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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

*DCI-Designate
for NSC mtg on
3 Feb Yugoslavia*



1 February 1993

FOR: *John Miller* Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJ: Principals Meeting on "Yugoslavia"
Set for Wednesday Afternoon

I have just learned that a Principals Committee meeting is being arranged for Wednesday afternoon, 3 February. It will consider the NSC/IWG policy options paper we have been crafting since Friday.

Tony Lake still insists no copies of the NSC/IWG paper may leave the NSC for fear of leaks. The attached paper, however, provides CIA analysis of likely reactions by the "Yugoslav" parties, Key Allies, Russia, and the Middle Eastern Muslim states to each of the proposed options.

We are preparing a matrix of these reactions that Mr. Woolsey could use at the Principals meeting. I will provide that along with Talking Points on the NSC/IWG paper tomorrow. In the meantime, you may want to pass this paper to Mr. Woolsey for his reading. *(2 copies)*



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Daniel Wagner
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

Attachment: 2 copies - "Yugoslav" Policy
Options: Likely Resp
1 February 1993

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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
1 February 1993**"Yugoslavia" Policy Options: Likely Responses**

This paper assesses how we believe influential states and "Yugoslav" parties would respond to potential US policy options in the former Yugoslavia.

- We focus on the various "Yugoslav" parties, key US Allies, Russia, Ukraine, and the Muslim states in the Middle East.
- The expected reactions are keyed to options set forth in an NSC/IWG study. The options are arrayed along a continuum of increasing US involvement and pressure on Serbia--i.e., three packages of US "minimal, moderate, and militant activism."

Package 1: Minimal Activism

The first package would continue many existing US policies: delivering humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina, enforcing UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, curbing atrocities and war crimes, preventing spillover of the conflict, promoting alternatives to Serbian President Milosevic, and possibly enforcing the No-Fly Ban over Bosnia and/or easing the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. Summarizing views toward this wide array of policies is difficult, but we believe that:

- Most parties in the former Yugoslavia support these options. Serbia, Montenegro, and the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY), however, are the targets of most of the existing or proposed pressures and would resist. Some proposed options might raise expectations of US military intervention in Kosovo, which could encourage greater Kosovar Albanian resistance and brutal Serbian suppression.

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- The UK, France, and Ukraine probably would go along with most initiatives here except that--as contributors to UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina--all are acutely concerned about the likelihood of Bosnian Serb or Serbian retaliation against UNPROFOR and the humanitarian aid effort. Russia, however, would find some of these options extremely unpalatable. Its traditional ties with Slavic and Eastern Orthodox Serbia and domestic pressures on Yel'tsin in the runup to the April referendum severely limit his flexibility and Moscow's willingness to accept the use of greater force against the Serbs. Even for those options that do not require military force, Moscow probably will look for closer and more extensive consultations than in the past.
- The Muslim states generally favor any help to the predominantly-Muslim Bosnian Government; they also support increased pressure on the Serbs. Even-handedness among the parties in Bosnia may be criticized by the Muslim states as tilting toward Serbia. []

Humanitarian Aid in Bosnia

1. Increase US Donations. No negative response from any of the Bosnian parties; Bosnian Muslims would appreciate more humanitarian aid as a sign of US commitment.

- Serbia and local Serbs would object if aid were provided only to the Muslims and Croats. []

Russia would not oppose increases in US contributions. Moscow probably would not do more to assist, however, than it is doing now--offering trucks and drivers. []

2. Demand Unimpeded Deliveries. The three main parties in Bosnia probably would agree to US demands for unimpeded deliveries, but sporadic attacks against relief convoys would continue. []

The British and French Governments would expect an explanation of the range of actions the US would contemplate in enforcing this demand. []

The Russians co-sponsored the resolution on using force to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid. If fully consulted in advance, they probably would accept the US decision. They might, however, insist that some aid be delivered to Bosnian Serb areas to gain political cover at home.

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- Ukraine would be wary of more forceful methods. Ukrainian casualties might cause Kiev to reduce or even remove its UNPROFOR battalion.

3. Air Drops. The Bosnian Government would strongly support parachuting aid to isolated Muslim communities in need. Other Bosnian parties would object, however, if aid were provided only to the Muslims. Low- and slow-flying cargo planes would fly at risk because irregular forces on all sides (armed with AAA and shoulder-fired SAMs) could regard relief planes as legitimate targets (i.e., helping an encircled foe avoid surrender).

US allies in Western Europe would want any air drop program to be closely coordinated.

Air drops would draw positive media coverage in Muslim countries.

- Ankara almost certainly would offer military transports to assist. The Saudis might offer aircraft, but probably would insist on guarantees that they would be protected.

Russia might respond positively to a US request to conduct air drops, but probably would ask for monetary assistance, firm guarantees of safety for its aircraft, and deliveries arranged for all parties. Moscow would view its agreement as a means of tempering Western hostility to Russia's refusal to permit more forceful actions.

