Baptiste (that of the former mission to the Arendarhonnons) seven years earlier, as well as of Attiwendaronk (Neutrals) and Onnontiogas (Wenros or Eries, perhaps, or western Algonquians).¹ In 1667 it was similarly reported that Hurons and Algonquins made up two thirds of the population of the village of Oneida, where they had “become Iroquois in temper and inclination”, and a similar proportion of the Mohawk village of Gandaouagué.² The three Cayuga villages were around the same time described as composed partly of Cayugas, partly of Hurons, and partly of Susquehannocks.³ While Hurons appear to have been the most numerous among the refugees and captives of Iroquoia, the presence of seven different nations was attested

¹ JRAD 36: 143; JRAD 44: 21; JRAD 54: 79; JRAD 57: 193. The identity of the Onnontioga (Onnontiogas, Onnontiogats) is a mystery. The name has erroneously been understood to mean the “people of Onontio”, or allies of the French from the St. Lawrence Valley. Cf. Frederick Webb Hodge, “Onnontioga” in *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, 3: (1912) 129. In fact, the *Jesuit Relations* point out that like the Senecas and Neutrals, the Onnontioga “have scarcely seen any Europeans”. They were thus a western nation: the Wenros or Eries, Iroquoian nations of the Niagara frontier defeated by the Iroquois in the 1640s and 1650s, or the Algonquians of the western Great Lakes, called “Ontôgannha” or Fire Nation by the Iroquois, are more convincing identifications.

² JRAD 51: 123, 187.

³ JRAD 52: 179.

among the Onondagas, and of as many as eleven among the Senecas.⁴ The Iroquois, wrote Jérôme Lalemant in 1660, had become “for the most, only aggregations of different peoples whom they have conquered”.⁵

As the Huron elder pointed out, the absorption of thousands of refugees and captives, in the swift span of some three decades, entailed a dangerous loss of social cohesion among the victors.⁶ His forecast of what would because of this come to pass during the campaign against the Mohawks had proven overly optimistic, however. As the French, Algonquin, and Huron force neared the enemy’s villages, no opportunity had presented itself to compel the Mohawks, by threats or force, to deliver up the foreigners in their midst. Nor is there any evidence that any seized the opportunity to escape from “the service of those cruel masters”, towards whom they purportedly felt “only fear and hatred [...], and not love”. At this exceedingly tense juncture, the risks involved in revealing any negative sentiments towards captors were great. In one of the abandoned villages the invaders indeed discovered “the mutilated bodies of two or three natives of another nation, [...] half burned over a slow fire”, plausibly individuals who had attempted to escape or were suspected of planning the same.⁷

The invasion of Mohawk Country nonetheless represented a signal blow against an already compromised nation. Ongoing conflicts against Algonquian neighbours to the east – the Mahicans, Sokokis, Abenakis, and Maliseets – plagued the Mohawks throughout these years.⁸ The crucial flow of trade goods had been restricted as a result of the annexation of the New

⁴ JRAD 43: 264.

⁵ JRAD 45: 206.

⁶ See Richter, “Ordeals of the Longhouse: The Five Nations in Early American History” in Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell, eds., *Beyond the Covenant Chain: Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), p. 21.

⁷ JRAD 50: 144.

⁸ Talon to Colbert, 13 November 1666, C11A 2: 224-228; Daniel Gookin, “Historical Collections of the Indians of New England: Of Their Several Nations, Numbers, Customs, Manners, Religion, And Government, Before The English Planted There”, in *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, 1st ser, (1792) 1: 166-167; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, p. 99; Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, pp. 133-134.

Netherlands by England in 1664.⁹ The destruction of fields and stores by the French, Algonquin, and Huron forces in the fall of 1666 resulted in unprecedented famine in the winter that followed.¹⁰ In the spring of 1667, Mohawk delegates returned to the negotiating table more committed than ever. Peace was concluded that July.¹¹

With peace, large numbers of Hurons and other “New Iroquois” streamed towards the St. Lawrence Valley and its mission villages. Something akin to the population movement presaged by the elder would come to pass after all. Picking up on the theme of warfare as an integrative process outlined in the first chapter and explored in the second, this chapter probes the limits of integration in Iroquoia as well as the fusion of diverse social fragments in the mission villages of the St. Lawrence Valley. Through the return of Hurons, as the elder had predicted, the refugee community would see its bones “knit together with muscles and tendons”, its “flesh [...] be born again”, and its “strength [...] restored”. The nation would not be remade as it had been “of old”, however, for though a distinct community would persist near Quebec, many of the Huron and other “New Iroquois” newcomers would instead choose to relocate in the Montreal region, and form a new mission village at Kentake (La Prairie), and later Kahnawake (Sault-Saint-Louis) and Kanehsatake (La Montagne). Former identities and solidarities would persist for a time, but in the end the process of assimilation sparked in the villages of Iroquoia would, for many, be completed in these new communities, where a distinct Christian Iroquois political and cultural identity would emerge.¹²

⁹ *JRAD* 57: 25-27. On the English takeover of the Dutch colony, see Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 99-102; Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, pp. 130, 132-133.

¹⁰ “What will become of them?” Marie de l’Incarnation wondered of the Mohawks, “Where will they go?” Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 775.

¹¹ *NYCD* 3: 136-127; *JRAD* 50: 205-209; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 775-776, 786-787.

¹² Cf. Parmenter, *Edge of the Woods*, p. 133.

The integrations of foreigners into mid-century Iroquois society could take many forms, as signaled in the previous chapters. Among the missionary chroniclers who pointed to the processes of incorporation and ethnic realignment, the most insightful described it as one of naturalization, distinguishing the old stock “*francs Iroquois*” from the “*Iroquois naturalisés*”. Alternatively, we might speak of “Old Iroquois” and “New Iroquois”.¹³ Through ritual adoption and marriage, newcomers could be enfranchised to become a full-fledged member of their adoptive society, assuming all of the rights and obligations that followed. Among war captives, women and children stood the highest chance of being allowed this opportunity, as they were less likely than men to escape or resort to violent resistance, and as they were perceived to be easier to assimilate than men. As one Jesuit noted, “many a young man will not hesitate to even marry a prisoner, if she is very industrious; and thereafter she will pass as a woman of his country.”¹⁴ It was not uncommon for such naturalized women, children, or even for men, to attain positions of considerable trust and authority within their adoptive community. Such was the case, for example, of the unnamed “Huron captain, formerly a captive of the Iroquois, and now a captain among them”, who had accompanied the Onondaga embassy to Quebec in 1655.¹⁵

Yet in spite of the open and fluid nature of Iroquoian societies, and for all the remarkable elasticity of Iroquoian incorporative practices, it was not uncommon for a captive to be maintained in a state of precarious servitude. The French used the word “esclave”, or slave, to refer to the non-naturalized war captives of the Iroquois to reflect the fact that they were often

¹³ See “francs Iroquois” in *JRAD* 45: 207; “anciens captifs des Iroquois, naturalisés avec eux” in *JRAD* 35: 141; “plusieurs qui n’étaient pas Iroquois naturalisés” in *JRAD* 63: 166; “Hurons [...] iroquoisés” in Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 621. Historians have used a variety of labels. Jetten speaks of “Iroquois de souche” in *Enclaves amérindiennes : Les “réductions” du Canada, 1637-1701* (Sillery, Quebec: Septentrion, 1994) p. 65. Allan Greer refers on one occasion to “old-stock Iroquois”, but is careful to follow up by observing that “Of course the term ‘old-stock,’ redolent of European fetishes about bloodlines, has limited meaning in an Iroquois context where personal identities were not so strictly determined by biological descent.” *Mohawk Saint*, p. 27.

¹⁴ *JRAD* 9: 254.

¹⁵ *JRAD* 42: 56.

subjected to abusive treatment and to the constant threat of death if their behavior proved unacceptable to others. A parallel distinction was made within Iroquoian languages, where a common set of words commonly referred to both captives and domestic animals (Enaskwa, in one Mohawk word list), to their respective taking or taming (Kenaskonnis, *idem*), and to the act of driving either along (Kenaskwenhawis, *idem*).¹⁶ An individual whose adoption and assimilation was indefinitely delayed remained an outsider to the community, little more than a domesticated beast. “[A]mong the Iroquois”, concluded one missionary, “the life of a captive is valued no more than that of a dog, and it needs only a slight disobedience on his part to merit a hatchet-stroke.”¹⁷

More subtly but no less crucially, many of the New Iroquois – the well-integrated adoptees, women and men who had married into their adoptive communities, who had given themselves over freely or who, captured as children, had spent the better part of their lives there – retained a distinct identity, more or less pronounced from one individual to the next, that overlapped with their new ethnic alignment. For former captives, the psychological shock of violent capture and uprooting, what we would recognize today as post traumatic stress disorder, must have continued to disrupt lives and to foster a feeling of alienation. Yet even for the willing, “happy” migrants, assimilation was far from immediate. The Huron-Onondaga captain alluded to earlier could thus explain to his kinsmen: “I have not changed my soul, despite my change of country; nor has my blood become Iroquois, although I dwell among them. My heart is all Huron, as well as my tongue.”¹⁸ Attachment to an old network of kin and friends, to a language and a culture, and to the memory of a common experience, could only fade gradually.

¹⁶ Viau, *Enfants du néant*, pp. 148-149.

¹⁷ *JRAD* 49: 105. See also *JRAD* 43: 292-294. On the precariousness of captivity, see Viau, *Enfants du néant*, pp. 119-199; Starna and Watkins, “Northern Iroquois Slavery”, pp. 33-53; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 68-74.

¹⁸ *JRAD* 42: 56.

Beyond the persistence of ancient beliefs and practices, the persistence of comparably new ones also contributed to the ongoing dichotomization between members and outsiders. Many Hurons clung to elements of Christianity, having been initiated before or during the ruin of their homeland, or having since then been initiated by fellow captives, adoptees, and after 1667 by the swelling number of neophytes among the Old Iroquois.¹⁹ Especially for captives, who had particularly good reasons to accept the promise of a better life after death, there was solace to be found in these beliefs and practices and in the sense of distinctive identity and group solidarity that they fostered. Bonds of biological kinship and friendship with other adoptees, the recognition of a shared fate, would have reinforced such tendencies.

Crucially, the reluctance or inability of the New Iroquois to easily and rapidly merge into the mass of the Old Iroquois often made them the object of the latter's vocal resentment. In a vicious cycle of social tension, the resentment of the Old, however slight or sporadic, played its part in reinforcing the persistence of distinct identities among the New. If in 1656, within five years of their mass resettlement to the country of the Senecas, the Tahontaenrats and Arenderhonnons might appear to be "united" with their hosts "in good feeling and friendship", by 1672-1673 it seems that they could be more accurately described as "miserable" and "abandoned". The Neutrals who in a similar fashion had "given themselves voluntarily" to the Onondagas were also by this time "treated like slaves by them."²⁰ Between New and Old Iroquois throughout Iroquoia, fault lines persisted.

¹⁹ For examples of Huron Christianity in exile, *JRAD* 41: 94-124, 132; *JRAD* 42: 70-82, 184-188; *JRAD* 46: 108-112; *JRAD* 47: 58, 132; *JRAD* 4: 106-108; *JRAD* 50: 114-116; *JRAD* 54: 80-93.

²⁰ *JRAD* 44: 20; *JRAD* 58 : 232-234; *Relations inédites de la Nouvelle-France (1672-1679)* (Paris: C. Douniol, 1861), p. 173.

The undoing of Iroquois success in war and diplomacy through the release of captives had long been a feature of their peace negotiations. While the Hurons were not so bold as to raise the issue, painfully aware that their declined military strength meant that they were in no position to dictate such terms, the Algonquians consistently brought it up through the 1640s and 1650s. In 1646, Tessouat challenged the Mohawks to show their good faith by giving releasing the “children of the Algonquins, or even [...] the adult persons who should still be in their country”. In 1653, Tekouerimat likewise advised Mohawk deputies that if they were truly interested in peace they should send back the women whom they were holding in captivity so that they might come back to dwell in “the country of the Algonquins”.²¹

Beside the stipulation that past hostilities would be forgotten and that cordial relations would follow, the Franco-Iroquois peace talks carried out between 1665 and 1667 hinged on the release of captives and the exchange of hostages. In consideration of the release of two Frenchmen at the conclusion of a preliminary treaty with the four western nations in December of 1665, Tracy arranged for that of an Iroquois woman, captive of the Algonquins, who resided at Trois-Rivières, but also of “a Huron woman belonging to a refugee family at Seneca, actually a captive in the Huron fort at Quebec.” The Onondaga Garakontié on behalf of the four nations extended an invitation to missionaries and, acknowledging “the advantages they have derived from the union with the French and from the communication they had with them, when they had them in their habitations” (a reference to the short-lived mission at Gannentaha), asked that some French families settle among the Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas and offered to aid them in their establishment “and to sustain them with their power against those nations that would wish to oppose or retard it”. Tracy committed himself on behalf of the French king to sending along some families and missionaries the next spring after the ratification of the treaty, on condition

²¹ *JRAD* 28: 298-300; *JRAD* 40: 188, 192.

that in each of these countries “fields shall be granted suitable for the erection of cabins to shelter said families and to plant some Native corn, to be furnished for seed, in exchange for such their provisions as shall be transported for that purpose by the French”. He in turn asked that there be sent from each of the four upper nations to Montreal, Trois-Rivières, and Quebec, “two of the principal Iroquois families to whom fields, grain and Indian corn shall be furnished, besides the privilege of hunting and fishing in common, which shall be granted them”.²²

Seneca ambassadors who came to ratify the treaty in May of 1666 similarly expressed their willingness to send some of their families to reside near the French, while demanding that some missionaries and French families be sent to reside among them. The Senecas would “not only prepare cabins in which to lodge them, but [...] they would moreover aid to construct forts to shelter them against the incursions of their common enemies, the Andastaëronnons [Susquehannocks] and others”. Oneida ambassadors who came to ratify the treaty on their behalf and on that of the Mohawks in July similarly promised to “restore all the Frenchmen, Algonquins, and Hurons whom they hold prisoners among them of what condition and quality they may be”, and to send families to serve as hostages. They demanded “reciprocally among all other things the restoration to them in good faith, of all those of their nation who are prisoners at Quebec, Montreal, and Three Rivers,” and that French families and missionaries be sent to them.²³ So too did Tracy remind the emissaries who were sent back to their villages that November, in the wake of the destruction of the Mohawk villages, of this crucial condition. When the Mohawk emissaries reappeared in the colony with no prisoners in tow in April of 1667, they were chastised and given two additional months to comply under threat of a new

²² For the treaty of 13 December 1665, see *NYCD* 3: 121-125.

²³ For the ratification by the Senecas on 22 May 1666 and by the Oneida and Mohawks on 7 July 1666, see *NYCD* 9: 44-47 (also *NYCD* 3: 125-127 and *DHNY* 1: 75-76); *JRAD* 124-136, 190.

invasion.²⁴ When a definitive peace was concluded with the Mohawks in July of that year, it was again stipulated that they would bring back all of their captives and that both sides would offer families as hostages.²⁵

The relationship between hostages, visitors, and migrants from Iroquoia – the distinction between them, even – was often blurred. From the *Relations* and other chronicles of this period we can catch glimpses of the diverse experiences of migration and settlement about this time. The case of an Algonquin woman, one of several French and Aboriginal women and girls whom the Iroquois relinquished to the French at this time and who were handed over to the Ursulines to be re-educated, reveals how bonds created in Iroquoia might draw individuals of Old Iroquois stock to the St. Lawrence Valley. Her Iroquois husband “had such a passion for her”, in Marie de l’Incarnation’s telling, that he had followed her to Quebec. As the Ursuline explained it “he was continually in our visiting room, for fear that the Algonquins would take her away.” He was seen “moaning, losing his speech, stomping around, and coming and going like a madman.” His young wife apparently found his insecurity terribly amusing. At length the Ursulines felt compelled to release the wife to the husband on condition that he convert.²⁶ It is not clear what became of the pair afterwards, though it takes no stretch of the imagination to believe that they remained in the St. Lawrence Valley.

Then there was the elderly Pierre Atironta, who had “suffered greatly during his captivity”, and who appears to have been among the first few Hurons to return to Quebec and to reintegrate the community which upon news of the peace had left the safety of its fortified encampment in the upper town for the fertile Jesuit estate of Notre-Dame des Anges near

²⁴ NYCD 3: 136-127; JRAD 50: 205-209; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 775-776, 786-787.

²⁵ Talon to Colbert, 25 August 1667, C11A 2: 298-301v; Talon to Louvois, 19 October and 19 December 1667, in *Rapport de l’Archiviste de la Province de Québec pour l’année 1930-1931*, hereafter *RAPQ* (Quebec: Rédemptil Paradis, 1931), pp. 88-89; JRAD 50: 204-212; JRAD 51: 180; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, p. 775-787.

²⁶ Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, pp. 786-787.

Beauport, a short distance east of town. He rapidly learned his prayers, was promptly admitted to the Holy Family Congregation and rose to the rank of dogique in his longhouse, quickly becoming a pillar of the community. At the time of his death in December 1672, Atironta was described as “Captain of the Hurons”.²⁷ He was not typical, however, of the approximately two hundred individuals who travelled from Iroquoia to Quebec between 1666 and 1668, for of that number only a small fraction chose to remain among the Hurons for the long run. In 1668, the community at Notre-Dame des Anges numbered only a hundred and fifty persons. It was barely more populous, in other words, than it had been three years earlier.²⁸

The well-documented case of François-Xavier Tonsahoten and his wife Catherine Gandeaktena illustrates most clearly the parameters and contingencies of migration and settlement around this time. Like many of those who trickled into the St. Lawrence Valley after the conclusion of the peace, the pair were New Iroquois: Tonsahoten was a Huron who had been captured and adopted by the Oneida during the invasion of his homeland, while Gandeaktena had been born in the “nation des Chats” or Eries, and probably adopted by the Oneida in the mid-1650s at the time of her people’s demise. Both appear to have integrated well within their adoptive community. When a young Father Jacques Bruyas arrived at Oneida in September of 1667, one of a handful of missionaries to scatter throughout eastern Iroquoia as a result of the summer’s peace settlement, he quickly befriended Gandeaktena and came to depend on her.

²⁷ *JRAD* 57: 36-44. Atironta was probably of Ahrendarrhonon origin, for his name had been borne by two of that nation’s leaders: one Atironta alias Darontal or Durendal, fl. 1615-1624; and one Aëoptahon alias Jean-Baptiste Atironta, named head chief in 1642 and killed by the Iroquois in 1650. The *Jesuit Relations* are unclear as to the date of Atironta’s return. Taken literally, the indication that he “returned six years ago from the country of the Iroquois” indicates that he returned as early as 1665. It seems more likely, however, that he returned in 1666 or 1667.

²⁸ *JRAD* 52: 17; Anne-Maire Blouin, “Histoire et iconographie des Hurons de Lorette du XVIIe au XIXe siècle” (Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Montréal, 1987), 1: 265. Between 1665 and 1668, “more than 200 persons from the country of the Iroquois” were instructed among the Hurons of Quebec, 60 of whom received baptism. *JRAD* 52: 17. Another source states that by the summer of 1668, some fifty Iroquois had been baptized at Quebec. *JRAD* 51: 175. Many of these visitors died at Quebec. *JRAD* 52: 17. On the relocation to Notre-Dame des Anges and subsequently to Notre-Dame de Foy, see *JRAD* 52: 229; Chaumonot, *Un Missionnaire des Hurons*, pp. 174-176.

During the winter of 1667-1668, both she and Tonsahoten accompanied Charles Boquet, one of the Jesuits' ablest lay assistants, back to Montreal. The journey, as far as we can tell, was undertaken for a variety of reasons. The hosts were extending courtesy to their guest by escorting him back home, and could expect the reciprocal courtesy of being introduced by him to the missionaries, officials, and traders of the colony. Gandeaktena's blossoming interest in Christian teachings reportedly represented a major motivation, and it is likely that Tonsahoten saw it as an opportunity of catching up with Huron relatives at Notre-Dame des Anges. At the same time, Tonsahoten was also hoping to receive from the French medical attention for an ailing leg.²⁹

Having reached the vicinity of Montreal, Tonsahoten and Gandeaktena's seven-person band set up camp for the winter on a plain on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River facing the town, at a site known to the Iroquois as Kentake, meaning "at the meadow", and to the French as La Prairie de la Madeleine. Towards the end of the season they were joined there by another hunting band to which belonged Gandeaktena's aunt. In mid April – at which time the group had swelled to some thirty individuals, all nominally Oneidas – Tonsahoten went on ahead to Quebec with Boquet. Having some Huron relatives at Notre-Dame des Anges, he naturally fell in with the community and was eventually joined by his wife and eight or ten other relatives.

²⁹ For the background of Tonsahoten and Gandeaktena (Gandeacteu), their encounter with Bruyas and their journey to the St. Lawrence in 1667-1668, see *JRAD* 50: 212-216; *JRAD* 51: 147-149; *JRAD* 52: 21-27; *JRAD* 61: 194-208; *JRAD* 63: 154-182; Claude Chauchetière, *La vie de la B. Catherine Tegakouita, dite à présent La Sainte Sauvagesse par le R.P. Claude Chauchetière pretre missionnaire de la Compagnie de Jésus* (New York: Presse Cramoisy, 1887), pp. 80-101. Besides a few contemporaneous allusions, the earliest and most detailed accounts of Tonsahoten and Gandeaktena's establishment at Kentake were written more than a decade later, by Vincent Bigot (1679) and Chauchetière (c.1686). For historians' attempts at resolving the confusions and contradictions of these sources, see Henri Béchar, *The original Caughnawaga Indians* (Montreal: International Publishers' Representatives, 1976), pp. 5-55; Yvon Lacroix, *Les origines de La Prairie (1667-1697)* (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1981), pp. 15-30; Allan Greer, *Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 91-95; Gretchen Lynn Green, "A New People in an Age of War: The Kahnawake Iroquois, 1667-1760" (Ph.D. Dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1991), pp. 26-30; Richter, "Ordeal of the Longhouse", pp. 179-181; Béchar, "Gandeacteu" and "Tonsahoten" in *DCB* 1: 321-322, 651. The figure of Charles Boquet has been the subject of some confusion among historians. Cf. Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, pp. 842-843; J. Monet, "Charles Boquet", in *DCB* 1: 108; Richter, "Ordeal of the Longhouse", p. 180; and Greer, *Mohawk Saint*, p. 91-93.

There they stayed for a time, receiving religious instruction from Father Chaumonot before being baptized with others in great pomp by the bishop.³⁰

Though Tonsahoten was pressured by his Huron relatives to remain with them, and though Gandeaktena it is said would have gladly remained there owing to her blossoming interest in Christianity, her husband was “determined to return to his country” – Oneida Country, that is. Gandeaktena’s aunt and other relatives must have been equally impatient, for they “had no acquaintances at Quebec”, and it had been only with great difficulty that she had convinced them to accompany her there.³¹ The possibility of reconnecting with family and friends was indeed the most powerful enticement to visit or join the Hurons at Notre-Dame des Anges and later at Notre-Dame de Foy. In the absence of such bonds of kinship (as in the case of the aunt), or when such bonds were weak (as must have been Tonsahoten’s case), there were little reasons to remain with that community near Quebec. A compromise was nonetheless reached, as a result of which ten to twelve Oneidas decided in the fall of 1668 to spend another winter at Kentake.³²

Tonsahoten and Gandeaktena’s band was one of many that swarmed beyond the Iroquois homeland, to the north shore of Lake Ontario and to the upper St. Lawrence, in the years that followed the Franco-Iroquois peace. The temporary establishments of Seneca, Cayuga, and Oneida hunting bands along the northern shore of Lake Ontario would result, by the end of the decade, in the formation of a number of permanent settlements, the inhabitants of which the French would collectively recognize as “Iroquois du Nord” or North Iroquois. In parallel, Mohawk and Oneida hunters and traders journeyed to Algonquin and French territories on the

³⁰ JRAD 51: 148; JRAD 63: 154; Chauchetière, *La vie de la B. Catherine Tegakouita*, pp. 83-84, 89-90.

³¹ Idem and JRAD 52: 22.

³² JRAD 63: 154-156; Chauchetière, *La vie de la B. Catherine Tegakouita*, p. 90.

Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers.³³ For the eastern Iroquois, the Montreal region was a familiar country, and there is evidence that the Mohawks in particular considered it to be the northern edge of their traditional territory.³⁴

Like the region which stretched along the north shore of Lake Ontario, that of Montreal was a conveniently situated hunting ground; because wildlife had had the opportunity to thrive in this conflict zone, it was a particularly well stocked one. With the conclusion of the 1667 peace the French observed that many bands now came from Iroquoia “to hunt in the region of Montreal and settle aimlessly in various areas on the island”.³⁵ More than the north shore of Lake Ontario and the upper St. Lawrence, however, this region also offered enticing commercial possibilities. As Bruyas noted, the price of cloth had around this time become so dear at Fort Orange (Albany) on the northern edge of the New Netherlands as a result of the English takeover of that colony that the Iroquois were determined to obtain it in Montreal.³⁶ In the decades that followed, as the Albany trade blossomed anew, the advantages of the Montreal region over that of Quebec or of the north shore of Lake Ontario would become even more pronounced.

Evidence of the Island of Montreal’s continued appeal as a village site has been commented upon in the previous two chapters. Shortly after the founding of Ville-Marie,

³³ By the mid 1670s, there existed six or seven Iroquois villages on the north shore of Lake Ontario: Ganneious, an Oneida community on the Bay of Quinte; Quinté, a Cayuga community near the isthmus of the Quinte peninsula; Ganaraské, another Cayuga community at the mouth of the river of the same name; Quintio, on Rice Lake, possibly an offshoot of Ganaraské; Ganestiquiagon, a Seneca village near the mouth of the Rouge River; Teyaiagon, a Seneca community near the mouth of the Humber River; and Quinaouatoua, on the portage between the western end of the Lake and the Grand River, likely another Seneca community. It is unclear why no Onondagas formed a village of their own on the north shore. On this northward migration and the settlements, see Victor Konrad, “An Iroquois frontier: the north shore of Lake Ontario during the late seventeenth century”, *Journal of Historical Geography*, 7, 2 (1981) 129-144; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 105-132; J.S. Pritchard, “For the glory of God: the Quinté mission, 1668–1680”, *Ontario History*, 65 (1973), pp. 131–148. Jon Parmenter breaks with other historians in describing this northward migration as “planned returns to former areas of residency” and a purposeful effort “to effect permanent changes in the spatial composition of the League”. *Edge of the Woods*, pp. 127-147.

³⁴ David Blanchard, *Seven generations: A History of the Kanienkehaka* (Kahnawake: Kahnawake Survival School, 1980, pp. 152-153; Brenda Gabriel-Doxtater and Arlette Van den Henden, *At the Wood's Edge: An Anthology of the History of the People of Kanehsata:ke* (Kanehsatake: Kanehsata:ke Education Center, 1995), pp. 23-29.

³⁵ *JRAD* 63: 153 (retranslated).

³⁶ *JRAD* 57: 25-27.

Algonquins and Hurons had shown an interest in resettling there as long as the French were willing and able to provide them with assistance against their Iroquois enemy; passing through it a little less than a decade later during their exodus from Huronia to Quebec, the first contingent of refugees had given some thought to establishing themselves there, but decided against it owing to the region's exposed situation. That the region's attraction was still potent is further illustrated by the ruse proposed by the Onondagas in 1655, according to which the Hurons of Île d'Orléans should "allege that they were attracted by the beauty of Montreal and wished to make their home there" before being spirited away to Iroquoia.³⁷

The Jesuits had toyed with the idea of forming a mission in the Montreal area as early as 1641. With the conclusion of a solid peace, the Jesuits were eager to populate and develop their seigneurie of La Prairie, which had until then been ignored due to its vulnerable location. Doubling up the settlement of French *habitants* with the establishment of a community of neophytes seemed like a promising venture.³⁸ The Crown's encouragement – for Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the Secretary of State for the Navy, was particularly enthusiastic about the Francisation of Aborigines around this time – doubtlessly contributed, directly or indirectly, to the impetus behind this project.³⁹ During the winter of 1667-1668, Father Raffeix made it clear to Tonsahoten, Gandeaktena and their half-dozen followers that their settlement here would receive missionary assistance. It was some time, however, before the seasonal encampment of a family

³⁷ JRAD 24: 262-264; JRAD 35: 208; JRAD 41: 54.

³⁸ For the grant to the fief of la prairie de la Magdelaine, dated 1 April 1647, see *Pièces et documents relatifs à la tenure seigneuriale*, pp. 75-76. On the evolution of the seigneurie, see Yvon Lacroix, *Les origines de La Prairie*; Louis Lavallée, *La Prairie en Nouvelle-France, 1647-1760. Etude d'histoire sociale* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).

³⁹ Colbert to Talon, 5 January and 5 April 1666, in *RAPQ 1930-1931*, pp. 41, 45; Colbert to Talon, 5 April 1667, in *RAPQ 1930-1931*, p. 72; Colbert to Laval, 7 March 1668, in Honorius Provost, *Le Séminaire de Québec: documents et biographies* (Quebec: Séminaire de Québec, 1964), 1: 36; Talon to Colbert, 13 November 1666, C11A 2: 214-215; Talon to Colbert, 27 October 1667, C11A 2: 306-320v. On the ambition and policy of Francisation, see Saliha Belmessous, "Assimilation and Racism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century French Colonial Policy", *American Historical Review*, 110, 2 (April 2005): 322-349.

hunting band grew into a more permanent village. As noted above, of the approximately thirty Oneidas reportedly encamped in the vicinity of Montreal in April of 1668, only ten or twelve were back at Kentake in the fall of that year. During the winter that followed, even the latter scattered in the neighbouring woods for the habitual winter hunt, returning only periodically to La Prairie's makeshift chapel to attend the Christian feasts. In an effort to maintain these families there for good, Raffeix had a plot of land cleared and sowed for them as he awaited their return in the early spring of 1669. It was only then that Tonsahoten made what in hindsight would seem like a clear commitment to settlement by building a longhouse for the two families who lived there.⁴⁰

This decision could not have been an easy one, as the winter and spring of 1669 were marked by a troubling series of murders. Six "Loups" (Mahicans or some other Algonquians from the Hudson River Valley) who had come up to the St. Lawrence Valley were murdered by three Frenchmen intent on stealing the furs they had amassed.⁴¹ Three soldiers from the Montreal garrison for the same reason murdered "one of the most prominent" Senecas who had come to visit the town. One Oneida family, composed of three men, two women, and one child, encamped on the banks of the Mascouche River, north of the Island, was massacred by three other colonists. While it came to light during the latter's trial that they had committed this act with the aim of stealing fifty-three deer hides, twenty-three beaver skins, and sundry belongings, it is tempting to see, behind this act of criminal violence, antagonisms shaped by decades of conflict: one of the guilty men, Pierre Lafontaine dit Cochon, had served in Huronia between

⁴⁰ *JRAD* 63: 158.

⁴¹ Oury, ed., *Marie de l'Incarnation*, pp. 863-864.

1641 and 1646; another, Jean Turcot, had himself been captured by the Iroquois in 1652 and may have spent over a decade among them.⁴²

The news of the killings soon reached Oneida Country and made “all this nation very angry”; the Senecas reacted no differently. “It is beyond a doubt that an affair of this nature is very unfavorable,” wrote Father Frémin from Onondaga, “and capable of rekindling the war between the Iroquois and the French.”⁴³ Colonial authorities were consequently quick to identify and punish the guilty who had “exposed, by the means of their avarice and concupiscence, the whole country to a total destruction” and whose great crimes consisted not only in murder and theft, but in having “hindered the Natives from coming in peace to settlements and having here a favourable retreat”. The guilty soldiers were shot in front of Seneca delegates, while the three who had killed the Oneidas were condemned to death in absentia, having fled into the interior. The governor was careful to send wampum belts to the Senecas and Oneidas to express his regrets.⁴⁴

Tonsahoten, Gandeaktena, and their followers must have been greatly troubled by the murders – the six Oneidas would have been acquaintances of theirs, perhaps even relatives or good friends. But, no doubt owing to official efforts to disavow the killings, they were not dissuaded from returning to Kentake. If anything, it’s possible that these violent incidents contributed to the attraction of that site, where a missionary presence offered a measure of protection against potentially murderous colonists. The embryonic settlement attracted the attention of the Iroquois hunting bands dispersed around the Island of Montreal and along the

⁴² Procureur fiscal vs. Etienne Bancaud, Turcot and Lafontaine, 8 July 1669, ANQM, Archives judiciaires, pièces détachées, 001-009; Margry, *Découvertes et établissements*, 1: 109-112; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, pp. 863-865; Trudel and Baboyant, eds., *Histoire de Montreal*, p. 279; *JRAD* 53: 240; 54: 112-114. On Turcot’s captivity, see *JRAD*, 37: 112; *JRAD* 38: 58.

⁴³ Idem. See also Grabowski, “Common Ground”, pp. 170-173. On Turcot’s subsequent life in the interior, see Margry, *Découvertes et établissements*, 2: 104.

⁴⁴ Verdict de Migeon de Branssat, 12 Septembre 1669, ANQM, AJPD, 001-009; *JRAD*, 54: 112-114; Oury, ed., *Marie de l’Incarnation*, pp. 863-865.

upper St. Lawrence towards Lake Ontario. Between 1669 and 1673 visitors came by the hundreds. “Curiosity”, observed Chauchetière, “attracted them to La Prairie.” Traditional subsistence patterns played a fundamental role in the settlement’s growth. “[H]unting”, Chauchetière went on to explain, “was the pretext which they then adopted in order to come to live at La Prairie. The Christians who left La Prairie, in going to hunt beasts, went also to hunt men.” The people of Kentake who dispersed for the winter hunt unavoidably encountered in the process the hunting bands of relatives and acquaintances. On these occasions they vaunted the advantages of their new settlement, both material and spiritual, and extended invitations to join them there, at least for a visit if not the long term.⁴⁵

Though many of the curious who were drawn to Kentake left uninspired by the fledgling community and its ties to the French, others were inclined to stay on a more permanent basis for the very same reasons that had motivated Tonsahoten and Gandeaktena. The Jesuits’ willingness to hire colonists to do the initial agricultural work, clearing and sowing fields for the newcomers, was an attractive feature. As Chauchetière noted, “These visitors, seeing the corn very fine, resolved to remain there and build their cabins.”⁴⁶ By the end of 1669, the settlement at Kentake numbered five such longhouses, sheltering perhaps fifty persons. By the fall of 1671, it was said to number eighteen or twenty families, an estimated 100 to 120 individuals.⁴⁷

By 1671, the encampment at Kentake had grown into a veritable village community. An important council was held that summer during which its inhabitants decided to remain there indefinitely.⁴⁸ In the *Relation* of 1670-1671, the name of the new mission first appeared in print: Saint-François-Xavier des Prés. A tentative indigenous and missionary experiment, hence, had

⁴⁵ *JRAD* 63: 167-169.

⁴⁶ *JRAD* 63: 158.

⁴⁷ *JRAD* 55: 34; *JRAD* 63: 158 (Chauchetière situates this detail in 1670, but refers to the relation for 1670-1671).

⁴⁸ *JRAD* 63: 162.

evolved into a more serious affair. The choice of name reflected missionary devotion to Saint Francis Xavier, the pioneering Jesuit apostle to the Indies. More significantly, however, this choice stood as a testament to the prominence among the founders of the community of emigrants from Oneida, where Bruyas had already named his mission Saint-François-Xavier.⁴⁹ It was perhaps also indicative of the personal influence of Tonsahoten within that community, as he had himself taken on the name François-Xavier in 1667.⁵⁰ The steady arrival of newcomers had now made it necessary to formalize and legitimize the political structure of the village. In the summer of 1671, two chiefs were chosen by common accord, following what the missionaries took to be Iroquois custom, one to oversee general administration and war, and the other to supervise the exercise of Christianity.⁵¹ The first of the two was plausibly Tonsahoten, who at the time of his wife's death in 1673 would be described as "first captain".⁵²

The New Iroquois, adoptees and captives of Huron and various other origins, featured prominently among the newcomers to the St. Lawrence Valley. Kentake, in particular, was in its early years characterized by a great ethnic diversity. Describing the first settlers, Chauchetière noted that "one was from the *nation des Chats* [Eries], another from the Hurons, a few *francs Iroquois*, others Gandastogues [Susquehannocks]".⁵³ Soon the mission was said to be home to as many as twenty-two nations, "many of which have completely different languages", including

⁴⁹ "De la résidence de S. Xavier des Praiz", *JRAD* 55: 32. For the "bourg de St-François-Xavier" in Oneida, see *JRAD* 52: 20.

⁵⁰ There is some confusion with regards to Tonsahoten's baptismal name. The *Relation* for 1667-1668 speaks of a Huron that "had formerly been baptized by our Fathers in his own country", and Chauchetière's *Narration* notes that "He was a Christian, and was named Pierre". But in the same chronicle Chauchetière nevertheless goes on to mention the baptism of the summer 1668 and remark that he "was called François Xavier". In his account of the life of Catherine Tekakwitha, Chauchetière again names him François or François-Xavier. *JRAD* 52: 23; *JRAD* 63: 151, 155; Chauchetière, *La vie de la B. Catherine Tegakouita*, pp.81, 88, 100.

⁵¹ *JRAD* 63: 163.

⁵² *JRAD* 61: 206.

⁵³ *JRAD* 63: 153.

“Outouagannah” (a generic name for Algonquians of the western Great Lakes), “Gentagega” (a subdivision of the Eries), Algonquins, Montagnais, Nipissings, “Loups” or Mahicans, and Sokokis.⁵⁴ Many of these newcomers were, like the Huron-Oneida Tonsahoten and Erie-Oneida Gandeaktena, relatively well integrated adoptees who, for a variety of reasons chose to cast their fate with the French. Others were escaping the state of virtual slavery described earlier. As Chauchetière remarked, “Many who were not naturalized Iroquois resolved to steal away and come to La Prairie. Many thus slipped away during all the following years.”⁵⁵ Yet the attractions of the mission villages did not capture only the interest of the New Iroquois. Old stock Iroquois came too. This to the great joy of the missionaries, who saw in the willingness of former captors and captives – “victors” and “their prey”, “wolves” and “lambs” – to come together as the portent of a Christian utopia.⁵⁶

For New and Old Iroquois alike, kinship ties and family networks acted as a catalyst to migration. Individuals attracted to life at Notre-Dame de Foy or Kentake almost systematically brought their spouses, children and relatives. When an unnamed Mohawk neophyte returned from Notre-Dame de Foy to his country to bring back his entire family, a resident of the mission named Marie Tsaouenté took the opportunity to address a wampum belt to her father, who still lived among the Mohawks, to convince him to “join her here to find his salvation”.⁵⁷ Women were generally observed to be the most enthusiastic promoters of the mission villages. The Jesuits were quick to chalk this up to the fact that they had always been recognized as “the pious sex”. The peculiar appeal of Roman Catholicism for Iroquoian women has more convincingly been explained by the empowering resonance of the cult of the Virgin Mary, the

⁵⁴ *JRAD*, 58: 74.

⁵⁵ *JRAD* 63: 167.

⁵⁶ *JRAD* 58: 74.

⁵⁷ *Relations inédites*, p. 160. Marie Tsaouenté is described as an “Iroquois” in *JRAD* 61: 37. For another example, *JRAD* 60: 49.

reverence of other female saints, and the influential model of religious sisterhoods. More importantly, there was the fact that in Iroquoian – matrilineal – societies, the leadership of women was at the root of kinship solidarities and community cohesion. It was only natural for women such as Catherine Gandeaktena and Marie Tsaouenté to endeavor to reconstitute extended families and strengthen their communities.⁵⁸

An ever increasing number of newcomers to both Notre-Dame de Foy and Kentake in the early 1670s came from the Mohawk villages, and especially that of Gandaouagué. As the easternmost village of the Mohawk Valley, Gandaouagué had been particularly exposed to spiritual and military offensives in recent years. Though Jogues's early effort in the 1640s had fared poorly, it was there that Fathers Frémin, Bruyas, and Pierron built their first chapel when they returned in earnest to Iroquoia in 1667. They found a particularly receptive audience, most notably among the women and men of Huron origin who now represented an estimated two thirds of the population. Social tensions between neophytes and traditionalists were apparent.⁵⁹ Furthermore, Gandaouagué was still in the process of being rebuilt when the missionaries arrived, having been razed during the French invasion of the previous year. Although the solid Franco-Iroquois peace made it unlikely that this disaster would soon be repeated, the village remained vulnerable to the raids of the now well-armed Mahicans, with whom the Mohawks were still at war. In 1669, it endured a particularly difficult siege, which was repelled in extremis thanks to

⁵⁸ As Richter observes, while men exercised their leadership in relation to the world beyond the villages, in diplomacy, warfare or hunting, the villages and adjoining fields were the domain of women. It was the latter who took the initiative whenever the normal course of swidden cultivation prompted the relocation of a community. "Permanent Iroquois settlements", he points out, "could not have been established in Canada if females had declined a leading role." *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 125-126

⁵⁹ *JRAD*, 51: 187; *JRAD* 57: ch. 2. Gandaouagué (as "Kaghnawage", and later in various forms: Gandawaga, Gandaouge, Gandaouaguen, Caghnawaga, Caughnawaga, Cahaniaga, Kaknnaogue, Andaraque) appears as a new village name in 1659. It was the relocated community known as Ossernenon in the 1640s. Dean R. Snow, *Mohawk Valley Archaeology: The Sites* (Albany: University at Albany Institute for Archaeological Studies, 1995), pp. 365-375. On the social tensions between Christians and traditionalists there and throughout Iroquoia, see Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois: Jesuit Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642-1686", *Ethnohistory*, 32, 1 (Winter, 1985), pp. 1-16.

the leadership of a man named Togouiroui, known to the Dutch and English as Kryn, and to the French as the *Grand Agnier* or Great Mohawk.⁶⁰

As the continuing activity of Jesuit missionaries and Aboriginal proselytes through the 1670s exacerbated the schism between traditionalists and Christians in Mohawk country, waves of epidemics, combined with the socially disruptive inroads of the New York liquor trade, further contributed to making life there intolerable for New and Old Iroquois alike.⁶¹ At some point in 1672 or 1673, a Huron captain named Jacques Annhatetaionk and his family left the Mohawk village where they had spent the previous fifteen years for Notre-Dame de Foy. Arriving there, he explained that he had grown disturbed by the drunkenness that reigned among the Mohawks and was fearful that his children would adopt these disorderly habits.⁶²

Annhatetaionk and his followers may have belonged to, or otherwise been incited by the departure of, a group of fifty persons that was known to have travelled at about this time from an unnamed Mohawk village to Notre-Dame de Foy.⁶³ By this time, even Togouiroui the Great Mohawk, a war chief of high stature and Old Iroquois stock, had grown disenchanted with life at Gandaouagué. Having visited Kentake during the winter hunt and been impressed, he rounded up forty of his people in secret and led them there in June of 1673. It is likely that most of these

⁶⁰ The instigator of the raid was Chickwallop, a chief of the Pocumtuck. The Algonquian raiders, 600 to 700 according to Gookin, or half as many according to Pierron, assembled near Springfield before assaulting Gandaouagué in August. *JRAD* 53: 136-59; John Pynchon and Carl Bridenbaugh, ed., *Letters of John Pynchon, 1654-1700*, in *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, hereafter *MHSC*, 60 (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1982), p. 80; Daniel Gookin, "Historical Collections of the Indians of New England", pp. 166-167; Thomas E. Burke, Jr., *Mohawk Frontier: The Dutch Community of Schenectady, New York, 1661-1710* (Albany: State University of New York Press, [1991] 2009) pp. 74-75.

⁶¹ *JRAD* 51: 125, 217; *JRAD* 53: 240; *JRAD* 57: 90, 96-100; *JRAD* 58: 83, 250-252; *JRAD* 61: 159-160; *JRAD* 63: 251. On the circulation and consumption of liquor among the Iroquois, see Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 85-86; Maia Conrad, "Disorderly Drinking Reconsidering Seventeenth-Century Iroquois Alcohol Use", *American Indian Quarterly*, 23, 3-4 (1999). For a discussion of the broader context, see Peter C. Mancall, *Deadly Medicine: Indians and Alcohol in Early America* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997); Catherine Ferland, *Bacchus en Canada. Boissons, buveurs et ivresses en Nouvelle-France* (Quebec and Paris: Septentrion, 2010), pp. 225-302.

⁶² *JRAD* 57: 62-66; *JRAD* 60: 101-103.

⁶³ *JRAD* 57: 70.

latter migrants belonged to the Turtle Clan, as that clan dominated at Gandaouagué and as Togouiroui is known to have belonged to it.⁶⁴

The mix of spiritual and strategic motives that incited these men and women to abandon Gandaouagué was summed-up by Bruyas when he informed the recently arrived governor Louis de Buade Frontenac that they sought to “take refuge in your arms as in an asylum, where they hope to preserve their faith and be secure from their enemies”.⁶⁵ This latest wave of resettlement corresponded, finally, to a shift in missionary strategy. For the past twenty years the Jesuits had tended to view their mission villages of the St. Lawrence Valley as secondary to whatever missions could be established among the Iroquois. The challenges encountered in Iroquoia, coupled with the discovery that many neophytes were eager to leave it, now led Lamberville to reason that “to make them good Christians in their own country is a difficult thing, and one that will take a long time to accomplish, but if we could gradually detach them from their dwelling-place, and attract them to our Huron colonies, it would be very easy to make worthy Christians of them in a short time.”⁶⁶

It is likely that it was in an effort to capitalize on the recent wave of migrants, or perhaps as a response to the fact that newcomers increasingly favoured Kentake over Notre-Dame de Foy as their destination, that a “squadron of Hurons” headed by Louis Thaondechoren, the dogique of Notre-Dame de Foy, decided to accompany Frontenac during his expedition to Cataraqui (current-day Kingston, Ontario) in late June and July of 1673. While the Jesuit account of these

⁶⁴ According to one account, Togouiroui’s estranged wife had shown an interest in Christianity before her husband. On Togouiroui’s migration, see *JRAD* 57: 25, 105-111; *JRAD* 63: 174-178. The single piece of evidence which makes it possible to identify Togouiroui as a member of the Turtle Clan is a Dutch affidavit in favour of Jacques Cornelius Van Slyck bearing his mark – a turtle – dated 12 September 1683. In 1948 it was displayed at the Schenectady Gazette offices, on loan from an unidentified “Schenectadian who is a collector of valuable documents.” See the brief write-up in “Display Dutch Affidavit Signed by Indian Cryn”, *Schenectady Gazette*, 25 June 1948.

⁶⁵ *JRAD* 57: 24.

⁶⁶ *JRAD* 57: 68-70.

events explains that Thaondechoren's intention was to use the governor's conference with the Iroquois as an opportunity to "carry the Gospel and publish the name of Jesus-Christ", an official's account paints a more exact picture. During his conference with the Iroquois, Frontenac voiced his allies' concern, blaming the "cruelty" that the Iroquois exercised against their "Huron brothers" who lived among them by "preventing them from coming to visit their parents" in the St. Lawrence Valley and "calling them slaves and threatening to break their heads". Thaondechoren in turn took the floor. Describing the advantages of Christianity, his speech nevertheless centered on the migration of his countrymen. He offered a wampum belt to his Iroquois interlocutors in the hope that they would not refuse his people's request that they "allow the return of their relatives among them". The celebrated Onondaga chief Garakontié, speaking on behalf of the League nations, apparently agreed in principle.⁶⁷

While Frontenac was overseeing the foundation of the fort which would bear his name at Cataracoui, Thaondechoren proceeded to Onondaga in the company of two other Hurons and Garakontié. He encountered there a particularly receptive audience of Hurons and Neutrals. Even as he "sowed in the mind of many infidel Iroquois the seeds of the Faith", he "excited in the hearts of the Christian Hurons a great desire to travel to Quebec to fulfill in peace the duties of Christianity, with more liberty than they have in the country of their captivity". The Neutrals, who had willingly given themselves over to the Onondagas only to find themselves treated as slaves, took the opportunity to convene Thaondechoren to a secret council and asked him to convince Onontio to send soldiers who might cover their escape to the colony. Knowing that the

⁶⁷ "Voyage du Comte de Frontenac au Lac Ontario", in Pierre Margry, ed., *Découvertes et établissements des Français dans l'ouest et dans le sud de l'Amérique septentrionale, 1614-1698* (Paris: D. Jouaust, 1876), 1: 200, 202, 210, 219, 223-231; Frontenac to Colbert, 13 November 1673, in *RAPQ 1926-1927*, pp. 35-41. Cf. *JRAD* 57: 74-76; *Relations inédites*, p. 171-177. For an overview of Frontenac's expedition to Cataracoui, see Eccles, *Frontenac: the Courtier Governor* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1959), pp. 104-107; Trudel, *HNF 4 : La seigneurie de la Compagnie des Indes occidentales*, pp. 223-226. On Louis Thaondechoren (Taondechoren, Taondechorend), see *JRAD* 50: 210; *JRAD* 52: 236-238; *JRAD* 55: 266-268, 276, 298; *JRAD* 57: 74-76; *JRAD* 58: 134, 148-150, 196-198; *JRAD* 60: 78-80, 306.

governor would be loath to threaten the Franco-Iroquois peace by going along with such schemes, Thaondechoren made no commitment. He nevertheless suggested that the Neutrals could retire to the newly built Fort Frontenac at Cataracoui, on the pretext of carrying out their regular hunt, where the French would receive them kindly and from whence they would ensure their safe passage to Quebec.⁶⁸ One wonders if it occurred to those involved that two decades earlier an Onondaga emissary had proposed essentially the same thing to the Hurons of Île d'Orléans. In any case, Thaondechoren's discussions with the Neutrals would have no apparent sequel.

Migrations from Iroquoia brought the total population of Lorette (later relabeled Ancienne-Lorette), where the mission of Notre-Dame de Foy was relocated in late 1673 and early 1674, to about three hundred in 1675.⁶⁹ The population of Kentake probably reached about the same level that year, having numbered 280, with daily arrivals, in 1674.⁷⁰ While Father Lamberville might still in 1673 describe both communities as "Huron colonies", the influx of Old Iroquois heralded a new phase in the evolution of the mission villages and in the formation of local identities. The migration of Togouiroui and his followers to Kentake, in particular, would have a multiplying effect – Chauchetière hailed it in hindsight as the "first shock given to infidelity". If the first to settle at Kentake had been Oneidas by adoption or birth, the newcomers from the Mohawk villages, and from Gandouagué in particular, now "took the first rank".⁷¹

⁶⁸ *Relations inédites*, pp. 171-177.

⁶⁹ *JRAD* 54: 287; 60: 27. On migration to Lorette, in 1673, see Chauchetière, *Un Missionnaire des Hurons*, p. 194-196.

⁷⁰ *JRAD* 58: 248-250; *JRAD* 63: 179.

⁷¹ *JRAD* 63: 179; *JRAD* 63: 169 (retranslation). For descriptions of Kentake as a "Huron colony", see *JRAD* 56: 18; *JRAD* 57: 68, 77.

The political structure adopted in 1671 to respond to the growth of the community, according to which one chief oversaw civil and military affairs and a second oversaw religious matters, was found to be maladapted to the new face of the community. It was deemed necessary in 1673 to name a chief for each of the three most numerous nations in the village, namely the Mohawks, Hurons, and Onondagas. When a council was assembled for this purpose the Mohawks and Onondagas quickly named their respective leaders, but the deliberations dragged on among the Hurons.⁷² While the nature of their disagreement was not documented, we can plausibly attribute it to the divergent experiences of the last two decades. The passage of time had frayed the old solidarities of Huronia, and had allowed a variety of strong local solidarities and leaders to emerge. It is possible that Huron arrivals from Gandouagué and the Mohawk villages clashed against those Hurons who arrived from Onondaga in a flare-up of old divergences between Attignawantans and Arendarhonons. Or that Hurons from Oneida, who had figured prominently among the founders of Kentake and until now retained a measure of moral authority, clashed with the more recent Huron arrivals.

The site of Kentake, like its political structure, was proving poorly adapted to the influx of newcomers. The yield of the corn fields, though impressive in the first few years, soon became insufficient to satisfy the needs of the community. At the same time as traditional horticultural methods were rapidly depleting the soil of the first fields, the fact that much of the area's soil was too humid to cultivate corn discouraged the preparation of new ones. Missionary stores, which supplemented the growing community's needs, were stretched to the maximum. "Poverty", according to Chauchetière, now characterized life at the mission.⁷³ Proximity to colonists also posed challenges, as the influence of alcohol, which many newcomers had sought

⁷² *JRAD* 63: 180.

⁷³ *JRAD* 63: 191, 195; *JRAD* 58: 80; *JRAD* 59: 286; *JRAD* 60: 274; *JRAD* 62: 178; *JRAD* 63: 190, 194.

to escape, became more prevalent in the Aboriginal community in parallel with the growth of the neighbouring French settlement of La Prairie.⁷⁴ By late 1674, the Jesuits were thinking about relocating the mission, perhaps in response to an indigenous initiative. They began investigating possible sites and applying to Governor Frontenac and Intendant Duchesneau for a grant that would expand the seigneurie of La Prairie.⁷⁵

Marginalized by political divisions and impoverished by the dearth of arable land at Kentake, a number of Huron families opted to detach themselves from the village. While some of these families may have joined the Hurons at Lorette, at least for a time, others preferred to remain in the region. In 1675, a delegation of Hurons from La Prairie headed by a certain Achindwanes and accompanied by Father Fremin petitioned the Sulpician seigneurs of Montreal for a plot of land on the island. Glossing over the existence of tensions at Kentake, Achindwanes complained about the smallness and barrenness of their fields as he expressed the desire to form a new village. He asked for a priest to be stationed in this village, and for the religious and civil authorities to provide them with assistance in times of famine and during the hunting season.⁷⁶

The success of Achindwanes and his followers speaks to the strength of their unhappiness at Kentake, of their autonomy from the rest of the community, as well as of their ability to pressure missionaries and officials into allowing a something about which they had not been enthusiastic.⁷⁷ Frémin and the other Jesuit missionaries at Kentake had, it is likely, tried their

⁷⁴ *JRAD* 56: 18-20; *JRAD* 63: 179-181.

⁷⁵ *JRAD* 58: 111-125. Frontenac resented the Jesuits, and was strongly opposed to their request for an extension of their seigneurie. Duchesneau was much more responsive, and issued a grant by 1675 of “une belle terre d’une lieue et demie”. Given the governor’s opposition, the grant was regularized only in 1680. *JRAD* 59: 284-286; *JRAD* 63: 194; Frontenac to Colbert, 14 November 1674, in William B. Munro, ed., *Documents relating to the seigniorial tenure in Canada* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1908), pp. 39-40; Lacroix, *Les origines*, pp. 35-36.

