

# Improving KVM x86 Nested Virtualization

Liran Alon

# Who am I?


- Architect at OCI (Oracle Cloud Infrastructure)
- ~4 years of Virtualization, SDN and Cloud Computing
- ~8 years of cyber R&D in PMO & IDF
- Active KVM nVMX contributor
- Interests: Anything low-level
  - CPU, OS internals, networking, vulnerabilities, exploits, virtualization and etc.
- Twitter: @Liran\_Alon

# Outline


- Focus only on nVMX (Sorry AMD...)
- Deep-dive into one nVMX mechanism which had many issues
  - First documentation of mechanism outside code
  - Maybe relevant for other architectures nested support
- Present recent nVMX improvements in high-level
- Highlight nVMX open issues
- Suggest possible nVMX future directions

How does nVMX works?


# L0 runs L1 with vmcs01




# L1 creates vmcs12 for running L2



# L1's VMRESUME triggers VMExit to L0




# L0 merges vmcs01 & vmcs12 to vmcs02







# L0 runs L2 with vmcs02



# L2 runs until VMExit triggered because of vmcs02




# L0 decides if to handle VMExit itself or reflect VMExit to L1



nVMX event injection

# Basic KVM event-injection

1. L1 RDMSR bad\_msr
2. RDMSR exits to L0



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3. L0 emulates RDMSR and queues #GP:
  - (a) Save pending exception in struct `kvm_vcpu_arch`
  - (b) Set `KVM_REQ_EVENT`



L1

A light gray rectangular box with a thin black border, containing the text 'L1' in the center.



L0

A light gray rectangular box with a thin black border, containing the text 'L0' on the left and a smaller white rectangular box with a thin black border containing the text 'pending #GP' on the right.

pending #GP

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2. RDMSR exits to L0
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4. Before host entry to guest, `KVM_REQ_EVENT` evaluates queued events:


L1

L0

pending #GP

# Basic KVM event-injection


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  - (b) Set `KVM_REQ_EVENT`
4. Before host entry to guest, `KVM_REQ_EVENT` evaluates queued events:  
Inject pending #GP to guest by VMCS





# Basic KVM nVMX event-injection

1. L2 RDMSR bad\_msr
2. RDMSR exits to L0
3. L0 emulates RDMSR and queues #GP:
  - (a) Save pending exception in struct `kvm_vcpu_arch`
  - (b) Set `KVM_REQ_EVENT`
4. Before host entry to guest, `KVM_REQ_EVENT` evaluates queued events:
  - (a) If (vCPU in guest-mode && Has event which should L2→L1)  
⇒ Emulate L2→L1
  - (b) Otherwise ⇒ Inject pending #GP to guest by VMCS



# Exit during event-delivery

- A VMExit can occur during event-delivery
- Example: Write of exception frame to stack triggers EPT\_VIOLATION

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- On guest→host:
  1. KVM checks if `vmcs→idt_vectoring_info` valid
  2. If valid, queue `injected` event in struct `kvm_vcpu_arch` and set `KVM_REQ_EVENT`

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  1. KVM checks if `vmcs→idt_vectoring_info` valid
  2. If valid, queue `injected` event in struct `kvm_vcpu_arch` and set `KVM_REQ_EVENT`
- `KVM_REQ_EVENT` will evaluate injected event on next entry to guest

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  - L1 **should not** intercept event!
  - L1 should not be aware L0 had exit during attempt to deliver event



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  - L1 **should not** intercept event!
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- How L0 knows L1 cannot intercept event on KVM\_REQ\_EVENT handler?
- **nVMX requires clear separation between pending vs. injected!**
  - A **pending** event **can** be intercepted by L1
  - An **injected** event **cannot** be intercepted by L1

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- L1 dmesg reveals some hints on the issue
- All L1 CPUs but one waiting on KVM's mmu\_lock:
  - `_raw_spin_lock+0x20/0x30`  
`tdp_page_fault+0x1b1/0x260 [kvm]`  
`? __remove_hrtimer+0x3c/0x90`  
`kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x65/0x130 [kvm]`  
`handle_ept_violation+0xaa/0x1a0 [kvm_intel]`

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`handle_ept_violation+0xaa/0x1a0 [kvm_intel]`
- One L1 CPU is holding KVM's mmu\_lock while waiting for IPI ACK:
  - `? smp_call_function_many+0x1c7/0x250`  
`kvm_make_all_cpus_request+0xbb/0xd0 [kvm]`  
`kvm_flush_remote_tlbs+0x1d/0x40 [kvm]`  
`kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page+0x22/0xf0 [kvm]`  
`mmu_free_roots+0x13c/0x150 [kvm]`