- Ukraine would be wary of participation because of the danger to its aircraft, but it might permit the use of Ukrainian air bases for the effort--a decision that would call for close consultations to reassure Moscow.

Sanctions against Serbia.

4. Enforce Sanctions: Tightened sanctions against Serbia/Montenegro would provoke strong protests from Belgrade, which would redouble efforts to seek relief from its perceived Russian allies and would attempt new ways of circumventing the measures. Additional sanctions probably would strengthen Milosevic's domestic position in the short term.

- Bosnian Croats and Muslims, and Kosovar Albanians, probably would applaud new sanctions against Serbia as a sign that US and Western attitudes toward Milosevic were hardening.

The West Europeans consistently have pushed for more vigorous enforcement of UN sanctions and are actively studying additional measures.

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- Greece would be reluctant to enforce sanctions, however, and might turn a blind eye toward Serbian attempts to circumvent them. []

Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania would require extensive aid to increase the effectiveness of their sanctions enforcement procedures and may demand that the West make good their losses. []

Russia is reluctant to agree to enhanced sanctions enforcement. Ambassador Shustov in Vienna, for example, has been given explicit instructions to stonewall on the creation of an overall sanctions coordinator in the CSCE. Only if Serbian intransigence were to cause the peace talks to fail might Russia support tightening sanctions.

- Moscow, in fact, believes sanctions should be eased to reward positive behavior by Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs--especially in the peace talks. Domestic calls to ease the sanctions have increased sharply in recent weeks, partly because of alleged economic costs to Russia.
- If Croatia continues its offensive, Russia probably will press for sanctions against Zagreb. []

[] Ukraine supports existing sanctions, but in an enhanced regime probably would argue against using deadly force to stop ships because of humanitarian and environmental concerns. []

5. Financial Aid to Macedonia. Serbia would view such assistance as a continued effort by the international community to isolate it; Belgrade might step up efforts to support dissension by Macedonian Serbs. Belgrade would also try to ensure continued Macedonian economic dependence on Serbia.

- Bosnian Muslims and Croats probably would not react strongly.
- Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo could see such assistance as an indication of Western willingness to become engaged in the region, possibly leading them to stir up trouble to gain Western support for their cause.
- Greece would protest US financial aid to Macedonia as a step towards recognition. Athens would also oppose any attempt by the EC to provide such assistance. (West European states probably would provide only modest assistance on a bilateral basis.) []

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The Muslim states would be unlikely to provide aid to Macedonia:

Russia would probably support the beginning of US aid to Macedonia. Moscow has warned for some time that Macedonia is a powderkeg, and it would welcome any efforts to stabilize the situation. Russia might suggest that diplomatic recognition accompany aid, and it might give token aid itself.

6. Seize Ships, Assets. The Serbians probably would attempt to test Western resolve. They would continue to threaten to dump their cargos, which would cause environmental disasters. Belgrade could also confiscate neighboring states' vessels on the Danube or threaten the ethnic-Hungarian and ethnic-Bulgarian minorities in Serbia to discourage Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria from seizing vessels.

The West Europeans would support such moves, but would want clear rules of engagement, command and control, and understanding of whose military assets were involved. If the peace talks remain deadlocked, the Russians might support the seizure of Serbian ships as a means of forestalling tougher measures. They, like the West Europeans, would insist upon clear rules of engagement and command and control. They would likely also demand that all ships violating either the sanctions against Serbia or the UN arms embargo be subject to seizure regardless of destination.

Muslim states would approve the seizing of Serbian ships and assets. Muslim leaders and media, however, would continue to charge that current enforcement of the arms embargo does far more harm to Bosnia than Serbia.

7. Expose Illegal Financial Practices. Serbian companies would still look for friendly locations, such as in Cyprus and Russia, to hide their financial assets. Belgrade also would increase pressure on neighboring states, particularly Macedonia, to flaunt the sanctions.

Western European states would go along.

Russia and Ukraine would support, in principle, exposure of illegal financial practices. If anything were discovered taking place inside their nations, however, they would argue--with considerable credibility given the embryonic state of their financial oversight capabilities--that they lack the ability to control this kind of activity.

Isolate Serbia

8. Expel Serbia/Montenegro from International Organizations. Belgrade would appeal to Russia and other sympathetic states to resist such measures. At the worst, Serbs might try to launch

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terrorist attacks against sponsors of the expulsion or the international agencies themselves.

- Other non-Serb Yugoslav actors would welcome such action.

The EC is considering expulsion as part of a package of measures designed to increase pressure on Belgrade. Nonetheless, West European states believe it is easier to influence Serbian behavior and to keep a dialogue with Belgrade open if Serbia remains within the international community. They would also be concerned that expelling Serbia would alienate Moscow.

- Greece probably would oppose the expulsion of Serbia as counterproductive; it would argue that international contacts offer a chance to exert a moderating influence on Serbia. Athens is likely to keep up contacts in any event.