⁷⁶ For the request and response of the Hurons, c. 1675, see Archives du Séminaire de Québec, Polygraphie 4, no 20. Achind8anes in the original.

⁷⁷ The suggestion made by Louise Tremblay that “la mission de la Montagne doit son existence à la volonté d’autonomie d’une population autochtone hétéroclite qui avait comme dénominateur commun un statut d’esclave”, which has influenced other authors to speak of the request of Huron “captives”, is inaccurate. While social tensions

best to convince Achindwanes and his followers to remain in the community, no doubt promising that it would soon be relocated to a more amenable site, and perhaps proposing as an alternative that they move to Notre-Dame de Foy. From the Jesuits' perspective, increased proximity to the town and taverns of Montreal increased the dangers of drunkenness and dispossession. For them, Sulpician competition in the mission field was also a source of aggravation.⁷⁸ Gabriel Souart, acting superior of the Seminary, seems to have been equally reluctant at first. His answer to Achindwanes was cautious, suggesting that his group needed to consider this move very carefully, and that it might not be in their best advantage to abandon the care of the Jesuits who, as they spoke their language (the Sulpicians did not as of yet), were best equipped to care for them. Still, Souart concluded by offering them a tract of land and two missionaries of his own. François-Marie Perrot, the governor of Montreal, who was also at the meeting, gave his approval.⁷⁹

Souart's apparent hesitation to take on the Hurons may very well have had something to do with his society's frustrated missionary ventures, or with the recent return to France of its most experienced missionary, François de Salignac de La Mothe-Fénelon. Arriving at Ville-Marie in 1657, the Sulpicians had begun by concentrating their resources on the island's French population, baptizing only a few men and women who were passing through: the sacramental registers of Notre-Dame, the town's parish, recorded only eleven Aboriginal baptisms between

may have subsisted, the product of former captor-captive dynamics, there is no evidence that the Hurons of Kentake were still considered as such by 1673. Cf. Louise Tremblay, "La politique missionnaire des Sulpiciens au XVIIe et début du XVIIIe siècle" (M.A., Université de Montréal, 1981), pp. 57-58; John A. Dickinson, "Évangéliser et former des prêtres : les missions sulpiciennes" in Dominique Deslandres, John A. Dickinson, and Ollivier Hubert, eds., *Les Sulpiciens de Montréal. Une histoire de pouvoir et de discrétion, 1657-2007* (Montreal : Fides, 2007), p. 359. Similarly, it is perhaps not so much the Mohawk predominance that some Hurons resented, as has been suggested, as the predominance of another Huron faction. Cf. Greer, *Mohawk Saint*, p. 96.

⁷⁸ Tremblay, "La politique missionnaire", pp. 50-51.

⁷⁹ Idem.

that year and 1667.⁸⁰ Like the Jesuits, however, they had sought to exploit the opportunity presented by the peace of 1667. In October of 1668, two of their number, Fénélon and Claude Trouvé founded the mission of Kenté in a Cayuga village on the north shore of Lake Ontario.⁸¹

In parallel, René de Bréhant de Galinée and other priests began to minister on an irregular basis to the Algonquin and Huron families who were now encamping at various points on the upper Island of Montreal, above the Lachine rapids and on the shore of Lake Saint-Louis. Around 1672, Fénélon was recalled from Kenté, which was yielding disappointing results, to establish an Algonquin mission on a somewhat more solid footing on the island's shore, near three islands which were given the name Gentilly. But in 1674, he and his would-be replacement, his colleague and cousin François-Saturnin Lascaris d'Urfé, were both called to France on pressing business, leading to the dissolution of this embryonic mission.⁸² In any case, as Souart had agreed during his meeting with Achindwanès, a plot of land of four arpents was marked-off at La Montagne in early December 1675; within a few months, Guillaume Bailly was assigned as missionary there.⁸³ The mission village of La Montagne, known to its inhabitants as Kanehsatake, appears to have grown rather slowly during its first years, not unlike Kentake. The secession nonetheless created much bitterness. "This separation was painful," explained Chauchetière in his chronicle, "and did not fail to keep their minds at variance for

⁸⁰ Dickinson, "Évangéliser et former des prêtres", p. 351.

⁸¹ Dollier de Casson, *Histoire du Montréal*, pp. 301-311. On the Sulpician ventures on Lake Ontario, see Pritchard, "For the glory of God", pp. 131-148; Tremblay, "La politique missionnaire".

⁸² Pierre Rousseau, historical notes on Dominique de Galinier, Archives du Séminaire de Saint-Sulpice de Montréal (hereafter ASSSM), drawer 72, no. 36; Olivier Maurault, "Les vicissitudes d'une mission sauvage", *Revue trimestrielle canadienne*, 16 (1930), pp. 121-149; Tremblay, "La politique missionnaire", pp. 48-49; Dickinson, "Évangéliser et former des prêtres", p. 356.

⁸³ "Procès-verbal d'arpentage fait par Bénigne Basset, notaire royal, en présence de Gilles Perrot, Michel Barthélémy, Pierre Rémy, ecclésiastiques, des quatre arpents réservés par le Séminaire au domaine de la Montagne (Fort de la Montagne)", 6 December 1675, ASSSM, drawer 43, file 2, no 3 bis. See also Olivier Maurault, "Le Fort des Messieurs" in *Marges d'histoire*, 3 (Montreal: Librairie d'Action canadienne-française, 1930), p. 29; Bruno Harel, "Le Domaine du Fort de la Montagne (1666-1860)" in *Montréal : artisans, histoire, patrimoine* (Montreal: Fides, 1979), p. 19. Cf. Lacroix, *Les origines*, p. 28

some time.”⁸⁴ Tensions remained apparent during the long awaited relocation of the people of Kentake to a new site a short distance upriver, along the Sault-Saint-Louis rapids, in July 1676. That summer, the community’s principal Huron captain threatened to move to Kanehsatake, and in the process “he spoke very harshly of this mission here, and even offended several individuals”, including the two other captains of the village, the Mohawk (Togouriou, presumably) and the Onondaga.⁸⁵

The identity of this chief, whom the two other captains had until then “deferred to [...] in all things, as the first and the senior of the captains”, is regrettably uncertain. The likeliest figure is Tonsahoten, who as noted earlier had been described as “first captain” of the mission at the time of his wife’s death in 1673.⁸⁶ During the summer of the move, far from eliciting deference, the Huron chief’s harsh words attracted the opprobrium of his Mohawk and Onondaga counterparts, who reportedly ceased to “look up to him”. In a Jesuits’ recounting, it was the missionaries who pointed out to the two Iroquois that “for the glory of God and the welfare of the mission, they should become reconciled with him, and thus sacrifice resentment to God and to the public good.”⁸⁷ With or without missionary intervention, however, it would have been apparent to the Mohawk and Onondaga captains that the further subdivision of their community was not in its ideal interest.

At the new site the senior captain is said to have given up his field for the construction of the mission chapel, “to show his affection for the faith.”⁸⁸ As the chronology is vague, it is impossible to ascertain whether this donation was an assertion of authority which contributed to

⁸⁴ JRAD 63: 181.

⁸⁵ JRAD 60: 277, 287-289. For an indication that village relocation could be a tense time even in Iroquoia, see Claude Chauchetière, *La vie de la B. Catherine Tegakouita*, p. 60.

⁸⁶ JRAD 61: 206.

⁸⁷ JRAD 60: 286-288.

⁸⁸ Claude Chauchetière, *La vie de la B. Catherine Tegakouita*, p. 100.

the rift in the community's leadership, or whether on the contrary it was intended as a pledge of reconciliation. In any case, the community managed to resolve its crisis of leadership. When the Mohawk and Onondaga chiefs returned from the hunt in the fall or early winter of 1676 they each in turn "gave feasts" to the Huron captain, "thereby putting him on a footing with them – or, rather, putting him above their own heads, to be thereafter the master of the others."⁸⁹ As of January 1677, the Jesuits of Kahnawake could breathe a sigh of relief that the Huron captain had chosen to remain in the mission. Tonsahoten, if he was indeed the leader in question, did remain there until his death in 1688. For having been the founding member of the community, Chauchetière tells us, he continued to be called "The father of the believers".⁹⁰

In an attempt to strengthen their ranks, the small core of Hurons who had seceded from Kentake sent a delegation to Lorette for the purpose of inviting some of its inhabitants to join them. Some seventy years later, a headman from Lorette would state that in response to the appeal of the people of Kanehsatake, who complained that they were but young men and that they accordingly lacked a council, the people of Lorette "gave a chief" to their village and established a constitution for the community which was embodied in twelve wampum belts.⁹¹ It

⁸⁹ *JRAD* 60: 287-289. A tantalizing sketch of the mission's leadership structure as of May 1679 is provided by the account of Bishop Laval's visit of the mission. He was first greeted by the captain of the Hurons and Huron elders, then by the captain of the Onondaga and an Oneida elder, and lastly by Paul, the dogique of the mission. Curiously, the Mohawks are omitted. *JRAD* 59: 269-291, esp. p. 275.

⁹⁰ Claude Chauchetière, *La vie de la B. Catherine Tegakouita*, p. 100.

⁹¹ In 1740, Vincent, one of the Great Chiefs of Lorette, went to visit the village of Kanehsatake at Lac des Deux-Montagnes asking to see the community's wampum. He was insulted to discover that only two remained of the twelve that "his nation" had deposited there when it lit "their fire", the others having perhaps been traded away. Vincent took the belts with him back to Lorette, saying "that fire was dead since they had disposed of the Belts". When governor Beauharnois investigated the situation he found that the Hurons of Lorette claimed to have certain "rights" at Kanehsatake, based on the fact that some seven [sic] years ago, the inhabitants of Kanehsatake had found themselves composed entirely of young men, and without a council. They had sent deputies to the Hurons of Lorette for that reason. The later had listened to their request, established a constitution at Kanehsatake by presenting twelve wampum belts, one for each article, and "given a chief" to it. While the manuscript indicates that these events took place "about 7 years ago" ("il y a environ 7 ans"), I argue that this is a clerical error that should read 70. There is no evidence that such a dramatic event took place circa 1734: by then Kanehsatake at the Lac des Deux-

is safe to assume that not only a chief, but several families took this opportunity to migrate from Lorette to Kanehsatake. This resettlement would have been particularly attractive to those Hurons who wished to retain links with Iroquoia, or for that matter with the Huron-Tionontaté community that had found its own refuge in the western Great Lakes. It is tempting, furthermore, to think that the chief in question was the elderly Louis Thaondechoren – who was himself, according to Chauchetière, of Tionontaté origin. In the spring of 1676, the *Relation* reports that he made a journey from Lorette “to go to see his countrymen, who had come to Montreal to trade” (in other words, Huron-Tionontatés from the Great Lakes), “in order to exhort them to become Christians.”⁹² Besides encouraging these visitors to remain, he may very well have joined the new community of Kanehsatake. Certainly the fact that he does not appear in the accounts of Lorette, or for that matter in the writings of the Jesuits, after this time makes this plausible.

In 1677, the Hurons of Lorette sent an “exhortative wampum belt” to Kahnawake, inviting its inhabitants to take up the Christian faith for good, to build a chapel as soon as possible, and to “combat the various demons who conspired for the ruin of both missions.” The meaning and purpose of the belt was surely more complex than the missionary chronicler let on. For the Hurons of Lorette, it was an expression of goodwill and an invitation to reconciliation: internal reconciliation at Kahnawake, possibly, between the Huron captain and his Mohawk and Oneida counterparts; inter-community reconciliation between Kahnawake and Kanehsatake; or even between Kahnawake and Lorette, for in supporting the secessionists the latter had no doubt incurred the disapproval of the former. The Hurons’ wampum belt was hung up in the church,

Montagnes was well-established and well-populated community, and colonial administrators tended to be diligent in documenting major occurrences in the missions. See *Mémoire de Canada*, 1740 et 41, par Josué Dubois Berthelot de Beaujours, [1741], COL C11A 76: 263-264v; Beauharnois to Maurepas, 21 September 1741, C11A 75: 138-142v.

⁹² *JRAD* 60: 307. On Thaondechoren’s Tionontaté origins, see *Relations inédites*, p. 171-172.

just above the altar, where it remained as a testament to the common faith and goodwill that united the two communities.⁹³

At the same time, Lorette's wampum was also an assertion of their primacy within the Christian family: in light of the Algonquians' removal from Kamiskouaouaganchit, and given their persistence through Iroquois diplomatic and military offensives the 1650s, the Hurons of Lorette could make a claim to having been the first to embrace the faith and to establish a solid community in the St. Lawrence Valley. But however solid it may have been, it remained small. The promise of regeneration held by the peace of 1667 had proven disappointing. Relocated to Notre-Dame des Anges, the community numbered 150 persons in 1668. Relocated once more to Notre-Dame de Foy and then to Lorette, it swelled to approximately 300 individuals by 1675. Yet these population gains were entirely undone in the years that followed by the strong gravitational pull of Kanehsatake and, we may also suppose, Kahnawake. By the time of the 1685 census, Lorette once again numbered only 146 persons. Disease may have contributed in a small way to this depopulation, but outmigration was its main cause.⁹⁴

Having welcomed New and Old Iroquois alike in the few years that followed the peace accord, Lorette now reemerged as a decidedly Huron community. Most of its leading figures had experienced captivity. For some, it had been brief. Ignace Tsaouenhohoui, who was considered "captain of his nation" until his death in 1670, as well as Louis Thaondechoren, who emerged as the "first dogique" of the Hurons and who presided over the foundation of Lorette in

⁹³ *JRAD* 63: 193-195. This wampum belt continued to adorn the church at Kahnawake until the late twentieth century, at which time it was stolen. See Jonathan Christopher Laney, *La "monnaie des sauvages": les colliers de wampum d'hier à aujourd'hui* (Sillery, Quebec: Septentrion, 2006), pp. 266-267; another illustration in Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga*, p. 48.

⁹⁴ Blouin, "Histoire et iconographie des Hurons de Lorette", 1: 265; *JRAD* 52: 228; *JRAD* 54: 286; *JRAD* 60: 27; Chaumonot, *Un Missionnaire des Hurons*, pp. 174-176, 194-196. Census of 1685, Library and Archives Canada, MG1 G1, 461: 1. It would be mistaken to attribute these population losses only, or even primarily, to disease. Cf. Karin Velez, *Resolved to Fly: The Virgin of Loreto, the Jesuits & the Miracle of Portable Catholicism in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World* (Ph.D., Princeton, 2008), p. 505.

1674. Both had escaped from the Iroquois after the debacle of 1660. Others had spent decades among the Iroquois, returning from captivity only after the peace. Pierre Atironta, already elderly when he returned from Iroquoia, soon emerged as a pillar of the community; he was described as “Captain of the Hurons” at the time of his death in 1672. Jacques Annhatetaionk, who arrived from Mohawk country in 1672-1673, was in also recognized as leading captain by the community. Pierre Andahiacon, who died circa 1676, was in a similar fashion recognized as one of the community’s “worthy captains” soon after his return from Iroquoia.⁹⁵

The return of Huron families from Iroquoia after years of captivity altered the ethnic makeup of the community, insofar as its Attigeenongnahac character became less marked. From the identity of leaders and the parts from whence they came we can get a sense. Pierre Atironta was likely of Ahrendarrhonon origin, as his name had been borne by two of that nation’s leaders before the destruction of Huronia. Meanwhile, the number of families said to be returning from Mohawk country suggests an increased presence of Attignawantan. Additional evidence for this shift comes from the fact that variations of the name formerly used for the Bear Nation appear in eighteenth century Wendat-Tionontaté dictionaries as referring to the inhabitants of Lorette: Potier thus gives Attinnia8enten, Hatindia8Ointen, Hatingia8Ointen, Hatindia8Ointen, Hatingia8Ointen, and Bruté Hatendia8enten.⁹⁶ In defining themselves to others in their diplomatic discourse, the community however appears to have preferred the label of “Wendat Loretronon” (or, reflecting their pronunciation, *Rorekronon*): Hurons of Lorette.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ On Jacques Annhatetaionk, *JRAD* 60: 102. On Pierre Andahiacon (Andahiach, Andaiakon, Endahiach), *JRAD* 58: 132, 136-138; *JRAD* 60: 302-305. On Thaondechoren, see *supra*.

⁹⁶ In light of this John Steckley has suggested that the Huron community at Quebec may “been constructed around an amalgam of Bear and Cord” after 1656, with Atsena and his followers representing the Northern Bear and the Southern Bear preferring to stay with the French. See *Words of the Hurons*, pp. 29-32. It is more likely, as I argue here, that the “Bear” character of the mission was the result of return migration from Mohawk Country in the late 1660s and 1670s.

⁹⁷ In a letter to the chapter of Chartres in 1678, the terms “Ouendat Lorétronon Teiatontarigè” and “ouendat ouaatsi Loretronnon Teiatontarigué” (Teiatontarie being the Huron name for Quebec). See Lucien Merlet, *Histoire des*

All of this was surely not the outcome expected by the elder who, welcoming Tracy, described his hopes to see Huron bones knit together with muscles and tendons, and Huron flesh to be born again. To be sure, in the years that followed the peace settlement the Huron community at Quebec was reinvigorated, gaining if not the glory and prosperity that it had once enjoyed, at least solid foundations which would allow it to persist in its distinct identity. Some captives and New Iroquois of Huron origin became Hurons anew. Theirs was a new society, however, for in refuge and exile the constituent units of the Huron Confederacy – Attignawantan, Attigneenongahac, Arendarhonon, and Tahontaenrat – had coalesced into a common entity. As old divisions faded, new ones emerged. Decades of voluntary or reluctant residence among Mohawk, Onondaga, Oneida, Cayuga, or Seneca hosts or captors, or among the French at and near Quebec, had driven political and cultural wedges between Huron groups.

Whereas Lorette remained a small but decidedly Huron community, Kahnawake and Kahnésatake were emerging as populous – attaining a population of 682 and 222, respectively by 1685 – and *Iroquois* ones.⁹⁸ Due to the arrival of waves of Old Iroquois, and to the need for a common identity and mutually intelligible language among New Iroquois of diverse origins, the process of assimilation which had begun in the villages of Iroquoia was completed on the shores of the St. Lawrence. This process was quicker at Kahnawake, which had become the favored destination for newcomers. The departure of the most disruptive Huron elements circa 1675

relations des Hurons et des Abnakis du Canada avec Notre-Dame de Chartres (Chartres: Petrot-Garnier, 1858), pp. 3-4. Potier's dictionary translates Lorette as "Roreke" (and Ancienne-Lorette as Andatraka). He also indicates that the people of Lorette were known as "hatindgia8ointen", "Ekeenteeronnon" and "Lorechtr8nnon" by the Hurons of Detroit. (a later entry suggests that they "Lorechtr8nnon" might also refer to the "French of Lorette"). Colden alludes for his part to the "Quatoghies of Loretto", Quatoghie apparently being an Iroquois name for the Hurons. Robert Toupin, ed., *Les Écrits de Pierre Potier* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1996), pp. 230, 263; Cadwallader Colden, *The History of The Indian Nations of Canada* (London: T. Ossborne, 1747), p. 143 (see also 21, 28-29, 69, 121, xv)-xvi.

⁹⁸ Census of 1685, Library and Archives Canada, MG1 G1, 461: 1.

allowed harmony to return to the community which after its relocation from Kentake took on the name of Saint-François-Xavier *du Sault*, or Kahnawake, meaning “at the foot of the Rapids”. If the oft reiterated, but tenuously documented, statement that Kahnawake and Gandouagué are variations of the same word is accurate, this name change was not a mere reflection of the village’s changed landscape, but a further reflection of the ascendancy of the Mohawks there.⁹⁹ Allusions to “Huron” chiefs, or to a distinct Huron presence at the mission for that matter, are not documented thereafter. Though the presence of Oneidas would be noted in the final decade of the century, Mohawks would predominate. When he penned his chronicle of the mission’s development in 1686, Chauchetière observed that the “warriors of Anié [i.e. Mohawks] have become more numerous at Montreal than they are in their own country”, and indicated that though ten or twelve nations were represented at Kahnawake (not the twenty-two identified claimed in the early years, it will be noted), all of them were Iroquois-speaking.¹⁰⁰ The community would retain this character through its three subsequent relocations upriver, in 1690, 1696, and 1716.

Kanehsatake meanwhile would remain the most heterogeneous of the mission villages until the end of the French Regime. For one, its Huron founding core was slower to be submerged. Of the fifteen individuals from La Montagne who were cited in judicial proceedings of the seigneurial court of the island of Montreal during the period from 1677 to 1686, a full seven were identified as Hurons.¹⁰¹ More impressionistically but no less tellingly, Bishop de

⁹⁹ Concerning the relocation and the new site, see *JRAD* 60: 274; *JRAD* 62: 166; *JRAD* 63: 190-194. The new village was built on a strip of land at the mouth of the rivière Le Portage (St-Régis). Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga*, p. 40-41. There is an unresolved contradiction between scholarly claims that (a) the new community was named after Gandaouagué, which the English did call Caughnawaga, and (b) the new community’s name reflected the landscape of the new location, and meant “at the foot of the rapids”. From the late seventeenth century, the English did refer to the mission village as Caughnawaga. Homophony may have contributed to the confusion.

¹⁰⁰ *JRAD* 63: 152, 178. See also *JRAD* 64: 242.

¹⁰¹ Grabowski, “Common Ground”, appendix 2, pp. 340-341. Of the other Aborigines who appeared before the courts, two were Algonquin, two were Sokokis, one was a Mohawk, another a Seneca, and another a Cayuga.

Saint-Vallier and Governor Denonville, writing in 1688 and 1690 respectively, both described the mission as being composed of “Iroquois *and* Hurons”.¹⁰² The presence of Algonquians, primarily Algonquins and Nippissings whom the Sulpicians had attempted to regroup at various points on the Island of Montreal since the early 1670s, but also including Ottawas, Sokokis, and Mahicans, also contributed to Kanehsatake’s heterogenous character. In the eighteenth century, the Algonquian component would become even more substantial, so that by the 1740s the mission – which had by then relocated to the site of Lac des Deux Montagnes – could be most accurately described as consisting of “two villages”, one of Iroquois and one of Algonquins and Nipissings, “which are separated one from the other only by the church which is common to both”.¹⁰³ For the time being, as an ever increasing number of Iroquois newcomers, among whom Onondagas appear to have featured most prominently, chose Kanehsatake as their destination, it was nevertheless evolving like Kahnawake into an “Iroquois” mission.¹⁰⁴

Kahnawake and Kanehsatake were in many ways extensions of Iroquoia. The New and Old Iroquois inhabitants of the mission villages retained traditional matrilineal kinship structures, subsistence patterns that hinged on the combination of horticultural activity with hunting and fishing expeditions that drew most of the population away from its village for most of the years, not to mention spoken dialects of Iroquois. The boundary between traditional and missionary teachings was fluid. Men and women shuttled to and from the two zones to visit family and friends, to find partners, to trade and take part in ritual obligations. In spite of high mobility and

¹⁰² Jean-Baptiste de La Croix de Chevreières de Saint-Vallier, *Estat present de l’Église et de la colonie française dans la Nouvelle-France* (Quebec : A. Cote, 1856 [1688]), pp. 26-28; NYCD 9: 441.

¹⁰³ “Mémoire sur l’État de la Mission des Sauvages du Lac des Deux Montagnes envoyé en France en 1755 par p.s.s. Montgolfier”, ASSSM, Fonds Oka.

¹⁰⁴ From Paris, Tronson already alluded to the “mission Iroquois de la Montagne” in 1684. Tronson to La Barre, 30 April 1684, *Lettres de M. Tronson aux ecclésiastiques du Séminaire de Montréal*, typewritten copy by Mère Ste-Miriam du Temple, BANQ-M, 4: 124. On the ethnic composition of the mission, see Cuoq, “Notes pour servir à l’histoire de la mission”, ASSSM, carton 49-50, no. 6, p. 4; “Notes de M. Roupe sur la composition ethnique de la mission”, APSSM, carton 49-50, no. 4; Olivier Maurault, “Les vicissitudes d’une mission sauvage”, p. 122; Tremblay, “La politique missionnaire”, p. 49; Dickinson, “Évangéliser et former des prêtres”, p. 356.

overlapping identities, Christianity was nevertheless emerging as a fundamental constituent of individual and collective identity for the people of the two mission villages, a crucial means of understanding and negotiating internal and external belonging. In the upcoming decades, this would have major repercussions on the course of war and peace in the region.

CHAPTER 4

AGAINST THEIR OWN NATION: War Between the Christian and League Iroquois, 1684-1701

The peace settlement of 1667, at the same time as it initiated an important population movement from Iroquoia to the mission villages of the St. Lawrence River, had ushered a wave of French expansion to the *Pays d'en Haut* of the Great Lakes and beyond. Trading posts multiplied in the interior under the governorship of Frontenac, as traders, officers and missionaries strengthened old commercial partnerships and political alliances with the Hurons-Petuns, Ottawas, and Ojibwas, and extended new ones to the Potawatomes, Menomines, Miamis, Mascoutens, Kickapoos, Illinois, and others. Through the late 1670s and early 1680s, the willingness of French traders to supply these nations with arms and to promote their coalition was cause for alarm among their traditional western Iroquois enemies – the Senecas, in particular.¹

The Christian Iroquois inhabitants of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake apparently played only a minor part in the French commercial thrust towards the *Pays d'en Haut*, but they could not help being embroiled in the escalating conflict.² The fact that they retained strong cultural ties and kinship bonds with the “Infidel Iroquois” of the Five Nations, even as they cultivated a distinct religious and political identity which drew them closer to the French, made them a target of suspicion in this increasingly tense period. Governor Frontenac, whose dislike for the Jesuits

¹ See Havard, *Empire et métissage*, pp. 69-70, 206-214; White, *The Middle Ground*, pp. 23-33; Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, p. 172-176; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 144-150; Brandão, *Your Fyre Shall Burn No More*, pp. 118-125.

² There is little doubt that the inhabitants of the mission took part in the western fur trade during this period, but evidence is scant. Judicial records reveal, for example, that a Huron from La Montagne named Louis Ouacouts or le Boiteux (8akouts, 8acouse, Oakon, Ouacout, 8akont), associated with Marie-Félix, a Huron woman from Lorette married to the Frenchman Laurent Dubeau (Dubosc), and journeyed to trade to Michilimackinac in 1682. See BANQ-M, Fonds Bailliage de Montréal (1644-1693), TL2, feuilles détachées (copies in Joseph L. Peyser and José António Brandão, *Edge of Empire: Documents of Michilimackinac, 1671-1716* [East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2008], pp. 3-21).

extended to their missions and residents, was characteristically captious, as was his coterie. The Kahnawakes were alarmed, around 1679, by rumors that officials wished to hold their captain (Togouiroui, it is likely) accountable for the insolence of the League Iroquois and to place him in prison for his role in “complicating affairs”.³ The Jesuits, although they shared many of the officials’ reservations about the Iroquois of the League, could not disagree more when it came to their wards in the mission villages. On the contrary, in these increasingly troubled times they began to make the claim that their missions played a crucial strategic role. “Those barbarians”, Father Thierry Beschefer wrote of the Five Nations, “have often resolved to wage war against the French, but they have always been checked by those whose kindred were at the Sault.” The Mohawks, in particular, had continually refused to give their consent to such a war because their “nephews and children” lived among the French.⁴

With Frontenac’s return to France in 1682, the strategic views of the missionaries spread to the colonial administration. No sooner had he arrived in the colony that the new governor Joseph-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre reported to the Secretary of State for the Navy on the subject of Kahnawake that “this mission is one of the things that will most engage the Iroquois to make peace with us”. For one thing, he claimed that its development had all but depopulated Mohawk Country. For another, the people of the four eastern nations, because of their many relatives in that mission, could be easily “adjusted” and isolated from the Senecas.⁵ As “Iroquois” aligned with the French, the people of the mission villages were well placed to act as mediators. When an expected Seneca embassy failed to show up at Montreal in December of

³ *JRAD* 63: 207-209, 213-215. Chauchetière alludes to a number of other crises that year, including rumours that a trading post would be established above the village or that the brandy trade would find a foothold there, and the killing of a Loup (Mahican) headman by the Iroquois, which was nearly – falsely – imputed to Kahnawakes. It was Togouiroui who investigated and cleared up the matter.

⁴ *JRAD* 62: 255.

⁵ When he wrote this report, La Barre was as of yet unacquainted with the mission, which he erroneously referred to as the “mission iroquoise du saut de Sainte Marie”. La Barre to the Minister [12 nov 1682], C11A 6: 63v-64.

1682, four of Kahnawake's principal chiefs and Kanehsatake's head chief journeyed with the fur trader and interpreter Charles Le Moyne (known among the Iroquois as Akouessan, or the Partridge) to insist that they send a delegation so that the newly arrived La Barre might resume the discussions initiated by his predecessor. Threatened upon their arrival in Seneca Country, these emissaries nevertheless proved persuasive, for a Seneca embassy reached Montreal in July, followed by delegates from the other four nations that August. During the Franco-Iroquois councils which ensued, the deputies from Kahnawake and Kanehsatake continued to lend their support to the French position. From the governor's perspective, they had "done their duty very well".⁶

In the two decades that followed, the Christian Iroquois would distinguish themselves not only as diplomats, but as warriors. Visiting Kahnawake for the first time in the summer of 1683, the new governor found "much goodwill" among its inhabitants. The chiefs enthusiastically pledged that their village would supply 150 warriors in case of war, even against the Iroquois of the League if the latter were so bold as to break their peace with the French.⁷ In 1684 and 1687, the inhabitants of the mission villages would set out to war against the Senecas; in 1693 they would reach Mohawk Country, and in 1696 that of the Onondagas and Oneidas. "Who would have ever believed", marveled the Jesuit Claude Chauchetière, "that the Faith and religion would have united them so thoroughly with the French as to make them take up arms against the Iroquois [...] their own nation."⁸

⁶ La Barre to the Minister, 4 November 1683, C11A 6: 135-137v (copy in NYCD 9: 202-203); François Vachon de Belmont, "Recueil de pièces sur l'histoire du Canada", Bibliothèque nationale de France, Français 13516, 21-22v. The first part of this manuscript has been transcribed with some errors and omissions as Belmont, *Histoire du Canada par M. l'abbé de Belmont* (Quebec: Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, 1840).

⁷ La Barre to the Minister, 4 November 1683, C11A 6: 135-135v; JRAD 62: 255-257.

⁸ Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, hereafter JRAD (Cleveland: Burrows Bros. Co., 1896-1901), 63: 240-241 (retranslated by the author).

Where Chauchetière expressed delighted wonder we must express scholarly inquisitiveness: how can we make sense of the fact that Iroquois went to war against other Iroquois during the final two decades of the seventeenth century? If scholars have tended, like Chauchetière and most other colonial observers, to frame this conflict in terms of *Iroquois* against *Iroquois*, this chapter points to the value of looking beyond this broad tribal label and paying attention to the specific solidarities at play. Paying close attentions to the rhythm of the conflict as well as to the identity of the belligerents reveals the extent to which, as with the Huron-Iroquois conflict covered in the second chapter, patterns of kinship and migration played a fundamental role in shaping patterns of war and peace-making.⁹

Peace was thus not to last. Reports that the Senecas had resumed their raids against the Illinois and Miamis and, in early 1684, the news that they had dared to attack the French outpost of Fort Saint-Louis in the Illinois Country, determined the governor to go to war against the offending nation.¹⁰ Sometime in late spring or early summer of 1684, La Barre's decision was announced at Kahnawake. Three courses of action, presented by the missionaries and digested

⁹ In explaining the involvement of the people of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake in the Franco-Iroquois conflict, historians have tended to see them as succumbing or resisting to French pressures. Richter writes that "to a striking degree Kahnawake and Kanehsatake Iroquois went out of their way to avoid direct military engagement with the League Iroquois or with New York." They were "Unwilling to engage in the fratricidal war that would result from war with New York but also in no position to betray their military obligations to the French." Richter, *Facing East*, 159. Allan Greer has more recently stated that the people of Kahnawake "were dragged into a deadly struggle against their own kinfolk. Members of the community did manage to minimize their own direct participation in the conflict and successfully weathered the storm, perhaps more terrible in anticipation than in the event." Greer, *Mohawk Saint*, 99. Some historians, notably Gretchen Green, have gone further and claimed that the Christian Iroquois were compelled by fear or force to take part in military operations. This chapter rejects this position. Cf. Green, *A New People*, 88-90. Neither has the central role played by the Christian Iroquois in negotiating the Great Peace of 1701 been appreciated. In emphasizing the peace settlement as a triumph of French or Five Nations diplomacy, historians have portrayed the inhabitants of the missions as mere messengers, rather than as true mediators. See Gilles Havard, *The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); José António Brandão and William A. Starna, "The Treaties of 1701: A Triumph of Iroquois Diplomacy", *Ethnohistory*, 43 (Spring 1996), pp. 209-244.

¹⁰ Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 15; La Barre to the Minister, 4 November 1683, C11A 6: 136-137v; La Barre to the Minister, 4 June 1684, C11A 6: 276v; La Barre to the King, 5 June 1684, C11A 6: 282-282v.

by the community's leaders, were discussed in council: the villagers could return to Iroquoia from whence they had come; they could remain in the mission village without taking any action; or they could accompany the French to war. The Kahnawakes reportedly found the first two alternatives unsatisfactory: to leave their village would mean abandoning the Christian faith (and, if we push beyond the missionary's reporting biases, abandoning expanded hunting grounds and whole networks of trade and alliance); to remain there without taking part in operations would, by provoking French mistrust, similarly undermine the community's relations with its colonial neighbours. The people of Kahnawake instead concluded that "having but one and the same faith with the French, they should also to run the same risks together."¹¹

For Chauchetière, there was no doubt that it was "Faith and religion" that "had so thoroughly united them with the French as to cause them to take arms against the Iroquois and their own nation".¹² Indeed, the inhabitants of the two mission villages had developed over the previous decade and a half a vibrant religious and political identity distinct from that of the Five Nations, that of Christians and allies of the French. To be sure, the boundary between traditional and missionary teachings was fluid; notwithstanding the tendency of Jesuit and Sulpician chroniclers to portray the Christian Iroquois as having thoroughly rejected ancient practices to embrace the new religion, a great religious eclecticism characterized life in the mission. Though baptism served as a crucial initiation ceremony, an apparent requirement for full membership into the community, not everyone living in the villages was baptized. And even among the baptized, long-term inhabitants of the villages, a number of traditional shamanic practices persisted – offerings to the sun and dream divination, for example – and were adapted to the new context. Christianity had nevertheless emerged as a fundamental constituent of individual and

¹¹ JRAD 63: 241-243. The French *se risquer* might alternatively be translated as "dare themselves".

¹² JRAD 63: 241.

collective identity for the people of the two mission villages, a crucial means of understanding and negotiating internal and external belonging.¹³

The rituals and symbols of the new religion were valued for their sacred qualities, as means of accessing the divine, as a means of sharing in the source of French power and of counteracting some of the divisive trends that now seemed to characterize society in Iroquoia. The vocabulary of the new religion, moreover, provided the social and cultural cement which generated a sense of shared belonging in the mission villages and allowed the formation of cohesive communities out of culturally heterogeneous fragments. Through salient gestures and symbols, the Kahnawakes and Kanesatakes set themselves apart from – and above, many believed – the people of Iroquoia. Common observances gave rhythm to the day and to the year, as men and women came together for the recitation of prayers, for mass – attended by almost all on Sunday and feast days, and by a substantial number on other days of the week – and for the celebration of baptisms, weddings, and funerals. Rituals of collective and individual penance, both public and private, were observed. Crucifix and rosaries were worn as a means of accessing the sacred and as markers of affiliation. Even though the absolute temperance that had characterized Kentake's first decade was breaking down by the early 1680s as a result of colonists dabbling in the brandy trade, a formal prohibition and an ideal remained very much alive. Traditional religious customs and liberal sexual practices, categorized as sinful by missionaries, were similarly rejected.¹⁴

¹³ *Idem.*

¹⁴ On the appropriation and adaptation of Christianity in the mission context and at Kahnawake in particular, see Allan Greer, "Conversion and Identity: Iroquois Christianity in Seventeenth-Century New France" in Kenneth Mills and Anthony Grafton, eds, *Conversion: Old Worlds and New* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2003), pp. 175-198; and *Mohawk Saint*, p. 100-110.

Probing the identities and solidarities of the inhabitants of the mission villages raises a tentative challenge to the recent scholarly trend of adopting the autonym “Haudenosaunee”, in lieu of the more familiar name “Iroquois” – the latter being an English loan from the French, derived from an Algonquian pejorative of possible Basque origin. Though the notions of Haudenosaunee (or Rotinonhsionni, “People of the Longhouse”, i.e. members of the Confederacy) and Onkwehón:we (“Real Men”, i.e. *ethnic* Iroquois) would become conflated in the nineteenth century, there is good reason to believe that the distinction did matter during the decades under examination. While the Christian Iroquois surely continued to view themselves and be viewed by other Iroquois as Onkwehón:we, they ceased to be Haudenosaunee. Evidence on this point is scant, but it appears that through the final decades of the seventeenth century they instead identified themselves and were identified as “Karikwists” (in period sources Karigouistes, Caraguists, Garih8ioston), which we might translate as “Believers”, “Those who Pray” or “Christians”.¹⁵ This identification had a fluid, situational, and volitional character, to be sure. Yet though men and women flowed across this divide, changing participation and membership in the community did not prevent the emergence and maintenance of discrete solidarities and identities.¹⁶

¹⁵ I am grateful to Roy Wright for his assistance with the linguistic evidence. Domine Delliuss wrote “Karig8istes”, La Potherie “Karigouistes” and Colden “Caraguists”. See NYCD 4: 95; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 200-203; Cadwallader Colden, *The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada* (London: T. Osborne, 1747), pp. 203-210. Bruyas’ Mohawk lexicon translates Garih8ioston as “croire, être Chrétien”. Jacques Bruyas, *Radical Words of the Mohawk Language, with their derivatives* (New York: Cramoisy Press, 1862), p. 91. In recent years a few historians have repeated David Blanchard’s claim that the people of Kahnawake referred to themselves as “ongwe honwe tehatiisontha (real men who make the Sign of the Cross)”. As no colonial sources confirm this, it appears safer at this time to interpret this as a modern turn of phrase. See David Blanchard, “... To the Other Side of the Sky: Catholicism at Kahnawake, 1667-1700”, *Anthropologica*, New Series, 24, 1 (1982), p. 90.

¹⁶ On communal identities and boundaries, see Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969); Gerald Suttles, *The Social Construction of Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); Anthony P. Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (London: Tavistock, 1985); Joane Nagel, “The Political Construction of Ethnicity”, in Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel, ed., *Competitive Ethnic Relations* (Academic Press, 1986), pp. 93-112; E. Frazer, *The Problem of Communitarian Politics. Unity and conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Heaviest invested in this distinct Christian identity and privileged bond to the French were the leading figures of the mission communities. It was in no small part due to their ability to promote the new religion and attract droves of migrants that leaders such as Togouiroui the Great Mohawk and the Onondaga Ogenheratarihens achieved prominence at Kahnawake (behind them we can sense the role of influential women, whom the historical record relegates to the shadow). There, such men exercised what we might recognize as a form of patronage over the local church. As noted previously, Tonsahoten had supplied the land for the construction of the mission's chapel in 1676; when the building was destroyed in a storm in the fall of 1683, Togouiroui offered his newly built longhouse to replace it. The following year, before going to war, Togouiroui offered as "a monument to his piety" an impressive eight-branched bronze candelabrum very similar to the one which then adorned the Dutch Reformed church in Albany, where he purchased his exemplar for the exorbitant amount of twenty four beavers worth 240 English pounds.¹⁷ As Chauchetière noted, it was in no small part due to the fact that the captains of Kahnawake "gave such a skillful spin to the affair" that the entire community expressed the desire "to perish rather than lose their faith" upon being invited by La Barre to wage war against the Senecas.¹⁸

To "lose" the Christian faith, beyond losing access to potent spiritual forces, entailed a weakening of bonds to an ever-expanding network of French and Aboriginal actors, brothers

¹⁷ JRAD 63: 231, 243. An illustration of the interior of the Reformed church after its 1715 enlargement (and before its 1806 destruction), shows a candelabrum hanging from the ceiling at the center of the room. Whether it is the one mentioned by Chauchetière, or a later replacement, is unknown. See Arthur J. Weise, *Weise's History of Albany The History of the City of Albany, New York from the Discovery of the Great River in 1524, by Verrazzano, to the Present Time* (Albany: E.H. Bender, 1884), p. 282b. With respect to the value of the candelabrum, it must be noted that while the Thwaites edition speaks of four beavers, the original indicates "ving-quatre" [sic]. If Chauchetière might value these twenty four beavers at 240 pounds, a new estimate based on Louis Jordan's data only reaches about a hundred guilders or about fifteen pounds in New York money of account – still a significant sum. See Louis Jordan, "Money Substitutes in New Netherland and Early New York: The Beaver Pelt", <http://www.coins.nd.edu/ColCoin/ColCoinIntros/NNBeaver.html> (accessed 18 November 2009).

¹⁸ JRAD 63: 241 (I have retranslated the "gave such a skillful spin to the affair" part of the quote).

through baptism, who shared overlapping beliefs and practices.¹⁹ Moreover, to ignore La Barre's plea for assistance would run counter to the dynamics that lay at the center of the relationship between Onontio – the French king (Great Onontio or Onontio Goa, properly) and his representative in the colony, the governor general (Onontio) – and his allied “children”. Paralleling the metaphor of brotherhood, that of fatherhood was first tentatively introduced in the 1640s, extending first to the Algonquins and Hurons, before being institutionalized beginning in the early 1670s. By 1690s if not well before that, orators from the Kahnawake and Kanehsatake spoke publicly of the governor, Onontio, as their “Father” and of their people as numbering among the “Children” who owed him obedience. Beyond the realm of rhetoric, this relationship can more accurately be understood as one of not of obedience but of mutual obligation. In this respect, Iroquoian traditions presented a model: although clan affiliation was matrilineal, kinship retained a bilateral dimension insofar as a sense of pronounced reciprocity governed the relationship of a son to his father's lineage. Significantly, this reciprocity manifested itself in times of war, when a family lost one of its members: “The children become obligated to their fathers' lodge, to which they are strangers,” observed Lafitau, “and contract the obligation of replacing them [the deceased]”.²⁰

¹⁹ On the theme of spiritual kinship through baptism, see Greer, “Conversion and Identity”, pp. 182-183; and *Mohawk Saint*, pp. 51-53; Kenneth M. Morrison, “Baptism and Alliance: The Symbolic Mediations of Religious Syncretism,” *Ethnohistory*, 37, 4 (1990), pp. 416-437. On the theme of metaphorical fatherhood in the Franco-Aboriginal alliance, see Havard, *Empire et métissage*, pp. 215-218; Havard, pp. 29-30; White, *The Middle Ground*, pp. 36, 84-86, 94-95, 104-105, 112, 116-118; Peter Laurence Cook, “Vivre comme frères: Native-French alliances in the St Lawrence Valley, 1535-1667” (Ph.D. dissertation, McGill, 2008), pp. 453-494; Patricia Galloway, “‘The Chief Who Is Your Father’: Choctaw and French Views of the Diplomatic Relation” in Peter H. Wood, Gregory A. Waselkov, and M. Thomas Hatley, eds., *Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast* (Lincoln and London: 1989), pp. 254-78. And for metaphors of fatherhood in the specific context of Franco-Iroquois relations, Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1984), pp. 44-45; and Francis Jennings et al., eds., *The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), pp. 119-120.

²⁰ Joseph-François Lafitau, *Customs of the American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1977), 2: 99. On the relation between men and their children, expressed by the concept of “agadoni” among the Mohawks and Oneida (as opposed to the “owachira” of female lineages), see Mary

The need to respond to the governor's call to arms would have been made all the more necessary by Onontio's willingness to embrace, in this context of reciprocity and mutual obligation, the role of provider. In anticipation of war, La Barre initiated a generous policy of gift-giving that in effect grafted itself onto both the missionary practice of supplying material assistance in times of need, and onto the exchange of presents that traditionally accompanied diplomatic rituals. Within weeks of his arrival, and though he had not yet visited Kahnawake, the governor was writing to the king to request a continuation of the annual grant of 500# to the missionaries there. The following summer, he gave special gifts to the four ambassadors who travelled to Iroquoia, and during the distribution of presents that followed the conference held at Montreal that August he took particular care in giving a generous share to the Christian Iroquois. A few months later, La Barre was again petitioning the king for funds to assist in rebuilding the village's destroyed chapel in recognition of the community's goodwill. The funds requested were granted.²¹ Thereafter, his successors at the head of the colony would continue to view – albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm (e.g. Denonville) or repugnance (e.g. Frontenac) – the distribution of presents as crucial to maintaining the cooperation of the warriors and diplomats of the mission villages.²²

Druke Becker, "Structure and Meaning of Leadership among the Mohawk and Oneida during the Mid-18th Century" (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 166-169; J.N. B. Hewitt, "The Requickening Address of the Iroquois Condolence Council", ed. William N. Fenton, *Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences* 34, 3 (March 1944), p. 67; and Fenton's introduction to Lafitau's *Customs*, p. lxxxi.

²¹ La Barre to the Minister, [12 November 1682], C11A 6: 63v-64v; La Barre to the Minister, 4 November 1683, C11A 6: 135v, 137, 140, 143.

²² Denonville to the Minister, 10 November 1686, C11A 8: 132; "Résumé des lettres du Canada" with commentaries, 1686, C11A 8: 176; Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 18. "État de la dépense faite en l'année 1688 jusqu'au premier novembre au sujet de la guerre contre les Iroquois", 1 November 1688, C11A 10: 138v; "Memoire Pour les Iroquois Chrestiens du saut en Canada", February, 1692, in *JRAD* 64: 108-112. Regarding the importance of gifts in the Franco-Aboriginal alliance, see Cornelius Jaenen, "The role of presents in French-Amerindian trade" in Duncan Cameron, ed., *Explorations in Canadian Economic History* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1985); Peter L. Cook, "Symbolic and material exchange in intercultural Diplomacy: The French and the Hodenosaunee in the early eighteenth century" in Jo-Anne Fiske, Susan Sleeper-Smith, and William Wicken, eds, *New Faces of the Fur Trade: Selected Papers of the Seventh North American Fur Trade Conference* (East Lansing: Michigan State

While spiritual and metaphorical kinship, enacted through shared beliefs and rituals, as well as through mutual obligations, induced the inhabitants of the mission villages to assist their French “brothers” and “fathers” in their war, an equally crucial factor was their absence of ties to the Senecas. Though Chauchetière and other commentators might marvel at the fact that the Christian Iroquois had agreed to wage war against “their own nation”, this constituted a gross oversimplification of identity and overstatement of solidarity among the Five Nations. As observed in the previous chapter, the men and women who settled in the mission villages from the late 1660s onward came overwhelmingly from the eastern Iroquois nations: Oneidas formed an initial core at Kentake, but they were soon submerged by waves of Mohawk newcomers; Mohawks also came to dominate at Kanehsatake, though there Onondagas represented a substantial minority. Notwithstanding occasional tensions, ties between the residents of the mission villages and their village of origin remained strong. Meanwhile, the Senecas’ demographic contribution to the mission villages had been negligible. Factoring in the tenuous nature of solidarity across the League’s constituent nations, and the geographical, biological, and conceptual distance that separated the Christian Iroquois from the Senecas provides the key to understanding their actions through the 1680s. As the Albany fur trader Anthony L’Espinard would observe just a few years later, Togouiroui and the rest of his people “were no ways inclined to engage in the war if the Maquas [Mohawks], Oneydes [Oneidas] and Onnondages [Onondagas] were concerned, *because their brethren, sisters, uncles, aunts, etc. were there*”, but they were willing to “immediately join” the French against the Senecas.²³

University, 1998), pp. 75-100; Catherine Desbarats, “The Cost of Early Canada's Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric”, *William and Mary Quarterly*, 52, 4 (1995): 609-630.

²³ NYCD 3: 487-488 (emphasis mine).

The challenge, as recognized by both La Barre and the leading men at Kahnawake and Kanehsatake, was to check the League's potential political and military unity. In preparation for the campaign, two of their number (including Togouioui), were dispatched with wampum belts to the Mohawks, two others to the Oneidas (including Ogenheratarihyens), and three to the Onondagas. These emissaries were to make it clear that the French wished only to avenge the misdeeds of the Senecas, who by their recent aggression had breached the peace accord made at Montreal the previous year; that the French and their allies had no qualms with the other four nations, and intended to live with them as friends.²⁴ In many ways, this diplomatic gambit was in keeping with the proselytizing habit of the mission communities' leaders over the past decade and a half. In fact, it was now reported with apprehension at Albany that Togouioui and two other men who arrived at the Mohawk villages had among their aims that of inciting their inhabitants "to move to Canada".²⁵

To be sure, consensus was not total at Kahnawake. Many warriors, following their personal inclinations or bending to the will of their families' leading women and men, chose to remain home at the risk of disappointing their French brothers and father. These included one of the village's four chiefs, the Oneida Ogenheratarihyens, who took part in the diplomatic offensive but was unwilling to join the military operations that followed, leading some to believe that he would abandon the village.²⁶ Some nine or ten households – a roughly estimated hundred

²⁴ "Mémoire de La Barre concernant son expédition au Lac Ontario", 1 October 1684, C11A 6: 308-309v (copy in NYCD 9:239-240); Jean de Lamberville to La Barre, 13 July 1684, copy in NYCD 9: 254; Pierre-François-Xavier de Charlevoix, *Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle France, avec le Journal historique d'un voyage fait par ordre du roi dans l'Amérique septentrionale* (Paris: Nyon, 1744), 2: 313; Chauchetière, *La vie de la B. Catherine Tegaköüita*, p. 68; Cadwallader Colden, *History of the Five Indian Nations*, p. 64

²⁵ A. J. F. van Laer, ed., *Minutes of the Court of Albany, Rensselaerswyck, and Schenectady, 1668-1685* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1926), 3: 463, 470; see also Thomas Grassman, *The Mohawk Indians and Their Valley, Being a Chronological Documentary Record to the End of 1693* (Schenectady, New York: Eric Hugo, 1969), p. 388.

²⁶ Chauchetière, *Vie de la B. Catherine Tegaköüita*, p. 71.

individuals – sure enough registered their discontent or alarm by leaving the village the year of the campaign. Vincent Bigot, missionary among the Abenakis recently settled at the village of Saint-François de Sales near Quebec, attributed this departure to the ravages of brandy. Those who left Kahnawake “said that they had withdrawn there solely to live in peace, far from the disorders caused by intemperance; but that they found themselves as greatly annoyed by drunkards as they were in their own country”.²⁷ Yet while liquor may very well have contributed to driving men and women away from the mission, the timing makes it probable that looming war against the Senecas, another major complication for those who wished only to “live in peace”, also factored into this burst of emigration.

Enthusiasm ran high at Kanehsatake and at Lorette: during the muster at Cataraqui, the warriors of each village respectively numbered 60 and 40, representing a remarkably high rate of mobilization for a community whose total population would be reported the following year as being of 222 and 146 (a rate of one warrior fielded for each 3.7 individual in the community). The small size of these communities likely contributed to the feasibility of reaching such a consensus and such a thorough mobilization. At Lorette, where memories of the Senecas’ role in the destruction of Huronia may have remained vivid, even men who were well past their prime and older boys who had not yet been initiated to the art of war responded to the call to arms. Though representing a third less than the numbers pledged the previous year, Kahnawake’s contingent of 101 warriors (a rate of 1 warrior per 6.8 person) was nevertheless the single largest

²⁷ *JRAD* 63: 131. According to Chauchetière liquor had indeed been “unchained” among the Kahnawakes in 1681. See *JRAD* 63: 223.

besides that of the French, and on its own it represented almost a quarter of the 410 Aboriginal warriors present at Cataraqui on August 18th, 1684.²⁸

With these warriors advancing towards Cataraqui as part of La Barre's army, Christian Iroquois delegations came and went to Onondaga where "a general assembly of all the Iroquois" was being held to discuss the situation. Their urging that the Senecas "give satisfaction" to Onontio was reciprocated by the Onondagas' resolve to mediate a peace.²⁹ With his forces in no state to carry out the offensive, poorly provisioned and decimated by malaria, La Barre was compelled to accept humiliating terms at a peace conference at La Famine, on the south shore of Lake Ontario. Accounts of the proceedings on September 5th allow us to catch a glimpse of what the campaign meant for the people of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake. Indeed, Otreouti's final point during the discussions – otherwise devoted to the affairs of the French, their allies in the Upper Country, and the Senecas – concerned them specifically. He requested that the governor "Prevent the Christians of Sault Saint Louis and la Montagne from coming among us to attract our people to Montreal; make them cease to dismember our land as they do every year."³⁰

Chauchetière's allusion to the proceedings suggests an even more divisive encounter, during

²⁸ *Revue faite au fort Frontenac le 17 aoust 1684 des Sauvages qui nous ont suivis pour la guerre*, 17 August 1684, C11A 6: 297-298. Factoring in the uncertain but no doubt small number of men who had at the time of the muster gone on ahead with Le Moyne on an embassy to Onondaga would probably not alter this substantially. Supporting the hypothesis that the Kahnawakes who around this time accompanied Le Moyne to Onondaga were excluded from this count is the fact that Le Moyne's name does not show up in either the "Revue faite au fort Frontenac le 17 aoust 1684 des Sauvages qui nous ont suivis pour la guerre", 17 August 1684, C11A 6: 297-298, or in the "Reveüe des troupes qui ont accompagné Monsieur de la Barre lors de son expedition contre les Iroquois", 14 August 1684, C11A 6: 295-298v. For the census data, see Library and Archives Canada, MG1 G1, 461: 1. It was no doubt as a consequence of this comprehensive mobilization that French officers described the contingent from of Lorette as consisting of "mediocre" men, in comparison to the "good men" of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake. "Revue faite au fort Frontenac [...]", 17 August 1684, C11A 6: 297-298.

²⁹ Lamberville to La Barre, 13 July 1684, in *NYCD* 9: 254.