# L0 KVM event trace

```
qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_nested_vmexit: rip: ← Exit L2 to L0  
0xfffff802c5dca82f reason: EPT_VIOLATION ext_inf1: 0x00000000000000182  
ext_inf2: 0x00000000800000d2 ext_int: 0x00000000 ext_int_err: 0x00000000
```

⇒ L2→L0 exit during event-delivery of interrupt 0xd2


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
- ⇒ L2→L0 exit during event-delivery of interrupt 0xd2
- ⇒ L0 queues event for injection + Set KVM\_REQ\_EVENT



# L0 KVM event trace

qemu-system-x86-19054 [028] kvm\_apic\_accept\_irq: apicid f vec 252 (Fixed|edge)

⇒ Received IPI queued pending interrupt 252 in L1 vLAPIC





# L0 KVM event trace

qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm\_inj\_virq: irq 210 ← re-inject interrupt to L2

qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm\_entry: vcpu 15 ← Resume L2


⇒ **KVM\_REQ\_EVENT re-inject queued injected interrupt to L2**



# L0 KVM event trace

```
qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_nested_vmexit: rip: ← Exit L2 to L0  
0xffffe00069202690 reason: EPT_VIOLATION ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000083  
ext_inf2: 0x0000000000000000 ext_int: 0x00000000 ext_int_err: 0x00000000
```

⇒ L2→L0 on EPT\_VIOLATION (not during event-delivery)



# L0 KVM event trace

```
qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason:  
EPT_VIOLATION ext_inf1: 0x000000000000000083 ext_inf2: 0x0000000000000000  
ext_int: 0x00000000 ext_int_err: 0x00000000  
← Emulate exit from L2 to L1
```

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qemu-system-x86-19066 [030] kvm_entry: vcpu 15 ← Resume L1
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⇒ L0 resumes L1




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


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  - ⇒ Bug: L1 will see exit on EXTERNAL\_INTERRUPT during event-delivery



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  - ⇒ Queued **injected** event will be written to **vmcs12->idt\_vectoring\_info**
  - ⇒ **Bug: L1 will see exit on EXTERNAL\_INTERRUPT during event-delivery**
- We wish to inject to L2 **and** immediately after re-evaluate L1 pending event

# “Immediate exit” mechanism

- Sometimes KVM is blocked from exiting from L2 to L1:
  - E.g. There is an [injected](#) event for L2

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- In these cases, we can request an “`immediate-exit`” from L2 to L0
- “`immediate-exit`” requests CPU to exit guest immediately after entering it
  - Set `KVM_REQ_EVENT`
  - Disable interrupts + self-IPI, just before entering the guest

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- “`immediate-exit`” requests CPU to exit guest immediately after entering it
  - Set `KVM_REQ_EVENT`
  - Disable interrupts + self-IPI, just before entering the guest
- CPU will inject event and then immediately exit on `EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT`
- When exit back to L0, re-evaluate L1 pending event

# Example: nVMX event handling issue

- Miss of L1 IPI when on L2→L0 exit during interrupt-delivery
  - L1 stuck as a result of losing an IPI while holding KVM mmu\_lock
- Root-cause: Reinjection of L2 events blocked evaluation of L1 pending events
- 1a680e355c94 (“KVM: nVMX: Require immediate-exit when event reinjected to L2 and L1 event pending”)

# Recent nVMX improvements

# Mechanisms fixes

- nVMX event-injection fixes
  - Missing L1 events, SMI while in guest-mode, handling L1 not intercepting interrupts
  - TODO: Ability to get/set vCPU events considering pending/injected
  - TODO: Keep CR2/DR6 unmodified if #PF/#DB intercepted by L1
    - Jim Mattson series to handle all mentioned above:  
<https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/kvm/list/?series=31593>
  - TODO: L2 pending trap exceptions can still be lost because of L2→L1 transition
- Nested APICv fixes
  - Nested posted-interrupts race-condition and EOI-exitmap corruption
  - Enabled running **ESXi as L1 hypervisor** with APICv enabled
  - TODO: Use hardware for re-evaluation of missed nested posted-interrupts
    - <https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10132081/>
    - <https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10132083/>