Russia has consistently opposed expulsion of the rump Yugoslav state from important international bodies, arguing such a move would undercut the ability of the international community to press for a political dialogue. Moscow accepted the FRY expulsion from the UNGA, but has fought expulsion from all other UN bodies. Moscow would demarche the US firmly in opposition and lobby other international actors for support.

- Ukraine would abstain from any votes to expel the rump Yugoslav state, largely because it fears retaliation against UNPROFOR.

9. Sever Serbian Communications. Serbia would claim that such actions only increase the strength of nationalist hardliners, and would seek to continue communication links with regional states and friends elsewhere. At worst, it might try to take hostage foreign diplomatic missions that were in the process of evacuating from Belgrade.

- Croatia would initially welcome moves to isolate Serbia, but would be concerned that such moves might increase the unpredictability of Serbian action.
 - Bosnian Serbs would try to use Bosnia's possible exemption from such sanctions to assist Serbia in evasion.
 - Kosovar Albanians would be concerned that severing communications would also isolate them, but probably would welcome the move since they would realize that it is intended to weaken Serbia.
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The Europeans are already studying this option. Greece, however, would try to maintain its communication links with Serbia.

Much like efforts to expel Serbia from international organizations, Russia would oppose cutting Serbia's international communications. The Russians would argue that such steps have had no impact to date.

Atrocities

10. Publicize the Camps. Serbia probably would press the Bosnian Serbs to be cooperative in closing the detention camps and reining in local warlords still engaging in ethnic cleansing operations in order to avoid further damage to the Serbs' image. Serbia would move to ensure that publicity is given to atrocities committed and camps run by Bosnian Croats and Muslims.

The three Bosnian factions probably would increase efforts toward bilateral prisoner exchanges. They might also consent to greater access to camps and more ICRC-brokered prisoner releases. At the same time, however, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims probably would take additional measures to disguise any detention facilities they did not intend to close, disperse prisoners, and clean up atrocity sites before they could be investigated.

The West Europeans strongly favor publicizing atrocities.

Russia has no objection to publicizing the presence of detention camps. If, however, the West publicized only the Bosnian and Serb camps, Moscow would itself publicize the existence of Croat and Muslim camps.

11. Establish a War Crimes Tribunal. Serb paramilitary leaders charged with war crimes might attempt terrorist operations in the West. The Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian Governments might harbor some high-ranking war criminals while turning over those considered expendable. They may even rid themselves of war criminals to cover up war crimes.

Most West Europeans--with the exception of Greece--probably would support this option.

Muslim states would approve a War Crimes Tribunal and publicizing Serbian atrocities. Even treatment of Bosnian transgressions, however, would be regarded as tilting in Belgrade's favor.

Moscow opposes convening a tribunal at this time on the grounds that it would undercut the peace negotiations. Moscow would lobby the European states and the US to prevent this step and likely would veto convocation if it were to come before the Security Council. The Russian leadership probably is extremely

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uneasy about the precedent of such a tribunal. Kiev might give cautious support but probably would harbor many of the same concerns as Moscow.

Spillover

12. Dramatize Kosovo. Serbia probably would take no significant steps to loosen its grip in Kosovo in response to a US campaign, but it might try to rein-in Serbian paramilitary groups now active there to avoid further escalating tensions.

-- Vocal denunciation of Serb actions in Kosovo, however, could embolden ethnic-Albanian radicals into provoking a violent Serbian crackdown in order to encourage a Western military response.

The West Europeans would prefer quiet diplomacy over dramatizing the situation in Kosovo because of a fear that it could help spur an Albanian rebellion. Athens also would oppose dramatizing Kosovo for fear that such efforts could incite rebellion among ethnic Albanians and trigger a wider Balkan War. And Ankara probably would be uneasy over any initiative that might encourage Kosovo's Albanians to rebel or fan popular pressure in Turkey to provide military assistance to the Kosovars.

Moscow and Kiev are both concerned about potential spillover and would welcome raising the profile of dangers in Kosovo.

13. Establish/Increase International Presence in Macedonia and Albania. Albania and Macedonia would welcome further moves in this direction as tangible signs of Western commitment to their stability and defense. Croatia and the Bosnian Government would favor such indirect pressure on Serbia. Bulgaria also would welcome greater international presence as a means to prevent the spread of the conflict and Macedonia's collapse.

The West Europeans support this. They are concerned, however, that the military and financial burden be evenly distributed and would look to the US to supply at least financial support. Greece would support a UN presence in Albania or Macedonia but would seek assurances that current borders would be maintained.

Ankara would strongly support such action as an important contribution to heading off any broader Balkan conflict. Most Muslim states would give pro-forma approval.

Because Russia has recognized Macedonia and Albania as sovereign states, it would support any requests made by these governments for monitors or peacekeepers on their own territory. Moscow almost certainly would put pressure on Serbia to accept an international presence in Kosovo--an expansion of the CSCE

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mission or under the UN--but would veto insertion of international forces over Serbian objections. The current long-term monitoring mission in Kosovo is under CSCE auspices with Serbian approval. []

Undermining Milosevic.