³⁰ "Mémoire de La Barre concernant son expédition au Lac Ontario", 1 October 1684, C11A 6: 310v-312; Jean de Lamberville to La Barre, 17 August 1684, C11A 6: 540-540v; Lamberville to La Barre, 28 August 1684, C11A 6: 541-541v; "Presens des Onontaguez faits à Onontio, à La Famine le cinq septembre 1684", C11A 6: 299-300; Louis-Armand de Lom d'Arce de Lahontan, *Œuvres complètes*, Réal Ouellet and Alain Beaulieu, eds (Montreal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1990), 1: 302-310.

which the Iroquois of the Five Nations spoke harshly to the Christian Iroquois, jeering at them, “renouncing” and threatening them.³¹

The willingness of the Onondagas, Cayugas, and Oneidas to lend their diplomatic support to the Senecas at this critical juncture ushered unprecedented tensions between the inhabitants of the missions and those of Iroquoia.³² The people of Kahnawake took the threats uttered at La Famine seriously enough that they decided to cut short their fall hunt in order to devote themselves to fortifying their village. A bastioned pentagonal wooden palisade was completed with haste during the beginning of the following year and crowned shortly thereafter by the addition of a single iron cannon delivered on the orders of the new governor of Montreal, Louis-Hector de Callières.³³ At Kanehsatake, the energetic and independently wealthy Sulpician missionary François Vachon de Belmont did his best to improve the mission complex, enclosing its chapel and administrative buildings within a rectangular stone masonry wall – of which two corner turrets have survived to this day – and the adjacent longhouses within a rectangular

³¹ JRAD 63: 245. See also Chauchetière, *Vie de la B. Catherine Tegakoiïta*, p. 73.

³² A number of scholars have interpreted this moment as a significant political break, a point when the headmen of the League stopped recognizing the Christian Iroquois as their own people. I would contend that the political break occurred gradually and well before then. Thwaites’s inaccurate transcription/translation of Chauchetière’s *Narration* appears to be responsible for the interpretation of the 1684 meeting as an expulsion from the League council. Chauchetière wrote that “Ils avoient déclamé contre eux, ils les avoient hués et enfin ils leur firent plusieurs menaces qui n’aboutirent enfin qu’à leur faire *perdre leur chasse* parce qu’ils la quittèrent pour venir achever la palissade.” This was regrettably transcribed as “*perdre leur place*” and translated as “They had declaimed against them, had jeered at them, and finally uttered various threats against them, which eventually ended only in causing them to *lose their places in the council*, because they left it in order to come to finish the palisade.” (emphasis mine). See Claude Chauchetière, *Narration annuelle de la mission du Sault depuis sa fondation jusqu’en 1686*, ed. Hélène Avisseau (Bordeaux : Archives départementales de la Gironde, 1984); JRAD 63: 245. Cf. Green, *A New People*, pp. 74-75 (Green’s interpretation of these events is further muddled by her confusion of sources relating to the negotiations of 1683 and of 1684); Gerald F. Reid, *Kahnawà:ke: Factionalism, Traditionalism, and Nationalism in a Mohawk Community*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), p. 10.

³³ JRAD 63: 245; Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga*, p. 72-73, citing Nicholas Victor Burtin’s Notes, pp. 167-168.

wooden carpentry palisade erected, in the missionary's words, "for the security of the Natives in their extreme danger".³⁴

The offensive turned out to be diplomatic, rather than military. Arriving in 1683, Governor Thomas Dongan of New York took the opportunity presented by the Onondagas', Cayugas', and Senecas' request for assistance to extend English claims over the Iroquois and to undermine the standing of the French among them.³⁵ He encouraged the Mohawks to advocate the return-migration of their relatives in Canada, promising that the latter would receive "as much land as they needed" at Saratoga on the lower Hudson, as well as a Catholic priest who might "instruct them in religion". While a segment of the Mohawk leadership was likely inclined to let their relatives in the mission villages be, another was convinced of the need to induce a return-migration. In the late summer of 1686, a man named Onnonragewas (known at Albany as both Janetje and Lawrence), who had spent some time at Kahnawake and been baptized there before resettling in Mohawk Country, journeyed back to the mission to convey the invitation to its people.³⁶ A number of families – eight, reports one source – showed interest in returning back to Mohawk Country, including those of a certain Garistasi (or Le Fer, "The Iron") and his brother Kakare.³⁷ Along with Onnonragewas, these two men would emerge as the

³⁴ See Vachon de Belmont's "Plant [sic] de la Mission de la Montagne", 1694, Archives nationales de France, N/III/Canada/12; Vachon de Belmont to Louis XIV, LAC, MG17-A7-2, pp. 222-224; Tronson to Belmont, 4 June 1686, LAC, MG17-A7-2, pp. 3901-3914; Olivier Maurault, "Le Fort des Messieurs" in *Marges d'histoire* (Montreal: Librairie d'Action canadienne-française, 1930), 3: 24-54; Germain Casavant, *Domaine et tours du fort des messieurs de Saint Sulpice* (Quebec: Les Publications du Québec, 2001).

³⁵ Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 150-159, 167; Parmenter, *Edge of the Woods*, pp. 174-175.

³⁶ J.-F. Lozier, "Ononchragewas the Mohawk and Lawrence the Cigar Store Indian", paper presented at the Conference on Iroquois Research, Akwesasne, 2 October 2010. Because of these multiple names and nicknames, scholars have failed to appreciate the crucial activity of this Mohawk warrior and diplomat between 1686 and 1692. See Lawrence R. Leder, ed., *The Livingston Indian Records*, hereafter *LIR* (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical Society, 1956), p. 104; Peter R. Christoph ed., *The Leisler papers, 1689-1691: files of the Provincial Secretary of New York*, pp. 26, 106, 189; *NYCD* 9: 517; Belmont, "Recueil", f. 41 (Cf. *Histoire*, p. 33); *Year book of the Holland Society of New-York*, (New York: Nickerbocker Press, 1904), pp. 7, 51, 53.

³⁷ Onnonragewas' gave a misleading report at Albany to the effect that all the Christian Iroquois had answered that "they would be very willing to come to live at Sarachtoge", and that Onontio would not object to this relocation.

staunchest promoters of a return-migration in the following years. The mainstream of the mission villages' residents found little appeal in the invitation.

Louis XIV had like many observers been disappointed by the “shameful peace” negotiated at La Famine and had issued instructions to impress French military might on the League.³⁸ By early 1687, La Barre's replacement, Jacques-René de Brisay de Denonville, sent word to the Christian Iroquois to remind them “that it is necessary to destroy the Iroquois in order to establish religion; to destroy the Iroquois, it is necessary to attack them”.³⁹ The actual message was surely couched in more nuanced terms, for although Denonville secretly hoped to conduct operations against all of the Five Nations, the target of his initial efforts would again be the Senecas, whose persistent depredations against allies and traders in the interior constituted a strong *casus belli*. By all accounts the leadership of the mission villages again responded with commitment. Togouiroui, but this time also Ogenheratarihiens, and a third captain, respectively representing the Mohawks, Oneidas, and Onondagas, headed Kahnawake's contingent. It was about this time that Anthony L'Espinard, upon encountering Togouiroui “the Indian General” at Chambly, observed him to be “very true to the French” and added that he “would immediately

LIR, p. 104. Garistasi's name (Garistatsi, Gastari, Caristie, Caristasie, Caristsie, Caristase, Caristagie, Cristagie, Christagie, Christagio) meant Iron, and his was accordingly known among the French as Le Fer. In 1689, Belmont described Garistatsi as the husband of a resident of Kanehsatake plausibly named Anastatsi (Anastasie?). Compare the hard to decipher original in Belmont “Recueil de pieces”, f. 37, with the erroneous transcription “Aratable” in Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 28). He had a son named Christian. See Fernow and Van Laer, eds., *Calendar of Council Minutes 1668-1783*, p. 98-99. See also *Dongan Papers*, pp. 210-211. On Kakare (Kakarrial, Kakarriel, Kakariel, Kakare, Kaakhare, Kacharri, Kacharry, Cakare, Cakarij), see *NYCD* 3: 817. His name may have meant breechcloth, as suggested in Bruyas, *Radical Words*, p. 107; and Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, *Notes on the Iroquois, or Contributions to the Statistics, Aboriginal History, Antiquity, and General Ethnology of Western New York* (New York: Bartlett and Welford, 1846), p. 266.

³⁸ Louis XIV to La Barre, 10 March 1685, B 11: 85; De Meulles to the Minister, 10 October 1684, C11A 6: 388v-389. Though he had many detractors, La Barre also had some apologists who included Lahontan and Perrot. Lahontan, *Oeuvre*, 1: 311-312; Perrot, *Mémoire sur les mœurs*, pp. 390-391.

³⁹ “Mémoire de Denonville”, 8 November 1686, C11A 7: 124v. Jean Leclerc provides the best study of Denonville's mandate in *Le marquis de Denonville : gouverneur de la Nouvelle-France, 1685-1689* (Montreal: Fides, 1976).

join with the French in the war against the Sniekas [Senecas]" as long as their Mohawk, Oneida, and Onondaga relatives remained uninvolved.⁴⁰

As Ogenheratarihien's participation suggests, willingness to engage against the Senecas was more generalized at Kahnawake than it had been three years earlier. Of the approximately 350 warriors from the St. Lawrence Valley who accompanied the expedition, a full 150 to 170 warriors reported to be from Kahnawake (some forty Hurons of Lorette appear to have been subsumed among the latter, or possibly within the "Sillery" contingent), and another 50 to 60 from Kanehsatake.⁴¹ The Kahnawake contingent nonetheless included a small number of men who felt strong-armed into taking part in the campaign, among whom were Garistasi and Kakare, who had returned to the village after the winter hunt with the intention of soon relocating to Mohawk Country. The testimony of one Adandidaghko, a Mohawk from the village of Gandagaro who had come to Canada to see relatives and obtain beaver skins to trade in Albany, only to be caught up in the preparations for war, points to the nature of the pressures. When he meant to return home, his "relations would not suffer it because the French had given contrary orders". When these Christian relatives inquired whether he intended to "go and fight with the French against the Sinnakes or not", he answered no. To which they reportedly replied that "you

⁴⁰ NYCD 3: 487-488. This report in fact refers to both "Sniekas and Maques", i.e. "Senecas and Mohawks" but this appears to be an error in reporting.

⁴¹ See "Liste generale des officiers, soldats, habitants, sauvages, canots et bateaux qui sont avec Monsieur le Marquis pour son expédition" in Louis Henri de Baugy, *Journal d'une expédition contre les Iroquois en 1687* (Paris : Ernest Leroux, 1931), pp. 86-87. The presence of the Hurons of Lorette during this campaign is problematic. They are conspicuously absent from Baugy's muster list: the reading of Baugy's "bande d'Arhetil" as Lorette is erroneous, as this refers to the Hertel's band. Cf. Green, *A New People*, p. 84. There is no doubt, however, that warriors from Lorette took part in the expedition. Belmont writes that the four missions contributed warriors: 100 from Kahnawake, 60 from Kanehsatake, 40 from Lorette, 60 Abenakis and a few Algonquins. Beschefer similarly alludes to a force composed of 300 Iroquois, Algonquins, Abenakis, and Hurons. Denonville mentions a Huron of Lorette who took two scalps during the expedition. Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 20; JRAD 63: 269; Denonville, "Mémoire du Voyage", C11A 9: 118.

shall be forced to go, and the French will put you in prison till the war is done and the army returns”.⁴²

Denonville was indeed intent on surprising the enemy and ready to imprison those persons who threatened to jeopardize his campaign. Before the army’s departure from Montreal, he sent a detachment of fifteen Frenchmen to seize an Onondaga and three other Iroquois who were in the vicinity of Châteauguay, purportedly “to spy on what was going on, and [who] said a thousand impertinences about the governor”. They were promptly placed in the prisons of Montreal.⁴³ Beyond such a pointed intervention, though, neither Denonville nor any of the French had any coercive authority over the inhabitants of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake. It was the pressure of more highly invested relatives rather than largely unenforceable threats of imprisonment by colonial authorities that “forced” men such as Garistasi, Kakare, and Adandidaghko to take reluctant part in the expedition.

Denonville’s resolve to ensure the secrecy and security of his army by seizing every Iroquois encountered along the route of the upper St. Lawrence and throughout the north shore of Lake Ontario did, on the other hand, clash with the natural tendency of the Christian Iroquois to make distinctions between elements of the Five Nations. When the scouts of the advancing army spotted a band fishing on the island of Toniata, Jacques Le Moyne de Sainte-Hélène with a party of Christian Iroquois, were immediately deployed in cooperation with a corps of Algonquins and

⁴² For the interviews, see *NYCD* 3: 431-435. While Kakariall and Adandidagko’s accounts of Denonville’s campaign are extremely valuable, they must be interpreted carefully. The two men were in English custody (once source mentions fetters) when they gave these accounts, and it was in their interest to demonstrate that they were force to take part. A case in point might be the advance up the St. Lawrence River towards Cataragui: Kakariall claimed that the warriors “the Indians” were placed “in the middle” of the French forces to prevent their escape. French sources instead reveal that they were positioned at the vanguard, rearguard, and on the flanks to screen the advancing army, and that they provided crucial assistance in passing the rapids. Compare *NYCD* 3: 431, and Baugy, *Journal*, pp. 62, 64, 71; see also Denonville, “Mémoire du voyage pour l’entreprise de M. le Marquis de Denonville contre les Sonnotouans”, C11A 9: 106v, 107v; *JRAD* 63: 269.

⁴³ Baugy, *Journal*, pp. 58, 61; Denonville, “Mémoire du voyage”, C11A 9: 108v; Jean Leclerc, “Denonville et ses captifs iroquois”, *RHAF*, 14, 4 (1961), pp. 549.

Abenakis to encircle them. According to Louis Henri de Baugy, the officer who served as Denonville's aide-de-camp during the campaign, the deployment of the Christian Iroquois on this occasion had been intended as a test, "to arouse their honor and see if they would do what they had promised". Baugy's misgivings were confirmed when, upon learning that their intended targets had withdrawn to Cataraqui, these warriors expressed relief to Sainte-Hélène and made it known that it would have saddened them to carry out the capture. Relief was short lived, though, for upon arriving at Cataraqui on July 3rd, the warriors discovered there some two hundred Cayugas, Onondagas, and Oneidas who had been seized by ruse after having been invited to a great feast.⁴⁴

Though contemporary French observers might lump these prisoners together under the rubric of "Iroquois", the missions' warriors would have recognized them plainly as Cayugas, Onondagas, and Oneidas, and as relatives and friends. This must have been particularly true for the men of Kanehsatake, given that many of the people who now found themselves in custody had orbited around the now defunct Sulpician missions of the north shore of Lake Ontario, and that over the years these missions had constituted something of a recruiting ground for their own missions near Montreal.⁴⁵ Disgusted and alarmed by the behavior of their French allies, who had neglected their desire not to take part in the war if their relatives were involved, about a hundred

⁴⁴ Baugy, *Journal*, 72-77; Denonville, "Mémoire du voyage", C11A 9: 109v-112v; Leclerc, "Denonville et ses captifs iroquois", *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*, 14, 4 (1961), pp. 549-550. It is curious that neither Kakariall nor Adandidaghko alluded to these captures or their shock during their interrogations.

⁴⁵ Denonville to the Minister, 25 August 1687, C11A 9: 61-77v; Denonville, "Mémoire du Voyage", C11A 9: 109v-112v; Baugy, *Journal*, 72-78; *JRAD* 64: 66. On the Sulpician mission at Kinté, see Tremblay, "La politique missionnaire", pp. 5-47; James Pritchard, "For the Glory of God: The Quinte Mission 1668-1680", *Ontario History*, 65 (1973), pp. 668-680. Regarding the role played by the dissolution of the Lake Ontario missions in the development of La Montagne, in terms of both personnel and proselytes, see Lettre de Tronson to Trouvé, 10 April 1680, ASSSM, Correspondance de Tronson, cahier 2, no 105; Tronson to Dollier de Casson [?], 1 May 1679, *ibid.*, cahier 1, no 73; Tronson to Trouvé, May 1679, *ibid.*, cahier 1, no 82; Tronson to Dollier de Casson, 1680, *ibid.*, cahier 2, no 98; Tronson to Belmont, 30 May 1681, *ibid.*, cahier 2, no 149; Tronson to Belmont, 13 March 1683, *ibid.*, cahier 2, no 190; Lechassier to Belmont, May 1704, in *Lettres aux Messieurs du Séminaire de Montréal*, typewritten copy at BANQ-M, vol. 1, no 146, p. 208.

Christian Iroquois warriors took advantage of the confusion of the army's departure from Cataraqui on the morning of July 4th to return to their villages. Garistasi and a second man meanwhile chose to slip away towards Seneca Country to warn its inhabitants of the impending attack.⁴⁶

A solid core of some 120 Christian Iroquois, centered no doubt on those warriors who had no kinship ties or otherwise felt little affinity to the prisoners, remained with the army as it made its way across Lake Ontario and towards the Seneca villages. When three or four Seneca scouts appeared at a distance and asked what the intentions of the French were, it was a Christian Mohawk who, interpreting for his French brothers-in-arms, shouted out defiantly from the lines: "You blockheads, I'll tell you what I have come to do: to war upon you; and tomorrow I will march up with my army to your castles".⁴⁷ At a half league from the main Seneca village of Ganaguiara, the army engaged in battle with an opposing force of approximately 450 Seneca warriors. While commentators noted that the Ottawa warriors posted on the right flank faltered, and that confusion and disorder momentarily set in among the soldiers and militiamen, the conduct of the warriors of the mission villages was universally praised. In retelling the episode, Baugy deviated from his habitually mistrustful tone: "our Christian Natives [...] performed deeds of valour, our Iroquois outdid themselves and showed that they surpassed by far the Senecas and that we could henceforth trust them."⁴⁸ That the Christian Iroquois had not shirked

⁴⁶ Baugy, *Journal*, pp. 90-91, 104; Gédéon de Catalogne, *Recueil de ce qui s'est passé en Canada au sujet de la guerre : tant des Anglais que des Iroquois depuis l'année 1682* (Quebec: Société historique et littéraire de Québec, 1866), p. 14; Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 22.

⁴⁷ NYCD 3: 434. For other versions of this exchange see NYCD 3: 431; JRAD 6: 271; Baugy, *Journal*, p. 97.

⁴⁸ On the march and battle, see Baugy, *Journal*, pp. 99-101, 200-203; Catalogne, *Recueil*, p. 14-15; Denonville, "Mémoire du voyage", C11A 9: 114v-115; NYCD 3: 431-432, 434. Here again, Kakariall's claim that "the Govr put all the Indians in the front, because he mistrusted them for fear, they would join with the Sinnakes" is unconvincing. NYCD 3: 431. For the Seneca perspective on this battle, consult NYCD 3: 444-447. For the laudatory reviews of the role played by the Christian Iroquois during the battle, and by the other Christian allies, see Baugy, *Journal*, p. 101; Denonville to Seignelay, 25 August 1687, C11A 9: 65; Lahontan, *Oeuvres*, p. 351.

the action was further confirmed by the fact that three or four of their number lay among the army's dozen dead, including a chief from Kanehsatake named Tegaretouan (The Sun), as well as Kahanawake's celebrated Ogenheratarihien.⁴⁹

In the days that followed the advancing army found the four Seneca villages abandoned and smoldering. The divergent priorities of the allies became readily apparent when Denonville ordered the destruction of the adjoining corn fields and the abundant stores. To starve out the Senecas would turn them into a burden for the other four nations, and could only serve to unite the League and harden its attitude towards the French. The Christian Iroquois accordingly refused to destroy the Seneca's corn or, as warriors separated themselves from the main forces to scout and loot the surroundings, to facilitate the Frenchmen's job by pointing out a few outfields.⁵⁰ Divergences again manifested themselves when Denonville made it known that his intention was to proceed to Niagara to build a fort there. Victorious in battle, weary after a long campaign and eager to get started on the fall hunt, the missions' warriors were reluctant to follow. Togouiroui and his men momentarily ceded to the governor's arguments, but when the time came to embark – and in a repetition of what had occurred three weeks earlier – the warriors set out eastwards in the direction of Cataraqui. Only after Denonville's insistence and one

⁴⁹ Chauchetière, *Vie de la Bonne Catherine Tekakwitha*, p. 73; Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 24. Besides Le Soleil and Oyenratarihen [sic], Belmont provides the name of three other dead: Tégaretouan, Gonhiagou, and “Le Ciel des Tionnontatés, Huron” (the latter apparently a Huron from the Great Lakes). Estimates of Franco-Amerindian and Seneca casualties vary. Denonville's official report indicates 27 Senecas killed, and among his forces 6 Frenchmen and 5 allies killed and some 20 more wounded. Denonville, “Mémoire du Voyage”, C11A, 9: 115; Baugy, *Journal*, 105-109; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 2: 353-354. Kakare's estimates are similar, at 8 Frenchmen killed, 4 “Christian Indians” and 2 other warriors killed, and several wounded. Adandidaghko reported 7 Frenchmen killed, many wounded, 5 dead warriors, and several wounded, with sixteen Senecas killed and many wounded. NYCD 3: 432, 434. Lahontan overstates the losses of the allies, at 100 Frenchmen, 10 warriors, and 20 or 22 wounded. Lahontan, *Oeuvres*, p. 351.

⁵⁰ NYCD 3: 432, 434-435.

warrior's impassioned speech did all but two of the Christian Iroquois canoes resolve to accompany the army (the unenthusiastic Kakare being aboard one of the two that did not).⁵¹

No sooner had their warriors returned from campaign – the governor and the bulk of his army having spent only five days at Niagara – that the Christian Iroquois sent emissaries southward to probe the intentions of League's eastern nations and to ensure that they remained neutral. Togouiroui and seven other men, including the reluctant Kakare and Adandigaghko, journeyed towards the Mohawk villages. About halfway there, they encountered a party of sixty warriors from the Mohawk village of Tionnondoge, intent on raiding Canada in retaliation for the recent invasion. After calling out from a distance to make sure that the party included no Senecas, Togouiroui approached them, delivered his message and dissuaded the warriors from going any further. While Kakare and Adandigaghko journeyed on towards the Mohawk villages, four of the would-be raiders accompanied Togouiroui back to Kahnawake.⁵² Meanwhile five Christian Onondagas had been dispatched with wampum belts and presents to Onondaga to “persuade them not to war” and to offer, on Denonville and Bruyas’ instruction, the release of the prisoners taken on the way to Cataraqui.⁵³ This would have been a persuasive argument. In June of 1688, an Onondaga, Cayuga, and Oneida delegation headed by Otreouti arrived at Montreal to declare their neutrality. The people of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake accordingly handed over 91 prisoners that the colonial officials had entrusted to them.⁵⁴

Freed captives were not alone in streaming back to Iroquoia around this time. As in 1684, the realization that to remain in Canada meant being drawn into a large scale conflict, now

⁵¹ Baugy, *Journal*, p. 115; *NYCD* 3: 435.

⁵² *NYCD* 3: 432-433, 435-437, 483, 565; *NYCD* 9: 352-353.

⁵³ *NYCD* 3: 478 (Jean Rosie’s report would place the departure of these Christian Onondaga emissaries on 17 August).

⁵⁴ Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 28.

coupled with English promises that lands and a priest would be made available, led a wave of individuals and families to abandon the mission villages. Kakare and his brother Garistatsi, who had been contemplating this move for some time and who had turned out to be the most reluctant element during the recent campaign, returned to Kahnawake during by the winter of 1688. The former explained to the missionaries that he had come back “for his religion[’s] sake”, but in fact the pair had come to fetch their close relatives and to encourage others to undertake the return-migration to Mohawk Country. According to Vachon de Belmont, some thirty men and twenty women left the community as a result of these and other visitors’ entreaties.⁵⁵ The extant census records confirm that Kahnawake experienced a significant dip in population between 1685 and 1688, from 682 individuals to 485, and that Kanehsatake’s population similarly fell from 222 to 181.⁵⁶

Garistasi and Kakare settled at Tionnondoge, which was quickly emerging as a center of Anglophile sentiment and Mohawk Protestantism. It should not surprise that many of the men and women who had been disappointed by life in the Canadian missions did not reject Christianity altogether. They found that Protestantism offered a promising alternative to Roman Catholicism: insofar as the Frenchmen’s religion had torn Iroquoia apart, draining its population and power northward, that of the New Yorkers might provide the means of reversing the trend. Mohawk leaders’ oft reiterated requests for English missionaries were partly answered by the intervention of the Dutch Reformed minister Domine Godfredius Dellius who, having taken the pulpit at Albany in 1683, began to cultivate an Aboriginal constituency in the fall of 1689; by the following year, he was taking an active part in indigenous affairs as a close collaborator of the

⁵⁵ NYCD 3: 431-436, 481, 530, 531; *Dongan Papers*, 166, 210-211; Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 28-29; Fernow and Van Laer, eds., *Calendar of Council Minutes 1668-1783*, p. 54. Belmont mentions the activity of two other “apostates”, Ganonsa8enrat and Tannatakas. See “Recueil”, f. 37 (the names were not transcribed in Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 28).

⁵⁶ Library and Archives Canada, MG1, G1, 461: 1-2.

town's officials.⁵⁷ Garistatsi, who within a few years would emerge as Tionnondoge's "chief sachem", as well as Kakare and Onnonragewas were among those who developed and nurtured the strongest ties to the minister and the magistrates.⁵⁸ Over the next few years they would continue to act as the most persistent promoters of a return-migration from Canada to Mohawk Country, alternating between diplomatic and military means to achieve it.

The offensives of 1684 and 1687 had pushed the League to its greatest unity and fullest elaboration yet.⁵⁹ Events unfolding on both sides of the Atlantic would complicate relations between the Christian and League Iroquois even further. During the summer of 1688, a party of Huron-Tionontatés attacked an Iroquois delegation en route to Montreal to ratify the terms discussed by Otreouti earlier that summer. Amidst reports that Denonville had ordered the attack, the projected peace settlement fell through.⁶⁰ During the winter that followed, across the ocean, Louis XIV invaded the German Palatinate and William of Orange deposed James II of England in a "Glorious Revolution". In the spring, England and the Dutch Republic declared

⁵⁷ On Tionnondoge (Tinnondoge, Tiononderoge, Tinnondogen, Tenontoge, Tinondoge, Tionondage, Tionondoge, Tionodoga, Tionondorage, Tionnontogon, Tionnontoguen) through the seventeenth century, see Dean R. Snow, *Mohawk Valley archaeology: the sites*, esp. pp. 425-428. On Tinnondoge as a center of Mohawk Protestantism, see NYCD 3: 771-772; NYCD 4: 81; Hugh Hastings, ed., *Ecclesiastical Records, State of New York* (Albany: James B. Lyon, 1901), 2: 1010-1011. On Protestantism among the Mohawks more broadly, see John Wolfe Lydekker, *The Faithful Mohawks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 1-41; Lois M. Feister, "Indian-Dutch Relations in the Upper Hudson Valley: A Study of Baptism. Records in the Dutch Reformed Church", *Man in the Northeast*, 24, 2-3 (Fall 1982), pp. 89-113; Charles E. Corwin, "Efforts of the Dutch-American Colonial Pastors for the Conversion of the Indians," *Journal of the Presbyterian Historical Society*, 12 (Oct. 1925), 238-41; Daniel K. Richter, "'Some of Them... Would Always Have a Minister with Them': Mohawk Protestantism, 1683-1719", *American Indian Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 4, (Autumn, 1992), pp. 471-484; *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 165, 178, 221-223, 229-234.

⁵⁸ Garistatsi likely emerged as chief sachem of Tionnondoge after the death of Tahaïodoris, in the summer of 1691. NYCD 3: 783. On the close collaboration of Garistatsi, Kakariall, and Onnonragewas with the colonial officials and among themselves, see *infra*, as well as *Dongan Papers*, p. 180; *Leisler Papers*, pp. 31-32; E.B. O'Callaghan, *Documentary History of the State of New York*, hereafter *DHSNY* (Albany: Weed, Parsons, & Co., 1849-1850), 2: 144; NYCD 3: 815-817; Catalogue, *Recueil*, p. 47.

⁵⁹ Richter, "Ordeals of the Longhouse", pp. 24-25.

⁶⁰ Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 159-161; Parmenter, *Edge of the Woods*, pp. 201-203.

war against France, joining the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and Sweden in what soon would become formalized as the Grand Alliance or League of Augsburg. Dongan, Schuyler, Dellius and others at Albany redoubled their efforts to incite the Five Nations to wage an open war against the French.⁶¹

The Five Nations' response to this new context was very much in keeping with the traditional patterns of incorporative warfare and diplomacy. As one Mohawk chief explained it to Dongan in early August of 1687, "We are much inclined to get our Christian Indians back again from Canida, but know no way to effect it except by taking one or more of their prisoners and send[ing] them into the castle to tell the rest that they may come freely, and to know why they fight against their brethren".⁶² Through the summer of 1689, rumors of an impending major offensive against the colony by the Five Nations reached the ears of the Christian Iroquois. When a certain Jean-Baptiste Honnontarionni from Kanehsatake encountered a party of Iroquois on the Island of Montreal, they stole his shirt and bracelet and told him that they would give them back only if he persuaded the people of his village to return to Iroquoia. The French, they explained, "were lost". Despite the fact that a Kanehsatake chief vouched for the validity of this report, neither missionaries nor officials believed it.⁶³ Louis Ateriata, an early Onondaga resident of Kentake who had visited France and received Louis XIV as godfather but had since

⁶¹ For the French declaration of war, see "Ordonnance du Roy, portant déclaration de guerre", 25 June 1689, in *CMNF* 1: 463-464. On the Glorious Revolution and the outbreak of the War of the League of Augsburg, also known as Nine Years' War or, in the United States, as King William's War, see Jonathan I. Israel ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Richard R. Johnson, The Revolution of 1688-9 in the American Colonies, in Israel ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, pp. 215-250; G. Symcox, *Louis XIV and the Outbreak of the Nine Years' War, in Louis XIV and Europe* (Ragnhild Hatton, 1976); John A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 1999), pp. 191-265.

⁶² *NYCD* 3: 444. See also Berthold Fernow and Arnold Johan Ferdinand Van Laer, eds., *Calendar of Council Minutes 1668-1783* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1902), 87.

⁶³ Belmont, "Recueil de pièces...", f. 38 (partially transcribed in *Histoire du Canada*, p. 29).

been banished from the mission on account of his loose morals, now returned to Kahnawake with alarming reports. Owing to his dubious reputation, they were similarly dismissed.⁶⁴

French mistrust would have grave consequences. On August 5th, a combined Five Nations force estimated at 1500 warriors fell in a surprise attack on the parish of Lachine, located across the river and just a few miles upstream from Kahnawake. Over eighty colonists were captured or killed in the raid. The next day some thirty to fifty warriors from the two nearby mission villages responded by joining the French troops in a poorly orchestrated and disastrous defensive maneuver. Although word circulated that the raiders aimed only at the French, and not at the Christian Iroquois, at least seven men from Kahnawake were killed in the affair, and a few more from both villages were taken prisoners.⁶⁵

The “Lachine Massacre”, as it became known, understandably caused much alarm among both the French and their allies. The Kahnawakes and Kanestates who had been willing to go to war only against the distant and unrelated Senecas now clearly faced the hostility of united elements of the Five Nations. In late August or early September, five “Praying Canada Indians” were captured by Mohawks on Lake Champlain.⁶⁶ It was rumoured that Kahnawake, whose fortifications were already in an advanced state of disrepair, would be the next target of the Five Nations and of the English. According to Charlevoix and Vachon de Belmont, “fear overtook the natives” who henceforth ceased to “consider themselves safe in their village”. At Denonville’s urging, and though a substantial segment of the community believed this measure

⁶⁴ Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 29; Catalogne, *Recueil*, pp. 16, 22. On Louis Ateriat, see *infra*.

⁶⁵ Regarding the “Lachine Massacre”, see Belmont, “Recueil de pièces...”, f. 39 (partially transcribed in *Histoire du Canada*, p. 29-30); Catalogne, *Recueil*, pp. 24-25; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 58-59; Charlevoix, *Histoire* 2: 403-405; Lahontan, *Nouveaux voyages*, 1: 193; Pascale Grenier, *Le Massacre de Lachine. Essai d'ethnohistoire* (M.A. Thesis, Université de Montréal, 1997).

⁶⁶ *DNCY* 2: 50, 52.

to be excessive, the people of the village sought refuge in a makeshift encampment within the recently fortified town of Montreal.⁶⁷

The French were convinced that the raid on Lachine had been incited by the English. Frontenac, who returned to the colony two months after the event to replace Denonville, began plotting a series of major strikes against the neighbouring colonies.⁶⁸ In parallel, various parties made tentative steps towards reconciliation with the Five Nations. During the general council of eighty chiefs of the Five Nations that opened at Onondaga on February 1st 1690, Ateriata – who was described in the reports that reached Albany as “chief Sachem of the praying Indians”, despite his tricky relationship to the missions – presented a wampum belt and advised his interlocutors “to meet the Governor of Canada as he desires. Agree to this if you would live”. Ateriata presented two other belts, one on behalf of one the prominent Iroquois who remained captive in the colony, and the other on behalf of Father Lamberville, Le Moyne de Sainte-Hélène, and Hertel de la Fresnière, all of whom also advised the Five Nations that “it will be for your advantage” to send delegates to Cataraqui in the spring. Unconvinced, the council resolved to send no one to meet with the governor and declared that it would not consider peace until the all prisoners remaining in French custody had been released.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Frontenac to the Minister, 15 November 1689, C11A 10: 217-224v; “Résumé de lettres et mémoires de Frontenac, Denonville, Champigny, Callière et autres”, [1689], C11A 10: 339v; Denonville to the Minister, January 1690, C11A 11: 186; Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 31; Catalogne, *Recueil*, p. 45; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 2: 408; Daniel K. Richter, “Rediscovered Links in the Covenant Chain: Previously Unpublished Transcripts of New York Indian Treaty Minutes, 1677-1691”, *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society* 92 (1982), p. 84.

⁶⁸ Leclerc, *Le marquis de Denonville*, pp. 235-262; Eccles, *Frontenac*, pp. 199-202, 223-224.

⁶⁹ Charles de Monseignat, “Relation... [1690-1691]”, C11A 11: 7, 13-14; NYCD 3: 733-734; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 63-64, 70, 73-74; Frontenac to the Minister, 30 April 1690, C11A 11: 83-85v; NYCD 3: 733-734; Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 32; Colden, *History of the Five Indian Nations*, p. 105-113; Peter W. R. Stiles (Charles Howard McIlwain, ed.), *An Abridgement of the Indian Affairs* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), pp. 14-15; Richter, “Rediscovered Links”, pp. 69-72. Governor Frontenac, who displayed no more love for the Jesuits or their

During these discussions, a three-pronged winter attack, in which war parties from Montreal, Trois-Rivières, and Quebec would raid in three different directions along the frontiers of New York and New England, was under way. At Montreal, eighty Christian Iroquois warriors (mainly from Kahnawake) under Togouiroui's leadership joined sixteen Algonquins and about 110 soldiers and militiamen under the command of Lieutenants Nicolas d'Ailleboust de Manthet and Le Moyne de Sainte-Hélène.⁷⁰ Almost invariably, period accounts of such intercultural military endeavours depict colonial officers as commanding of French and Aboriginal alike. But their position was not such much that of commanders than of negotiators. Men like Manthet and Sainte-Hélène enjoyed no coercive authority over the warriors whom they accompanied; at the most, they could hope to earn the respect and deference given to war chiefs through demonstrations of bravery, ability, and generosity. Only through inspiration, persuasion, and negotiation could they shape the course of an expedition, and ensure that the parallel objectives of the people of the mission villages and of the colonial authorities continued to overlap.⁷¹

The party set out from Montreal in late January 1690 with orders to proceed opportunistically down the Hudson and to strike against whatever enemy position could be destroyed with minimal risk. While the campaign had been one of Frontenac's initiatives, the

associates during his second mandate than he had during his first, in the spring sent an officer to Onondaga to disavow whatever the emissary might have said on behalf of other parties. The identity of this chief emissary is confused. French sources speak of Gagniegoton (or Gagnioton, Gagniégoton, Gagnyoton) or Nez Coupé (Cut Nose). He was one of the three ambassadors, with Chaudière Noire and Otréouti, who had come to declare their neutrality at Montreal in June 1688. He apparently returned to the colony after (?) the raid on Lachine and had spoken insolently to Denonville. After arriving in the colony and at Oréouaré's suggestion, Frontenac sent back Gagniegoton and four prisoners to Onondaga. He was back in Montreal with wampum by early March 1690, but did not return to his country with the ambassadors who returned with Chevalier d'Aux. Yet the English accounts of the council that occurred at Onondaga allude to Adarjachta or Adarhata, "chief" or "chief sachem of the Praying Indians". Besides the above-noted sources, see Belmont, *Histoire*, p. 32.

⁷⁰ Monseignat, "Relation... [1690-1691]", C11A 11: 5-40; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 61; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 63-4.

⁷¹ For insights into French leadership in intercultural contexts, see D. Peter Macleod, *The Canadian Iroquois*; Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals*; Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*; Arnaud Balvay, *L'épée et la plume: Amérindiens et soldats des troupes de la marine en Louisiane et au Pays d'en Haut (1683-1763)* (Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2006), pp. 252-256.

course of the expedition leaves no doubt as to where the leadership resided. During a war council held towards the southern end of Lake George, the warriors “rejected heartily” Manthet and Sainte-Hélène’s proposal that they attack Albany. Much more familiar than the French with the region, the Christian Iroquois understood the difficulty of attacking such a populous, well garrisoned and fortified town. Instead they proposed the hamlet of Schenectady. Hoping to sway their allies, the officers proposed to defer the decision until the party reached a fork in the path. By that time, however, it was Manthet and Le Moyne who had made up their mind and abandoned the hope of changing that of their allies.⁷²

As the raiders neared Schenectady in the afternoon of February 8th, it was Togouiroui who “urged on all to perform their duty, and to forget their past fatigue, in the hope of taking ample revenge for the injuries they had received from the Iroquois at the solicitation of the English, and of washing them out in the blood of those traitors.”⁷³ Pleased to discover that Schenectady’s stockades were unmanned, the raiders launched a surprise assault around midnight. Over the course of about two hours, sixty colonists were killed and twenty-seven more were taken prisoner. Some thirty Mohawks who had been in the village were meanwhile spared to make the point that the French and their allies held the English responsible for the attack on Lachine (though even if Manthet and Saint-Hélène had wished to harm them, it is unlikely that Togouiroui and his men would have allowed it).⁷⁴ Consequently, it was only with

⁷² On this campaign, see Monseignat, “Relation... [1690-1691]”, C11A 11: 5-40; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 67-70; LIR, p. 158-160; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 64-5; Colonial officials had for some time plotted to attack Albany. See Denonville to Seignelay, [January 1690], C11A 11: 186-188. An alternative account, given by three captured French prisoners, was that Schenectady had been the target all along. LIR, pp. 158-162.

⁷³ Monseignat, “Relation... [1690-1691]”, C11A 11: 5-40; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 67-68; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 65.

⁷⁴ Some twenty five to fifty inhabitants of Schenectady survived, whether because they were spared or absent at the time of the attack. On the fate of the colonists, see DHSNY 1: 301-306; DHSNY 2: 199-202; William Henry Whitmore, ed., *The Andros Tracts* (Boston: John Wilson and Son, 1874), 3: 114-118; Thomas E. Burke Jr., *Mohawk frontier: the Dutch community of Schenectady, New York, 1661-1710* (Albany: University State of New York Press, 1991), pp. 109-110. On the sparing of the Mohawks, see NYCD 9:468 (*Col MSS* 1:491); JRAD 64: 61.

great difficulty that the officials at Albany finally persuaded the warriors of the two easternmost villages – led by Onnonragewas, as it happens, to join a force of militiamen and Mahicans in a vain pursuit of the raiders.⁷⁵

The resounding success of the raid on Schenectady, coupled with that of the attacks against Salmon Falls by Frenchmen and Algonquins who had left Trois-Rivières, and against Casco by soldiers and Abenakis who had left Quebec, sent shockwaves through the English colonies.⁷⁶ For the Christian Iroquois, who had grown convinced that the New Yorkers were ultimately responsible for jeopardizing their relationship with their relatives and friends in Iroquoia, the triumph was tempered by tragedy. Buoyed by the success of the raid on Schenectady, Togouiroui raised a party of Kahnawakes and Kanehsatakes, who were joined by a handful of Frenchmen, to venture towards the Hudson in May of 1690. Somewhere to the south of Lake Champlain they surprised two bands of unidentified hunters, Mahicans it is likely, taking forty two prisoners in all. Tragically, the triumphant party was attacked during the return journey by French-allied Algonquins and Abenakis from the vicinity of Trois-Rivières, who mistook them for League Iroquois and Englishmen. Several were killed and wounded on both sides – Togouiroui numbering among the former – before the misunderstanding could be cleared up. The Great Mohawk was mourned by Kahnawakes and French alike, the latter of whom generally acknowledged this to be an “irreparable” loss.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Monseignat, “Relation... [1690-1691]”, C11A 11: 41-79; *NYCD* 3: 700, 708, 717. See also the deposition of three French prisoners, *LIR* 158-162, and *Andros Tracts*, 3: 116

⁷⁶ Monseignat, “Relation... [1689-1690]”, C11A 11: 5-40; W. Noel Sainsbury, J. W. Fortescue, Cecil Headlam et al., eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial*, hereafter *CSPC* (London: Public Records Office, 1860-1969), 13: 240; “A trew relation given by Robart Wattson”, Newberry Library, Ayer MS 965; Kenneth M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 124-125.

⁷⁷ Monseignat, “Relation... [1669-1690]”, C11A 11: 19; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 1: 347-348; Catalogne, *Recueil*, pp. 47-48; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 69-72.

One of Togouiroui's nephews, known by the French as La Plaque and plausibly named Onondaquiro, must have felt this loss particularly dearly. He became particularly active on the warpath. Though he was thought to be, quite unlike his uncle, a "rather bad Christian", acquired like him a great renown for bravery and for being "strongly attached to the French".⁷⁸ Yet as Bruyas observed in the months following the death of the man who had most defined his community's politics during the previous decade and half, the "most reasonable men at the Sault" had by this time grown disgusted with the war.⁷⁹ To wage war against the Senecas or the English was one thing, but to do so against Mohawk, Oneida, and Onondaga relatives was quite another. What is more, it had quickly become apparent that the social costs of the community's encampment within the confines of Montreal, which afforded unprecedented access to liquor and related acts of violence, greatly outweighed its defensive benefits. At some point during the summer or fall of 1690, the Kahnawakes relocated to a new site on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River, a few leagues west of where the old village had stood.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Regarding La Plaque's activity, see La Potherie, *Histoire*, 1: 322-323; 3 : 154, 179, 191-192, 199, 204, 211, 224; Champigny to the Minister, 10 May 1691, C11A 11: 259; "Mémoire de Champigny sur ce qui s'est passé au sujet de la guerre de novembre 1691 à octobre 1692", 5 October 1692, C11A 12: 93-95v. English sources allude to warriors led by a certain Onontaquirott or Onwondaquiro against Boston in 1693, and towards Albany in 1695. *NYCD* 4: 50, 124. Tentative linguistic evidence supports the circumstantial evidence that this is the same man: *plaque de fusil* (gun plate) was "otginonkara" in Onondaga. See John Gilmary Shea, ed., *A French-Onondaga Dictionary: from a manuscript of the seventeenth century* (New York: Presse Cramoisy, 1859), p. 80. Lahontan for his part describes La Plaque as "a Seneca raised among the French", erroneously it seems. Lahontan, *Oeuvres complètes* 2:1029-1030. In later years, his attachment to the French waned. By 1705, Raudot explained that after living three years (this may be an understatement) in the colony he returned among his people, "bringing back with him only our vices". His chief vice, it seems, was his "passionate love of women" and his habit of seducing of other men's wives. Copy of an anonymous letter, 30 September 1705, C11A 122: 14; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 86; 6: 33. By 1709, however, a man named La Plaque was again leading a party of scouts, suggesting that he had returned to Kahnawake. Vaudreuil's instructions to Ramezay, 14 July 1709, C11A 30: 112v.

⁷⁹ Champigny to the Minister, 10 May 1691, C11A 11: 252-260v; Monseignat, "Relation... [1690-1691]", C11A 11: 41-79v.

⁸⁰ Denonville to Seignelay, January 1690, C11A 11: 186; Frontenac to the Minister, 15 November 1689, C11A 10: 217-224; Memoir of the king to Frontenac and Champigny, 14 July 1690, copy in *NYCD* 9: 453; Frontenac to the Minister, 12 November 1690, C11A 11: 86-98v. Frontenac was extremely critical of his predecessor's decision, but Denonville's own unequivocal recommendations on the matter appear decisive. As for the question of timing, Charlevoix suggests that the return to the south shore took place shortly after the Schenectady raid. Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 65. Jean Leclerc's claim that Denonville attempted to persuade the Kahnawakes of returning home through the fall of 1689 is unconvincing. Leclerc, *Le marquis de Denonville*, p. 258. Vachon de Belmont

That winter, most of the inhabitants of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake scattered for their hunt as usual, expecting that peace would prevail. Towards the very end of the hunting season, though, a band of hunters from the two villages was surprised in the vicinity of Chambly by a Mohawk party. A few of the hunters were killed in the clash, but the remaining ten or twelve were taken prisoner. This presented the warriors with an occasion to reciprocate the benevolence of those who had spared the Mohawks at Schenectady in February 1690, and to renew the diplomatic dialogue. Continuing their journey northwestward with their captives, the force of about a hundred and fifty men encamped about two leagues from Kahnawake and sent three deputies, headed by none other than Onnonragewas, onward to the village where they were admitted “without arms and as friends”. Releasing the captive hunters, Onnonragewas explained that while he had not been delegated by his community, he and the warriors genuinely desired to put an end to the war. They had hastened here to warn the people of Kahnawake that an Iroquois army of eight hundred men was fast approaching, with the aim of “carry[ing] them off” and of wreaking as much destruction as possible on the colony. The only way of avoiding the violence of capture, he proposed, was for the village’s inhabitants to relocate to Mohawk country.⁸¹

This approach was in keeping with the pattern of military and diplomatic activity described in the first and second chapters, whereby demonstrations of goodwill and negotiations alternated with shows of force and violence, all aimed persuading an opponent to migrate willingly, or if the occasion presented itself of capturing them and forcing their migration. At

chronicled some of these acts of violence: a certain Sona8enton, presumably of Kanehsatake, killed a certain Kentaratyron of Kahnawake; a Kahnawake named Sorma8ches was also killed by a knife thrust to the armpit. Belmont, *Histoire de l'eau de vie en Canada* (Quebec: Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, 1840), p. 18.

⁸¹ Accounts of the negotiations diverge. NYCD 3: 777-778; Monseignat, “Relation... [1690-1691]”, C11A 11: 41-79v; Bruyas to Frontenac, 5 April 1691, C11E 10: 9-12v; “Relation concerning Canada, brought by two Maquase to Albany”, 28 April 1691, NYSA, A1894, v. 37, no. 56; Belmont, “Recueil”, f. 41 (“ganna8ages” is misleadingly transcribed as “Ganneyousses” in *Histoire du Canada* p. 33); La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 129-133; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 135-8; NYCD 3: 782.

midcentury the opponents to be absorbed had been neighbouring nations (Hurons, Eries, Neutrals, Susquehannocks, etc.), now they were stubborn relatives and acquaintances who had aligned themselves with an antagonistic colonial power. Though they welcomed heartily Onnonragewas's attempt at reconciliation, the Kahnawakes rejected his suggestion that they abandon the village. In fact, fearing that they might be forcibly detained, the three visitors felt it necessary to give the impression that they and their relatives were themselves entertaining the possibility of relocating there. The Kahnawakes warned Onnonragewas that he should not go back on this word, and asked that in the meanwhile he exhort his people to suspend hostilities and to pressure their Mahican allies to do the same. Onnonragewas responded that he would make the other Iroquois nations and the governor of New York concur in his desire for peace, and that if they did not agree, he would abandon them "and [...] watch their defeat while smoking quietly on his mat."⁸²

As Onnonragewas had warned, it was not long before a large contingent of warriors from the western and central nations appeared in the vicinity of Montreal and dispersed to raid farmsteads throughout the region. About twenty of these Iroquois left their encampments to "surrender" and "risk themselves" among the Kahnawakes, leading Bruyas to believe that more would soon follow.⁸³ The Kanehsatakes, who believed that in keeping with Onnonragewas' recent overtures their community "was not supposed to be subject to insult", were not so fortunate. An enemy party composed mainly of Onondagas struck there on May 17th, capturing

⁸² Idem.

⁸³ Bruyas to Frontenac, 5 April 1691, C11E 10: 9-12v; Champigny to the Minister, 12 May 1691, C11A 11: 251-251v; Champigny, "Mémoire", 5 October 1692, C11A 12: 93-95v; Monseignat, "Relation... [1690-1691]", C11A 11: 41-79v; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 137-8; NYCD 3: 777-778.

thirty to thirty five women and children working the fields, and killing six or seven other persons in the process.⁸⁴

Characteristically, the Onondagas released two of the women in the weeks that followed, entrusting them with two secret wampum belts addressed to Louis Ateriata at Kahnawake and to one Tamouratoüia at Kanehsatake. The two chiefs were thereby exhorted to return to their country and to bring along as many of their relatives and friends as possible. Failure to comply, they threatened, would bring about their “inevitable destruction”. The Onondagas had misjudged the commitment or impressionability of the two men, for upon receiving the wampum belts they promptly presented them to Callières and reiterated their allegiance to the French.⁸⁵ Informed of Onnonragewas’ overture and given the opportunity to discuss the matter with the two other deputies, Callières thought best to leave the entire matter in the hands of the Kahnawakes.⁸⁶

The complicated, apparently contradictory nature of the relations between the Christian and League Iroquois was a source of great frustration to the French. While the latter found it easier to wage their war against the Five Nations, the inhabitants of the missions persisted in approaching the conflict with a more nuanced perspective. Although warriors from all of the League’s nations had collaborated in the attack against La Prairie, there was reason to believe as a result of Onnonragewas’ overture that the eastern nations were inclined to peace. When a party

⁸⁴ Belmont, “Recueil”, f. 41v (the published version does not include Belmont’s list of the dead, and erroneously transcribes “semoint” [sic] as “dormoient”: *Histoire du Canada*, p. 33); Belmont, *Histoire de l’eau de vie*, p.17. See also Monseignat, “Relation... [1690-1691]”, C11A 11: 41-79v; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 138.

⁸⁵ Monseignat, “Relation... [1690-1691]”, C11A 11: 41-79v; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 153; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 144-145. La Potherie spells it Tannouraoua.

⁸⁶ Bruyas to Frontenac, 5 April 1691, C11E 10: 9-12v; NYCD 9: 515. Champigny notes that La Plaque, who was returning from an expedition with five prisoners encountered on his way the Mohawks returning from the Sault, who informed him of what they had done, after which he released them. Champigny to the Minister, 10 May 1691, C11A 11: 252-260v. One of the two emissaries who stayed behind was named Taonnochrío. NYCD 3: 782.

of Christian Iroquois and Frenchmen who had set out along the upper St. Lawrence in response to the raid on Kanehsatake came upon a smaller party whom they recognized as Mohawks (and Oneidas), they heard them out for fear “of breaking off all accommodation between them and that canton”, and allowed the bulk to return home unharmed on the agreement that a few would accompany the Christian Iroquois to meet with Callières and that they would send a formal embassy to meet with the governor.⁸⁷

When reports reached the colony that a force of New Yorkers, Mohawks, and Mahicans, nominally led by Peter Schuyler, and including the ubiquitous Garistatsi and Onnonragewas, was advancing along the Richelieu, the Christian Iroquois responded tentatively. Only “a few” of their warriors, under the leadership of the dogique Paul Honoguenhag from Kahnawake and cheered on by Father Gay of La Montagne, joined the reconnaissance force sent towards Chambly. During the fighting that followed the enemy’s strike at La Prairie on the morning of August 11th, the small number of Christian Iroquois present fought bravely – Honoguenhag being killed in the process –, but it was the Hurons of Lorette, led on this occasion by Ouréhouaré, the Cayuga former galley slave turned great friend of Frontenac, who earned the highest praise. A reinforcement of 120 warriors from Kahnawake who arrived an hour after battle could not be persuaded by the French commander to pursue the harried enemy. When gunshots were heard resounding from La Prairie, these warriors rushed back in that direction. As it turns out, these shots had merely been fired in honor of the officers who had died that morning.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ NYCD 9: 517; Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 33; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 133-134; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 141-4. An English source alludes to thirty warriors going out against the Onondagas in June. NYCD 3: 782.

⁸⁸ NYCD 3: 790, 800-805; Richter, “Rediscovered Links”, p. 85; Monseignat, “Relation... [1690-1691]”, C11A 11: 41-79v; “Examination of Two Frenchmen”, 1 August 1692, NYSA, A1894, v. 38, no. 158; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 138-144; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 149-155; Belmont, “Recueil”, f. 42-42v (here again the published version errs by

Whether the warriors genuinely believed that they were urgently needed at La Prairie (as they and their missionaries would protest), no doubt fearing that an enemy force had positioned itself between them and their village, or whether they had merely found a pretext to avoid fighting against Mohawks (as Frontenac would persist in believing), it is impossible to say.⁸⁹ What is clear is that the conflict was spiraling into a new, radicalized phase. A Mohawk and Oneida war party, led by Garistasi and motivated by the desire to avenge the death of Onnonragewas and others who had perished during the attack on La Prairie, surprised between Sorel and Chambly one of the many Christian Iroquois bands that had again scattered for the winter hunt, killing four and capturing sixteen. Instead of releasing these captives, as they had done in June of the previous year, they headed home with them. When a woman who had escaped the attack reached Kahnawake, a party of forty or fifty warriors launched an immediate pursuit. They caught up with the enemy along Lake Champlain, annihilating them and recovering their captives. Garistatsi, his son, Kakare, as well as a brother of Onnonragewas – “all the principal Captains” and “the best Indians”, from the New Yorkers’ perspective – were among the dead.⁹⁰

The French and their Aboriginal allies were emboldened by the outcome of this latest encounter. When some of the warriors who had taken part in it journeyed immediately to Quebec to inform Frontenac of the victory and to request that a new party be outfitted to venture against the western Iroquois, the governor was only too happy to oblige. In February of 1692,

indicating that the warriors were wavering, when the original indicates that the habitants wavered. *Histoire du Canada*, p. 33-34). For an overview of the battles, see Gaëtan Bourdages, Jean Joly, Stéphane Tremblay, 1691. *La bataille de La Prairie* (Montreal: Histoire Québec, 2009).

⁸⁹ For a sense of the whirlwind of suspicion and blame projected by the governor and his entourage, see Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 141-4; Frontenac to the Minister, 20 October 1691, C11A 11: 233v.