# Mechanisms fixes

- Nested VPID fixes & optimizations
  - Invalidation of wrong TLB mappings and unnecessary TLB flushes
- Nested MMU optimizations
  - L1<->L2 transitions avoid MMU unload, fast switch EPTP and L1/L2 separate MMU contexts
- L1→L2 VMEntry optimizations
  - Dirty-track non-shadowed VMCS fields, faster build of vmcs02 MSR bitmap, optimize shadow VMCS copying
- Exposure of VMX features to guest fixes
  - Affected by CPU features, KVM module parameters and guest CPUID!
- More L1→L2 VMEntry checks

# New mechanism: nVMX Migration support

- KVM holds internal CPU state for running L2
  - VMXON region address, active vmcs12 address
  - Cached vmcs12 & cached shadow vmcs12
  - Internal nested flags (E.g. nested\_run\_pending)
- Required IOCTLs to save/restore this state for migration
  - KVM\_{GET,SET}\_NESTED\_STATE
- Required ability to set VMX MSRs from userspace
- TODO: QEMU patches for supporting this
  - <https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10601689/>

# New mechanism: VMCS Shadowing virtualization

- Use-case: Triple-Virtualization!
- Accelerate L2 VMREADs/VMWRITEs

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- Use-case: Triple-Virtualization!
- Accelerate L2 VMREADs/VMWRITEs
- However, L3 performance still insufficient for Oracle's production workloads
  - [See appendix slides for details](#)
- TODO: Optimizations for VMCS Shadowing virtualization
  - Avoid building vmcs02→{vmread,vmwrite}\_bitmap when vmcs12 bitmaps unchanged
  - Cache CPU unsupported VMCS fields on KVM boot-time
  - Get rid of cached shadow vmcs12

Recent improvements have led to...

**kvm-intel.nested=1 default on kernel 4.20!**

<https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10644311/>



# Future directions of nVMX

- Microsoft Hyper-V improved nested perf by PV interface (eVMCS)

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- Microsoft Hyper-V improved nested perf by PV interface (eVMCS)
- KVM should have it's own PV interface for nested
  - eVMCS too coupled with Hyper-V PV interface
- Future of supporting all combinations of L0/L1 hypervisors PV interfaces?
  - E.g. KVM was recently enhanced to be able to both use and expose Hyper-V eVMCS
- Should there be cross-hypervisor PV standard for nested-virtualization?



Conclusion

# Conclusion

- Many nVMX advancements over past year which we don't have time for...
  - **Appendix slides contain deep-dive to some of those mechanisms for reference!**
- nVMX semantics stabilized very well over the past year
  - Thanks to multiple contributors: Google, AWS, Intel, RedHat, Oracle and more
  - Most semantic issues discovered by running various hypervisors as L1
- kvm-unit-tests VMX tests cover mainly edge cases and regression tests
- Challenges ahead: PV for nested & Triple-Virtualization

# Questions?

Thank you!

# Appendix

Things I wish I had time to present... :)

# Appendix Outline

- VMCS Shadowing
- Triple-Virtualization
- Nested APICv
- nVMX event injection

# VMCS Shadowing

# VMCS cache

- On VMPTRLD, VMCS loaded to CPU is cached in per-CPU VMCS cache
- Access to VMCS done by dedicated instructions: VMREAD/VMWRITE

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nVMX implementation:


- L0 VMPTRLD emulation copy in-memory vmcs12 into software cache
- L0 VMREAD/VMWRITE emulation read/write from/to cached vmcs12  
⇒ Exits on L1's VMREAD/VMWRITE are significant performance hit




# VMCS Shadowing

- Hardware VMX feature to improve nVMX performance
- Reduce #VMExits on L1 VMREAD/VMWRITE
- VMCS->vmcs\_link\_ptr points to “shadow vmcs”
- L1 VMREAD/VMWRITE directed to “shadow vmcs”
  - According to VMCS->{vmread,vmwrite}\_bitmap


# VMCS Shadowing usage





# L1 VMPTRLD vmcs12




# L0 copies vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01




# L1 VMREAD/VMWRITE read/write shadow vmcs01



# L0 VMCLEAR vmcs12



# L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to vmcs12



# VMCS Shadowing usage (Many copies...)

- On L1 VMPTRLD, L0 copies cached vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01
  - L1 will read values using VMREAD from shadow vmcs01
- On L1 VMCLEAR, L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12
  - L1 may have modified shadow vmcs01 using VMWRITE
- On L1→L2 transition, L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12
  - L1 has written values using VMWRITE to shadow vmcs01
- On L2→L1 transition, L0 copies cached vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01
  - L1 will read values using VMREAD from shadow vmcs01



Triple-Virtualization!