14. Help the Political Opposition. The strong showing by Milosevic and the ultranationalists in the December elections has marginalized the democratic opposition. Any benefits derived from foreign assistance to the opposition almost certainly would not be apparent for some time. The Milosevic regime might try to block overt assistance. Belgrade certainly would attempt to brand the opposition as Western puppets, and it might imprison or expel some as examples. []

The opposition, fearing a government crackdown, would be nervous, but probably would accept the aid; it would welcome National Endowment for Democracy-type assistance as a sign of Western support.

- The Bosnian and Croatian Serbs would also harass the opposition, but would largely follow Belgrade's line.
- All other Yugoslav parties would welcome outside assistance to Serbia's democratic opposition. []

Paris is taking some actions to help unofficial media in Serbia, and the West Europeans would support additional low-key steps that do not endanger Serbian government support for the peace process. []

Muslim states are little aware of or interested in helping the Serbian opposition. []

15. Establish US Military-to-Military Ties with Serbs and Others. As the sole "carrot" among a menu of US "sticks" against the Serbs, the Milosevic regime would welcome such action if it perceived that it would reduce Belgrade's isolation. But Belgrade would work closely to control the relationship for fear that it could drive wedges between Milosevic and the military.

- The Yugoslav Army also would be wary. Serbian nationalist officers would be non-cooperative, but many officers would be encouraged if they perceived prospects of help in modernizing the Serbian armed forces.
- The Bosnian Serbs would be critical, but would follow Belgrade's lead.

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- The Croatians, Bosnian Government/Muslims, and Kosovar Albanians would attempt to halt and undermine any such relationship if they were not reassured by the US of the effort's intended purpose.

Most Muslim states would criticize US contacts with the Serbian military but welcome any high visibility US interaction with Bosnian military officials.

16. Enforce No-Fly

If the West began enforcing the No-Fly Ban, Bosnian Serb leaders probably would not order organized attacks against UN forces and relief workers for fear of provoking more massive Western intervention. Local warlords and renegade Bosnian Serb commanders, however, probably would attack UN facilities and humanitarian assets and might try to shut down Sarajevo airport. The Bosnian Serbs might also expel UN personnel from Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia.

- Belgrade's strategic interest in avoiding greater international military intervention almost certainly would restrain Milosevic from responding militarily to enforcement of no-fly in Bosnia, despite pressure from Serb ultranationalists and elements of the military to do so. Serbia would retaliate militarily against any expansion of the air campaign into Serbia and Montenegro, and this would put at risk US and UN personnel, facilities, and operations in Serbia and Bosnia.
- Other than the Bosnian Serbs, the remaining parties in Yugoslavia would applaud US enforcement of the No-Fly Zone. Bosnian Muslims and Croats would view the action as a step closer to Western military engagement against Serbia. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo may see no-fly enforcement as a sign the US would become engaged in ground operations against Bosnian Serbs or Serbia itself and be encouraged to stage disturbances that could quickly escalate into violence.

Paris and London have agreed to a phased approach to no-fly enforcement. They are not convinced that enforcement will have any military impact on the conflict, but believe it sends a strong political message to the Serbs that the West is ready to commit military forces if necessary to stop the conflict. They remain concerned about risks to their forces on the ground, however, and the British, in particular, would withdraw their forces if retaliation against them became too great. Germany would support enforcement, but not participate.

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Enforcement of the No-Fly Ban remains a particularly delicate issue for Moscow. *Russian diplomats insist that enforcement be limited to attacking individual aircraft in the act of violating the ban in the air over Bosnia and apply equally to all sides; the Russians want no attacks on ground targets or into Serbia.

- If the US attempted to enforce the no-fly zone over Russia's objections, Moscow might respond by pulling its peacekeepers out of Croatia, siding against the West in the UNSC, declaring a unilateral moratorium on UN sanctions against the FRY, and blocking consensus on extending "Yugoslavia's" suspension from CSCE. Over the longer term, failure to consult Moscow--especially given recent US actions in Iraq--could reduce the willingness of Russia's most senior leaders to cooperate with the West on the entire range of Yugoslav issues, as well as other international problems.
- The Ukrainians would oppose the use of force to enforce the no-fly zone because of the risk of retaliation against UNPROFOR.

Enforcing the ban would resonate well in the Muslim world if the action were seen to be tough and effective. Turkey probably would offer F-16 aircraft under a NATO umbrella, but would not expect the offer to be accepted.

17. **Partially Lift Arms Embargo (Permit Infantry Weapons)**

Belgrade probably would increase its covert support to the Bosnian Serb Army, but likely would not supply significant amounts of military equipment or supplies unless it believed Bosnian Government capabilities threatened Serb gains in Bosnia.

- Muslims would welcome relaxation of the embargo as the first step toward more extensive Western involvement in the conflict, and almost certainly would be encouraged to continue fighting.
- Croatian officials probably oppose relaxation of the arms embargo against Bosnia unless it is coupled with greater Western involvement. The Croats fear relaxing or ending the embargo will widen and prolong the conflict without bringing a Serbian defeat or other satisfactory end any closer. Zagreb almost certainly sees a well-armed Muslim force as anathema to its ultimate goal of uniting ethnic-Croat areas of Bosnia with Croatia proper.