⁹⁰ NYCD 3: 815, 817; Catalogne, *Recueil*, p. 47; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 154-155; Charlevoix, *Histoire* 3 : 163. Belmont, “Recueil”, f. 42v (*Histoire*, p. 34). For evidence that Onnonragewas (Onnonragouas) had been killed, see NYCD 9: 525. After this defeat the Mohawks and Oneidas told the New Yorkers that they had lost ninety men in two years time, and that the three Mohawk villages now held only 130 men.

about 120 warriors from Kahnawake, 40 from Kanehsatake, and 20 from Lorette set out along the upper St. Lawrence with another 120 Frenchmen. At the island of Toniata they surprised an encampment of fifty to sixty Senecas and Onondagas, killing twenty four and taking sixteen captives.⁹¹ La Plaque, who had just returned from a voyage to France and whose enthusiasm must have been exceptionally high as a result, followed up that September by mobilizing a party of 160 Christian Iroquois warriors with the intention of striking against Mohawk Country.⁹² This party did not go far, however, turning back upon reports (unfounded, as it turns out) that a coordinated enemy offensive was afoot.

In response to recent setbacks, and to the encouragement of Peter Schuyler who pressed them to “lay their principal design against” the French Praying Indians, two contingents representing the League’s western and eastern nations mounted a coordinated offensive against Kahnawake. As the Mohawk chief Rode put it to Schuyler, they intended by the persuasion or violence to “put the Praying Indians out of a capacity of ever doing you or us any more harm”.⁹³ Forewarned and reinforced by French troops, the people of Kahnawake were however exceedingly well equipped to repel the enemy’s words and arms. The western contingent, composed of up to 400 Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas, was the first to appear in sight of the village. Discovering that their arrival was expected and observing that the village was strong enough to resist an assault, the besiegers remained at the edge of the woods and exchanged

⁹¹ According to Belmont and La Potherie, the victims were led by the Seneca headman Sategaronhies. Belmont mentions six “Sauteurs” (probably meaning the Kahnawakes, as no other account alludes to Sauteurs i.e. Ojibwas) and three chiefs of Kanehsatake killed. Catalogne mentions the death of “trois ou quatre de nos plus braves sauvages”. Champigny, “Mémoire”, 5 October 1692, C11A 12: 93-95v (gives 120 Frenchmen and 205 allies); Belmont, “Recueil”, f. 42v-43 (Sategaronhies in the original is transcribed as Tateguenondahi, and the names of the three chiefs are not transcribed at all, in *Histoire du Canada*, p. 34). Catalogne, *Recueil*, p. 52-53; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 155-157; Charlevoix, *Histoire* 3: 163-164.

⁹² Champigny, “Mémoire”, 5 October 1692, C11A 12: 93-95v; Monseignat, “Relation... [1692-1693]”, C11A 12: 182-205v.

⁹³ *LIR*, p. 162-167; *NYCD* 9: 538, 555-556.

sporadic fire during two days as smaller parties turned to raiding French farmsteads throughout the region. The contingent of 350 Mohawks and Oneidas, upon realizing that its intentions had been uncovered, for its part journeyed no further than Lake Champlain.⁹⁴

While the relations of the Kahnawakes and the Mohawks continued to worry Frontenac, Intendant Champigny reported at this time that “one cannot see more faithfulness and bravery than our natives are showing on all occasions.” The French had “a very great interest in treating them well.”⁹⁵ The Christian Iroquois had until now demonstrated a willingness to take part in military operations against the distant and unrelated Senecas, to strike at the people of New York and New England, and to take part in defensive operations in the Montreal region, mounting pursuits in response to threats or attacks on outlying settlements, and escorting on a few occasions fur trading convoys past the most dangerous stretch of the Ottawa River. Their isolated hunters and fishermen had periodically fallen victim to enemy war parties throughout this period.⁹⁶ Just as their acquaintances, friends, and relatives of the League had resolved to “lay their principal design against” them, the inhabitants of the missions began to resort to more drastic means to ensure their own security and to resolve the conflict in a way that would strengthen their community. During the showdown against the Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca warriors in 1692, an emerging Kahnawake chief of Oneida origin named Tatakwiséré dragged out of the palisade the captive wife of the famous Onondaga war chief Black Kettle. Because she had revealed an inclination to attempt and escape, and in a pointed gesture of defiance to the

⁹⁴ Frontenac and Champigny to the Minister, 11 November 1692, C11A 12: 46-48v; Champigny to the Minister, 10 November 1692, C11A 12: 87v; Monseignat, “Relation... [1692-1693]”, C11A 12: 182-205v; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3 : 167-169; Charlevoix, *Histoire* 3: 183-84.

⁹⁵ Champigny to the Minister, 10 November 1692, C11A 12: 87v; Monseignat, “Relation... [1692-1693]”, C11A 12: 183. For Frontenac’s misgivings, see Charlevoix, *Histoire* 3: 185.

⁹⁶ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 129-130, 158-161; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 168.

besiegers, he clubbed her to death. Proclaiming that he would show no mercy to defectors, he exhorted the people of Kahnawake to do the same.⁹⁷

Having attempted, “by all acts of kindness to persuade” their relatives “to come and join them and to unite with them in prayer”, and having experienced the increasingly aggressive and intractable approach of their eastern Iroquois kinsfolk over the previous year, the Kahnawakes reached the conclusion that an attack against their villages was in order. Meeting with Frontenac and Callières, they now “demanded permission to organize this expedition”, requested the assistance of regular troops and militiamen, and went so far as to specify which officers should accompany them (Nicolas d’Ailleboust de Manthet, a veteran of the raid on Schenectady, Augustin Le Gardeur de Courtemanche, and Zacharie Robutel de Lanoue). Together the chiefs and governors agreed that the campaign’s objective would be the complete destruction of the Mohawk villages, and that all women and children were to be captured “to populate the two Christian villages of their nation.”⁹⁸

The small army raised as a result of these discussions numbered some six hundred men, including between one and two hundred warriors from Kahnawake and Kanehsatake, joined by a few Hurons of Lorette, Abenakis from the Sault de la Chaudière, as well as Algonquins and Sokokis from the vicinity of Trois-Rivières. Reaching the three Mohawk villages in mid-

⁹⁷ Tatakwiséré’s name is here spelled Tataconicere (elsewhere Tatachquiserax, Tatachquistioro, Thatha Kouicheré). Monseignat, “Relation... [1692-1693]”, 12 August 1693, C11A 12: 256-260v; Frontenac and Champigny to the Minister, 11 November 1692, C11A 12: 46-48v; Champigny to the Minister, 10 November 1692, C11A 12: 87v; Monseignat, “Relation... [1692-1693]”, C11A 12: 183; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 168; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 183-84.

⁹⁸ Monseignat, “Relation [...] 1692 [...] 1693”, C11A 12: 256; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 169-170. Monseignat indicates that they “demanded permission to organize this expedition”, and La Potherie that they “resolved to adopt other [i.e. this] extreme measure”. Charlevoix, chronicling these events several decades later, places the initiative with Frontenac. Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 170, 185-6. See also Colden, *History*, pp. 181-182; W.J. Eccles, *Frontenac, the Courtier Governor* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), p. 252. Historians who have written on Franco-Iroquois warfare have situated the initiative for the invasion of Mohawk country in 1693 squarely with Governor Frontenac and the Canadian military establishment. A careful rereading of the sources, however, provides strong evidence that this was in fact a Christian Iroquois project.

February, at a time when most of their inhabitants had dispersed for the winter hunt, the forces rapidly overcame those who had remained behind: between 250 and 350 Mohawk captives were taken. The Christian Iroquois were satisfied when these captives asked for clemency by volunteering to emigrate to the missions, claiming that they had been for some time intending to do so. While the French officers wished to press on to Albany, their allies refused and compelled the army's return to Montreal.⁹⁹

During the attack and the return journey, the Christian Iroquois made it clear that “they alone were masters” over the prisoners. Well aware that the escorting of over two hundred captives from Mohawk Country to Canada would slow down the force and facilitate an enemy pursuit, these masters released some of their captives with warnings that they would kill all those who remained in their custody in case of pursuit, and allowing most to flee. Only 64 prisoners, almost all women and children, thus reached Montreal. French commentators who were quick to cast aspersions on the loyalty of their allies for having failed to bring back more than that were also quick to forget that it was the Christian Iroquois who had initiated the campaign. From the latter's perspective, it had been a resounding success: they had taken many captives, and it could be expected that many would follow willingly.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Champigny “Relation... [1692-1693]”, 17 August 1693, C11A 12: 256-260v; Monseignat, “Relation... [1692-1693]”, C11A 12: 182-205v; NYCD 4: 6-7, 14-24, 222; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 1: 322; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 185-8; Nicholas Bayard and Charles Lodowick, *A Narrative of an Attempt made by the French of Canada upon the Mohaques Country Being Indians under the Protection of His Majesties Government of New York* (New York, 1693).

¹⁰⁰ NYCD 4: 17-19; Champigny “Relation... [1692-1693]”, 17 August 1693, C11A 12: 256-260v; Monseignat, “Relation... [1692-1693]”, C11A 12: 182-205v; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 185-186; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 1: 322-323; Callière to the Minister, 10 October 1694, C11A 13:109; Belmont, “Recueil”, f. 43v (“les gens du saut firent echaper 100 [de] leur parens” becomes “virent échapper” in *Histoire du Canada*, p. 35).

Sure enough, as in 1666, the destruction of the Mohawk villages initiated a significant northward migration. During the summer that followed, many Mohawks voluntarily relocated to the mission villages.¹⁰¹ The show of force proved an equally powerful motivator for the Mohawks' closest neighbours. That June an Oneida headman named Taréha led a delegation of seven of his people to Canada, intending to obtain the release of a relative who was kept prisoner at Kahnawake, and more ambitiously to meet with Frontenac and look into the possibility of negotiating a peace. Offering to act as a mediator, he declared to Frontenac that if he was fortunate enough to reconcile his own nation with the French, his design was "to come among them and spend the rest of his days with his brothers of Sault S. Louis."¹⁰²

While such destruction represented a strong encouragement to migration, as in recent years the force of arms was not the only factor at play at this juncture. There existed powerful bonds of biological and spiritual kinship between the Oneidas and the residents of the mission villages, Kahnawake in particular. As indicated in the previous chapter, the founding core of that community had come from Oneida; though Mohawks now predominated, a regular influx of Oneidas had continued through the late 1670s. Tatakwiséré, who would emerge as the most influential man at Kahnawake in the decade following the death of Togouiroui, was himself of Oneida origin.¹⁰³ The continued presence and influence at Oneida of the Jesuit Pierre Millet in recent years further contributed to this privileged relation between the two communities. In

¹⁰¹ Champigny "Relation... [1692-1693]", 17 August 1693, C11A 12: 256-260v; Monseignat, "Relation... [1692-1693]", C11A 12: 182-205v.

¹⁰² In September, Tareha returned with the bad news that no embassy would arrive; over the next few years, he made several more diplomatic journeys between Iroquoia and Canada. On Tareha's embassy and subsequent embassies, and on Governor Fletcher and the Albany magistrates' renewed efforts to undermine Franco-Iroquois diplomacy, see Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 190-191 (quote); NYCD 4: 38-51, 59-64, 76-78; Champigny "Relation... [1692-1693]", 17 August 1693, C11A 12: 256-260v; Monseignat, "Relation... [1692-1693]", C11A 12: 182-205v; Colden, *History*, pp. 154-156; Examination of Jurian, 25 July 1693, NYSA, A1894, v. 39, no. 82; LIR, pp. 170-172. On Tareha himself (alternatively spelled Tarriha, Tarrigha, Tarsha, Tharca), see Henri Béchar, "Tareha", in *DCB*, 1: 633-634. Regarding the capture of two boys belonging to his family, one of whom was doubtlessly the subject of his visit in June, see NYCD 3: 783.

¹⁰³ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 268.

charge of the mission at Oneida between 1672 and 1684, he had returned there as a war captive in 1689 only to be requickened shortly thereafter as Otasseté, a hereditary League sachem of the Wolf Clan. Until his release in 1694, Millet continued to wield considerable moral authority at Oneida.¹⁰⁴ His adoptive relatives of the Wolf Clan – with Taréha at the forefront since 1693 – played a central role in the negotiation of a Franco-Iroquois settlement, and numbered among those most willing to consider the possibility of relocating to Canada.

As Frontenac sent Taréha back to muster a more substantial peace delegation, the Christian Iroquois pressed the advantage. Having asserted themselves as a military power to be reckoned with, they returned to diplomacy as a means of establishing peace on their own terms. In the fall, Tatakwiséré dispatched a messenger to warn the Five Nations “to come speedily before the French destroyed them”. The Onondagas took this threat sufficiently seriously to call back their dispersed hunting bands and to promise that a League delegation would meet with Onontio in the spring. When in February of 1694 two Mohawk elders arrived at Kahnawake to explain that no delegation would be coming, and that “if the Karigouistes [Christian Iroquois] or the French have something to propose to the Five Nations” they would be welcome at an upcoming conference in Albany, the Christian Iroquois made their displeasure manifest. Before the two emissaries and Callières, in whose presence the Kahnawake headmen insisted on speaking, the Kahnawakes rejected these overtures and placed their full diplomatic weight behind the French. “We will have no correspondence with the Five Nations, but by order of the Governor of Canada our Father,” went their ultimatum, and unless the League’s deputies came before the Feast of St. John of June 24th, “the way will be shut up for ever after, and our Father’s

¹⁰⁴ On Pierre Millet and on his influence at Oneida, see Daniel St-Arnaux, *Pierre Millet en Iroquoisie au XVII^e siècle : le sachem portait la soutane* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1998); Lucien Campeau, “Pierre Millet” in *DCB* 2: 473-474; *JRAD* 64: 118-120, 132; *NYCD* 4: 47, 169-170.

ears will be stopped. We however assure you, that if the deputies come in that time the path shall be safe both coming and going.”¹⁰⁵

That a delegation headed by Teganissorens did reach Kahnawake and then Quebec in early May must be interpreted not only as an indication of the Five Nations’ willingness to entertain peace with the French in spite of English interference, but also of the Kahnawakes’ considerable weight as mediators. Further evidence of this was given during the conference held at Quebec, which was attended by all the leading men of Kahnawake and of Kanehsatake. At one point, Teganissorens addressed the Kahnawakes, “whom in former times I called Iroquois” (no doubt here a translation of *Haudenosaunee*, people of the League) but whom he now recognized as the children of Onontio and Christians, to act as mediators. Explaining that “you know us and know our ways of doing things”, he prayed that they would entertain thoughts of peace among both the French and the Iroquois, and that they would stifle all occasions for quarrel. He said as much to the Kanehsatakes before addressing the people of the two mission villages: “We have killed one another. Forget what has passed, as we intend to do on our side”.¹⁰⁶

The conference yielded constructive results, with Frontenac promising a temporary cessation of raids and guaranteeing the safety of any emissaries who would travel to the colony. In the weeks that followed, a second council was held at Montreal during which the headmen of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake answered the speeches addressed to them at Quebec. Reiterating their attachment to the French, they reproached Teganissorens for the fact that Mohawk war parties were reported to be on the move. When the Onondaga diplomat attempted to transmit a

¹⁰⁵ The quotes here are taken from Colden; La Potherie provides a lengthier and plausibly more accurate version of the message that reached Canada. Colden, *History*, pp. 203-210; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 200-203; *NYCD* 4: 86-87; Lamothe-Cadillac, “Mémoire...”, [1694], C11A 13: 140-151v; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 203.

¹⁰⁶ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 204-220

secret wampum belt to two of the main chiefs of Kahanawake, as further encouragement to work towards peace and to keep the people of Iroquoia informed of the governor's dispositions, they refused to accept and promptly informed Callières of it – just as their predecessors had done three years earlier. By way of response to Teganissorens, they merely reiterated that the Five Nations should trust and conform to what had been pledged at Quebec.¹⁰⁷

Though at times they acted as colonial agents, relaying messages between the French and the Five Nations, and generally reinforcing the authority of Onontio, it is clear that the Christian Iroquois strove to mediate a peace on their own terms. When Frontenac declared to Cayuga and Seneca delegates, in September of 1694, that he had placed “the hatchet in their [his allies'] hands again” until representatives of all Five Nations sued for peace, many of the Christian Iroquois in attendance expressed reluctance. While they had made unqualified declarations of submission to the governor's will in May, when the issue at hand was peace, they now showed themselves unwilling to take up arms at the governor's whim. Instead, they reportedly challenged Frontenac: “if we take up the hatchet again, let us go and kill Cayenquiragoe [governor Fletcher, and by extension the New Yorkers], for the sooner the better then there is an end.”¹⁰⁸ Perhaps this was a bluff. More likely it represented a genuine belief that it was the English who interfered with a resolution of the Franco-Iroquois conflict, and ultimately of the conflict between the Iroquois of the missions and of their relatives of the League. It was at the same time an expression of the conviction that diplomacy, at this juncture, was the surest way to achieve a peace settlement with the latter.

¹⁰⁷ *Idem.*

¹⁰⁸ NYCD 4: 115; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 231-244; La Potherie's account mentions that the visitors consoled the people of La Montagne whose village had just been destroyed in an accidental fire, and exhorted them to keep working for peace; but makes no allusion to Christian Iroquois outrage at the governor's whim.

A modest party of warriors from Kahnawake ventured south towards Albany in March of 1695, but in the absence of substantial French support there was to be no major expedition against Cayenquiragoe and his people. The Christian Iroquois' diplomatic activity in the meantime continued unabated. Attending a council at Onondaga in February of 1695, a Mohawk from Kahnawake called Thioratarion and an Oneida from Kanehsatake called Ononsista ritually condoled the losses of the League and insisted that they comply with Frontenac's desire to meet with their ambassadors. The Onondaga speaker Aqueendera reciprocated the condolence rituals, but he and his people were unwilling to entertain the proposals of Onontio. Instead he asked Thioratarion and Ononsista, and the people of their respective villages, to use their influence to persuade the governor to release his prisoners. Aqueendera entrusted a wampum belt to Thioratarion, addressed to himself and Tatakwiséré, which was to symbolically remain hidden underground (i.e. secret) for three years. With it, the League Iroquois exhorted the two men to "think much of the union that ought to exist between us, and not forget that here [in Iroquoia] is your ancient country; that you ought to advise us of the designs of Onontio without letting him know it. Fear not visiting us: you will be always welcome."¹⁰⁹

The leadership in the Canadian Iroquois villages continued to favour its relationship with the French, and their warriors continued to take part in Franco-Aboriginal operations throughout this period.¹¹⁰ In judging Tatakwiséré to be "our friend and the most influential at the Sault" and accordingly expecting him to be secretive, Aqueendera and the League chiefs were only half right, for he resolved in conjunction with the other leading men at Kahnawake to reveal the nature of the secret communication to Callières and to expose Thioratarion, who favoured

¹⁰⁹ Monseignat, "Relation... [1694-1695]", C11A 14: 65-99v; *NYCD* 4: 120-121. In the report produced at Albany, the names of these messengers were transcribed as Tiurhadareio otherwise diakognorak'igl's, and Jehanontsiesta. In Monseignat's relation they are named Tiorhatarion (or Thioratarion, Thiorhatharion, Thioratarions) and Ononsista (or Ononsiaka).

¹¹⁰ *NYCD* 4: 124-126, 151-152, 158.

continued diplomatic secrecy.¹¹¹ Once again, League Iroquois efforts to short-circuit the relationship of the French and the Christian Iroquois were thwarted.

Wampum belts and mutual declarations of goodwill were circulating as never before between Iroquoia and the mission villages of the St. Lawrence Valley, but reconciliation remained elusive. In response to the news of negotiations towards a separate peace settlement between the nations of the Great Lakes and the Five Nations, and fearing the English penetration in the interior that would unavoidably ensue, colonial authorities proposed a new campaign for 1696. This time the Onondagas would be the target.¹¹² Though rather little is known as to how allied warriors were mobilized on this occasion, there is no evidence that the Christian Iroquois were as reluctant to take part in it as they may have been in earlier years. Some 500 Kahnawake, Kanehsatake, Huron, Abenaki, Sokoki, Algonquin, Nipissing, and Ottawa warriors numbered among the approximately 2,150 men who left the staging point of Lachine under the nominal command of the elderly Frontenac on July 4th. Undisturbed in its progress, the army found the main Onondaga village abandoned and already smoldering a month later.¹¹³

As Frontenac's army proceeded to loot and spoil the stores and crops of the villages, the governor sent a strong detachment under the command of Philippe de Rigaud Vaudreuil towards the Oneida villages; at the same time, the worried Oneidas dispatched a delegation of their own to the governor. Frontenac promised peace to the latter on condition that they resettle in Canada,

¹¹¹ Monseignat, "Relation... [1694-1695]", C11A 14: 65-99v.

¹¹² Frontenac to the Minister, 25 October 1696, C11A 14: 148-150; Frontenac to the Minister, 25 October 1696, C11A 14: 154-167; Monseignat, "Relation... [1695-1696]", C11A 14: 35-64; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 224-7; NYCD 4: 123.

¹¹³ Monseignat, "Relation... [1695-1696]", C11A 14: 35-64; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 270-278; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 246-249.

where they would be generously provided with land and seeds. In the meantime, Vaudreuil's force reached the fields of the main Oneida village where they were met by an Oneida woman who offered to come with eighty of her people to join the Christian Iroquois near Montreal. Vaudreuil accepted the offer but nevertheless saw cruelly fit to destroy the village and fields, explaining that "it was useless to think of preserving their grain [...] as they should want for nothing when settled among us", and likewise "that their fort and cabins would not be spared, either, as some were quite ready for their reception."¹¹⁴

The Kahnawakes, given this destruction and their special ties to this community, had good reason to desire and expect that this latest demonstration of Franco-Aboriginal military superiority would precipitate their reconciliation with the Oneidas on terms that strengthened their mission community both politically and demographically. Eager to ensure that the Oneidas followed up on their pledge to join the Franco-Aboriginal fold in the St. Lawrence Valley, they advised Frontenac to maintain a strong presence in Iroquoia through the winter of 1696-1697 and made their displeasure manifest when he instead ordered the army to return to Montreal. A few months after the campaign, Tatakwiséré travelled to Oneida to ensure that its inhabitants complied with their promises of resettlement. Returning to Montreal in January of 1697, he was glad to announce that two bands totaling sixty persons were on the way.¹¹⁵

The first of these bands, numbering from thirty to forty individuals, reached Montreal on February 5th. Its leader, a certain Otacheté who like Taréha belonged to Millet's adoptive Wolf Clan, explained to Callières that they had come to keep the promise made to "their Father" to join the ranks of his children and settle on his land. Asserting his followers' desire to maintain a

¹¹⁴ Monseignat, "Relation... [1695-1696]", C11A 14: 35-64; La Potherie, *Histoire* 3: 280-282; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 253.

¹¹⁵ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 285; Monseignat, "Relation... [1695-1696]", C11A 14: 35-64; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 256-7, 292-293.

distinctive identity and a good measure of autonomy, he requested that they be provided with land and assistance in the preparation of a site for a new village, “so that the name of Oneida may be preserved”, and that Millet be assigned as their missionary. The remainder of the Oneidas expected to follow, he claimed, and had been prevented from doing so only by the Mohawks and the Onondagas who had retained them “each by an arm”.¹¹⁶

By mid-1697, it was becoming abundantly clear that in spite of recent years’ diplomatic maneuvering and shows of force only a minority of Oneidas and Mohawks were ready to join their relatives and acquaintances near Montreal. Contrary to Otachété’s hopes and efforts, at Oneida it was resolved by the “general vote of old and young men and women” that none of their village “should again go to live at Canada”.¹¹⁷ A momentarily entertained hope of large-scale Mohawk resettlement was similarly dashed. In June the Kahnawakes received an underground wampum belt by which the headmen of the Mohawk villages informed “their Brothers of the Sault that they were weary of fighting and had resolved to come and reside with them”. But when a Kahnawake delegate reached the Mohawk villages to pursue the discussion, he was informed that there had been a miscommunication: the Mohawks had not implied a “willingness to come and settle among us”, but merely desired to discuss peace; once peace was achieved, then “they would see what they should do”.¹¹⁸ When Oneida and Onondaga delegates appeared before Frontenac in the company of Otacheté in November of 1697, they discussed peace and

¹¹⁶ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 285; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 295-296; Monseignat, “Relation [...] 1696 [...] 1697”, C11A 15: 3-21 (copy in NYCD 9: 665); see also Callière to Minister, 15 October 1697, C11A 15: 148-153v; NYCD 4: 279-280. On Otacheté (alternatively, Odatsichta, Odatsigtha, Odasishtee, Odatsighte, Odatrighte), see also NYCD 4: 348, 407, 558-559, 563. His name is one of the hereditary names of Oneida League chiefs (Otacheté, Otasseté, Odatsheghte, Otatschéchte, Otatchette, Otachecté, Odat-sighte, Odaksichte, Odatrighte, Odatsichte, Odatsichta, Ondaghsighte). See William A. Starna, “Retrospecting the Origins of the League of the Iroquois”, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 152, 3 (September 2008), pp. 295, 313. Some confusion needs to be resolved, however, as Millet wrote several years earlier that he had himself been adopted to replace a chief named Otasseté. *JRAD* 64: 101.

¹¹⁷ NYCD 4: 279-282; Monseignat, “Relation... [1696-1697]”, C11A 15: 3-21; Treaty minutes, 9-12 March, 8 July 1697, NYSA, A1894, v. 41, no. 92; Callières to the Minister, 15 October 1697, C11A 15: 148-153v; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 295-296; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 308-309.

¹¹⁸ Monseignat, “Relation... [1696-1697]”, C11A 15: 3-21; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 294, 297, 309-310.

went so far as to show an interest in adopting the Christian faith, but significantly made no allusion to the question of migration.¹¹⁹

No wholesale relocation had occurred, but through the incorporation of willing migrants and war captives the population of the mission villages had not only compensated their losses from emigration between 1684 and 1689, but expanded. Between 1692 and 1698, the Kanehsatakes, who besides having borne the brunt of the assault in the early years of the war had been subjected to a disruptive fire in 1693 (unrelated to the conflict) and partial relocation of their mission, had gone from a total of 212 individuals to a total of 273 now subdivided between the old site of La Montagne and a new site at Sault-au-Récollet. Kahnawake had for its part increased in population by a full third during the same period, from 509 individuals to 790.¹²⁰ As the people of Kahnawake made a special effort to absorb these newcomers so as to strengthen their own community, the separate village requested by Otacheté to accommodate Oneida newcomer was never established. On the other hand, in 1698 Father Millet was posted at Kahnawake in what was surely an effort to accommodate the influx of Oneidas and probably in the hope of attracting even greater numbers.¹²¹

In a roundabout fashion, what migration had occurred as a result of recent diplomatic and military offensives provided the key to Christian and League Iroquois reconciliation. Waves of newcomers to the mission villages brought communities on either side of the divide closer to each other than they had been in recent years, with the newest Christian Iroquois softening the attitudes of long-time, more zealous community members. The conclusion of the Peace of

¹¹⁹ Monseignat, "Relation... [1696-1697]", C11A 15: 3-21; Monseignat, "Relation... [1697-1698]", 20 October 1698, C11A 15: 22-37.

¹²⁰ LAC, MG1 G1, 461: 5- 6, 8. See also *JRAD* 65: 28-30.

¹²¹ Millet's dates of posting at Kahnawake are given by Campeau, "Millet", *DCB* 2: 474.

Ryswick between the France and England in September of 1697, did much to ease the relations of the Christian and League Iroquois.¹²² Though Franco-Iroquois peace negotiations would remain inconclusive for a few years still, owing to Frontenac's insistence that his Great Lakes allies be included in the peace settlement and to his unwillingness to accept anything less than a full submission from the Five Nations, the intercolonial peace did much to ease the relations between the French, the Christian Iroquois, and those of the League – especially the Mohawks, whose ties to the New Yorkers had been the strongest. During the war years, those who had travelled to the missions from Iroquoia or vice versa had generally done so alone or in small official delegations. Now they could travel in groups. Early in the summer of 1698, several Kahnawakes motivated by “curiosity, or a desire to see their relatives” travelled to the Mohawk villages.¹²³ Conversely, the French observed during the fall that “Some Mohawk families came on a visit to their relatives at the Saut, and possibly some will settle there. They are left at perfect liberty, and walk daily in the streets of Montreal with as much confidence as if Peace were perfectly ratified. We do not wish to alarm them, and possibly their example will serve to bring the others to their duty.”¹²⁴

Benefiting from a greater freedom of movement than at any time during the previous decade, the Christian Iroquois continued to act as diplomatic emissaries between Montreal and Onondaga. Otacheté, though discredited among both the French and his people for having entertained fanciful ambitions of full-scale migration, continued to relay messages to Oneida and Onondaga. A young man from Kahnawake named Tegayesté, who had accompanied him on one

¹²² NYCD 4: 497-498, 558-563. Regarding news of the Peace of Ryswick in the colonies, see Monseignat, “Relation... [1697-1698]”, 20 October 1698, C11A 15: 22-37; NYCD 4: 338-341, 347-351; Wraxall, *Abridgement*, pp. 29-30. Havard, *Great Peace*, pp. 73-74.

¹²³ They were back in Canada by August 21st. Monseignat, “Relation... [1697-1698]”, 20 October 1698, C11A 15: 22-37; NYCD 4: 347-351; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 336-337.

¹²⁴ Monseignat, “Relation... [1697-1698]”, 20 October 1698, C11A 15: 22-37. See also La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 106.

occasion to Onondaga, was himself entrusted at the time of his return in the fall of 1698 with a wampum belt with which the Onondagas asked the Canadian Iroquois to intercede with the governor to obtain peace. Similar overtures had been made in the past, but this one appears to have represented something of a turning point. During the ratification of the Great Peace in the summer of 1701, the Kahnawakes orator would remind the League delegates that “you sent us a belt *three years ago* to invite us to procure you peace” and presented them with another “to tell you that we have worked at it”.¹²⁵

And work at it they did. When an intransigent Frontenac refused to receive the message and belt brought by the young Tegayesté, he exposed himself to the reproaches of other Christian Iroquois. According to the account of the meeting that reached the ears of the authorities in Albany, they expressed their amazement that Onontio was declining “those fair offers of peace, it is as if bereaved of your senses or drunk”, and compared him unfavorably with the New Yorkers and Mohawks who, they claimed, were now all doing their part to promote “the public good, peace and tranquility of us all.”¹²⁶ An Onondaga resident of Kanehsatake named Tsihenne (known among the French as Massias) intervened at this juncture and convinced an initially reluctant Frontenac to send Tegayesté back on his personal (Tsihenne’s, that is) account to exchange conciliatory courtesies and to request that the Onondagas assemble all the Five Nations’ and deliver them to Montreal in forty or fifty days. If the Five Nations complied,

¹²⁵ Monseignat, “Relation... [1697-1698]”, 20 October 1698, C11A 15: 22-37, emphasis mine.

¹²⁶ *Propositions made by the Five Nations of Indians, viz. the Mohaques, Oneydes, Onnondages, Cayouges & Sinnekes, to His Excellency Richard Earl of Bellomont, capt. general and governour in chief His Majesties province of New-York, &c. in Albany, the 20th of July, anno Dom. 1698*, (New York: William Bradford, 1698), pp. 20-21.

promised Tsihenne, a “firm peace” would result. But “If you hear not my word,” his message went, “I will be the first to wage war against you.”¹²⁷

The significance of migration patterns and kinship bonds as both the motivation and means for reconciliation leaves little doubt. Tsihenne and his wife, a Frenchwoman who had been captured at Lachine in 1689, had relocated to Kanehsatake with an infant son around 1697. Tsihenne’s links to the people and leaders of Onondaga remained strong in spite of his withdrawal to the St. Lawrence. Though he was recognized to be “entirely attached to the French nation”, he often spoke on behalf of Five Nation deputies during their meetings with the French. The fact that a grown son of his by a previous union remained among the Onondagas, where he was recognized as “one of the principal chiefs”, facilitated even further relations. In January of 1699, this Ohonsiowanne reached the colony professing an inclination to visit his father.¹²⁸

By this time the inhabitants of the mission villages were exceedingly frustrated by the fact that the League Iroquois’ leaders seemed uncommitted to peace and reconciliation. Ohonsiowanne was challenged on several occasions by the people of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake to account for the fact that the Five Nations had not sent a formal delegation to

¹²⁷ Monseignat, “Relation... [1697-1698]”, 20 October 1698, C11A 15: 22-37; *Propositions made by the Five Nations of Indians*, pp. 20-21; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 100.

¹²⁸ This individual is named Massias or Massiac in the source. He appears to be the same person as the man named René Chioui, René Tsiheme, alias Tsioueouy, alias Jacques René Mathias, Tsihene or Tsienne, husband of the Frenchwoman Anne Mouflet. This man of Onondaga origin appears to have inherited the nickname “Mathias” from the name of his wife’s first husband, Mathias Chadouteaux. The latter died in captivity after having been taken at Lachine in 1689; Anne, who was 19 years old at the time, remained a captive for some time. She and Tsihenne married about 1697, about which time their son Paul Massias was born. See Hélène Lamarche’s “Les habitants de Lachine et le massacre de 1689”, *Mémoires de la société généalogique canadienne-française*, 50-3 (fall 1999), p. 221. His name is mistranscribed as Blassia in *NYCD* 9: 685. La Potherie, unexplicably, appears to refer to the same man as “Egrederie”. La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4:100. On Ohonsiowanne (Cohensiowanne, Cohonsiowanne, Ohonsiowanne, Tohonsiowanne, apparently also mistranscribed as Sannoghtowanne), who visited the colony in January and September 1699, see La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 124-125; *NYCD* 4: 492-496, 558, 658. For Ohonsiowanne’s visit, see *NYCD* 4: 492-496; Wraxall, *Abridgement*, pp. 31.

discuss peace with the French. They entrusted him with belts of wampum to warn the four western nations that this was the last time they would be asked to come and treat with Onontio. They would warn them no more, “for they were worse than beasts”.¹²⁹ During subsequent councils held in Montreal in July and September of 1700, as the peace negotiations dragged on owing in part to English interference, the Christian Iroquois again “made great reproaches, and spoke with much haughtiness to the deputies” of the Oneidas and Onondagas.¹³⁰

Notwithstanding the forceful language, the bottom line was conciliatory. The Kahnawakes and Kanehsatakes assured their interlocutors that if the Five Nations came to discuss peace, the French would listen to them and “consider it done”.¹³¹ The confidence of the Christian Iroquois in this respect may have derived from the recent death of Frontenac, in November of 1698, and the belief that the new governor would not be as obdurate as the previous one. Sure enough, the inhabitants of the missions welcomed warmly, in the spring of 1699, the news that Callières had been named to the post. Over the previous decade and a half he had collaborated closely with the inhabitants of the mission villages and developed with them a relation of mutual trust and relative understanding. A Kanehsatake orator called Paul Tsiheoui by La Potherie, but who may in fact have been Tsiehenne (though the latter’s baptismal name was René), declared that the king had been wise to choose a man such as him. “[W]e have no doubt that we will be forever happy under your conduct”, he concluded.¹³² Hyperbole aside, there is good reason to believe that what might in other circumstances have been an empty courtesy was, in fact, an expression of real relief among the Christian Iroquois. Nowhere in the records is Frontenac the subject of such praiseworthy expressions from them.

¹²⁹ NYCD 4: 492-496.

¹³⁰ Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 362, 372.

¹³¹ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 116-117.

¹³² La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 122-123

In March of 1699, to keep the flames of peace alive at a time when officials in Albany were doing their utmost to scuttle Franco-Iroquois accommodation, two Christian Iroquois brought four prisoners to Onondaga.¹³³ If the presence in the mission villages of men and women who like Tsihenne had willingly migrated could hardly be debated, the presence there of persons kept against their will continued to trouble the Five Nations. It had for some time. At Quebec in the spring of 1694, Teganissorens had asked Frontenac to allow those who showed an inclination to return home to do so freely, but had made no claims on the other “prisoners” who might prefer to stay in the colony. Recognizing that the Christian Iroquois had parallel preoccupations, Teganissorens released as a token of goodwill an Iroquois woman from Kanehsatake, and pledged that all of the prisoners of the Five Nations who wished to return home would eventually be released.¹³⁴ At Onondaga during the following winter, Thioratarion and Ononsista had in turn been asked to convince the people of their villages to deliver to Onontio all of the Iroquois and English held captive among them so that they might then be brought to Onondaga.¹³⁵ In 1698, it had been Tegayesté’s turn to be entrusted by the Onondagas with a wampum belt for the people of Kahnawake, so that they might intercede with the governor of Canada for the release of the prisoners.¹³⁶

The Kahnawakes and Kanehsatakes responded to these entreaties by periodically releasing some of their prisoners. They continued to retain a significant number of men and

¹³³ The leading man was called Segowane (Sagawane, Sannoghtowanne), while the other revealed himself intent on not returning to the mission after two years of residence there because the “French Indians” had killed his brother the year before. See *NYCD* 4: 559, 579.

¹³⁴ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 210.

¹³⁵ Monseignat, “Relation [1694-695]” C11A 14: 65-99v; *NYCD* 4: 121-122. For similar cases, see La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 180, 286.

¹³⁶ Monseignat, “Relation... [1697-1698]”, 20 October 1698, C11A 15: 22-37.

women against their will, however. In September 1700, a Seneca orator again insisted on behalf of the Five Nations that Callières intervene to free all prisoners, held by the nations of the Great Lakes but also by those of the missions.¹³⁷ At Onondaga in June of the following year, during an embassy headed by Le Moyne de Maricourt and Bruyas for the purpose of obtaining the release of the French captives of the Five Nations, Teganissorens again asked for the liberation of Iroquois captives in Canada. “I do not speak of the prisoners that are among the Dowaganhaes [Great Lakes Algonquians], but those that are under your roof in Caghnuage [Kahnawake]”, he declared, pointing to Bruyas, “and if they do not come it will be your fault. You will stir them up, but we expect that all those that are unwilling [i.e. to leave the mission], you will bind them and throw in our Canoes”.¹³⁸ This frustrated appeal for the return not only of those captives who were against their will, but also of those who had found a happy home in the mission villages was a far cry from the position voiced in 1694.

The Great Peace of 1701 has been recognized as a triumph of French diplomacy by historians such as Gilles Havard.¹³⁹ Without taking away from the value of that interpretation, it must also be recognized as a triumph of Christian Iroquois. The Kahnawakes, in particular, had emerged as a military and diplomatic force to be reckoned with – the most powerful of Onontio’s children east of the Great Lakes, or arguably of all his children on the continent. Warfare had provided them with a challenge, but also an opportunity to assert in a powerful way their political and cultural independence from the Five Nations. They had demonstrated their ability to fight and to act as diplomats. Much more than mere messengers relaying the communications

¹³⁷ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 165.

¹³⁸ NYCD 4: 895. Cf. La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 192.

¹³⁹ For a detailed account of the atmosphere and proceedings of the Great Peace of Montreal, see Gilles Havard, *The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), ch. 7.

of the French and the Five Nations, they had played a key role in bringing both parties to the negotiation table.

It is of great significance that when the delegates of the Five Nations and Great Lakes finally travelled to Montreal to take part in a great peace ratification conference in the summer of 1701, they first stopped and spent a day at Kahnawake. Bacqueville de La Potherie, who witnessed the proceedings, described in detail the arrival of the Onondaga, Cayuga, and Oneida ambassadors on July 21st, and of the peoples of the Great Lakes and the Senecas on the following day. The approaching canoes of the visitors were greeted with joyous musket and canon salutes, and the village's streets were cleared of weeds and swept clean for this special occasion. The event had airs of a great family reunion. As the Kahnawake orator Ontonnionk (The Eagle) explained, his people were always eager to greet "a father, a brother, an uncle or a cousin"; they were distressed when ambassadors of the Five Nations neglected to stop at Kahnawake, as they had unfortunately done during the peace negotiations of the previous year.¹⁴⁰

The halt at Kahnawake played a crucial diplomatic function. For the Iroquois hosts and guests, it corresponded to what historians have described as the "wood's edge" protocol, a key stage of the condolence ceremony when guests were ritually welcomed and where the process of reconciliation could begin. After disembarking, the Onondaga, Cayuga, and Oneida ambassadors headed straight for Tatakwiséré's longhouse. It was there that Ontonnionk greeted the ambassadors. Thanking them at length for having made the difficult journey, he set up the relationship between Kahnawake as "a small fire of dried brambles to get one's breath back," and Montreal "where the mat has been properly laid." He proceeded to go through the condolence ritual to ease their grief and clear their minds in preparation for the conference to come. The "true fire being at Montreal," added Ontionnionk, "they should not be surprised if

¹⁴⁰ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 193-200

they did not enter into any the details of affairs”. Still, although Kahnawake was not the site of the council, he asserted the Five Nations should henceforth always pass through here.¹⁴¹

A parallel ritual of reconciliation took place the next day after the arrival of the ambassadors of the Great Lakes and their entourage, who amounted to seven or eight hundred persons. Received with great excitement, their deputies and leading men entered the cabin of Haronhiateka (Burning Sky or Burning Cloud). “Chief of the Calumet”, keeper of a ceremonial pipe of the type used among the Algonquians of the Great Lakes and Mississippi Valley to seal alliances and to declare peace or war, Haronhiateka led the visitors through the calumet dance, each man rhythmically miming and singing his exploits before making conciliatory statements. Feasting and dancing ensued into the night.¹⁴² Though universal in the western Great Lakes and Mississippi Valley, the calumet was only rarely used by the Iroquois: its deployment at Kahnawake as evidence of its inhabitants’ complex links to the French-allied nations of the interior, and of their great adaptability as diplomats. The importance of Haronhiateka during these proceedings represents a second significant feature: he too was a relative newcomer to the community, having settled there only around 1699.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Idem. On the wood’s edge protocol, the three bare words, and condolence ceremonies, see Michael K. Foster, “Another Look at the Function of Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils” in Francis Jennings et al, eds., *The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), pp. 105-107; J.N. B. Hewitt (William N. Fenton, ed.), “The Requickenning Address of the Iroquois Condolence Council”, *Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences* 34, 3 (March 1944), p. 65-85; William N. Fenton, *The Great Law and the Longhouse: a political history of the Iroquois League*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998). pp. 135-140; Michael M. Pomedli, “Eighteenth-Century Treaties: Amended Iroquois Condolence Rituals”, *AIQ* 19, 3 (1995), pp. 319-39. Pointing to the ritual function of this stop at Kahnawake, a few scholars have minimized its broader meaning. Arguing that this event cannot be interpreted as a sign of Kahnawake’s political importance, contrary to subsequent Kahnawake claims, Jean-Pierre Sawaya writes that “le rôle de Kahnawake ne se limitait alors qu’à des fonctions protocolaires dépourvues de tout pouvoir réel”. Sawaya, “Les Sept-Nations du Canada et les Britanniques”, p. 50-51. Along similar but less radical lines, see Havard, *Great Peace*, p. 125. Regarding the existing scholarship on Kahnawake’s involvement in the peace negotiations, it should also be noted that Gretchen Green confuses the events of 1699 and 1701 and the identity of the speakers. Green, *A New People*, p. 165.

¹⁴² La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 197-199.

¹⁴³ In 1701, Haronhiateka (also Arioteka, Oraj Dicka, Orojadicka, Orighjadikha, Oriojadricko) was reported to have “been two years among the French in Canada”. According to one account, his wife was a white (former captive)

The role of the Christian Iroquois during the peace conference at the “true fire” of Montreal between July 23rd and August 7th was muted in comparison. This should not come as a surprise, given that they had already made their peace with the Five Nations. The issue of the prisoners, assuming that it had not been satisfyingly resolved during the preceding year, may have been further discussed and concluded. Another issue brought to the table, the progressive disappearance of fur-bearing animals and the sharing out of hunting grounds, was apparently resolved by an agreement according to which the hunting territories of new and old allies would be pooled; the territories were metaphorically represented as a great dish, and a ladle and a knife was distributed to everyone so that they might serve themselves from it.¹⁴⁴ What part the Kahnawakes played in this arrangement was not recorded, though it is clear that over the next century they developed a strong conviction that they had on this occasion been given preeminence. In 1791, one of the village’s chiefs gave a speech to the British authorities in which he claimed that the French King had assembled all the nations of the continent and laid his “dish” at the “great fire” of Kahnawake.¹⁴⁵ Though this late eighteenth century memory of preeminence had much to do with a post-1760 developments, there was nevertheless a kernel of truth to it insofar as the prominence of Kahnawake among France’s Aboriginal allies would have left little doubt in the minds of the people assembled in 1701.

During the closing speeches of the conference on August 4th 1701, Ontonnonk again asserted Kahnawake’s preeminence: “For us [the Kahnawakes] who have the advantage of

Seneca woman. Recognized as a chief at Kahnawake by 1701, he remained so until 1711 at least. See Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 42; *NYCD* 4: 907; *NYCD* 5: 243, 246.

¹⁴⁴ While Brandão and Starna argue that this was an important subject, Havard believes that it was of only minor importance. Havard, *Great Peace*, 145-149; J.A. Brandão and William A. Starna, “The Treaties of 1701: A Triumph of Iroquois Diplomacy”, *Ethnohistory* 43, 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 209-244.

¹⁴⁵ “Conseil adressé à Mr Le Colonel Campbell”, 7 October 1791, LAC, RG 10, vol. 8, p. 8202. Scholars have observed that the claims made in 1791 distort the importance of Kahnawake in 1701. As Sawaya has demonstrated, its pre-eminence among the mission villages was formalized only in the early years of the British Regime. Havard, *Great Peace*, pp. 147-148; Sawaya, “Les Sept-Nations du Canada et les Britanniques”, pp. 50-54.

knowing more intimately and from a closer distance than they the true feelings of your heart, we readily throw down the hatchet on your word, which we had only taken up at your command, and give the Tree of Peace that you have erected such strong, deep roots, that neither winds nor storms, nor other misfortune will be able to uproot it.” When he was done, an orator named Tsahouanhos (Tsihenne, it is likely) spoke with equal fervor on behalf of the Kanehsatakes, declaring that he had no hatchet “other than that of my Father. As he carries us in his bosom, I return mine to him, and at the same time withdraw my hand, for he throws away his [own] hatchet.”¹⁴⁶ It was Haronhiateka who, in spite of his status as a newcomer or perhaps because of it, affixed his mark to the final peace treaty in 1701 on behalf of his new community.¹⁴⁷

Unsurprisingly, the flowery declarations of devotion and obedience to Onontio made by Ontonnionk and Tsahouanhos offer only an imperfect reflection of the course of war and peace during the last two decades of the seventeenth century. The Christian Iroquois, undeniably, had had “the advantage of knowing more intimately and from a closer distance than they the true feelings” of Onontio’s heart. But in their eyes Onontio’s views had not always been “so just and so reasonable”. Under the leadership of charismatic men whose influence was intertwined with the new religion, the inhabitants of the missions sided with the French in their campaigns against the distant and weakly-related Senecas. Drawn into a war against the English, and more

¹⁴⁶ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 249-251; see also Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 417-8. Havard interprets the fact that the Kiskakon chief was the first to speak as an indication of Ottawa preeminence in the Franco-Amerindian alliance. In fact, that the inhabitants of the mission villages spoke last might be interpreted in the same way. Havard, *Great Peace*, pp. 136-137.

¹⁴⁷ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 249-251; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 417-8. Interpreting the signatures of the Christian Iroquois on the treaty is problematic. It is not clear why Haronhiateka was the one who placed a mark on behalf of the Kahnawakes, and why a certain Mechayon did so on behalf of the Kanehsatakeronon. Neither is it clear why their respective marks – representing a deer, perhaps – is almost identical to that of the Sinago Ottawas. On the signatures, see Havard, *Great Peace*, 253; Yann Guillaud, Denys Delâge and Mathieu d'Avignon, “Les signatures amérindiennes : Essai d’interprétation des traités de paix de Montréal de 1700 et de 1701”, *RAQ*, 31, 2 (2001), pp. 21-41.

reluctantly against their close relatives the Mohawks, Oneidas, and Onondagas, they had exchanged with the Iroquois of the League hatchet blows and wampum belts with disconcerting regularity, at a rhythm that had not corresponded to the French rhythm of war and diplomacy.

From these years of conflict and dialogue, a new geopolitical landscape had emerged. The Five Nations were more united now than they had been: henceforth there would be no thought of going to war against the distant Senecas with the expectation that Mohawk, Oneida, and Onondaga relatives would not be “concerned”, to borrow L’Espinard’s phrase. More importantly perhaps, the Christian and League communities had each demonstrated their endurance: henceforth neither would make any serious attempt to persuade the other “by [...] acts of kindness”, or to force it by acts of violence, to migrate. France’s peace in 1701 with the Five Nations, and the Five (soon Six) Nations’ willingness to henceforth cleave to a policy of neutrality in times of intercolonial conflicts, would allow cordial relations to resume between the inhabitants of the mission and their relations and acquaintances in Iroquoia. There would yet be moments of tension and incidents of violence, but never on the scale seen in the last decades of the seventeenth century.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Jon Parmenter, “After the Mourning Wars: The Iroquois as Allies in Colonial North American Campaigns, 1676-1760”, *William and Mary Quarterly*, 64, 1 (2007), pp. 39-82; D. Peter Macleod, *The Canadian Iroquois*.

CHAPTER 5

FRIENDS AND BROTHERS WHO PRAY LIKE US: Abenaki Alliances and Migrations, 1675-1712

The people of Huronia were not alone in seeking refuge from a war-torn homeland in the St. Lawrence Valley. Over the summer and fall of 1675, Aboriginal resistance sparked by the Wampanoags of Plymouth Colony spread first to neighbouring groups such as the Nimpucks of central Massachussets and the Pocumtucks of the Connecticut Valley, and then further on to the Abenaki inhabitants of the Merrimac, Saco, Androscoggin and Kennebec Rivers. The ensuing conflict, most familiarly known as King Philip's or Metacomet's War, but which in its northern theatre can more accurately be conceptualized as the First Anglo-Abenaki War, brought about the beginning of what scholars have described as the "Algonquian diaspora" and the "Abenaki diaspora".¹⁴⁹ During the first winter of the war, indigenous populations deserted their vulnerable villages. They scattered in small hunting bands throughout their home territories, in keeping with traditional subsistence patterns and in a way that made it harder for the enemy to find them.

¹⁴⁹ On King Philip's War, see James D. Drake, *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999); Douglas E. Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in the King Philip's War* (New York: Macmillan, 1958); Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999). On the impact of the war on the Abenakis, more specifically, see Colin G. Calloway, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), pp. 76-89; and "Wanalancet and Kancagamus: Indian Strategy and Leadership on the New Hampshire Frontier", *Historical New Hampshire* 43, 4 (Winter 1988), pp. 264-90; Frank T. Siebert, "The First Maine Indian War: Incident at Machias (1676)" in *Proceedings of the 14th Algonquian Conference* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1976), pp. 137-56; Alvin Morrison, "Tricentennial Too: King Philip's War Northern Front (Maine, 1675-1678)" in *Proceedings of the 8th Algonquian Conference* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1977), pp. 208-212; Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula", pp. 266-267; Andrew Miller, "Abenakis and Colonists in Northern New England, 1675-1725" (Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University, 2005), pp. 60-115; Christopher John Bilodeau, "The Economy of War: Violence, Religion, and the Wabanaki Indians in the Maine Borderlands" (Ph.D., Cornell University, 2006), pp. 36-85. There is some scholarly debate as to whether what occurred in these years can be more accurately described as a single conflict, with the Anglo-Abenaki conflict as the northern front of King Philip's War, or as two wars waged and concluded at different times, in different places, and for different reasons. On the Algonquian or Abenaki diaspora, see Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, p. 6; Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, "Wattanummon's World: Personal and Tribal Identity in the Algonquian Diaspora, c.1660-1712," in *Papers of the 25th Algonquian Conference*, ed. by William Cowan (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-46; P. André Sévigny, *Les Abenakis; habitat et migrations, 17^e et 18^e siècles* (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1976), p. 117-167; Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula", *Ethnohistory*, 36, 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 257-284; Gordon M. Day, *The Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, Mercury Series Paper No. 71, 1981), pp. 16-21.

Some bands drifted farther into the interior than usual as an additional precaution, however. Of the latter, a number journeyed westward, towards the Hudson, the Mohawk River, and the villages of Iroquoia. Others travelled northward, to the headwaters of the rivers they new well, and in some cases on to Canada where they formed the core of new mission communities.

Though the French invariably described the refugees who reached the St. Lawrence Valley as “Abenakis”, “Sokokis”, or “Loups”, these newcomers represented a great Algonquian diversity.¹⁵⁰ All of these groups shared broadly similar social, cultural, and political patterns. Their lives centred on semipermanent villages, and their means of subsistence combined seasonal farming, hunting, and fishing. The languages they spoke belonged to the continuum of Eastern Algonquian languages: broadly, Eastern Abenaki dialects were spoken in what is today central and western Maine, while Western Abenaki dialects were spoken in New-Hampshire, Vermont, and northern Massachusetts; the languages spoken by the peoples of central and southern New England were similarly related. Dialect subdivisions within Wabanakia (the Dawn Land) paralleled political subdivisions, which usually were centred on specific river drainages. Trade and intermarriage were frequent between groups who inhabited contiguous drainages. As a result, though conflict occasionally marred their relations, there prevailed among them a general feeling of unity. Cultural contrast and socio-political antagonism between these Algonquians and the Iroquois who lived to the west also encouraged this state of affairs.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ There has been much scholarly disagreement over the proper identification of these groups and on their relationship to modern Aboriginal populations. During the colonial period, the English adopted a geographically-oriented perspective on ethnicity, identifying indigenous communities as riverine tribes, while the French adopted a linguistically-oriented perspective. For the most recent and authoritative discussions of this question, see Bruce J. Bourque, “Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759,” *Ethnohistory* 36 (Summer 1989), pp. 257–84; and Emerson Woods Baker, “Finding the Almouchiquois: Native American Territories, Families, and Land Sales in Southern Maine,” *Ethnohistory* 51 (Winter 2004), pp. 73–100. In this dissertation I use the collective terms Abenaki for the inhabitants of northern New England, and where relevant make distinctions between Eastern and Western Abenakis, and specific populations using their riverine identifications (ex. Kennebecs, Penobscots, etc.).

¹⁵¹ William C. Sturtevant and Bruce G. Trigger, eds., *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 15, Northeast* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), pp. 58-88, 137-159, 198-212.