# Triple-Virtualization: Why?!


- Some of Oracle Ravello guests are hypervisors themselves...
  - ESXi, KVM, Xen, Hyper-V
- Therefore, setup is:
  - L0 = Public cloud provider hypervisor
  - L1 = Ravello's hypervisor (KVM based)
  - L2 = Ravello guest which is a hypervisor (e.g. ESXi)
  - L3 = L2 guests
- We are dealing with a Triple-Virtualization scenario!

# Triple-Virtualization: VMCS Shadowing


## Virtualization

- Triple-Virtualization works but...
- L2 will execute VMREADs / VMWRITEs
- They will **perform extremely poorly** unless L1 is utilizing VMCS Shadowing  
⇒ We need L0 to support **VMCS Shadowing Virtualization!**
- Lead us to contact Jim Mattson to implement this in GCE L0 KVM
- Jim developed the patches and I have further modified them for upstream
- <https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg170724.html>


# VMCS Shadowing Emulation




# L2 executes VMWRITE




# L0 examines vmcs12 → vmwrite\_bitmap



# Option 1: VMWRITE intercepted by L1 by bitmap



# Option 2: L0 emulates VMWRITE on shadow vmcs12






# VMCS Shadowing Emulation

- All L2 VMREAD/VMWRITE still exit to L0
- Reflect exit on VMREAD/VMWRITE to L1 based on `vmcs12→{vmread,vmwrite}_bitmap`
- Modify L0 VMREAD/VMWRITE exit handlers to write to cached shadow `vmcs12` instead of cached `vmcs12` if vCPU in guest-mode
- Cache shadow `vmcs12`
  - L1→L2: Copy from `vmcs12→vmcs_link_ptr` to shadow VMCS12 cache
  - L2→L1: Flush shadow `vmcs12` cache to guest `vmcs12→vmcs_link_ptr`
- 32c7acf04487 (“KVM: nVMX: Expose VMCS shadowing to L1 guest”)


⇒ Saves exits to L1 on L2’s VMREADs/VMWRITEs!

# VMCS Shadowing Virtualization




# L1 executes VMRESUME


#VMExit on  
VMRESUME




# L0 creates vmcs02 with shadow vmcs




# L0 copies shadow vmcs12 to shadow vmcs02



# L0 executes L2 with vmcs02




# L2 executes VMWRITE writes to shadow vmcs02




# L2 executes VMRESUME

#VMExit on  
VMRESUME






# L0 copies shadow vmcs02 to shadow vmcs12



# L0 forward exit on VMRESUME to L1



# VMCS Shadowing Virtualization

- Allocate shadow VMCS and {vmread,vmwrite}\_bitmap for vmcs02
- vmcs02→{vmread,vmwrite}\_bitmap based on vmcs12 bitmaps
  - Not identical as unsupported VMCS fields by L0 are still intercepted
- On L1→L2, copy cached shadow vmcs12 to shadow vmcs02
- On L2→L1, copy shadow vmcs02 to cached shadow vmcs12
- Not applied yet. v1 of patch series:

<https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg170724.html>

⇒ Saves exits to both L0 & L1 on L2's VMREADs/VMWRITES!

# VMCS Shadowing usage: Many copies...

- On L1→L2 transition, L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12
- On L2→L1 transition, L0 copies cached vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01
- On L1 VMPTRLD, L0 copies cached vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01
- On L1 VMCLEAR, L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12

# VMCS Shadowing Emulation: More copies...

- On L1→L2 transition, L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12  
**And cache shadow vmcs12**
- On L2→L1 transition, L0 copies cached vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01  
**And flush cached shadow vmcs12 to shadow vmcs12**
- On L1 VMPTRLD, L0 copies cached vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01
- On L1 VMCLEAR, L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12

# VMCS Shadowing Virtualization: Even more copies!

- On L1→L2 transition, L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12  
**And cache shadow vmcs12**  
**And build vmcs02→{vmread,vmwrite}\_bitmap from vmcs12 bitmaps**  
**And copy cached shadow vmcs12 to shadow vmcs02**
- On L2→L1 transition, L0 copies cached vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01  
**And copy shadow vmcs02 to cached shadow vmcs12**  
**And flush cached shadow vmcs12 to shadow vmcs12**
- On L1 VMPTRLD, L0 copies cached vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01
- On L1 VMCLEAR, L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12