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- Croatian inability to recapture Serb-controlled territory in Croatia would make Zagreb much more inclined to see a lifting of the arms embargo. The Croatian forces' will also want more weapons.
- Selective relaxation of the embargo could encourage the Kosovar Albanians to believe that international intervention was in the offing. []

Most West Europeans--especially the British--are opposed, arguing that such a move would escalate rather than stop the fighting. They believe that sending any arms to the Bosnian Muslims would encourage them to seek a military rather than a negotiated solution, and they fear that UN troops would be put at greater risk. Greece would oppose any lifting of the arms embargo for fear that this would provide an opportunity for Turkey to expand its influence among Balkan Muslims.

- Germany, however, has recently called for the lifting of the embargo if the peace talks continue to stall. []

Russia probably would veto lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia, even partially. Moscow believes that legalizing even small arms could exacerbate the conflict. In particular, Moscow fears arms would come primarily from Islamic countries and could lead to increased fundamentalist influence in the region.

- To have any chance of avoiding a Russian veto, prior consultations would be critical. Moscow is still stinging from a perceived lack of consultation over the strikes in Iraq and would view actions taken without its approval in Yugoslavia--an area of far greater policy sensitivity for Yel'tsin--as a bad omen of what to expect from the new UN Administration. Moreover, the Russian leadership is already taking heat from the legislature over START II, is heavily criticized for a perceived loss of income through adherence to sanctions regimes against both Iraq and Yugoslavia, and is again viewed as being led by the nose by the US in foreign policy issues overall.
- Yel'tsin probably would view actions on Yugoslavia taken without his agreement as a body-blow that would severely circumscribe his ability to maneuver on other domestic and foreign policy issues in the run-up to the April referendum. He must continue

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to search for accommodation with key military and industrial figures--many of whom will be his most severe critics on "things Yugoslav"--if he is to pull off the referendum and break the deadlock with Congress. []

The Muslim states would applaud a partial lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government, but they would press hard to expand the relaxation to permit delivering heavy weapons as well. Efforts to smuggle weapons still on the proscribed list would increase. []

Package 2: Moderate Activism

Clear threats to use force against Serbia if it does not curb the Bosnian Serbs would appear to exaggerate the control that Belgrade has over the Bosnian Serbs. It also would appear to expect the Bosnian Serb leadership to exercise full control over its indisciplined local military commanders and units.

- The seemingly high probability that US military force would be used to back up the demands set out here--which would risk Bosnian Serb retaliation against UNPROFOR--would cause the Allies, Russia, and Ukraine to suspect or oppose several options. Russia probably would veto fully lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia or Croatia, and it would criticize a forceful restatement of the US "Christmas demarche" threat to use military force in Kosovo, Bosnia, or possibly Serbia proper. []

Humanitarian Aid in Bosnia

1. Use US/NATO Air Power to Protect Relief Effort. The Federal "Yugoslav" armed forces probably would not challenge Western aircraft protecting relief efforts in Bosnia unless they perceived a direct threat to FRY territory (Serbia and Montenegro). Serbia, however, probably would cease cooperation with humanitarian relief efforts and might encourage attacks on relief agencies and UN forces by Bosnian Serbs and ultranationalist forces.

- The Bosnian Serb military probably would not challenge Western aircraft protecting relief efforts, but we cannot rule out that Serb elements might attempt to shoot down such aircraft using SA-2 missiles or anti-aircraft artillery. []

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The Bosnian Government would welcome such action as another step toward broader Western military involvement and would be encouraged to continue fighting rather than negotiate.

- Croatia would support use of allied air power if it was part of overall international effort to assist in rolling back Serb gains.
- Kosovar Albanians would be encouraged and would increase efforts to resist Serbian control.

~~The West Europeans would support the use of US airpower to protect relief efforts. They would probably agree to some token participation in such a mission, although they are not sanguine that airpower alone will be sufficient.~~

Russia probably would oppose use of air power to guard convoys, despite its strong support for humanitarian aid and its tacit acceptance of defensive force by ground escorts. The key to gaining any Russian support, once again, would be full and prior consultations as well as restrictive operational guidelines. The Russians are wary of the presence of US and NATO air forces in the Balkans and fear they might conduct preemptive strikes against Bosnian Serbs. Moscow would want full information on what action the US planned to take in the event warnings were ignored. Russia would insist that the implied threat in any warning apply to all parties.

Most Muslim states would strongly welcome air cover for relief efforts. The Turks probably would offer to contribute aircraft.

- Tehran would condemn unilateral action by the US but would be less critical if a large number of countries, especially ones not normally allied with Washington, were involved.

2. Warn Serbia Not to Let Bosnian Serbs Impede Relief Effort. Belgrade would shrug off such warnings and claim that it already told Bosnian Serbs not to interfere with relief efforts.