During the First Anglo-Abenaki War (1675-1678) and in its immediate aftermath, Western Abenaki groups described by the French as “Sokokis” and “Loups” reached the headwaters of the Connecticut, and from there took the Lake Champlain and Richelieu route and perhaps that of the Saint-François River to emerge onto the St. Lawrence. These included Sokokis proper and Pocumtucks from the Connecticut River, Pennacooks from the Merrimac, and Pigwackets from the Saco and Pisquataqua, but also a diversity of Algonquians from Massachusetts who had initially sought refuge among these other groups – the presence of Nipmucks and at least one Narraganset is attested. A small number of these Western Abenakis reached Kamiskouaouangachit, but they generally gravitated towards Montréal and Trois-Rivières where they largely escaped missionary attention.¹⁵² Sillery, meanwhile, became the preserve of Eastern Abenakis who followed the Kennebec, Penobscot, and Androscoggin Rivers to emerge on the St. Lawrence at the mouth of the Chaudière, just a few miles upstream from Quebec.¹⁵³ A first band of some thirty refugees reached Kamiskouaouangachit about the month of May 1676, “after suffering during the winter from so unusual a famine that many of them died.” By October of that year, the missionary Jean Enjalran could report that 150 Abenakis had

¹⁵² *JRAD* 60: 233. As one Jesuit noted, only “some” Sokokis arrived at Sillery. *JRAD* 60: 135. The idea that the Penacooks were the first Abenakis to settle at Sillery, suggested by Sévigny on the basis of their absence from Penacook in the summer of 1675 and on the correspondence between Wanalancet’s wish for peace and the statement of a French chronicler that the first Abenaki residents of Sillery sought to avoid involvement in the war, was rejected by Gordon Day. The latter concludes that while it is likely that the early residents of Sillery included some Penacooks, most withdrew around the headwaters of the Connecticut. Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, pp. 124-126; and Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, pp. 17-18, 21; David Stewart-Smith, *The Pennacook Indians and the New England frontier, circa 1604-1733* (Ph.D., The Union Institute, 1998), pp. 195-215. Cf. John Daly, *No Middle Ground: Pennacook-New England relations in the seventeenth century* (M.A., Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1997), pp. 126-128.

¹⁵³ *JRAD* 60: 233. The “30” is given by Beschefer, writing eight years later, while Vaultier wrote that 150 Abenakis arrived in the spring of 1676. *JRAD* 60: 133-135; *JRAD* 62: 258. Regarding migration from the Kennebec, see *DHSM* 6: 118-119.

reached the mission, and that an uncounted number of primarily Sokoki refugees had assembled near Trois-Rivières.¹⁵⁴

Over the half century that followed, the continual advance of English settlement up the coast and into the interior of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Connecticut, and Vermont, and the intertwining of local and imperial conflicts forced the abandonment of villages, agricultural zones, fishing sites, and hunting territories. This chapter chronicles how hundreds of displaced Algonquians sought temporary or long-term refuge in the St. Lawrence Valley, both within and without the mission villages, during the period spanning from 1675 to 1713. To accommodate the influx of newcomers, “Abenaki” mission villages were formed and transformed: the existing village of Sillery or Kamiskouaouangachit was moved to a location up the Chaudière River, where a new village was named after Saint-François-de-Sales, known as Msakkikkan; relocated within a decade to the river’s mouth, the mission village became known as Néssawakamighé; in the early eighteenth century it was further relocated to a succession of new sites on the Saint-François River, about halfway between Quebec and Montreal, and a second mission was established on the nearby Bécancour River. To their inhabitants, these last two communities would become known as Arsikantegouk and Wowenoc, and later as Odanak and Wôlinak. Both exist to this day.

This chapter argues that conflict and related processes – not merely the indigenous search for refuge, but also alliance building, colonial mobilization and defense – were central to the emergence and development of these communities. As with the Huron and Iroquois missions, evangelization, migration, and military mobilization were mutually reinforcing processes here.

¹⁵⁴ *JRAD* 60: 233 (quote). The “30” is given by Beschefer, writing eight years later, while Vaultier wrote that 150 Abenakis arrived in the spring of 1676. *JRAD* 62: 258; *JRAD* 60: 133-135, 233. Regarding migration from the Kennebec, see James Phinney Baxter, ed. *The Documentary History of the State Of Maine, containing the Baxter Manuscripts*, hereafter *DHSM* (Portland: Maine Historical Society, 1889-1916) 6: 118-119.

In tracing the formation of these communities, this chapter follows the growing importance of the Abenakis and their mission villages in the eyes of colonial officials and of their aboriginal neighbours. Mere refugees in the late 1670s, the Abenakis became – like the Christian Iroquois – valued military allies in the 1680s. By the turn of the century they too emerged as key players in the geopolitics of the St. Lawrence Valley.

As intimated in the first chapter, the northward migration of Abenaki and Algonquian refugees beginning in the late seventeenth century was not a blind, happenstance flight. The waterways and portages linking Wabanakia to the St. Lawrence Valley were already well trodden by the time the French arrived in the area. The Abenakis had affinities with the region's Montagnais and Algonquin inhabitants. Algonquians all, they shared similar beliefs and customs. They spoke languages that, though not mutually intelligible, were sufficiently related that individuals from one group could achieve with relative ease some degree of understanding of the other's tongue. The range of their hunting grounds overlapped in the woodlands of the south shore of the St. Lawrence. It was not uncommon for bands from the two regions to hunt together and intermarry. It is likely that these interactions became more frequent through the early decades of the seventeenth century as hunting patterns shifted to accommodate trade with the Europeans on the Atlantic coast, with Abenakis ranging increasingly far to the north in search of coveted beaver pelts. Trading networks shifted to accommodate the influx of new items in the east, with the peoples of the St. Lawrence Valley exchanging beaver pelts for wampum and perhaps corn. Even as they satisfied material needs, these commodities joined the symbolic vocabulary used to negotiate intertribal relations and to cultivate alliances. Indeed, a common enmity towards the Iroquois united the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Abenakis. Periodically,

small groups of men from the Kennebec came down the Chaudière River and the St. Lawrence towards the vicinity of Trois-Rivières “to help their allies in their wars” during the 1630s and 1640s.¹⁵⁵

As explained in the first chapter, visits and the occasional unions at Kamiskouaouangachit had allowed the Jesuits to hope that the village would soon be “inhabited by Abnaquiois”.¹⁵⁶ Two Abenaki ambassadors who had visited Sillery in 1640 to make amends for the murder of an Algonquin man in their country took the opportunity to renew the peace between their people and the people of Kamiskouaouangachit. One of that community’s principal men, Tekouerimat it is likely, had explained the importance of the new faith: “If you wish to bind our two nations by a perfect friendship, it is necessary that we should all believe the same: have yourself baptized, and cause your people to do likewise; that bond will be stronger than any gifts. We pray to God, and know no other friends or brothers than those who pray like us.”¹⁵⁷ Through the 1640s, a handful of Algonquin, Montagnais, and Abenaki leaders persisted in their efforts to cultivate an alliance between their peoples by occasionally visiting each other’s villages.¹⁵⁸

Between 1650 and 1653, Tekouerimat and the Jesuit Gabriel Druillettes undertook efforts to broaden the alliance from the familiar Eastern Abenakis of the Kennebec to the less familiar Western Abenakis. It was not uncommon for Algonquins, and sometimes Montagnais, to encounter bands of Sokokis and Loups in the woods that lay just east of the Richelieu and Lake

¹⁵⁵ Champlain, *Works* 1: 103, 109, 298, 320; 5: 313-316; 6: 43-45; *JRAD* 12: 187-189; *JRAD* 20: 117; *JRAD* 28: 215, 229; *JRAD* 29: 67-69; Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, pp. 64-66; Sylvie Savoie and Jean Tanguay, “Le nœud de l’ancienne amitié”, pp. 30-32.

¹⁵⁶ *JRAD* 21: 117.

¹⁵⁷ *JRAD* 21: 67-71; *JRAD* 25: 117-119, 153.

¹⁵⁸ *JRAD* 23: 283; *JRAD* 24: 59-65, 159-161, 183-185; *JRAD* 25: 117-121, 153, 177-179; *JRAD* 28: 203-205, 215; *JRAD* 29: 67-71; *JRAD* 30: 179-180, 183, 195; *JRAD* 31: 183-207; *JRAD* 36: 83-89, 129; *JRAD* 37: 261; Druillettes *Journal of an embassy*; Druillettes, “Rapport du R.P. Druillettes”. On Druillettes, see Lucien Campeau’s entry in *DCB* 1: 281-282.

Champlain valley, where their hunting ranges overlapped. Although some of their respective elders could recollect an “ancient friendship” between them, the language barrier and the apprehensive climate fostered by the Five Nations’ aggression meant that encounters now tended to be characterized by violence. Hunting parties frequently mistook each other for the dreaded Iroquois and came to blows; the dead, even when mistakes were elucidated, cried for vengeance.¹⁵⁹ Tekouerimat and Druillette’s efforts to extend the Franco-Aboriginal alliance to the Sokokis, “to tie the knot of the ancient friendship that had once been maintained between them”, as well as to the Sokokis’ own Pocumtuck, Penacook, Mahican, and Minisink allies, began to yield results in 1653.¹⁶⁰ The renewal of this peace cleared the way for Sokokis and these “Loups” to hunt in the St. Lawrence Valley, especially toward the mouth of the Richelieu and Lake Saint-François, and to trade in its French establishments. The destruction by the Iroquois of the main Sokoki village of Squakheag in 1663, and the conclusion of the Franco-Iroquois peace of 1667, both appear to have contributed to this trend.¹⁶¹ That said, it was in small and mobile numbers that the Sokokis and Loups reached the St. Lawrence. Though a handful accepted baptism at Montreal and Trois-Rivières, few showed an inclination to join the mission at Kamiskouaouangachit.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ *JRAD* 24: 183-185; *JRAD* 27: 79, 245; *JRAD* 28: 169-171, 203-205, 277. For the reference to the “ancient friendship”, see *JRAD* 40: 201.

¹⁶⁰ *JRAD* 36: 101-105, 129, 139-141; *JRAD* 38: 173-175; *JRAD* 40: 195-209; Druillettes, *Journal of an embassy*; Druillettes, “Rapport du R.P. Druillettes”.

¹⁶¹ On the Sokoki and Loups in the St. Lawrence Valley during the late 1650s and 1660s, see Day, *The Identity of the Saint Francis*, pp. 13-18; Peter A. Thomas, “In the Maelstrom of Change: The Indian Trade and Cultural Process in the Middle Connecticut River Valley, 1635-1665” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts – Amherst, 1979), pp. 203-260. On the violent end of the Sokoki-Iroquois truce in 1663, see *NYCD* 3: 68; *NYCD* 13: 191-192, 297-298, 308-309, 355-356; Gordon M. Day, “The Ouragie War: A case Study in Iroquois-New England Indian Relation”, in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, Marianne Mithun, eds., *Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroquoian Studies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), pp. 35-50. Gordon Day’s reading of the evidence to suggest that there was a “village” of Sokokis in the vicinity of the Saint-François river in 1669 is unwarranted, for the document he cites merely indicates the presence of a band of Sokokis led by a certain Mananset and his second Maanitou 8amet. Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, p. 13.

¹⁶² Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, p. 15.

Though all but deserted by the mid-1670s, Kamiskouaouangachit nevertheless continued to retain importance as a ritual and diplomatic center for the Montagnais and Algonquins. Even after relocating away from the mission with their followers, male descendants of the mission's influential first leaders, Tekouerimat and Etinechkaouat, continued to be recognized as its head.¹⁶³ The several hundred Abenakis who reached the mission beginning in the late spring of 1676 "were gladly received [and] adopted" by the few people who remained there.¹⁶⁴ Like their Iroquoian neighbours, though on a much more limited scale, the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Abenakis all used formalized adoption as a means of incorporating outsiders into the community.¹⁶⁵ In this context it would have been conceived of, at least in part, in religious terms: through baptism neophytes were adopted into the family of the Christian God. Perhaps the refrain intoned thirty-six years earlier – "we know no other friends or brothers than those who pray like us" – was again repeated. In any case, it would have been apparent to the Abenaki newcomers to Kamiskouaouangachit, and particularly to the leaders who had guided their followers there, that conversion to the new religion was a key to solidifying the alliance with the local community, with the missionaries and with the neighboring colonists.¹⁶⁶

A captain named Pirouakki, who arrived in the spring or summer of 1676 and who enjoyed considerable prominence among the refugees, was quick to appropriate the spiritual power and seize the practical advantages that Christianity represented. Like Togouiroui at Kentake only a few years earlier, he may have perceived in the missionary teachings an antidote

¹⁶³ See chapter 1.

¹⁶⁴ *JRAD* 62: 259-261; Saint-Vallier, *Estat présent de l'Église*, p. 68. See also William Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars of New England from the first settlement to the termination of the war with King Philip, in 1677*, ed. Samuel G. Drake (Roxbury, Massachusetts: W Elliot Woodward, 1865), 2: 204.

¹⁶⁵ In contrast to Iroquoian adoption practices, the adoption practices of the northeastern Algonquians have not attracted much scholarly attention. On adoption among the Abenakis, see Nash, "Abiding Frontier", pp. 280-282.

¹⁶⁶ On Abenaki leadership, see Alvin H. Morrison, "Dawnland Directors: Status and Role of Seventeenth Century Wabanaki Sagamores", in William Cowen, ed., *Papers of the Seventh Algonquian Conference, 1975* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1976), pp. 1-19; Nash, "Abiding Frontier", p. 102-103.

to the epidemics, drunkenness, and wide-ranging cultural disruptions that his people were facing in these times of upheaval and exile. More cynically, he may have realized that conversion was a prerequisite to securing whatever material assistance the missionaries were willing to offer. Following an initial meeting with the missionary, Father Jacques Vaultier, Pirouakki displayed an “incredible ardor to become a Christian, and to incite the others to procure the same happiness for themselves”. He responded to the Vaultier’s invitation to come to church, brought with him “those over whom he had more special authority, because they were his nearest relatives”, and took the habit of exhorting on a daily basis the others to do the same and of denouncing drunkenness. Baptized in November, Pirouakki took on the name Michel – a plausible badge of his importance, in light of the fact that Sillery’s parish church was consecrated to Saint-Michel. Circumstantial evidence suggests that he went on to adopt the title of Tekouerimat, succeeding Charles Negaskouat alias Tekouerimat, who had died in 1675, as the mission community’s “first captain”.¹⁶⁷

Though a small number of Western Abenakis reached Kamiskouaouangachit as a result of the First Anglo-Abenaki War, these tended as in past decades to gravitate towards Trois-Rivières and Montréal and to set up small encampments in the vicinity of Sorel and Lac Saint-Pierre.¹⁶⁸ Most of these refugees, like those who arrived at Kamiskouaouangachit, came in search of a safe place where they might weather the storm. It was because “they did not wish to get mixed up in the war that most of the Natives of New England had with the English, [that]

¹⁶⁷ *JRAD* 60: 239-243. The context suggests that the unnamed captain alluded to in an earlier report from Sillery was none other than Pirouaki. *JRAD* 60: 137. Michaelém (Michel) Pir8akk or Pir8akki and his wife Franciscam (Françoise) Tessaansk8e were both baptized on 13 November 1676, as indicated in the *Registres de Sillery*, p. 230. The evidence that he went on to adopt the name Tekouerimat is circumstantial: five years later the mission’s chief was named *Michel* Tekouerimat and was married to a *Françoise*; this man had been living in the mission when Bigot arrived in 1679. No other couple bearing the same two baptismal names appear in Sillery’s registers. See Bigot, *Relation [...] 1685*, pp. 13-16. For their likely confirmation (under their new names Tek8erimat and Etek8erimansk8e) in 1682, see *Registres de Sillery*, p. 293.

¹⁶⁸ *JRAD* 60: 131-135, 233.

they had left their country to live among the French”, claimed a Jesuit petition for funding submitted to the Crown a few years later.¹⁶⁹ A small number may have intended to use Canada as a base of operations, as New Englanders were wont to believe of the whole, and its traders as a source for the lead shot and gunpowder necessary to continue hostilities.¹⁷⁰

French colonial authorities, in fact, offered little material or moral support to the visiting warriors. The imperial contest on North American soil had not yet begun, and Frontenac was intent on preventing the arrival of Abenakis from drawing the colony into another ruinous conflict against the Five Nations (even as he sponsored an aggressive westward expansion of the fur trade that would do just that). Meeting with some of the refugees, he “received them on condition that they would not return to make war on the English” and informed them that they were not to fight the Iroquois “on the territories of the French”.¹⁷¹ As one resentful Abenaki warrior would put it to one of his captives during the final stretch of the war, “the French love the English better than the Indians”.¹⁷²

Lack of official sympathy was but one of many causes of concern for the refugees. The Jesuits of Kamiskouaouangachit were not as proficient in the Abenaki language as they were in Montagnais and Algonquin, and accordingly had some difficulty communicating with the newcomers. The missionaries, more significantly, lacked the means to adequately supply them with provisions, even though fields were available around the mission. The food shortages which plagued Kamiskouaouangachit through much of 1676 were compounded during the

¹⁶⁹ “Mémoire touchant les sauvages abenakis de Sillery”, 1679, in *CMNF* 1: 272.

¹⁷⁰ See Francis Card’s declaration in *DHSM* 6: 159-151 (compare with Hubbard, *History*, 2: 204). For other claims of French assistance, see *MHSC*, 1st ser., 6: 205; *MHSC*, 4th ser., 6: 307. On the necessity of powder for hunting and Canada as a source of powder, see also *DHSM* 6: 119; Hubbard, *History*, 2: 147, 152, 156, 210.

¹⁷¹ *JRAD* 60: 135. Many New Englanders nevertheless believed that the French were inciting and supplying the Abenakis. See for example *DHSM* 6: 150.

¹⁷² Quentin Stockwell in Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, eds., *Captive Histories: English, French, and Native Narratives of the 1704 Deerfield Raid* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006), p. 45.

summer by a “serious illness”.¹⁷³ A few years later, the western explorer René-Robert Cavelier de La Salle would encounter in current-day Michigan a diverse group of “Sauvages de la Nouvelle-Angleterre” who as a result of the war had set out in search of a new country. “They did not choose it amongst our habitations,” they explained to him, “because of the rarity of beaver as well as the difficulty of making clearings, because they [these habitations] consist only of forests”. Instead, these wandering refugees now hoped to establish themselves either with the Iroquois or “in some other good country similar to that which they had left.”¹⁷⁴ From his vantage point at Kamiskouaouangachit, Jacques Bigot was forced to concur that “the country in which they lived is much better than this one with regard to food, to hunting, and to fishing”.¹⁷⁵

The St. Lawrence Valley was a pale substitute for Wabanakia, indeed. At Kamiskouaouangachit all but the most zealous catechumens – Pirouakki was identified as one of the stalwarts – left it on a regular basis, and in keeping with traditional subsistence patterns nearly all of them scattered for the winter hunt.¹⁷⁶ Discovering that the bulk of Metacomet’s supporters had capitulated, and that the head rebel’s own death in August of 1676 had largely ended the conflict in the south, these bands attempted to return to the lands from which they had been driven away. Many were dismayed to discover that settlers and garrisons had taken their place. Frustrated, one party of Pocumtucks and Norrwottucks who had found what they hoped would be only a temporary refuge in Canada launched a devastating raid on both the towns of Hatfield and Deerfield on the Connecticut River in September of 1677. Another band of

¹⁷³ For evidence of the distribution of supplies, see *JRAD* 60: 136-137. For evidence of the shortages and epidemic, see *JRAD* 60: 237-239.

¹⁷⁴ Pierre Margry, ed., *Découvertes et établissements des Français dans l’ouest et dans le sud de l’Amérique septentrionale (1614-1754)* (Paris: D. Jouaust, 1876-1886), 1: 525-526, 532-534, 538-544, 593-594, 600; 2: 139-140, 148-149, 153-154. Regarding the westward migration of eastern Algonquians (Mahicans, Munsees) towards the Great Lakes in the second half of the 1670s, see Ted Brasser, *Riding on the Frontier’s Crest: Mahican Indian Culture and Culture Change* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1974), pp. 21-24, 66-67.

¹⁷⁵ *JRAD* 62: 43.

¹⁷⁶ *JRAD* 60: 239.

Penacooks and Nipmucks returned to the Merrimack valley, but quickly made their minds to not to remain and did their best to convince relatives who had spent the last two years around the headwaters of the Connecticut to accompany them back to Canada.¹⁷⁷

Hostilities between New England and the Abenakis came to an end in April of 1678, when Governor Edmund Andros negotiated a treaty with the last of the hostile bands. But the persistent threat posed by real and rumored Mohawk raiding parties, who had been invited by the English to assist in the repression of the uprising, continued for a few years to serve as a spur to migration to Canada.¹⁷⁸ Though hostilities abated, the relocation of families from the Kennebec to Kamiskouaouangachit had a snowballing effect. As at Kentake, the importance played by subsistence patterns and bonds of kinship in drawing Abenakis to the St. Lawrence Valley, and to Kamiskouaouangachit in particular, was considerable. One missionary noted of the newcomers who arrived there in the late 1670s: “Several returned to Acadia: some to bring hither

¹⁷⁷ Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, p. 21; Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp. 84-85; Daniel Gookin, “An Historical account of the doings and sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England, in the years 1675, 1676, 1677”, *Transactions and Collections of the American Antiquarian Society* 2 (1836), pp. 520-521; Hubbard, *History*, 2: 239-240; *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 1st ser., 3 (1794), p. 179. On the raids, see also Stockwell’s accounts in Haefeli and Sweeney, eds., *Captive Histories*, pp. 35-48 (alternatively, in Alden T. Vaughan and Edward W. Clark, eds., *Puritans Among the Indians: Accounts of Captivity and Redemption, 1676-1724* [Cambridge: Harvard, 1981], p. 79-89); and Daniel White Wells and Reuben Field Wells, *A history of Hatfield, Massachusetts* (Springfield: F.C.H. Gibbons, 1910), pp. 88-98.

¹⁷⁸ *JRAD* 63: 207-209, 213-215; *NYCD* 9: 795; Gookin, “An Historical Account”, pp. 519-520; Hubbard, *History*, 2: 226-229, 233; Jeremy Belknap, *History of New Hampshire* (Boston: Isaiah Thomas and Ebenezer T. Andrews, 1791 [1784]) 1: 152-154. On Mohawk raiding, see *DHSM* 6: 166-167; Gookin, “An Historical Account”, pp. 520-521; *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 1st ser., 3 (1794), pp. 180-181, 185. Sévigny concluded that the Penacooks were the first Abenakis to settle at Sillery, on the dubious basis of their absence from Penacook in the summer of 1675 and on the correspondence between Wanalancet’s wish for peace and the statement of a French chronicler that the first Abenaki residents of Sillery sought to avoid involvement in the war. While Gordon Day agrees that it is likely that the early residents of Sillery would have included Penacooks, he judiciously concludes that “The movements of the Penacooks in their attempt to remain neutral remain somewhat mysterious.” Sévigny, *Les Abénaquis*, pp. 124-126; Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, pp. 17-18, 21. On the movements of the Penacooks and of their principal headman Wanalancet during this period, see also Colin G. Calloway, “Wanalancet and Kancagamus: Indian Strategy and Leadership on the New Hampshire Frontier”, *Historical New Hampshire*, 43 (1988): 276; Calloway, *Western Abenakis of Vermont*, pp. 81-82, 84-85; Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, “Wattanummon’s World”, pp. 212-224; David Stewart-Smith, “The Pennacook Indians and the New England Frontier, circa 1604-1733” (Ph.D. dissertation, The Union Institute, 1998), pp. 196-198.

their fathers and mothers; some their brethren; others their best friends, and even all their countrymen, if they could, and with such eagerness for their salvation that, on their arrival, the missionary found them already instructed in most of our mysteries".¹⁷⁹

Though they lacked the institutionalized political power that Iroquoian women and clan mothers enjoyed in their matrilinear and matrilocal societies, Abenaki women too played a powerful role in attracting people to Kamiskouaouangachit. A large number of persons belonging to the "Cabin of a woman named Margueritte" (possibly Marguerite Weramihwe or Weranmiwe) arrived at the mission beginning around 1680. By 1682, her "kindred" at the mission were said to number forty-five persons who "all lead a very exemplary life". By its sheer size and by its energetic appropriation of the missionary teachings, this family soon gained prominence within the community.¹⁸⁰

Jacques Bigot, who with his brother Vincent had recently taken over the mission, chronicled in a haphazard fashion this influx of Abenakis: during the first six months of 1681, it received sixty newcomers, of whom forty received baptism; on September 13th, twenty arrived (including the purportedly "most noted of all the captains"); during the spring and summer of the following year, there arrived at the mission more than a hundred persons.¹⁸¹ Owing to the rapid expansion of the mission's population and the fact that over the half century its site had grown increasingly hemmed in by the plots of French *habitants*, it became necessary to relocate the

¹⁷⁹ JRAD 62: 25, 37, 45-47, 259-261; Saint-Vallier, *Estat présent de l'Église*, pp. 68-69. For references to Abenakis from Acadia receiving instruction from Christians from Sillery, see JRAD 63: 47.

¹⁸⁰ JRAD 62: 25-33, 51, 143. For references to Marguerite's relatives, see Léo-Paul Hébert, ed., *Le registre de Sillery (1638-1690)*, pp. 60, 109, 243, 247, 249, 252, 257, 263, 268, 269, 272, 274, 275, 281, 286, 293. For another example of female proselytization, see JRAD 62: 45-47. For a discussion of female leadership among the Abenakis, see Nash, *Abiding Frontier*, chapt. 3.

¹⁸¹ JRAD 62: 25, 37, 45-47, 109. Bigot claimed that these numbers did not include those "who stay here only a month or two". Another tantalizing piece of evidence of these Eastern Abenakis' presence at the mission is Brouillan's assertion, two decades later, that "Les Canibas sont ceux qui sont établis dans la rivière de Kinibequi, dont ils prennent leur nom, et de ceux-là même il y a une forte mission à deux lieues de Québec, conduite par les pères jésuites." He later indicates that the people of Quinibequey and Pentagouët "que l'on confond sous le nom de Canibas". Brouillan to the Minister, 1 June 1703, in CMNF 2: 404.

mission. As most of the newcomers at this juncture came from the Kennebec and Penobscot River basins it was no coincidence that Jacques Bigot requested and obtained from the governor and intendant, on July 1st 1683, a new tract of land up the Chaudière River. This site, situated beyond the seigneurie of Lauzon and some fifteen leagues from Quebec (about where Saint-Marie-de-Beauce now stands), was known as Msakkikkan by the Abenakis who it is likely had been using it as a campsite. “As that place is on the road that leads to their country,” reasoned the missionaries, “it will induce many who are still in Acadia to come to settle among us.”¹⁸²

In the few years that followed there was considerable circulation between Kamiskouaouangachit and the new mission, which at the recommendation of the Bigot brothers received as its titular patron Saint-François de Sales. Though the ritual and social center of the mission shifted to the new location, both sites welcomed a stream of migrants throughout the winter of 1684.¹⁸³ La Barre’s expedition against the Senecas that year provided officials and missionaries with an opportunity to capitalize on the recent wave of newcomers to both expand the colony’s military strength against the Five Nations and enlarge the community split between Kamiskouaouangachit and Msakkikkan.

With the assistance of Bigot, the governor made an appeal to the men of the two Abenaki missions, tugging at their pride by urging only the most courageous and loyal among them to join his campaign. What is more, he called on the Christian Abenakis to reach beyond the St.

¹⁸² *JRAD* 62: 265-267. Already in 1679 the Jesuits had submitted a petition for funds to have land cleared for the Abenakis. “Mémoire touchant les sauvages abenakis de Sillery”, 1679, in *CMNF* 1: 272-273). A copy of the grant can be found in Maurault, *Histoire des Abénaquis*, pp. 234-236. See also Lucien Campeau, “Msakkikkan ou la première mission de Saint-François-de-Sales” in Honorius Provost, ed., *Les Abénaquis sur la Chaudière* (Quebec: Éditions de la Nouvelle-Beauce and Séminaire de Québec, 1983), pp. 52-71.

¹⁸³ On the naming of the mission, *JRAD* 63: 27-29; [Jacques Bigot], *Copie d’une lettre écrite par le père Jacques Bigot de la Compagnie de Jésus l’an 1684, pour accompagner un collier de porcelaine envoyé par les Abnaquis de la mission de Saint François de Sales dans la Nouvelle-France au tombeau de leur saint patron à Annecy* (New York: Presse Cramoisy de Jean-Marie Shea, 1858). On the circulation and arrivals, *JRAD* 63: 51-53. The years 1683-1687 marked the twilight of Sillery: during this period more baptisms were recorded there than during any other five year period in the mission’s history. *Registre de Sillery*, pp. 23-25.

Lawrence Valley and secure the active participation of their relatives and friends in Acadia. Etienne Nekoutneant, the second son of the Marguerite alluded to earlier, was tasked with carrying presents and at least one wampum belt inviting “all the Abnaquis who remain in Acadia” to join the residents of Kamiskouaouangachit and Msakkikkan and “march to war with the French against the Iroquois”.¹⁸⁴ Nekoutneant’s staunch opposition to drunkenness and his strict observance of missionary teachings had earned him, with the approval of the mission’s two captains, the appointment of dogique in 1682. In this capacity he presided over public prayers and was responsible for religious indoctrination at Kamiskouaouangachit, and it is likely that he also undertook regular proselytizing journeys to Acadia. That he was one of the most sought-after godfathers among catechumens of Kamiskouaouangachit during the 1680s is a testament to his importance as a key intermediary between Christians and non-Christians, between the mission’s regulars and its newcomers.¹⁸⁵

Whereas La Barre’s call to arms represented for the Christian Iroquois of Kahnawake and Kanehstakake a reconfiguration of traditional alliances, for the Abenakis it was merely a new expression of longstanding animosities. It may very well have come at a particularly appealing time, for just a few months earlier rumours had circulated among the settlers of northern New England that the Penobscots and Kennebecs were preparing to attack their neighbours, and Governor Dongan of New York had responded by promising to incite the Mohawks to crush them.¹⁸⁶ Whereas the Christian Iroquois made distinctions between each of the Five Nations, the

¹⁸⁴ *JRAD* 63: 55-65.

¹⁸⁵ *JRAD* 60: 25-27, 111; *JRAD* 63: 63, 77. Etienne Nekoutneant (Neketucant, Neghetnanan, Neketnant, Neketneant, Neketneant, Neketnehante, Nek8tneant, Kenetneant, his given name is occasionally Latinized as Stephanus in the Sillery register) had arrived at Sillery in 1680 and received baptism the following year. He and his wife, Agathe Nek8t8-sk8e8it (Nek8t8sk8e8it, Nek88sk8e8it, or Neketneantsk8e), were baptized on May 24th, 1681; four of their children were baptized in 1680 and 1682. See *Registre de Sillery*, pp. 60, 109, 243, 247, 249, 252, 257, 263, 268, 269, 272, 274, 275, 281, 286, 293.

¹⁸⁶ W. Noel Sainsbury, J. W. Fortescue, Cecil Headlam et al., eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial*, hereafter *CSPC* (London: Public Records Office, 1860-1969), 11: 634-635. On the tension in Acadia in 1684-5, see Andrew

Abenakis did not; to them, all League Iroquois were the same. It is plausible that news of this reached Abenaki ears, and that this steeled their resolve to strike first against the Iroquois or at the very least to strengthen their defensive alliance with the French. Several Eastern Abenaki warriors and their families responded positively to La Barre and Nekoutneant's call. The influential Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie, baron de Saint-Castin, a son-in-law of the Penobscot chief, surely placed his own weight and influence behind the French invitation, though he declined to personally accompany the warriors because English interlopers had recently summoned him to abandon his trading post.¹⁸⁷ Mobilization would follow the same pattern in the spring of 1687, when Denonville would lead another army against the Senecas: once again, an invitation was sent to Acadia; and once again, rumours that the English were inciting the Iroquois to war against the region's inhabitants likely contributed to the joint expedition's appeal.¹⁸⁸

In the summer of 1684, Bigot estimated that a total of eighty or a hundred Abenaki, Algonquin, and Sokoki warriors (but certainly including a few Montagnais and perhaps some Micmacs) had gone to war from or through Msakkikkan and Kamiskouaouangachit.¹⁸⁹ These warriors, who had displayed much anti-Iroquois fervor and who in many cases had travelled a great distance to take part in the expedition, were no doubt irritated by the fact that the campaign

Miller, "Abenakis and Colonists in Northern New England, 1675-1725" (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2005), pp. 131-139.

¹⁸⁷ *JRAD* 63: 62-65. See also La Barre to Dongan, 24 July 1684, C11A 6: 268v; "Mémoire de La Barre concernant son expédition au Lac Ontario", 1 October 1684, C11A 6: 309v. The presence at the mouth of the Penobscot River of Saint-Castin, former officer of the Carignan-Salières Regiment who had taken up the trading post there in the mid-1670s, ingratiated himself with the locals and married a headman's daughter, contributed to the Franco-Penobscot alliance. On Saint-Castin, see Georges Cerbelaud Salagnac's entry in *DCB* 2: 4-7.

¹⁸⁸ *CMNF* 1: 410; Baugy, *Journal*, pp. 86-87; Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 20. While the entry in the *DCB* claims that Saint-Castin took part in the campaign of 1687, he was at Petagouet throughout the summer. See *CMNF* 1: 399-401 403; cf. Cerbelaud Saragnac "Abbadie de Saint-Castin, Jean-Vincent".

¹⁸⁹ *JRAD* 63: 63-67. The muster held at Cataragui indicates that there were "Abnakis chresiens de Sillery et autres endroits qu'on n'a pas pû ramasser n'en ayant eu le temps, soixante cinq bons hom[m]es", as well as to seventy-two Algonquins, commanded by Hertel and Grand Pré. "Revue faite au fort Frontenac le 17 aoust 1684 des Sauvages qui nous ont suivis pour la guerre", 17 August 1684, C11A 6: 267.

ended with a humiliating truce.¹⁹⁰ A mysterious illness, characterized by intermittent fevers and imputed to a variety of outlandish causes by French observers, proved to be an ever greater source of grief. It is likely that this was malaria, which until the nineteenth century was endemic in the wetlands around Cataraqui. While there is no indication that the Christian Iroquois were affected, hinting at the fact that their population was regularly exposed to malaria parasites of the upper St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario wetlands, French soldiers and militiamen were plagued by these fevers. The eastern Algonquians, too, were particularly hit. Several of the Sokokis who had established their encampments on the St. François River, a short distance from its mouth, died during the winter as a result. From Kamiskouaouangachit and Msakkikkan, Jacques Bigot wrote that only one or two of all those who had gone to war “escaped the attack of a malignant fever”, all the rest having fallen “dangerously sick.”¹⁹¹

Bigot found that this ordeal had awakened in the Abenakis an interest in Christian teachings but was left to worry about the effect that news of it would produce in their homeland, “whether that will not prevent those from coming who already have some design of leaving Acadia to come here”. It was in vain that he tried to convince those who showed inclinations to return there to instead remain, or to otherwise come back in the spring with friends and family. “[T]he rumour went around Acadia that all the Natives [of the missions] were dead”, and as a result few came.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ While there is no clear evidence that the Abenakis were disappointed by the outcome of the campaign, that this may have been the case can be inferred from reports that the allies from the Great Lakes felt that way. See “Mémoire de La Barre concernant son expédition au Lac Ontario”, 1 October 1684, C11A 6: 311v-312; Lahontan, *Oeuvres*, p. 302.

¹⁹¹ La Barre to Louis XIV, 13 November 1684, C11A 6: 346v-347; Lahontan, *Oeuvres Complètes*, pp. 298-299. On the illness among the Abenakis in particular, see *JRAD* 63: 73, 81-99; Jacques Bigot, *Relation [...] 1685*, pp. 5-6. On the disease affecting the Sokokis near the Saint-François River, see Maurault, *Histoire des Abénaquis*, p. 273. On the prevalence of malaria in the wetlands around Cataraqui, see A. Murray Fallis, “Malaria in the 18th and 19th centuries in Ontario”, *Canadian Bulletin of Medical History* 1, 2 (1984), pp. 25-38.

¹⁹² *JRAD* 63: 87-93; Jacques Bigot, *Relation [...] 1685*, pp. 17.

Early census records for Sillery and Saint-François on the Chaudière point to what Bigot was not quick to spell-out: though several hundreds passed through, the core community remained relatively small. While the 1685 census tallied 488 residents, it counted only seventeen houses; three years later, 512 individuals and twenty-seven houses were reported. Seventeen and twenty-seven houses in fact suggest a semi-permanent population of only approximately 85 and 135 individuals.¹⁹³ Although he strove with little success to build up his mission by drawing Eastern Abenakis from Acadia, Bigot was guarded with respect to the Western Abenaki bands who roamed between Montreal and Trois-Rivières. He thought it wise not to admit Sokokis to his mission without carefully selecting them, owing to that people's "inconstant nature" and the fact that they seemed "much inclined to drunkenness". "[O]ur mission is not yet sufficiently established in Christian piety", declared the missionary, "to admit that sort of mixture".¹⁹⁴ Bigot and his fellow missionaries nevertheless entertained the idea of ministering to this population by flying mission or by forming new mission villages. According to Bishop Saint-Vallier, these "Sokokis and Algonquins" were now showing some interest in receiving missionaries of their own.¹⁹⁵ Although the Hertel and Crevier families developed a close commercial relationship with the bands that frequented their seigneurie at the mouth of the Saint-François River, which emerges into a swelling of the St. Lawrence known as Lac Saint-Pierre, on the whole this small and nomadic population failed to capture the interest of the missionaries or colonial authorities.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ LAC, MG1 G1, 461: 1.

¹⁹⁴ *JRAD* 63: 71.

¹⁹⁵ For traces of the early population, see Charland, *Histoire des Abénakis d'Odanak*, (Montreal: Éditions du Lévrier, 1964), pp. 40-42; Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, pp. 32-33. For early plans for a flying mission, see *JRAD* 63: 71. Bigot may have attempted to carry out this plan among the region's Sokokis in 1699. See Champigny to the Minister, 20 October 1699, C11A 17: 66-75.

¹⁹⁶ The census of 1692, only one to record a presence there, recorded the presence of 25 individuals. LAC, MG1 G1, 461: 3-4.

Quite the contrary was true of the authorities in New York, who began to court the Western Abenakis actively. A delegation of “north Indians [...] come from Canada” conferred with Governor Dongan at Albany in 1684, and promised that they would resettle nearby. During the summer of 1685, fifty-six men accompanied by about a hundred women and children did return from Canada under the leadership of a certain Sadochquis. They revealed that they had gone to Canada “to live there” and had been embraced “as children” by its governor. Now, however, they declared to the Albany magistrates that “our thoughts and inclinations when we rose in the morning were always to come hither and to live at *Skachkook*” among their relatives.¹⁹⁷

This village of Schaghticoke, on the Hoosick River near its confluence with the upper reaches of the Hudson, twenty miles northeast of Albany, had in a sense been New York’s answer to Canada’s mission villages. During the First Anglo-Abenaki war, the people of Albany and New York’s provincial officials had grown worried of the Algonquian’s northward exodus and sensitive to the need of strengthening their frontier. In August of 1678, Governor Andros ordered that these refugees should be directed to a convenient site and took the Albany magistrates’ suggestion that the mouth of the Hoosick River, on the east bank of the Hudson, offered such a site. The village welcomed two hundred persons in its first year. It is likely that the area’s Mahicans formed a substratum to the village’s population, but they were soon joined by a variety of Sokokis, Pocumtucks, Nonotucks, Woronokes, Agawams, Pennacooks, Narragansetts, Nipmucks, Wampanoags, and others. They retained close connections with their

¹⁹⁷ *LIR*, pp. 77-79, 95-96; ; *NYCD* 4: 576; Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, pp. 22-23. Sadochquis or Sadocquis who is here described as “our Sachim” who “came to Canada to live there” appears to be the same man as the “Shattoockquis alias Shadookis” who in 1665 signed a deed for land in what is now Brookfield, New Hampshire, along with a Pocumtuck sachem. The family name Sadoques has persisted among the Abenakis. See Marge Bruchac, “Abenaki Connections to 1704: The Sadoques Family and Deerfield, 2004,” in Haefeli and Sweeney, eds., *Captive Histories*, pp. 262-278.

Abenaki relatives. Algonquian identities in the records are confused, reflecting a melding process: the community's inhabitants became known among the English as "Schagticokes" or "River Indians", but the French continued to describe them as "Loups".¹⁹⁸

Several factors explain why, in the summer of 1685, Western Abenaki bands chose to leave the St. Lawrence Valley for the Hudson. Schagticoke was located much closer to the traditional homelands and hunting territories of this heterogeneous population. French willingness to go to war against the Senecas and by extension the Five Nations may also have worried these Western Abenakis who, as the Mohawks' closest and most vulnerable neighbours to the east, had much more to lose than their more distant Eastern Abenaki counterparts. The fact that, like the people of Kamiskouaouangachit and Msakkikkan, the Western Abenakis had recently "been sick even to death", would have been viewed by them as yet another indication that alliance with the French and residence near them were not auspicious.¹⁹⁹

At this juncture, the Schagticokes' head sachem, Wamsachko, had proven a charismatic champion of rapprochement with Albany and New York. "[W]e are now come and are one body with him", explained the newcomers' orator, "[...] we are fully resolved to live and die at Skachkook and there to be buried". They would "not be North Indians any longer but all River Indians [...] and behave our selves like River Indians." The speaker asked that colonial officials not worry if any of their people should absent themselves temporarily from the village. At the same time, he requested that "the path be shut" between there and Canada, for fear that the Governor of Canada "will maybe come here to look for us".²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Instructions to Thomas Delavall, 30 May 1676, NYSA, A1894 25:121; Council Minute, 30 May 1676, NYSA, A1895 3(2): 101; Council Meeting, 20 August 1678, NYSA, A1894 28: 186; Wraxall, *Abridgement*, pp. 101-102. On Schagticoke, see Midtrodt, "So Great a Correspondence", pp. 253-326; Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp. 82-83.

¹⁹⁹ *LIR*, pp. 95-96.

²⁰⁰ *Idem*.

The Albany magistrates welcomed these North Indians and requested that they send a belt of wampum to the rest of their nation still in Canada so that they too might come. A month later it was learnt that the people for whom this wampum was intended had themselves gone to Penacook, on the Merrimack River, to be with their “brethren and friends”. Though the invitation was redirected there, its appeal was lost amidst rumours of impending Mohawk aggression against the Abenakis.²⁰¹

Of the 353 Aboriginal warriors who took part in Denonville’s offensive in the summer of 1687, alongside 1647 soldiers and militiamen, 76 were reported to be from “Sillery” but likely consisting mainly in Abenakis from Saint-François de Sales and Acadia. Another 57 were said to belong to “Hertel’s band”, probably Algonquins and Sokokis from the vicinity of Trois-Rivières among whom the trader and officer Joseph-François Hertel de La Fresnière had a credit comparable to that, alluded to in the previous chapter, of Charles Le Moyne and his family among the Christian Iroquois.²⁰² We can be sure that many of the Abenakis, especially those who had journeyed all the way from Acadia, rejoiced at the destruction of the Seneca villages. For others, especially among the Western Abenakis who in recent decades had ranged along the Lake Champlain axis, the campaign gave cause to reconsider their alignment with the French.

The interception and seizure, in the months preceding the campaign, of a convoy of Albany traders headed for Ottawa Country exposed the heightened state of intercolonial

²⁰¹ *LIR*, pp. 77-79, 82, 95-96; *NYCD* 4: 576; Belknap, *History*, 1: 182, 225-227; Calloway, “Wanalancet and Kancagamus”, pp. 277-280.

²⁰² Champigny to the Minister, 16 July 1687, C11A 9: 32-38; Baugy, *Journal*, pp. 74-75, 86-87; Belmont, *Histoire du Canada*, p. 20; *JRAD* 63: 269; Denonville, “Mémoire du Voyage Pour l’Entreprise de M. le Marquis de Denonville contre les Sonnotouans”, 1687, C11A 9: 118. As noted in the previous chapter, while others have interpreted Baugy’s reference to the “bande d’Arhetil” as a reference to Huron warriors from Lorette, I would instead read this as a botched spelling of Hertel, and thus a likely reference to Algonquians from the Trois-Rivières region. Cf. Green, “A New People”, p. 84.

tensions.²⁰³ Several men described by the English as River Indians and the French as Loups, possibly from Schaghticoke, were among the arrested interlopers. In recognition of cultural affinities and perhaps of bonds of kinship, they were handed over to the expedition's Abenakis who treated them with "a great deal of kindness" and who at the campaign's end granted them their freedom and enough provisions for the journey to a short-lived "Castle [i.e. village] of Pennekook Indians", apparently located somewhere between Montreal and Albany, possibly along Lake Champlain, from which they returned home. At Albany these River Indians reported that the Abenakis to whom they had been given had "declared their great dislike of the French warring with the Sinnekes" and for the French's mistreatment of the traders. The Abenakis, they claimed, had also let them know that "it would be no hard matter to persuade them to come here".²⁰⁴

Thrilled by such assurances, Peter Schuyler and Albany's Commissioners of Indian Affairs resolved at once to send some of "our Indians" with belts of wampum to that Penacook village, so that its inhabitants might in turn send some of their people as messengers to the Abenakis in Canada. But upon further reflection they decided to give a full report of the affair to Governor Dongan in New York, and await his instructions.²⁰⁵ Though there is no evidence that Dongan acted on this report, it is likely that the River Indians pursued their attempts to win over their acquaintances and relatives in Canada. In early 1688 some of the Loups who occupied the vicinity of Trois-Rivières packed up and left to resettle near Albany (probably at Schaghticoke). According to French accounts they were motivated by the desire to escape the debts they had

²⁰³ NYCD 3: 436-437. On the commercial expeditions led by Johannes Oseboom and Patrick Magregory, see David Armour, *The Merchants of Albany, New York, 1686-1760* (New-York: Garland, 1986), pp. 1-22.

²⁰⁴ NYCD 3: 482. The Abenakis are termed "Onnagonque Indians" in the English record. Day and Calloway after him reasoned that this Penacook village must have been situated somewhere along Lake Champlain. Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, p. 30; Calloway, "Wanalancet and Kancagamus", p. 281.

²⁰⁵ Idem.

incurred in town. In July they returned for a brief period in the company of other Loups, likely with the intent of convincing others to follow them. Out of frustration with the Canadian traders and colonists, or with the relatives and acquaintances who proved unwilling to accompany them back south, they caused havoc in the parishes of Sorel and Boucherville, looting and setting fire to homesteads, going as far as to cause the death of one colonist.²⁰⁶

French officials and missionaries made remarkably little fuss about this incident, which they appear to have understood merely as a result of the colony's brandy trade and the volatility of intoxicated Aboriginals.²⁰⁷ More preoccupying was the activity of eleven warriors led by a Penacook named Wampolack. Early that summer, he had approached Governor Denonville to request the permission to raid Schaghticoke. His party of eleven warriors consisted mainly of Penacooks, but also included one Nashua, one Pocumtuck, one Wappinger, and two probable Nipmucs; several of them had formerly lived at Half Moon, a site of encampment at the junction of the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers, just north of Albany (now Waterford, New York). Their aim, most plausibly, was to contribute to the reunion of elements of a scattered community – through persuasion or if necessary capture. Denonville, wary of troubling the peace between the colonies, denied the warriors the permission to take the warpath but allowed them to go on a reconnaissance mission. Suspicious of the party's true intentions, he cautioned two visitors from Albany who happened to be in Montreal at the time that Wampolack's party had left the colony. "[W]hen they are in the woods," he explained of the Abenakis, washing his hands of the matter, "they do what they will."²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Belmont, "Recueil", 37v; Denonville to Dongan, 20 August 1688, C11A 10: 61-62v.

²⁰⁷ Idem.

²⁰⁸ NYCD 3: 561-565, 569-570; Champigny to the Minister, 19 October 1688, C11A 10: 127-129. The circumstances of Wampolack's raid have been examined by Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp. 92-93; and Jean-François Lozier, "Lever des chevelures en Nouvelle-France: la politique française du paiement des scalps", *RHAF* 56, 4 (2003), pp. 513-542.

Denonville's misgivings had been justified. Near the Connecticut River, Wampolack's party encountered a band of Schaghticoke hunters and claimed to them that they were "going to fight by order of the Governor of Canada" against Native or English alike in response to recent Mohawk depredations. At a place called Spectacle Pond they killed five Algonquian allies of the English before moving on to Northfield, the uppermost settlement on the Connecticut River, where they killed six settlers. They may have gone on to Penacook to visit their relatives before returning with seven scalps and an Algonquian woman captive to the St. Lawrence Valley. When an angry Denonville confiscated these prizes, the fearful warriors are said to have fled Canada.²⁰⁹

Everywhere the tenuous peace that existed between Abenakis and New Englanders was fissuring. The Penobscots were alarmed by Massachusetts' repeated raids on Saint-Castin's post at Pentagouet. To Massachusetts' requests for a pledge of submission, they opposed a refusal. The Pigwackets were frustrated by a decade of encroaching English settlement, fisheries, and ranging livestock along the mouth of the Saco River. Attacks on cattle during the summer devolved into interpersonal violence, with casualties on both sides. The seizure of prominent Pigwacket leaders suspected of having caused the unrest was reciprocated by the capture of several colonists during a raid on New Dartmouth in September. When a group of settlers began building a fort at Casco, they were attacked by a party of Abenakis. Having killed several, the warriors moved on to attack at Merrymeeting Bay and Sheepscot. Meanwhile, although several Pennacook leaders approached New England officials with pledges of continued friendship, most

²⁰⁹ Idem. On the Anglo-American reaction, see also W.H. Whitmore, ed., *The Andros Tracts* (Boston: Prince Society, 1868), 2: 207; *NYCD* 3: 550-570.

of their people were choosing to resist colonial intrusions.²¹⁰ Soon the Second Anglo-Abenaki War would weave itself into the broader conflict that is today remembered as the War of the League of Augsburg or King William's War. With it, the Abenakis would acquire an unprecedented strategic importance in the eyes of the French.

During the final year of his mandate, Denonville had grown particularly sensitive to the place of the Abenakis of Kamiskouaouangachit and Msakkikkan in the grand scheme of colonial defense. While he appears to have been either unaware or unmoved by New York's recent efforts to attract the Loups away from the St. Lawrence Valley, New England's attempts to lure the Eastern Abenakis of Acadia away from the French alliance were more difficult to ignore. Informed that Governor Edmund Andros of the Dominion of New England had made great presents to the Penobscots to conciliate them and retain them on lands claimed by the English, Denonville dispatched Father Jacques Bigot on his behalf to incite the Penobscots "to make new villages on the lands of the King" and warned the Minister that it would be necessary to offer them presents for that purpose.²¹¹

Though French officials in Acadia feared that this relocation would undermine their trade and defenses and made their reservations known, Denonville was adamant. In the summer of 1686, the Jesuits had purchased a plot of land, near the mouth and falls of the Chaudière River, with the aim of relocating their Abenaki mission village there; so as to retain and draw the Abenakis, Denonville and Champigny granted a large extension to this land in August of 1689. Relocated there, the mission village of Saint-François became known as Néssawakamighé by its

²¹⁰ Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, pp. 113-117; *DHSM* 6: 250-500; Nathaniel Bouton, ed., *Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire*, hereafter *DRPNH* (Manchester: John B. Clarke 1868), 2: 46-55; *NYCD* 3: 550-554, 561-562.

²¹¹ "Mémoire de Denonville au ministre sur l'état présent des affaires du Canada depuis le 10 août jusqu'au 31 octobre", 1688, C11A 10: 110.

Abenaki residents.²¹² Later that fall, the pair advised the Crown of the need to draw the Abenakis who inhabited New England and were “disposed to make themselves Christians” to the mission of Saint-François de Sales on the Chaudière, from where they might shield Quebec, and stressed the advantages of “sustaining them” with provisions and gifts of clothing, powder, and lead.²¹³

The Penacooks who had moved to Canada in recent years – “all” of the Penacooks, claimed one report – had by the summer of 1689 returned to their ancestral lands on the Merrimack.²¹⁴ It is likely that some of these return migrants were among the Abenakis who carried out the attack on Dover that June, in what became the first major incident of the Second Anglo-Abenaki War. In describing the assault on the English settlement at Pemaquid in early August of that year, Intendant Champigny reported that the attackers were “for the most part of the mission of Sillery” (sic: Sault de la Chaudière).²¹⁵ Abenaki warriors also played a crucial role in Frontenac’s three pronged offensive during the winter of 1690. François Hertel’s twenty soldiers and volunteers were accompanied by twenty to twenty-four nominally Sokoki warriors

²¹² Joseph-Edmond Roy, *Histoire de la Seigneurie de Lauzon* (Quebec: Mercier & Cie, 1897), 1 : 401; grant by Denonville et Champigny, 14 October 1689, in *Pièces et documents relatifs à la tenure seigneuriale*, pp. 394-395. See also Honorius Provost, “Le fief Miville sur la Chaudière”, *BRH* 56, 1-3 (January-March 1950), pp. 33, 36; Campeau, “Msakkikkan”, pp. 60-61. Râle, who began compiling his dictionary soon after his arrival and posting at the mission at the Chaudière Falls in 1689 gives “néssa8akamighé” for “village de S. Fran[çois] de Sales”, and “8néssa8akamighé8iak” for its inhabitants (“ses hommes”). Sébastien Rasles, *A Dictionary of the Abnaki Language*, ed. John Pickering, *Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, new series, 1 (Cambridge: Charles Folsom, 1833), pp. 458, 542, 565.

²¹³ See Denonville to the Minister, 30 October 1688, C11A 10: 86-93; Champigny to the Minister, 16 November 1689, C11A 10: 244-250v; Denonville, “Mémoire concernant le Canada”, 1689, C11A 10: 315-316; “Résumé des lettres sur les sauvages abénaquis”, 1689 *CMNF* 1: 468-469; “Observations sur l’état des affaires de Canada au départ des vaisseaux”, 18 November 1689, C11A 10: 535; “Mémoire de Denonville à Seignelay”, January 1690, C11A 11: 185-194; Louis XIV to Frontenac and Champigny, 14 July 1690, B 15: 121.

²¹⁴ *DHSNY* 2: 20. On the Penacooks’ movements at this juncture, see Stewart-Smith, “The Penacook Indians”, pp. 224-234; Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, pp. 81-84.