# Triple-Virtualization insufficient performance

- L3→L2 results in a total of **15 copies!**
  - Of shadow vmcs to cached vmcs (/ cached shadow vmcs) and vice-versa

# Triple-Virtualization insufficient performance

- L3→L2 results in a total of **15 copies!**
  - Of shadow vmcs to cached vmcs (/ cached shadow vmcs) and vice-versa
- Key Observations:
  1. All transitions from/to Lx involves all underlying layers
  2. Lx<->Ly involve copies of shadow vmcs to cached vmcs and vice-versa
  3. Copies of shadow VMCS requires VMPTRLD which incur #VMExit



# Triple-Virtualization possible solutions

- Should create a KVM PV interface for nested? Similar to Hyper-V?
- Should there be cross-hypervisor PV standard for nested-virtualization?
  - Supporting all combinations of L0/L1 hypervisors PV interfaces is complex...
  - KVM was recently enhanced to be able to both use and expose Hyper-V eVMCS
- Can we suggest a new VMX feature for Intel to improve triple-virtualization?
  - Ability to read/write from/to shadow VMCS without VMPTRLD to make it active?

\* Note: Deeper perf analysis wasn't performed yet

# Triple-Virtualization!

Technical details

# VMCS Shadowing Virtualization: L3→L2

- L3 exits to L0 which decides to forward exit to L1
  - L0 copy cached shadow vmcs12 to shadow vmcs12
  - L0 copy cached vmcs12 to shadow vmcs01
- L0 resume into L1 which decides to forward exit to L2
  - L1 copy cached shadow vmcs23 to shadow vmcs23
  - L1 VMPTRLD vmcs12 which exit to L0
    - L0 copy shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12
    - L0 copy vmcs12 to cached vmcs12
    - L0 copy vmcs12 to shadow vmcs02
  - L1 copy cached vmcs23 to shadow vmcs12
    - L1 VMPTRLD shadow vmcs12 which exit to L0
      - L0 does 3 copies...
    - L1 copies VMCS fields
    - L1 VMCLEAR shadow vmcs12 which exit to L0
      - L0 copies shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12
    - L1 VMPTRLD vmcs12
      - L0 does 3 copies...

# VMCS Shadowing Virtualization: L3→L2 (continue..)

- L1 resume into L2 exit to L0
  - L0 copy shadow vmcs01 to cached vmcs12
  - L0 copy shadow vmcs12 into cached shadow vmcs12
- And that's it! :)

**Total of 15 copies!**

(And we haven't counted L2→L3...)

# Triple-Virtualization using Binary-Translation

- HVX == Oracle Ravello binary-translation hypervisor
- **L1 binary translation results in L3→L2 not involving L0**
- Performance test setup:
  - L0 = GCE\_KVM
  - L1 = KVM / HVX (Haswell, 4 vCPUs, 26GB memory)
  - L2 = KVM (8 vCPUs, 16GB memory)
  - L2 is running 2 Ubuntu 16.04 guests as L3 (4 vCPUs, 8GB memory)
- netperf between L3 guests:
  - HVX performs **~4x** better than KVM both in throughput and latency
- Sysbench:
  - HVX performs **~2x** better than KVM

# Triple-Virtualization using eVMCS

- We can avoid shadow VMCS performance hit with PV interfaces
- Hyper-V eVMCS mechanism helps
- L0 emulate Hyper-V PV interface with eVMCS and L1 will consume it
- Probably was first one to run such a setup...
  - Created patches for L0 QEMU to expose eVMCS
  - Fixed bug: 2307af1c4b2e (“KVM: VMX: Mark VMXArea with revision\_id of physical CPU even when eVMCS enabled”)
- Not a real solution for the general case
  - Works only if L1 knows how to use eVMCS...
  - We don't really want to expose Hyper-V PV interface for L1
- TODO: Collect concrete perf numbers

Nested APICv

# How APICv works?


- Generic name for combination of APIC related VMX features
- Aim to reduce #VMExits because of APIC and interrupts virtualization



# How APICv works?

- APIC {access,register} Virtualization:  
CPU emulates read/write from/to vLAPIC without #VMExit
- Virtual interrupt delivery:  
CPU emulates LAPIC interrupt evaluation and delivery without #VMExit
- Posted-Interrupts:  
Post interrupt to another CPU without #VMExit target CPU