- Bosnian Serb leaders would not be concerned, but most probably would temporarily reduce harassment of relief convoys to avoid trouble with Belgrade.

Demilitarization in Bosnia

3. Demand All Heavy Weapons Be Placed Under UN Control. We believe that a demand to Bosnia's warring factions to turn over heavy weapons or face military action probably would result in only token compliance. Political leaders of all three factions might publicly direct their forces to comply but almost certainly

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have insufficient control over all units to ensure complete compliance. Many units would attempt to circumvent UN efforts by caching or dispersing a significant number of weapons in Bosnia's mountainous terrain, where they would be difficult, if not impossible, to locate and destroy.

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The West Europeans remain concerned about the UN engaging in peacemaking as opposed to peacekeeping. They would caution that such activities as collection of heavy weapons and demilitarizing Sarajevo would require a much larger troop presence than is currently in Bosnia. The British would probably be willing to contribute additional forces for such efforts only if the US were to commit ground troops.

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Muslim states would approve in principle, but would call for guarantees that weapons would be effectively secured. Pakistan almost certainly would contribute several battalions of ground forces to any broad UN enforcement action in Bosnia. Saudi Arabia would probably also offer troops to a UN effort.

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Russia wants all heavy weapons put under UN control but would insist that Moscow be included in: (1) deciding on punitive actions against those who resisted, and (2) ensuring the security of the weapons. Ukraine would support this kind of measure as long as it was under UN auspices.

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✓ 4. Join Planning to Demilitarize Sarajevo. Belgrade probably would not object to a scheme to demilitarize Sarajevo; gaining control of that area is less important to Serbia than to the Bosnian Serbs. Serbia would hope that Serb acquiescence in a demilitarization plan would help build international goodwill.

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The three main Bosnian factions accept the demilitarization of Sarajevo in principle, but no side would be willing to disarm without ironclad guarantees of compliance; all parties would probably demand a large international monitoring force. The Bosnian Government, nevertheless, would be the most reluctant to disarm its forces around Sarajevo since this would result in surrendering *de facto* control of the capital to the Serbs and Croats. (The Bosnian Government refused to sign the Vance-Owen proposals on military measures last week, whereas the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats did sign.) Regardless, irregular forces would attempt to retain mortars and small arms.

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Most Muslim states probably would approve demilitarizing Sarajevo, provided the authority of Bosnian government was not undercut.

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Both Russia and Ukraine would welcome joint planning in the demilitarization of Sarajevo. Both would probably be willing to contribute troops to patrol the city as long as their concerns had been largely met in the planning; Ukraine would not want its forces under Russian command, for example, while Russia would not want its forces in live-fire situations. Both would prefer to avoid actively engaging the Serbs; Kiev would fear its troops might perform poorly, and Russia would be concerned about domestic backlash if its soldiers were firing on Serbs.

5. Full Lifting of Arms Embargo on Bosnia

Belgrade would increase its modest support to the Bosnian Serb Army in step with improvements to the Muslim forces, and it could be tempted to send heavy weapons or even troops to Bosnia if Belgrade believed improved Muslim forces were capable of rolling back Serb gains. Croatian officials generally oppose lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, although their own weapons requirements (probably increasing due to the on-going fighting in Croatia) may cause them to favor lifting the embargo on both Bosnia and Croatia.

- Lifting the arms embargo on Croatia would increase the prospects for a more destructive war than in 1991. Belgrade might be tempted to initiate a conflict before Zagreb acquired sufficient heavy weapons and air defenses to forcibly reclaim the Serb-held areas of Croatia.

The West Europeans, with the possible exception of Germany, would strongly oppose such an action.

The Russians almost certainly would veto lifting the embargo. Moscow believes the arms embargo is one of the few tools to stifle the conflict over time. Moscow would have even deeper concerns about a full lifting of the arms embargo than those mentioned earlier.

Muslim states, virtually without exception, would support lifting the arms embargo. Apart from the Turks, however, few likely have considered the possibility that this action might precipitate a full scale assault by Serbian regular forces. Saudis have considered this but believe the Bosnians are in such bad straits that it is a chance worth taking.

- If Serbian regulars entered Bosnia and scored successes, most Muslim states would increase weapons shipments dramatically and step up calls for direct military intervention by the US and other Western forces under either UN or NATO auspices. There might also be a dramatic increase in Muslim "volunteers."

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Protecting Humanitarian Aid/Avoiding Conflict Spillover

6. Reaffirm the Christmas Demarche

Belgrade would insist that it is not involved in any activities proscribed in the Christmas demarche. Belgrade, however, might discreetly urge the Bosnian Serbs to avoid confrontations with humanitarian convoys and UNPROFOR forces until it can assess the new US Administration's readiness to intervene with military force in the former Yugoslavia.

- The Bosnian Serbs would not be significantly constrained by a reaffirmation of the Christmas demarche--they have heard such threats before--until it becomes clear that the West is serious about enforcing its demands. Muslims might be tempted to attack UNPROFOR and relief convoys if they believe the Serbs will be blamed.