²¹⁵ See “Résumé des lettres sur les sauvages abénaquis”, 1689, in *CMNF* 1: 468. On the attack on Dover and subsequent raids, see *DRPNH* 2: 50-55; Belknap, *History*, 1: 198-203, 246-25, 254-255; Cotton Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum: An History of Remarkable Occurrences in the Long War, which New England hath had with the Indian Salvages, From the Year, 1688. To the Year 1698*. (Boston: B. Green and J. Allan, 1699); *NYCD* 3: 611; John Gyles, *Memoirs of odd adventures, strange deliverances, etc. in the captivity of John Giles, Esq.* (Boston: S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1736), pp. 1-4.

drawn from the bands who occupied the region south of Trois-Rivières, and five Algonquins from the region. That these “Sokokis” who acted as the party’s “principal pilots” had links to the Penacooks is suggested by the fact that its initial target was Dunstable on the Merrimack, in what was the Penacooks homeland. It was only after “often vary[ing] in their opinions about what place to fall upon” that they settled on the New Hampshire frontier settlement of Salmon Falls on the Piscataqua River. There they struck on the morning of March 28th. Sixty Abenaki warriors from the Néssawakamighe, in the meantime, had accompanied René Robinau de Portneuf and fifty Frenchmen up the Chaudière to the Kennebec. Reinforced by warriors from the area, and subsequently by Hertel’s party as well as men brought from the Penobscot by Saint-Castin, this small army took the fort at Casco on May 29th before going on to destroy Pemaquid and Falmouth.²¹⁶

It was in this context, on June 4th, that a party of Abenakis and Algonquins from the vicinity of Trois-Rivières, some of whom had recently distinguished themselves during the raid on Salmon Falls, had the unfortunate run-in with Togouiroui and his party alluded to in the previous chapter. Two of the Algonquians, like Togouiroui and one of his men, were lost before the misunderstanding could be cleared up; several more were wounded on both sides. Incensed by the death of their charismatic leader, the Kahnawake warriors refused categorically to free those whom they had captured in the scuffle. The Algonquins and Abenakis in turn refused to free the Kahnawakeronon whom they had seized.²¹⁷ As the two parties parted way, the tension

²¹⁶ Monseignat, “Relation [1689-1690]”, C11A 11: 5-40; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 73-76; *DHSM* 5: 55-66; *CSPC* 13: 240; *NYCD* 4: 115; “A trew relation given by Robart Wattson”, Ayer MS 965, Newberry Library; Belknap, *History*, 1: 256-260. See also Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, pp. 124-125.

²¹⁷ Monseignat, “Relation [1689-1690]”, C11A 11: 5-40; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 1: 347-348; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 70-72; Catalogne, *Recueil*, pp. 47-48. Mather reported that around this time the Abenaki chief Hope Hood or Wohawa (or Wayhamoo) was “by a strange mistake” ambushed and killed by a group of “French Indians” who mistook him for an enemy. One scholar has interpreted the parallels between this account and Togouiroui’s death as suggesting that Mather was confused about the two chiefs. It is tempting, however, to hypothesize that Hope Hood was also killed in the June 4th incident. *Publick Occurrences Both Foreign and Domestic*, 1 (Boston: 25 September

must have been considerable. The event had reopened old wounds. It had after all been while fighting against Algonquians from New England that Togouiroui had achieved initial fame as the “Great Mohawk” twenty years earlier. Through the 1670s, relations had remained tense between the Iroquois – of the Five Nations and of the Canadian missions – and these Algonquians, some of whom were gravitating towards the French and others towards the English.²¹⁸ The joint participation of Christian Iroquois and a variety of Abenakis and Sokokis in the expeditions of 1684 and 1687 had evidently not produced close, amicable relations.

The crisis of 1690 dragged on until the fall when, with the help of their missionary Jacques Bigot, the Abenakis of Saint-François submitted a written petition and a wampum belt to Frontenac asking that he use his influence to obtain the liberation of their people who were still being kept against their will at Kahnawake. At the same time, the Abenakis addressed a wampum belt directly to their “Brother Praying Iroquois”. The exchange, which was chronicled by Frontenac’s secretary, is of particular interest because it is the earliest documented exchange between the inhabitants of the St. Lawrence Valley’s Iroquois and Abenaki missions. The tone of the Abenaki overture was conciliatory: Had the incident, after all, not been a tragic misunderstanding? Was the accidental killing of a friend not merely one “of the misfortunes attendant on war, and which it is impossible to avoid”? While the Abenakis assured their Christian Iroquois brothers that they bore them no ill will for the death of two of their own men, they reasoned that “you would have an ill disposed heart, if after having mistaken my relatives, your allies, for enemies, after having carried them prisoners to your village, you would persist in detaining them when you are aware of your error.” Though the Abenakis partook in the

1690); Belknap, *History*, 1: 256-260; Charles W. Tuttle’s report in *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 17 (February 1880), pp. 352-354.

²¹⁸ For examples of violence between the Mohawks and Sokokis or Loups, see Frontenac to Louis XIV, 14 November 1680, C11A 9: 373.

Kahnawakes' grief over the death of Togouriou, they begged them to move on. "Let us weep for the brave who are dead, without allowing their deaths to upset our minds and estrange our hearts which prayer and friendship so long unite."²¹⁹

The Kahnawkaes offered only a partial response to these entreaties, releasing the principal chiefs of the Abenakis and a few women. They promised to send the others over once they saw the Abenakis of Acadia "all disposed to join their brethren who are settled here at the Sault de la Chaudière".²²⁰ Perhaps this was a bluff, a pretext to retain prisoners whose incorporation in the community would compensate the recently departed in accordance with time honoured traditions. But it is likely that at the same time the Kahnawakes sought to use this opportunity as leverage to strengthen the growing Franco-Aboriginal family and to assert their preeminence within it. The missionaries, who hoped to strengthen their missions in the St. Lawrence Valley, may also have encouraged them to adopt this stance.

Frontenac, who had returned to the colony to replace Denonville in the fall of 1689, concurred with his predecessor that "Of all the Natives," the Abenakis "are the bravest and most formidable to the English." Yet he did not share Denonville's esteem for the missions of Sillery and Saint-François. He dismissed, not unreasonably, his predecessor's argument that a strong Abenaki settlement on the Chaudière would defend Quebec from English or Iroquois insults,

²¹⁹ Monseignat, "Relation [1689-1690]", C11A 11: 5-40; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 1: 347-348; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 69-72; Catalogne, *Recueil*, pp. 47-48.

²²⁰ *Idem*. The Penobscots in turn asked Frontenac to secure the release of the Kahnawakeronon's captives. "Parolles des Sauvages de la Mission de Pentagouet", 6 January 1691, in *CMNF* 2: 36 (the clerk or transcriber mistakenly refers to "l'Anglois qui prit mon frère"); "Réponse de Frontenac", 8 March 1691, in *CMNF* 2: 38-39; Monseignat, "Relation [1690...1691]", C11A 11: 41-79. The Penacook leader Wattanumon may have been among the Kahnawakeronon's Abenaki captives. In March of 1692 he showed up at Jonathan Tyng's house [at Chelmsford?] and claimed that he had spent a year in captivity at Montreal, that he and others "were first taken by the Eastern Indians from whom they escaped and afterward by French Indians". *DHSM* 5: 376-377. Cf. Calloway, "Wanalancet and Kancagamus", pp. 285-286; Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, pp. 78-84.

reasoning that it was in Acadia that the Abenakis could be of most use to the colony.²²¹ Officials there, notably the acting governor Joseph Robinau de Villebon (brother, incidentally, of René Robinau de Portneuf), were of the same mind. In response to Villebon's lobbying and to Frontenac's apathy, the Crown ordered in 1691 that the annual presents to the Abenakis henceforth be shipped directly to Acadia, rather than Quebec.²²² Jesuit petitions, supported by Champigny, that the funding allocated by the Crown to the allies be extended to the "Christian Abenakis" of Sillery (sic: Sault de la Chaudière) appear to have had no effect.²²³ More abundantly supplied in Acadia, Abenakis returned or remained there. By 1692, when officials took the next census of the colony, the mission of Néssawakamighé on the Chaudière was home to 336 persons, and no mention was made of Sillery which appears to have been defunct by this time.²²⁴ The absence of references in the official correspondence to an influx of refugees into the St. Lawrence Valley during these years of conflict contradicts the impression that mission population naturally swelled in wartime. Instead, it suggests that only when both officials and

²²¹ Denonville to the Minister, January 1690, C11A 11: 185-194; "Observations sur l'état des affaires du Canada", C11A 11: 321-323; Louis XIV to Frontenac and Champigny, 14 July 1690, in *NYCD* 9: 453. Regarding the strategic importance of the Abenakis, see also Extracts from a Memoir of M. de la Mothe Cadillac, 1692, Concerning Acadia and New England...," trans. James Robb, *CMHS* 6: 281-82. On Denonville's enthusiasm for the Jesuit missions, see also Denonville to Seignelay, 4 May 1690, C11A 11: 185-194.

²²² Villebon to the Minister (?), 1691, in *CMNF* 2: 47-48; "Mémoire de ce qui est nécessaire pour l'entretien des sauvages de l'Acadie [...]", in *CMNF* 2: 48; Louis XIV to Frontenac and Champigny, 7 April 1691, B 16: 34; Instructions to Villebon, 7 April 1691, C11D 2: 178-179v; Louis XIV to Frontenac, 7 April 1691, C11D 2: 180-182v.

²²³ "Resumé d'un mémoire pour ces Abenakis Chrestiens", 1692, in *CMNF* 1: 78-79; Champigny to the Minister, 5 October 1692, C11A 12: 72-83v. The flurry of correspondence in 1692 and 1693 make no mention of an extension of the funds to the Jesuit mission at Sillery/Chaudière. For lists of presents and subsidized trading goods shipped directly to Acadia, and references to the funds set aside for the missionaries of Acadia, see "Mémoire des munitions, armes, ustanciles à envoyer aux sauvages de l'Acadie", 27 February 1692, B 16: 72 v; Louis XIV to Villebon, April 1692, B 16: 106; "État des munitions et approvisionnements à envoyer en Acadie", January 1693, B 16: 139; "Munitions et marchandises pour les troupes et les Sauvages d'Acadie", April 1693, B 16: 286; "État des présens à envoyer aux chefs abenakis à l'Acadie, 1693", in *CMNF* 2: 111; "État des présens à envoyer aux sauvages abenakis dans lesquels chefs auront part", in *CMNF* 2: 111; "État des munitions et marchandises embarquez en France sur la frégate 'La Suzanne' en 1693, pour estre portez à l'Acadie", in *CMNF* 2: 129-130; "Mémoire pour servir d'instruction au sieur de Villebon", 13 March 1694, B 17 : 44v; "État des présents ordinaires pour les sauvages de l'Acadie", 3 March 1696, in *CMNF* 2: 206-207; "Présents des sauvages de l'Acadie", 1698, in *CMNF* 2 : 291-292.

²²⁴ LAC, MG1 G1, 461: 5- 6. The population remained stable, with 355 inhabitants (including an estimated fifty to seventy warriors) recorded in 1698. LAC, MG1 G1, 461: 8

missionaries collaborated to encourage migration and settlement, and only when they were able and willing to offer material incentives to that aim, did Abenakis resolve to stay there for any length of time.

The fifty to seventy warriors of Néssawakamighé, and those who in uncertain numbers habitually resided between the mouth of the Richelieu and Trois-Rivières, were active throughout the decade. The dearth of references to these warriors in the accounts of the intermittent raiding on the New England frontier invites two conclusions. The first is that the warriors who resided in Canada acted in concert with local relatives and friends of the borderlands, in a way that made it impossible for colonial observers to distinguish the ones from the others.²²⁵ The second, however, is that French officials believed that the Abenakis from Néssawakamighé, and the Algonquins and Sokokis from the vicinity of Trois-Rivières, could be more useful in the war against the Five Nations and encouraged them to direct their activity accordingly. Indeed, they are reported to have taken part in the defense of the Montreal region against Iroquois incursions and in the campaigns against the Mohawk villages in 1693 and against the Onondagas in 1696; in 1695, men from Néssawakamighé were also with Frontenac when, against everyone's advice, he travelled to Cataraqui to rebuild the fort there.²²⁶

The Sokoki, Loup, and Algonquin bands who occupied the Lake Champlain and Richelieu axis had the most to fear from the Iroquois, as the region was exposed to their raiding parties through the 1690s.²²⁷ Franco-Iroquois accommodation towards the end of the decade consequently represented an opportunity for growth. Towards July 1697, "Joseph, Chief of the Soquokis residing among us", was returning from a raid during which his party had killed an

²²⁵ For one of the rare accounts that distinguish the activity of the warriors from the Chaudière in the New England theatre of war, see Champigny to the Minister, 5 October 1692, in *CMNF* 2: 89-90.

²²⁶ Monseignat, "Relation [1692-1693]", C11A 12: 182-205v; Monseignat, "Relation [1695...1696]", C11A 14: 35-64; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 185, 225, 247; La Potherie, *Histoire* 1: 319-320.

²²⁷ Monseignat, "Relation [1691-1692]", C11A 12: 182-205v.

Englishman when on the way he encountered a party of Loups.²²⁸ These may very well have been from Schaghticoke, which had borne the brunt of New York's war effort and suffered considerable demographic decline as a result of disease, military losses, and outmigration. As one of their own explained to their neighbours, they had ““Become a small nation, the flesh taken from our bodies””.²²⁹

The Schaghticoke's alienation from their English neighbours had recently been heightened by the killing and imprisonment of some of their number, falsely accused of murder, at Hatfield in January of 1697. According to a Schaghticoke complaint, this had been for no other reason “than the hatred and malice that the English of that colony has against us.”²³⁰ The fact that a resolution to the Franco-Iroquois conflict, and with it of the war between the Abenaki-Iroquois, was in sight, also contributed to the appeal of alignment with the French and migration to the St. Lawrence Valley. Indeed, during the final ratifications of the Franco-Iroquois peace of 1701, the orator of the Abenakis of Saint-François, a certain Haouatchouath, declared that his people had been at peace with the Five Nations since 1697, at which time Frontenac had apparently removed the metaphorical hatchet from their hand.²³¹

In July of 1697, at any rate, Joseph spent two days in discussions with the Loups. As a result, they authorized him to inform Frontenac “that they would return to settle among us, as in former times, were they not apprehensive of his displeasure and merited to be chastised for the

²²⁸ Monseignat, “Relation [1696-1697]”, C11A 15: 3-21.

²²⁹ *LIR*, pp. 189-190; Wraxall, *Abridgement*, pp. 60, 91; *NYCD* 4: 337, 575-577, 648-652, 743-745, 983-985, 990-992.

²³⁰ Propositions made to Governor Benjamin Fletcher by the Schaghticoke Indians, 14 January 1697, A1894 41:25.

²³¹ On the Abenaki presence at the discussions in 1700, see La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 146; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 372; “Discours des Iroquois qui sont venus à Montréal avec le père Bruyas et les sieurs de Maricourt et Joncaire. Réponses de Callière. Discours de chefs [...]”, 3 September 1700, C11A 18: 85, 87v, 88. On their presence in 1701, see La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 251-252; “Ratification de la paix”, August-September 1701, C11A 19: 43. The Abenakis of Acadia were represented by a certain Mask8adoue or Meskouadoue in both 1700 and 1701, accompanied in 1700 he was accompanied by Ounag8imy, Netamimes (?), and other “principaux Abenakis de l’Acadie”.

blow they struck on us at Saint François” – an apparent reference to an attack on the embryonic French settlements on that River seven years earlier. Upon reporting this to the governor, Joseph was permitted to tell them “that they would be willingly received, on condition that they should behave themselves and bring in their wives and children.”²³²

When news of the Peace of Ryswick reached Canada towards the close of January 1698, the colonial war effort ground to a halt. Frontenac purportedly took measures to prevent the inhabitants of the mission villages from continuing hostilities against New England, but allowed the Abenakis of Acadia to pursue the war until they could reach a peace settlement of their own with their English neighbours. It is nonetheless plausible that some of the warriors from the missions were among those relatives and friends from Acadia who struck at Andover, Haverhill, and Spruce Creek in Massachusetts through the late winter and spring of 1698. Only in January of 1699 did Penboscot, Kennebec, Androscoggin, and Saco leaders manage to negotiate with New England an end to the Second Anglo-Abenaki War.²³³

These new circumstances – the imperial, Anglo-Abenaki, and Franco-Iroquois peace settlements – coupled with the death of Frontenac, that adversary of the Jesuits and their missions, prepared the ground for a major shift in the importance and location of the Abenaki missions in Canada. The records are silent as to how many, if any, Loups responded to Joseph’s invitation of 1697. Yet by 1700 it is apparent that the embryonic community established on the Saint-François River, a short distance from its mouth, had reached under the leadership of two unbaptised captains (one of whom may have been Joseph) a size and a degree of organization

²³² Monseignat, “Relation [1696-1697]”, C11A 15: 3-21.

²³³ Monseignat, “Relation [1697-1698]”, C11A 15: 22-37; *NYCD* 4: 338-341; Louis XIV to Villebon, 26 March 1698, B 20: 42; Minister to Villebon, 26 March 1698, B 20: 42v; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3: 335; *NYCD* 4: 343-344.

that attracted the attention of the Abenakis of Néssawakamighé and their missionaries.²³⁴ The French families who held seigneurial title to that land, the Hertels and Creviers, welcomed the formation and growth of a more substantial mission village there. This measure would increase the revenues of the small scale fur trade that had been going in the region for some time, and dissuade the Iroquois or Loups from undertaking any raids in the region as they had been prone to do until recently.²³⁵ By notarial deed, the co-seigneurs Marguerite Hertel and her son Joseph Crevier ceded a tract of land on their seigneurie to accommodate the mission.²³⁶

The extent to which the relocation corresponded to missionary or indigenous desires is unclear. Whatever the case may be, ethno-linguistic affinities made the relocation more or less attractive to different segments of the community of Néssawakamighé on the Chaudière. While a portion of it which included “some Loups and some Sokokis” accompanied Bigot to the Saint-François River in the fall of 1700, those (Eastern) Abenakis who maintained stronger ties to the Kennebec and Penobscot basin chose instead to withdraw fifteen leagues up the Chaudière, plausibly to the lands which corresponded to the Msakkikkan grant of 1682. From there many returned to Acadia, to be reabsorbed into their parent populations.²³⁷

The bands that had occupied the site of the new mission – which, placed under the fitting patronage of Saint-François de Sales, became a new Saint-François – were also divided. The two local captains responded differently to the arrival of the newcomers who did their best to convince them to embrace their religion. One rejected Christianity, with the result that within a

²³⁴ Jacques Bigot, *Relation de la Mission Abnauquise de St. François de Sales l'Année 1702* (New York: Presse Cramoisy de Jean Marie Shea, 1865), pp. 7-8.

²³⁵ Regarding the seigneurie's vulnerability, see NYCD 4:66.

²³⁶ Charland, *Histoire des Abénakis d'Odanak*, p. 22.

²³⁷ Bigot, *Relation [...] 1702*, pp.15-17; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 1: 309. According to Abenaki oral tradition reported by Maurault, Bigot left Quebec with 1500 warriors, 500 of whom remained at Bécancour and the rest at Saint-François. Maurault thought that these figures might refer to total numbers, rather than just warriors. Charland and Day after him have countered that even these figures would be too high, given that the 1698 census reported a population of only 355 at the mission on the Chaudière. Maurault, *Histoire des Abénaquis*, pp. 282-283; Charland, *Histoire des Abénakis d'Odanak*, p. 40; Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, p. 32.

year or so of the mission's foundation all its Christians "were on the verge of ceasing to recognize him as chief, unless he adopted better thoughts at the earliest". The other captain and his wife on the contrary gave some of their fields to the newcomers and displayed much fervor in preparing for baptism, which both received on Christmas day of 1701.²³⁸ Several other Sokoki and Abenaki heads of bands, including many reprobates, began to pay close attention to the missionary's preaching, publicly renounced drinking, and declared that they "wished absolutely to remain here". By attracting surrounding bands of Sokokis and Abenakis – as well as a small number of Algonquins – who had until then roamed the woods and parishes between Trois-Rivières and Montreal, the mission rapidly swelled, from its founding core of maybe a hundred to a hundred and fifty migrants from the Chaudière, to perhaps three hundred.²³⁹

The persistence of links between the new community and the Abenakis who had withdrawn to Acadia was confirmed in June of 1701 when delegates from the villages of Norridgewock on the Kennebec, Amesokanti on the Sandy River (near current-day Farmington Falls, Maine), and Narrakamagog near the headwaters of the Saco and Androscoggin Rivers, met with representatives of New England at Casco to exchange mutual expressions of goodwill. Thanking the English for their willingness to resume trading, the Abenakis brushed aside their request for an exclusive commercial relationship. "In case we should stop up our roads to Canada", explained their orator, "many of our Brethren would be hindered from coming over to us". They nevertheless agreed to neutrality in case of renewed imperial war and promised to

²³⁸ Bigot, *Relation* [...] 1702, pp. 7-10; La Potherie, *Histoire*, 3: 121.

²³⁹ Bigot, *Relation* [...] 1702, pp. 15-17.

“endeavour what we can to bring the Indians that live upon the French ground under the same obligations with ourselves.”²⁴⁰

Peace was short-lasting. News that France and England had once again declared war, over the issue of the succession to the Spanish throne, reached the colonies in the spring of 1702. Canadian authorities, as the next chapter reveals, were not eager to strike the first blow against their neighbours to the south. As he waited for instructions from Versailles, Governor Callières at first encouraged Abenaki neutrality. Yet as the prospect of renewed intercolonial war became more and more certain, he soon grew preoccupied with revivifying the Franco-Abenaki alliance. He and the new intendant, François de Beauharnois de la Chaussaye, began by advising the Crown that it ought to reverse the policy established a decade earlier and shift the responsibility for the management of Abenaki affairs and the distribution of presents back from Acadia to Quebec.²⁴¹ Then, with the aim of withdrawing the Abenakis of Acadia from the English sphere of influence and of establishing more solidly the security of the colony, he revived Denonville’s policy of encouraging migration to the St. Lawrence Valley. In the late summer of 1702, the governor sent messengers and wampum belts to Penacook on the Merrimack River, and perhaps

²⁴⁰ *DHSM* 10: 87-95. For the account of the proceedings that reached the ears of Bigot and Callières, see Bigot, *Relation [...] 1702*, pp. 21-25. Bigot, interestingly, claimed that some of the “most considerable” men of his mission were among the delegates.

²⁴¹ “Parolles des Sauvages Abénakis des quatre villages de l’Acadie à M. le Chevalier de Callière [...] réponses de Callière”, 1 October 1702, F3 2: 277-279; Callières to Pontchartrain, 4 November 1702, C11A 20: 72; Beauharnois to the Minister, 11 November 1702, C11A 187: 187-202v. On Acadian opposition to Callière’s plans, see Villebon to the Minister (summary), 1698, in *CMNF* 2: 305-306; Villebon to the Minister, 27 October 1699, in *CMNF* 2: 330; Villieu to the Minister, 20 October 1700, in *CMNF* 2: 337; Villieu to the Minister (summary), 20 October 1700, in *CMNF* 2: 336; “Mémoire joint à la lettre de Monsieur de Brouillan”, 6 October 1701, C11A 4-1: 146; Brouillan to the Minister (summary), 30 October 1701, in *CMNF* 2: 386; Minister to Brouillan, 15 March 1702, C11A 4-2: 315.

other villages, to invite their inhabitants “to break up and come and live at Canada, that there were houses, land and provisions for their entertainment”.²⁴²

At Penacook, the two unnamed messengers presented the locals with the stern alternative of either withdrawing to Canada or among the “Onnongongues” (the Eastern Abenakis of the Kennebec and Penobscot) but advised the villagers against remaining where they were. Onontio, they warned, intended to send the Christian Iroquois marauding along the Hartford River while he personally led an offensive up the Hudson (it is not clear whether this bluff was Beauharnois’ or the emissaries’ own invention). According to a report that reached Albany, the Penacooks refused to accept the five wampum belts and protested that they wished to remain on friendly terms with the government of New York, the Schaghticokes, and the Five Nations.²⁴³

Whereas Callières had adopted a cautious approach, preferring to observe the evolving imperial conflict and to await instructions from his superiors, the man who succeeded him after his death in May of 1703, Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, adopted a much more aggressive stance. The surest way of turning the Abenakis and the English against each other, he reasoned, was to unleash war parties against the frontiers of New England. Assured by Father Sébastien Rasle, who was ministering among the Abenakis of Acadia, that the nations of these parts were ready to “raise the hatchet” against the English whenever the governor gave the order, Vaudreuil sent in the late summer of 1703 a first party of twenty soldiers and volunteers, accompanied by Micmacs under the leadership of Alexandre Leneuf de la Vallière et de Beaubassin. With the allied warriors swelled along the way to five hundred by Abenaki reinforcements from Norridgewock and Pigwacket, the force subdivided into smaller parties and struck

²⁴² This, at least, was the substance of the message which reached the Penacooks. *NYCD* 4: 996-997; *CSPC* 1702: 642-643.

²⁴³ *NYCD* 4: 996-997; *CSPC* 1702: 642-643.

simultaneously and without warning at the northernmost edge of English settlement, from Wells to Saco to Casco Bay, on August 21st.²⁴⁴

The people of Wabanakia responded to the outbreak of hostilities by calling on their allies in the St. Lawrence Valley. Penobscot messengers were sent to Canada to “advertise [to] the Macquas and Indians [that is, the Iroquoian and Algonquian inhabitants of the mission villages] that the English had begun a war”.²⁴⁵ As in past conflicts, the Abenakis also responded to the outbreak of hostilities by altering their residential and subsistence patterns. Concerned with avoiding the fragmentation of communities and the concurrent breakup of their missions in Acadia, Fathers Antoine Gaulin and Joseph Aubery, respectively missionaries to the Penobscots and the Malecites, began to envision a mass exodus towards the St. Lawrence. Vaudreuil too began to envision a resettlement of Abenakis which would “cover” the colony from the incursions of the English or Iroquois (initially he imagined it near Chambly, on the Richelieu).²⁴⁶ In the fall of 1703, he picked up where Callières had left off by dispatching a new round of messengers armed with wampum belts. Such wartime invitations found more resonance than those issued by Beauharnois before the outbreak of hostilities. In late 1703 or early 1704 a council was held at Norridgewock during which the Jesuits represented the situation to the locals and told them “that they must look for some other country, for that it was impossible for them to

²⁴⁴ Vaudreuil to the Minister, 14 November 1703, C11A 20: 187-202v; Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to the Minister, 15 November 1703, C11A 21: 5-28v; Brouillan to the Minister (summary), 4 October 1703, *CMNF* 2: 404-405; Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to the Minister, 17 November 1704, C11A 22: 4-28. On these operations, see Samuel Penhallow, *The History of the Wars of New-England with the Eastern Indians, or a Narrative of Their Continued Perfidy and Cruelty* (Boston: T. Fleet, 1726), pp. 5-10; Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, p. 158; John G. Reid, “Unorthodox Warfare in the Northeast, 1703”, *CHR* 73 (1992), pp. 215-217.

²⁴⁵ John Williams, *The Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion* (Northampton, Mass.: Hopkins, Bridgman, and Company, 1853), p. 28.

²⁴⁶ Vaudreuil to the Minister, 14 November 1703, C11A 21: 50-59; Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to the Minister, 15 November 1703, 21: 5-28v; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 3 April 1704, C11A 22: 32-33; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 14 November 1704, C11A 22: 34-40; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 16 November 1704, C11A 22: 34-40; Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to the Minister, 17 November 1704, C11A 22: 4-28; Vaudreuil, Beauharnois and Raudot to the Minister, 19 October 1705, C11A 22: 171-200. Vaudreuil’s plan to settle Abenakis at Chambly was never carried out, contrary to what Sévigny assumed in *Les Abénaquis*, p. 166.

live there.” They had reportedly all agreed to abandon their village, leaving their rough household stuff and corn behind.²⁴⁷

In the fall of 1703, Penacooks from Cowass on the Upper Connecticut asked the French to join them in a raid of retribution on New England. Vaudreuil had agreed, wishing to capitalize on his allies’ initiative and to demonstrate that the French could be counted on. Approximately 250 men, French and Aboriginal, marched south under Jean-Baptiste Hertel de Rouville and met with unqualified success in a raid against Deerfield on February 29th 1704. Following this action, bands of warriors with their families and captives in tow made their way towards Chambly, conducting their winter hunt along the way.²⁴⁸ While the French might hope that they were in the process of responding to their invitation to resettlement, most in fact intended to return to Cowass. A delegation of “Sauvages de Koessek” (Cowass) arriving in the colony in June politely declined Vaudreuil’s invitation to relocate. They felt confident that they could hold the region from whence they had come and from there wage more effectively their war against the English. To mollify the governor, the speaker promised that his village would act as an “advanced fort” or a “palisade” to the French colony. It was to little effect that the governor insisted that they choose lands towards “Rivière Nicholas” (sic: Nicolet), halfway between the Saint-François and Bécancour Rivers, where their families could be secure and from where the men could conduct the war at leisure while benefiting from French assistance.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ “Conseil entre les sauvages d’Amesouquenty et M. de Beauharnois”, 12 May 1704, F3 2: 392-395; “Conseil entre les sauvages Abenakis de Koessek et Monsieur le Marquis de Vaudreuil”, 13 June 1704, F3 2: 407-410; Thomas Church, *The History of Philip’s War, Commonly Called the Great Indian War, of 1675 and 1676. Also, of the French and Indian Wars at the Eastward, in 1689, 1690, 1692, 1696, and 1704*, ed. Samuel G. Drake (Exteter, N.-H.: J. and B. Williams, 1829), pp. 283-284; *Boston News-Letter* (26 February, 12 March, and 26 March 1705), pp. 45, 47, 49; Penhallow, *History of the Wars*, p. 28.

²⁴⁸ On the Deerfield raid see Haefeli’s and Sweeney’s excellent *Captors and Captives*. For the events of the campaign specifically, see pp. 95-142.

²⁴⁹ “Conseil entre les sauvages Abenakis de Koessek et Monsieur le Marquis de Vaudreuil”, 13 June 1704, F3 2: 407-410.

Cowass was unfortunately not as secure from English and allied raids as its residents had expected and hoped. By the end of summer, its inhabitants resolved to abandon their village and accepted Vaudreuil's offer.²⁵⁰ Eastern Abenakis were doing the same. On May 12th, a small number of headmen of the "Sauvages d'Amesoqueuty" – likely not only the people of the village of Amesokanti proper, but also those of Norridgewock and the Kennebec drainage – held a council with Beauharnois in the absence of the governor. This delegation displayed a willingness to "obey" the governor, but beyond this rhetorical deference made clear what they "desired of him": to replace the "beautiful site" that they had left behind, they wished Ouauouinac (Wowneoc), a site opposite the cape on the river of the same name where the soil was good and near where blueberries and roots grew in abundance; fields should be cleared for them, and a chapel and fort should be built to replace those left behind; the royal presents of lead, powder, and various goods should continue. If these conditions were not met, their people would be forced to "regret [their] country". Although some of the headmen present and their followers were intent on settling at Wowneoc, but others wished to make sure that this first group was well received before following, and a third group consented only that their wives and children come, suggesting that they would follow "once they had their fill of beating the English".²⁵¹ That year Vaudreuil also spoke with the "Sauvages de Pintagouet" who declared that though they thought they would never leave their country, they now purported to accept his offer.²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Penhallow, *History of the Wars*, pp. 20-23; Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, pp. 140-141; Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp. 104-105.

²⁵¹ "Conseil entre les sauvages d'Amesoqueuty et M. de Beauchamois", 12 May 1704, F3 2: 392-395. See also the notarial deed of 30 April 1708 in Maurault, *Histoire des Abénakis*, pp. 285-288. On Amesokanti (Amassokanty, Amesoqueuty, Amesoqueanty, Ammassakantick, Ammassakantick), see Harald E.L. Prins, "Amesokanti: Abortive Tribe Formation on the Colonial Frontier", unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society for Ethnohistory (Williamsburg, 1988); and Prins and Bruce J. Bourque, "Norridgewock: Village Translocation on the New England-Acadian Frontier", *Man in the Northeast* 33 (1987), p. 148.

²⁵² "Réponses des sauvages de Pintagouet aux parolles de Monsieur de Vaudreuil et de Monsieur de Beauharnois", [1704], F3 2: 306, 627-8.

Through the spring and summer of 1705, Vaudreuil and Beauharnois oversaw the clearing of proper cornfields for the newcomers on the Saint-François, Wonenock (Bécancour), and Nicolet Rivers. The king's money, they assured the fiscally conservative officials in Versailles, was being "very well" spent.²⁵³ A few detractors in the colony, the most vocal of whom was the governor of Montreal, Claude de Ramezay, fuelled the court's misgivings regarding Abenaki resettlement. While Ramezay cautiously approved of the resettlement of the people of Pentagouet, who, he conceded, could not subsist on their traditional lands without accepting the aid of the enemy, he argued that the resettlement of other Abenakis had unfortunate consequences. Besides incurring considerable expenses, by distancing the Abenakis from the English this resettlement actually decreased the number of incursions against the enemy. He further argued that in Canada they became lazy and thievish, vaguely citing otherwise undocumented incidences of theft and rape. Ramezay recommended that the missionaries be used to encourage the Abenakis – except those of Pentagouet – to return home, and that the funds would have been better spent on the fortifications at Quebec.²⁵⁴

The Crown had initially given a paternalistic approval to the Abenaki resettlement. Louis XIV's instructions to officials in Quebec in 1704 stressed that ensuring the well-being of the Abenakis who had "delivered themselves with good grace to do what we desired from them" should be a "capital" priority, as should be providing them with the "security necessary to be protected from the English". This approval became somewhat more reluctant in light of the

²⁵³ Vaudreuil to the Minister, 16 November 1704, C11A 22: 34-40; Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to Pontchartrain, 17 November 1704, C11A 22: 4-28. For discussions of the Abenaki resettlement, see "Mémoire du Roi à Vaudreuil et Beauharnois", 14 June 1704, B 25: 112; Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to the Minister, 17 November 1704, C11A 22: 4-28; Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to the Minister, 3 May 1705, C11A 22: 165-170; "Mémoire du Roi à Vaudreuil et Beauharnois", 17 June 1705, B 27: 61; Louis XIV to Vaudreuil and Beauharnois, 17 June 1705, B 27: 72v; Vaudreuil, Beauharnois and Raudot to the Minister, 19 octobre 1705, C11A 22: 171-200. Cf. Vaudreuil to the Minister, 19 October 1705, C11A 22: 235-254.

²⁵⁴ Ramezay to the Minister, 12 October 1705, C11A 22: 326-342; Ramezay to the Minister (summary), 12 October 1705, C11A 22: 142-143. See also Louis XIV to Vaudreuil and Raudot, 9 June 1706, C11A 27: 214v.

rising costs. In 1705, the governor and intendant were informed that the Crown saw the resettlement scheme as an “inconvenient”. The next years’ royal instructions concluded that the Abenakis who had stayed behind in Acadia should be received if they ever decided to join their brothers in Canada – but that this should not result in new expenses.²⁵⁵

The waves of migrants altered the ethnic makeup of the nominally “Abenaki” missions of Saint-François, known to its inhabitants as Arsikantegouk (“empty cabin river”), San Plassowa (Saint-François) or Plaswa Ksal (Saint-François-de-Sales), and of Bécacour, known as Wowenoc (later spelled Wôlinak).²⁵⁶ Descendants of the Montagnais and Algonquins of Kamiskouaouangachit, by now assimilated as Abenakis, continued to retain a degree of preeminence at Arsikantegouk. In 1706, the “chief of the Abenakis of the mission of St François” was a man named 8takamachi8enon, also known among the French as “Thék8érimat”; none other than the son of the chief of the same name, and grandson (possibly through adoption) of the celebrated Noël Negambat Tekouerimat.²⁵⁷ Among more recent arrivals, ethno-linguistic divisions and old regional solidarities persisted to a large extent. At Arsikantegouk, the Western Abenakis maintained the ascendancy, as the old core of Sokokis and Loups was reinforced by Penacook newcomers. It was also there that the Pigwackets (the westernmost of the Eastern

²⁵⁵ Louis XIV to Vaudreuil and Beauharnois, 17 June 1705, B 27: 72; Louis XIV to Vaudreuil and Beauharnois, 14 June 1704, B 25: 112; Louis XIV to Vaudreuil and Raudot, 9 June 1706, B 27: 214v.

²⁵⁶ There has been much confusion surrounding the use of the name Arosaguntacook. Beginning in the early eighteenth century it was used to identify the inhabitants of Saint-François. But it had also been used in reference to the Aboriginal inhabitants of the Androscoggin River, and this indiscriminate use has persisted in scholarly works with considerable confusion ensuing. Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, p. 1; David L. Ghere, “The ‘Disappearance’ of the Abenakis in Western Maine”, in Calloway, ed., *After King Philip’s War*, pp. 73-74. Cf. Dean Snow, “Eastern Abenaki”, in Sturtevant and Trigger, eds., *Handbook* 15: 143-146. Day etymologises Arsikantegok to mean “empty cabin river”, which he attributes to a reference to the area’s reduced population as a result of disease and Iroquois attacks in the 1690s. The current name of the Abenaki reserve of Saint-François, Odanak, meaning “the village”, is attested only beginning in the late nineteenth century. See Joseph Laurent, *New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues* (Quebec: Léger Brousseau, 1884), p. 206; *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the year ended 31st December 1884* (Ottawa: Maclean, Roger & Co., 1885), p. 28.

²⁵⁷ “Procès-verbal de l’interrogatoire de trois Montagnais du lac Saint-Jean”, 3 August 1706, C11A 25: 33-36v; Savoie and Tanguay, “Le nœud de l’ancienne amitié”, p. 40-41.

Abenakis), some some sixty warriors and their families, perhaps three hundred people, chose to settle under the leadership of Atecouando around 1707.²⁵⁸ Wowenoc, where the Kennebecs of Ameskonti and Norridgewock constituted an initial core, was meanwhile a decidedly Eastern Abenaki community.²⁵⁹ For their part, the Penobscots who had paid lip service to Vaudreuil's invitation in 1705 were back – or still – at Pentagouet the following year.²⁶⁰

Some of the newcomers stayed only briefly. Periodic epidemics of smallpox ravaged the villages (in 1702, one such epidemic had spread to “almost everyone” at Saint-François) and the ongoing use and abuse of brandy continued to plague the community.²⁶¹ Christian ways of life, moreover, were not to everyone's liking. The Pennacook leader Wattanummon, who had arrived at Saint-François with his family shortly after the Deerfield raid, found that he “could not comply” with the “rites and customs” of the mission. He handed over a captive he had brought with him to his relative “Sagamore George” Tohanto, who apparently had fewer qualms with life there, and promptly left for Schaghticoke.²⁶² This said, the balance nevertheless remained positive: from a population of perhaps 300 at the beginning of the war, the missions of Arsikantegouk and Wowenoc were reported by 1710 to number approximately 250 men, suggesting a total population of over a thousand.²⁶³

²⁵⁸ Ramsay and Bégon to the Minister, 7 November 1715, C11A 35: 15-52v; *JRAD* 67: 30-32; *DHSM* 9: 142; Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, p. 34; Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp. 105, 109-111.

²⁵⁹ “Conseil entre les sauvages d'Amesouquenty et M. de Beauchamois”, 12 May 1704, F3 2: 392-395; deed of 30 April 1708, in Maurault, *Histoire des Abénakis*, pp. 285-288; *Complément des ordonnances et jugements des gouverneurs et intendants du Canada* (Quebec : E.R. Frechette, 1856), pp. 142-143, 148-150. For evidence that the people of the Kennebec, save 28 men, had gone to Canada, see La Chasse's “Recensement général fait au mois de novembre 1708 de tous les Sauvages de l'Acadie”, Newberry Library, Ayer Collection, Ms. 751.

²⁶⁰ Vaudreuil to the Minister, 4 November 1706, C11A 24: 214-237.

²⁶¹ On the epidemic at Saint-François and the ravages of alcohol, see Bigot, *Relation [...] 1702*, p. 4-9, 16-18.

²⁶² [Stephen Williams], *Narrative of the Captivity of Stephen Williams*, ed. George Sheldon (Deerfield, Mass.: Pocumtuck Valley Memorial Association, 1889), pp. 9-10.

²⁶³ For the estimate of 250, see Antoine Raudot (Camille Rochemonteix, ed.), *Relation par lettres de l'Amérique Septentrionale* (Paris : Letouzey et Ané, 1904), p. 211-212. Other reports of Saint-François's population at about this time allude to 170 men “when all at home”, and 260 men. *NYCD* 5: 86; James F. Kenney, ed., “A British Secret Service Report on Canada, 1711”, *CHR* 1 (1920), p. 52. There is no census for the period to provide a count of the houses.

These were crowded sites of refuge. As the initial land grant on the Saint-François River proved insufficient to ensure the subsistence of the entire community, its inhabitants pressured Bigot to have it extended by the governor and intendant. In 1705, one of the seigneurs of Saint-François responded to Vaudreuil's pressure by granting another piece of land to the Abenakis and Sokokis, where the village was relocated soon thereafter. Wowenak, which appears to have initially been established on Île Montesson at the mouth of the Bécancour River, was similarly relocated on land granted upstream in 1708.²⁶⁴ The massive influx of population also put a strain on traditional natural resource management arrangements. During the winter of 1705, seventy to a hundred Abenakis under the leadership of Stakamachi8enon alias Thék8érimat, chief of the Abenakis of Saint-François, and including a small number of Hurons from Lorette, ventured north of Trois-Rivières to hunting grounds claimed by both them and the Montagnais.²⁶⁵

The territory in question, as Tekouerimat's son Louis would later testify, had been "given" by his grandfather, who had been chief of the Algonquins (sic) of Tadoussac, to his father. Until now, the Abenakis apparently "went there whenever they wished [and] no one had ever prevented them from doing so". But unprecedented Abenaki migration to the missions now may have warranted more far-reaching and aggressive hunting expeditions. Louis implied as

²⁶⁴ Charland, *Histoire des Abénaquis*, pp. 27-28; Day, *Identity of the Saint Francis Indians*, p. 33. "Conseil entre les sauvages d'Amesqueanty et M. de Beauharnois", 12 May 1704, F3 2: 392-395; deed of 30 April 1708 in Maurault, *Histoire des Abénakis*, pp. 285-288; *Complément des ordonnances et jugements des gouverneurs et intendants du Canada* (Québec : E.R. Frechette, 1856), pp. 142-143, 148-150.

²⁶⁵ This sequence of events was well documented, owing to the complaints lodged with the authorities. Hazeur to the Directeur général of the Compagnie de la Colonie de Canada, 19 June 1705, C11A 25: 86-86v; "Requête de François Hazeur au gouverneur Philippe Rigaud de Vaudreuil", 4 November 1705, C11A 25: 75-76v; "Requête de François Hazeur à l'intendant [Raudot]", 5 November 1705, C11A 25: 77-78v; "Requête de François Hazeur à l'intendant Raudot", 3 August 1706, C11A 25: 29-30v; "Faits et articles sur lesquels le sieur Hazeur... désire faire interroger trois Indiens du lac Saint-Jean", 3 August 1706, C11A 25: 31-31v; "Procès-verbal de l'interrogatoire de trois Montagnais du lac Saint-Jean", 3 August 1706, C11A 25: 33-36v; "Procès-verbal de l'interrogatoire de Godefroy de Saint-Paul par Raudot", 11 August 1706, C11A 25 : 39-41v; "Procès-verbal de l'interrogatoire de Pierre Poulin par Jacques Raudot", 12 October 1706, C11A 25 : 46-47v. See also Sylvie Savoie and Jean Tanguay, «Le nœud de l'ancienne amitié. La présence abénaquise sur la rive nord du Saint-Laurent aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles», *RAQ* 33, 2 (2003): 29-43; Jean Tanguay, "La liberté d'errer et de vaquer: Les Hurons de Lorette et l'occupation du Territoire, XVIIe-XIXe siècles" (M.A. thesis, Université Laval, 1998), pp. 27-36.

much, when he declared that “being presently a great number,” the Abenakis “were forced to go make a living wherever they could”. Approximately twenty leagues from Trois-Rivières, perhaps in the vicinity of current-day La Tuque, in the basin of the Saint-Maurice River, the Abenakis ran afoul of a band of Montagnais from the Chicoutimi post. Claiming these hunting grounds as their own, the Abenakis and Hurons manhandled the Montagnais’ and stole their furs.²⁶⁶ Two decades of competition over hunting grounds north of the St. Lawrence would ensue. This, to the great dismay of both the Montagnais inhabitants of the region and of their French trading partners at Tadoussac and other points in the interior, who observed with dread the Abenakis channel the regions’ furs to competing merchants in Trois-Rivières.²⁶⁷

Of all the mission villages established in the St. Lawrence Valley, Arsikantegouk and Wowenoc would remain the most porous. The progression of English settlement along the Atlantic coast and up the rivers of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Connecticut and Vermont, resulted in the dislocation and displacement of Algonquian populations through the period. As in the case of Huron and Iroquois migrations and community formation, evangelization, subsistence and kinship patterns, and military threats and mobilizations all contributed to attract Abenakis, Sokokis, Loups, and others to the St. Lawrence Valley. Unlike the Huron community near Quebec, and the Iroquois communities near Montreal, the nominally “Abenaki” communities at Arsikantegouk and Wowenoc would until the end of the French Regime continue to serve as sites of refuge, their population swelling in times of conflict along

²⁶⁶ Idem.

²⁶⁷ “Requête de François Hazeur à l’intendant Raudot”, 22 September 1707, C11A 59: 297; “Ordonnance de l’intendant Raudot”, 26 September 1707, C11A 59: 298; Hocquart, “Mémoire sur toutes les parties de la r  gion du Domaine d’Occident en Canada”, 1733, C11A 59: 318-381v. As late as 1829 Algonquins denounced the presence of Abenakis on the north shore, and both groups cited longstanding claims. See Savoie and Tanguay, “Le n  ud de l’ancienne amiti  ”, pp. 29-43; Russel Bouchard, “De la pr  sence des ‘Ab  naquis-Montagnais’ dans le Domaine du Roi”, *Recherches am  rindiennes au Qu  bec* 33, 3 (2003): 107-108; Sylvie Savoie and Jean Tanguay, “R  ponse des auteurs”, *idem*, pp. 108-109.

the northern border of New England and receding when relative calm returned. The traditional Abenaki homelands, even as they had evolved into imperial borderlands, continued to offer familiar and attractive hunting and fishing grounds.

For many of the Abenaki newcomers to the St. Lawrence Valley, Arsikantegouk and Wowenoc thus represented only temporary havens. The evacuation of Saint-François and Bécancour during the invasion scare of 1711, coupled with news that France and England had reached a truce in Europe in early 1712 and a peace treaty in the summer of the following 1713, incited many of those who had found refuge at Arsikantegouk and Wowenoc during the previous decade to return to their Acadian homelands. In July of 1713, the Third Anglo-Abenaki War was brought to an end with the conclusion of a formal peace treaty at Portsmouth between Penobscots from Panaouamské, Kennebecs from Norridgewock and Amesokanti, Malecites, and a small delegation of Micmacs, and Governor Dudley and representatives from Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Then, in July of the following year, the treaty was ratified by other leaders including Atecouando, the principal chief of the Pigwackets who had returned from Canada with the intention of reoccupying with his followers the site of their old village up the Saco River.²⁶⁸ The pattern of migration, kinship, and alliance which again brought families to the two villages and drew them away through the 1720s, 1740s, and 1750s, was in many respects little different from that which had guided families to Kamiskouaouangachit and back in the late 1670s.

Such mobility and porosity notwithstanding, the communities of Arsikantegouk and Wowenoc had been established on a solid, lasting footing. As it has been argued here, their roots in the St. Lawrence were deep, stretching back some seventy years to the Montagnais and

²⁶⁸ For a copy of the Treaty of Portsmouth, 14 July (OS) 1713, see Frederic Kidder, ed., *The Abenaki Indians and Their Treaties 1713 and 1717, and a Vocabulary with a Historical Introduction* (Portland: Brown Thurston, 1859), pp. 22-28. See also Penhallow, *History of the Wars*, pp. 74-80; Rasle to Vaudreuil, 9 September 1713, *CMNF* 2: 562-564. For a copy of the ratification, 18 July (OS) 1714, see Kidder, ed., *The Abenaki Indians and Their Treaties*, pp. 29-31. See also Penhallow, *History of the Wars*, pp. 80-81.

Algonquin communities at Kamiskouaouangachit; within a few years of the establishment of Arsikantegouk, some of its leading members did not hesitate to claim the heritage of the famed Tekouerimat. Yet the solidity of the twin communities established on the Saint-François and Bécancour rivers has perhaps more to do with the evolving importance of the Abenakis and their mission villages in the eyes of colonial officials. Viewed as burdensome interlopers through the 1640s, then helpless refugees in the late 1670s, they came to be understood as crucial military allies in the 1680s and particularly so during the intercolonial wars of the 1690s and 1700s. As the next chapter reveals, however, the evolving context of intercolonial conflict could place a wedge between the residents of the mission villages and their French allies, even as it had brought them together.

CHAPTER 6
TRADE AND PEACE WE TAKE TO BE ONE THING:
Commerce, alliance and conflict in the St. Lawrence Valley, c.1680-1740

Speaking to the Commissioners of Indian Affairs at Albany on September 20th, 1735, in reference to a recent visit by “Indians from Canada” who had come to “renew their old Friendship”, an orator from the Five Nations made the Iroquois understanding of politics and economics explicit. “Trade and Peace we take to be one thing”, he declared. Consequently, “no passages ought to be stopped where messengers come through to make peace”.¹ This view was regularly brought to the attention of the English and the French alike. “One of the fruits of peace, Father,” declared another League Iroquois to the Canadian governor, “is that when we meet we trade together what we have.”² The inhabitants of the mission villages of the St. Lawrence Valley would not have explained it differently. As these speakers and others struggled to explain to their European interlocutors, peace and material exchange were inseparable in the way their people understood and managed their internal and external affairs.³

Although Aboriginals, like Europeans, conceptualized a distinction between gift-giving (the apparently unidirectional transaction) and trade (balanced and usually unceremonial transactions), these practices are best interpreted not as fundamentally different categories of social activity but rather as points along a continuum of circulation and consumption.⁴ Peace achieved and confirmed through ceremonial exchanges allowed more mundane exchanges to

¹ Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 195.

² “Paroles des chefs agniers [...] à M. de Ramezay”, 29 September 1707, C11A 26: 83.

³ See Peter Cook, “Symbolic and Material Exchange in Intercultural Diplomacy: The French and the Haudenosaunee in the Early Eighteenth Century” in Jo-Ann Fiske, Susan Sleeper-Smith, and William Wicken, eds., *New Faces of the Fur Trade: Selected Papers of the Seventh North American Fur Trade Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1995* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998), 75-100; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 47-48;

⁴ For evidence of the distinction between giving and trading among mid-seventeenth century Mohawks, see Bruyas, *Radical Words*, pp. 25, 27, 45, 82, 92.

occur within an expanded social network. Colonists were often dismissive of – or exasperated by – the unmistakable link between long-term social relationships and the satisfaction of material needs. As one French commentator exclaimed with respect to Aboriginal peoples, “they have no other friends than those who give to them, and who sell to them cheaply”.⁵ Yet there was no way around it. This chapter examines how exchanges, like kinship and religion, fostered solidarities and tensions that shaped the patterns of conflict and diplomacy in the St. Lawrence Valley. Gift-giving and trading indeed formed one of the founding blocks of the relationship between the inhabitants of the mission villages and the French. Yet they also became a basis for friendship between them and their would-be enemies, the colonists of New York and New England. Even as Onontio sought to maintain his role as provider, a variety of factors thus conspired to destabilize the alignment of the *domiciliés* and the French during the early decades of the eighteenth century.

Beyond the satisfaction of a basic need for security, food, and shelter in times of ordeal and scarcity, the greater availability of manufactured goods represented a significant appeal to resettlement in the mission villages of the St. Lawrence Valley. From the early seventeenth century on, Aboriginal peoples had responded with keenness to the growth of transatlantic markets and to the expanding range of goods, selectively adopting and appropriating the newcomer's manufactured tools and other goods as improved versions of familiar objects.⁶ To

⁵ [Charon de la Barre?], *Mémoire*, [1707], C11A 27: 123v.

⁶ Scholarship on the appropriation of European trade goods by Aboriginal peoples is abundant. For example, see Arthur J. Ray, “Indians as Consumers in the Eighteenth Century” in Carol M. Judd and Ray, eds., *Old Trails and New Directions: Papers of the Third North American Fur Trade Conference* (Toronto: 1980), pp. 255-71; Christopher L. Millet and George R. Hamell, “A New Perspective on Indian-White Contact: Cultural Symbols and Colonial Trade”, *Journal of American History*, 73 (1986), 311-28; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 75-104; James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the*

cultivate a relationship with the Frenchmen – who were tellingly called *Onseronni on8e*, meaning “makers of hatchets” by the Mohawk-speakers of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake⁷ – meant to gain a privileged access to these foreign commodities. The missionaries operating in the colony rapidly reached the conclusion that, as Lamberville put it with respect to his experience at Onondaga in the early 1670s, “here the temporal and the spiritual go well together; he who would have much to give would assuredly bring about many conversions”.⁸ Decades earlier at Sillery, Lamberville’s predecessors had taken the habit of distributing rosaries, knives, and bonnets to those individuals who responded most positively to their religious instruction.⁹ By providing assistance in the form of clothing and food to members of the community in need in a more systematic fashion, the Jesuit and Sulpician missionaries, and through them Onontio, took on the mantle of guardians of the *domiciliés*’ material welfare.¹⁰

Even as they enacted their own culture’s charitable and paternalistic ideals, missionaries and officials were joining in the redistributive economic and social organization of Algonquian and Iroquoian societies. A reciprocity of obligations and goods structured relationships between

Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: 1989), pp. 32-34; James Axtell, “The First Consumer Revolution” in *Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial America* (Oxford: 1992), pp. 125-51.

⁷ Bruyas’s dictionary translates Gaseronni (Onseronni) as “accommoder q.c. faire un hache. Inde vocant Europaei [...] Aseronni”. This and other sources indicate that the Mohawks sometimes used the term in reference to all Europeans (i.e. French and Dutchmen), but in several of his phrases Bruyas translates this word specifically as “les Français”. See *Radical Words*, pp. 96, 97, 80, 84, 103. For the nineteenth-century use at Kahnawake and Kanehsatake of “Onseronni on8e” in specific reference to Frenchmen (as opposed to “Tiorhensaka on8e”, “inhabitants of the east”, for the English), see Cuoq, *Lexique de la langue iroquoise* (Montreal: J. Chapleau, 1882), p. 62.

⁸ *JRAD* 57: 129 (my retranslation). English commentators believed that the Jesuits had “bribed” the natives to accept Roman Catholicism and settle in mission villages. See Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 201, 239; John Oldmixon, *The British empire in America, containing the history of the discovery, settlement...* (London: 1741 [orig. 1708]), 1: 554.

⁹ *JRAD* 23: 310; *JRAD* 25: 25.