# How posted-interrupts work?





# How posted-interrupts work?


CPU A



CPU B




# How posted-interrupts work?




# How posted-interrupts work?

CPU A




1. Set bit in pi\_desc → PIR
2. Set pi\_desc → ON


CPU B



# How posted-interrupts work?



# How posted-interrupts work?



# How posted-interrupts works?

- What if target CPU currently at L0?
- L0 needs to evaluate pending posted-interrupts in software




# How posted-interrupts works?


- What if target CPU currently at L0?
- L0 needs to evaluate pending posted-interrupts in software  
⇒ Before each entry to guest, sync PIR to LAPIC IRR

# Example: nVMX posted-interrupt issue

CPU A



CPU B




# Example: nVMX posted-interrupt issue


CPU A



CPU B




#VMExit




# Example: nVMX posted-interrupt issue

CPU A



CPU B





# Example: nVMX posted-interrupt issue

CPU A



CPU B





1. Set bit in pi\_desc → PIR
2. Set pi\_desc → ON

# Example: nVMX posted-interrupt issue

CPU A



CPU B



Sync PIR to LAPIC IRR


# Example: nVMX posted-interrupt issue

CPU A



VMRESUME

CPU B





# Example: nVMX posted-interrupt issue


CPU A

CPU B

What about the IPI sent to L1?



VMR SUME





# Example: nVMX posted-interrupt issue


- L1 pending posted-interrupt needs to be evaluated before entry to L2!
  - L1 intercepts external-interrupts  $\Rightarrow$  L0 should L2 $\rightarrow$ L1
  - Otherwise, inject interrupt directly to L2
- f27a85c4988d (“KVM: nVMX: Re-evaluate L1 pending events when running L2 and L1 got posted-interrupt”)

# Example: nVMX posted-interrupt issue

```
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 5ea482bb1b9c..5fe94e375d2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -8978,6 +8978,7 @@ static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
     struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
     int max_irr;
+    bool max_irr_updated;


     WARN_ON(!vcpu->arch.apicv_active);
     if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc)) {
@@ -8987,7 +8988,16 @@ static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
     /*
      * But on x86 this is just a compiler barrier anyway.
      */
     smp_mb__after_atomic();
-    kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vmx->pi_desc.pir, &max_irr);
+    max_irr_updated =
+        kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vmx->pi_desc.pir, &max_irr);
+
+    /*
+     * If we are running L2 and L1 has a new pending interrupt
+     * which can be injected, we should re-evaluate
+     * what should be done with this new L1 interrupt.
+     */
+    if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && max_irr_updated)
+        kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode(vcpu);
     } else {
         max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu);
     }
 }
```

# How nested posted-interrupts work?




# How nested posted-interrupts work?

CPU A




CPU B



# How nested posted-interrupts work?

CPU A




CPU B




# How nested posted-interrupts work?



CPU A



1. Set bit in `vmcs12`→`pi_desc`→`PIR`
2. Set `vmcs12`→`pi_desc`→`ON`




CPU B



# How nested posted-interrupts work?




CPU A



#VMExit on Send  
vmcs12 → pi\_notification\_vector




CPU B






# How nested posted-interrupts work?

CPU A



CPU B



Send IPI with  
vmcs02→pi\_notification\_vector








# How nested posted-interrupts work?

CPU A



1. CPU merge PIR to vAPIC IRR
2. CPU eval pending interrupts
3. CPU injects interrupt

CPU B



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⇒ Signal pending nested-posted-interrupt and set KVM\_REQ\_EVENT
- KVM\_REQ\_EVENT **emulate nested-posted-interrupt delivery in software!**
  - Clear pi\_desc ON bit
  - Sync pi\_desc→pir to L1 vLAPIC page
  - Update vmcs02→guest\_intr\_status (RVI/SVI) accordingly

# HW-assisted nested posted-interrupt

- Software emulation error prone and less efficient
  - Could mistakenly diverge from hardware implementation
  - TODO: Bug: If target vCPU exits to L1 after sender sets pi\_pending, than notification-vector interrupt is not raised to L1!
- TODO: Get rid of pi\_pending and instead use L1 LAPIC IRR as CPU does
- TODO: Install host handler for vmcs02→pi\_notification\_vector to avoid missing pending interrupt
- TODO: Trigger CPU posted-interrupt logic by self-IPI in case of pending nested posted interrupt