The West Europeans would expect prior consultation and would caution that the US should be prepared to back any threat with military force. They would also request time to withdraw or reinforce their troops before Washington took any action.

- The Greeks would oppose reaffirmation of threats to use military force for fear of encouraging the ethnic Albanians into an uprising in Kosovo.

Most Muslim states would approve. Ankara would worry, however, about encouraging provocative actions by the Kosovars. Iran would not actively oppose the demarche but would criticize any unilateral action by Washington.

Moscow and Kiev probably would oppose Western intervention in Kosovo because it would constitute interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Both can envision having to take actions in their own states that might be opposed by the international community and would want to guard against the precedent of intervention. If Western military action required a new UN resolution, Russia would likely veto it.

- Moscow would lobby the international community not to support a blanket threat to retaliate against a Serb attack on Kosovo. Russia would use organizations like CSCE to propose alternate steps, like increasing the long-term monitoring mission in Kosovo.

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- Russia and Ukraine support in principle the use of force to protect or rescue UNPROFOR forces or aid convoys, but would demand well-defined ground rules and be particularly concerned about the use of air power.

Package 3: Militant Activism

The US probably could make some headway with efforts to force Belgrade to restrain the Bosnian Serbs, but ultimately Serbia cannot "deliver" the Bosnian Serb forces at a bargaining table.

- The Russians and perhaps the Allies would part company with the US over many of the options listed here--particularly the intention to use military force to back up US demands.
- Middle Eastern audiences would approve of most measures--aimed as they are at Serbia--but would publicly oppose pressure on the Bosnian Muslims to concede territory to get a settlement.

Bosnian Cease-fire

1. Specific Demands to Belgrade to End War in Bosnia and Prevent Spillover/Cease All Support to Bosnian Serbs

Belgrade would claim that it is not involved in the war in Bosnia, that Serbs there are "defending their homes," and that Serbia cannot dictate to the Bosnian Serbs.

- Belgrade would respond to specific demands backed by a credible military threat by better concealing its activities in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. It would not abandon, however, its strategic goal of creating a greater Serbia.
- Bosnian Serb leaders also would reduce their overt military activities if the threat were seen as genuine, but would continue efforts--militarily and diplomatically--to partition the republic.
- The Bosnian Government probably would take such an opportunity, if the threat appeared credible, to step-up attacks against Serb forces in hopes of forcing US military intervention. The Bosnian Government would be less willing to make compromises in the UN/EC-brokered negotiations.

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- If they believed Serbia was sufficiently cowed, Croatia probably would attempt to regain Serb-controlled territory in Croatia by force.
- Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo would see Western threats as a sign to continue efforts to achieve independence even at the risk of a confrontation with Belgrade.

The West Europeans would be reluctant to take on the task of forcing Serbian compliance with the demand, particularly at a time when Serbia's image has been improved somewhat by Milosevic's willingness to cooperate in the Geneva negotiations.

Russia would criticize a US intention to use force against Serbia if Belgrade ignores Washington's demands, arguing that such an intent would be totally counter to Russia's interests in the Balkans. Western attacks on Belgrade would fuel domestic criticism of Yel'tsin's Yugoslav policy, and he probably would have no option but to back away from cooperation with the West on Yugoslavia. We doubt, however, that Moscow would reorient its policy in favor of Milosevic or send arms to the Serbs.

2. Demand that Belgrade Use All Possible Influence to Make Bosnian Serbs Cease Fire. Belgrade would pledge to do so if similar efforts were applied to other antagonists in conflict, and there was a credible threat behind the demand. But Milosevic would repeat that his control over the Bosnian Serbs is limited.

- The Bosnian Serbs would not adhere to a cease-fire demand by Belgrade unless Muslim and Croats did the same. In the short-term, if the threat to Belgrade was credible, they might cease shelling of Bosnian cities, and most units might avoid other engagements, in response to pressure from Milosevic.

Most Muslim states would take their cues from the Bosnian Government leaders. If the Bosnians argued that a Cease-fire would effectively confirm Serbia's current gains, most Muslim states would support Bosnian position and argue for guarantees that Bosnian Serbs would make substantial withdrawals.

Russia probably would accept pressing Belgrade to help secure a cease-fire. However, they would insist on an even-handed approach, arguing that pressing only Belgrade ignores Zagreb's responsibility for continuing the fighting. They would also point out publicly and privately that Belgrade has only a limited ability to control the Bosnian Serbs.

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Bosnian Settlement

3. Insist all accept a Bosnian Map That is Less Than Serbian Roll-Back; Demand that Serbs and Croats Relinquish Significant Territories. Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs probably would accept the map provided Serbs are awarded most of the territory they now control, including the strategic northern corridor.