¹⁰ See for example Vachon de Belmont to Louis XIV, “État des dépenses du séminaire pour la mission de la montagne de 1676 à 1697”, MG17-A7-2, pp. 221-226; and Pierre de Lauzon, “Mémoire concernant la mission des Iroquois du Sault-Saint-Louis”, [1741], C11A 75 : 143-146.

individuals and groups, between humans, animals, and the supernatural.¹¹ Adapting longstanding traditions of reciprocal exchange with powerful otherworldly beings, the residents of the mission villages gave gifts of their own to the Christian God and to his priests: a portion of their crop or of their catch in game or fish, beaver pelts and other animal skins.¹² Generosity, moreover, was the essence of leadership in these societies. Leaders were not expected to accumulate and hoard wealth, but rather to distribute it among their followers according to their needs. It was by acting as providers that the missionaries, like the prominent members of the communities to which they ministered, acquired and maintained a measure of moral authority.¹³

Formalized gift exchanges played a vital role in both internal and external politics. What the Jesuits had observed in Huronia, that “all affairs of importance are managed here by presents” and that “Here not a thing is said, nor a thing done, except by presents”, was true throughout the indigenous northeast and would remain true in the mission villages of the St. Lawrence Valley.¹⁴ Words formally spoken during councils were unavoidably accompanied by presents of economically valuable or symbolically charged items. These reflected the close relationship that existed between a leader's role as a provider of economic resources and as a representative of this kin and followers: by offering a guarantee that the speaker and the followers who had pooled their resources to back him shared the same views on an issue and were likely to respect commitments, these presents embodied and authenticated the spoken word. Strings and belts of shell wampum, traditionally thought to carry an inherent spiritual power, but

¹¹ Regarding the reciprocal and redistributive ethic of the Algonquian and Iroquoian societies, see Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country*, pp. 6-7, 14-15, 51-53.

¹² For the eel and salmon fisheries at Sillery, see for example *JRAD* 23: 306-308; 36: 140. For the gifts of furs and skins, see *JRAD* 36: 196; 58: 154; 60: 288. The anecdotal nature of the reference to these gifts in the sources unfortunately does not allow the quantification of the extent to which the reciprocity would have been balanced, or whether one party may have benefited more than the other.

¹³ On generosity as a prerequisite of leadership, see Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country*, pp. 52-53; Druke, *Structure and Meaning of Leadership*, esp. pp. 141-142.

¹⁴ *JRAD* 10: 27; *JRAD* 33: 241.

also conveniently compact and designed in ways that allowed them to function as mnemonic devices, were a preferred diplomatic commodity throughout the northeast in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Tobacco was another such commodity, for the convivial act of sitting and smoking together “cleared minds” and engendered “good thoughts” before any council. At the same time, diplomatic encounters also offered the opportunity to fulfill an interlocutor’s material wants and needs: Europeans would regularly be presented with beaver pelts and moose skins, and in return would offer clothing and blankets, tools and weapons.¹⁵

Royal officials began to offer gifts to indigenous ambassadors and allies in the 1680s in response to the threat posed by the Five Nations. At this juncture, colonial officials identified the need to draw and retain Iroquois men and women in the mission villages as a priority. In 1681, Intendant Duchesneau suggested to the Minister that royal funds be allocated to provide “some small presents to the sauvages of the villages established among us to attract a greater number”. In 1683, Governor La Barre gave presents to the headmen of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake who “did their duty well” in the councils with the Confederacy; for the same reason he saw fit to ask for a royal act of “charity” of 1500# to rebuild Kahnawake’s chapel.¹⁶ Denonville, Champigny, and (reluctantly) Frontenac in turn became great believers in the imperative need to offer goods to the inhabitants of the mission villages to attract, reward, or compensate them for diplomatic and military services. With the early 1690s, the Crown began to authorize on a regular basis

¹⁵ For an in-depth study of wampum with a particular emphasis on the St. Lawrence Valley, see Jonathan C. Lainey, *La «monnaie des Sauvages». Les colliers de wampum d'hier à aujourd'hui* (Sillery, Quebec: Septentrion, 2004).

¹⁶ Intendant Duchesneau to Minister, 13 November 1681, C11A 5: 291-291v; “Mémoire de La Barre concernant son expédition au lac Ontario”, 1 October 1684, C11A 6: 308-313 (copy in NYCD9 : 241); La Barre to the Minister, 4 November 1683, C11A 6: 135v, 137, 143. See also Catherine M. Desbarats, “The Cost of Early Canada's Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric”, *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., Vol. 52, No. 4. (Oct., 1995), p. 612.

payments of gifts to its allies, including those of the mission villages, in an ongoing effort to elicit the active support of their warriors against the Five Nations and the English colonies.¹⁷

To go to war meant to use up ammunition, to run the risk of breaking or losing weapons, to wear out clothes and equipment, and to consume several weeks' or months' worth of provisions. Because it so often meant forsaking the opportunity to hunt, to go to war also tended to conflict with a man's obligation to provide for his wife, children, and relatives. For these reasons, it seemed only fair for the *domiciliés* to expect that Onontio would give unstintingly. "Though the Indian disposition be naturally prone to war," observed one memorialist regarding efforts to mobilize the warriors of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake, "and though an attempt was made to persuade them that they are carrying on hostilities as much for their own, as for our interest, yet they fail not to demand, every time they set out, a quantity of provisions and ammunition which costs a considerable sum, and to refuse, would be to utterly disgust them."¹⁸ Wartime gifts were never numerous or valuable enough to push peaceably inclined individuals to take up the warpath, but they obviated the obstacles which might prevent enthusiastic warriors from doing so.

¹⁷ "Mémoire de l'état présent des affaires de Canada", 27 October 1687, C11A 9: 129-144 (copy in *NYCD* 9: 353-354); "État de la dépense faite en l'année 1688 jusqu'au premier novembre au sujet de la guerre contre les Iroquois", 1 November 1688, C11A 10: 138v; "Observations sur l'état des affaires du Canada", 18 November 1689, C11A 10: 321-323 (copy in *NYCD* 9: 433); "Mémoire de Denonville à Seignelay", [January 1690], C11A 11: 185-194 (copy in *NYCD* 9: 440); "Mémoire du Roi à Frontenac et Champigny", 14 July 1690, B 15: 7-9v. "Mémoire pour les Iroquois Chrestiens du saut en Canada", February 1692, C11A 12: 148-151v (copy in *JRAD* 64: 108-112). "Résumé d'un mémoire pour ces abénaquis chrestiens", 1692, in *CMNF* 1: 88. On the economy and culture of the gift in the Franco-Aboriginal alliance more generally, see Cornelius Jaenen, "The Role of Presents in French Amerindian Trade" *Explorations in Canadian Economic History: Essays in Honour of Irene Spry* (Ottawa, 1985), pp. 231-50. On presents in the alliance, see W.R. Jacobs, *Wilderness Politics and Indian Gifts*; Jaenen, *Les relations*; White, *Middle Ground*, pp. 112-113; Axtell, *Beyond 1492*, p. 66; Desbarats, "The Cost of Early Canada's Native Alliances"; Havard, *Empire et métissages*, 393-395; Peter Cook, "Symbolic and Material Exchange in Intercultural Diplomacy".

¹⁸ Monseignat, "Relation de ce qui s'est passé au Canada depuis le mois de septembre 1692 jusqu'au départ des vaisseaux en 1693", 1693, C11A 12: 182-205v (copy in *NYCD* 9: 563); "Mémoire pour les Iroquois Chrestiens du saut en Canada", February 1692, C11A 12: 148-151v (copy in *JRAD* 64: 108-112); "Paroles des Sauvages du Sault-Saint-Louis en réponse aux reproches que leur fit cet été 22 juillet 1741", [1741] COL C11A 75/ fol.156-158; Lauzon, "Mémoire concernant la mission des Iroquois du Sault-Saint-Louis", [1741], C11A 75: 143-146.

It was trade, rather than formal diplomacy, that most regularly brought the Iroquoian and Algonquian *domiciliés* and their French neighbours together throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While the fur trade dominated these transactions, the inhabitants of the mission villages also bartered other commodities for the variety of cloth and metal goods they desired: wampum belts, canoes, paddles, snowshoes, moccasins, various craftworks which they sold in the towns on market days, and, by the early eighteenth century, capillary and ginseng which they harvested in the forest for French medicinal use.¹⁹ The inhabitants of the mission villages unavoidably developed relationships characterized by mutual trust and respect with their trading partners. Terms of exchange were varied in ways that expressed generosity or produced its appearance. Relationships of lingering debt and credit between traders and indigenous suppliers and customers contributed to sustained relationships, although they could foster tensions if they were managed without consideration. The common practice of offering reciprocal hospitality, of lodging, feeding, and entertaining visitors further contributed to the cultivation of intercultural solidarity. These were not simply facilitating or secondary aspects of trade: they were central to its organization and its meaning to participants.²⁰

¹⁹ For wampum belts, see Hocquart, "Bordereau des recettes et dépenses faites par le sieur Taschereau, commis en ce pays de Messieurs les trésoriers généraux de la Marine, pendant l'année 1739", 20 October 1741, C11A 114: 106v. For paddles (not canoes, interestingly), see "État de la dépense faite en l'année 1689 au sujet de la guerre en Canada", [1689], C11A 113: 16v; Hocquart, "Bordereau des recettes et dépenses faites par le sieur Taschereau, commis en ce pays de Messieurs les trésoriers généraux de la Marine, pendant l'année 1739", 20 October 1741, C11A 114: 112. For various crafts, see Pehr Kalm, *Travels into North America* (London: T. Lowndes, 1773), p. 239. For ginseng (Saint-François and Bécancour, 1752), see Franquet, *Voyages et Mémoires*, pp. 95, 99; and capillary (Lorette, 1710), *JRAD* 66: 153.

²⁰ Scholarship on trade and gifts in small-scale societies abounds. I derive my own interpretation from a reading of the classics by Mauss and Sahlins, and primarily from the subsequent critique by Healy. Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies* (London: Cohen and West, 1954); Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (London: Tavistock, 1972); Christopher J. Healey, "Trade and Sociability: Balanced Reciprocity as Generosity in the New Guinea Highlands", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Feb., 1984), pp. 42-60; and *Maring Hunters And Traders: Production and Exchange in the Papua New Guinea Highlands*, (Berkley: University

Though the precise patterns of exchange remain obscure, a variety of roles were available to the *domiciliés* according to circumstances. They could sell to traders the pelts they had themselves acquired on the hunt. Yet by acquiring additional pelts from more remote groups in exchange for the manufactured goods to which they had privileged access, they could also act as traders in their own right. For Aboriginal men and women who, for whatever reason, were not inclined to convert and resettle in the mission villages, the presence of relatives and acquaintances there represented a valuable entry into the French market. The *domiciliés*' greater familiarity with the town's traders, from both a personal and cultural standpoint, no doubt meant that they could navigate the local market more successfully and obtain better prices than visitors might on their own. This allowed them to act as agents, brokering transactions between Aboriginal visitors and local merchants, or otherwise as hosts, offering lodging to visitors and who sheltered their goods for various lengths of time. In 1681, Frontenac observed that the Iroquois and Loups "since a long time" traded with Montreal "by means of those of their nations who are habituated to the Sault Saint-Louis [...] which serves them as warehouse for this traffic."²¹

It was no coincidence that the men who, besides the missionaries, emerged as the *domiciliés*' principal colonial interlocutors in the late seventeenth century were traders turned officers. In the Montreal region, the most prominent among them belonged to the Le Moyne family. Its patriarch, Charles Le Moyne, had become acquainted with Iroquoian culture and languages while serving as an engage or servant of the Jesuits in Huronia. He had then settled in Montreal early enough to carve out a niche as an interpreter and to grab a lion's share of the

of California Press, 1990), esp. pp. 314-356. For the argument in the context of the northeast, see Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, pp. 47-49.

²¹ Frontenac to Louis XIV, 2 November 1681, C11A 5: 382-391 (copy in *RAPQ* 1926-1927, p. 126).

burgeoning fur trade. His commercial activities further cemented his standing among the Iroquois, who knew him as Akouessan, the Partridge, and who developed for him a “great consideration”.²² Though his relationship with the residents of the missions that sprung up around Montreal is poorly documented, Le Moyne’s high standing among the Iroquois, coupled with his close collaboration with the Jesuits, whose strict stance with respect to the trade in brandy he supported, and with the location of his trading posts, leave no doubt that it evolved into a particularly close one. It was he who accompanied Christian headmen to Iroquoia in 1683 and 1684. His sons followed in his footsteps after his death in 1685, most notably Jacques Le Moyne de Saint-Hélène and Paul Le Moyne de Maricourt (the latter of whom was known as “Stow Stow”).²³ In 1704, Vaudreuil remarked in a letter to the minister that “it is a family, Monseigneur, that the Iroquois consider as being entirely in their interests”.²⁴ The Hertel family acquired a comparable influence among the Algonquins, Sokwakis and Abenakis who frequented the region around Trois-Rivières and Saint-François.²⁵ To a large extent, it was the friendship and confidence acquired through trade that laid a basis for cooperation on the warpath.

²² “Mémoire de Frontenac”, 13 November 1673, C11A 4 : 25-26.

²³ On Charles Le Moyne, his family, and his position in the trade, see Jean-Jacques Lefebvre, “Charles Le Moyne de Longueuil et de Châteauguay”, and Jean Blain, “Jacques Le Moyne de Sainte-Hélène”, *DCB* 1: 463-467; Frégault, *Iberville le Conquérant*, pp. 26-37; Dechêne, *Habitants and Merchants*, pp. 114-117, and *Le peuple, l'État et la guerre*, p. 156; Leon Robichaud and Alan M. Stewart, “Étude historique du site de la maison Le Ber-Le Moyne”, Report presented to the Ministère de la Culture et des Communications, the Musée de Lachine and Art-Gestion, March 1999; “Mémoire et preuves de la cause du désordre des coureurs de bois”, 1681, C11A 5: 359-362.. For evidence of his diplomatic role, *Jugements et délibérations du Conseil Souverain* 1: 277; La Barre to the Minister, 4 November 1683, C11A 6: 135-135v; *JRAD* 62: 255-257; Belmont, “Recueil”, f. 21 (copy in *Histoire du Canada*, p. 15);

²⁴ Vaudreuil au ministre. 3 avril 1704, RAPQ (1938-39): 25. “Paul Le Moyne de Maricourt.” *DCB* 2: 405; Céline Dupré, “Charles Le Moyne de Longueuil,” *DBC* 2: 418. Regarding Sainte-Hélène’s disinclination for the liquor trade. Laval to Dollier de Casson, 14 January 1684, Arch du SS? (Copy in *Histoire des grandes familles*, pp. 220-221). On “Stow Stow” as Maricourt’s name, see *NYCD* 4: 492-493, 495-496, 598.

²⁵ On the Hertels and the related Crevier family, see Thomas Charland, “Jean Crevier de Saint-François”, *DCB* I: 238-239; Raymond Douville, “Jacques Hertel de La Fresnière”, *DCB* I: 268-269; Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, pp. 48-49.

To the great dismay of French officials, the *domiciliés*' bonds of trade and friendship nevertheless stretched beyond the intercolonial divide. It was in 1679 that Frontenac for the first time lamented in his correspondence the fact that "the Natives who are among us, and principally those of the Mission of la Prairie de la Magdelaine" "ordinarily" "carried their furs there [to Albany]".²⁶ In 1683, an *habitant* of La Prairie similarly testified "that he has seen many *Sauvages domiciliés* either from the Sault or the Montagne going to the Flemish [i.e. Dutch of Albany] and bringing back merchandise."²⁷ For the Christian Iroquois inhabitants of these two missions, trading with Albany came naturally as the result of their ongoing relationship with relatives in the Mohawk country and with the neighbouring Dutch merchants. The availability in Albany of a variety and quality of goods unavailable in Montreal provided an additional incentive: Togouiroui's purchase in Albany of an impressive brass candelabra for his village's chapel will be recalled. Even more significantly, a pelt had greater purchasing power in Albany: in 1681, that town's merchants were offering the equivalent 8# in goods for a beaver pelt, without distinction of its grade, compared with 4# 12s 6d in Montreal.²⁸ It was presumably for reasons of convenience that many men and women from Iroquoia still bothered to travel to Montreal to trade. It was much closer than Albany to hunting grounds along the upper St. Lawrence and lower Ottawa Rivers, and trading there was easily combined with other social or diplomatic activities among the colonists or the people of the nearby missions.

²⁶ Frontenac to Louis XIV, 6 November 1679, C11A 5: 12-16v. See also Frontenac to Louis XIV, 2 November 1681, C11A 5: 385; A. J. F. van Laer, ed., *Minutes of the Court of Albany, Rensselaerswyck, and Schenectady, 1668-1685* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1926), 2: 433.

²⁷ Interrogatoire d'Antoine Barrois, 7 October 1683, ANQM, AJPD, 47.

²⁸ "Mémoire de Duchesneau", 13 Novembre 1681, C11A 5: 323. An often cited table of prices offered in Albany and Montreal in 1689 shows differences ranging from a factor of two to four. NYCD 9: 408-409. As Marc Guévin has pointed out, however, this price differential does not map onto the prices of beaver across the Atlantic, where beaver actually fetched a higher price in Paris than in London. See Guévin, *Le commerce Montréal-Albany sous le Régime français : histoire d'un phénomène commercial* (M.A., Université de Montréal, 1995), pp. 29-30.

The Canadian Iroquois were not alone in their desire to trade at Albany. Some of the *coureurs de bois* who operated illegally in the west had begun to trickle there in the late 1660s. A variety of factors conspired to push Canadian merchants to trade with their counterparts in Albany during the following decade: the dwindling prices paid for furs by the monopolist Compagnie des Indes and the levies it collected; the comparatively low cost of trade goods at Albany; the fact that while the Company paid in cumbersome letters of credit, the Albany merchants were willing to purchase furs in hard cash or valuable wampum.²⁹

The earliest regulations prohibiting the intercolonial trade were issued in the French colony in 1682, in the wake of Colbert's establishment of a system of western trade licenses or *congés*.³⁰ What succeeded in halting this trade, however, was not so much official prohibitions as the outbreak of the War of the League of Augsburg in 1689 and of the hostilities between the *domiciliés* and French on the one hand, and the League Mohawks and New Yorkers on the other.³¹ It followed that with the easing of tensions and the formalization of peace, the old commercial relations resumed in earnest. Heading towards Montreal in May of 1698 to carry the news of the Treaty of Ryswick, Peter Schuyler and Godfrey Delliuss encountered a canoe "with French Indians, loaded with beavers, on their way to trade at Albany."³² As La Potherie would

²⁹ For evidence of the dwindling prices, see "Mémoire sur le Canada", 1667, C11A 2: 35 1-3 53; "Mémoire de Charles Aubert de la Chesnaye", 1670, C11A 3: 1501-51; "Mémoire concernant le commerce du castor en Canada", 26 June 1756, C11A 121: 34-60. Concerning the immediate cash or wampum payments at Albany, Duchesneau to the Minister, 13 November 1680, C11A 5: 161-181. More broadly, see Guévin, *Le commerce Montréal-Albany*, pp. 12-33; Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1713-1760", *Canadian Historical Association Annual Report* (1939), p. 61; *Le développement économique de la Nouvelle-France* (Montreal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1986); W.J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism", *WMQ*, 3rd series, 40 (1983), pp. 341-362; Thomas Wien, "Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760: The Uses of Fur-Trade Imperialism", *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*.

³⁰ Ordonnances of 8 May and 27 August 1682, in P.-G. Roy, *Ordonnances, commissions, etc. etc., des gouverneurs et intendants de la Nouvelle-France. 1639-1706*, (Beauceville, L'Eclaireur, 1924),.

³¹ Armour, *The Merchants of Albany*, p.35.

³² *JRAD* 4: 347. Three "Praying Indians from Canada" happened to be at Albany during Bellomont's first meeting with the Five Nations in July of 1698. According to Charlevoix, these *domiciliés* had gone to Mohawk country to visit their kin. Wraxall, *Abridgement*, pp. 29-30; Charlevoix, *Histoire*, 3 :335-336.

soon observe, it was not only to see relatives but also “to trade some of their furs” that large numbers of League Iroquois and peoples of the Great Lakes stopped at Kahnawake in July 1701.³³

To Peter Schuyler and other active members of Albany's fur trading elite, the significance of the “French Indians” was both economic and strategic. While a decade of intercolonial conflict had drastically curtailed Albany's supply in beaver, decades of western expansion had had the opposite effect of glutting the Canadian market. The *domiciliés*, whether they acted on their own behalf or as porters for commercial contacts in Montreal, represented a promising means of gaining access to this market.³⁴ To accommodate visitors at Albany, the decade-old municipal regulations that had prohibiting persons from lodging natives in their houses were relaxed in June of 1699 to allow “the Canada Indians” to be taken in.³⁵

From a strategic standpoint, drawing back the “French Indians” seemed of the utmost importance to officials in Albany and New York who had grown exceedingly worried about the weakened strength of the Five Nations. In early 1698, it was alarmingly estimated that their population had declined from about 2800 men before the war to 1320; the prospect of a Franco-Iroquois peace settlement threatened additional outmigration. This demographic shift translated

³³ La Potherie, *Histoire*, 4: 195.

³⁴ For a good overview of the Albany merchants' activity in these interwar years, see Armour, *Merchants of Albany*, pp. 44-85. Regarding the French beaver market's glut during the 1690s, see Guy Frégault, “La Compagnie de la colonie”, in *Le XVIIIe Siècle canadien : Études* (Montreal: éditions HMH, 1968), pp. 242-288; Eccles, *Canada Under Louis XIV*, pp. 202-204; Havard, *Empire et métissages*, pp. 71-72. Regarding the visits of Albany “Indian traders” to Montreal and relations with merchants there, see the petition of Hendrick Hansen and Joannes Bleeker, 30 January 1699, A1894 42: 128; *Calendar of historical manuscripts in the office of the secretary of state, Albany, N.Y.* (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1865), 2: 138-139; NYCD 3: 478-479, 487-488, 563; NYCD 4: 746. On the *coureurs de bois* who turned towards Albany at this time, see NYCD 4: 739, 797; Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, pp. 106-108.

³⁵ This was the amendment of trade regulations proclaimed in 1689 and repeated in 1696. Munsell, *Annals of Albany*, 1: 108; 3: 13-14, 51.

into a considerable loss of trade, commentators figured, but also into a signal threat to the colony's security in case of renewed war.³⁶

During their journey to Canada, Schuyler and Delliuss covertly invited all the *domiciliés* they encountered to make the return journey with them and “settle among us”, with the promise that they would continue to receive Christian instruction there. Forty men and women appeared to respond to the call, meeting him at Chambly, and journeying to Albany with canoes laden with five to six hundred beaver pelts.³⁷ Subsequent ambassadors sent from Albany to Canada were instructed, as was Johannes Schuyler, son of Peter, to “feel the pulse of the Indians that have formerly belonged to the Five Nations”, and see whether they might not be convinced to return.³⁸ Johannes and others found out during a visit to Montreal that though the headmen of the mission villages had been forbidden to speak with them, many “French Mohawks” as well as “North Indians” in fact sought them out to insist on their wish for neutrality, and in the case of an unnamed “French Mohawk Sachem” on his people's willingness to relocate to their “former habitations” if only a missionary could be supplied to them there.³⁹

Intent on maintaining the strength of his colony, Governor de Callières opposed such attempts to draw away the Canadian Iroquois as emigrants or visiting traders. Within a day of encountering the canoe of “French Indians” in May of 1698, Peter Schuyler and Delliuss met with two others whose occupants explained that they had been sent by Callières to fetch the canoe that

³⁶ NYCD 4: 168, 333-334, 349, 351. For population estimates NYCD 4: 330, 487.

³⁷ NYCD 4: 350. It is not clear that these forty chose to remain in Iroquoia, however.

³⁸ NYCD 4: 340-341, 369, 404-406, 574 (in this last, Rosie's report, it is not clear if he heard *from* or merely *about* the French Mohawks).

³⁹ NYCD 4: 404-406, 574

had just passed; during Schuyler and Delliuss's return journey, two men were similarly sent in pursuit of the forty men and women who accompanied them.⁴⁰

Notwithstanding the assurances given by the unnamed "French Mohawk Sachem" to Johannes, and though some *domiciliés* continued to entertain in New York minds the chimera of a large-scale return migration, subsequent encounters formalized under the aegis of Albany's Commissioners of Indian Affairs make it clear that the Christian Iroquois were mainly interested in renewing cordial relations and trade. In 1700, a certain Sagronwadie, described as "Chief Sachem" of Kahnawake in the English records, organized a group of "Sachems of the Canada Praying Indians" (including two "head Sachems" and two captains) of his village and encouraged them to accompany him to Albany to make satisfaction for the death of a Schagticoke man killed by their people during the hunting season. Meeting with the town's Commissioners of Indian Affairs in early July, Sagronwadie declared "We are come here to trade with you as formerly, and therefore desire you to use us well, and receive us kindly being only come upon the score of trade". He asked that the people of Albany "be kind to us and not too dear with your goods", that they treat his people fairly and offer good prices to them. The Kahnawakes accompanied their words with twenty-nine beaver skins. The Commissioners responded with some wampum, and pledged that the visitors' people would be free to find the best buyers and allowed to trade in whichever house they pleased. When the Commissioners attempted to press their interlocutors – with the argument that they had received much better prices here than in Canada and with the promise that Protestant ministers would be made

⁴⁰ NYCD 4: 347, 350. Canadian regulations prohibiting the intercolonial fur trade remained very much in effect. See NYCD 4: 478; François de Gallifet to René Boucher de Laperrière, 22 June 1703, Viger-Verreau, P32/008/129; François de Gallifet to René Boucher de Laperrière, 10 August 1703, Viger-Verreau, P32/008/130.

available to them – to relocate with their people to Iroquoia, Sagronwadie was nevertheless insistent: “We are now come to trade and not to speak of religion”⁴¹

The essence of this encounter was repeated two years later, in 1702, when two Canadian Mohawk sachems named Taquayanout and Sinjaderise, accompanied by a third man from the Canadian missions named Degayedore, found themselves in Albany when the new governor of New York, Edward Hyde, Viscount Cornbury, arrived for his first conference with the Five Nations. The visitors took the opportunity to pay their compliments to this latest “Father Corlaer”, yet they made it clear that they had not been sent “in the quality of Sachems from Canada”, but had rather “come here to trade”. Presenting a series of beaver skins, “the fruits of our Peaceable hunting”, they expressed their personal resolve to stand neutral if war broke out and their hope that the new governor would do his part to maintain the “Peace and Tranquility we now enjoy”. They were regaled with gifts in response, and were pleased to find Cornbury willing to respect their neutrality and to maintain for them the same “Privileges of Trade” with the New Yorkers as the Five Nations enjoyed – as long, that is, as they did not join the French.⁴²

The French, as it happens, were themselves in no mood to go to war against New York. In April of 1702, Callières and Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil assured their guests David and Abraham Schuyler and Jean Rosie that if an imperial war were to break out they “will not be the

⁴¹ NYCD 4: 690, 692-693.

⁴² NYCD 4: 978-83. Barbara J. Siversten makes a plausible case that this Taquayanout (also Taquayenout, Taquayanont) is the same man as Quaynant, a sachem living in Mohawk country after 1711, where he played host to the young Conrad Weiser. Siversten suggests that he may have eventually moved on to the Mohawk settlement of Onaquaga on the Susquehanna River. Interestingly enough, “French Peter” Taquayanont, likely his son, was by mid-century identified as a Kahnawake. See *Turtles, Wolves, and Bears*, pp. 65, 85, 92, 116-117, 171. Sinjaderise is most certainly the same man as Senjaad’riesen, a Canadian Mohawk sachem who in 1707 traded with Wendell. Waterman, ed., *Wendell Accounts*, pp. 167, 185. No additional information could be found on Degayedore or Degagedore.

first to send out such parties against us [New York] as formerly”.⁴³ At the heart of this French policy of neutrality was a reluctance to plunge the colony into a new Franco-Iroquois war, and the recognition that if the New Yorker took up arms they would surely bring pressure to bear on the Five Nations to do the same. If New York could be kept at bay, New France would be free to bring its energies and resources to bear against an isolated New England. The latter's lack of indigenous allies, in the minds of the French, meant that it was “not in a position to do great harm”.⁴⁴

The Albany merchants and provincial government of New York were only too happy to reciprocate: the defences of their frontier towns and even the provincial capital were in a ruinous state; no military support seemed forthcoming from England; and the Five Nations, without whose warriors there was no hope of waging a guerrilla war against the French and their allies, indeed showed no interest in derogating from the peace settlement only recently reached in Montreal. Merchants on both sides of the colonial divide were reluctant to close down the newly reopened intercolonial trade route.⁴⁵ Callières, as Taquayanout and Sinjaderise happily informed Cornbury in the summer of 1702, told the inhabitants of the mission villages that they too should stand neutral with respect to New York in case of an imperial war.⁴⁶ The instruction was unnecessary.

In the summer of 1703, as revealed in the previous chapter, Penobscot messengers sent to Canada to “advertise [to] the Macquas and Indians [that is, the Iroquoian and Algonquian

⁴³ Joel Munsell, ed., *The Annals of Albany* (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1853) 4: 129-130.

⁴⁴ “Paroles de Teganissorens” and “Réponse de Vaudreuil”, 31 October 1703, C11A 21: 72-73; Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to the Minister, 15 November 1703, C11A 21: 5-28v; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 3 April 1704, C11A 22: 32-33; Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 19 October 1705, C11A: (copy in NYCD 9: 766).

⁴⁵ the perspective from Albany and New York, see NYCD 4: 718, 753; CSPC 1702-1703, p. 673; Armour, *Merchants of Albany*, pp. 86-92.

⁴⁶ NYCD 4: 978.

inhabitants of the mission villages] that the English had begun a war” elicited a positive response.⁴⁷ At this juncture it bears pointing out, however, that the label of *the English*, used here by John Williams and by many other period commentators, is misleading. From the imperial perspective there was no question that this was a war between French and English subjects, yet in which the inhabitants of the province of New York enjoyed a special exemption. From the indigenous perspective, however, there was little substance to the imagined community of *the English*. The Canadian Iroquois, like their relatives in Iroquoia, found it more appropriate to distinguish between the peoples who fell under the authority of Albany, New York, and Boston. The distinction between Albany, personified by “Quider” (its one-time mayor Peter Schuyler), and the province of New York as a whole, personified by “Corlaer” (the successive governors), came to the fore in the diplomatic language of the Iroquois in the 1690s.⁴⁸ Indeed, a majority of the residents of Albany at this time were Dutch, not English. Equally important was the fact that it was to the people of Albany, not New York, that the visitors brought their pelts; it was the people of Albany, not New York, who spoke their language and understood their way of life.

For the Christian Iroquois, the distinction between either of these two entities and New England was even more pronounced, as the inhabitants of the latter were distant strangers. To be sure, Mohawks had traded with John Pynchon – Kinsie, in their language – at his establishment on the Connecticut River in the mid seventeenth-century. But in 1677, in a move orchestrated by

⁴⁷ John Williams, *The Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion* (1853), p. 281.

⁴⁸ For references to Quider or Peter (Schuyler), of which it was the Mohawk rendering, and indications of the man's significance, see Colden, *History of the Five Indian Nations*, pp. 95-105; *LIR*, pp. 162-166, 176-177; *NYCD* 3: 771-777; *NYCD* 4: 693-695; *NYCD* 5: 245-249; *NYCD* 9: 579?, 596, 743-748, 842. Governor Andros had been requickenened as “Corlaer” in 1675, after Arent van Curler. The name was passed on to his successors with the notable exception of Governor Fletcher, who was instead known as Cayenquiragoe. *NYCD* 4: 6-7, 14-24, 222. Potier's Huron dictionary also provides entries for both “etiohenchtronnon...anglois” and “skandetatironnon...flamands d'orange”. *Écrits de Pierre Potier*, pp. 232, 264.

Governor Andros of New York in an effort to assert authority, New England had renounced its power to treat directly with Five Nations and that colony's other indigenous peoples. Only in the 1720s did the governor of Massachusetts acquire a diplomatic personality of his own as Yehowanne or "the Broad Way".⁴⁹ Thus, just as the Christian Iroquois had been willing to go to war against the distant Senecas in the 1680s, they now proved willing to go to war against the distant New Englanders. Doing so while maintaining friendly relations with New York, though, became an increasingly delicate equation.

One source of difficulty was that the paths of war and of trade ran dangerously close to each other. As Vaudreuil would soon remark of his allies, it is "the way of the Rivers of Lake Champlain that leads them to the war into the government of Boston".⁵⁰ Only at the south end of the lake did the path of war fork from the path of peace, with the Winooski River or Otter Creek leading eastward to the Connecticut, and Wood Creek or Lake George leading southward towards the Hudson and Albany. With this relative proximity came the risk that New Yorkers might be mistaken for New Englanders. Or more likely that some small isolated party (*ionneg8atsera* in Mohawk) composed of rash young warriors might choose to conveniently overlook the distinction between friends and enemies, in order to avoid the humiliating prospect of returning home empty-handed.

⁴⁹ Regarding the relations between the Five Nations and the New Englanders, see Neal Salisbury, "Toward the Covenant Chain: Iroquois and Southern New England Algonquins, 1637-1684", in Richter and Merrell, eds., *Beyond the Covenant Chain*, pp. 61-73; Francis Jennings, *Invasion of America*, chapters 17-18; *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, pp. 148-149. Evidence of the use of Yehowanne or "Broad Way" to refer to the governor and government of Boston emerges only in the 1720s. William Taylor, Spencer Phips, and John Stoddard were addressed as Yehowanne ("a broad way") and Kinsie (meaning "Pington", the name of John Pynchon who had formerly treated with the Five Nations on behalf of the government of Boston) by the orator of the Five Nations on 28 May (OS) 1723. *LIR*, 236. See also *CMHS* 23: 154, 177. William Shirley was similarly addressed as Yehowanne, Yehowhanne, Yahowanne, Jehowanne, or Yohakowano, in 1748 and 1755. *NYCD* 6: 443-445, 450-452; *NYCD* 7: 29.

⁵⁰ Vaudreuil to Peter Schuyler, 11 August 1708, New York State Library, Manuscripts and Special Collections, Single Accession #5501.

Intent on preventing this type of collateral damage which might drag their community into a destructive cycle of war, the Christian Iroquois headmen made clear their preference for the fielding of large forces (*gannenra*, armies).⁵¹ Large forces indeed ensured a critical mass of mature warriors who could dissuade their young and more impulsive counterparts from easy victories that might prove dangerous for the community in the long term. In 1704, when a number of young Kahnwakeronon and Kanestakaeronon warriors emboldened by the success of the raid against Deerfield asked Vaudreuil for permission to disperse in small parties, the elders reacted by imploring the governor to prohibit this and by requesting that he instead form one large party with which “great things” might be undertaken. Again in 1708, a Kahnawakes headman would explain to Ramezay that the elders did not wish to send their young men “in small parties against the English”.⁵²

Another source of difficulty was that although the New Yorkers were unwilling to jeopardize their own well-being by entering the war, they were genuinely concerned about the plight of their neighbours in New England. Though the New Englanders were quick to cast aspersions on the traders and officials of Albany, the latter's moral and diplomatic support was unwavering: whenever reports reached them that war parties were on the warpath, often from the mouths of visitors from the missions, local officials promptly sent word to their counterparts in Connecticut or Massachusetts.⁵³ Friendly relations with the Christian Iroquois also provided the men of Albany with opportunities to undermine the Franco-Aboriginal alliance. When Peter

⁵¹ [La Galissonière], “Petit Dictionnaire de la langue des Iroquois de la nation d’Agné”, c. 1747-1749, MG7 1A1, 17: 9, 48.

⁵² Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to the Minister, 17 November 1704, C11A 22: 4-28; “Paroles des Indiens du Sault et réponse de Ramezay”, 31 January 1708, C11A 29: 16-16v.

⁵³ For examples of Albany's correspondence with New England and incitement of the Five Nations, see *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 6th ser., v. 3 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1889) pp. 156, 168-169, 177, 184, 194, 200-202, 217-219, 222, 259-260, 268-269, 274-276, 331, 344-345, 365-366; Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 58.

Schuyler encountered a number of Kahnawakes who had been visiting among the Mohawks, during the summer that followed the raid on Deerfield, he convinced them to carry back one wampum belt for their village and two more for Kanehsatake (as its population was at this time divided between two sites, at La Montagne and Sault-au-Récollet). With this wampum Schuyler reiterated the standing offer of lands to those who were willing to relocate, and invited the remainder to stay the hatchet they had taken up against Boston and to maintain their cordial relationship with Albany.⁵⁴

Few Christian Iroquois were inclined to accept this latest invitation to relocation, but a majority was intent on maintaining an amicable relationship with Albany and willing to put an end to their sorties against New England if that was what it took. When Schuyler's invitation was brought to the attention of Vaudreuil, he instructed Ramezay to stamp out this spirit of accommodation. To that end the governor of Montreal met with the headmen in September, berating and flattering them in an effort to convince them to leave the overture unanswered. Ramezay explained that Lake Champlain was to be considered as "locked up for them in this matter [i.e. diplomacy], as also in regard of merchandise". It was to be "only a path for soldiers and no other". The Christian Iroquois were perplexed by this forceful declaration, even as they agreed to relinquish Schuyler's three belts. Did this mean that Onontio had declared war on Schuyler, they asked? Ramezay had to clarify that this was not the case, and that by deference to the Five Nations the French had no intention to attack Albany or to condone any attack on it. Raids against Boston, nonetheless, should continue. Ramezay was satisfied to hear the Christian

⁵⁴ *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 6th ser., v. 3 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1889) pp. 260; *LIR*, p. 194. Vaudreuil and Beauharnois to the Minister, 17 November 1704, C11A 22: 4-28; Charlevoix based his own account, *Histoire*, 3: 434-435, on this one); Vaudreuil to the Minister, 16 November 1704, C11A 22: 34-40; *NYCD* 4: 1163-4; Wraxall, *Abridgement*, pp. 42-43; Ramezay to the Minister, 14 November 1704, C11A 22: 76; "Paroles échangées entre Claude de Ramezay et les Indiens du Sault-Saint-Louis, de la Montagne et du Sault-au-Récollet", 22 and 22 September 1704 (miscatalogued as 1715), C11A 61: 349-350v.

Iroquois declare that they now blocked the path to Albany, and that they would henceforth not travel that route to trade – or even, if the governor so desired, to visit their Mohawk brethren.⁵⁵

Whatever their headmen had told Ramezay in council, the Kahnawakes were not about to place their relationship with their Mohawk relatives on hold, nor to jeopardize their association with Schuyler and the Albany merchants by failing to respond to their overture. Before the year was over a “French Praying Indian” arrived at Albany with news that Schuyler’s wampum belts had been well received and that a delegation of headmen would soon follow with a formal answer.⁵⁶ Sure enough, in June of 1705 six “Chief sachems” of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake who had visited Mohawk country arrived at Albany in a “friendly and peaceable manner” to “wipe away all blood which had been shed by them”. On Schuyler’s insistence two of them accompanied him to Manhattan and listened to Governor Cornbury’s promises of land and missionaries. The call to resettle in New York fell flat, and the call to extend the peace to New England fared little better: while Schuyler reported proudly to the Council of Connecticut that the men had “confirm[ed] a peace” which would “stop all inroads upon the English for the future”, the Kahnawake headmen handed over his wampum to Vaudreuil and proceeded to make a show of dismissing Corlaer’s “ridiculous” invitations in a meeting with their Abenaki brothers.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ *Idem*, especially “Paroles échangées [...]”.

⁵⁶ Wraxall, *Abridgement*, pp. 42-43.

⁵⁷ Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 44; *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 6th ser., v. 3 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1889) pp. 299-300; “Paroles adressées au gouverneur général par les Indiens du Sault-Saint-Louis qui sont allés à Manate”, 1 August 1705, C11A 22: 264; “Paroles échangées entre les Indiens du Sault-Saint-Louis et les Abénaquis”, 13 August 1705, C11A 22 : 264v-265v.

The incentives for maintaining a friendly relationship with Albany were nevertheless growing more powerful than ever. The Royal Navy's disruption to French shipping, combined with the absence of profitable return cargo in this period of unrelenting beaver skin glut on the metropolitan market, now resulted in an unprecedented shortage of trade goods in Canada. By the spring of 1706, Vaudreuil and Raudot were evocatively describing their allies in their reports to the Minister as "all naked owing to the high cost of trade goods and the low price of beaver".⁵⁸ However much the colonial authorities would have preferred to believe that this state of affairs drove their allies to seek plunder on the frontiers of New England, they quickly conceded that it was rather driving them to seek out trading opportunities on the frontier of New York. More specifically, it was the scarcity and cost of red and blue woollen cloth, and even of gunpowder and lead, that attracted the *domiciliés* to Albany – where, in addition, they ended up acquiring a variety of other goods that were available among the French. Another memorialist reported words that encapsulated an attitude which had become commonplace among the *domiciliés*: "What would you do, if you were in our place? Would you purchase very dearly, when you could find them cheaper? Tell me the truth. Are we the slaves of the French? We have believed until now that they loved us – we called them our brothers, and anontjot [Onontio] our father – but we see the contrary, because they abandon us, and steal our beaver. We will carry it to the English of Orange [Albany] and Corlacq [Schenectady]; it is they who love us, embrace us, and give us twice as much merchandise as you do."⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Vaudreuil and the Raudots to the Minister, 30 April 1706, C11A 24: 8-19. On the shortages, see Pritchard, "Ships, Men and Commerce", pp. 255-259. We should wonder to what extent goods manufactured in France but captured on the Atlantic may have made their way into the hands of Albany merchants, and from there circuitously reached those of the *domiciliés*.

⁵⁹ [Charon de la Barre?], Memoir, [1707], C11A 27: 123-123v, 126v-127. Additional evidence for a burst in the intercolonial trade around this time comes from the account book of the Albany merchant Evert Wendell. His transactions with *domiciliés* begin to swell in 1705. See Kees Jan Waterman, ed., "To do justice to him & myself" : Evert Wendell's account book of the fur trade with Indians in Albany, New York, 1695-1726 (Philadelphia:

The policies adopted in response to the beaver glut and the financial woes of the Compagnie de la Colonie only fuelled the flames of resentment. In 1706 not only was the price of *castor sec* once again lowered, but the more valuable *castor gras* ceased to be accepted by the Company with the aim of allowing the metropolitan market to absorb its surplus; not until 1713 would this measure be reversed. If the merchants understood something of the dynamics of European supply and demand, Natives who until now had been encouraged to supply *castor gras* above all had considerably difficulty understanding this decision as anything other than an act of “bad faith”.⁶⁰ While the *domiciliés* turned to Albany to trade their own supplies of beaver, they also found that as a result of the stricter policing and harsher penalties imposed on colonists the Montreal merchants increasingly turned to them to “continue the commerce”. The practice was becoming well established.⁶¹

Although provisions were increasingly made for policing the colonists, Vaudreuil, the Raudots, and Ramezay all adopted “*ménagement*” – consideration, tact – as their governing principle when dealing with their indigenous allies. To Pontchartrain’s reminder that stopping the southward trade and travels of the *domiciliés* “must be done by all means that can possibly be used”, local officials responded by warning that any attempt to seize or otherwise prevent them from taking furs to Albany would “estrangle the natives from us” and generally have “very ill

American Philosophical Society, 2008), pp. 45-46. Wendell’s accounts represent the only such source available for this period.

⁶⁰ “Chefs concernant le Canada pour l’année 1707”, C11A 27: 94-95. On the financial woes and reform of the Compagnie de la Colonie, see Guy Frégault, “La Compagnie de la colonie”, *Revue de l’université d’Ottawa*, 30, 1 (1960), 127-49 (also in Frégault, *Le XVIIIe siècle canadien* [Montreal : HMH, 1968], ch. 5); Harold A. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956 [1930]), pp. 70-74; Dale Miquelon, *New France, 1701-1744: A Supplement to Europe* (Toronto, 1987). pp. 65-66.

⁶¹ Ramezay to Pontchartrain, 12 November 1707, C11A 27: 3-7v. See also Breslay to Pontchartrain, 8 November 1707, C11A 27: 141-142v; Annotated summary of Charon de la Barre to Pontchartrain, [1707], C11A 27: 138-141v.

results”.⁶² The intercolonial trade seemed unstoppable. Vaudreuil and Raudot explained to Pontchartrain that as long as the goods were dear and beaver pelts cheap, it would be “absolutely impossible” to prevent the natives from taking their pelts to Albany. Ramezay for his part advised the minister that it would be “very difficult” and that only a fund of 30 000# to 40 000# worth of trade goods could resolve it.⁶³

Faced with the inability of supplying his allies and the risk of appearing powerless to stop them, so as “not to lose entirely our Natives who were slackening on their own”, Vaudreuil reluctantly cleared the metaphorical path by allowing “some” of his allies to trade in Albany. “Adgekantekoke Indians” (Abenakis from Arsikantegouk or Saint-François, plausibly also Bécancour) as well as Nipissings who orbited around the mission of Île-aux-Tourtes were soon visiting Albany, leading an exasperated Ramezay to exclaim that “all the native nations of this continent” had followed the lead of the Kahnawakes.⁶⁴

At Albany, Peter Schuyler continued to “use all means every day when any of those [...] Indians come here to trade to divert [them?] from any designs against New England”.⁶⁵ He and the Commissioners of Indian Affairs found the visiting Abenakis more difficult to convince. In

⁶² Pontchartrain to Raudot, 6 June 1708, C11G 2: 164-180 (copy in *NYCD* 9: 811); Vaudreuil and Raudot to Pontchartrain, 14 November 1708, C11A 28: 47-48 (copy in *Historical Collections*, 33 [Lansing: Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, 1904], p. 420).

⁶³ Vaudreuil and Raudot to Pontchartrain, 14 November 1708, C11A 28: 47-48. For Ramezay's views, see Ramezay to Pontchartrain, 12 November 1707, C11A 27: 6.

⁶⁴ Ramezay to Pontchartrain, 12 November 1707, C11A 27: 3-7v. For evidence of the Abenaki trade with Albany, see Vaudreuil to the Minister, 4 November 1706, C11A 24: 214-237; “Réponse de Vaudreuil aux Abénaquis”, 15 September 1706, in *CMNF* 2: 458-459; Colden, *Letters and Papers*, 9: 362-364. For evidence of the Nipissing trade with Albany, see “Résumé d'une lettre de René-Charles de Breslay avec commentaires”, 8 November 1707, C11A 27: 141-142; Ramezay to Pontchartrain, 12 November 1707, C11A 27: 4; Vaudreuil and Raudot to Pontchartrain, 15 November 1707, C11A 26: 25v; Summary of a letter by Jacques Leber de Senneville, 1708, C11A 29: 264-264v; “Requête des habitants du haut de l'île de Montréal au roi”, 1708, C11A 29: 264v-265.

⁶⁵ Peter Schuyler to Samuel Partridge, 1 October 170[8?], New York Public Library, Emmet Collection, 3: 8175.

August of 1707, a delegation from Arsikantegouk passed through Albany on their way to Mohawk Country. Though they extended a wampum belt to the Commissioners on that occasion “as a token of their desire to live in Friendship with this Government”, they refused the one that was in return offered to them to urge them to make peace with New England.⁶⁶

Owing to their longstanding relations with the men and women of Albany and Iroquoia, the people of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake were more receptive to such calls. In June of 1707, a Kahnawakes headman named Onongaresson obtained from the Commissioners an underground wampum belt intended to invite the headmen of the mission to “Shut up the Path” to New England.⁶⁷ Through the fall, the Confederacy Mohawks applied pressure of their own on the Christian Iroquois in a parallel effort to have them lay down the hatchet.⁶⁸ Combined efforts soon bore fruit. In the final days of January 1708, a delegate from Kahnawake named “Stiataque” – almost certainly Tataquiséré, who around this time was described at Albany as “well inclined to the English interests” – met with Ramezay in Montreal to bluntly declare that his village’s elders now stopped the hatchets of their young men.⁶⁹ Then, as soon as ice had cleared from the waterways, five chiefs from the village similarly set out for Albany. Arriving there on June 2nd, they offered a formal response to the wampum sent by the Commissioners the

⁶⁶ This seems to be the earliest reference to the Abenaki name for Saint-François (spelled here Adgekantekoke, Adgecontekoke, Adgecontekok). That winter, another group of Adgekantekoke who had been hunting near Wood Creek came to Albany and declared that “though they had another father [...] they desired to live in & [sic] peace & friendship with this government”. They were favourably received and asked to observe a strict neutrality. Colden, *Letters and Papers*, 9: 362-364.

⁶⁷ Onnogarichson (Onongaresson, Onnogarichson, Onongaresson, Onnogarichson) is described here as a “Sachim of Canada”. He also received on this occasion wampum belts to try and secure the release of Eunice Williams. While Livingston’s record of the meeting of the Commissioners leaves the impression that Onongaresson requested the wampum (he “desires” it), it is plausible that he was convinced to accept it while on a trading journey. *LIR*, p. 201.

⁶⁸ Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 50; “Paroles des chefs agniers ... à M. de Ramezay”, 29 September 1707, C11A 26: 81-83v; “Paroles de Vaudreuil envoyées à Ramezay pour répondre aux Agniers venus à Montréal”, after 29 Sept 1707, C11A 26: 84-85v; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 5 November 1708, C11A 28 : 100-147v; Minister to Vaudreuil, 6 June 1708, LAC, MG1 B 26: 328-334v.

⁶⁹ “Paroles des Indiens du Sault et réponse de Ramezay”, 31 January 1708, C11A 29: 16-16v; “Paroles de Vaudreuil aux Indiens du Sault-Saint-Louis”, 4 June 1708, C11A 29: 17-20v; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 5 November 1708, C11A 28 : 100-147v; *LIR*, p. 212.

previous year, confirming that their people now buried the hatchet and were “resolved never to take it in hand again against the people of New England.” For their part, they asked to “have goods cheap and a good price for their beaver”.⁷⁰

New York's entry into the war would complicate the delicate equation of peace. In late 1708, an Abenaki named Echampany was told while visiting Albany that the French and their allies would soon be the target of a major expedition, for the English had resolved to “eat their villages”.⁷¹ Indeed, the British crown was finally responding to New England's outcry against New France by placing its weight behind a scheme, concocted by Samuel Vetch of Massachusetts, for a combined invasion of Canada by land and sea. New York shed its neutrality for the occasion. In early June of 1709, an army under the command of Samuel Nicholson, a former governor of Virginia, left Albany and began to creep towards the foot of Lake Champlain.⁷² Reports of the army's advance were accompanied by special overtures and threats for the *domiciliés*. The Confederacy chiefs sent messengers to Canada with wampum belts addressed to Tatakwiséré, to warn the Kahnawakes and Kanehsatakes that the English had formed and expedition by water and land, and to advise them “by no means to join with the French, or any ways engage themselves with them”. For otherwise they could “expect no mercy,

⁷⁰Wraxall, *Abridgement*, pp. 52-3. See also Vaudreuil to Schuyler, 11 August 1708, New York State Library, Manuscripts and Special Collections, Single Accession #5501; Copy of a letter from Schuyler to Vaudreuil, 26 September [7 October N.S.] 1708, C11A 28: 185-186 (copy in NYCD 9: 818-819).

⁷¹“Rapport d'un abenaquis” (Echampany), 24 December 1708, C11A 28: 233-234v. For similar reports, see also Vaudreuil to the Minister, 12 November 1708, C11A 28 : 152v; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 12 November 1708, C11A 28: 153.

⁷² Regarding New York's entry into the war and the expedition of 1709, see G. M. Waller, “New York's Role in Queen Anne's War, 1702 -1713”, *New York History*, 32 (1952), pp. 40-53; Bruce T. McCully, “Catastrophe in the Wilderness: New Light on the Canada Expedition of 1709”, *William and Mary Quarterly*, Ser. 3, 11 (July 1954), pp. 440-456.

but to be treated like open enemies".⁷³ Schuyler similarly let it known that his fight was with the French, and in not in the least with the people of the mission villages, but that "nevertheless, if the latter wished to side with the French [...] no quarter would be given to them and they would be entirely destroyed".⁷⁴

New York's breach of the neutrality and the lightly veiled threats of its officials created disbelief and panic in the missions. Many believed that "Pitre [Peter Schuyler] and the Flemish [Dutch of Albany] had been forced by the English to take up arms" against the French and their allies.⁷⁵ Mehuman Hinsdale, a Deerfield man who had been captured by two Kahnawakes in April, was told by several natives "that they were now undone, for they feared they should not be able to trade any longer with Albany, and that Canada was not able to furnish them with what they wanted".⁷⁶ Many, especially at Kahnawake and Kanehsatake, continued to favour a neutral stance, looking forward to the end of the imperial conflict and a return to the geopolitical and commercial status quo.

Yet there was good reason to fear that the villages would not be spared should an enemy invasion ever prove successful. The surest means of self-preservation, in this perspective, was to contribute to the French war effort. In late July of 1709, some 450 Abenakis, Christian Iroquois, Algonquins, Nipissings, Ojibwa, and Ottawa responded to the French call to arms, mobilizing alongside 750 militiamen and regulars led by Ramezay to oppose the enemy advance. Yet upon learning that the enemy army, at three thousand men, was over twice as strong as the combined

⁷³ *LIR*, pp. 212-3.

⁷⁴ "Déclarations d'un Indien du Sault [Tegannontiagon or Tegannonsiagon]", 28 August 1709, C11A 30: 139-140. Along the same lines, see *LIR*, pp. 212-3; "Paroles des Indiens du Sault-Saint-Louis aux Agniers", 18 September 1709, C11A 30: 137

⁷⁵ Though this feeling must have been common among the Canadian Iroquois, the words quoted here are from Onondaga deputies. Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 1 May 1710, C11A 31: 216-218v; Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 2 November 1710, C11A 31: 15-38v; Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 3 November 1710, C11A 31: 39-62v.

⁷⁶ *CSPC* 21: 276; Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, pp. 201-202.

Franco-Aboriginal forces, and that it had built three solid forts at the foot of Lake Champlain, all of these allies opted to disband.⁷⁷ Fortunately for the people of the mission villages, the advancing enemy never made it beyond Lake Champlain.

The experience would repeat itself in 1711, when news reached Canada that a second pincer offensive was afoot. Warriors from the mission villages once again accepted from Vaudreuil a hatchet to be used against “Pitre” (Peter Schuyler, i.e. Albany), taking part in defensive manoeuvring in anticipation of enemy forces which, like two years earlier, never reached the St. Lawrence Valley.⁷⁸ French officials missed no occasion to reinforce the view that neutrality was no guarantee against the violence of an invasion. As Vaudreuil explained to the people of Saint-François, “the only means to resist our enemies was for us to unite together and all to form but one body; that it was a mistake to expect to be able to defend ourselves in different places; that this war was one of religion, but at the same time a common one, it being the intention of the English to utterly destroy them, if successful in conquering us and driving us from this continent.”⁷⁹

The threat of invasion elicited mixed reactions among the inhabitants of the mission villages. New York's about-face, its departure from the very neutrality it so ardently requested from its trading partners, inspired in some individuals a radical change of heart. Onongaresson, the man who had accepted a wampum belt from the Commissioners in Albany aimed at “Shut[ting] up the Path” to New England in the summer of 1707, figured prominently among the

⁷⁷ The defensive campaign is described in Ramezay to the Minister, 4 November 1709, C11A 30: 346-351v; Catalogne, *Recueil*, pp. 72-77. For a perspective from the opposing army, see Bruce T. McCully, “Catastrophe in the Wilderness: New Light on the Canada Expedition of 1709”, *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 11, 3 (July 1954), pp. 441-456.