# HW-assisted nested posted-interrupt

- <https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10132081/>
- <https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10132083/>

## Example 2: Nested posted-interrupt issue

- Race-Condition in delivering nested Posted-Interrupts
- Root-cause: Delivering event in non-standard way
  - Should use `kvm_make_request()` + `kvm_vcpu_kick()`
- 6b6977117f50 (“KVM: nVMX: Fix races when sending nested PI while dest enters/leaves L2”)

# How virtual interrupt delivery works?

- VMCS→`guest_intr_status` specifies:
  1. RVI: Holds pending virtual interrupt vector
  2. SVI: Holds in-service virtual interrupt vector
- Certain actions cause evaluation of pending virtual interrupts
  - VMEntry, Write to TPR, Write to EOI, Self-IPI and posted-interrupts processing



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  - VMEntry, Write to TPR, Write to EOI, Self-IPI and posted-interrupts processing
- VMCS→`eoι_exitmap` defines vectors on which EOI will cause VMExit in addition to EOI virtualization
  - In order to emulate LAPIC EOI broadcast to IOAPIC EOI

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  - Configure VMCS->eoi\_exitmap according to vectors IOAPIC require EOI broadcast on
- Nested virtual interrupt delivery is “trivial”
  - vmcs02->guest\_intr\_status = vmcs12->guest\_intr\_status
  - vmcs02->eoi\_exitmap = vmcs12->eoi\_exitmap
  - Disable WRMSR intercept on LAPIC EOI and SELF\_IPI

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  3. One CPU runs `SCAN_IOAPIC` handler while vCPU in guest-mode!  
⇒ Will update `eoimap` of `vmcs02` instead of `vmcs01`!
  4. L1 NIC IRQ EOI will not exit to L0 and thus won't propagate to IOAPIC

# Example: Nested virtual-interrupt-delivery issue

- IOAPIC never got EOI for previous NIC IRQ
- Issue found only when running ESXi as L1
  - Many issues caused by ESXi IOAPIC steering mechanism...
- Root-cause: IOAPIC EOI-exitmap code not adjusted to nested case
  - Update of EOI-exitmap should be delayed to when vCPU is running L1
  - Handle case LAPIC & IOAPIC are pass-through by updating `vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors` and only delay update of EOI-exitmap
- e40ff1d6608d (“KVM: nVMX: Do not load EOI-exitmap while running L2”)



## Example 2: Nested virtual-interrupt-delivery issue

- vCPU should not halt when L1 is injecting events to L2
- Root-Cause: Not checking if VMEntry is vectoring when guest activity state is set to HLT
- 135a06c3a515 (“KVM: nVMX: Don't halt vcpu when L1 is injecting events to L2”)
- Should also wake blocked vCPU while in guest-mode if pending RVI
  - Evaluating pending vCPU events should include check if  $RVI[7:4] > vPPR[7:4]$
  - e6c67d8cf117 (“KVM: nVMX: Wake blocked vCPU in guest-mode if pending interrupt in virtual APICv”)

## Example 3: Nested virtual-interrupt-delivery issue

- Direct interrupt injection to L2 don't update L1 LAPIC IRR and ISR and doesn't consider PPR
- Root-cause: Not using standard `inject_pending_event()` event injection framework for injecting interrupt directly to L2
- 851c1a18c541 (“KVM: nVMX: Fix injection to L2 when L1 don't intercept external-interrupts”)



# nVMX event injection

More issues...

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  - b. L1 has pending interrupt in LAPIC (Other L1 CPU sent IPI)
5. L0 emulates L2→L1 on EXTERNAL\_INTERRUPT
6. Exception still pending in struct kvm\_vcpu\_arch  
⇒ Will be injected to L1 on next KVM\_REQ\_EVENT!

# Example: nVMX event-injection issue

- L2 exception injected into L1!
- Root-cause: Not clearing exception.pending on L2→L1 transition
  - Bug mistakenly introduced when exception.injected was added
- Fix: Clear pending exception on L2→L1
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- Fix: Clear pending exception on L2→L1
  - 5c7d4f9ad39d (“KVM: nVMX: Fix bug of injecting L2 exception into L1”)
- OK to clear exception.pending?
  - A pending exception will be **re-triggered\*** on next resume of L2

\* TODO: L2 pending trap exceptions can still be lost...