The Bosnian Government, as seen last week in Geneva, would oppose any Bosnian map that is less than a Serb roll-back unless it is convinced that the West is unwilling to intervene in order to regain all the territory lost to aggression. The Bosnian Croats and Croatia probably would accept such a map (again, as already seen in Geneva) if the Croats were assured of retaining their gains in Bosnia, as well as regaining Serb-held areas of Croatia.

The Serbs and Croats would accept minor adjustments to the Vance-Owen map proposal as long as the principle of the ethnic division of Bosnia is retained. They would actively oppose any significant loss of territory, and probably would attempt to reach a bilateral deal at the expense of the Muslims.

The West Europeans generally support the Vance-Owen plan to decentralize Bosnia, although they are concerned about the additional troops, money, and time needed to carry it out. They are less concerned about the potential for ultimate partition than about continued conflict in the region and the concurrent possibility for spillover and/or need for Western military intervention.

Moscow probably could accept all of the conditions listed as part of the Bosnian settlement but not the use of force to ensure their implementation.

4. Set deadlines for Bosnian Serb Military to Allow UN and Refugees Back Into Their Territories. The Croats and Muslims would welcome deadlines imposed on the Serbs. The Serbs may conditionally acquiesce, but local forces would attempt to undermine any implementation. Both the Croats and Serbs probably would attempt to block the return of Muslim refugees to their respective provinces.

5. Make Clear to Bosnians That We Cannot Get Back All Territory Lost To Aggression. Belgrade and Zagreb would welcome this because it would recognize realities on the ground and put pressure on the Muslims to seek a political solution in which the three parties would re-draw Bosnia's internal borders.

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This is probably the only way to force the Bosnian Government to accept a negotiated solution to the conflict. The Bosnian Government otherwise will almost certainly continue efforts to regain territory by force, and bring about Western military intervention. Both the Serbs and Croats favor pressure on the Muslims to accept the Vance-Owen plan and, in turn, probably would continue their military pressure on the Muslims to keep them at the bargaining table.

Some Turkish leaders would encourage the Bosnian Muslims to hold out for a Serb rollback, but Ankara would go along with any agreement accepted by the Bosnian Muslim leaders. Strong Western pressure on the Bosnian Muslims to accept Serb gains almost certainly would strengthen the feeling widespread in Turkey that its NATO allies are selling out Muslim interests worldwide and would contribute to Ankara's shift toward less pro-Western foreign policies.

- Saudi Arabia might counsel the Bosnians behind-the-scenes to accept some territorial loss, provided a viable Bosnian political/economic entity could be maintained.
- Tehran would chastise Washington for advising the Bosnians to concede any territory as part of a settlement and would try to strengthen ties to rejectionist elements in Bosnia.

Croatian Settlement

6. Demand That Belgrade Implement the Vance Plan for Croatia. Belgrade and the Krajina Serbs would oppose any UN effort to fully implement the Vance Plan because it effectively would end Croatian Serb dominance in heavily Serb-populated areas. The Krajina Serbs probably would attack UN forces seeking to implement the Vance Plan.

For Zagreb to renew the Vance Plan, Croatia believes that UNPROFOR must act to disarm Serb militias and move to return Serb-held territory to Croatian control. Zagreb would welcome further pressure on Belgrade to cease aid to the Croatian Serbs, particularly if coupled with Western commitments to use military force against Serbia if the Yugoslav Army reintervened. Zagreb, however, could also interpret Western demands as strengthening its position if it decided to launch a major offensive to reconquer Serb-held territory.

The West Europeans probably would be reluctant to accept this proposal because it would jeopardize the safety of the peacekeepers and require deployment of a much larger--and costlier--force.

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Moscow could accept making the demand--Belgrade, after all, signed on to the plan--but would again reject the use of force if Belgrade resisted. Moscow almost certainly would insist the Croats abide by the cease-fire that is the initial step in the plan.

Curb Greater Serbia

7. Agree to Internationally Supervised Reduction of Serbia's Armed Forces. Belgrade undoubtedly would balk at reducing its armed force under international supervision unless it suffered complete defeat on the battlefield. Even then, it would be difficult to locate Serbia's widely dispersed weapons caches. International monitors undoubtedly would become the target of thousands of warlords who would not accept Serbia's defeat.

- Croatia, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Kosovar Albanians all would welcome a reduction in Serbian forces. A shift in the military balance probably would lead Croatia and the Kosovars to be more assertive in their dealings with Belgrade.

Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria also would welcome a realignment of military power in the Balkans that would result from Serbia's partial disarmament.

Russia would be torn initially, but would come out against the US on this issue. On the one hand, Moscow would view a reduction of Serbia's military forces as one means of promoting stability in the Balkans and has always supported disarming irregular formations. On the other hand, however, Western efforts to forcibly take away Serbia's arms would deepen Russia's suspicions. Russia would see this action as a violation of the rights of sovereign states and probably would complement strong diplomatic demarches with the introduction of resolutions in the UN condemning US actions.

- Cooperation on a broad range of issues--including European security discussions--would suffer significantly. Ukraine would also be concerned about the precedent of intervention, but probably would try to avoid confrontation with the US.

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