⁷⁸ Vaudreuil to the Minister, 25 October 1711, C11A 32: 41-54v.

⁷⁹ Vaudreuil to the Minister, 25 October 1711, C11A 32: 41-64v. See also “Mémoire de la marquise de Vaudreuil au ministre Pontchartrain”, [1710], C11A 31 : 67-70v; *JRAD* 66: 193.

Christian Iroquois warriors active on the warpath three years later.⁸⁰ Following the dissolution of the forces amassed at Albany in 1711, some “French Indians” similarly went to prowl in the town’s vicinity. That October, in what would be the final incident of the war in New York, a party of perhaps twenty warriors from Kanehsatake cut down two families.⁸¹

The imperial and intercolonial war was at an end, with France and Britain declaring an armistice in 1712. That spring, a Kahnawake sachem by the name of Sarachdowane arrived at Albany with three unidentified Frenchmen. During a meeting with the Commissioners on May 30th, he acknowledged that the Nippissing, Abenaki, Algonquin, and Iroquois *domiciliés* had during the previous fall by their actions shut the “open path of peace and unity” but that he had now been sent by them to wipe the blood and bury the hatchet. He asked that it be “forgotten and forgiven” and that the path be reopened.⁸² This suited the Commissioners, who advised Governor Hunter “that it would be proper to grant them liberty to come as formerly; if not, then we can expect nothing else but an open war with those Indians and we can’t see that we are in a capacity to wage war considering the poor circumstances these frontiers are in at present.” Hunter saw things differently. Amidst rumours of renewed hostilities on the frontier, he issued orders directing the commissioners to “stop the trade between Albany and the French Indians”

⁸⁰ Onongaresson returned to Montreal in the fall of 1710 with a prisoner reportedly taken some eight to ten leagues from Boston. Ramezay to the Minister, 25 October 1710, C11A 31: 168; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 3 November 1710, C11A 31: 39-62v. Similarly, the famous La Plaque, who had taken his distance from the mission in recent years, was once again distinguishing himself as a scout in 1709 alongside a man named “Le Grand Goyongouin” (“The Great Cayuga”). “Mémoire pour Mr de Ramezay”, 14 July 1709, C11A 30:112v. See also Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 3 November 1710, C11A 31: 39-62v; Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 80.

⁸¹ NYCD 5: 281-282, 284, 302. The prisoners made by the people of Sault-au-Recollet in the fall of 1711 had not yet been released a year later. Vaudreuil to the Minister, 15 October 1712, C11A 33: 44-49v.

⁸² Speech of a sachem of Cachnawaga to the Commissioners of Indian affairs, 19 May 1712 (OS), A1984 57: 152. The document in fact refers to the Skawanaquatie, Skachsowane, Erondax, and Cachnawage. The latter term appears to refer here to the Christian Iroquois of both Kahnawake and Kanehsatake, as “Cachnawage” is mistakenly described as “a Praying Indian castle on Montreal Island”. Erondax (Orondax) refers to the Algonquins, In his *Lexique de la langue iroquoise*, Cuoq confirms that the Mohawk-speaking Christian Iroquois called the Abenakis of Saint-François “Skensowahneronon” (from Skensowa, Saint-François, and Skensowahne, meaning from Saint-François). He similarly translates Nippissing in Mohawk as “Skekwanen-hronon”. See *Lexique*, pp. 42, 155.

and advising that “all French Indians coming to Albany should be secured as prisoners”.⁸³ There is no evidence, however, that this measure was ever applied before news of a definitive peace settlement reached the colony.⁸⁴

With the Peace of Utrecht, France's transatlantic shipping enjoyed a resurgence which rectified the shortages of trade goods that had plagued Canada for the better part of a decade. The beaver glut had subsided and metropolitan demand was once more on the rise. In the colony, the Company once again began accepting *castor gras* in its warehouses.⁸⁵ The core incentives to trading across the colonial divide nevertheless persisted for both merchants and *domiciliés*. Royal and ministerial instructions to the governor and intendant continued to insist on the necessity of preventing the Natives from trading with the English. But Vaudreuil, as well as Bégon and Ramezay, maintained the stance that had been adopted a decade earlier: as long as the price of beaver remained low and that of trade goods remained high, the natives and merchants would “find their advantage” in this illicit trade and it would be impossible to curb it; until then, *ménagement* continued to be the wisest policy, and the “*voies de l'insinuation*” (persuasion, suggestion) the only prudent means at their disposal. On a number of occasions Ramezay spoke to the headmen of the mission villages, notably in the presence of an agent of the Company, to discourage them “as much as it was possible for him to do so” from carrying their beaver to Albany.⁸⁶

⁸³ Commissioners of Indian affairs to Governor Hunter, 19 May 1712 (OS), A1984 57: 153; Council to Commissioners, 13 August 1712 (OS), A1984 58: 5; Colden, *Letters and Papers*, 9: 412.

⁸⁴ Commissioners of Indian Affairs to Hunter, 16 December 1712, A1984 57: 75a.

⁸⁵ Pritchard, *Ships, Men, and Commerce*, pp. 304-307.

⁸⁶ “Mémoire du Roi” to Vaudreuil and Bégon, 25 June 1713, B 35: 275-279v; “Mémoire du Roi” to Ramezay and Bégon, 10 July 1715, B: 37(3): 708; Ramezay and Bégon to the Minister, 7 November 1715, C11A 35: 31v-32;

The culmination of these sporadic councils occurred in the spring of 1719, when Vaudreuil met with the headmen of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake. The recent transfer of the monopoly from the Compagnie de la Colonie to the Compagnie d'Occident (soon to be absorbed by the Compagnie des Indes) may very well have prompted this latest intervention. The coincidental murder that winter of the two-year-old son of a La Prairie *habitant* by an inebriated Tatakwiséré, and the willingness of the colonial authorities to allow this serious incident to go unpunished, may also have given the governor more leverage among the village's headmen and elders than usual.⁸⁷ In any case, Vaudreuil impressed on the headmen the importance of carrying to Albany only the fruit of their own hunt, and of bringing back only goods for their own use. The governor proposed a novelty: henceforth canoes venturing south should take with them written permits issued on his authority and specifying the amount of furs carried, and on their return they should report to the fort at Chambly to submit to a proper inspection. Any goods unaccounted for would be seized there or by the patrol posted at the north end of Lake Champlain. Vaudreuil triumphantly reported to the minister that the headmen had acquiesced to all of his proposals.⁸⁸

Vaudreuil to the Conseil, 14 October 1716, C11A 36: 79; Lanouiller, 2 Octobre 1716, ANQ-M, Archives judiciaires, pièces détachées, 90.

⁸⁷ Three inebriated men from Kahnawake, of whom one was identified as "Th8atak8isere" and the two others remained anonymous, were accused of the murder in February 1719. The Kahnawakes countered that it was Jacques Detailly who had sold brandy to the three men, and that it was accordingly Detailly who had "killed Gagné's child". The case never went to trial. The fact that Detailly had taken a silver medal as security is a good indication that we are dealing here with Tatakwiséré the headman, and not merely a man who had inherited his name, as royal silver medals were awarded selectively by the governor. The fact that "Th8atak8isere" is mentioned only once in the file, and that he is not identified as a headman, suggests the extent to which the internal politics of Kahnawake were of surprisingly little interest to the judicial authorities. See "Procès contre Jacques Destailly [Detailly]", 22-25 February 1719, ANQ, TL4, S1, D2325; also 8 November 1719, ASSM, Fonds Faillon, HH 98. For an analysis of this and other *domicilié* brushes with colonial justice, see Grabowski, *Common Ground*, p. 161.

⁸⁸ Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Minister, 26 October 1719, C11A 40: 56-57v; Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Council of Marine, 26 October 1720, C11A 42: 21-23. The fact that Vaudreuil played up this arrangement in his correspondence should not be taken to mean that the Kahnawakes necessarily saw this as a special encounter. Though in the following years the Conseil instructed Vaudreuil to ensure that the detachments at Chambly and on Lake Champlain examine the contents of the native canoes, and taking down the names of the individuals, of their mission, and the goods carried on both the way to and from Albany, there is little evidence that the arrangement

Later that year, officials in the colony made another tentative departure from the policy of *ménagement* by pushing for the posting of a military officer and for the construction of a fort at Kahnawake. Throughout the war years, the oft relocated village had scrupulously been fortified and on a number of occasions had welcomed garrisons. Most recently, Pierre Boucher de Boucherville and a handful of soldiers had briefly been posted there.⁸⁹ But the presence of either a palisade or military men proved bothersome in peacetime. The relocation of the village to a site a short distance upriver in 1716 allowed the community to shed this small but inconvenient garrison. Though royal funds were allocated to fortify the new village, neither its inhabitants nor its missionaries took the trouble of encircling the village with a palisade – this, after all, could be achieved in little time if and when war ever broke out. By 1719 it occurred to Vaudreuil, Bégon, and Ramezay that the posting of a permanent officer and a garrison in the mission, and the construction of the attendant barracks and fort, offered the surest means of keeping the illicit trade in check.⁹⁰

If the headmen of Kahnawake were willing to pay lip-service to Vaudreuil's scheme requiring written permits, inspections and seizures, it was because it was largely unenforceable and unobtrusive. A garrisoned fort within the village, on the other hand, represented a real

heralded by the governor was ever enforced. See Grabowski, *Common Ground*, pp. 263-264; Délibération du Conseil de la Marine, 25 January 1723, C11A 124: 573v-574; Louis XV to Vaudreuil and Bégon, 8 June 1722, copy in NYCD 9: 908-909; Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Minister, 14 October 1723, C11A 45: 24; Mémoire du Roy to Beauharnois and Dupuy, 14 May 1726, B: 49(2): 407; Ordonnance of 21 March 1720, BANQ, 03Q_E1,S1,P1158; Ordonnance of 5 September 1722, 03Q_E1,S1,P1436; Ordonnance of 16 August 1723, Q_E1,S1,P1554.

⁸⁹ René Boucher de Laperrière had been posted at Kahnawake in 1704, but it is not clear for how long this lasted. See Vaudreuil to Boucher de Laperrière, 5 June 1704, Viger-Verreau, P32/008/131. His nephew Pierre Boucher de Boucherville was posted there c. 1716, as noted in TL4,S1,D1991.

⁹⁰ Both Devine and Green follow the Jesuit lead in attributing the lead in this affair to Ramezay. In fact, though Vaudreuil was careful to avoid jeopardizing his relations with the Jesuits, his correspondence with the court reveals that he too was a proponent of the fort and garrison, which he saw as "necessary". See for example Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Conseil de la Marine, and Conseil's deliberation, 8 October 1721, 44: 37v-38. Though Vaudreuil and Ramezay were often at odds, there exists a tantalizing hint that they collaborated on this issue: in trying to understand the situation at an ocean's remove, the Conseil de la Marine concluded that "it must have been M. de Ramezay who obtained this posting [place] from M. de Vaudreuil for the Sr. de Contrecoeur". See Résumé d'une requête des missionnaires du Sault-Saint-Louis et délibération du Conseil de Marine, 24 May 1721, C11A 43: 250v. Cf. Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga*, pp. 185-191; Green, *A New People*, pp. 183-184.

imposition and threat to the community's autonomy, including to its ability to maintain a relationship with the people of Albany. The Kahnawakes responded with alarm and indignation to the news that Ramezay had obtained a royal order to post François-Antoine Pécaudy de Contrecoeur as commander in the village. As they would soon explain to Vaudreuil, "Our fields and our cabins, which are left open, and – what is of more importance – our wives and our daughters, are not safe with the French soldiers. Our young men, who are very numerous, follow but too willingly the bad examples before their eyes; and a thousand vices that were formerly unknown among us have unfortunately been introduced in our midst since we have had a garrison. [...] Tranquillity and good order have been banished".⁹¹

The speaker was well aware that invocations of morality and order were more likely to sway colonial officials than claims to free trade. Still, this underlying issue could not be ignored. "[W]e are distrusted, which is very insulting to us", lamented the community's orator, "[...] we are treated as slaves". The fact that there was no talk of garrisoning any of the other mission villages made the affront even more difficult to stomach for the people of Kahnawake, who felt that they were being unfairly singled out. "[W]e promise to go there no longer," declared the speaker regarding Albany, in what amounted to a defiant bluff, "provided the rule be the same for all the other villages – who go there like us, and to whom not a word is said." As for the expense of maintaining a garrison, it "would be much better spent in supplying more pressing needs – such as those of poor widows and orphans, whose husbands and fathers have been killed

⁹¹ "Résumé d'une requête des missionnaires du Sault-Saint-Louis et délibération du Conseil de Marine", 24 May 1721, C11A 43: 250-256; "Délibération du Conseil de Marine au sujet des représentations des missionnaires du Sault-Saint-Louis", 12 May 1722, C11A 106 : 183-187 (copy in *JRAD* 67: 72-82); "Extrait de quelques lettres des missionnaires de Canada au père d'Avaugour, leur procureur en France, depuis la fin d'août jusqu'au commencement de novembre 1721", 1721, C11A 124: 513-513v.

in war for the good of the colony.”⁹² Again, the material welfare and underlying human relations of the community were paramount.

The Jesuits and the Bishop of Quebec, added their own voices to the protest and made sure that it reached ears in Versailles. To post a garrison at Kahnawake, according to the missionaries, was bound to result in “the ruin of the village”. Based on their past experience, they claimed that soldiers and officers supplied the villagers with liquor and that continual quarrels ensued. Moreover, they pointed out that far from curbing the illicit trade, garrison commanders posted in the villages had often shared in its profits, and would no doubt encourage it.⁹³ Vaudreuil suspended the execution of the project to give an opportunity for the Jesuits to voice their complaints and for the Conseil de la Marine to settle the matter. Although the governor continued until the fall of 1721 to advise the Crown of the “necessity” of building and garrisoning a fort in the mission village to curb the illicit trade, he backed off thereafter. Ramezay and Bégon, and in a haphazard way the Conseil de la Marine, for their part continued to push for the construction of a palisade and garrison house through 1724; the royal engineer Chaussegros de Léry, at the urging of the intendant, went as far as to draft plans and make a detailed estimate of the costs. Yet Vaudreuil persisted in obstructing the project, on the grounds that it was crucial to avoid “embittering” the villagers at a time when their military support was “more than ever” needed.⁹⁴ By 1725, the Crown abandoned the idea of building and garrisoning

⁹² Idem.

⁹³ Idem.

⁹⁴ “Extrait d'une lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon datée du 26 octobre 1720” with the deliberations of the Conseil de Marine, January 1721, C11A 43: 8-8v; “Résumé d'une requête des missionnaires du Sault-Saint-Louis” with the deliberations of the Conseil de Marine, 24 May 1721, C11A 43: 250-256; “Résumé d'une lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon datée du 8 octobre 1721” with the deliberations of the Conseil de Marine, 2 December 1721, C11A 43: 202-206; Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Conseil de la Marine, with the deliberations of the Conseil de Marine, 8 October 1721, 44: 6-28v; Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Conseil de la Marine, with the deliberations of the Conseil de Marine, 8 October 1721, 44 : 37v-38; “Résumé d'une lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon datée du 8 octobre 1721” with the deliberations of the Conseil de Marine, 19 December 1721, C11A 43: 380-402; Chaussegros de Léry, “Estimations pour une maison, un corps de garde et un fort de pieux à faire au Sault-Saint-Louis” and “Plans pour une maison et

a fort and agreed that the funds that had been destined for the construction – totalling 4181# – be instead employed to the fortifications of Montreal, on the condition that this amount be redirected to the fortifications of the village if the need ever arose.⁹⁵

Strong evidence of the Kahnawakes's frustration and of their intention to keep on trading with Albany come what may had manifested itself in the spring of 1722, when an unusually large convoy of sixty *domiciliés* in twenty four fur-laden canoes journeying south on Lake Champlain met with a patrol commanded by François Hérault de Saint-Michel de Gourville. When the officer attempted to stop them, they “went to him hatchet in hand, making *sasacoys* [war-whoops]”. Saint-Michel responded by ordering his detachment to take up arms. The Kahnawakes told his interpreter that they were heading together for Albany, and that they would be coming back together so as to “prevent anyone from opposing the execution of their enterprise”. He was forced to let them pass.⁹⁶ Nothing quite like this had ever occurred, it would seem. The tensions that surfaced between 1719 and 1722 point to a significant shift in the nature of the relationship between the *domiciliés* and the colonial military establishment; as officers-fur traders gave way to officers-law enforcers, *domiciliés* and military officers increasingly found themselves at cross-purpose.

corps de garde à faire au Sault-Saint-Louis pour y loger un officier et placer une garde”, 30 September 1721, C11A 44: 254-255; Délibération du Conseil de Marine sur une lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon datée du 4 novembre 1721, 8 June 1722, C11A 124 : 553-554; Délibération du Conseil de Marine, April 1722, C11A 124: 509-511v; Délibération du Conseil de la Marine, 25 January 1723, C11A 124: 571v; Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Minister, with commentaries, 14 October 1723, C11A 45: 28v-29; Chaussegros de Léry to the Minister, 30 October 1723, C11A 45: 372-373v; Ordres de Vaudreuil à Chaussegros de Léry, 27 January 1724, C11A 46: 151, 299-299v, 343; Chaussegros de Léry to the Minister, 23 May 1724, C11A 46: 320-321v; Ordre de Vaudreuil à Chaussegros de Léry, 18 October 1724, C11A 46: 150; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 25 October 1724, C11A 46: 99-101v; Mme de Vaudreuil to the Minister, 29 October 1724, C11A 46: 117-122v; Bégon to the Minister, 2 November 1724, C11A 46: 149-149v; Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Minister, 2 November 1724, C11A 46: 27-42v.

⁹⁵ Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga*, p. 191.

⁹⁶ Ramezay to the Council, 15 October 1722, C11A 44: 414-415v.

Although the mutually supportive dynamic of trade and military alliance thrived in the continent's interior, where commercial privileges were given over to the post commanders in an effort to compensate them and reinforce indigenous alliances, it seems to have come undone as far as the missions of the St. Lawrence Valley were concerned.⁹⁷ Over a quarter of a century, the face of the military establishment had changed. War had decimated the men of the Le Moyne family. Though its last remaining scion in the St. Lawrence Valley, Charles le Moyne de Longueuil the younger, had inherited a high standing among the Iroquois of the Confederacy and the mission villages, his social ascension had deprived him of the daily trade-centered interactions that had made his father and brothers the most skilled and appreciated intercultural intermediaries. "As he understands their language better than he speaks it," wrote Vaudreuil, revealingly, of Longueuil's relations with the Iroquois, "he cannot do without the Sieur de Joncaire or Sieur de la Chauvignerie when he goes to these nations".⁹⁸

Those few officers who did develop a profound understanding of the inhabitants of the mission villages during the early eighteenth century, chief among them Louis-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire and Michel Maray de la Chauvignerie, were expected to use their skills to enforce the state's haphazard regulation of trade. When reports surfaced that eight pieces of red and blue

⁹⁷ It should also be pointed out that as Gratien Allaire has demonstrated, the role of post commanders and officers in fur trading partnerships has been exaggerated: while they brought to partnerships the right to trade, their merchant partners managed the business activity. After about 1730, the officers' direct involvement in the trade declined even further. See Allaire, "Officiers et marchands : les sociétés de commerce des fourrures, 1715-1760", *RHAF*, 40 (1987): 424-25; Cf. Cameron Nish, *Les Bourgeois-Gentilshommes de la Nouvelle-France, 1729-1748* (Montreal: Fides, 1968), p. 98.

⁹⁸ Charles le Moyne de Longueuil senior had died in 1685, weakened by the previous year's expedition to Iroquoia; Jacques Le Moyne de Maricourt died in 1690; François Le Moyne de Bienville died in 1691; Louis Le Moyne de Châteauguay died in 1694; Paul Le Moyne de Maricourt died in 1704; Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville died in 1706; Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville relocated to Louisiana in 1699. Primogeniture, meanwhile, had ensured Le Moyne de Longueuil jr. a privileged upbringing as a page in a noble household in the metropole, from which he returned only in his late twenties. It might be noted that Jacques Leber de Senneville, son of Pierre Le Moyne de Longueuil's brother-in-law and business partner, similarly spent his youth in France. See the relevant *DCB* entries. Regarding Longueuil's linguistic limits, see Vaudreuil to the Minister, 6 November 1712, C11A 33: 50-70v (copy in *RAPQ* 1947-48: 167).

cloth belonging to men from Albany were being stored in the cabin of Ontachogo, a war chief from Kahnawake, it was left to La Chauvignerie to travel to the village, make him admit the fact, and “persuade” him to allow a seizure “without making any opposition” (at length and only upon being promised that he could keep two of the pieces of cloth for himself, Ontachogo accepted to relinquish the remaining six).⁹⁹ La Chauvignerie’s intercultural skills were uncommon. Most of the officers who were posted along the Richelieu-Lake Champlain axis and entrusted with the duty of policing the illicit trade lacked the linguistic and cultural skills necessary to minimize tensions. The Sieur de Saint-Michel, on that harrowing day in the spring of 1722, had required the services of one of his men to interact with the determined convoy. Confrontation, rather than collaboration, increasingly typified this relationship between *domiciliés* and military officers.

The outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Abenaki War in 1721 did little to reverse this trend. In the years following the Peace of Utrecht and the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Abenaki War, many of the men and women who left Saint-François and Bécancour to return to the watersheds of Acadia found that coexistence with the English settlers who now swarmed to the region was increasingly untenable. Massachusetts officials persisted in interpreting the Abenakis’ desire to live in peace as admissions of guilt in previous wars, as declarations of “hearty subjection and obedience unto the Crown of Great Britain”, and as legally binding transfers of land. As the encroachment of settlers continued to creep up the Kennebec Valley and as fortified outposts multiplied in the region, some Abenakis reiterated their desire to live in peace, while other asserted their sovereignty to their interlocutors’ deaf ears. Episodes of frontier tension

⁹⁹ For an overview of Joncaire and La Chauvignerie’s careers, see Yves F. Zoltvany, “Louis-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire”, *DCB* 2: 125-127; Serge Goudreau, “Michel Maray de La Chauvignerie : interprète des langues iroquoises (1706-1778), *Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, (1996) 48: 317-330. For the incident with Ontachogo, see TL4, S1, D1991.

multiplied, as small groups of warriors made their resentment of settlers' encroachments manifest by attacking their property and livestock, and on occasion beating and manhandling settlers, which prompted additional colonial military build-up.¹⁰⁰

French officials and missionaries, long given to worrying about the possibility of Anglo-Abenaki rapprochement and what it would mean for the security of New France, welcomed these tensions and lost no opportunity to remind their allies that they should tolerate no intrusion on their lands. French agents such as Sébastien Rasle, the Jesuit missionary of Norridgewock on the Kennebec River, and Joseph d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin, an Abenaki *métis* and officer living on the Penobscot, continued to distribute annual presents in Acadia and to assure the region's inhabitants that additional assistance would be forthcoming if they were willing to defend their territory.¹⁰¹ Yet Governor Vaudreuil was prohibited by his superiors in Versailles from openly supporting the Abenakis. When two chiefs from Norridgewock travelled to Quebec, in the fall of 1719, with the aim of drawing their French and *domicilié* allies into the brewing conflict, they discovered that the governor was willing to offer only hatchets and ammunition. "Is it thus", countered one of them, "that a father succours his children? And have we succoured you in this way?" A true father, he explained, "advances, withdraws his son, and declares to the enemy that it is with him that he must deal."¹⁰² This Vaudreuil could not offer.

Reiterated French offers of assistance and calls for active resistance did, nevertheless, contribute to the ascendancy of those in favour of defiance and armed confrontation at

¹⁰⁰ Miller, "Abenakis and Colonists", pp. 250-271; Vaudreuil to Conseil, 31 October 1718, C11A 39: 157-162v.

¹⁰¹ Vaudreuil to Duc d'Orléans, February 1716, C11A 36: 124-141 (copy in *NYCD* 9: 871); Vaudreuil to Conseil, 31 October 1718, C11A 39: 157-162v; Pierre-François-Xavier de Charlevoix, "Mémoire sur les limites de l'Acadie, envoyé à Monseigneur le Duc d'Orléans par le père Charlevoix", 19 October 1720, C11E 2: 63-68 (copy in *CMNF* 3: 49-54, and misdated in *NYCD* 9: 878-881).

¹⁰² Compare Vaudreuil and Bégon's account with that of Charlevoix. Vaudreuil and Bégon to Council, 26 October 1719, C11A 40: 50-67v; Charlevoix, "Mémoire sur les limites de l'Acadie", 19 October 1720, C11E 2: 63-68 (copy in *CMNF* 3: 52-53).

Norridgewock and elsewhere in Abenaki Country. Acts of mutual defiance along the northern boundary of Maine quickly spiralled into open conflict. English officials detained four Abenaki hostages in Boston, while soldiers captured Saint-Castin at Penobscot and, in a failed attempt to seize Rasle, burned Norridgewock to the ground. Bent on avenging these actions and on seizing a number of captives with which they might secure the safe return of their hostages, Abenaki war parties spread out from Norridgewock to raid the settlements at the mouth of the Kennebec River.¹⁰³ Shortly thereafter, the people of Norridgewock secured the assistance of their brethren of Saint-François and Bécancour, as well as of the warriors of Lorette.¹⁰⁴ Whereas French officers, soldiers, and militiamen had formerly made it a custom to take the field alongside warriors from the mission villages, they were conspicuously absent this time around.

Motivating the Christian Iroquois of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake to take the field alongside their *domiciliés* allies also proved a challenge. Their intimate links to the people of Iroquoia and Albany were a powerful motivation to neutrality. Late in 1722, the Christian Iroquois received a wampum belt from the Confederacy telling them “My brothers [...] if you join the Abenakis against the English we will join the English to make war to you.”¹⁰⁵ Early the following year, the Mohawks dispatched another belt to the people of Saint-François and Bécancour, demanding that they too abandon the cause of the Norridgewocks and warning that otherwise the Six Nations would declare war against them. Informed that the Iroquois were threatening war, Governor Vaudreuil sent word to Kahnawake to formally request the village's

¹⁰³ Vaudreuil to Shute, 22 December 1721, copy in *CMNF* 3: 63; Vaudreuil and Bégon to Council, 17 October 1722, 44: 303-307 (copy in *CMNF* 3: 85-88, and *NYCD*, 9:909-912). Samuel Penhallow, *History of the Wars of New-England with the Eastern Indians, or a Narrative of their Continued Perfidy and Cruelty* (Boston: Oscar H. Harpel, 1859 [1726]), pp. 86-89; Alexander Hamilton's Journal, in James Phinney Baxter, *Pioneers of New France in New England* (Albany: Munsell and Sons, 1984), pp. 317-320.

¹⁰⁴ Vaudreuil and Bégon to Council, 17 October 1722, 44: 303-307; Vaudreuil to Council, 22 October 1722, C11A 124: 562-563 (copy in *CMNF* 3: 82-88).

¹⁰⁵ Ramezay to the Minister, 12 October 1723, C11A 45: 326.

assistance. Although he was confident that the Six Nations would not dare to declare war against their brethren in the mission villages, his political opponent Ramesay was convinced of the contrary; whereas the one did his best to incite the people of the missions to join the war, the other attempted to dissuade them from it. Most certainly, Ramesay feared the effect that a falling out between the two Iroquois populations might have on the lucrative illicit trade between his town and Albany.¹⁰⁶

The warriors of Saint-François and Bécancour campaigned alongside those of Abenaki Country through 1724, assisted by others “of the nation of the Loups” (Connecticut Valley Algonquians) and from Lorette”.¹⁰⁷ Although Vaudreuil continued to entertain the hope in his correspondence that the Canadian Iroquois would also take up the cause, an English captive returning from Canada had a better grasp of the situation when he reported that the sachems of Kahnawake were against the war, and that only ten villagers or so were in favour of it. An unimpressive seven were reported to have taken the warpath.¹⁰⁸ Responding to a wampum belt addressed to them by the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, several sachems “deputed from four castles of Indians living in Canada” – most plausibly a reference to the Iroquois of Kahnawake, and the Iroquois, Algonquins, and Nipissings from Kanesatake – arrived at Albany on June 10th,

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 326-331v; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 6 October 1723, copy in *CMNF* 3: 91-93; Vaudreuil and Begon to Minister, 14 October 1723, C11A 45: 13v-16v. For another example of Mohawk threats to the Abenakis, Alexander Hamilton's Journal in Baxter, *Pioneers of New France*, pp. 327-332.

¹⁰⁷ Vaudreuil to the Minister, 25 October 1724, copy in *CMNF* 3: 108-110; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 18 November 1725, copy in *CMNF* 3: 111-114.

¹⁰⁸ Idem. Alexander Hamilton's Journal in Baxter, *Pioneers of New France*, pp. 327-328, 330-332; Vaudreuil to the Minister, 6 October 1723, copy in *CMNF* 3: 91-93; Vaudreuil and Begon to Minister, 14 October 1723, C11A 45: 20v-21; Ramezay to the Minister, 12 October 1723, C11A 45: 326-331; *The Courant*, 31 August 1724, cited in Coleman, *New England Captives*, p. 152.

explaining that they had come to lay down the hatchet that they had raised against New England and promising to use their influence to convince the other nations to do the same.¹⁰⁹

The razing of Norridgewock by the English in August of 1724 had a stimulating effect among the Abenaki and Huron *domiciliés*, notably owing to the arrival of refugees who found a haven at Bécancour and Saint-François. Motivating the Christian Iroquois was another matter. The following year, towards the end of August a massive party of Christian Iroquois finally raised as a result of French efforts was dissuaded and turned back “partly by the persuasion of the people of this place [Albany] and partly by their sachems”.¹¹⁰ On September 20th, a delegation representing the Iroquois of Kahnawake and the Iroquois, Algonquins, and Nipissings of Kanehsatake, arrived at Albany and attempted to convene a meeting there with the governor of Massachusetts or his delegates, as well as with the representatives of the Six Nations. While the men would not reveal their intentions, it was supposed by all that they were going to propose a peace. Though the optimistic Commissioners of Indian Affairs promptly informed Governor Dummer of Massachusetts of this, the latter declined the invitation to negotiate anything at Albany.¹¹¹

Meanwhile, the Abenaki war effort was increasingly undermined from another direction. The Penobscots' commitment to Abenaki resistance had been lagging. Beginning in the summer of 1725, they responded to English overtures and took a leading role in negotiating an end to the conflict. The Abenaki of the St. Lawrence Valley, along with the Norridgewocks who had found

¹⁰⁹ Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 151. Wraxall suspected in hindsight that the true intent of this visit was to obtain trade goods, and that the laying down the Hatchet “was but a specious pretense”.

¹¹⁰ *DCHM* 10: 328-329, 333-334, 337.

¹¹¹ *DCHM* 10: 336, 338; Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 160.

a refuge among them, held out somewhat longer. While they took no part in the treaty concluded between the Penobscots and New England in August of 1726, they began to respond to the Penobscots' diplomatic efforts early the following year. That spring, they sent some of their own headmen southward to inform the New Englanders of their resolve to enter into the previous years' treaty. Several families followed, assembling at Taconock on the Kennebec (the site of current-day Winslow, Maine) to await news of Dummer's intentions, and to receive supplies distributed on his orders. A peace conference finally got under way at Falmouth on July 28th.¹¹²

Among the issues raised by Auyaummowett, who spoke on behalf of the Abenakis of the St. Lawrence Valley and Norridgewock, were questions of cohabitation and trade. He informed Dummer that a "great number of people", his people, would soon come over to the Pejepscot and Saco Rivers, and requested that "a sufficient supply of goods" be made available to them in those places. After the conclusion of the treaty, he explained, "we [the Arresaguntacooks] shall scatter some east some west, and all go different ways". To meet his people's material needs, he asked that John Gyles (an interpreter who had spent the years 1689 to 1698 as a captive of the Maliseet) and Samuel Jordan (another of the few Englishmen who could speak Abenaki) be appointed truck masters at Pejepscot Fort and Saco, respectively, and that gunsmiths be made available in both places. The Norridgewock speaker made similar requests regarding the staffing of the posts on the Kennebec River and at Richmond. Various complaints about trade were heard by the governor, who ordered that offending traders offer satisfaction.¹¹³ In early August

¹¹² For the lead-up to the conference, see *DCHM* 10: 401-404, 406-407, 410. For the conference proceedings, see "[Second] Conference with the Eastern Indians at the Further Ratification of the Peace, held at Falmouth in Casco-Bay, in July 1727" in *Collections of the Maine Historical Society*, 3 (1853): 407-447.

¹¹³ *CMHS* 3: 416-442. See also *DCHM* 10: 358-359, 391-392; Penhallow, *History*, pp. 119-127.

1727, a delegation of Abenaki chiefs arrived in Albany to re-establish "Peace & Friendship" with New York's government.¹¹⁴

Trading outlets were cropping up throughout the borderlands. John (Johannes) Schuyler, Peter's brother and a prominent trader in his own right, had established an estate at Saratoga on the Hudson River in 1714. Over the next three decades it would grow into one of the largest in the province.¹¹⁵ At Oswego, on the south shore of Lake Ontario, Anglo-Dutch merchants were trading without opposition since about 1720. In an effort to wrest the western trade from the control of the French, who had built a fortified post at Niagara, and from that of the Albany merchants, Governor Burnet of New York subsequently obtained from the Six Nations a tentative permission to erect a fortified trading post at Oswego.¹¹⁶

Vaudreuil and his successor Beauharnois were vehemently opposed to the enemy's presence at Oswego. In February of 1725, Vaudreuil convinced a delegation of four headmen from Kahnawake, led by Tekarihogen, and a fifth from Kanehsatake, to travel to Albany to register their protest with the Commissioners of Indian Affairs. Though they allowed the French governor to believe that they would threaten to destroy whatever post was erected at Oswego, the Commissioner's minutes indicate that the headmen merely pointed out that it was Vaudreuil who intended to do so and advised that the English abandon this project which threatened to "interrupt" the trade between Montreal and Albany.¹¹⁷ After the construction of a stone

¹¹⁴ Wraxall, *Abridgement*, p. 171.

¹¹⁵ On the development of Saratoga and its state in 1745, see Corbett, *A Clash of Cultures*, pp. 112-117. On trading there, see Philip Livingston to Robert Livingston, 20 February 1721, Livingston Family Papers, Franklin Delanoe Roosevelt Presidential Library.

¹¹⁶ On Oswego, see Johnson Gaylord Cooper, *Oswego in the French-English Struggle in North America, 1720-1760* (Ph.D., Syracuse University, 1961).

¹¹⁷ Vaudreuil to the Minister, 22 May 1725, 46: 165-173; Bégon to the Minister, 10 June 1725, 47: 231-238v. See also Wraxall, *Abridgement*, pp. 170-171. Tekarihoken (Tegarioken) is identified as chief of Kahnawake in 1726; and in 1750, Tegariogouin is identified as one of the principal chiefs of Kahnawake and of the "bande des Aniatins" (i.e. of the *ratiniahten* or people of the Turtle Clan). See "Copie d'une lettre adressée à La Jonquière par Alexandre

blockhouse at Oswego went ahead in 1727, alarms would periodically be raised that Onontio and his allies were preparing to destroy it.¹¹⁸ In fact, though Kahnawakes speakers complained on a number of occasions that they did not like visiting Oswego because rum flowed profusely there and because its attendant disruptions were all too common, neither they nor any of the other *domiciliés* showed an inclination to destroy it.¹¹⁹

In 1728, a “truck house” was opened at Fort Dummer where the West River flowed into the Connecticut River (now Brattleboro, Vermont). The man appointed as its commander and truckmaster was Joseph Kellogg, who having been carried away from Deerfield as a boy had spent six formative years at Kanehsatake before taking on the mantle of a *coureur de bois* in the upper country and making his way back to New England.¹²⁰ The man appointed in 1732 to serve as chaplain was Ebenezer Hinsdale, whose father, Mehuman, and mother had both experienced captivity among the Canadian Iroquois; by his marriage to Abigail Williams, daughter of the “Redeemed Captive” Rev. John Williams, Ebenezer was also brother-in-law to the unredeemed

Dagneau Douville”, 28 May 1750, C11A 95: 178-179; “Paroles des chefs du Sault-Saint-Louis”, 2 June 1750, C11A 95: 187-189v; “Paroles de Tegariogouin”, 5 June 1750, C11A 95: 181-182; La Jonquière to the Minister, 26 July 1750, C11A 95: 163-173v. While Fenton has identified this individual as one of the Mohawk title holders of the League, Parmenter has countered that internal evidence in the Commissioners’ minutes indicates that he was a young man, and thus unlikely to be a League chief. Fenton, *Great Law and the Longhouse*, p. 449. See also Siversten, *Turtles, Wolves, and Bears*, pp. 22, and figure 4-4.

¹¹⁸ Cooper, *Oswego in the French-English Struggle*, pp. 39-40. By 1728, the king instructed Beauharnois not to attempt anything against Oswego that might precipitate war. See Louis XV to Beauharnois and Dupuy, 14 May 1728, copy in NYCD 9: 1003. The mobilization that preceded campaigns against the Foxes and Chickasaws in the late 1720s and through the 1730s nevertheless gave rise to rumors that Oswego would be attacked. See Minutes of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Albany (hereafter cited as MACIA), 2 July 1729, LAC, RG10-A-3-a 1820: 290; MACIA, 11 September 1739, 1821: 173-173a.

¹¹⁹ In 1742, following the killing of one of their men by a drunken Onondaga at Oswego, Kahnawakes advised the Onondagas to take back the land they had ceded to the English for the construction of Oswego. “Paroles des Nontagués à Beauharnois”, [6 July 1742], C11A 77: 169-171; “Réponse de Beauharnois aux paroles des Nontagués”, [18 July 1742], C11A 77: 172-174. For evidence of domicilié visitors at Oswego, see “Compte rendu du voyage de La Chauvignerie”, [1728], C11A 50: 405-407v; Boisberthelot de Beaujours to Jacques-Pierre Daneau de Mui, 18 February 1735, Papiers de Mui, BANQ-Q, P32/010/055; NYCD 6: 538.

¹²⁰ CMHS 4: 131; Calloway, *Western Abenakis*, pp. 137-138. For an overview of the fort’s early years, see Egbert C. Smyth, “Papers Relating to the Construction and First Occupancy of Fort Dummer”, in *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 2nd Ser., 6 (1891): 359-381.

Eunice Williams of Kahnawake. Parties of “Canady Mowhawks” – Mohawks from Canada – began to regularly appear at Fort Dummer.¹²¹

Even in the St. Lawrence Valley, the persons who established the closest and most cordial ties with the inhabitants of the mission villages in this period, perhaps excluding the missionaries, were the men and women who took part with them in the trade with Albany. Most prominent among them, as the first half of the eighteenth century wore on, were the “demoiselles Desauniers”. These three daughters of the prosperous Montreal merchant Pierre Trottier-Desauniers, Marie-Magdelaine (born 1701), Marguerite (born 1704) and Marie-Anne (born 1709), first set up shop at Kahnawake in 1727. Only three years earlier, Vaudreuil had asked the Minister to write to the missionaries “not to permit any stores to exist in the mission of Sault St. Louis” in an effort to curb the illicit trade, apparently to little effect.¹²²

The missionaries, on the contrary, gladly welcomed the sisters when they set up shop in the village, reasoning that their store for provision and dry goods would contribute to the retention of the villagers and would allow them to dispense with visits to Montreal where the temptation of brandy was strong. The villagers were equally hospitable: not only were these three newcomers willing to learn their language and to offer better rates than those available in town, they took up the habit of giving to their poor and sick. Though accusations that the sisters' store was a “warehouse for contraband” would only surface in the late 1730s, there is little doubt that from early on they were facilitating and encouraging a lively intercolonial trade. Nor is

¹²¹ Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, pp. 201-202, 259-260, 269; Herbert Cornelius Andrews and Alfred L. Holman, *Hinsdale Genealogy* (Lombard, Illinois: A.H. Andrews, 1906), pp. 84-87. In 1730, “twelve Canady Mowhawks”. The following year Kellogg asks for reimbursement for his entertaining of “French Maquas” who had brought the “calumet of peace”. Mary Rogers Cabot, *Annals of Brattleboro* (E. L. Hildreth & Co., 1922), pp. 13-14.

¹²² Cited in Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga*, p. 213.

there any question that they continued to do so until their belated expulsion from the village in 1752.¹²³

Controversy was quicker to erupt around the person of John Hendrick Lydius. This native of Albany – a son, in fact, of one of the town's ministers – made his way to Montreal by 1725. There he developed a brisk business as a fur trader, in the course of which he cultivated a particularly strong relationship with the inhabitants of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake whom he regularly visited and received at his house (in one report we find him merrily applying paint to the bodies of his guests). "[W]ith presents and entertainment" he encouraged their correspondence with Albany. Unlike the Desauniers, however, Lydius made no effort to win over the missionaries. Though he had converted to Catholicism upon settling in the colony, he now ridiculed the Catholic faith by telling the *domiciliés* that the teachings of their missionaries "were pure impositions which they ought not to believe". Beauharnois and Hocquart became convinced that this "foreigner was a very dangerous man in the colony". In 1730 they had him tried, found guilty, imprisoned and shipped to France. When the governor heard that the Kahnawakes and Kanehsatakes were planning to send him some deputies to solicit his prisoner's release, he sent word to them that he would be inflexible.¹²⁴

No sooner had Lydius been banished from the colony that he set about establishing a trading post just beyond its bounds. In a speech intended for Governor Jonathan Belcher of Massachusetts delivered at Northampton in August of 1732, two men named Andatsago (the

¹²³ Hocquart to the directors of the Compagnie des Indes, 1 November 1739, C11A 72: 38-39; copy of a letter from Hocquart to the directors of the Compagnie des Indes, 3 November 1740, C11A 73: 384-386v. Regarding the Desauniers sisters, see Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade", pp. 73-75; Lavallée, *La Prairie*, pp. 235-237. The fact that Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas-Roch de Ramezay, son of the late governor of Montreal, had to rely on their services as translators when was stationed as commander of the local garrison during the War of Austrian Succession in 1748, is telling. See Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas-Roch de Ramezay to one of the Desauniers sisters, 12 June 1750, C11A 97: 385; "Mémoire des services de Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas-Roch de Ramezay", 14 September 1748, C11A 97: 180-180v.

¹²⁴ Beauharnois and Hocquart to Maurepas, 15 October 1730, C11A 52: 21-26 (copy in NYCD 9: 1019-1021).

aforementioned Ontachogo, most plausibly) and Angagsagigta voiced their favourable inclinations toward the man and his latest venture: "We of the Caknawage are desirous that Mr. Lydius may dwell at the Otter Creek that we may resort to him, inasmuch as he may not be allowed to live in Canady: Many of our people are indebted to him and will be able at the Otter Creek to discharge their debts".¹²⁵ In the end it was not at Otter Creek, but at the portage at Wood Creek, between the upper Hudson valley and Lake Champlain, that Lydius erected the trading post (known as Fort Lydius, and later Fort Edward) from which he resumed his lively commerce with the *domiciliés*.¹²⁶ Like the trading posts along the Pejepscot, Saco, and Kennebec Rivers, like Fort Dummer on the Connecticut, the Schuyler estate at Saratoga, or the western outpost at Oswego, Lydius's post at Wood Creek offered to the people of the mission villages a convenient alternative site for trade and entertainment.

Across the St. Lawrence Valley and beyond, gift-giving and exchange played a critical role in the establishment and continuation of the solidarities that determined the course of war and peace. Both material welfare and a climate of mutual trust and respect, fostered by the liberal redistribution of wealth and fair exchanges, were clear priorities for the men and women who established themselves in the mission villages of the St. Lawrence Valley through the seventeenth century. Their ongoing relationship with the French was founded, in no small way,

¹²⁵ Colden, *Letters and Papers*, 53: 202-203. This "Andatsago" is almost certainly the same person as Ontachogo (Ontachogo, Ontachogog), who in 1716 was found to be holding in his cabin cloth belonging to merchants from Albany. Between 1723 and 1738-1739, Ontachogo (Entasogo, Entasogo, Entatsogo) was described as a chief of Kahnawake, and was one of the more active delegates from the community at Albany. See "Procès contre Barrois, accusé de traite illégale avec les sauvages", 6-8 August 1716, ANQ, TL4, S1, D1991; Ramezay to Vaudreuil, 12 October 1723, C11A 45: 329v; *ibid.*, 16 October 1723, C11A 45 : 348-348v; "Paroles qu'Entasogo et quelques autres Iroquois", 1735, (copy in *CMNF* 3 : 175-176); and response (copy in *CMNF* 3: 176-177).

¹²⁶ On Lydius, see Peter N. Moogk, "John Hendricks Lydius", DCB 4: 488-490; William H. Hill, *Old Fort Edward, before 1800: An account of the historic ground now occupied by the Village of Fort Edward, New York* (Fort Edward, 1929), pp. 27-49.

on these conditions. Yet imperial conflicts and the shifts in distant markets in time began to undermine this foundation and to reveal the limits of the alliance. In a number of ways, the interests of *domicilié* individuals and communities ran at cross-currents to those of the Crown.

A number of interrelated trends played a role in undermining the foundational *bonne entente* during the early decades of the eighteenth century: the glut in the metropolitan beaver market, a product of a pronounced western expansion, and the resulting price differential between Canada and Albany; the abundance and higher quality of certain trade goods, particularly desirable woollens, manufactured in England; Versailles' protectionist persistence in attempting to forbid intercolonial trade; merchants' willingness to seek profits from it notwithstanding; the professionalization of colonial officers, whose new profiles and responsibilities distanced them from the *domiciliés*; finally, the proliferation of trading outlets across the borderlands, manned by individuals who knew the people of the mission villages and were appreciated by them.

Visions of trade, at the core, were difficult to reconcile. One vision, harboured by officials in Versailles and a number of their subalterns in the colony, placed trade squarely at the service of a centralized, imperial state. More than a means of ensuring the material wellbeing of its subjects, it was an instrument to further dynastic aspirations. Trade was a field of competition and regulation; in times of peace, it was an instrument with which to wage a cold war. For the inhabitants of the small-scale societies that were the mission villages, on the contrary, trade was a means of satisfying individual and communal needs and responsibilities. Peace and trade accordingly went hand in hand; to divorce them went against common sense. In a period of growing rivalry between France and Great Britain, the tensions between local and imperial interests were bound to chip away at the bonds between the *domiciliés* and Onontio.

CONCLUSION

In Each Other's Arms emerges as a survey of what might be termed the Aboriginal settlement of the St. Lawrence Valley. Although settlement is usually a word reserved for Europeans, it is a compelling way of describing the processes described here. It relates well to the experimentation with village-formation among Algonquian hunter-gatherers during the 1630s and 1640s. But beyond this tentative sedentarization of non-sedentary people, the notion of settlement reflects quite well the arrival of a diversity of peoples – whom contemporaries lumped under the rubrics of “Algonquins”, “Hurons”, “Iroquois”, “Abenakis” and “Loups” – into the St. Lawrence Valley through the second half of the seventeenth century. It was often as refugees of war, and always as persons searching to better their lives in difficult times, that men and women established new village communities, several of which persist to this day. The French habit of speaking of Huron or Iroquois “colonies” near Quebec and Montreal, albeit short-lived, is a tantalizing reminder of the parallels between European and Aboriginal settlement.

Continuities must not be dismissed. The first mission at Kamiskouaouangachit, as well as the less fruitful Algonquian coalescences near Trois-Rivières and Montreal around the same time, involved Algonquian populations who already inhabited the region at the time of the French arrival. Huron and Iroquois migrants to the St. Lawrence Valley during the second half of the seventeenth century may also have had similar memories of having occupied the St. Lawrence Valley, even though there is no evidence that claims to this effect were voiced before the current era of land rights advocacy. Yet continuities notwithstanding, the St. Lawrence Valley in the seventeenth and the sixteenth century was very much a “New World for all”, in the ethnohistorian Colin Calloway's phrase.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ Colin G. Calloway, *New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

In exploring contingency and Aboriginal agency, the crucial role played by specific individuals has emerged as a central theme of this dissertation. This perspective is by no means new, insofar as the Jesuit Relations and other missionary writings did emphasise the evangelising role of certain figures: Tekouerimat at Kamiskouaouangachit, Tonsahoten, Gandeakteua, and Togouiroui at Kentake, etc. In re-examining these figures, reading between the hagiographic lines, and identifying other figures whose role has not been equally appreciated (such as Etienne Nekoutneant or Tatakwiséré), it becomes clear that settlement or resettlement in the vicinity of the French was a venture promoted by specific, charismatic individuals who mobilized their kinship and communal networks and were empowered by them.

Considering Tessouat the Kichepirini or Ononragewas the Mohawk in the context of the story of the mission villages also allows a better appreciation for the experimentation with mission villages. These were men who considered and experimented with settlement and resettlement but who, for a variety of reasons, found it undesirable and so became promoters of alternative visions. These men came to be perceived as threats not only by the French, but also by the leading members of the mission village communities themselves.

In identification and reconstruction of individual paths, it is important to acknowledge that these visible and vocal figures represent more than themselves. In keeping with the social and cultural structures of Algonquian and Iroquoian societies, they wielded great authority but could not be authoritarian. Influence was more widely spread than a cursory reading of the sources – or of this dissertation – would suggest. While chiefs and warriors loom largest in the record, their influence rested not only on personal ability and charisma but on networks of men and, crucially, women. The latter's fundamental import can be glimpsed from the accounts of Gandeakteua's role in the development of Kentake during the late 1660s; Marguerite

Weramihwe's part in the Abenaki "rebirth" of Kamiskouaouangachit in the 1680s is more difficult to reconstruct, but appears to have been equally crucial.

In this dissertation, individuals also emerge as a key to understanding broader population movements and geopolitical developments. It is by noticing the appearance of a chief named Tekouerimat among the nominal "Abenakis" of Saint-François during the first decade of the eighteenth century that we can get a sense of the continuities – through intermarriage, and an understanding of tradition – reaching back to the origins of Kamiskouaouangachit. In a similar fashion, it is by recognizing not only that Togouiroui was a Mohawk (a fact which the sources make clear, the "Great" Mohawk), but that Tatakwiséré was a Oneida and Massias was an Onondaga (facts that are far from obvious) that we can make sense of patterns of migration and conflict.

As this dissertation argues, paying close attention to the nuanced identities, solidarities and enmities at play is key to understanding patterns of conflict and migration. Although one must rely on labels such as "Algonquin", "Huron", "Iroquois", or "Abenaki" in some contexts, it is important to recognize their inadequacy in others. Terms of convenience, they conceal an array of personal and collective identities. Without exception, the mission villages came into being as heterogeneous, multiethnic and multinational communities, communities within which certain groups might be well or not so well represented. The snowballing predominance of Mohawks and Oneidas at Kahnawake, and the Onondaga presence at Kanehsatake – or, more crucially, the concurrent absence of Senecas – indeed help us understand the course of the wars that marked the last two decades of the seventeenth century and the coming of peace.

The men and women who moved to the mission villages had in common a readiness to experiment with cooperation and cohabitation, a willingness to adapt identities and adopt new

ones. Taking up residence in the mission villages meant taking up the Catholic faith and its outward markers, albeit in a syncretic way. Missionaries and officials failed, however, in their initial ambition to turn the Aboriginal residents of the mission villages into perfect Frenchmen and Frenchwomen. This historiographical mainstay must nonetheless be followed by the recognition that these villages *were* dynamic sites of cultural and ethnic assimilation: the emergence of Kahnawake and Kanehsatake as “Mohawk” communities within decades of their foundation is a case in point, as is the subsequent emergence of Arsikantegouk and Wowenac as “Abenaki” communities.

Patterns of association and assimilation were matched by dynamics of dissociation and distinction. Individuals and groups might choose not to join one mission community, as countless numbers did at various times; others joined such a community only during a portion of their lives, according to their personal circumstances and broader geopolitical developments. Having spent time in one mission village, some went on to form another. The ways in which the Huron nations present at Quebec during the 1650s attempted to take different paths, joining the Mohawks, the Onondagas, or remaining with the French, or in which, two decades later, another group of Hurons decided to leave Kentake to set up a parallel community at Kanehsatake, is illustrative of this fundamental feature of the mission villages' early history.

The relationship between the residents of the mission villages and the French emerges as a complex and evolving one. For all the merits of evaluating the formation and development of mission villages in terms of the success or failure of one missionary model or another, these villages must be recognized as the joint product of missionary, official, and indigenous will and efforts. French encouragement and sponsorship of these village communities seems to have been

a key to their success, but as this dissertation argues, their establishment and persistence was more often than not the product of Aboriginal initiative.

The St. Lawrence Valley offered a convenient site of refuge and renewal, but its efficacy varied according to the evolving geopolitical context. Indeed, the Algonquins and Montagnais of Kamiskouaouangachit found that with the Huron arrival their resources became constrained, and opted to withdraw into the hinterland; for their part, the Hurons found that the French would not and could not protect them from the Iroquois. So too did the Abenaki and Algonquian refugees find that they were a second thought to their would-be French hosts. Only beginning in the 1680s, and with the 1690s and 1700s, did the French authorities recognize the potential of the mission villages as bulwarks, and of their inhabitants as precious allies.

Yet increased appreciation for the strategic importance of the mission villages did not put an end to French paternalism. On the contrary, it contributed to amplifying French expectations of subservience, expectations which clashed with the reality of Aboriginal autonomy. The exploration of the evolving relationship between the *domiciliés* and the residents of New England and New York in the final chapter of this dissertation indeed points to the ultimate limits of the Franco-Aboriginal alliance.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANF: Archives nationales de France

ASQ: Archives du Séminaire de Québec

BANQ: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec.

CHR: Canadian Historical Review

CMNF: Jean Gervais Protais Blanchet, Faucher de Saint-Maurice, and Narcisse Henri Edouard, eds. *Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres*

. 4 v. Quebec: A. Côté, 1883-1885.

CSPC: W. Noel Sainsbury, J. W. Fortescue, Cecil Headlam et al., eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial* (London: Public Records Office, 1860-1969).

DCB: Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966-2005.

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LAC: Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa.

LIR: Lawrence R. Leder, ed., *The Livingston Indian Records*. Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical Society, 1956.

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NYSA: New York State Archives, Albany.

NYSL: New York State Library, Albany.

RHAF: Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française

WMQ: William and Mary Quarterly

RAPQ : Rapport de l'archiviste de la Province de Québec. Québec: Éditeur Officiel du Québec, 1921-1960.

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